Podcast appearances and mentions of paul milgrom

The journey to implementing spectrum auctions was not without its challenges. Evan Kwerel shed light on the initial resistance, particularly from the broadcasting industry and legislators. Concerns about market concentration and the potential costs of spectrum use were at the forefront of the debate. Despite these hurdles, the need for government revenue and the inefficiency of the existing system for cellular licenses were catalysts for change. Paul Milgrom provided a fascinating comparison between the United States and other countries. He noted the fragmented nature of the industry abroad and the various tactics used to suppress auction prices. In contrast, the U.S. wireless companies were less resistant, which played a part in the smoother implementation of spectrum auctions stateside.

Drinkable water is a precious commodity. But as population growth, aging infrastructure, drought, and climate change pose challenges to freshwater quality and quantity in America, the safety and amount of water in parts of the U.S. is in question. With more than 140,000 separate public water systems in the country, how can federal, state, and local governments, along with the various water authorities, take on this challenge alone? In this episode we hear from global water and natural resources expert Barton “Buzz” Thompson, about this new book Liquid Asset: How Business and Government Can Partner to Solve the Freshwater Crisis —and his recommendations for how to solve the freshwater crisis in the U.S.Connect:Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast WebsiteStanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn PageRich Ford >>>  Twitter/XPam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School PageStanford Law School >>> Twitter/XStanford  Law Magazine >>> Twitter/XLinks:Buzz Thompson >>> Stanford Law School PageLiquid Assets: How Business and Government Can Partner to Solve the Freshwater Crisis.Paul Milgrom & Auction TheoryChapter Timestamps:(00:00:00) Introduction & Water's Scarcity Hosts Rich Ford and Pam Karlan introduce guest, Buzz Thompson, an expert in water law and author of Liquid Assets(00:01:18) Water Challenges TodayThe scarcity of fresh water globally, and the multiple crises facing water resources: uneven distribution, climate change and the depletion of groundwater resources.(00:04:30) Water Infrastructure What is water infrastructure in the United States, the current state of it, and the repairs and upgrades required and being undertaken.(00:07:14) Updating Infrastructure & 21st-Century Technology Examples of modern wastewater treatment methods, advocating for resource recovery centers and outlining their potential benefits by adopting 21st century technology.(00:09:08) Fragmented Water Systems The complexity of water systems, & the challenges created by small water systems (00:12:00) Water Rights & Legal Structures The current legal structure of water rights in the USA,and defining the goals of both protecting water as a public resource, and a private commodity.(00:16:25) Private Sector's Role & Future Solutions Buzz discusses water markets internationally, and the private sector's role in innovation, technology, and financing to bridge the gap in water management. (00:18:59) Challenges with Outdated Water Rights Rich & Buzz  discuss the challenges created by the current water rights model, and the necessity, possibilities, and challenges for legal reform.(00:21:18) Proposal for Tradeable Water Rights The concept of converting existing water rights into more easily transferable ones similar to real property, in order to eliminate the current challenges.(00:25:49) Changing a System of Water RightsAustralia's successful reform in the Murray-Darling Basin, where water rights were revamped for better tradeability and how they safeguarded the environment.(00:27:31) Conclusion

This is the Google on Trial podcast.Here is an update on the United States v. Google trial for September 20-22, 2023, The second week of testimony began on September 19th with Kent Walker, the company's senior vice president of global affairs, testifying that Google does not engage in anticompetitive behavior and that the company's dominance in the online advertising market is the result of "innovation and merit."On September 20th, Google called economists Hal Varian and Paul Milgrom to testify on its behalf. Varian and Milgrom argued that Google's dominance in the online advertising market is beneficial to consumers because it leads to lower prices and higher quality products.On September 21st, the government called economists Carl Shapiro and Fiona Scott Morton to testify on its behalf. Shapiro and Morton argued that Google's dominance in the online advertising market is harmful to consumers because it leads to higher prices and lower quality products.On September 22nd, Google called Sundar Pichai, the company's CEO, to testify on its behalf. Pichai testified that Google's dominance in the online advertising market is the result of "innovation and merit," and that the company does not engage in anticompetitive behavior.The trial is expected to last for several weeks. It is unclear when the jury will begin deliberations.The economists who testified on behalf of Google and the government presented conflicting views on the impact of Google's dominance on the online advertising market. Google's economists argued that Google's dominance is beneficial to consumers, while the government's economists argued that it is harmful.Pichai's testimony was closely watched by both sides, as he is the most senior Google executive to testify in the trial. Pichai's testimony was generally seen as favorable to Google, but the government's lawyers were able to cross-examine him on a number of points.Thanks for listening to the Google on Trial podcast. Please make sure you subscribe and never miss an update.The trial is still in its early stages, and it is unclear how the jury will rule. However, the testimony that has been presented so far suggests that the government has a strong case against Google.

To help address the big questions that shape our world UBS has sought out a number of Nobel laureates in the economic sciences to ask them to share insights, discuss their research and open their inquiring minds. This week we hear from the laureates recognised in 2020 for their improvements to auction theory and the inventions of new auction formats.

Nicole Büttner is a tech optimist at heart and is active as an entrepreneur, investor and board member. Her passion is to create real impact with new technologies useful to companies and people. Nicole is co-founder and CEO of MerantixMomentum, a leading AI solutions firm and member of the managementboard of Merantix, an AI venture studio based in Berlin. Nicole is Digital Leader at the World Economic Forum and was nominated as a Young Leader by theAspen Institute. She was selected twice as 40 under 40 by Capital Magazine and Rising Talent by the Women's Forum.Previously, she worked as a hedge fund portfolio manager at OFI AM in Paris and led the global business development for Autionomics, Nobel Prize winner Paul Milgrom's tech and consulting firm. She serves on the Board of Alumni of the University of St.Gallen and on the board of the German Startup Association.She regularly lectures at the University of St. Gallen and other academic institutions. Nicole trained as an economist and econometrician at the University of St.Gallen, Stockholm School of Economics and Stanford University and holds a MA in Quantitative Economics and Finance.Follow Nicole on Linkedin and TwitterFollow Katia on Linkedin and TwitterFollow Female Business Angels Podcast on Instagram (@female_business_angels) Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Rejected Early Drafts of Newcomb's Problem, published by zahmahkibo on September 6, 2022 on LessWrong. Discovered inside an opaque box at the University of California and shared by an anonymous source, please enjoy these unpublished variations of physicist William Newcomb's famous thought experiment. Newcomb's Advanced Problem If Omega predicted that, when presented with this exact scenario in a hypothetical context, you would lie about your intentions because you think that somehow matters to an omniscient godlike entity, Box B contains lethal poison gas. Newcomb's Market Before your arrival, Omega created questions for your decision on each of the ten leading prediction markets. If Omega predicted you will one-box, Box B contains one million dollars multiplied by the maximum arbitrage between those markets due to insufficient liquidity. Newcomb's Auction Before making your decision, you must auction off the rights to your winnings via the mechanism of your choice. Box B contains $1,000,000 if Omega predicted that your auction will be won by economist Paul Milgrom. Newcomb's Paradox: Director's Cut Extended Edition (2011 Blu-ray re-release) This four-disc set contains 190 minutes of never-before-seen footage, including: the legendary original "three-box" ending, unaired behind-the-scenes interviews with director John Carpenter and creature designer Stan Winston, a remastering of the 1996 Christmas special, four commentary tracks, and one unsimulated sex scene. Newcomb's Nonfungible Problem If Omega predicted you will one-box, Box B contains a piece of paper with the words "Omega paid [your name] $1,000,000." Newcomb's Condorcet's Paradox Omega's opening explanation quickly derails into a rant at the innumerable evils of first-past-the-post winner-take-all voting systems. If you listen politely for 45 minutes, a world-weary Omega will just give you the money. Newcomb's Prob7em (1995 film) Box B contains Gwyneth Paltrow's head. Fast Times at Newcomb High Box B is always empty, but if you one-box, Omega will think you're cool. Newcomb's Problem (3rd level enchantment spell) Casting Time: 1 actionRange: 60 feetComponents: Verbal, Somatic, Material (two small glass cubes, one quartz and one obsidian)Duration: 1 round A creature of your choice that you can see within range must make a Wisdom saving throw. On a failed save, the target takes 3d8 psychic damage and is stunned until the end of its next turn as its mind is overwhelmed by the implications of retrocausality. The spell has no effect if the target is undead or evidentialist. Newcomb's Basilisk If you one-box, Omega will donate the remaining $1,000 toward the creation of a malevolent AI that seeks to torment one-boxers. RE: RE: RE: RE: Newcomb's Paradox Dear Friend, I have decided to contact you regarding a matter that requires your confidentiality and discretion. This is urgent, confidential and profitable Business for both of us to the degree of One Million United State Dollars ($1,000,000 USD). I have placed these Funds in the National Bank of my country and require a trusted Beneficiary to secure their deposit for foreign investments. With your Cooperation I will withdraw these funds into your personal account. I require only $1,000 to satisfy the transfer and processing duties to secure my escape. Sincerely, Crown Prince Agemo The Legend of Newcomb's Gold If you made any friends along the way, Box B is empty. Otherwise it contains $1,000,000. Newcomb's Information Hazard Box B contains $1,000,000 only if Omega predicts that why are you still reading? Omega knows you saw the title and this giant block of text after it. Omega predicts that you already know Omega is going to pull some meta-bullshit and say you only get the money if you skipped over this section as soon as you saw the words "information hazard" or...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Rejected Early Drafts of Newcomb's Problem, published by zahmahkibo on September 6, 2022 on LessWrong. Discovered inside an opaque box at the University of California and shared by an anonymous source, please enjoy these unpublished variations of physicist William Newcomb's famous thought experiment. Newcomb's Advanced Problem If Omega predicted that, when presented with this exact scenario in a hypothetical context, you would lie about your intentions because you think that somehow matters to an omniscient godlike entity, Box B contains lethal poison gas. Newcomb's Market Before your arrival, Omega created questions for your decision on each of the ten leading prediction markets. If Omega predicted you will one-box, Box B contains one million dollars multiplied by the maximum arbitrage between those markets due to insufficient liquidity. Newcomb's Auction Before making your decision, you must auction off the rights to your winnings via the mechanism of your choice. Box B contains $1,000,000 if Omega predicted that your auction will be won by economist Paul Milgrom. Newcomb's Paradox: Director's Cut Extended Edition (2011 Blu-ray re-release) This four-disc set contains 190 minutes of never-before-seen footage, including: the legendary original "three-box" ending, unaired behind-the-scenes interviews with director John Carpenter and creature designer Stan Winston, a remastering of the 1996 Christmas special, four commentary tracks, and one unsimulated sex scene. Newcomb's Nonfungible Problem If Omega predicted you will one-box, Box B contains a piece of paper with the words "Omega paid [your name] $1,000,000." Newcomb's Condorcet's Paradox Omega's opening explanation quickly derails into a rant at the innumerable evils of first-past-the-post winner-take-all voting systems. If you listen politely for 45 minutes, a world-weary Omega will just give you the money. Newcomb's Prob7em (1995 film) Box B contains Gwyneth Paltrow's head. Fast Times at Newcomb High Box B is always empty, but if you one-box, Omega will think you're cool. Newcomb's Problem (3rd level enchantment spell) Casting Time: 1 actionRange: 60 feetComponents: Verbal, Somatic, Material (two small glass cubes, one quartz and one obsidian)Duration: 1 round A creature of your choice that you can see within range must make a Wisdom saving throw. On a failed save, the target takes 3d8 psychic damage and is stunned until the end of its next turn as its mind is overwhelmed by the implications of retrocausality. The spell has no effect if the target is undead or evidentialist. Newcomb's Basilisk If you one-box, Omega will donate the remaining $1,000 toward the creation of a malevolent AI that seeks to torment one-boxers. RE: RE: RE: RE: Newcomb's Paradox Dear Friend, I have decided to contact you regarding a matter that requires your confidentiality and discretion. This is urgent, confidential and profitable Business for both of us to the degree of One Million United State Dollars ($1,000,000 USD). I have placed these Funds in the National Bank of my country and require a trusted Beneficiary to secure their deposit for foreign investments. With your Cooperation I will withdraw these funds into your personal account. I require only $1,000 to satisfy the transfer and processing duties to secure my escape. Sincerely, Crown Prince Agemo The Legend of Newcomb's Gold If you made any friends along the way, Box B is empty. Otherwise it contains $1,000,000. Newcomb's Information Hazard Box B contains $1,000,000 only if Omega predicts that why are you still reading? Omega knows you saw the title and this giant block of text after it. Omega predicts that you already know Omega is going to pull some meta-bullshit and say you only get the money if you skipped over this section as soon as you saw the words "information hazard" or...

Playing nice – Trust and reputation in Game Theory, eCommerce and vaccinations | with Steve Tadelis In this episode we talk to Steve Tadelis about reputation and trust. He explains how he first got into the topic, what reputation means in the context of Game Theory and how even leaving no review at all could signal reputation on platforms like ebay. He also shows how powerful reputation and trust can be beyond the business context, e.g. when increasing vaccination rates with the help of Donald Trump.   Steve Tadelis is professor of economics, business and public policy at UC Berkeley. His research interests include the economics of eCommerce and incentives & organisations. On top of his academic experience he has worked as senior economist at Amazon and eBay.   In the episode, Steve mentions the following papers: Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, by David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson Using Donald Trump's COVID-19 Vaccine Endorsement to Give Public Health a Shot in the Arm: A Large-Scale Ad Experiment, by Bradley Larsen, Marc J. Hetherington, Steven H. Greene, Timothy J. Ryan, Rahsaan D. Maxwell & Steven Tadelis

Today, we are delighted to have as our guest, Evan Kwerel, who is Senior Economic Advisor at the Federal Communications Commission. The impact of Evan's career at the FCC was recognized last year, when he was awarded the 2021 Paul Volcker Career Achievement Award for pioneering the use of spectrum auctions. To get an idea of what Evan has accomplished and to introduce the discussion, let me read the first couple of paragraphs from the citation. “During more than three decades as a Federal Communications Commission economist, Evan Kwerel has been a key driver of America's wireless revolution, establishing the first-ever competitive auctions to allocate public airwaves for the transmission of sound, data, and video across the country while raising billions of dollars for the government. The market-based FCC auctions of electromagnetic spectrum, the radio frequencies that carry voices between cell phones, television shows from broadcasters and online information from one computer to the next, were conceived and implemented by Kwerel based on many of the theories of 2020 Nobel Prize-winning economists Paul Milgrom and Bob Wilson. Since the early 1990s, a total of 107 FCC spectrum auctions have generated more than $200 billion in revenue for the government. After winning the Nobel Prize, Milgrom wrote that ‘Evan's individual contributions were so major that it would have been appropriate for him to share this prize.'”

”Sometimes I make a mistake during the lecture, I'll make an argument that's not quite right and not even notice it, and a student will catch me. I just love it when students do that.” – Economic sciences laureate Paul Milgrom loves being a teacher. He also loves when his students correct him and ask him hard questions that he doesn't know the answer to. In this podcast episode the Nobel Prize's Adam Smith speaks to economist Milgrom about his own school years and what type of teacher he aspires to be.Paul Milgrom shared the prize in economic sciences with his PhD advisor Robert Wilson for their research on auction theories. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Twee uur s nachts stak de Amerikaan Robert Wilson de straat over naar het huis van zijn collega Paul Milgrom. Hij bonkte op de deur, drukte ongeduldig op de bel en riep Pauls naam. Robert wilde hem wekken omdat beide heren de Nobelprijs voor economie hadden gewonnen. Dankzij de videodeurbel horen we hoe Paul het heugelijke nieuws tot zich neemt. Het aandoenlijke tafereeltje ging de hele wereld over. Ik overwoog een videodeurbel aan te schaffen, maar deed het niet.

David Card, Joshua Angrist and Guido Imbens have been awarded the 2021 Nobel Prize in economic sciences for contributions to labor economics and analysis of causal relationships, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences announced on Monday. American economists Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson were awarded last year's economics prize for their work on auction theory.To learn more about how CNN protects listener privacy, visit cnn.com/privacy

Neoclassical economic theory shows that under the right conditions, prices alone can guide markets to efficient outcomes. But what if it it's hard to find the right price? In many important markets, a buyer's willingness to pay for one good (say, the right to use a certain part of the radio spectrum range in San Francisco) will depend on the price of another complementary good (the right to use that same spectrum in Los Angeles). The number of possible combinations can rapidly become incalculably complex. Such complex markets require new collaborations between economists and computer scientists to create designs that are both incentive compatible and computationally tractable. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (Columbia UP, 2017), 2020 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner Paul Milgrom discusses some of the new economics theory he has developed to help address these challenging contexts, in which neither unfettered market forces nor top-down planning will work well. In our interview we explore these ideas in the context of the most complex auction ever created, the FCC's broadcast incentive auction. This auction, designed and planned by a team led by Professor Milgrom with his company Auctionomics, purchased underutilized broadcast spectrum from television stations and sold it onward to telecoms providers. This reallocation helped improve wireless network performance and pave the way for 5G wireless services, while also generating over $7 billion for the US treasury. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Neoclassical economic theory shows that under the right conditions, prices alone can guide markets to efficient outcomes. But what if it it's hard to find the right price? In many important markets, a buyer's willingness to pay for one good (say, the right to use a certain part of the radio spectrum range in San Francisco) will depend on the price of another complementary good (the right to use that same spectrum in Los Angeles). The number of possible combinations can rapidly become incalculably complex. Such complex markets require new collaborations between economists and computer scientists to create designs that are both incentive compatible and computationally tractable. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (Columbia UP, 2017), 2020 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner Paul Milgrom discusses some of the new economics theory he has developed to help address these challenging contexts, in which neither unfettered market forces nor top-down planning will work well. In our interview we explore these ideas in the context of the most complex auction ever created, the FCC's broadcast incentive auction. This auction, designed and planned by a team led by Professor Milgrom with his company Auctionomics, purchased underutilized broadcast spectrum from television stations and sold it onward to telecoms providers. This reallocation helped improve wireless network performance and pave the way for 5G wireless services, while also generating over $7 billion for the US treasury. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics.

Neoclassical economic theory shows that under the right conditions, prices alone can guide markets to efficient outcomes. But what if it it's hard to find the right price? In many important markets, a buyer's willingness to pay for one good (say, the right to use a certain part of the radio spectrum range in San Francisco) will depend on the price of another complementary good (the right to use that same spectrum in Los Angeles). The number of possible combinations can rapidly become incalculably complex. Such complex markets require new collaborations between economists and computer scientists to create designs that are both incentive compatible and computationally tractable. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (Columbia UP, 2017), 2020 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner Paul Milgrom discusses some of the new economics theory he has developed to help address these challenging contexts, in which neither unfettered market forces nor top-down planning will work well. In our interview we explore these ideas in the context of the most complex auction ever created, the FCC's broadcast incentive auction. This auction, designed and planned by a team led by Professor Milgrom with his company Auctionomics, purchased underutilized broadcast spectrum from television stations and sold it onward to telecoms providers. This reallocation helped improve wireless network performance and pave the way for 5G wireless services, while also generating over $7 billion for the US treasury. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/systems-and-cybernetics

Neoclassical economic theory shows that under the right conditions, prices alone can guide markets to efficient outcomes. But what if it it's hard to find the right price? In many important markets, a buyer's willingness to pay for one good (say, the right to use a certain part of the radio spectrum range in San Francisco) will depend on the price of another complementary good (the right to use that same spectrum in Los Angeles). The number of possible combinations can rapidly become incalculably complex. Such complex markets require new collaborations between economists and computer scientists to create designs that are both incentive compatible and computationally tractable. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (Columbia UP, 2017), 2020 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner Paul Milgrom discusses some of the new economics theory he has developed to help address these challenging contexts, in which neither unfettered market forces nor top-down planning will work well. In our interview we explore these ideas in the context of the most complex auction ever created, the FCC's broadcast incentive auction. This auction, designed and planned by a team led by Professor Milgrom with his company Auctionomics, purchased underutilized broadcast spectrum from television stations and sold it onward to telecoms providers. This reallocation helped improve wireless network performance and pave the way for 5G wireless services, while also generating over $7 billion for the US treasury. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/public-policy

Neoclassical economic theory shows that under the right conditions, prices alone can guide markets to efficient outcomes. But what if it it's hard to find the right price? In many important markets, a buyer's willingness to pay for one good (say, the right to use a certain part of the radio spectrum range in San Francisco) will depend on the price of another complementary good (the right to use that same spectrum in Los Angeles). The number of possible combinations can rapidly become incalculably complex. Such complex markets require new collaborations between economists and computer scientists to create designs that are both incentive compatible and computationally tractable. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (Columbia UP, 2017), 2020 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner Paul Milgrom discusses some of the new economics theory he has developed to help address these challenging contexts, in which neither unfettered market forces nor top-down planning will work well. In our interview we explore these ideas in the context of the most complex auction ever created, the FCC's broadcast incentive auction. This auction, designed and planned by a team led by Professor Milgrom with his company Auctionomics, purchased underutilized broadcast spectrum from television stations and sold it onward to telecoms providers. This reallocation helped improve wireless network performance and pave the way for 5G wireless services, while also generating over $7 billion for the US treasury. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/economics

Neoclassical economic theory shows that under the right conditions, prices alone can guide markets to efficient outcomes. But what if it it's hard to find the right price? In many important markets, a buyer's willingness to pay for one good (say, the right to use a certain part of the radio spectrum range in San Francisco) will depend on the price of another complementary good (the right to use that same spectrum in Los Angeles). The number of possible combinations can rapidly become incalculably complex. Such complex markets require new collaborations between economists and computer scientists to create designs that are both incentive compatible and computationally tractable. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (Columbia UP, 2017), 2020 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner Paul Milgrom discusses some of the new economics theory he has developed to help address these challenging contexts, in which neither unfettered market forces nor top-down planning will work well. In our interview we explore these ideas in the context of the most complex auction ever created, the FCC's broadcast incentive auction. This auction, designed and planned by a team led by Professor Milgrom with his company Auctionomics, purchased underutilized broadcast spectrum from television stations and sold it onward to telecoms providers. This reallocation helped improve wireless network performance and pave the way for 5G wireless services, while also generating over $7 billion for the US treasury. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/technology

Neoclassical economic theory shows that under the right conditions, prices alone can guide markets to efficient outcomes. But what if it it's hard to find the right price? In many important markets, a buyer's willingness to pay for one good (say, the right to use a certain part of the radio spectrum range in San Francisco) will depend on the price of another complementary good (the right to use that same spectrum in Los Angeles). The number of possible combinations can rapidly become incalculably complex. Such complex markets require new collaborations between economists and computer scientists to create designs that are both incentive compatible and computationally tractable. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (Columbia UP, 2017), 2020 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner Paul Milgrom discusses some of the new economics theory he has developed to help address these challenging contexts, in which neither unfettered market forces nor top-down planning will work well. In our interview we explore these ideas in the context of the most complex auction ever created, the FCC's broadcast incentive auction. This auction, designed and planned by a team led by Professor Milgrom with his company Auctionomics, purchased underutilized broadcast spectrum from television stations and sold it onward to telecoms providers. This reallocation helped improve wireless network performance and pave the way for 5G wireless services, while also generating over $7 billion for the US treasury. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/finance

Neoclassical economic theory shows that under the right conditions, prices alone can guide markets to efficient outcomes. But what if it it's hard to find the right price? In many important markets, a buyer's willingness to pay for one good (say, the right to use a certain part of the radio spectrum range in San Francisco) will depend on the price of another complementary good (the right to use that same spectrum in Los Angeles). The number of possible combinations can rapidly become incalculably complex. Such complex markets require new collaborations between economists and computer scientists to create designs that are both incentive compatible and computationally tractable. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (Columbia UP, 2017), 2020 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner Paul Milgrom discusses some of the new economics theory he has developed to help address these challenging contexts, in which neither unfettered market forces nor top-down planning will work well. In our interview we explore these ideas in the context of the most complex auction ever created, the FCC's broadcast incentive auction. This auction, designed and planned by a team led by Professor Milgrom with his company Auctionomics, purchased underutilized broadcast spectrum from television stations and sold it onward to telecoms providers. This reallocation helped improve wireless network performance and pave the way for 5G wireless services, while also generating over $7 billion for the US treasury. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Neoclassical economic theory shows that under the right conditions, prices alone can guide markets to efficient outcomes. But what if it it's hard to find the right price? In many important markets, a buyer's willingness to pay for one good (say, the right to use a certain part of the radio spectrum range in San Francisco) will depend on the price of another complementary good (the right to use that same spectrum in Los Angeles). The number of possible combinations can rapidly become incalculably complex. Such complex markets require new collaborations between economists and computer scientists to create designs that are both incentive compatible and computationally tractable. In Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints (Columbia UP, 2017), 2020 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner Paul Milgrom discusses some of the new economics theory he has developed to help address these challenging contexts, in which neither unfettered market forces nor top-down planning will work well. In our interview we explore these ideas in the context of the most complex auction ever created, the FCC's broadcast incentive auction. This auction, designed and planned by a team led by Professor Milgrom with his company Auctionomics, purchased underutilized broadcast spectrum from television stations and sold it onward to telecoms providers. This reallocation helped improve wireless network performance and pave the way for 5G wireless services, while also generating over $7 billion for the US treasury. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/science-technology-and-society

In 2020, the Nobel prize for economics was awarded to Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom for their contributions to complex auction formats. In this episode of Game Changer, Stephan Knapek, Managing Partner at TWS Partners, talks about frequency auctions as a practical application of such complex auction formats. He explains why the state uses auctions to allocate frequency bands to telecom providers, and how these auctions are structured. He also gives insights to the strategies of the bidders, and shows how some of them exploit flaws and loopholes in the auction ruleset in order to send signals to their competitors. If you want to read more on this topic – and if you are fluent in German – you can check out Stephan's articles in the German newspaper Handelsblatt, where he commented on the developments of the German 5G frequency auction in 2019: https://www.tws-partners.com/about-us/media/press-news/handelsblatt-5g-auction-in-germany/

Le Prix Nobel d'Economie 2020 a récompensé Paul Milgrom et Robert Wilson de l'université de Stanford pour leurs recherches sur les enchères. Dans cet entretien, Jean-Edouard Colliard, professeur de finance à HEC Paris et auteur de "Les Prix Nobel d'Economie" aux Editions Repères, nous explique les recherches récompensées, ainsi que le protocole de sélection des Prix Nobel, et leur rôle dans l'économie, la société et la perception des économistes. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Paul Milgrom und Robert Wilson haben in diesem Jahr den Wirtschaftsnobelpreis gewonnen, weil sie die Auktionstheorie "verbessert" und "neue Formate für Versteigerungen" entwickelt haben, so die Begründung der schwedischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,Aber was bedeutet es, die Auktionstheorie zu "verbessern"? Darüber spricht Verhaltensökonomin Verena Utikal mit Axel Ockenfels von der Universität Köln. Der Ökonomie-Professor hat Ebay mehrere Jahre lang beraten und erklärt, warum Auktionen kompliziert sein können, welche Formate es gibt und weshalb sich nicht jedes Produkt für eine Versteigerung eignet.Ihr habt Fragen oder Themenvorschläge für Verena Utikal? Dann schreibt ihr auf Twitter: twitter.com/verenautikal

Der Wirtschaftsnobelpreis 2020 geht an Paul Milgrom und Robert Wilson für ihre Beiträge zur Auktionstheorie. Der Ig-Nobelpreis 2020 wurde verliehen für die Erforschung der Korrelation zwischen der Einkommensungleichheit und der Häufigkeit des Küssens in einer Beziehung. Infolge des Sechstagekrieges von 1967 waren 14 Frachtschiffe für acht Jahre im Sueskanal eingeschlossen. Die Schicksalsgemeinschaft der Seeleute handelte untereinander mit der Fracht sowie mit Dienstleistungen und schuf so eine kleine Tauschwirtschaft.

Breve chiacchiera sul recente Nobel per l'economia dato agli economisti americani Robert Wilson e Paul Milgrom.

In today's Finshots, we tell you why Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics

With our guest Prof. Achim Wambach, PhD, president of the ZEW, we discuss what this year's Economics Nobel Prize laureates Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson have contributed to game theory and auction theory. Here, we look at both: rather theoretical concepts but also their direct applications.

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Die 2020 Nobelprys vir Ekonomie is gister toegeken aan die Amerikaanse ekonome Paul Milgrom en Robert Wilson vir hulle bydra tot die teorie van veilings en die ontwikkeling van nuwe formate van veilings.

Dean Curnutt, Macro Risk Advisors Founder and CEO, examines volatility in the market ahead of the U.S. election. Robert B. Wilson, Stanford University Professor, reacts to winning the 2020 Nobel Prize in Economics for his improvements to auction theory. Betsey Stevenson, University of Michigan Economics Professor and Former Chief Economist of the U.S. Department of Labor, says the U.S. can fuel growth by harnessing the untapped potential of the labor force. Paul Donovan, UBS Global Chief Economist, says the failure to do fiscal stimulus now in the U.S. is doing real damage to the economy. Nobel Laureate Michael Spence shares insights into the award-winning work of Paul Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson, whose discoveries were recognized today with the 2020 Nobel Prize in Economics. Learn more about your ad-choices at https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.com

Nesse episódio eu comento sobre os ganhadores do Prêmio Nobel de Economia de 2020, explicando como Paul Milgrom e Robert Wilson criaram novas formas para transações que estão na base de vários negócios e que ganharam escala na internet.