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Gregory Copley analyzes European responses, noting UK Prime Minister Starmer's perceived weakness and the largely symbolic nature of French nuclear and naval deployments in the region. (11)1909 CAIRO

Gregory Copley explores regional reactions, noting Australia's military integration with the US and Beijing's shock as its propaganda regarding Iranian invulnerability is proven false. (12)   1909 CAIRO

Edmond Fitton-Brown discusses Iran's retaliatory strikes on Gulf neighbors like Qatar and the UAE, noting the effectiveness of regional air defenses against Iranian drones. Guest: Bill Roggio, Edmond Fitton-Brown. 11.1830

John Hardie explains Russia's marginal influence in the Iran crisis, noting Putin's cautious attempt to balance ties with Trump while focusing resources on Ukraine. Guest: Bill Roggio, John Hardie. 13.1887

The duo analyzes Persia's historical resilience, noting that even Rome struggled to subdue the empire and eventually had to treat it as an equal. They argue Americans lack "cultural sensibility," viewing Iran through modern clichés rather than recognizing its history of surviving imperialism. A thought experiment explores the potential for internal collapse, suggesting that both the US and Iran risk fracturing into independent, warlord-led "statelets" if central authority fails.1700 AENEAS

China firmly opposes and strongly condemns the attack on Iran and the killing of its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by the United States and Israel, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson said on Sunday, while experts warned that the joint military strikes will have far-reaching repercussions in the region and the world.外交部发言人3月1日表示，中方坚决反对并强烈谴责美国和以色列对伊朗发动的袭击以及刺杀伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊的行为。专家警告称，此次联合军事行动将对该地区乃至全世界产生深远影响。Calling the attack a grave violation of Iran's sovereignty and security, the spokesperson said it also tramples on the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and basic norms governing international relations. "We urge an immediate stop to the military operations, no further escalation of the tense situation, and joint effort to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East and the world at large," the spokesperson added.发言人在回答记者提问时表示，袭击并杀害伊朗最高领导人，严重侵犯伊朗主权安全，践踏《联合国宪章》宗旨原则和国际关系基本准则，中方对此予以坚决反对和强烈谴责。"我们敦促立即停止军事行动，避免紧张事态进一步升级，共同维护中东和世界和平稳定。"发言人强调。The US-Israeli airstrikes, which entered a second day on Sunday, have killed more than 200 people in Iran, including Khamenei, 86, and dozens of students at a girls' primary school in the southern part of the country, according to Iranian authorities.据伊朗官方证实，美以空袭进入第二天，已造成伊朗境内200余人死亡，包括86岁的最高领袖哈梅内伊，以及该国南部一所女子小学的数十名学生。The joint strikes have drawn the Middle East into unknown territory, as Iran has retaliated by firing missiles targeting Israel and 27 US military bases in the region.此次联合打击使中东地区局势进入未知境地，伊朗已向以色列及该地区27处美军基地发射导弹作为报复。The attack has opened a dangerous new chapter in terms of US intervention in Iran, marking the second time in over eight months that the US and Israel have attacked Iran amid negotiations over its nuclear program.此次袭击开启了美国干预伊朗事务的危险新篇章，这是八个多月以来，美以在其核计划谈判期间第二次对伊朗发动袭击。On Sunday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi sharply criticized the strikes in a telephone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, calling for an immediate cessation of US-Israel military operations in Iran, a prompt return to dialogue and negotiations, and joint opposition to such unilateral actions. Wang said that China has consistently advocated adherence to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and is opposed to the use of force in international relations.3月1日，外交部长王毅同俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫通电话时严厉批评了此次袭击行动。王毅呼吁立即停止军事行动，尽快重回对话谈判，共同反对单边行径。王毅表示，中方一贯主张遵守联合国宪章宗旨原则，反对在国际关系中使用武力。The blatant killing of a leader of a sovereign state and the incitement of regime change are "unacceptable", he said, adding that these actions "violate international law and the basic norms governing international relations".在国际关系中动辄使用武力，公然击杀一个主权国家领导人、鼓动政权更迭，这种行为"不可接受"，他补充说，这些行为"违反了国际法和国际关系基本准则"。Noting that the conflict has spread throughout the Persian Gulf, Wang said the situation may be pushed into a dangerous abyss, and China is highly concerned about this. He emphasized that launching military strikes against a sovereign state without the authorization of the UN Security Council undermines the foundation for peace established after World War II.王毅指出，目前战事已延烧至整个波斯湾，中东局势有可能被推向危险的深渊，中方对此高度关切。他强调，未经联合国安理会授权对主权国家大打出手，破坏二战之后建立的和平根基。Wang called on the international community to clearly and unequivocally voice opposition to the world regressing to the law of the jungle.王毅呼吁国际社会应当发出明确、清晰声音，反对世界倒退回丛林法则。Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said the killing of Khamenei was a "declaration of war against Muslims". Iran issued a statement vowing that this "great crime will never go unanswered", its official news agency IRNA reported.伊朗总统佩泽希齐扬表示，刺杀哈梅内伊是对"穆斯林的宣战"。伊朗官方通讯社援引伊方声明称，这一"重大罪行绝不会得不到回应"。Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Al Jazeera network on Sunday that a new supreme leader will be chosen in "one or two days". Iran's semi-official Tasnim News Agency reported that leadership duties would temporarily be assumed by the Iranian president, the judiciary chief and a jurist from the nation's Constitutional Council.伊朗外长阿拉格齐3月1日告诉半岛电视台，将在"一两天内"选出新的最高领袖。伊朗塔斯尼姆通讯社报道，领导职责将暂时由伊朗总统、司法部长和宪法监护委员会的一名法学家共同承担。Local media reports quoted Iran's Revolutionary Guard as saying that the Strait of Hormuz — a vital waterway for oil and gas shipments — was restricted to vessels on Saturday.当地媒体报道援引伊朗革命卫队称，霍尔木兹海峡——这一至关重要的油气运输水道——已于2月28日对船只实施限制。Jasim Al-Azzawi, an analyst in Iraq, said the conflict already looked broader and deeper than the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June last year.伊拉克分析人士阿扎维表示，此次冲突的广度和深度已经超过去年6月以色列与伊朗为期12天的战争。The recent strikes "followed mediators' announcement of a significant 'breakthrough' in negotiations", with talks set to resume last week, Al-Azzawi told Al Jazeera, adding that "clearly, diplomacy was never meant to succeed and was merely used to mask war plans".他指出，最近的袭击发生在调解人宣布谈判取得重大"突破"之后，原定上周恢复谈判，"显然，外交从未真正打算成功，只是用来掩盖战争计划的幌子"。"From the timing of the attack, it is apparent that Washington and Tel Aviv had already made up their minds weeks ago. Iran's readiness to retaliate across the region suggests it is willing to wage a long war rather than compromise," he added."从袭击时机来看，华盛顿和特拉维夫显然数周前就已下定决心。伊朗准备在整个地区进行报复，这表明它愿意打一场持久战，而不是妥协。"他补充道。Sun Degang, director of Fudan University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies in Shanghai, said the previous rounds of talks between the US and Iran appear to have been a mere delaying tactic, giving time for US-Israeli military deployments.复旦大学中东研究中心主任孙德刚分析认为，前几轮美伊谈判似乎只是拖延战术，为美以军事部署争取时间。"The US and Israel, seeking a pretext for military action against Iran, used the talks to enable the deployment of two US aircraft carriers to the Middle East," he said."美国和以色列在寻求对伊朗采取军事行动的借口时，利用谈判促成了两艘美国航母向中东的部署。"Sun added that the recent strikes in Iran may be the beginning of a full-scale conflict, as this time, Iran's determination to retaliate is significantly greater, potentially leading to the mobilization of its full capabilities to counter US-Israeli actions".他表示，此次对伊朗的打击可能是全面冲突的开端，因为这一次伊朗报复的决心明显更大，可能会调动全部能力来反击美以行动。Yan Wei, deputy director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at China's Northwest University, pointed out that Iran's retaliatory actions may lead to the US and Israel taking further escalatory measures.西北大学中东研究所副所长闫伟指出，伊朗的报复行动可能导致美以采取进一步升级措施。"In addition to intensifying military strikes and potentially expanding the range of targets, the US and Israel may further tighten economic sanctions on Iran, and step up information campaigns aimed at weakening the Iranian government's domestic and international standing," he said."除了加强军事打击和可能扩大目标范围外，美以可能进一步收紧对伊朗的经济制裁，并加大信息宣传力度，以削弱伊朗政府在国内外地位。"Emphasizing that the US-Israeli strikes in Iran constitute violations of the UN principles and international law, Yan urged nations in the Global South, as well as the UN, to unite to promote peace, end the conflict and resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through political means.他强调美以在伊朗的打击行为违反联合国原则和国际法，敦促全球南方国家以及联合国团结起来，促进和平，结束冲突，通过政治手段解决伊朗核问题。far-reaching repercussion /ˈfɑːˈriːtʃɪŋ ˌriːpəˈkʌʃən/深远影响grave violation /ɡreɪv ˌvaɪəˈleɪʃən/严重侵犯retaliate /rɪˈtælieɪt/报复blatant /ˈbleɪtənt/公然的incitement of regime change /ɪnˈsaɪtmənt ɒv reɪˈʒiːm tʃeɪndʒ/煽动政权更迭abyss /əˈbɪs/深渊unequivocally /ˌʌnɪˈkwɪvəkəli/明确地

Liza Mundy concludes with the legacy of the "Sisterhood," noting where key women are now and the persistent struggles for credit and promotion within CIA culture. 8.GAR DETROIT

Bud Weinstein argues that coal remains a vital base load power source for the US grid, noting that while coal's share has dropped to 15-20%, these plants are critical because they operate 24/7, meeting high electricity demands that renewables cannot always satisfy.

Josiah Hessie shares his memoir about growing up among evangelical Christians in Iowa, noting the state's transition from a "purple state" that supported Barack Obama in 2008 to a different voting bloc by 2016 following significant youth outward migration.

President Xi Jinping said on Wednesday that the more volatile and turbulent the international situation becomes, the greater the need for China and Germany to strengthen strategic communication, enhance mutual trust and promote the continuous new development of their comprehensive strategic partnership.Xi made the remarks when receiving German Chancellor Friedrich Merz as the first foreign leader in the Year of the Horse at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing. Merz arrived on Wednesday morning for his inaugural visit to China since taking office in May last year."The Chinese New Year celebrations continue until the Lantern Festival. Your visit during the Chinese New Year is just like friends and relatives visiting each other," Xi told the German guest, saying that it fully reflects the closeness and high level of China-Germany relations.Xi called on the two sides to use the stability and vitality of China-Germany ties to promote cooperation in China-European Union relations and contribute to harmony and common good in a turbulent world.Speaking about the future development of China-Germany relations, Xi said the two countries should strive to be reliable partners that support each other, partners for innovation committed to openness and mutual benefit, and partners in cultural exchanges that understand and respect one another.Xi stressed that China remains committed to the path of peaceful development and has both the confidence and capability to advance Chinese modernization. China will continue to share development opportunities with countries around the world, including Germany, he said. It is hoped that Germany will view China's development in an objective and rational way, uphold a positive China policy and meet China halfway to work for sustained and steady progress in growing China-Germany relations, Xi said.The two sides should strengthen the alignment of their development strategies, promote the two-way flow of talent, knowledge and technology, and enhance dialogue and cooperation in frontier fields such as artificial intelligence, he said.Xi said that China and Germany should properly handle the relationship between competition and cooperation, explore mutually beneficial and win-win pathways of cooperation, and jointly keep industrial and supply chains stable and unimpeded.Noting that both China and Germany are major countries with profound cultural heritage, Xi called on the two sides to deepen mutual learning between civilizations, expand people-to-people exchanges and consolidate the public foundation of friendship between the two nations.Xi also noted the importance of China and Germany upholding the central role of the United Nations and reinvigorating its leading role.Beijing and Berlin should take the lead in being upholders of multilateralism, practitioners of international rule of law, defenders of free trade and advocates of solidarity and coordination, he said.Xi said China supports Europe's efforts to strengthen its strategic autonomy and hopes the EU will work with China in the same direction, uphold the positioning of their strategic partnership, adhere to openness, inclusiveness and win-win cooperation, and promote greater development of China-EU relations in order to make a larger contribution to world peace and development.Merz said the German side attaches great importance to its relations with China and remains firmly committed to the one-China policy. Germany stands ready to work with China to carry forward the tradition of friendship, uphold mutual respect, openness and cooperation, and continuously deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries, he said.Merz, who is accompanied by a high-level trade delegation with senior executives from around 30 leading German companies, said the German business community places high importance on the Chinese market and hopes to further expand cooperation to achieve mutual benefit and shared development.Xi and Merz also exchanged views on the Ukraine crisis. Xi outlined China's principled position on the crisis, saying that seeking solutions through dialogue and negotiation is key to the issue.Xi noted the necessity of ensuring the equal participation of all parties to lay a solid foundation for peace, addressing the legitimate concerns of all sides to strengthen the will for peace, and achieving common security to build a lasting framework for peace.The two sides issued a joint press statement, in which they expressed their willingness to properly address each other's concerns through candid and open dialogue, so as to ensure a long-term, balanced, reliable and sustainable economic and trade relationship.As part of his two-day visit, Merz is scheduled to tour Beijing's Forbidden City and the Mercedes-Benz production facility, before traveling to Hangzhou, capital of Zhejiang province, to visit Chinese robotics company Unitree and German turbine manufacturer Siemens Energy.Jin Ling, director of the Department for Global Governance and International Organizations at the China Institute of International Studies, said Merz's visit itself carries significance against the backdrop of debate within Europe over how to approach China.By emphasizing partnership and a cooperative tone, Merz has sent a signal aimed at filtering out "noise" and external interference, and at anchoring China-Germany and China-EU relations in pragmatic cooperation, she said.Merz is the latest in a string of Western leaders to visit Beijing in close succession within just a few weeks after French President Emmanuel Macron, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer."These visits reflect recognition of China's global role and the opportunities presented by its market. Missing out on the Chinese market would mean missing out on opportunities, is a view that appears to be gaining wider consensus," Jin added.

General Blaine Holt analyzes China's J-35, noting it uses stolen F-35 designs but suffers from engine unreliability and systemic corruption within Chinese military procurement systems. 10.1793

Ahmad Sharawi and Bill Roggio debate the chaotic Syrian civil war, noting the complex web of actors including the SDF and Turkey, while criticizing the US withdrawal and strategy. 14.

Colonel Grant Newsham explores why economic intertwining will not prevent war, noting China's willingness to endure domestic hardship for national rejuvenation and the failure of Western appeasement strategies to deter aggression. 31949

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

Gregory Zuckerman profiles Moderna CEO Stephane Bancel and the pivotal mRNA research by Kariko and Weissman, noting the company's difficult transition from drug therapies to vaccines. 2

Sir Max Hastings discusses General Montgomery's expanded vision for D-Day and the initial chaos of the airborne landings, noting that despite the shambles at Merville battery, paratroopers' bravery confused German defenders and secured the mission's early vital stages. 101944 SWORD BEACH

Sir Max Hastings describes specialized armored funnies that supported British landings on Sword Beach, noting that while technically successful, heavy traffic and Montgomery's overly ambitious objectives prevented the Allies from capturing Caen on D-Day. 121944 Sir Max Hastings describes specialized armored funnies that supported British landings on Sword Beach, noting that while technically successful, heavy traffic and Montgomery's overly ambitious objectives prevented the Allies from capturing Caen on D-Day. 121944 SWORD BEACH

16  FBI Failures and the Mueller Limitations Unger argues the FBI failed to investigate Trump's Russian ties, noting that former directors later worked for Russian mobsters. He claims the Mueller investigation was limited to criminal acts rather than counterintelligence, allowing Trump to avoid consequences for "willful blindness" regarding money laundering through his properties. Guest Author: Craig Unger1907 NYSE

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Judy Dempsey and Thaddeus Mart identify a leadership void in Europe, noting weakness in Macron and Starmer, arguing Europe possesses treaty tools for defense but lacks political will, often blaming Donald Trump rather than addressing internal paralysis.1900 BRUSSELS

Matthew Shindell outlines the history of robotic exploration, from Mariner to Ingenuity, while noting the political and technical hurdles facing future human missions to Mars.

The balance of global power changed profoundly over the course of the twentieth century, above all with the economic and political rise of Asia. Asia after Europe: Imagining a Continent in the Long Twentieth Century (Harvard UP, 2024) is a bold new interpretation of the period, focusing on the conflicting and overlapping ways in which Asians have conceived their bonds and their roles in the world. Tracking the circulation of ideas and people across colonial and national borders, Sugata Bose explores developments in Asian thought, art, and politics that defied Euro-American models and defined Asianness as a locus of solidarity for all humanity.Impressive in scale, yet driven by the stories of fascinating and influential individuals, Asia after Europe examines early intimations of Asian solidarity and universalism preceding Japan's victory over Russia in 1905; the revolutionary collaborations of the First World War and its aftermath, when Asian universalism took shape alongside Wilsonian internationalism and Bolshevism; the impact of the Great Depression and Second World War on the idea of Asia; and the persistence of forms of Asian universalism in the postwar period, despite the consolidation of postcolonial nation-states on a European model.Diverse Asian universalisms were forged and fractured through phases of poverty and prosperity, among elites and common people, throughout the span of the twentieth century. Noting the endurance of nationalist rivalries, often tied to religious exclusion and violence, Bose concludes with reflections on the continuing potential of political thought beyond European definitions of reason, nation, and identity. Sugata Bose is Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs, Harvard University. Lucas Tse is Examination Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The balance of global power changed profoundly over the course of the twentieth century, above all with the economic and political rise of Asia. Asia after Europe: Imagining a Continent in the Long Twentieth Century (Harvard UP, 2024) is a bold new interpretation of the period, focusing on the conflicting and overlapping ways in which Asians have conceived their bonds and their roles in the world. Tracking the circulation of ideas and people across colonial and national borders, Sugata Bose explores developments in Asian thought, art, and politics that defied Euro-American models and defined Asianness as a locus of solidarity for all humanity.Impressive in scale, yet driven by the stories of fascinating and influential individuals, Asia after Europe examines early intimations of Asian solidarity and universalism preceding Japan's victory over Russia in 1905; the revolutionary collaborations of the First World War and its aftermath, when Asian universalism took shape alongside Wilsonian internationalism and Bolshevism; the impact of the Great Depression and Second World War on the idea of Asia; and the persistence of forms of Asian universalism in the postwar period, despite the consolidation of postcolonial nation-states on a European model.Diverse Asian universalisms were forged and fractured through phases of poverty and prosperity, among elites and common people, throughout the span of the twentieth century. Noting the endurance of nationalist rivalries, often tied to religious exclusion and violence, Bose concludes with reflections on the continuing potential of political thought beyond European definitions of reason, nation, and identity. Sugata Bose is Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs, Harvard University. Lucas Tse is Examination Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

The balance of global power changed profoundly over the course of the twentieth century, above all with the economic and political rise of Asia. Asia after Europe: Imagining a Continent in the Long Twentieth Century (Harvard UP, 2024) is a bold new interpretation of the period, focusing on the conflicting and overlapping ways in which Asians have conceived their bonds and their roles in the world. Tracking the circulation of ideas and people across colonial and national borders, Sugata Bose explores developments in Asian thought, art, and politics that defied Euro-American models and defined Asianness as a locus of solidarity for all humanity.Impressive in scale, yet driven by the stories of fascinating and influential individuals, Asia after Europe examines early intimations of Asian solidarity and universalism preceding Japan's victory over Russia in 1905; the revolutionary collaborations of the First World War and its aftermath, when Asian universalism took shape alongside Wilsonian internationalism and Bolshevism; the impact of the Great Depression and Second World War on the idea of Asia; and the persistence of forms of Asian universalism in the postwar period, despite the consolidation of postcolonial nation-states on a European model.Diverse Asian universalisms were forged and fractured through phases of poverty and prosperity, among elites and common people, throughout the span of the twentieth century. Noting the endurance of nationalist rivalries, often tied to religious exclusion and violence, Bose concludes with reflections on the continuing potential of political thought beyond European definitions of reason, nation, and identity. Sugata Bose is Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs, Harvard University. Lucas Tse is Examination Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford University. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/southeast-asian-studies

The balance of global power changed profoundly over the course of the twentieth century, above all with the economic and political rise of Asia. Asia after Europe: Imagining a Continent in the Long Twentieth Century (Harvard UP, 2024) is a bold new interpretation of the period, focusing on the conflicting and overlapping ways in which Asians have conceived their bonds and their roles in the world. Tracking the circulation of ideas and people across colonial and national borders, Sugata Bose explores developments in Asian thought, art, and politics that defied Euro-American models and defined Asianness as a locus of solidarity for all humanity.Impressive in scale, yet driven by the stories of fascinating and influential individuals, Asia after Europe examines early intimations of Asian solidarity and universalism preceding Japan's victory over Russia in 1905; the revolutionary collaborations of the First World War and its aftermath, when Asian universalism took shape alongside Wilsonian internationalism and Bolshevism; the impact of the Great Depression and Second World War on the idea of Asia; and the persistence of forms of Asian universalism in the postwar period, despite the consolidation of postcolonial nation-states on a European model.Diverse Asian universalisms were forged and fractured through phases of poverty and prosperity, among elites and common people, throughout the span of the twentieth century. Noting the endurance of nationalist rivalries, often tied to religious exclusion and violence, Bose concludes with reflections on the continuing potential of political thought beyond European definitions of reason, nation, and identity. Sugata Bose is Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs, Harvard University. Lucas Tse is Examination Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/central-asian-studies

The balance of global power changed profoundly over the course of the twentieth century, above all with the economic and political rise of Asia. Asia after Europe: Imagining a Continent in the Long Twentieth Century (Harvard UP, 2024) is a bold new interpretation of the period, focusing on the conflicting and overlapping ways in which Asians have conceived their bonds and their roles in the world. Tracking the circulation of ideas and people across colonial and national borders, Sugata Bose explores developments in Asian thought, art, and politics that defied Euro-American models and defined Asianness as a locus of solidarity for all humanity.Impressive in scale, yet driven by the stories of fascinating and influential individuals, Asia after Europe examines early intimations of Asian solidarity and universalism preceding Japan's victory over Russia in 1905; the revolutionary collaborations of the First World War and its aftermath, when Asian universalism took shape alongside Wilsonian internationalism and Bolshevism; the impact of the Great Depression and Second World War on the idea of Asia; and the persistence of forms of Asian universalism in the postwar period, despite the consolidation of postcolonial nation-states on a European model.Diverse Asian universalisms were forged and fractured through phases of poverty and prosperity, among elites and common people, throughout the span of the twentieth century. Noting the endurance of nationalist rivalries, often tied to religious exclusion and violence, Bose concludes with reflections on the continuing potential of political thought beyond European definitions of reason, nation, and identity. Sugata Bose is Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs, Harvard University. Lucas Tse is Examination Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

Josh Rogin discusses the trade conflict between the US and India, noting that tariffs were used as leverage regarding Russian oil and Modi's diplomatic de-risking from Washington.1860 INDIA

Guest: Simon Constable. As Storm Nills approaches France, Constable reports on rising copper prices and volatile gold, while noting UK PM Starmer faces severe political pressure from opposition parties.MONET

Guest: Jonathan Schanzer. Schanzer analyzes Iran's stalling tactics in negotiations via Oman, noting the pressure from a US armada while questioning Oman's neutrality as a mediator.1560 PERSIA

Guest: Grant Newsham. Newsham analyzes Prime Minister Takichi's landslide victory in Japan, noting her hawkish defense stance and economic plans significantly strengthen the US-Japan security alliance.1930

PREVIEW FOR LATER TODAY Guest: Jonathan Schanzer. Schanzer outlines the urgency of the Israel-U.S.alignment on Iran, noting the high cost of U.S. deployment and the risks of delaying action.1936 ABOLITION OF THE VEIL IN PERSIA

PREVIEW FOR LATER TODAY Guest: Judy Dempsey. Dempsey highlights Europe's helplessness regarding U.S.political shifts, noting a lack of strategic leadership to navigate the changing geopolitical landscape driven by the U.S.1890 BRUSSELS

PREVIEW: Peter Huessy joins the show to discuss the end of the New START treaty and the modernization of nuclear arsenals since 2011. Huessy highlights the disparity in battlefield nuclear capabilities, noting that while the US assumes its systems work without testing, Russia and China are actively testing to develop "battlefield nukes." He warns that in military war games, once nuclear weapons are introduced, "nothing holds," and conventional US superiority becomes irrelevant.1958

Jim McTague reveals a mysterious worldwide shortage of cod discovered at a Lancaster Costco, noting skyrocketing prices and a puzzling lack of coverage by major newspapers investigating the supply disruption.1942 ARMISTICE DAY, LANCASTER PA

Andrea Stricker evaluates the stressed Non-Proliferation Treaty ahead of a review conference, noting Middle Eastproliferation risks and the challenge of deterring near-peer adversaries in an evolving threat environment.1940

Practical advice from a straight-talking former criminal and occasionally profane Dharma teacher.  Vinny Ferarro has practiced insight meditation (vipassanā) since the mid-90s. He's the Guiding Teacher of the Big Heart City Sangha in San Francisco and has led a weekly sitting group for almost two decades. As a fully empowered Dharma Teacher through Spirit Rock/IMS, he has taught residential retreats at various centers and currently leads Spirit Rock's Year to Live course.  This episode originally dropped in May of 2024, but we're re-posting it because it was one of our most successful episodes.  In this episode we talk about: Alignment Vinny's concept of "flashing your basic goodness" Noting practice The deep satisfaction in not seeking satisfaction Redirecting awareness Being an "empathetic witness" for yourself When to opt for distraction Not taking what's not yours  Vinny's ancestor practice What is the connection between seeing our family patterns and not taking what is not ours?   How loyal have we been to our suffering? Related Episodes: How To Be Okay No Matter What | Kamala Masters Vitamin E: How To Cultivate Equanimity Amidst Political Chaos | Roshi Joan Halifax Non-Preachy Ethics | Jozen Tamori Gibson Get the 10% with Dan Harris app here Sign up for Dan's free newsletter here Follow Dan on social: Instagram, TikTok Subscribe to our YouTube Channel   Thanks to our sponsors:  LinkedIn:  Spend $250 on your first campaign on LinkedIn ads and get a $250 credit for the next one. Just go to linkedin.com/happier. Tonal:   Go to tonal.com and use the promo code Happier for $200 off your purchase. Cozy Earth: Go to cozyearth.com/HARRIS for up to 20% off! To advertise on the show, contact sales@advertisecast.com or visit https://advertising.libsyn.com/10HappierwithDanHarris

PREVIEW FOR LATER TODAY Guest: Elizabeth Peek. Peek analyzes lingering inflation, noting consumer resistance to price hikes and hope that AI productivity will help companies improve margins without increasing costs further.JANUARY 1931

Guest: Elizabeth Peek. Peek discusses Trump's nomination of hawk Kevin Warsh for Federal Reserve Chairman, noting the immediate drop in precious metals and potential monetary policy shifts.1905 BUTTE MONTANA

Guest: Judy Dempsey. Dempsey analyzes the stalemated Ukraine conflict, noting European refusal to accept Russianvictory, while discussing rising tensions and internal political divisions within Iran.1895 KRAKOW

Guest: Joseph Sternberg. Sternberg details Starmer's unpopularity and lack of economic agenda, noting potential leadership challenges within the Labour Party from rivals like Burnham and Streeting.1808 GREST HSLL BSNK OF ENGLAND

Guest: Gregory Copley. Copley analyzes new talks involving Turkey and the UAE, noting U.S. reluctance to support Iranian civil society leaves the clerical regime breathing room despite weakness.1890 ALEPPO

Guest: Gregory Copley. Copley observes Russia targeting Ukrainian infrastructure to pressure the public, noting that despite Western support, Moscow retains the upper hand while demanding territorial concessions.1941 UKRAINE

Jessica Pierce and Mark Bekoff explain that without humans, dogs will likely adopt communal parenting strategies and reduced reproductive cycles to maximize survival, noting dogs already possess latent social skills for conflict resolution with lifespans stabilizing around eight years like wild wolves.1861 DUNDRUM HOUSE. LORD HAWARDEN AND SPRINGER

Jessica Pierce and Mark Bekoff discuss whether dogs will see themselves as apex predators or ecosystem participants, noting pack behavior may mirror wolves if hunting large prey while dogs retain their distinct genetic history, concluding that this experiment teaches humans to view dogs as individuals.1900 ENGLISH SPRINGERS, HUNTING

Joe Truzman and Bill Roggio describe the war as a slow boil, noting Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire is stalling because Hamas refuses to disarm or surrender heavy weapons to Israel.1898 GAZA

Edmund Fitton Brown and Bill Roggio argue Saudi Arabia's refusal to allow airspace use for strikes on Iran is theatrical to avoid Iranian retaliation, noting Riyadh privately remains a dependable US partner.1890 TEHRAN

Guest: Dan Flores. Flores critiques 19th-century explorers, noting how Lewis and Clark needlessly slaughtered grizzlies and how Audubon, though later regretful, killed birds to capture their likenesses.1873 VULTURE BISON