Podcasts about kalecki

Wykład profesora Jerzego Osiatyńskiego z cyklu "Czwartki Razem", państwomiasto, 17 marca 2016 [1h19min] https://wszechnica.org.pl/wyklad/kalecki-dla-opornych/ Michał Kalecki (1899-1970) był najbardziej oryginalnym polskim ekonomistą rangi światowej, choć nie był nim z wykształcenia. Gdyby nie przedwczesna śmierć w 1970 roku, był bardzo poważnym kandydatem do Nagrody Nobla – mówił prof. Jerzy Osiatyński podczas wykładu z cyklu "Czwartki Razem". Podczas swojego wystąpienia ekonomista przypomniał biografię Kaleckiego oraz przedstawił podstawy stworzonej przez niego myśli ekonomicznej. Prelegent zwrócił uwagę, że Kalecki podczas swojej pracy szukał odpowiedzi na pytanie, jakie są przyczyny kryzysu, którego doświadczył na własnych plecach (jego ojciec był właścicielem niewielkiej przędzalni, którą na początku XX w. musiał sprzedać, aby pokryć długi). Kalecki był wraz z Ludwikiem Landauem autorem pionierskich w Polsce badań "Szacunek dochodu społecznego w 1929 roku". W 1933 roku opublikował "Próbę teorii koniunktury", w której na trzy lata przed opublikowaniem "Ogólnej teorii zatrudnienia, procentu i pieniądza" J. M. Keynesa zwracał uwagę na konieczność interwencjonizmu państwowego w warunkach dekoniunktury. Czy recepty Michała Kaleckiego są możliwe do zastosowania współcześnie? Odpowiedź prof. Jerzego Osiatyńskiego na to pytanie znajdziecie w załączonym filmie z wykładu. Zapraszamy do oglądania. Znajdź nas: https://www.youtube.com/c/WszechnicaFWW/ https://www.facebook.com/WszechnicaFWW1/ https://anchor.fm/wszechnicaorgpl---historia https://anchor.fm/wszechnica-fww-nauka https://wszechnica.org.pl/ #kalecki #michałkalecki #ekonomia #kryzys #landau #ludwiklandau #dochód #zatrudnienie #pieniądz #interwencjonizm #keynes

Wykład Rafała Wosia w ramach cyklu "Czwartki Razem", Państwomiasto, 18 lutego 2016 [1h37min] https://wszechnica.org.pl/wyklad/trzy-nurty-polskiej-szkoly-ekonomii-kalecki-laski-luksemburg/ Polskich problemów ekonomicznych nie rozwiążą ani koncepcje stworzone w bogatych krajach rozwiniętych, ani opracowane na potrzeby państw rozwijających się. Polska jest w połowie drogi między tymi krajami. Rozwiązań ekonomicznych powinniśmy szukać w rodzimej szkole ekonomicznej, przekonuje Rafał Woś. Dziennikarz i publicysta ekonomiczny przedstawia sylwetki polskich ekonomistów, których łączyło przekonanie o konieczności aktywnej roli państwa w gospodarce. Rafał Kalecki (1899-1970) stworzył teorię efektywnego popytu, bliską odkryciom tworzącego w tym samym czasie brytyjskiego ekonomisty Johna Maynarda Keynesa (1883-1946). Kalecki wychował sobie w Polsce uczniów. Należał do nich Kazimierz Łaski (1921-2015) i Tadeusz Kowalik (1926-2012). Obaj należyli do krytyków polskiej tranformacji ustrojowej po 1989 roku. Rafał Woś przypomina też postać Róży Luksemburg (1871-1919). Dziennikarz zachęca, by spojrzeć na nią jako ekonomistkę, a nie krytyczkę polskich dążeń niepodległościowych. Przypomniał, że zrobiła doktorat z ekonomii w czasach, kiedy kariera naukowa kobiet nie była w powszechna. W pracy "Akumalacja kapitału" wydanej w 1913 roku dowodziła, że kapitalizm nie tworzy rynku zbytu dla towarów. Dlatego musi tworzyć rynki zbytu poprzez podboje. Po zasadniczej części wykładu dziennikarz odpowiada na pytania słuchaczy zgromadzonych na sali. Znajdź nas: https://www.youtube.com/c/WszechnicaFWW/ https://www.facebook.com/WszechnicaFWW1/ https://anchor.fm/wszechnicaorgpl---historia https://anchor.fm/wszechnica-fww-nauka https://wszechnica.org.pl/ #ekonomia #gospodarka

What if you could navigate the complexities of investment strategies and market cycles with expert advice from a trillion-dollar asset manager? Join us as we sit down with Chris Brightman, CEO and CIO of Research Affiliates, to uncover the secrets of smart investing and the potential of smart beta strategies in the current market landscape.In this fascinating conversation, Chris shares valuable insights on the ever-changing investment world, the risks associated with the technology trend, and the history of market bubbles and crashes. We also delve deep into the potential of small cap dynamics for alpha generation and examine the notion of quality as a factor. Additionally, we explore the relationship between government budget deficits and corporate profits, touching on the Kalecki profit equation and the possible implications of a recession on government stimulus and corporate profits.We wrap up our discussion by covering various investment fund options, such as Schwab and PIMCO, and emphasize the importance of finding the right advisor or financial planner to guide you through these critical decisions. Don't miss this incredible opportunity to learn from Chris Brightman's wealth of experience and knowledge in the investment world!ANTICIPATE STOCK MARKET CRASHES, CORRECTIONS, AND BEAR MARKETS WITH AWARD WINNING RESEARCH. Sign up for The Lead-Lag Report at www.leadlagreport.com and use promo code PODCAST30 for 2 weeks free and 30% off.Nothing on this channel should be considered as personalized financial advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any securities. The content in this program is for informational purposes only. You should not construe any information or other material as investment, financial, tax, or other advice. The views expressed by the participants are solely their own. A participant may have taken or recommended any investment position discussed, but may close such position or alter its recommendation at any time without notice. Nothing contained in this program constitutes a solicitation, recommendation, endorsement, or offer to buy or sell any securities or other financial instruments in any jurisdiction. Please consult your own investment or financial advisor for advice related to all investment decisions.See disclosures for The Lead-Lag Report here: https://www.leadlagreport.com/static/termsandconditionsFoodies unite…with HowUdish!It's social media with a secret sauce: FOOD! The world's first network for food enthusiasts. HowUdish connects foodies across the world!Share kitchen tips and recipe hacks. Discover hidden gem food joints and street food. Find foodies like you, connect, chat and organize meet-ups!HowUdish makes it simple to connect through food anywhere in the world.So, how do YOU dish? Download HowUdish on the Apple App Store today:

Franklin Serrano é professor associado do Instituto de Economia da UFRJ com vasta experiência na área de macroeconomia e de economia política, tendo uma extensa contribuição publicada ao longo dos últimos 20 anos em artigos e livros. É um importante expoente da corrente sraffiana da abordagem do excedente, que integra as contribuições de Keynes e Kalecki sobre demanada efetiva e ciclo econômico a uma teoria dos preços e distribuição baseada na retomada dos economistas clássicos porposta por P. Sraffa. Essa teoria do valor e distribuição é notória por criticar os mecanismos neoclássicos que de ajustamento ao equilíbrio, e propor a sua superação.

Welcome to episode 141 of Activist #MMT. Today's part two of my three-part conversation with Scott Fullwiler, on his 2008 paper, Modern Central Bank Operations: The General Principles. Last time in part one, we discussed some generic but related topics, and then principles one and two. Today in part two, we discuss principles three to six. Next time in part three, we discuss seven through ten. My full and detailed question and summary list can be found in the show notes to part one. Also, be sure to check out the list of audio chapters at the bottom of today's show notes, to find precisely where each principle, and otherwise, can be found. (A list of the audio chapters in today's episode can be found at the bottom of this post.) Principal three is that, outside of a floor system, it's not possible for the central bank to target the quantity of reserves. This is for two reasons: first, as in principle one, banks need reserves to settle payments and meet reserve requirements. Both of these are rigid needs. They need exactly that amount, no more no less. In other words, banks' demand for reserves is always vertical. Any less, and the payment system, and consequently society, breaks down. Any more and the reserves sit around unused. (The excess may earn a bit of interest, but, outside of a Volcker shock, where rates are set up around 20%, it's not much.) This means the amount of reserves in the system is determined by commercial banks (that is, it's endogenous) not the central-bank (which would be exogenous). The other reason the central bank can't set the quantity of reserves (outside a floor system), is because many transactions occur that are outside the central bank's control. A few examples are government spending and taxation (both of which the central bank must do), and calendar factors such as more cash being desired by the public as each weekend and vacation day approaches. Related is principle four, which is that all of these extra transactions must be offset. This is required if banks' demands for reserves is to be met, which is required to manage the payment system, which is required to have a stable society. Specifically, these extra transactions result in reserves entering and leaving the system in an uncontrollable and volatile fashion, making it less likely that banks' needs will be met. Therefore, the central bank must buy and sell bonds in order to keep reserve levels sufficient. Principal five is that reserve requirements are not for controlling reserve aggregates (which as in the previous principal, isn't possible anyway), but rather are an additional tool for reducing interest rate volatility. Although nothing changes what the central bank has to do, correctly designed reserve requirements allow the actions to occur at a more measured pace. They also provide some foresight and notification before some actions become urgent. (Think of it in terms of the tickets and doors at a sports stadium. Everyone with a ticket needs to get inside before the game starts and outside after it ends. The doors and the tickets make it such that the crowd enters and exits in a controlled fashion, distributed over time.) Finally, principle six is that volatility in the target rate can only exist within the central bank's corridor, meaning interest on reserves at the minimum and the discount window's penalty rate at a maximum. The decision to not regulate, or not enforce existing regulations, is just another form of regulation. When there is no deliberate floor or ceiling, as is our current reality, it means the highs will be dangerously high and lows dangerously low. In the same way, Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is only true within the ceiling and floor set by governments. We could set a rigid floor and ceiling such as with a job guarantee, but then, as Kalecki says in his 1942 paper, Political Aspects of Full Employment, if the government governs, then the rich and their feelings can't. This is why the rich pay our legislators to not legislate, especially when it comes to employment. Principals seven through ten come in part three, but for now, let's get right back to my conversation with Scott Fullwiler. Enjoy. Audio chapters 6:07 - Relation between fractional reserve banking and money multiplier 9:10 - Principle 3: Outside a floor system, it's impossible for the central bank to target the quantity of reserves. 15:12 - Another comment regarding the Fed being in charge of the government (not) 15:54 - Principle 4: The CB must offset many things out of its control, and government spending is mind-twisting! 28:21 - Principle 5: Unless using a floor system, it's impossible for the CB to control the amount of reserves. It can only control the price of those reserves (the interest rate). Also, reserve requirements (and TT&L accounts) are to BUFFER. 34:51 - Using the target rate to manage inflation is a terrible thing to do (it has real-world consequences) but does not limit the ability of the central bank to manage the stability of the payment system. 38:28 - Liar, Liar reference 39:18 - Principle 6: How does the CB defend a precise target, as opposed to only ensuring it's remains within the corridor? 48:38 - What if the penalty rate was intentionally set below interest on reserves (IOR)? 52:16 - It would mean they could buy reserves for low interest (penalty rate) and then earn high interest for holding it (IOR) 54:33 - Principle 7: There is no "liquidity effect" associated with central bank changes to its operating target. (Apologies for the very long question! I got it wrong at first, and scrambled to rewrite it at the last minute.) 58:36 - Duplicate of introduction, with no background music (for those with sensitive ears)

Welcome to episode 141 of Activist #MMT. Today's part two of my three-part conversation with Scott Fullwiler, on his 2008 paper, . Last time in part one, we discussed some generic but related topics, and then principles one and two. Today in part two, we discuss principles three to six. Next time in part three, we discuss seven through ten. My full and detailed question and summary list can be found in the show notes to . Also, be sure to check out the list of audio chapters at the bottom of today's show notes, to find precisely where each principle, and otherwise, can be found. (A list of the audio chapters in today's episode can be found at the bottom of this post.) Principal three is that, outside of a floor system, it's not possible for the central bank to target the quantity of reserves. This is for two reasons: first, as in principle one, banks need reserves to settle payments and meet reserve requirements. Both of these are rigid needs. They need exactly that amount, no more no less. In other words, banks' demand for reserves is always vertical. Any less, and the payment system, and consequently society, breaks down. Any more and the reserves sit around unused. (The excess may earn a bit of interest, but, outside of a Volcker shock, where rates are set up around 20%, it's not much.) This means the amount of reserves in the system is determined by commercial banks (that is, it's endogenous) not the central-bank (which would be exogenous). The other reason the central bank can't set the quantity of reserves (outside a floor system), is because many transactions occur that are outside the central bank's control. A few examples are government spending and taxation (both of which the central bank must do), and calendar factors such as more cash being desired by the public as each weekend and vacation day approaches. Related is principle four, which is that all of these extra transactions must be offset. This is required if banks' demands for reserves is to be met, which is required to manage the payment system, which is required to have a stable society. Specifically, these extra transactions result in reserves entering and leaving the system in an uncontrollable and volatile fashion, making it less likely that banks' needs will be met. Therefore, the central bank must buy and sell bonds in order to keep reserve levels sufficient. Principal five is that reserve requirements are not for controlling reserve aggregates (which as in the previous principal, isn't possible anyway), but rather are an additional tool for reducing interest rate volatility. Although nothing changes what the central bank has to do, correctly designed reserve requirements allow the actions to occur at a more measured pace. They also provide some foresight and notification before some actions become urgent. (Think of it in terms of the tickets and doors at a sports stadium. Everyone with a ticket needs to get inside before the game starts and outside after it ends. The doors and the tickets make it such that the crowd enters and exits in a controlled fashion, distributed over time.) Finally, principle six is that volatility in the target rate can only exist within the central bank's corridor, meaning interest on reserves at the minimum and the discount window's penalty rate at a maximum. The decision to not regulate, or not enforce existing regulations, is just another form of regulation. When there is no deliberate floor or ceiling, as is our current reality, it means the highs will be dangerously high and lows dangerously low. In the same way, Minsky's is only true within the ceiling and floor set by governments. We could set a rigid floor and ceiling such as with a , but then, as Kalecki says in his 1942 paper, , if the government governs, then the rich and their feelings can't. This is why the rich pay our legislators to not legislate, especially when it comes to employment. Principals seven through ten come in part three, but for now, let's get...

In the wake of the Great Financial Crisis, the work of John Maynard Keynes experienced a revival, as people sought answers to the problem of sluggish growth. In this cycle, sluggish growth isn't the problem. If anything, you hear business leaders and central bankers talking about the labor market being "too hot," and the need for the unemployment rate to rise. So what explains the current dynamic? And how can we sustain a hot economy without the pain of inflation? Perhaps the work of the lesser-known Polish economist Michał Kalecki holds the answers. Like Keynes, he also viewed the free market as being inherently unstable, but he came to different conclusions about why. He also explored the political economy of full employment and why this condition frustrates business leaders. On this episode, we speak with Jan Toporowski, professor of Economics and Finance at SOAS University of London, about Kalecki's work and how it can help us understand today's economy.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

For this episode we talk to Herman Mark Schwartz on a wide range of issues - from biopolitics, industrial policy, and the New Cold War political economy to why "financialization" is a limited analytical frame for recent history. Mark argues that conflict between firms over profits is just as important - if not moreso - than conflict between capital and labor over the consumption share. The shift from midcentury "Fordism" to today's three-tiered economic structure happened as the result of a "Kalecki moment" in the late-1960s and early-1970s: workers, women, and the third world wanted more, and corporate strategy transformed to meet, and rebuff, their challenges.*** LINKS ***You can find his faculty profile here: https://politics.virginia.edu/people/profile/schwartzAnd the articles we discussed today here: https://americanaffairsjournal.org/author/herman-mark-schwartz/and here: https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/manufacturing-stagnation/

I'm less concerned with the recession/no-recession arguments (hey, don't US politics just absolutely fascinate you? Me neither), than with the implications for profits and stockmarket valuations. Three observations: 1. Regardless of headline GDP, once you strip out extremely volatile inventory-flows, there's been essentially no growth in final sales of domestic product now for five quarter. There's just no momentum at all. 2. The massive fiscal stimulus has not yet completely been washed out of the Kalecki profits reckoning. I calculate profits were down 7.4% qoq and 19.4% yoy, mainly thanks to the fiscal deficit moderating. But there's worse - the profits/GDP ratio has fallen to its lowest level since 1Q16 - so there's cyclical as well as one-off structural pressure at work. 3. All of which means the S&P500 remains overvalued on my slow-model basis, which has been essentially on the money for the last 30 years. July's rally will extend that overvaluation. So the vulnerability continues, and rises.

The speed and severity with which data from the US has collapsed over the last month is extremely unusual. Why is the outbreak of inflation doing such damage so quickly. One reason is the way in which the US profits model has changed over the years, until since 2000 to the present day, 77.6% of Kalecki profits are attributable to household and government dissavings, whilst only 22.4% come from net investment and net exports. Compare that to 1960-1980, when net investment and exports accounted for 65.7% of profits, with h'hold and govt dissavings generating only 34.3%. Let's state the obvious: if your profit model depends disproportionately on h'holds and governments spending more than the earn, sooner or later, even the strongest financial balance sheet will become impaired, fragile. And it's that financial fragility which is kicking in, and kicking down, right now.

Jan Toporowski joins Long Reads for a discussion about Polish economist Michal Kalecki. Kalecki is best known for his celebrated essay on full employment, which has lost none of its topical value. Jan is a professor of economics at SOAS in London and the author of a two-volume intellectual biography of Kalecki.Read Jan's article "Michal Kalecki and the Politics of Full Employment" here: https://jacobinmag.com/2022/01/michal-kalecki-keynes-full-employment-political-economyYou can also find Michal Kalecki's classic 1943 essay, "The Political Aspects of Full Employment" here: https://jacobinmag.com/2018/05/political-aspects-of-full-employment-kalecki-job-guaranteeLong Reads is a Jacobin podcast looking in-depth at political topics and thinkers, both contemporary and historical, with the magazine's longform writers. Hosted by Features Editor Daniel Finn. Produced by Conor Gillies, music by Knxwledge. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

US GDP - Cyclical Position, Profits, S&P Valuations In volume terms, GDP rose an annualized 6.9%, which was stronger than the 5.7% consensus expected, and a sharp acceleration from the 2.3% annualized in 3Q. But that strength is misleading, since approximately 74% of the qoq growth recorded in 4Q came from a build-up of private inventories. There's no way of knowing how voluntary that build-up of inventories was: remember, yesterday we reported retail inventories up 4.4% in Dec after retail sales fell 1.9% - which doesn't sound voluntary to me. Strip out inventory movements, and final sales of domestic product rose only 1.8% annualized - pretty much a crawl. Within that, the star was personal consumption up 3.3%, but non-residential investment was running at just 2% and residential investment fell 0.8%. Despite the headline growth rate, this was not, then, a strong result, or one suggesting a strong cyclical impulse. What of profits? The principle behind the Kalecki profits equation is that corporate profits must be equal to net investment, minus the savings imbalances of the rest of the economy - in practice that means the government, the household sector, and interactions with other economies. In the 12m to 4Q, profits fell 0.5% qoq, and rose only 2.8% yoy. The main thing boosting profits during the pandemic was the extraordinary rise in the fiscal deficit - and the main factor now dragging it down is the continuing moderation of that fiscal deficit. That will remain true for the foreseeable future. In the meantime, profits are still a far higher proportion of GDP than previously - 30.3% in the 12m to December, vs a pre-covid long-term average of 24.6%, with a standard deviation of 2pps. The key question is whether h'hold dissaving can rise faster than the fiscal deficit narrows. I think its' unlikely: savings rates are back to pre-covid levels, and dissaving/GDP is running at 13.9% of GDP, vs a pre-covid average of 14.6%. There's not a great deal of room to raise that proportion, so I think profits will remain under pressure in the short and medium term. What do today's numbers do for S&P valuations? The Coldwater Slow Model considers that an asset is fairly valued when it maintains is value relative to the economy. In practice, I take the Kalecki profits and discount them based on l/t nominal GDP growth rates and volatilities. That model has tracked the S&P well since 1990, and continued to do so last year. On that basis, it told us the S&P 500 was approximately 10% overvalued at year-end when it was at 4766, and even if profits stabilized (which I don't think they will) then its still about 3% overvalued today. If profits continue to fall - so will that valuation. Given the sharp downturn in economic data in January, it's difficult to expect an S&P recovery any time soon.

Terms of trade - which track the difference between changes in export prices minus changes in import prices - are important. When your terms of trade are rising, the chances are that manufacturers and traders are seeing their margins, and their profits, rise. And you'll see that in an improving trade balance. But when terms of trade deteriorate, margins and profits are going to get squeezed, trade balances fall. But look, it takes time to work through, because manufacturers and traders will fight like hell against a falling terms of trade. They'll avoid buying inputs at these high prices and run down their inventories instead. They'll avoid passing on prices as long as they can to maintain their market position. Eventually the weakest will go out of business, and the survivors will finally be able to put up prices. That's typically the sort of dynamic at work. At the moment, it's probably Germany which faces one of the biggest challenges because its terms of trade are falling sharply, but the country remains fundamentally mercantalist, with net exports accounting for 35.2% of Kalecki profits in the last 12m - second only as a contributor to net investment. But look what's happening: in November, export prices rose 0.8% mom and 9.9% yoy - pretty good, eh? But import prices were up 3% mom and 24.7% yoy. That led to terms of trade falling 2.2% on the month, and 12.1% yoy. That's the sharpest yoy collapse in terms fo trade that modern Germany has seen, and terms of trade are now the worst we've seen since 2012. And look at some of those import prices: fertilizers 144%, aluminium 64%, iron& steel 60.2%, plastics 44.7%. It takes time to work through - Germany's manufacturers and traders have been fighting it hard. Really, it was really only in the last couple of months, and Oct in particular, that the implications are beginning to show: In the 3m to October, the trade surplus came to Eu40.5bn, which was down 21.5% yoy; and the current account was Eu 47.2bn, which was down 28.7%. But it is very likely that Germany's trade and current account surpluses are going to shrink far more noticeably in the next couple of quarters, taking margins and profits with it. Sorry about that, but modern Germany really hasn't experienced this sort of terms of trade shock before, and 2022 will be the year when we find out how it copes with it.

“I think there are a lot of people who feel a genuine frustration at how the system has behaved, and more importantly about how there has been this dynamic of privatized gains and socialised losses. The way I would resolve it is, you know that’s wrong. And yet it seems that the models or the tools that are being used give us no option to that. And at the core, what that’s telling you is that the models are a mistake…” Mike Green In this podcast, Mike Green and I discussed political philosophy. Well, I fumbled around trying to articulate my frustrations, objections and questions and Mike managed to read between the lines and carry the show. By way of background, I’ve been frustrated with a few things since the late 1990s. Most of my frustrations relate to how regulators, governments and central banks have repeatedly undermined the capitalist process of creative destruction by bailing out imprudent risk-takers. We got a taste of this in 1998 when the Fed bailed on LTCM, and a belly-full of it in 2008 when they changed the rules on mark-to-market accounting and bailed out the banking sector. Since then central banks have supported asset prices at every turn, with increasingly direct intervention, culminating in direct purchases of corporate credit in March of 2020. For the most part, Mike and I are frustrated about the same things: regulatory capture and a fundamental misalignment of political power and incentives, the compound effect of which is responsible for most of the forces that are tearing America apart from within. However, where my experience has festered and soured, Mike has been diagnosing the problems and seeking solutions. Viewed through the prism of Mike’s philosophical framework, our current situation is a function of decades of policy choices rooted in a misguided faith in Calvanist meritocracy, amplified by a fundamental misapprehension that goes to the very heart of economics. These themes converge as we explore: How treating the economy as an ergodic system inevitably leads to accelerating boom-bust dynamics How central bank policy is largely motivated by a policy choice that has placed the social safety net in the hands of the corporate sector Why a policy of offering guaranteed, non-dischargeable loans to children to pay for higher education is criminally irresponsible, and creates a cascade of corrupt signaling mechanisms and mal-incentives, with obscene repercussions MMT, the Kalecki equation and how policy can be structured to narrow the wealth gap Ergodicity economics, the Farmer’s Fable, and the myth of meritocracy The importance of the Fourth Turning as a time to dismantle corrupt institutions and rebuild in a new image Disentangling skill from luck, and designing a redistribution policy that socializes windfall gains to support distributed entrepreneurship and economic dynamism Creating a system of accounting that recognizes non-monetary contributions and externalities How citizens will think about taxes in a modern monetary world, and whether taxes have only ever been paid at the business end of a gun Whether we can move past the Fourth Turning without a major catalyst, what that catalyst might look like, and how to look across the chasm with optimism about the future This is a two-hour podcast, and I apologize in advance for meandering questions and the occasional non-sequitur. Still, this was a deeply important conversation, and I think it’s worth your time. I think many of us who think about the state of the world know that something is very wrong. Many of us have worked to bury these frustrations and work within the game and the rules as they are. But at root we are mostly checked out. Mike makes the case that the system is broken, but it can be fixed. And he expresses an incredibly coherent framework for a system of values, principles, and policies that just might work. I came away feeling almost hopeful. And I think some of you might too. “Contradictions do not exist. Whenever you think that you are facing a contradiction, check your premises. You will find that one of them is wrong.” Francisco d'Anconia, Atlas Shrugged      

Iniciamos nuestra temporada analizando los estados de excepción, toque de queda y la locura de la eficiencia marginal al capital de la teoría keynesiana.

Iniciamos nuestra temporada analizando los estados de excepción, toque de queda y la locura de la eficiencia marginal al capital de la teoría keynesiana.

Episode for patrons $10+. Subscribe at patreon.com/bungacast This month we discuss Polish economist Michal Kalecki's landmark essay, "Political Aspects of Full Employment". This follows on from our recent free episode, 'It's Not Robots, It's Capitalism' (ep 149) focusing on unemployment. Kalecki anticipated both the Keynesian postwar settlement as well as its undoing, and the neoliberalism that followed. We focus on how Kalecki introduces the question of political authority into economics. For reference, the next five Reading Clubs have already been announced: https://www.patreon.com/posts/41524278 

Today I look at the 20.4% qoq fall in the UK's 2Q GDP. I identify three issues: First, the relatively lacklustre rebound in services activity in June 2020; Second, the degree to which the UK's world-losing performance reflects the highest degree of lockdown stringency in Europe; Third, the surprisingly positive impact on Kalecki profits.

The end of the month brings a data-crush, so today's bulletin is slightly longer than yesterday's. First, I look at what the mass of data from NE Asia for May is telling us about conditions. The conclusion is that the data shows NE Asia's industrial economy is still under the cosh, but domestic demand is beginning to stir nonetheless. I also look at the UK's current account balance and revised GDP data for 1Q. They show the private sector in rapid retreat from its dissavings, and it is likely that by 2Q we'll see the UK showing a private sector savings surplus. At the same time, although GDP was revised down, Kalecki profits growth was maintained, with the structure moving away from household sector dissaving and back towards net investment spending. Which is good news.

A busy day from which I selected two strands which I thought are interesting: First, I look at the sharply divergent trends in Japan's wholesale sales relative to retail sales. Disentangled, it looks as if the initial disequilibrium between supply and demand which opened up so sharply in March and April had begun to close quite nicely by May. This is almost certainly good news for how Japan's inventory/shipment spikes are being dealth with. Second, I look at May's UK money and credit numbers, note the continuing fall in consumer credit, the absence of mortgage lending and the rise in household financial asset holdings, and conclude that whilst that's bad for Kalecki profits in the short term, it looks like the sort of structural change which the UK's growth model badly needs.

The purpose of this bulletin is simple to state - trying to keep you abreast of what's happening in unexpectedly positive or negative ways in the data from the world's major economies. Today I focus on the disinflationary forces showing across the globe, and particularly in Asia's CPI and PPI results. This disinflationary is almost solely the result of falling oil prices, which is the combined result of a very high base of comparison in April-May 2019 and the collapse in prices owing to coronavirus. Both factors are now coming off, and so disinflationary forces will wane obviously in the second half of the year. I also note the rise in S Korea's May unemployment rate, but attribute it to people coming back into the workforce en masse as coronavirus retreats. In fact, employment rose quite sharply in May. In the US, I note the sharp fall in April's freight transport services index - the worst since 2009 - a clear signal about weakness in the industrial and construction sectors. In Europe, I trace the implications of yesterdays 1Q Eurozone GDP breakdown to calculate Kalecki profits: I estimate they were down 12.7% qoq and fell 9.1% yoy to the lowest profits/GDP that I've come across.

We continue our discussion with Prof Nick Potts of Solent University and parse the problems the caused by the equilibrium approach of Post-Keynesian and Kalecki, and what Marxists can learn from MMT about money.

This week I am delighted to welcome Prof Nick Potts of Solent University to talk about the problems of equilibrium theories and a possible synthesis between Post-Keynesian and MMT approaches with the TSSI of Marx

Amit Bhaduri (Jawaharlal Nehru University, Council for Social Development, Pavia University) Discussant: Jerzy Osiatynski (Polish Monetary Policy Committee) Professor Bhaduri presents a demand determined model inspired by Keynes and Kalecki, in which the real and the financial commodity producing sector coexist. Their interaction is captured through stock and flow accounting in a macroeconomic model which accommodates the stock market to show how growth and financial catastrophe arise. The dynamic processes have a stock equilibrium that resembles the generic neoclassical growth model and the flow equilibrium the generic post-Keynesian growth model. The combined stock-flow dynamics has the unusual property of generating in some circumstances sudden and drastic change in the stock market like a ‘cusp catastrophe’ similar to financial meltdown. Spearker biography: Amit Bhaduri was educated in Presidency College, Calcutta; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Cambridge University, where he received a Ph.D. in 1967. He has taught in various universities around the world as professor/ visiting professor, including Presidency College and Institute of Management, Calcutta; Delhi School of Economics and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum; El Colegio de Mexico; Stanford University; Vienna and Linz University, Austria; Norwegian University of Science and Technology; Bremen University, Germany; and Bologna and Pavia University, Italy. He has been a fellow of various institutes of advanced studies in Austria, Sweden, Germany, and Italy; worked on various expert bodies of the United Nations; and served as member on some national and international commissions. Bhaduri has published more than 60 papers in standard international journals and is currently on the editorial boards of five of them. He has written: The Economic Structure of Backward Agriculture (London: Academic Press, 1982), Macroeconomics: The Dynamics of Commodity Production (London: Macmillan, 1986), Unconventional Economic Essays (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1992), An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Liberalisation(co-authored with D. Nayyar) (India: Penguin, 1996), On the Border of Economic Theory and History (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), and Development with Dignity (India: National Book Trust, 2006). Some of his books and articles have been translated into several European and Asian languages. Organised by the Money & Finance Research Cluster. Speakers: Amit Bhaduri (Jawaharlal Nehru University, Council for Social Development, Pavia University), Jerzy Osiatynski (Polish Monetary Policy Committee), Jan Toporowski (SOAS) Released by: SOAS Economics Podcasts

Jan Toporowski (SOAS), Geoffrey C. Harcourt (Cambridge), Victoria Chick (UCL), Jerzy Osiatynski (Polish Academy of Sciences & National Bank of Poland) Launch of Jan Toporowski’s book “Michal Kalecki: An Intellectual Biography, Volume II: By Intellect Alone 1939–1970” “This volume of intellectual biography records the work of Michał Kalecki’s maturity: his work on monetary economics and the theory of profits; his work on the problems of socialism and developing countries; and the extension of his theory of capitalism to define his work in relation to Keynes and previous political economic principles. Kalecki had, by 1939, laid out the essential elements of his theory of the business cycle in capitalism. This book begins at Oxford where, at the Institute of Statistics, he worked on the economic planning and financing of World War Two, as well as extending and detailing the particulars of his theory and examining the conditions for full employment in the post-War international monetary and financial system. Kalecki would then work for the United Nations on full employment, inflation, and developing countries. He departed from the United Nations in 1955, and returned to Poland to extend two new directions of his ideas – on the economics of developing countries and his theory of growth in the socialist economy, alongside further work on business cycles. This book is essential reading for all those who want to understand Kalecki’s lasting contribution to economic theory and policy.” Source: http://www.springer.com/gb/book/9783319696638 Speaker biography: Jan Toporowski is Professor of Economics and Finance at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK, Visiting Professor of Economics and Finance at the International University College, Turin, Italy, and Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Bergamo, Italy. He has worked in fund management, international banking, central banking and financial and economic consultancy. He has published extensively on monetary and financial theory and policy and the history of economic thought. The first volume of this intellectual biography, Michał Kalecki: An Intellectual Biography – Volume I: Rendez-vous in Cambridge 1899–1939, was published in 2013. Speakers: Jan Toporowski (SOAS), Geoffrey C. Harcourt (Cambridge), Victoria Chick (UCL), Jerzy Osiatynski (Polish Academy of Sciences & National Bank of Poland) Event Date: 21 March 2018 Released by: SOAS Economics Podcast

This week I am delighted to welcome back Alexander Douglas to show. Alex is a lecturer in philosophy at St. Andrews University, and is the author of ‘The Philosophy Of Debt’. This show digs deeper into the murky world of understanding the differences and possible syntheses between MTT and Marxist economics. We discuss the problems an inflationary crisis poses to MMT, the stability of MMT and a job guarantee under times of duress, and Kalecki’s class based critique of full employment policies. We also discuss keynsian accounting identities, what they mean for marx’s ideas on profits driving investment, and the impact of government investment upon our understanding of Marxist economics. Enjoy!

This week I am delighted to welcome to the show Jose A Tapia Granados, associate Professor in the Department of History and Politics in Drexel University. Originally trained as a medical doctor, Jose now specialises in the links between fluctuations in the economy and health conditions. He also is interested in purely economic issues, and is the co-author of the book ‘La Gran Recesión y el capitalismo del siglo XXI’ or ‘The Great Recession and capitalism of the XXI century’ in english. The interview is based upon a really fascinating paper of his I read recently called, ‘Does investment call the tune? Empirical evidence and endogenous theories of the business cycle’. In this paper, Jose looks at the different theories of crisis, in particular those of Keynes and Marx, and sees how they stand up when you test them against the historical empirical data. Very interesting stuff indeed. Here is the podcast's new YouTube channel, with all the episodes uploaded: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCD63zXEPxFpl9Y0Vh8abp4A You can find the paper here: http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tapia_granados/files/does_investment_call_the_tune_may_2012__forthcoming_rpe_.pdf You can find his book here: http://www.amazon.co.uk/GRAN-RECESION-CAPITALISMO-DEL-SIGLO/dp/8483196115 The music on this show was: ‘The Order of the Pharaonic Jesters’ by Sun Ra and his Arkestra ‘That's How It Works’ by The Retinas ‘Hurricane’ by Ms Mr ‘Forever And Ever’ by Demis Roussos

This week we have the second part of our interview with Professor Andrew Kliman. We continue our discussion about his latest book - ‘The Failure of Capitalist Production’ - and in particular focus on Andrews critique of the Underconsumptionist Theory of Crisis, which is pretty dominant on the Marxist and non-Marxist left alike. We hear how the empirical evidence sits squarely in the face of this theory, what role financialisation has actually played in the economy, and the similarities between Keynesianism and Underconsumptionism. We also talk about the new book Andrew is working on, and just how impressed I am by how well Marx’s theories are able to explain the world around us today. You can find the article for the New Left Project that Andrew mentions in the interview, critiquing Sam Gindin's view of the crisis as financial, here: http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/clarifying_secular_stagnation_and_the_great_recession And you can find Sam Gindins response to Andrew here: http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/underestimating_capital_overestimating_labour_a_response_to_andrew_kliman Enjoy!