Podcasts about Minsk

Derybas dėl prisidėjimo prie valdančiosios koalicijos su demokratais pradėjęs socialdemokratų lyderis Mindaugas Sinkevičius teigia, kad esminių nesutarimų neatrasta. Šiandien planuojamas jau trišalis - socialdemokratų, „valstiečių“ ir demokratų – derybininkų susitikimas.Lietuvoje teisiamas A.Kandrotas - Celofanas gegužės pradžioje netikėtai išvykęs į Minską ten atsidūrė kartu su skandalingu Latvijos politiku Aleksėjumi Roslikovu. Abu veikėjai bendradarbiauti pradėjo dar kovido pandemijos laikais. LRT Tyrimų skyriaus surinktais duomenimis, jiedu kartu su bendražygiais iš Estijos savo šalyse būrė judėjimus, kurie skatino nepasitikėjimą valstybės institucijomis, ragino priešintis pandemijos apribojimams bei skleidė sąmokslo teorijas apie vakcinas. Ekspertai jų veikloje įžvelgia koordinuotos kremliaus operacijos požymių.Šiandien prasideda Pasaulio futbolo čempionatas. Jis šiemet vyks Meksikoje, Jungtinėse Valstijose ir Kanadoje. Šiemet dėl pasaulio futbolo čempionų taurės kovos rekordiškai daug nacionalinių rinktinių – 48. Čempionate neišvengiama ir politikos – Jungtinės valstijos atsisakė išduoti vizas daliai šios komandos pagalbinių darbuotojų, todėl iraniečiai kol kas apsistojo Meksikos šiaurės vakaruose, pasienyje su Jungtinėmis valstijomis.Lietuvos bankas išleidžia kolekcinę 10 eurų sidabro monetą „Lietuvos radijui – 100“.LRT šimtmečio proga kviečiame kartu pasikapstyti po radijo archyvus. Kolega Adomas Šimkus domėjosi laidomis, kurių eteryje jau nebėra, nors savo laiku, jas turbūt žinojo visi.Ved. Rūta Kupetytė

Franklin Graham's May 2026 visit to Belarus wasn't just an evangelistic crusade — it was a diplomatic mission for Donald Trump. Lukashenko, Europe's last dictator and Putin's key ally in the northern invasion of Ukraine, used Graham's visit to send "warm greetings to President Trump." That's not gospel. That's Christian nationalism with a passport. Tihomir Kukolja, former Executive Director of the Forum for Leadership and Reconciliation, was born in the former Yugoslavia, where Billy Graham preached to 10,000 people in a steady rain in 1967 — braving communist power to reach ordinary people with nothing to offer him politically. He watched that legacy get dismantled in real time when Franklin Graham sat across from Lukashenko and called it an honor. In this conversation, Tihomir — a Croatian theologian, reconciliation leader, and eyewitness to both legacies — walks through exactly what happened in Minsk, what it reveals about Franklin Graham's double gospel, and why a message that poses no threat to authoritarian power is not the gospel of Jesus Christ. This is the Belarus dictator story American evangelicals aren't talking about. It should be.

Đầu năm 2026, nhiều thúc đẩy từ phía Nga cũng như nội bộ chính giới châu Âu để Liên Âu trực tiếp đối thoại với điện Kremlin nhằm tìm ra giải pháp chấm dứt cuộc chiến tranh Nga – Ukraina, kéo dài từ hơn 4 năm nay. Đầu tháng 6, trước thềm thượng đỉnh của khối 27 nước ngày 18-19/06/2026, theo một số thông tin báo chí, giới lãnh đạo châu Âu có thể đề nghị với Nga « một thỏa thuận ngừng bắn », như một điều kiện tiên quyết trước khi bước vào đàm phán chính thức.  *** Việc khối 27 nước tìm lập trường thống nhất để đối thoại trực tiếp với Nga là một diễn biến mới, và đáng được khích lệ, trong bối cảnh cho đến nay, « Liên Hiệp Châu Âu gánh vác một phần chủ yếu và ngày càng lớn cái giá về kinh tế, tài chính cũng như về chính trị của cuộc xung đột này, nhưng lại bị gạt ra bên lề trong các cuộc đàm phán quan trọng » (Le Diplomat). Thống nhất lập trường, duy trì áp lực để buộc Nga có giải pháp chấm dứt chiến tranh là điều cần thiết, tuy nhiên, nhiều chuyên gia hàng đầu cảnh báo, một thỏa thuận ngừng bắn vội vàng với Nga là lợi bất cập hại. Đọc thêm : Nan giải của châu Âu là tìm được “tiếng nói chung” để đối thoại Putin « Trên thực tế, một thỏa thuận ngừng bắn vội vàng hoặc được thiết kế kém có thể khiến việc đạt được một giải pháp lâu dài trở nên khó khăn hơn », theo nhận định của chuyên gia Trung tâm tư vấn độc lập Chatham House, thuộc Royal Institute of International Affairs, có trụ sở tại Luân Đôn (bài « Một thỏa thuận ngừng bắn giữa Nga và Ukraina có thể gây nguy hiểm cho an ninh của Ukraine và châu Âu như thế nào? » của ông Simon Smith, đồng tác giả, đồng phụ trách chương trình nghiên cứu về khu vực Á – Âu và Nga). Nhận định của chuyên gia Chatham House ngụ ý nhắc đến vết xe đổ của hai thỏa thuận ngừng bắn Minsk I và Minsk II, được xác lập hồi 2014-2015, rút cục đã bị nhiều người coi như một « thất bại của ngoại giao châu Âu », tạo điều kiện cho Nga tiếp tục lấn tới bảy năm sau đó, với cuộc xâm lăng trên quy mô lớn, kéo dài cho đến nay. Thỏa thuận Minsk I và Minsk II cụ thể ra sao ? Các thỏa thuận, được ký kết tại Minsk, thủ đô Belarus, trong hai đợt, tháng 9/2014 (tên chính thức là Nghị định thư Minsk, thường được gọi là Thỏa thuận Minsk I), và tháng 2/2015 (« Gói biện pháp nhằm thực thi các Thỏa thuận Minsk », thường gọi là Thỏa thuận Minsk II), có mục tiêu hướng đến chấm dứt xung đột ở miền đông Ukraina. Ký kết hai thỏa thuận này là các thành viên của nhóm tiếp xúc ba bên, bao gồm các đại diện của Nga và Ukraina, cùng đại diện của Tổ chức An ninh và Hợp tác châu Âu - OSCE. Thỏa thuận sau đó được các lực lượng ly khai được Nga hậu thuẫn ký kết. Các thỏa thuận này bao gồm 13 điểm: ngoài lệnh ngừng bắn, là việc rút vũ khí hạng nặng ra xa đường chiến tuyến, trao đổi tù nhân và con tin. Các thỏa thuận cũng quy định cải cách hiến pháp ở Ukraina để ban hành quy chế đặc biệt của hai vùng lãnh thổ, chiếm một phần của hai tỉnh Luhansk và Donetsk, do phe ly khai kiểm soát. Hai thỏa thuận này là kết quả các vận động ngoại giao của tổng thống Pháp François Hollande và thủ tướng Đức Angela Merkel, phối hợp với tổng thống Nga Vladimir Putin và đương kim tổng thống Ukraina Petro Poroshenko. Sự kết hợp của Bộ Tứ này thường được gọi là « Công thức Normadie », do bắt nguồn từ cuộc gặp không chính thức giữa lãnh đạo bốn nước tại lâu đài Château de Bénouville (Calvados), vùng Normandie - Pháp, bên lề lễ kỷ niệm 70 năm ngày đồng minh đổ bộ trong Thế chiến Hai, vài tháng sau khi chiến tranh bùng nổ ở Donbass.   Ít ngày sau khi Thỏa thuận Minsk II được đúc kết, Hội Đồng Bảo An Liên Hiệp Quốc đã ra một nghị quyết, yêu cầu các bên tôn trọng Thỏa thuận này, nhưng không mang tính cưỡng chế. Vì sao các thỏa thuận Minsk bị coi là nguy hại cho Ukraina ? Đằng sau các biện pháp có vẻ rất bài bản như trên là một thực tế hoàn toàn khác. Viện Nghiên cứu Chiến tranh ISW, có trụ sở Washington, trong một bài phân tích về « Những bài học rút ra từ Thỏa thuận Minsk » (Lessons of the Minsk Deal), nhận định hệ quả nói chung của các Thỏa thuận Minsk này là đã không mang lại nền hòa bình lâu dài mà chủ yếu giúp Nga có thời gian tái tổ chức lực lượng, tăng cường hậu thuẫn phe ly khai, chấp nhận « đóng băng chiến sự », củng cố nền kinh tế chiến tranh để chuẩn bị cho cuộc tấn công trong tương lai. Chuyên gia Viện Nghiên cứu Chiến tranh Mỹ nhấn mạnh, một thỏa thuận ngừng bắn mới được đưa ra nhanh chóng, vội vã và thiếu bảo đảm có thể lặp lại mô hình của các thỏa thuận Minsk, cho phép Nga phục hồi sức mạnh, thay vì buộc Matxcơva phải thay đổi các tính toán chiến lược. Đọc thêm : Bất đồng Nga-Ukraina về Donbass có thể khiến Thỏa thuận Minsk tan vỡ ? Chuyên gia chính trị quốc tế Kristian Åtland, người Na Uy, tác giả nhiều khảo cứu về các thỏa thuận Minsk, nhấn mạnh là các thỏa thuận này là hoàn toàn « không hiệu quả », « không công bằng », « không bền vững », Ukraina đã bị buộc phải chấp nhận trong bối cảnh lực lượng ly khai được Nga hậu thuẫn đẩy quân đội Ukraina vào chân tường tại vùng Donbass (« War, diplomacy, and more war: why did the Minsk agreements fail? », Springer, 2024). Vị chuyên gia này cũng là tác giả bài « Đàm phán ngừng bắn Nga-Ukraina: Những bài học từ Tiến trình thất bại của các thỏa thuận Minsk » (2025). Đàm phán bên họng súng : Hàng nghìn binh sĩ Ukraina bị bao vây, Putin báo động nguy cơ thảm sát Hai thỏa thuận được ký kết đúng vào thời điểm hàng nghìn binh sĩ Ukraina bị vây hãm tại Ilovaisk (từ ngày 7/8 đến ngày 2/9/2014) và Debaltseve (từ 14/01 đến 20/02/2015). Nhà ngoại giao Pháp Jacques Audibert, cố vấn của tổng thống Hollande, người có mặt trực tiếp trong các đàm phán dẫn đến hai thỏa thuận nói trên, cho biết cụ thể: « Tình hình càng trở nên căng thẳng hơn, bởi rõ ràng là ông Putin đã cố tình kích động. Tuyên bố đầu tiên của ông ấy trong cuộc đàm phán này là: ‘‘Tôi xin lỗi, có 8.000 binh sĩ bị mắc kẹt trong vòng vây ở Debaltseve. Bao vây họ là các lực lượng pháo binh của quân  ly khai mà tôi không thể kiểm soát được. Tôi không thể làm gì được ! Vì tôi là người Nga mà ! Tất cả những binh sĩ này đều có nguy cơ bị thảm sát, nếu chúng ta không đạt được thỏa thuận tối hôm nay." Đó là bầu không khí mở đầu cuộc đàm phán kéo dài 16 giờ. Rõ ràng khi bạn bị đặt vào trong tình huống căng thẳng và hoàn toàn khác biệt như thế này, khi ai đó nói thẳng với bạn rằng, có thể có hàng ngàn người chết, nếu đàm phán thất bại, bạn sẽ phải ở trong tâm trạng căng thẳng tột độ. Điều này đúng với tất cả mọi người, nhưng đặc biệt là với người Ukraina. » Nga đã sử dụng việc leo thang quân sự có chủ đích để buộc Kiev chấp nhận các nhượng bộ lớn, trong bối cảnh Kiev cũng chịu áp lực nhiều từ các nước phương Tây ủng hộ tiến trình Minsk, để buộc phải ký kết các thỏa thuận này.   Hàng loạt điều bất khả: Ngôn từ mơ hồ, Kiev không được quyền kiểm soát biên giới… Ngoài chuyện ý đồ và mục tiêu của các bên, chuyên gia Na Uy Kristian Åtland nêu bật diễn đạt mơ hồ trong các thỏa thuận cũng là một nguyên nhân trực tiếp dẫn đến việc Thỏa thuận trở nên bất khả thi ngay từ đầu (« The vagueness and ambiguity of the language used in the Minsk agreements became an obstacle to the agreements' implementation »). Các thỏa thuận nói trên không có giá trị pháp lý khi chỉ được ký kết bởi các đại diện cấp thấp, gồm cựu tổng thống Ukraina, Leonid Koutchma, đại sứ Nga tại Ukraina và đại diện của OSCE. Không chỉ đến sau này, mà ngay vào lúc Thỏa thuận Minsk II được ký kết, truyền thông Pháp đã ghi nhận triển vọng thỏa thuận bất khả thi, đặc biệt với việc Ukraina sẽ chỉ được quyền kiểm soát hơn 400 km đường biên giới Ukraina – Nga, nằm giữa các khu vực ly khai ở Donbass và lãnh thổ Nga, một khi bầu cử địa phương ở các vùng ly khai được tổ chức, mà thời gian lại chưa được ấn định. Tổ chức An ninh và Hợp tác châu Âu - OSCE cũng không có thẩm quyền gì với việc giám sát tình hình ở đường biên giới. Trong thời gian đó, không có gì ngăn cản Nga tiếp tục đưa binh sĩ và phương tiện quân sự vào các vùng đất của Ukraina, do phe ly khai kiểm soát. Niềm tin vào Thỏa thuận Minsk và Putin: Ngay trước thềm cuộc xâm lăng 2022 Ngay tại thời điểm đó, và giờ đây nhìn lại, các thỏa thuận Minsk đã được coi như là bình phong, một phương tiện câu giờ đối với cả hai bên. Không chỉ cho Nga có thêm thời gian để chuẩn bị cho cuộc xâm lăng lớn mà phía Ukraina cũng tạm thời tránh được các tổn thất lớn trong bối cảnh lực lượng vũ trang còn rất yếu. Điều đáng nhấn mạnh là 7 năm sau, trước thềm cuộc xâm lăng quy mô lớn của Nga, ngày 24/02/2022, trong một bộ phận giới ngoại giao, học giả châu Âu, về mặt chính thức, các thỏa thuận Minsk vẫn được xem như là một cánh cửa dẫn đến hòa bình. Ngay cả một nhà nghiên cứu hàng đầu trong lĩnh vực này, như Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, giám đốc Trung tâm Nga thuộc Viện Pháp về Quan hệ Quốc tế - Ifri, hai tuần trước cuộc tấn công của Nga (24/02/2022), vẫn đặt hy vọng vào việc thúc đẩy thực thi thỏa thuận Minsk, trong lúc tổng thống Pháp đang tiếp tục các vận động ngoại giao dồn dập, với hy vọng còn nước còn tát: « Nước Pháp đang gánh vác một trách nhiệm đặc biệt vào thời điểm này. Thật vậy, Emmanuel Macron đang đưa tiếng nói của châu Âu trở lại vị trí hàng đầu, đặc biệt là về một khía cạnh: các thỏa thuận Minsk. Đây là những thỏa thuận được ký kết vào tháng 2/2015 với mục tiêu giải quyết tình hình ở miền đông Ukraina. Đó là một mảnh ghép trong bức tranh toàn cảnh đối đầu căng thẳng hiện tại, với việc Nga tăng cường quân đội áp sát biên giới, trước khi đưa ra các yêu sách rộng hơn liên quan đến an ninh châu Âu và trật tự của châu Âu nói chung, thời kỳ sau khi Liên Xô sụp đổ ». Đọc thêm - Nửa thế kỷ ''Hiệp định Helsinki'': Chiến tranh Ukraina xóa sổ "Kiến trúc an ninh châu Âu" Nhà nghiên cứu viện Ifri tin tưởng vào khả năng Nga có thể sẵn sàng cho một giải pháp ngoại giao : « Chúng ta còn rất xa mới giải quyết được cuộc khủng hoảng. Nhưng với những diễn biến mới nhất này, tôi nghĩ chúng ta có thể mang lại thêm một chút hy vọng cho giải pháp ngoại giao. Tổng thống Putin đã để ngỏ cánh cửa thỏa hiệp. Ông ấy đã dành nhiều lời khen ngợi cho tổng thống Pháp Macron, cảm ơn ông ấy đã trở lại, đã đích thân đến, v.v. Trên thực tế, nếu chúng ta đang ở bên bờ vực chiến tranh, thì đây ắt không phải là kiểu hành vi mà chúng ta thấy ». (« Ukraina/Nga, một thỏa hiệp bất khả? », Tọa đàm với đài Pháp France Info, ngày 09/02/2022).   Kẻ xâm lăng được coi là người hòa giải: Nghệ thuật đàm phán của Putin  Minsk I và Minsk II đã được điện Kremlin sử dụng hiệu quả để khẳng định tính chính đáng của Nga trong hồ sơ chiến tranh vùng Donbass của Ukraina. Tại châu Âu, có người còn mong muốn có thêm một Thỏa thuận Minsk III. Điều mà nhiều chuyên gia nhấn mạnh là ảo tưởng hòa bình nhờ có được thiện chí của Nga, đã từng khiến châu Âu mất phương hướng trong một thời gian dài, và có thể sẽ tiếp tục mắc bẫy. Đọc thêm : Sử gia Françoise Thom: ‘‘Cho đến nay, người Nga vẫn coi nước Nga là một đế chế'' Bà Céline Marangé, chuyên gia về Nga, Ukraina và Belarus, Viện nghiên cứu chiến lược IRSEM thuộc Trường Quân sự - Ecole militaire Paris, lưu ý đến việc tổng thống Nga đã thành công một cách ngoạn mục, khi thể hiện mình là một bên trung gian hòa giải trong các thỏa thuận Minsk : « Tổng thống Nga coi các thỏa thuận Minsk II là một chiến thắng cá nhân của mình, một dấu hiệu cho thấy kỹ năng đàm phán và giành được những nhượng bộ từ các đối thủ. Trên thực tế, ông ta đã thành công đáng kể trong việc bảo đảm rằng các thỏa thuận không xác định bất kỳ nghĩa vụ rõ ràng nào đối với Matxcơva. Vì vậy, theo một cách nào đó, Điện Kremlin có thể tự thể hiện mình không phải là một bên tham gia xung đột, như trên thực tế từ đầu đã luôn là như vậy. Nga thể hiện là một bên trung gian hòa giải trong một cuộc xung đột nội bộ ở nước láng giềng, do quản lý kém, giống như một người trung gian hòa giải đối với một cuộc nội chiến. Trong khi đó, trên thực tế, tình hình bất ổn đã được Matxcơva đạo diễn ngay từ đầu, và vũ khí hạng nặng mà phe ly khai có được rõ ràng là đến từ Nga. » *** Nhiều chuyên gia khẩn thiết nhấn mạnh là, trong các đối thoại có thể diễn ra với điện Kremlin sắp tới, các lãnh đạo châu Âu cần kiên quyết duy trì lập trường, chỉ có thể chấp nhận một thỏa thuận đình chiến khi có được các đảm bảo vững chắc, các cơ chế thực thi rõ ràng, chặt chẽ, cùng với việc hậu thuẫn để Ukraina gia nhập các cấu trúc an ninh của châu Âu, để khiến cho mọi hành động gây hấn của Nga trong tương lai phải trả giá đắt. Chỉ có như vậy, châu Âu mới không bị rơi vào vết xe đổ của các thỏa thuận Minsk.

I augusti 1920 utkämpades slaget om Warszawa mellan en sovjetisk invasionsarmé och den polska armén under generalen Pilsudski. Utgångsläget för polackerna var inte bra. Försvaret runt den polska huvudstaden sviktade.I detta läge genomförde den polska armén en omfattade omgruppering och därefter en snabb motoffensiv. De sovjetiska arméerna krossades och ringades in 16-25 augusti 1920 i ett slag som har kallats ”undret vid Visla”. Den polska segern räddade den unga polska republiken och stoppade en eventuell sovjetiska fortsatt frammarsch mot Tyskland.I detta avsnitt av Militärhistoriepodden berättar Martin Hårdstedt och Peter Bennesved om ett måhända lite mindre känt krig. Som en direkt följd av första världskriget inleddes i Östeuropa ett antal militära konflikter frammanade av olika nationella strävanden. Polacker, balter, ukrainare, rumäner och så vidare försökte skapa egna nationer och vinna så stort territorium som möjligt. Samtidigt rasade inne i Ryssland ett inbördeskrig 1918-22.Polens ledare Pilsudski hade en vision om att skapa en federation av stater under polsk ledning som motsvarade det gamla Pols-Litauiska samväldet som slutade att existera 1795. Polska trupper kom under 1919 att ockupera stora områden i både dagens östra Ukraina – provinsen Galicien – och flytta gränsen mot Sovjet österut mot Minsk. Den sovjetiska motoffensiven i augusti 1920 tillintetgjorde dessa erövringar och det var först efter segern i slaget om Warszawa som den polsk-sovjetiska gränsen kunde stabiliseras i och med freden i Riga i mars 1921. Polen hade vi det laget även lagt sig till med de östra delarna av dagens Litauen i vilket Pilsudskis hemstad Vilnius ingick.För Lenin och bosjevikerna var nederlaget framför Warszawa en stor katastrof. Drömmarna om att tränga längre västerut och understödja en tysk kommunistisk revolution grusades. Vision om en världsrevolution fick ett abrupt slut i augusti 1920.Bild: Polska soldater bemannar en kulspruteställning vid försvarslinjerna nära Miłosna i byn Janki utanför Warszawa, augusti 1920, under polsk-sovjetiska kriget och striderna om Polens självständighet. Foto: okänd, Public Domain, via Wikimedia Commons.Klippare: Emanuel Lehtonen Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

"Samfundsnedbrydende", lyder dommen over Søren Sveistrups bestseller. Hvorfor er styret i Minsk bange for en dansk krimi? I "Anmelderne" handler det denne gang ikke om et kunstværk, men om en dansk pinsegudstjeneste. Vært: Casper Dyrholm Medvirkende: Mille Rode: Generalsekretær i dansk PEN Amalie Langballe: Forfatter samt teater- og litteraturkritiker ved Weekendavisen Rasmus Ugilt: Filosof og kommunikationskonsulent. Producer: David Turner Redaktør: Lasse Lauridsen

It's Thursday, May 21st, A.D. 2026. This is The Worldview in 5 Minutes heard on 140 radio stations and at www.TheWorldview.com.  I'm Adam McManus. (Adam@TheWorldview.com) By Jonathan Clark Finnish member of Parliament appeals religious liberty ruling A Finnish member of Parliament is appealing her religious freedom case to the European Court of Human Rights.  Finland's Supreme Court convicted Päivi Räsänen of hate speech in March. Her offense was writing a pamphlet about biblical sexuality 20 years ago. Alliance Defending Freedom International announced this month that she is making a final appeal in her case.  Räsänen commented, “The failure of the Finnish Supreme Court to uphold freedom of speech has set a dangerous precedent in my country and across Europe. ... I know I am not alone in facing unjust persecution under ‘hate speech' laws that make sharing Christian beliefs a criminal offense.”  French legislature rejects legalization of suicide French lawmakers rejected a bill to legalize assisted suicide last week.  The measure would even impose prison terms and heavy fines on people deemed to be obstructing access to assisted suicide.  Bruno Retailleau leads the conservative Les Républicains Party in France. The lawmaker argued against the bill, saying, “We cannot support a text that, in the name of a misguided progressivism, risks sacrificing the most vulnerable among us to the cold logic of budgetary constraints and legal precedents.” Franklin Graham preached to 30,000 people in Belarus On May 16th, Evangelist Franklin Graham shared the Gospel of Jesus Christ with over 30,000 people in Minsk, Belarus which is located in Eastern Europe with Russia to the east, Ukraine to the south and Poland to the west. Listen. GRAHAM: “Lying is a sin. We have all have lied. So, we're sinners. We've broken God's laws. We're under a judgment. We're under a death sentence. The wages of sin is death.” Indeed, Romans 6:23 declares, “For the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.” (You can watch his sermon through a special link in our transcript today at www.TheWorldview.com) It was reportedly the largest Evangelical event ever in the Eastern European country. Hundreds of people turned to Christ during the event. Graham wrote about one unique conversion story. He said, “One man shared that he had planned to end his life last Tuesday, but was not successful. He came tonight, heard the Gospel, and found true hope by putting his faith and trust in Christ.” John 3:17 says, “For God did not send His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world, through Him, might be saved.” Secretary of State Rubio blames Cuban problems on Communism Yesterday was Cuban Independence Day. It's the 124th anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Cuba. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio marked the day by sharing a Spanish-language video message with the people of Cuba.  RUBIO: “The reason you are forced to survive 22 hours a day without electricity is not due to an oil ‘blockade' by the U.S. As you know, better than anyone, you have been suffering from blackouts for years. The real reason you don't have electricity, fuel, or food is because those who control your country have plundered billions of dollars, but nothing has been used to help the people. “Thirty years ago, Raúl Castro founded a company called GAESA. This company is owned and operated by the Armed Forces, and has revenues three times greater than your current government's budget. Today, while you suffer, these businessmen have $18 billion dollars in assets and control 70% of Cuba's economy.” Rubio blamed the country's economic hardship on its communist leadership. He stated, “President Trump is offering a new relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. … First, we are offering $100 million dollars in food and medicine for you, the people. But they must be distributed directly to the Cuban people by the Catholic Church or other trusted charitable groups. Not stolen by [government-run businesses] to sell in one of their stores.” Trump's endorsement defeats Rep. Thomas Massie in Kentucky In the United States, Republican Trump-backed candidates won their primaries on Tuesday.  Most notably, U.S. House candidate Ed Gallrein won a primary in Kentucky against Rep. Thomas Massie. Gallrein won 54.9 percent to 45.1 percent. Massie was an outspoken critic of some of President Trump's actions like the war with Iran.  The race cost $32 million, making it the most expensive contest for the U.S. House of Representatives in history.  U.S. parents more likely to identify as Christian than non-parents The American Bible Society released the second chapter of its report, “State of the Bible: USA 2026.” The survey evaluated parenting and faith. Notably, Gen Z and Millennial parents are much more likely to identify as Christians than people their age who are not parents. Over 60 percent of parents from the younger generations call themselves Christians. Meanwhile, less than 50 percent of non-parents do the same.   Among parents, 29 percent pray with their children regularly and 14 percent read the Bible with them regularly. Those numbers more than doubled among parents who are practicing Christians.  Bibles for the World will distribute 1.4 million copies of John And finally, Bibles For The World hopes to distribute 1.4 million copies of the Gospel of John this coming Saturday.  The global evangelism effort will span over 20 countries on Pentecost Saturday, May 23.  John Pudaite, the president of Bibles for the World, told the Christian News Wire, “It is record-breaking in that it's the single largest provision of Scripture in history for a one-day evangelistic event.” Romans 10:15 says, “How beautiful are the feet of those who preach the Gospel of peace, who bring glad tidings of good things!” Close And that's The Worldview on this Thursday, May 21st, in the year of our Lord 2026. Subscribe for free by Spotify, Amazon Music, or by iTunes or email to our unique Christian newscast at www.TheWorldview.com.  Plus, you can get the Generations app through Google Play or The App Store. I'm Adam McManus (Adam@TheWorldview.com). Seize the day for Jesus Christ.

Latvijas hokeja izlasei šodien, 21.maijā, spēlē ar ziemeļu kaimiņiem - Somiju. Vakar komandai bija brīvdiena un treniņš, tajā piedalījās daļa komandas. Pieredzējušais hokeja žurnālists Jānis Matulis sarunā ar Latvijas Radio pauda, vērtējot Latvijas līdzšinējās spēles un arī abu komandu spēku samēru, uzskata, ka uzvarēt somu Latvijas komandai ir praktiski nereāli. Somija šī gada čempionātā demonstrē labu hokeju - trīs uzvaras trīs spēlēs, pēdējā mačā ar 6:2 sakauta ASV izlase, kas uz somu fona izskatījās diezgan nevarīga. Pirms pasaules čempionāta tieši maču pret somiem lietpratēji saskatīja kā iespēju ļaut atpūsties pamatvārtsargam Kristeram Gudļevkim, bet maz ticams, ka šodien vārtu drošību uzticēs Marekam Mitenam vai Gustavam Grigalam. Somi ir piektā rezultatīvākā komanda čempionātā ar 13 vārtiem. Viņiem arī augsta uzbrukuma efektivitāte, trāpot 15% metienu. Somijai arī ļoti labs vairākums - izmantotas 5 no 11 iespējām. Labāk klājies tikai šveiciešiem. Somija trīs spēlēs tikusi pie 11 iespējām vairākumā, mūsējie tikai pie piecām. Tas ir sliktākais rādītājs čempionātā. Līdz šim pasaules čempionātā Latvijai somus izdevies uzvarēt tikai 2014. gadā - toreiz Minskā 3:2 uzvara Latvijai.

Russland feuert unaufhaltsam Drohnen in Richtung der Ukraine - und nutzt dabei offenbar Belarus als Startrampe. Außerdem hilft das Regime in Minsk seinem wichtigsten Partner dabei, russische Wehrpflichtige an der Ausreise zu hindern. Der ukrainische Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskj droht Machthaber Alexander Lukaschenko inzwischen indirekt mit venezolanischen Verhältnissen. Text und Moderation: Kevin Schulte Sie haben Fragen? Schreiben Sie eine E-Mail an podcasts@ntv.de Sie möchten "Wieder was gelernt" unterstützen? Dann bewerten Sie den Podcast gerne bei Apple Podcasts oder Spotify. Dieser Podcast wird vermarktet von Julep Media: sales@julep.de Wir verarbeiten im Zusammenhang mit dem Angebot unserer Podcasts Daten. Wenn Sie der automatischen Übermittlung der Daten widersprechen wollen, melden Sie sich hier: datenschutz@julep.de

Bundesforschungsministerin Dorothee Bär will Deutschland mit der Hightech-Agenda wieder zur Weltspitze führen. Am Mittwoch will Bär ihre Pläne im Detail vorstellen. 18 Milliarden Euro stehen zur Verfügung. Es gebe ganz klare Zielvorgaben. Zum Beispiel sei definiert, dass „wir bis 2030 zehn Prozent der Wirtschaftsleistung in Deutschland KI-basiert erwirtschaften wollen.“ Bär kündigt an, in einigen Bereichen - zum Beispiel der Kernfusion - werde es auch die Möglichkeit geben, Förderungen einzustellen, wenn sich ein Weg als der falsche herausstellen sollte. [12:52]Altkanzlerin Angela Merkel hat beim WDR-Europaforum auf der re:publica den etablierten Parteien geraten, sich weniger über die AfD zu definieren und stattdessen eine eigene Erzählung für Deutschland zu liefern. Sie hat sich auch zur Ukraine-Diplomatie geäußert: „Ich persönlich wäre jetzt nicht auf die Idee gekommen, einen Vermittler zu fragen, ob er für mich nach Minsk fährt und dort mit Putin spricht. Das muss man selber in die Hand nehmen." [01:26]Marc Biadacz, Sprecher für Arbeit und Soziales der Unionsfraktion, fordert Arbeitsministerin Bärbel Bas auf, sich an den Koalitionsvertrag zu halten und die vereinbarte Flexibilisierung der Arbeitszeit umzusetzen. „Es hat mich schon ein bisschen gewundert, dass Bärbel Bas dann doch denjenigen so weit entgegenkommt, die völlig dagegen sind, egal ob das in der SPD oder in der Gewerkschaft ist", sagt Biadacz. Bas hatte beim DGB-Bundeskongress gesagt, wenn es nach der SPD und ihr persönlich ginge, würde man das Thema Arbeitszeit gar nicht erst anfassen – es stehe aber im Koalitionsvertrag. [05:59]Table.Briefings - For better informed decisions. Sie entscheiden besser, weil Sie besser informiert sind – das ist das Ziel von Table.Briefings. Wir verschaffen Ihnen mit jedem Professional Briefing, mit jeder Analyse und mit jedem Hintergrundstück einen Informationsvorsprung, am besten sogar einen Wettbewerbsvorteil. Table.Briefings bietet „Deep Journalism“, wir verbinden den Qualitätsanspruch von Leitmedien mit der Tiefenschärfe von Fachinformationen. Professional Briefings kostenlos kennenlernen: table.media/testenHier geht es zu unseren Werbepartnern Hol dir deine persönlichen Daten mit Incogni zurück und hol dir 60 % Rabatt auf ein Jahresabo: https://incogni.com/tabletodayImpressum: https://table.media/impressumDatenschutz: https://table.media/datenschutzerklaerungBei Interesse an Audio-Werbung in diesem Podcast melden Sie sich gerne bei Laurence Donath: laurence.donath@table.media Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Newly released emails and financial records show that Jeffrey Epstein's office relied heavily on the ultra-exclusive American Express Centurion “Black Card” program to quietly arrange travel for dozens of women, many of them from Eastern Europe, while maintaining extreme secrecy around the bookings. The records reveal that Epstein's longtime assistant, Lesley Groff, repeatedly instructed American Express staff to keep flight information hidden, remove email addresses from confirmations, and ensure that travel details were tightly controlled. The documents also describe how fake or temporary itineraries were allegedly arranged for visa purposes, allowing women to secure travel documents using reservations that were later canceled. Internal communications show at least one Amex representative acknowledging that some of the requests were “against Amex policy,” while still offering ways to accommodate them.The records provide a rare inside look at how Epstein allegedly used elite financial services and concierge-style corporate relationships to facilitate the movement of women across borders for years after his 2008 Florida conviction. Emails describe flights being coordinated between cities such as Moscow, Minsk, Miami, Palm Beach, Paris, and New York, with Groff at times referring to groups simply as “the girls.” The documents also show how obsessed Epstein's office was with secrecy, with repeated panic over flight confirmations accidentally being sent to the wrong people. The reporting further highlights how Epstein remained an enormously valuable client for American Express despite being a convicted sex offender, generating massive spending volumes and holding multiple Centurion cards tied to associates and entities connected to his operation. Critics quoted in the coverage argued that the travel patterns, fake itineraries, and visa-related booking requests should have raised obvious red flags about possible trafficking activity long before Epstein's 2019 arrest.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:Jeffrey Epstein America Express: How he moved women around the world with his credit card

Newly released emails and financial records show that Jeffrey Epstein's office relied heavily on the ultra-exclusive American Express Centurion “Black Card” program to quietly arrange travel for dozens of women, many of them from Eastern Europe, while maintaining extreme secrecy around the bookings. The records reveal that Epstein's longtime assistant, Lesley Groff, repeatedly instructed American Express staff to keep flight information hidden, remove email addresses from confirmations, and ensure that travel details were tightly controlled. The documents also describe how fake or temporary itineraries were allegedly arranged for visa purposes, allowing women to secure travel documents using reservations that were later canceled. Internal communications show at least one Amex representative acknowledging that some of the requests were “against Amex policy,” while still offering ways to accommodate them.The records provide a rare inside look at how Epstein allegedly used elite financial services and concierge-style corporate relationships to facilitate the movement of women across borders for years after his 2008 Florida conviction. Emails describe flights being coordinated between cities such as Moscow, Minsk, Miami, Palm Beach, Paris, and New York, with Groff at times referring to groups simply as “the girls.” The documents also show how obsessed Epstein's office was with secrecy, with repeated panic over flight confirmations accidentally being sent to the wrong people. The reporting further highlights how Epstein remained an enormously valuable client for American Express despite being a convicted sex offender, generating massive spending volumes and holding multiple Centurion cards tied to associates and entities connected to his operation. Critics quoted in the coverage argued that the travel patterns, fake itineraries, and visa-related booking requests should have raised obvious red flags about possible trafficking activity long before Epstein's 2019 arrest.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:Jeffrey Epstein America Express: How he moved women around the world with his credit cardBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-moscow-murders-and-more--5852883/support.

Vitaly, the UX lead with the European Parliament and co-founder of Smashing Magazine, reflects on the messy reality of designing AI products and why UX matters more than ever in the age of artificial intelligence and AI agents. He also explores how and why many companies rush into implementing AI without addressing issues in their processes and systems and discusses the importance of trust, transparency, and guidance in designing AI products.

Newly released emails and financial records show that Jeffrey Epstein's office relied heavily on the ultra-exclusive American Express Centurion “Black Card” program to quietly arrange travel for dozens of women, many of them from Eastern Europe, while maintaining extreme secrecy around the bookings. The records reveal that Epstein's longtime assistant, Lesley Groff, repeatedly instructed American Express staff to keep flight information hidden, remove email addresses from confirmations, and ensure that travel details were tightly controlled. The documents also describe how fake or temporary itineraries were allegedly arranged for visa purposes, allowing women to secure travel documents using reservations that were later canceled. Internal communications show at least one Amex representative acknowledging that some of the requests were “against Amex policy,” while still offering ways to accommodate them.The records provide a rare inside look at how Epstein allegedly used elite financial services and concierge-style corporate relationships to facilitate the movement of women across borders for years after his 2008 Florida conviction. Emails describe flights being coordinated between cities such as Moscow, Minsk, Miami, Palm Beach, Paris, and New York, with Groff at times referring to groups simply as “the girls.” The documents also show how obsessed Epstein's office was with secrecy, with repeated panic over flight confirmations accidentally being sent to the wrong people. The reporting further highlights how Epstein remained an enormously valuable client for American Express despite being a convicted sex offender, generating massive spending volumes and holding multiple Centurion cards tied to associates and entities connected to his operation. Critics quoted in the coverage argued that the travel patterns, fake itineraries, and visa-related booking requests should have raised obvious red flags about possible trafficking activity long before Epstein's 2019 arrest.to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:Jeffrey Epstein America Express: How he moved women around the world with his credit cardBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.

Eine Reise nach Belarus mit viel Geschichte, interessanter Gegenwart und Sorge um die ZukunftEin Kommentar von Tilo Gräser.Ich schreibe diesen Text in der Hauptstadt eines Landes, das in Deutschland fast so etwas wie eine terra incognita ist, ein unbekanntes Land, das noch niemand gesehen hat. Ich sitze in einem Hotel in Minsk, der Hauptstadt von Belarus. Der Blick aus dem Fenster im siebten Stock zeigt uns ein Panorama eines Teils der Stadt, mit einem Park, dem Palast der Unabhängigkeit und einem weiteren Gebäude, mit muschelartiger Architektur und wahrscheinlich ebenfalls für Veranstaltungen. Weiter weg sind mehrere der zahlreichen Wohngebiete zu sehen, die in den letzten Jahren entstanden sind.Uns – meiner Partnerin Éva Péli und mir sowie einer Gruppe Deutscher zumeist aus dem Umfeld der DKP, der wir uns angeschlossen haben – zeigt sich ein Land mitten in Europa, wie es tatsächlich für viele weitgehend unbekannt ist. Dabei liegt es mitten auf dem gemeinsamen Kontinent, hat seine Besonderheiten und Eigenheiten, aber auch ganz viele Gemeinsamkeiten mit den anderen europäischen Ländern. Und es ist überhaupt nicht gefährlich, erst recht nicht feindlich, auch nicht arm oder Ähnliches. Belarus und seine Menschen sind freundlich, besonderes gegenüber Gästen, aufgeräumt und sauber, vielfältig und farbenfroh, lebendig und voller interessanter Natur. Und es ist ein Land voller Geschichte, dessen Menschen gerade mit der Erinnerung an den deutschen Überfall vor fast genau 85 Jahren und seinen etwa drei Millionen Opfern – ein Drittel der damaligen Bevölkerung der Belorussischen Sowjetrepublik – sich vor allem eines wünschen: Frieden.Das haben wir immer wieder in Gesprächen gehört, ob mit „einfachen Menschen“, dem Direktor des Museums der Festung Brest, Alexander Korkotadse, und dessen Mitarbeitern oder dem stellvertretenden Außenminister Igor Sekreta. Dieses einfache Ziel ist für die Politik der belarussischen Regierung unter Präsident Alexander Lukaschenko ebenso wichtig wie den Menschen, die in diesem Land leben. Das haben wir auch bei den Feierlichkeiten zum „Tag des Sieges“ am 9. Mai in der Festung Brest erlebt. Dort dankte eine Offizierin der Streitkräfte von Belarus den Veteranen des „Großen Vaterländischen Krieges“, wie die sowjetische Verteidigung gegen den faschistischen deutschen Vernichtungskrieg auch hier heute noch genannt wird, für etwas, das sie vor 81 Jahren errungen hatten: „Спасибо за мир.“ (Danke für den Frieden!)Ein klarer WunschDer Krieg, der vor fast genau 85 Jahren über Belarus und die gesamte Sowjetunion kam, hat unzählige Narben hinterlassen. An vielen Orten wird der Opfer gedacht und an die deutschen Verbrechen erinnert. Wir haben einige von ihnen gesehen, so unter anderem die Gedenkstätte bei der Station Bronnaja Gora im Rajon Brest, wo mehr als 50.000 jüdische Menschen aus Europa ermordet wurden, und die Gedenkstätte für das von den deutschen Faschisten vernichtete Dorf Dremljewo mit seinen 196 Einwohnern. Wir haben uns von Historikern und anderen, die die Erinnerung wachhalten, erklären lassen, was jeweils genau geschah, und sind betroffen und auch beschämt. Nicht nur wegen den unglaublichen und unfassbaren Verbrechen, die Deutsche, ob in der Wehrmachts- oder SS-Uniform, als Polizisten oder Verwalter hier begingen, oftmals mit Helfern vor allem aus der Ukraine....https://apolut.net/besuch-in-einem-unbekannten-land-mitten-in-europa-von-tilo-graser/ Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Harriet Clark comes from a long line of radicals. Her ancestors were gun runners in Minsk. Her grandparents were active members of the Communist Party USA, and the family moved to Moscow for a time, where her grandfather wrote for the Daily Worker. Her mother is Judith Clark, a former member of the Weather Underground and the May 19th Communist Organization, who was given a life sentence for her participation in the Brinks robbery in 1981 that killed three people. (Judith was paroled in 2019.)Harriet Clark's debut novel, The Hill, tells the story of a girl who vows to visit her mother every week in the upstate New York prison where she is being held. In this episode of On the Nose, Arielle Angel speaks with Harriet about her stunning new book, what comes after failure in radical movements, and the heroism of trying to keep families affected by incarceration together.Thanks to Jesse Brenneman for editing and to Nathan Salsburg for the use of his song “VIII (All That Were Calculated Have Passed).”Media Mentioned and Further ReadingThe Hill by Harriet Clark“I'm Not Black, I'm Kanye,” Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Atlantic“Photos of the migrant caravan and the Trump military response tell different stories,” Johnny Simon, QuartzJoseph Campbell's Hero's Journey“Judith Clark's Radical Transformation,” Tom Robbins, The New York TimesHouse and Fire by Maria HummelHousekeeping by Marilynne Robinson“To a Student” by Diane Di PrimaTranscript forthcoming.

Helayna Minsk is an experienced executive leader who has led major organizational transformation for brands like Unilever, Walgreens, and Johnson & Johnson. Helayna's work encompasses general management, P&L leadership, portfolio evolution, and revitalization campaigns, both domestically and internationally. Her approach to brand stewardship and cross-functional collaboration has led to an extensive track record of profit expansion, scalable growth, and strategic implementation for some of the largest CPG companies in the world. Helayna joins Roy to discuss leadership lessons learned during periods of immense change, how communication is the cornerstone of high-performance teams, the upside of ambition, and much more. Highlights from our conversation include: - Core values that have become part of Helayna's leadership playbook (3:07) - Mentors and learning opportunities that helped shape her leadership philosophy (5:16) - How Helayna's leadership developed and evolved as she took on different roles (7:44) - The role talent plays in driving growth and impact (10:17) - Tips for navigating changing market dynamics and consumer behavior (14:10) - How Helayna developed an aptitude for hiring top performers and building high performance teams (16:05) - Comparing the approach to talent and hiring at different brands (18:25) - What Helayna looks for when she's hiring for her own leadership teams (20:09) - How she approached leading a turnaround for J&J in China (22:17) - Cultural differences when working in China that adapted her thinking -(25:27) - Advice Helayna has for people early in their careers (28:33) - What's next for Helayna (30:29)

Show NotesRelease Date: May 5, 2026 Guest: Jason Prokowiew, author of War BoysAbout the Episode: How do you learn to love a man you were raised to fear? In this episode, we speak with author Jason Prokowiew about his transformative new memoir, War Boys. Jason shares the harrowing history of his father's survival in Nazi-occupied Belarus and explores how that trauma rippled through their suburban American household. We dive into the “braiding” of two lives: a father fighting for survival and a son fighting for his identity as a queer man.Key Topics Discussed:* The 50-Hour Tapes: How Jason used long-form interviewing to bridge the emotional gap with his father before his passing in 2002.* Inherited Trauma: The reality of growing up with an abusive, alcoholic parent whose “survival mode” never truly turned off.* The “Replacement” Family: Understanding his father's drive to have 13 children as a response to losing his mother and sister in the bombing of Minsk.* Queer Identity & Resilience: How Jason navigated loneliness and shame while finding his own voice in a house dominated by his father's presence.* The Power of Storytelling: Why claiming your own narrative is the final step in the healing process.Resources Mentioned:* Book: War Boys: A Father and Son Memoir (Trio House Press - July 1, 2026)* Watch: Jason Prokowiew on Stories from the Stage (WBUR)* Connect: Follow Jason's work and upcoming book events on social media.Support the Show: If you enjoyed this episode, please leave a review on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Your support helps us bring more stories of resilience to your ears. Get full access to Melvin E. Edwards at storiesfromreallife.substack.com/subscribe

Liam Nolan on how the release of Polish-Belarusian journalist is part of a bid by authorities in Minsk to get the United States to ease sanctions.

In Chapter 50, Ghost walks through the actual war that erupted in Eastern Ukraine following the 2014 Maidan coup, covering the timeline from the Donetsk and Luhansk separatist declarations all the way through the Minsk Two agreement of 2015. He breaks down the MH17 shootdown, the competing narratives around who fired the missile, and why the Western media's version may not hold up. Ghost also examines why both Minsk agreements ultimately failed due to unresolvable sequencing disputes between Ukraine and the separatists and explains how seven years of frozen trench warfare laid the groundwork for Russia's full-scale 2022 invasion. A methodical, plainspoken deep dive into one of the most misrepresented conflicts of the modern era.

How did a choir become one of the symbols of the 2020 Belarus protests? In this Talk Eastern Europe Deep Dive interview, Nina Panikova speaks with Sasha from Volny Chor, the Belarusian choir that emerged after the stolen election and mass demonstrations against Alyaksandr Lukashenka.Volny Chor became famous for surprise public performances of Belarusian freedom songs in Minsk, singing in shopping centers, courtyards, and public squares while avoiding arrest. Since then, members have faced repression, imprisonment, and exile – yet they continue to perform across Europe to preserve the Belarusian identity, language, and culture.This episode explores protest music, authoritarian repression in Belarus, the meaning of Belarusian national symbols, and how culture can become resistance.Some examples of their music:Volny Chor, Mahutny Boža (Almighty God): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kZKpd900L-EVolny Chor, Pahonia (Coat of arms of Belarus):https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c49ZmYZhGaASupport our podcast – join us on patreon: https://www.patreon.com/talkeasterneuropeSubscribe for more interviews on Eastern Europe, democracy,Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and regional politics.

Deze diepgaande analyse werpt een nieuw licht op de decennialange spanningen tussen Rusland, Oekraïne en het Westen. Centraal staat de expertise van Marie-Thérèse ter Haar, die vanuit haar Rusland & Eurazië Instituut al dertig jaar de brug slaat tussen Oost en West. Zij betoogt dat de huidige crisis niet uit de lucht is komen vallen, maar het resultaat is van een fundamenteel onbegrip voor de Russische psyche en de geopolitieke dynamiek in de Euraziatische regio.Het gesprek voert terug naar de traumatische jaren '90, waarin de chaos van het wilde kapitalisme de weg plaveide voor de roep om een sterke hand. Ter Haar en Ad Verbrugge ontleden hoe westerse expansiedrift en de Amerikaanse Wolfowitz-doctrine botsten met de Russische rode lijnen. Daarbij komt de complexe rol van Oekraïne als tragisch breekijzer tussen twee machtsblokken aan bod, waarbij de Maidan-revolutie en de mislukte Minsk-akkoorden als cruciale kantelpunten worden gemarkeerd.De essentie van dit betoog ligt in het geopolitiek realisme: het besef dat een duurzame Europese veiligheidsarchitectuur onmogelijk is zonder de erkenning van Russische belangen en de diepe historische wortels van de regio. Het is een pleidooi voor bezinning, cultuur en dialoog, tegen de stroom van de hedendaagse polarisatie in. Een onmisbaar perspectief voor wie de werkelijke drijfveren achter de wereldgeschiedenis wil doorgronden.--------------------------------Bronnen en links bij deze uitzending: Steun het Eurazië Instituut! https://www.eurazie-instituut.nlKoop nu je kaartjes voor de Theater Tour! ⭐7 mei: Op Hodenpijl, Schipluiden met Kees de Kort: https://ophodenpijl.nl/evenement/nieuwe-wereld-kees-de-kort/?occurrence=2026-05-0719 mei: Grote Kerk Alkmaar met Maurice de Hond: https://grotekerkalkmaar.nl/tickets/seizoen-25-26/de-nieuwe-wereld-ondergang-van-het-avondland/?showId=3878151937-177159177816 juni: De Maagd, Bergen op Zoom: Willem Middelkoop: vanaf woensdag in de verkoop!

Er zählt zu den spannendsten Talenten der jungen Dirigentengeneration. Mit seinem Buch "Die weißen Tage von Minsk" hat der Musiker ein eindrucksvolles Zeichen für kulturelle Verantwortung gesetzt.

Ils 26 d'avrigl 1986 è stà in bel di da primavaira en l'Ucraina – dentant era quel di ch'il reactur numer quatter da l'ovra atomara da Tschernobyl è explodì. Igl è stà in Super-GAU, ina catastrofa nucleara betg pli controllabla. Ina da las consequenzas è dentant era stada positiva – numnadamain las experientschas che millis dad uffants da las regiuns pertutgadas han pudì far a l'exteriur. Uschia èn arrivads ils «uffants da Tschernobyl» er en Surselva, nua ch'ina regiun ha beneventà els sur onns cun bratscha averta. Tranter els eran era Jolanda e Beat Erb. Cun lur sustegn fa la Marella l'artg tranter l'ier e l'oz e po raquintar uschia era l'istorgia da Mascha ch'è vegnida cun nov onns en Surselva e ch'è oz dentista a Minsk.

The provided sources detail a series of interviews with historian Serhii Plokhy regarding the deep-seated origins and escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War. He argues that Vladimir Putin operates as a dictator driven by 19th-century imperial ideologies, viewing Ukrainians and Russians as a single people to justify his aggression. The discussion highlights how the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict in the Donbas were met with a Western policy of appeasement similar to that of the 1930s. This lack of a forceful initial response, combined with NATO's military unreadiness and the failure of the Minsk agreements, allegedly emboldened the Kremlin to pursue a full-scale invasion in 2022. However, the sources note that Putin severely miscalculated by assuming Ukraine remained as divided as it was in 2014, failing to realize that his previous actions had actually unified the Ukrainian nation. Ultimately, the text explores how intelligence failures, historical delusions, and shifting political landscapes transformed a regional struggle into a global catastrophe.1855 CRIMEA

5. Plokhy compares the 2014 annexation of Crimea to the 1930s policy of appeasement, criticizing the West's inadequate response. He discusses the Minsk agreements as a Russiantool to destabilize Ukraine and explains how NATO's fear of escalation allowed Putin to solidify control over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. (5)1855 COLONEL DALRYMPLE SCOTS FUSILIERS GUARDS

Чым далей, ты больш жорсткай становіцца міграцыйная палітыка еўрапейскіх краін. Закранае яна ў тым ліку і беларусаў. Наяўнасць праблем з легалізацыяй на фоне шматлікіх сустрэч Ціханоўскай з лідарамі нараджае папрокі, што Офіс і дэмсілы ўвогуле вырашэннем і адвакацыяй праблем беларусаў не займаюцца. А можа, і ўвогуле імі не цікавяцца. Чым адметная міграцыйная палітыка канцлера Германіі Мерца і як яна закранае інтарэсы беларусаў? Чаму Офіс Ціханоўскай і іншыя структуры дэмсіл не вырашаюць легалізацыйныя праблемы беларусаў, і ці варта верыць словам заходніх палітыкаў пра падтрымку беларусаў? Ці пойдзе Германія і ЕС увогуле па шляху замірэння з Лукашэнкам, і калі чакаць гэтага развароту? На гэтыя ды іншыя пытанні ў эфіры Еўрарадыё адказвае сяброўка Пашыранай рады беларускага аб'яднання ў Германіі Razam, каардынатарка фестывалю Minsk x Minga, супрацоўніца ўніверсітэта Пасау (The University of Passau) Хрысціна Дарапей

Probst, Carsten www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de, Fazit

Broecking, Maxi www.deutschlandfunk.de, Kultur heute

Today on another encore episode of the Rarified Heir Podcast we are talking to David Pressman, son of actors Lawrence Pressman and Lanna Saunders. Now if you are a fan of soap operas, you know Lanna who starred on more than 500 episodes of the NBC daytime show Days of Our Lives as Marie Horton. And if you are a fan of film you know Lawrence Pressman for his many roles starring in movies like 9 to 5, Making It and American Pie. From television, you know Lawrence Pressman from Doogie Howser M.D., The Bob Newhart Show, M*A*S*H & likely hundreds of other programs. He's a very familiar face, you just know brings a comedic edge to many of his 'oily' roles And he's still with us at age 86. (It must be all that craft service, ahem). As we learn and as we have heard on recent episodes and guests, David was born into an acting family that goes back, generations in fact – evidently his great grandfather performed on the Russian/Ukrainian stage when Minsky's Follies was simply known as Minsk. You get the picture. We are talking a long time ago! And it was the stage where both David's parents got their start as well on Broadway and other regional theater alike. But when the family moved to Los Angeles from New York when David was 7, the cameras took over for the footlights as Hollywood came calling for both his parents. And guess what? It came for David too as he had roles in films & television alike in big budget films such as Tropic Thunder & Blades of Glory as well as tv shows like Newhart, It's Always Sunny in Philadelphia, Monk and many others. We dive deep into some behind the scenes stories involving Steve Coogan, Jane Fonda, Bob Newhart (him again) and Ben Stiller. This is a fun one. Take a listen to this episode of the Rarified Heir Podcast right now.

Au nom de la sécurité, peut-on limiter les droits de l'homme, les droits des migrants ? C'est le débat qui sous-tend les attaques répétées dont la Cour fait l'objet. La CEDH sous pression Longtemps portée par les extrêmes droites européennes, l'idée de déroger aux droits humains des personnes en migration, pour des raisons de sécurité, est désormais à l'agenda politique de nombreux gouvernements du Vieux Continent. Pour preuve, cette déclaration commune publiée en décembre 2025 par plus de la moitié des 46 États membres du Conseil de l'Europe, qui demandent à ce que l'interprétation de la Cour Européenne des droits de l'homme sur les questions migratoires soit révisée. Alors que la Cour doit bientôt se prononcer sur plusieurs affaires, notre correspondante à Strasbourg, Wyloën Munhoz Boillot s'est penchée sur ce débat juridique de plus en plus politisé. En Pologne, la frontière avec la Biélorussie est le théâtre d'une crise migratoire dramatique depuis 2021, une crise orchestrée par le régime du dictateur biélorusse Alexandre Loukachenko. Pour déstabiliser Varsovie, Minsk organise l'acheminement de migrants vers les dangereuses forêts frontalières de l'Union européenne, et la Pologne répond par une politique extrêmement dure, quitte à être accusée de violer le droit d'asile et les droits humains. À Varsovie, les précisions d'Adrien Sarlat.    La chronique musique de Vincent Théval : Orgulho, du groupe belge Ão.    Au Royaume-Uni, la monarchie britannique ressort très affaiblie la médiatique affaire Epstein, dont les ramifications n'ont sans doute pas fini de rattraper certains des hommes les puissants de la planète. Le frère du roi Charles III, Andrew Windsor, a été arrêté le 19 février 2026. Il a passé 11h en garde à vue, soupçonné d'abus de pouvoir, lorsqu'il était représentant spécial du Commerce entre 2001 et 2011. Déjà accusé d'agressions sexuelles sur une Américaine qui avait 17 ans au moment des faits, le prince déchu pourrait être renvoyé devant la justice et risque la prison à vie. De quoi changer le regard que les Britanniques portent sur leur monarchie. À Londres, le reportage de Marie Billon.

Au nom de la sécurité, peut-on limiter les droits de l'homme, les droits des migrants ? C'est le débat qui sous-tend les attaques répétées dont la Cour fait l'objet. La CEDH sous pression Longtemps portée par les extrêmes droites européennes, l'idée de déroger aux droits humains des personnes en migration, pour des raisons de sécurité, est désormais à l'agenda politique de nombreux gouvernements du Vieux Continent. Pour preuve, cette déclaration commune publiée en décembre 2025 par plus de la moitié des 46 États membres du Conseil de l'Europe, qui demandent à ce que l'interprétation de la Cour Européenne des droits de l'homme sur les questions migratoires soit révisée. Alors que la Cour doit bientôt se prononcer sur plusieurs affaires, notre correspondante à Strasbourg, Wyloën Munhoz Boillot s'est penchée sur ce débat juridique de plus en plus politisé. En Pologne, la frontière avec la Biélorussie est le théâtre d'une crise migratoire dramatique depuis 2021, une crise orchestrée par le régime du dictateur biélorusse Alexandre Loukachenko. Pour déstabiliser Varsovie, Minsk organise l'acheminement de migrants vers les dangereuses forêts frontalières de l'Union européenne, et la Pologne répond par une politique extrêmement dure, quitte à être accusée de violer le droit d'asile et les droits humains. À Varsovie, les précisions d'Adrien Sarlat.    La chronique musique de Vincent Théval : Orgulho, du groupe belge Ão.    Au Royaume-Uni, la monarchie britannique ressort très affaiblie la médiatique affaire Epstein, dont les ramifications n'ont sans doute pas fini de rattraper certains des hommes les puissants de la planète. Le frère du roi Charles III, Andrew Windsor, a été arrêté le 19 février 2026. Il a passé 11h en garde à vue, soupçonné d'abus de pouvoir, lorsqu'il était représentant spécial du Commerce entre 2001 et 2011. Déjà accusé d'agressions sexuelles sur une Américaine qui avait 17 ans au moment des faits, le prince déchu pourrait être renvoyé devant la justice et risque la prison à vie. De quoi changer le regard que les Britanniques portent sur leur monarchie. À Londres, le reportage de Marie Billon.

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

Luigi Ippolito racconta la scioccante giornata per la Gran Bretagna, dove al fratello di re Carlo III è stato notificato un provvedimento giudiziario per i suoi rapporti col finanziere pedofilo Jeffrey Epstein. Viviana Mazza parla della prima riunione  del Board of Peace, l'organismo internazionale voluto dal presidente Usa Donald Trump. Marco Bonarrigo spiega come si è arrivati alla riammissione dei due Paesi banditi dalle competizioni sportive.Caso Epstein, l'ex principe Andrea arrestato nella sua residenza: avrebbe condiviso informazioni riservate con il finanziere pedofiloTrump al Board of Peace: Accordo con l'Iran o succederanno cose brutte. A Gaza? Situazione complessa, ma siamo qui per la paceIl caso inni e bandiere di Mosca e Minsk alle Paralimpiadi invernali, timori per la presenza in Italia di agenti russi e bielorussi

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

It's the season 4 finale and we're celebrating at 150 bpm, when Vitaly Friedman joins us to talk about his lifelong journey through techno music. It all began in Belarus when, as a child, he discovered The Prodigy on cassette, continuing into his teens, that were spent obsessively exploring every possible musical avenue. Vitaly explains his preference for minimal, melodic, and "honest" techno over mainstream EDM, emphasizing his deep appreciation for the craft, passion, and commitment artists put into their work. He discusses how music serves different functions in his life, whether providing flow and calmness while working, or creating vivid, cinematic experiences at live concerts, and reveals his practice of continuously discovering new artists to avoid getting stuck.Guest BioVitaly Friedman (he/him) loves beautiful content and does not give up easily. Born in Minsk, Belarus, he studied computer science and mathematics in Germany. While writing algebra proofs and preparing for software engineering at nights in the kitchen, at the same time he discovered passion for typography, interface design and writing. After working as a freelance designer and developer for 6 years, he co-founded Smashing Magazine back in 2006, a leading online magazine for designers and developers. His curiosity drove him from interface design to front-end to performance optimization to accessibility and back to user experience over all the years. Vitaly is the author, co-author and editor of Smashing Books (https://www.smashingmagazine.com/books), and a curator of Smashing Conferences (https://www.smashingconf.com). He is the UX lead with the European Parliament and Smashing Magazine and front-end/UX consultant in Europe and abroad, working with large and small companies and organizations like Haufe-Lexware, Axel-Springer and others. He also runs Measure UX (https://measure-ux.com) and Smart Interface Design Patterns (https://smart-interface-design-patterns.com), friendly video courses on UX and design patterns, along with a live UX training for passionate UX and product designers. LinksVitaly on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/vitalyfriedmanAmelie Lens at EXIT 2021: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=80jdSJxZUAEAmelie Lens — Live In the tunnel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1-Xc7EfT44Worakls: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jXJawwVI03EPaul Kalkbrenner: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YPbpWeIx2QExtrawelt: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ryc3YudCYXUProdigy — Out of Space: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a4eav7dFvc8CreditsCover design by Raquel Breternitz.

Belarus gewinnt durch kluges Taktieren jene Handlungsspielräume zurück, die nach 2020 verloren schienen. Indem Präsident Alexander Lukaschenko seine traditionell engen Drähte zum Kreml nutzt, um seine Rolle als Vermittler zu profilieren, und dabei geschickt auf den Kurswechsel in Washington reagiert, mildert Minsk den äußeren Druck langsam, aber spürbar ab. Ein Beitrag von Gábor Stier, ausWeiterlesen

Matt welcomes Producer /engineer/mixer and film composer Sanford Parker. As an artist he's performed and released albums with extreme heavy and industrial bands like Black Cross Hotel, Corrections House, Mirrors for Psychic Warfare and Minsk. Throughout the years he's collaborated with members of Sonic Youth, Ministry, Napalm Death and Neurosis as well as producing and mixing albums for Darkthrone, Voivod, Brutal Truth, Pelican, YOB, Hide, Youth Code, Wovenhand, Rwake, Local H and many others. TakeawaysSanford opened his studio in March 2020, just before the pandemic.He prefers working with independent artists and punk music.Chicago's music scene is affordable compared to other major cities.Managing overhead is crucial for running a successful studio.Sanford transitioned to mixing in the box for efficiency.He values genuine relationships with artists over bureaucracy.The pandemic shifted his work focus back to mixing.The flexibility of working remotely with clients.Learning to navigate financial discussions with bands.Independent music often allows for quicker decision-making.Links and Show Notes:Sanford's SiteMatt's Rant: Your JourneyCredits:Guest: Sanford ParkerHost/Engineer/Producer: Matt BoudreauWCA Theme Music: Cliff TruesdellThe Voice: Chuck Smith

Über fünf Jahre hatten wir auf dieses Interview mit Maria Kalesnikava kaum zu hoffen gewagt. Kalesnikava hatte sich mit zwei anderen Frauen 2020 dem belarussischen Diktator Alexander Lukaschenko entgegengestellt. In Belarus protestierten Hunderttausende friedlich gegen die gefälschte Wahl, Kalesnikavas Mitstreiterinnen flohen aufgrund der Bedrohung außer Landes – Maria Kalesnikava aber blieb. Sie zahlte dafür einen hohen Preis. Im September 2020 wurde sie mitten in Minsk verschleppt, tauchte Tage später in einem belarussischen Gefängnis auf und wurde schließlich zu elf Jahren Lagerhaft verurteilt. In all der Zeit bemühten wir uns, mit ihr in Kontakt zu bleiben – vergeblich. Denn von den fünf Jahren war Maria Kalesnikava drei Jahre lang verschwunden. Es erreichten sie keine Briefe mehr. Nicht einmal ihre Familie wusste, ob sie noch lebt. Sie befand sich in Isolationshaft. Im Dezember dann die Freilassung von 123 politischen Gefangenen dank eines Deals Lukaschenkos mit den Amerikanern. Maria Kalesnikava war dabei. In dieser Ostcast-Folge sprechen Michael Thumann und Alice Bota über ihre Begegnung mit Maria Kalesnikava und ihre erstaunliche Resilienz. Denn erstmals seit ihrer Ankunft in Deutschland hat Kalesnikava mit einem deutschen Medium gesprochen. Darüber, warum sie sich selbst im Kerker frei fühlte, wie sie Kunst und Kultur gerettet haben und warum sie nun darum kämpft, politische Gefangene in Belarus zu befreien.  Alice Bota und Michael Thumann ordnen Kalesnikavas Erlebnisse ein, sprechen über ihre außergewöhnliche Resilienz sowie den Widerstand anderer politischer Gefangener wie Alexej Nawalny. Und sie blicken auf Kalesnikavas Forderung, die Isolation von Belarus aufzugeben und mit Alexander Lukaschenko zu reden, damit weitere politische Gefangene aus belarussischen Kerkern freikommen. Alle drei Wochen sprechen wir im Ostcast über Politik und Gesellschaft der osteuropäischen Länder. Alice Bota berichtet von ihren Gesprächen und Erfahrungen in Osteuropa, Michael Thumann erzählt von seinen Begegnungen und Reisen in Russland und den Nachbarländern. Unter ostcast@zeit.de erreichen Sie das Team per Mail. [ANZEIGE] Mehr über die Angebote unserer Werbepartnerinnen und -partner finden Sie HIER. [ANZEIGE] Mehr hören? Dann testen Sie unser Podcast-Abo mit Zugriff auf alle Dokupodcasts und unser Podcast-Archiv. Jetzt 4 Wochen kostenlos testen. Und falls Sie uns nicht nur hören, sondern auch lesen möchten, testen Sie jetzt 4 Wochen kostenlos DIE ZEIT. Hier geht's zum Angebot. 

Day 1,434.Today, as Russia kills five civilians in a drone attack targeting a passenger train in Ukraine, we report on how a senior European diplomat has said the world must call this what it is: terrorism. As President Zelensky urges all “decent people of the world” not to remain silent in the face of Russian war crimes, we examine a new US assessment which concludes that Russia has suffered more military losses than any major power in any conflict since the Second World War. We also ask whether the North Sea and Baltic Sea are now effectively closed to Russia's shadow fleet following coordinated action by 14 European countries. Plus, we speak to colleagues at The Telegraph about why EU leaders' long-held ambitions to turn the European Union into a genuine geopolitical power may, at last, be taken seriously. ContributorsDominic Nicholls (Associate Editor of Defence). @DomNicholls on X.Lily Shanagher (Foreign Reporter). @LilyShanagher on X.Joe Barnes (Brussels Correspondent). @Barnes_Joe on X.James Crisp (Europe Editor). @JamesCrisp6 on X.SIGN UP TO THE ‘UKRAINE: THE LATEST' WEEKLY NEWSLETTER:http://telegraph.co.uk/ukrainenewsletter Each week, Dom Nicholls and Francis Dearnley answer your questions, provide recommended reading, and give exclusive analysis and behind-the-scenes insights – plus maps of the frontlines and diagrams of weapons to complement our daily reporting. It's free for everyone, including non-subscribers.CONTENT REFERENCED:The growing risks to maritime safety (UK Government):https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-growing-risks-to-maritime-safety/the-growing-risks-to-maritime-safetyUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN):https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdfThe plans to turn Europe into a new superpower (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/01/26/plans-turn-europe-new-superpower/‘After Budapest and Minsk, Ukraine knows what empty guarantees look like' (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/01/28/why-ukraine-cant-trust-another-ceasefire-with-putin/ Ukraine: We won't accept meaningless security guarantees (The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/01/27/ukraine-russia-security-guarantees-trump-nato/EU-sanctioned oil tanker escorted to Morocco by Spanish rescue ship, merchant marine says (Reuters):https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/eu-sanctioned-oil-tanker-escorted-morocco-by-spanish-rescue-ship-merchant-marine-2026-01-27/Russia's Grinding War in Ukraine (CSIS):https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-grinding-war-ukraineLISTEN TO THIS PODCAST IN NEW LANGUAGES:The Telegraph has launched translated versions of Ukraine: The Latest in Ukrainian and Russian, making its reporting accessible to audiences on both sides of the battle lines and across the wider region, including Central Asia and the Caucasus. Just search Україна: Останні Новини (Ukr) and Украина: Последние Новости (Ru) on your on your preferred podcast app to find them. Listen here: https://linktr.ee/ukrainethelatestSubscribe: telegraph.co.uk/ukrainethelatestEmail: ukrainepod@telegraph.co.uk Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Welcome back to the Magician On Duty Journey Series! Magician On Duty Journey Series opens a new chapter in 2026 with Melamanos (@melamanos), a selector from Minsk, Belarus, whose relationship with music is less about genre and more about devotion. This is sound chosen with intention — soulful, patient, and unafraid to linger in the in-between. A true believer in the art of the slow dance, Melamanos moves through a wide emotional spectrum: from multicultural electronica and organic rhythms to romantic, introspective shades of tech. Since 2018, his path has been guided by downtempo and midtempo currents, tribal echoes, folktronic details, and the hypnotic pull of chillrave — music designed not to rush, but to breathe. His vision has shaped countless slow-rave gatherings in Minsk and carried him across distant dancefloors in Istanbul, Tbilisi, Milan, Moscow, Ericeira, and Ponta Delgada. When physical borders fade, his sound continues to travel — through podcasts and mixtapes shared with downtempo communities around the world. Now, that journey lands in Miami, woven into the fabric of Magician On Duty. This Journey Series mix is an exercise in balance and honesty. A gentle tension between slow and fast, light and shadow, beauty and imperfection. Melodies dissolve into minimalism, the old converses with the new, and movement emerges naturally from stillness. It is introspective without losing its pulse — a mix that invites both contemplation and dance. Featuring music from Dandara & Arutani, Niklas Paschburg, Bedouin, Geju, Ninze, Roze, MC and me, and more, the selection unfolds like a quiet ritual — subtle, deep, and deeply human. This is music for late hours and open minds. A slow flame, carefully tended. An invitation to listen, feel, and move — honestly. Enjoy the journey. Follow Melamanos here: soundcloud.com/melamanos instagram.com/me.lama.nos Tracklist: Dandara & Arutani - Too Close (Iorie's Pink Glasses Mix) Niklas Paschburg - Tuur Mang Welten (Sydney Seymour Edit) Biralo feat. Jerry - Endless Story (AVM Extended Version) 9EYE - Loco Pilot Lukas Endhardt - Chegou O Rei Congo Dr Parnassus - Locomotiva Billy Caso - LA Landhouse & Raddantze - Nicht Mit Jup Dieter Iannis Ritter & Christopher Schwarzwalder - Bob Ross Lokke & Wodoo Wolcan - 00deep und das gefährliche Unterstrassphantom Ninze - trmpln O-Y - Achromasie Geju - Amm Roze feat. Eisor - Dare You Lui Mafuta - One More Time kalupke - Alonely Arutani - Láska Thujan - Gorkana Bedouin - Tomorrow Never Knows (Andara Edit) MC and me - Laughing Gas (Laaar & Diereva remix)

On this week's Defense & Aerospace Report Washington Roundtable, Dr. Patrick Cronin of the Hudson Institute think tank, Michael Herson of American Defense International, former DoD Europe chief Jim Townsend of the Center for a New American Security, and Pentagon comptroller Dr. Dov Zakh of the Center for Strategic and International Studies join Defense & Aerospace Report Editor Vago Muradian to discuss passage of the $901 billion National Defense Authorization Act For the 65th year in a row, congress passed and the president signed the $901 billion National Defense Authorization Act as lawmakers work appropriations to keep the government running after current funding runs out late next month; President Trump's decision to use a $2.4 billion in military housing funding for a $1,776 one-time “warrior dividend” bonus for troops to thank them for their service on the nation's 250th birthday; European nations agree to extend a $105 billion, two-year loan to Ukraine after failing to unlock frozen Russian assets to support Kyiv as Russia ramps up its rhetoric; a week after Washington lifted some sanctions on Belarus as part of a deal to release political prisoners, Minsk said it would host Russian long-range hypersonic missiles; frustrated with the progress on trade talks, Washington suspends a $41 billion tech deal with Britain signed this summer; the White House approves more than $11 billion in arms sales to Taiwan as it also okays the sale of NVIDIA H200 chips to China; Japan deploys radar units to Kitadaitōjima island to monitor Chinese military activity; former Hong Kong tycoon Jimmy Lai was found guilty of violating both China's new national security law and a colonial-era sedition measure; Beijing backs UAE's claim over three Gulf islands drawing Tehran's ire; two gunmen shaped by ISIS ideology attacked a Hanukkah celebration on Bondi beach, killing 15 and wounding another 40; Israel conducted strikes against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in South Lebanon; and our year in review.

Belarusian pro-democracy activist Andrei Sannikov recently joined Beet editor Eilish Hart for a conversation recorded on the sidelines of the Halifax International Security Forum. The interview focused on the Trump administration's growing engagement with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, including efforts to secure the release of more than a thousand political prisoners. In these negotiations, Lukashenko has leveraged a tactic honed by his regime over decades of authoritarian rule. Sannikov knows the consequences of that system firsthand. He ran against Lukashenko in the 2010 presidential election, was badly beaten by riot police, and served time in prison after protests erupted over the rigged vote. From exile, he has watched Minsk turn prisoner releases into bargaining chips, trading a few high-profile dissidents for sanctions relief and then refilling the prisons with new detainees. Against the backdrop of Trump's second term and renewed U.S.–Belarus engagement, Sannikov warned that Washington risks falling into a familiar trap. While the White House celebrates diplomatic “breakthroughs,” Lukashenko continues to imprison more Belarusians than he frees, raising the unsettling question of whether outreach to Minsk delivers any real progress or merely legitimizes repression. Timestamps for this episode: (3:06) Trump's second term and Belarus relations(9:48) Lukashenko's role in the Ukraine war(11:17) The geopolitical impact of Belarus breaking isolation(15:13) The future of Belarus: Neutrality vs. alliances(21:52) The importance of political prisoners and democratic resistanceКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

In this episode, Adam and Nina are together in Brussels recording the latest updates on the news from the region. The biggest discussion is around the diplomatic flurry over the last week and the remodelled 28-point peace plan between the US, Russia and Ukraine. Adam reflects on the current situation and discusses what might be next. They also discuss Viktor Orban's visit to MoscowLater, Nina sits down in Brussels with Peter Vermeersch, a professor of Politics and Eastern European Studies at the University of Leuven (KU Leuven, Belgium), and a writer of essays, reportage, and narrative non-fiction. They discuss his latest book Pollslag (Pulse) and, more broadly, the role of music as a form of resistance against authoritarianism beyond Belarus.During the interview, Peter mentions several artists featured in this Spotify playlist:https://open.spotify.com/playlist/3YmjGTewBHutfgJWUOASiD?si=jcJ-lu-OSj6dr8csRAf8PAPollslag was initially written for a Belgian audience, and Peter is now planning to translate it into English. In the meantime, you can read his non-fiction story about his family to get a sense of his narrative style: https://petervermeersch.craft.me/hbzUOUDh9tgMxIPeter is also part of the Forum on Central and Eastern Europe at the University of Leuven, which aims to bring insights from the region to Belgian audiences: https://fcee.beThe Forum also produces its own podcast, Studio Central Eastern Europe, offering brief and concise insights into new research on the region for English-speaking audiences: https://soc.kuleuven.be/lines/fcee/fcee-studio/studio-ceePeter also works as a researcher–photographer. His photographs from Minsk (2016) can be found here: https://vsco.co/petervermeersch/journal/belarusAnd read Adam's op-ed on the Ukraine peace talks via Brief Eastern Europe: https://briefeasterneurope.eu/p/december-1-2025For our Patrons, Peter stayed on to speak about visual art and Belarusian pro-democracy activism outside of Belarus. The bonus content can be found here: https://www.patreon.com/posts/episode-247-145134701

Lithuania's Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys joins Cipher Brief CEO Suzanne Kelly in Washington with a blunt warning: Western military restraint is encouraging, not deterring, the Kremlin. Budrys explains why Lithuania is raising defense spending to more than 5% of GDP by 2026—the highest in the democratic world—and pushing NATO toward offensive deterrence and denial "from the very first inch." He details Belarus' role as a state-enabled criminal actor, from weaponized migration to smuggling operations using high-altitude balloons that forced Lithuania to shut down its main international airport, and why Minsk deserves tougher sanctions. Budrys also walks through recent Russian gray-zone activity in the Baltic Sea and NATO airspace, arguing that only stronger posture—not de-escalation—has stopped undersea infrastructure attacks and drone incursions. The Minister lays out what a potential Ukraine ceasefire would mean for the Baltics, why Vilnius is committing 0.25% of GDP annually to Ukraine's security for ten years, and how Russian forces redeployed from Ukraine could reshape the threat on NATO's eastern flank. He also highlights Lithuania's energy break from Moscow—now sourcing 75% of its LNG from the U.S.—and its push for tougher economic security policies toward China as it prepares to hold the EU presidency in 2027. A candid, front-line view of deterrence, gray-zone warfare, and the future of the transatlantic alliance.

Paul Gregory recounts how his father, Pete Gregory, first met Lee Harvey Oswald in June 1962 after being contacted by the Texas Employment Office. Oswald, recently returned from three years in Minsk, sought work utilizing his Russian language skills. Pete, a fluent Russian speaker, tested Lee and, finding his Russian fluent but grammatically poor, wrote a letter supporting him. Later, Paul met Lee and Marina and proposed taking Russian lessons from Marina to practice with a native speaker. The Oswalds were very poor, living off Lee's tight $56 weekly earnings. Marina eventually earned $35 for the lessons, which she considered a fantastically large amount of money. Guest: Paul Gregory.

2. The Colossal Misjudgment: Underestimating Ukraine and Putin's Imperial Ambitions. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) covers the lead-up to the 2022 full-scale invasion, noting Russia's military buildup in 2021 while President Biden publicly stated that no US troops or weapons would be sent to Ukraine, which constituted a "colossal misjudgment of Putin." Despite the lack of meaningful preparatory military aid for Ukraine, US intelligence performed exceptionally well, accurately predicting the timing of the war and releasing this intelligence in real time, hoping to "shame" Putin. The expectation that Kyiv would fall within days reflected a profound misjudgment: underestimating the resolve of the Ukrainian state and people, and overestimating the Russian military's capacity. To justify his actions, Putin built an argument to the Russian people based on a "misreading of history," reviving 19th-century Russian imperial ideas that claimed Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians constituted a single whole. This false belief led to the expectation that Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops with flowers, rather than weapons. Putin's consistent goal since 2014 was to stop Ukraine's Western trajectory and integrate it into the Russian-controlled Eurasian Union. When President Zelensky refused Putin's demands regarding the implementation of the Minsk agreements in Paris in December 2019, many observers mark this moment as the countdown to the 2022 invasion.

3. US Intelligence Successes vs. Policy Failures Leading to the 2022 Invasion. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) details the period leading to the February 2022 invasion, where Russia positioned troops along the border, while the Biden administration publicly ruled out sending US troops or weapons to Ukraine. This policy is identified as a "colossal misjudgment" of Putin. Although US intelligence successfully reported Kremlin war plans almost in real time, hoping to deter Putin, little was done to militarily strengthen Ukraine. The prevailing Western assessment—that Kyiv would fall quickly and Ukraine would be overrun within a week—was based on a massive miscalculation that underestimated the Ukrainian military and people's resolve. Vladimir Putin framed the war using historical claims, stating that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people." This belief, rooted in 19th-century Russian imperial ideas, led to the flawed expectation that 150,000 to 200,000 troops would be sufficient and that Ukrainians would welcome them. Putin's central aim, consistent since the 2014 war, remains stopping Ukraine's Western drift and forcing it into the Russian-controlled Eurasian Union. The countdown to the current war began after President Zelensky, who was an unlikely war leader elected in 2019, refused to implement the Minsk agreements according to Putin's destabilizing agenda during their meeting in Paris in December 2019.

5. Western Appeasement of 2014: Crimea Annexation and the Flawed Minsk Accords. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) examines the Western reaction to the annexation of Crimea in February 2014, following the appearance of "little green men." Professor Plokhy asserts that had the West reacted to the Crimean annexation with the same severity as they did to the 2022 invasion, the major war might have been avoided. Instead, the collective West treated Crimea as an isolated exception, drawing a historical parallel to the 1930s Anschluss of Austria, and mistakenly believed that Putin would stop there. This flawed assumption led Germany to pursue economic ties like Nord Stream 2, hoping escalation would be less likely. Moreover, NATO's policy was to pacify Russia by not placing military units close to its borders, leaving the alliance with "very little to respond with" in 2014. Although the annexation was quickly followed by Russian-concocted violence in Donbas, leading to a massive Russian counterattack in summer 2014, the West pursued the Minsk II agreements. These agreements were often implemented according to Russia's interpretation: requiring elections first under Russian military control, intended to create a "Trojan horse" to destabilize Ukraine and preclude its movement toward the EU or NATO. This approach was closely related to the "policies of appeasement of the 1930s." 1840 KHIV

Is Ukraine seeing an exodus of young men? Why does Russia have veto power over UN resolutions? And would Moscow defend Minsk if Nato allies invoked Article 5 in response to an attack by Belarus?To answer your questions, Lucy Hockings is joined by senior digital journalist Laura Gozzi, and Ukraine correspondent James Waterhouse. The team also discuss US aid, China's role in the conflict, and whether Vladimir Putin is grooming a successor for the top job in the Kremlin. Today's episode is presented by Lucy Hockings. The producers were Laurie Kalus and Julia Webster. The technical producer was Philip Bull. The social producer was Sophie Millward. The executive producer was Lewis Vickers. The series producer is Chris Flynn. The senior news editor is Sam Bonham. Email Ukrainecast@bbc.co.uk with your questions and comments. You can also send us a message or voice note via WhatsApp, Signal or Telegram to +44 330 1239480You can join the Ukrainecast discussion on Newscast's Discord server here: tinyurl.com/ukrainecastdiscord

Bienvenidos a nuestro último capítulo de la serie. Hoy vamos a adentrarnos en uno de los conflictos más determinantes de nuestro tiempo: la guerra entre Rusia y Ucrania. Estos dos pueblos comparten una historia en común, desde la Rus de Kiev y el Imperio Ruso hasta la Unión Soviética y su disolución en 1991. Vamos a recorrer cómo esa historia común se convirtió en ruptura, cuáles son las posiciones y argumentos de cada bando, y cómo esta guerra no sólo redefine a Europa del Este, sino también a la Unión Europea, la OTAN y, en general, al mundo entero en un momento de multipolaridad. Porque lo que ocurre en el Donbás y en cualquier escenario de este conflicto influye en la economía global, la energía, la alimentación y el futuro de la geopolítica planetaria. Notas del episodio: Este episodio fue traído a ustedes gracias a Boston Scientific La historia milenaria en común de Ucrania y Rusia La Ucrania soviética en pocas palabras El memorándum de Budapest: un acuerdo para dejar las armas nucleares 2014: el año de explosión del conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania Los acuerdos de Minsk: el fracaso de las negociaciones entre los dos países Guerra y paz entre Ucrania y Rusia: un análisis de Mira Milosevich-Juaristi Sigue mis proyectos en otros lugares:  YouTube ➔ youtube.com/@DianaUribefm  Instagram ➔ instagram.com/dianauribe.fm Facebook ➔ facebook.com/dianauribe.fm Sitio web ➔ dianauribe.fm Twitter ➔ x.com/DianaUribefm  LinkedIn ➔ www.linkedin.com/in/diana-uribe    Gracias de nuevo a nuestra comunidad de patreon por apoyar la producción de este episodio. Si quieres unirte, visita www.dianauribe.fm/comunidad