Podcasts about allied

Joseph Picard was a teenager when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Unlike some of his peers, Picard was neither excited to join the service nor dreading it. He just accepted that he would need to serve.After completing basic training, Picard was assigned to the 552nd Field Artillery Battalion, working with the massive 240mm guns. The battalion was held out of D-Day operations and landed at Utah Beach in late June 1944.In this edition of Veterans Chronicles, Picard takes us through all the work involved in assembling and operating the 240mm guns. He also walks us from Utah Beach through the Battle for St. Lo and the Allied drive to Paris.Picard also describes the devastating combat at the Battle of Aachen, losing his best friend in combat, and the chaos and bitter cold at the Battle of the Bulge.

Battleship North Carolina has a distinguished history as part of the Allied victory in World War Two, and for decades has served as a living museum and monument to that effort and to the technological innovations in its design. But it's also one of the most haunted places in the Carolinas! Come aboard for a deep dive discussion with Charlie and Michael about one of the Carolinas' most iconic locations! Links: Arcane Carolinas Vol. 3 (Charlie's newest entry in our series of nonfiction volumes!) Children of Solitude (Michael's latest horror novel!) Upcoming Live Appearances: SplatterFlix Film Series (Durham, NC - October 10 & 11, 2025) - Michael solo (he'll be selling books and giving away AC swag!) Book Ferret (Winston-Salem, NC - early November, dates TBD) - Michael solo (he'll be doing a reading and signing books) Follow us! Arcane Carolinas on Patreon Arcane Carolinas on Facebook Arcane Carolinas on Instagram Arcane Carolinas on Tumblr Contact us! arcanecarolinas@gmail.com

In the wake of the nuclear attacks on Japan, the official Allied line was that radiation sickness was not a danger. Yet, as this Long Read written by Steve O'Hagan reveals, the first Western journalist to witness the effects on the people of Hiroshima told a very different story. HistoryExtra Long Reads brings you the best articles from BBC History Magazine, direct to your ears. Today's feature originally appeared in the September 2025 issue, and has been voiced in partnership with the RNIB. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Allied forces in Tunisia, now designated the 18th Army gets a new leader, Harold Alexander. He wants training and new leadership. So on his way from Casablanca is Gen. Patton. Meanwhile, Rommel is out as the North African Axis Commander. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We're a day late because spam filters can really slow things down. This week, Patrick and Lori welcome Drew Medlock, the CEO of Allied Cycle Works in Bentonville, Arkansas. The international nature of the bike business has been thrown into turmoil by government tariffs and we wanted to talk to Drew as Allied has experience […]

See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The last 100 days of Franklin Roosevelt's life coincided with some momentous events in US history. As WWII was drawing to a close, the Yalta Conference brought together the three Allied leaders, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin to confront some of the thorniest issues of the day and that still loom large to this day. That conference laid the groundwork for the Post World War II Order which prevail to this day, 80 years later.

Send us a message or question! Have we got a treat for you...Something different - U-boats instead of aircraft!In our final episode of this series, “The U-boat War - Wolfpack,” we explore the U-Boat War from the German perspective with historian and author Roger Moorhouse, whose new book Wolfpack: Inside Hitler's U-Boat War will be published on 9 October 2025. Hosts James Jefferies and Jane Gulliford-Lowes dive into what life was really like aboard German U-boats, the shifting strategies of the Battle of the Atlantic,  the human stories behind the steel hulls, the role of Ultra Intelligence, the impact of Allied bombing and developments in technology. By looking at the war through the eyes of the U-boat crews, this episode reveals a side of World War II history that's often overlooked. Join us for a fascinating conversation that brings these powerful and complex narratives to life.Further reading: You can read Jane's articles on Ultra Intelligence in the Battle of the Atlantic and How to Survive Being Sunk by a U-Boat here. Never Mind the Dambusters Merchandise is now available at https://never-mind-the-dambusters.teemill.com/Support the showPlease subscribe to Never Mind The Dambusters wherever you get your podcasts. You can support the show, and help us produce great content, by becoming a paid subscriber from just $3 a month here https://www.buzzsprout.com/2327200/support . Supporters get early access to episodes and invitations to livestreams. Thank you for listening! You can reach out to us on social media at @RAF_BomberPod (X) or @NeverMindTheDambusters (Instagram)You can find out about James' research, articles, lectures and podcasts here .You can read more about Jane's work on her website at https://www.justcuriousjane.com/, and listen to podcasts/media stuff here

Marcia Franklin talks with Idaho author Anthony Doerr about his bestselling novel, "All the Light We Cannot See," which took ten years to research and write. The book debuted at #10 on the New York Times' Best Sellers list and received glowing reviews around the country. It also won the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction in 2015 shortly after this interview. Franklin talks with Doerr, who lives in Boise, about his novel, which depicts the lives of two European children in World War II, children whose lives ultimately intersect in war-torn Saint Malo, France. The town was nearly destroyed by Allied forces at the end of the war. Doerr discusses the book's themes, which include the power of radio during that time period, and the moral choices faced by civilians during wartime. Doerr also talks about what kept him motivated during the decade-long writing process. Originally aired: 07/10/14

Welcome to the Secret War! July, 1940: After a devastating loss in the Battle of France, the ragged remnants of the French Army and the British Expeditionary Force huddle in the besieged Dunkirk, praying the line can hold while they await evacuation. When our small band of Allied resistance fighters are pulled from the front for a top secret mission behind enemy lines, they learn that battle between good and evil has only just begun, and the occult horrors the ememy is starting to harness are beyond their worst nightmares. Mentioned in this episode:QNC OutroThis is the outro section. If you want your name listed please join us at https://patreon.com/QuestsAndChaos.QNC Intro AdJoin our Patreon at https://patreon.com/QuestsAndChaos or buy merch at https://shop.questsandchaos.com

Rome orders a new attack plan. Rommel tries to carry it out, but the Allied forces stop him. Still, the Axis take control of the Kasserine Pass. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

[This is one of the finalists in the 2025 review contest, written by an ACX reader who will remain anonymous until after voting is done. I'll be posting about one of these a week for several months. When you've read them all, I'll ask you to vote for a favorite, so remember which ones you liked] 1. The Internet That Would Be In July 1945, Vannevar Bush was riding high. As Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, he'd won World War II. His proximity fuse intercepted hundreds of V-1s and destroyed thousands of tanks, carving a path for Allied forces through the French countryside. Back in 1942, he'd advocated to President Roosevelt the merits of Oppenheimer's atomic bomb. Roosevelt and his congressional allies snuck hundreds of millions in covert funding to the OSRD's planned projects in Oak Ridge and Los Alamos. Writing directly and secretively to Bush, a one-line memo in June expressed Roosevelt's total confidence in his Director: “Do you have the money?” Indeed he did. The warheads it bought would fall on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in mere weeks. The Germans had already given up; Victory in the Pacific was nigh. So Bush was thinking ahead. In The Atlantic, Bush returned to a pre-war obsession with communication and knowledge-exchange. His essay, “As We May Think,” imagined a new metascientifical endeavor (emphasis mine): https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-review-project-xanadu-the-internet

The final showdown in North Africa is here. In the final episode of our Tunisgrad series Saul and Roger discuss the climax of the campaign as Allied forces converge on the Axis in Tunisia. Together they break down the pivotal battles that sealed the fate of the Axis, from Montgomery's breakthrough at the Mareth Line to the decisive pincer movement at Wadi Akarit. And the final, coordinated assault, Operation Strike, which leads to the fall of Tunis and a capitulation on a scale even greater than Stalingrad. Discover the key factors behind the Allied victory: overwhelming logistical superiority, complete air supremacy, and a unified command structure that finally worked. Over 250,000 Axis troops surrender, marking the end of the African campaign and, as one historian notes, "the beginning of the end" for Hitler. If you have any thoughts or questions, you can send them to - podbattleground@gmail.com Producer: James Hodgson X (Twitter): @PodBattleground Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This is the second episode in a mini series on the history of the Clan Line, one of Britain's most distinctive and influential shipping companies. In this episode Dr Sam Willis travels the length and breadth of the UK to speak with sailors who served on Clan Line ships, to hear and preserve their memories of this most crucial time in global maritime history. Founded in Glasgow in 1877 by Charles Cayzer, the line quickly grew into a vast fleet that connected Scotland with Africa, India, and beyond. What made it particularly interesting was its combination of commercial power and cultural identity: every ship bore a “Clan” name, giving the company a strong Scottish character that set it apart in the crowded world of British shipping.The Clan Line was important because it played a crucial role in Britain's imperial trade. Its ships carried goods such as jute, tea, and cotton, linking colonial economies to British markets. During both World Wars, the company's vessels were vital to the Allied cause, transporting troops, supplies, and munitions—often at great risk from enemy submarines. Many were lost, but the service of its crews contributed directly to victory.Beyond trade and war, the line symbolised the globalisation of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It represented Scotland's industrial and maritime strength, while also reflecting the dangers and opportunities of long-distance shipping. Today, the Clan Line stands as a reminder of how shipping shaped commerce, conflict, and community. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions.   Hey before I begin I just want to thank all of you who have joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please let me know what other figures, events or other things you want to hear about in the future and I will try to make it happen.   So as you can see the title of this episode is, Why did the Japanese perform so many Atrocities during the Pacific War. Phewww, its honestly a difficult one to tackle, for there are countless reasons. I had a university professor who taught; ancient and modern Japanese history, history of the Japanese empire and the Pacific War. He actually answered this very question in a single lecture and in many ways I found it to be one of the most illuminating things I ever learnt about the Pacific War. To truly understand the reasons why they did such horrible things, you actually need to learn the general history of Japan, particularly the changes from Tokugawa, to Meiji, to Showa. I am going to do my very best, but I know many of you might be asking “what were the worst things they did?”, not everyone takes a special interest into such a niche part of history. May I recommend for those with strong stomachs “the knights of Bushido” by Edward Russel that covers pretty much all the atrocities of the Asia-Pacific War. For those of you who like darker things, check out Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II by David Wallace and Peter Williams, absolute nightmare fuel.   I can't go through the entire history of Japan, but I think it's important to start off with the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. This was the first time the Empire of Japan fought a true war with a foreign nation, that being the Qing dynasty. At this point in time, there really emerged a sort of, to be blunt, race war. The Chinese had historically referred to the Japanese as “woren”, a racist term meaning dwarf. Now historically the Japanese had always revered the Chinese, kind of like in the way a little brother looks up to his big brother. In tokugawa Japan they would learn from the Chinese, but as the Meiji restoration began this dramatically changed. Japan watched as the Chinese were humiliating and abused by the western powers and failed to modernize. Meanwhile Japan emulated the best of the west, to modernize and become a great power themselves. In many ways, Japan saw itself become big brother and now China was little brother. The Meiji restoration had an element of nationalism built into it that would explode come the Show era. Japan for its entire history had this belief they were the “Yamato Race” dating back to the 6th century. Now while the Meiji restoration sought to emulate the west, they also emulated racism and propaganda, which in the 19th century was kind of a big deal. The Japanese government gradually began a long term campaign promoting the idea the Japanese, or Yamato people were superior to that of the other asian races. Who was the next big asian boy on the block? China, so it was inevitable they would direct a lot of racist attitudes towards the Chinese. During the first sino-japanese war, the Chinese, particularly Manchu had a habit of performing atrocities upon the Japanese. They would often cut off body parts of Japanese soldiers in grotesque manners and leave them to be found by their comrades. This was honestly a pretty typical thing of war in the region, but it did also have a racist element to it, the Chinese certainly saw the Japanese as lesser people. Just before the battle of Port Arthur, the Japanese found mutilated remains of the comrades, here is a passage from Makio Okabe who was there:   As we entered the town of Port Arthur, we saw the head of a Japanese soldier displayed on a wooden stake. This filled us with rage and a desire to crush any Chinese soldier. Anyone we saw in the town, we killed. The streets were filled with corpses, so many they blocked our way. We killed people in their homes; by and large, there wasn't a single house without from three to six dead. Blood was flowing and the smell was awful. We sent out search parties. We shot some, hacked at others. The Chinese troops just dropped their arms and fled. Firing and slashing, it was unbounded joy. At this time, our artillery troops were at the rear, giving three cheers [banzai] for the emperor.   The Japanese performed a massacre at Port Arthur, butchering perhaps up to 3000 Chinese civilians, some claim 10's of thousands and in full few of western war correspondents. It became a huge controversy that destroyed the image of the IJA internationally and hurt the Japanese governments efforts at riding themselves of unequal treaties with the western powers. The Japanese learnt a hell of a lesson and an Imperial Proclamation was made in 1894 stating that Japanese soldiers should make every effort to win the war without violating international laws. According to Japanese historian Yuki Tanaka, Japanese forces during the First Sino-Japanese War released 1,790 Chinese prisoners without harm, once they signed an agreement not to take up arms against Japan if they were released.   During the next major war the Japanese performed a dramatic 180, well at least to their enemy. During the Russo-Japanese War, over 80,000 Russian POWs were held by the IJA who were treated in accordance with the Hague conventions of 1899. The Japanese paid them for labor, housed them in conventional POW camps, made sure they received good medical treatment, ironically better than the Russians were capable of. The Japanese did all of this, making sure the foreign war correspondents wrote about it. It was a massive PR stunt in many ways. The Japanese were emulating how a world power should act, because they sought to be one. Meanwhile the Japanese swallowed their pride at being called yellow monkeys, as the prevalent Yellow Peril ideology was being pushed by Kaiser Wilhehelm and Tsar Nicholas II heavily. The Japanese treated the entire war like gentlemen and suffered horrific higher casualties than necessary because of it. But something many people don't take much notice of, because the IJA made sure of it, was they horrible treatment of the Chinese during the war.   Now the Russians in Manchuria looted, killed and raped many Chinese, pushed quite a bit by the Yellow Peril. The Chinese, certainly the Honghuzi bandits were working for the Japanese to attack them, so its not like they had no reasons. The IJA was more professional and had orders not to molest the Chinese, as they were helping the war effort, but this did not prevent it. The Japanese also looted, killed and raped Chinese. The Japanese would often wave it off as reprisals against potential spies. I only bring this up as it was very apparent, the Japanese treated the Russians much different than the chinese.   Fast forward to WW1, the Japanese had a battle against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians known in the west as the Siege of Tsingtau. The Japanese took up an identical methodology to the Russo-Japanese war with their approach to the Germans, but even took it a step further. After winning the siege, the Japanese seized nearly 5000 German POW's who were treated with a surreal amount of respect. They were brought back to Japan and housed for the rest of the war in 12 cities around Tokyo and Kumamoto. The POW's enjoyed humane treatment and a rather famous event occurred at the Bando camp where a large orchestra was formed of German POW's who toured the nation performing 100 concerts, lectures and plays. Evidence the Germans were treated well can be seen in the fact 170 prisoners never left Japan and sought wives and lives there. Now is this all a feel good love story, no, just like during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was playing up the PR, for during WW1 they wanted official recognition as a world power and that of being racially equal to the whites.    Japan was officially recognized as a world power during the treaty of Versailles, but when Japan gave its racial equality proposal, President Woodrow Wilson of the US and Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes refused to allow it to pass, even though they received majority votes. Now The Japanese had been for a lack of better words, fucked over, during the first sino-japanese war when the triple intervention of France, Germany and Russia stole away their war earning of the Liaodong peninsula. During the Russo-Japanese war, Theodore Roosevelt limited the Japanese war gains and now here after WW1 the Japanese received another humiliation. To the Japanese, it was the last straw and it was a major reason they went to war with the west, who they viewed, and honestly rightfully so, would never see them as equals.   Ompf, lot of history there, but now we come to the Showa era, which was molded by the feelings of the past decades.   In 1937 Japan and China enter an unofficial war that saw one of the worst wartime atrocities in human history, the rape of Nanjing. It began on December 13th of 1937, lasting 6 or so weeks seeing the murder of possibly 300,000 civilians and pows, the mass rape of 20,000 and untold hardship upon the Chinese people. The Japanese followed this up with numerous other massacres in China such as the Changjiao Massacre claiming possibly 30,000 Chinese civilian lives, the Alexandra Hospital Massacre killing 200 patients and medical staff in Hong Kong, the Laha Massacre on Ambon island where 300 members of the Gull force were executed, the Bangka island massacre where 60 Australian and British soldiers and 22 Australian nurses were murdered, the Parit Sulong massacre in Malay where 150 wounded Australian and Indian POW's were executed, the Bataan Death march where negligence and brutality took the lives of 650 Americans and perhaps a possible 18,000 Filipinos, the Manila massacres claiming the lives of perhaps 54,000 filipinos including women and children in the Philippines, the Balikpapan massacre in the dutch east indies taking the lives of 78 Dutch Civilians, I can keep going and going. Where the Japanese went, massacres and horrors occurred.    Again if you really want to delve into these stories check out “the knights of Bushido”.   The Japanese also had the infamous special units like 731, who conducted horrifying experiments on civilians and POWs like vivisectioning live people without anesthesia, testing biological and chemical weapons on live people, the freezing peoples to study frostbite treatment and giving people sexually transmitted diseases to study. Lt General Shiro Ishii's unit 731 deployed plague infested fleas, cholera, bubonic plague and other nasty weapons upon Chinese civilians killing perhaps up to 500,000. This was seen during the battle of Changde and famously during operation Sei-go also known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign.    The Japanese also enacted the infamous “Sanko Sakusen / three all's policy : kill all, urn all, loot all” in retaliation to the Chinese communists Hundred regiments offensive in December of 1940. Sanctioned by Hirohito personally, it is thought this act resulted in the death of 2.7 million Chinese civilians. According to author Werner Gruhl 8 million Chinese civilian deaths could be attributable to the Japanese.     So then we come back to the big question, why? So now that I've covered the loose history for coherency sake I want to list here the largest reasons for the atrocities and by no means is this official categories or even all of them, I am simply stating kind of my top ones I guess you can say:   Treaties signed or not signed War strategy and indoctrination  Ultra-Nationalism and Racism Surrender & the Bastardization of the Bushido code The Brutality of the Japanese military Treaties signed or not signed   Yes its time to talk about treaties, yawn. Now I said previously Japan did sign the Hague Conventions of 1899 and would ratify them in 1907. The Hague conventions did contain laws for prisoners of war, protection of civilians. Alongside this, in 1894 an imperial proclamation was made stating Japanese soldiers should make every effort to win a war without violating international laws. More significantly Japan “signed” but unlike the majority of other world powers did not ratify the Geneva convention of 1929. Why? To be blunt, the geneva conventions did not really benefit the Japanese military from their point of view.   First the Japanese had a very specific perspective on surrendering, they simply did not do it, so they did not expect many of their soldiers to ever become POW's, so how would it benefit them to ratify such a thing? If they are not going to have many POW's, why would they burden themselves with upholding all the conventional laws for POW's they would obtain during war?  Another glaring reason involved aerial bombing. Many Japanese leaders, like Kanji Ishiwara, believed the home islands would be subjected to massive aerial bombing if a global war broke out. If Japan was subjected to aerial bombing and ratified the geneva convention, this meant they would have to take the pilots who were caught prisoner. The Japanese believed this would encourage further bombing. Lastly the convention had rules for POW treatment that literally contradicted how Japanese soldiers were treated by their own superiors. More about that in the last part about the military's brutality, but summarized, the Japanese army were abusive as hell and to sign such a thing would literally contradict how they did things.   Emperor Hirohito personally ratified a decision to remove certain constraints of the Hague Conventions when it came to the treatment of Chinese POW's in the directive of 5 August 1937. This notification advised staff officers to simply stop using the term "prisoners of war". They would refer to their enemy as bandits, guerillas and such, anything but soldiers so they would not have to take any prisoners, though they typically did not leave anyone alive in China regardless. The Geneva Convention exempted POWs of sergeant rank or higher from manual labor, and stipulated that prisoners performing work should be provided with extra rations and other essentials. The Japanese in the later half of the war would be starved of provisions and resources, thus its to no surprise they could not meet these demands, even if they sought to uphold them. I will note in 1942, Japan indicated they would “follow” the Geneva rules and would observe the Hague Convention of 1907 outlining the laws and customs of war. Yet this is like a verbal confirmation, it had no legal basis, something the Japanese particularly loved to do during the war.   According to Dr. William Skelton III, who produced a document entitled American Ex Prisoners of War for the U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs, more POWs died at the hands of the Japanese in the Pacific theater and specifically in the Philippines than in any other conflict to date. For example in Germany, POWs died at a rate 1.2%. In the Pacific theater the rate was 37%. In the Philippines, POWs died at a rate of 40%.    Now these pieces of paper that were signed or not signed, what does this really matter when it comes to war, its obvious they were not upholding certain rules, but how did this quote en quote make them more brutal and perform more atrocities? Well here is the sticky thing, if you are part of the Japanese military and you know your nation did not ratify certain rules of war, this meant your enemy had no supposed legal basis to follow said rules against you either.    So I want you to think of two aspects of this. If your nation did not sign or ratify certain treaties, then you could not expect the enemy to respect such rules when it comes to you. But more importantly, what if the leader of your nation…just told you to believe that?    In early 1942, Great Britain, the United States of America and other great powers did officially let the Japanese know that they would, on their  part, observe all the provisions of the Convention and requested reciprocity. Japanese foreign minister at the time, Hideki Tojo gave a formal assurance that although Japan was not bound by the Geneva convention, the Japanese would apply it “mutatis mutandis” towards the Americans, British, Canadians, Australians and New Zealander POW's, note he most definitely did not extend this to the asiatic groups, nor the Dutch whom I guess he just forgot about. But this did morally bind Japan to comply with the convention. However the top brass of the Japanese military, notably Hideki Tojo in these cases, went out of his way to instill beliefs within the military as to what they should expect from the enemy. As you will see in the next points, this was basically a type of indoctrination.   War strategy and indoctrination    The leaders of Japan knew full well how unmatched they were in terms of resources and productivity before they began the war with the west. How could they possibly win the war? The IJN was dead set on a decisive naval battle, but for the IJA to compensate for their lack of resources, they believed their “spirit” would overcome the enemy. In many ways this spirit meant going above and beyond normal human endurance, to literally outperform the allies and notably to conduct the war with absolutely zero mercy. Once Japan lost the initiative in the war, after Guadalcanal, the IJA were forced to fight a war of attrition. Now they would prolong and exact maximum casualties upon the allies hoping to force them to the peace table. The idea was quite simple, the IJA would do everything possible to make the allies believe they would never give up and it would far too costly to defeat them. How does one go about achieving these aims? Well the IJA officers would tell you “by steeling your hearts”. To achieve all of this required extreme indoctrination.    Japanese children grew up in regimentation, they were desensitized to violence through tales of martial glory, and were taught that their purpose in life was to serve the emperor. Upon entering  military service, they were trained out of any individualistic spirit, and taught that compassion was a weakness and had no place in the field of war. The soldier's motto was faith equaled strength.  Faith being devotion to duty and service to the Divine Emperor. Apart from ideology and spiritual toughening, training in the Japanese Imperial Army was also extremely harsh and violent. This was not even particularly a special aspect of Showa Japan, it went all the way back to the Meiji era. From a young age children's education directed them, like a pipeline for military duty.   Now at the offset of the war, Hideki Tojo released the “Senjinkun” “instructions for the battlefield”. This was basically a manual for soldiers on how to conduct war. The document was used to establish standards of behavior for Japanese troops and improve discipline and morale within the Army, it also included things like a prohibition against being taken prisoner. It stated if you were captured by the enemy, because Japan did not sign or ratify certain treaties, you would be killed or tortured by the allies, and if you survived you and your family would face shame back home, and punishment resulting typically in 6 months of prison.   Here is a small excerpt from the document Those who know shame are weak. Always think of [preserving] the honor of your community and be a credit to yourself and your family. Redouble your efforts and respond to their expectations. Never live to experience shame as a prisoner. By dying you will avoid leaving a stain on your honor.   The purpose was basically psychological warfare, against their own army. Those like Hideki Tojo believed Japan could only defeat the resource rich Americans with spirit. Thus the manuals like Senjinkun demanded the forces not ever surrender, because the allies would do horrible things, it was shameful to do so and there were disciplinary actions for any who did. In 1942 the Army amended its criminal code to specify that officers who surrendered soldiers under their command faced at least six months imprisonment, regardless of the circumstances in which the surrender took place. This change attracted little attention, however, as the Senjinkun imposed more severe consequences and had greater moral force.   In a report dated June 1945, the U.S. Office of War Information noted that 84 percent of one group of interrogated Japanese prisoners, many of whom had been injured or unconscious when captured stated that they had expected to be killed or tortured by the Allies if taken prisoner. The OWI analysts described this as being typical, and concluded that fear of the consequences of surrender, “rather than Bushido,” was the motivation for many Japanese battle deaths in hopeless circumstances–as much as, and probably more than, the other two major considerations: fear of disgrace at home, and “the positive desire to die for one's nation, ancestors, and god-emperor.”   Something barely talked about in the west, was during the Pacific War, the Americans had a habit of taking human trophies. Human trophies were Japanese skulls, gold teeth, finger bones and such. The famous novel “With the Old Breed” by Eugene Sledge spoke of his personal accounts of these actions, its a rather gruesome and dark part of the war. Now some of these actions were publicized, despite the US military's efforts to quell and hush it down. Time magazine famously had an iconic photo of a woman whose enlisted boyfriend sent her home a Japanese skull. FDR also famously was given a letter opener carved out of Japanese bones. These stories were seized up greedily by the Japanese government who used them as propaganda to prove to their soldiers what would happen if they were captured. It had a profound effect as you can imagine. And this was not limited to Japanese soldiers. The propaganda machine would contribute at the end of the war to mass civilian suicides on Okinawa and Saipan.   Back to the POW subject. When it came to the treatment of POW's, Hideki Tojo began submitting in May of 1942 a series of memorandum, basic orders as to how POW's should be treated. “Prisoners of war can be used for the enlargement of our production and as military labor, white prisoners of war will be confined successively in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria. Superior technicians and high ranking officers -- Colonels and above -- will be included among the prisoners of war confined in Formosa. Those who are not suitable for use in enlargement of our production will be confined in prisoner of war camps which will be built immediately on the spot.Although the working of prisoner of war officers and warrant officers is forbidden by the Regulations of 1903, the policy of the control authorities is that under the situation of our country where not one person now eats without working they want them to set to work. It is desired that you give proper orders on this.The present situation of affairs in this country does not permit anyone to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely. With that in view, in dealing with prisoners of war, I hope you will see that they may be usefully employed. In Japan, we have our own ideology concerning prisoners of war, which should naturally make their treatment more or less different from that in Europe and America. In dealing with them, you should, of course, observe the various Regulations concerned, aim at an adequate application of them . . . At the same time, you must not allow them to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely for even a single day. Their labor and technical skill should be fully utilized for the replenishment of production, and contribution rendered toward the prosecution of the Greater East Asiatic War for which no effort ought to be spared."   Thus in the end as a grunt in the IJA you were led to believe: if I am captured I will be tortured, killed maybe turned into a letter opener, or someone will place my skull on their mantle. If I surrender and survive and make it back home, I will be severely punished and worst of all me and my family will be shamed. I could not expect any humanity from the enemy, because my nation did not sign or ratify treaties like the Geneva convention. More so, because my armies conduct was so unbelievably barbaric, I could only expect the very same from my enemy. It was a vicious cycle. You perform atrocities, expecting the enemy to do the same, and thus it just keeps perpetuating itself. Ultra-Nationalism and Racism   Now we spoke a little bit about the concept of the Yamato race, the Japanese were indoctrinated to believe they were a superior race and that their emperor was something akin to a living god. Until this war, the Japanese empire was on a hell of a winning streak going all the way back to the Meiji Era. For the first half of the Pacific war, the Japanese won nearly every battle. This led to something historians called “victory disease” that made them become somewhat arrogant and cocky, but it also made them feel “superhuman”. The allies' news reporting at the beginning of the war began to frantically refer to the Japanese as “supermen”or  “super jungle fighters”. Particularly because of the Malay campaign, the Japanese soldier just seemed to be tougher, could survive harsher jungle climates, even doing so with less food or war materials. The Japanese read the allied news reports and came to the conclusion that had been driven down their throats by their government, indeed the Japanese spirit was winning the war. The Japanese public ate this up in their propaganda and it perpetuated their ultra-nationalistic beliefs. The Japanese truly came to believe they were destined to rule the asia-pacific. Look at the results in China for example. Within a short amount of time they conquered much of China, though the public really had no idea how bad the China was bottled down by 1940. Then came the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere propaganda, which is an excellent example of their megalomania.    Yet alongside their ultra-nationalism, seen more strongly perpetuated against other Asian groups, the Japanese also indoctrinated their public with racism against them. The Yellow Peril of the 19th century and anti-japanese or anti-asian racism fueled the Japanese soldiers. The Japanese as a people had faced brutal racist hardships historically at the hands of the west, particularly from their point of view from America. There was the slights against them during the first sino-japanese war, the infamous triple intervention of france, germany and Russia stealing away their prize that was the liaodong peninsula. Then during the Boxer rebellion they faced racism, not being allowed to lead mutli national army formations, despite them being the lionshare of said military force. The Russo-Japanese war saw from their point of view, America stealing their war prizes. Last but not least, after WW1 they were told to their faces that they were a world power, but not racially equal. The Japanese faced anti-Japanese and anti-asian immigration laws when it came to America in the form of the gentleman's agreement and Australia's “great white Australia policy”. During the war, the American propaganda machine began pumping out racist caricatures of Japanese as rats, goggle eyed  bucktooth people, literal yellow monkey's.   For the IJA the pacific war in many was a holy war directed at the arrogant whites who had abused them for so long. This will probably sound controversial, but indeed, the pacific war was very much a race war. If you are not convinced of that, I recommend reading “War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War” by John Dower. The human trophy taking, anti-japanese bucktooth, rat people cartoon propaganda, history of racial abuse like the japanese concentration camps, the gentleman's agreement, the stealing of victories during the first sino-japanese war, russo-japanese war and ww1 all plagued the mind of a Japanese soldier. To them in many ways, the “whites had it coming”. Which is rather ironic given how the Japanese would treat the other asian racial groups they came into contact with. But such is the contradictory nature of the Imperial Japanese military.    The Japanese also held racist beliefs about the westerners. The Japanese soldiers were taught the allies were akin to demons or beasts. They were described often as “the hairy ones” or “anglo-American demons”. Taught these men would rape women and girls, stample upon the civilians they captured with the treads of their tanks. The marines were especially dreaded.  According to a story circulated widely among the Japanese on Saipan, all Marine Corps recruits were compelled to murder their own parents before being inducted into service. It was said that Japanese soldiers taken prisoner would suffer hideous tortures—their ears, noses, and limbs would be cut off; they would be blinded and castrated; they could also be cooked and fed to dogs. As silly as this may sound, do remember the Americans were taking human trophies so the Japanese propaganda machine had its evidence. Tons of photos of skulls atop american tanks for example were displayed to the Japanese public. Another famous one was the cartoon appearing in an American servicemen's magazine, which was later reproduced and translated in the Japanese press. It suggested the existence of “Japanese hunting licenses, promising open season on the enemy, complete with free ammunition and equipment—with pay!    In terms of how the Japanese exacted their own racism towards their fellow asians. During the War the Japanese dragged into forced labor, Koreans, Chinese and southeast asians. 670,000 Koreans were brought to Japan to work mines and heavy industry, around 60,000 of them died to harsh conditions. Between April 1943 to May 1945, 41,862 Chinese were sent to Japan to work, 2800 died before even reaching the home islands. 6872 died in the work sites again from brutal conditions. When it comes to southeast asian numbers are hard to pinpoint but its safe to say at least 300,000 Javanese, Malay, Burmese, Tamil and other groups were mobilized to construct the Burma-Siam railroad between October 1942 to november 1943 and 60,000 perished. This all went for the men, for the women, all those racial groups would face the horrors of becoming comfort women, historians estimate there could have been 50-200,000 pressed into it. But for the Japanese, believing their were superior to these other asiatic groups, groups whom they would publicly say were like children, they as the father figure would guide, well they simply abused them.   So in a contradictive fashion, the Japanese believed they were superior and could do horrible things to their Asian neighbors while simultaneously decrying the racism cast towards them by western powers as justification for their brutal actions against them. These types of feelings and perspectives molded the mind of the average Japanese soldier, dehumanizing others has always been a standard military practice afterall.    Surrender & the Bastardization of the Bushido code   I think this is one the vast majority of WW2 history buffs know, the Japanese perspective on surrender and the bushido code. In the book “military trials of war criminals in the Netherlands east indies 1946-1949” Fred Borch had this to say about the variable of bushido for the brutality   As Japan continued its modernization in the early 20th century, her armed forces became convinced that success in battle would be assured if Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen had the "spirit" of Bushido. ... The result was that the Bushido code of behavior "was inculcated into the Japanese soldier as part of his basic training." Each soldier was indoctrinated to accept that it was the greatest honor to die for the Emperor and it was cowardly to surrender to the enemy. ... Bushido therefore explains why the Japanese soldiers who were stationed in the NEI so mistreated POWs in their custody. Those who had surrendered to the Japanese—regardless of how courageously or honorably they had fought—merited nothing but contempt; they had forfeited all honor and literally deserved nothing. Consequently, when the Japanese murdered POWs by shooting, beheading, and drowning, these acts were excused since they involved the killing of men who had forfeited all rights to be treated with dignity or respect. While civilian internees were certainly in a different category from POWs, it is reasonable to think that there was a "spill-over" effect from the tenets of Bushido.   It is very true, the Japanese soldiers and sailors were taught Japan was a sacred nation. Traditional samurai values of bushido were merged with modern training and weaponry. The government propagandized the figure of the Emperor as a living god who embodied the Japanese state, the Kokutai. Emperor Hirohito and his family were the spiritual essence of Japan. To even show your back to the enemy let alone surrender was deemed cowardly and brought dishonor upon your family. As written by Inouye Jukichi in 1910, something read by many Japanese “The Japanese warriors looked upon it as shame to themselves not to die when their Lord was hard pressed . . . their own shame was the shame upon their parents, their family, their house and their whole clan, and with this idea deeply impressed upon their minds, the Samurai, no matter of what rank, held their lives light as feathers when compared with the weight they attached to the maintenance of a spotless name”.    Young men of Japan were taught that "The greatest honor is to die for the Emperor" Additionally precept the Japanese were taught that it is an ignominy to surrender to the enemy. The combined effect of these two precepts was to inculcate in the Japanese soldier a spirit of contempt for Allied soldiers who surrendered, which, in defiance of the rules of war, was demonstrated in their ill-treatment of prisoners. They made no distinction between the soldier who fought honorably and courageously up to an inevitable surrender, and the soldier who surrendered without a fight. All enemy soldiers who surrendered under any circumstance were to be regarded as being disgraced and entitled to live only by the tolerance of their captors.   Surrender was unforgivable under their code, drilled into them through the Imperial Japanese education system and military. When the Japanese would come across vast swathes of the enemy surrendering, particularly if the enemy used up all their ammunition killing their comrades and then surrendered, well it added fuel to their brutality. One only needs to look at the deaths due to Banzai charges, take for example the incredibly massive one at the battle of Saipan seeing around 4000 dead Japanese. IJA officers brought ancestral katana's to the war, the Japanese cut off the heads of the enemies as it was seen to be honorable. When faced with death, many chose to commit seppuku, the bushido propaganda was intense.    A brutal practice emerged in the Pacific island hopping campaign, whereupon wounded Japanese would pretend to be dead or surrender only to explode grenades upon allied forces coming closer. This began to be noticed by US marines during the battle of Guadalcanal and Australians in New Guinea. This began a vicious cycle . There were of course Japanese who would surrender. Hell the Koreans forced into service often did try to surrender, but they would all be hampered by something. Because of the actions of those Japanese feinted death and taking down allied soldiers with them, the allied soldiers gradually began a practice of not bothering to accept surrender. It became a self fulfilling prophecy. Many Japanese made the allies believe all they could expect was a grenade death, thus the allies became more brutal to them. This simply led the Japanese to conclude their government was accurate about how the allies would treat them, so more and more did not surrender. An absolutely horrible cycle that went on to the very end of the war, though the allies did figure out means to get Japanese to surrender more in the last year.    The Brutality of the Japanese military   I think this is probably one of the most important factors, and its also one the “normies” would not know as much about. The Imperial Japanese military, more so the Army, had what I can only describe as a built in system of abuse. As described to me by the same university professor I keep bringing up in podcasts, picture a literal pecking order. Going from the highest ranked general to the very bottom grunt. Imagine each one who is higher than the other, routinely physically abuses them. For example, it was very typical for a colonel to slap a major across the face, the major would then strike one of his captains, and the abuse would continue through the ranks to the grunts who would have no one to abuse, thus they turned to POW's or civilian populations. This was not just an accepted part of the Japanese Imperial Army it was indoctrinated.    From day one of basic training, IJA officers taught their men, races like the Chinese were their blood enemies and racially inferior. These were people the Japanese would rule over one day. The trainers would toss the boys into rigorous training activities involving physical violence towards another alongside the notion any orders given by a higher ranking officer was infallible and to be treated as if the divine emperor himself, the living god was giving it.    The Japanese army even taught methods of torture that would be employed in all areas they occupied. Among these tortures were the water treatment, burning, electric shocks, the knee spread, suspension, kneeling on sharp instruments and flogging. The Kempetai, were the ones doing the lionshare of these tortures. Other Army and Navy units, however, used the same methods as the Kempetai. Camp guards performed similar methods, local police forces organized by the Kempetai in the occupied territories also applied the same methods of torture. The Kempetai were administered by the War Ministry, trained at specialized schools who were maintained and operated by the War Ministry in Japan. Thus the conduct of Kempetai and the camp guards directly reflected the policy of the War Ministry.    The Japanese army leadership made sure recruits were physically and mentally abused, they were given strenuously duty tasks and pushed to their absolute limit. During the war given where they were deployed, take guadalcanal for example, the Japanese soldiers would be facing starvation as well. Being half starved, beaten and suffering the effects of war would drive anyone to perform horrifying acts. The life of a Japanese solider was simply at the whims of an extremely toxic management culture. The lowest ranking echelons received the lionshare of abuse and they took out their frustration with whomever they could find deemed lower than them, ie: POW's, civilians, etc.   All of these variables combined contributed to the creation of a military willing to perform just about any atrocity they thought necessary to win the war. It was a war they could not hope to win, but many of them went to their deaths trying to defeat the hands of fate. There are countless other reasons of course for the atrocities committed in cold or hot blood. Countless books have been written on this subject, please do check out the few I mentioned. With that again, a big thanks to you patreons, you guys are awesome. Please let me know what you think in the comments, and what you want to hear more about in the future. This has been the pacific war channel over and out.

Send us a message or question! In Episode 56 ( the penultimate episode of series 3), we delve into a chilling chapter of World War II history: the murders of Allied airmen in Germany. As the war raged on, downed airmen often found themselves at the mercy of their captors - military, civilian authorities and sometimes ordinary citizens.This episode uncovers the fate of one Allied airman, missing in action in January 1945. We are joined by German historian Thomas Rost, and together we explore the complex web of wartime  and post-war justice, and the search for the truth.  A thought -provoking discussion about crime, justice, due process, human responses and revenge.Support the showPlease subscribe to Never Mind The Dambusters wherever you get your podcasts. You can support the show, and help us produce great content, by becoming a paid subscriber from just $3 a month here https://www.buzzsprout.com/2327200/support . Supporters get early access to episodes and invitations to livestreams. Thank you for listening! You can reach out to us on social media at @RAF_BomberPod (X) or @NeverMindTheDambusters (Instagram)You can find out about James' research, articles, lectures and podcasts here .You can read more about Jane's work on her website at https://www.justcuriousjane.com/, and listen to podcasts/media stuff here

The business travel industry is fueled by innovative supplier companies who focus on serving the needs to both corporate travel programs and the travelers these corporate customers send out on the road for work trips.   GBTA is fortunate to have many of these innovative supplier companies serving on its Allied Leadership Council – which is made up of its top industry supporters across several travel categories.   In this podcast series, GBTA Allied Leadership Council members along with key executives from their companies discuss top company focus areas, the latest business travel trends they're seeing, and what the future holds for corporate travel programs.  Moderator Suzanne Neufang, CEO, GBTA – New York, NY, USA Jorge Cruz: Executive Vice President, Global Sales & Marketing Yannis Karmis: Senior Vice President, Product Planning & Development   Music track is Space Jazz by Kevin MacLeod  Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 License 

New Brunswick – Upcoming National and International Recruitment Events, Healthcare, Transportation, Skilled, Forestry, released by New Brunswick on 12 September 2025Good day ladies and gentlemen, this is IRC News. I am Joy Stephen, a certified Canadian Immigration Practitioner, bringing you this Provincial News Bulletin from the province of New Brunswick. This recording originates from the Polinsys studios in Cambridge, Ontario.International EventsSeptember 27–28: NB Forestry and Transportation Recruitment Mission – Belgrade, SerbiaOctober 12–13: Healthcare – Nurses, Allied and MedicalOctober 24 – November 1: Multisector – INB Mission Brazil and ChileNovember 5–12: Multisector – Air Canada, Lyon & Lille, France (Registration opening soon)National EventsOctober 8–9: Multisector – Job Fair, Montreal, QuebecOctober 21: Healthcare – Healthdaq Healthcare Job Fair, Vancouver, British ColumbiaOctober 21: Halifax Universities Career Fair 2025, Halifax, Nova ScotiaOctober 25: Healthcare – Nursing Event, Edmonton, AlbertaVirtual EventsNovember 4: Healthcare – National Virtual Connector: Long-Term Care NB (Registration opening soon)December: Skilled Trades and Transportation Connector Event (Virtual Event Registration opening soon)You can always access past news from the Province of New Brunswick by visiting: https://myar.me/tag/nb/For insights on the Provincial Express Entry Federal pool, Canadian Permanent Residence Programs, or other Canadian immigration pathways, connect with us here: https://myar.me/cJoin our complimentary Zoom resource meetings every Thursday, with a Q&A session with Canadian Authorized Representatives every Friday: https://myar.me/zoomLearn more about selecting a qualified immigration representative here: https://ircnews.ca/consultant

Operation Little Vittles" - an initiative during the Berlin Airlift to drop Allied sweets and chocolates from planes as a gift to the German children below - began on September 22, 1948. Lt. Gail Halvorsen, a 27-year-old U.S. pilot, had been moved to the gesture by a group of children he encountered one day near Tempelhof airport. After seeing their eagerness to share even the most meagre of resources, he decided to drop sweets for them during his next flight, signalling his arrival by waggling his plane's wings. The drop soon became a weekly event, remembered by a generation of Berliners, some of whom had never tasted chocolate before. In this week's Sunday's episode, exclusively for our

The landscape of American defense manufacturing has transformed dramatically since World War II—and not for the better. What happens when a nation with the world's most advanced military technology can't produce enough conventional artillery shells to supply Ukraine while maintaining its own reserves?This episode brings together three exceptional voices to examine America's critical vulnerability: our diminished industrial capacity. Arthur Herman, author of "Freedom's Forge," provides historical context on how America became the "arsenal of democracy" during WWII, when two-thirds of all Allied war materials came from American factories. Rand Simberg offers insights on how this manufacturing crisis affects the space industry, where China is rapidly closing the gap with American capabilities. Cameron Schiller, CEO of Rangeview, shares frontline experience trying to rebuild American manufacturing through advanced robotics.Their conversation reveals how decades of globalization created a nation with "a surplus of designers and a deficit in people who actually make real stuff." While America once had abundant workers with mechanical aptitude, today's workforce requires different approaches—highlighting SpaceX's role as an industrial "graduate school" teaching engineers how to build physical systems. The panel examines how vulnerable supply chains, dependent on foreign sources for critical components, create national security risks.The solution? A return to the "founder mentality" that prioritizes innovation over efficiency, rebuilding domestic supply chains, leveraging new technologies like AI and robotics, and cultivating a workforce skilled in modern manufacturing techniques. This isn't just about economics—it's about America's ability to project power and protect itself in an increasingly competitive world.Listen now to understand why, as Schiller puts it, "a nation that can't produce is a nation that can't project power."Support Our WorkThe Center for Demographics and Policy focuses on research and analysis of global, national, and regional demographic trends and explores policies that might produce favorable demographic results over time. It involves Chapman students in demographic research under the supervision of the Center's senior staff.Students work with the Center's director and engage in research that will serve them well as they look to develop their careers in business, the social sciences, and the arts. Students also have access to our advisory board, which includes distinguished Chapman faculty and major demographic scholars from across the country and the world.For additional information, please contact Mahnaz Asghari, Associate Director for the Center for Demographics and Policy, at (714) 744-7635 or asghari@chapman.edu.Follow us on LinkedIn:https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-feudal-future-podcast/Tweet thoughts: @joelkotkin, @mtoplansky, #FeudalFuture #BeyondFeudalismLearn more about Joel's book 'The Coming of Neo-Feudalism': https://amzn.to/3a1VV87Sign Up For News & Alerts: http://joelkotkin.com/#subscribeThis show is presented by the Chapman Center for Demographics and Policy, which focuses on research and analysis of global, national and regional demographic trends and explores policies that might produce favorable demographic results over time.

In this eye-opening episode of History Rage, host Paul Bavill is joined by Professor Hanna Diamond, a leading expert in French history and author of "Josephine Baker's Secret War." Together, they uncover the remarkable and often overlooked wartime contributions of the iconic entertainer and spy, Josephine Baker, who defied expectations and played a crucial role in the Second World War. Episode Highlights:- The Real Josephine Baker: Hanna passionately debunks the myth of Baker as merely a performer in a banana skirt, revealing her as a brave spy and activist who used her fame to fight for justice.- Unseen Wartime Activities: Discover the extent of Baker's involvement in espionage, including her vital contributions to the Allied efforts in North Africa and her work with General de Gaulle.- Celebrity and Intelligence: Explore how Baker's celebrity status allowed her to navigate dangerous territories, gathering intelligence while performing for troops and dignitaries alike.- Intersection of Race and War: The discussion highlights Baker's experiences as a woman of colour in a predominantly white intelligence world, and how her identity both aided and complicated her efforts.- Post-War Activism: Hanna shares insights into Baker's transformation into a civil rights activist, advocating for equality and using her platform to address segregation in America.Join us for a compelling journey through history that not only celebrates Josephine Baker's extraordinary life but also challenges us to reconsider the narratives we hold about historical figures. For those eager to learn more, Hanna's book "Josephine Baker's Secret War" is a must-read. Connect with Professor Hanna Diamond:- Follow Hanna on Twitter: @hannaediamond- Follow Hanna on Instagram: @hdiamond2010- Find her on Bluesky: hdiamond.bsky.socialBuy the Book: Josephine Baker's Secret War: https://uk.bookshop.org/a/10120/9780300279986Support History Rage on Patreon for early episode access, exclusive content, and the chance to engage with future guests at patreon.com/historyrage. Stay connected with History Rage on social media:- Twitter: @HistoryRage- Instagram: @historyrage- Facebook: HistoryRageStay curious, stay passionate, and most importantly, stay angry! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

When 35,000 Allied paratroopers dropped into Holland in September 1944, four Australians from opposite corners of the continent found themselves at the heart of one of World War Two's most catastrophic operations.In this remarkable episode, Mat McLachlan reveals the forgotten Australian stories of Operation Market Garden. Through authentic accounts and personal testimonies, we follow Keith Prowd from Gympie as his burning bomber falls from the sky at 550 feet; Alan Wood from Sydney, typing dispatches while German mortars explode around him; John Hackett from Perth, leading bayonet charges before being hidden by three Dutch sisters who risk everything to save him; and Tom Hall from Melbourne, whose Typhoon rockets try desperately to keep Hell's Highway open.From Prowd's Death March through frozen Poland to Hackett's months in hiding during the Hunger Winter, these four men experienced Market Garden from every angle - in the air, on the ground, and through the typewriter keys that would preserve its history. Their stories capture not just the military disaster, but the extraordinary humanity that emerged from catastrophe.Why did the de Nooij sisters risk execution to hide a stranger? How did Alan Wood keep typing as the battle raged? What drove Keith Prowd's mates to carry him through freezing temperatures when dropping him would save their own lives? Mat explores these questions through the actual words of the men who were there.A powerful testament to the Australians who fought at Arnhem - and the Dutch civilians who saved them."If in years to come any man says to you, 'I fought with the Arnhem airborne force,' take your hat off to him and buy him a drink." - Alan Wood, September 1944Episode Length: 24 minutesFeatures: First-hand accounts from Keith Prowd's 2003 interview, excerpts from personal memoirs and on-location insights from Arnhem and OosterbeekPresenter: Mat McLachlanProducer: Jess StebnickiReady to walk in the footsteps of heroes? Join Mat McLachlan on an exclusive river cruise that visits the battlefields of Waterloo, WWI and WW2 in 2027: https://battlefields.com.au/history-cruises/Find out everything Mat is doing with books, tours and media at https://linktr.ee/matmclachlanFor more great history content, visit www.LivingHistoryTV.com, or subscribe to our YouTube channel at https://www.youtube.com/c/LivingHistoryTV Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

“I focus on contributing and winning—and it's not winning for me—it's winning for everyone on my team.” - Pete HilgerThank you for tuning in to The CUInsight Network, with your host, Robbie Young, Vice President of Strategic Growth at CUInsight. In The CUInsight Network, we take a deeper dive with the thought leaders who support the credit union community. We discuss issues and challenges facing credit unions and identify best practices to learn and grow together.My guest on today's show is Pete Hilger, CEO and president of Allied Solutions, a leading provider of products and services to the credit union industry. Pete shares his fascinating journey, from a young man with entrepreneurial ambitions to his current role leading a company that has a $3 billion annual impact on the credit union industry. Pete describes how he initially wanted to be an entrepreneur, but after a stint in the military, he ended up co-founding a document destruction business with his brother, an experience which taught him the realities of running a company which then led to an opportunity to join his family's business.In our conversation, Pete reveals how he worked his way up through the organization, eventually becoming President and then CEO when the company was sold to Securian in 2004. He discusses the importance of understanding a business from the ground up and how that has made him a stronger and more effective leader. He also discusses the various services Allied Solutions provides to credit unions, from generating non-interest fee income to asset recovery management. He highlights the company's focus on trust in its partnerships, openly sharing financial details to build long-term relationships.As we wrap up, Pete touches upon his deep admiration for his mom and shares insights into leadership, work-life balance, and the importance of gratitude and positivity. Enjoy my conversation with Pete Hilger!Find the full show notes on cuinsight.com.Connect with Pete:Pete Hilger, C.E.O. and president of Allied Solutionsalliedsolutions.net Pete: LinkedInAllied Solutions: LinkedIn | FacebookBook mentioned: Tools of Titans by Timothy Ferriss

On 17 November 1943 Allied troops began their campaign against the Germans and Italians in the Tunisian campaign, in the last effort to push the Axis out of North  Africa, and open the way to Sicily and Italy, and,  as you heard from the Winston Churchill quote at the top, meaning Germany would be surrounded in the last 18 months of the war. So why was this campaign so important, and who was involved? Bestselling historian Saul David joins to discuss Tunisgrad, the long running fight to secure Africa. His new book is out, and links are in the shownotes. Saul David Links Tunisgrad⁠ Aspects of History Links ⁠⁠Latest Issue out - Annual Subscription to Aspects of History Magazine only $9.99/£9.99⁠⁠ ⁠⁠Ollie on X⁠⁠ ⁠⁠Aspects of History on Instagram⁠⁠ Get in touch: history@aspectsofhistory.com Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

This Day in Legal History: Lord Haw-Haw SentencedOn September 19, 1945, William Joyce—infamously known as “Lord Haw-Haw”—was sentenced to death by a British court for high treason. Joyce had gained notoriety during World War II for broadcasting Nazi propaganda over German radio to British audiences, aiming to demoralize Allied troops and civilians. Born in Brooklyn, New York, and raised in the UK and Ireland, Joyce later became a naturalized German citizen and an enthusiastic supporter of Hitler. His broadcasts, delivered in a nasal, sneering voice, opened with the phrase “Germany calling,” and earned him the derisive nickname "Lord Haw-Haw" from British listeners.After the war, Joyce was captured by British forces in Germany and brought back to the UK to stand trial. Despite his German citizenship, the court ruled that he had committed treason because he had held a British passport when he began working for the Nazis. His legal defense argued that he owed no allegiance to Britain at the time of the broadcasts, but the court held that possession of the passport created a duty of allegiance. The case raised significant questions about the limits of national loyalty and the reach of British treason laws.On January 6, 1946, Joyce was executed by hanging at Wandsworth Prison, becoming one of the last people to be executed for treason in the UK. The trial and execution were controversial, with some legal scholars and public commentators questioning the soundness of the court's interpretation of allegiance. Nevertheless, the sentence was seen by many at the time as a necessary response to one of the most prominent domestic collaborators of the war.The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), long considered a cost-effective and critical pillar of U.S. workplace safety, has been effectively dismantled under the Trump administration's 2025 restructuring efforts. The agency, a division of the CDC responsible for certifying N95 masks, studying firefighter deaths, and leading occupational health research, saw roughly 90% of its 1,000 staff receive layoff notices on April 1. This move paralyzed core programs, from black lung screenings to PPE certifications, halting NIOSH's role as both a public safeguard and a quiet corporate consultant. The sudden cuts sparked chaos: lab animals were euthanized, crucial research was frozen, and businesses warned of safety gaps and market instability.Many affected workers have since resigned or are stuck on administrative leave, while others remain in limbo as lawsuits challenge the legality of the terminations. Despite statements from HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. claiming essential functions remain intact, internal confusion and partial walk-backs—like budget proposals still seeking to slash 80% of NIOSH funding—suggest deeper dismantling intentions. Business leaders, labor unions, and safety advocates have united in rare bipartisan pushback, warning of long-term risks to both worker health and industrial standards.The agency's downfall is part of a broader campaign to weaken the federal workforce, spearheaded by Project 2025 architects and executed with sweeping firings, anti-DEI mandates, and deep budget cuts across agencies. Former government scientists describe the collapse of safety infrastructure as a slow, invisible crisis—where the full damage may not emerge for years. With morale shattered and talent fleeing, the future of U.S. workplace safety research is in jeopardy.Trump Team Derailed Corporate America's Most Valuable ConsultantTwo major elements of President Donald Trump's economic agenda—his global tariffs and his attempt to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook—are now in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court, raising pivotal questions about the scope of presidential power. The court has agreed to hear a challenge to Trump's use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose sweeping tariffs, a law traditionally used to sanction hostile foreign actors, not manage trade. Arguments are set for November 5. Separately, Trump is seeking to fire Cook, claiming misconduct; however, critics argue this is a pretext for targeting her policy views and that doing so violates the 1913 law establishing the Fed's independence.Legal scholars warn that siding with Trump in either case could dramatically expand executive authority. Trump has already tested legal boundaries across immigration, diversity, and civil service policy. While lower courts have often blocked his initiatives, the Supreme Court—now with a 6-3 conservative majority including three Trump appointees—has frequently sided with him. The Cook case raises unprecedented constitutional questions, as no president has ever removed a Fed governor.Meanwhile, Trump's tariff actions have destabilized global trade relations and spurred economic uncertainty, though his allies argue they are central to his economic strategy. A decision favoring Trump in both cases could weaken institutional checks on executive power and erode the principle of independent monetary policy.Key parts of Trump's economic agenda now in Supreme Court's hands | ReutersIn Washington, D.C., immigrant neighborhoods like Mount Pleasant, Petworth, and Columbia Heights are pushing back against a surge in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrests under President Donald Trump's intensified immigration enforcement campaign. Local residents have begun organizing in real-time—using chat groups and in-person protests—to disrupt ICE detentions, including a recent case where bystanders successfully pressured officers to release a Guatemalan man. These actions reflect growing distrust and fear within largely Latino communities, where residents report increased racial profiling and aggressive policing.The Trump administration's recent declaration of a “crime emergency” in D.C., coupled with the federalization of local police and a heightened ICE presence, has heightened tensions, especially in areas with deep immigrant roots. Community members and advocacy groups say people are being targeted based on appearance or location, not criminal history. Businesses that once bustled with immigrant patrons are seeing sharp declines in foot traffic, as many residents now avoid public spaces out of fear.Federal officials defend the enforcement as targeting serious offenders, but critics point out that many arrests involve individuals without criminal records. A Supreme Court ruling this month has further enabled ICE to continue race- or location-based arrests. Meanwhile, residents like Yessica Gonzalez and Nelvin Rodriguez say the climate of fear is unlike anything they've previously experienced. The increased enforcement has not only disrupted lives but also strained local economies and community trust.Washington's immigrant neighborhoods push back against ICE arrests | ReutersThe U.S. Senate has confirmed John Squires, a veteran intellectual property attorney and former Goldman Sachs executive, as the new head of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) under President Donald Trump. Squires takes over at a critical time, as the agency grapples with global competition from China and emerging legal challenges surrounding artificial intelligence in the patent process. His appointment follows a broad push by Senate Republicans to confirm a slate of Trump nominees despite Democratic opposition.Squires brings a deep background in both corporate and legal arenas, having worked on IP and tech issues at firms like Honeywell and most recently at Dilworth Paxson, where he focused on AI, blockchain, and cybersecurity. He has also taught at the University of Pennsylvania. His predecessor, Kathi Vidal, led the USPTO during the Biden administration and returned to private practice following Trump's 2024 election victory.The USPTO plays a vital role in the American innovation ecosystem, handling patent and trademark applications and advising the government on intellectual property policy. The agency's Patent Trial and Appeal Board frequently mediates high-stakes disputes over patent validity, especially in the tech sector. Squires steps into the role amid heightened political scrutiny, including a controversial Commerce Department order to review patents held by Harvard University as part of a broader White House campaign linked to campus antisemitism concerns.US Senate confirms Trump's pick to run US Patent and Trademark Office | ReutersThis week's closing theme is by Gustav Mahler.This week's closing theme comes from one of the most enigmatic works in the orchestral repertoire: Mahler's Symphony No. 7, specifically its haunting first movement, Langsam – Allegro risoluto, ma non troppo. Composed between 1904 and 1905 and premiered on September 19, 1908, this symphony marks a fascinating midpoint in Mahler's artistic evolution—bridging the lush Romanticism of his earlier works with the more fractured, modernist terrain of his later symphonies.The first movement opens with a dark, slow introduction featuring the eerie voice of the tenor horn, an instrument rarely heard in symphonic writing. Its strange, searching call sets a tone of unease, as if the music is emerging from shadow. What follows is a restless march full of contrasts—grim fanfares, lyrical episodes, and bursts of uneasy energy—all presented with Mahler's characteristic sense of orchestral color and irony.Unlike the more spiritual or pastoral moods of Mahler's other symphonies, the Seventh is often described as "problematic," even "nightmarish"—a label Mahler himself rejected. He referred to the symphony as a progression “from night into day,” and this opening movement represents the beginning of that journey: turbulent, disoriented, and shot through with moments of beauty and menace.Mahler's orchestration here is dense and highly detailed, often requiring massive forces and unconventional instruments. Yet beneath its complexity lies a deep emotional current—one that shifts rapidly from the grotesque to the sublime. The movement ends not with resolution but with a kind of defiant uncertainty, a theme Mahler would continue to explore in his final works.As our closing theme this week, Langsam – Allegro reminds us that the path through darkness is rarely straightforward—and that art, like life, often resists tidy interpretation.Without further ado, Gustav Mahler's Langsam – Allegro risoluto, ma non troppo– enjoy! This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

In August 1942, over 7,000 Allied troops stormed the beaches of Normandy, France, in a largely forgotten landing, with only a small fraction surviving unscathed. The raid failed due to poor planning and lack of underwater reconnaissance, which left the Allies unaware of strong German coastal defenses and underwater obstacles. Inadequate submersible technology prevented effective pre-landing surveys, leading to heavy casualties and the inability to secure a foothold. Scientists had a rudimentary grasp of mixing air for prolonged underwater survival, with limited rebreather technology, poor understanding of oxygen toxicity, and inadequate gas supply systems. Two summers before D-Day, the Allies realized they desperately needed underwater intelligence to succeed in another beach invasion and win the war. Led by controversial biologists J.B.S. Haldane and Dr. Helen Spurway, an ingenious team of ragtag scientists worked in makeshift labs throughout the London Blitz. Amid a rain of bombs, they pioneered groundbreaking advances in underwater reconnaissance through painful and potentially fatal self-experiments. Their discoveries enabled the safe use of miniature submarines and breathing apparatuses, ultimately allowing the Allies to take the beaches of Normandy. Blast-injury specialist Dr. Rachel Lance, author of Chamber Divers: The Untold Story of the D-Day Scientists Who Changed Special Operations Forever, joined us a few years ago to discuss the CSS Hunley, a Confederate submersible used during the American Civil War, the first submarine to sink an enemy ship in combat. We explore these experiments while bringing to life the men and women whose brilliance and self-sacrifice shaped the war’s outcome, including the danger they faced in their quest to enable Allied troops to breathe underwater.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Imagine you're an Allied soldier in the Pacific during WWII. You're captured by the Japanese, survive brutal conditions as a POW, and the dangerous voyage in a “hell ship” to Japan, where you endure more years of captivity. Finally, in August 1945, the war ends. You're freed, ready to go home. But there will be no happy ending. Some transport planes and ships never make their destination, including a B-24 carrying 20 former POWs, which crashes into a 3,496-meter peak in Taiwan's southern Central Mountain Range during a typhoon. Compounding the sadness, 26 members of a team made up of Japanese, Taiwanese, and Indigenous people die in a rescue/retrieval attempt.This once little-known story was featured in Season Two of Formosa Files. In 2025, however – the 80th anniversary – many news organizations featured stories marking the event. Taiwan President Lai offered a moving tribute in a Facebook post, which in part read, “Eighty years ago, a group of people, without regard to nationality, blood, or side in the war, risked their lives to save others.”Help others find us by rating/reviewing the show.

Washington restarts US arms shipments to Kyiv under a new agreement. Plus: Why Japan will not recognise a Palestinian state at next week’s UN summit and photographer Olivia Arthur on the Fujikina London 2025 festival.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Allied Intervention into the Russian Civil War remains one of the most ambitious yet least talked about military ventures of the 20th century. Coinciding with the end of the first World War, some 180,000 troops from several countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Greece, Poland, and Romania, among others, were sent to fight alongside Russian “Whites” against the Red Army. Despite one victory for the Allied troops – independence for the Latvians and the Estonians – the two-year long attempt at reversing the 1917 Russian Revolution ended in humiliating defeat. To explore this crucial event of the early 20th century is today’s guest, Anna Reid, author of “A Nasty Little War: The Western Intervention into the Russian Civil War.” What was originally aimed to prevent Germany from exploiting the power vacuum in Eastern Europe left by the Russian Revolution ultimately morphed into the Allies’ gamble to destroy Communist ideology. It was a mixture of good intentions and self-delusion, flag-waving and empty promises, cover-ups, exaggerations, and downright lies from politicians.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions. Why did Japan, or better said, why did Emperor Hirohito decide to finally surrender? It seems obvious on the face of it, but there is actually a lot more to it than bombs or Soviet invasions. I guess you can call this episode a teaser or a shameless plug for going over to my Youtube Membership or Patreon. There's honestly a lot of interesting subjects such as ‘why was the japanese army so brutal”, “Hirohito's war time responsibility”, “the 4 part Kanji Ishiwara series”. Thus if you liked this one please show some love and check out my other stuff on my Youtube Membership or over at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.   Stating all of that lets just jump right into it.   We first need to start off briefly looking at Emperor Hirohito.    Upon taking the throne, Emperor Hirohito in 1926 Hirohito inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. From the beginning, despite what many of you older audience members may have been told, Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. Hirohito chose when to act and when not to. When the Kwantung Army assassinated Zhang Zuolin, he indulged their insubordination. This emboldened them to invade Manchuria in 1931, whereupon Hirohito was furious and demanded they be reigned in. Attempts were made, but they were heavily undermined by radicals. Hirohito could have put his foot down, but he chose not to. On September 22nd, at 4:20pm Hirohito said to the IJA Chief of General staff, Kanaya Hanzo “although this time it couldn't be helped, the army had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito again acquiesced to the military, despite wanting them to stop or at least localize the conflict. The military had disregarded his wishes, they should have been severely punished. Why did Hirohito not take a firmer stance?    Again for older audience members you may have heard, “hirohito was a hostage at the whim of his own military”. This narrative made it seem he was some sort of hostage emperor, but this is not the case at all. In fact Hirohito was instrumental in many military decisions from 1931-1945. The reason this, I will call it “myth” , went on was because after Japan's surrender, the US basically rewrote the Japanese constitution and covered up the Emperor's involvement in all the nasty stuff, to maintain control over Japan. Yeah it sounds a bit conspiracy esque, but I assure you it was indeed the case. This narrative held firm all the way until Hirohito's death, when finally meeting notes and personal accounts from those close to him came out, illuminating a lot. Though to this day, many records are still red -tapped.   The reason Hirohito did not stamp his foot down has to do with the Kokutai.    The Kokutai   So before I carry on, I have to explain what exactly is the Kokutai.    The Kokutai, loosely translated as "national essence," refers to the qualities that distinguish the Japanese identity. However, this concept is remarkably vague and poorly defined; even Japanese historians acknowledge this ambiguity. In contrast to Kokutai is seitai, or "form of government." While the Kokutai embodies the eternal and immutable aspects of Japanese polity—rooted in history, traditions, and customs centered around the Emperor—Japan's seitai has evolved significantly throughout its extensive history. For instance, shoguns governed for over 700 years until 1868, when the Meiji Restoration reinstated direct imperial rule.   Nevertheless, Emperor Meiji's direct authority came to an end with the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, which established a constitutional monarchy, introducing significant complexities into the governance system.   Article 4 of the constitution declares: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the Imperial Diet.” Under this framework, the Emperor alone possessed the power to appoint or dismiss ministers of state, declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties, direct national administration, and command the army and navy.   A glaring flaw in this arrangement is the inherent ambiguity of the Meiji Constitution. While it established a democratic parliament, it simultaneously afforded the Emperor absolute authority to usurp it. The document failed to clearly define the relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and its language was intentionally vague. Most critically, the military—the army and navy—were not directly accountable to the civilian government.    So with the kokutai, the Emperor is a divine figure who embodies the state's sovereignty. It was not necessarily the Emperor's job to surrender on behalf of the official government of Japan, but he most certainly could do so, given the Japanese people still remained faithful to the kokutai.    Now Hirohito did not live an ordinary life. According to the imperial custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. One thing that was absolutely indoctrinated into him was to defend the kokutai. It became his top mission as a monarch, it was the only mission in many ways. At the very core of how he saw the world and how he acted, it was always to protect the kokutai.    So when the Japanese military began these insubordinate acts, Hirohito's primary concern was to the kokutai, ie: anything that threatened his imperial authority and the imperial institution itself. Although the military usurped his authority, the operations had been successful. Hirohito was not at all opposed to seeing his empire expand. He understood the value of manchuria, he was fully onboard with the military plans to eventually seize control over it, but these radicals were accelerating things to quickly for everyone's liking. He turned a blind eye, dished light punishments and carried on. However the local conflict escalated. It traveled to Shanghai by 1932 and here Hirohito took action. He understood Shanghai was full of western powers. Nations like Britain and America could place economic sanctions on Japan if things were allowed to get out of hand here. So he ordered General Yoshinori Shirakawa to bring the Shanghai expedition to a close.    During this period, two factions emerged within the Japanese military: the Kodoha, or “Imperial Way,” and the Toseiha, or “Control” faction. The Kodoha was founded by General Sadao Araki and his protégé, Jinzaburo Masaki. Their primary objective was a Shōwa Restoration aimed at purging Japan of corrupt politicians and businessmen, especially those associated with the zaibatsu. Composed mainly of young army officers, the Kodoha espoused a romanticized and radical interpretation of Bushido, idealizing pre-industrial Japan, which Araki believed had been tainted by Western influences. To achieve their goals, they resorted to assassinations and planned a coup d'état.   In response, the Toseiha faction was formed, initially led by Lt. General Tetsuzan Nagata and later by Hideki Tojo. Like the Kodoha, the Toseiha sought a Shōwa Restoration but adopted a more moderate and conservative approach. They recognized the importance of preserving traditional values while integrating Western ideals, advocating for a balanced perspective. The Toseiha promoted pragmatic military strategies to navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Although they acknowledged the existence of corrupt politicians and zaibatsu, they preferred to work within the existing political system, anticipating that future total wars would necessitate a strengthened industrial and military capacity. Their ranks primarily included promising graduates from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Academy, Army Staff College, and select naval members. The most significant distinction between the two factions was that the Toseiha explicitly rejected the use of a coup d'état in pursuit of their goals.   Between 1932-1936 radical officers, mostly of the Kodoha faction assassinated politicians and military leaders trying to usher in a showa restoration. You might be led to believe this was in the interest of Hirohito, you would be mistaken. Hirohito did not want a military dictatorship at the whim of the cult of the emperor. Ironic to say, given how WW2 turns out mind you. This really would have been a hostage situation. Hirohito wanted to maintain the exact ambiguous situation that was Showa Era Japan pre 1945. He saw this as the most ideal structure to defend the kokutai, because blame could not be placed solely upon his shoulders. He always maintained a get out of jail free card one could say.    The February 26 incident of 1936, was the climax of the Kodoha faction. They performed a mutiny trying to usher in a SHowa restoration. They assumed when their messenger came to the emperor he would join them and take direct rule. Instead Hirohito was furious. His first thought was the mutineers were trying to enlist his brother Chichibu to overthrow him. He dragged his brother who was a fraternizer amongst the kodoha members mind you, into a meeting, demanding he never associate with them again nor attempt to challenge him. Then Hirohito furious demanded the mutineers be dealt with. At one point he even threatened to lead the imperial guards to put them down. The coup failed, the kodoha faction was destroyed. Ironically the toseiha faction were the ones to do it and thus they became the defacto ruling clique.    The military, especially the kwantung army did not stop with their insubordination.    On July 8th of 1937 the Kwangtung army performed the Marco Polo Bridge incident, ushering in the second sino-japanese war. This was one of many false flag operations they had pulled off over the years. Upon being told about this Hirohito's first response was whether the USSR would invade Manchukuo over the matter. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied. Hirohito furious demanded to know what contingency plans existed and his advisors told him before he gave his red seal of approval to invade northern china.   Henceforth he micromanaged a lot of the military decisions going forward and he oversaw the forming and dissolving of numerous cabinets and positions when things went his way or did not in the military and political scene.  Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Nanking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer.   By 1939 the US began threatening sanctions for what Japan was doing in China. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”.   Fast forward a bit, with war raging in Europe Hirohito, on June 19th of 1940 Hirohito asked if chief of staff Prince Kan'in and Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” This question highlighted Hirohito's belief at that time that Germany was close to achieving victory, which led him to gradually consider deploying troops to French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies since neither of those parent nations was in a position to protect their territories and vital resources. Regarding the war in China, the Japanese aimed to stop the flow of materials entering China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicating that Britain would not agree to block the shipment of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military recognized that an invasion of Hong Kong might be necessary, which would mean declaring war on Britain. When this was communicated to him, Hirohito responded, “If that occurs, I'm sure America will enforce an embargo, don't you think?” In response, Kido, the lord of the privy seal, reassured him by stating, “The nation must be fully prepared to resist, proceeding with caution and avoiding being drawn into events instigated by foreign interests.”   Hirohito went through countless meetings, but eventually signed order number 458 authorizing the invasion of French Indochina, knowing full well the consequences. The US,UK and Netherlands began embargoes of oil, rubber and iron. In the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.   On October 13th Hirohito told his closest advisor Koichi Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.”   The reason I am bringing up all this stuff is to solidify, Hirohito had agency, he was micromanaging and forming decisions. After the war broke out with the west, Hirohito did have the ability to stamp his foot down. Of course there could have been wild repercussions, his military could have usurped him with Chichibu, it was definitely possible. But you need to keep this mind set, as far as why Hirohito acts or doesn't, its always to protect the Kokutai. Thus one of the levers for peace, solely rested on Hirohito's perception if the kokutai could be retained or not.    From the outset of the Pacific War, Hirohito believed Germany was going to defeat the USSR. In line with his military leaders, they all believed Japan had to seize everything they could in the asia-pacific and thwart off the US until a negotiated peace could be met. Hirohito committed himself to overseeing the war, determined to achieve victory at any cost. He was a very cautious leader, he meticulously analyzed each campaign, anticipating potential setbacks and crafting worst-case scenario predictions. He maintained a skeptical view of the reports from his senior officials and was often harshly critical of high commanders.   While he did not frequently visit the front lines like other commanders in chief, Hirohito wielded significant influence over theater operations, shaping both planning and execution whenever he deemed necessary. Similar to his approach during the war in China, he issued the highest military orders from the Imperial Headquarters, conducted audited conferences, and made decisions communicated under his name. He regularly welcomed generals and admirals to the imperial palace for detailed briefings on the battlefront and visited various military bases, battleships, and army and naval headquarters. His inspections encompassed military schools and other significant military institutions, adding to his comprehensive involvement in the war effort.   Now the war went extremely well for Japan until the battle of Midway. This was as major setback, but Japan retained the initiative. Then the Guadalcanal campaign saw Japan lose the initiative to the Americans. Upon receiving the initial report of the Ichiki detachment's destruction, Hirohito remarked, “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” Despite the numerous reports detailing the devastating effects of tropical diseases and starvation on his troops, he persistently demanded greater efforts from them. Hirohito exerted continuous pressure on his naval and land commanders to retake the island. On September 15th, November 5th, and November 11th, he requested additional Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops and aircraft to be allocated to the cause.   General Sugiyama expressed concerns about dispatching more IJA pilots due to their inexperience in transoceanic combat, preferring to reinforce the North China Army for an attack on Chongqing instead. Hirohito pressed the issue again, but Sugiyama responded that the IJA had diverted its air resources to New Guinea and Rabaul. Undeterred by the objections from senior commanders, Hirohito persisted in his demands. By late November, it became evident that Guadalcanal was a lost cause.   At an Imperial Headquarters conference on December 31st, 1942, the chiefs of staff proposed canceling the attempts to recapture Guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned this decision but stated, “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” He insisted on this point, leading to the selection of new strategic targets in the Solomons, north of New Georgia, and in the Stanley Range on New Guinea. Hirohito even threatened to withhold authorization for withdrawing troops from Guadalcanal until a new plan was established. He later opposed the withdrawal from Munda Airfield, as it contradicted the newly defined defensive line.   As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern Solomons began to crumble, Hirohito continued to insist that the navy engage in decisive battles to regain the initiative, allowing for the transport of supplies to the many soldiers trapped on various islands. When he learned of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd, he asked, “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for a while.” The phrase “Do this for me” would come to be his signature rallying cry.   After Guadal canal, it was loss after loss for Japan. By February of 1944, Hirohito forced Sugiyama to resign so Hideki Tojo could take his position as chief of the general staff, note Tojo was prime minister and army minister at this point. Hirohito worked alongside Tojo to plan some last ditch efforts to change the war situation. The most significant one was Operation Ichi-Go. As much damage as they did to China with that, Chiang Kai-Shek's government survived. Hirohito watched as island by island fell to the Americans. When the Americans were poised to take Saipan he warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” Saipan fell, so Hirohito stopped supporting Tojo and allowed his rivals to take down his cabinet by june 18th of 1944.    Hirohito remained resolute in his determination to wrest victory from the Allies. On October 18th, the Imperial Headquarters ordered a decisive naval engagement, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After the war, Hirohito publicly stated, "Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I consented to the showdown battle at Leyte, believing that if we launched an attack and America hesitated, we might find an opportunity to negotiate." Leyte Gulf didnt work. The military began the kamikaze program. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    The Surrender time   Now we come to the time period where Japan seriously began looking for ways to surrender. In Europe Germany was heading to its defeat and Japan knew this. As for Japan, their army in Burma had been annihilated. Their forces in China were faring better after Operation Ichi-go, having opened up a land corridor along the main railway from Beiping to Wuhan and from throughout Guangdong but still stuck in a deadlock stalemate, facing a guerrilla war that was costing them 64% of their military expenditures. They deeply feared once the Soviets finished up with Germany, they would undoubtedly turn east against Manchuria. With the Soviets attacking from the north, the US would attack from the south, perhaps landing in Shanghai and the home islands. The Kamikaze tactics were proving formidable, but not nearly enough. By 1945, 43% of the IJA were now stationed in Japan, Korea and Formosa, bracing for the final stand. Former prime minister Reijiro Wakatsuki came out of retirement in may of 1945, having heard Germany collapsed, to urge Hirohito and the Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki to open negotiations with the US as soon as possible. However he also said “the enemy must first be made to see the disadvantages of continuing the war”. To this Hirohito's chief counselor Makino Nobuaki said that “the ultimate priority is to develop an advantageous war situation.” Advisor admiral Kesiuke Okada said Japan should wait for “a moment favorable for us,” then make peace. Advisors Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota advised the emperor to fight on until the end.   Now I want to bring in a key player to the surrender decision, that of Prince Konoe. Konoe was very close to Hirohito and understood the emperors mentality, especially how he viewed things in relation to the kokutai.    The senior statesman Prince Konoe had been consulting with Hirohito for over 18 months at this point trying to convey the message that if the war continued it would threaten the kokutai. Many months prior, he confided in the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, that the army was suffering from “a cancer” in the form of the Toseiha faction. However, he noted that “Kido and others” did not share his perspective, while “his Majesty is relatively unconcerned with ideological issues.” For the past four years, he continued, the emperor had been advised and still believed that “the true extremists are the Kodoha faction.” In reality, the greater threat to the kokutai arose from the Toseiha faction. Konoe further asserted that if the war escalated, they would attempt to alter the kokutai.   Konoe speculated that whether the threat originated from communists within the nation, primarily referring to left-wing radicals in the Toseiha faction, or from the “Anglo-American enemy,” both would seek to preserve the emperor while pushing towards the country's communization.In his written report to the emperor on February 14, which Kido listened to attentively, Konoe elaborated on his conspiracy theory. He asserted that the Soviet Union regarded Japan as its primary threat in East Asia. The Soviets had allied with the Chinese Communists, the largest and most formidable Communist party in Asia, and were collaborating with the United States and Britain to drive Japan out of China. He warned that they would enter the war when the opportunity arose.   Defeat, he cautioned the emperor, was inevitable if the conflict persisted. However, he emphasized that a far greater fear was the potential destruction of the kokutai. The ongoing war was eroding the domestic status quo, unleashing forces that threatened Japan and its imperial institution from within as much as from external adversaries. The real danger lay in the emperor's and Kido's trust in the generals of the Toseiha faction, who were unintentionally facilitating the communization of Japan. Konoe implored for a swift peace settlement before a Communist revolution emerged, making the preservation of the kokutai impossible. Hirohito agreed with Konoe but stated “ To end the war would be “very difficult unless we make one more military gain.” Konoe allegedly replied, “Is that possible? It must happen soon. If we have to wait much longer, . . . [a mere battle victory] will mean nothing.” Hirohito replied “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.”   On February 15th of 1945, Hirohito's intelligence warned the Soviet Union would likely abrogate its Neutrality Pact with Japan. Even Tojo conceded there was a 50/50 chance the USSR would invade Manchuria. In March, the US began B-29 incendiary bombing raids over Tokyo, turning 40% of the capital into ash. On March 18th, Hirohito with some aides drove around the capital to witness the devastation. The civilians looked exhausted and bewildered to Hirohito. Factory production was collapsing, absenteeism was rising, instances of lese majeste were running rampant. For the next 5 months imperial family members and senior statesmen all began speaking to Hirohito about the “crises of the kokutai”. The threat Konoe had warned about for months was becoming the main talking point. It seemed like the Japanese people within the countryside and urban areas remained steadfast in the resolve to obey their leaders, work and sacrifice for their nation, but for how long would they feel so?    It was only after the battle for Okinawa was lost and 60 Japanese cities had been leveled by American incendiary bombs that Hirohito openly indicated he wanted to negotiate a surrender.   Kido's diary reveals the first clear indication that the emperor might be urged to consider an early peace on June 8, 1945, when Kido drafted his “Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation.” This marked a pivotal moment. It followed the unintentional bombing of the Imperial Palace, the complete loss of hope for saving Okinawa, and coincided with the day the Supreme War Leadership Council adopted the “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War.” With the fighting in Europe concluded, Japan found itself entirely isolated. Kido's plan, although vague, proposed seeking the Soviet Union's assistance as an intermediary to help Japan gain leverage in negotiations with its adversaries. By drafting this plan, Kido signaled the end of his long alliance with the military hard-liners. Hirohito's acceptance of it indicated his readiness for an early peace.   Hirohito was moved to an underground bunker in the mountains of Matsushiro in Nagano prefecture where upon those around him noted he fell into a deep depression. On June 22nd  Hirohito informed the Supreme War Leadership Council he wanted them to open diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. In early July Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik broke off inconclusive talks with Hirota. Hirohito stepped in immediately and ordered a new special envoy be sent to Moscow. However Hirohito nor the Suzuki government had concrete plans on how to mediate a surrender through the Soviets. The only things they did prioritize was a guarantee of the emperors political position and retainment of the imperial system, ie the kokutai. This was taken into consideration rather than ending the war as quickly as possible to save the lives of millions.    From April 8, 1945, until Japan's capitulation, the Suzuki government's chief war policy was “Ketsugo,” an advanced iteration of the “Shosango” (Victory Number 3) plan for defending the homeland. The hallmark of this strategy was a heavy reliance on suicide tactics, including deploying a massive number of kamikaze “special attack” planes, human torpedoes launched from submarines, dynamite-stuffed “crash boats” powered by truck engines, human rocket bombs carried by aircraft, and suicide assaults by specially trained ground units.   While preparations for Operation Ketsu progressed, the Imperial Diet convened on June 9 to pass a Wartime Emergency Measures Law, along with five additional measures aimed at mobilizing the entire nation for this final battle. On the same day, the emperor, who had yet to initiate efforts to end the war, issued another imperial rescript in conjunction with the Diet's convocation, instructing the nation to “smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations” and “achieve the goals of the war.” Concurrently, the controlled press launched a daily die-for-the-emperor campaign to foster gratitude for the imperial benevolence and, from around mid-July onward, initiated a campaign to “protect the kokutai.”   The Americans countered with their own propaganda aimed at breaking Japan's will to fight. B-29 bombers dropped millions of leaflets written in Japanese, announcing the next scheduled targets for bombing raids and urging surrender, while using the emperor to challenge the militarists. Leaflets bearing the chrysanthemum crest criticized the “military cliques” for “forcing the entire nation to commit suicide” and called on “everyone” to “exercise their constitutional right to make direct appeals [for peace] to the Emperor.” They asserted that “even the powerful military cliques cannot stop the mighty march for peace of the Emperor and the people.” One notable batch of seven million leaflets conveyed the terms of the “joint declaration” issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China. “Today we come not to bomb you,” they stated. “We are dropping this leaflet to inform you of the response from the United States government to your government's request for conditions of surrender.... Whether the war stops immediately depends on your government. You will understand how to end the war if you read these two official notifications.”   Amid pressures from imperial edicts to continue preparations for a final battle and focus solely on victory, the Japanese people were also subjected to an intense American psychological warfare campaign in addition to aerial bombardment. During late July and August, prefectural governors, police chiefs, and officers of the “special higher police” submitted reports to the Home Ministry detailing the rapidly deteriorating national morale.    Now on the other side, Roosevelt made it known back in January of 1943 at the Casablanca conference, the allies would only accept unconditional surrender. By 1945, the allies understood the predicament this left Japan with. On May 8th of 1945, Truman added “Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people” trying to indicate a non vindictive spirit. However the Kokutai question always remained ambiguous. State Department Joseph Grew, the former ambassador to Japan, began arguing to Truman they needed to make public a clear definition of the terms to persuade Japan to surrender. As he argued to Truman: Emperor Hirohito was seen as the key figure in Japan's surrender, likened to a "queen bee in a hive... surrounded by the attentions of the hive." Throughout the war, he was characterized in various ways—as a “puppet” of the militarists, a constitutional monarch, and a pacifist. Grew had immense faith in the influence exerted by what he referred to as the “moderates” surrounding the Japanese throne.    However many of Grew's colleagues argued the future existence of the monarchy was intolerable as it was akin to fascism. Many wanted to punish the emperor. Truman was in a tug of war. The Potsdam declaration issued on July 26th of 1945 came in the form of a ultimatum aiming to quicken japans surrender. Truman clarified the terms for the unconditional surrender at the end of its terms: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Zero mention of the emperor. Grew had argued to add “this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.” But it was deleted from the article. The status of the emperor was not guaranteed, the kokutai was thus up in the air.    The next day, the Suzuki cabinet rejected the terms. The Japanese leadership and Hirohito were still banking and awaiting Soviet replies to their terms.    Lets talk about the Soviet talks now   Back on July 12th ambassador Naotake Satō sent this message to the Soviets: “His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland”.  However the Soviets had made commitments to their allies, promising in fact to invade Japan to aid them.    As for the Soviets their primary objective was to ensure unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean. The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastline, particularly Vladivostok, could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. Securing these territories to guarantee free access to the Soya Strait was their main goal. Secondary objectives included acquiring leases for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Southern Manchuria Railway, as well as gaining control over Dairen and Port Arthur.   To achieve these aims, Stalin and Molotov prolonged negotiations with the Japanese, creating a false sense of hope for a Soviet-mediated peace. Simultaneously, in their discussions with the United States and Britain, the Soviets insisted on strict adherence to the Cairo Declaration, which had been reaffirmed at the Yalta Conference. This declaration stipulated that the Allies would not accept a separate or conditional peace with Japan; thus, the Japanese would need to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. The Soviets aimed to prolong the war by opposing any efforts to dilute this requirement. This approach would provide the Soviets with the necessary time to complete the transfer of their troops from the Western Front to the Far East and to conquer Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and potentially Hokkaidō, starting with an assault on Rumoi. AUGUST 1945   Thus we come to at last the critical point, August of 1945.    The Americans prepared for the deployment of atomic bombs and for an invasion of southern Kyushu, known as Operation Olympic, scheduled to commence on November 1. At 8:15 A.M. on August 6, a single B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay dropped little boy, devastating much of the undefended city of Hiroshima, instantly killing an estimated 100,000 to 140,000 people and leading to the deaths of possibly another 100,000 over the next five years. At the epicenter of the explosion, “a light appeared 3,000 times brighter than the sun,” creating a fireball that emitted thermal radiation capable of “instantly scorching humans, trees, and houses.” As the air heated and rushed upward, cold air surged in to ignite a firestorm. Hours later, a whirlwind escalated the flames to their peak until more than eight square miles were virtually reduced to cinders. Subsequently, black, muddy rain filled with radioactive fallout began to fall. Two days later, using Japan's rejection of the Potsdam Declaration as a pretext, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Then on August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, resulting in the immediate deaths of approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people and injuring more than 60,000.   Meanwhile, in Tokyo, during the critical period between the Potsdam Declaration and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito remained silent about accepting the Potsdam terms. However, on July 25 and 31, he explicitly conveyed to Kido that the imperial regalia must be defended at all costs. The three sacred objects—a mirror, a curved jewel, and a sword—symbolized the legitimacy of his rule through the northern court and were integral to his identity as the divine sovereign. Hirohito's focus was on protecting these symbols of office, as he insisted on having them brought to the palace. This fixation on maintaining his symbols occurred during a pivotal moment when the pressing issue was whether to accept immediate capitulation. Reflecting on this, he was unprepared to seize the opportunity to end the war himself.   Prime Minister Suzuki, following his initial rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum, also saw no need for further action. His Cabinet Advisory Council, which included the president of Asano Cement, the founder of the Nissan consortium, the vice president of the Bank of Japan, and other representatives from the nation's leading business interests that had profited significantly from the war, convened on the morning of August 3. They recommended accepting the Potsdam terms, arguing that the United States would permit Japan to retain its non-military industries and continue participating in world trade.    Here are some reactions to the two bombs and invasion of Manchuria.    Yonai Mitsumasa said to admiral Takagi Sokichi, on August 12, that “I think the term is perhaps inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods [tenyu, also “heaven-sent blessings”]. This way we don't have to say that we quit the war because of domestic circumstances. I've long been advocating control of our crisis, but neither from fear of an enemy attack nor because of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. The main reason is my anxiety over the domestic situation. So, it is rather fortunate that we can now control matters without revealing the domestic situation”.    Konoe's characterized the Soviet involvement in the war as “a godsend for controlling the army,”. Kido viewed of both the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the conflict as “useful” elements for ensuring a smooth transition. A nascent power struggle was unfolding, rendering the potential death toll—whether one hundred thousand or two hundred thousand—immaterial to those involved, as long as their desired outcome was achieved: an end to the war that would leave the monarchy intact and capable of managing the discontent that defeat would inevitably provoke. Throughout the final acts of this wartime drama, the Japanese “moderates” found it easier to capitulate to external pressures than to take decisive action on their own to conclude the war.   Another illuminating looks at Japan's elite's perspective on surrender terms was the document titled “Essentials of Peace Negotiations” (wahei kosho no yoryo). Drafted by Konoe and his adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Sakai Koji, after Konoe had reluctantly accepted a mission to Moscow, this document, stipulated the preservation of the emperor system, along with most of the imperial prerogatives, as the absolute minimum condition for peace. It defined the “original” or “essential homeland” as including the southern half of the Kurile Islands but showed a willingness to concede all overseas territories to the enemy, including Okinawa and the American-occupied Bonin Islands, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. The “Essentials” also accepted complete disarmament for an unspecified period, thereby compromising on the issues of demobilizing and disarming the armed forces. More significantly, an “explanation” attached to the “Essentials” emphasized that “the main aim is to secure the imperial line and maintain the political role of the emperor.”    Why Japan surrendered   We come to it atleast after a long podcast. Why did Japan ultimately surrender?   The twin psychological shocks of the first atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, combined with Kido's and the emperor's concern over escalating public criticism of the throne and its occupant, fueled an almost paranoid fear that, sooner or later, the populace would react violently against their leaders if the war persisted much longer. These factors ultimately led Hirohito to accept, in principle, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.   At the first meeting of the six member constituents of the Supreme War Leadership Council, held from 10:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. on August 9, Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chiefs of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, representing the army, and Yonai, representing the navy, along with Tōgō, from the Foreign Ministry, were expected to discuss the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Instead, the conversation revolved around whether to attempt a conditional surrender—specifically, should they insist on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, or four?   After Suzuki addressed the assembly regarding the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet attack, Yonai, as recounted by Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, was the first to speak, framing the issue in terms of four conditions. “Let's start to talk, Do we accept the Potsdam Declaration with no conditions? If not, and we wish to insist on attaching hopes and conditions, we may do so this way. First, preservation of the kokutai; then for the rest, the main items in the Potsdam Declaration: treatment of war criminals, method of disarmament, and the matter of sending in an army of occupation.” Thus, the participants identified what they perceived to be the ambiguous points within the Potsdam Declaration and used them as the foundation for their discussions.   The army insisted on four conditions: First, the preservation of the kokutai, which they considered distinct from the Potsdam Declaration itself. The other conditions proposed were, second, that the Imperial Headquarters assume responsibility for disarmament and demobilization; third, a prohibition on occupation; and fourth, the delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government. The army equated the kokutai with the emperor's right of supreme command. Their self-serving desire for autonomous war crimes trials was based on the belief that the Allies would use such trials to politically indict the military. Consequently, army leaders aimed to preempt the activities of any international tribunal by conducting their own trials—similar to the approach taken by the uninvaded and unrepentant Germans after World War I.   Supporting the military's views during cabinet meetings that day were three civilian members of the Suzuki cabinet: Justice Minister Matsuzaka Hiromasa, Home Minister Yasui Toji, and Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko. At the imperial conference that night, which extended into the early hours of the tenth, Foreign Minister Tōgō's interpretation of the “preservation of the kokutai” referred solely to the safeguarding of the Imperial House or dynasty, rather than the continuation of Hirohito's reign.   Hiranuma, another advocate for the single condition, interpreted the kokutai as the “emperor's sovereign right to rule the state [not] deriving from national law. Even if the entire nation is sacrificed to the war, we must preserve both the kokutai and the security of the imperial house.” This discrepancy illustrated that there was no completely unified understanding of what the kokutai entailed; the debate over one condition versus four represented conflicting visions for the future of the Japanese state and masked the competition for political power that was already unfolding.   It remains doubtful whether the emperor and Kido initially sided with Tōgō against the four conditions proposed by the senior military leaders. A more likely inference is that both men retained sympathies for the hardliners, both military and civilian, who preferred to continue the futile war rather than surrender immediately and unconditionally. This may explain why, on August 9, Konoe had Hosokawa Morisada approach Navy General Headquarters to urge the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, to pressure Hirohito (through Kido) to accept the Potsdam terms. Later that afternoon, Konoe enlisted the help of diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru to persuade Kido to reconsider his stance on the four conditions. Ultimately, at the urging of Takamatsu and Shigemitsu, Kido did shift to support Tōgō's position.   At the end of the war, as at its beginning and throughout every stage of its progression, Emperor Hirohito played a highly active role in supporting the actions carried out in his name. From the very beginning of the Asia-Pacific war, the emperor played a significant role in the unfolding events around him. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, he consistently advocated for a decisive victory. Afterward, he acknowledged the necessity of pursuing an early peace, although he did not favor an immediate cessation of hostilities. Instead, he wavered, steering Japan toward ongoing warfare rather than direct negotiations with the Allies. When the final crisis fully unfolded, the only option left was unconditional surrender. Even then, he continued to procrastinate until the atomic bomb was dropped and the Soviets launched their attack. The wartime emperor ideology that once sustained morale made it exceedingly difficult for Japan's leaders to accept the act of surrender. Aware of their objective defeat, yet indifferent to the suffering the war inflicted on their own people—as well as on the populations of Asia, the Pacific, and the West whose lives they had disrupted—the emperor and his military leaders sought a means to lose without appearing to lose. They aimed to mitigate domestic criticism following surrender while preserving their power structure.   Blinded by their fixation on the fate of the imperial house and committed to an overly optimistic diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, Japan's leaders missed several opportunities to end their lost war. Would Japan's leaders have surrendered more promptly if the Truman administration had “clarified” the status of the emperor before the cataclysmic double shocks of the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war? Probably not. However, it is likely they would have surrendered to prevent the kokutai from being destroyed from within. The evidence suggests that the first atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war led Hirohito, Kido, and other members of the court to believe that continuing the war would inevitably result in that destruction. They recognized that the populace was war-weary and despondent, with rising hostility toward the military and the government, accompanied by increasing criticism of the emperor himself. More specifically, Kido and Hirohito were privy to Home Ministry reports, which contained information from governors and police chiefs nationwide. These reports indicated that citizens were beginning to label the emperor as an incompetent leader responsible for the deteriorating war situation.   This is the third variable, never spoken about. Many first look at the atomic bombs. Bigger brain people turn to the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria. But hardly anyone reads about how the collapse of Japan's social fabric, scared the shit out of the Emperor and his closest advisors. You can't have a kokutai, without a populace that worshiped you.    When the emperor expressed in February, “What worries me is whether the nation [could] endure” long enough to achieve victory, he was not merely voicing concern for the suffering of his subjects; rather, he feared that such suffering could lead to social upheaval—in short, revolution. At that time, he referred to the ordinary, war-related hardships of food shortages, air raids, devastated cities, destruction of homes, and the omnipresent grief from the loss of loved ones. The atomic bomb escalated death, pain, and suffering to unimaginably higher levels, intensifying the threat from within. After the bombings of Japan and two atomic bombs, Hirohito was in a dark way, given a golden get out of jail free card. Hirohito could now save his suffering people from further anguish by surrendering, allowing him to deflect responsibility for leading them into misery while adopting an air of benevolence and care. Indeed, Hirohito did care—though not primarily for the Japanese people, but rather for the survival of his own imperial house and throne.   After the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito delayed for a full two days before instructing Kido, shortly before 10 A.M. on August 9, to “quickly control the situation” because “the Soviet [Union]” had declared war. Kido immediately communicated with Prime Minister Suzuki, who began arrangements for an Imperial Conference scheduled for later that night. Following the seidan of August 10, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu took charge of drafting the “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” based on Hirohito's directives. Assisted by two scholars of the Chinese classics, Kawada Mizuho and Yasuoka Masahiro, Sakomizu worked tirelessly for over three days before submitting a version of the rescript to the Suzuki cabinet. After six hours of contentious discussion on the night of August 14, the cabinet modified and approved the document. Hirohito promptly signed it, and Shimomura and Kido persuaded him to record a suitably opaque final version for broadcast to the nation.   On the night of August 14, the Suzuki government notified the United States and other Allied nations that it had accepted both the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes letter of August 11. Accelerating the emperor's actions during this climactic moment of the unconditional surrender drama was the American psychological warfare campaign. When a leaflet dropped from B-29 bombers came into Kido's possession on the night of August 13 or the morning of the fourteenth, he conferred with the emperor and explained the gravity of the situation. The latest enemy leaflets were informing the Japanese people of the government's notification of surrender under one condition, along with the full text of Byrnes's response. If this continued, it would undermine the imperial government's reliance on secrecy to obscure the true nature of the lost war and the reasons for the prolonged surrender delay.   Given Kido's and the emperor's concerns about rising signs of defeatism, including criticism of the throne, immediate action was necessary to prevent the populace from acting on their own initiative. Thus, the second seidan was convened. At noon on August 15, the Japanese people gathered around their radio receivers and heard, for the first time, the high-pitched voice of their emperor telling them:    “After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration. To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable”.   Clearly Hirohito sought to justify his decision to surrender by citing the dropping of the atomic bombs. He wanted to become the saviour of the Japanese people. Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai.  Interestingly, the surrender declaration to the civilian population was not the same one sent to the military. On August 17th Hirohito issued a second “rescript to soldiers and sailors” throughout the asia-pacific.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The lesser-known August 17 rescript to the army and navy specified Soviet participation as the sole reason for surrender, while maintaining the kokutai as the primary aim. Dissembling until the end—and even beyond—it was noted that the emperor presented two different justifications for his delayed surrender. Both statements were likely true.   Months later Hirohito's said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.”    There exists this sort of childish argument today whether it was the atomic bombs or the Soviet Invasion that caused Japan to surrender. However, this overlooks as I think I've explained in 9000 words jeez, the influence of the kokutai. Defending the kokutai was Hirohito's number one priority. The Soviets threatened it. Communism threatened it. What Japan perceived to be “democracy” threatened it. American victory threatened it. And the destruction of Japan's social fabric threatened it. I love this one piece of history, that I have only come across in one book, that being the main one I am using here.   On August 12th, Hirohito came to the imperial family to tell them he had made the decision to surrender. His uncle Prince Yasuhiko Asaka asked him whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito replied “of course”.

Nick Lloyd's "The Western Front: The History of the Great War, Volume 1" provides a comprehensive narrative of the Great War in Belgium and France from 1914 to 1918. As the first volume of a planned trilogy, this work aims to offer a nuanced understanding of this pivotal theater, moving beyond common myths and focusing on the operational perspective of senior commanders across all involved powers. 1916 VERDUN Here's a summary of the key aspects, figures, and events covered: Lloyd's Ambition and Approach Comprehensive Narrative: Lloyd, a reader in military and imperial history at King's College London, undertook this "big project" to create a grand narrative of the entire Western Front, encompassing the French sector, American sector, and the German story, alongside the often-emphasized British perspective. Focus on Senior Commanders: A primary goal was to view the war from the lens of senior commanders, challenging the traditional portrayal of them as "donkeys or butchers and bunglers." Lloyd aims to help readers appreciate the immense pressures and difficulties these individuals faced, offering a "cooler perspective" on their successes and errors. Trilogy: This book is the first of three volumes; future volumes will cover the Eastern Front and global warfare in the Middle East and Africa. Lloyd emphasizes that while other fronts are mentioned, the Western Front remained the decisive theater where Germany, France, Britain, and America determined the war's outcome. British Involvement and Leadership Initial Reluctance: Britain initially entered the conflict with a limited commitment, deploying only four infantry divisions and one cavalry division as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), a "small army" compared to the French (80 divisions) and Germans (over 100 divisions). This reflected a desire for "limited liability" to the Western Front, contrasting sharply with French demands for more manpower. Early Leaders: H.H. Asquith (Prime Minister) was reportedly distracted by personal affairs at the war's outset. Lord Kitchener (Minister of War) was a professional soldier and hero of the empire, wary of deep British involvement but committed to supporting the French. Field Marshal Sir John French (Commander-in-Chief, BEF) was a Boer War hero who found himself "out of his depth" by 1914, struggling with the war's scale and intensity. During the August 1914 retreat, French considered pulling the BEF out of the line due to immense losses and pressure, a move Kitchener personally intervened to prevent, ordering French to stay and fight. Frencheventually "breaks down" due to losses and pressure and is sent home at the end of 1915. Later Leadership and Strategy: David Lloyd George (Prime Minister from late 1916) is credited as "the prime minister that wins the war" in Britain. He showed great energy in revitalizing British industry and re-equipping the army, despite having poor relations with his top generals. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig replaced French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Haig and Lloyd George had fundamentally different strategic outlooks, leading to "constant arguments and backstabbing". At the Battle of the Somme (1916), Haig favored a breakthrough strategy, aiming for maneuver and cavalry deployment to defeat the German army. However, his army commander, Rawlinson, advocated a "bite and hold" strategy, focusing on concentrated artillery to smash enemy lines, take ground, then consolidate before repeating, acknowledging that a grand breakthrough was not yet feasible for the largely "green" British army. German Strategy and Commanders Initial Invasion: The German invasion of France and Belgium in 1914 was based on the ambitious Schlieffen Plan, which aimed for a massive attack through Belgium to outflank French defenses and destroy their army in a grand battle of envelopment. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (Chief of the General Staff) was under immense pressure and altered the Schlieffen Plan, weakening its critical right wing, and ultimately suffered a nervous breakdown by mid-September 1914. Moltke's controversial decision to order General Kluck's First Army to turn southeast instead of enveloping Paris contributed to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, despite Kluck initially ignoring the order. Kaiser Wilhelm: His character was inconsistent, often described as a "weather vane," and he gradually became a less central figure as Hindenburg and Ludendorff gained influence from 1916. Erich von Falkenhayn (replaces Moltke in 1914) was the architect of the Verdun Offensive (1916). His vision was unique, aiming not for territorial gains but for attrition: to "kill Frenchmen" and exhaust them. Political Interference: Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg often opposed Falkenhayn's desire for unrestricted submarine warfare due to diplomatic concerns (e.g., fear of American entry), illustrating the German military's tendency to prioritize tactical effectiveness over political and strategic issues, which was ultimately "fatal". French Efforts and Leadership Joseph Joffre (Commander of French Forces): Described as a "great hero" of the French army, Joffrepossessed remarkable calmness and an ability to absorb punishment and react quickly. His leadership was crucial in defeating the Schlieffen Plan and counterattacking at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, preventing a German victory. Raymond Poincaré (President of the French Republic): A nationalist deeply involved in military analysis, Poincaré was central to the political efforts to reassert civilian primacy over the army and secure British manpower commitments. General Castelnau (Joffre's chief of staff): A deeply religious man who personally lost three sons in the war, Castelnau exemplifies the human cost and personal horror experienced by some senior commanders, helping to humanize these figures in Lloyd's narrative. Robert Nivelle: An artillery officer who rose rapidly due to his successes at Verdun, Nivelle replaced Joffrein December 1916. He attempted a decisive breakthrough in his Nivelle Offensive in April 1917 with a "formula" for success, but it failed catastrophically due to his being "out of his depth" at the command-in-chief level, leading to French army issues including mutiny. Philippe Pétain: Replaced Nivelle, Pétain became a "savior of France." He was renowned for his deep understanding of battlefield realities and a strong connection with his troops. At Verdun, he innovated by rotating divisions out of the line for rest and recuperation, contrasting with the German practice of fighting units "until basically there's not a lot left". Ferdinand Foch (Supreme Allied Commander from April 1918): Foch is widely regarded as one of the most important generals of the war. He was an energetic and charismatic leader who successfully coordinated the American, British, and French forces in 1918, leading them to victory in the multinational war. His reputation continues to strengthen over time. American Involvement Entry into War: The United States declared war on Germany and Austria in April 1917. General John J. Pershing arrived in Paris in June 1917 to lead the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), despite having only 113,000 men in the army at the time. Rejection of Amalgamation: Pershing steadfastly resisted French and British desires to "amalgamate" American manpower into their existing divisions, insisting that American soldiers fight as an independent army. He argued that the Allies had a poor record of "not killing your own troops". German Miscalculation: Germany severely underestimated how quickly the United States could build and deploy an army, believing it would take years. This misjudgment ultimately contributed to their defeat once the Americans demonstrated their seriousness in 1918. American involvement became "crucial" by 1917, changing the atmosphere. Evolution of Warfare on the Western Front From Movement to Stalemate: The initial German invasion failed to achieve a decisive victory, leading to the establishment of trench warfare after the Battle of the Marne. Realization of No Breakthrough: After the Second Battle of Champagne (1915), Allied and Germancommanders like Joffre and Falkenhayn began to recognize that a "grand shattering breakthrough" was not achievable in the foreseeable future. Constant Adaptation: This realization led to a continuous arms race. As Allied artillery and tactics improved, German defenses evolved from single lines to complex "zones of pill boxes," making progress difficult and bloody. The war became an intense exercise in violence where commanders constantly adapted to a "cauldron of war". Key Battles and Their Significance Battle of the Marne (September 1914): Joffre's successful counterattack forced the Germans to retreat, effectively ending the Schlieffen Plan and leading to the beginning of trench warfare. Second Battle of Champagne (September-October 1915): A major French offensive that, despite immense effort and casualties, failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, solidifying the understanding that trench deadlock could not be easily broken. Verdun (1916): Falkenhayn's attrition battle, designed to "kill Frenchmen," concentrated immense firepower in a small area, creating a "moonscape effect." While not decisive in destroying the French, it was a moment where "things start to go wrong for Germany," from which she never truly recovers. Somme (1916): A British and French offensive intended to relieve pressure on Verdun, but also driven by Haig's ambition for a breakthrough. The debate between breakthrough and Rawlinson's "bite and hold" strategy highlighted the dilemmas of Western Front warfare. Nivelle Offensive (April 1917): A disastrous French attempt at a breakthrough, which highlighted Nivelle'soverreach and led to significant disillusionment and mutiny within the French army. End of the War and its Legacy German Defeat: Lloyd's book argues that the German army was "falling apart" and "defeated rapidly in 1918" despite the persistent "stab in the back" myth that claimed they were betrayed at home. Armistice Decision: The decision by the Allies not to invade Germany was primarily political, as the British and French were "totally exhausted," while the Americans were "much fresher" and more keen to continue. Lloyd considers the armistice "fair on all sides". Lloyd's work underscores that the Western Front was a complex, multinational struggle marked by evolving strategies, immense pressures on commanders, and profound human costs, which ultimately determined the course of the Great War and cast a long shadow over the 20th century.

Nick Lloyd's "The Western Front: The History of the Great War, Volume 1" provides a comprehensive narrative of the Great War in Belgium and France from 1914 to 1918. As the first volume of a planned trilogy, this work aims to offer a nuanced understanding of this pivotal theater, moving beyond common myths and focusing on the operational perspective of senior commanders across all involved powers. 1919 LONDON CHURCHILL Z PERSHING Here's a summary of the key aspects, figures, and events covered: Lloyd's Ambition and Approach Comprehensive Narrative: Lloyd, a reader in military and imperial history at King's College London, undertook this "big project" to create a grand narrative of the entire Western Front, encompassing the French sector, American sector, and the German story, alongside the often-emphasized British perspective. Focus on Senior Commanders: A primary goal was to view the war from the lens of senior commanders, challenging the traditional portrayal of them as "donkeys or butchers and bunglers." Lloyd aims to help readers appreciate the immense pressures and difficulties these individuals faced, offering a "cooler perspective" on their successes and errors. Trilogy: This book is the first of three volumes; future volumes will cover the Eastern Front and global warfare in the Middle East and Africa. Lloyd emphasizes that while other fronts are mentioned, the Western Front remained the decisive theater where Germany, France, Britain, and America determined the war's outcome. British Involvement and Leadership Initial Reluctance: Britain initially entered the conflict with a limited commitment, deploying only four infantry divisions and one cavalry division as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), a "small army" compared to the French (80 divisions) and Germans (over 100 divisions). This reflected a desire for "limited liability" to the Western Front, contrasting sharply with French demands for more manpower. Early Leaders: H.H. Asquith (Prime Minister) was reportedly distracted by personal affairs at the war's outset. Lord Kitchener (Minister of War) was a professional soldier and hero of the empire, wary of deep British involvement but committed to supporting the French. Field Marshal Sir John French (Commander-in-Chief, BEF) was a Boer War hero who found himself "out of his depth" by 1914, struggling with the war's scale and intensity. During the August 1914 retreat, French considered pulling the BEF out of the line due to immense losses and pressure, a move Kitchener personally intervened to prevent, ordering French to stay and fight. Frencheventually "breaks down" due to losses and pressure and is sent home at the end of 1915. Later Leadership and Strategy: David Lloyd George (Prime Minister from late 1916) is credited as "the prime minister that wins the war" in Britain. He showed great energy in revitalizing British industry and re-equipping the army, despite having poor relations with his top generals. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig replaced French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Haig and Lloyd George had fundamentally different strategic outlooks, leading to "constant arguments and backstabbing". At the Battle of the Somme (1916), Haig favored a breakthrough strategy, aiming for maneuver and cavalry deployment to defeat the German army. However, his army commander, Rawlinson, advocated a "bite and hold" strategy, focusing on concentrated artillery to smash enemy lines, take ground, then consolidate before repeating, acknowledging that a grand breakthrough was not yet feasible for the largely "green" British army. German Strategy and Commanders Initial Invasion: The German invasion of France and Belgium in 1914 was based on the ambitious Schlieffen Plan, which aimed for a massive attack through Belgium to outflank French defenses and destroy their army in a grand battle of envelopment. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (Chief of the General Staff) was under immense pressure and altered the Schlieffen Plan, weakening its critical right wing, and ultimately suffered a nervous breakdown by mid-September 1914. Moltke's controversial decision to order General Kluck's First Army to turn southeast instead of enveloping Paris contributed to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, despite Kluck initially ignoring the order. Kaiser Wilhelm: His character was inconsistent, often described as a "weather vane," and he gradually became a less central figure as Hindenburg and Ludendorff gained influence from 1916. Erich von Falkenhayn (replaces Moltke in 1914) was the architect of the Verdun Offensive (1916). His vision was unique, aiming not for territorial gains but for attrition: to "kill Frenchmen" and exhaust them. Political Interference: Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg often opposed Falkenhayn's desire for unrestricted submarine warfare due to diplomatic concerns (e.g., fear of American entry), illustrating the German military's tendency to prioritize tactical effectiveness over political and strategic issues, which was ultimately "fatal". French Efforts and Leadership Joseph Joffre (Commander of French Forces): Described as a "great hero" of the French army, Joffrepossessed remarkable calmness and an ability to absorb punishment and react quickly. His leadership was crucial in defeating the Schlieffen Plan and counterattacking at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, preventing a German victory. Raymond Poincaré (President of the French Republic): A nationalist deeply involved in military analysis, Poincaré was central to the political efforts to reassert civilian primacy over the army and secure British manpower commitments. General Castelnau (Joffre's chief of staff): A deeply religious man who personally lost three sons in the war, Castelnau exemplifies the human cost and personal horror experienced by some senior commanders, helping to humanize these figures in Lloyd's narrative. Robert Nivelle: An artillery officer who rose rapidly due to his successes at Verdun, Nivelle replaced Joffrein December 1916. He attempted a decisive breakthrough in his Nivelle Offensive in April 1917 with a "formula" for success, but it failed catastrophically due to his being "out of his depth" at the command-in-chief level, leading to French army issues including mutiny. Philippe Pétain: Replaced Nivelle, Pétain became a "savior of France." He was renowned for his deep understanding of battlefield realities and a strong connection with his troops. At Verdun, he innovated by rotating divisions out of the line for rest and recuperation, contrasting with the German practice of fighting units "until basically there's not a lot left". Ferdinand Foch (Supreme Allied Commander from April 1918): Foch is widely regarded as one of the most important generals of the war. He was an energetic and charismatic leader who successfully coordinated the American, British, and French forces in 1918, leading them to victory in the multinational war. His reputation continues to strengthen over time. American Involvement Entry into War: The United States declared war on Germany and Austria in April 1917. General John J. Pershing arrived in Paris in June 1917 to lead the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), despite having only 113,000 men in the army at the time. Rejection of Amalgamation: Pershing steadfastly resisted French and British desires to "amalgamate" American manpower into their existing divisions, insisting that American soldiers fight as an independent army. He argued that the Allies had a poor record of "not killing your own troops". German Miscalculation: Germany severely underestimated how quickly the United States could build and deploy an army, believing it would take years. This misjudgment ultimately contributed to their defeat once the Americans demonstrated their seriousness in 1918. American involvement became "crucial" by 1917, changing the atmosphere. Evolution of Warfare on the Western Front From Movement to Stalemate: The initial German invasion failed to achieve a decisive victory, leading to the establishment of trench warfare after the Battle of the Marne. Realization of No Breakthrough: After the Second Battle of Champagne (1915), Allied and Germancommanders like Joffre and Falkenhayn began to recognize that a "grand shattering breakthrough" was not achievable in the foreseeable future. Constant Adaptation: This realization led to a continuous arms race. As Allied artillery and tactics improved, German defenses evolved from single lines to complex "zones of pill boxes," making progress difficult and bloody. The war became an intense exercise in violence where commanders constantly adapted to a "cauldron of war". Key Battles and Their Significance Battle of the Marne (September 1914): Joffre's successful counterattack forced the Germans to retreat, effectively ending the Schlieffen Plan and leading to the beginning of trench warfare. Second Battle of Champagne (September-October 1915): A major French offensive that, despite immense effort and casualties, failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, solidifying the understanding that trench deadlock could not be easily broken. Verdun (1916): Falkenhayn's attrition battle, designed to "kill Frenchmen," concentrated immense firepower in a small area, creating a "moonscape effect." While not decisive in destroying the French, it was a moment where "things start to go wrong for Germany," from which she never truly recovers. Somme (1916): A British and French offensive intended to relieve pressure on Verdun, but also driven by Haig's ambition for a breakthrough. The debate between breakthrough and Rawlinson's "bite and hold" strategy highlighted the dilemmas of Western Front warfare. Nivelle Offensive (April 1917): A disastrous French attempt at a breakthrough, which highlighted Nivelle'soverreach and led to significant disillusionment and mutiny within the French army. End of the War and its Legacy German Defeat: Lloyd's book argues that the German army was "falling apart" and "defeated rapidly in 1918" despite the persistent "stab in the back" myth that claimed they were betrayed at home. Armistice Decision: The decision by the Allies not to invade Germany was primarily political, as the British and French were "totally exhausted," while the Americans were "much fresher" and more keen to continue. Lloyd considers the armistice "fair on all sides". Lloyd's work underscores that the Western Front was a complex, multinational struggle marked by evolving strategies, immense pressures on commanders, and profound human costs, which ultimately determined the course of the Great War and cast a long shadow over the 20th century.

Nick Lloyd's "The Western Front: The History of the Great War, Volume 1" provides a comprehensive narrative of the Great War in Belgium and France from 1914 to 1918. As the first volume of a planned trilogy, this work aims to offer a nuanced understanding of this pivotal theater, moving beyond common myths and focusing on the operational perspective of senior commanders across all involved powers. 1918 JOHN MONASH Here's a summary of the key aspects, figures, and events covered: Lloyd's Ambition and Approach Comprehensive Narrative: Lloyd, a reader in military and imperial history at King's College London, undertook this "big project" to create a grand narrative of the entire Western Front, encompassing the French sector, American sector, and the German story, alongside the often-emphasized British perspective. Focus on Senior Commanders: A primary goal was to view the war from the lens of senior commanders, challenging the traditional portrayal of them as "donkeys or butchers and bunglers." Lloyd aims to help readers appreciate the immense pressures and difficulties these individuals faced, offering a "cooler perspective" on their successes and errors. Trilogy: This book is the first of three volumes; future volumes will cover the Eastern Front and global warfare in the Middle East and Africa. Lloyd emphasizes that while other fronts are mentioned, the Western Front remained the decisive theater where Germany, France, Britain, and America determined the war's outcome. British Involvement and Leadership Initial Reluctance: Britain initially entered the conflict with a limited commitment, deploying only four infantry divisions and one cavalry division as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), a "small army" compared to the French (80 divisions) and Germans (over 100 divisions). This reflected a desire for "limited liability" to the Western Front, contrasting sharply with French demands for more manpower. Early Leaders: H.H. Asquith (Prime Minister) was reportedly distracted by personal affairs at the war's outset. Lord Kitchener (Minister of War) was a professional soldier and hero of the empire, wary of deep British involvement but committed to supporting the French. Field Marshal Sir John French (Commander-in-Chief, BEF) was a Boer War hero who found himself "out of his depth" by 1914, struggling with the war's scale and intensity. During the August 1914 retreat, French considered pulling the BEF out of the line due to immense losses and pressure, a move Kitchener personally intervened to prevent, ordering French to stay and fight. Frencheventually "breaks down" due to losses and pressure and is sent home at the end of 1915. Later Leadership and Strategy: David Lloyd George (Prime Minister from late 1916) is credited as "the prime minister that wins the war" in Britain. He showed great energy in revitalizing British industry and re-equipping the army, despite having poor relations with his top generals. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig replaced French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Haig and Lloyd George had fundamentally different strategic outlooks, leading to "constant arguments and backstabbing". At the Battle of the Somme (1916), Haig favored a breakthrough strategy, aiming for maneuver and cavalry deployment to defeat the German army. However, his army commander, Rawlinson, advocated a "bite and hold" strategy, focusing on concentrated artillery to smash enemy lines, take ground, then consolidate before repeating, acknowledging that a grand breakthrough was not yet feasible for the largely "green" British army. German Strategy and Commanders Initial Invasion: The German invasion of France and Belgium in 1914 was based on the ambitious Schlieffen Plan, which aimed for a massive attack through Belgium to outflank French defenses and destroy their army in a grand battle of envelopment. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (Chief of the General Staff) was under immense pressure and altered the Schlieffen Plan, weakening its critical right wing, and ultimately suffered a nervous breakdown by mid-September 1914. Moltke's controversial decision to order General Kluck's First Army to turn southeast instead of enveloping Paris contributed to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, despite Kluck initially ignoring the order. Kaiser Wilhelm: His character was inconsistent, often described as a "weather vane," and he gradually became a less central figure as Hindenburg and Ludendorff gained influence from 1916. Erich von Falkenhayn (replaces Moltke in 1914) was the architect of the Verdun Offensive (1916). His vision was unique, aiming not for territorial gains but for attrition: to "kill Frenchmen" and exhaust them. Political Interference: Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg often opposed Falkenhayn's desire for unrestricted submarine warfare due to diplomatic concerns (e.g., fear of American entry), illustrating the German military's tendency to prioritize tactical effectiveness over political and strategic issues, which was ultimately "fatal". French Efforts and Leadership Joseph Joffre (Commander of French Forces): Described as a "great hero" of the French army, Joffrepossessed remarkable calmness and an ability to absorb punishment and react quickly. His leadership was crucial in defeating the Schlieffen Plan and counterattacking at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, preventing a German victory. Raymond Poincaré (President of the French Republic): A nationalist deeply involved in military analysis, Poincaré was central to the political efforts to reassert civilian primacy over the army and secure British manpower commitments. General Castelnau (Joffre's chief of staff): A deeply religious man who personally lost three sons in the war, Castelnau exemplifies the human cost and personal horror experienced by some senior commanders, helping to humanize these figures in Lloyd's narrative. Robert Nivelle: An artillery officer who rose rapidly due to his successes at Verdun, Nivelle replaced Joffrein December 1916. He attempted a decisive breakthrough in his Nivelle Offensive in April 1917 with a "formula" for success, but it failed catastrophically due to his being "out of his depth" at the command-in-chief level, leading to French army issues including mutiny. Philippe Pétain: Replaced Nivelle, Pétain became a "savior of France." He was renowned for his deep understanding of battlefield realities and a strong connection with his troops. At Verdun, he innovated by rotating divisions out of the line for rest and recuperation, contrasting with the German practice of fighting units "until basically there's not a lot left". Ferdinand Foch (Supreme Allied Commander from April 1918): Foch is widely regarded as one of the most important generals of the war. He was an energetic and charismatic leader who successfully coordinated the American, British, and French forces in 1918, leading them to victory in the multinational war. His reputation continues to strengthen over time. American Involvement Entry into War: The United States declared war on Germany and Austria in April 1917. General John J. Pershing arrived in Paris in June 1917 to lead the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), despite having only 113,000 men in the army at the time. Rejection of Amalgamation: Pershing steadfastly resisted French and British desires to "amalgamate" American manpower into their existing divisions, insisting that American soldiers fight as an independent army. He argued that the Allies had a poor record of "not killing your own troops". German Miscalculation: Germany severely underestimated how quickly the United States could build and deploy an army, believing it would take years. This misjudgment ultimately contributed to their defeat once the Americans demonstrated their seriousness in 1918. American involvement became "crucial" by 1917, changing the atmosphere. Evolution of Warfare on the Western Front From Movement to Stalemate: The initial German invasion failed to achieve a decisive victory, leading to the establishment of trench warfare after the Battle of the Marne. Realization of No Breakthrough: After the Second Battle of Champagne (1915), Allied and Germancommanders like Joffre and Falkenhayn began to recognize that a "grand shattering breakthrough" was not achievable in the foreseeable future. Constant Adaptation: This realization led to a continuous arms race. As Allied artillery and tactics improved, German defenses evolved from single lines to complex "zones of pill boxes," making progress difficult and bloody. The war became an intense exercise in violence where commanders constantly adapted to a "cauldron of war". Key Battles and Their Significance Battle of the Marne (September 1914): Joffre's successful counterattack forced the Germans to retreat, effectively ending the Schlieffen Plan and leading to the beginning of trench warfare. Second Battle of Champagne (September-October 1915): A major French offensive that, despite immense effort and casualties, failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, solidifying the understanding that trench deadlock could not be easily broken. Verdun (1916): Falkenhayn's attrition battle, designed to "kill Frenchmen," concentrated immense firepower in a small area, creating a "moonscape effect." While not decisive in destroying the French, it was a moment where "things start to go wrong for Germany," from which she never truly recovers. Somme (1916): A British and French offensive intended to relieve pressure on Verdun, but also driven by Haig's ambition for a breakthrough. The debate between breakthrough and Rawlinson's "bite and hold" strategy highlighted the dilemmas of Western Front warfare. Nivelle Offensive (April 1917): A disastrous French attempt at a breakthrough, which highlighted Nivelle'soverreach and led to significant disillusionment and mutiny within the French army. End of the War and its Legacy German Defeat: Lloyd's book argues that the German army was "falling apart" and "defeated rapidly in 1918" despite the persistent "stab in the back" myth that claimed they were betrayed at home. Armistice Decision: The decision by the Allies not to invade Germany was primarily political, as the British and French were "totally exhausted," while the Americans were "much fresher" and more keen to continue. Lloyd considers the armistice "fair on all sides". Lloyd's work underscores that the Western Front was a complex, multinational struggle marked by evolving strategies, immense pressures on commanders, and profound human costs, which ultimately determined the course of the Great War and cast a long shadow over the 20th century.

Nick Lloyd's "The Western Front: The History of the Great War, Volume 1" provides a comprehensive narrative of the Great War in Belgium and France from 1914 to 1918. As the first volume of a planned trilogy, this work aims to offer a nuanced understanding of this pivotal theater, moving beyond common myths and focusing on the operational perspective of senior commanders across all involved powers. Here's a summary of the key aspects, figures, and events covered: Lloyd's Ambition and Approach Comprehensive Narrative: Lloyd, a reader in military and imperial history at King's College London, undertook this "big project" to create a grand narrative of the entire Western Front, encompassing the French sector, American sector, and the German story, alongside the often-emphasized British perspective. Focus on Senior Commanders: A primary goal was to view the war from the lens of senior commanders, challenging the traditional portrayal of them as "donkeys or butchers and bunglers." Lloyd aims to help readers appreciate the immense pressures and difficulties these individuals faced, offering a "cooler perspective" on their successes and errors. Trilogy: This book is the first of three volumes; future volumes will cover the Eastern Front and global warfare in the Middle East and Africa. Lloyd emphasizes that while other fronts are mentioned, the Western Front remained the decisive theater where Germany, France, Britain, and America determined the war's outcome. British Involvement and Leadership Initial Reluctance: Britain initially entered the conflict with a limited commitment, deploying only four infantry divisions and one cavalry division as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), a "small army" compared to the French (80 divisions) and Germans (over 100 divisions). This reflected a desire for "limited liability" to the Western Front, contrasting sharply with French demands for more manpower. Early Leaders: H.H. Asquith (Prime Minister) was reportedly distracted by personal affairs at the war's outset. Lord Kitchener (Minister of War) was a professional soldier and hero of the empire, wary of deep British involvement but committed to supporting the French. Field Marshal Sir John French (Commander-in-Chief, BEF) was a Boer War hero who found himself "out of his depth" by 1914, struggling with the war's scale and intensity. During the August 1914 retreat, French considered pulling the BEF out of the line due to immense losses and pressure, a move Kitchener personally intervened to prevent, ordering French to stay and fight. Frencheventually "breaks down" due to losses and pressure and is sent home at the end of 1915. Later Leadership and Strategy: David Lloyd George (Prime Minister from late 1916) is credited as "the prime minister that wins the war" in Britain. He showed great energy in revitalizing British industry and re-equipping the army, despite having poor relations with his top generals. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig replaced French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Haig and Lloyd George had fundamentally different strategic outlooks, leading to "constant arguments and backstabbing". At the Battle of the Somme (1916), Haig favored a breakthrough strategy, aiming for maneuver and cavalry deployment to defeat the German army. However, his army commander, Rawlinson, advocated a "bite and hold" strategy, focusing on concentrated artillery to smash enemy lines, take ground, then consolidate before repeating, acknowledging that a grand breakthrough was not yet feasible for the largely "green" British army. German Strategy and Commanders Initial Invasion: The German invasion of France and Belgium in 1914 was based on the ambitious Schlieffen Plan, which aimed for a massive attack through Belgium to outflank French defenses and destroy their army in a grand battle of envelopment. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (Chief of the General Staff) was under immense pressure and altered the Schlieffen Plan, weakening its critical right wing, and ultimately suffered a nervous breakdown by mid-September 1914. Moltke's controversial decision to order General Kluck's First Army to turn southeast instead of enveloping Paris contributed to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, despite Kluck initially ignoring the order. Kaiser Wilhelm: His character was inconsistent, often described as a "weather vane," and he gradually became a less central figure as Hindenburg and Ludendorff gained influence from 1916. Erich von Falkenhayn (replaces Moltke in 1914) was the architect of the Verdun Offensive (1916). His vision was unique, aiming not for territorial gains but for attrition: to "kill Frenchmen" and exhaust them. Political Interference: Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg often opposed Falkenhayn's desire for unrestricted submarine warfare due to diplomatic concerns (e.g., fear of American entry), illustrating the German military's tendency to prioritize tactical effectiveness over political and strategic issues, which was ultimately "fatal". French Efforts and Leadership Joseph Joffre (Commander of French Forces): Described as a "great hero" of the French army, Joffrepossessed remarkable calmness and an ability to absorb punishment and react quickly. His leadership was crucial in defeating the Schlieffen Plan and counterattacking at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, preventing a German victory. Raymond Poincaré (President of the French Republic): A nationalist deeply involved in military analysis, Poincaré was central to the political efforts to reassert civilian primacy over the army and secure British manpower commitments. General Castelnau (Joffre's chief of staff): A deeply religious man who personally lost three sons in the war, Castelnau exemplifies the human cost and personal horror experienced by some senior commanders, helping to humanize these figures in Lloyd's narrative. Robert Nivelle: An artillery officer who rose rapidly due to his successes at Verdun, Nivelle replaced Joffrein December 1916. He attempted a decisive breakthrough in his Nivelle Offensive in April 1917 with a "formula" for success, but it failed catastrophically due to his being "out of his depth" at the command-in-chief level, leading to French army issues including mutiny. Philippe Pétain: Replaced Nivelle, Pétain became a "savior of France." He was renowned for his deep understanding of battlefield realities and a strong connection with his troops. At Verdun, he innovated by rotating divisions out of the line for rest and recuperation, contrasting with the German practice of fighting units "until basically there's not a lot left". Ferdinand Foch (Supreme Allied Commander from April 1918): Foch is widely regarded as one of the most important generals of the war. He was an energetic and charismatic leader who successfully coordinated the American, British, and French forces in 1918, leading them to victory in the multinational war. His reputation continues to strengthen over time. American Involvement Entry into War: The United States declared war on Germany and Austria in April 1917. General John J. Pershing arrived in Paris in June 1917 to lead the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), despite having only 113,000 men in the army at the time. Rejection of Amalgamation: Pershing steadfastly resisted French and British desires to "amalgamate" American manpower into their existing divisions, insisting that American soldiers fight as an independent army. He argued that the Allies had a poor record of "not killing your own troops". German Miscalculation: Germany severely underestimated how quickly the United States could build and deploy an army, believing it would take years. This misjudgment ultimately contributed to their defeat once the Americans demonstrated their seriousness in 1918. American involvement became "crucial" by 1917, changing the atmosphere. Evolution of Warfare on the Western Front From Movement to Stalemate: The initial German invasion failed to achieve a decisive victory, leading to the establishment of trench warfare after the Battle of the Marne. Realization of No Breakthrough: After the Second Battle of Champagne (1915), Allied and Germancommanders like Joffre and Falkenhayn began to recognize that a "grand shattering breakthrough" was not achievable in the foreseeable future. Constant Adaptation: This realization led to a continuous arms race. As Allied artillery and tactics improved, German defenses evolved from single lines to complex "zones of pill boxes," making progress difficult and bloody. The war became an intense exercise in violence where commanders constantly adapted to a "cauldron of war". Key Battles and Their Significance Battle of the Marne (September 1914): Joffre's successful counterattack forced the Germans to retreat, effectively ending the Schlieffen Plan and leading to the beginning of trench warfare. Second Battle of Champagne (September-October 1915): A major French offensive that, despite immense effort and casualties, failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, solidifying the understanding that trench deadlock could not be easily broken. Verdun (1916): Falkenhayn's attrition battle, designed to "kill Frenchmen," concentrated immense firepower in a small area, creating a "moonscape effect." While not decisive in destroying the French, it was a moment where "things start to go wrong for Germany," from which she never truly recovers. Somme (1916): A British and French offensive intended to relieve pressure on Verdun, but also driven by Haig's ambition for a breakthrough. The debate between breakthrough and Rawlinson's "bite and hold" strategy highlighted the dilemmas of Western Front warfare. Nivelle Offensive (April 1917): A disastrous French attempt at a breakthrough, which highlighted Nivelle'soverreach and led to significant disillusionment and mutiny within the French army. End of the War and its Legacy German Defeat: Lloyd's book argues that the German army was "falling apart" and "defeated rapidly in 1918" despite the persistent "stab in the back" myth that claimed they were betrayed at home. Armistice Decision: The decision by the Allies not to invade Germany was primarily political, as the British and French were "totally exhausted," while the Americans were "much fresher" and more keen to continue. Lloyd considers the armistice "fair on all sides". Lloyd's work underscores that the Western Front was a complex, multinational struggle marked by evolving strategies, immense pressures on commanders, and profound human costs, which ultimately determined the course of the Great War and cast a long shadow over the 20th century.

Nick Lloyd's "The Western Front: The History of the Great War, Volume 1" provides a comprehensive narrative of the Great War in Belgium and France from 1914 to 1918. As the first volume of a planned trilogy, this work aims to offer a nuanced understanding of this pivotal theater, moving beyond common myths and focusing on the operational perspective of senior commanders across all involved powers. 1914-1918 US MERCHANT NAVY Here's a summary of the key aspects, figures, and events covered: Lloyd's Ambition and Approach Comprehensive Narrative: Lloyd, a reader in military and imperial history at King's College London, undertook this "big project" to create a grand narrative of the entire Western Front, encompassing the French sector, American sector, and the German story, alongside the often-emphasized British perspective. Focus on Senior Commanders: A primary goal was to view the war from the lens of senior commanders, challenging the traditional portrayal of them as "donkeys or butchers and bunglers." Lloyd aims to help readers appreciate the immense pressures and difficulties these individuals faced, offering a "cooler perspective" on their successes and errors. Trilogy: This book is the first of three volumes; future volumes will cover the Eastern Front and global warfare in the Middle East and Africa. Lloyd emphasizes that while other fronts are mentioned, the Western Front remained the decisive theater where Germany, France, Britain, and America determined the war's outcome. British Involvement and Leadership Initial Reluctance: Britain initially entered the conflict with a limited commitment, deploying only four infantry divisions and one cavalry division as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), a "small army" compared to the French (80 divisions) and Germans (over 100 divisions). This reflected a desire for "limited liability" to the Western Front, contrasting sharply with French demands for more manpower. Early Leaders: H.H. Asquith (Prime Minister) was reportedly distracted by personal affairs at the war's outset. Lord Kitchener (Minister of War) was a professional soldier and hero of the empire, wary of deep British involvement but committed to supporting the French. Field Marshal Sir John French (Commander-in-Chief, BEF) was a Boer War hero who found himself "out of his depth" by 1914, struggling with the war's scale and intensity. During the August 1914 retreat, French considered pulling the BEF out of the line due to immense losses and pressure, a move Kitchener personally intervened to prevent, ordering French to stay and fight. Frencheventually "breaks down" due to losses and pressure and is sent home at the end of 1915. Later Leadership and Strategy: David Lloyd George (Prime Minister from late 1916) is credited as "the prime minister that wins the war" in Britain. He showed great energy in revitalizing British industry and re-equipping the army, despite having poor relations with his top generals. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig replaced French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Haig and Lloyd George had fundamentally different strategic outlooks, leading to "constant arguments and backstabbing". At the Battle of the Somme (1916), Haig favored a breakthrough strategy, aiming for maneuver and cavalry deployment to defeat the German army. However, his army commander, Rawlinson, advocated a "bite and hold" strategy, focusing on concentrated artillery to smash enemy lines, take ground, then consolidate before repeating, acknowledging that a grand breakthrough was not yet feasible for the largely "green" British army. German Strategy and Commanders Initial Invasion: The German invasion of France and Belgium in 1914 was based on the ambitious Schlieffen Plan, which aimed for a massive attack through Belgium to outflank French defenses and destroy their army in a grand battle of envelopment. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (Chief of the General Staff) was under immense pressure and altered the Schlieffen Plan, weakening its critical right wing, and ultimately suffered a nervous breakdown by mid-September 1914. Moltke's controversial decision to order General Kluck's First Army to turn southeast instead of enveloping Paris contributed to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, despite Kluck initially ignoring the order. Kaiser Wilhelm: His character was inconsistent, often described as a "weather vane," and he gradually became a less central figure as Hindenburg and Ludendorff gained influence from 1916. Erich von Falkenhayn (replaces Moltke in 1914) was the architect of the Verdun Offensive (1916). His vision was unique, aiming not for territorial gains but for attrition: to "kill Frenchmen" and exhaust them. Political Interference: Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg often opposed Falkenhayn's desire for unrestricted submarine warfare due to diplomatic concerns (e.g., fear of American entry), illustrating the German military's tendency to prioritize tactical effectiveness over political and strategic issues, which was ultimately "fatal". French Efforts and Leadership Joseph Joffre (Commander of French Forces): Described as a "great hero" of the French army, Joffrepossessed remarkable calmness and an ability to absorb punishment and react quickly. His leadership was crucial in defeating the Schlieffen Plan and counterattacking at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, preventing a German victory. Raymond Poincaré (President of the French Republic): A nationalist deeply involved in military analysis, Poincaré was central to the political efforts to reassert civilian primacy over the army and secure British manpower commitments. General Castelnau (Joffre's chief of staff): A deeply religious man who personally lost three sons in the war, Castelnau exemplifies the human cost and personal horror experienced by some senior commanders, helping to humanize these figures in Lloyd's narrative. Robert Nivelle: An artillery officer who rose rapidly due to his successes at Verdun, Nivelle replaced Joffrein December 1916. He attempted a decisive breakthrough in his Nivelle Offensive in April 1917 with a "formula" for success, but it failed catastrophically due to his being "out of his depth" at the command-in-chief level, leading to French army issues including mutiny. Philippe Pétain: Replaced Nivelle, Pétain became a "savior of France." He was renowned for his deep understanding of battlefield realities and a strong connection with his troops. At Verdun, he innovated by rotating divisions out of the line for rest and recuperation, contrasting with the German practice of fighting units "until basically there's not a lot left". Ferdinand Foch (Supreme Allied Commander from April 1918): Foch is widely regarded as one of the most important generals of the war. He was an energetic and charismatic leader who successfully coordinated the American, British, and French forces in 1918, leading them to victory in the multinational war. His reputation continues to strengthen over time. American Involvement Entry into War: The United States declared war on Germany and Austria in April 1917. General John J. Pershing arrived in Paris in June 1917 to lead the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), despite having only 113,000 men in the army at the time. Rejection of Amalgamation: Pershing steadfastly resisted French and British desires to "amalgamate" American manpower into their existing divisions, insisting that American soldiers fight as an independent army. He argued that the Allies had a poor record of "not killing your own troops". German Miscalculation: Germany severely underestimated how quickly the United States could build and deploy an army, believing it would take years. This misjudgment ultimately contributed to their defeat once the Americans demonstrated their seriousness in 1918. American involvement became "crucial" by 1917, changing the atmosphere. Evolution of Warfare on the Western Front From Movement to Stalemate: The initial German invasion failed to achieve a decisive victory, leading to the establishment of trench warfare after the Battle of the Marne. Realization of No Breakthrough: After the Second Battle of Champagne (1915), Allied and Germancommanders like Joffre and Falkenhayn began to recognize that a "grand shattering breakthrough" was not achievable in the foreseeable future. Constant Adaptation: This realization led to a continuous arms race. As Allied artillery and tactics improved, German defenses evolved from single lines to complex "zones of pill boxes," making progress difficult and bloody. The war became an intense exercise in violence where commanders constantly adapted to a "cauldron of war". Key Battles and Their Significance Battle of the Marne (September 1914): Joffre's successful counterattack forced the Germans to retreat, effectively ending the Schlieffen Plan and leading to the beginning of trench warfare. Second Battle of Champagne (September-October 1915): A major French offensive that, despite immense effort and casualties, failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, solidifying the understanding that trench deadlock could not be easily broken. Verdun (1916): Falkenhayn's attrition battle, designed to "kill Frenchmen," concentrated immense firepower in a small area, creating a "moonscape effect." While not decisive in destroying the French, it was a moment where "things start to go wrong for Germany," from which she never truly recovers. Somme (1916): A British and French offensive intended to relieve pressure on Verdun, but also driven by Haig's ambition for a breakthrough. The debate between breakthrough and Rawlinson's "bite and hold" strategy highlighted the dilemmas of Western Front warfare. Nivelle Offensive (April 1917): A disastrous French attempt at a breakthrough, which highlighted Nivelle'soverreach and led to significant disillusionment and mutiny within the French army. End of the War and its Legacy German Defeat: Lloyd's book argues that the German army was "falling apart" and "defeated rapidly in 1918" despite the persistent "stab in the back" myth that claimed they were betrayed at home. Armistice Decision: The decision by the Allies not to invade Germany was primarily political, as the British and French were "totally exhausted," while the Americans were "much fresher" and more keen to continue. Lloyd considers the armistice "fair on all sides". Lloyd's work underscores that the Western Front was a complex, multinational struggle marked by evolving strategies, immense pressures on commanders, and profound human costs, which ultimately determined the course of the Great War and cast a long shadow over the 20th century.

Nick Lloyd's "The Western Front: The History of the Great War, Volume 1" provides a comprehensive narrative of the Great War in Belgium and France from 1914 to 1918. As the first volume of a planned trilogy, this work aims to offer a nuanced understanding of this pivotal theater, moving beyond common myths and focusing on the operational perspective of senior commanders across all involved powers. 1914 HINDENBERG Here's a summary of the key aspects, figures, and events covered: Lloyd's Ambition and Approach Comprehensive Narrative: Lloyd, a reader in military and imperial history at King's College London, undertook this "big project" to create a grand narrative of the entire Western Front, encompassing the French sector, American sector, and the German story, alongside the often-emphasized British perspective. Focus on Senior Commanders: A primary goal was to view the war from the lens of senior commanders, challenging the traditional portrayal of them as "donkeys or butchers and bunglers." Lloyd aims to help readers appreciate the immense pressures and difficulties these individuals faced, offering a "cooler perspective" on their successes and errors. Trilogy: This book is the first of three volumes; future volumes will cover the Eastern Front and global warfare in the Middle East and Africa. Lloyd emphasizes that while other fronts are mentioned, the Western Front remained the decisive theater where Germany, France, Britain, and America determined the war's outcome. British Involvement and Leadership Initial Reluctance: Britain initially entered the conflict with a limited commitment, deploying only four infantry divisions and one cavalry division as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), a "small army" compared to the French (80 divisions) and Germans (over 100 divisions). This reflected a desire for "limited liability" to the Western Front, contrasting sharply with French demands for more manpower. Early Leaders: H.H. Asquith (Prime Minister) was reportedly distracted by personal affairs at the war's outset. Lord Kitchener (Minister of War) was a professional soldier and hero of the empire, wary of deep British involvement but committed to supporting the French. Field Marshal Sir John French (Commander-in-Chief, BEF) was a Boer War hero who found himself "out of his depth" by 1914, struggling with the war's scale and intensity. During the August 1914 retreat, French considered pulling the BEF out of the line due to immense losses and pressure, a move Kitchener personally intervened to prevent, ordering French to stay and fight. Frencheventually "breaks down" due to losses and pressure and is sent home at the end of 1915. Later Leadership and Strategy: David Lloyd George (Prime Minister from late 1916) is credited as "the prime minister that wins the war" in Britain. He showed great energy in revitalizing British industry and re-equipping the army, despite having poor relations with his top generals. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig replaced French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Haig and Lloyd George had fundamentally different strategic outlooks, leading to "constant arguments and backstabbing". At the Battle of the Somme (1916), Haig favored a breakthrough strategy, aiming for maneuver and cavalry deployment to defeat the German army. However, his army commander, Rawlinson, advocated a "bite and hold" strategy, focusing on concentrated artillery to smash enemy lines, take ground, then consolidate before repeating, acknowledging that a grand breakthrough was not yet feasible for the largely "green" British army. German Strategy and Commanders Initial Invasion: The German invasion of France and Belgium in 1914 was based on the ambitious Schlieffen Plan, which aimed for a massive attack through Belgium to outflank French defenses and destroy their army in a grand battle of envelopment. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (Chief of the General Staff) was under immense pressure and altered the Schlieffen Plan, weakening its critical right wing, and ultimately suffered a nervous breakdown by mid-September 1914. Moltke's controversial decision to order General Kluck's First Army to turn southeast instead of enveloping Paris contributed to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, despite Kluck initially ignoring the order. Kaiser Wilhelm: His character was inconsistent, often described as a "weather vane," and he gradually became a less central figure as Hindenburg and Ludendorff gained influence from 1916. Erich von Falkenhayn (replaces Moltke in 1914) was the architect of the Verdun Offensive (1916). His vision was unique, aiming not for territorial gains but for attrition: to "kill Frenchmen" and exhaust them. Political Interference: Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg often opposed Falkenhayn's desire for unrestricted submarine warfare due to diplomatic concerns (e.g., fear of American entry), illustrating the German military's tendency to prioritize tactical effectiveness over political and strategic issues, which was ultimately "fatal". French Efforts and Leadership Joseph Joffre (Commander of French Forces): Described as a "great hero" of the French army, Joffrepossessed remarkable calmness and an ability to absorb punishment and react quickly. His leadership was crucial in defeating the Schlieffen Plan and counterattacking at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, preventing a German victory. Raymond Poincaré (President of the French Republic): A nationalist deeply involved in military analysis, Poincaré was central to the political efforts to reassert civilian primacy over the army and secure British manpower commitments. General Castelnau (Joffre's chief of staff): A deeply religious man who personally lost three sons in the war, Castelnau exemplifies the human cost and personal horror experienced by some senior commanders, helping to humanize these figures in Lloyd's narrative. Robert Nivelle: An artillery officer who rose rapidly due to his successes at Verdun, Nivelle replaced Joffrein December 1916. He attempted a decisive breakthrough in his Nivelle Offensive in April 1917 with a "formula" for success, but it failed catastrophically due to his being "out of his depth" at the command-in-chief level, leading to French army issues including mutiny. Philippe Pétain: Replaced Nivelle, Pétain became a "savior of France." He was renowned for his deep understanding of battlefield realities and a strong connection with his troops. At Verdun, he innovated by rotating divisions out of the line for rest and recuperation, contrasting with the German practice of fighting units "until basically there's not a lot left". Ferdinand Foch (Supreme Allied Commander from April 1918): Foch is widely regarded as one of the most important generals of the war. He was an energetic and charismatic leader who successfully coordinated the American, British, and French forces in 1918, leading them to victory in the multinational war. His reputation continues to strengthen over time. American Involvement Entry into War: The United States declared war on Germany and Austria in April 1917. General John J. Pershing arrived in Paris in June 1917 to lead the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), despite having only 113,000 men in the army at the time. Rejection of Amalgamation: Pershing steadfastly resisted French and British desires to "amalgamate" American manpower into their existing divisions, insisting that American soldiers fight as an independent army. He argued that the Allies had a poor record of "not killing your own troops". German Miscalculation: Germany severely underestimated how quickly the United States could build and deploy an army, believing it would take years. This misjudgment ultimately contributed to their defeat once the Americans demonstrated their seriousness in 1918. American involvement became "crucial" by 1917, changing the atmosphere. Evolution of Warfare on the Western Front From Movement to Stalemate: The initial German invasion failed to achieve a decisive victory, leading to the establishment of trench warfare after the Battle of the Marne. Realization of No Breakthrough: After the Second Battle of Champagne (1915), Allied and Germancommanders like Joffre and Falkenhayn began to recognize that a "grand shattering breakthrough" was not achievable in the foreseeable future. Constant Adaptation: This realization led to a continuous arms race. As Allied artillery and tactics improved, German defenses evolved from single lines to complex "zones of pill boxes," making progress difficult and bloody. The war became an intense exercise in violence where commanders constantly adapted to a "cauldron of war". Key Battles and Their Significance Battle of the Marne (September 1914): Joffre's successful counterattack forced the Germans to retreat, effectively ending the Schlieffen Plan and leading to the beginning of trench warfare. Second Battle of Champagne (September-October 1915): A major French offensive that, despite immense effort and casualties, failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, solidifying the understanding that trench deadlock could not be easily broken. Verdun (1916): Falkenhayn's attrition battle, designed to "kill Frenchmen," concentrated immense firepower in a small area, creating a "moonscape effect." While not decisive in destroying the French, it was a moment where "things start to go wrong for Germany," from which she never truly recovers. Somme (1916): A British and French offensive intended to relieve pressure on Verdun, but also driven by Haig's ambition for a breakthrough. The debate between breakthrough and Rawlinson's "bite and hold" strategy highlighted the dilemmas of Western Front warfare. Nivelle Offensive (April 1917): A disastrous French attempt at a breakthrough, which highlighted Nivelle'soverreach and led to significant disillusionment and mutiny within the French army. End of the War and its Legacy German Defeat: Lloyd's book argues that the German army was "falling apart" and "defeated rapidly in 1918" despite the persistent "stab in the back" myth that claimed they were betrayed at home. Armistice Decision: The decision by the Allies not to invade Germany was primarily political, as the British and French were "totally exhausted," while the Americans were "much fresher" and more keen to continue. Lloyd considers the armistice "fair on all sides". Lloyd's work underscores that the Western Front was a complex, multinational struggle marked by evolving strategies, immense pressures on commanders, and profound human costs, which ultimately determined the course of the Great War and cast a long shadow over the 20th century.

Nick Lloyd's "The Western Front: The History of the Great War, Volume 1" provides a comprehensive narrative of the Great War in Belgium and France from 1914 to 1918. As the first volume of a planned trilogy, this work aims to offer a nuanced understanding of this pivotal theater, moving beyond common myths and focusing on the operational perspective of senior commanders across all involved powers. 1914 BELGIUM Here's a summary of the key aspects, figures, and events covered: Lloyd's Ambition and Approach Comprehensive Narrative: Lloyd, a reader in military and imperial history at King's College London, undertook this "big project" to create a grand narrative of the entire Western Front, encompassing the French sector, American sector, and the German story, alongside the often-emphasized British perspective. Focus on Senior Commanders: A primary goal was to view the war from the lens of senior commanders, challenging the traditional portrayal of them as "donkeys or butchers and bunglers." Lloyd aims to help readers appreciate the immense pressures and difficulties these individuals faced, offering a "cooler perspective" on their successes and errors. Trilogy: This book is the first of three volumes; future volumes will cover the Eastern Front and global warfare in the Middle East and Africa. Lloyd emphasizes that while other fronts are mentioned, the Western Front remained the decisive theater where Germany, France, Britain, and America determined the war's outcome. British Involvement and Leadership Initial Reluctance: Britain initially entered the conflict with a limited commitment, deploying only four infantry divisions and one cavalry division as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), a "small army" compared to the French (80 divisions) and Germans (over 100 divisions). This reflected a desire for "limited liability" to the Western Front, contrasting sharply with French demands for more manpower. Early Leaders: H.H. Asquith (Prime Minister) was reportedly distracted by personal affairs at the war's outset. Lord Kitchener (Minister of War) was a professional soldier and hero of the empire, wary of deep British involvement but committed to supporting the French. Field Marshal Sir John French (Commander-in-Chief, BEF) was a Boer War hero who found himself "out of his depth" by 1914, struggling with the war's scale and intensity. During the August 1914 retreat, French considered pulling the BEF out of the line due to immense losses and pressure, a move Kitchener personally intervened to prevent, ordering French to stay and fight. Frencheventually "breaks down" due to losses and pressure and is sent home at the end of 1915. Later Leadership and Strategy: David Lloyd George (Prime Minister from late 1916) is credited as "the prime minister that wins the war" in Britain. He showed great energy in revitalizing British industry and re-equipping the army, despite having poor relations with his top generals. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig replaced French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Haig and Lloyd George had fundamentally different strategic outlooks, leading to "constant arguments and backstabbing". At the Battle of the Somme (1916), Haig favored a breakthrough strategy, aiming for maneuver and cavalry deployment to defeat the German army. However, his army commander, Rawlinson, advocated a "bite and hold" strategy, focusing on concentrated artillery to smash enemy lines, take ground, then consolidate before repeating, acknowledging that a grand breakthrough was not yet feasible for the largely "green" British army. German Strategy and Commanders Initial Invasion: The German invasion of France and Belgium in 1914 was based on the ambitious Schlieffen Plan, which aimed for a massive attack through Belgium to outflank French defenses and destroy their army in a grand battle of envelopment. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (Chief of the General Staff) was under immense pressure and altered the Schlieffen Plan, weakening its critical right wing, and ultimately suffered a nervous breakdown by mid-September 1914. Moltke's controversial decision to order General Kluck's First Army to turn southeast instead of enveloping Paris contributed to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, despite Kluck initially ignoring the order. Kaiser Wilhelm: His character was inconsistent, often described as a "weather vane," and he gradually became a less central figure as Hindenburg and Ludendorff gained influence from 1916. Erich von Falkenhayn (replaces Moltke in 1914) was the architect of the Verdun Offensive (1916). His vision was unique, aiming not for territorial gains but for attrition: to "kill Frenchmen" and exhaust them. Political Interference: Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg often opposed Falkenhayn's desire for unrestricted submarine warfare due to diplomatic concerns (e.g., fear of American entry), illustrating the German military's tendency to prioritize tactical effectiveness over political and strategic issues, which was ultimately "fatal". French Efforts and Leadership Joseph Joffre (Commander of French Forces): Described as a "great hero" of the French army, Joffrepossessed remarkable calmness and an ability to absorb punishment and react quickly. His leadership was crucial in defeating the Schlieffen Plan and counterattacking at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, preventing a German victory. Raymond Poincaré (President of the French Republic): A nationalist deeply involved in military analysis, Poincaré was central to the political efforts to reassert civilian primacy over the army and secure British manpower commitments. General Castelnau (Joffre's chief of staff): A deeply religious man who personally lost three sons in the war, Castelnau exemplifies the human cost and personal horror experienced by some senior commanders, helping to humanize these figures in Lloyd's narrative. Robert Nivelle: An artillery officer who rose rapidly due to his successes at Verdun, Nivelle replaced Joffrein December 1916. He attempted a decisive breakthrough in his Nivelle Offensive in April 1917 with a "formula" for success, but it failed catastrophically due to his being "out of his depth" at the command-in-chief level, leading to French army issues including mutiny. Philippe Pétain: Replaced Nivelle, Pétain became a "savior of France." He was renowned for his deep understanding of battlefield realities and a strong connection with his troops. At Verdun, he innovated by rotating divisions out of the line for rest and recuperation, contrasting with the German practice of fighting units "until basically there's not a lot left". Ferdinand Foch (Supreme Allied Commander from April 1918): Foch is widely regarded as one of the most important generals of the war. He was an energetic and charismatic leader who successfully coordinated the American, British, and French forces in 1918, leading them to victory in the multinational war. His reputation continues to strengthen over time. American Involvement Entry into War: The United States declared war on Germany and Austria in April 1917. General John J. Pershing arrived in Paris in June 1917 to lead the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), despite having only 113,000 men in the army at the time. Rejection of Amalgamation: Pershing steadfastly resisted French and British desires to "amalgamate" American manpower into their existing divisions, insisting that American soldiers fight as an independent army. He argued that the Allies had a poor record of "not killing your own troops". German Miscalculation: Germany severely underestimated how quickly the United States could build and deploy an army, believing it would take years. This misjudgment ultimately contributed to their defeat once the Americans demonstrated their seriousness in 1918. American involvement became "crucial" by 1917, changing the atmosphere. Evolution of Warfare on the Western Front From Movement to Stalemate: The initial German invasion failed to achieve a decisive victory, leading to the establishment of trench warfare after the Battle of the Marne. Realization of No Breakthrough: After the Second Battle of Champagne (1915), Allied and Germancommanders like Joffre and Falkenhayn began to recognize that a "grand shattering breakthrough" was not achievable in the foreseeable future. Constant Adaptation: This realization led to a continuous arms race. As Allied artillery and tactics improved, German defenses evolved from single lines to complex "zones of pill boxes," making progress difficult and bloody. The war became an intense exercise in violence where commanders constantly adapted to a "cauldron of war". Key Battles and Their Significance Battle of the Marne (September 1914): Joffre's successful counterattack forced the Germans to retreat, effectively ending the Schlieffen Plan and leading to the beginning of trench warfare. Second Battle of Champagne (September-October 1915): A major French offensive that, despite immense effort and casualties, failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, solidifying the understanding that trench deadlock could not be easily broken. Verdun (1916): Falkenhayn's attrition battle, designed to "kill Frenchmen," concentrated immense firepower in a small area, creating a "moonscape effect." While not decisive in destroying the French, it was a moment where "things start to go wrong for Germany," from which she never truly recovers. Somme (1916): A British and French offensive intended to relieve pressure on Verdun, but also driven by Haig's ambition for a breakthrough. The debate between breakthrough and Rawlinson's "bite and hold" strategy highlighted the dilemmas of Western Front warfare. Nivelle Offensive (April 1917): A disastrous French attempt at a breakthrough, which highlighted Nivelle'soverreach and led to significant disillusionment and mutiny within the French army. End of the War and its Legacy German Defeat: Lloyd's book argues that the German army was "falling apart" and "defeated rapidly in 1918" despite the persistent "stab in the back" myth that claimed they were betrayed at home. Armistice Decision: The decision by the Allies not to invade Germany was primarily political, as the British and French were "totally exhausted," while the Americans were "much fresher" and more keen to continue. Lloyd considers the armistice "fair on all sides". Lloyd's work underscores that the Western Front was a complex, multinational struggle marked by evolving strategies, immense pressures on commanders, and profound human costs, which ultimately determined the course of the Great War and cast a long shadow over the 20th century.

Nick Lloyd's "The Western Front: The History of the Great War, Volume 1" provides a comprehensive narrative of the Great War in Belgium and France from 1914 to 1918. As the first volume of a planned trilogy, this work aims to offer a nuanced understanding of this pivotal theater, moving beyond common myths and focusing on the operational perspective of senior commanders across all involved powers. 1914 ROYAL FLYING CORPS Here's a summary of the key aspects, figures, and events covered: Lloyd's Ambition and Approach Comprehensive Narrative: Lloyd, a reader in military and imperial history at King's College London, undertook this "big project" to create a grand narrative of the entire Western Front, encompassing the French sector, American sector, and the German story, alongside the often-emphasized British perspective. Focus on Senior Commanders: A primary goal was to view the war from the lens of senior commanders, challenging the traditional portrayal of them as "donkeys or butchers and bunglers." Lloyd aims to help readers appreciate the immense pressures and difficulties these individuals faced, offering a "cooler perspective" on their successes and errors. Trilogy: This book is the first of three volumes; future volumes will cover the Eastern Front and global warfare in the Middle East and Africa. Lloyd emphasizes that while other fronts are mentioned, the Western Front remained the decisive theater where Germany, France, Britain, and America determined the war's outcome. British Involvement and Leadership Initial Reluctance: Britain initially entered the conflict with a limited commitment, deploying only four infantry divisions and one cavalry division as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), a "small army" compared to the French (80 divisions) and Germans (over 100 divisions). This reflected a desire for "limited liability" to the Western Front, contrasting sharply with French demands for more manpower. Early Leaders: H.H. Asquith (Prime Minister) was reportedly distracted by personal affairs at the war's outset. Lord Kitchener (Minister of War) was a professional soldier and hero of the empire, wary of deep British involvement but committed to supporting the French. Field Marshal Sir John French (Commander-in-Chief, BEF) was a Boer War hero who found himself "out of his depth" by 1914, struggling with the war's scale and intensity. During the August 1914 retreat, French considered pulling the BEF out of the line due to immense losses and pressure, a move Kitchener personally intervened to prevent, ordering French to stay and fight. Frencheventually "breaks down" due to losses and pressure and is sent home at the end of 1915. Later Leadership and Strategy: David Lloyd George (Prime Minister from late 1916) is credited as "the prime minister that wins the war" in Britain. He showed great energy in revitalizing British industry and re-equipping the army, despite having poor relations with his top generals. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig replaced French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Haig and Lloyd George had fundamentally different strategic outlooks, leading to "constant arguments and backstabbing". At the Battle of the Somme (1916), Haig favored a breakthrough strategy, aiming for maneuver and cavalry deployment to defeat the German army. However, his army commander, Rawlinson, advocated a "bite and hold" strategy, focusing on concentrated artillery to smash enemy lines, take ground, then consolidate before repeating, acknowledging that a grand breakthrough was not yet feasible for the largely "green" British army. German Strategy and Commanders Initial Invasion: The German invasion of France and Belgium in 1914 was based on the ambitious Schlieffen Plan, which aimed for a massive attack through Belgium to outflank French defenses and destroy their army in a grand battle of envelopment. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (Chief of the General Staff) was under immense pressure and altered the Schlieffen Plan, weakening its critical right wing, and ultimately suffered a nervous breakdown by mid-September 1914. Moltke's controversial decision to order General Kluck's First Army to turn southeast instead of enveloping Paris contributed to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, despite Kluck initially ignoring the order. Kaiser Wilhelm: His character was inconsistent, often described as a "weather vane," and he gradually became a less central figure as Hindenburg and Ludendorff gained influence from 1916. Erich von Falkenhayn (replaces Moltke in 1914) was the architect of the Verdun Offensive (1916). His vision was unique, aiming not for territorial gains but for attrition: to "kill Frenchmen" and exhaust them. Political Interference: Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg often opposed Falkenhayn's desire for unrestricted submarine warfare due to diplomatic concerns (e.g., fear of American entry), illustrating the German military's tendency to prioritize tactical effectiveness over political and strategic issues, which was ultimately "fatal". French Efforts and Leadership Joseph Joffre (Commander of French Forces): Described as a "great hero" of the French army, Joffrepossessed remarkable calmness and an ability to absorb punishment and react quickly. His leadership was crucial in defeating the Schlieffen Plan and counterattacking at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, preventing a German victory. Raymond Poincaré (President of the French Republic): A nationalist deeply involved in military analysis, Poincaré was central to the political efforts to reassert civilian primacy over the army and secure British manpower commitments. General Castelnau (Joffre's chief of staff): A deeply religious man who personally lost three sons in the war, Castelnau exemplifies the human cost and personal horror experienced by some senior commanders, helping to humanize these figures in Lloyd's narrative. Robert Nivelle: An artillery officer who rose rapidly due to his successes at Verdun, Nivelle replaced Joffrein December 1916. He attempted a decisive breakthrough in his Nivelle Offensive in April 1917 with a "formula" for success, but it failed catastrophically due to his being "out of his depth" at the command-in-chief level, leading to French army issues including mutiny. Philippe Pétain: Replaced Nivelle, Pétain became a "savior of France." He was renowned for his deep understanding of battlefield realities and a strong connection with his troops. At Verdun, he innovated by rotating divisions out of the line for rest and recuperation, contrasting with the German practice of fighting units "until basically there's not a lot left". Ferdinand Foch (Supreme Allied Commander from April 1918): Foch is widely regarded as one of the most important generals of the war. He was an energetic and charismatic leader who successfully coordinated the American, British, and French forces in 1918, leading them to victory in the multinational war. His reputation continues to strengthen over time. American Involvement Entry into War: The United States declared war on Germany and Austria in April 1917. General John J. Pershing arrived in Paris in June 1917 to lead the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), despite having only 113,000 men in the army at the time. Rejection of Amalgamation: Pershing steadfastly resisted French and British desires to "amalgamate" American manpower into their existing divisions, insisting that American soldiers fight as an independent army. He argued that the Allies had a poor record of "not killing your own troops". German Miscalculation: Germany severely underestimated how quickly the United States could build and deploy an army, believing it would take years. This misjudgment ultimately contributed to their defeat once the Americans demonstrated their seriousness in 1918. American involvement became "crucial" by 1917, changing the atmosphere. Evolution of Warfare on the Western Front From Movement to Stalemate: The initial German invasion failed to achieve a decisive victory, leading to the establishment of trench warfare after the Battle of the Marne. Realization of No Breakthrough: After the Second Battle of Champagne (1915), Allied and Germancommanders like Joffre and Falkenhayn began to recognize that a "grand shattering breakthrough" was not achievable in the foreseeable future. Constant Adaptation: This realization led to a continuous arms race. As Allied artillery and tactics improved, German defenses evolved from single lines to complex "zones of pill boxes," making progress difficult and bloody. The war became an intense exercise in violence where commanders constantly adapted to a "cauldron of war". Key Battles and Their Significance Battle of the Marne (September 1914): Joffre's successful counterattack forced the Germans to retreat, effectively ending the Schlieffen Plan and leading to the beginning of trench warfare. Second Battle of Champagne (September-October 1915): A major French offensive that, despite immense effort and casualties, failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough, solidifying the understanding that trench deadlock could not be easily broken. Verdun (1916): Falkenhayn's attrition battle, designed to "kill Frenchmen," concentrated immense firepower in a small area, creating a "moonscape effect." While not decisive in destroying the French, it was a moment where "things start to go wrong for Germany," from which she never truly recovers. Somme (1916): A British and French offensive intended to relieve pressure on Verdun, but also driven by Haig's ambition for a breakthrough. The debate between breakthrough and Rawlinson's "bite and hold" strategy highlighted the dilemmas of Western Front warfare. Nivelle Offensive (April 1917): A disastrous French attempt at a breakthrough, which highlighted Nivelle'soverreach and led to significant disillusionment and mutiny within the French army. End of the War and its Legacy German Defeat: Lloyd's book argues that the German army was "falling apart" and "defeated rapidly in 1918" despite the persistent "stab in the back" myth that claimed they were betrayed at home. Armistice Decision: The decision by the Allies not to invade Germany was primarily political, as the British and French were "totally exhausted," while the Americans were "much fresher" and more keen to continue. Lloyd considers the armistice "fair on all sides". Lloyd's work underscores that the Western Front was a complex, multinational struggle marked by evolving strategies, immense pressures on commanders, and profound human costs, which ultimately determined the course of the Great War and cast a long shadow over the 20th century.

During the summer break, the 15-Minute History podcast team are republishing some of their favorite episodes. This episode originally aired on June 12, 2023.___The dull hum of aircraft filled the morning air. German soldiers looked up from the French town of St. Lô, expecting to see a few enemy fighters bearing down on them. Their hearts froze in their chests as nearly a thousand bombers emerged from the clouds. They had heard of the devastation wrought by their enemy on the Fatherland's cities, but St. Lô was only a tiny provincial settlement far from the Paris metropolis. In minutes, their world was aflame as Allied bombs exploded around them and tore flesh and metal apart in equal measure. The panzer division holding St. Lô was nearly annihilated in the first of three waves, and little was left as the sun reached its noon height. Then, the survivors heard engines approaching from the north and east in the direction of the Normandy beaches. Tanks and half-tracks bearing white stars swarmed through the town, finishing off the defenders and ripping open the Nazi left flank that had held the Allies back for over a month.The Third United States Army is one of the best-known units of the Second World War. From the opening move on St. Lô in August 1944 to the war's end nine months later, it liberated an area of Nazi-occupied Europe roughly the size of Afghanistan. Its soldiers were the best-trained men in the US Army, its officers and NCOs among the most professional in American military history, and its record of battle remains unsurpassed in enemy casualties inflicted and land covered. Most of the credit is due, of course, to the soldiers in tanks and trucks, but even the proudest of these would point to their commander as the man who made the Third Army such a terrifying weapon of war: General George S. Patton, Jr.Join us for this special, double-length episode of 15-Minute History as we teach you about General George Patton, his life, leadership, heroism, and his effect on the world we know today.

CONTINUED David Pietrusza's book, Roosevelt Sweeps Nation: FDR's 1936 Landslide and the Triumph of the Liberal Ideal, chronicles Franklin Delano Roosevelt's pivotal re-election campaign in 1936, a moment that fundamentally reshaped American political demographics and solidified the New Deal as a national agenda. The campaign began under the shadow of the death of Louis Howe in April 1936, FDR's closest political strategist and confidant since 1912. Howe, despite his "unpleasant acerbic" nature and poor health, was an invaluable aide, worshiping FDR and actively pushing Eleanor Roosevelt into political activism following FDR's 1917 affair. His passing left Roosevelt to navigate a complex political landscape on his own. Roosevelt faced significant opposition from both the political right and left. On the right, Al Smith, former Governor of New York and FDR's erstwhile mentor, emerged as a fierce critic. Disaffected since FDR's governorship, Smith believed Roosevelt's "forgotten man" speech and New Deal policies constituted "class warfare." Allied with wealthy individuals like the DuPonts and E.F. Hutton, Smith co-founded the American Liberty League, which lambasted the New Deal as unconstitutional and socialist, compelling Roosevelt to wage his own campaign of "class warfare" against these "rich guys in the Silk Hats." From the populist left, FDR contended with the legacy of Huey Long, the charismatic Louisiana senator assassinated in September 1935. Long's radical "Share Our Wealth" program, advocating for massive wealth redistribution and government provision of cars and radios to every family, garnered millions of followers and represented "the greatest force of the populist left." His strategy was to siphon votes in 1936 to ensure a Republican victory, creating a worse economic situation that would pave his way to the presidency in 1940. In Georgia, conservative populist Eugene Talmadge, while ideologically different from Long (being a "Jeffersonian conservative" who refused to fund welfare), also vigorously opposed the New Deal through "race baiting" and accusations of "communist influence," drawing some of Long's former supporters. A significant third-party challenge coalesced around Dr. Francis Everett Townsend, an elderly physician whose Townsend Plan proposed giving $200 a month to every person over 60, requiring them to spend it within 30 days to stimulate the economy. Though Roosevelt personally disliked "the dole," the plan's immense popularity and the formation of millions of Townsend clubs pushed FDR to swiftly introduce Social Security. Townsend later joined forces with Father Charles Edward Coughlin, an influential "radio priest" who initially supported FDR but turned against him over monetary policy, and Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith, a fiery orator akin to Long, along with Congressman William Lemke. This "amateur" coalition, however, failed to gain significant electoral traction, securing only 1.2% of the vote due to ballot access issues in major states and a lack of experienced political leadership. Coughlin, notably, was a more prominent radio figure than FDR for a period, influencing millions through his syndicated broadcasts. FDR's secret meeting with Coughlin at Hyde Park, orchestrated by Joseph Patrick Kennedy, famously ended in a rupture, leading to open political warfare. Ideological parties also presented concerns. The Socialist Party, led by Norman Thomas, consistently polled hundreds of thousands of votes, particularly in urban centers like New York City. The Communist Party USA, under Earl Browder (chosen by Stalin for his pliability and non-Jewish background), initially condemned the New Deal as "fascist." However, with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the global shift to a "popular front" strategy, the Communist Party covertly supported FDR to keep him in power against the looming international threats, while running their own candidate to avoid the "kiss of death" of an overt endorsement. Media mogul William Randolph Hearst, who controlled a vast empire of 28 newspapers and eight radio stations, also became a powerful opponent. Despite initially supporting FDR in 1932, Hearst grew increasingly disaffected by the New Deal's progressive policies and taxes on the wealthy, leading to a "long bumpy involved breakup." FDR even considered "throwing 46 men who make a million dollars a year to the wolves," a direct reference to Hearst and his wealthy allies. The Republican Party ultimately nominated Alf Landon, the Governor of Kansas, a "complete surprise" and "least interesting character." Landon, a progressive Republican favored by Hearst, was known for balancing Kansas's budget but was widely regarded as uncharismatic and a poor public speaker, especially on radio, a crucial medium of the era. His campaign message, promising only a more efficient implementation of New Deal programs he had largely supported, failed to energize the electorate. Earlier potential nominees included Herbert Hoover, William Borah, Frank Knox, and Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg. Roosevelt's campaign, in stark contrast, was dynamic. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt played an indispensable role, defying initial party reluctance to campaign vigorously. She became a crucial link to the African-American vote in Northern cities, even though FDR, for political reasons, declined to support an anti-lynching law favored by Eleanor and the NAACP. Roosevelt himself delivered powerful, "frenzied and irate" speeches, most notably his Madison Square Garden address on Halloween night, where he famously embraced the "hatred" of "economic royalists" and promised accountability, a compelling message of "class warfare" that galvanized the electorate despite his own staff's initial horror at its perceived demagoguery. Despite initial polls, like the Literary Digest (which had predicted a Landon victory), suggesting a close race, Rooseveltachieved an unprecedented landslide. He won 46 of 48 states, secured overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress (74 senators, 334 representatives), and claimed 38 governorships. Crucially, FDR carried 104 of 106 major cities, solidifying the Democratic Party's urban strength and marking a profound political realignment in American history. This decisive victory was a clear mandate for the New Deal and established the foundation of the modern Democratic Party.

David Pietrusza's book, Roosevelt Sweeps Nation: FDR's 1936 Landslide and the Triumph of the Liberal Ideal, chronicles Franklin Delano Roosevelt's pivotal re-election campaign in 1936, a moment that fundamentally reshaped American political demographics and solidified the New Deal as a national agenda. The campaign began under the shadow of the death of Louis Howe in April 1936, FDR's closest political strategist and confidant since 1912. Howe, despite his "unpleasant acerbic" nature and poor health, was an invaluable aide, worshiping FDR and actively pushing Eleanor Roosevelt into political activism following FDR's 1917 affair. His passing left Roosevelt to navigate a complex political landscape on his own. 1936LOWELL THOMAS & FDR Roosevelt faced significant opposition from both the political right and left. On the right, Al Smith, former Governor of New York and FDR's erstwhile mentor, emerged as a fierce critic. Disaffected since FDR's governorship, Smith believed Roosevelt's "forgotten man" speech and New Deal policies constituted "class warfare." Allied with wealthy individuals like the DuPonts and E.F. Hutton, Smith co-founded the American Liberty League, which lambasted the New Deal as unconstitutional and socialist, compelling Roosevelt to wage his own campaign of "class warfare" against these "rich guys in the Silk Hats." From the populist left, FDR contended with the legacy of Huey Long, the charismatic Louisiana senator assassinated in September 1935. Long's radical "Share Our Wealth" program, advocating for massive wealth redistribution and government provision of cars and radios to every family, garnered millions of followers and represented "the greatest force of the populist left." His strategy was to siphon votes in 1936 to ensure a Republican victory, creating a worse economic situation that would pave his way to the presidency in 1940. In Georgia, conservative populist Eugene Talmadge, while ideologically different from Long (being a "Jeffersonian conservative" who refused to fund welfare), also vigorously opposed the New Deal through "race baiting" and accusations of "communist influence," drawing some of Long's former supporters. A significant third-party challenge coalesced around Dr. Francis Everett Townsend, an elderly physician whose Townsend Plan proposed giving $200 a month to every person over 60, requiring them to spend it within 30 days to stimulate the economy. Though Roosevelt personally disliked "the dole," the plan's immense popularity and the formation of millions of Townsend clubs pushed FDR to swiftly introduce Social Security. Townsend later joined forces with Father Charles Edward Coughlin, an influential "radio priest" who initially supported FDR but turned against him over monetary policy, and Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith, a fiery orator akin to Long, along with Congressman William Lemke. This "amateur" coalition, however, failed to gain significant electoral traction, securing only 1.2% of the vote due to ballot access issues in major states and a lack of experienced political leadership. Coughlin, notably, was a more prominent radio figure than FDR for a period, influencing millions through his syndicated broadcasts. FDR's secret meeting with Coughlin at Hyde Park, orchestrated by Joseph Patrick Kennedy, famously ended in a rupture, leading to open political warfare. Ideological parties also presented concerns. The Socialist Party, led by Norman Thomas, consistently polled hundreds of thousands of votes, particularly in urban centers like New York City. The Communist Party USA, under Earl Browder (chosen by Stalin for his pliability and non-Jewish background), initially condemned the New Deal as "fascist." However, with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the global shift to a "popular front" strategy, the Communist Party covertly supported FDR to keep him in power against the looming international threats, while running their own candidate to avoid the "kiss of death" of an overt endorsement. Media mogul William Randolph Hearst, who controlled a vast empire of 28 newspapers and eight radio stations, also became a powerful opponent. Despite initially supporting FDR in 1932, Hearst grew increasingly disaffected by the New Deal's progressive policies and taxes on the wealthy, leading to a "long bumpy involved breakup." FDR even considered "throwing 46 men who make a million dollars a year to the wolves," a direct reference to Hearst and his wealthy allies. The Republican Party ultimately nominated Alf Landon, the Governor of Kansas, a "complete surprise" and "least interesting character." Landon, a progressive Republican favored by Hearst, was known for balancing Kansas's budget but was widely regarded as uncharismatic and a poor public speaker, especially on radio, a crucial medium of the era. His campaign message, promising only a more efficient implementation of New Deal programs he had largely supported, failed to energize the electorate. Earlier potential nominees included Herbert Hoover, William Borah, Frank Knox, and Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg. Roosevelt's campaign, in stark contrast, was dynamic. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt played an indispensable role, defying initial party reluctance to campaign vigorously. She became a crucial link to the African-American vote in Northern cities, even though FDR, for political reasons, declined to support an anti-lynching law favored by Eleanor and the NAACP. Roosevelt himself delivered powerful, "frenzied and irate" speeches, most notably his Madison Square Garden address on Halloween night, where he famously embraced the "hatred" of "economic royalists" and promised accountability, a compelling message of "class warfare" that galvanized the electorate despite his own staff's initial horror at its perceived demagoguery. Despite initial polls, like the Literary Digest (which had predicted a Landon victory), suggesting a close race, Rooseveltachieved an unprecedented landslide. He won 46 of 48 states, secured overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress (74 senators, 334 representatives), and claimed 38 governorships. Crucially, FDR carried 104 of 106 major cities, solidifying the Democratic Party's urban strength and marking a profound political realignment in American history. This decisive victory was a clear mandate for the New Deal and established the foundation of the modern Democratic Party.

CONTINUED David Pietrusza's book, Roosevelt Sweeps Nation: FDR's 1936 Landslide and the Triumph of the Liberal Ideal, chronicles Franklin Delano Roosevelt's pivotal re-election campaign in 1936, a moment that fundamentally reshaped American political demographics and solidified the New Deal as a national agenda. The campaign began under the shadow of the death of Louis Howe in April 1936, FDR's closest political strategist and confidant since 1912. Howe, despite his "unpleasant acerbic" nature and poor health, was an invaluable aide, worshiping FDR and actively pushing Eleanor Roosevelt into political activism following FDR's 1917 affair. His passing left Roosevelt to navigate a complex political landscape on his own. 1944 FALAH Roosevelt faced significant orpposition from both the political right and left. On the right, Al Smith, former Governor of New York and FDR's erstwhile mentor, emerged as a fierce critic. Disaffected since FDR's governorship, Smith believed Roosevelt's "forgotten man" speech and New Deal policies constituted "class warfare." Allied with wealthy individuals like the DuPonts and E.F. Hutton, Smith co-founded the American Liberty League, which lambasted the New Deal as unconstitutional and socialist, compelling Roosevelt to wage his own campaign of "class warfare" against these "rich guys in the Silk Hats." From the populist left, FDR contended with the legacy of Huey Long, the charismatic Louisiana senator assassinated in September 1935. Long's radical "Share Our Wealth" program, advocating for massive wealth redistribution and government provision of cars and radios to every family, garnered millions of followers and represented "the greatest force of the populist left." His strategy was to siphon votes in 1936 to ensure a Republican victory, creating a worse economic situation that would pave his way to the presidency in 1940. In Georgia, conservative populist Eugene Talmadge, while ideologically different from Long (being a "Jeffersonian conservative" who refused to fund welfare), also vigorously opposed the New Deal through "race baiting" and accusations of "communist influence," drawing some of Long's former supporters. A significant third-party challenge coalesced around Dr. Francis Everett Townsend, an elderly physician whose Townsend Plan proposed giving $200 a month to every person over 60, requiring them to spend it within 30 days to stimulate the economy. Though Roosevelt personally disliked "the dole," the plan's immense popularity and the formation of millions of Townsend clubs pushed FDR to swiftly introduce Social Security. Townsend later joined forces with Father Charles Edward Coughlin, an influential "radio priest" who initially supported FDR but turned against him over monetary policy, and Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith, a fiery orator akin to Long, along with Congressman William Lemke. This "amateur" coalition, however, failed to gain significant electoral traction, securing only 1.2% of the vote due to ballot access issues in major states and a lack of experienced political leadership. Coughlin, notably, was a more prominent radio figure than FDR for a period, influencing millions through his syndicated broadcasts. FDR's secret meeting with Coughlin at Hyde Park, orchestrated by Joseph Patrick Kennedy, famously ended in a rupture, leading to open political warfare. Ideological parties also presented concerns. The Socialist Party, led by Norman Thomas, consistently polled hundreds of thousands of votes, particularly in urban centers like New York City. The Communist Party USA, under Earl Browder (chosen by Stalin for his pliability and non-Jewish background), initially condemned the New Deal as "fascist." However, with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the global shift to a "popular front" strategy, the Communist Party covertly supported FDR to keep him in power against the looming international threats, while running their own candidate to avoid the "kiss of death" of an overt endorsement. Media mogul William Randolph Hearst, who controlled a vast empire of 28 newspapers and eight radio stations, also became a powerful opponent. Despite initially supporting FDR in 1932, Hearst grew increasingly disaffected by the New Deal's progressive policies and taxes on the wealthy, leading to a "long bumpy involved breakup." FDR even considered "throwing 46 men who make a million dollars a year to the wolves," a direct reference to Hearst and his wealthy allies. The Republican Party ultimately nominated Alf Landon, the Governor of Kansas, a "complete surprise" and "least interesting character." Landon, a progressive Republican favored by Hearst, was known for balancing Kansas's budget but was widely regarded as uncharismatic and a poor public speaker, especially on radio, a crucial medium of the era. His campaign message, promising only a more efficient implementation of New Deal programs he had largely supported, failed to energize the electorate. Earlier potential nominees included Herbert Hoover, William Borah, Frank Knox, and Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg. Roosevelt's campaign, in stark contrast, was dynamic. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt played an indispensable role, defying initial party reluctance to campaign vigorously. She became a crucial link to the African-American vote in Northern cities, even though FDR, for political reasons, declined to support an anti-lynching law favored by Eleanor and the NAACP. Roosevelt himself delivered powerful, "frenzied and irate" speeches, most notably his Madison Square Garden address on Halloween night, where he famously embraced the "hatred" of "economic royalists" and promised accountability, a compelling message of "class warfare" that galvanized the electorate despite his own staff's initial horror at its perceived demagoguery. Despite initial polls, like the Literary Digest (which had predicted a Landon victory), suggesting a close race, Rooseveltachieved an unprecedented landslide. He won 46 of 48 states, secured overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress (74 senators, 334 representatives), and claimed 38 governorships. Crucially, FDR carried 104 of 106 major cities, solidifying the Democratic Party's urban strength and marking a profound political realignment in American history. This decisive victory was a clear mandate for the New Deal and established the foundation of the modern Democratic Party.

CONTINUED David Pietrusza's book, Roosevelt Sweeps Nation: FDR's 1936 Landslide and the Triumph of the Liberal Ideal, chronicles Franklin Delano Roosevelt's pivotal re-election campaign in 1936, a moment that fundamentally reshaped American political demographics and solidified the New Deal as a national agenda. The campaign began under the shadow of the death of Louis Howe in April 1936, FDR's closest political strategist and confidant since 1912. Howe, despite his "unpleasant acerbic" nature and poor health, was an invaluable aide, worshiping FDR and actively pushing Eleanor Roosevelt into political activism following FDR's 1917 affair. His passing left Roosevelt to navigate a complex political landscape on his own. Roosevelt faced significant opposition from both the political right and left. On the right, Al Smith, former Governor of New York and FDR's erstwhile mentor, emerged as a fierce critic. Disaffected since FDR's governorship, Smith believed Roosevelt's "forgotten man" speech and New Deal policies constituted "class warfare." Allied with wealthy individuals like the DuPonts and E.F. Hutton, Smith co-founded the American Liberty League, which lambasted the New Deal as unconstitutional and socialist, compelling Roosevelt to wage his own campaign of "class warfare" against these "rich guys in the Silk Hats." From the populist left, FDR contended with the legacy of Huey Long, the charismatic Louisiana senator assassinated in September 1935. Long's radical "Share Our Wealth" program, advocating for massive wealth redistribution and government provision of cars and radios to every family, garnered millions of followers and represented "the greatest force of the populist left." His strategy was to siphon votes in 1936 to ensure a Republican victory, creating a worse economic situation that would pave his way to the presidency in 1940. In Georgia, conservative populist Eugene Talmadge, while ideologically different from Long (being a "Jeffersonian conservative" who refused to fund welfare), also vigorously opposed the New Deal through "race baiting" and accusations of "communist influence," drawing some of Long's former supporters. A significant third-party challenge coalesced around Dr. Francis Everett Townsend, an elderly physician whose Townsend Plan proposed giving $200 a month to every person over 60, requiring them to spend it within 30 days to stimulate the economy. Though Roosevelt personally disliked "the dole," the plan's immense popularity and the formation of millions of Townsend clubs pushed FDR to swiftly introduce Social Security. Townsend later joined forces with Father Charles Edward Coughlin, an influential "radio priest" who initially supported FDR but turned against him over monetary policy, and Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith, a fiery orator akin to Long, along with Congressman William Lemke. This "amateur" coalition, however, failed to gain significant electoral traction, securing only 1.2% of the vote due to ballot access issues in major states and a lack of experienced political leadership. Coughlin, notably, was a more prominent radio figure than FDR for a period, influencing millions through his syndicated broadcasts. FDR's secret meeting with Coughlin at Hyde Park, orchestrated by Joseph Patrick Kennedy, famously ended in a rupture, leading to open political warfare. Ideological parties also presented concerns. The Socialist Party, led by Norman Thomas, consistently polled hundreds of thousands of votes, particularly in urban centers like New York City. The Communist Party USA, under Earl Browder (chosen by Stalin for his pliability and non-Jewish background), initially condemned the New Deal as "fascist." However, with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the global shift to a "popular front" strategy, the Communist Party covertly supported FDR to keep him in power against the looming international threats, while running their own candidate to avoid the "kiss of death" of an overt endorsement. Media mogul William Randolph Hearst, who controlled a vast empire of 28 newspapers and eight radio stations, also became a powerful opponent. Despite initially supporting FDR in 1932, Hearst grew increasingly disaffected by the New Deal's progressive policies and taxes on the wealthy, leading to a "long bumpy involved breakup." FDR even considered "throwing 46 men who make a million dollars a year to the wolves," a direct reference to Hearst and his wealthy allies. The Republican Party ultimately nominated Alf Landon, the Governor of Kansas, a "complete surprise" and "least interesting character." Landon, a progressive Republican favored by Hearst, was known for balancing Kansas's budget but was widely regarded as uncharismatic and a poor public speaker, especially on radio, a crucial medium of the era. His campaign message, promising only a more efficient implementation of New Deal programs he had largely supported, failed to energize the electorate. Earlier potential nominees included Herbert Hoover, William Borah, Frank Knox, and Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg. Roosevelt's campaign, in stark contrast, was dynamic. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt played an indispensable role, defying initial party reluctance to campaign vigorously. She became a crucial link to the African-American vote in Northern cities, even though FDR, for political reasons, declined to support an anti-lynching law favored by Eleanor and the NAACP. Roosevelt himself delivered powerful, "frenzied and irate" speeches, most notably his Madison Square Garden address on Halloween night, where he famously embraced the "hatred" of "economic royalists" and promised accountability, a compelling message of "class warfare" that galvanized the electorate despite his own staff's initial horror at its perceived demagoguery. Despite initial polls, like the Literary Digest (which had predicted a Landon victory), suggesting a close race, Rooseveltachieved an unprecedented landslide. He won 46 of 48 states, secured overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress (74 senators, 334 representatives), and claimed 38 governorships. Crucially, FDR carried 104 of 106 major cities, solidifying the Democratic Party's urban strength and marking a profound political realignment in American history. This decisive victory was a clear mandate for the New Deal and established the foundation of the modern Democratic Party.

CONTINUED David Pietrusza's book, Roosevelt Sweeps Nation: FDR's 1936 Landslide and the Triumph of the Liberal Ideal, chronicles Franklin Delano Roosevelt's pivotal re-election campaign in 1936, a moment that fundamentally reshaped American political demographics and solidified the New Deal as a national agenda. The campaign began under the shadow of the death of Louis Howe in April 1936, FDR's closest political strategist and confidant since 1912. Howe, despite his "unpleasant acerbic" nature and poor health, was an invaluable aide, worshiping FDR and actively pushing Eleanor Roosevelt into political activism following FDR's 1917 affair. His passing left Roosevelt to navigate a complex political landscape on his own. Roosevelt faced significant opposition from both the political right and left. On the right, Al Smith, former Governor of New York and FDR's erstwhile mentor, emerged as a fierce critic. Disaffected since FDR's governorship, Smith believed Roosevelt's "forgotten man" speech and New Deal policies constituted "class warfare." Allied with wealthy individuals like the DuPonts and E.F. Hutton, Smith co-founded the American Liberty League, which lambasted the New Deal as unconstitutional and socialist, compelling Roosevelt to wage his own campaign of "class warfare" against these "rich guys in the Silk Hats." From the populist left, FDR contended with the legacy of Huey Long, the charismatic Louisiana senator assassinated in September 1935. Long's radical "Share Our Wealth" program, advocating for massive wealth redistribution and government provision of cars and radios to every family, garnered millions of followers and represented "the greatest force of the populist left." His strategy was to siphon votes in 1936 to ensure a Republican victory, creating a worse economic situation that would pave his way to the presidency in 1940. In Georgia, conservative populist Eugene Talmadge, while ideologically different from Long (being a "Jeffersonian conservative" who refused to fund welfare), also vigorously opposed the New Deal through "race baiting" and accusations of "communist influence," drawing some of Long's former supporters. A significant third-party challenge coalesced around Dr. Francis Everett Townsend, an elderly physician whose Townsend Plan proposed giving $200 a month to every person over 60, requiring them to spend it within 30 days to stimulate the economy. Though Roosevelt personally disliked "the dole," the plan's immense popularity and the formation of millions of Townsend clubs pushed FDR to swiftly introduce Social Security. Townsend later joined forces with Father Charles Edward Coughlin, an influential "radio priest" who initially supported FDR but turned against him over monetary policy, and Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith, a fiery orator akin to Long, along with Congressman William Lemke. This "amateur" coalition, however, failed to gain significant electoral traction, securing only 1.2% of the vote due to ballot access issues in major states and a lack of experienced political leadership. Coughlin, notably, was a more prominent radio figure than FDR for a period, influencing millions through his syndicated broadcasts. FDR's secret meeting with Coughlin at Hyde Park, orchestrated by Joseph Patrick Kennedy, famously ended in a rupture, leading to open political warfare. Ideological parties also presented concerns. The Socialist Party, led by Norman Thomas, consistently polled hundreds of thousands of votes, particularly in urban centers like New York City. The Communist Party USA, under Earl Browder (chosen by Stalin for his pliability and non-Jewish background), initially condemned the New Deal as "fascist." However, with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the global shift to a "popular front" strategy, the Communist Party covertly supported FDR to keep him in power against the looming international threats, while running their own candidate to avoid the "kiss of death" of an overt endorsement. Media mogul William Randolph Hearst, who controlled a vast empire of 28 newspapers and eight radio stations, also became a powerful opponent. Despite initially supporting FDR in 1932, Hearst grew increasingly disaffected by the New Deal's progressive policies and taxes on the wealthy, leading to a "long bumpy involved breakup." FDR even considered "throwing 46 men who make a million dollars a year to the wolves," a direct reference to Hearst and his wealthy allies. The Republican Party ultimately nominated Alf Landon, the Governor of Kansas, a "complete surprise" and "least interesting character." Landon, a progressive Republican favored by Hearst, was known for balancing Kansas's budget but was widely regarded as uncharismatic and a poor public speaker, especially on radio, a crucial medium of the era. His campaign message, promising only a more efficient implementation of New Deal programs he had largely supported, failed to energize the electorate. Earlier potential nominees included Herbert Hoover, William Borah, Frank Knox, and Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg. Roosevelt's campaign, in stark contrast, was dynamic. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt played an indispensable role, defying initial party reluctance to campaign vigorously. She became a crucial link to the African-American vote in Northern cities, even though FDR, for political reasons, declined to support an anti-lynching law favored by Eleanor and the NAACP. Roosevelt himself delivered powerful, "frenzied and irate" speeches, most notably his Madison Square Garden address on Halloween night, where he famously embraced the "hatred" of "economic royalists" and promised accountability, a compelling message of "class warfare" that galvanized the electorate despite his own staff's initial horror at its perceived demagoguery. Despite initial polls, like the Literary Digest (which had predicted a Landon victory), suggesting a close race, Rooseveltachieved an unprecedented landslide. He won 46 of 48 states, secured overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress (74 senators, 334 representatives), and claimed 38 governorships. Crucially, FDR carried 104 of 106 major cities, solidifying the Democratic Party's urban strength and marking a profound political realignment in American history. This decisive victory was a clear mandate for the New Deal and established the foundation of the modern Democratic Party.

CONTINUED David Pietrusza's book, Roosevelt Sweeps Nation: FDR's 1936 Landslide and the Triumph of the Liberal Ideal, chronicles Franklin Delano Roosevelt's pivotal re-election campaign in 1936, a moment that fundamentally reshaped American political demographics and solidified the New Deal as a national agenda. The campaign began under the shadow of the death of Louis Howe in April 1936, FDR's closest political strategist and confidant since 1912. Howe, despite his "unpleasant acerbic" nature and poor health, was an invaluable aide, worshiping FDR and actively pushing Eleanor Roosevelt into political activism following FDR's 1917 affair. His passing left Roosevelt to navigate a complex political landscape on his own. Roosevelt faced significant opposition from both the political right and left. On the right, Al Smith, former Governor of New York and FDR's erstwhile mentor, emerged as a fierce critic. Disaffected since FDR's governorship, Smith believed Roosevelt's "forgotten man" speech and New Deal policies constituted "class warfare." Allied with wealthy individuals like the DuPonts and E.F. Hutton, Smith co-founded the American Liberty League, which lambasted the New Deal as unconstitutional and socialist, compelling Roosevelt to wage his own campaign of "class warfare" against these "rich guys in the Silk Hats." From the populist left, FDR contended with the legacy of Huey Long, the charismatic Louisiana senator assassinated in September 1935. Long's radical "Share Our Wealth" program, advocating for massive wealth redistribution and government provision of cars and radios to every family, garnered millions of followers and represented "the greatest force of the populist left." His strategy was to siphon votes in 1936 to ensure a Republican victory, creating a worse economic situation that would pave his way to the presidency in 1940. In Georgia, conservative populist Eugene Talmadge, while ideologically different from Long (being a "Jeffersonian conservative" who refused to fund welfare), also vigorously opposed the New Deal through "race baiting" and accusations of "communist influence," drawing some of Long's former supporters. A significant third-party challenge coalesced around Dr. Francis Everett Townsend, an elderly physician whose Townsend Plan proposed giving $200 a month to every person over 60, requiring them to spend it within 30 days to stimulate the economy. Though Roosevelt personally disliked "the dole," the plan's immense popularity and the formation of millions of Townsend clubs pushed FDR to swiftly introduce Social Security. Townsend later joined forces with Father Charles Edward Coughlin, an influential "radio priest" who initially supported FDR but turned against him over monetary policy, and Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith, a fiery orator akin to Long, along with Congressman William Lemke. This "amateur" coalition, however, failed to gain significant electoral traction, securing only 1.2% of the vote due to ballot access issues in major states and a lack of experienced political leadership. Coughlin, notably, was a more prominent radio figure than FDR for a period, influencing millions through his syndicated broadcasts. FDR's secret meeting with Coughlin at Hyde Park, orchestrated by Joseph Patrick Kennedy, famously ended in a rupture, leading to open political warfare. Ideological parties also presented concerns. The Socialist Party, led by Norman Thomas, consistently polled hundreds of thousands of votes, particularly in urban centers like New York City. The Communist Party USA, under Earl Browder (chosen by Stalin for his pliability and non-Jewish background), initially condemned the New Deal as "fascist." However, with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the global shift to a "popular front" strategy, the Communist Party covertly supported FDR to keep him in power against the looming international threats, while running their own candidate to avoid the "kiss of death" of an overt endorsement. Media mogul William Randolph Hearst, who controlled a vast empire of 28 newspapers and eight radio stations, also became a powerful opponent. Despite initially supporting FDR in 1932, Hearst grew increasingly disaffected by the New Deal's progressive policies and taxes on the wealthy, leading to a "long bumpy involved breakup." FDR even considered "throwing 46 men who make a million dollars a year to the wolves," a direct reference to Hearst and his wealthy allies. The Republican Party ultimately nominated Alf Landon, the Governor of Kansas, a "complete surprise" and "least interesting character." Landon, a progressive Republican favored by Hearst, was known for balancing Kansas's budget but was widely regarded as uncharismatic and a poor public speaker, especially on radio, a crucial medium of the era. His campaign message, promising only a more efficient implementation of New Deal programs he had largely supported, failed to energize the electorate. Earlier potential nominees included Herbert Hoover, William Borah, Frank Knox, and Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg. Roosevelt's campaign, in stark contrast, was dynamic. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt played an indispensable role, defying initial party reluctance to campaign vigorously. She became a crucial link to the African-American vote in Northern cities, even though FDR, for political reasons, declined to support an anti-lynching law favored by Eleanor and the NAACP. Roosevelt himself delivered powerful, "frenzied and irate" speeches, most notably his Madison Square Garden address on Halloween night, where he famously embraced the "hatred" of "economic royalists" and promised accountability, a compelling message of "class warfare" that galvanized the electorate despite his own staff's initial horror at its perceived demagoguery. Despite initial polls, like the Literary Digest (which had predicted a Landon victory), suggesting a close race, Rooseveltachieved an unprecedented landslide. He won 46 of 48 states, secured overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress (74 senators, 334 representatives), and claimed 38 governorships. Crucially, FDR carried 104 of 106 major cities, solidifying the Democratic Party's urban strength and marking a profound political realignment in American history. This decisive victory was a clear mandate for the New Deal and established the foundation of the modern Democratic Party.

CONTINUED David Pietrusza's book, Roosevelt Sweeps Nation: FDR's 1936 Landslide and the Triumph of the Liberal Ideal, chronicles Franklin Delano Roosevelt's pivotal re-election campaign in 1936, a moment that fundamentally reshaped American political demographics and solidified the New Deal as a national agenda. The campaign began under the shadow of the death of Louis Howe in April 1936, FDR's closest political strategist and confidant since 1912. Howe, despite his "unpleasant acerbic" nature and poor health, was an invaluable aide, worshiping FDR and actively pushing Eleanor Roosevelt into political activism following FDR's 1917 affair. His passing left Roosevelt to navigate a complex political landscape on his own. Roosevelt faced significant opposition from both the political right and left. On the right, Al Smith, former Governor of New York and FDR's erstwhile mentor, emerged as a fierce critic. Disaffected since FDR's governorship, Smith believed Roosevelt's "forgotten man" speech and New Deal policies constituted "class warfare." Allied with wealthy individuals like the DuPonts and E.F. Hutton, Smith co-founded the American Liberty League, which lambasted the New Deal as unconstitutional and socialist, compelling Roosevelt to wage his own campaign of "class warfare" against these "rich guys in the Silk Hats." From the populist left, FDR contended with the legacy of Huey Long, the charismatic Louisiana senator assassinated in September 1935. Long's radical "Share Our Wealth" program, advocating for massive wealth redistribution and government provision of cars and radios to every family, garnered millions of followers and represented "the greatest force of the populist left." His strategy was to siphon votes in 1936 to ensure a Republican victory, creating a worse economic situation that would pave his way to the presidency in 1940. In Georgia, conservative populist Eugene Talmadge, while ideologically different from Long (being a "Jeffersonian conservative" who refused to fund welfare), also vigorously opposed the New Deal through "race baiting" and accusations of "communist influence," drawing some of Long's former supporters. A significant third-party challenge coalesced around Dr. Francis Everett Townsend, an elderly physician whose Townsend Plan proposed giving $200 a month to every person over 60, requiring them to spend it within 30 days to stimulate the economy. Though Roosevelt personally disliked "the dole," the plan's immense popularity and the formation of millions of Townsend clubs pushed FDR to swiftly introduce Social Security. Townsend later joined forces with Father Charles Edward Coughlin, an influential "radio priest" who initially supported FDR but turned against him over monetary policy, and Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith, a fiery orator akin to Long, along with Congressman William Lemke. This "amateur" coalition, however, failed to gain significant electoral traction, securing only 1.2% of the vote due to ballot access issues in major states and a lack of experienced political leadership. Coughlin, notably, was a more prominent radio figure than FDR for a period, influencing millions through his syndicated broadcasts. FDR's secret meeting with Coughlin at Hyde Park, orchestrated by Joseph Patrick Kennedy, famously ended in a rupture, leading to open political warfare. Ideological parties also presented concerns. The Socialist Party, led by Norman Thomas, consistently polled hundreds of thousands of votes, particularly in urban centers like New York City. The Communist Party USA, under Earl Browder (chosen by Stalin for his pliability and non-Jewish background), initially condemned the New Deal as "fascist." However, with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the global shift to a "popular front" strategy, the Communist Party covertly supported FDR to keep him in power against the looming international threats, while running their own candidate to avoid the "kiss of death" of an overt endorsement. Media mogul William Randolph Hearst, who controlled a vast empire of 28 newspapers and eight radio stations, also became a powerful opponent. Despite initially supporting FDR in 1932, Hearst grew increasingly disaffected by the New Deal's progressive policies and taxes on the wealthy, leading to a "long bumpy involved breakup." FDR even considered "throwing 46 men who make a million dollars a year to the wolves," a direct reference to Hearst and his wealthy allies. The Republican Party ultimately nominated Alf Landon, the Governor of Kansas, a "complete surprise" and "least interesting character." Landon, a progressive Republican favored by Hearst, was known for balancing Kansas's budget but was widely regarded as uncharismatic and a poor public speaker, especially on radio, a crucial medium of the era. His campaign message, promising only a more efficient implementation of New Deal programs he had largely supported, failed to energize the electorate. Earlier potential nominees included Herbert Hoover, William Borah, Frank Knox, and Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg. Roosevelt's campaign, in stark contrast, was dynamic. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt played an indispensable role, defying initial party reluctance to campaign vigorously. She became a crucial link to the African-American vote in Northern cities, even though FDR, for political reasons, declined to support an anti-lynching law favored by Eleanor and the NAACP. Roosevelt himself delivered powerful, "frenzied and irate" speeches, most notably his Madison Square Garden address on Halloween night, where he famously embraced the "hatred" of "economic royalists" and promised accountability, a compelling message of "class warfare" that galvanized the electorate despite his own staff's initial horror at its perceived demagoguery. Despite initial polls, like the Literary Digest (which had predicted a Landon victory), suggesting a close race, Rooseveltachieved an unprecedented landslide. He won 46 of 48 states, secured overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress (74 senators, 334 representatives), and claimed 38 governorships. Crucially, FDR carried 104 of 106 major cities, solidifying the Democratic Party's urban strength and marking a profound political realignment in American history. This decisive victory was a clear mandate for the New Deal and established the foundation of the modern Democratic Party.