Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)

The respondent was accused of beating a person to death with an axe. Prior to his death, the deceased socialized with the respondent and a number of other persons. At some point, many people left to another venue but the respondent and the deceased remained. The deceased made a phone call to a third party in which he referred to having to fight someone. That person testified to the time of the phone call and the words used by the deceased; she also testified to hearing sounds consistent with the deceased having been beaten to death.The respondent was convicted of second-degree murder following a trial by judge alone. The trial judge referred to the statement of the deceased by phone in her decision. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge improperly used the statement for a hearsay purpose rather than only the fact that the statement was made. The majority allowed the appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial. Crighton J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the trial judge did not err in her treatment of the statement of the deceased. Argued Date 2025-11-12 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Hearsay — Statement of deceased shortly before death — Use of statement of the deceased by trial judge — Whether statement by deceased was used for a hearsay purpose — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in holding that trial judge improperly admitted statement for truth of its content —Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in setting aside conviction for murder Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Jacques-Taylor and a co-accused were jointly charged with firearms offences. On July 6, 2022, each co-accused's defence counsel, Crown counsel, and a trial coordinator appeared in court to set a trial date. Mr. Jacques-Taylor's counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022 or for any date in August but was not available in September. Crown counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022. Counsel for Mr. Jacques-Taylor's co-accused was not available for any date in August. Counsel agreed on trial dates from October 2 to 4, 2022. Time from laying of charges to the anticipated start of trial was 22 months and 2 weeks. Mr. Jacques-Taylor filed a motion to stay the proceedings against him for unreasonable delay in breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time guaranteed by s. 11 (b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The motions judge, after attributing delay, calculated net delay to be 2 weeks over the 18-month presumptive ceiling. The motions judge declined to attribute 25 days of the delay following the appearance to schedule trial dates that were caused only by the unavailability of counsel for the co-accused as defence delay. Had those 25 days been attributed to the defence, the net delay would have been below the presumptive ceiling. The motions judge granted a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-07 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Co-accused being tried jointly — Delay for accused, including period of delay caused only by unavailability of co-accused's counsel for available court dates, exceeding presumptive Jordan ceiling — Where it is in the interests of justice to pursue a joint prosecution, how is the Jordan framework to be applied as to each accused — What is the scope and proper application of the contextual approach to delay set out in R. v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On the advice of the Prime Minister of Canada, the Privy Council Office recommended that the Governor General issue an Order in Council appointing a Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick who was not bilingual. At trial, that appointment was found inconsistent with the bilingualism requirements in ss. 16(2), 16.1(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal set aside that decision on the basis that the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor who was not bilingual did not infringe ss. 16(2), 16.1(1), 18(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. Argued Date 2025-11-13 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Language rights — Role of Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Language requirement for Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Whether Order in Council 2019 1325 dated September 4, 2019, infringes ss. 16(2), 16.1, 18(2) and 20(2) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, if so, what would be appropriate remedy. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario's Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada's appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-06 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament's power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution's own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario's Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada's appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-05 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament's power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution's own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents are owners of lots that border three lakes in Ville d'Estérel. Following the renewal of the cadastre of Ville d'Estérel in 2016, the respondents discovered that they were not owners of a submerged strip of land that goes around each of the lakes and is situated in front of their respective lots. The appellant claimed to own that strip of land, immatriculated separately in the cadastre as several lots, whereas the respondents stated that they own it. Through an application for a declaratory judgment, the respondents sought a declaration confirming that they are respectively owners of the submerged lots adjacent to the lands they own. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed their application, finding that the submerged lots are the property of the appellant. The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the respondents' appeal in part. It found that the submerged strip of land is accessory to the riparian lots pursuant to the doctrine of accessory. Argued Date 2025-11-10 Keywords Property — Immovables — Submerged lots — Extent of right of ownership near watercourses and lakes — Doctrine of accessory — Whether doctrine of accessory is applicable to lots submerged as result of construction of dam — If so, whether doctrine should apply only in residual manner, if doubt persists as to common intention of parties — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interfering, without identifying palpable and overriding error, with findings at trial concerning interpretion of words [TRANSLATION] “bounded by the lake” and common intention of parties. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)Canadian Patent No. 2,655,335 (“'335 Patent”), which was issued to Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. for INVEGA SUSTENNA, involves a suspension of paliperidone palmitate for the treatment of schizophrenia and related disorders. The '335 Patent teaches a dosing regimen to achieve an optimum plasma concentration-time profile. Its claims have been construed in previous litigation and are not in issue: Janssen Inc. v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2020 FC 593,; Janssen Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc., 2022 FC 62, aff'd 2024 FCA 10 (“PMS Paliperidone”)). Its disclosure indicated that “[t]hose of ordinary skill in the art will understand that the maintenance dose may be [adjusted] up or down in view of patients condition (response to the medication and renal function)”.Pharmascience Inc. has served two Notices of Allegation in respect of pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE, its proposed generic version of INVEGA SUSTENNA. In 2020, Janssen's infringement action related to Pharmascience's Abbreviated New Drug Submission No. 236094 was discontinued on consent. Shortly thereafter, Pharmascience served a Notice of Allegation and Detailed Statement in respect of a different Abbreviated New Drug Submission — No. 244641 — seeking approval to market and sell doses of pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE. Janssen again commenced an infringement action under s. 6(1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133. In that proceeding, Pharmascience moved for summary trial. It was found that if Pharmascience's pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE was made, constructed, used or sold as set out in the Abbreviated New Drug Submission, it would influence prescribers to prescribe the dosing regimen claimed in the '335 Patent, leading to direct infringement: PMS Paliperidone. The defence of invalidity went forward, with Janssen seeking a declaration that Pharmascience would infringe the '335 Patent if it were to make, use or sell pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE in 50, 75, 100 and 150 mg doses.The Federal Court found that the Patent was not invalid based on obviousness or for lack of patentable subject matter. The claims provided specified dosing regimens meant to produce a concentration of the medication within the therapeutic range. If a physician chose to use a dose other than that claimed, to stop treatment or to change therapies, they would no longer be practicing the claimed invention. The Court of Appeal dismissed Pharmascience's appeal, finding that the use of the invention did not require the exercise of skill and judgment. Argued Date 2025-10-09 Keywords Intellectual property — Patents — Validity — Lack of patentable subject matter — Method of medical treatment — Vendible product — Skill and judgment — Fixed or variable dosing regimen — Canadian Patent No. 2,655,335 teaches dosing regimen that includes first loading dose, second loading dose and monthly maintenance doses — Regimen incorporates dosing windows of +/- 2 days for the second loading dose and +/- 7 days for the maintenance doses — Whether patent is invalid in that it claims an unpatentable method of medical treatment. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant's spouse went missing in 2008. In 2017, the appellant obtained a declaratory judgment of her spouse's death pursuant to art. 92 of the Civil Code of Québec in a proceeding contested by the spouse's life insurance company. After the spouse was declared deceased, the life insurance company applied to annul the declaration of death on the basis that there was evidence he was alive in another country as late as 2018. The application was not served on the party declared to have died.The Superior Court of Quebec judge granted the life insurance company's application and annulled the declaration of death. She concluded that there was no prejudice flowing from the fact that the application was not served on the declared decedent. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal only with respect to application judge's costs award but otherwise affirmed the Superior Court judge's decision. Argued Date 2025-10-10 Keywords Status of persons — Absence — Return — Declaratory judgment of death — Life insurance company seeking to annul declaratory judgment of death — What proof of return is required to annul a declaratory judgment of death — Whether an application by a third party to annul a declaratory judgment of death must be served on the person declared to be deceased — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 92, 97, 98. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During the course of an investigation under the Traffic Safety Act, a police officer attempted to effect a warrantless arrest of the applicant for obstruction under s. 129(a) of the Criminal Code. In a pre-trial application, the trial judge found that the police officer was not executing a lawful arrest, and therefore breached the applicant's s. 9 Charter right not to be arbitrarily detained by attempting the arrest. The trial judge acquitted the applicant of assault causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-10-17 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Can a police officer arrest an individual for obstruction under the Criminal Code, during the course of a regulatory (or municipal) investigation where the regulatory (or municipal) statute provides for a lesser enforcement remedy — Does the discretion referenced in Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46 allow police officers to engage the more serious Criminal Code provisions during the course of an investigation for less serious regulatory or municipal offences? Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

A police investigation into the production of marijuana led to criminal proceedings against 11 individuals. A stay of proceedings was entered for the respondents in light of unreasonable delays. The Court of Québec dismissed the motion to dismiss the motion for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) of the Cr. C. and s. 16(2) of the CDSA. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the motion for prohibition and certiorari in aid. The Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the Superior Court judge's decision and stated that the Court of Québec did not have the jurisdiction required to deal with motions for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) of the Cr. C. and s. 16(2) of the CDSA. Argued Date 2025-10-16 Keywords Criminal law — Proceeds of crime — Offence related property — Restraint order — Jurisdiction of provincial court — Appropriate procedural vehicles — Whether property included in application for forfeiture pursuant to s. 462.37(2) of Criminal Code and s. 16(2) of Controlled Drugs and Substances Act must be related to offence for which there was conviction — Whether stay of proceedings prevents prosecutor from proving facts forming basis for charges in context of motion for forfeiture of offence related property or of proceeds of crime — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 462.37(2) — Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 16(2). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Anglin was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta from 2012 until 2015, when he was unsuccessful in his re-election bid. He accepts the result of the election, but alleges that the Chief Electoral Officer interfered with the fairness of the election and, by doing so, injured his chances of being elected. He seeks damages for the alleged loss of the chance to be elected. During the election, the Chief Electoral Officer, Mr. Resler, investigated problems with Mr. Anglin's election signs and his handling of the list of electors. After the election, the Chief Electoral Officer assessed two administrative penalties against Mr. Anglin, who appealed both penalties. One penalty was overturned due to the Chief Electoral Officer's failure to provide Mr. Anglin with the investigation report, but the basis for assessing the fine was not found to be problematic. Mr. Anglin then commenced this action against the Chief Electoral Officer and others alleging that the Chief Electoral Officer should not have commenced the investigations and that he should have known that his actions would injure Mr. Anglin. The Chief Electoral Officer denied the factual allegations and invoked ss. 5.1 of the Election Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-1, which provides a general immunity when the Chief Electoral Officer acts in good faith, and s. 134(5), which authorizes the Chief Electoral Officer to remove non-compliant signs. Later, he applied to strike the claim for failure to disclose a cause of action or for abuse of process, with an alternative request for summary judgment due to lack of merit.Finding that the claim was a collateral attack on the validity of the election, the chambers judge struck the entire statement of claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action or as an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstated the claim other than the allegations of malicious prosecution, and remitted the Chief Electoral Officer's claim for summary judgment application to trial court. Argued Date 2025-10-14 Keywords Elections — Jurisdiction — Chief Electoral Officer — Chief Electoral Officer required candidate to remedy inappropriate elements of signs — Candidate losing election — Candidate sued Chief Electoral Officer for damages for loss of chance to win election — Candidate did not challenge result of election — Chief Electoral Officer moved to strike claim for failure to disclose a cause of action, abuse of process or lack of merit — Whether an unsuccessful candidate for election can bring a private action against an election officer for the loss of chance of being elected. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

11368 NL Inc. was the owner of commercial real estate known as Kenmount Terrace. Patrick Street Holdings Limited is part of a group of related companies that, through loans secured by mortgages, financed development projects undertaken by a group of related companies including 11368 NL Inc. In early 2016, two mortgages known as Mortgage 608132 and Mortgage 708519 went into default and notices of power of sale were issued under the Conveyancing Act, RSNL 1990, c. C-34. These power of sale proceedings halted when 11368 NL Inc., as the mortgagee, gave a third mortgage known as Mortgage 759678. Mortgage 759678 is a collateral mortgage registered against Kenmount Terrace to a limit of $4,000,000 in support of 11368 NL Inc.'s guarantee of Mortgage 608132. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. reactivated power of sale proceedings under Mortgage 708519 and obtained Kenmount Terrace at public auction. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. provided an accounting of the proceeds of the power of sale to all encumbrancers of Kenmount Terrace stating that specific charges including Mortgage 759678 took priority and exhausted the power of sale proceeds such that not all encumbrancers could be paid. Two unpaid encumbrancers commenced an application challenging the accounting. 11368 NL Inc. filed an interlocutory application claiming entitlement to any surplus funds from the power of sale plus interest, but also advancing a claim of priority for another encumbrancer, Ms. Cheeke. On October 3, 2017, Handrigan J. determined the two encumbrancers' application but not 11368's interlocutory application. Handrigan J. held there was a surplus on the power of sale of approximately $4.2 million. He accepted most of Patrick Street Holdings Ltd.'s accounting but did not include its claim to $4,000,000 under Mortgage 759678 in his accounting. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed, The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. paid the two applicant encumbrancers' claims and withheld the balance of the surplus of the power of sale proceeds. On July 16, 2022, Handrigan J. determined the interlocutory application filed by 11368 NL Inc. Handrigan J. held Ms. Cheeke's encumbrance took priority and was due from the remaining surplus. He held that his conclusion on October 3, 2017, that Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. had not established what was owing under Mortgage 759678 had been accepted on appeal and nothing had been shown to cause him to change his mind on this issue. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. was ordered to pay the surplus remaining after payment to Ms. Cheeke to 11368 NL Inc. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-10-15 Keywords Civil procedure — Res judicata — Estoppel — Abuse of process by re-litigation — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in finding res judicata may be raised for first time on appeal — If so, whether requirements of res judicata satisfied — Whether doctrine of abuse of process by re-litigation applied beyond permissible limits — Whether abuse of process for purchaser to rely on collateral mortgage — Amount due and payable under a mortgage at the time of power of sale proceedings. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective's record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee's counsel that records relating to the detective's past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective's credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King's Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted. Argued Date 2025-10-08 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective's record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective's past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused's prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown's office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective's record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee's counsel that records relating to the detective's past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective's credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King's Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted. Argued Date 2025-10-07 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective's record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective's past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused's prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown's office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

B.F., a surgical nurse, has a child, E. B.F. and E.'s father are separated and, in 2019, were engaged in litigation about parenting rights. An interim ruling in that case in early June 2019 granted E.'s father supervised access, which B.F. resisted. At this time, B.F. was residing with her mother, I.F.On June 12, 2019, after the interim ruling, a neighbour found B.F., I.F., and E., then 19 months old, in B.F.'s home. All three were unconscious in B.F.'s bedroom; E. was in her crib. First responders found five empty insulin pens at the scene, each of which originally contained many times the normal adult dose. There were nine visible injection marks on E.'s body and evidence that E. had resisted the injections; no injection marks were visible on B.F. or I.F. The first responders also located a handwritten letter at the scene that they characterized as a suicide note. Due to the quantity of insulin injected into her system, E. suffered serious and permanent brain damage, as well as permanent damage to other organs. She was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and spasticity, and suffers from seizures. She requires constant medical care. B.F. and I.F. have since fully recovered. B.F. was arrested and charged with two counts of attempted murder by administering a noxious substance (a potentially lethal amount of insulin by injection), and two counts of aggravated assault.The jury convicted B.F. of the attempted murder of E. and I.F., and of the aggravated assault of E. The jury acquitted B.F. of the aggravated assault of I.F.B.F. appealed her conviction and sentence. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of E. was dismissed. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of I.F. was allowed and a new trial ordered. Argued Date 2025-05-22 Keywords Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Charge to jury — Party liability — Attempted murder and aiding suicide — Suicide pact defence — Whether victim of a crime may also be a principal of an offence — Whether accused may be liable as a party to an offence without a principal offender being found guilty — Whether trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the scenario presented by counsel for B.F. — Whether jury instructions were misleading to the point of error — Whether jury instructions raise a reasonable apprehension of biais — Whether suicide pact defence available — Whether Court of Appeal erred in approach to causation — Whether Court of Appeal incorrectly required additional elements that must be satisfied for an act that may assist suicide to also constitute murder Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was arrested without warrant by the police 11 days after the date of an alleged crime. At his trial, he brought a motion in which he claimed that his arrest and his detention following his arrest were unlawful pursuant to s. 495(2)(b), (d) and (e) of the Criminal Code and s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He argued that the power to arrest and detain without warrant for a hybrid offence is lawful only if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed or is about to be committed and that such measures are necessary in the public interest.The trial judge summarily dismissed the motion on the ground that it had no chance of success. The police officers could, pursuant to s. 495(3) of the Criminal Code, proceed solely on reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed. There was nothing unlawful about his arrest. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred in refusing to hold a voir dire on the motion, because the motion was not bound to fail. The right to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is guaranteed by the terms of s. 495(3) in accordance with a viable interpretation of the limitations imposed on the power of arrest without warrant set out in s. 495(2). The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-21 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Police — Powers — Arrest without warrant — Whether s. 495(2) of Criminal Code modifies peace officer's power to arrest person without warrant — Whether s. 495(3) of Criminal Code excuses non compliance with s. 495(2) — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that trial judge had erred in summarily dismissing motion in which unlawfulness of arrest by reason of non compliance with s. 495(2) was alleged — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 495. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On December 6, 2021, S.A. was charged with assault and sexual assault. He elected to be tried by judge and jury. A trial date of April 17, 2023 was set but, on April 17, 2023, the trial could not commence because no judge was available. A trial date was set for February 12, 2024. Forestell J. held that delay of 6 to 10 months was unreasonable and breached s. 11(b) of the Charter. Notwithstanding that net delay was below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months set in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, she stayed the proceedings. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2025-05-16 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to tried in reasonable time — How should delay caused by judicial vacancy be treated under s. 11(b) of the Charter? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2019, Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah both applied for transfer to a minimum security institution. At the time, Mr. Dorsey, a dangerous offender, was incarcerated at a medium security facility; Mr. Salah was sentenced to concurrent life sentences and is incarcerated at a different medium security facility. Mr. Dorsey's case management team, his Manager of Assessment and Intervention, and his Warden all agreed that he met the criteria for reclassification to minimum security but, because of his dangerous offender status, his transfer request had to be approved by the Regional Deputy Commissioner and then the Assistant Commissioner of Correctional Operations and Programs. In September 2019, the Regional Deputy Commissioner assessed Mr. Dorsey's public safety rating as moderate. His request was denied.Mr. Salah's case management team, his parole officer, and his Manager of Assessment and Intervention recommended reclassification and transfer to a minimum security facility, but, in October 2019, a new Manager of Assessment and Intervention and Intervention was assigned to his file. He assessed Mr. Salah as a moderate escape risk, so the Warden wrongly denied his transfer request.Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah each applied under the Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-1, for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid. Although they did not apply under the Charter, they alleged that the denial of their transfer requests engaged ss. 7, 9, 10(c) and 12 of the Charter. On consent, the applications were joined for the purpose of determining a common threshold legal issue: whether Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah could resort to habeas corpus to challenge the denials of their applications for transfer to lower security prisons.The applications were dismissed on the grounds that habeas corpus was not available for denials of reclassification, which were not deprivations of residual liberty. After the application judge's decision, Mr. Dorsey was reclassified and transferred to a minimum security institution, but he continued his appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-05-13 Keywords Prerogative writs — Habeas corpus — Prisons — Deprivation of residual liberty — Security classification — Transfer — Denial of reclassification — Denial of transfer to lower security institution — Whether denial of reclassification and transfer to lower security institution is deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent is a criminal defence lawyer whose client was the subject of a wiretap authorization under the Criminal Code. The authorization did not permit live monitoring of phone calls with a lawyer; such calls could be recorded, but a judge's order was required to access them. During the surveillance operation, the respondent called her client, which was automatically recorded. A civilian employee also listened to a portion of the call before disconnecting.A reviewing judge concluded that an initial portion of the telephone call was not subject to solicitor-client privilege and it was released to the Crown. The recording revealed the respondent informed her client that a third party had been arrested and that the police would likely be obtaining search warrants for places where the third party had been. The respondent was charged with wilfully attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by interfering in an ongoing police investigation, contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the respondent's rights under s. 8 of the Charter were not breached with respect to the civilian employee listening to her phone conversation. However, she also concluded that her rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter had been breached due to her inability to access the second, privileged portion of the recording. She ordered the entire recording excluded under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Crown called no evidence and the respondent was acquitted.A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the acquittal and the trial judge's decision with respect to the breaches of the respondent's rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. However, it also concluded that her rights under s. 8 had been breached, and it therefore would have excluded the evidence of the telephone call under s. 24(2) of the Charter rather than s. 24(1). The dissenting judge would have held that the respondent's ss. 7 and 11(d) rights were not breached. He agreed with the majority that there was a breach of her s. 8 rights, but he would have held that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2). He would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-20 Keywords Criminal Law — Charter of rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Full answer and defence (ss. 7 and 11(d) — Solicitor-client privilege — Wire-tap authorization — Interaction between solicitor-client privilege and an accused's lawyer's Charter rights — Wire-tap monitoring and recording of phone call between defence counsel and client — Whether the respondent's right to make full answer and defence was breached by not having access to the full recording of a phone call protected by solicitor-client privilege — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-15 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-14 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Rousselle was arrested for impaired driving and administered a breathalyser test. Based on the results of the test, he was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours of ceasing to operate a motor vehicle. At trial, a Certificate of Qualified Technician from the officer who administered the breathalyzer test was admitted into evidence but the trial judge refused to admit two certificates of analysts who had certified the target value of the alcohol standard used by the qualified technician to conduct a required system calibration check of the breathalyzer device. The trial judge held the Certificate of Qualified Technician was not evidence of the target value of an alcohol standard and proof of the target value of an alcohol standard was a pre-condition to the Crown relying on the presumption in s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code that breathalyzer test results are conclusive proof of blood alcohol concentration. The trial judge acquitted Mr. Rousselle. A summary conviction appeal was allowed, the acquittal was set aside and a conviction was entered. The Court of appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-04-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Breathalyser test results — Target value of alcohol standard — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interpretation of s. 320.31(1)(a) of Criminal Code as permitting Crown to prove alcohol standard was certified by an analyst through hearsay evidence of qualified technician? Notes (New Brunswick) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The complainant was at that time, a grade 7 student at an all-male boarding school in Alberta. The respondent was a teacher at the school. After a trial by judge and jury, the respondent was found guilty of sexual interference (count 1), invitation to sexual touching (count 2), and sexual assault (count 3) of a person under the age of 14 years. The offences occurred in 1993 and 1994. In view of the multiple incidents in this case, the sentencing judge was satisfied that it was appropriate to sentence the respondent on counts 1 and 2. Convictions were entered on counts 1 and 2. The charge of sexual assault was stayed in accordance with Kienapple. The respondent was sentenced to a six year prison term with the counts to be served concurrently. A majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal (Wakeling and Feehan JJ.A.) allowed the respondent's sentence appeal reducing the sentence to 47 months. Crighton J.A., dissented and would have upheld the six year sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. Argued Date 2025-04-23 Keywords Criminal law – Sentencing – Did the Alberta Court of Appeal err in law in finding the sentencing judge's reasons for sentence to be insufficient? Do the principles articulated in R. v. Friesen apply to historic offences? Did the Alberta Court of Appeal err in interfering with the sentence imposed at trial? Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a trial by judge alone, the appellant, Buddy Ray Underwood, was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, unlawful confinement and murder. The trial judge acquitted the appellant of first degree murder but entered a conviction for the included offence of second degree murder instead. The respondent Crown appealed the acquittal and the appellant cross-appealed the conviction. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown's appeal, quashed the acquittal on first degree murder and substituted a conviction for first degree murder under ss. 231(2) and (5) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. First, the court agreed with the Crown that the trial judge erred in law in his analysis of constructive first degree murder by narrowing the causation analysis to focus exclusively on the direct medical cause of death. Second, the court concluded that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending the time frame for assessing planning as well as the meaning of “planned” more generally. The appellant's cross-appeal, not at issue, was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-04-17 Keywords Criminal law – Appeals – Murder – First degree murder – Elements of offence – Constructive first degree murder – Planning and deliberation – Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in convicting the appellant of first degree murder by concluding that his actions satisfied the elements of s. 231(2) and (5)(e) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2020 the Chief Medical Officer of Health for Newfoundland and Labrador issued certain orders under the province's Public Health Protection and Promotion Act, in an effort to curtail the spread of COVID-19. These orders restricted travel, by limiting the circumstances in which non-residents were permitted to enter the province. Appellant Kimberley Taylor resides in Nova Scotia. Her mother, a resident of Newfoundland and Labrador, passed away suddenly in 2020. Ms. Taylor sought an exemption from the travel restrictions in order to attend her mother's funeral. Her request was denied. Ms. Taylor brought an application seeking a declaration that the travel restriction orders, and the provision of the Act under which they were issued, were beyond the legislative authority of the province and of no force and effect. Ms. Taylor also argued that the travel restrictions violated her rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador dismissed the application. The application judge held that the legislation at issue was constitutional, but that the right to remain in Canada, protected by s. 6(1) of the Charter, included a right of mobility simpliciter within Canada. The decision to deny Ms. Taylor entry into the province infringed her s. 6(1) right to mobility, but the infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter. By the time the appeal and cross-appeal from that judgment came before the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador, the travel restrictions were no longer in effect. The Court of Appeal declined to hear the appeal and cross-appeal on the basis that they were moot. Argued Date 2025-04-16 Keywords Charter of Rights – Mobility rights – Public health – COVID-19 – Chief medical officer of health issuing orders pursuant to provincial legislation to restrict travel into province during public health emergency – Appellant seeking to enter province to attend funeral – Appellant denied entry – Whether travel restriction order unconstitutional – Whether travel restriction order violates s. 6(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – Whether travel restriction order violates s. 6(2)(a) of Charter – Whether s. 6 violation justified by s. 1 of Charter – Whether Court of Appeal correct to reject appeal as moot – Public Health Protection and Promotion Act, S.N.L. 2018, c. P-37.3, s. 28(1)(h). Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Shamar Meredith, and a co-accused were charged with first degree murder. The victim was shot multiple times in the washroom area of a restaurant. Prior to the trial, the Crown brought a motion to have a video admitted as prior discreditable conduct evidence. The trial judge ruled that the video was admissible. After the written ruling was released and before the video was played for the jury, the appellant and the co-accused brought a motion to have the trial judge reconsider his decision on the prior discreditable conduct motion, which was dismissed. The appellant was eventually found guilty of second-degree murder by a jury. The appellant appealed his conviction. He raised, among other grounds of appeal, that the trial judge erred in admitting the video as evidence of prior discreditable conduct and/or failed to properly instruct the jury on the permissible use of such evidence. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. The majority found that the trial judge applied the correct legal test in deciding to admit the video, and that his assessment of the probative value and prejudicial effect of the video was reasonable. Further, the majority found that trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the permitted and prohibited uses of the video. In dissent, van Rensburg J.A., would have allowed the appeal and directed a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder. She found that the trial judge erred in law (1) in concluding that the video was probative of whether the appellant and the co-accused were engaged in a joint enterprise to kill the victim, and admitting the video for this purpose; (2) in admitting the video for any purpose after the appellant and the co-accused offered to make certain admissions under s. 655 of the Criminal Code; and (3) in his instructions to the jury about the permitted and prohibited uses of the video, which were internally inconsistent, specifically instructed the jury to use the video for an improper purpose, and did not alleviate the significant prejudice to the appellant and the co-accused that resulted from the admission of this evidence. Argued Date 2025-03-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Prior discreditable conduct evidence— Charge to jury — Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct as probative of whether the appellant and his co-accused were involved in a joint enterprise to kill the victim — Whether the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of prior discreditable conduct after the appellant and his co-accused proposed to make admissions covering and negating its probative value — Whether the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the permitted and prohibited uses of the prior discreditable conduct and failed to alleviate the prejudice to the appellant and his co-accused. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, P.B., was charged with sexual assault for having allegedly sexually assaulted the complainant on three occasions in the course of one night. At trial, the complainant was the only witness called. The appellant argued that the complainant's testimony was not sufficiently credible or reliable to prove the case against him beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, he alleged that her evidence was unreliable because she claimed that her memory of the relevant events was based on “flashbacks”. The trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence and found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his decision, in that he failed to make concrete factual findings about which parts of the complainant's evidence he accepted and which he did not, and that the trial judge erred in evaluating the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, notably her “flashback” memory. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed the appeal. On the first issue, the majority found that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient. Having read the trial judge's reasons in a functional and contextual manner, the majority concluded that there is no difficulty discerning what the trial judge decided, from a factual standpoint, and why. The majority found the reasons also contained enough detail to permit appellate review for error. As for the second issue, the majority found that the trial judge's conclusion on the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence is one that a reasonable view of the evidence supports. As such, the majority concluded that there was no proper basis to interfere. In dissent, Barrington-Foote J.A. would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. He concluded that the trial reasons are insufficient to permit effective appellate review and that the trial judge's analysis on the reliability issues arising from the evidence was very brief and was not enough in the circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2025-03-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Credibility — Sufficiency of reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to identify and apply the correct approach to the analysis of the reliability of evidence of recovered memories based on flashbacks. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 1978, the appellant, R.A., was babysitting the then five-year-old complainant at his home. In a statement made to the police, he explained that he asked the complainant to touch him and she did so. The appellant was charged with one count of indecently assaulting the complainant contrary to s. 149 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Following a trial in the Provincial Court, the appellant was acquitted on the basis that there had been no “assault” under the Criminal Code. There had been no direct, intentional application of force to the complainant and no attempt or threat by an act or gesture to apply force to the complainant.On appeal, the Crown submitted that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the elements of assault and holding that the sexual touching had to be physically initiated by the accused. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the acquittal. It concluded that the appellant touched the complainant in a manner constituting an assault and that any intentional contact with a child by an adult that is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature constitutes a direct and intentional application of force by the adult to the child's person, regardless of whose physical movement initiated the contact. Considering that the only issue was whether the appellant's conduct amounted to an assault and that the question had been answered in the affirmative, the court entered a conviction for indecent assault and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court for the appellant to be sentenced. Argued Date 2025-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Indecent assault — Elements of offence — Intentional application of force — Did the Court of Appeal for British Columbia err in holding that in order to ground the offence of indecent assault in 1978, the element of assault did not require the intentional application of force by an accused? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 149. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During a roadside stop, the police found a handgun in the fanny pack belonging to the appellant, Mr. Amari Donawa. The handgun was sent to the Centre of Forensic Sciences, but for reasons that were not explained, the police did not send the magazine or the ammunition.At trial, the expert testified that the handgun could not be fired easily without the magazine. The trial judge, Justice Edward of the Ontario Court of Justice, found that the handgun was not a firearm because making it operational, according to the expert, required special expertise, considerable time, and part not readily available. The Crown appealed Mr. Donawa's acquittals entered by the trial judge on the various firearm offences. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge was correct in his finding that the handgun was not a firearm as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown's appeal and set aside the acquittals. It entered convictions on two counts (careless storage of a firearm and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number) and ordered a new trial on other counts. In its view, the trial judge made a number of errors in reaching his conclusion. He failed to consider whether the handgun, as found, was operable, based on the evidence. The failure to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence was an error of law. Argued Date 2025-03-26 Keywords Criminal Law —Firearm — Definition of firearm in Criminal Code — Evidence — Assessment — Does the definition of a “firearm” under s. 2 of the Criminal Code always dispense with proof of the availability of a functional magazine? — Did the Court of Appeal for Ontario err in finding that the trial judge had failed to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 2 “firearm”. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents are various professionals who obtained judgments against the appellant in 2004, to which a ten-year prescriptive period applies under art. 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec. Certain actions interrupted prescription between 2005 and 2007, after which prescription started running again.A bailiff served a notice of execution on the appellant in 2016, which authorized the bailiff to seize the appellant's movable property. However, the bailiff concluded that the appellant's movable property was exempt from seizure pursuant to section 89 of the Indian Act. The bailiff later had discussions with the appellant's Grand Chief and was informed that there was no property outside of its land base. The bailiff did not prepare and file minutes of seizure. Subsequently, the appellant informed the respondents that it held a property outside of its land base but that it was exempt from seizure. The respondents registered a legal hypothec against that property.The appellant sought a declaration that the prescriptive period applicable to the judgment had expired before the respondents registered the hypothec. The trial judge concluded that prescription had been interrupted in November 2016 when the respondents served a notice of execution on the appellant. The actions of the respondents amounted to a judicial application that interrupted prescription per article 2892 C.C.Q. Although the seizure was unfruitful, it had not been dismissed or annulled by a court, in which case prescription would not have been interrupted, per article 2894 C.C.Q. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial judge's decision. Argued Date 2025-03-19 Keywords Prescription — Extinctive prescription — Interruption of prescription — Whether service of notice of execution interrupted prescription — Whether service of notice of execution amounts to unsuccessful seizure if there are no assets available to seize — Whether section 89 of the Indian Act applies so as to render appellant's movable property unseizable — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 2892, 2894 — Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 89. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Stephen and Claudette Emond lived in a home on the Ottawa River that was located in the catchment area of the Mississippi Valley Conservation Authority (“MVCA”). They had purchased a standard form residential homeowners' insurance policy from Trillium Mutual Insurance Company. The Emonds' home was deemed a total loss as a result of flooding in April 2019. Although the insurer acknowledged coverage for the loss under the policy, the parties could not agree on what, if any, costs of replacement of the insureds' home were excluded from coverage under the policy. The Emonds claimed that the Guaranteed Rebuilding Cost (“GRC”) coverage endorsement fully guaranteed their rebuilding costs. Trillium acknowledged that the GRC coverage applied to replace the insureds' home, but took the position that the costs to be incurred to comply with the MVCA's regulation policies and other by-laws and regulations enacted after the original building of the home were excluded from coverage by an exclusion in the policy. The application judge accepted the Emonds' position that the GRC coverage was intended to guarantee the costs of rebuilding their home, without any limitation of coverage resulting from the operation of any rule, regulation, by-law, or ordinance. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal and concluded that the exclusion applied to exclude coverage for increased costs to comply with any law, including by-laws and regulations such as the MVCA regulation policies. Argued Date 2025-03-18 Keywords Insurance — Homeowner's insurance — Home deemed total loss as a result of flooding — Home insured through standard form residential homeowners' insurance policy including endorsement for guaranteed rebuilding cost — Policy containing exclusion for increased costs of replacement due to operation of any law regulating construction of buildings — Insurer disputing homeowners' claim for coverage for costs of complying with regulatory policies to rebuild home — Application judge concluding coverage included and Court of Appeal concluding coverage excluded — What is the correct interpretation of the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement? — Whether an exclusion clause in the basic policy can be used to deny expanded coverage granted by the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Judge Gagnon of the Court of Québec acquitted the appellant, Frédéric Rioux, of the offence of sexual assault committed between August 1 and 2, 2019, in Bonsecours. Although the Crown had laid only one charge for a sexual assault that occurred in Bonsecours, the Crown's evidence related to two instances of sexual intercourse, one in Magog and the other in Bonsecours. With regard to the first sexual act, which took place in a park in Magog, the judge found that the accused's evidence was probative of the complainant's consent and had not been contradicted by the complainant, who had no memory of the incident. The actus reus was therefore not established beyond a reasonable doubt. As for the second instance of sexual intercourse, which occurred at the accused's house in Bonsecours, the judge found that the Crown had met its burden but that Mr. Rioux's version raised a doubt concerning his honest but mistaken belief in the complainant's consent.For the reasons given by Bachand J.A. and concurred in by Hamilton J.A., the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, but only with respect to Mr. Rioux's criminal liability for the events that took place in the park in Magog on the evening of August 1, 2019, since the Crown had decided not to challenge the trial judge's conclusion that Mr. Rioux had no criminally liability for the events in Bonsecours. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had made errors of law in analyzing the issue of the complainant's capacity to consent to the sexual acts that had taken place in Magog. Those errors of law on the issue of the consensual nature of the sexual acts made it necessary to hold a new trial. Mainville J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, as he was of the view that the trial judge had considered all the circumstantial evidence but had found that Mr. Rioux could nevertheless be acquitted based on the probative value of his testimony. Mainville J.A. expressed serious reservations about the validity of the Crown's appeal with regard to events that were not part of the charge, given that the accused had been acquitted of the offence directly covered by the indictment. He added that it was not appropriate to order a new trial when Mr. Rioux would be tried again for an offence of which he had been finally acquitted. Argued Date 2025-01-22 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Capacity to consent — Absence of direct evidence from complainant — Consideration of all evidence — Appeal — Powers of Court of Appeal — Charge — Order limiting scope of new trial — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had failed to consider all evidence on ultimate issue of guilt or innocence — If trial judge made error of law, whether majority erred in law in failing to address question of whether respondent had shown with reasonable degree of certainty that verdict would not necessarily have been same without that error in light of trial judge's conclusion that he believed appellant. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Roger Patrick Bilodeau, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of manslaughter for the shooting deaths of two men. He was found liable as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, for having formed an intention to carry out an unlawful purpose common with his son, who shot the deceased. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the jury was improperly instructed, including regarding the common unlawful purpose. The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It concluded that many errors identified benefited the appellant, often by imposing on the Crown an unduly onerous burden. No substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred: s. 686(1)(b)(iii) should be applied. Pentelechuck J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In her view, there were additional legal errors in the charge not identified by the majority, one or more of which were not harmless, precluding a route under s. 686(1)(b)(iii). There was a real risk that the common unlawful purpose alleged by the Crown merged into the secondary offence of murder. The dissenting judge was not convinced that the evidence was so overwhelming that, notwithstanding the serious nature of the error, a reasonable and properly instructed jury would inevitably have convicted. Argued Date 2025-02-19 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Party liability — Common unlawful purpose — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in determining that the instruction to the jury with regard to the appellant's alleged liability as a party, pursuant to s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, contained no prejudicial error — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 21(2). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a jury trial before Blanchard J. of the Superior Court, the appellant, Maxime Chicoine-Joubert, was convicted of one count of second degree murder and one count of assault with a weapon. On appeal, Mr. Chicoine-Joubert argued that the judge had erred in his instructions regarding manslaughter and in his answer to questions from the jury by failing to mention the necessary mens rea.The Quebec Court of Appeal, for the reasons of Vauclair J.A., Hamilton J.A. concurring, dismissed Mr. Chicoine-Joubert's appeal. It found that the instructions to the jury were correct in the context of the case. Since Mr. Chicoine-Joubert conceded his guilt for the manslaughter verdict, the question from the jury on that offence did not require that the judge address it. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge had not adequately answered the questions from the jury and that there was a reasonable possibility that the jurors had misunderstood the requisite mens rea for second degree murder. Although the dissenting judge agreed with the majority that the initial instructions contained no error warranting the court's intervention, he found that the trial judge had not fulfilled his obligation to answer questions from the jury clearly, correctly and comprehensively. He did not instruct the jurors on manslaughter or provide them with an example. Argued Date 2025-02-20 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Questions from jury — Manslaughter — Whether trial judge erred in his instructions and in his answer to questions from jury regarding offence of manslaughter, offence that appellant does not acknowledge having committed — Whether majority of Court of Appeal made reviewable error in declining to order new trial. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was found not guilty of sexual assault following a jury trial. Consent was the central issue. The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal, submitting that the trial judge erred in law by restricting Crown counsel's examination of the complainant on her prior statements (text messages that were exchanged between the complainant and the respondent after the event) and erred in law in rulings related to the admission of evidence about the complainant's prior sexual history. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal. It concluded that although the trial judge placed restrictions on the text messages exhibit during direct examination of the complainant in excess of what was necessary to prevent the jury from improperly using the text messages, his interventions were within the reasonable exercise of his trial management power. The majority also concluded the trial judge made no error in finding that the prior sexual history evidence was capable of being admissible. There was no error regarding the judge's finding of an inconsistency between the complainant's evidence on cross-examination and her prior statement to the police. The trial judge did not err in admitting the prior sexual history evidence and in refusing to allow Crown counsel to question the complainant about the inconsistency on re-examination. Knickle J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She concluded that the trial judge erred in his treatment of the text messages conversation evidence and therefore improperly restricted the Crown's direct examination of the complainant. The trial judge also erred in admitting evidence of the complainant's previous sexual history for the purpose of cross-examining her on alleged inconsistencies, because the complainant's testimony was not inconsistent with what she had stated to police and she had not put her previous sexual history with the respondent in issue. The trial judge also erred by denying Crown counsel's re-examination of the complainant. These errors had a material bearing on the verdict of acquittal rendered by the jury. Argued Date 2025-01-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Complainant's prior sexual history — Text messages — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the prior sexual history evidence of the complainant was properly admitted by (i) deferring to the trial judge's finding that there was an inconsistency; (ii) finding that the evidence met the threshold of legitimate relevance; and (iii) finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion by prohibiting the Crown from asking the complainant questions on redirect about the prior sexual history — Whether the majority erred in holding that the trial judge's restrictive treatment of text messages was a reasonable exercise of his trial management powers — Whether the errors had a material bearing on the acquittal and the test in R. v. Graveline, 2006 SCC 16, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 609, has been met — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 276. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On March 20, 2019, at approximately 11:00 p.m., police officers received a tip that Mr. Singer was driving a truck and the caller believed that he was intoxicated. More than an hour later, an officer observed a vehicle matching the vehicle description given by the caller. The truck was parked on a residential driveway. Its lights were on and its ignition was running. Officers could not see anyone in the vehicle from the road. They entered the driveway and approached the vehicle. They observed a single occupant sleeping in the driver's seat. They knocked on the driver's window and got no response. They opened the front doors and immediately smelled a strong odour of alcohol. The officers reached into the vehicle and shook Mr. Singer awake. Mr. Singer had red, bloodshot eyes and there was a strong odour of alcohol coming from his breath. Cst. Lapointe detained Mr. Singer and administered a roadside breath sample. Mr. Singer failed the roadside breath test. He was arrested for care or control of a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol level. At a police station, he declined to provide a breath sample. Mr. Singer was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand for a breath sample made by a peace officer. At trial, Mr. Singer argued that his s. 8 Charter rights were breached and the evidence should be excluded. The trial judge dismissed the Charter application and convicted Mr. Singer of failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample. The Court of Appeal held that the police officers' conduct constituted a search in breach of s. 8 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, excluded the evidence and entered an acquittal. Argued Date 2025-02-18 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Criminal law — Exclusion of evidence — Implied license to knock — Does the driver of a vehicle parked in the driveway of a dwelling house have a privacy interest protected by s. 8 of the Charter such that police officers responding to a complaint of impaired driving are prohibited from approaching the vehicle, communicating with the driver and observing signs of impairment — If the police conducted a search within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, was that search unreasonable — If the police conducted an unreasonable search, should the evidence obtained from the search be excluded? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The parties were married in 1999 in India. During their sixteen years of marriage, they had two children. The trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia was abusive during the marriage. The trial judge accepted Ms. Ahluwalia's evidence that the parties' relationship was characterized by a pattern of emotional and physical abuse and financial control. Ms. Ahluwalia testified to three specific incidents of physical violence: in 2000, 2008, and 2013. Ms. Ahluwalia brought an action for statutory relief and also claimed damages for Mr. Ahluwalia's conduct during the marriage. Justice Mandhane, the trial judge, awarded Ms. Ahluwalia $100,000 in compensatory and aggravated damages for the new tort of family violence. She also awarded an additional $50,000 in punitive damages for a total of $150,000 in damages. Benotto J.A., for the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal in part and reduced the damage award by $50,000. The Court of Appeal declined to recognize the new torts of domestic violence or coercive control as defined in this case. Argued Date 2025-02-12 Keywords Family law – Tort of family violence – Was Justice Mandhane correct in recognizing a tort of family violence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The parties were married in 1999 in India. During their sixteen years of marriage, they had two children. The trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia was abusive during the marriage. The trial judge accepted Ms. Ahluwalia's evidence that the parties' relationship was characterized by a pattern of emotional and physical abuse and financial control. Ms. Ahluwalia testified to three specific incidents of physical violence: in 2000, 2008, and 2013. Ms. Ahluwalia brought an action for statutory relief and also claimed damages for Mr. Ahluwalia's conduct during the marriage. Justice Mandhane, the trial judge, awarded Ms. Ahluwalia $100,000 in compensatory and aggravated damages for the new tort of family violence. She also awarded an additional $50,000 in punitive damages for a total of $150,000 in damages. Benotto J.A., for the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal in part and reduced the damage award by $50,000. The Court of Appeal declined to recognize the new torts of domestic violence or coercive control as defined in this case. Argued Date 2025-02-11 Keywords Family law – Tort of family violence – Was Justice Mandhane correct in recognizing a tort of family violence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In the 1990s, Promotion M.G. Larochelle inc. (Promotion M.G.) was involved in real estate development in Ville de Sainte-Julie (City), the applicant/cross respondent. In December 2000, the total area of Promotion M.G.'s real estate projects was 760,926.3 m2. The municipal by law on parks and playgrounds required 76,092.63 m2, that is, 10% of that area, to be transferred free of charge to the City. However, Promotion M.G. had already transferred 3,898.27 m2 in excess to the City. In February 2001, the City and Promotion M.G. signed an agreement (Agreement) regarding land transfers for the purposes of parks or playgrounds. The Agreement included an undertaking by Promotion M.G. to transfer land with an area of 45,615 m2 to the City, 50% of that area (22,807.5 m2) being applicable, along with the 3,898.27 m2 already transferred in excess, to the creation of a total [TRANSLATION] “area bank” of 26,705.78 m2. The creation of that bank allowed the City to avoid having to compensate Promotion M.G. in money for the excess area transferred. In fact, the parties expressly agreed that the bank was to be applied in compensation for park fees to be paid to the City in the context of future real estate development by Promotion M.G. or companies related to it in the City. While at the time Promotion M.G. did not have any land to develop in the City, a company related to it, the respondent/cross applicant, Les Investissements Laroda inc. (Laroda), owned lots located in an agricultural zone that it intended to develop for real estate purposes. On two occasions, that is, in 2004 and 2008, the City filed an application with the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec (CPTAQ) to have part of the sector (called “Du Moulin”) where Lorada's lots were located excluded from the agricultural zone, and each time, the application was rejected. The Administrative Tribunal of Québec dismissed the appeal from CPTAQ's last decision in 2011. In December 2015, Laroda, which, since 2010, had had all the rights, titles and interest that belonged to Promotion M.G., sent a letter, through its representative, Éric Larochelle, to the City's mayor requesting that she make it a monetary offer that corresponded to the present value of the area included in the bank provided for in the Agreement. After talks broke down, Laroda filed an originating application against the City asking the court to fix a term for the Agreement and to order the City to pay damages. The Superior Court dismissed the originating application and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-02-17 Keywords Contract — Transaction — Novation — Modalities of obligation — Compensatory prestation — Prescription of right of action — Insofar as Agreement P 5 dated February 19, 2001, constitutes transaction, whether Court of Appeal erred in not finding it to have novatory if not declaratory nature that modified pre existing obligations of parties — Whether Court of Appeal could order restitution of prestations where no situation set out in art. 1699 of Civil Code of Québec was alleged or proven and where parties had signed notarial acts by which Les Investissements Laroda transferred surplus parks free of charge — Whether Court of Appeal, in interpreting Agreement P-5, erred in characterizing City's obligation to reimburse as being obligation with term; if not, whether it could simultaneously apply arts. 1510 and 1512 of Civil Code of Québec with direct effect on prescriptive period — Whether Court of Appeal erred in failing to apply performance by equivalence regime in context of this case after having previously recognized that City's obligation had become exigible — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 1497, 1508, 1510, 1512, 1660, 1699, 1700, 2631, 2925. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Enrico Di-Paola, is a construction contractor committed for trial on four charges related to a corruption and fraud matter involving an official with whom he was doing business and with whom he had a friendship. The day before his trial, Mr. Di-Paola entered into a negotiated agreement with the prosecutor to plead guilty to a charge of having conferred a benefit on an official while having dealings with the government and without the written consent of the official's superior (s. 121(1)(b)), and the prosecutor dropped the more serious charges. The prosecutor amended the indictment in accordance with the agreement. Following the guilty plea, the Superior Court imposed a 15-month conditional sentence of imprisonment on Mr. Di-Paola. The judge accepted as one of the aggravating factors the fact that Mr. Di-Paola had conferred advantages and benefits on the official in consideration of the awarding of lucrative contracts by the official. The Court of Appeal reduced the length of the conditional sentence of imprisonment imposed on Mr. Di-Paola from 15 months to 6 months, finding that the trial judge had erred in principle in accepting aggravating facts associated with another charge that had previously been laid and that had not been carried over in accordance with the agreement entered into between the parties. Argued Date 2025-02-13 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Consideration of facts forming part of circumstances of offence — Agreement entered into by prosecutor and accused regarding guilty plea — Whether evidence of facts that demonstrate offence with which offender was initially charged, but which is no longer pending and for which there was no verdict, is admissible as aggravating factor for sentencing pursuant to s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code — What are duties of fairness of prosecutor who intends to use s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code to prove such offence as aggravating factor in sentencing following guilty plea? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 725(1)(c). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After friends spent a night drinking heavily in a basement apartment, Mr. Boucher was fatally stabbed multiple times in a bedroom. No one witnessed the stabbing. Mr. Hussein was charged with second degree murder and tried before a jury. He testified at trial. Defence counsel brought an application to prevent or restrict the Crown from cross-examining Mr. Hussein on his extensive criminal record. The trial judge dismissed the application. In cross-examination of Mr. Hussein, Crown counsel raised his criminal record. The trial judge instructed the jury on the use it could make of Mr. Hussein's criminal record. The jury convicted Mr. Hussein of second degree murder. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the conviction. Argued Date 2025-01-23 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Prior convictions — Should the test for admitting a testifying accused's criminal record into evidence at trial be modified and if so, what is the appropriate test — Whether the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the accused's criminal record? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants, the Attorney General of Quebec and His Majesty the King, obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the declaration of unconstitutionality made by the Quebec Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 with respect to the mandatory minimum sentences of 12 months' imprisonment provided for in s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code. According to the majority of the Court of Appeal, these provisions violate s. 12 of the Canadian Charter, namely, the guarantee provided against cruel and unusual punishment, and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter. That declaration of unconstitutionality resulted from appeals filed notably in respect of two decisions rendered by the Court of Québec regarding the sentences to be imposed on the respondents, Mr. Naud and Mr. Senneville. Mr. Naud was convicted of two counts relating to possession and distribution of child pornography. Sentences of 9 months' imprisonment for possession and 11 months' imprisonment for distribution pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (3) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, along with various consequential orders. Mr. Senneville was convicted of two counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography. Sentences of 90 days' imprisonment to be served intermittently for possession and 90 days' imprisonment to be served intermittently for accessing child pornography pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, also along with various consequential orders. Argued Date 2025-01-20 Keywords Charter of Rights — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — One-year minimum sentences — Child pornography — Counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography — Whether s. 163.1(4)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether s. 163.1(4.1)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12 and 1 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) Following their trial, the appellants, Mikhail Kloubakov and Hicham Moustaine, were convicted of obtaining a material benefit from sexual services (s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code) and of procuring, as parties (s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code). However, after entering the convictions, the trial judge determined that the provisions in question were overbroad and that they deprived certain sex workers of the right to security without being in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, thereby infringing s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She held that the infringements were not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and she accordingly declared ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) unconstitutional and suspended the declaration of invalidity for 30 days. She entered a stay of proceedings as a remedy. The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the declarations of invalidity concerning ss. 286.2 and 286.3 and the stay of proceedings, and entered convictions against Mr. Kloubakov and Mr. Moustaine. It referred the matter back to the Court of King's Bench for sentencing. In its view, the impugned provisions did not infringe s. 7, and a s. 1 analysis was therefore unnecessary. Argued Date 2024-11-12 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to security of person — Criminal law — Commodification of sexual activities — Accused challenging constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions concerning offence of obtaining material benefit from sexual services and offence of procuring — Whether Court of Appeal erred in determining purpose of legislation and of relevant provisions — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that provisions were not overbroad in relation to their purpose, contrary to s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether it is possible to displace presumption that purposes articulated by Parliament are valid — If it is possible, whether presumption is displaced in this case — Whether ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) of Criminal Code infringe rights guaranteed in s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If so, whether these infringements can be justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If infringements are not justified under s. 1, what remedies are most appropriate in this case — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 286.2, 286.3. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants are owners of a residential property in the City of Toronto. They sought an order for adverse possession of a parcel of City parkland that their predecessors in title had fenced off with a chain link fence and enclosed into their backyard. The City acknowledged that the appellants' evidence satisfied the traditional test for adverse possession. The issue was whether the disputed land was nevertheless immune to a claim for adverse possession by virtue of being City land. The application judge found that a private landowner could not acquire title by encroaching on public land and fencing off portions for their private use. This decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2025-01-16 Keywords Courts — Jurisdiction — Property — Real property — Adverse possession — Home owner fencing off part of municipal parkland for their own use and subsequent owners seeking to acquire that land by way of a claim for adverse possession — Does the statutory scheme or existing case law support the Court of Appeal's decision to exempt municipal parkland from the real property limitations legislation? — Did the Court of Appeal have the jurisdiction to use the common law to provide that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from the real property limitations legislation? — If so, was it appropriate for the Court of Appeal to amend the law of adverse possession to find that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from claims of adverse possession? — Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, ss. 4, 15, 16. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Dov Markowich, is a shareholder of the appellant, Lundin Mining Corporation (“Lundin”). He sought leave under s. 138.8 of Ontario's Securities Act, to bring a statutory cause of action against Lundin and its officers and directors for Lundin's alleged failure to make timely disclosure of pit wall instability and a subsequent rockslide at a mine in Chile (“events”). He also sought to certify the action as a class action under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, advancing claims on behalf of certain shareholders of Lundin. Lundin did not publicly disclose the events at the time they occurred on October 25 and October 31, 2017, respectively. It advised investors about them approximately a month later, on November 29, in its regularly scheduled update. The next day, the price of Lundin's securities fell 16 per cent on the TSX. The issue at the heart of the appeal involves the competing interpretations of whether there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Markowich's action will be resolved in his favour at trial based on his claim that Lundin's lack of disclosure was contrary to its obligations to disclose forthwith a “material change” in its “business, operations or capital”. Argued Date 2025-01-15 Keywords Securities — Civil procedure — Commencement of proceedings — Statutory cause of action for failure to make timely disclosure — Leave to proceed — Mining company disclosing occurrence of pit wall instability and subsequent rockslide in periodic disclosure rather than at time of occurrence — Shareholder seeking to institute class action for company's failure to make timely disclosure — Commencement of action requiring leave of the court based on whether there is reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved in favour of the plaintiff at trial — Motion judge dismissing motion for leave — Court of Appeal allowing appeal and granting motion for leave — What is a “material change” for the purpose of Canadian securities law? — Should the leave requirement modify or lessen the burden to show a “material change”? — Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss. 138.3(4) and 138.8. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Section 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, provides that no person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of the offence of simple possession of a controlled substance if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene of the medical emergency. Mr. Wilson was with three other people when one overdosed on fentanyl and one of them called 911. Police responding to the 911 call arrested Mr. Wilson for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose. Police conducted a search of the group's truck and, in a green backpack, discovered modified handguns, parts for firearms, ammunition and identification papers. Later at a police station, Mr. Wilson admitted he was the owner of the green backpack, the guns and the ammunition. He admitted that the identification papers did not belong to him. Mr. Wilson was charged with possession of identity documents, fraudulent impersonation and a number of firearms offences. He was not charged with possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge dismissed an application for a declaration that the evidence should excluded for breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and admitted the evidence. Mr. Wilson was convicted of firearms offences. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and entered acquittals on all counts. Argued Date 2025-01-14 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Arbitrary detention — Good Samaritan law — Police responding to 911 call reporting an overdose and arresting accused for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose — Police conducting search incident to arrest and discovering evidence of firearms offences and false identity offences — Whether police had authority to arrest accused for simple possession of a controlled substance — Whether arrest and search were unlawful and in violation of Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) The appellant, an Indigenous man with significant cognitive difficulties, repeatedly sexually assaulted a worker at the group home where he resided. He remained in custody pending trial, including a period of detention in a psychiatric facility while temporarily unfit to stand trial. After resiling from three agreements to plead guilty, the appellant did so the fourth time. From charge to conviction, nearly four years elapsed. The sentencing judge imposed a nine-year custodial term. This term was lengthier than the one requested by the appellant, in part because his cognitive difficulties increase the amount of time required for rehabilitative programming. The sentencing judge considered the appellant's repeated abandonment of agreements to plead guilty to be wrongful conduct and disallowed enhanced pre-sentence custodial credit for part of the appellant's detention. The sentencing judge also relied on the relatively favourable conditions of detention in the psychiatric facility as a basis to deny enhanced credit. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal in part, due to an error in calculating the number of days the appellant spent in custody, but otherwise dismissed the appeal. It found that the length of time required to complete rehabilitative programming was one of multiple factors that the sentencing judge considered, and that she was entitled to do so. Furthermore, there was an evidentiary basis to conclude that the appellant's repeated abandonment of guilty pleas was wrongful conduct, and that the appellant's conditions of detention did not warrant enhanced credit for his entire period of pre-sentence custody. Argued Date 2024-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Whether anticipated time to complete rehabilitative programming may be considered when determining length of custodial sentence outside of dangerous offender regime — Whether delay caused by offender is wrongful conduct justifying denial of enhanced custodial credit — Whether offenders detained in mental health facilities prior to sentencing entitled to enhanced credit for those periods Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC) The appellant, Tammy Marion Bouvette, was babysitting a 19-month old baby who died while having a bath. An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Evan Matshes. The appellant was charged with second degree murder. The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death. The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that a body of relevant information was within the possession of the Crown and/or police and was not disclosed to the appellant's counsel. Most significantly, the undisclosed evidence pertained to the reliability of the evidence and opinions of Dr. Matshes. The Court of Appeal held that the conviction must be set aside as the product of a miscarriage of justice, as the evidence and circumstances establish a reasonable possibility that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death had full disclosure been made. The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, vacated the guilty plea, set aside the conviction and entered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2024-11-14 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Powers of the Court of Appeal — Setting aside guilty plea when there has been a miscarriage of justice — Scope of appellate courts' remedial discretion under s. 686(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to enter an acquittal — Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the entirety of the record as amplified on appeal admits the reasonable possibility of a conviction on a theoretical retrial? — If there remains a reasonable possibility of a conviction on a retrial, does s. 686(2)(a) nevertheless permit a court of appeal to enter an acquittal and, if so, in what circumstances? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Opsis Airport Services Inc., is a federal company that operates the emergency call dispatch centre at Pierre Elliot Trudeau International Airport. The respondent the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions charged Opsis with operating an enterprise that carried on private security activities without holding an agency licence of the appropriate class, contrary to ss. 4 and 114 of the Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5 (“PSA”). Opsis admitted that, without holding an agency licence, it was carrying on activities related to electronic security systems, which are normally subject to the PSA. However, it challenged the PSA's constitutional applicability. The Court of Québec held that the PSA applied to Opsis and therefore accepted the guilty pleas, convicted Opsis of the offences as charged and imposed fines on it. The court found that the PSA did not intrude on the core of a federal head of power because the PSA had no impact or only a very small impact on Opsis's operations. The Superior Court allowed Opsis's appeal, declared the PSA inapplicable to Opsis's activities related to the operation of the emergency call centre pursuant to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, quashed the convictions and acquitted Opsis of the offences charged. The judge held that the PSA intruded on the core of the federal aeronautics power, which included airport security, and that the intrusion constituted an impairment of the core of the federal power. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the Superior Court's judgment and affirmed the convictions entered by the Court of Québec. Although Opsis's activities fell within the core of Parliament's aeronautics power, the application of the PSA did not cause any actual impairment. A purely speculative or hypothetical impairment did not suffice. Ruel J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. He was of the view that if the PSA were applicable to Opsis's operations, the provisions would impair the core of federal jurisdiction over aeronautics safety and security. Argued Date 2024-12-11 Keywords Constitutional law — Interjurisdictional immunity — Impairment — Evidence — Federal paramountcy — Conflict of purposes — Provincial offences — Licences — Application of provincial statute to airport security activities — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inapplicable to appellant pursuant to doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity on ground that it impairs Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inoperative in relation to appellant pursuant to doctrine of federal paramountcy on ground that there is conflict of purposes between it and federal legislative scheme relating to aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act and associated regulations apply to appellant's airport security activities, which are essentially public and governmental in nature — Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) Mr. Kinamore, when he was 22-years old, and the complainant, when she was 16-years old, met at a motorcycle shop and they exchanged messages for a few months. They met for dinner and a movie at Mr. Kinmore's apartment. Afterwards, Mr. Kinamore was charged with sexual assault. Both the complainant and Mr. Kinamore testified at trial. The complainant described a sexual assault. Mr. Kinamore described a consensual sexual encounter. Both the Crown and the defence tendered evidence of prior messages between the complainant and Mr. Kinamore. In many text messages, the complainant repeatedly stated that she did not intend to have a sexual relationship with Mr. Kinamore. However, the defence led evidence of communications of a sexual nature and some prior communications entered into evidence by Crown counsel contain content that was sexual in nature or that the defence argued was sexual in nature. No voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by Crown counsel and no application was made pursuant to s. 276 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by the defence. Mr. Kinamore was convicted of sexual assault. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2024-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Complainant's sexual activity — Text messages — Accused charged with sexual assault — Whether prior text messages between accused and complainant were of a sexual nature — If so, whether voir dire was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by Crown counsel — Whether application under s. 276 of Criminal Code was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by defence counsel — Whether complainant's prior text messages were relevant to whether she consented to sexual activity? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The parties were married in June 2015. They lived in Japan until 2016 when they moved to the United Arab Emirates. They separated for a period in 2017, but reconciled in 2018 and then lived together in Oman until March 2020 when they travelled to Ontario for a number of reasons, including to visit Mr. Dunmore's parents. They had planned to return to Oman in early April 2020 however, the pandemic precluded them from doing so and they stayed with Mr. Dunmore's parents in Ontario until January 2021. In the meantime, Ms. Mehralian became pregnant and their son M was born in Ontario in December 2020. The parties and M returned to Oman in January 2021 but came back to Ontario in April 2021. The parties then separated in May 2021. Mr. Dunmore moved to the United Arab Emirates and later Oman, while Ms. Mehralian remained in Ontario with M. Ms. Mehralian commenced proceedings in Ontario in June 2021, seeking a divorce, corollary relief and equalization of property. At the same time, Mr. Dunmore commenced a court proceeding in Oman seeking a divorce and joint custody. Ms. Mehralian contested the jurisdiction of the Omani courts, but in March 2022, the Omani Court of Appeal found that Oman had jurisdiction. In subsequent litigation in which both parties participated, an Omani lower court as well as the Omani Court of Appeal found that the parties had been validly divorced in accordance with Omani law and awarded primary custody of M to Ms. Mehralian. Mr. Dunmore brought a motion in the Ontario Superior Court seeking an order recognizing the validity of the Omani divorce in Ontario and an order returning M to Oman. The two issues were heard separately by two different judges. One judge found that the Omani divorce should be recognized in Ontario. The second judge found that M should not be ordered returned to Oman. Ms. Mehralian appealed the first order and Mr. Dunmore appealed the second. Both appeals were dismissed. Argued Date 2024-12-09 Keywords Family law — Custody — Habitual residence — How should Canadian courts determine the habitual residence of children allegedly abducted from or withheld from a non-Hague Convention signatory state — How should courts balance the countervailing policy objectives outlined in s. 19 of Ontario's Children's Law Reform Act — Whether the statutory definition of habitual residence should apply to cases involving non-Hague Convention signatory countries or should the reformulated hybrid test for habitual residence set out in Office of the Children's Lawyer v. Balev apply — If the statutory definition applies, whether shared parental intention should be the focus of the analysis — Whether the lower courts erred in finding that Ontario has jurisdiction — Whether the lower courts erred in law in exercising jurisdiction over the child in the face of the respondent's attornment to the jurisdiction of the Omani courts — Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).