Podcast appearances and mentions of serhii plokhy

Orzessek, Arno www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de, Studio 9

Orzessek, Arno www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de, Studio 9

Orzessek, Arno www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de, Studio 9

Orzessek, Arno www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de, Studio 9

Serhii Plokhy explains that Anastas Mikoyan emerged as a voice of reason, having opposed the missiles from the start. As the U.S. blockade began, Khrushchev ordered missile-carrying ships to turn back, though one ship with nuclear warheads was ordered to proceed. Washington remained dangerously unaware of Soviet submarines armed with nuclear torpedoes and the true number of Soviet troops on the island. Kennedy privately admitted he felt he had "no choice" but to act, partly fearing impeachment. Dean Rusk famously noted that the Soviets "blinked" when their ships finally stopped. (5)1920

Serhii Plokhy recounts how October 27, "Black Saturday," was the closest the world came to nuclear war as local commanders took control. In the Sargasso Sea, the Soviet submarine B-59, harassed by U.S. dummy depth charges, nearly fired a nuclear torpedo. Disaster was only averted by Vasily Arkhipov, who overruled the captain. Simultaneously, Soviet officers in Cuba shot down a U-2 plane, killing Major Anderson, without orders from Moscow. They believed the flight was a precursor to a bombing raid. Communication failures left the world's survival to pure luck. (7)1959

Serhii Plokhy describes how on October 26-27, Khrushchev sent conflicting messages: a private letter offering a non-invasion pledge and a public demand to remove U.S. Jupiters in Turkey. This caused chaos in the White House, with officials fearing Khrushchev had been ousted by his military. Kennedy believed a missile swap was the only logical solution but could not agree publicly without undermining NATO credibility. Khrushchev's failure to consult Fidel Castro on these terms sowed deep resentment, creating a secondary crisis between the Soviet Union and its Cuban ally. (6)1956

Serhii Plokhy concludes that the crisis ended with a secret deal, but Fidel Castro was outraged, having advocated for a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Anastas Mikoyan was forced to negotiate the removal of tactical nukes while his wife was dying in Moscow. The Soviet military felt deeply humiliated by the public withdrawal. Plokhy warns that modern threats like cyber warfare and a lack of fear among current leaders make the world more dangerous today than in 1962. He emphasizes the "human factor"—the risk of a subordinate acting independently—as the ultimate danger in nuclear brinkmanship. (8)1959

Serhii Plokhy describes how by October 20, the Joint Chiefs, led by Curtis LeMay, were pushing for Oplan 312 (a full-scale invasion), accusing Kennedy of "appeasement." Kennedy feared an invasion would trigger a Soviet takeover of West Berlin. He successfully hid the crisis from the media for a week to weigh his options. Choosing the term "quarantine" to avoid a legal act of war, he bought critical time. Meanwhile, Khrushchev fell into a panic in Moscow, fearing an imminent U.S. strike and even considering a false-flag claim that the missiles were under Cuban control. (4)1920

Serhii Plokhy details that Khrushchev's decision was driven by the USSR having only five or six ICBMs capable of hitting the U.S. mainland. By deploying medium-range R-12 and R-14 missiles to Cuba, he sought to balance the threat from American Minutemen. He appointed General Pliyev, despite the general's poor health, because he needed a commander capable of defending the island from a potential ground invasion. Newly tapped KGB records reveal the inhuman secrecy of the transit. Soviet units, unfamiliar with the tropics, faced significant technical obstacles, like mismatched electrical frequencies, making their survival a "heroic deed." (3)1915

Serhii Plokhy explains that Khrushchev placed missiles in Cuba to counter the U.S. "missile gap" and the Jupitermissiles in Turkey. He chose General Issa Pliyev, a loyal cavalryman, to lead Operation Anadyr because of his experience with multi-force coordination and his ruthless loyalty. The secret mission involved over 40,000 Soviet troops, far exceeding CIA estimates. These soldiers endured horrific conditions on overheated ships, only breathing fresh air at night. Upon arrival, they struggled with incompatible technology and a Cuban environment that failed to hide their missiles, yet they persevered out of duty. (2)1899

Serhii Plokhy describes how on October 16, 1962, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy informed President Kennedy that U-2 spy planes had discovered Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Kennedy felt personally betrayed by Khrushchev's prior lies regarding the deployment. Faced with intense political pressure and accusations of being "weak" during the midterms, Kennedy initially acted as a hawk, leaning toward an immediate air strike. Robert Kennedy was also surprisingly hawkish during early deliberations. However, advisors like Robert McNamara eventually persuaded the President to adopt a quarantine (blockade) to avoid an immediate nuclear escalation. (1)1897

As we mark the 200th episode of the Leaders in Finance Podcast, we are honoured to welcome Mikael Björknert. Mikael Björknert became CEO of PrivatBank on 20 January 2025. He now leads Ukraine's largest state owned bank, serving more than 18 million active customers, with over 70% of Ukrainians using its services.  He brings more than 25 years of experience in the financial sector. Before taking the helm at PrivatBank in Kyiv, he held several senior leadership positions at Swedbank, including Head of Swedish Banking, where he was responsible for one of the bank's core business areas. He also served as Chairman of Bankgirot and as a board member of Nasdaq in Sweden.  Mikael holds a Bachelor of Business Administration from Uppsala University. He is 59 years old, lives in Kyiv, and is married with two children.    *** Leaders in Finance is made possible by the support of EY, Mogelijk Vastgoedfinancieringen, and Lepaya. More information about our partners is available at our partner page.   *** Books mentioned in this episode: The Gates of Europe, Serhii Plokhy   *** Want to stay up to date with Leaders in Finance? Subscribe to the newsletter.   *** Questions, suggestions, or feedback? We'd love to hear from you! You can reach us via email at info@leadersinfinance.nl and check out our website.   *** Previous guests on the Leaders in Finance podcast include:  Klaas Knot (President DNB), Frank Elderson (Executive Board, ECB), Roland Boekhout (CEO ASN Bank), Gerrit Zalm (former Minister of Finance and former CEO of ABN AMRO),  Ingrid de Swart (member of the Executive Board, a.s.r.), Pinar Abay (Management Board ING, Head of Retail Banking), Robert Swaak (CEO ABN AMRO), Marcel Zuidam (CEO NN Bank), Saul van Beurden (CEO Consumer, Small & Business Banking, Wells Fargo), David Knibbe (CEO NN Group), Janine Vos (Executive Board, Rabobank), Nadine Klokke (CEO Knab), Maarten Edixhoven (CEO Van Lanschot Kempen), Jeroen Rijpkema (CEO Triodos Bank), Nout Wellink (former President DNB), Onno Ruding (former minister of finance), Yoram Schwarz (CEO Movir), Laura van Geest (Executive Board, AFM),  Katja Kok (CEO Van Lanschot CH), Ali Niknam (CEO bunq), Nick Bortot (CEO BUX), Petri Hofsté (supervisory board member, including at Rabobank and Achmea), Peter Paul de Vries (CEO Value8), Barbara Baarsma (CEO Rabo Carbon Bank), Jan van Rutte (C supervisory board member, including at Rabobank and Achmea), Marguerite Soeteman-Reijne (Chair Aon Holdings), Lidwin van Velden (CEO Nederlandse Waterschapsbank), Jan-Willem van der Schoot (CEO Mastercard NL), Joanne Kellermann (Chair PFZW), Steven Maijoor (former Chair ESMA), Radboud Vlaar (CEO Finch Capital), Jos Baeten (CEO a.s.r.), Karin van Baardwijk (CEO Robeco), Annette Mosman (CEO APG).   

We go deep inside the Chernobyl nuclear-power plant and the surrounding exclusion zone, recounting the history of the accident on April 26 1986, and speaking with plant workers who were on shift that day. A pre-eminent Chernobyl historian discusses the lessons learned and yet to be learned from the disaster. And we consider the science still being done at Chernobyl.In 2024 “The Weekend Intelligence” went to Ukraine to consider the aftermath of the Russian invasion and occupation of Chernobyl, and then of the Zaporizhia nuclear-power plant. What we found was an industry that had no expectation that could even happen, and nothing of a plan when it did. Listen here.Guests and host:Serhii Plokhy, historian, Harvard UniversityOlena Pareniuk, radiobiologist, Institute for Safety Problems of Nuclear Power PlantsJim Smith, environmental scientist, University of PortsmouthJason Palmer, co-host of “The Intelligence”Topics covered: Chernobyl nuclear-power plant, historynuclear safety, nuclear-energy policyradiation exposure, radiobiology, radioecology Get a world of insights by subscribing to Economist Podcasts+. For more information about how to access Economist Podcasts+, please visit our FAQs page or watch our video explaining how to link your account. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

We go deep inside the Chernobyl nuclear-power plant and the surrounding exclusion zone, recounting the history of the accident on April 26 1986, and speaking with plant workers who were on shift that day. A pre-eminent Chernobyl historian discusses the lessons learned and yet to be learned from the disaster. And we consider the science still being done at Chernobyl.In 2024 “The Weekend Intelligence” went to Ukraine to consider the aftermath of the Russian invasion and occupation of Chernobyl, and then of the Zaporizhia nuclear-power plant. What we found was an industry that had no expectation that could even happen, and nothing of a plan when it did. Listen here.Guests and host:Serhii Plokhy, historian, Harvard UniversityOlena Pareniuk, radiobiologist, Institute for Safety Problems of Nuclear Power PlantsJim Smith, environmental scientist, University of PortsmouthJason Palmer, co-host of “The Intelligence”Topics covered: Chernobyl nuclear-power plant, historynuclear safety, nuclear-energy policyradiation exposure, radiobiology, radioecology Get a world of insights by subscribing to Economist Podcasts+. For more information about how to access Economist Podcasts+, please visit our FAQs page or watch our video explaining how to link your account. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The provided sources detail a series of interviews with historian Serhii Plokhy regarding the deep-seated origins and escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War. He argues that Vladimir Putin operates as a dictator driven by 19th-century imperial ideologies, viewing Ukrainians and Russians as a single people to justify his aggression. The discussion highlights how the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict in the Donbas were met with a Western policy of appeasement similar to that of the 1930s. This lack of a forceful initial response, combined with NATO's military unreadiness and the failure of the Minsk agreements, allegedly emboldened the Kremlin to pursue a full-scale invasion in 2022. However, the sources note that Putin severely miscalculated by assuming Ukraine remained as divided as it was in 2014, failing to realize that his previous actions had actually unified the Ukrainian nation. Ultimately, the text explores how intelligence failures, historical delusions, and shifting political landscapes transformed a regional struggle into a global catastrophe.1855 CRIMEA

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comSally is a journalist, columnist, TV commentator, author, wife to Ben Bradlee, and legendary DC hostess. Who better to talk to about the implosion of The Washington Post? She also founded the Post's religion website, “On Faith.” She's the author of six books, including the spiritual memoir Finding Magic, and We're Going to Make You a Star — about her time at “CBS Morning News.” Her latest novel is Silent Retreat, and she's now working on a memoir called Never Invite Sally Quinn. Her energy at 84 is, well, humbling. We had a blast.For two clips of our convo — on Sally's initial impression of Bezos, and the time Bill Clinton called her the b-word — head to our YouTube page.Other topics: born in Savannah, GA, and learning voodoo as a kid; moving as an Army brat; her general dad who captured Göring and helped create the CIA; at Smith College wanting to be an actress; rebelling against Vietnam and the wishes of her dad by marrying Bradlee; the Georgetown party circuit and how it's grown more partisan; throwing a pajama party for Goldwater; dating Hunter S. Thompson; Watergate and Woodstein; the Grahams; Tom Stoppard; Hitchens; Howell Raines; Newt's revolution; Bill's womanizing; Hillary defending her cheater; the Monica frenzy; Obama rising on merit; Barack the introvert; Jerry Brown; the catastrophe of Biden running in 2024; Dr. Jill's complicity and cruelty; Jon Meacham; Maureen Dowd; David Ignatius; Bradlee's dementia; declining trust in journalism; Bezos nixing the Harris endorsement; his life with Lauren Sanchez; sucking up to Trump; the Will Lewis debacle; Sally's spiritual life; silent retreats; Zen meditation; the humor in Buddhism; the denial of death; debating the the Golden Rule; children in Gaza; and the need more than ever for in-person gatherings.Browse the Dishcast archive for an episode you might enjoy. Coming up: Jeffrey Toobin on the pardon power, Michael Pollan on consciousness, Derek Thompson on abundance, Matt Goodwin on the UK political earthquake, Jonah Goldberg on the state of conservatism, Tom Holland on the Christian roots of liberalism, Tiffany Jenkins on privacy, Adrian Wooldridge on “the lost genius of liberalism,” and Kathryn Paige Harden on the genetics of vice. As always, please send any guest recs, dissents, and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com. A listener writes:Thanks for all these good episodes. Is Vivek still planning to be a guest soon? I have been looking forward to that episode.He got cold feet. Too bad. On the other hand, I tend to avoid active politicians. Because they're rarely as candid as I'd like a guest to be. Oh well.A fan of last week's pod who lives near Atlanta writes, “The longtime Dishheads on the Mableton cul-de-sac definitely approve of your interview with homegrown talent Zaid Jilani”:I agree with his description of Mableton as a bit like the United Nations; I see that diversity in our grocery stores and local restaurants. He mentioned how he was often the only Pakistani and thus perceived as a nonthreatening minority. It makes me wonder how much the diversity mix affects how people perceive immigration? If a large group from one country arrives, does that seem more like an invasion? If a similar number arrives but from a wide range of locations, does that seem more like the normal American melting pot?After 30 years of living in Mableton, this may partly explain why I am not bothered by immigration in the way that you are, Andrew. I expect to see and hear all sorts of people wherever I go in my neighborhood. Today the teller at the bank spoke accented English. There are regular clerks at my grocery store who are immigrants. Our new HVAC was installed by immigrants. As an Atlanta suburb, there are many people descended from African slaves. European ancestry is merely one possibility off the long colorful menu around here.I think pace and numbers matter. A slower pace and fewer — with no massive homogenous populations arriving at once. And a new emphasis on Americanization over “multiculturalism”.From a listener who wants to “Make Democrats Great Again”:Great conversation with Zaid Jilani last week. I am very concerned that hardly any Democrats are being at all introspective, trying to figure out where they went wrong and how to become a party that can actually win elections — maybe even hearts and minds. They are only defined as anti-Trump, and their only hope is for Trump to go down in flames — which he very well might, but all they aspire to is winning as the least-worst party.The policy directions for reclaiming sanity and moderate voters are obvious (to me, at least). Here are my top three issues:1. AffordabilityThe longest lever to affect affordability is housing. Democrats have been complete failures in this regard, with strongholds like California and NYC being the least affordable places. When they talk about “affordable housing,” they only mean housing that is forced below market rate for the few poor people lucky enough to get it. They offer no solutions for the middle class or young people.The solution is obvious: build more. Plough through the various restrictions that are preventing housing from being built. There is no reason housing can't be cheap, except for NIMBY politics. Scott Weiner in California has been doing great work on this.Health care is the second-longest affordability lever. Obamacare made some progress, but not nearly enough, especially in terms of keeping costs down. But I'm not sure we're ready for another push on this; I say focus on housing.2. ImmigrationObviously there should be some immigration, and obviously we have structured our economy such that many jobs are only done by immigrants. But the Democrats' policy of simply not enforcing immigration law is untenable, especially for a group asking to be put in charge of law enforcement. We need those migrant workers, so find a way for them be here legally. Not through amnesty, but through some sort of bureaucratic process: have the employers fill out a form; have the prospective worker fill out a form in some office in Mexico; have someone process the form; and give them a green card.This is simple stuff! And yes, it would be helpful to admit that open borders, sanctuary cities, and subverting the law were not good ideas.3. CultureEnd wokeness. America is not a country consumed by white supremacy, and the people who voted for Trump are not racists. There are hardly any racists! And drop the other insanities, like the trans stuff.The message needs to be, “We are the Democrats and we want to help anybody from any state who needs help.” Hard to convince struggling white people in the South that you're going to help them when you seem to despise them. Love your brother, for crying out loud. And naturally, today's woke Democrats would be much more accepting of this message if it came from a racial minority candidate.Another wanted to hear more:I wish you had asked Zaid about Josh Shapiro. Also, when Zaid talked about affordability, he never mentioned housing — which is why there are so many ex-Californians in his home state of Georgia and elsewhere. “Build Baby Build” should be the slogan of the Democratic Party, rather than gaslighting Americans into believing housing prices will come down because we are getting rid of immigrants (Vance).Here's a dissent:About 20:30 into your interview with Zaid Jilani, he said that the root of all the Abrahamic faiths is that the meek have rights. You replied that this applied more to Christianity and Islam than to Judaism. I say this neither rhetorically nor to admonish you, but how much do you know about Judaism? Your comment is completely mistaken. Just what do you think Judaism says about the meek?Another has examples:In Genesis, you find that all humans were created b'tzelem Elohim (in the image of God). Moreover, Jewish texts consistently frame care for the poor as a legal obligation and moral imperative, not mere charity. Every Jewish child learns that promoting economic justice is mandated. It is called tzedakah.This religious mandate has manifested itself in the real world. Jews have been disproportionately represented in social justice movements aimed at promoting human equality. It wasn't an accident that two of three civil rights movement activists murdered in Neshoba County, Mississippi by the Ku Klux Klan were Jewish.Points taken. Big generalizations in a chat can be dumb. My quarrel may be semantic: the meek is not merely the weak. It's about the quiet people, those easily trampled upon. Like many of Jesus' innovations, it takes a Jewish idea further.Another listener on the Zaid pod:I wonder if you ever play the game of “which time would you like to go back to”? I do! And only half-jokingly, I often say 1994 in DC. Something about, for example, Christopher Hitchens on CSPAN in a dreary suit jacket discussing such *trivial* aspects of politics in a serious way. How perfect! When I listened to your episode with Zaid Jilani about how the left can win, it seemed dated to about this period in the early ‘90s.Ah yes, the Nineties. They were heady times and I think we all kinda realized it at the time. The economy was booming, crime was plummeting, Annie Leibovitz took my picture, and we had the luxury of an impeachment over a b*****b. Good times.On another episode, a listener says I have a “rose-colored view of President Obama”:In your conversation with Jason Willick, you said that Obama was a stickler for proper procedure and doing things the right way. I might instance, on the other side:* Evading the constitutional requirements on treaties in pursuit of the Iran deal (an evasion that the Republicans were stupid enough to go along with)* Encouraging the regulatory gambit of “sue and settle”* The “Dear Colleague” letter* “I've got a pen and a phone”Points taken. Especially the DACA move. But compared to Biden and Trump? Much better. One more listener email:I've been following you for years, but more recently I became a subscriber, and it's a decision I don't regret! I usually listen to the Dishcast over the weekend, and I always find it extremely stimulating, but there is also something relaxing about the length and scope of your conversations.I want to respond to something you said in your Claire Berlinski episode on the subject of Ukraine. Although I appreciate your position in defence of international law, you implied that Russia's claim to Ukrainian land is somehow “historically legitimate.” This is not only problematic from a logical standpoint (does Sweden have a historically legitimate claim to Finland and Norway, or does the UK have a claim to the Republic of Ireland, the US, and all its former colonies?), but also not based on historical reality.Unfortunately, this is not the first time your comments on Ukraine seem come through the prism of a Russian lens. I am sure it's not intentional; perhaps that's not a subject you have invested much time in, which is legitimate. However, I find it a bit surprising that, as we approach the fifth year of Russia's full-scale invasion, you still don't seem to have had the curiosity to explore this and invite any specialist on Ukraine. If Timothy Snyder is too political these days, I would recommend Serhii Plokhy — possibly the most eminent historian of Ukraine — or Yaroslav Hrytsak. They would each be a very interesting conversation.The Dishcast has featured many guests with expertise on the Ukraine war, including Anne Applebaum (twice), John Mearsheimer, Samuel Ramani (twice), Edward Luttwak, Fiona Hill (twice), Robert Wright, Robert Kaplan, Fareed Zakaria, Douglas Murray, Edward Luce, and Niall Ferguson.A reader responds to last week's column, “The President Of The 0.00001 Percent”:Like you, I'm not against people getting rich. A lot of good is done by a few people who have enough money to seed research and the arts, and pursue things that ordinary worker bees would never have the margin of time or resources to pursue. Good so far.But all strong forces need regulation and/or protective barriers, whether it's the weather, sex, patriotism, or capitalism. What's going on now is obscene. Progressive taxation is a social good: it doesn't stop anyone from getting richer and richer; it doesn't remove the positive motivators for success; it just means that the farther they get, the higher their proportionate contribution to the system that lets them get there. There are various ways to tweak the dials, but there is nothing philosophically wrong with tweaking them in a way the sets some outer limit. Let it be very high, but let it not be infinite.Here's a familiar dissent:You were right to torch the nihilism of the .00001 class. You were right to call out moral evasions. But when you referred to “the IDF's massacre of children in Gaza,” you collapsed a morally and legally distinct reality into a slogan. Words matter. “Massacre” implies intent. It suggests that the deliberate killing of children is policy rather than tragic consequence. That is a serious charge, and it deserves serious evidence.The governing reality in Gaza is not that Israel woke up one morning and decided to target children.

Next week, Ukraine will mark a violent anniversary: four years since Russia's full-scale invasion. The war has already reshaped Europe's security order, strained Western unity, and tested the limits of diplomacy. It's a conflict that historian Serhii Plokhy explores in his new book "David and Goliath: Commentaries on the Russo-Ukrainian War." He joins the show to discuss.  Also on today's show: actors Billy Crudup and Denise Gough; author Emily Galvin    Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

2026-01-28 | UPDATES #116 | Is Russia's imperial phase ending — and is Putin speeding up the collapse? Russia is waging a 21st-century war with an 18th-century imperial mindset, and dark ages political system. Empires, when they start bleeding out, don't usually stop the haemorrhaging of strength by throwing themselves militarily on their neighbours' territory. Is Russia's imperial phase ending — and is Putin accelerating the collapse? Serhii Plokhy, the Ukrainian Harvard historian argues that Russia's attempt to preserve its empire through war follows a historical pattern of overreach and collapse (United24). Is Russia's imperial phase finally reaching its limits — and is Putin's attempt to “save the empire” destroying it in real-time?----------SUPPORT THE CHANNEL:https://www.buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtain----------SOURCES: UNITED24 Media — “Putin's Plan to Save the Empire Is Destroying It—A Harvard Historian on Russia's Fate” (Jan 19, 2026; updated Jan 23, 2026).Ukrainian World Congress — “Plokhy: The battle for minds is part of the war” (Jan 14, 2026; citing Ukrainska Pravda interview).Tymofiy Mylovanov (LinkedIn) — reaction summarizing Plokhy's collapse triggers and Russia's exhaustion dynamic (posted Jan 2026). Ukrainian World Congress — “Serhii Plokhy on Russia's aggression: This is war of empire's collapse” (May 13, 2024; background framing on imperial logic).----------SILICON CURTAIN LIVE EVENTS - FUNDRAISER CAMPAIGN Events in 2026 - Advocacy for a Ukrainian victory with Silicon Curtainhttps://buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtain/extrasOur events of the first half of the year in Lviv, Kyiv and Odesa were a huge success. Now we need to maintain this momentum, and change the tide towards a Ukrainian victory. The Silicon Curtain Roadshow is an ambitious campaign to run a minimum of 12 events in 2025, and potentially many more. Any support you can provide for the fundraising campaign would be gratefully appreciated. https://buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtain/extras----------

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama, then a very young political scientist, declared that history was over. He wrote a book with the same title just a couple of years later. The Cold War had finished, the USSR had collapsed, liberal democracy and market capitalism reigned supreme, and it wasn't going to change. And yet in the […]

Day 1,345.Today, as Donald Trump and Xi Jinping meet in South Korea, we ask whether Ukraine can ever expect China to face real consequences for its support of Russia throughout the war. We also examine Vladimir Putin's ongoing air campaign to cripple Ukraine's energy infrastructure – including last night's major assault – and bring you the latest stories from inside the Russian Federation, from renewed public protests to fresh signs of deepening economic stagnation.Contributors:Francis Dearnley (Executive Editor for Audio). @FrancisDearnley on X.Adélie Pojzman-Pontay (Journalist and Producer). @adeliepjzon X.James Kilner (former Foreign Correspondent). @jkjourno on X.SIGN UP TO THE NEW ‘UKRAINE: THE LATEST' WEEKLY NEWSLETTER:https://secure.telegraph.co.uk/customer/secure/newsletter/ukraine/ Each week, Dom Nicholls and Francis Dearnley answer your questions, provide recommended reading, and give exclusive analysis and behind-the-scenes insights – plus maps of the frontlines and diagrams of weapons to complement our daily reporting. It's free for everyone, including non-subscribers.WATCH OUR SPECIAL LIVE EPISODEFrancis's Interview with Serhii Plokhy on the nuclear arms race:YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bmcJqyD8eXsApple: https://shorturl.at/Hq3la Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/7oSVN1czV0hqnvi0fAomea CONTENT REFERENCED:Trump orders Pentagon to ‘immediately' start testing nuclear weapons (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/news/2025/10/30/trump-nuclear-weapons-testing-russia-poseidon-drone/ Donald Trump claims victory after ‘amazing' trade talks with Xi Jinping (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/politics/2025/10/30/trump-xi-meeting-south-korea-trade-war/ Geert Wilders' Dutch PM hopes in tatters (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/10/29/geert-wilders-hopes-of-becoming-dutch-pm-in-tatters/ Exploding Shahed drone toys sold to Russian children (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/10/30/exploding-toy-replicas-of-drones-sold-to-children-russia/ Ukraine is bracing for the harshest winter since 2022 (Tomorrow's Affairs):https://tomorrowsaffairs.com/ukraine-is-bracing-for-the-harshest-winter-since-2022 Red hands and pig heads: Russia's plan to destabilize France goes on trial (POLITICO):https://www.politico.eu/article/red-hands-and-pig-heads-russias-plan-to-destabilize-france-goes-on-trial/ Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Day 1,342.Today, after a weekend of Russian bombardments on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities – with fires killing multiple civilians – we examine Moscow's failed diplomatic bid to block Donald Trump's latest sanctions on Russian energy. Then we consider how Vladimir Putin's unveiling of a “next-generation” cruise missile reveals growing unease in the Kremlin. Later, we sit down with Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy, to discuss the Cold War arms race, and how Kyiv could have retained nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union.Please note this episode features distressing recordings from the bombardment on Kyiv, including sounds of incoming drones.Contributors:Francis Dearnley (Executive Editor for Audio). @FrancisDearnley on X.With thanks to Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy. @SPlokhy on X.WATCH OUR SPECIAL LIVE EPISODELink here: https://youtu.be/Mw_lWhp-flUQuestions from the audience are answered in the podcast version, below:Apple: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/special-putin-could-strike-london-in-90-minutes-russias/id1612424182?i=1000733450202 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/7DKehIQCz24eKK73xjP2e8 LINKSSerhii Plokhy's new book, ‘The Nuclear Age: An Epic Race for Arms, Power and Survival':https://www.amazon.co.uk/Nuclear-Age-Epic-Power-Survival/dp/0241582865 ‘Will I die?' Moment nursery children rescued after Russian strike (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/10/25/will-i-die-moment-nursery-children-rescued-russian-strike/ Russia's latest attempt to woo the US reeks of desperation (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/10/27/kirill-dmitriev-russia-donald-trump-marco-rubio-putin/ Russians circling around Trump to sway his mind, warns key ally (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/10/25/russians-circling-around-trump-to-sway-his-mind-key-ally/ At least 250 Russians in Pokrovsk, Ukrainian troops walk 10-15 km to reach positions (Ukrainska Pravda):https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/10/24/8004333/ Europe's Plan B for Ukraine (POLITICO):https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/Europes-Plan-B-for-Ukraine/ Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Despite suggestions of an agreement on the supply of long-range Tomahawk missiles, President Zelensky went back to Kyiv empty handed after his meeting with Donald Trump on Friday.So what happened? Victoria and Vitaly speak with Christopher Miller, the Ukraine correspondent for the Financial Times, which has been reporting details of swearing from Donald Trump in the room, and the ‘tossing' of battlefield maps.Vitaly also speaks with acclaimed historian Serhii Plokhy about the nuclear threat and lessons from the Cold War that he writes about in his new book The Nuclear Age: An Epic Race for Arms, Power, and Survival. Today's episode is presented by Victoria Derbyshire and Vitaly Shevchenko. The producers were Clare Williamson and Julia Webster. The technical producer was Jonny Hall. The series producer is Chris Flynn. The senior news editor is Sam Bonham. Email Ukrainecast@bbc.co.uk with your questions and comments. You can also send us a message or voice note via WhatsApp, Signal or Telegram to +44 330 1239480You can join the Ukrainecast discussion on Newscast's Discord server here: tinyurl.com/ukrainecastdiscord

1. The Roots of the Russo-Ukrainian War: Putin's Power and the Failure of the 2008 NATO Summit. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) analyzes the origins of the Russo-Ukrainian War, highlighting Vladimir Putin's authority, which is derived from Russia's super-presidential constitution. This power allowed him to move toward dictating who could align with the West. The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest proved critical: the alliance split, with the US favoring membership for Ukraine and Georgia, and Germany leading opposition. This resulted in a failure to agree, leaving Ukraine and Georgia exposed to future Russian attacks without military guarantees. Putin responded by starting the war in Georgia later that year, effectively annexing territory and rendering Georgia ineligible for NATO. In Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, backed by Putin, lost the 2004 election due to the Orange Revolution, which Putin viewed as a serious threat to his authority in Russia. Yanukovych returned in 2010 and, pressured by Russia, refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union in 2013, triggering the Euromaidan Revolution. This protest against Moscow's influence was a direct prelude to the annexation of Crimea and the start of the 2014 war. 1855 TATARS CRIMEA

2. The Colossal Misjudgment: Underestimating Ukraine and Putin's Imperial Ambitions. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) covers the lead-up to the 2022 full-scale invasion, noting Russia's military buildup in 2021 while President Biden publicly stated that no US troops or weapons would be sent to Ukraine, which constituted a "colossal misjudgment of Putin." Despite the lack of meaningful preparatory military aid for Ukraine, US intelligence performed exceptionally well, accurately predicting the timing of the war and releasing this intelligence in real time, hoping to "shame" Putin. The expectation that Kyiv would fall within days reflected a profound misjudgment: underestimating the resolve of the Ukrainian state and people, and overestimating the Russian military's capacity. To justify his actions, Putin built an argument to the Russian people based on a "misreading of history," reviving 19th-century Russian imperial ideas that claimed Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians constituted a single whole. This false belief led to the expectation that Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops with flowers, rather than weapons. Putin's consistent goal since 2014 was to stop Ukraine's Western trajectory and integrate it into the Russian-controlled Eurasian Union. When President Zelensky refused Putin's demands regarding the implementation of the Minsk agreements in Paris in December 2019, many observers mark this moment as the countdown to the 2022 invasion.

3. US Intelligence Successes vs. Policy Failures Leading to the 2022 Invasion. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) details the period leading to the February 2022 invasion, where Russia positioned troops along the border, while the Biden administration publicly ruled out sending US troops or weapons to Ukraine. This policy is identified as a "colossal misjudgment" of Putin. Although US intelligence successfully reported Kremlin war plans almost in real time, hoping to deter Putin, little was done to militarily strengthen Ukraine. The prevailing Western assessment—that Kyiv would fall quickly and Ukraine would be overrun within a week—was based on a massive miscalculation that underestimated the Ukrainian military and people's resolve. Vladimir Putin framed the war using historical claims, stating that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people." This belief, rooted in 19th-century Russian imperial ideas, led to the flawed expectation that 150,000 to 200,000 troops would be sufficient and that Ukrainians would welcome them. Putin's central aim, consistent since the 2014 war, remains stopping Ukraine's Western drift and forcing it into the Russian-controlled Eurasian Union. The countdown to the current war began after President Zelensky, who was an unlikely war leader elected in 2019, refused to implement the Minsk agreements according to Putin's destabilizing agenda during their meeting in Paris in December 2019.

4. The 2014 Kremlin Decision and Ukrainian Unity Against Russian Imperialism. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses the all-night Kremlin meeting on February 23–24, 2014, where Vladimir Putin and his state security chiefs unilaterally decided to annex Crimea and fragment Ukraine. This scene exemplifies modern Russia's nature as a dictatorship, where critical decisions are made by one man—Putin, a former FSB chekist—without democratic oversight. Putin's dictatorial powers are legally based on the super-presidential constitution approved in 1993, following Boris Yeltsin's actions against the parliament. Previously, Putin built credibility by being brutal during the conquest of Chechnya in 1999. A longstanding stereotype divided Ukraine between westward (often Roman Catholic/cosmopolitan) and eastward (Orthodox/Russian-speaking) orientations. While Russia exploited these existing linguistic, cultural, and religious tensions in 2014 to facilitate the seizure of Crimea and initiate hybrid warfare in Donbas, the ultimate effect of the 2014 aggression was the creation of a much more unified Ukrainian society than had ever existed before. Moscow's failure to recognize this post-2014 change was a fundamental miscalculation when invading in 2022.

5. Western Appeasement of 2014: Crimea Annexation and the Flawed Minsk Accords. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) examines the Western reaction to the annexation of Crimea in February 2014, following the appearance of "little green men." Professor Plokhy asserts that had the West reacted to the Crimean annexation with the same severity as they did to the 2022 invasion, the major war might have been avoided. Instead, the collective West treated Crimea as an isolated exception, drawing a historical parallel to the 1930s Anschluss of Austria, and mistakenly believed that Putin would stop there. This flawed assumption led Germany to pursue economic ties like Nord Stream 2, hoping escalation would be less likely. Moreover, NATO's policy was to pacify Russia by not placing military units close to its borders, leaving the alliance with "very little to respond with" in 2014. Although the annexation was quickly followed by Russian-concocted violence in Donbas, leading to a massive Russian counterattack in summer 2014, the West pursued the Minsk II agreements. These agreements were often implemented according to Russia's interpretation: requiring elections first under Russian military control, intended to create a "Trojan horse" to destabilize Ukraine and preclude its movement toward the EU or NATO. This approach was closely related to the "policies of appeasement of the 1930s." 1840 KHIV

6. The Dictatorial Power of Putin and the Unification of Ukraine Post-2014. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the unilateral nature of decision-making in the Kremlin regarding the 2014 invasion. The decision to annex Crimea and fragment Ukraine was made by Vladimir Putin and his security chiefs during an all-night meeting on February 23–24, 2014. This process confirmed that Russia operates as a dictatorship, transitioning from the hope of Russian democracy under Yeltsin to the current reality where Putin's power is rooted in the super-presidential constitution established in 1993. Putin initially gained public support through brutality in Chechnya. While Ukraine was traditionally viewed as split between Eastern and Western orientations, Russia actively exploited these linguistic, cultural, and religious divisions in 2014 to justify the takeover of Crimea and the initiation of hybrid warfare in Donbas. Crucially, the professor emphasizes that the shock of the 2014 conflict had the opposite effect desired by Moscow: it unified Ukrainian society far more than it had ever been before. Moscow's biggest error in planning the 2022 invasion was proceeding under the assumption that Ukraine was still the divided country it had been in 2014.

7. Bucharest 2008 and the Failed Bid to Prevent Russian Aggression. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses how Vladimir Putin's powerful presidency, rooted in a manipulated super-presidential constitution, enabled him to assert the right to dictate which countries could align with the West. The April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest was a critical turning point. Though the US, led by George W. Bush, favored inviting Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance, Western allies, notably Germany, opposed the idea, leading to a split. The outcome—a promise of future membership with no specifics—was the "worst outcome possible." Putin used this weakness, starting a war in Georgia months later, effectively annexing territory and disqualifying Georgia from joining NATO due to territorial conflicts. This demonstrated that Ukraine and Georgia had exposed themselves to future Russian attacks by publicly seeking NATO membership without securing "meaningful Western support," meaning military aid. Domestically, Putin viewed the 2004 Orange Revolution, which rejected his preferred candidate Viktor Yanukovych, as a threat to his own power structure. Yanukovych later returned and, in 2013, was bribed and pressured by Russia not to sign an EU association agreement, sparking the Euromaidan Revolution which served as a stepping stone toward the 2014 Crimean annexation.

8. The West's 2014 Appeasement: The Failure to Respond to Crimean Annexation. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the annexation of Crimea in 2014 via "brute force" and the Western response. Professor Plokhy suggests that if NATO's reaction to Crimea had been commensurate with its response to the 2022 invasion, the current large-scale war might have been avoided. Instead, the West treated the annexation as an exception, comparing it to the 1930s Anschluss of Austria, believing Putin would cease aggression after securing the Russian-majority region. This thinking was a mistake; for example, Germany continued pursuing Nord Stream 2, based on the failed premise that economic ties guaranteed peace. NATO's overall policy was designed to pacify Russia and avoid placing military units near its borders, resulting in NATO having "very little to respond with" when the annexation occurred. Russia quickly moved beyond Crimea, concocting uprisings in Donbas, leading to a massive Russian counterattack against Ukrainian forces in the summer of 2014. This led to the Minsk II agreements, which NATO backed. However, Russia exploited Minsk II by insisting on holding elections first under its military control—a plan intended to insert a "Trojan horse" into Ukraine's political body to destabilize it and block its Euro-Atlantic integration. This resembled the policies of appeasement seen in the 1930s. 1855 BRITISH ARMY CRIMEA

HEADLINE: The Two Letters: The Demand for Jupiter Missiles in Turkey GUEST NAME: Professor Serhii PlokhyBOOK TITLE: Nuclear Folly TOPIC: Accidental War Warning SUMMARY: Khrushchev sent two conflicting letters during the height of the crisis: a private one discussing withdrawal for a guarantee not to attack Cuba, and a second, broadcast via Radio Moscow, demanding the withdrawal of US Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Kennedy personally favored trading the Turkey missiles, which were a NATO liability, but ExComm feared the political consequences of undermining the alliance. 1920 CUBA

HEADLINE: Mikoyan Negotiates the "Crisis of November" with Fidel Castro GUEST NAME: Professor Serhii Plokhy BOOK TITLE: Nuclear Folly TOPIC: Accidental War Warning SUMMARY: After the crisis resolution, Nikita Khrushchev rationalized his actions but faced internal criticism. Fidel Castro, who had advocated nuclear attack, felt insulted by the lack of consultation. Khrushchev sent Mikoyan to negotiate with Castro, who refused to allow inspections and sought to retain tactical nuclear weapons, leading to the "crisis of November." The eventual, humiliating Soviet withdrawal verified by US ships was cited in Khrushchev's later removal. 1899 HAVANA

HEADLINE: Black Saturday Escapes Catastrophe: The Submarine and the Downed U-2 GUEST NAME: Professor Serhii Plokhy BOOK TITLE: Nuclear Folly TOPIC: Accidental War Warning SUMMARY: Black Saturday(October 27, 1962) saw two accidents nearly trigger nuclear war. In the Sargasso Sea, the Soviet submarine B-59, tracked by the USS Cony, prepared to fire a nuclear torpedo until Captain Vasily Arkhipov overruled the order. Separately in Cuba, Soviet forces, believing invasion was imminent following orders from Fidel Castro, shot down an American U-2plane, killing Major Anderson. 1959

      HEADLINE: "The Other Guy Blinked": Soviets Reverse Ships to Avoid Quarantine GUEST NAME: Professor Serhii Plokhy BOOK TITLE: Nuclear Folly TOPIC: Accidental War Warning SUMMARY: The experienced diplomat Anastas Mikoyan served as a calming influence in the Presidium, having opposed the missile deployment from the start. Following Kennedy's speech, the Soviets ordered missile ships to turn back to avoid the quarantine. This news reached the White House hours later, minutes after Kennedy authorized an attack. Dean Rusk described the tense situation with the famous "eyeball to eyeball" metaphor. 1962

HEADLINE: Kennedy Chooses Quarantine Despite Military Demands for Invasion GUEST NAME: Professor Serhii Plokhy BOOK TITLE: Nuclear Folly TOPIC: Accidental War Warning SUMMARY: President Kennedy faced fierce opposition from the Joint Chiefs, led by General LeMay, who accused him of appeasement by referencing Munich and demanded immediate invasion (OPLAN 312). Kennedy refused to "cave under pressure," fearing that invading Cubawould lead the Soviets to seize Berlin. He ultimately chose the quarantine (blockade), announcing it on Monday, October 22, while the Presidium in Moscow awaited in panic.1920 CUBA

HEADLINE: The Missile Gap Drives Operation Anadyr in Cuba GUEST NAME: Professor Serhii Plokhy BOOK TITLE: Nuclear Folly TOPIC: Accidental War Warning SUMMARY: Khrushchev conceived the idea of placing missiles in Cuba during a trip to Bulgaria, responding to US Jupiter missiles in Turkey. This deployment, Operation Anadyr, aimed to quickly solve the strategic missile gap favoring the United States. Khrushchev chose cavalryman Ivan Pliyev of North Ossetia to command the operation, valuing his loyalty and multi-unit experience. Over 40,000 unprepared Soviet troops were deployeD.   1962 CUBA

HEADLINE: Nikita Khrushchev's Miscalculation and the Specter of Berlin GUEST NAME: Professor Serhii PlokhyBOOK TITLE: Nuclear Folly TOPIC: Accidental War Warning SUMMARY: Nikita Khrushchev, a shrewd politician who succeeded Joseph Stalin, was widely misunderstood as a clown. Khrushchev expected to manipulate the young Jack Kennedy, having once offered campaign assistance. Khrushchev was surprised when Kennedy refused to compromise over the missile deployment. Both leaders were constantly concerned about Berlin; Khrushchev used the threat of escalation there to manipulate Kennedy. 1920 HAVANA

HEADLINE: President John F. Kennedy Learns of Soviet Missiles in Cuba GUEST NAME: Professor Serhii PlokhyBOOK TITLE: Nuclear Folly TOPIC: Accidental War Warning SUMMARY: On October 16, 1962, McGeorge Bundy informed President John F. Kennedy that Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles had been spotted in Cuba. Kennedy was immediately upset, viewing Nikita Khrushchev as an "immoral gangster." Initial options included an air strike (Kennedy's preferred hawk stance) or a quarantine/blockade. John McCone of the CIA was notably absent, being on his honeymoon. 1963

MOSCOW VS DC NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP & ITS UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS:  8/8:  Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Serhii Plokhy  https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Folly-History-Missile-Crisis/dp/0393540812/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today's world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis. 1962

MOSCOW VS DC NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP & ITS UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS:  1/8:  Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Serhii Plokhy  https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Folly-History-Missile-Crisis/dp/0393540812/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today's world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis. 1962

MOSCOW VS DC NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP & ITS UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS: 2/8:  Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Serhii Plokhy  https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Folly-History-Missile-Crisis/dp/0393540812/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today's world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis.

MOSCOW VS DC NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP & ITS UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS:  3/8:  Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Serhii Plokhy  https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Folly-History-Missile-Crisis/dp/0393540812/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today's world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis.

MOSCOW VS DC NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP & ITS UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS:  4/8:  Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Serhii Plokhy  https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Folly-History-Missile-Crisis/dp/0393540812/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today's world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis. 1962

MOSCOW VS DC NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP & ITS UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS: 5/8:  Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Serhii Plokhy  https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Folly-History-Missile-Crisis/dp/0393540812/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today's world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis.

MOSCOW VS DC NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP & ITS UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS: 6/8:  Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Serhii Plokhy  https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Folly-History-Missile-Crisis/dp/0393540812/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today's world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis.

MOSCOW VS DC NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP & ITS UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS:  78:  Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Serhii Plokhy  https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Folly-History-Missile-Crisis/dp/0393540812/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= Nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, today's world leaders are abandoning disarmament treaties, building up their nuclear arsenals, and exchanging threats of nuclear strikes. To survive this new atomic age, we must relearn the lessons of the most dangerous moment of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis.

HAS THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION SWITCHED SIDES TO KYIV?   2/8: The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. by  Serhii Plokhy  (Author) 1920 https://www.amazon.com/Russo-Ukrainian-War-Return-History/dp/1324051191 Despite repeated warnings from the White House, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shocked the world. Why did Putin start the war―and why has it unfolded in previously unimaginable ways? Ukrainians have resisted a superior military; the West has united, while Russia grows increasingly isolated. Serhii Plokhy, a leading historian of Ukraine and the Cold War, offers a definitive account of this conflict, its origins, course, and the already apparent and possible future consequences. Though the current war began eight years before the all-out assault―on February 27, 2014, when Russian armed forces seized the building of the Crimean parliament―the roots of this conflict can be traced back even earlier, to post-Soviet tensions and imperial collapse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Providing a broad historical context and an examination of Ukraine and Russia's ideas and cultures, as well as domestic and international politics, Plokhy reveals that while this new Cold War was not inevitable, it was predictable. Ukraine, Plokhy argues, has remained central to Russia's idea of itself even as Ukrainians have followed a radically different path. In a new international environment defined by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the disintegration of the post–Cold War international order, and a resurgence of populist nationalism, Ukraine is now more than ever the most volatile fault line between authoritarianism and democratic Europe.

HAS THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION SWITCHED SIDES TO KYIV?   1/8: The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. by  Serhii Plokhy  (Author) POPULAR SCIENCE 1920 https://www.amazon.com/Russo-Ukrainian-War-Return-History/dp/1324051191 Despite repeated warnings from the White House, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shocked the world. Why did Putin start the war―and why has it unfolded in previously unimaginable ways? Ukrainians have resisted a superior military; the West has united, while Russia grows increasingly isolated. Serhii Plokhy, a leading historian of Ukraine and the Cold War, offers a definitive account of this conflict, its origins, course, and the already apparent and possible future consequences. Though the current war began eight years before the all-out assault―on February 27, 2014, when Russian armed forces seized the building of the Crimean parliament―the roots of this conflict can be traced back even earlier, to post-Soviet tensions and imperial collapse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Providing a broad historical context and an examination of Ukraine and Russia's ideas and cultures, as well as domestic and international politics, Plokhy reveals that while this new Cold War was not inevitable, it was predictable. Ukraine, Plokhy argues, has remained central to Russia's idea of itself even as Ukrainians have followed a radically different path. In a new international environment defined by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the disintegration of the post–Cold War international order, and a resurgence of populist nationalism, Ukraine is now more than ever the most volatile fault line between authoritarianism and democratic Europe.

HAS THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION SWITCHED SIDES TO KYIV?   3/8: The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. by  Serhii Plokhy  (Author) 1883 UKRAINE https://www.amazon.com/Russo-Ukrainian-War-Return-History/dp/1324051191 Despite repeated warnings from the White House, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shocked the world. Why did Putin start the war―and why has it unfolded in previously unimaginable ways? Ukrainians have resisted a superior military; the West has united, while Russia grows increasingly isolated. Serhii Plokhy, a leading historian of Ukraine and the Cold War, offers a definitive account of this conflict, its origins, course, and the already apparent and possible future consequences. Though the current war began eight years before the all-out assault―on February 27, 2014, when Russian armed forces seized the building of the Crimean parliament―the roots of this conflict can be traced back even earlier, to post-Soviet tensions and imperial collapse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Providing a broad historical context and an examination of Ukraine and Russia's ideas and cultures, as well as domestic and international politics, Plokhy reveals that while this new Cold War was not inevitable, it was predictable. Ukraine, Plokhy argues, has remained central to Russia's idea of itself even as Ukrainians have followed a radically different path. In a new international environment defined by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the disintegration of the post–Cold War international order, and a resurgence of populist nationalism, Ukraine is now more than ever the most volatile fault line between authoritarianism and democratic Europe.