Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)

The appellant, Aphria Inc. (“tenant”), entered into a ten-year lease for commercial office premises with the respondent landlords and successors (collectively, “landlord”). The tenant served a notice of repudiation on the landlord and vacated the premises. The landlord did not accept the tenant's repudiation of the lease. Ultimately, the landlord sued the tenant for rents owing.The motion judge in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the landlord summary judgment for the rent owing plus interest. The motion judge declined to grant the landlord judgment for future rent. The motion judge dismissed the tenant's cross-motion for summary judgment for a declaration that if rent was owing, the amount was capped at rent owing for two years from the date of default pursuant to the lease. The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the tenant's appeal. It held that the motion judge did not err by refusing to depart from Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas and Co. Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 562, in order to recognize a duty to mitigate on commercial landlords who reject a repudiation of a lease by the tenant. The court also held that the motion judge did not err in his interpretation of the lease. Argued Date 2026-02-18 Keywords Contracts — Commercial leases — Repudiation — Duty to mitigate — Stare decisis — Interpretation — Are commercial landlords exempt from the duty to mitigate damages? — If the common law is able to grow and adapt to changing conditions, when and how should lower courts depart from Supreme Court of Canada decisions on common law? — Should courts apply the plain meaning of the words chosen by the parties in interpreting a contract, in the absence of any factual matrix evidence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ms. Korduner was a motor vehicle driver involved in a two-vehicle accident. A responding police officer questioned her at the scene for approximately three minutes, during which she stated that she should not have been driving because she was drunk. Ms. Korduner was arrested for impaired operation of a motor vehicle. She refused to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device and was charged for refusing to provide a breath sample. In voir dire proceedings to determine the admissibility of Ms. Korduner's statements, the trial judge held that Ms. Korduner's statements were compelled by the Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, and were inadmissible pursuant to the use immunity principle; reliance on s. 320.31(9) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as a basis for admitting the statements would breach Ms. Korduner's rights under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and Crown counsel failed to prove the breach was justified pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter. The charges were dismissed. The Court of King's Bench of Alberta dismissed a summary conviction appeal. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Alberta allowed an appeal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2026-02-17 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Principles of fundamental justice — Self-incrimination — Criminal law — Evidence — Use immunity — Remedies — Police officer responding to motor vehicle accident questioning driver involved in accident — Statements by driver causing officer to demand breath samples in order to administer approved roadside screening device — Trial judge declaring statements to officer compelled by Traffic Safety Act — Section 320.31(9) of Criminal Code setting out that a statement to a peace officer including statement compelled under provincial Act admissible in evidence for purpose of justifying demand to provide breath sample — Whether s. 320.31(9) infringes s. 7 of Charter — If so, whether limit reasonable and demonstrably justified pursuant to s. 1 of Charter — If not, appropriate remedy — Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, ss. 69(1), 71(1) — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 320.21(9). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents in these applications for leave to appeal, Mr. Walter and Mr. Gobeil, were recognized as representative plaintiffs for the class covered by a class action brought against the applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, that is, the Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as the Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League Inc., and the impleaded hockey teams that are members of the League. In the class action, the respondents submitted that the applicants/interveners were refusing to recognize major junior hockey players as having employee status, with the result that the players had no access to the protection provided by legislation governing working conditions. Two other similar class actions were authorized, one in Ontario against the Ontario Hockey League and one in Alberta against the Western Hockey League. In total, 4,286 major junior hockey players, including 1,702 in Quebec, are covered by the class actions. On March 31, 2020, the parties to the three class actions reached a settlement agreement. The agreement was submitted to the superior courts in each of the three provinces through a joint hearing. The superior courts rejected the agreement in October 2020 solely on the basis that the scope of the release provided for was overly broad. In June 2023, after the releases were renegotiated, all of the parties, including the respondents, signed an amendment to the initial settlement agreement in order to replace the release provisions. However, it appears that, shortly after the signing, the respondents disavowed their signature and announced that they would oppose the submission of the amended agreement for judicial approval. Despite the instructions given by the respondents, Mr. Savonitto, a member of one of the firms that are applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, nevertheless submitted the amended settlement agreement to the Superior Court judge for her approval. In response, the respondents filed notices with the Superior Court formally revoking the mandate of the law firms that are applicants/interveners in this case and announced that they were retaining the services of other lawyers. The applicant/intervener law firms opposed the notices of revocation and asked the Superior Court to determine the conditions for approving the amended settlement agreement. The Superior Court recorded the revocation of the mandate of the applicants/interveners as far as the respondents were concerned, but it confirmed that the applicants/interveners still continued to represent the members of the class covered by the class action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Superior Court's decision. Argued Date 2026-02-16 Keywords Civil procedure – Class action – Lawyer client relationship in context of class action –Lawyer's ethical obligations to client in context of class action – Protection for class members – Revocation of legal mandates given to firms by class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in ordering that agreement to settle authorized class action be submitted to court by applicants/defendants for approval, thereby placing their lawyers in conflict of interest and in situation that compromised their ethical obligations – Whether Court of Appeal erred in ruling that lawyer who acts for plaintiffs in class action: (i) has lawyer client relationship only with class representative; (ii) does not represent class members; and (iii) has no duty to act in best interests of class where those interests conflict with instructions of class representative – Whether Court of Appeal erred in breaching its own duty to protect interests of absent members, especially where those interests conflict with interests of class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that art. 2633 of Civil Code of Québec and art. 528 of Code of Civil Procedure concerning homologation of transaction under ordinary law apply to process for approval of transaction in class action, and thus in asking defendants to submit amended settlement agreement for approval if Mr. Gobeil and Mr. Walter refused to do so – Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, arts. 87, 528, 571, 575, 586, 589 and 590 – Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers, CQLR, c. B 1, r. 3.1, ss. 20, 23, 71, 72 and 120. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents in these applications for leave to appeal, Mr. Walter and Mr. Gobeil, were recognized as representative plaintiffs for the class covered by a class action brought against the applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, that is, the Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as the Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League Inc., and the impleaded hockey teams that are members of the League. In the class action, the respondents submitted that the applicants/interveners were refusing to recognize major junior hockey players as having employee status, with the result that the players had no access to the protection provided by legislation governing working conditions. Two other similar class actions were authorized, one in Ontario against the Ontario Hockey League and one in Alberta against the Western Hockey League. In total, 4,286 major junior hockey players, including 1,702 in Quebec, are covered by the class actions. On March 31, 2020, the parties to the three class actions reached a settlement agreement. The agreement was submitted to the superior courts in each of the three provinces through a joint hearing. The superior courts rejected the agreement in October 2020 solely on the basis that the scope of the release provided for was overly broad. In June 2023, after the releases were renegotiated, all of the parties, including the respondents, signed an amendment to the initial settlement agreement in order to replace the release provisions. However, it appears that, shortly after the signing, the respondents disavowed their signature and announced that they would oppose the submission of the amended agreement for judicial approval. Despite the instructions given by the respondents, Mr. Savonitto, a member of one of the firms that are applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, nevertheless submitted the amended settlement agreement to the Superior Court judge for her approval. In response, the respondents filed notices with the Superior Court formally revoking the mandate of the law firms that are applicants/interveners in this case and announced that they were retaining the services of other lawyers. The applicant/intervener law firms opposed the notices of revocation and asked the Superior Court to determine the conditions for approving the amended settlement agreement. The Superior Court recorded the revocation of the mandate of the applicants/interveners as far as the respondents were concerned, but it confirmed that the applicants/interveners still continued to represent the members of the class covered by the class action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Superior Court's decision. Argued Date 2026-02-16 Keywords Civil procedure – Class action – Lawyer client relationship in context of class action –Lawyer's ethical obligations to client in context of class action – Protection for class members – Revocation of legal mandates given to firms by class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in ordering that agreement to settle authorized class action be submitted to court by applicants/defendants for approval, thereby placing their lawyers in conflict of interest and in situation that compromised their ethical obligations – Whether Court of Appeal erred in ruling that lawyer who acts for plaintiffs in class action: (i) has lawyer client relationship only with class representative; (ii) does not represent class members; and (iii) has no duty to act in best interests of class where those interests conflict with instructions of class representative – Whether Court of Appeal erred in breaching its own duty to protect interests of absent members, especially where those interests conflict with interests of class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that art. 2633 of Civil Code of Québec and art. 528 of Code of Civil Procedure concerning homologation of transaction under ordinary law apply to process for approval of transaction in class action, and thus in asking defendants to submit amended settlement agreement for approval if Mr. Gobeil and Mr. Walter refused to do so – Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, arts. 87, 528, 571, 575, 586, 589 and 590 – Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers, CQLR, c. B 1, r. 3.1, ss. 20, 23, 71, 72 and 120. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Confidentiality order)Following the Canadian general election held on April 28, 2025, and the subsequent judicial recount, the respondent Tatiana Auguste became a member of Parliament for the electoral district of Terrebonne. Only one vote in her favour separated her from her closest rival, the appellant, Nathalie Sinclair-Desgagné. One voter then notified the media that her special ballot, mailed within the prescribed time, had been returned to her after the polling day, marked [translation] “Moved or unknown – return to sender”. In fact, there was an error in the postal code that the returning officer placed on the prepaid envelope sent to the voter in that the last three characters of the postal code were for somewhere other than the polling station. But that voter maintained that she voted for Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné.The Superior Court found that there was no irregularity within the meaning of s. 524(1)(b) of the Canada Elections Act. It therefore dismissed the application to contest the election filed by Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné. Argued Date 2026-02-13 Keywords Elections — Application to contest election — Irregularity — Allegations of irregularities that affected result of election made by candidate defeated by single vote in federal election — Whether trial judge erred in interpretation of notion of irregularity — Whether trial judge erred in determination of consequences of irregularity on integrity of electoral system — Whether trial judge erred in imposing burden much greater than that under Canada Elections Act on voter — Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 524(1)b), 531(2). Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Maxime Bergeron was expelled from a mock parliament organized by one of the respondents, the Assemblée parlementaire des étudiants du Québec inc. Some participants said that they were afraid of him because of his [TRANSLATION] “disruptive behaviour”. His father, Jean Bergeron, a lawyer, quickly became involved in the situation, seeking to have the expulsion decision revoked and to obtain reparation for the damage sustained by his son. The respondents filed a motion to have J. Bergeron declared disqualified.The Superior Court found that exceptional circumstances warranted declaring J. Bergeron disqualified. A reasonably informed member of the public knowing the facts of the case would be satisfied that he did not have the distance he was required to have. The Court of Appeal found that there was no reviewable error. Public confidence in the proper administration of justice could be compromised if M. Bergeron's father were authorized to continue representing him in the particular circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2026-02-12 Keywords Civil procedure — Motion to have lawyer declared disqualified — Whether principles applicable with regard to conflict of interest since MacDonald Estate apply by analogy in context of disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance — Criteria and factors to be weighed by trial judge considering application for disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance to balance lawyer's obligations as officer of court — Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, art. 193. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Sophia Hemmings was left with a severe brain injury after suffering cardiac arrest during a caesarean section at the respondent Scarborough Hospital (hereafter, the “Hospital”).The appellants, Sophia Hemmings, by her Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, Rosalie Brown personally, Samantha Camile Gayle and Moses Hemmings, minors by their Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, and Samantha Hemmings, commenced an action against a number of health care practitioners, alleging that their negligence had caused Sophia's injuries. The parties agreed on the amount of her damages. The action went to trial, solely on the issue of liability.At trial, Lloyd Gregory Padmore, Dr. Neil Thomas Jamensky, and the Hospital were found liable in negligence. The Court of Appeal allowed appeals brought by Dr. Padmore and the Hospital, and set the judgment as against them aside. The appeal brought by Dr. Jamensky was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-02-10 Keywords Torts – Professional liability – Negligence – Causation – Mother suffering severe brain injury following cardiac arrest during delivery of child by caesarian section – Application of law of causation by Canadian courts – How principles of causation to be applied in the context of women's healthcare in Canada – What is required to show factual causation and how Courts should engage with counterfactual analyses – What is required to show legal causation and demonstrate meaningful contemplation of applicable test Civil procedure –Trial – Judgments – Reasons for judgment – Appeals – What is the permissible nature and extent of appellate courts' power to review trial record when assessing sufficiency of reasons that are, on their face, deficient Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Gaétan Ouellet, was acquitted by Judge Garneau of the Court of Québec of a charge of sexual assault relating to three distinct incidents. On appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal, the prosecutor raised four grounds of appeal.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial judgment gave insufficient reasons. The majority were of the opinion that for that same reason, it was extremely difficult and speculative to assess the well foundedness of the two first grounds raised by the prosecutor, but they were nevertheless of the view that with respect to the second incident, the judge made a finding in the absence of evidence, which was an added reason for ordering a new trial. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, being of the opinion that the trial judge's reasons were not so insufficient so as to undermine the validity of the judgment and that the other grounds of appeal were unfounded. Argued Date 2025-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Appeal — Sufficiency of reasons — Evidence — Absence of evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Whether trial judge's reasons were so insufficient so as to undermine validity of his decision — Scope of error of law described in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, as “finding of fact for which there is no supporting evidence”. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Robert Joseph DeSutter, was charged with various sexual offences and one charge of assault, in relation to three different complainants, M.H., S.H. and J.R. The trial judge acquitted the respondent of all charges except the assault charge, finding insufficient evidence of a sexual purpose in the respondent's actions and the lack of an exploitative relationship. The appellant Crown appealed the acquittals in relation to two counts of sexual exploitation (counts 3 and 14), alleging that the trial judge erred in law by excluding from evidence images of women found on a USB stick and concluding that the respondent was not in an exploitative relationship with one of the complainants, J.R. The majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Crown had not met its burden of establishing an error of law on the part of the trial judge justifying appellate intervention. In contrast, Derrick J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on counts 3 and 14. She found that the trial judge erred in her analysis of the USB images' probative value and prejudicial effect. She also found that the trial judge failed to properly assess the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R., given the power imbalance and J.R.'s vulnerability. In her view, these errors could have materially affected the verdicts, warranting a new trial on the two counts of sexual exploitation. Argued Date 2025-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Assessment — Whether the trial judge erred in her analysis of the admissibility of the images on the USB — Whether the trial judge erred in her assessment of the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Bank of Nova Scotia (“taxpayer”), filed its return for the 2006 taxation year, reported taxable income, and paid such taxes as it calculated to be owing. The Minister of National Revenue (“Minister”) later audited the taxpayer's 2006 to 2010 taxation years. In March 2015, the taxpayer and the Minister entered into a settlement agreement which required additional amounts to be included in the taxpayer's 2006 income. The day before entering into the settlement agreement, the taxpayer wrote to the Minister to request to carryback a loss from its 2008 taxation year to apply it to offset the increase in its 2006 income. The Minister reassessed the taxpayer, implementing the audit adjustment and the requested loss carryback, and imposing interest resulting from the reassessment. The Minister applied a provision that requires that, for a specified period of time, interest is calculated by ignoring the loss carryback. The computing of interest that ignores the loss carryback ceases to apply 30 days after the latest of four end dates listed in s. 161(7)(b)(i)-(iv) of the Income Tax Act. The Minister computed interest by applying s. 161(7)(b)(iv) to ignore the loss carryback until the date the taxpayer requested it. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax Court of Canada, taking the position that s. 161(7)(b)(iv) did not apply because the Minister's reassessment of its tax for 2006 was not “as a consequence” of its request to carryback losses from 2008 to offset its 2006 tax liability. The Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayer's appeal. Argued Date 2026-01-21 Keywords Taxation — Income tax — Computation of interest payable — Minister's reassessment taking into account audit adjustment and carryback requested by taxpayer to offset a loss — Minister applying s. 161(1)(b)(iv) of Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) to compute taxpayer interest up until day taxpayer requested loss carryback — Taxpayer appealing applicability of provision Minister relied on — Courts dismissing taxpayer's appeal — Whether the event set out in s. 161(7)(b)(iv) occurred when the Minister reassessed taxpayer's previous taxation year at a later date — What is the proper construction of s. 161(7)(b)(iv) and the words “where, as a consequence of a request in writing, the Minister reassessed the taxpayer's tax for [a previous year] to take into account the deduction” of a loss? — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 161(7)(b)(iv). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver's licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge's findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-20 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver's licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge's findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-19 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner's decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General's motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch's application for judicial review was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-01-15 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner's decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General's motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch's application for judicial review was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-01-14 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Two fictitious advertisements were published by the police on Internet sites offering escort services; the text of the advertisements highlighted the youthfulness of the people. Mr. Denis communicated with someone who turned out to be a police officer acting in an undercover capacity. She stated that she mentioned the young girl's age at least four times but that Mr. Denis did not react to that information. He was arrested by the police when he entered the room where the “escort” was.Following the trial, Mr. Denis was convicted of the offence under s. 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code (communication for the purpose of obtaining sexual services for consideration from a person under the age of 18 years). He brought a motion to have the mandatory minimum sentence declared invalid and of no force or effect. The trial judge, considering the six month minimum sentence to be appropriate, did not conduct the Charter analysis. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part to rule on the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentence and declare it invalid and of no force or effect, in accordance with s. 52(1) of the Charter. Argued Date 2026-01-13 Keywords Criminal law — Abuse of process — Entrapment — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — Mandatory minimum sentence — Commodification of sexual activity as regards person under age of 18 years — Whether s. 286.1(2)(a) of Criminal Code breaches s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 286.1 — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12, 24(1) and 52(1). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Indigenous respondent pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault of his Indigenous common law partner. He had a significant criminal record and a history of serious mental illness. The sentencing judge concluded the respondent's incarceration was required to protect the public. The respondent was sentenced to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eight months' incarceration for breaches of release orders. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to three years' imprisonment for aggravated assault. The dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-12 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations — Aboriginal offender and Aboriginal female victim — Sentencing of Aboriginal offender for aggravated assault — Offence against vulnerable person — What does the deferential standard of review mean in terms of weighing sentencing factors and making factual findings? — How should courts approach sentencing when ss. 718.04, 718.201, and 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code apply? Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Indigenous respondent pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault of his Indigenous common law partner. He had a significant criminal record and a history of serious mental illness. The sentencing judge concluded the respondent's incarceration was required to protect the public. The respondent was sentenced to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eight months' incarceration for breaches of release orders. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to three years' imprisonment for aggravated assault. The dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-11 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations — Aboriginal offender and Aboriginal female victim — Sentencing of Aboriginal offender for aggravated assault — Offence against vulnerable person — What does the deferential standard of review mean in terms of weighing sentencing factors and making factual findings? — How should courts approach sentencing when ss. 718.04, 718.201, and 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code apply? Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation entered into a contract with Mellon Trust Financial pursuant to which it provided market pricing data for various types of securities. Mellon Trust Financial merged with Bank of New York to form Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation succeeded to the rights and duties under the contract. Mellon Trust Financial and Bank of New York Mellon Corporation breached the contract by redistributing market pricing data to affiliates. Upon learning of the breach of contract, SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation's counsel demanded an accounting and that Bank of New York Mellon Corporation preserve all related communications, documents, and files. Records including records created after the preservation demand were destroyed. SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation commenced an action against Bank of New York Mellon Corporation seeking damages for breach of contract. Based on spoliation, SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation in part asked the trial judge to draw an adverse inference that its data had been shared with 65 affiliates and it has lost the opportunity to enter into 65 additional agreements on substantially the same terms as the contract. The trial judge found Bank of New York Mellon Corporation liable for breach of contract. The trial judge did not accept SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation's proposed adverse inference but did draw an adverse inference that all data usage was by Bank of New York Mellon Corporation's affiliates. He awarded damages of CAD $922,887 and USD $5,696,850. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the finding of liability and allowed a cross-appeal on liability. It allowed an appeal from the damages award in part and set aside the award of CDN $922,887. Argued Date 2025-12-10 Keywords Civil procedure — Evidence — Spoliation — What is the appropriate remedy for spoliation — What should the appropriate remedy have been in this case? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Gitanyow Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title over certain lands in British Columbia, and has advanced claims against the federal and provincial Crown. Another Aboriginal group with a modern treaty covering an overlapping geographic area, the appellant, the Nisga'a Nation, sought to be added as a defendant in the Gitanyow action. A case management judge at the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the Nisga'a Nation's application to be added as a defendant. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Nisga'a Nation's appeal from the first decision. Argued Date 2025-12-09 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal title — Aboriginal rights — Treaty rights — Aboriginal group advancing rights and title claims against Crown — Second group seeking to join action as defendant, given its modern treaty governing rights in overlapping territory — Case management judge declining to add second group as defendant in first group's action — Court of Appeal upholding case management judge's order — What is potential effect of declaration of Aboriginal title in favour of Indigenous claimant in respect of lands over which different Indigenous nation has existing section 35 rights under modern treaty, including modified Aboriginal title? — Did courts below incorrectly interpret Nisga'a Treaty by ruling that Treaty Party Provisions were not engaged in action and would not become operative until only after Plaintiffs established Aboriginal title within Claimed Lands? — Did courts below err in concluding that, while tests for joinder under Rule 6-2(7) of Supreme Court Civil Rules are met in respect of competing assertion of Aboriginal title, same tests are not met in respect of competing Aboriginal title and other rights that are recognized under modern treaty? — Nisg_a'a Final Agreement Act, S.C., 2000, c. 7, ss. 3, 4, 5, 20 — Nisg_a'a Final Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, ss. 2, 3, 5, 8 — Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 6-2(7). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Gitanyow Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title over certain lands in British Columbia, and has advanced claims against the federal and provincial Crown. Another Aboriginal group with a modern treaty covering an overlapping geographic area, the appellant, the Nisga'a Nation, sought to be added as a defendant in the Gitanyow action. A case management judge at the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the Nisga'a Nation's application to be added as a defendant. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Nisga'a Nation's appeal from the first decision. Argued Date 2025-12-08 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal title — Aboriginal rights — Treaty rights — Aboriginal group advancing rights and title claims against Crown — Second group seeking to join action as defendant, given its modern treaty governing rights in overlapping territory — Case management judge declining to add second group as defendant in first group's action — Court of Appeal upholding case management judge's order — What is potential effect of declaration of Aboriginal title in favour of Indigenous claimant in respect of lands over which different Indigenous nation has existing section 35 rights under modern treaty, including modified Aboriginal title? — Did courts below incorrectly interpret Nisga'a Treaty by ruling that Treaty Party Provisions were not engaged in action and would not become operative until only after Plaintiffs established Aboriginal title within Claimed Lands? — Did courts below err in concluding that, while tests for joinder under Rule 6-2(7) of Supreme Court Civil Rules are met in respect of competing assertion of Aboriginal title, same tests are not met in respect of competing Aboriginal title and other rights that are recognized under modern treaty? — Nisg_a'a Final Agreement Act, S.C., 2000, c. 7, ss. 3, 4, 5, 20 — Nisg_a'a Final Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, ss. 2, 3, 5, 8 — Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 6-2(7). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents, Robert Vrbanic and Sarah Josipovic, were jointly charged with possession of significant quantities of four different drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime. They sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. The appellant Crown did not dispute that the delay in this case was over the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, for a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, but argued that this delay was justified by the complexity of the case. The application judge concluded that the delay was not justified as an exceptional circumstance on the basis of the complexity of the case, and ordered a stay of proceedings. The Crown appealed the application judge's order. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It found that the application judge's assessment of the complexity of the case was free of legal error and entitled to deference. Roberts J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings on the basis that the application judge's miscalculation of the net delay and misapplication of the governing principles respecting exceptional circumstances materially affected his ultimate decision as to whether the delay was unreasonable. Argued Date 2025-12-04 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Exceptional circumstances — Complexity of case — Remedy — Stay of proceedings — Whether the application judge misapplied the governing principles on s. 11(b) Charter litigation by miscalculating the net delay and failing to properly assess complexity — Whether the determination of complexity, for the purposes of an exceptional circumstance under the s. 11(b) framework, ought to be evaluated within the context of the case as a whole — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b). Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant was acquitted at trial of transmitting sexually explicit material to a person under the age of 16 for the purpose of facilitating the commission of either a sexual assault or the indecent act of exposing his genital organs to a person under 16 years of age for a sexual purpose. The trial judge accepted that the appellant sent sexually explicit material to a minor, but he was left with a reasonable doubt on two elements : the identity of the appellant in a sexually explicit video and the specific intent to transmit the material for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an enumerated offence. The trial judge concluded that the transmission of the material could have been “flirtation” and was left with a doubt as to whether the appellant personally intended to commit one of the enumerated offences.The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in acquitting the appellant. The Crown was not required to prove the identity of the appellant in the transmitted video, nor was it required to prove that the appellant personally intended to commit one of the enumerated offences. The conduct referred to by the trial judge as “flirtation” is a tool used to facilitate the commission of sexual offences against children. In its view, but for the trial judge's errors, the appellant would have been convicted. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction. Argued Date 2025-11-14 Keywords Criminal Law —Transmit sexually explicit material to a person under age of 16 for purpose of facilitating commission of sexual assault or indecent act — Elements of offence — Powers of Court of Appeal — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded jurisdiction by allowing appeal and quashing acquittal under Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 171.1(1)(b), because alleged errors were errors of fact — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded jurisdiction by substituting conviction for acquittal under s. 171.1(1)(b) based on its own findings of fact. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, SGS Canada Inc. (SGS), is a subsidiary of a foreign company that offers inspection, analysis, certification and quality control services with respect to Canadian grain destined for interprovincial trade and international export. On November 22, 2019, the intervener Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs des industries manufacturières – CSN filed a petition for certification with the Administrative Labour Tribunal (ALT) under the Labour Code, CQLR, c. C 27. The union wanted to represent inspectors and grain graders employed by SGS in Quebec, who work mainly at grain elevators located in Quebec ports along the St. Lawrence River. In December 2019, SGS notified the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, that it intended to challenge the ALT's jurisdiction. It argued that the certification of the employees in question did not fall under provincial jurisdiction, but rather under direct federal jurisdiction with respect to the regulation of labour relations because the employment relates to a work, undertaking or business within the legislative authority of Parliament within the meaning of the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada and therefore that it was up to the Canada Industrial Relations Board to dispose of the petition for certification in accordance with the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L 2. In July 2020, SGS gave its agreement on the composition of the proposed bargaining unit, whose representative character was also established. On February 26, 2021, the ALT refused the petition for certification under the Labour Code. The ALT found that the unit contemplated in the union's petition for certification was subject to derivative federal legislative jurisdiction and that consequently the petition was refused. The Superior Court dismissed the application for judicial review, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-02 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Labour relations — Direct and derivative federal jurisdiction — Works declared “for the general advantage of Canada” — Company operating “elevators” within meaning of Canada Grain Act — Whether SGS's labour relations fall directly under federal jurisdiction over works declared for the general advantage of Canada pursuant to s. 92(10)(c) of Constitution Act, 1867 by reason of its inspection activities — Whether SGS's labour relations fall derivatively under federal jurisdiction over works declared for the general advantage of Canada pursuant to s. 92(10)(c) of Constitution Act, 1867 by reason of its inspection activities — Canada Grain Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. G 10, s. 55 — Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91(29) and 92(10)(c). Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was accused of beating a person to death with an axe. Prior to his death, the deceased socialized with the respondent and a number of other persons. At some point, many people left to another venue but the respondent and the deceased remained. The deceased made a phone call to a third party in which he referred to having to fight someone. That person testified to the time of the phone call and the words used by the deceased; she also testified to hearing sounds consistent with the deceased having been beaten to death.The respondent was convicted of second-degree murder following a trial by judge alone. The trial judge referred to the statement of the deceased by phone in her decision. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge improperly used the statement for a hearsay purpose rather than only the fact that the statement was made. The majority allowed the appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial. Crighton J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the trial judge did not err in her treatment of the statement of the deceased. Argued Date 2025-11-12 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Hearsay — Statement of deceased shortly before death — Use of statement of the deceased by trial judge — Whether statement by deceased was used for a hearsay purpose — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in holding that trial judge improperly admitted statement for truth of its content —Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in setting aside conviction for murder Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Jacques-Taylor and a co-accused were jointly charged with firearms offences. On July 6, 2022, each co-accused's defence counsel, Crown counsel, and a trial coordinator appeared in court to set a trial date. Mr. Jacques-Taylor's counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022 or for any date in August but was not available in September. Crown counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022. Counsel for Mr. Jacques-Taylor's co-accused was not available for any date in August. Counsel agreed on trial dates from October 2 to 4, 2022. Time from laying of charges to the anticipated start of trial was 22 months and 2 weeks. Mr. Jacques-Taylor filed a motion to stay the proceedings against him for unreasonable delay in breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time guaranteed by s. 11 (b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The motions judge, after attributing delay, calculated net delay to be 2 weeks over the 18-month presumptive ceiling. The motions judge declined to attribute 25 days of the delay following the appearance to schedule trial dates that were caused only by the unavailability of counsel for the co-accused as defence delay. Had those 25 days been attributed to the defence, the net delay would have been below the presumptive ceiling. The motions judge granted a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-07 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Co-accused being tried jointly — Delay for accused, including period of delay caused only by unavailability of co-accused's counsel for available court dates, exceeding presumptive Jordan ceiling — Where it is in the interests of justice to pursue a joint prosecution, how is the Jordan framework to be applied as to each accused — What is the scope and proper application of the contextual approach to delay set out in R. v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On the advice of the Prime Minister of Canada, the Privy Council Office recommended that the Governor General issue an Order in Council appointing a Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick who was not bilingual. At trial, that appointment was found inconsistent with the bilingualism requirements in ss. 16(2), 16.1(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal set aside that decision on the basis that the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor who was not bilingual did not infringe ss. 16(2), 16.1(1), 18(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. Argued Date 2025-11-13 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Language rights — Role of Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Language requirement for Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Whether Order in Council 2019 1325 dated September 4, 2019, infringes ss. 16(2), 16.1, 18(2) and 20(2) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, if so, what would be appropriate remedy. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario's Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada's appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-06 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament's power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution's own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario's Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada's appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-05 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament's power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution's own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents are owners of lots that border three lakes in Ville d'Estérel. Following the renewal of the cadastre of Ville d'Estérel in 2016, the respondents discovered that they were not owners of a submerged strip of land that goes around each of the lakes and is situated in front of their respective lots. The appellant claimed to own that strip of land, immatriculated separately in the cadastre as several lots, whereas the respondents stated that they own it. Through an application for a declaratory judgment, the respondents sought a declaration confirming that they are respectively owners of the submerged lots adjacent to the lands they own. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed their application, finding that the submerged lots are the property of the appellant. The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the respondents' appeal in part. It found that the submerged strip of land is accessory to the riparian lots pursuant to the doctrine of accessory. Argued Date 2025-11-10 Keywords Property — Immovables — Submerged lots — Extent of right of ownership near watercourses and lakes — Doctrine of accessory — Whether doctrine of accessory is applicable to lots submerged as result of construction of dam — If so, whether doctrine should apply only in residual manner, if doubt persists as to common intention of parties — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interfering, without identifying palpable and overriding error, with findings at trial concerning interpretion of words [TRANSLATION] “bounded by the lake” and common intention of parties. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)Canadian Patent No. 2,655,335 (“'335 Patent”), which was issued to Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. for INVEGA SUSTENNA, involves a suspension of paliperidone palmitate for the treatment of schizophrenia and related disorders. The '335 Patent teaches a dosing regimen to achieve an optimum plasma concentration-time profile. Its claims have been construed in previous litigation and are not in issue: Janssen Inc. v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2020 FC 593,; Janssen Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc., 2022 FC 62, aff'd 2024 FCA 10 (“PMS Paliperidone”)). Its disclosure indicated that “[t]hose of ordinary skill in the art will understand that the maintenance dose may be [adjusted] up or down in view of patients condition (response to the medication and renal function)”.Pharmascience Inc. has served two Notices of Allegation in respect of pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE, its proposed generic version of INVEGA SUSTENNA. In 2020, Janssen's infringement action related to Pharmascience's Abbreviated New Drug Submission No. 236094 was discontinued on consent. Shortly thereafter, Pharmascience served a Notice of Allegation and Detailed Statement in respect of a different Abbreviated New Drug Submission — No. 244641 — seeking approval to market and sell doses of pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE. Janssen again commenced an infringement action under s. 6(1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133. In that proceeding, Pharmascience moved for summary trial. It was found that if Pharmascience's pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE was made, constructed, used or sold as set out in the Abbreviated New Drug Submission, it would influence prescribers to prescribe the dosing regimen claimed in the '335 Patent, leading to direct infringement: PMS Paliperidone. The defence of invalidity went forward, with Janssen seeking a declaration that Pharmascience would infringe the '335 Patent if it were to make, use or sell pms-PALIPERIDONE PALMITATE in 50, 75, 100 and 150 mg doses.The Federal Court found that the Patent was not invalid based on obviousness or for lack of patentable subject matter. The claims provided specified dosing regimens meant to produce a concentration of the medication within the therapeutic range. If a physician chose to use a dose other than that claimed, to stop treatment or to change therapies, they would no longer be practicing the claimed invention. The Court of Appeal dismissed Pharmascience's appeal, finding that the use of the invention did not require the exercise of skill and judgment. Argued Date 2025-10-09 Keywords Intellectual property — Patents — Validity — Lack of patentable subject matter — Method of medical treatment — Vendible product — Skill and judgment — Fixed or variable dosing regimen — Canadian Patent No. 2,655,335 teaches dosing regimen that includes first loading dose, second loading dose and monthly maintenance doses — Regimen incorporates dosing windows of +/- 2 days for the second loading dose and +/- 7 days for the maintenance doses — Whether patent is invalid in that it claims an unpatentable method of medical treatment. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant's spouse went missing in 2008. In 2017, the appellant obtained a declaratory judgment of her spouse's death pursuant to art. 92 of the Civil Code of Québec in a proceeding contested by the spouse's life insurance company. After the spouse was declared deceased, the life insurance company applied to annul the declaration of death on the basis that there was evidence he was alive in another country as late as 2018. The application was not served on the party declared to have died.The Superior Court of Quebec judge granted the life insurance company's application and annulled the declaration of death. She concluded that there was no prejudice flowing from the fact that the application was not served on the declared decedent. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal only with respect to application judge's costs award but otherwise affirmed the Superior Court judge's decision. Argued Date 2025-10-10 Keywords Status of persons — Absence — Return — Declaratory judgment of death — Life insurance company seeking to annul declaratory judgment of death — What proof of return is required to annul a declaratory judgment of death — Whether an application by a third party to annul a declaratory judgment of death must be served on the person declared to be deceased — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 92, 97, 98. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During the course of an investigation under the Traffic Safety Act, a police officer attempted to effect a warrantless arrest of the applicant for obstruction under s. 129(a) of the Criminal Code. In a pre-trial application, the trial judge found that the police officer was not executing a lawful arrest, and therefore breached the applicant's s. 9 Charter right not to be arbitrarily detained by attempting the arrest. The trial judge acquitted the applicant of assault causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-10-17 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Can a police officer arrest an individual for obstruction under the Criminal Code, during the course of a regulatory (or municipal) investigation where the regulatory (or municipal) statute provides for a lesser enforcement remedy — Does the discretion referenced in Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46 allow police officers to engage the more serious Criminal Code provisions during the course of an investigation for less serious regulatory or municipal offences? Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

A police investigation into the production of marijuana led to criminal proceedings against 11 individuals. A stay of proceedings was entered for the respondents in light of unreasonable delays. The Court of Québec dismissed the motion to dismiss the motion for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) of the Cr. C. and s. 16(2) of the CDSA. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the motion for prohibition and certiorari in aid. The Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the Superior Court judge's decision and stated that the Court of Québec did not have the jurisdiction required to deal with motions for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) of the Cr. C. and s. 16(2) of the CDSA. Argued Date 2025-10-16 Keywords Criminal law — Proceeds of crime — Offence related property — Restraint order — Jurisdiction of provincial court — Appropriate procedural vehicles — Whether property included in application for forfeiture pursuant to s. 462.37(2) of Criminal Code and s. 16(2) of Controlled Drugs and Substances Act must be related to offence for which there was conviction — Whether stay of proceedings prevents prosecutor from proving facts forming basis for charges in context of motion for forfeiture of offence related property or of proceeds of crime — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 462.37(2) — Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 16(2). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Anglin was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta from 2012 until 2015, when he was unsuccessful in his re-election bid. He accepts the result of the election, but alleges that the Chief Electoral Officer interfered with the fairness of the election and, by doing so, injured his chances of being elected. He seeks damages for the alleged loss of the chance to be elected. During the election, the Chief Electoral Officer, Mr. Resler, investigated problems with Mr. Anglin's election signs and his handling of the list of electors. After the election, the Chief Electoral Officer assessed two administrative penalties against Mr. Anglin, who appealed both penalties. One penalty was overturned due to the Chief Electoral Officer's failure to provide Mr. Anglin with the investigation report, but the basis for assessing the fine was not found to be problematic. Mr. Anglin then commenced this action against the Chief Electoral Officer and others alleging that the Chief Electoral Officer should not have commenced the investigations and that he should have known that his actions would injure Mr. Anglin. The Chief Electoral Officer denied the factual allegations and invoked ss. 5.1 of the Election Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-1, which provides a general immunity when the Chief Electoral Officer acts in good faith, and s. 134(5), which authorizes the Chief Electoral Officer to remove non-compliant signs. Later, he applied to strike the claim for failure to disclose a cause of action or for abuse of process, with an alternative request for summary judgment due to lack of merit.Finding that the claim was a collateral attack on the validity of the election, the chambers judge struck the entire statement of claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action or as an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstated the claim other than the allegations of malicious prosecution, and remitted the Chief Electoral Officer's claim for summary judgment application to trial court. Argued Date 2025-10-14 Keywords Elections — Jurisdiction — Chief Electoral Officer — Chief Electoral Officer required candidate to remedy inappropriate elements of signs — Candidate losing election — Candidate sued Chief Electoral Officer for damages for loss of chance to win election — Candidate did not challenge result of election — Chief Electoral Officer moved to strike claim for failure to disclose a cause of action, abuse of process or lack of merit — Whether an unsuccessful candidate for election can bring a private action against an election officer for the loss of chance of being elected. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

11368 NL Inc. was the owner of commercial real estate known as Kenmount Terrace. Patrick Street Holdings Limited is part of a group of related companies that, through loans secured by mortgages, financed development projects undertaken by a group of related companies including 11368 NL Inc. In early 2016, two mortgages known as Mortgage 608132 and Mortgage 708519 went into default and notices of power of sale were issued under the Conveyancing Act, RSNL 1990, c. C-34. These power of sale proceedings halted when 11368 NL Inc., as the mortgagee, gave a third mortgage known as Mortgage 759678. Mortgage 759678 is a collateral mortgage registered against Kenmount Terrace to a limit of $4,000,000 in support of 11368 NL Inc.'s guarantee of Mortgage 608132. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. reactivated power of sale proceedings under Mortgage 708519 and obtained Kenmount Terrace at public auction. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. provided an accounting of the proceeds of the power of sale to all encumbrancers of Kenmount Terrace stating that specific charges including Mortgage 759678 took priority and exhausted the power of sale proceeds such that not all encumbrancers could be paid. Two unpaid encumbrancers commenced an application challenging the accounting. 11368 NL Inc. filed an interlocutory application claiming entitlement to any surplus funds from the power of sale plus interest, but also advancing a claim of priority for another encumbrancer, Ms. Cheeke. On October 3, 2017, Handrigan J. determined the two encumbrancers' application but not 11368's interlocutory application. Handrigan J. held there was a surplus on the power of sale of approximately $4.2 million. He accepted most of Patrick Street Holdings Ltd.'s accounting but did not include its claim to $4,000,000 under Mortgage 759678 in his accounting. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed, The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. paid the two applicant encumbrancers' claims and withheld the balance of the surplus of the power of sale proceeds. On July 16, 2022, Handrigan J. determined the interlocutory application filed by 11368 NL Inc. Handrigan J. held Ms. Cheeke's encumbrance took priority and was due from the remaining surplus. He held that his conclusion on October 3, 2017, that Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. had not established what was owing under Mortgage 759678 had been accepted on appeal and nothing had been shown to cause him to change his mind on this issue. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. was ordered to pay the surplus remaining after payment to Ms. Cheeke to 11368 NL Inc. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-10-15 Keywords Civil procedure — Res judicata — Estoppel — Abuse of process by re-litigation — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in finding res judicata may be raised for first time on appeal — If so, whether requirements of res judicata satisfied — Whether doctrine of abuse of process by re-litigation applied beyond permissible limits — Whether abuse of process for purchaser to rely on collateral mortgage — Amount due and payable under a mortgage at the time of power of sale proceedings. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective's record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee's counsel that records relating to the detective's past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective's credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King's Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted. Argued Date 2025-10-08 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective's record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective's past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused's prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown's office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective's record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee's counsel that records relating to the detective's past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective's credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King's Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted. Argued Date 2025-10-07 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective's record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective's past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused's prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown's office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

B.F., a surgical nurse, has a child, E. B.F. and E.'s father are separated and, in 2019, were engaged in litigation about parenting rights. An interim ruling in that case in early June 2019 granted E.'s father supervised access, which B.F. resisted. At this time, B.F. was residing with her mother, I.F.On June 12, 2019, after the interim ruling, a neighbour found B.F., I.F., and E., then 19 months old, in B.F.'s home. All three were unconscious in B.F.'s bedroom; E. was in her crib. First responders found five empty insulin pens at the scene, each of which originally contained many times the normal adult dose. There were nine visible injection marks on E.'s body and evidence that E. had resisted the injections; no injection marks were visible on B.F. or I.F. The first responders also located a handwritten letter at the scene that they characterized as a suicide note. Due to the quantity of insulin injected into her system, E. suffered serious and permanent brain damage, as well as permanent damage to other organs. She was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and spasticity, and suffers from seizures. She requires constant medical care. B.F. and I.F. have since fully recovered. B.F. was arrested and charged with two counts of attempted murder by administering a noxious substance (a potentially lethal amount of insulin by injection), and two counts of aggravated assault.The jury convicted B.F. of the attempted murder of E. and I.F., and of the aggravated assault of E. The jury acquitted B.F. of the aggravated assault of I.F.B.F. appealed her conviction and sentence. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of E. was dismissed. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of I.F. was allowed and a new trial ordered. Argued Date 2025-05-22 Keywords Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Charge to jury — Party liability — Attempted murder and aiding suicide — Suicide pact defence — Whether victim of a crime may also be a principal of an offence — Whether accused may be liable as a party to an offence without a principal offender being found guilty — Whether trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the scenario presented by counsel for B.F. — Whether jury instructions were misleading to the point of error — Whether jury instructions raise a reasonable apprehension of biais — Whether suicide pact defence available — Whether Court of Appeal erred in approach to causation — Whether Court of Appeal incorrectly required additional elements that must be satisfied for an act that may assist suicide to also constitute murder Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was arrested without warrant by the police 11 days after the date of an alleged crime. At his trial, he brought a motion in which he claimed that his arrest and his detention following his arrest were unlawful pursuant to s. 495(2)(b), (d) and (e) of the Criminal Code and s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He argued that the power to arrest and detain without warrant for a hybrid offence is lawful only if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed or is about to be committed and that such measures are necessary in the public interest.The trial judge summarily dismissed the motion on the ground that it had no chance of success. The police officers could, pursuant to s. 495(3) of the Criminal Code, proceed solely on reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed. There was nothing unlawful about his arrest. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred in refusing to hold a voir dire on the motion, because the motion was not bound to fail. The right to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is guaranteed by the terms of s. 495(3) in accordance with a viable interpretation of the limitations imposed on the power of arrest without warrant set out in s. 495(2). The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-21 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Police — Powers — Arrest without warrant — Whether s. 495(2) of Criminal Code modifies peace officer's power to arrest person without warrant — Whether s. 495(3) of Criminal Code excuses non compliance with s. 495(2) — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that trial judge had erred in summarily dismissing motion in which unlawfulness of arrest by reason of non compliance with s. 495(2) was alleged — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 495. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On December 6, 2021, S.A. was charged with assault and sexual assault. He elected to be tried by judge and jury. A trial date of April 17, 2023 was set but, on April 17, 2023, the trial could not commence because no judge was available. A trial date was set for February 12, 2024. Forestell J. held that delay of 6 to 10 months was unreasonable and breached s. 11(b) of the Charter. Notwithstanding that net delay was below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months set in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, she stayed the proceedings. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2025-05-16 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to tried in reasonable time — How should delay caused by judicial vacancy be treated under s. 11(b) of the Charter? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2019, Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah both applied for transfer to a minimum security institution. At the time, Mr. Dorsey, a dangerous offender, was incarcerated at a medium security facility; Mr. Salah was sentenced to concurrent life sentences and is incarcerated at a different medium security facility. Mr. Dorsey's case management team, his Manager of Assessment and Intervention, and his Warden all agreed that he met the criteria for reclassification to minimum security but, because of his dangerous offender status, his transfer request had to be approved by the Regional Deputy Commissioner and then the Assistant Commissioner of Correctional Operations and Programs. In September 2019, the Regional Deputy Commissioner assessed Mr. Dorsey's public safety rating as moderate. His request was denied.Mr. Salah's case management team, his parole officer, and his Manager of Assessment and Intervention recommended reclassification and transfer to a minimum security facility, but, in October 2019, a new Manager of Assessment and Intervention and Intervention was assigned to his file. He assessed Mr. Salah as a moderate escape risk, so the Warden wrongly denied his transfer request.Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah each applied under the Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-1, for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid. Although they did not apply under the Charter, they alleged that the denial of their transfer requests engaged ss. 7, 9, 10(c) and 12 of the Charter. On consent, the applications were joined for the purpose of determining a common threshold legal issue: whether Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah could resort to habeas corpus to challenge the denials of their applications for transfer to lower security prisons.The applications were dismissed on the grounds that habeas corpus was not available for denials of reclassification, which were not deprivations of residual liberty. After the application judge's decision, Mr. Dorsey was reclassified and transferred to a minimum security institution, but he continued his appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-05-13 Keywords Prerogative writs — Habeas corpus — Prisons — Deprivation of residual liberty — Security classification — Transfer — Denial of reclassification — Denial of transfer to lower security institution — Whether denial of reclassification and transfer to lower security institution is deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent is a criminal defence lawyer whose client was the subject of a wiretap authorization under the Criminal Code. The authorization did not permit live monitoring of phone calls with a lawyer; such calls could be recorded, but a judge's order was required to access them. During the surveillance operation, the respondent called her client, which was automatically recorded. A civilian employee also listened to a portion of the call before disconnecting.A reviewing judge concluded that an initial portion of the telephone call was not subject to solicitor-client privilege and it was released to the Crown. The recording revealed the respondent informed her client that a third party had been arrested and that the police would likely be obtaining search warrants for places where the third party had been. The respondent was charged with wilfully attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by interfering in an ongoing police investigation, contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the respondent's rights under s. 8 of the Charter were not breached with respect to the civilian employee listening to her phone conversation. However, she also concluded that her rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter had been breached due to her inability to access the second, privileged portion of the recording. She ordered the entire recording excluded under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Crown called no evidence and the respondent was acquitted.A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the acquittal and the trial judge's decision with respect to the breaches of the respondent's rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. However, it also concluded that her rights under s. 8 had been breached, and it therefore would have excluded the evidence of the telephone call under s. 24(2) of the Charter rather than s. 24(1). The dissenting judge would have held that the respondent's ss. 7 and 11(d) rights were not breached. He agreed with the majority that there was a breach of her s. 8 rights, but he would have held that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2). He would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-20 Keywords Criminal Law — Charter of rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Full answer and defence (ss. 7 and 11(d) — Solicitor-client privilege — Wire-tap authorization — Interaction between solicitor-client privilege and an accused's lawyer's Charter rights — Wire-tap monitoring and recording of phone call between defence counsel and client — Whether the respondent's right to make full answer and defence was breached by not having access to the full recording of a phone call protected by solicitor-client privilege — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-15 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-14 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Rousselle was arrested for impaired driving and administered a breathalyser test. Based on the results of the test, he was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours of ceasing to operate a motor vehicle. At trial, a Certificate of Qualified Technician from the officer who administered the breathalyzer test was admitted into evidence but the trial judge refused to admit two certificates of analysts who had certified the target value of the alcohol standard used by the qualified technician to conduct a required system calibration check of the breathalyzer device. The trial judge held the Certificate of Qualified Technician was not evidence of the target value of an alcohol standard and proof of the target value of an alcohol standard was a pre-condition to the Crown relying on the presumption in s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code that breathalyzer test results are conclusive proof of blood alcohol concentration. The trial judge acquitted Mr. Rousselle. A summary conviction appeal was allowed, the acquittal was set aside and a conviction was entered. The Court of appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-04-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Breathalyser test results — Target value of alcohol standard — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interpretation of s. 320.31(1)(a) of Criminal Code as permitting Crown to prove alcohol standard was certified by an analyst through hearsay evidence of qualified technician? Notes (New Brunswick) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The complainant was at that time, a grade 7 student at an all-male boarding school in Alberta. The respondent was a teacher at the school. After a trial by judge and jury, the respondent was found guilty of sexual interference (count 1), invitation to sexual touching (count 2), and sexual assault (count 3) of a person under the age of 14 years. The offences occurred in 1993 and 1994. In view of the multiple incidents in this case, the sentencing judge was satisfied that it was appropriate to sentence the respondent on counts 1 and 2. Convictions were entered on counts 1 and 2. The charge of sexual assault was stayed in accordance with Kienapple. The respondent was sentenced to a six year prison term with the counts to be served concurrently. A majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal (Wakeling and Feehan JJ.A.) allowed the respondent's sentence appeal reducing the sentence to 47 months. Crighton J.A., dissented and would have upheld the six year sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. Argued Date 2025-04-23 Keywords Criminal law – Sentencing – Did the Alberta Court of Appeal err in law in finding the sentencing judge's reasons for sentence to be insufficient? Do the principles articulated in R. v. Friesen apply to historic offences? Did the Alberta Court of Appeal err in interfering with the sentence imposed at trial? Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a trial by judge alone, the appellant, Buddy Ray Underwood, was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, unlawful confinement and murder. The trial judge acquitted the appellant of first degree murder but entered a conviction for the included offence of second degree murder instead. The respondent Crown appealed the acquittal and the appellant cross-appealed the conviction. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown's appeal, quashed the acquittal on first degree murder and substituted a conviction for first degree murder under ss. 231(2) and (5) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. First, the court agreed with the Crown that the trial judge erred in law in his analysis of constructive first degree murder by narrowing the causation analysis to focus exclusively on the direct medical cause of death. Second, the court concluded that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending the time frame for assessing planning as well as the meaning of “planned” more generally. The appellant's cross-appeal, not at issue, was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-04-17 Keywords Criminal law – Appeals – Murder – First degree murder – Elements of offence – Constructive first degree murder – Planning and deliberation – Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in convicting the appellant of first degree murder by concluding that his actions satisfied the elements of s. 231(2) and (5)(e) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2020 the Chief Medical Officer of Health for Newfoundland and Labrador issued certain orders under the province's Public Health Protection and Promotion Act, in an effort to curtail the spread of COVID-19. These orders restricted travel, by limiting the circumstances in which non-residents were permitted to enter the province. Appellant Kimberley Taylor resides in Nova Scotia. Her mother, a resident of Newfoundland and Labrador, passed away suddenly in 2020. Ms. Taylor sought an exemption from the travel restrictions in order to attend her mother's funeral. Her request was denied. Ms. Taylor brought an application seeking a declaration that the travel restriction orders, and the provision of the Act under which they were issued, were beyond the legislative authority of the province and of no force and effect. Ms. Taylor also argued that the travel restrictions violated her rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador dismissed the application. The application judge held that the legislation at issue was constitutional, but that the right to remain in Canada, protected by s. 6(1) of the Charter, included a right of mobility simpliciter within Canada. The decision to deny Ms. Taylor entry into the province infringed her s. 6(1) right to mobility, but the infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter. By the time the appeal and cross-appeal from that judgment came before the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador, the travel restrictions were no longer in effect. The Court of Appeal declined to hear the appeal and cross-appeal on the basis that they were moot. Argued Date 2025-04-16 Keywords Charter of Rights – Mobility rights – Public health – COVID-19 – Chief medical officer of health issuing orders pursuant to provincial legislation to restrict travel into province during public health emergency – Appellant seeking to enter province to attend funeral – Appellant denied entry – Whether travel restriction order unconstitutional – Whether travel restriction order violates s. 6(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – Whether travel restriction order violates s. 6(2)(a) of Charter – Whether s. 6 violation justified by s. 1 of Charter – Whether Court of Appeal correct to reject appeal as moot – Public Health Protection and Promotion Act, S.N.L. 2018, c. P-37.3, s. 28(1)(h). Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Shamar Meredith, and a co-accused were charged with first degree murder. The victim was shot multiple times in the washroom area of a restaurant. Prior to the trial, the Crown brought a motion to have a video admitted as prior discreditable conduct evidence. The trial judge ruled that the video was admissible. After the written ruling was released and before the video was played for the jury, the appellant and the co-accused brought a motion to have the trial judge reconsider his decision on the prior discreditable conduct motion, which was dismissed. The appellant was eventually found guilty of second-degree murder by a jury. The appellant appealed his conviction. He raised, among other grounds of appeal, that the trial judge erred in admitting the video as evidence of prior discreditable conduct and/or failed to properly instruct the jury on the permissible use of such evidence. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. The majority found that the trial judge applied the correct legal test in deciding to admit the video, and that his assessment of the probative value and prejudicial effect of the video was reasonable. Further, the majority found that trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the permitted and prohibited uses of the video. In dissent, van Rensburg J.A., would have allowed the appeal and directed a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder. She found that the trial judge erred in law (1) in concluding that the video was probative of whether the appellant and the co-accused were engaged in a joint enterprise to kill the victim, and admitting the video for this purpose; (2) in admitting the video for any purpose after the appellant and the co-accused offered to make certain admissions under s. 655 of the Criminal Code; and (3) in his instructions to the jury about the permitted and prohibited uses of the video, which were internally inconsistent, specifically instructed the jury to use the video for an improper purpose, and did not alleviate the significant prejudice to the appellant and the co-accused that resulted from the admission of this evidence. Argued Date 2025-03-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Prior discreditable conduct evidence— Charge to jury — Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct as probative of whether the appellant and his co-accused were involved in a joint enterprise to kill the victim — Whether the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of prior discreditable conduct after the appellant and his co-accused proposed to make admissions covering and negating its probative value — Whether the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the permitted and prohibited uses of the prior discreditable conduct and failed to alleviate the prejudice to the appellant and his co-accused. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, P.B., was charged with sexual assault for having allegedly sexually assaulted the complainant on three occasions in the course of one night. At trial, the complainant was the only witness called. The appellant argued that the complainant's testimony was not sufficiently credible or reliable to prove the case against him beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, he alleged that her evidence was unreliable because she claimed that her memory of the relevant events was based on “flashbacks”. The trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence and found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his decision, in that he failed to make concrete factual findings about which parts of the complainant's evidence he accepted and which he did not, and that the trial judge erred in evaluating the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, notably her “flashback” memory. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed the appeal. On the first issue, the majority found that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient. Having read the trial judge's reasons in a functional and contextual manner, the majority concluded that there is no difficulty discerning what the trial judge decided, from a factual standpoint, and why. The majority found the reasons also contained enough detail to permit appellate review for error. As for the second issue, the majority found that the trial judge's conclusion on the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence is one that a reasonable view of the evidence supports. As such, the majority concluded that there was no proper basis to interfere. In dissent, Barrington-Foote J.A. would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. He concluded that the trial reasons are insufficient to permit effective appellate review and that the trial judge's analysis on the reliability issues arising from the evidence was very brief and was not enough in the circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2025-03-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Credibility — Sufficiency of reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to identify and apply the correct approach to the analysis of the reliability of evidence of recovered memories based on flashbacks. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 1978, the appellant, R.A., was babysitting the then five-year-old complainant at his home. In a statement made to the police, he explained that he asked the complainant to touch him and she did so. The appellant was charged with one count of indecently assaulting the complainant contrary to s. 149 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Following a trial in the Provincial Court, the appellant was acquitted on the basis that there had been no “assault” under the Criminal Code. There had been no direct, intentional application of force to the complainant and no attempt or threat by an act or gesture to apply force to the complainant.On appeal, the Crown submitted that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the elements of assault and holding that the sexual touching had to be physically initiated by the accused. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the acquittal. It concluded that the appellant touched the complainant in a manner constituting an assault and that any intentional contact with a child by an adult that is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature constitutes a direct and intentional application of force by the adult to the child's person, regardless of whose physical movement initiated the contact. Considering that the only issue was whether the appellant's conduct amounted to an assault and that the question had been answered in the affirmative, the court entered a conviction for indecent assault and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court for the appellant to be sentenced. Argued Date 2025-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Indecent assault — Elements of offence — Intentional application of force — Did the Court of Appeal for British Columbia err in holding that in order to ground the offence of indecent assault in 1978, the element of assault did not require the intentional application of force by an accused? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 149. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).