NATO Review

As the NATO Summit approaches, we stand at a pivotal moment for our Alliance and our shared mission to safeguard peace. The Madrid, Vilnius and Washington Summits already set a clear path for NATO following Russia's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine and a shifting global security landscape. In The Hague, we will evaluate our progress and go even further, cementing our new capability targets and establishing new spending commitments to strengthen our collective defence.

Recent events have solidified the Baltic Sea as an area of critical strategic importance. It serves as a vital maritime trading route, hosts considerable networks of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI), and holds significant potential for the development of new sources of energy. As a result, it is also an area which is highly vulnerable to the increasingly prevalent threat of hybrid attacks – that is, attacks just below the threshold of kinetic warfare, which blur the lines between peace and conflict, such as the sabotage of critical infrastructure.

The defence posture of NATO member countries, which had already dramatically shifted after 2014, was accelerated irreversibly in 2022 with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The trend of boosting defence spending has been witnessed across the Alliance, however, it has been especially strong in the countries closer to NATO's eastern flank, as Europe has recognised its obligation to share more fairly the financial burden of defending itself. Within this new paradigm, Poland and Germany represent two examples of European countries who are stepping up to this challenge by securing significant defence funding in different yet equally effective ways.

Three years on from the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the values of liberty and volia—a unique Ukrainian word that signifies an unyielding drive for freedom and overcoming obstacles — have remained central to Ukraine's identity. They say that the true value of something is only fully understood when it is either lost or when one gives everything to defend it. As we endure this war, we Ukrainians fully understand what it means to be free.

On 6 December 2024, in an unprecedented move, Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the results of the first round of its 24 November presidential election, citing evidence provided by intelligence agencies that the electoral process had been “compromised throughout its duration and across all stages”. This dramatic decision, unparalleled in Romania's history since the 1989 revolution against the communist regime, underscores the evolving nature of hybrid warfare, one aspect of which includes algorithmic manipulation and cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns that target and destabilise democracies. The prospect of a NATO Ally on the Alliance's south-eastern flank being undermined—not through military invasion but through algorithm-driven social media manipulation—serves as a stark reminder of national security vulnerabilities in the digital age. The implications extend far beyond Romania, highlighting the urgent need to integrate robust information security measures into NATO's strategic framework.

Many Colombians were surprised when the government announced in 2017 that their country was becoming a NATO “global partner”. In a polarised political atmosphere, where citizens are accustomed to news and debates about combatting armed rebels and criminal groups, this development was confusing. Was the country becoming a member of the Alliance? Were Colombian soldiers to be deployed in remote war theatres? Could NATO members support Colombia if the country went to war?

On December 3, 2021, the Washington Post published an article referring to unclassified US intelligence reports on massive Russian troop movements, suggesting that “the Kremlin is planning a multi-front offensive as soon as early next year involving up to 175,000 troops”. The article marked the beginning of a British and American campaign to disclose classified information on Russian President Vladimir Putin's plans.

The United Nations International Day of Persons with Disabilities is celebrated every year on December 3rd. This year, the international community is also celebrating the 75th anniversary of the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Geneva Conventions are cornerstones of international humanitarian law that came in the wake of World War II and the Holocaust, when hundreds of thousands of persons with disabilities were exterminated alongside Jewish people and other minorities. The Nuremberg tribunal found that the mass killing of persons with disabilities during World War II constituted a crime against humanity, and thus gave explicit recognition to persecution based on disability.

In his first press conference following the elections, the United Kingdom's new Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer stressed the UK's “unshakable” commitment to NATO and that his government's “first duty” must be security and defence. As part of this commitment, a significant focus should be placed on securing Britain's and other NATO Allies' digital supply chains against stepped up cyber attacks by threat actors determined to breach our critical national infrastructure.

As I approach the end of my tenure as NATO Secretary General, I look back at some of the important lessons of the past 10 years that I believe must continue to guide the Alliance in the future.

Modern, well-functioning, agile and responsive militaries rely on personnel with an eclectic range of skills and attributes. This, by definition, requires a diverse workforce. Militaries are historically predominantly male, but across NATO, Allied forces are looking to recruit and retain more women in their ranks. Women still only occupy an average of 9 to 16% of roles across NATO Allies, and shocking reporting in mainstream media of military rape cultures and rife sexual violence may detrimentally impact the future recruitment and retention of women in militaries.

Undersea infrastructure is vital in a global economy powered by data. 99% of the world's data is transmitted through a global network of subsea cables. An estimated USD 10 trillion in financial transactions alone traverses these vast cable networks each day. As well as data cables, critical undersea infrastructure also includes electricity connectors and pipelines supplying oil and gas. As great power tensions escalate, undersea infrastructure serving the Euro-Atlantic community has emerged as an attractive target for hybrid interference, meaning that the security of this infrastructure should be a NATO priority.

NATO is “brain dead.” NATO is “obsolete.” NATO is “a relic of the Cold War.” These are the familiar tropes espoused by NATO's critics who have become drowned out by the Russian onslaught in Ukraine. With Putin's brutal invasion, the march of authoritarianism has quickened its step. NATO, however, has responded with a demonstration of unity and resolve capable of redefining the future of the Alliance, if we can bring ourselves to admit an uncomfortable truth: the fight for democracy in the 21st century is an existential one and NATO is an indispensable party to the conflict.

At their February 2024 meeting, Allied Defence Ministers formally adopted NATO's Biotechnology and Human Enhancement Technologies Strategy. Current NATO staff driving the development and delivery of this Strategy outline one of its main features: the first-ever set of Principles of Responsible Use for Biotechnology and Human Enhancement technologies in defence and security.

In February 1988, I sat in a plain interrogation room in Portsmouth, England, under arrest. I had been warned that what I said may be used to prosecute me, and my answers were written down word-for-word by a naval policeman, then taken page-by-by page to be typed up for me to sign. I was asked detailed questions about my sex life and about whom I counted among my friends in the armed forces.

In an article previously published on NATO Review, I explained that the nature of modern warfare is changing at a rapid pace. Consequently, wars are no longer merely about kinetic operations. This means that it is not just physical warfare, but also non-military strategies and tactics that define modern-day conflicts and wars.

Against a backdrop of conflict and global security concerns, 2023 may prove to have also been a pivotal year for automated nuclear weapons systems. A year that began with chatbots and Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the subjects of major news stories - some with particularly concerning headlines - ended with members of the United States Congress introducing legislation to ban AI systems from nuclear weapons and US President Biden signing an Executive Order on the subject. The issue was even raised in discussions between the United States and China at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which met in San Francisco in November.

This year we are commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Czech Republic's accession to NATO, which marked a watershed moment on the path to ensuring our national security. Joining NATO gave not only Czechia but also all of Central and Eastern Europe the greatest guarantee of security in its entire history.

I asked the receptionist at a Lviv hotel I was staying in if she had any Sellotape I could borrow. I had an important package to deliver, and it was crucial for it to be well wrapped. The woman handed her stationery set to me and I perched on the edge of a chair in the hotel lobby to get on with my task. The package I was wrapping could not be sent by ordinary mail. I had to deliver it personally because its destination was in the world of the dead.

In early February 2022, as the drumbeat of war grew louder and louder, I sat glued to my phone, scrolling social media, and starting to build what would eventually become Saint Javelin. It had been several years since I'd worked as a journalist in Ukraine, but I couldn't focus on anything besides the impending invasion. As global leaders released waves of intelligence about Putin's intentions, my mind began to replay key moments that shaped my understanding of Russia's brutality against Ukraine.

Complacency is a lethal error in strategy making and warfare. As Russia has learned in Ukraine, overestimating your own capabilities and underestimating your enemy can lead to failure. NATO cannot take its own continued strategic success for granted.

During the horror of World War II, many Jewish families in Belgium were forced to hide their children in the hopes that they would avoid detection by the Gestapo and ultimately survive the war. In Belgium alone, more than 5000 children survived the genocide via disguise and concealment from the world. This is the story of Baroness Regina Sluszny: one of Belgium's remaining Holocaust survivors, and one of the Hidden Children.

NATO's ability to gather information and fuse intelligence from multiple sources over space, air, sea and land has just reached an important milestone. On Wednesday (10 February 2016), the NATO Secretary General welcomed the statement by Defense Ministers on the Initial Operating Capability for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. “We, the Allied Defense Ministers, have today declared the initial operational capability for NATO's Joint, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance initiative. This achievement follows up to the commitments that our nations made at the Chicago Summit and subsequently reaffirmed at the Wales Summit.” the Ministers declared, stressing that “JISR will maximize the resources we have at hand already, both in NATO and in individual Allies: enhanced inter-connectivity across our system, more training and expertise among our personnel, and lead to better procedures for information handling and sharing. All these improvements will ultimately contribute to a better informed and more watchful Alliance. JISR stands ready to support rapid decision making across several major lines of effort, including the Readiness Action Plan, our strategy on hybrid warfare, and our overall deterrence posture.” Providing the right information to decision-makers and action-takers is vital for all military operations. While surveillance and reconnaissance can answer the questions “what,” “when” and “where”, the combined information from various intelligence sources and disciplines provide the answers to “how” and “why.” When all of this is combined, you create Joint ISR. NATO JISR has just reached the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) that means promoting and enabling data sharing within the NATO Response force.

How policy planners can learn from the future to make better decisions now. “Don't fight the problem, decide it!” This quote, attributed to former United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall, pithily sums up the attitude of effective policy planning in times of turbulence. The temptation to “fight” problems comes from the expectation that all problems are solvable. Yet some problems are unsolvable, and the fight becomes a losing battle.

NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept defines climate change as a “crisis and a threat multiplier”, but what does that actually mean for NATO's ability to deter and defend? At the NATO Summit in Brussels in 2021, Allies agreed to put climate change at the top of NATO's agenda, endeavouring to become the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of this epochal phenomenon on security. The new Strategic Concept, which was agreed at the 2022 Madrid Summit, reaffirmed this commitment. Since then, NATO has produced several flagship reports on the topic, which show how the effects of climate change have profound impacts on everyday life. However, there is still a strong need to explore how climate change affects NATO operations across different domains.

The war in Ukraine has underscored the growing geopolitical interdependence between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. For one, China has helped Russia cushion Western economic and political pressure. Indeed, Beijing's image in Europe (which has been on a downward trajectory for years) has tanked as the perception of tacit support for Moscow's assault on the Euro-Atlantic security order and global norms has spread. Conversely, diplomatic, economic and military support from Indo-Pacific partners like Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea has helped to strengthen Ukraine's resilience and uphold global norms. More broadly, the war has triggered an intense debate in the United States about how to reconcile the need to assist Ukraine while maintaining focus on the threat that China poses in the Indo-Pacific. This debate continues to raise questions about the implications of U.S. prioritisation for transatlantic relations and European security.

NATO's multinational battlegroups need help transitioning verified technical interchangeability into national policies that allow them to operate, train, and maintain readiness from a common ammunition stockpile that is legally permitted and safe to use. In February and March of this year, the NATO Standardization Office coordinated with a team from the US Army War College (USAWC) to conduct a ground-level survey within three of NATO's eight multinational battlegroups. The team's most salient observation was this: battle group key leaders believe that national policies prevent ammunition exchange within their multinational formation. This perception may hinder a multinational unit's wartime interoperability, and certainly impedes operational efficiency in peacetime.

Amongst the many vital strategic and security priorities on the agenda at the NATO summit in Vilnius, it was refreshing to see important discussions about space security taking place. Space has long been an important domain for military operations and has been used actively by NATO for its own satellite communications (SATCOM) programme for almost two decades. However, it was not until 2019 that NATO Allies formally recognised space as an operational domain, opening the door to a greater focus on how space can play a pivotal role in our defence.

The dismal performance of Russia's conventional forces in the early days of the war in Ukraine risks convincing some in NATO that the future Russian threat to the Alliance can be deterred primarily via NATO's conventional superiority, and that enhancing deterrence of Russian nuclear use in a future conflict is therefore no longer a high priority. This is a dangerous fallacy. It fails to take into account the relevant lessons learned from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the fundamental change in the future security environment in which NATO will have to deter or defeat Russian aggression and escalation.

As the 2023 Invictus Games begin, my heart is filled with a myriad of emotions. The Games provide an opportunity for wounded, injured and sick service personnel and veterans to participate in international sporting competition, and also support broader programmes of rehabilitation and recovery. My journey to the Games has not only been about me, but also about representing the unbreakable spirit of my fellow soldiers who are unable to take part in this remarkable event. Let me take you back to the moment when my world came crashing down and I discovered the true meaning of resilience.

On 4 April 2023, Finland's Blue Cross Flag was hoisted at NATO Headquarters, marking the nation's entry into the Alliance. Finland's formal accession to NATO was the culmination of an 11-month membership path that was triggered following Russia's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. The overwhelming majority of Finns supported their nation's NATO membership, and many toasts were raised that day in early spring. Though joining the Alliance without Sweden – which was left to wait for the completion of its own accession process - put a slight damper on the festive occasion.

Russia's full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine is not the only challenge NATO has to grapple with today. The week preceding the NATO Summit in Vilnius marked the planet's hottest week in recorded history. Last summer's gruelling heat claimed 20,000 excess deaths in Western Europe alone, threatened critical military and civilian infrastructure and caused additional military deployments in response to immense forest fires across Europe.

The Heads of State and Government of NATO countries convened in Vilnius, Lithuania for a summit that took place on 11 and 12 July. This, unequivocally, was the most important meeting of the summer 2023. Due to a plethora of international issues, politics, and global security, this year's event became the epicenter and confluence of significant issues requiring Allied Leaders to take definitive action. These decisions will have impacts for years to come.

The issue of the appropriate level of defence spending for each NATO Ally is as old as NATO itself. It touches upon two core debates for the Allies. First, as NATO's mission is to ensure the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, defence spending supports the ability of Allies to preserve peace and to deter all threats, at all times.

This coming summer will mark the twentieth anniversary of the initiation of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan in August 2003, which ended in August 2021 as a result of the collapse of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the return to power of the Taliban. This endeavour, extraordinary in both ambition and scope, brought together the commitments and contributions of troops and other resources by nearly 50 NATO and non-NATO nations from around the world, with the goal of building a stable Afghanistan freed from use as a safe haven for terrorism.

NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirmed its commitment to NATO's founding principles and to its core mission of collective defence and security in a Euro-Atlantic zone definitively ‘not at peace'. It also reiterated its long-held view that cyberspace, the global domain of interconnected information technologies and data, is ‘contested at all times' by a range of state and non-state actors. Set against the backdrop of widespread competition in cyberspace between military and intelligence agencies, firms, criminals, hackers, hacktivists and assorted adventurers, this assertion is hard to deny.

In the face of the “pervasive instability and threat” described by NATO's Strategic Concept, Allies must do more to strengthen the resilience of our societies. We face a growth in the challenges we face together, illustrated by the UK's Integrated Review describing the world as “volatile and contested”. As our National Resilience Framework sets out, we need a whole-of-society approach to better prepare ourselves for instability - and communication is crucial in delivering this by informing, mobilising and preparing populations.

How do innovators get better at anticipating and preparing for problems in the future? Most innovation efforts focus on problems in the present — ones that are easy to identify and thus to justify investing in (e.g. how do we make an airplane fly higher, or faster, or with fewer carbon emissions?) But focusing on the present can leave us unprepared for problems that may come in the future. It is equally valuable for innovation efforts to look beyond the present and to prepare for disruptions yet to come.

The USS Gerald R. Ford – the US Navy's newest supercarrier, and the largest and most technologically advanced aircraft carrier in the world – recently crossed the Atlantic alongside warships from other NATO Allies. Aboard ship, two brothers mark the Ford's first deployment – and one brother's final flight.

The return of great power competition is reinvigorating the study of military alliances. In this article, Dr Pilster reviews three remarkable books from recent years: A. Wess Mitchell and Jakub J. Grygiel's “The Unquiet Frontier” (2017); Mira Rapp-Hooper's “Shields of the Republic” (2020); and Alexander Lanoszka's “Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century” (2022). The authors straddle academia and policy: Lanoszka is a political scientist with a specialisation in alliances; Grygiel, Mitchell, and Rapp-Hooper all served in the US State Department; and Mitchell was co-chair of the independent reflection group on NATO 2030. The common denominator among the three books is that they systematically analyse the benefits, costs, and challenges of the Western alliance system.

Today, the battle for hearts and minds is unfolding on the devices in the palms of our hands. The media environment operates with unfamiliar rules and without systems of checks and balances, and information proliferates at an extraordinary pace. How do governments and international organisations get ahead in this new war of narratives, and how do we secure the victory for truth?

I'd never served in the Armed Forces before. Hadn't even done compulsory military service. I'd always been a journalist – both before 2014, when I lived in Crimea, and after 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and I had to move to Kyiv. Then in 2022, on day two of Russia's full-scale invasion, I went and joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine.