Podcasts about rav kahana

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar in loving memory of her husband Dennis, Shimon Avraham, on his 3rd yahrzeit. "We all miss him." Today's daf is sponsored by Raquel Pilzer & Jennifer Lankin in loving memory of their beloved brother, Avigdor Chai Avraham on his 4th yahrzeit. "You are always on our minds and in our hearts." And also for the constant strength & safety of Raquel's husband Zevi in his current round of miluim." Today's daf is sponsored by Sara Berelowitz in honor of her newest grandchild, Levi, son of Chava and Meyer Sterman. The Gemara establishes the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael by explaining the case of oaths in the Mishna to refer to one who transgresses intentionally and is to receive lashes, not a sacrifice. This raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan who holds like an unattributed Mishna but does not hold by this Mishna, as there is a case where no action is performed and Rabbi Yochanan holds there are no lashes in that case. To resolve the difficulty, they bring a different Mishna that Rabbi Yochanan holds by instead. Why would Rabbi Yochanan choose one and not the other? Why would Rebbi bring two different contradictory Mishnayot? After resolving all the issues, the Gemara raises a further issue. How can the Mishna be referring to lashes as leprosy and Shabbat as they are not punishable by lashes? There is a case of leprosy where one receives lashes and for Shabbat there are lashes if one is warned regarding lashes as Rabbi Yishmael holds that a negative commandment that is punishable by death can also be punishable by lashes. This explains why from the start the Mishna was explained according to Rabbi Yishmael. However, the Gemara questions this last point as the Mishna clearly doesn't accord with Rabbi Akiva for other reasons as he does not include one who forgets about the Temple and sacrificial items. This question can be resolved in the same way as we read the Mishna according to Rabbi Yishmael, with lashes instead of a sacrifice. After resolving the previous issues, more difficulties are raised with explaining the Mishna to be referring to lashes, as in the case of impurity, it is clear from the wording in the Mishna that the issue is one who sinned unwittingly and is obligated to bring a sacrifice. Therefore Rav Kahana (on the basis of Rav Yosef, but with a modification) explains that the Mishna accords with Rebbi who holds like Rabbi Yishmael in the case of impurity and Rabbi Akiva in the case of oaths. How can Rav Kahana be sure that Rebbi holds like Rabbi Yishmael in impurity and Rabbi Akiva in oaths. The Gemara provides sources for each one.  

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

Today's daf is sponsored for a refua shleima for my uncle, Naftali ben Henna. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about two issues regarding the accidental murderer - do they pay rent/taxes to the Levites/refuge city; when they are released, can they reassume their previous position in their city? Rav Kahana limits the first debate to the six refuge cities, while Rava limits the debate to the other forty-two Levite cities, but explains that in the six major refuge cities, all agree that no payment is necessary. The third chapter lists all those who receive lashes. The Mishna categorizies them. Those who are liable for karet for forbidden relations receive lashes, if they do not also receive a death penalty by the court. If a kohen marries a woman he is forbidden to marry, they both receives lashes. More prohibitions where one receives karet for violating it intentionally also receive lashes, such as, a impure person who enters the Temple or ate sacrificial meat, one who eats forbidden fats of an animal or the blood, and several other prohibtions. One who eats non kosher meat or untithed produce also receives lashes. The Mishna follows the position of Rabbi Akiva that only prohibitions that are punishable by karet only are also punishable by lashes. However, Rabbi Yishmael holds that even those punishable by death in the hands of the court are punishable by lashes. Rabbi Yitzchak holds that none of these cases obligate one in lashes. What is the root of the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael?  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-sorrow-and-the-shame-of-the-accidental-killer

This week's learning is sponsored by the Hadran family for the refuah shleima of Phyllis Hecht, Gittel Pasha bat Masha Rachel. "Phyllis, you are a true fighter, a yereat shamayim a mega baalat chesed, and a "fellow" daf learner. May your surgery on Thursday go well, with the wonderful shlichim at Sheba Hospital. עברת את פרעה, תעברי גם את זה!!! We are behind you and continue davening for you with all our might." Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about whether one gets exiled for killing if the blade fell off the handle and killed someone and if one was killed from wood chips that splintered off while chopping. Rebbi holds that the case described in the Torah in Devraim 19:5 refers to the latter case and the rabbis hold that it refers to the former. A braita brings two proofs from the text for Rebbi's reading of the verse. Rav Chiya bar Ashi explains the root of the debate is whether there is em l'mikra, we follow the way the verse is traditionally read, or em l'masoret, we follow the way the verse is written. There are different rules for accidental murder depending on what domain the death occurred and whether the victim was already there or put his head out the window after, for example, a rock was thrown in that direction. Abba Shaul rules that if one accidentally killed while performing a mitzva, the murderer is exempt from exile. This is derived from Devraim 19:5. A rabbi raised a difficulty with this derivation to Rava, but it is resolved. In a different version of the sugya, the rabbi asked the same question but on a different sugya. The Mishna rules that a child is exiled to a refuge city for killing a parent, but a braita rules the opposite. Rav Kahana and Rava each reconcile the contradiction in a different manner. A braita rules that slave or a Cuti are exiled to a refuge city for killing a Jew and can receive lashes. Likewise, a Jew is exiled and receives lashes for doing the same to a Cuti or slave. For what offense are the lashes?

This week's learning is sponsored by the Hadran family for the refuah shleima of Phyllis Hecht, Gittel Pasha bat Masha Rachel. "Phyllis, you are a true fighter, a yereat shamayim a mega baalat chesed, and a "fellow" daf learner. May your surgery on Thursday go well, with the wonderful shlichim at Sheba Hospital. עברת את פרעה, תעברי גם את זה!!! We are behind you and continue davening for you with all our might." Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about whether one gets exiled for killing if the blade fell off the handle and killed someone and if one was killed from wood chips that splintered off while chopping. Rebbi holds that the case described in the Torah in Devraim 19:5 refers to the latter case and the rabbis hold that it refers to the former. A braita brings two proofs from the text for Rebbi's reading of the verse. Rav Chiya bar Ashi explains the root of the debate is whether there is em l'mikra, we follow the way the verse is traditionally read, or em l'masoret, we follow the way the verse is written. There are different rules for accidental murder depending on what domain the death occurred and whether the victim was already there or put his head out the window after, for example, a rock was thrown in that direction. Abba Shaul rules that if one accidentally killed while performing a mitzva, the murderer is exempt from exile. This is derived from Devraim 19:5. A rabbi raised a difficulty with this derivation to Rava, but it is resolved. In a different version of the sugya, the rabbi asked the same question but on a different sugya. The Mishna rules that a child is exiled to a refuge city for killing a parent, but a braita rules the opposite. Rav Kahana and Rava each reconcile the contradiction in a different manner. A braita rules that slave or a Cuti are exiled to a refuge city for killing a Jew and can receive lashes. Likewise, a Jew is exiled and receives lashes for doing the same to a Cuti or slave. For what offense are the lashes?

Today's daf is sponsored by Samuel Berlad in honor of Esther Sarah bat Sarah to get good passing grades in the exams and parnassah tova. Also in loving memory of Devorah bat Avraham, for the refuah shleima of Shmuel Lev ben Bracha.  Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey and Jake Levant in honor of Deborah and Michael Dickson. "Wishing you a huge mazel tov  on the engagement of Dalia to Yared Posnasky." Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav that a conspiring witness pays according to his share. After four unsuccessful attempts to explain the meaning of his statement, they explain it to be a case where the witness said he was convicted and charged money in a court for being a conspiring witness. Based on his testimony, he can be obligated to pay his share, even though his testimony cannot incriminate the other witness. If conspiring witnesses testify that a man divorced his wife and did not pay her the ketuba money, how is the payment for their punishment assessed, as they tried to obligate him to pay money that he may have had to pay later if he predeceases his wife or divorces her? If conspiring witnesses testify that a debtor who had a ten-year loan had a thirty-day loan, how is the payment for their punishment assessed? Both these cases are explained in the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that a ten-year loan is canceled when the shmita year arrives. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on his statement from the Mishna as it implies that a ten-year loan can be collected. Rava resolves the contradiction. According to an alternative version of the sugya, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav the opposite - that a ten-year loan is collected. Rav Kahana supported his statement from our Mishna.Rava rejects the support from the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that if one loans another upon the condition that the shmita year not cancel the loan, the loan is canceled anyway as the condition is invalid. However, this contradicts a different statement of Shmuel regarding ona'ah, that a condition that goes against the Torah is valid if the issue relates to money. How is this resolved? Two other statements are brought by Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav and Rav Kahana raises a difficulty against them - one about laws of Shabbat and one about laws of mikveh.

Today's daf is sponsored by Samuel Berlad in honor of Esther Sarah bat Sarah to get good passing grades in the exams and parnassah tova. Also in loving memory of Devorah bat Avraham, for the refuah shleima of Shmuel Lev ben Bracha.  Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey and Jake Levant in honor of Deborah and Michael Dickson. "Wishing you a huge mazel tov  on the engagement of Dalia to Yared Posnasky." Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav that a conspiring witness pays according to his share. After four unsuccessful attempts to explain the meaning of his statement, they explain it to be a case where the witness said he was convicted and charged money in a court for being a conspiring witness. Based on his testimony, he can be obligated to pay his share, even though his testimony cannot incriminate the other witness. If conspiring witnesses testify that a man divorced his wife and did not pay her the ketuba money, how is the payment for their punishment assessed, as they tried to obligate him to pay money that he may have had to pay later if he predeceases his wife or divorces her? If conspiring witnesses testify that a debtor who had a ten-year loan had a thirty-day loan, how is the payment for their punishment assessed? Both these cases are explained in the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that a ten-year loan is canceled when the shmita year arrives. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on his statement from the Mishna as it implies that a ten-year loan can be collected. Rava resolves the contradiction. According to an alternative version of the sugya, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav the opposite - that a ten-year loan is collected. Rav Kahana supported his statement from our Mishna.Rava rejects the support from the Mishna. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that if one loans another upon the condition that the shmita year not cancel the loan, the loan is canceled anyway as the condition is invalid. However, this contradicts a different statement of Shmuel regarding ona'ah, that a condition that goes against the Torah is valid if the issue relates to money. How is this resolved? Two other statements are brought by Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav and Rav Kahana raises a difficulty against them - one about laws of Shabbat and one about laws of mikveh.

Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandmother, Ann Barnett on her yahrzeit. "Her strength kept us going and she maintained her dedication to seeking knowledge all the days of her life." How do all the cases in the previous braita accord with Rabbi Meir's opinion that a rebellious elder can only be in a case that can lead to a prohibition of karet? In what way does a rebellious elder need to disagree with the court in order to be convicted? Rav Kahana rules that only if he dares to disagree based on his own logic with a tradition of the rabbis of the court, he is convicted. Rabb Elazar disagrees and says that the purpose of convicting a rebellious elder is to prevent debates and therefore any disagreement of any sort will lead to a conviction.  Two sources (one of them from our Mishna) are brought to raise a difficulty with Rav Kahane's position and the second is left unresolved.  What is the hierarchy of the courts? How were judges chosen? The rebellious elder is convicted only if he either goes back and teaches against the ruling of the High Court and he himself acts according to his ruling or people follow his ruling. A difficulty is raised on the former possibility as if he follows his own ruling, he should already be liable for the death penalty for the action, not for being a rebellious elder. The Gemara offers a few possibilities to resolve this difficulty. The Mishna explains that there is a stringency with Rabbinic law for a rebellious elder - if he tells people to go against Torah law, he is not convicted, but if he differs from the court regarding the rabbinic definition of a Torah law and adds to it, like five compartments in the tefillin, he can be convicted. Rav Oshaya says that this would be the only possible case. Why not the four species? Why not tzitzit?

Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandmother, Ann Barnett on her yahrzeit. "Her strength kept us going and she maintained her dedication to seeking knowledge all the days of her life." How do all the cases in the previous braita accord with Rabbi Meir's opinion that a rebellious elder can only be in a case that can lead to a prohibition of karet? In what way does a rebellious elder need to disagree with the court in order to be convicted? Rav Kahana rules that only if he dares to disagree based on his own logic with a tradition of the rabbis of the court, he is convicted. Rabb Elazar disagrees and says that the purpose of convicting a rebellious elder is to prevent debates and therefore any disagreement of any sort will lead to a conviction.  Two sources (one of them from our Mishna) are brought to raise a difficulty with Rav Kahane's position and the second is left unresolved.  What is the hierarchy of the courts? How were judges chosen? The rebellious elder is convicted only if he either goes back and teaches against the ruling of the High Court and he himself acts according to his ruling or people follow his ruling. A difficulty is raised on the former possibility as if he follows his own ruling, he should already be liable for the death penalty for the action, not for being a rebellious elder. The Gemara offers a few possibilities to resolve this difficulty. The Mishna explains that there is a stringency with Rabbinic law for a rebellious elder - if he tells people to go against Torah law, he is not convicted, but if he differs from the court regarding the rabbinic definition of a Torah law and adds to it, like five compartments in the tefillin, he can be convicted. Rav Oshaya says that this would be the only possible case. Why not the four species? Why not tzitzit?

Today's daf is sponsored by Avi Yonitzman for finishing Mashechet Shekalim. "I've now closed the gap from Berakhot to Shekalim and may we be zoche to finishing the 14th cycle together." Today's daf is sponsored for a refuah shleima to Pesha Etel bat Sara. If a man engages in intercourse with a gentile woman, a zealot can kill him if they are still engaged in the act. Rav Kahana asked Rav what punishment is given if a zealot did not kill him at the time of the act. Rav did not remember, but Rav Kahana heard a verse from Malachi 2:11 in a dream and when he recounted it to Rav, Rav remembered that the person gets karet, death by the hands of God. Rabbi Chiya bar Avuya taught that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman is as if he married an idol, as he derived from the verse Rav Kahana heard in his dream. He also brought a story about the skull of Yehoyakim that would not be buried and was subsequently burned, which he derived from a verse in Yirmiyahi 22:19. The Hasmonean court made a decree that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman could be liable for four violations. Rav Dimi and Ravin disagreed about which four. Both Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explained that even though a zealot can kill a man who engages in relations with a gentile woman, if one consults with the court about it, the court will not tell the person to kill. The person is also not permitted to kill once the couple is no longer engaged in relations. And if the man engaged in relations kills the zealot, he is not liable as the zealot is considered a rodef. The Gemara recounts the story of Pinchas killing Zimri and Cosbi and elaborates on the details provided in the Torah. Rav Acha asked Rav Sheshet is a kohen who serves while impure punished by death by the hands of God? Can the answer be found in our Mishna?  

Today's daf is sponsored by Avi Yonitzman for finishing Mashechet Shekalim. "I've now closed the gap from Berakhot to Shekalim and may we be zoche to finishing the 14th cycle together." Today's daf is sponsored for a refuah shleima to Pesha Etel bat Sara. If a man engages in intercourse with a gentile woman, a zealot can kill him if they are still engaged in the act. Rav Kahana asked Rav what punishment is given if a zealot did not kill him at the time of the act. Rav did not remember, but Rav Kahana heard a verse from Malachi 2:11 in a dream and when he recounted it to Rav, Rav remembered that the person gets karet, death by the hands of God. Rabbi Chiya bar Avuya taught that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman is as if he married an idol, as he derived from the verse Rav Kahana heard in his dream. He also brought a story about the skull of Yehoyakim that would not be buried and was subsequently burned, which he derived from a verse in Yirmiyahi 22:19. The Hasmonean court made a decree that one who engages in relations with a gentile woman could be liable for four violations. Rav Dimi and Ravin disagreed about which four. Both Rav Chisda and Rabbi Yochanan explained that even though a zealot can kill a man who engages in relations with a gentile woman, if one consults with the court about it, the court will not tell the person to kill. The person is also not permitted to kill once the couple is no longer engaged in relations. And if the man engaged in relations kills the zealot, he is not liable as the zealot is considered a rodef. The Gemara recounts the story of Pinchas killing Zimri and Cosbi and elaborates on the details provided in the Torah. Rav Acha asked Rav Sheshet is a kohen who serves while impure punished by death by the hands of God? Can the answer be found in our Mishna?  

There are four sources in the Torah to derive the law that the accused must be warned before committing the crime in order for the court to convict. Why were all four necessary? Rav Chanan ruled that eidim zomemim who falsely testified against a betrothed woman that she engaged in relations with another man are not killed as they can claim they were only trying to forbid her to her husband and not to get her killed. However, a question is raised regarding laws of warning - as when they testified, mustn't they need to testify that they warned her that if she engaged in relations with this man, she would receive the death penalty, and then it would be clear that they were trying to get her punished with murder?! The Gemara answers that Rav Chanan must have made his statement regarding a case where the woman was a chavera, a woman who adheres strictly to mitzvot and according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda who does not require a warning for chaverim. Rav Chisda explains which types of contradictions are accepted in testimony and which ones are not. However, four sources are brought to raise difficulties with Rav Chisda's statement, but each is resolved. One source was from our Mishna regarding Ben Zackai who asked about the stem of the fig. Is Ben Zackai Rabban Yochanan ben Zackai or not? The Mishna explains that if one witness says "I don't know" regarding a bedika question, the testimony is accepted, and also if both say "I don't know." The latter case is unnecessary and that leads Rav Sheshet and Rava to offer alternative versions of that line in the Mishna. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Safra and Rav Kahana: if both bedikot and chakirot are required by Torah law, why if the witnesses say they don't know in a chakira question, the testimony is cancelled but in a bedika question, their testimony stands? They answered that chakira questions are necessary to establish the testimony since without it, it is testimony that cannot be cancelled by eidim zommemim, as they establish where and when the event transpired. If the witnesses have a discrepancy of one day regarding the date, it can be assumed that one did not know when Rosh Chodesh was, and that they are actually referring to the same day. However, this is limited to the first part of the month, as once it is the middle of the month, one can assume that they know the correct date. There is a blessing that is recited each month on the new moon, birkhat (kiddush) ha'levana. Until what day of the month can it be recited? Rabbi Yochanan answered, however, there are two opinions to explain what date he was referring to - the seventh of the month or the sixteenth.  

There are four sources in the Torah to derive the law that the accused must be warned before committing the crime in order for the court to convict. Why were all four necessary? Rav Chanan ruled that eidim zomemim who falsely testified against a betrothed woman that she engaged in relations with another man are not killed as they can claim they were only trying to forbid her to her husband and not to get her killed. However, a question is raised regarding laws of warning - as when they testified, mustn't they need to testify that they warned her that if she engaged in relations with this man, she would receive the death penalty, and then it would be clear that they were trying to get her punished with murder?! The Gemara answers that Rav Chanan must have made his statement regarding a case where the woman was a chavera, a woman who adheres strictly to mitzvot and according to Rabbi Yosi b'Rabbi Yehuda who does not require a warning for chaverim. Rav Chisda explains which types of contradictions are accepted in testimony and which ones are not. However, four sources are brought to raise difficulties with Rav Chisda's statement, but each is resolved. One source was from our Mishna regarding Ben Zackai who asked about the stem of the fig. Is Ben Zackai Rabban Yochanan ben Zackai or not? The Mishna explains that if one witness says "I don't know" regarding a bedika question, the testimony is accepted, and also if both say "I don't know." The latter case is unnecessary and that leads Rav Sheshet and Rava to offer alternative versions of that line in the Mishna. Rami bar Hama asked Rav Safra and Rav Kahana: if both bedikot and chakirot are required by Torah law, why if the witnesses say they don't know in a chakira question, the testimony is cancelled but in a bedika question, their testimony stands? They answered that chakira questions are necessary to establish the testimony since without it, it is testimony that cannot be cancelled by eidim zommemim, as they establish where and when the event transpired. If the witnesses have a discrepancy of one day regarding the date, it can be assumed that one did not know when Rosh Chodesh was, and that they are actually referring to the same day. However, this is limited to the first part of the month, as once it is the middle of the month, one can assume that they know the correct date. There is a blessing that is recited each month on the new moon, birkhat (kiddush) ha'levana. Until what day of the month can it be recited? Rabbi Yochanan answered, however, there are two opinions to explain what date he was referring to - the seventh of the month or the sixteenth.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Penina Lipskier in honor of her son's wedding, Daniel to Ella and in loving memory of his friends, Yakir Hexter and David Schwartz HY"D who were killed during the war. "May we only know smachot!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff Perlman in honor of the occasion of their daughter Yael Perlman and her new husband Matt Shapiro making aliyah to Jerusalem on Sunday! "We are so proud of their decision and look forward to sharing their experiences of their new life in our holy land!"  Ravina suggests to Rav Ashi a fourth response to Rav Sheshet's question, can an item can be acquired by the buyer when it is placed in the buyer's vessels on the property of the seller? However, this too is rejected and the question is left unanswered. The Mishna in Kiddushin Chapter 1, Mishna 5 established that moveable items can be acquired by pulling. However, it is limited by either Rav Chisda, Rav Kahana, or Rava to a case where the item cannot be lifted. When Abaye taught this qualification of the Mishna, Rav Ada bar Matna raised a difficulty against it from a tannaitic source. Three other sources are also brought to question this limitation, but all the difficulties are resolved. Rav and Shmuel differentiate between a case where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor (30 se'ah) of wheat for 30 sela" and one where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor for 30 sela, each se'ah for a zuz." In the former, the sale is final only when the measuring is complete, in the latter, the sale is final for each se'ah as it goes into the measuring cup. A difficulty is raised against the first case from a braita quoted previously where the sale is final even before filling up the cup, provided the cup used was the buyer's. This difficulty is resolved by assuming the braita refers to a case more similar to the latter case of Rav and Shmuel.

Today's daf is sponsored by Penina Lipskier in honor of her son's wedding, Daniel to Ella and in loving memory of his friends, Yakir Hexter and David Schwartz HY"D who were killed during the war. "May we only know smachot!" Today's daf is sponsored by Beth Kissileff Perlman in honor of the occasion of their daughter Yael Perlman and her new husband Matt Shapiro making aliyah to Jerusalem on Sunday! "We are so proud of their decision and look forward to sharing their experiences of their new life in our holy land!"  Ravina suggests to Rav Ashi a fourth response to Rav Sheshet's question, can an item can be acquired by the buyer when it is placed in the buyer's vessels on the property of the seller? However, this too is rejected and the question is left unanswered. The Mishna in Kiddushin Chapter 1, Mishna 5 established that moveable items can be acquired by pulling. However, it is limited by either Rav Chisda, Rav Kahana, or Rava to a case where the item cannot be lifted. When Abaye taught this qualification of the Mishna, Rav Ada bar Matna raised a difficulty against it from a tannaitic source. Three other sources are also brought to question this limitation, but all the difficulties are resolved. Rav and Shmuel differentiate between a case where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor (30 se'ah) of wheat for 30 sela" and one where the seller says, "I am selling you a kor for 30 sela, each se'ah for a zuz." In the former, the sale is final only when the measuring is complete, in the latter, the sale is final for each se'ah as it goes into the measuring cup. A difficulty is raised against the first case from a braita quoted previously where the sale is final even before filling up the cup, provided the cup used was the buyer's. This difficulty is resolved by assuming the braita refers to a case more similar to the latter case of Rav and Shmuel.

If one buys the produce of a dovecote, a beehive, a honeycomb, or a tree for its wood, the buyer is entitled to the produce but must leave a certain amount for the seller to ensure continued growth. The Mishna and Gemara discuss the amounts for each item. Rav Kahana explained that honey while still in the honeycomb is considered food and is susceptible to impurity, even if the bees are eating it. However, in a braita, the opposite ruling is brought. Abaye and Rava resolve the contradiction each differently and the Gemara raises two difficulties against Rava's ruling. A braita is brought in support of Rav Kahan's ruling. A braita expands on the law in the Mishna regarding trees sold for their wood and distinguishes between different trees and the amounts that need to be left to ensure regrowth. Some sources are brought that contradict some laws in the braita but are resolved. 

If one buys the produce of a dovecote, a beehive, a honeycomb, or a tree for its wood, the buyer is entitled to the produce but must leave a certain amount for the seller to ensure continued growth. The Mishna and Gemara discuss the amounts for each item. Rav Kahana explained that honey while still in the honeycomb is considered food and is susceptible to impurity, even if the bees are eating it. However, in a braita, the opposite ruling is brought. Abaye and Rava resolve the contradiction each differently and the Gemara raises two difficulties against Rava's ruling. A braita is brought in support of Rav Kahan's ruling. A braita expands on the law in the Mishna regarding trees sold for their wood and distinguishes between different trees and the amounts that need to be left to ensure regrowth. Some sources are brought that contradict some laws in the braita but are resolved. 

This week's learning is sponsored by Rozy Jaffe and family in loving memory of her father Mickey Muhlrad, משה יעקב בן ר׳ דוד ע״ה on his 11th yahrzeit. "My father was a humble man of incredible honesty and integrity. He never spoke Loshen Hara and though his cheder studies were cut short by WWII- he supported and encouraged Torah learning for his children and others throughout his lifetime!"  Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in loving memory of Harlene Appleman, Chaya bat Osna Rachel v’Shmuel. "Harlene, our cherished friend and mentor, was the consummate professional and the ultimate friend. Her clear sechel and her passion for Jewish education and identity continue to “whisper in my ear” as an expression of שפתי ישנים דובבות. May our learning be a zechut for her!"  If one designates the border of a field but one side extends farther than the other, what size field does the buyer get? Rav rules that a line is drawn from the shorter border, but Rav Kahana and Rav Asi say that a trapezoid shape is drawn from the shorter border to the longer one. In what case did Rav concede to the others? A question is asked about three similar cases – where the border delineated is just the corners of a field, or in the shape of an L, or there were two fields on each side and the border delineated skipped every other one. No answer is given to these questions. If three border strips were delineated but the fourth was not, does the seller get the field and the fourth border strip, the field without the fourth border strip, or just a strip of land alongside each of the three border strips? Rav, Shmuel, and Rav Asi each hold a different position. Rava rules and the Gemara brings two different versions of Rava’s ruling. The Gemara then summarizes the two different versions of Rava’s ruling. The Ramban and others comment that the summary is an addition of Rav Yehudai Gaon and not part of the original Gemara. Raba brings two rulings in which he differentiates between different wording used and their meaning. Abaye disagrees with both differentiations and holds that in each case, there is no difference in the law whether one language was used or another – the meaning is the same. 

This week's learning is sponsored by Rozy Jaffe and family in loving memory of her father Mickey Muhlrad, משה יעקב בן ר׳ דוד ע״ה on his 11th yahrzeit. "My father was a humble man of incredible honesty and integrity. He never spoke Loshen Hara and though his cheder studies were cut short by WWII- he supported and encouraged Torah learning for his children and others throughout his lifetime!"  Today's daf is sponsored by Gitta and David Neufeld in loving memory of Harlene Appleman, Chaya bat Osna Rachel v’Shmuel. "Harlene, our cherished friend and mentor, was the consummate professional and the ultimate friend. Her clear sechel and her passion for Jewish education and identity continue to “whisper in my ear” as an expression of שפתי ישנים דובבות. May our learning be a zechut for her!"  If one designates the border of a field but one side extends farther than the other, what size field does the buyer get? Rav rules that a line is drawn from the shorter border, but Rav Kahana and Rav Asi say that a trapezoid shape is drawn from the shorter border to the longer one. In what case did Rav concede to the others? A question is asked about three similar cases – where the border delineated is just the corners of a field, or in the shape of an L, or there were two fields on each side and the border delineated skipped every other one. No answer is given to these questions. If three border strips were delineated but the fourth was not, does the seller get the field and the fourth border strip, the field without the fourth border strip, or just a strip of land alongside each of the three border strips? Rav, Shmuel, and Rav Asi each hold a different position. Rava rules and the Gemara brings two different versions of Rava’s ruling. The Gemara then summarizes the two different versions of Rava’s ruling. The Ramban and others comment that the summary is an addition of Rav Yehudai Gaon and not part of the original Gemara. Raba brings two rulings in which he differentiates between different wording used and their meaning. Abaye disagrees with both differentiations and holds that in each case, there is no difference in the law whether one language was used or another – the meaning is the same. 

One who passes on information about other people's property to non-Jews who are looking to seize/steal it - is this considered theft? Is the informant liable to return the value of the item? On what does it depend? The Gemara brings a series of cases where Jews informed Gentiles about the whereabouts of others' possessions and the rulings of the rabbis are brought. In the context of a story about a Jew who wanted to inform about another, we are told of a famous story of the showdown between Rav Kahana and Rabbi Yochanan when Rav Kahana ran away to Israel from Babylonia. This story highlights the dangers of misjudging others, and holding oneself in high regard, and also highlights the power struggle between Babylonia and Israel, particularly in the second generation of amoraim, in terms of determining where the real center of authority is. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether land is "acquired" by a thief or not. 

One who passes on information about other people's property to non-Jews who are looking to seize/steal it - is this considered theft? Is the informant liable to return the value of the item? On what does it depend? The Gemara brings a series of cases where Jews informed Gentiles about the whereabouts of others' possessions and the rulings of the rabbis are brought. In the context of a story about a Jew who wanted to inform about another, we are told of a famous story of the showdown between Rav Kahana and Rabbi Yochanan when Rav Kahana ran away to Israel from Babylonia. This story highlights the dangers of misjudging others, and holding oneself in high regard, and also highlights the power struggle between Babylonia and Israel, particularly in the second generation of amoraim, in terms of determining where the real center of authority is. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether land is "acquired" by a thief or not. 

The critical lessons to be learned from Rav Kahana's tragic death

Bava Kamma 117 : Marc Chipkin : 2024-02-27 Showing someone's property to idolators under duress. Rav Kahana's death and subsequent revival due to Rebbe Yochanan. If someone stole a field, and a river flooded it what is his responsibility therefor?

Dedicated in memory of Ariel Eliyahu A"H who was killed Al Kiddush Hashem on October 7, 2023 defending Medinat Yisrael. He completed Shas by the age of 19 and began with Baba Kama.

The bnei marava shita,Rav Kahana when he purchased flax,and when you need to go to madai to return gzaila

The bnei marava shita,Rav Kahana when he purchased flax,and when you need to go to madai to return gzaila

Study Guide Bava Kamma 103 In Israel, they raised a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation explaining one of the braitot like Rabbi Yehuda - how could a sale be valid when the agent changes what the buyer wanted as the seller intends to sell it to the agent, not knowing the agent is buying for someone else, and the agent is not acting as an agent, as the agent is purchasing a different item than the one the buyer wanted? A braita is quoted about one who buys land but uses someone else's name on the document of sale to discourage others from bringing claims against the property rights of the land. At first, it is suggested that the author of this braita disagrees with the opinion of the rabbis in Israel as the seller thinks the buyer is the other person (whose name appears in the sale document) when it is actually sold to the buyer. However, the braita is then explained differently and the ruling in the braita does not relate to the issue the rabbis in Israel were discussing. Rav Kahana bought flax from someone but hadn't yet received the flax. As the price of flax then increased, the seller sold Rav Kahan's flax and returned Rav Kahana the amount of money he received for selling it, which was more than Rav Kahana had given him originally. Is there an issue of interest here? Rav ruled that it depended on whether or not the one who bought the flax for the higher price knew that it was Rav Kahana's flax or thought it was the seller's. At first, the Gemara suggests that this distinction suggests that Rav held like the rabbis in Israel, but then they explain that the issue was a different one and was unrelated. The Mishna explained that one who steals, takes an oath denying it, and then admits their lie, must return the lost item directly to the hands of the one it was stolen from and adds an extra fifth (which is calculated as 25% of the value of the item) and brings a guilt offering, asham gezeila, to achieve atonement. The Mishna assumes that only if the thief took an oath it is necessary to return the lost item directly to the one who it was stolen to receive the atonement, but if one did not take an oath, but witnesses testified against the thief, then it is enough to put the item aside and wait for the one who it was stolen from to come and collect it. The Gemara questions that this seems to match neither Rabbi Tarfon's nor Rabbi Akiva's opinion about returning a stolen item as appears in the Mishna in Yevamot 118b regarding one who stole and five people claim he/she stole from them and the thief doesn't know which one is the one he/she stole from. Three different suggested answers are brought. The first two are rejected.

A story used to assess halakhic stance: flax that is purchased, but not acquired, and then appreciates in value, and the shopkeeper sold it, with the intent to give the money to the original owner (Rav Kahana, in this case). What are the implications for ownership, interest, and the rights to the flax? Plus, how this can come to smack of robbery... Also, a new mishnah, where a thief swears falsely about what he's taken, and therefore has to pay a fifth above the principle he must pay back anyway.

Study Guide Bava Kamma 103 In Israel, they raised a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's interpretation explaining one of the braitot like Rabbi Yehuda - how could a sale be valid when the agent changes what the buyer wanted as the seller intends to sell it to the agent, not knowing the agent is buying for someone else, and the agent is not acting as an agent, as the agent is purchasing a different item than the one the buyer wanted? A braita is quoted about one who buys land but uses someone else's name on the document of sale to discourage others from bringing claims against the property rights of the land. At first, it is suggested that the author of this braita disagrees with the opinion of the rabbis in Israel as the seller thinks the buyer is the other person (whose name appears in the sale document) when it is actually sold to the buyer. However, the braita is then explained differently and the ruling in the braita does not relate to the issue the rabbis in Israel were discussing. Rav Kahana bought flax from someone but hadn't yet received the flax. As the price of flax then increased, the seller sold Rav Kahan's flax and returned Rav Kahana the amount of money he received for selling it, which was more than Rav Kahana had given him originally. Is there an issue of interest here? Rav ruled that it depended on whether or not the one who bought the flax for the higher price knew that it was Rav Kahana's flax or thought it was the seller's. At first, the Gemara suggests that this distinction suggests that Rav held like the rabbis in Israel, but then they explain that the issue was a different one and was unrelated. The Mishna explained that one who steals, takes an oath denying it, and then admits their lie, must return the lost item directly to the hands of the one it was stolen from and adds an extra fifth (which is calculated as 25% of the value of the item) and brings a guilt offering, asham gezeila, to achieve atonement. The Mishna assumes that only if the thief took an oath it is necessary to return the lost item directly to the one who it was stolen to receive the atonement, but if one did not take an oath, but witnesses testified against the thief, then it is enough to put the item aside and wait for the one who it was stolen from to come and collect it. The Gemara questions that this seems to match neither Rabbi Tarfon's nor Rabbi Akiva's opinion about returning a stolen item as appears in the Mishna in Yevamot 118b regarding one who stole and five people claim he/she stole from them and the thief doesn't know which one is the one he/she stole from. Three different suggested answers are brought. The first two are rejected.

What is a Melacha? Does our mindset and intention impact the Melacha? Fundamental questions arise around the philosophy of transgression. Whether you're a beginner looking to develop your learning skills or eager to further your depth of knowledge in Gemora and Rishonim, this week's Shiur will challenge you to rethink conventional borders.   This week, Reb Asaf Aharon Prisman gave a Shiur at Kollel Beis Hillel on Maseches Shabbos, examining what defines a Melacha that is prohibited on Shabbos versus a mundane weekly act.   How integral is our Kavana (intention) to the definition of a prohibited Melacha? We try to define what a Melacha is and what makes the prohibitions unique - actually destroying something rather than creating (Mochek, Soser, Korea, etc'). Understanding these intricate details will help address an incredible question posed by Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Tosfos.   All this is based on an innocent statement in Gemora Shabbos 73B where Rav Kahana mentions that a person cutting branches is liable for Planning and Zomer, but only if he actually wants the branches for firewood. Tosfos clarifies that this is even in Rav Yehuda's view that any time a person does a dry action resulting in a prohibition, it is always "over" the prohibition no matter the intention.   We will address Rabbi Akiva Eiger's question on the Tosfos, despite it remaining largely unresolved. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/prismoftorah/message

Today's daf is sponsored by Hadar Hecht in loving memory of Michal Rut bat Itamar Yitzhak & Ada Etel and Tova bat Arye Yitzhak & Sara. We are continuing to learn for the safety of our soldiers, residents of the South and the North, and the whole country, the safe return of the captives, in memory of those who have fallen and for a refua shleima to all those injured.  A man who says he betrothed his older daughter - if he has two sets of wives and daughters from both wives, there is a debate whether or not all of them except the youngest are considered betrothed out of doubt or only the oldest of the older group of sisters. Abaye clarifies that the debate would not apply in a case of three daughters all from the same mother - in that case, it would be clear that "older" would only include the oldest and not the middle daughter. Two difficulties are raised against Abaye's opinion, but they are resolved.  The Mishna brings four cases - two where either the man or the woman admits to being betrothed but the other does not, and two more where they each disagree about who was the betrothed a woman or her daughter. Why was each case in the Mishna necessary? Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether we ask him to give the woman a get or force him to. Regarding which case is this debate? In the end, they explain that there is no debate between them - when Rav said we force, he meant that if the man gives the get on his own initiative, we can force him to pay her the ketuba money. Rav Nachman quoted a ruling of Shmuel that if there is only one witness to a betrothal, even if both the man and woman admit to the betrothal, they are not considered betrothed. This opinion is questioned by our Mishna and a Mishna in Gittin 81, but both difficulties are resolved. Rav and perhaps Rebbi both held this way as well. Another braita is brought to raise a difficulty against this opinion but is resolved. Rav Papa rules against Rav Kahana (who held like the others) and holds that even with one witness, one needs to be concerned that the betrothal was effective. Rav Ashi asks Rav Kahana why the principle of "when the plaintiff admits something (here, both the husband and wife admitted to the betrothal), it is as if there were one hundred witnesses" which applies in monetary law doesn't apply here as well. Rav Kahana answers that in this case, their confession limits others as well (relatives of the other are now forbidden to marry them) and therefore their admission is not accepted. Confessions are only accepted when they do not negatively affect others.

Today's daf is sponsored by Hadar Hecht in loving memory of Michal Rut bat Itamar Yitzhak & Ada Etel and Tova bat Arye Yitzhak & Sara. We are continuing to learn for the safety of our soldiers, residents of the South and the North, and the whole country, the safe return of the captives, in memory of those who have fallen and for a refua shleima to all those injured.  A man who says he betrothed his older daughter - if he has two sets of wives and daughters from both wives, there is a debate whether or not all of them except the youngest are considered betrothed out of doubt or only the oldest of the older group of sisters. Abaye clarifies that the debate would not apply in a case of three daughters all from the same mother - in that case, it would be clear that "older" would only include the oldest and not the middle daughter. Two difficulties are raised against Abaye's opinion, but they are resolved.  The Mishna brings four cases - two where either the man or the woman admits to being betrothed but the other does not, and two more where they each disagree about who was the betrothed a woman or her daughter. Why was each case in the Mishna necessary? Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether we ask him to give the woman a get or force him to. Regarding which case is this debate? In the end, they explain that there is no debate between them - when Rav said we force, he meant that if the man gives the get on his own initiative, we can force him to pay her the ketuba money. Rav Nachman quoted a ruling of Shmuel that if there is only one witness to a betrothal, even if both the man and woman admit to the betrothal, they are not considered betrothed. This opinion is questioned by our Mishna and a Mishna in Gittin 81, but both difficulties are resolved. Rav and perhaps Rebbi both held this way as well. Another braita is brought to raise a difficulty against this opinion but is resolved. Rav Papa rules against Rav Kahana (who held like the others) and holds that even with one witness, one needs to be concerned that the betrothal was effective. Rav Ashi asks Rav Kahana why the principle of "when the plaintiff admits something (here, both the husband and wife admitted to the betrothal), it is as if there were one hundred witnesses" which applies in monetary law doesn't apply here as well. Rav Kahana answers that in this case, their confession limits others as well (relatives of the other are now forbidden to marry them) and therefore their admission is not accepted. Confessions are only accepted when they do not negatively affect others.

For an effective symbolic act (Kinyan) that creates a binding marriage agreement of Kiddushin, is an appraisal of the consideration necessary? • Why was Rav Kahana able to effect the redemption of the firstborn? • Sliding scale values: an object can be worth more than the market value to some individuals • Discerning through context the acceptance or rejection of a suitor

Study Guide Gittin 6 Is Babylonia considered like Israel for gittin and therefore one who brings from place to place in Babylonia would not need to say "in front of me it was written..."? Rav and Shmuel disagree about this. First, they suggest that the root of the debate is based on the debate between Rava and Raba, but they reject it and explain that it is because there are now yeshivot in Babylonia. Rav holds that since they now travel from place to place to learn, they recognize signatures. Shmuel holds that they are busy learning and therefore do not recognize the signatures of others. What are the boundaries of Babylonia? Some places have unique laws related to this that are dependent on the nature of the places and whether or not people from one place would recognize signatures of the other. Rav Kahana brought a get from one big city in Babylonia to the other and Rav told him that he did not need to say "In front of me it was written..." but if he did, it would help - in the event that the husband will try to claim it was not a valid get, as can be learned from a different story told in a braita of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Evyatar ruled that there is no need to say the declaration if bringing a get from Babylonia to Israel as there are always people traveling from one place to the other. Is Rabbi Evyatar someone who can be relied on in his rulings?  

Study Guide Gittin 6 Is Babylonia considered like Israel for gittin and therefore one who brings from place to place in Babylonia would not need to say "in front of me it was written..."? Rav and Shmuel disagree about this. First, they suggest that the root of the debate is based on the debate between Rava and Raba, but they reject it and explain that it is because there are now yeshivot in Babylonia. Rav holds that since they now travel from place to place to learn, they recognize signatures. Shmuel holds that they are busy learning and therefore do not recognize the signatures of others. What are the boundaries of Babylonia? Some places have unique laws related to this that are dependent on the nature of the places and whether or not people from one place would recognize signatures of the other. Rav Kahana brought a get from one big city in Babylonia to the other and Rav told him that he did not need to say "In front of me it was written..." but if he did, it would help - in the event that the husband will try to claim it was not a valid get, as can be learned from a different story told in a braita of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Evyatar ruled that there is no need to say the declaration if bringing a get from Babylonia to Israel as there are always people traveling from one place to the other. Is Rabbi Evyatar someone who can be relied on in his rulings?  

Study Guide Sotah 36 The Gemara lists all the miracles that happened to the Jews on the day they crossed over the Jordan into Israel. When it is recorded in the book of Joshua about the blessings and curses it is written "half" went up to Mount Gerizim "and the half" went up to Mount Eival. Why is it written "and the half." Rav Kahane says this comes to teach that the division of the tribes on the two mountains was the same division that is in the two stones in which the names of all the tribes were written that were on the efod that would sit on the shoulders of the high priest. But in a braita there are two opinions regarding the distribution of the names in the efod and neither opinion is in accordance with Rav Kahana. So they reject his opinion and offer a different interpretation of "and the half" - that those who stood on Mount Gerizim were more numerous than those on Mpunt Eival even though the tribe of Levi was with them and some of them stood below, because the tribe of Joseph was also there and they were numerous. How do we know that Joseph's tribe was numerous? The Gemara continues with many drashot on Joseph.

Study Guide Sotah 36 The Gemara lists all the miracles that happened to the Jews on the day they crossed over the Jordan into Israel. When it is recorded in the book of Joshua about the blessings and curses it is written "half" went up to Mount Gerizim "and the half" went up to Mount Eival. Why is it written "and the half." Rav Kahane says this comes to teach that the division of the tribes on the two mountains was the same division that is in the two stones in which the names of all the tribes were written that were on the efod that would sit on the shoulders of the high priest. But in a braita there are two opinions regarding the distribution of the names in the efod and neither opinion is in accordance with Rav Kahana. So they reject his opinion and offer a different interpretation of "and the half" - that those who stood on Mount Gerizim were more numerous than those on Mpunt Eival even though the tribe of Levi was with them and some of them stood below, because the tribe of Joseph was also there and they were numerous. How do we know that Joseph's tribe was numerous? The Gemara continues with many drashot on Joseph.

Dedication opportunities are available for episodes and series at ohr.edu/donate/qa   Questions? Comments? podcasts@ohr.edu   Subscribe to the Rabbi Breitowitz Q&A Podcast at https://plnk.to/rbq&a   Submit questions for the Q&A with Rabbi Breitowitz https://forms.gle/VCZSK3wQJJ4fSd3Q7   Subscribe to our YouTube Channel at https://www.youtube.com/c/OhrSomayach/videos   00:00 What does it mean when a Rabbi in the Gemara kills another, like Rabbi Yochanan learning with Rav Kahana?   09:55 How does the genetic study that the Lebanese are 90% Canaanite influence the decision in Berachos, that a man living in Ammon could marry into the Jewish people?   16:09 Will the distinction between Ashkenazim and Sepharadim continue forever, or will they be unified in the times of Moshiach?   23:36 Can we judge those who go on Har haBayis favorably?   26:31 When one sees another do something wrong, should he rebuke? If so, how?   31:03 If an observant Jew learns that they are not halachically Jewish, do they have an obligation to convert?   36:50 Can one request the difference of inflation on a loan?   38:58 What does the Torah mean when it says Yitzchak was "playing" with Rivkah? Is that tzanua?   45:00 How could Yaakov "explode" at Lavan in next week's parsha? What did he seek to gain?   47:05 What is the standard of men's tznius?   50:07 What is the place of scientific discovery and experimentation in Torah?   56:41 How should we relate to Leah, considering some of her statements in this week's parsha?   1:05:47 Is it agreed that Hebrew is the original language?   1:12:43 What do mitzvos bein adam l'chavero only apply to Jews and not to goyim?   1:23:46 Should we judge Neturei Karta favorably, or can we call them reshaim?   1:30:35 How could Shimon and Levi destroy all of Shechem? What's the halachic justification?   1:36:12 Is Sefer haYashar an authoritative Midrash?   1:38:27 Is one allowed to listen to Jewish music in the bathroom?   1:39:31 Can one speak in the bathroom?   1:41:32 If a kohen isn't tamei, what is the issur of going on Har haBayis?   1:43:51 Does the concept of interest account for exchange rate?   1:45:05 Why is it good to be normal?   You can listen to this and many other Ohr Somayach programs by downloading our app, on Apple and Google Play, ohr.edu and all major podcast platforms. Visit us @ ohr.edu  PRODUCED BY: CEDAR MEDIA STUDIOS

Ceci est une conversation avec Meir Benhayoun, porte-parole du parti Otzma Yehudit.Meir a fait son alya il y a longtemps, a servi dans golani et est engagé en politique depuis de nombreuses années.Dans cette discussion, on a pu aborder son parcours qui l'a mené au parti d'Otzma Yehudit aujourd'hui associe à la liste du parti HaTsionout Hadatit, qui est le 3ᵉ plus grand parti d'Israël.On discute du système juridique, du conflit israelo-palestinien et des éventuelles solutions, du Rav Kahana et bien d'autres.Cette conversation ne sera pas facile pour tout le monde, mais ce podcast est fait pour se confronter à toutes sortes d'idées aussi radicales soit-elles.À cette occasion, il est bon de rappeler que les opinions exprimées par les intervenants n'engagent qu'eux.Le site de Meir:http://jerusalem24.com/Chapitres :00:00:00 Parcours00:36:00 Le Rav Kahana, Les Arabes et le Conflit02:18:00 Débat, Boycott et Liberté d'Expression

Dans ce dernier épisode de la série, nous revenons à la question comme ethos formateur du monde rabbinique, comme ce qui peut transformer un élève en maître, et un maître en élève. Avec une mise à mort, une résurrection miraculeuse et un serpent magique…

There is a beautiful thought from one of the early midrashim Piskta D'Rav Kahana (12,3) In Shir HaShirim, Shlomo Hamelech says, “ I am lovesick .” Rav Kahana goes on to quote Rav Levi, who says that there was a prince that was in the hospital for six months. When he finally got out, the principal called up and said, “Time to go to school.” The king answered, “ My son is still sick. He is not ready to go to school. Let me take care of him for a few months and rehabilitate him, and then he will go back to school.” So too, when the Jewish people left Mitzrayim, they weren't ready to receive the Torah. They weren't shining yet. They were working with bricks and mortar. They weren't ready to go to school and receive the Torah. They needed 2-3 months of rehab. And their rehabilitation was the mann, the be'er /well, and the slav/quail. After that, they'd be ready to receive the Torah. This can be understood on a deeper level as well, based on a famous Chazal in Midrash Tanhuma that says, “ The Torah was only given to be properly understood by the people that are the mann in the desert. Why? What was so special about the mann , the be'er and the slav? They all symbolized that when a person relies on Hashem, his needs are taken care of. And only then can a person learn the Torah properly. The midrash continues and says that second to these people are the people that eat Teruma . These are the Kohanim that were given their tithes. When a person is able to rely on Hashem, he can learn without any worries. This is why Hashem said, “ My children are not ready to go to school yet. They need a few months of rehab. ” And those few months of rehab were the months were we learned Bitachon, which prepared us to receive the Torah. Because without Bitachon a person really can't properly learn Torah. There is a famous Ben Ish Chai, in his Sefer Ben Yodaya, on Masechet Shabbat 31a ( Thank you Rabbi Ebstein) that answers Tosafot's question, which is that there is seemingly a contradiction: It says that after 120 years, God ask us questions. One of them is, “ Did you set aside time to learn?” And another is, “ Did you deal in business honestly? ” There seems to be a contradiction about which is the first question and which is the second. The Ben Ish Chai answers that the first main question really is, “ Did you set aside time for learning ?” That's the the number one question, because without that, nothing follows. But if you are first asked whether you learned Torah, you might answer that you didn't because you were too busy taking care of your expenses, that raising children costs money, so there was no time to learn. Therefore, the first question is Did you do business with Emuna? Did you believe that Hashem is the One that gives you parnasa, and that He is the one that is supervising all the money you get? The man then answers, “Of course I believe! Of course I relied on Hashem!” Now, when the next question is, “ Did you set aside time to learn Torah?” he can't say that he didn't have time. Only seconds ago, he said that he said that he had Bitachon and that he relied on Hashem. So if that's the case, how can he not find time to learn? Bitachon goes hand-in-hand with the ability to commit oneself to learning Torah. Every day, in the beracha that we say before Kiryat Shema, we say,” In the merit of our forefathers that relied on You.” We see from here that that is the fundamental of Kabbalat HaTorah/accepting the Torah . As long as a person Is worried about his Parnasa, he can't focus on learning. He doesn't have the time, nor the head to learn, because he's all worried. He does not have the clarity of mind and he cannot focus. The Chatam Sofer writes is his Derashot that the only person that is able to learn properly, without a mind full of worry is a person with bitachon. So we need bitachon for the time to learn, and we need bitachon for the clarity of mind to learn. As we get ready for the great holiday of Shavuot, we must re-commit ourselves to bitachon. That was the purpose of the days of the Omer; We have to prepare our bitachon, and get the rehab necessary to go to school. That's what happens on Shavuot. We are going back to school.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in honor of the birth of Maeve Ray Winestock, “the ‘rainbow baby’ of my niece Gabi and her husband Benji.” Rabbi Yochanan had a series of psukim that used to cause him to cry. If God is going to be incited to destroy us or if God doesn’t trust his righteous ones (as the verses in Job seem to indicate) what hope does humanity have? Once Rabbi Yochanan saw a man picking unripe figs, and the man explained that this was a metaphor for God sometimes killing the righteous before they sin. Another time, a young scholar died and the comment was made that he could have lived. However, in that instance, he acted irreverently. Another verse that causes Rabbi Yochanan to cry relates to Malachi 3:5, which seemingly says that God judges man and testifies against him, and the continuation of this verse was explained by other amoraim. Rabbi Yochanan also cried when he recited the verse from Kohelet 12:14 that speaks about God judging us for inadvertent sins, not just deliberate ones.  The verse speaks about “hidden things” which are interpreted as things that a person does (like spitting) that offend others. The final part of that verse says “whether good or bad” which means good acts that have a bad side to them. Some examples are giving charity in public (which creates embarrassment), giving charity to a woman (which suggests impropriety) or even sending meat to one’s wife on Friday afternoon which hasn’t had the sciatic nerve removed – which might cause her to forget to remove it. Rabbi Yochanan also cried at the verses which said that God punishes us with “evils” and “troubles.” This doubling is interpreted as punishments that have mutually exclusive cures, or loans that come with burdensome payback plans. These verses also are explained to be referring to “hester panim” and financial burdens imposed by gentile regimes which the rabbis understood to be something every Jew must undergo. Rava, who seemingly had a great relationship with King Shapur and didn’t suffer very much explains that in fact, people didn’t know how he had to bribe King Shapur. “Hester panim” is counterbalanced by God continuing to protect us, and this was reflected in a public debate between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hanania and a heretic in front of the Roman Caesar. There is a debate whether a man is accountable for frivolous conversations between himself and his wife during intimate moments, and Rav Kahana was so committed to learning from his teacher Rav, that he slept under his bed, until Rav reprimanded him. Though God hides Himself, there is a debate whether God cries for the Jews and for the Temple. In addition, God cries for bittul Torah. Various sages are lauded for their capacity to study Torah or see other sages even for a short time, highlighting the significance of every moment of Torah.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Caroline Ben-Ari in honor of the birth of Maeve Ray Winestock, “the ‘rainbow baby’ of my niece Gabi and her husband Benji.” Rabbi Yochanan had a series of psukim that used to cause him to cry. If God is going to be incited to destroy us or if God doesn’t trust his righteous ones (as the verses in Job seem to indicate) what hope does humanity have? Once Rabbi Yochanan saw a man picking unripe figs, and the man explained that this was a metaphor for God sometimes killing the righteous before they sin. Another time, a young scholar died and the comment was made that he could have lived. However, in that instance, he acted irreverently. Another verse that causes Rabbi Yochanan to cry relates to Malachi 3:5, which seemingly says that God judges man and testifies against him, and the continuation of this verse was explained by other amoraim. Rabbi Yochanan also cried when he recited the verse from Kohelet 12:14 that speaks about God judging us for inadvertent sins, not just deliberate ones.  The verse speaks about “hidden things” which are interpreted as things that a person does (like spitting) that offend others. The final part of that verse says “whether good or bad” which means good acts that have a bad side to them. Some examples are giving charity in public (which creates embarrassment), giving charity to a woman (which suggests impropriety) or even sending meat to one’s wife on Friday afternoon which hasn’t had the sciatic nerve removed – which might cause her to forget to remove it. Rabbi Yochanan also cried at the verses which said that God punishes us with “evils” and “troubles.” This doubling is interpreted as punishments that have mutually exclusive cures, or loans that come with burdensome payback plans. These verses also are explained to be referring to “hester panim” and financial burdens imposed by gentile regimes which the rabbis understood to be something every Jew must undergo. Rava, who seemingly had a great relationship with King Shapur and didn’t suffer very much explains that in fact, people didn’t know how he had to bribe King Shapur. “Hester panim” is counterbalanced by God continuing to protect us, and this was reflected in a public debate between Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hanania and a heretic in front of the Roman Caesar. There is a debate whether a man is accountable for frivolous conversations between himself and his wife during intimate moments, and Rav Kahana was so committed to learning from his teacher Rav, that he slept under his bed, until Rav reprimanded him. Though God hides Himself, there is a debate whether God cries for the Jews and for the Temple. In addition, God cries for bittul Torah. Various sages are lauded for their capacity to study Torah or see other sages even for a short time, highlighting the significance of every moment of Torah.

Study Guide Rosh Hashanah 4 Today's daf is sponsored by Sami Groff "in memory of my father, Rabbi Abner Groff. It is fitting that we are starting to learn Masechet Rosh Hashana at the time of your yahrzeit – the High Holiday tefillot were the highlight of your year as a Chazan- after weeks of preparation, your incredibly beautiful tefillot inspired all who had the privilege to hear them. We miss you always." And by Rachel Alexander Levy in honor of the birthday of Miriam Sophie Levy. "Happy 8th Birthday to my daughter! You inspire me to learn the daf every day." The Gemara resolved the contradiction Rav Yosef raised in the two sets of verses about Darius (one seemed to have the count start from Nissan and the other from Tishrei) by saying that one took place when Darius was good to the Jews and the other once he became bad. Rav Kahana asks if it is true if Darius became a bad king. Four answers are brought to show that he did become bad. Questions are raised on these answers and some are resolved. Referring back to the Mishna where it said that the first of Nissan is the first for the holiday, what is the relevance of this? One who takes a vow cannot delay in bringing it. What is considered a delay? Rabbi Shimon held that after three holidays pass in their order - and the order begins with Nissan, Pesach. His opinion is one of five opinions regarding this halakha and all are brought in a braita. From where in the Torah is each opinion derived and what does each one do with the verses that the others use for their proof? 

Study Guide Rosh Hashanah 4 Today's daf is sponsored by Sami Groff "in memory of my father, Rabbi Abner Groff. It is fitting that we are starting to learn Masechet Rosh Hashana at the time of your yahrzeit – the High Holiday tefillot were the highlight of your year as a Chazan- after weeks of preparation, your incredibly beautiful tefillot inspired all who had the privilege to hear them. We miss you always." And by Rachel Alexander Levy in honor of the birthday of Miriam Sophie Levy. "Happy 8th Birthday to my daughter! You inspire me to learn the daf every day." The Gemara resolved the contradiction Rav Yosef raised in the two sets of verses about Darius (one seemed to have the count start from Nissan and the other from Tishrei) by saying that one took place when Darius was good to the Jews and the other once he became bad. Rav Kahana asks if it is true if Darius became a bad king. Four answers are brought to show that he did become bad. Questions are raised on these answers and some are resolved. Referring back to the Mishna where it said that the first of Nissan is the first for the holiday, what is the relevance of this? One who takes a vow cannot delay in bringing it. What is considered a delay? Rabbi Shimon held that after three holidays pass in their order - and the order begins with Nissan, Pesach. His opinion is one of five opinions regarding this halakha and all are brought in a braita. From where in the Torah is each opinion derived and what does each one do with the verses that the others use for their proof? 

Study Guide Beitzah 33 Today's daf is sponsored by Sagi Carmel in honor of Ashley Offenheim on their marriage today. Is it permissible to use wood for other purposes or can it only be used for kindling on Yom Tov? Rabbi Shimon allows and sages forbid. Leading an animal by a stick on a Yom Tov is a dispute between Rabbi Elazar Bar Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis. The rabbis forbid it besides that it is muktze, also because it appears as if he is leading the animal to sell in the market – therefore, even rabbi Shimon would forbid it. There is a dispute between Rav Sheshet and Rav Nachman as to whether it is possible to use a wooden branch for a skewer. Do they disagree about a wet or dry branch? What is the root of their debate? Rava did not allow one to take a branch from the storage shed of wood to use as a coal stoker or to use one that broke on Yom Tov. Why? Is it because he held like Rabbi Yehuda that broken pieces are muktze? Does it not appear from another case that he does not hold like Rabbi Yehuda in this matter? There is a dispute between R. Eliezer and the rabbis – can one collect sliver from the yard for cooking? Can one take a sliver to use for cleaning one’s teeth? It is forbidden to light a fire from stones, trees, etc. because it is creating something new. Rav Yehuda said that if a vessel (such as a toothpick for example) is made from animal food, it is permitted because it is not considered that one has created a vessel. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty against him from a braita and the Gemara solves by differentiating between hard and soft. The hard ones are forbidden to be cut to use a toothpick to clean one’s teeth on a Torah level and therefore they are forbidden by rabbinic law to cut them for smelling purposes. But Rav Acha raises a contradiction between this and a Mishnah in Masechet Shabbat that it is permissible to break a barrel and remove fruit from it, provided that he does not intend to make a vessel and there is no concern that if we permit it not to create a vessel, one may come to break it also to make a vessel. Also, Rav Yehuda cut branches and distributed them. The contradiction is resolved by connecting these two approaches to a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis. Rabbi Eliezer thinks that creating a toothpick is forbidden from the Torah and therefore the rabbis forbade cutting it for smelling. The rabbis thought it was only forbidden by rabbinic law to cut to make a toothpick and therefore the rabbis did not forbid cutting for smelling or other permitted purposes. However, how could Rabbi Eliezer disagree with the Mishnah in Shabbat? They answer that he establishes the Mishnah in a case of Mustaki - a rickety barrel. According to the Mishnah, it is permissible according to Rabbi Eliezer to gather trees from the yard. There is controversy in a braita as to whether it is permissible to put in piles. The basis for the controversy is: do we fear that it seems he is doing it for tomorrow or do his actions prove that he is not.

Study Guide Beitzah 33 Today's daf is sponsored by Sagi Carmel in honor of Ashley Offenheim on their marriage today. Is it permissible to use wood for other purposes or can it only be used for kindling on Yom Tov? Rabbi Shimon allows and sages forbid. Leading an animal by a stick on a Yom Tov is a dispute between Rabbi Elazar Bar Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis. The rabbis forbid it besides that it is muktze, also because it appears as if he is leading the animal to sell in the market – therefore, even rabbi Shimon would forbid it. There is a dispute between Rav Sheshet and Rav Nachman as to whether it is possible to use a wooden branch for a skewer. Do they disagree about a wet or dry branch? What is the root of their debate? Rava did not allow one to take a branch from the storage shed of wood to use as a coal stoker or to use one that broke on Yom Tov. Why? Is it because he held like Rabbi Yehuda that broken pieces are muktze? Does it not appear from another case that he does not hold like Rabbi Yehuda in this matter? There is a dispute between R. Eliezer and the rabbis – can one collect sliver from the yard for cooking? Can one take a sliver to use for cleaning one’s teeth? It is forbidden to light a fire from stones, trees, etc. because it is creating something new. Rav Yehuda said that if a vessel (such as a toothpick for example) is made from animal food, it is permitted because it is not considered that one has created a vessel. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty against him from a braita and the Gemara solves by differentiating between hard and soft. The hard ones are forbidden to be cut to use a toothpick to clean one’s teeth on a Torah level and therefore they are forbidden by rabbinic law to cut them for smelling purposes. But Rav Acha raises a contradiction between this and a Mishnah in Masechet Shabbat that it is permissible to break a barrel and remove fruit from it, provided that he does not intend to make a vessel and there is no concern that if we permit it not to create a vessel, one may come to break it also to make a vessel. Also, Rav Yehuda cut branches and distributed them. The contradiction is resolved by connecting these two approaches to a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis. Rabbi Eliezer thinks that creating a toothpick is forbidden from the Torah and therefore the rabbis forbade cutting it for smelling. The rabbis thought it was only forbidden by rabbinic law to cut to make a toothpick and therefore the rabbis did not forbid cutting for smelling or other permitted purposes. However, how could Rabbi Eliezer disagree with the Mishnah in Shabbat? They answer that he establishes the Mishnah in a case of Mustaki - a rickety barrel. According to the Mishnah, it is permissible according to Rabbi Eliezer to gather trees from the yard. There is controversy in a braita as to whether it is permissible to put in piles. The basis for the controversy is: do we fear that it seems he is doing it for tomorrow or do his actions prove that he is not.

Study Guide Beitzah 30 Today's daf is sponsored by Hadassah and Michael Fortinsky in honor of Elisheva and Sam Lightstone, on their son Avishai's wedding today. There are actions that should be done in a different manner on Yom Tov because they look like actions done normally on a weekday, such as carrying things like jugs of water, etc. However,  when it is not possible to do them in a different manner, it can be done in the usual way, provided it is for the holiday. It is forbidden to clap and dance on Shabbat (rabbinic decree so that one doesn’t come to fix musical instruments), but we see that people do and no one stops them - how can this be explained? The answer is that it is better if they do not know and do things unwittingly than to tell them and since they won’t listen anyway, they will end up doing it intentionally and that will be much worse (mutav she’yihyu shogigin v’al yuhi mezidin). In what circumstances is this principle valid? The Mishnah allows one to take straw from the haystack but not from the trees that were placed in the muktze. Does the Mishnah follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara brings two versions of Rav Kahana on the matter. According to the Mishnah, wood cannot be taken from the sukkah, but can be taken from next to it. What is "next to it" and why is it permitted? A braita is quoted with a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis, however, they all agree that wood from a sukkah on the holiday of Sukkot is muktze unless one stipulated before. First, the Gemara questions whether one can stipulate on Sukkot and concludes that one cannot. Then a difficulty is raised from a source that says it is possible to make a condition on a sukkah of Sukkot. How is this explained? Another difficulty is raised from a source about etrogs where one can dedicate an etrog for only one day! How can one explain the difference between a sukkah and an etrog?

Study Guide Beitzah 30 Today's daf is sponsored by Hadassah and Michael Fortinsky in honor of Elisheva and Sam Lightstone, on their son Avishai's wedding today. There are actions that should be done in a different manner on Yom Tov because they look like actions done normally on a weekday, such as carrying things like jugs of water, etc. However,  when it is not possible to do them in a different manner, it can be done in the usual way, provided it is for the holiday. It is forbidden to clap and dance on Shabbat (rabbinic decree so that one doesn’t come to fix musical instruments), but we see that people do and no one stops them - how can this be explained? The answer is that it is better if they do not know and do things unwittingly than to tell them and since they won’t listen anyway, they will end up doing it intentionally and that will be much worse (mutav she’yihyu shogigin v’al yuhi mezidin). In what circumstances is this principle valid? The Mishnah allows one to take straw from the haystack but not from the trees that were placed in the muktze. Does the Mishnah follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara brings two versions of Rav Kahana on the matter. According to the Mishnah, wood cannot be taken from the sukkah, but can be taken from next to it. What is "next to it" and why is it permitted? A braita is quoted with a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis, however, they all agree that wood from a sukkah on the holiday of Sukkot is muktze unless one stipulated before. First, the Gemara questions whether one can stipulate on Sukkot and concludes that one cannot. Then a difficulty is raised from a source that says it is possible to make a condition on a sukkah of Sukkot. How is this explained? Another difficulty is raised from a source about etrogs where one can dedicate an etrog for only one day! How can one explain the difference between a sukkah and an etrog?

Part two of David's Zoom series, Unorthodox Episodes from the Talmud, mixes Jewish history with textual learning and fascinating storytelling. The talk continues the story begun in the previous episode regarding Rav Kahana, a third-century sage who fled Babylonian authorities to find refuge in the Land of Israel following a violent confrontation in a rabbinical court. … Continue reading "#95 Unorthodox Episodes from the Talmud (2)" The post #95 Unorthodox Episodes from the Talmud (2) first appeared on David Solomon. Related posts: #94 Unorthodox Episodes from the Talmud (1) Unorthodox Episodes from the Talmud #36 Chazal in the Age of Empires: An Overview of the Talmudic Period (part 3)

Today's learning is sponsored Sponsor a day's learning (thousands of minutes!) for only $72 click here https://www.flipcause.com/secure/cause_pdetails/ODUwOTU= Summary Beraisa: One who builds a sukkah for his use recites a shehechyanu [this bracha is actually for the whole Yom Tov. It may be made already at the time of building the sukkah]. When he enters it on Yom Tov, he recites leisheiv basukkah. If the sukkah is already built, he may recite the bracha if he renews something in its construction, otherwise he can recite it when he enters it on Yom Tov. Rav Ashi: I saw Rav Kahana make all the blessings on the kos of kiddush [this is our minhag as well, so as not to confuse some people who have a built sukkah all year round]. Beraisa: If one has several mitzvos before him, he can lump them together in one bracha “Asher kidshanu b'mitzvosav v'tzivanu al hamitzvos”. Rabbi Yehuda: Each mitzvah should get its own bracha [for more on this, see the lashon kodesh maamar here]. https://groups.google.com/a/torasavigdor.org/g/toras-avigdor-ey/c/GSRU628fWrQ/m/oFPXQB4UAQAJ Rabbi Zeira and some say Rabbi Chanina bar Papa: We follow Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Zeira and some say Rabbi Chanina bar Papa: The reason for this is because the possuk says “Blessed is Hashem every day”. Is Hashem not blessed at night? It means every day should get the blessing appropriate for that day (every season deserves its own thanks. In the summer we're grateful that we save on heating costs). Similarly, each mitzvah should get its own blessing. Rabbi Zeira and some say Rabbi Chanina bar Papa: The way of Hakodosh Boruch Hu is not the way of human beings. The way of human beings is that if something is empty it can be filled but if it's full it can no longer be filled. But the way of Hakodosh Boruch Hu is that someone full can be filled with even more (if his mind is filled with Hashem, then there's room for more), but if he's an empty man he cannot accept anything. This is based on the possuk “If you listened, you will listen”. Another pshat: “If you listen to the old, you'll hear new” (one explanation is that if you'll review the old things, you'll gain new understanding of the old things. Another explanation is that if you listen to old things, Hashem will give you more opportunity to hear new things). But if you don't listen to the old, you won't hear.

Today's learning is sponsored Sponsor a day's learning (thousands of minutes!) for only $72 click here https://www.flipcause.com/secure/cause_pdetails/ODUwOTU= Summary Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: One of them said that the aravah was instituted by the Nevi'im, and one said that is was a custom of the Nevi'im [Rashi explains that if it was instituted by the nevi'im it would require a bracha but not if it's a custom]. A proof that Rabbi Yochanan is the one who says it was instituted by the Nevi'im: Rabbi Avahu quoting Rabbi Yochanan: The Aravah was instituted by the Nevi'im. Rabbi Zeira to Rabbi Avahu: Did Rabbi Yochanan say that? “Rabbi Asi quoting Rabbi Yochanan from Rabbi Nechunya of bikaas Beis Churson: The law of Ten Saplings, Aravah, and Nisuch Hamayim are Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai.” So it's D'orayso, and not an institution of the nevi'im. Rabbi Avahu was dumbfounded for a little while, then he said: It was forgotten due to Golus and was later reinstated by the nevi'im. Challenge: Rabbi Yochanan said “What I thought is yours is really theirs” [When Rabbi Yochanan heard the teachings of Rav from his disciple Rav Kahana, he declared that the Torah, which he thought was in Eretz Yisroel, was actually chiefly in Bavel. So it seems that it wasn't forgotten due to Golus]. Resolution: In the Beis Hamikdash it was a Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai, everywhere else it was instituted later by the nevi'im.* Rabbi Ami: The Aravah used on Hoshana Rabbah [or every day in the Beis Hamikdash] requires a certain measure. It must be taken on its own, not with the lulav. One cannot fulfill his obligation with the Aravah that's bound in the lulav. Challenge: Since it must be taken on its own, why repeat that the aravah bound with the lulav cannot discharge his obligation? Resolution: It teaches that the lulav cannot be picked up a second time for the mitzvah of aravah, but it must be taken on its own. Click here to listen to the shiur with Tosfos https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lYWAQs8o51137Zcjf9k8pqvX2DdjgiCe/view?usp=sharing * Rashi: This is why a bracha can be made on it. But according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that it's a minhag, a bracha cannot be said. Tosfos: Some use this as a proof that no bracha is recited on Hallel Rosh Chodesh which is only a minhag [this minhag was discovered by Rav when he came to Sura (nowadays the minhag is universal because it was the practice of Rav's yeshiva so it spread)] (indeed, one should be careful to pray with a minyan on Rosh Chodesh; while we make a bracha anyway, it is easier to make a bracha b'tzibbur). Rabbeinu Tam: There are minhagim which we make a bracha on, such as the second day of Yom Tov which we only keep because it is a minhag. Besides, reciting Hallel is no different than reading the Torah upon which we make a bracha. Aravah would not require a bracha if it were a minhag because it is a minor symbolic act.

Today's learning is sponsored Sponsor a day's learning (thousands of minutes!) for only $72 click here https://www.flipcause.com/secure/cause_pdetails/ODUwOTU= The hadas must have three leaves growing in one row. Summary Rav Kahana: Even two [in one row] and one [in the row beneath] is kosher. Rav Acha brei d'Rava would seek out specifically such hadassim because it came from Rav Kahana's mouth (we don't pasken this way). Mar bar Ameimar to Rav Ashi: My father would call such a hadas, a hadas shoteh (Shoteh means something that's out of ordinary). Beraisa: If most of its leaves fell out but a minority remained, it is kosher, on condition that the braided effect remained. Challenge: This is a self-contradictory statement. If most of its leaves fell out, how can it remain braided? Abayye: It is possible in the case of Egyptian Hadassim which have seven leaves in each row. Abayye: We learn from this beraisa that Egyptian hadassim can be used, despite the fact that it has an attached name (11.2). The Torah doesn't tell us to take hadassim but eitz avos, these are eitz avos as well. Beraisa: If the hadassim are dried out, but three stems with [three] fresh leaves remain, it is kosher. Rav Chisda: This fresh row must be at the top of these stems. We learned in the mishna (26.4): “If the tip is broken off, it is possul”. Ulla bar Chinena: If the tip broke off and a little bulb grew at the tip, it is kosher. Rabbi Yirmiyah inquired: If the tip broke off before yom tov and the bulb grew on yom tov, what is the law? Does dichui (once it was possul when yom tov came in, it can no longer become kosher) apply to mitzvos or only to korbanos?

Study Guide Yoma 11 Pictures Today's daf is sponsored by Shana Lowell for the refuah of Bobby Schochet, Shaina Rochel bat Rivka. Bobby is an artist, loving mother, grandmother, aunt, and friend. She is both loyal and giving, and has always been supportive of women’s learning. And for a refuah shleima for  Noach Avraham ben Batya Shana. What types of places are obligated in mezuza? Rav Kahana and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding a storage room. The gemara brings various braitot and explains them according to each opinion. Is the house of a woman or partners obligated? Why would one think it is not? Can those houses also become a leprous house? How are the verses, which are masculine and singular to be understood? What about a shul?

Yoma 11 – Requirements for Mezuzah A. Entrance gate B. Does a storage place require a mezuzah? Rav Kahana barn – Yes (No) makeup – Yes Rav Yehuda barn – No makeup – No (Yes) C. Personal Residence vs Synagogue Sponsored by Z and Merav Dweck

Study Guide Yoma 11 Pictures Today's daf is sponsored by Shana Lowell for the refuah of Bobby Schochet, Shaina Rochel bat Rivka. Bobby is an artist, loving mother, grandmother, aunt, and friend. She is both loyal and giving, and has always been supportive of women’s learning. And for a refuah shleima for  Noach Avraham ben Batya Shana. What types of places are obligated in mezuza? Rav Kahana and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding a storage room. The gemara brings various braitot and explains them according to each opinion. Is the house of a woman or partners obligated? Why would one think it is not? Can those houses also become a leprous house? How are the verses, which are masculine and singular to be understood? What about a shul?

Pesahim 79 Rav Gidel in the name of Rav – can follow R. Yehoshua Mishnah follows R. Yehoshua re Heleb Mishnah – Utensils Tameh ok to offer Pesah Rav Hisda – only when knife has corpse-impurity causing people to be tameh Rava – even rodent impurity Half and half a) Rav – both perform first pesah separately b) Rav Kahana 1 – impure perform Pesah Sheni c) Rav Kahana 2 – impure never perform Pesah Challenge to Rav Challenge to Rav Kahana 2 Challenge to Rav kahana 1 Proofs for each opinion How the other opinions explain each proof

Today's learning sponsored by. The Wolhendler Family לע"נ הרה"ח ר' חיים שמואל מאיר ב"ר יצחק פינחס ז"ל Sponsor a day's learning (thousands of minutes!) for only $72 click here https://www.flipcause.com/secure/cause_pdetails/ODUwOTU Summary Rav Ashi encountered Rav Kahana who was putting schach on a postless exedra. He said to him: Don't you agree with the rule taught by Rava (16.2) “If there are no posts, it is possul”? (The sukkah was not wholly without walls. There were two walls at a right angle adjacent to a long, unwalled, postless exedra. Rav Ashi thought Rav Kahana was relying on ‘pi tikrah' even though Rava did not rely on ‘pi tikrah' in the case of exedra). Rav Ashi showed him: [There was a third wall] visible from the outside but not from the inside (The sukkah was made up of a lengthwise wall parallel to the exedra, and another wall perpendicular to it leading up to the exedra. Then there was a tefach extending out behind the second wall, near the exedra, which, if extended, would make up a third wall). This is in accordance with what we learned (Eiruvin): A lechi which is visible from the outside but not from the inside, permits a mavuy. And this case is actually the debate of Abayye and Rava (16.2, 16.4) regarding 'posts' (the posts that they argue about is such a case, where the post is 'visible from the outside' only).

Pesahim 41 – Many methods of cooking Mishnah A. Flour in water/acidic mix B. Pesah in juice C. Baker's water A. Flour in mustard may eat. What about flour in haroset? Rav Kahana – must burn acc. to all Shmuel – may eat acc. to sages B1. Pesah in juice – liable, derivation In a pot with no water roasted and then boiled - liable 2. Burnt Pesah - not liable 3. Raw - not liable, undercooked - liable 4. Boiling without fire – liable Violated prohibition against eating without roasting Multiple prohibitions for improper cooking & for nazir 5. Eating undercooked before sunset – not liable 6. boiling before sunset 7. roasted before sunset C. Water regulations שמות יב, ח-ט וְאָכְל֥וּ אֶת־הַבָּשָׂ֖ר בַּלַּ֣יְלָה הַזֶּ֑ה צְלִי־אֵ֣שׁ וּמַצּ֔וֹת עַל־מְרֹרִ֖ים יֹאכְלֻֽהוּ׃ They shall eat the flesh that same night; they shall eat it roasted over the fire, with unleavened bread and with bitter herbs. אַל־תֹּאכְל֤וּ מִמֶּ֙נּוּ֙ נָ֔א וּבָשֵׁ֥ל מְבֻשָּׁ֖ל בַּמָּ֑יִם כִּ֣י אִם־צְלִי־אֵ֔שׁ רֹאשׁ֥וֹ עַל־כְּרָעָ֖יו וְעַל־קִרְבּֽוֹ׃ Do not eat any of it raw, or cooked in any way with water, but roasted—head, legs, and entrails—over the fire. במדבר ו, ד כֹּ֖ל יְמֵ֣י נִזְר֑וֹ מִכֹּל֩ אֲשֶׁ֨ר יֵעָשֶׂ֜ה מִגֶּ֣פֶן הַיַּ֗יִן מֵחַרְצַנִּ֛ים וְעַד־זָ֖ג לֹ֥א יֹאכֵֽל׃ Throughout his term as nazirite, he may not eat anything that is obtained from the grapevine, even seeds or skin.

This Erev Yom Kippur we speak with Rav Nachman Kahana about his thoughts in this new year and he explains how it's the Jews that choose to remain in exile's fault that we don't have a completely religious country today in Eretz Yisrael! Please visit our website at: IsraelTorah.org and subscribe to our inspirational video series at: YouTube.com/IsraelTorah --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/joshua-wander/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/joshua-wander/support

The story of Slake ben Rav Kahana, why you can't sell jewels in a barn, and why the habitat you create in your fish tank can make all the difference.