Podcasts about Reconnaissance

Dans cet épisode de Yes We Care, Faustine Duriez reçoit Michaël Dandrieux, sociologue (docteur à la Sorbonne), co-fondateur d'Eranos, enseignant à Sciences Po et conseiller de grandes organisations (L'Oréal, Pernod Ricard, Chloé, Air France…). Son sujet : ce que les KPI ne captent pas — l'invisible qui fait (ou défait) une organisation : la confiance, l'imaginaire, le désir, la reconnaissance… et surtout l'espoir. On parle de transformations qui échouent, de culture d'entreprise (“the way we do things around here”), de ce qui se joue quand un leader part… et de pourquoi la matière humaine n'est pas un “soft sujet” mais le cœur de la stratégie. AU PROGRAMME

Bob Boeke was 16 years old when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Nearly two years later, he enlisted in the U.S. Army as part of a program to help get a college education and become an officer. But the program soon closed down. After basic training, Boeke was assigned to an intelligence and reconnaissance unit within the 86th Infantry Division.In this edition of Veterans Chronicles, Boeke tells us about intelligence and reconnaissance training, finding and removing German mines on the Normandy beaches, dealing with German mortar fire on the way to the front, and what he experienced after getting to the front lines.Boeke also shares how he and other recon soldiers scouted out whether the Germans had evacuated the villages they came to or whether they had retreated, how he got across the Rhine, and horrors he witnessed at Dachau. You'll also find out how Boeke ended up in the Pacific at the end of the war.Finally, we'll learn how the 75th anniversary of D-Day helped to reunite Boeke with the girlfriend he had to leave in the 1940's and how they tied the knot all these years later.

The surge is slowing. After weeks of round-the-clock operations with four hundred investigators, sources say the Nancy Guthrie case may transition to a smaller, sustainable task force. The family has been briefed on the change. And the questions that remain unanswered are significant.The DNA recovered at the scene hit no match in CODIS. No vehicle has been connected to the crime. Two individuals were detained and released with no established connection. The ransom notes contained details suggesting inside knowledge—but no collection mechanism was ever viable. Command coordination between Sheriff Chris Nanos and the FBI has faced scrutiny throughout.Former FBI hostage negotiator Rich Frankel framed the transition directly: investigators must eventually move to a sustainable level of manpower. The case isn't closed. But the operational posture is changing.Robin Dreeke ran the FBI's Counterintelligence Behavioral Analysis Program for years. He joins Hidden Killers to break down what this transition actually means—not the public messaging, but the institutional reality. What gets prioritized when resources contract? What leverage points remain? And what does the incoming task force lead need to protect to keep this case solvable?The evidence suggests contradictions that may point to multiple actors. Reconnaissance without a coherent plan. Forensic discipline at the door but a glove dropped miles away. Someone planned this. Someone executed it. And someone in the perpetrator's life is watching them unravel under the pressure of a two-hundred-thousand-dollar reward and genetic genealogy closing in.Robin explains the psychology of the break—and who historically becomes the person who talks.Join Our SubStack For AD-FREE ADVANCE EPISODES & EXTRAS!: https://hiddenkillers.substack.com/Want to comment and watch this podcast as a video? Check out our YouTube Channel. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC8-vxmbhTxxG10sO1izODJg?sub_confirmation=1Instagram https://www.instagram.com/hiddenkillerspod/Facebook https://www.facebook.com/hiddenkillerspod/Tik-Tok https://www.tiktok.com/@hiddenkillerspodX Twitter https://x.com/TrueCrimePodThis publication contains commentary and opinion based on publicly available information. All individuals are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. Nothing published here should be taken as a statement of fact, health or legal advice.#NancyGuthrie #SavannahGuthrie #TaskForce #RobinDreeke #ChrisNanos #FBIInvestigation #TucsonKidnapping #GeneticGenealogy #TrueCrime #HiddenKillers

La Government Teachers Union mobilisée pour l'égalité salariale et la reconnaissance du diplôme B.Ed by TOPFM MAURITIUS

durée : 00:28:25 - Les Midis de Culture - par : Marie Sorbier - Icône de la pop française, Lio fête ses quarante-cinq ans de carrière avec un disque écrit par la nouvelle génération d'autrices, sur mesure pour une femme qui s'aime, vieillit sereinement et n'a besoin de personne pour être heureuse. - réalisation : Laurence Malonda - invités : Lio Chanteuse

Chaque soir dans un podcast inédit, un ou une membre de l'équipe vous dévoile l'un des cas les plus attendus de l'émission du lendemain ! Tous les jours, retrouvez en podcast les meilleurs moments de l'émission "Ça peut vous arriver", sur RTL.fr et sur toutes vos plateformes préférées.Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

  Jeremy Zakis describes Dallas, an eleven-year-old dog, patrolling to protect his property from aggressive cockatoos that previously dismantled a neighbor's roof, with a gang of up to seven birds conducting reconnaissance from a nearby pine tree while targeting solar panels. 2

Les actions de grâces sont un aspect important de la prière, parce qu'elles sont agréables à Dieu, comme le sont la louange et l'adoration. C'est quelque chose que Dieu aime, quelque chose qui réchauffe son cœur. Chaque fois que nous lui exprimons notre gratitude, notre intimité avec lui grandit – et notre vie de prière s'en trouve améliorée. Par ailleurs, une attitude reconnaissante ouvre la porte aux bénédictions de Dieu. Si nous ne sommes pas reconnaissants pour ce que nous avons, pourquoi Dieu nous donnerait-il ce qui ne ferait que susciter davantage de murmures et de récriminations? Mais s'il voit que nous apprécions et sommes sincèrement reconnaissants pour tout ce qu'il nous donne – les grandes choses comme les petites – il a envie de nous bénir encore plus. Père, merci parce que je peux avoir une relation personnelle avec toi. Je prie que mes actions de grâces te soient agréables. Je t'aime et te suis infiniment reconnaissant pour tout ce que tu m'as donné, les grandes choses comme les petites. — Êtes-vous prêt à aller plus loin ?

A retired Marine who served three tours in Vietnam. An investigative journalist racing against time. Seventy-six recording sessions and counting. In this episode, we bring you the story behind one granddaughter's loving determination to capture an aging warrior's memories.

Le syndicat CGT Kalhyge Longvic a manifesté ce vendredi 20 février midi, comme annoncé en début de semaine. Une soixantaine de salariés de cette blanchisserie étaient mobilisés devant l'entreprise boulevard Gustave Eiffel de 11h à 13h.À notre micro, Samia (19 ans d'ancienneté), Ali (13 ans) et Mohammed (7 ans) ont expliqué les revendications portées. Ils affirment demander « des mesures légitimes par rapport au travail fourni ». Des représentants de l'entreprise étaient sur place pour veiller au bon déroulé de la manifestation. Sans pour autant vouloir s'exprimer sur le sujet. Ils invitent à se rediriger vers le siège parisien.Crédit photo : K6FM

durée : 00:03:20 - Les Archives départementales du Puy-de-Dôme dépoussièrent les photos de classes du Lycée Blaise Pascal de Clermont-Ferrand - Des photos du lycée Blaise Pascal de Clermont-Ferrand datant de 1930 à 1960, ont été dépoussiérées par les Archives départementales du Puy-de-Dôme. Un atelier de reconnaissance photographique, ouvert au grand public, s'est déroulé ce mardi après-midi. Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

Ce mercredi 18 février, Niagalé Bagayoko, politologue et enseignante à Sciences Po, était l'invitée d'Annalisa Cappellini dans Le monde qui bouge - L'Interview, de l'émission Good Morning Business, présentée par Laure Closier. Elles ont discuté du Somaliland, une république autoproclamée qui a fait sécession de la Somalie en 1991, ainsi que des réactions à sa reconnaissance par Israël. Retrouvez l'émission du lundi au vendredi et réécoutez la en podcast.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

Vous connaissez ce moment où nos réactions débordent ? Ce moment où les conflits se répètent dans nos familles… Avec des relations qui épuisent sans qu'on comprenne vraiment pourquoi…Je suis sûre que vous voyez…Ce que l'on croit être des problèmes de couple, de parentalité ou de comportements sont souvent l'expression de quelque chose de bien plus ancien. Des traumas. Des liens d'attachement fragilisés. Des stratégies de survie mises en place très tôt et qui continuent de gouverner nos vies d'adultes.Pour en parler, j'ai reçu Melissa Vidal, psychologue spécialisée en psychologie de la santé. Avec elle, j'ai voulu comprendre comment l'attachement se construit, comment il s'active dans les moments de crise, et comment il influence notre manière d'aimer, de nous disputer, de dormir, d'élever nos enfants.Nous avons aussi élargi le regard. Sortir de l'individu pour regarder le système. Le couple, la famille, les rôles que l'on endosse parfois au détriment de soi. La thérapie systémique permet de lire autrement les symptômes, non pas comme des défaillances personnelles, mais comme des signaux relationnels.Un échange exigeant, éclairant, qui remet du sens là où il n'y avait que de la culpabilité.Je sais que cet épisode peut transformer votre façon de voir vos relations. C'est un bonbon à ne pas négliger et à partager.La théorie de l'attachement a besoin de circuler le plus possible. Je vous souhaite une très belle écouteLe Programme :

durée : 00:02:52 - Bientôt chez vous - Aux États-Unis, la police de l'immigration (ICE) s'appuie sur la reconnaissance faciale, la géolocalisation et des logiciels très intrusifs pour identifier migrants et manifestants, suscitant de vives inquiétudes jusque chez les citoyens américains. Ces pratiques, dénoncées par des ONG et des élus, illustrent l'extension d'outils de surveillance. Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

Vous avez raté l'épisode d'hier ? Vous n'avez pas le temps d'écouter la version intégrale ? Pas d'inquiétude, Happy Work LE RÉSUMÉ est là !!!En moins de 2 minutes, l'épisode d'hier est résumé !!!!NOUVEAU : retrouvez moi sur WhatsApp sur la chaîne Happy Work... pas de spam, c'est gratuit et il n'y a que du feelgood !!! : https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VbBSSbM6BIEm0yskHH2gEt pour retrouver tous mes contenus, tests, articles, vidéos : cliquez iciDÉCOUVREZ MON AUTRE PODCAST, HAPPY MOI – Développement personnel & bien-être au quotidien: bio.to/oYwOeESoutenez ce podcast http://supporter.acast.com/happy-work. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Vous faites bien votre travail, même quand personne ne vous applaudit. Et si vous aviez le droit d'en être fier quand même ? Dans cet épisode de Happy Work, je parle d'un sujet simple mais essentiel : la fierté au travail. Nous avons souvent appris à associer la fierté à la reconnaissance extérieure : les compliments, les promotions, les applaudissements. Pourtant, une grande partie du travail quotidien est silencieuse, régulière, invisible. Quand la fierté dépend uniquement de ce qui est reconnu ou applaudi, elle devient fragile. Nous doutons, nous minimisons ce que nous faisons et nous attendons des signes qui arrivent peu.Dans cet épisode, je vous propose une autre approche : reconnaître votre engagement, votre constance et votre cohérence, même sans validation extérieure, pour rester engagé sans vous épuiser.NOUVEAU : retrouvez moi sur WhatsApp sur la chaîne Happy Work... pas de spam, c'est gratuit et il n'y a que du feelgood !!! : https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VbBSSbM6BIEm0yskHH2gEt pour retrouver tous mes contenus, tests, articles, vidéos : www.gchatelain.comDÉCOUVREZ MON AUTRE PODCAST, HAPPY MOI, LE PODCAST POUR PRENDRE SOIN DE VOUS, VRAIMENT: lnk.to/sT70cYfierté au travail reconnaissance engagement professionnel travail invisible bien-être au travail charge émotionnelle motivation durable équilibre professionnel Happy Work00:00 Introduction – Le droit d'être fier sans applaudissements 00:25 Pourquoi nous associons fierté et reconnaissance 01:13 Le travail invisible et rarement applaudi 01:47 La fierté silencieuse comme socle personnel 02:26 Ce que cela change sur la motivation et la charge émotionnelle 03:11 Rester engagé sans attendre de validation extérieure 03:47 Ce qu'il faut retenir de cet épisode / citationSoutenez ce podcast http://supporter.acast.com/happy-work. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Vous avez raté l'épisode d'hier ? Vous n'avez pas le temps d'écouter la version intégrale ? Pas d'inquiétude, Happy Work LE RÉSUMÉ est là !!!En moins de 2 minutes, l'épisode d'hier est résumé !!!!NOUVEAU : retrouvez moi sur WhatsApp sur la chaîne Happy Work... pas de spam, c'est gratuit et il n'y a que du feelgood !!! : https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VbBSSbM6BIEm0yskHH2gEt pour retrouver tous mes contenus, tests, articles, vidéos : cliquez iciDÉCOUVREZ MON AUTRE PODCAST, HAPPY MOI – Développement personnel & bien-être au quotidien: bio.to/oYwOeESoutenez ce podcast http://supporter.acast.com/happy-work. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

durée : 00:02:41 - L'info d'ici, ICI Pays d'Auvergne - Caroline Grandjean, directrice de l'école de Moussages dans le Cantal, a mis fin à ses jours le 1er septembre dernier. De décembre 2023 à août 2024, l'enseignante avait reçu des menaces de mort et des insultes à caractère homophobe. Le corbeau n'a jamais été interpellé. Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

Il y a un moment où attendre d'être reconnu au travail commence à coûter plus d'énergie que cela n'en apporte. Dans cet épisode de Happy Work, je reviens sur un moment précis de mon parcours professionnel, celui où j'ai compris que j'attendais trop du regard des autres pour continuer à avancer sereinement. Attendre que l'on nous voie, que l'on remarque nos efforts, que l'on reconnaisse notre engagement est profondément humain. Mais lorsque cette attente devient centrale, elle peut transformer le travail en source de fatigue silencieuse. À travers une réflexion personnelle, cet épisode explore ce que cette dépendance au regard extérieur produit sur l'énergie, la charge mentale et le rapport au travail. Cesser d'attendre la reconnaissance comme condition pour avancer ne signifie pas renoncer à s'investir, mais déplacer son point d'appui pour rester engagé sans s'épuiser.NOUVEAU : retrouvez moi sur WhatsApp sur la chaîne Happy Work... pas de spam, c'est gratuit et il n'y a que du feelgood !!! : https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VbBSSbM6BIEm0yskHH2gEt pour retrouver tous mes contenus, tests, articles, vidéos : www.gchatelain.comDÉCOUVREZ MON AUTRE PODCAST, HAPPY MOI, LE PODCAST POUR PRENDRE SOIN DE VOUS, VRAIMENT: lnk.to/sT70cYreconnaissance au travail fatigue émotionnelle charge mentale énergie au travail sens du travail équilibre émotionnel engagement professionnel bien-être au travail Happy Work00:00 Introduction – Le moment où j'ai compris que j'attendais trop 00:46 Pourquoi attendre la reconnaissance est humain 01:59 Quand l'attente devient une dépendance 02:40 La fatigue silencieuse de l'attente permanente 03:42 Changer de point d'appui sans se désengager 04:32 Ce que cela change sur l'énergie et la charge mentale 05:59 Ce qu'il faut retenir de cet épisode / citationSoutenez ce podcast http://supporter.acast.com/happy-work. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Dans cet épisode du podcast de la JLMB, l'avocat Patrick Henry aborde le sujet suivant : Reconnaissance et contestation de paternité. Ce sujet est traité dans les numéros 05/2026 de la JLMB. Suivez ce lien pour consulter la version numérique : https://bit.ly/3kI5YFPHébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Vous avez raté l'épisode d'hier ? Vous n'avez pas le temps d'écouter la version intégrale ? Pas d'inquiétude, Happy Work LE RÉSUMÉ est là !!!En moins de 2 minutes, l'épisode d'hier est résumé !!!!NOUVEAU : retrouvez moi sur WhatsApp sur la chaîne Happy Work... pas de spam, c'est gratuit et il n'y a que du feelgood !!! : https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VbBSSbM6BIEm0yskHH2gEt pour retrouver tous mes contenus, tests, articles, vidéos : cliquez iciDÉCOUVREZ MON AUTRE PODCAST, HAPPY MOI – Développement personnel & bien-être au quotidien: bio.to/oYwOeESoutenez ce podcast http://supporter.acast.com/happy-work. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

durée : 00:03:20 - L'info d'ici, ICI Pays d'Auvergne - Des photos du lycée Blaise Pascal de Clermont-Ferrand datant de 1930 à 1960, ont été dépoussiérées par les Archives départementales du Puy-de-Dôme. Un atelier de reconnaissance photographique, ouvert au grand public, s'est déroulé ce mardi après-midi. Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

Quand la reconnaissance devient floue, intermittente ou silencieuse, le travail peut devenir émotionnellement épuisant sans que l'on sache vraiment pourquoi. Dans cet épisode de Happy Work, nous partons d'un chiffre fort issu d'un sondage mené auprès de plus de 2 300 personnes : 74 % des salariés ne se sentent pas pleinement reconnus. Derrière ce chiffre, il n'y a pas seulement une question de motivation, mais un besoin humain fondamental : se sentir vu, compris et reconnu pour ce que nous faisons vraiment. Reconnaissance intermittente, silence managérial, fatigue émotionnelle, pression invisible : cet épisode met des mots sur un malaise diffus que beaucoup vivent sans oser le formuler. Un épisode pour comprendre, normaliser, et sortir de la culpabilité silencieuse liée au manque de reconnaissance au travail.NOUVEAU : retrouvez moi sur WhatsApp sur la chaîne Happy Work... pas de spam, c'est gratuit et il n'y a que du feelgood !!! : https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VbBSSbM6BIEm0yskHH2gEt pour retrouver tous mes contenus, tests, articles, vidéos : www.gchatelain.comDÉCOUVREZ MON AUTRE PODCAST, HAPPY MOI, LE PODCAST POUR PRENDRE SOIN DE VOUS, VRAIMENT: lnk.to/sT70cYbien-être au travailreconnaissance au travailfatigue émotionnellecharge mentalemotivation professionnellesens du travailmanagement humainengagement salariéHappy Work00:00 Introduction – La fatigue de donner sans être sûr que cela compte00:24 La reconnaissance n'est pas binaire01:19 La zone grise du « parfois »02:36 La reconnaissance intermittente comme fatigue émotionnelle03:46 Invisibilité, silence et désengagement progressif04:54 Même reconnus, parfois épuisés06:50 Ce qu'il faut retenir de cet épisode / citationSoutenez ce podcast http://supporter.acast.com/happy-work. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

durée : 00:11:19 - Le Fil de l'histoire - par : Stéphanie Duncan - Parallèlement au développement des abattoirs et des zoos, se développe, à la fin du XIXe siècle, une sensibilité à la cause animale. - invités : Eric BARATAY - Éric Baratay : Professeur d'histoire contemporaine à l'université Lyon 3, spécialiste de l'histoire des animaux - réalisé par : Claire DESTACAMP Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

durée : 00:21:20 - Le monde d'Elodie - par : Elodie SUIGO - Tous les jours, une personnalité s'invite dans le monde d'Élodie Suigo. Vendredi 30 janvier 2026, l'auteur, compositeur et interprète Bénabar. Il sort vendredi son nouvel album, "Le soleil des absents". Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

✨ Selon une étude de l'Université de Warwick, les salariés qui se sentent reconnus sont 12% plus productifs. Incroyable, n'est-ce pas ? Mais pourquoi la reconnaissance est-elle si puissante ?

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durée : 00:25:11 - David Krakauer, clarinettiste (4/5) - par : Judith Chaine - Le chemin de David Krakauer vers le klezmer s'est construit peu à peu, au fil d'émotions, de doutes et de rencontres heureuses. Une aventure musicale, mais surtout une quête intérieure, intime et fidèle à lui-même. - réalisé par : Pierre Willer Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

Send us a textWhat does biblical courage look like when obedience carries real risk?In Joshua 2:1–7, we're introduced to Rahab, an unlikely figure whose fear of the Lord led her to decisive action. As Israel stands on the edge of the Promised Land, God uses a woman with a complicated past to protect the spies and advance His redemptive plan.In today's episode, we explore what this passage teaches men about courage, faith, and obedience when no one is watching. We'll talk about taking responsibility, acting wisely under pressure, and trusting God even when the path forward feels uncertain.This is a call for men to live with conviction, to choose faith over fear, and to remember that God often works through unexpected people who are willing to act.Learn more about The Pursuit of Manliness: https://www.thepursuitofmanliness.com/ Join The Herd:  https://www.thepursuitofmanliness.com/join-the-herd Build your own local Tribe with Tribe Builder: https://www.thepursuitofmanliness.com/gear/p/tribe-builderRegister for our 2026 Fall Men's Retreat: https://www.thepursuitofmanliness.com/gear/p/2026-mens-retreatSupport the show

The secretive National Reconnaissance Office has announced a new top official. William Adkins was appointed principal deputy director of the NRO on Monday. Adkins previously served as professional staff on the House Appropriations Committee. He's also a veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency and had been detailed to the NRO to manage technology development projects in the late 1990's. See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Dans ce troisième épisode de Cheminements de notre série sur les patients experts, on s'interroge sur la reconnaissance des patients engagés. Que recouvrent les termes « pair-aidant », « patient expert », « patient partenaire », « usager » ? Quels statuts, quelles protections, quelles rémunérations ? Avec mes invités, nous mettons en lumière les réalités contrastées de l'engagement : entre solitude, précarité et espoirs de transformation. Eric-Jean Salat partage un parcours bouleversant, du VIH à l'expertise patient. Célia Cardoso évoque son action pour un véritable partenariat dans la recherche. Ensemble, ils interrogent les zones grises d'un engagement encore mal reconnu.Dans cet épisode, on aborde :Le parcours d'Eric-Jean : maladie, exclusion, résilience, et engagement militant.L'expertise patient : savoir situé, savoir reconnu ?Les limites actuelles : absence de cadre juridique clair, manque de financement, précarité.Le partenariat patient dans la recherche, vu par Célia Cardoso.Les tensions entre reconnaissance symbolique et reconnaissance effective.L'évolution nécessaire vers un statut professionnel pour les patients engagés.Mes invités : Eric-Jean Salat, patient-expert et patient-formateur. Son parcours, marqué par le VIH, un cancer dermatologique et des années d'engagement, dit avec force ce qu'on gagne et ce qu'on perd quand l'expertise d'usage n'a pas de cadre clair.Et Célia Cardoso, Coordinatrice du Partenariat Patient en Recherche à l'Institut Imagine et présidente fondatrice de l'Association Tintamarre. Cette série d'épisodes est toujours parrainée par Impact Tank et je remercie sincèrement l'équipe pour sa confiance !Dans Cheminements, des femmes du quotidien, vos voisines, vos collègues, vos sœurs, partagent leurs parcours de santé mentale, physique ou sociale, entre luttes, victoires et transformations, pour mettre en lumière des sujets trop souvent passés sous silence.

Send us a textPeaches goes straight at a viral hype video that sells Special Reconnaissance with bad math, bad facts, and Hollywood fluff. No hate on SR—those dudes do real work—but saying “1 Special Reconnaissance operator for every 100 SEALs,” claiming JTAC authority, and tossing around cyber buzzwords isn't transparency, it's misinformation. This episode breaks down what Special Reconnaissance actually does, what they don't, why recruiting myths stick around, and how AI-generated hype is making things worse.⏱️ Timestamps: 00:00 Ones Ready intro and why this matters 02:05 Why recruiting myths won't die 04:35 The viral SR video that crossed the line 07:45 “1% elite” math doesn't work 11:35 SR vs SEALs—numbers ≠ difficulty 14:10 Who can actually call airstrikes 16:20 Cyber buzzwords vs real missions 18:45 Why accuracy matters to candidates 21:10 How to ask better questions 23:30 Truth over hype—every time

durée : 00:28:47 - Une histoire particulière - par : Maylis Besserie - Le 12 janvier 1978, à 64 ans, Marcel Bascoulard est assassiné, étranglé dans sa cabine de camion désaffectée. Les berruyers choqués par la nouvelle accourent en masse à son enterrement. Il s'ensuit un soudain engouement pour son œuvre. - réalisation : Yvon Croizier

durée : 00:28:47 - Une histoire particulière - par : Maylis Besserie - Le 12 janvier 1978, à 64 ans, Marcel Bascoulard est assassiné, étranglé dans sa cabine de camion désaffectée. Les berruyers choqués par la nouvelle accourent en masse à son enterrement. Il s'ensuit un soudain engouement pour son œuvre. - réalisation : Yvon Croizier

Pierre Chasseray, le délégué général de "40 millions d'automobilistes", a testé de conduire sous l'emprise de protoxyde d'azote dans le cadre d'une étude, pour des résultats "cataclysmiques".Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Coup de théâtre dans la Corne de l'Afrique. Pour la première fois, l'État sécessionniste du Somaliland est reconnu officiellement par un autre État, en l'occurrence, Israël. Pour le président de la République fédérale de Somalie Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, c'est un coup dur, car la nouvelle tombe juste après les élections locales qu'il a réussi à organiser, malgré la pression croissante des islamistes shebab. L'initiative d'Israël suscite beaucoup de réactions négatives. Mais va-t-elle rester isolée ? Matt Bryden est conseiller stratégique au centre de recherches Sahan Research. En ligne de Nairobi, il répond à Christophe Boisbouvier. RFI : pourquoi les shebabs ont-ils réussi à regagner le terrain perdu depuis trois ans ? Matt Bryden : Il y a trois ans, l'offensive contre les Shebabs était menée par les milices de clans qui voulaient se libérer d'Al-Shabab, et ils ont reçu un appui du gouvernement fédéral ainsi que des Américains. Mais les milices de clans sont capables de se battre seulement dans le territoire de leur clan. Donc, dès qu'ils avaient libéré leur propre territoire, ils ne pouvaient pas avancer plus loin. Et donc l'offensive, c'était vraiment une collection de petites offensives, des milices de clans, mais ce n'était pas une opération coordonnée cohérente. Et aujourd'hui, est-ce que ces milices claniques se sont alliées avec les Shebabs contre le gouvernement ? Non, la plupart sont toujours contre les shebabs, surtout dans la région, là où ils se sont battus. Mais ils ne sont pas forcément alliés avec le gouvernement non plus. Et ça, c'est un autre grand problème pour le gouvernement fédéral, c'est que le gouvernement se bat pas simplement contre les Shebabs, mais aussi contre certaines des provinces, les régions de la Somalie qui eux-mêmes se battent contre Al-Shabab. Donc le gouvernement Mogadiscio ne contrôle à la limite que 15 % du territoire de la Somalie. Et ça, c'est généreux. Mais tout de même, ces premières élections sans attentats, est-ce que ce n'est pas un succès pour le président Hassan Mahamoud ? Tout à fait. Il y avait du monde dans certains centres ou des lieux de vote, ça c'est sûr. Mais la Somalie est un pays de clans et donc les clans qui soutiennent le gouvernement, leurs membres votent. Mais d'autres clans, et donc les clans qui soutiennent l'opposition, ne se sont pas présentés pour voter. Donc, l'élection risque d'approfondir les divisions entre les clans et les régions de la Somalie. Ceux qui soutiennent le gouvernement, qui sont minoritaires actuellement, et les autres, les clans et les régions qui s'y opposent. Le président somalien Hassan Sheikh Mohammed était rayonnant jeudi lors de ces élections. Mais le lendemain, il a appris une très mauvaise nouvelle. Pour la première fois, l'État sécessionniste du Somaliland a été reconnu officiellement par un autre État, en l'occurrence Israël. Est-ce que c'est une surprise pour vous ? Pour la Somalie, sûrement. C'est une surprise qui n'est pas du tout bienvenue. D'abord parce que le Somaliland, maintenant, risque de recevoir non seulement la reconnaissance d'Israël, mais d'autres pays derrière. Parce que c'est sûr que ce qu'Israël a fait n'est pas une initiative isolée, mais ça a été coordonné avec d'autres États en Afrique et aussi quelques pays arabes, et probablement les États-Unis aussi. Vous dites que d'autres pays pourraient suivre, mais il y a deux ans, l'Éthiopie avait failli reconnaître l'indépendance du Somaliland. Finalement, elle y avait renoncé sous la pression de la Somalie et de la Turquie. Oui, tout à fait. Mais l'initiative de l'Éthiopie n'était pas coordonnée avec d'autres États et ça a été une déclaration sans la reconnaissance. Maintenant, l'Israël a officiellement reconnu le Somaliland. Et d'après ce que j'entends des diplomates dans la région, ça fait des mois, peut-être plus qu'un an, qu'Israël et d'autres pays ont coordonné cette décision pour qu'Israël ne soit pas seul et qu'il y ait d'autres pays derrière, dans les semaines et les mois à venir pour reconnaître le Somaliland. Les Israéliens laissent entendre que cette reconnaissance du Somaliland est dans l'esprit des accords d'Abraham, par lesquels Israël a normalisé ses relations avec notamment les Émirats arabes unis et le Maroc. Voulez-vous dire que les Américains sont peut-être derrière ? Oui tout à fait. Les Américains, surtout depuis l'élection du président Trump. Ils ont signalé qu'ils sont très frustrés avec la situation en Somalie, qu'ils ont dépensé des milliards de dollars pour la sécurité de ce pays et qu'en fait la situation est pire qu'avant. Donc, les Américains commencent à travailler directement avec les régions de Dublin et de Puntland pour se battre contre Al-Shabab et aussi l'État islamique, qui était très actif dans la région nord-est du Puntland. Et les relations avec le Somaliland sont en croissance. Le général Anderson d'Africom était là il y a quelques mois. Donc, je crois que c'est assez clair que les Américains voient le Somaliland comme un partenaire potentiel pour sécuriser les routes maritimes dans le golfe d'Aden et la mer Rouge, aussi bien que se battre contre les mouvements extrémistes dans la Corne de l'Afrique.

✨ Selon une étude de l'Université de Warwick, les salariés qui se sentent reconnus sont 12% plus productifs. Incroyable, n'est-ce pas ? Mais pourquoi la reconnaissance est-elle si puissante ?

The SR-71 was used to conduct reconnaissance missions over hostile territory, providing high-quality photographic and electronic intelligence until its retirement in ...

Bienvenue sur Sensées, le format audio de ma newsletter hebdomadaire. Chaque semaine, retrouvez des conseils de leadership féminin, des expériences vécues et toute l'énergie dont vous avez besoin pour réussir avec confiance et sérénité. Cette semaine, je vous révèle mon cadeau de Noël, qui concerne les deux compétences clés du leadership pour les femmes.Dans cet épisode de Sensées, j'ai envie de vous parler de ce que j'ai réussi à faire dans une période morose… et surtout des compétences qui m'ont permis de le faire. Ces 4 dernières semaines, j'ai négocié et signé cinq conférences pour les 3 prochains mois et j'ai décroché 2 nouveaux clients. Autour de moi, beaucoup pensent que “c'est impossible en ce moment”. Et pourtant, les résultats sont là.S'il y a bien deux compétences clés du leadership que je maîtrise aujourd'hui, ce sont :savoir vendre la valeur de mon travail (ce qui permet notamment de gagner en visibilité et en reconnaissance)prendre la parole avec confiance (en public, en réunion, en individuel, etc.)Je ne suis pas née avec ces compétences. Je les ai développées dans l'action au fil des années parce que j'étais déterminée à prendre ma place, à gagner de l'argent et à m'épanouir dans mes fonctions. Parce que je crois profondément que donner du pouvoir aux femmes, c'est rendre le monde meilleur (et qu'en ce moment il a plus que besoin de notre aide), j'ai crée depuis 2023 deux formations d'excellence déjà approuvées par des centaines de leaders.✨ Savoir vendre sa valeur professionnelle (cliquez ici)✨ Réussir ses prises de parole (cliquez ici)Pour la première fois depuis leur création - et pour la première fois chez Coachappy - nous faisons une offre exceptionnelle dans le cadre

durée : 00:06:15 - La tech la première - Une youtubeuse, Amy Plant, démontre comment, avec des lunettes connectées et des outils en ligne, il est possible d'identifier des inconnus dans le métro. Cette expérience soulève des questions sur la reconnaissance faciale et ses implications. Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

In this episode, we dive into some thought-provoking topics that could reshape our understanding of the universe. A groundbreaking study introduces the immersion theory, suggesting that Earth-like planets may be far more common than previously believed, thanks to the explosive influence of nearby supernovae. We also explore the Eschtachian hypothesis, which proposes that our first contact with extraterrestrial life might come in the form of a powerful signal from a civilization in distress. Additionally, we highlight an exciting week of record space launches, including China's Long March 12A rocket and South Korea's Hanbit Nano. We celebrate a significant milestone for NASA's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, which has captured its 100,000th image, and we wrap up with the announcement of NASA's Orbit Challenge, inviting college students to innovate for future space exploration.### Timestamps & Stories01:05 – **Story 1: Immersion Theory and Earth-like Planets****Key Facts**- A new study suggests rocky planets may be more common due to supernova explosions.- Estimates indicate that 10-50% of sun-like stars could host planetary systems formed under these conditions.03:20 – **Story 2: The Eschtachian Hypothesis****Key Facts**- Proposed by David Kipping, this theory posits that first contact with aliens may come from a civilization in its final phase.- The idea suggests we may receive a powerful signal as a last testament rather than a friendly communication.05:45 – **Story 3: Record-Breaking Week for Space Launches****Key Facts**- Multiple agencies, including SpaceX and China's space program, are set to launch various missions.- Notable launches include the Ariane 6 for Galileo satellites and Blue Origin's crewed flight.08:00 – **Story 4: Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter Milestone****Key Facts**- NASA's MRO has captured its 100,000th image, chosen by a high school student through the HiWish program.- The landmark photo features stunning mesas and dunes in Syrtis Major.10:15 – **Story 5: NASA's Orbit Challenge for Students****Key Facts**- This new competition invites college students to develop solutions for Earth and deep space exploration.- With a prize pool of up to $380,000, registration is open until February 9, 2026.### Sources & Further Reading1. Science Advances2. NASA3. SpaceX4. European Space Agency5. JAXA### Follow & ContactX/Twitter: @AstroDailyPodInstagram: @astrodailypodEmail: hello@astronomydaily.ioWebsite: astronomydaily.ioClear skies and see you tomorrow!

This is the 2nd part of the story of Miles, a British National Service conscript during his military service in the late 1950s. I'd like to give special thanks for the Norfolk Tank Museum for highlighting Miles' story and one of his relatives for putting me in contact with him. Throughout the episode, our Miles shares captivating anecdotes and the thrill of being part of a light armoured reconnaissance regiment. He vividly recounts the challenges of operating various armoured vehicles, including the Saladin and Saracen, and the responsibilities that came with being on the front lines of military operations. One of the most intriguing aspects of his service was the border patrols, where he and his comrades would venture into the woods, often encountering their East German counterparts. The tension of those moments, coupled with the knowledge that they were living in a semi-war footing, adds a layer of gravity to his experiences. ⁠Help me preserve Cold War history. ⁠⁠ You'll become part of our community, get ad-free episodes, and get a sought-after CWC coaster as a thank you and you'll bask in the warm glow of knowing you are helping to preserve Cold War history. Just go to ⁠⁠⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/⁠⁠⁠ If a monthly contribution is not your cup of tea, We also welcome one-off donations via the same link. Episode Extras ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/episode434/ Find the ideal gift for the Cold War enthusiast in your life! Just go to ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/store/⁠ CONTINUE  THE COLD WAR CONVERSATION Follow us on BlueSky ⁠https://bsky.app/profile/coldwarpod.bsky.social⁠ Follow us on Threads ⁠https://www.threads.net/@coldwarconversations⁠ Follow us on Twitter/X ⁠https://twitter.com/ColdWarPod⁠ Facebook ⁠https://www.facebook.com/groups/coldwarpod/⁠ Instagram ⁠https://www.instagram.com/coldwarconversations/⁠ Youtube ⁠https://youtube.com/@ColdWarConversations Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Episode Synopsis:Are the effects of frequency relegated merely to AM/FM adjustments, or does understanding vibrational energy go beyond the electromagnetic spectrum and into the very essence of life itself?We talk about this and much more, including:Why is frequency a much broader topic than most people think?Is there a “right” or “wrong” way to tune music?What are some ways that frequency is weaponized against us?How has the occult influenced the music industry?Why is it important to have a biblical understanding of music and frequency?Original Air DateDecember 10th, 2025Special GuestKenny Seay from The Rock with Kenny SeayShow HostsJason Spears & Christopher DeanOur PatreonConsider joining our Patreon Squad and becoming a Tier Operator to help support the show and get access to exclusive content like:Links and ResourcesStudio NotesA monthly Zoom call with Jason and Christopher And More…ORP ApparelMerch StoreConnect With UsLetsTalk@ORPpodcast.comFacebookInstagram

The Evolution of Drone Warfare in Ukraine — John Batchelor, Bill Roggio, John Hardie — Roggio examines drone warfare's significant but sometimes exaggerated role in the Ukraine conflict, tracing technological evolution from ISRreconnaissance drones like the TB2 to FPV (First Person View) drones, bomber drones, and emergent interceptor drone systems. Hardie identifies a consistent pattern: Ukraine consistently leads in innovative military technology development and deployment, while Russia demonstrates superior capability in rapidly scaling technologies to mass production and tactical integration, occasionally achieving operational effectiveness superior to the original Ukrainian innovations. Batchelor emphasizes this dynamic reflects fundamentally different military cultures and organizational capabilities.

PREVIEW — John Hardie — The Evolution of Drone Warfare in the Ukraine Conflict. Hardie analyzes the expanding, evolving role of unmanned systems in the Ukraine war. Early intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drones, including the Turkish TB2, became progressively less effective as Russia improved integrated air defense capabilities. Subsequently, FPV (first-person view) combat drones became operationally critical, supplementing larger bomber-category unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)—often adapted agricultural equipment—deployed by both combatants, particularly Ukraine, to deliver precision munitions against distributed targets. 1953

Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin.  As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air.    #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff."  The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th);  (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th);  (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th).  Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix.  After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have".  Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident".  The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail."  The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng.   Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered.  At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled".  Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted."  The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war. 

Harry Harrison Young and the Jesse Scouts Lead Sheridan's Final Campaign — Patrick K. O'Donnell — After Blazer's capture, Harry Harrison Young led the Jesse Scouts, using Confederate disguises for reconnaissance. Scouts provided Phil Sheridan with real-time intelligence, serving as his "eyes." Young's scouts delivered critical strategic intelligence to Grant instead of going to Sherman. They identified weak points at Five Forks and interrupted Lee's supply trains, effectively sealing the Confederacy's retreat to Appomattox.