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A cat or a weasel (chulda) renders a bird a treifa through clawing (derisa), whereas only a cat can do so for small cattle such as young goats and lambs. Other predatory birds besides those explicitly listed in the Mishna can also render other birds a treifa by clawing, but only when targeting birds smaller than themselves, while a hawk (netz) can do so even to birds of its own size. According to an alternate version, ordinary predatory birds can claw birds of their own size or smaller, whereas the hawk can even render birds larger than itself a treifa. Furthermore, two conflicting versions are presented regarding Rav Kahana's ruling in the name of Rav Shimi bar Ashi concerning foxes, debating whether or not they possess the capacity to render animals a treifa through clawing. Abaye limits the laws of derisa to the predator's front legs, specifying that it must be executed specifically with a claw and not with teeth, must be done with intent, and must occur while the prey is still alive. In a case where a lion was found among oxen and a dislodged claw was subsequently discovered on the back of one of the oxen, Rabba bar Rav Huna ruled in the name of Rav that there is no concern for derisa. He reasoned that while most lions do claw, their claws do not generally detach in the process; thus, it is more probable that the ox rubbed against a wall and accidentally picked up a nail embedded there. The Gemara initially rejects this argument, countering that while oxen frequently rub against walls, nails rarely stick to their backs in this manner, and since the lion remains a viable source, one should rule stringently. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that because the logic can support either side, the ox retains its presumptive status of permissibility; as a matter of pure doubt, Rav remains consistent with his opinion stated elsewhere that we rule leniently in cases of uncertain clawing. Abaye restricts this leniency, clarifying that it only applies when an actual claw is found embedded rather than a mere mark, when the claw is moist rather than dry, and when there are only one, two, or three claws scattered at random rather than two or three found in a distinct row. Rav and Shmuel disagree on whether to rule leniently or stringently in cases of doubt regarding derisa. While both agree to rule leniently in certain scenarios, they dispute a case where a lion entered among oxen and the lion remained silent while the oxen were found bellowing in distress. Ameimar ruled stringently in accordance with Shmuel, either because he rejected Rav's view or because he believed Rav ultimately retracted his opinion, a shift suggested by a practical incident that occurred. Although several difficulties are raised regarding the specific details of that incident, they are successfully resolved. Rav Ashi similarly ruled leniently in a case of doubt. If there is a doubt as to whether an animal was clawed, the Gemara rules that one may inspect the internal areas of the carcass to see if redness has formed from the venom; if no redness is present, the animal is permitted. This testing method was originally stated by the sons of Rabbi Chiya, though Rav Yosef pointed out that Shmuel himself had already articulated this principle. This discussion leads the Gemara to a series of inquiries - some regarding the laws of clawing and others concerning unrelated laws of treifot - all of which were concisely resolved by an authority who declared that each question had already been answered by a prior Rabbinic statement.

A cat or a weasel (chulda) renders a bird a treifa through clawing (derisa), whereas only a cat can do so for small cattle such as young goats and lambs. Other predatory birds besides those explicitly listed in the Mishna can also render other birds a treifa by clawing, but only when targeting birds smaller than themselves, while a hawk (netz) can do so even to birds of its own size. According to an alternate version, ordinary predatory birds can claw birds of their own size or smaller, whereas the hawk can even render birds larger than itself a treifa. Furthermore, two conflicting versions are presented regarding Rav Kahana's ruling in the name of Rav Shimi bar Ashi concerning foxes, debating whether or not they possess the capacity to render animals a treifa through clawing. Abaye limits the laws of derisa to the predator's front legs, specifying that it must be executed specifically with a claw and not with teeth, must be done with intent, and must occur while the prey is still alive. In a case where a lion was found among oxen and a dislodged claw was subsequently discovered on the back of one of the oxen, Rabba bar Rav Huna ruled in the name of Rav that there is no concern for derisa. He reasoned that while most lions do claw, their claws do not generally detach in the process; thus, it is more probable that the ox rubbed against a wall and accidentally picked up a nail embedded there. The Gemara initially rejects this argument, countering that while oxen frequently rub against walls, nails rarely stick to their backs in this manner, and since the lion remains a viable source, one should rule stringently. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that because the logic can support either side, the ox retains its presumptive status of permissibility; as a matter of pure doubt, Rav remains consistent with his opinion stated elsewhere that we rule leniently in cases of uncertain clawing. Abaye restricts this leniency, clarifying that it only applies when an actual claw is found embedded rather than a mere mark, when the claw is moist rather than dry, and when there are only one, two, or three claws scattered at random rather than two or three found in a distinct row. Rav and Shmuel disagree on whether to rule leniently or stringently in cases of doubt regarding derisa. While both agree to rule leniently in certain scenarios, they dispute a case where a lion entered among oxen and the lion remained silent while the oxen were found bellowing in distress. Ameimar ruled stringently in accordance with Shmuel, either because he rejected Rav's view or because he believed Rav ultimately retracted his opinion, a shift suggested by a practical incident that occurred. Although several difficulties are raised regarding the specific details of that incident, they are successfully resolved. Rav Ashi similarly ruled leniently in a case of doubt. If there is a doubt as to whether an animal was clawed, the Gemara rules that one may inspect the internal areas of the carcass to see if redness has formed from the venom; if no redness is present, the animal is permitted. This testing method was originally stated by the sons of Rabbi Chiya, though Rav Yosef pointed out that Shmuel himself had already articulated this principle. This discussion leads the Gemara to a series of inquiries - some regarding the laws of clawing and others concerning unrelated laws of treifot - all of which were concisely resolved by an authority who declared that each question had already been answered by a prior Rabbinic statement.

The Gemara discusses what other protective materials a bird could fall upon that would successfully cushion its impact and prevent it from being rendered a treifa. Relatedly, if a bird's wings become stuck to each other or to its body, a debate arises as to whether or not the bird will become a treifa upon falling, as its ability to break the fall is compromised. Two opinions are brought regarding the scope of this debate - specifically, whether the dispute applies to a case where only one wing is glued or if it is restricted to a case where both wings are glued. The Mishna rules that if the majority of an animal's ribs are broken, it is a treifa. While there are twenty-six ribs total, consisting of thirteen on each side, two of these are excluded from the halakhic count; therefore, a majority is defined as twelve ribs, which can be comprised of six on each side or any other combination totaling twelve. Rav rules that even a single rib dislocated along with its socket from the vertebra renders the animal a treifa. Rav Asi and Rav Kahana then questioned Rav regarding a case where two opposite ribs are completely removed while the vertebra remains intact, to which Rav responded that it is a neveila because the animal is essentially cut in half. Several questions are raised against this response in light of Rav's own previous statement, wondering why they would ask about two ribs if Rav already held that even one dislocated rib is a treifa. Ultimately, the Gemara resolves this by reinterpreting the precise details of their question and explaining that they were unaware of Rav's original ruling when they questioned him. Three of the seven extra cases of treifot introduced by the Amoraim were authored by Shmuel and are analyzed here because one of them directly relates to uprooted ribs. The next case in the Mishna transitions to an attack by a predator animal that emits venom (derisa), creating a treifa status. At first, a statement of Rav is brought asserting that a cat does not emit venom capable of making an animal a treifa, prompting the Gemara to question why this rule could not be inferred directly from the wording of the Mishna itself. Rav Chisda rules that a cat and a mongoose do emit venom that can kill a small kid or a baby lamb. A contradictory braita is brought against this view, and the contradiction is ultimately resolved in two possible manners.

The Gemara discusses what other protective materials a bird could fall upon that would successfully cushion its impact and prevent it from being rendered a treifa. Relatedly, if a bird's wings become stuck to each other or to its body, a debate arises as to whether or not the bird will become a treifa upon falling, as its ability to break the fall is compromised. Two opinions are brought regarding the scope of this debate - specifically, whether the dispute applies to a case where only one wing is glued or if it is restricted to a case where both wings are glued. The Mishna rules that if the majority of an animal's ribs are broken, it is a treifa. While there are twenty-six ribs total, consisting of thirteen on each side, two of these are excluded from the halakhic count; therefore, a majority is defined as twelve ribs, which can be comprised of six on each side or any other combination totaling twelve. Rav rules that even a single rib dislocated along with its socket from the vertebra renders the animal a treifa. Rav Asi and Rav Kahana then questioned Rav regarding a case where two opposite ribs are completely removed while the vertebra remains intact, to which Rav responded that it is a neveila because the animal is essentially cut in half. Several questions are raised against this response in light of Rav's own previous statement, wondering why they would ask about two ribs if Rav already held that even one dislocated rib is a treifa. Ultimately, the Gemara resolves this by reinterpreting the precise details of their question and explaining that they were unaware of Rav's original ruling when they questioned him. Three of the seven extra cases of treifot introduced by the Amoraim were authored by Shmuel and are analyzed here because one of them directly relates to uprooted ribs. The next case in the Mishna transitions to an attack by a predator animal that emits venom (derisa), creating a treifa status. At first, a statement of Rav is brought asserting that a cat does not emit venom capable of making an animal a treifa, prompting the Gemara to question why this rule could not be inferred directly from the wording of the Mishna itself. Rav Chisda rules that a cat and a mongoose do emit venom that can kill a small kid or a baby lamb. A contradictory braita is brought against this view, and the contradiction is ultimately resolved in two possible manners.

Rava establishes further laws regarding physical anomalies that render a lung a treifa. If cysts appear on the lung, a single cyst does not disqualify the animal, whereas two distinct cysts render it a treifa. Rava provides a method to inspect an ambiguous cyst to determine whether it is a single divided structure or two separate entities. Regarding the lobes of the lung - which normally consist of three on the right and two on the left – Rava rules that deviations from this norm disqualify the animal. Meriemar permitted an extra lobe provided it is perfectly aligned with the natural row. However, if an extra lobe develops internally facing the heart, its status is disputed, as Rav Huna Mar bar Avia notes that this configuration is common in wild animals, and therefore permits it. Rafram rules that a lung resembling a wood chip is a treifa, a tradition that receives five distinct interpretations in the Gemara to clarify in what way it is similar to a wood chip – in color or in feel. Rava delineates which lung discolorations are valid and which are problematic, a discussion expanded upon by Rav Kahana and Rav Sama regarding specific shades and appearances. Ravina addresses a scenario where a lobe of the lung fails to inflate, explaining that a test must be performed to determine if the lack of airflow is due to a fatal defect or merely a temporary obstruction. Ulla rules that if the internal tissue of the lung liquefies, the animal remains kosher because internal decay does not compromise the outer membrane. Rava qualifies this leniency, limiting it to cases where the primary bronchial tubes remain intact, and Rav Ashi outlines the practical examination method to verify their structural integrity.

Rava establishes further laws regarding physical anomalies that render a lung a treifa. If cysts appear on the lung, a single cyst does not disqualify the animal, whereas two distinct cysts render it a treifa. Rava provides a method to inspect an ambiguous cyst to determine whether it is a single divided structure or two separate entities. Regarding the lobes of the lung - which normally consist of three on the right and two on the left – Rava rules that deviations from this norm disqualify the animal. Meriemar permitted an extra lobe provided it is perfectly aligned with the natural row. However, if an extra lobe develops internally facing the heart, its status is disputed, as Rav Huna Mar bar Avia notes that this configuration is common in wild animals, and therefore permits it. Rafram rules that a lung resembling a wood chip is a treifa, a tradition that receives five distinct interpretations in the Gemara to clarify in what way it is similar to a wood chip – in color or in feel. Rava delineates which lung discolorations are valid and which are problematic, a discussion expanded upon by Rav Kahana and Rav Sama regarding specific shades and appearances. Ravina addresses a scenario where a lobe of the lung fails to inflate, explaining that a test must be performed to determine if the lack of airflow is due to a fatal defect or merely a temporary obstruction. Ulla rules that if the internal tissue of the lung liquefies, the animal remains kosher because internal decay does not compromise the outer membrane. Rava qualifies this leniency, limiting it to cases where the primary bronchial tubes remain intact, and Rav Ashi outlines the practical examination method to verify their structural integrity.

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

The Gemara continues evaluating the position that exactly half of a siman is considered like a majority (mechtza kerov). Two difficulties are raised from braitot concerning pausing after slaughtering half a siman, or a siman that was pre-damaged. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects the initial understanding of Rav's statement regarding shechita and concludes that everyone agrees 50% is not a majority. The original debate between Rav and Rav Kahana applies exclusively to the laws of Pesach, in a case where the population is exactly half ritually pure and half impure. The Gemara notes a repetitive phrasing in the Mishna regarding the rule that a majority of a siman is sufficient. It explains that one sentence is needed for regular slaughter (chullin) and a second sentence for sacrifices (kodashim), as neither could be logically derived from the other. Various textual proofs and linguistic analyses of the Mishna's phrasing are brought by five Amoraim, each proving in a different way that the first sentence deals with chullin and the second with kodashim. Study Guide A fundamental debate is introduced between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan over whether shechita takes effect continuously from the beginning of the act until the end (yeshna leshechita mitchila ve'ad sof), or if it only takes effect at the very final moment (eina leshechita ela basof). Rava and Rav Yosef narrow the scope of the dispute, noting that everyone agrees in certain scenarios, but they differ over what exact case is actually the subject of the disagreement between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from a Mishna in Para against the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan that shechita applies from beginning to end. However, Rava refutes his difficulty and instead raises a counter-difficulty from that same Mishna against the opinion of Reish Lakish that shechita only takes effect at the final moment.

The Gemara asks whether the requirement to slaughter birds is a Torah law or a rabbinic law. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Pinchas rules that it is only a rabbinic law. The Gemara raises three difficulties against his position but resolves them. The final difficulty is resolved by pointing out that this matter is subject to a Tannaitic debate, and the Gemara brings both positions. Although only one siman needs to be slaughtered in a bird, the Gemara asks if it can be any siman or specifically the gullet. Rav Nachman and Rav Ada bar Ahava disagree on this point, and difficulties are raised against both positions. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that cutting either siman is valid. Rabbi Yehuda requires that the veins in the neck (veridin) must also be cut during slaughter. Rav Chisda explains that this rule applies specifically to birds, and its purpose is to drain out the extra blood so people will not come to eat it, but it is not an essential part of the shechita obligation. The Gemara raises three difficulties against this explanation, but they are all resolved. If exactly half of a siman was slaughtered, there is a debate between Rav and Rav Kahana - do we say that since the majority is not unslaughtered, the shechita is valid, or do we say that since the majority has not been slaughtered, the shechita is invalid? The Gemara begins by raising difficulties against Rav's position that half of a siman is considered as if the majority is slaughtered and the bird is permitted.

The Gemara asks whether the requirement to slaughter birds is a Torah law or a rabbinic law. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Pinchas rules that it is only a rabbinic law. The Gemara raises three difficulties against his position but resolves them. The final difficulty is resolved by pointing out that this matter is subject to a Tannaitic debate, and the Gemara brings both positions. Although only one siman needs to be slaughtered in a bird, the Gemara asks if it can be any siman or specifically the gullet. Rav Nachman and Rav Ada bar Ahava disagree on this point, and difficulties are raised against both positions. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that cutting either siman is valid. Rabbi Yehuda requires that the veins in the neck (veridin) must also be cut during slaughter. Rav Chisda explains that this rule applies specifically to birds, and its purpose is to drain out the extra blood so people will not come to eat it, but it is not an essential part of the shechita obligation. The Gemara raises three difficulties against this explanation, but they are all resolved. If exactly half of a siman was slaughtered, there is a debate between Rav and Rav Kahana - do we say that since the majority is not unslaughtered, the shechita is valid, or do we say that since the majority has not been slaughtered, the shechita is invalid? The Gemara begins by raising difficulties against Rav's position that half of a siman is considered as if the majority is slaughtered and the bird is permitted.

Pictures Rav Nachman permitted slaughtering above the large ring, at the point where the "hat" begins to slope inward, provided that the chitim (wheat-shaped glands) are at least partially left intact below the cut. This ruling matches neither the rabbis nor Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda, but appears to follow the position of Rabbi Chanina ben Antignus. Rav Huna and Rav Nachman dispute the exact parameters of the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda. One view posits that they disagree in a case where the slaughterer cut the first third too high up, and the remaining two-thirds in the correct place - whereas if one cut two-thirds in the correct place and then veered upward for the last third, all agree it is valid (as the majority was already severed properly). An alternative version shifts the opinions between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. Both versions include a difficulty and resolution exchanged between either Rav Chisda, Rav Yosef, and Abaye. Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda further disagree on cases of alternating validity - such as when one slaughters the first third in the wrong place, the next third in the right place, and the final third in the wrong place (or the reverse scenario). Rav Yehuda follows the absolute majority; if the total sum of the valid cuts constitutes a majority, the slaughter is kosher. Rav Huna, however, evaluates the chronological moment the majority is achieved, requiring the majority to be made continuously in a valid manner. Rav Kahana asked Rav Yehuda for the ruling on the cases of alternating thirds. He then raised several subsequent queries regarding the validity of shechita performed over a pre-existing perforation (nekev) in the windpipe. The Mishna notes that the location for shechita is the exact opposite of the location for melika (the sacrificial pinching of a bird's neck). Melika must be performed from the back of the neck (oref), whereas shechita must be performed from the front or the sides of the neck.

Pictures Rav Nachman permitted slaughtering above the large ring, at the point where the "hat" begins to slope inward, provided that the chitim (wheat-shaped glands) are at least partially left intact below the cut. This ruling matches neither the rabbis nor Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda, but appears to follow the position of Rabbi Chanina ben Antignus. Rav Huna and Rav Nachman dispute the exact parameters of the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yossi b'Rabbi Yehuda. One view posits that they disagree in a case where the slaughterer cut the first third too high up, and the remaining two-thirds in the correct place - whereas if one cut two-thirds in the correct place and then veered upward for the last third, all agree it is valid (as the majority was already severed properly). An alternative version shifts the opinions between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. Both versions include a difficulty and resolution exchanged between either Rav Chisda, Rav Yosef, and Abaye. Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda further disagree on cases of alternating validity - such as when one slaughters the first third in the wrong place, the next third in the right place, and the final third in the wrong place (or the reverse scenario). Rav Yehuda follows the absolute majority; if the total sum of the valid cuts constitutes a majority, the slaughter is kosher. Rav Huna, however, evaluates the chronological moment the majority is achieved, requiring the majority to be made continuously in a valid manner. Rav Kahana asked Rav Yehuda for the ruling on the cases of alternating thirds. He then raised several subsequent queries regarding the validity of shechita performed over a pre-existing perforation (nekev) in the windpipe. The Mishna notes that the location for shechita is the exact opposite of the location for melika (the sacrificial pinching of a bird's neck). Melika must be performed from the back of the neck (oref), whereas shechita must be performed from the front or the sides of the neck.

The Mishna rules that if one vows to bring a mincha (meal offering) but cannot recall which type, they must bring all five standard types. Abaye explains that this ruling can also align with Rabbi Shimon's position, which recognizes a sixth type consisting of both wafers and loaves; he argues that bringing the wafers and loaves separately covers the possibility of the combined type as well. The Gemara raises several practical difficulties regarding this possibility but resolves them all. Rav Kahana asks Rav Ashi why the person in the above case would not also need to offer a minchat nesachim (a meal offering brought with libations), given Rava's view that it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Rav Ashi identifies five distinct differences between a minchat nesachim and other voluntary meal offerings, demonstrating that someone in doubt about their vow would certainly not have been referring to an offering so fundamentally different. The Rabbis and Rebbi disagree in the Mishna regarding a case where one says, "I vowed to bring a mincha of esronim in one vessel, but I do not remember how many." The dispute centers on whether they must bring sixty esronim in one bowl or every amount from one to sixty in sixty separate bowls. The Gemara suggests five different explanations for the nature of this debate and analyzes each suggestion. The Mishna explains the minimum value one must provide when vowing to bring wood, frankincense, gold, silver, or copper to the Temple. The required amount depends on the phrasing used: if one said, "I vow to bring [the item]," they are required to bring the minimum. However, if one said, "I vowed an amount, but I do not remember what amount," they are required to bring the maximum.

The Mishna rules that if one vows to bring a mincha (meal offering) but cannot recall which type, they must bring all five standard types. Abaye explains that this ruling can also align with Rabbi Shimon's position, which recognizes a sixth type consisting of both wafers and loaves; he argues that bringing the wafers and loaves separately covers the possibility of the combined type as well. The Gemara raises several practical difficulties regarding this possibility but resolves them all. Rav Kahana asks Rav Ashi why the person in the above case would not also need to offer a minchat nesachim (a meal offering brought with libations), given Rava's view that it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Rav Ashi identifies five distinct differences between a minchat nesachim and other voluntary meal offerings, demonstrating that someone in doubt about their vow would certainly not have been referring to an offering so fundamentally different. The Rabbis and Rebbi disagree in the Mishna regarding a case where one says, "I vowed to bring a mincha of esronim in one vessel, but I do not remember how many." The dispute centers on whether they must bring sixty esronim in one bowl or every amount from one to sixty in sixty separate bowls. The Gemara suggests five different explanations for the nature of this debate and analyzes each suggestion. The Mishna explains the minimum value one must provide when vowing to bring wood, frankincense, gold, silver, or copper to the Temple. The required amount depends on the phrasing used: if one said, "I vow to bring [the item]," they are required to bring the minimum. However, if one said, "I vowed an amount, but I do not remember what amount," they are required to bring the maximum.

A Mishna in Chagigah 20b explains that sanctified items placed in the same sanctified vessel are considered combined for purposes of impurity; for example, if a tvul yom touched one, everything else in the vessel would become impure. However, this is only if they are all touching. The sons of Rabbi Chiya asked Rav Kahana if that would hold true even if they weren't touching. Rav Kahana derived from the word "tzeiruf" used in the Mishna there that they would combine. They ask two more related questions and Rav Kahana answers them. Then, Rav Kahana asks them a question about whether combining two items in a bowl, when not touching, would be valid for taking a kemitza (if the dough of the mincha was split into two parts). They attempted to make a comparison between the case in question and the case in our Mishna regarding the two minchas that got mixed together. However, Rava rejects the comparison as it is likely they were touching. Rabbi Yirmia asks a follow-up question about items being connected regarding impurity—in a case where the item is attached through water (in a pipe) to something outside of the vessel. Would the impurity extend to there as well? Or what if the outside piece became impure, would it extend to the other piece in the bowl as well? If a mincha offering was divided and one part became impure and was then added to a bowl with its other half, if a tvul yom then comes and touches the impure half while it is in the bowl with the other, is the other piece impure as well? This is in essence asking whether once something is impure, can impurity be added again? Rava asked this question and Abaye tried to answer it from a Mishna in Keilim 27:9, explaining that there is no such concept that once something is impure it cannot become impure again, but Rava rejects his proof as the cases aren't comparable. The Gemara further tries to prove Abaye's point from the continuation of that Mishna, but that is rejected as well. Rava and Abaye disagree about a case where there are three pieces—two from the original, one of which was lost temporarily, and a third that came to replace the lost half. What is the relationship between the three for laws of impurity and laws of kemitza?

A Mishna in Chagigah 20b explains that sanctified items placed in the same sanctified vessel are considered combined for purposes of impurity; for example, if a tvul yom touched one, everything else in the vessel would become impure. However, this is only if they are all touching. The sons of Rabbi Chiya asked Rav Kahana if that would hold true even if they weren't touching. Rav Kahana derived from the word "tzeiruf" used in the Mishna there that they would combine. They ask two more related questions and Rav Kahana answers them. Then, Rav Kahana asks them a question about whether combining two items in a bowl, when not touching, would be valid for taking a kemitza (if the dough of the mincha was split into two parts). They attempted to make a comparison between the case in question and the case in our Mishna regarding the two minchas that got mixed together. However, Rava rejects the comparison as it is likely they were touching. Rabbi Yirmia asks a follow-up question about items being connected regarding impurity—in a case where the item is attached through water (in a pipe) to something outside of the vessel. Would the impurity extend to there as well? Or what if the outside piece became impure, would it extend to the other piece in the bowl as well? If a mincha offering was divided and one part became impure and was then added to a bowl with its other half, if a tvul yom then comes and touches the impure half while it is in the bowl with the other, is the other piece impure as well? This is in essence asking whether once something is impure, can impurity be added again? Rava asked this question and Abaye tried to answer it from a Mishna in Keilim 27:9, explaining that there is no such concept that once something is impure it cannot become impure again, but Rava rejects his proof as the cases aren't comparable. The Gemara further tries to prove Abaye's point from the continuation of that Mishna, but that is rejected as well. Rava and Abaye disagree about a case where there are three pieces—two from the original, one of which was lost temporarily, and a third that came to replace the lost half. What is the relationship between the three for laws of impurity and laws of kemitza?

The Suffering Warrior: Unveiling Judah's Mashiyach ben Yosef and the Messianic Mystery Overview In this post, Rod explores Judah's conception of Mashiyach ben Yosef (Messiah son of Joseph), tracing its development through biblical, Rabbinic, and apocalyptic literature, and connecting it to Messianic faith in Yeshua. The study highlights the "suffering warrior" motif, the precursor role to Mashiyach ben David, and the eschatological implications for Israel and the world. Key Themes & Scriptural Foundations Mashiyach ben Yosef as Precursor: Mashiyach ben Yosef is depicted as a leader who precedes Mashiyach ben David, preparing Israel through military, political, and spiritual means (repentance and Torah observance). This role is likened to John the Immerser as a type of precursor. Two-Stage Eschatology: Rabbinic tradition envisions two Messiahs—ben Yosef (the suffering, martyred leader) and ben David (the glorious, reigning king). The first stage is marked by suffering and conflict, the second by peace and restoration. Scriptural Roots: Genesis 49:22–26: Joseph's blessing as a "fruitful bough" and a suffering deliverer, foreshadowing the Messiah's role. Isaiah 11:13: Prophecy of Ephraim and Judah's reconciliation, interpreted as the work of two Messiahs. Zechariah 12:10: The pierced one, mourned by Israel, linked to Mashiyach ben Yosefciteturn4search1L20, L29-30. Obadiah 1:18, 21: Two "saviors" leading Israel, interpreted as ben Yosef and ben David. Rabbinic and Apocalyptic References Talmudic Sources: Sukkah 52a–b: Explicit references to Mashiyach ben Yosef, his death in the war of Gog and Magog, and the mourning that follows. Also mentions four eschatological figures: Mashiyach ben David, Mashiyach ben Yosef, Elijah, and the righteous High Priest (https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.52b.16?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en)citeturn4search1L25, L29-31. Genesis Rabbah 75:6, 99:2: Describes the "War Messiah" from Joseph's lineage, involved in Temple restoration. Pesikta de-Rav Kahana 5:9 and Pesikta Rabbati 15.14/16: Discuss the "Anointed One for War" and the four messianic figures. Songs of Rabbah: Mentions Elijah, King Messiah, Melchizedek, and the Anointed for War (https://books.google.com/books?id=3YH99skQxGIC&q=Song+of+Songs+Rabbah+messiah+Elijah+war&pg=PA138). Sefer Zerubbabel: 7th-century apocalyptic text introducing Nehemiah ben Hushiel (Mashiyach ben Yosef) and Menahem ben Ammiel (Mashiyach ben David), outlining the sequence of redemption, warfare, death, resurrection, and the Messianic Age (https://pages.charlotte.edu/john-reeves/research-projects/trajectories-in-near-eastern-apocalyptic/sefer-zerubbabel). Dead Sea Scrolls: 4Q175 ("The Testimonia") and 4Q372 ("The Joseph Apocryphon"): Present a suffering, priestly, and warrior leader matching the ben Yosef persona. 1QS (Community Rule): Describes two Messiahs—of Aaron (priestly) and of Israel (kingly/warrior), with the latter subordinate to the former. Liturgical and Kabbalistic References: Amidah (Shemoneh Esrei): Kabbalists see the prayer for David's throne as a plea for Mashiyach ben Yosef's protection (https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/867674/jewish/Translation.htm). Kol HaTor: "Yosef is still alive" prayer for Mashiyach ben Yosef's mercy (https://vilnagaon.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/KOL_HATOR.pdf). Messianic Fulfillment and Insights Typology and Yeshua: Rod argues that Yeshua fulfills the typology of Mashiyach ben Yosef—suffering, atoning, gathering the lost sheep, and preparing the way for the Messianic Age. Scriptural parallels include Isaiah 53, Luke 4, Mark 13, Revelation 19, Zechariah 14, Ezekiel 34, and others. Conditional Redemption: Some Rabbinic sources suggest that the suffering and death of Mashiyach ben Yosef are conditional upon Israel's spiritual state. Practical Insights for Believers: Suffering: True discipleship involves suffering and persecution, echoing the path of Mashiyach ben Yosef and Yeshua (Matthew 24:9, John 15:20). Atonement: The suffering of Mashiyach ben Yosef is linked to atonement for Israel's sins, paralleling Yeshua's redemptive work (Ephesians 2:8, Matthew 5:3, 5). Redemption: The manuscript emphasizes the final redemption of Israel, rooted in biblical prophecy (Romans 11, Ezekiel 36–37, Zechariah 12–14, Isaiah 11, Jeremiah 31). Warfare: Both spiritual and physical warfare are central, with believers called to "put on the whole armor of God" (Ephesians 6). Call to Action Intercession for Judah: The manuscript urges Messianic believers to pray for and love the Jewish people, recognizing the "partial blindness" until the fullness of the Gentiles comes in (Romans 11:25). Invitation to Discipleship: The closing invites readers to enter into covenant relationship with Yehovah through Yeshua Messiah (2 Corinthians 6:2). References & Further Reading https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/101747/jewish/Mashiach-ben-Yossef.htm https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.52b.16?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en https://books.google.com/books?id=3YH99skQxGIC&q=Song+of+Songs+Rabbah+messiah+Elijah+war&pg=PA138 https://pages.charlotte.edu/john-reeves/research-projects/trajectories-in-near-eastern-apocalyptic/sefer-zerubbabel https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/867674/jewish/Translation.htm https://vilnagaon.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/KOL_HATOR.pdf https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.52a.1-52b.17?lang=bi https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messiah_ben_Joseph https://www.themessianictorahobserver.org/2026/01/16/beyond-protests-how-prayer-and-fasting-topple-evil-regimes-venezuela-minnesota-iran-the-extreme-radical-left-weighing-heavy-on-my-mind/

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: "For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala." Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word "to" between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no maaser sheni, based on a gezeira shava linking the two. When Reish Lakish challenges this - arguing that according to that gezeira shava, the Pesach offering and other sacrificial foods should also not be eaten - Rabbi Yochanan offers a different explanation: the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon's view that only obligatory sacrifices with a fixed time were brought, which excludes animal tithes. Since maaser sheni (grain tithes) is comparable to animal tithes, it too would not apply. According to this second explanation, Rabbi Yehuda would hold that maaser sheni was brought during the period of Nov and Givon, a view supported by a statement of Rav Ada and a braita cited by Rav Yosef. Although the verse in Devarim 12:9 was initially explained as referring to Shilo and Jerusalem through the terms menucha and nachala, three additional interpretations are presented, each examined in the context of the verse. The Mishna states that one who consecrates an animal for sacrifice at a time when bamot are permitted, but offers it when bamot are forbidden, is not liable for karet. Rav Kahana limits this exemption to slaughtering outside the Temple; one who actually offers the sacrifice outside is liable for karet. After Rav Kahana explains his derivation, Raba rejects his position on two grounds. The Mishna lists several differences between the sacrificial procedures on the large bama and on smaller bamot. The Gemara provides the Torah sources for each distinction. Two versions are recorded regarding a limitation taught by Rami bar Hama, and a braita is cited to either challenge or support his view. Finally, an alternative position is presented in the name of Rabbi Elazar.

התוכן הנהגת רבותינו נשיאינו היתה להדליק נרות חנוכה על פתח א' החדרים של הבית ולא ליד החלון הפתוח לרשות הרבים, וצ"ב עפ"י נגלה, כי מגמ' משמע שכשאין אפשרות להדליק את הנרות חנוכה "על פתח ביתו מבחוץ" יש להדליקן ליד חלון הבית הפונה לרה"ר? והרי הם נהגו כך גם בזמן שלא הי' סכנה וגם במציאות שבודאי יעברו ברה"ר עשרה מישראל ויהי' "פרסומא ניסא" וכו' (ואין לתרץ כי כך ראו אצל רבם וה"ז בבחי' "הואיל ונפק מפומא דרב כהנא", כי זה רק מעבירה את השאלה על רבם), והביאור י"ל: א) החיוב להדליק הנרות ליד החלון הוא רק אם החלון הוא למטה מעשרים אמה, כמפורש בגמ'. ב) לרוב ה"חנוכיות" בזמננו יש דופן מאחורי הנרות, ואם יעמיד את החנוכי' באופן שהנרות ייראו מבחוץ הנה אז: 1. ההדלקה עצמה תהי' קשה לו 2. יחסר הענין של "פרסומי ניסא" לבני-הבית עצמם כי הדופן יסתיר להם את הנרות, (וכיון ש"הדלקה עושה מצוה" לא כדאי להדליק קודם את הנרות כשהם לבפנים ואח"ז לסובב את הנרות לבחוץ וכו'). וכ"ז הוא לשקו"ט בלבד, אבל בנוגע לפועל ‏–‏ מכיון שזה הי' ה"מעשה רב" של רבותינו נשיאינו הרי כך צ"ל הנהגת כאו"א מאתנו.משיחת נר ה' דחנוכה ה'תש"ל ל"הנחה פרטית" או התרגום ללה"ק של השיחה: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=15-12-2025 Synopsis Explanation is required according to Nigleh as to why the Rebbeim would light Chanukah specifically in a doorway between two rooms inside the house, whereas it is understood from the Gemara that one should light Chanukah candles “at the entrance to one's house on the outside,” and if one cannot, he should light at a window facing the public domain. And the Rebbeim did this even in times when there was no danger from people outside seeing the candles, and even where it was certain that ten Jews would be passing by in the public domain (thus fulfilling the requirement of pirsumei nisa) etc. (And we cannot simply answer that they did so because that is what they observed by their Rebbe – “since it came from the mouth of Rav Kahana…” – because then the question just becomes why their Rebbe did so.) This can be explained as follows: (1) The obligation to light the candles by the window applies only if the window is lower than twenty amos, as the Gemara says. (2) Most Chanukah menorahs these days have a back panel behind the candles. Therefore, if the menorah is placed facing the public domain, then (a) one would have to reach over the panel to light, which is difficult, and (b) the candles won't be seen by the people inside the house because they will be blocked by the back panel. (Turning the menorah around after lighting it is not an option because “the lighting is the mitzvah,” so the candles shouldn't be moved after lighting.) All of this is in the realm of discussion and debate, but practically speaking, since in practice the Rebbeim lit at the doorway inside the house, this is what every one of us should do.Excerpt from sichah of the 5th night of Chanukah, 5730 For a transcript in English of the Sicha: https://thedailysicha.com/?date=15-12-2025

  According to the Mishna, in a burnt offering, items that are connected to the meat but not the meat itself—such as bones, hooves, horns, and sinews—are left on the altar if they remain attached to the meat. However, if they are detached, they must be removed from the altar. This ruling is derived from two different verses in the Torah: in Vayikra 1:9 it says that everything is burned on the altar, while in Devarim 12:27 it specifies that in burnt offerings, meat and blood are brought on the altar. This opinion in the Mishna is attributed to Rebbi, while another tannaitic view interprets "everything" more broadly to include these parts, with the limiting verse excluding bones, sinews, etc. only once they have already been consumed by the fire and separated from it. Rabbi Zeira qualifies Rebbi's opinion, explaining that if these parts became separated from the meat but moved closer to the pyre, they are to remain on the altar. The Gemara rejects this explanation, and Rabba offers a different interpretation of Rabbi Zeira's qualification. He explains that the qualification was not on Rebbi's words themselves but on an inference drawn from them—that if they separate, they must be removed from the altar, though they still retain sanctity and cannot be used for personal benefit. Rabba then distinguishes between items that separated before the blood was placed on the altar and those that separated afterward. If they were still attached at the time of the blood sprinkling and later separated, they are considered sanctified items that became disqualified, which are forbidden for benefit. But if they were already detached at the time of sprinkling, they were never destined for the altar and are therefore permitted for the kohanim's use, as derived from a gezeira shava from the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar takes the opposite approach. If they were still attached when the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling permits them, so there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, though they remain prohibited by rabbinic law. However, if they were already detached, the sprinkling has no effect on them, and they remain in their original consecrated state, making one liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Mishna further explains that if any of the disqualified offerings that are meant to remain on the altar (as mentioned in Zevachim 84a) fall off the altar, or if an ember of wood falls off, they do not need to be returned. The Mishna also rules that if parts of the sacrifice that are to be burned on the altar fall off, they must be put back on if this occurs before midnight. After midnight, however, they do not need to be returned. The Gemara limits this ruling to items that have hardened but not yet reduced to ash. Items not yet consumed to that state must be returned regardless of the time, while items already reduced to ash do not need to be returned. Rav brings a source for the significance of midnight in this law from a drasha on the verses in Vayikra 6:2–3. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on this braita from a Mishna in Yoma 20a, and Rabbi Yochanan brings a different drasha to explain the Mishna.

  According to the Mishna, in a burnt offering, items that are connected to the meat but not the meat itself—such as bones, hooves, horns, and sinews—are left on the altar if they remain attached to the meat. However, if they are detached, they must be removed from the altar. This ruling is derived from two different verses in the Torah: in Vayikra 1:9 it says that everything is burned on the altar, while in Devarim 12:27 it specifies that in burnt offerings, meat and blood are brought on the altar. This opinion in the Mishna is attributed to Rebbi, while another tannaitic view interprets "everything" more broadly to include these parts, with the limiting verse excluding bones, sinews, etc. only once they have already been consumed by the fire and separated from it. Rabbi Zeira qualifies Rebbi's opinion, explaining that if these parts became separated from the meat but moved closer to the pyre, they are to remain on the altar. The Gemara rejects this explanation, and Rabba offers a different interpretation of Rabbi Zeira's qualification. He explains that the qualification was not on Rebbi's words themselves but on an inference drawn from them—that if they separate, they must be removed from the altar, though they still retain sanctity and cannot be used for personal benefit. Rabba then distinguishes between items that separated before the blood was placed on the altar and those that separated afterward. If they were still attached at the time of the blood sprinkling and later separated, they are considered sanctified items that became disqualified, which are forbidden for benefit. But if they were already detached at the time of sprinkling, they were never destined for the altar and are therefore permitted for the kohanim's use, as derived from a gezeira shava from the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar takes the opposite approach. If they were still attached when the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling permits them, so there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, though they remain prohibited by rabbinic law. However, if they were already detached, the sprinkling has no effect on them, and they remain in their original consecrated state, making one liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Mishna further explains that if any of the disqualified offerings that are meant to remain on the altar (as mentioned in Zevachim 84a) fall off the altar, or if an ember of wood falls off, they do not need to be returned. The Mishna also rules that if parts of the sacrifice that are to be burned on the altar fall off, they must be put back on if this occurs before midnight. After midnight, however, they do not need to be returned. The Gemara limits this ruling to items that have hardened but not yet reduced to ash. Items not yet consumed to that state must be returned regardless of the time, while items already reduced to ash do not need to be returned. Rav brings a source for the significance of midnight in this law from a drasha on the verses in Vayikra 6:2–3. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on this braita from a Mishna in Yoma 20a, and Rabbi Yochanan brings a different drasha to explain the Mishna.

Why Did He Go Back?

Who Did He Overcome?

Why Did He Go Up?

Where Was He Buried?

What Was His Relationship?

When Did He Live?

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Baba Metzia 84a, focusing on a Talmudic discussion about Rabbi Yochanan's exceptional beauty and its spiritual implications. The episode delves into the concept of the evil eye, the influence of parental thoughts on conception, and the responsibility to use one's gifts thoughtfully. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan's Beauty: Rabbi Yochanan claims to be the last of Jerusalem's beautiful people, described vividly: a silver goblet filled with pomegranate seeds, crowned with roses, and placed between sun and shade reflects a fraction of his radiance. The Talmud questions this, noting Rav Kahana's beauty resembled Rav Avohu's, which resembled Yaakov's, which resembled Adam's. Rabbi Yochanan's distinction was his beardless face, enhancing his radiant appearance.Mikvah Practice: Rabbi Yochanan sat at the women's mikvah entrance so that women, emerging from ritual immersion, would see him and retain his image, influencing their conception to produce beautiful, Torah-learned children. This mirrors Yaakov's use of streaked rods to influence sheep traits. Rabbi Wolbe defends this as a responsible use of his gift, not arrogance, citing his grandfather's teaching that knowing and using one's virtues is an obligation, akin to knowing one's wealth to give charity.Evil Eye Concerns: The sages question if Rabbi Yochanan feared the evil eye from displaying his beauty. He responds that, as a descendant of Yosef, he is immune, per Genesis 49:22 (“Yosef is a charming son, above the eye”) and 49:24 (likening Yosef's progeny to fish, hidden from the evil eye). Rabbi Wolbe explains the evil eye's real impact: flaunting wealth or beauty can cause jealousy, stress, or harm in others, affecting their relationships or finances.Practical Lessons: Rabbi Wolbe shares anecdotes to illustrate avoiding the evil eye: his father's choice of a modest Toyota Camry over a Lincoln Town Car to avoid neighbors' jealousy, and leaving a broken blinker light to deter envy. He recounts Marvy Finger's mentor, a wealthy man flying coach to avoid wasteful display, emphasizing humility and consideration for others' feelings.Broader Message: The episode underscores the responsibility to use God-given gifts (beauty, wealth) for positive impact while avoiding harm through jealousy. Rabbi Yochanan's actions aimed to inspire righteousness, not pride. Rabbi Wolbe urges mindfulness of how one's actions affect others, promoting sensitivity in a world prone to envy and comparison.The episode concludes with a blessing for a wonderful Shabbos and a call to share Torah content._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on August 29, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 17, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Beauty, #Yochanan, #Gemara, #Radiant, #Responsibility, #Humility, #Mentor, #Practicality, #Luxury, #Mindfulness ★ Support this podcast ★

In this episode of the Thinking Talmudist Podcast, Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe explores Tractate Baba Metzia 84a, focusing on a Talmudic discussion about Rabbi Yochanan's exceptional beauty and its spiritual implications. The episode delves into the concept of the evil eye, the influence of parental thoughts on conception, and the responsibility to use one's gifts thoughtfully. Key points include:Rabbi Yochanan's Beauty: Rabbi Yochanan claims to be the last of Jerusalem's beautiful people, described vividly: a silver goblet filled with pomegranate seeds, crowned with roses, and placed between sun and shade reflects a fraction of his radiance. The Talmud questions this, noting Rav Kahana's beauty resembled Rav Avohu's, which resembled Yaakov's, which resembled Adam's. Rabbi Yochanan's distinction was his beardless face, enhancing his radiant appearance.Mikvah Practice: Rabbi Yochanan sat at the women's mikvah entrance so that women, emerging from ritual immersion, would see him and retain his image, influencing their conception to produce beautiful, Torah-learned children. This mirrors Yaakov's use of streaked rods to influence sheep traits. Rabbi Wolbe defends this as a responsible use of his gift, not arrogance, citing his grandfather's teaching that knowing and using one's virtues is an obligation, akin to knowing one's wealth to give charity.Evil Eye Concerns: The sages question if Rabbi Yochanan feared the evil eye from displaying his beauty. He responds that, as a descendant of Yosef, he is immune, per Genesis 49:22 (“Yosef is a charming son, above the eye”) and 49:24 (likening Yosef's progeny to fish, hidden from the evil eye). Rabbi Wolbe explains the evil eye's real impact: flaunting wealth or beauty can cause jealousy, stress, or harm in others, affecting their relationships or finances.Practical Lessons: Rabbi Wolbe shares anecdotes to illustrate avoiding the evil eye: his father's choice of a modest Toyota Camry over a Lincoln Town Car to avoid neighbors' jealousy, and leaving a broken blinker light to deter envy. He recounts Marvy Finger's mentor, a wealthy man flying coach to avoid wasteful display, emphasizing humility and consideration for others' feelings.Broader Message: The episode underscores the responsibility to use God-given gifts (beauty, wealth) for positive impact while avoiding harm through jealousy. Rabbi Yochanan's actions aimed to inspire righteousness, not pride. Rabbi Wolbe urges mindfulness of how one's actions affect others, promoting sensitivity in a world prone to envy and comparison.The episode concludes with a blessing for a wonderful Shabbos and a call to share Torah content._____________The Thinking Talmudist Podcast shares select teachings of Talmud in a fresh, insightful and meaningful way. Many claim that they cannot learn Talmud because it is in ancient Aramaic or the concepts are too difficult. Well, no more excuses. In this podcast you will experience the refreshing and eye-opening teachings while gaining an amazing appreciation for the divine wisdom of the Torah and the depths of the Talmud._____________This Podcast Series is Generously Underwritten by David & Susan MarbinRecorded at TORCH Meyerland in the Levin Family Studios to a live audience on August 29, 2025, in Houston, Texas.Released as Podcast on October 17, 2025_____________Listen, Subscribe & Share: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/thinking-talmudist-podcast-rabbi-aryeh-wolbe/id1648951154Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0cZ7q9bGYSBYSPQfJvwgzmShare your questions at aw@torchweb.org or visit torchweb.org for more Torah content.  _____________About the Host:Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe, Director of TORCH in Houston, brings decades of Torah scholarship to guide listeners in applying Jewish wisdom to daily life.  To directly send your questions, comments, and feedback, please email: awolbe@torchweb.org_____________Support Our Mission:Help us share Jewish wisdom globally by sponsoring an episode at torchweb.org. Your support makes a difference!_____________Listen MoreOther podcasts by Rabbi Aryeh Wolbe: NEW!! Prayer Podcast: https://prayerpodcast.transistor.fm/episodesJewish Inspiration Podcast: https://inspiration.transistor.fm/episodesParsha Review Podcast: https://parsha.transistor.fm/episodesLiving Jewishly Podcast: https://jewishly.transistor.fm/episodesThinking Talmudist Podcast: https://talmud.transistor.fm/episodesUnboxing Judaism Podcast: https://unboxing.transistor.fm/episodesRabbi Aryeh Wolbe Podcast Collection: https://collection.transistor.fm/episodesFor a full listing of podcasts available by TORCH at http://podcast.torchweb.org_____________Keywords:#Talmud, #Beauty, #Yochanan, #Gemara, #Radiant, #Responsibility, #Humility, #Mentor, #Practicality, #Luxury, #Mindfulness ★ Support this podcast ★

An oath on a deposit - to make it clear that it's not in the person's possession, for example. A deliberate false oath of deposit means a korban asham - a guilt-offering. Back when they were studying Shevuot in yeshiva in the time of the Gemara - witnesses warn the person not to swear falsely. Note - the korban asham is fairly unusual, in that it is itself the punishment, or the guilt, and not for the sake of atoning. Plus, Rav Kahana's question about witnesses warning against false testimony - but is that warning a halakhic warning for all sins, in general? It would seem not. Also, a refinement - the guilt-offering only is incumbent when the false oath is intentional - and without witnesses. Plus, the way the oath for the deposit has more stringent halakhot than those for the oath of testimony.

Regarding an oath on a deposit, Rav Kahana questions: if witnesses warned the person before taking the oath, that in the event they are lying, they will receive lashes, will they receive lashes in addition to a sacrifice or in place of the sacrifice? Several attempts are made to answer his question from various sources, but none are conclusive. Raba then challenges Rav Kahana's question and suggests that there can never be such a case because if there are witnesses to warn, then they must also be witnesses to the act in which case the denial is irrelevant as the witnesses can make the person pay, regardless of their denial. The Gemara then attempts to prove and then disprove this assumption of Raba that if there are witnesses, one cannot be obligated for an oath of deposit. Only from the last source do they succeed in conclusively disproving this assumption. Is an oath of deposit relevant in a case relating to land?

Regarding an oath on a deposit, Rav Kahana questions: if witnesses warned the person before taking the oath, that in the event they are lying, they will receive lashes, will they receive lashes in addition to a sacrifice or in place of the sacrifice? Several attempts are made to answer his question from various sources, but none are conclusive. Raba then challenges Rav Kahana's question and suggests that there can never be such a case because if there are witnesses to warn, then they must also be witnesses to the act in which case the denial is irrelevant as the witnesses can make the person pay, regardless of their denial. The Gemara then attempts to prove and then disprove this assumption of Raba that if there are witnesses, one cannot be obligated for an oath of deposit. Only from the last source do they succeed in conclusively disproving this assumption. Is an oath of deposit relevant in a case relating to land?

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

This week's learning is sponsored by the Hadran family for the refuah shleima of Phyllis Hecht, Gittel Pasha bat Masha Rachel. "Phyllis, you are a true fighter, a yereat shamayim a mega baalat chesed, and a "fellow" daf learner. May your surgery on Thursday go well, with the wonderful shlichim at Sheba Hospital. עברת את פרעה, תעברי גם את זה!!! We are behind you and continue davening for you with all our might." Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about whether one gets exiled for killing if the blade fell off the handle and killed someone and if one was killed from wood chips that splintered off while chopping. Rebbi holds that the case described in the Torah in Devraim 19:5 refers to the latter case and the rabbis hold that it refers to the former. A braita brings two proofs from the text for Rebbi's reading of the verse. Rav Chiya bar Ashi explains the root of the debate is whether there is em l'mikra, we follow the way the verse is traditionally read, or em l'masoret, we follow the way the verse is written. There are different rules for accidental murder depending on what domain the death occurred and whether the victim was already there or put his head out the window after, for example, a rock was thrown in that direction. Abba Shaul rules that if one accidentally killed while performing a mitzva, the murderer is exempt from exile. This is derived from Devraim 19:5. A rabbi raised a difficulty with this derivation to Rava, but it is resolved. In a different version of the sugya, the rabbi asked the same question but on a different sugya. The Mishna rules that a child is exiled to a refuge city for killing a parent, but a braita rules the opposite. Rav Kahana and Rava each reconcile the contradiction in a different manner. A braita rules that slave or a Cuti are exiled to a refuge city for killing a Jew and can receive lashes. Likewise, a Jew is exiled and receives lashes for doing the same to a Cuti or slave. For what offense are the lashes?

This week's learning is sponsored by the Hadran family for the refuah shleima of Phyllis Hecht, Gittel Pasha bat Masha Rachel. "Phyllis, you are a true fighter, a yereat shamayim a mega baalat chesed, and a "fellow" daf learner. May your surgery on Thursday go well, with the wonderful shlichim at Sheba Hospital. עברת את פרעה, תעברי גם את זה!!! We are behind you and continue davening for you with all our might." Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about whether one gets exiled for killing if the blade fell off the handle and killed someone and if one was killed from wood chips that splintered off while chopping. Rebbi holds that the case described in the Torah in Devraim 19:5 refers to the latter case and the rabbis hold that it refers to the former. A braita brings two proofs from the text for Rebbi's reading of the verse. Rav Chiya bar Ashi explains the root of the debate is whether there is em l'mikra, we follow the way the verse is traditionally read, or em l'masoret, we follow the way the verse is written. There are different rules for accidental murder depending on what domain the death occurred and whether the victim was already there or put his head out the window after, for example, a rock was thrown in that direction. Abba Shaul rules that if one accidentally killed while performing a mitzva, the murderer is exempt from exile. This is derived from Devraim 19:5. A rabbi raised a difficulty with this derivation to Rava, but it is resolved. In a different version of the sugya, the rabbi asked the same question but on a different sugya. The Mishna rules that a child is exiled to a refuge city for killing a parent, but a braita rules the opposite. Rav Kahana and Rava each reconcile the contradiction in a different manner. A braita rules that slave or a Cuti are exiled to a refuge city for killing a Jew and can receive lashes. Likewise, a Jew is exiled and receives lashes for doing the same to a Cuti or slave. For what offense are the lashes?

Today's daf is sponsored by Samuel Berlad in honor of Esther Sarah bat Sarah to get good passing grades in the exams and parnassah tova. Also in loving memory of Devorah bat Avraham, for the refuah shleima of Shmuel Lev ben Bracha.  Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey and Jake Levant in honor of Deborah and Michael Dickson. "Wishing you a huge mazel tov  on the engagement of Dalia to Yared Posnasky." Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav that a conspiring witness pays according to his share. After four unsuccessful attempts to explain the meaning of his statement, they explain it to be a case where the witness said he was convicted and charged money in a court for being a conspiring witness. Based on his testimony, he can be obligated to pay his share, even though his testimony cannot incriminate the other witness. If conspiring witnesses testify that a man divorced his wife and did not pay her the ketuba money, how is the payment for their punishment assessed, as they tried to obligate him to pay money that he may have had to pay later if he predeceases his wife or divorces her? If conspiring witnesses testify that a debtor who had a ten-year loan had a thirty-day loan, how is the payment for their punishment assessed? Both these cases are explained in the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that a ten-year loan is canceled when the shmita year arrives. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on his statement from the Mishna as it implies that a ten-year loan can be collected. Rava resolves the contradiction. According to an alternative version of the sugya, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav the opposite - that a ten-year loan is collected. Rav Kahana supported his statement from our Mishna.Rava rejects the support from the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that if one loans another upon the condition that the shmita year not cancel the loan, the loan is canceled anyway as the condition is invalid. However, this contradicts a different statement of Shmuel regarding ona'ah, that a condition that goes against the Torah is valid if the issue relates to money. How is this resolved? Two other statements are brought by Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav and Rav Kahana raises a difficulty against them - one about laws of Shabbat and one about laws of mikveh.

Today's daf is sponsored by Samuel Berlad in honor of Esther Sarah bat Sarah to get good passing grades in the exams and parnassah tova. Also in loving memory of Devorah bat Avraham, for the refuah shleima of Shmuel Lev ben Bracha.  Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey and Jake Levant in honor of Deborah and Michael Dickson. "Wishing you a huge mazel tov  on the engagement of Dalia to Yared Posnasky." Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav that a conspiring witness pays according to his share. After four unsuccessful attempts to explain the meaning of his statement, they explain it to be a case where the witness said he was convicted and charged money in a court for being a conspiring witness. Based on his testimony, he can be obligated to pay his share, even though his testimony cannot incriminate the other witness. If conspiring witnesses testify that a man divorced his wife and did not pay her the ketuba money, how is the payment for their punishment assessed, as they tried to obligate him to pay money that he may have had to pay later if he predeceases his wife or divorces her? If conspiring witnesses testify that a debtor who had a ten-year loan had a thirty-day loan, how is the payment for their punishment assessed? Both these cases are explained in the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that a ten-year loan is canceled when the shmita year arrives. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on his statement from the Mishna as it implies that a ten-year loan can be collected. Rava resolves the contradiction. According to an alternative version of the sugya, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav the opposite - that a ten-year loan is collected. Rav Kahana supported his statement from our Mishna.Rava rejects the support from the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that if one loans another upon the condition that the shmita year not cancel the loan, the loan is canceled anyway as the condition is invalid. However, this contradicts a different statement of Shmuel regarding ona'ah, that a condition that goes against the Torah is valid if the issue relates to money. How is this resolved? Two other statements are brought by Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav and Rav Kahana raises a difficulty against them - one about laws of Shabbat and one about laws of mikveh.

Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandmother, Ann Barnett on her yahrzeit. "Her strength kept us going and she maintained her dedication to seeking knowledge all the days of her life." How do all the cases in the previous braita accord with Rabbi Meir's opinion that a rebellious elder can only be in a case that can lead to a prohibition of karet? In what way does a rebellious elder need to disagree with the court in order to be convicted? Rav Kahana rules that only if he dares to disagree based on his own logic with a tradition of the rabbis of the court, he is convicted. Rabb Elazar disagrees and says that the purpose of convicting a rebellious elder is to prevent debates and therefore any disagreement of any sort will lead to a conviction.  Two sources (one of them from our Mishna) are brought to raise a difficulty with Rav Kahane's position and the second is left unresolved.  What is the hierarchy of the courts? How were judges chosen? The rebellious elder is convicted only if he either goes back and teaches against the ruling of the High Court and he himself acts according to his ruling or people follow his ruling. A difficulty is raised on the former possibility as if he follows his own ruling, he should already be liable for the death penalty for the action, not for being a rebellious elder. The Gemara offers a few possibilities to resolve this difficulty. The Mishna explains that there is a stringency with Rabbinic law for a rebellious elder - if he tells people to go against Torah law, he is not convicted, but if he differs from the court regarding the rabbinic definition of a Torah law and adds to it, like five compartments in the tefillin, he can be convicted. Rav Oshaya says that this would be the only possible case. Why not the four species? Why not tzitzit?

Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandmother, Ann Barnett on her yahrzeit. "Her strength kept us going and she maintained her dedication to seeking knowledge all the days of her life." How do all the cases in the previous braita accord with Rabbi Meir's opinion that a rebellious elder can only be in a case that can lead to a prohibition of karet? In what way does a rebellious elder need to disagree with the court in order to be convicted? Rav Kahana rules that only if he dares to disagree based on his own logic with a tradition of the rabbis of the court, he is convicted. Rabb Elazar disagrees and says that the purpose of convicting a rebellious elder is to prevent debates and therefore any disagreement of any sort will lead to a conviction.  Two sources (one of them from our Mishna) are brought to raise a difficulty with Rav Kahane's position and the second is left unresolved.  What is the hierarchy of the courts? How were judges chosen? The rebellious elder is convicted only if he either goes back and teaches against the ruling of the High Court and he himself acts according to his ruling or people follow his ruling. A difficulty is raised on the former possibility as if he follows his own ruling, he should already be liable for the death penalty for the action, not for being a rebellious elder. The Gemara offers a few possibilities to resolve this difficulty. The Mishna explains that there is a stringency with Rabbinic law for a rebellious elder - if he tells people to go against Torah law, he is not convicted, but if he differs from the court regarding the rabbinic definition of a Torah law and adds to it, like five compartments in the tefillin, he can be convicted. Rav Oshaya says that this would be the only possible case. Why not the four species? Why not tzitzit?

Today's daf is sponsored by Avi Yonitzman for finishing Mashechet Shekalim. "I've now closed the gap from Berakhot to Shekalim and may we be zoche to finishing the 14th cycle together." Today's daf is sponsored for a refuah shleima to Pesha Etel bat Sara. If a man engages in intercourse with a gentile woman, a zealot can kill him if they are still engaged in the act. Rav Kahana asked Rav what punishment is given if a zealot did not kill him at the time of the act. Rav did not remember, but Rav Kahana heard a verse from Malachi 2:11 in a dream and when he recounted it to Rav, Rav remembered that the person gets karet, death by the hands of God. Rabbi Chiya bar Avuya taught that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman is as if he married an idol, as he derived from the verse Rav Kahana heard in his dream. He also brought a story about the skull of Yehoyakim that would not be buried and was subsequently burned, which he derived from a verse in Yirmiyahi 22:19. The Hasmonean court made a decree that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman could be liable for four violations. Rav Dimi and Ravin disagreed about which four. Both Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explained that even though a zealot can kill a man who engages in relations with a gentile woman, if one consults with the court about it, the court will not tell the person to kill. The person is also not permitted to kill once the couple is no longer engaged in relations. And if the man engaged in relations kills the zealot, he is not liable as the zealot is considered a rodef. The Gemara recounts the story of Pinchas killing Zimri and Cosbi and elaborates on the details provided in the Torah. Rav Acha asked Rav Sheshet is a kohen who serves while impure punished by death by the hands of God? Can the answer be found in our Mishna?  

Today's daf is sponsored by Avi Yonitzman for finishing Mashechet Shekalim. "I've now closed the gap from Berakhot to Shekalim and may we be zoche to finishing the 14th cycle together." Today's daf is sponsored for a refuah shleima to Pesha Etel bat Sara. If a man engages in intercourse with a gentile woman, a zealot can kill him if they are still engaged in the act. Rav Kahana asked Rav what punishment is given if a zealot did not kill him at the time of the act. Rav did not remember, but Rav Kahana heard a verse from Malachi 2:11 in a dream and when he recounted it to Rav, Rav remembered that the person gets karet, death by the hands of God. Rabbi Chiya bar Avuya taught that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman is as if he married an idol, as he derived from the verse Rav Kahana heard in his dream. He also brought a story about the skull of Yehoyakim that would not be buried and was subsequently burned, which he derived from a verse in Yirmiyahi 22:19. The Hasmonean court made a decree that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman could be liable for four violations. Rav Dimi and Ravin disagreed about which four. Both Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explained that even though a zealot can kill a man who engages in relations with a gentile woman, if one consults with the court about it, the court will not tell the person to kill. The person is also not permitted to kill once the couple is no longer engaged in relations. And if the man engaged in relations kills the zealot, he is not liable as the zealot is considered a rodef. The Gemara recounts the story of Pinchas killing Zimri and Cosbi and elaborates on the details provided in the Torah. Rav Acha asked Rav Sheshet is a kohen who serves while impure punished by death by the hands of God? Can the answer be found in our Mishna?  

There are four sources in the Torah to derive the law that the accused must be warned before committing the crime in order for the court to convict. Why were all four necessary? Rav Chanan ruled that eidim zomemim who falsely testified against a betrothed woman that she engaged in relations with another man are not killed as they can claim they were only trying to forbid her to her husband and not to get her killed. However, a question is raised regarding laws of warning - as when they testified, mustn't they need to testify that they warned her that if she engaged in relations with this man, she would receive the death penalty, and then it would be clear that they were trying to get her punished with murder?! The Gemara answers that Rav Chanan must have made his statement regarding a case where the woman was a chavera, a woman who adheres strictly to mitzvot and according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda who does not require a warning for chaverim. Rav Chisda explains which types of contradictions are accepted in testimony and which ones are not. However, four sources are brought to raise difficulties with Rav Chisda's statement, but each is resolved. One source was from our Mishna regarding Ben Zackai who asked about the stem of the fig. Is Ben Zackai Rabban Yochanan ben Zackai or not? The Mishna explains that if one witness says "I don't know" regarding a bedika question, the testimony is accepted, and also if both say "I don't know." The latter case is unnecessary and that leads Rav Sheshet and Rava to offer alternative versions of that line in the Mishna. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Safra and Rav Kahana: if both bedikot and chakirot are required by Torah law, why if the witnesses say they don't know in a chakira question, the testimony is cancelled but in a bedika question, their testimony stands? They answered that chakira questions are necessary to establish the testimony since without it, it is testimony that cannot be cancelled by eidim zommemim, as they establish where and when the event transpired. If the witnesses have a discrepancy of one day regarding the date, it can be assumed that one did not know when Rosh Chodesh was, and that they are actually referring to the same day. However, this is limited to the first part of the month, as once it is the middle of the month, one can assume that they know the correct date. There is a blessing that is recited each month on the new moon, birkhat (kiddush) ha'levana. Until what day of the month can it be recited? Rabbi Yochanan answered, however, there are two opinions to explain what date he was referring to - the seventh of the month or the sixteenth.  

There are four sources in the Torah to derive the law that the accused must be warned before committing the crime in order for the court to convict. Why were all four necessary? Rav Chanan ruled that eidim zomemim who falsely testified against a betrothed woman that she engaged in relations with another man are not killed as they can claim they were only trying to forbid her to her husband and not to get her killed. However, a question is raised regarding laws of warning - as when they testified, mustn't they need to testify that they warned her that if she engaged in relations with this man, she would receive the death penalty, and then it would be clear that they were trying to get her punished with murder?! The Gemara answers that Rav Chanan must have made his statement regarding a case where the woman was a chavera, a woman who adheres strictly to mitzvot and according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda who does not require a warning for chaverim. Rav Chisda explains which types of contradictions are accepted in testimony and which ones are not. However, four sources are brought to raise difficulties with Rav Chisda's statement, but each is resolved. One source was from our Mishna regarding Ben Zackai who asked about the stem of the fig. Is Ben Zackai Rabban Yochanan ben Zackai or not? The Mishna explains that if one witness says "I don't know" regarding a bedika question, the testimony is accepted, and also if both say "I don't know." The latter case is unnecessary and that leads Rav Sheshet and Rava to offer alternative versions of that line in the Mishna. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Safra and Rav Kahana: if both bedikot and chakirot are required by Torah law, why if the witnesses say they don't know in a chakira question, the testimony is cancelled but in a bedika question, their testimony stands? They answered that chakira questions are necessary to establish the testimony since without it, it is testimony that cannot be cancelled by eidim zommemim, as they establish where and when the event transpired. If the witnesses have a discrepancy of one day regarding the date, it can be assumed that one did not know when Rosh Chodesh was, and that they are actually referring to the same day. However, this is limited to the first part of the month, as once it is the middle of the month, one can assume that they know the correct date. There is a blessing that is recited each month on the new moon, birkhat (kiddush) ha'levana. Until what day of the month can it be recited? Rabbi Yochanan answered, however, there are two opinions to explain what date he was referring to - the seventh of the month or the sixteenth.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Penina Lipskier in honor of her son's wedding, Daniel to Ella and in loving memory of his friends, Yakir Hexter and David Schwartz HY"D who were killed during the war. "May we only know smachot!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff Perlman in honor of the occasion of their daughter Yael Perlman and her new husband Matt Shapiro making aliyah to Jerusalem on Sunday! "We are so proud of their decision and look forward to sharing their experiences of their new life in our holy land!"  Ravina suggests to Rav Ashi a fourth response to Rav Sheshet's question, can an item can be acquired by the buyer when it is placed in the buyer's vessels on the property of the seller? However, this too is rejected and the question is left unanswered. The Mishna in Kiddushin Chapter 1, Mishna 5 established that moveable items can be acquired by pulling. However, it is limited by either Rav Chisda, Rav Kahana, or Rava to a case where the item cannot be lifted. When Abaye taught this qualification of the Mishna, Rav Ada bar Matna raised a difficulty against it from a tannaitic source. Three other sources are also brought to question this limitation, but all the difficulties are resolved. Rav and Shmuel differentiate between a case where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor (30 se'ah) of wheat for 30 sela" and one where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor for 30 sela, each se'ah for a zuz." In the former, the sale is final only when the measuring is complete, in the latter, the sale is final for each se'ah as it goes into the measuring cup. A difficulty is raised against the first case from a braita quoted previously where the sale is final even before filling up the cup, provided the cup used was the buyer's. This difficulty is resolved by assuming the braita refers to a case more similar to the latter case of Rav and Shmuel.

If one buys the produce of a dovecote, a beehive, a honeycomb, or a tree for its wood, the buyer is entitled to the produce but must leave a certain amount for the seller to ensure continued growth. The Mishna and Gemara discuss the amounts for each item. Rav Kahana explained that honey while still in the honeycomb is considered food and is susceptible to impurity, even if the bees are eating it. However, in a braita, the opposite ruling is brought. Abaye and Rava resolve the contradiction each differently and the Gemara raises two difficulties against Rava's ruling. A braita is brought in support of Rav Kahan's ruling. A braita expands on the law in the Mishna regarding trees sold for their wood and distinguishes between different trees and the amounts that need to be left to ensure regrowth. Some sources are brought that contradict some laws in the braita but are resolved.