From Conscience to Robots: Practical Ethics Workshops

Practical medical ethics symposium: Rationing responsibly in an age of austerity Health professionals face ever expanding possibilities for medical treatment, increasing patient expectations and at the same time intense pressures to reduce healthcare costs. This leads frequently to conflicts between obligations to current patients, and others who might benefit from treatment. Is it ethical for doctors and other health professionals to engage in bedside rationing? What ethical principles should guide decisions (for example about which patients to offer intensive care admission or surgery)? Is it discriminatory to take into account disability in allocating resources? If patients are responsible for their illness, should that lead to a lower priority for treatment? In this seminar philosophers from the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics will explore and shed light on the profound ethical challenges around allocating limited health care resources.

Practical medical ethics symposium: Rationing responsibly in an age of austerity. Health professionals face ever expanding possibilities for medical treatment, increasing patient expectations and at the same time intense pressures to reduce healthcare costs. This leads frequently to conflicts between obligations to current patients, and others who might benefit from treatment. Is it ethical for doctors and other health professionals to engage in bedside rationing? What ethical principles should guide decisions (for example about which patients to offer intensive care admission or surgery)? Is it discriminatory to take into account disability in allocating resources? If patients are responsible for their illness, should that lead to a lower priority for treatment? In this seminar philosophers from the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics will explore and shed light on the profound ethical challenges around allocating limited health care resources.

Practical medical ethics symposium: Rationing responsibly in an age of austerity Health professionals face ever expanding possibilities for medical treatment, increasing patient expectations and at the same time intense pressures to reduce healthcare costs. This leads frequently to conflicts between obligations to current patients, and others who might benefit from treatment. Is it ethical for doctors and other health professionals to engage in bedside rationing? What ethical principles should guide decisions (for example about which patients to offer intensive care admission or surgery)? Is it discriminatory to take into account disability in allocating resources? If patients are responsible for their illness, should that lead to a lower priority for treatment? In this seminar philosophers from the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics will explore and shed light on the profound ethical challenges around allocating limited health care resources.

Practical medical ethics symposium: Rationing responsibly in an age of austerity Health professionals face ever expanding possibilities for medical treatment, increasing patient expectations and at the same time intense pressures to reduce healthcare costs. This leads frequently to conflicts between obligations to current patients, and others who might benefit from treatment. Is it ethical for doctors and other health professionals to engage in bedside rationing? What ethical principles should guide decisions (for example about which patients to offer intensive care admission or surgery)? Is it discriminatory to take into account disability in allocating resources? If patients are responsible for their illness, should that lead to a lower priority for treatment? In this seminar philosophers from the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics will explore and shed light on the profound ethical challenges around allocating limited health care resources.

Practical medical ethics symposium: Rationing responsibly in an age of austerity Health professionals face ever expanding possibilities for medical treatment, increasing patient expectations and at the same time intense pressures to reduce healthcare costs. This leads frequently to conflicts between obligations to current patients, and others who might benefit from treatment. Is it ethical for doctors and other health professionals to engage in bedside rationing? What ethical principles should guide decisions (for example about which patients to offer intensive care admission or surgery)? Is it discriminatory to take into account disability in allocating resources? If patients are responsible for their illness, should that lead to a lower priority for treatment? In this seminar philosophers from the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics will explore and shed light on the profound ethical challenges around allocating limited health care resources.

Panel discussion at a conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

A conference on conscientious objection in medicine and the role of conscience in healthcare practitioners’ decision making, Oxford 2015. The conference aimed at analyzing from a philosophical, ethical and legal perspective the meaning and the role of “conscience” in the healthcare profession. Conscientious objection by health professionals has become one of the most pressing problems in healthcare ethics. Health professionals are often required to perform activities that conflict with their own moral or religious beliefs (for example abortion). Their refusal can make it difficult for patients to have access to services they have a right to and, more in general, can create conflicts in the doctor-patient relationship. The widening of the medical options available today or in the near future is likely to sharpen these conflicts. Experts in bioethics, philosophy, law and medicine explored possible solutions.

Talk delivered at 2015 Cyberselves Symposium, with contributions from technologists, psychologists, neuroscientists, philosophers and cultural theorists looking at the future societal and ethical impacts of virtual reality and immersive technologies. Prof Schroeder is Professor at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. He has interests in virtual environments, social aspects of e-Science, sociology of science and technology, and has written extensively about virtual reality technology. His current research is mainly related to e-science.

Talk delivered at 2015 Cyberselves Symposium, with contributions from technologists, psychologists, neuroscientists, philosophers and cultural theorists looking at the future societal and ethical impacts of virtual reality and immersive technologies Prof Verschure is an ICREA Research Professor in the Department of Information and Communication Technologies at Universitat Pompeu Fabra. He works on biologically constrained models of perception, learning, behaviour and problem solving that are applied to wheeled and flying robots, interactive spaces and avatars. Prof Verschure's aim is to find a unified theory of mind, brain and body through the use of synthetic methods and to apply such a theory to the development of novel cognitive technologies. He has pioneered novel VR based augmented feedback systems that are applied to the rehabilitation of a number of pathologies including stroke, TBI and Alzheimer's disease. .

Talk delivered at 2015 Cyberselves Symposium, with contributions from technologists, psychologists, neuroscientists, philosophers and cultural theorists looking at the future societal and ethical impacts of virtual reality and immersive technologies. Dr Halpern is an assistant professor at the New School for Social Research/Eugene Lang College in History and an affiliate in the Culture and Media Studies Department and in the Design Studies MA program at Parsons the New School of Design. In her work, she studies the histories of digital technologies, cybernetics, the human and cognitive sciences, and design. She especially focuses on histories of big data, interactivity, and ubiquitous computing.

Talk delivered at 2015 Cyberselves Symposium, with contributions from technologists, psychologists, neuroscientists, philosophers and cultural theorists looking at the future societal and ethical impacts of virtual reality and immersive technologies. Dr Whitby is a philosopher and ethicist at the University of Sussex, working on the social impact of new and emerging technologies. He is a leading researcher in the field and the author of many books, chapters and papers on the subject including “On Computable Morality”, “Reflections on Artificial Intelligence: The Legal, Moral and Ethical Dimensions and “Artificial Intelligence, A Beginner’s Guide”. Dr Whitby is a member of the Strategic Ethics Committee of BCS The Chartered Institute of IT and ethical advisor to the Royal Academy of Engineering.

Hawkins is Associate Research Professor of Philosophy and Trent Scholar in Bioethics at Duke University. In this inaugural workshop, professors from Duke University presented papers in Oxford in June 2015. This talk includes a response by Jeff McMahan.

Buchanan is James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. In this inaugural workshop, professors from Duke University presented papers in Oxford in June 2015. This talk, presented by Allen Buchanan, is based on a paper co-authored with Russell Powell.

Presentations from an international conference on the normative significance of cognitive science. Hosted by Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford July 2012). In July 2012 the VW Foundation Project 'Intuition and Emotion in Moral Decision-Making: Empirical Research and Normative Implications' held a conference entitled 'Normative Significance of Cognitive Science'. What is the relationship between normative ethics and scientific research on moral judgment and decision-making? What potential is there for drawing ethical implications from such empirical investigations? While questions in this area have received considerable attention lately, the discussion so far has been largely dominated by two opposing scepticisms: scepticism about the relevance of empirical research to ethics, and scepticism about the value of 'traditional' moral theory. This workshop aimed to go beyond such outright scepticism by investigating different ways in which empirical research might impact on normative ethics, focussing on philosophical reflection, whether critical or constructive, rather than on simply showcasing the latest scientific research.

Presentations from an international conference on the normative significance of cognitive science. Hosted by Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford July 2012). In July 2012 the VW Foundation Project 'Intuition and Emotion in Moral Decision-Making: Empirical Research and Normative Implications' held a conference entitled 'Normative Significance of Cognitive Science'. What is the relationship between normative ethics and scientific research on moral judgment and decision-making? What potential is there for drawing ethical implications from such empirical investigations? While questions in this area have received considerable attention lately, the discussion so far has been largely dominated by two opposing scepticisms: scepticism about the relevance of empirical research to ethics, and scepticism about the value of 'traditional' moral theory. This workshop aimed to go beyond such outright scepticism by investigating different ways in which empirical research might impact on normative ethics, focussing on philosophical reflection, whether critical or constructive, rather than on simply showcasing the latest scientific research.

Presentations from an international conference on the normative significance of cognitive science. Hosted by Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford July 2012). In July 2012 the VW Foundation Project 'Intuition and Emotion in Moral Decision-Making: Empirical Research and Normative Implications' held a conference entitled 'Normative Significance of Cognitive Science'. What is the relationship between normative ethics and scientific research on moral judgment and decision-making? What potential is there for drawing ethical implications from such empirical investigations? While questions in this area have received considerable attention lately, the discussion so far has been largely dominated by two opposing scepticisms: scepticism about the relevance of empirical research to ethics, and scepticism about the value of 'traditional' moral theory. This workshop aimed to go beyond such outright scepticism by investigating different ways in which empirical research might impact on normative ethics, focussing on philosophical reflection, whether critical or constructive, rather than on simply showcasing the latest scientific research.

Presentations from an international conference on the normative significance of cognitive science. Hosted by Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford July 2012). In July 2012 the VW Foundation Project 'Intuition and Emotion in Moral Decision-Making: Empirical Research and Normative Implications' held a conference entitled 'Normative Significance of Cognitive Science'. What is the relationship between normative ethics and scientific research on moral judgment and decision-making? What potential is there for drawing ethical implications from such empirical investigations? While questions in this area have received considerable attention lately, the discussion so far has been largely dominated by two opposing scepticisms: scepticism about the relevance of empirical research to ethics, and scepticism about the value of 'traditional' moral theory. This workshop aimed to go beyond such outright scepticism by investigating different ways in which empirical research might impact on normative ethics, focussing on philosophical reflection, whether critical or constructive, rather than on simply showcasing the latest scientific research.

Presentations from an international conference on the normative significance of cognitive science. Hosted by Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford July 2012). In July 2012 the VW Foundation Project 'Intuition and Emotion in Moral Decision-Making: Empirical Research and Normative Implications' held a conference entitled 'Normative Significance of Cognitive Science'. What is the relationship between normative ethics and scientific research on moral judgment and decision-making? What potential is there for drawing ethical implications from such empirical investigations? While questions in this area have received considerable attention lately, the discussion so far has been largely dominated by two opposing scepticisms: scepticism about the relevance of empirical research to ethics, and scepticism about the value of 'traditional' moral theory. This workshop aimed to go beyond such outright scepticism by investigating different ways in which empirical research might impact on normative ethics, focussing on philosophical reflection, whether critical or constructive, rather than on simply showcasing the latest scientific research.

Discussion of key themes emerging from a two-day interdisciplinary conference on reducing religious conflict. Organised by the SRC Project, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford (June 2012). In June 2012, the Science and Religious Conflict Project team in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University hosted a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Conflicts between different religious groups and between religious groups, governments and broader society are endemic to modern life and have been a feature of human existence for thousands of years. What can be done to reduce the rate of occurrence and the severity of such conflicts? In this conference leading international experts from different disciplines take up the theme of reducing religious conflict.

Presentations from a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Organised by the SRC Project, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford (June 2012). In June 2012, the Science and Religious Conflict Project team in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University hosted a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Conflicts between different religious groups and between religious groups, governments and broader society are endemic to modern life and have been a feature of human existence for thousands of years. What can be done to reduce the rate of occurrence and the severity of such conflicts? In this conference leading international experts from different disciplines take up the theme of reducing religious conflict.

Presentations from a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Organised by the SRC Project, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford (June 2012). In June 2012, the Science and Religious Conflict Project team in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University hosted a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Conflicts between different religious groups and between religious groups, governments and broader society are endemic to modern life and have been a feature of human existence for thousands of years. What can be done to reduce the rate of occurrence and the severity of such conflicts? In this conference leading international experts from different disciplines take up the theme of reducing religious conflict.

Presentations from a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Organised by the SRC Project, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford (June 2012). In June 2012, the Science and Religious Conflict Project team in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University hosted a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Conflicts between different religious groups and between religious groups, governments and broader society are endemic to modern life and have been a feature of human existence for thousands of years. What can be done to reduce the rate of occurrence and the severity of such conflicts? In this conference leading international experts from different disciplines take up the theme of reducing religious conflict.

Presentations from a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Organised by the SRC Project, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford (June 2012). In June 2012, the Science and Religious Conflict Project team in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University hosted a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Conflicts between different religious groups and between religious groups, governments and broader society are endemic to modern life and have been a feature of human existence for thousands of years. What can be done to reduce the rate of occurrence and the severity of such conflicts? In this conference leading international experts from different disciplines take up the theme of reducing religious conflict.

Presentations from a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Organised by the SRC Project, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford (June 2012). In June 2012, the Science and Religious Conflict Project team in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University hosted a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Conflicts between different religious groups and between religious groups, governments and broader society are endemic to modern life and have been a feature of human existence for thousands of years. What can be done to reduce the rate of occurrence and the severity of such conflicts? In this conference leading international experts from different disciplines take up the theme of reducing religious conflict.

Presentations from a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Organised by the SRC Project, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford (June 2012). In June 2012, the Science and Religious Conflict Project team in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University hosted a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Conflicts between different religious groups and between religious groups, governments and broader society are endemic to modern life and have been a feature of human existence for thousands of years. What can be done to reduce the rate of occurrence and the severity of such conflicts? In this conference leading international experts from different disciplines take up the theme of reducing religious conflict.

Presentations from a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Organised by the SRC Project, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford (June 2012). In June 2012, the Science and Religious Conflict Project team in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University hosted a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Conflicts between different religious groups and between religious groups, governments and broader society are endemic to modern life and have been a feature of human existence for thousands of years. What can be done to reduce the rate of occurrence and the severity of such conflicts? In this conference leading international experts from different disciplines take up the theme of reducing religious conflict.

Presentations from a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Organised by the SRC Project, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford (June 2012). In June 2012, the Science and Religious Conflict Project team in the Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University hosted a two-day international and interdisciplinary conference on the theme of reducing religious conflict. Conflicts between different religious groups and between religious groups, governments and broader society are endemic to modern life and have been a feature of human existence for thousands of years. What can be done to reduce the rate of occurrence and the severity of such conflicts? In this conference leading international experts from different disciplines take up the theme of reducing religious conflict.

Paper delivered at the Moral Evil in Practical Ethics Conference, Oxford 2012. I argue that there is a secular problem of evil analogous to the well-known theological problem of evil; give a definition of evil; consider two widely held inadequate explanations of it; and propose a better explanation. The critical aim of the argument is to argue that the prevalence of evil is a reason for rejecting the optimistic faith shared by numerous past and present thinkers. Its constructive aim is to explain evil as a result of ambivalence that is inherent in the human condition.

Paper delivered at the Moral Evil in Practical Ethics Conference, Oxford 2012. Many religious people use the term 'evil' to describe or explain actions and worldly events by appeal to a metaphysics involving the supernatural. A person performed a particular action because they were possessed by Satan; an apparent coincidence was no such thing but was the result of an intervention in the world by a demon, etc. It might be thought that because different religions postulate different supernatural ontologies, there would be a diversity of religious conceptions of evil. However, recent research in the cognitive science of religion suggests that there are very strong similarities in the conceptual commitments made by apparently very distinct religions. On the basis of such research I identify a shared religious conception of evil. This turns out to have much in common with the treatment of evil that falls out of Durkheim's classic analysis of the sacred.

Paper delivered at the Moral Evil in Practical Ethics Conference, Oxford 2012. A striking feature in historical instances of collective evildoing is the role played by narratives assuring the perpetrators that they are entitled to harming their victims. Pursuing what according to outsiders and conventional morality is to be condemned as blatantly wrong, is perceived by the perpetrators as the exact opposite: taking what is rightly theirs, giving the victims what they deserve. As a result, instead of regret there is pride, instead of feelings of guilt there is self-righteousness. Is this simply a reminder of the impact of ideology on perpetrators - recalling that the latter are also the creators of the former? Or do we need to move beyond the workings of ideology to appreciate what is going on here? More bluntly, the question may be put as follows: Are agents who report that they are morally right in doing what non-members of their group regard as utterly wrong, sincere or in bad faith? A deeper philosophical issue is buried here: To what extent is morality - crudely, the way to make the distinction between right and wrong - a group construction relative to the interests of its combined authors and addressees? Is morality epistemically self-sufficient, closing in on itself, as it were, without having to take recourse to a reality outside itself? Concentrating on the notion of entitlement as crucial to this issue, the paper will answer the latter question in the negative, and in doing so will argue the case for moral realism.

Paper delivered at the Moral Evil in Practical Ethics Conference, Oxford 2012. This essay explores ways in which John Rawls's ideas regarding combat by relatively well-ordered societies with outlaw societies might be a resource for women in responding to the great evils of global and local misogyny. Unlike so much feminist work on gender-related evils (including my own), this essay does not make the family a centerpiece of concern. Domestic violence is one of my concerns. But the family is not, on the whole, and has not been, the stage for many of the worst evils that target females: forcible and violent rape, kidnap for sexual slavery, forced prostitution, and witch-burning, to name a few. Victims are often women who have not had children, women who have had careers (not necessarily as care-givers) and economic independence, and women who have intimate relationships with women. The vulnerability of women to such evils is found in both what Rawls called outlaw societies and societies he considered (in his late work) relatively well-ordered. Even relatively well-ordered societies have pockets that are not well-ordered, areas where good laws are poorly and arbitrarily enforced when enforced at all, and fields where we who are women enter at our peril. What is often called a "war between the sexes" is better recognized as a "war on women" (or "wars on women"). Women have mostly not fought back very aggressively. War between the sexes would be progress. In The Law of Peoples Rawls takes up some of the thorny issues of justice in what have come to be called, euphemistically, "non-ideal" conditions, including the conditions of wars of self-defense. "Non-ideal" conditions are daily life for most of the world's women. How might women's self-defense and mutual defense against the evils of global and local misogyny embody values embedded in rules of war that seem intended to prevent many of the worst injustices in that extremely "non-ideal" context? The task I have set myself is to address that kind of question, considering some examples of women's responses both as individuals and in non-state groups.

Paper delivered at the Moral Evil in Practical Ethics Conference, Oxford 2012. Each of us has a moral obligation to refrain from evildoing. And yet evils persist in forms like child abuse, gay bashing, sexual and economic slavery, reckless dumping of toxic waste and fraudulent or risky financial practices that rob people of their homes and pensions. Scientific advances offer a possible solution to the challenge of eliminating evildoing: the moral enhancement of human beings through biomedical and biotechnological means. Assuming the efficacy and relative safety of moral enhancement, do we have a duty to use biomedical and biotechnological interventions to reduce the probability that we would become involved in evildoing? I address this question by teasing out and exploring different aspects of the problem. First, what is the target of moral enhancement? More precisely, what is being enhanced and to what extent? I argue against the perfectionist view that we should create moral saints or at least maximally improve people morally. The argument rests on the moral imperative to respect the separateness of persons and on the value of human freedom and autonomy. Second, I consider two alternatives regarding mandatory moral enhancement in society: universal enhancement and selective enhancement of specific groups like public office-holders and violent criminals. The question of who should be morally enhanced cannot be addressed without considering the ethical implications of different technological interventions. This is the third issue to be addressed. One important consideration is whether the intervention risks women's reproductive autonomy or affects only the enhanced individual. Another consideration is the potential for abuse inherent in each enhancement technology. I conclude by commenting on the moral costs and benefits of reducing evildoing through moral enhancement relative to those of alternative programs and the current status quo. It turns out that the question of moral enhancement as a response to evildoing is too complex to allow for a single all-encompassing answer. Exploring this complexity is the aim of this paper.

Paper delivered at the Moral Evil in Practical Ethics Conference, Oxford 2012. Secure psychiatric services offer treatments to men and women who are frequently characterised as 'evil'. In my paper, I will explore how the discourse of illness and the discourse of evil are similar and different: specifically in relation to concepts such as insult, injury and damage, and whether it makes sense to think of human value systems as being damaged or impaired. I will use case examples from my clinical practice in a high secure setting to illustrate.

Paper delivered at the Moral Evil in Practical Ethics Conference, Oxford 2012. This paper aims to investigate and connect aspects of two questions that may be raised about the idea of evil: firstly, the extent to which we can allay doubts about the legitimacy of the concept of evil; and secondly, the role played in our understanding of evil by the phenomenology - that is, by the nature of our distinctive response to evil-doing. Objections to attributions of evil may be moral, or metaphysical, or both; and they often lead to doubts about the legitimacy of the concept. Such doubts can take the form of (a) denying that anything falls under the concept; or (b) accepting that some cases do fall under the concept but claiming that they can be reduced to cases of less morally or metaphysically troubling forms of wrongdoing; or (c) claiming that the concept is itself an incoherent one. There are various ways of trying to establish whether a concept is legitimate: I canvass several of them, and focus on the investigation of what work the concept of evil does for us. I propose that the work in question is to capture a phenomenological distinction: the concept of evil marks off a discrete class of wrongful actions, namely those which produce in us a phenomenologically distinctive response of moral horror, rather than, say, the more ordinary disapproval (or fear or disgust) which other kinds of wrongful acts typically elicit. This focus on the phenomenology enables us to answer some of the doubts about evil mentioned above; but it does not, so it is argued, introduce an unwanted subjectivity into our attributions of evil. The paper concludes by considering what implications this view might have for a range of issues, such as the question of whether there is a qualitative or a quantitative difference between evil and other kinds of wrongdoing; the extent to which we can be mistaken in our attributions of evil; the relation between evil-doing and forgiveness; the attribution of evil to psychopathic actions; and our understanding of our own capacities for evil.