Podcasts about arms regulations itar

Host Gregg N. Sofer welcomes Husch Blackwell partner Grant Leach to the program to discuss the burgeoning set of requirements and restrictions placed on U.S. businesses in connection with trade law. Gregg and Grant identify the authorities and agencies involved in trade law and the various mechanisms the regulators use to make rules and enforce them. As trade law rapidly evolves to keep pace with geopolitical developments and challenges, corporate leaders and their compliance teams have the task of managing risks that are sometimes difficult to spot, especially as they involve multiple layers of the global supply chain. Our conversation stresses the necessity of diligence and knowing your customers and vendors, as well as exploring what a “reasonable, risk-based” compliance program looks like in practice.We also discuss a key change in the statute of limitations—from five years to ten—in connection with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions enforcement. This expansion of the lookback period has implications not just for compliance programs but could also complicate corporate transactions and the due diligence process.We conclude our discussion by addressing how the evolving trade law regime impacts smaller enterprises that might have difficulty scaling the compliance function to manage trade-based risk. These enterprises face heightened risk as they are often targeted by bad actors seeking to evade sanctions via transshipment or some other means.Gregg N. Sofer BiographyFull BiographyGregg counsels businesses and individuals in connection with a range of criminal, civil and regulatory matters, including government investigations, internal investigations, litigation, export control, sanctions, and regulatory compliance. Prior to entering private practice, Gregg served as the United States Attorney for the Western District of Texas—one of the largest and busiest United States Attorney's Offices in the country—where he supervised more than 300 employees handling a diverse caseload, including matters involving complex white-collar crime, government contract fraud, national security, cyber-crimes, public corruption, money laundering, export violations, trade secrets, tax, large-scale drug and human trafficking, immigration, child exploitation and violent crime.Grant Leach BiographyFull BiographyBased in Husch Blackwell's Omaha office and a member of the firm's International Trade & Supply Chain practice, Grant focuses on trade, export controls, sanctions and anti-corruption compliance. He has extensive experience helping clients navigate complex issues related to international commerce and its associated compliance challenges. As part of his practice, Grant advises clients on requirements under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), Export Administration Regulations (EAR) administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) administered by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), trade sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and other import- and export-related regulations.© 2024 Husch Blackwell LLP. All rights reserved. This information is intended only to provide general information in summary form on legal and business topics of the day. The contents hereof do not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. Specific legal advice should be sought in particular matters.

In this episode, Lisa Mays, an international trade attorney with Sheppard Mullin and leader of the firm's Supply Chain Industry Team, joins host Scott Maberry to discuss the state of the global supply chain, including the impact of the war in Russia, and the intensifying trade war with China.   What We Discussed in This Episode: Most trade lawyers are on the East coast. What benefits do you bring to your clients being in California?  What roles do the different government agencies play in enforcement, and why is recent inter-agency enforcement cooperation so significant? What is the compliance obligation regarding “diversion” of goods by suppliers, distributors, sales agents, and customers? How are U.S. trade wars playing out in the global supply chain?  What specific supply chain issues are created by the war in Ukraine? What recent actions has the U.S. taken as the trade war with China intensifies? How is international trade law impacting the way the solar industry operates? Why has it become critical for companies to trace their supply chains for forced labor? Will supply chain regulation continue to be a priority for the remainder of President Biden's current term?   About Lisa Mays An international trade lawyer based in Sheppard Mullin's Orange County office, Lisa Mays leads the firm's Supply Chain Industry Team and is a leading member of the Transportation Industry Team. Lisa's practice focuses on compliance counseling and investigations in the areas of export controls, economic sanctions, anti-corruption, and customs and import regulations. She regularly advises semiconductor manufacturers, automakers, airlines, aerospace and defense firms, importers, and exporters on sanctions; export controls, including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR); trade agreements; the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA); Customs and imports; antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD); the False Claims Act; Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS); anti-boycott controls; cybersecurity issues; and anti-money laundering (AML) matters.  Lisa also represents clients before the U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS), the Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the International Trade Commission (ITC), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and CFIUS.   About Scott Maberry An international trade partner in Governmental Practice, J. Scott Maberry counsels clients on global risk, international trade, and regulation. Scott's practice includes representing clients before the U.S. government agencies and international U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS), the Department of Commerce Import Administration, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the International Trade Commission (ITC) and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS). He also represents clients in federal court and grand jury proceedings, as well as those pursuing negotiations and dispute resolution under the World Trade Organization (WTO), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other multilateral and bilateral agreements. A member of the World Economic Forum Expert Network, Scott also advises the WEF community in the areas of global risk, international trade, artificial intelligence and values.   Contact Information Lisa Mays Scott Maberry Thank you for listening! Don't forget to SUBSCRIBE to the show to receive two new episodes delivered straight to your podcast player every month. If you enjoyed this episode, please help us get the word out about this podcast. Rate and Review this show on Apple Podcasts, Amazon Music, or Spotify. It helps other listeners find this show. This podcast is for informational and educational purposes only. It is not to be construed as legal advice specific to your circumstances. If you need help with any legal matter, be sure to consult with an attorney regarding your specific needs.  

Changes are coming to how arms manufacturers do business internationally. That is thanks to proposed changes in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). In fact, comments are due by the end of May. For details, Federal Drive Host Tom Temin talked with Stephanie Kostro, Executive Vice President for Policy at the Professional Services Council. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoicesSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Changes are coming to how arms manufacturers do business internationally. That is thanks to proposed changes in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). In fact, comments are due by the end of May. For details, Federal Drive Host Tom Temin talked with Stephanie Kostro, Executive Vice President for Policy at the Professional Services Council. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In today's episode, Izzy discusses the importance of a marketing plan with Amanda Hudswell at Equatorial Launch Australia.  A marketing plan provides a blueprint for your communication activities, maximizes your efforts by targeting the most important audiences, and determines the marketing activities that resonate with them. A plan transforms dreams into reality by establishing the steps necessary for an idea to come to fruition and it provides clarity for action for the entire company and its team.  Amanda Hudswell Head of Marketing Communications and Public Affairs  Equatorial Launch Australia https://ela.space CHAPTERS: 01:17 Importance of a marketing plan 03:01 Eclipse 04:27 Meet Amanda Hudswell 07:54 About ELA 13:59 When to bring in a marketing professional 16:24 The Marketing Plan 19:17 Your audience and crafting a message that resonates 22:25 Strategies and tactics of a marketing plan 24:02 Constructing the plan and getting scrappy 22:37 Measuring and testing 30:24 Non-digital results 32:52 Telling the space story 36:47 Your audience is the hero, your company is the guide 39:53 Marketing challenges 41:59 Marketing successes 44:17 Algorithms - shooting at a moving target 46:34 Bad actors, trolls, and grumpy people 53:59 The future of space 58:57 Final Thoughts MENTIONS: GSA Spaceport Summit - https://www.globalspaceportalliance.com/gsa-spaceport-summit-2/ Building a BrandStory by Donald Miller ITAR regulations - The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are a set of US government regulations that control the import and export of defense products, services, and information. The purpose of ITAR is to protect national security and advance American foreign policy interests. ITAR governs the following: Manufacture, Export, Temporary import, Provision of defense services, and Brokerage activities involving items described on the USML. https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=24d528fddbfc930044f9ff621f961987 ABOUT IZZY Izzy's website - https://izzy.house Author of Space Marketing: Competing in the new commercial space industry AND Space Marketing: Spaceports on Amazon and Audible - https://bit.ly/Space-Marketing Podcast host for Space Marketing Podcast - https://spacemarketingpodcast.com Organizer for Space for Kentucky Roundtable - https://spaceforkentucky.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Boeing continues to struggle with its core business activities. As troubles mount for Boeing, it is clear that it continues to suffer from real and pervasive culture issues that have been reflected in serious safety failures, financial difficulties, regulatory violations, and serious reputational damage. Boeing's troubles permeate every part of its organization -- from the board to senior executives to its operations and overall ethics and compliance commitment. As a result, Boeing stands at an important crossroads -- will it make a real commitment to change, reform, and ethics and compliance, or will it continue to limp along, suffering repeated incidents of harm?In its latest (mis)adventure, Boeing fell victim to a State Department fine for $51 million for violations of a number of export controls, including basic licensing requirements for exports to China and Russia. Boeing voluntarily disclosed the violations to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls ("DDTC") in the State Department.The violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR") included illegal exports to foreign employees and contractors who work in more than 15 countries, a trade compliance specialist fabricating an export license to illegally ship defense items abroad, and violations of the terms and conditions of other export licenses, among other things.The DDTC's $51 million penalty is the largest administrative penalty imposed for ITAR violations since it imposed a $79 million penalty against BAE Systems in 2011. Under the terms of the settlement, Boeing must pay $27 million to the DDTC within two years and use the remaining $24 million to improve its compliance program and procedures. In addition, Boeing is required to hire a DDTC-approved special compliance officer to oversee its compliance with ITAR for the next three years. That officer will regularly report to the DDTC on Boeing's progress.Boeing faced a $51 million settlement for ITAR violations, including unauthorized exports and re-transfers to foreign employees and contractors, notably in China.Violations involved illegal downloads of ITAR-controlled technical data from Boeing's digital repository, which affected Pentagon platforms like the F-18, F-15, and F-22 aircraft and the AH-64 Apache helicopter.Boeing voluntarily disclosed violations to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) and the State Department, leading to the $51 million penalty, the largest for ITAR violations since 2011.The settlement requires Boeing to pay the DDTC $27 million, improve its compliance program with the remaining $24 million, and hire a DDTC-approved special compliance officer for three years.Boeing must introduce a new automated export compliance system, update the State Department on its progress every six months, and undergo two export control audits by State Department-approved consultants.Despite the violations occurring mostly before 2020, Boeing made significant improvements to its trade compliance program, investigated issues, cooperated with authorities, and expressed regret.The case highlights the State Department and DDTC's aggressive enforcement of administrative controls over military items, signaling a broader crackdown on export control and sanctions violations.Resources:Michael Volkov on LinkedIn | TwitterThe Volkov Law Group

In this podcast, Jamey Petri and Jeffrey Thomas discuss recently-issued guidance provided in a fact sheet from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on avoiding discriminatory employment practices when complying with U.S. export control laws. Jeff and Jamey unpack the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), focusing on their anti-discrimination provisions as they relate to issues affecting employers, including hiring and retention practices, Form I-9 documentation and processes, and employee training.

In this episode, host Tim O'Toole and guest Scott Gearity, President of the Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI), talk in-depth about the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). They discuss the growing importance of the regulations related to the provision of defense services abroad by U.S. persons, the jurisdictional implications of importing of foreign made defense articles into the U.S., the growing compliance challenges of the deemed export rule, the recently revised Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) compliance guidelines and risk matrices, the reorganization of the ITAR, the 10-year anniversary of export control reform (ECR), and the effect ECR has had on the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).  Roadmap: Introduction Defense services abroad Subject to the ITAR from coming into the U.S. Deemed export/SpaceX ITAR Part 120 rewrite DDTC revised compliance program guidance/risk matrix 10-year anniversary of ECR Complexity at the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) ******* Thanks to Scott Gearity for joining us: https://www.learnexportcompliance.com/people/scott-gearity/  Questions? Contact us at podcasts@milchev.com. EMBARGOED! is not intended and cannot be relied on as legal advice; the content only reflects the thoughts and opinions of its hosts. EMBARGOED! is intelligent talk about sanctions, export controls, and all things international trade for trade nerds and normal human beings alike. Each episode will feature deep thoughts and hot takes about the latest headline-grabbing developments in this area of the law, as well as some below-the-radar items to keep an eye on. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts for new bi-weekly episodes so you don't miss out!

In this episode of From the Crows' Nest, we try to make sense of how to navigate the crazy labyrinth of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulatory regime. Host Ken Miller is joined by friend and colleague Steven Casazza, President of Defense Trade Solutions, a company dedicated to helping clients holistically approach international defense business. Ken and Steven discuss best practices, the most common mistakes, and what needs to be done to make this process easier without compromising national security. Whether you're a US company selling abroad or a foreign company trying to do business in the US, this is an episode you don't want to miss. To learn more about today's topics or to stay updated on EMSO and EW developments, visit our homepage. 

Related material Main page: https://billatnapier.medium.com/cryptography-fundamentals-8-rsa-rivest-shamir-and-adleman-445b91932bd0 RSA: https://asecuritysite.com/rsa  Introduction In August 1977, The Stranglers were in the music charts with “Something Better Change” and something really was changing, and it was something that would change the world forever. This was the month that Martin Gardner in his Scientific American column, posted a challenge of a method that has stood the test of time: RSA. It related to the work of R(ivest), A(dleman) and S(hamir) and was a puzzle on their discovery of a method which allowed two keys to be created, where one could encrypt and the other to decrypt. Their work had been based on a proposal from Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman on trapdoor functions that could be used to create the key pair. Mathematical Puzzles introducing RSA In order to explain the RSA concept, Martin's provided a background the Diffie-Hellman method for which he outlined: Then in 1975 a new kind of cipher was proposed that radically altered the situation by supplying a new definition of "unbreakable." a definition that comes from the branch of computer science known as complexity theory. These new ciphers are not absolutely unbreakable in the sense of the one-time pad. but in practice they are unbreakable in a much stronger sense than any cipher previously designed for widespread use. In principle these new ciphers can be broken. but only by computer programs that run for millions of years! Overall the Diffie-Hellman method has had a good run, but it has struggled in recent years to keep up with the processing power for computers, and the millions of years of running is not quite the case in the modern area, and where the original ciphers could now easily be broken with the simplest of computers within minutes. With the RSA method, Martin Gardner outlined: Their work supported by grants from the NSF and the Office of Naval Research. appears in On Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems (Technical Memo 82. April. 1977) issued by the Laboratory for Computer Science Massachusetts Institute of Technology 545 Technology Square. Cambridge Mass. 02139.The memorandum is free to anyone who writes Rivest at the above address enclosing a self-addressed. 9-by-12-inch clasp. On receipt the requesters eventually (it took over four months in many cases) received a precious piece of history (Figure ref{fig03}). RSA research paper It seems unbelievable these days, but the original methods were based on two 63-digit prime numbers that would be multiplied to create a 126-digit value: Contrast this with the difficulty of finding the two prime factors of a 125- or 126-digit number obtained by multiplying two 63-digit primes. If the best algorithm known and the fastest of today's computers were used, Rivest estimates that the running time required would be about 40 quadrillion years' A 256-bit number, at its maximum, generates 78-digits: 115,792,089,237,316,195,423,570,985,008,687,907,853,269,984,665, 640,564,039,457,584,007,913,129,639,936 Web: https://asecuritysite.com/encryption/keys3 The 40 quadrillion years has not quite happened, and where 512-bit keys are easily broken in Cloud. If you are interested, here is a 512-bit integer value and which has 148 digits, such as: 13,407,807,929,942,597,099,574,024,998,205,846,127,479,365,820,592,393,377,723,561,443,721,764,030,073,546,976,801,874,298,166,903,427,690,031,858,186,486,050,853,753,882,811,946,569,946,433,6 49,006,084,096 web: http://asecuritysite.com/encryption/random2 The search for prime numbers, too, has been progressive since 1977, and by 2014, the world discovered a 17,425,170-digit prime number. The finding of prime numbers make the finding of them in the RSA method must easier. So the RSA method has been under attack for years, from both discovering prime numbers and also in factorizing. Along with this computing power has increased massively. If think that 40 years that have passed, and take a quick assumption that computing power doubles every year then we get: 1977 4 Quadrillion Years (4,000,000,000,000,000)1978 2 Quadrillion Year1979 1 Quadrillion Year…2020 227 years2021 113 years2022 57 years2023 28 years and if we get a GPU card with 4,000 processors, we take it to less than a year, and we get of few of them today into a cluster, and we crack it within one day! The FREAK vulnerability was actually caused by the limiting of RSA keys, due to US Export controls, to 512-bits. The factorising of prime numbers too has generated methods which can quickly find the prime number factors  The Tension of Crypto and Academic Freedom Once Martin had published the article, the requests for the article came rushing in, especially as the paper had not yet appeared in the Communication of the ACM. Initially there were 4,000 requests for the paper (which rose to 7,000), and it took until December 1977 for them to be posted. Why did it take so long to get the paper published and also to send them out? Well the RSA method caused significant problems within the US defence agencies. This was highlighted in a letter sent from J.A.Meyer to the IEEE Information Theory Group on a viewpoint that cryptography could be violating the 1954 Munitions Control Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and could thus be viewed equivalent to nuclear weapons. In even went on to say that: Atomic weapons and cryptography are also covered by special secrecy laws The main focus of the letter was that any work related to cryptography would have to be cleared by the NSA before publication. In fact, the letter itself had been written by Joseph A Meyer, an employee of the NSA. Joseph had already been embroiled in controversy with a proposal to fit a tracking device to the 20 million US citizens who had been associated with crime. The tag would then be used to monitor the location of the “subscriber”, and to detect when they broke a curfew or committed a crime. In this modern era of GPS tracking of everyone's phones, Joseph's dream has actually become a reality, but now everyone is monitored. The RSA team thus had a major dilemma, as many of the requests for the paper come from outside the US. Martin Hellman, who was a co-author of the Diffie-Hellman method, had already had problems with ITAR, and even decided to present thep aper himself in 1977 at Cornell University rather than the practice of letting his PhD students present the work. His thinking was that the court case would be lengthy, and that it would damage his PhD student's studies (Ralph Merkle and Steve Pohlig), and so he stood up for academic freedoms. Initially the students wanted to present their work, but their families did not think it a good idea. Eventually though, Ralph and Steve stood beside Hellman on the stage to present the paper, but did not utter a word. With this stance the cryptographers held ground, and hoped that a stated exemption on published work within ITAR would see them through. The worry, though, did delay the paper being published, and for the posting of the article. In reply to Meyer's letter, the IEEE stood its ground on their publications being free of export licence controls, with the burden of permissions placed on the authors: RSA research paper and then additional response from the IEEE saying they put in place safeguards for the publishing of material. The scope of the impact of RSA was perhaps not quite known at the time with Len Adleman stating: I thought this would be the least important paper my name would ever appear on In fact, Adleman has said that he did not want his name on the paper, as he had done little work on it, but he did insist that his name went last. Often papers, too, have an alphabet order, and if so the method could have been known as the ARS method … not the kind of thing that you would want to say to audiences on a regular basis. RSA Within cryptography we typically use non-negative integer values, and perform integer operations. The challenge in public key encryption is to find a method which is computationally difficult for a computer to solve, if it does not know a given secret (normally the private key). One such problem is the difficulty in factorizing a value made up of the multiplication of two large prime numbers. In RSA, we take two large prime numbers — typically at least 512 bits long — and then multiply these together to create a modulus value, (N) (often at least 1,024 bits long). From this, we then derive a public exponent (e) and a modulus. The modulus N is thus determine by multiplying the two prime numbers (p and q): N = p x q The core challenge here is that it should be extremely difficult (and costly) to determine the two prime numbers which make up N. Next we select the value of our encryption key value for the public key (e). This is selected so that N and e do not share any factors: gcd(e,PHI)=1, and where  PHI = (p-1)(q-1) This is known as Euler's totient function. The most typical value we use for e is 65,537 (0x10001). To produce a cipher (C), we convert our message into the form of an integer (M) and then use e and N to give: C = M^e mod N To decrypt this, we take the cipher (C), and recover the message value using the decryption exponent (d) and the modulus (N): M = C^d mod N To make RSA work, we then need to calculate the private exponent (d) to obey: (d x e) mod{PHI} = 1 and where phi is: PHI = (p-1)(q-1) We determine d by determining the inverse of e modulus phi: d = e^{-1} pmod {phi} So let's take p=11 and q=7, and pick e of 3. N will be: N=p.q = 77   PHI is 6x10=60 We can't pick e of 3 or 5, so we will pick e=7. Now we compute the decryption exponent of d = e^{-1} mod (PHI) >>> pow(7,-1,60) 43 If we select a message of 19, we get a cipher of: C=19⁷ (mod 77) = 68 Now to decrypt: M= 68⁴³ (mod 77) = 19 Our public key is then (e,N) and the private key is (d,N). The usage of the (mod N) operation is the magic that makes this work. Unfortunately, the RSA method has suffered from performance issues as we have increased the size of the prime numbers used. Thus, if researchers can crack a modulus of 1,024 bits, they will factorize the two 512-bit prime numbers used. At the current time, a public modulus of 2,048 bits is recommended. So while a modulus of this size is acceptable within a powerful computer, devices which have limited CPU resources often struggle in creating the keys, and in the encryption and decryption process. RSA Signatures With the mathematical operations involved, RSA is hardly ever used for core encryption, as symmetric key methods are much more efficient in their implementation. But it is fairly efficient when dealing with relatively small data sizes, such as for a symmetric key (typically only 128 bits or 256 bits long). For this, Alice might protect a symmetric key with her public key, and whenever she needs to use it, she will decrypt it with her private key. Another area where we use RSA is to take a hash of a message, and then encrypt this with the private key. As the hash is relatively small (such as 128 bits, 160 bits or 256-bits), it is relatively efficient on the use of the computing resources. Where public key encryption methods come in most use is within creating digital signatures, and where Bob can take a hash of a message, and then encrypt this hash with his private key. Alice can then also take a hash of the received message, and decrypt Bob's encrypted hash with his public key, and compare the values produced. If they match, she determines that it was Bob who sent the message and that it has not been changed by anyone.  In Figure ref{fig_trust03} we see that Bob has a key pair (a public key and a private key). He takes a hash of the message and encrypts with his private key, and then appends this to the message. This and then message will be encrypted by the symmetric key that Bob and Alice share (typically this is either a long-term shared key, or has just been negotiated through a hand-shake). When she receives the ciphered message, she decrypts it with the shared symmetric key, and then takes her own hash of the message. She also decrypts the encrypted hash using Bob's public key, and then compares the hashes. As the public key and the private key work together, only the signing by Bob's private key will reveal the hash with his public key. Alice can then tell that the message has not been changed — as the hash would change if Eve has modified it — and that it was produced by Bob (and not by Eve pretending to be Bob). Obviously, we now have a problem in how we get Bob's public key. An important element here, is that they have to find a way for Bob to send Alice her public key in a trusted way, so that Eve cannot intercept it, and change the keys. For this, we introduce Trent, and who is trusted by Bob and Alice to prove their keys. For this Trent signs the public key of Bob with his private key, and then Alice uses Trent's public key to prove Bob's public key. For a few decades, RSA has been the main method in supporting public key encryption. We often use it when we connect to a secure Web site, and where the RSA method is used to prove the identity of the Web site. In this case the RSA public key of the site is presented to the user in the form of a digital certificate — and which is signed by a trusted source. The Web site can then prove its identity by signing a hash of the data with its private key, and the client can check this. A typical size of the public modulus is now 2,048 bits (created by two 1,024 bit prime numbers), and with some sites supporting 4,096 bits. So while desktop computers have the processing power to cope with these large numbers, less able devices (such as for low processing powered IoT — Internet of Things — devices) will often struggle to perform the necessary calculations. Simple example So let's take a simple implementation of RSA key generation, encryption and decryption. In this case the code is: Web: https://asecuritysite.com/encryption/rsa12 In this case, we generate two random prime numbers ($p$ and $q$) for a given number of bits. The more bits we use, the more secure the method is likely to be, as an increase in the number of bits increases the number of prime numbers that can be searched for. Once we have these, we then determine the public modulus ($N$) by multiplying the prime numbers together. The difficulty of the problem is then factorizing this modulus back into the prime numbers. If we have the public modulus, it is fairly simple to then find the decryption exponent value. In most modern examples of RSA, we select a public exponent value ($e$) of 65,537, and so our encryption key becomes $(65,537,N)$. The decryption exponent ($d$) is then the inverse of $e pmod {phi}$ (and where $phi=(p-1)(q-1)$). from Crypto.Util.number import *from Crypto import Randomimport Cryptoimport libnumimport sysbits=60msg="Hello"p = Crypto.Util.number.getPrime(bits, randfunc=Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes)q = Crypto.Util.number.getPrime(bits, randfunc=Crypto.Random.get_random_bytes)n = p*qPHI=(p-1)*(q-1)e=65537d=libnum.invmod(e,PHI)## d=(gmpy2.invert(e, PHI))m= bytes_to_long(msg.encode('utf-8'))c=pow(m,e, n)res=pow(c,d ,n)print ("Message=%snp=%snq=%snnd=%dne=%dnN=%snnPrivate key (d,n)nPublic key (e,n)nncipher=%sndecipher=%s" % (msg,p,q,d,e,n,c,(long_to_bytes(res))))end{lstlisting} A test run using 60-bit prime numbers is: Message=hellop=242648958288128614541925147518101769011q=299356840913214192252590475232148200447N=72638625604016464006874651287120524699932001616388639276131104258310920947917cipher=5847803746095553957863305890801268831081138920772806292673259864173015661385decipher=hello Conclusions RSA has been around for over 46 years, and is still going strong. It can encrypt and it can sign. While the prime numbers involved has got larger, and it needs to have padding applied, it is still one of the best public key methods around, and well used on the Web.  

Price tag aside, one of the biggest obstacles to the success of AUKUS is export controls. Stakeholders in all three AUKUS countries are increasingly concerned that the United States International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) present a significant challenge to the timely sharing of equipment, information, and technology between the three countries. These challenges are not new, but the stakes have never been higher. Realising the full potential of AUKUS hinges on timely ITAR reform. Indeed, ITAR reform is essential to the delivery of Australia's nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS Pillar I and fostering genuinely trilateral collaboration on advanced capabilities under AUKUS Pillar II.How might ITAR provisions hamper the implementation of the AUKUS agreement? Why did previous efforts to reform US export controls for Australia and the United Kingdom fall short? What sorts of revisions are being considered across the US system? Is the best route to enduring ITAR reform through legislative action or an executive order?In a report released prior to this webinar, non-resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Dr William Greenwalt and USSC Research Fellow in the Foreign Policy and Defence program Tom Corben tackled these questions and provided a roadmap towards reforming ITAR to realise the full potential of AUKUS. The Centre hosted a webinar with the authors, along with USSC non-resident fellow Jennifer Jackett, for a discussion on reforming US export controls to realise the potential of AUKUS.

Blackbaud released its financial results for its second quarter ended June 30, 2022. Second quarter total revenue increased 15.5% year-over-year with the first half of 2022, while non-GAAP organic recurring revenue increased 5.1%. IFS reported its financial results for H1 as of June 30, 2022, with its share of recurring revenue reaching 71% of total revenues and H1 2022 software revenue grew 22% over H1 2021. Salesforce announced Composable Storefront, a fully customizable, headless digital storefront. Features include best-in-class integrations, pricing, and implementation accelerators from across the Salesforce ecosystem, all anchored by Commerce Cloud. QAD introduced the Elevate Program, which provides its ERP customers a simplified upgrade path to QAD adaptive ERP through a rapid, low-cost, automation-powered approach. QAD's program leverages knowledgeable QAD consultants to upgrade to the QAD Cloud in less than six months. ECI Software Solutions, a provider of cloud-based business management solutions, released M1 ITAR – a cloud-based platform for manufacturers who serve the U.S. government's aerospace and defense needs to assist in maintaining compliance with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Leveraging Microsoft Azure for U.S. Government and AWS GovCloud, M1 ITAR helps manufacturers grow their business capabilities and maintain data in a secure cloud environment.https://www.erpadvisorsgroup.com866-499-8550LinkedIn:https://www.linkedin.com/company/erp-advisors-groupTwitter:https://twitter.com/erpadvisorsgrpFacebook:https://www.facebook.com/erpadvisorsInstagram:https://www.instagram.com/erpadvisorsgroupPinterest:https://www.pinterest.com/erpadvisorsgroupMedium:https://medium.com/@erpadvisorsgroup

Support us on Patreon!   News Discussed: Navalny jailed in Russia (also many protests) Successful Coup in Myanmar AZ vaccine less effective against South Africa variant Gina Carano got cancelled for being red tribe  Justice Department investigating SpaceX following complaint of hiring discrimination  The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)    Happy News! US is getting vaccines sooner than expected Covid-19 Vaccine Efforts Get a Boost From Black Communities' Pastors Promising weight loss drug   Got something to say? Come chat with us on the Bayesian Conspiracy Discord or email us at themindkillerpodcast@gmail.com. Say something smart and we'll mention you on the next show!   Follow us! RSS: http://feeds.feedburner.com/themindkiller Apple: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-mind-killer/id1507508029 Google: https://play.google.com/music/listen#/ps/Iqs7r7t6cdxw465zdulvwikhekm Pocket Casts: https://pca.st/vvcmifu6  Stitcher: https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/the-mind-killer    Intro/outro music: On Sale by Golden Duck Orchestra This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit mindkiller.substack.com/subscribe

In a blockbuster case, the Justice Department announced a global settlement with Airbus SE, a manufacturer of civilian and military aircraft, under which Airbus agreed to pay over $4 billion (yes, with a “B”) to resolve charges with the United States, France, and the United Kingdom for its role in a bribery scheme, and to resolve Airbus’ violation of the International Trade in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”).   In this Episode, Michael Volkov reviews the Airbus bribery and ITAR settlement.  

Be unmovably reasonable If a lawyer says it, it must be true! Today we speak with Matthew Larosiere, the Director of Legal Policy at the Firearms Policy Coalition. We discuss why 3D printed guns are protected free speech and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is unconstitutional against individuals. Matt explains how Heller and […]

Hey everyone, welcome back to Bionic Bug podcast! You’re listening to episode 16. This is your host Natasha Bajema, fiction author, futurist, and national security expert. I’m recording this episode on August 5, 2018. First off, I have a personal update. Next weekend, I’m headed to the Writer’s Policy Academy in Green Bay Wisconsin. I’ll be participating in two days of an interactive and educational hands-on experience led by police detectives and officers and designed for writers to enhance their understanding of all aspects of law enforcement, firefighting, EMS, and forensics. I’m currently signed up for hands-on sessions on high-speed pursuits, a car set ablaze and door entry/breaching among other things. Stay tuned for my read out in a few weeks. Let’s talk tech news. It’s been an “exciting” week for emerging technologies and their potential risks. 3D printing made the headlines across the country this week, even making it onto the daily show with Trevor Noah. In truth, this is a threat that has been building for more than six years that has largely remained off the public’s radar. This week, a legal battle broke out with 19 states pitted against the State Department and Defense Distributed. In 2012, Cody Wilson, a second year law student at the University of Texas, and his friends got together and named themselves “Defense Distributed” and launched the “Wiki Weapon Project.” The idea was to create a gun that anyone could easily make at home. They used a crowdfunding website to raise funds to develop a 3D printed plastic gun that can be printed by a low-cost, open source 3D printer known as the RepRap. The group successfully produced a plastic gun capable of firing a .22 caliber bullet in 2013. The gun is called “The Liberator”. Cody Wilson and his friends uploaded the blueprint online. The design has two metal components the firing pin and a small piece of steel. The steel part is designed to make the gun detectable with a metal detector. The U.S. Undetectable Firearms Act prohibits weapons that don't set off a metal detector. The design was downloaded 100,000 times in just two days before the State Department stepped in, demanding the removal of the blueprint from the website under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which governs the export of munitions. Wilson took down the blueprint, but it soon became available on disreputable file-sharing websites such as The Pirates Bay and on the Dark Web. Since this development, many more gun designs have been made available online. So why now? In 2015, Cody Wilson and Defense Distributed filed a law suit against the State Department, claiming his First Amendment rights were being infringed. The State Department settled with Wilson last month, allowing Defense Distributed to release the designs online for downloading. On Tuesday, a federal judge in Seattle granted a temporary restraining order to stop the posting of blueprints that would have legally allowed Americans to make 3D-printed guns in their own homes. Let’s unpack the issues. These guns are called “ghost guns” because they have no serial numbers, untraceable, undetectable They are homemade. Anyone with access to the Internet can download the blueprint and then print the parts using a cheap 3D printer. These guns are not entirely undetectable. “The TSA Has Found 3D-Printed Guns at Airport Checkpoints 4 Times Since 2016” The designs include a small metal part that can be detected by metal detectors. It remains illegal to develop guns that cannot be detected. I’m not sure if I understand why everyone is freaking out about this new development. We already have a gun accessibility problem in this country. Practically anyone can get access to weapons in the U.S., even semi-automatic weapons, including criminals. Plastic guns are not nearly as effective and run the risk of exploding after multiple shots.

AWS GovCloud (US) is an isolated AWS Region designed to help US government agencies and highly regulated organizations meet their compliance needs, including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP). AWS GovCloud (US) makes it safe and easy to move sensitive data and regulated IT workloads to the cloud, through its adherence to numerous compliance and regulatory requirements. Join us to learn about AWS GovCloud (US) and how AWS can do the heavy lifting for your government agency or regulated enterprise.

Sanjay Mullick concentrates his practice in export controls, economic sanctions, international dispute resolution and international trade regulation. He is a member of the firm's India practice and is located in the Washington, DC office. Mr. Mullick has a broad range of experience providing counsel to companies on export control matters administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the Department of Energy’s rules on nuclear exports under Part 810, as well as economic sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). He also assists clients with compliance matters concerning foreign trade zones (FTZ) and foreign lobbying rules under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).