Gulf International Forum's Majlis

Featured Speakers: Dr. Dania Thafer, Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Dr. Banafsheh Keynoush, and Dr. Kenneth Katzman. Synopsis: On March 10, 2023, the world was stunned by the announcement that the Gulf's greatest rivals, Iran and Saudi Arabia, would restore diplomatic ties. Concluded in China after two years of negotiations in Iraq and Oman, the agreement was penned by the Iranian and Saudi National Security Advisors in the presence of the Chinese Foreign Minister. The accord commits both parties to resume diplomatic relations in two months, to respect the principles of non-interference and the sovereignty of states in the region, and to revive the 2001 security agreement that once improved ties between Tehran and Riyadh. The world witnessed several rounds of talks since the first meeting between the two states in April 2021, but it was the concluding session in China this month that paved the way for a meeting of Iran and Saudi Arabia's foreign ministers and the ultimate announcement that the two countries would end the diplomatic deadlock of the past seven years. The March 10 statement gave observers few insights into the mechanisms that will resolve the two sides' several outstanding disputes, however. Little information begets significant speculation, and it remains to be seen if the agreement will change the relationship of the Gulf's most powerful rivals—or the regional roles of external great powers—in the years to come. How could the Gulf states leverage this agreement to end the war in Yemen? What factors motivated Iran and Saudi Arabia to sign the deal now? What were China's interests in persuading both sides to reestablish diplomatic contact and pursue rapprochement? How will the United States' role in the Gulf or America's relationship with Riyadh be affected by China's entry as a meditator in the region? Will this agreement limit the activities of the IRGC and proxy forces throughout the region? Will the IRGC commit to any de-escalation or security coordination agreements signed between Riyadh and the Raisi government? In the wider region, will conflict resolution efforts in Syria and Lebanon also benefit from the recent agreement? Is this agreement durable, or will it collapse?

Featured Speakers: Dr. Mark N. Katz and Dr. Diana Galeeva. Book Description In recent decades Russia has played an increasingly active role in the Middle East as states within the region continue to diversify their relations with major external powers. Yet the role of specific Russian regions, especially those that share an ‘Islamic identity' with the GCC has been overlooked. In this book Diana Galeeva examines the relations between the Gulf States and Russia from the Soviet era to the present day. Using the Republic of Tatarstan, one of Russia's Muslim polities as a case study, Galeeva demonstrates the emergence of relations between modern Tatarstan and the GCC States, evolving from concerns with economic survival to a rising paradiplomacy reliant on shared Islamic identities. Having conducted fieldwork in the Muslim Republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Dagestan, the book includes interviews with high-ranking political figures, heads of religious organisations and academics. Moving beyond solely economic and geopolitical considerations, the research in this book sheds light on the increasingly important role that culture and shared Islamic identity play in paradiplomacy efforts.

Featured Speakers: Dr. Dania Thafer, Dr. Cinzia Bianco, Dr. Samuel Ramani, and Eugene Chausovsky. Synopsis: As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches its first anniversary, the Gulf states have played a variety of roles in the conflict, both directly and peripherally. By providing drones and missiles to the Russian military, Iran has established itself as the Gulf's most direct participant in the conflict, and the only country in the region whose leadership has openly sided with the Kremlin. By contrast, all six of the GCC states immediately voted to condemn the invasion at the United Nations General Assembly, and most have provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine over the past year. However, the GCC's approaches to the conflict have varied by nation; while Kuwait and Qatar have vocally condemned Russia, the other four members of the bloc have preserved relatively cordial ties with Moscow, with the United Arab Emirates in particular emerging as an outlet for Russian finance. Much of the Gulf has continued to cooperate with Russia under the OPEC+ oil alliance, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE have worked to organize prisoner exchanges between the two sides, buying them goodwill in both Moscow and Kyiv and strengthening their soft-power credentials. Constrained by geopolitical considerations, the Western nations have adopted a nuanced approach toward the Gulf throughout the conflict. In the days following the invasion in February 2022, the United States and the European Union strongly pressured the six GCC states to condemn Russia at the General Assembly. After they did so, the West largely refrained from heavy-handed pressure on the Gulf to comply with sanctions on Moscow. Concurrently, Europe sought to increase its imports of oil and natural gas from the Gulf in order to offset sanctioned Russian hydrocarbons. However, after the OPEC+ decision in late 2022 to cut oil production in order to preserve high prices, a number of Western officials vocally condemned what they perceived as financial opportunism within the GCC states. In the second year of the war, with both the military outcome and its global financial impacts uncertain, the Gulf's importance in the conflict will only grow. What factors motivate the Gulf states' stances on the ongoing war? Why have some GCC nations condemned Russia and supported Ukraine more explicitly than others? How have the GCC states' relations with Russia changed over the last year? Can Saudi Arabia and the UAE preserve their cordial relations with Moscow if hostilities escalate? How can the West (and Russia) encourage the Gulf nations to adopt a Ukraine policy closer to their interests?

Featured speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros, Alia Moubayed, Dr. David Pollock, and Dr. Jean-Loup Samaan. Synopsis: As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its second year, the conflict has decisively shaped political and economic issues in the Gulf. The rapid increase in oil and gas prices in the aftermath of the invasion has come as a boon to the GCC states, giving some of them a sizable budget surplus for the first time in years and easing pressures for economic reform. High oil and gas prices have also increased the Gulf's strategic importance, giving its governments greater stature in international affairs. Both the United States and China have taken high-profile visits to the Gulf in the past year, encouraging GCC leaders to lower oil prices and increase strategic partnership. Each of the GCC capitals, and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in particular, have used their newfound status to seek concessions from the two superpowers, playing them off against each other for their own interests. At the same time, Iranian assistance to Russia during the conflict—providing the Kremlin with Iranian-made missiles and drones—has dashed early hopes that the United States and Europe would attempt to renegotiate the JCPOA in order to allow Iranian oil to flow once more. Instead, Tehran's crackdown on its ongoing protest movement has made the agreement politically untenable in the West. Negotiations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have also failed to make progress in resolving the two rivals' longstanding disputes, although further negotiations are planned for the coming year. What does 2023 hold for the Gulf? Will the region's windfall from high hydrocarbon prices decrease the odds of successful economic diversification? What role will the United States and China play in the region? Will Iran's political crisis make it less likely to engage in regional adventurism, or will it seek to fight foreign enemies to distract from its problems at home? At a time of relative prosperity, could intra-GCC tensions flare up once again?

Featured Speakers: Professor David Des Roches (moderator), Dr. Diana Galeeva, Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Professor Simon Chadwick, and Dr. Paul Michael Brannagan. Synopsis: The six Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have each affirmed the use of “soft power” as an essential part of their overarching national strategies. Soft power, as outlined by American international relations scholar Joseph Nye, refers to the use of diplomatic and cultural tools in order to promote a country's image abroad and improve its international relationships—usually contrasted with “hard power,” or the pursuit of foreign objectives via direct coercion and military force. Each of the six Gulf states has sought to bolster their international reputations through soft power: each has pursued regional and international mediation efforts, made substantial investments in sports—perhaps best exemplified by Saudi Arabia's LIV golf tournament and Qatar's hosting of the FIFA World Cup—and highlighted domestic art and cultural programs. This strategy has clearly had positive impacts for the GCC states' international relations and their perceptions around the world. However, the use of soft power has also come with controversy. International human rights organizations have accused the six GCC states of using achievement in diplomacy, culture and sports to cover up domestic struggles with political freedoms and labor rights. In particular, the six states' ambitious sports programs have led to accusations of “sportswashing,” or promoting sports development as a way of distracting from human rights concerns. What is the status of soft power in the six GCC states? Has it been an effective tool of statecraft? What benefits are associated with the use of soft power? Have there been any drawbacks to its use?  

Featured Speakers: Dr. Dania Thafer, Ambassador Julianne Smith, Ambassador Rend Al-Rahim, Dr. Banafsheh Keynoush, Ms. Maali Al-Asousi, and Dr. Mira Al-Hussein. This panel discussion is the final event in the joint program between Gulf International Forum and the U.S. Mission to NATO. Synopsis: In the ever-changing global security landscape, the increase of women's participation in peacebuilding is crucial for the stability, good governance, and gender equality of the Gulf region. Through coordinated public diplomacy efforts that seek to increase female inclusion in conflict prevention and resolution processes, the Gulf states, the United States, and other NATO member countries can address shared threats and improve collaboration in the security realm. Throughout the Gulf region, security risks and challenges are on the rise. However, there is a growing body of evidence which shows that the meaningful participation of women in peace operations and conflict resolution—especially in leadership positions—makes for stronger and more effective peacebuilding. Women's efforts in government institutions, civil society organizations, and the private sector were substantial in easing the effects of armed conflicts and geopolitical tensions. Therefore, current global dynamics that underpin the Gulf region's stability provide a strong foundation for constructive dialogue on women's role in peace and security in the context of domestic and regional policies, and the NATO-Middle East relationship. Throughout this one-year program, we delved into the analysis and sharing of best practices on the role of women in current and recent Gulf region security issues. In the final event, our panelists will discuss the factors that continue to limit more meaningful participation of Gulf women in the security establishment, the most effective methods for enhancing participation—grassroots activism or state-driven initiatives, what does successful integration look like? and what are the consequences of continued exclusion?

Featured speakers: Dr. Massaab Al-Aloosy, Rasha Al-Aqeedi, Dr. Shahla Al-Kli, and Zeidon Al-Kinani. Since October 2021, the government of Iraq has been embroiled in a seeming intractable political crisis. Following the victory of the “Sadrist Movement” in Iraq's general election, the party sought for eight months to build a national majority coalition between Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds opposed to Iran's growing influence in Iraq. However, the Sadrists' leader, influential cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, and his allies have consistently failed to break the majority required to appoint another president and prime minister. Al-Sadr's actions have been strongly opposed by Iraq's Shia pro-Iran “Coordination Framework,” which has pushed instead for a consensual government guaranteeing them decision-making authority. The Sadrists' efforts toward government formation abruptly ended in June when the bloc's members of parliament simultaneously resigned from parliament at Al-Sadr's request. The move was followed by several waves of protests, leading to repeated occupations of the heavily fortified Green Zone and even the Iraqi parliament building; in the most recent round of protest, rival Shia armed groups backed by Iran and Al-Sadr clashed for the first time in the Green Zone, threatening to engulf the country in a Shia-Shia civil war. Order was restored after Al-Sadr ordered his supporters to leave the Green Zone and the Iraqi armed forces imposed a curfew, but the incident, shocking though it was, does not appear to have resolved the larger crisis. Iraq's enduring social and sectarian divisions, exacerbated by foriegn influence, have led to an extremely unstable political situation in which no faction appears able to gain a secure majority and govern effectively and no authority seems willing or able to dissolve the current parliament and call for a new election. What are the constitutional dilemmas currently facing Iraq, particularly with regard to efforts to dissolve parliament? How have political alliances in Iraq changed since October 2021? What is the role of foreign intervention in exacerbating the crisis? How have militias growing power affected the political process? How can Iraqi leaders restore trust with each other? In the long run, what improvements, whether legislative or constitutional reforms or broader societal changes, could help to prevent a future crisis?

Featured speakers: Shaikha Al-Hashem, Dr. Ghanim Alnajjar, Dr. Courtney Freer, Mohammad Khlef Althunayyan, and Dr. Daniel Tavana. Several months after the political crisis in Kuwait, the crown prince Shaikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al Sabah announced an Amiri decree to dissolve the current session of the country's parliament, indicating that it would be resumed after early elections on September 28. The Amiri decree to dissolve parliament and hold new elections springs from enduring tensions between the legislative and executive branches, similar in many ways to previous political clashes that stalled the country's political life and undermined its public functions. The new Amiri decree marks the tenth time that the Kuwaiti leader has dissolved parliament since the country's first elections. In spite of this track record, many Kuwaitis are hopeful that the upcoming elections will bring a serious change to the legislative branch, and will lead to smoother collaboration between the parliament and the government. Several recent government decisions have led to optimism in this regard, including the appointment of a new prime minister, Sheikh Ahmad Nawaf al-Sabah, government efforts to end “tribal primaries” that unfairly allow tribes to coordinate their votes, and efforts to balance the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Who is likely to win Kuwait's upcoming election? How could the opposition blocs change their agenda and behavior to win more seats? Will factions within Kuwait, such as Islamists, gain or lose seats in the upcoming elections? Will female candidates have a better chance? What changes are likely to occur in the balance of power between the legislative branch and the new prime minister?

Featured speakers: Dr. Daniel Serwer (moderator), Dr. Abdullah Alshayji, Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Anna Jacobs, and Professor Douglas London. Ever since the highly consequential meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia in 1945, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has steadily grown to become an important cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. It is no secret that major challenges struck this relationship; policymakers in Washington and Riyadh traded harsh rhetorical blows over the 1973 oil embargo, the degree of Saudi Arabia's culpability for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and most recently the murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi operatives in Istanbul. In spite of these tensions, the partnership between the two states has endured. In 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and as the U.S. is engaged in talks with Iran to revive the JCPOA nuclear agreement, the two countries appear to have realized the need for closer coordination. Among many issues, the stability of global oil markets, the geopolitics of the Gulf region, and other shared security and economic interests have brought Riyadh and Washington closer together again. At time that U.S. and Saudi officials navigate the short-term ups and downs in their bilateral relationship, there have been signs of a deeper divergence of geopolitical interests. Over the past decade, the two countries have held opposite views on the Arab Spring, the war in Yemen, the implementation of the JCPOA, the degree of Washington's commitment to the security of the Gulf region, Saudi-Russian coordination in the oil market, and other topics related to the intra-GCC relations and domestic changes in Saudi Arabia. All of these topics have had an impact on the Saudi-American partnership. As the divergence becomes more obvious, Riyadh has pursued closer ties with Moscow and Beijing, and Washington has sought to form a more effective partnership with other Arab countries to balance its interests in the region. In 2022, what issues bring Washington and Riyadh closer together, or push them apart? Why is Biden visiting Riyadh after calling it a “pariah” state? Are the U.S.-Saudi relations institutionalized, or based on personal relations between the two countries' leaders? How have the foundations of the geopolitical relationship changed over the last decade? Is Saudi Arabia looking for a new superpower partner? Finally, how have economic issues, including the global transition to cleaner energy, changed the calculus of the two countries' relations?

Featured Speaker: Rachel Ziemba, Dr. Carole Nakhleh, Dr. Jim Krane, and Dr. Jean-François Seznec. Synopsis: Halfway through 2022, global oil prices remain at historic levels. On May 31, barrels of Brent crude traded at $115—a remarkable spike from $79 per barrel just six months ago. The crisis sparked by this meteoric price increase has been long in the making. In 2021, the price of oil  rebounded as the global economy recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic. Then, on February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, ratcheting prices further upward. The tumult caused by rising oil prices has reached the United States, where gasoline prices have soared above $4 a gallon, setting records. Higher prices at the pump will have knock-on effects that go beyond limiting summer road trips, however, and will almost certainly slow economic growth and contribute to even greater domestic inflation. Though the largest single producer of oil, the United States must rely on other states and producers to reduce global oil prices. To this end, no grouping is as consequential as OPEC. From its inception in 1960, OPEC has maintained a tenuous relationship with the United States as both tried to influence or balance oil prices. Today, OPEC's perceived inaction in the face of skyrocketing oil prices once again threatens to poison the United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of OPEC and a state with whom relations have been strained under President Biden's administration. In 2015, OPEC formed an alliance with Russia and other non-OPEC oil producers, known as OPEC+, to control global oil prices through close coordination of production levels and quotas between Moscow and Riyadh. Increasingly frustrated by the status quo, Congress appears poised to intervene in this burgeoning dispute through the No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels, or NOPEC Act. Originally introduced 19 years ago, the bill has resurfaced this year as the U.S. government seeks to weaken the price-setting powers of OPEC. NOPEC would allow U.S. federal courts to prosecute OPEC member states for coordinating on global oil prices, undermining the purpose and viability of the Organization itself. What is the current status of the OPEC+ grouping, and will it survive a possible boycott of Russian oil or mounting U.S. pressure on Riyadh? How long can OPEC+ keep prices above $100 per barrel? Will Biden's visit to Riyadh encourage the Saudis to pump more oil, or is their commitment to OPEC+ and their desire for higher oil prices more important than improved relations with Washington? What is the feasibility of NOPEC, and what would the likely consequences be of the legislation's passage?

Featured Speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros, Dr. Nabeel Khoury, Sama'a Al-Hamdani, and Dr. Andrea Carboni. Synopsis: Yemen witnessed many positive developments between the first and last week of April. In the first week, coinciding with the start of Ramadan, all Yemeni parties announced a truce that continues to hold. In the last week, the internationally-recognized Yemeni government announced the resignation of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and the appointment of a Presidential Leadership Council headed by Rashad Muhammad al-Alimi. The new council includes leaders of nearly all the warring parties, except for Ansar Allah, the Iran-supported Houthi rebels. As a start in this direction and in hopes of cementing the truce, the warring parties arranged a prisoner exchange. The new council aims to end the infighting between the Saudi and Emirati-backed factions, but will face an even harder mission, bringing peace to the country and finding an agreement with the Houthis. The truce, the new council, and the prisoner swap have surely had a positive influence on Yemen and the region; the Houthis stopped launching missiles at Saudi Arabia and the UAE and tentative steps have been taken to open Hodeida Port and Sanaa airport to international relief supplies. However, many issues remain unresolved. The new council, now based in Aden rather than Riyadh, faces multiple challenges: restoring the functioning of the Yemeni state, finding terms to establish trust measures and a good basis for negotiations with the Houthis, and sustaining the truce. How could the UN and U.S. envoys push the peace process in Yemen? How has the new council and the truce changed domestic politics and power dynamics between the different government factions? What steps should be prioritized right now to alleviate the cost of conflict on Yemeni civilians? What other actions should the new council prioritize? How could Iran and Saudi Arabia find terms of understanding to support the political process in Yemen? What role should we expect Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait, who have tried to mediate throughout the eleven years of turmoil and conflict?

Featured speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros, Dr. David Pollock, Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, and Dr. Banafseh Keynoush. Synopsis: As the Middle East awaits the outcome of the Vienna talks on reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1, Gulf states and other powers in the Middle East engage in multi-party consultations on the future of the region. All are preparing for a new geopolitical stage to be set when, or if, Iran rejoins the regional economy and any changed stipulations of a new JCPOA. Should these talks succeed, Iran will likely seek to maintain (or even grow) its influence in the region, while enhancing its trade and economic relations. Various GCC states have anticipated this shift in the geopolitical conditions by opening talks with Tehran. In late 2021, the UAE's national security adviser, Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, visited Tehran while the Saudis and Iranians have had an ongoing direct dialogue for a year in Baghdad. The United States has played a role in improving cross-regional talks as well. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently visited Morocco, Algeria, Bahrain, UAE, and Israel. Blinken sequentially met with the foreign ministers of the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, and Israel in Tel Aviv, and leaders of Iraq, UAE, Jordan, and Egypt met in Aqaba a day before. The war in Ukraine has also introduced new possibilities for improved regional relations, as it disrupts energy, trade, and economies in general. Should these JCPOA talks prove unsuccessful, however, the Gulf states may be more hesitant to continue their de-escalation efforts with Iran. Growing normalization with Israel could also impact some GCC relations with Iran, regardless of whether a new JCPOA is agreed or not. The UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain signed normalization agreements with Israel in 2020 and 2021, and other Arab countries have seemingly warmed to the idea of opening channels of communication as well. Ongoing proxy conflicts between Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, especially in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, have left the geopolitics of the region in an even more complicated position, with a strong potential for change in historic alignments and rivalry in the region. Whether the new JCPOA is signed or not, the Gulf states will see a direct impact on the geopolitics of the region, with the balance of power potentially shifting, and creating a potential for increased conflict. How will the new geopolitical scene impact seemingly strong bilateral Gulf ties? Will it create new relationships? How do the GCC states see their relationships with Israel and Iran playing out? Will the U.S. continue to play the major security role in the Gulf in a post-JCPOA situation? How do other international parties see the situation evolving?

Featured speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Anna Jacobs, and Professor David Des Roches. Synopsis: U.S.-GCC relations have become more complicated. U.S. signals of reduced interest in the Middle East and the increase in American oil and gas production to the highest record ever just as the Russian invasion of Ukraine exploded on the scene have strained the relationship more than ever before. In actions unprecedented in the U.S.-GCC relationship, both Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and UAE Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) snubbed President Joe Biden's request for a telephone call. As of this writing, the response of both the Kingdom and the Emirates to Biden's request to increase oil production in order to dampen oil price rises and allow Europe to reduce its dependence on Russian energy seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appear reluctant to end their commitment to the OPEC+ agreement with Russia to limit oil exports despite rapidly increasing oil prices worldwide, an increase with serious political and economic ramifications in the United States. To state that these developments have provoked great speculation about the future of U.S.-GCC relations would be an understatement. U.S.-GCC relations have had their frictions in the recent past. America has expressed concerns for more than a decade about growing economic and, in some cases, security and geopolitical, ties between all the GCC states and China. The decision of the Biden Administration to find a way to restore the JCPOA, Obama's 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran from which President Trump had withdrawn the U.S. in 2019, went down badly with those GCC states which had hoped for continued U.S. confrontation with Tehran. They saw the JCPOA as a signal that Washington sought to improve relations with Iran, reversing decades of unquestioned U.S. support for the Gulf Arab states and unbending hostility towards Tehran. Combined with Obama's announced “pivot to Asia” in 2009, U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and American support for the “Arab Spring” anti-authoritarian uprising, one can understand the concerns of some Gulf monarchies that the U.S. no longer cared about their security. Also, long-term contradictions in GCC views of the U.S. have resurfaced. On one hand, Biden rewarded Qatar, naming it a Major Non-NATO Ally, for its long-time loyalty in supporting U.S. activities in the region –not least facilitating the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. On the other hand, the U.S. continues to publicly criticize the Saudi-led war in Yemen, although it continues to provide material support to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to defend against Yemen's Houthis attacks on both countries. What do the GCC states expect from Washington? Are they allies or partners or “is it complicated”? How do the different GCC countries see their bilateral relationships with the U.S.? Is there a collective GCC view? Most importantly, how does Washington view its interests in the region?

Featured Speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros (moderator), Dr. Mark N. Katz, Dr. Samuel Ramani, Dr. Diana Galeeva and Rauf Mammadov.   Synopsis:   Russia's military operation in Ukraine, the largest in Europe since WWII, has thrown the entire world into disarray. Russian armed forces invaded Ukraine on February 24 from three directions and as of this writing were advancing across the country. This invasion will certainly have especially dire consequences for the security of Europe. The current crisis threatens to throw global oil and gas markets into turmoil, with indirect effects on the Gulf region. The already uncertain energy market, partly resulting from tensions over Ukraine, has now seen oil prices cross the $100 per barrel mark. Some observers predict much higher prices, especially in Europe. Even before the Russian invasion, President Joe Biden reportedly discussed with the Qatari Emir plans to supply Europe with Qatari LNG to decrease European dependence on Russian gas. While oil producers, particularly in the GCC, stand to benefit from the steep price increase, energy importing countries of the region, and beyond, are likely to suffer.   The invasion of Ukraine affects most of the world and the Gulf states will not avoid consequences. The GCC states depend on Washington for their security and defense, both directly and through arms sales. However, Russia has become an important trade partner for the GCC. Iraq as well, have deepened their trade and security ties with Moscow. The crisis threatens to undermine the GCC balancing act between Washington and Moscow. This dilemma explains most of the statements coming from GCC officials which have called for de-escalation. On the other hand, Iran has a different stake in the crisis. Tehran and the P5+1 are in the final stages of the JCPOA and many analysts predicted that the current crisis could give the Iranian negotiators leverage since the West would benefit from a de-escalation of tensions. The US and its European allies do not want potential confrontation with Iran to distract from the challenge in Europe. Moreover, should a JCPOA agreement end America's sanctions against Iranian oil exports, Tehran has the potential to ease Europe's energy crisis should Russian supplies stop. According to Bloomberg, Iran has 103 million barrels in floating storage that could move to Europe almost immediately and can add another 1.3 million barrels/day in production within a short time, making a major dent in world oil prices. Yet, Tehran has already sided with Moscow by adopting the Russian claims that the crisis was caused by “NATO's provocative actions,” according to the Iranian foreign minister tweet on February 25, 2022. On the other hand, it appears that Russia continues to cooperate with the US on bringing JCPOA talks to a successful end.   What options do the GCC states have in this crisis? How can they distance themselves from the consequences of Europe's worst conflict since WWII? Can the West exploit the relations with the GCC states to weaken Russia's position? How does the crisis affect JCPOA negotiations and Iran's perception of its interests vis-a-vis the US and Russia?

يدير الحوار زيد بنيامين مراسل تلفزيون العربي في العاصمة الامريكية واشنطن, بمشاركة الأستاذ الدكتور محمد الرميحي مستشار سابق لرئيس مجلس الوزراء الكويتي وبروفسور علوم سياسية في جامعة الكويت، الدكتورة شهلة الگلي باحثة في معهد الشرق الأوسط في واشنطن، الدكتور عباس كاظم زميل في برنامج الشرق الأوسط ومدير مبادرة العراق في مركز رفيق الحريري في المجلس الأطلسي، الدكتور مصعب الألوسي باحث وخبير عراقي.

Featured Speakers: Dr. Abu Bakr Al Qirbi and Ambassador Patrick Theros. While the Gulf region heads toward a de-escalation, the war in Yemen has heated up. Coalition successes, led by the UAE sponsored “Giants” Brigades blunted the Houthi victories around Shabwa and Marib have introduced new factors into the balance of power. The war has also extended to a new battlefront with Houthi missile attacks on the UAE in retaliation for the coalition escalations. The Saudi-led coalition struck back with attacks that dramatically increased the ferocity of the air war, added to the civilian death toll and partly crippled internet access across the entire country. As usual, Yemeni civilians continued to pay an even greater price in a war that destroyed the country's economy and infrastructure. Yemeni society has fractured, the economy has collapsed, tens of thousands have died and the majority of Yemenis now face real threats of unprecedented levels of poverty and possibly large-scale starvation. Until this sudden escalation, Yemenis had seen the first glimmers of peace. In March 2021, Baghdad hosted the first round of talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran aiming to de-escalate the tension between the Gulf's two pillars. These talks continue and many analysts expected Yemen that any agreement between Tehran and Riyadh would lead to a peace deal in Yemen and an end to missile attacks on Saudi Arabia. Instead, hostilities have not only escalated in Yemen but have spilled over into another country in the region. What are the possibilities for de-escalation? How can the Yemeni parties restart peace talks? Do the American Envoy Timothy Linderking and the UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg now have the capability to push for a peace deal in the country? Does Iran have the capability to to force the Houthis to sit on the negotiations table without deal-killing pre-conditions? To address these questions, discuss the possibility of de-escalation, future of the war and many other questions, the Forum is honored to host His Excellency Dr. Abu Bakr Al Qirbi, Former Foreign Minister for the State of Yemen.

Speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros, Dr. Lina Khatib, Alex Vatanka, and Dr. Ali Bakir. Unlike 2020, 2021 saw the many efforts at de-escalation, dialogue and normalization in the Middle East, in general, and in the Gulf region in particular. While these efforts did not resolve any conflicts, they opened channels of dialogue between nearly all regional and international rivals. Baghdad hosted several rounds of talks between Riyadh and Tehran, aimed at lowering tensions and perhaps resolving some issues between the two principal rivals in the Gulf. Turkey reached out to the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia after several years of hostility working on economic deals as a driver for de-escalation. The UAE seems to have taken the lead among GCC in seeking full normalization with Assad's Syria. Finally, 2021 saw the end of the GCC rift and resumption of full relations by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi with Doha. Even the US and Iran have persevered through 8 difficult rounds of trying to revive the JCPOA, the multilateral deal to restrain Iran's nuclear program. Nonetheless, none of these efforts have reached fruition and all remain works in progress. What role has the Biden Administration played, intentionally or  not, in the de-escalation? What obstacles need to be overcome to secure a deal between Riyadh and Tehran that would bring stability to Yemen and Lebanon? What are the prospects for success or failure of the JCPOA talks and how would they play out? https://gulfif.org/​​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Featured Speakers: Dr. Abdullah Baabood, Dr. Khalid Al-Jaber, Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Dr. Courtney Freer, and Sina Azodi. This book explores the phenomenon of political Islam in the Gulf region. Existing scholarship on this topic is mostly dedicated to the varied religious groups' position on violence and democracy. This book expands on the topic and investigates the complexities of the relationship of individuals to religion, the state, and societies, and the organization of their lives and spiritual affairs in the Middle East with particular emphasis on the unique environment of the Gulf. Given the importance of the political Islamic context to the politics, regional interventions, economics, and society of the Gulf states, this book will be an essential tool in giving, policy makers, practitioners, and the larger public a detailed view of a complicated but essential topic.

Featured speakers: Dr. Zoltan Barany and Ambassador Patrick Theros. Armies of Arabia is the first comprehensive analysis of the Gulf monarchies' armed forces, including their political, social, and economic characteristics, foreign relations, and battleground performance. The Arabian Peninsula is among the most strategically and economically important areas in the world, but its militaries remain terra incognita. In Armies of Arabia – the first book to comprehensively analyze the Gulf monarchies' armed forces – Zoltan Barany explains their notorious ineffectiveness with a combination of political-structural and sociocultural factors. Drawing on over 150 interviews and meticulous multidisciplinary research, Barany paints a fascinating portrait of Arabia's armies from Ibn Saud's Ikhwan to the present. He explores the methods ruling families employ to ensure their armies' loyalty, examines the backgrounds and career trajectories of soldiers and officers, and explains the monarchies' reliance on mercenaries and the enduring importance of tribal networks. Even though no other world region spends more on security, Arabia's armies remain ineffective because of an absence of meritocracy, the domination of personal connections over institutional norms, insipid leadership, a casual work ethic, and training that lacks intensity, frequency, and up-to-date scenarios. Massive weapons acquisitions are primarily pay-offs to the US for protecting them and have resulted in bloated and inappropriate arsenals and large-scale corruption. Barany explains why the Gulf Cooperation Council has been a squandered opportunity and examines the kingdoms' military relationships with the Arab world and beyond. The performance of the Saudi-led coalition's disastrous war in Yemen starkly illustrates the Gulf armies' humiliating combat record. The book concludes with thoughts on waste (of human potential, resources, institutions) as a dominant theme of Gulf military affairs, considers likely changes in response to long-term weakening demand for oil, and suggests ways in which the armies' effectiveness could be raised. Chock-full of insights and stories from the field and written with a general audience in mind, Armies of Arabia will be essential reading for anyone interested in military affairs and Middle Eastern politics, society, and international relations. https://gulfif.org/​​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Featured speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros, Dr. Ebtisam Al Ketbi, Dr. Sanam Vakil, Dr. Mohammad Al Rumaihi, and Sir Richard Dalton. Panel Synopsis: The last few months saw many efforts by Gulf states and the United States to restore diplomacy's central role in the resolution of regional tensions, hopefully prioritizing reason and negotiations over sanctions and escalation. Saudi Arabia and Iran held direct talks in Baghdad in an attempt to de-escalate their regional rivalry. Similarly, Iran and the U.S. have re-engaged through indirect negotiations to revive the JCPOA after President Donald Trump withdrew from the pact in 2018. Washington's wish to expand the deal to include curbs on Iran's ballistic missile program and Iranian support for Shia militias within the region on the agenda initially stalled the JCPOA negotiations. Then stalled the election and the inauguration of a new president in Tehran put them on indefinite hold. Given these developments, the region remains vulnerable to increasing tensions. As the world slowly recovers from the COVID19 pandemic, Gulf states—facing domestic political and economic challenges—might feel pushed to support diplomatic efforts to diminish regional security threats. Has the Gulf region moved past an era of military escalation? Is a diplomatic miracle the only hope for quelling regional rivalries, or will patience and consistent dialogue produce a breakthrough? What would the Saudis and Iranians be willing to bring to the table to ease tensions between the two pillars of the Gulf? Do President Joe Biden's Middle East priorities include de-escalating tensions in the Gulf? How will the U.S.-GCC relationship develop under President Biden, particularly the U.S.' relationship with Saudi Arabia? https://gulfif.org/​​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Featured Speakers: Dr. Dania Thafer, Dr. Ayad Allawi, Dr. Abdulla Baabood, Dr. Naser Alsane, Sara Allawi, Dr. Khalid Al-Jaber, and Dr. Daniel Tavana. Every nation in the Gulf has established a legislative or consultative body to form the country's legislation or help the leadership receive popular input. Some of these bodies, which vary widely in scope and authority across the Gulf states, have historically been more attuned to public opinion. For this reason, they have often been incubators for dissent and vehicles for political and social change. Traditional Gulf leaders, seeking to preserve their power have sought to constrain parliaments' authority. Some constraints are explicit, such as vetting candidates by ideology or political loyalty, limiting voting rights, supporting friendly candidates, or using state power to harass opposition candidates. Moreover, even when parliaments have de jure legislative authority, societal norms often restrict their roles. Despite their differences, Gulf parliaments have consistently opposed attempts by executive authorities to challenge their roles and authority. Some parliaments have been more successful at resistance than others. In Kuwait and Iraq, the parliaments have remained relatively powerful, but also face increasing anger from their constituents for their inability to meet demands to solve economic and social problems. Although earlier Iranian parliaments had more leeway to operate, the Guardian Council's strict vetting process now explicitly constrains the selection of candidates, barring candidates who have reformist agendas. Similar constraints exist in Bahrain, where the government has largely barred opposition candidates from office, keeping the parliament friendly to authorities' interests but limiting its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. What factors explain the success of some parliaments, such as Kuwait's, to maintain their authority, while others, such as Bahrain, were unable to? What future developments in the Gulf states could influence parliaments' authority? What options do weak parliaments have to strengthen themselves? Conversely, what other steps can monarchs or heads of state take to constrain their power? Finally, what outcomes in this contest have the best practical consequences for citizens of the Gulf?

Featured Speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros (moderator), Ambassador Javid Ahmad, Dr. Iulia-Sabina Joja, Obaidullah Baheer, and Dr. Samuel Ramani. The recent collapse of the Afghan government and the rise of the Taliban to power in Kabul has created a new challenge for the Gulf states. For the last four decades, Afghanistan has played a crucial role in Gulf security and factored into their relations (or rivalry) with the United States.  Regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE or Qatar, have long involved in Afghanistan since the 1970s. Now, the rise of radicals to power in Kabul and the debacle of the American departure have provoked concerns about the region's security and the spillover of instability into Gulf countries. Increasingly widespread evidence that the Taliban maintains ties to al-Qaeda and has not moderated its behavior only adds to Gulf leaders' anxiety. While Iran's history and geography make the rise of the Taliban to power especially worrisome to the country's leadership, Tehran has shown flexibility in dealing with the group in recent years, perhaps anticipating a Taliban victory. For their part, each of the GCC states has maintained different policies, interests, and levels of contact with the group. Doha hosted a Taliban representation office for over a decade based on the US request to facilitate the talks between Washington and the group. Now the Qataris are leveraging their years of interaction with the Taliban to facilitate communication between the Taliban and many Western states. On the other hand, the UAE and Saudi Arabia kept only irregular communications with the Taliban, preferring stronger relations with the Afghan government; they now find themselves at a disadvantage after the collapse of the Ghani government. Both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh must now scramble to establish relationships with the new power in Kabul. How do we expect the Taliban government to interact with the Gulf states, as well as the rest of Afghanistan's neighborhood? Which Gulf states will feel the greatest impact of the Taliban victory? Will Gulf states use Afghanistan as a battlefield for their rivalry as they have in other countries on their doorsteps? How will the developing situation in Afghanistan affect US interests and its future presence in the Gulf?

Featured Speakers: Professor David Des Roches, Bilal Y. Saab, Dr. Cinzia Bianco, and Dr. Geoffrey Gresh. Maritime security in the waters of the Gulf has in recent years experienced ongoing tensions. Rising security issues in the Strait of Hormuz, including the hijacking of ships and attacks on oil tankers, represent a major threat to the security of the global oil and gas market. So far, attempts to secure the Strait of Hormuz and other waterways near the Gulf have led to the creation of the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) in November 2019 by the United States and other European and GCC states. To secure their commercial interests, the European countries have established their own maritime security initiative, the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH), on January 20, 2020, reaching full operational capacity for one of its maritime surveillance missions in the strait the following month. The security and economic return of GCC states' ports also emerged as a crucial factor. Therefore, ports that are considered relatively safer, like Yanbu on the Red Sea or Khor Fakkan, Sohar, Salalah, and Duqm in the Gulf of Oman, could bring economic opportunities for these states and become central sites for the economic and security development of their respective countries. In parallel with the growing maritime security challenges in the Gulf and its surroundings, the GCC states have increased their investments in ports to improve their position within global maritime trade. However, over the past decade, attacks on vessels, including docked targets, have exposed the vulnerabilities of several ports' security arrangements. Therefore, GCC countries have focused on the protection of their maritime infrastructures and related free zones. As a clear example, the UAE ports introduced their own autonomous security boats, while also increasing cooperation with international actors in this regard. In the coming years, what trends are likely to be seen with regard to maritime security in the Gulf? How can the GCC states further protect and expand their critical maritime infrastructure? What steps can be taken to curb the danger posed by malign actors in the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Hormuz straits? And what additional role, if any, should the United States and Europe play in safeguarding international commerce? https://gulfif.org/​​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

The trend which saw oil prices hit their highest level in July in more than two years amid a surge over the last year was not foreseen by most analysts and experts, many of whom expected a more modest recovery from the pandemic's impact. During the newest wave of COVID-19, last year's forecasts did not envision a full recovery of oil demand, which could lead the benchmark Brent crude oil price to reach mid $70 per barrel. During a recent OPEC+ meeting, the United Arab Emirates objected to the plan for an extended easing of production cuts, promoted by Saudi Arabia and Russia. The discrepancies among OPEC's members, due to national production outputs set by the agreements, led to an impasse, signaling more profound regional tensions between the two Gulf powers. Once Saudi Arabia gave in on the Emirates' push for ensuring a higher amount, the crisis was resolved, as both the conflict and its resolution had a significant adverse impact on the oil price. The volatility of the market generated by several factors causes forecasts to differ among institutions. All three of the world's main forecasting agencies—OPEC, the International Energy Agency and the U.S. Energy Information Administration—expect a demand-led recovery to pick up in the second half of 2021, while Goldman Sachs sees Brent prices averaging roughly $80 in the third quarter, with potential spikes “well above” that level. Meanwhile, J.P. Morgan expects crude oil prices to “decisively” break into the $80 range during the final three months of the year. How would the uncertainties regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Delta variant impact the energy markets? What impacts have the delayed JCPOA talks and tensions among OPEC members on supply and price? Does it add to the difficulty of accurately forecasting the medium/long-term trend? What are the impacts on the economic recovery from the pandemic and inflation? Featured speakers: Rachel Ziemba (moderator), Professor Brenda Shaffer, Abhiram Rajendran, and Neil Atkinson.

Anas Alqaed hosted Dr. Rochelle Davis, Rasha Al Aqeedi, and Salma Al-Shami to discuss Iraq IDPs' problems and challenges, and why the Iraqi state has failed to end this dilemma.   https://gulfif.org/​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Featured speakers: Sophia Kagan (moderator), Claire Hobden, Ann Abunda, Shaikha Al-Hashem, and Aidah Kalash. https://gulfif.org/​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Ambassador Patrick Theros hosted Gissou Nia, Dr. Dina Esfandiary, and Maysam Behravesh to discuss the upcoming Iranian presidential elections.

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "Feminist Perspectives from the Gulf: Navigating Intersectionality" Featured Speakers: Zarqa Parvez (moderator), Dr. Haneen Ghabra, Dr. Mona Kareem, Shaikha Al-Hashem, Hasnaa Mokhtar, and Sana Quadri. https://gulfif.org/​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "Biden and the GCC: A New Start, or More of the Same?" Featured Speakers: Ambassador Patrick Theros (moderator), Dr. Dania Thafer, Dr. Hesham Alghannam, Ambassador Susan L. Ziadeh, and Dr. Steven Cook. https://gulfif.org/​ ​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "Climate Change in the Gulf: Challenges and Solutions." Featured speakers: Dr. Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou, Professor Cristina D’Alessandro, Dr. Nadim Farajalla, and Dr. Aisha Al-Sarihi. https://gulfif.org/​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "Iran and the GCC: Pathways for Constructive Dialogue." Panel moderator Dr. Dania Thafer was joined by Professor Ross Harisson, Dr. Ali Vaez, Dr. Abdulhadi AlAjmi, and Dr. Azadeh Zamirirad. https://gulfif.org/​​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "The Way Forward for America’s Foreign Policy in Yemen." Panel moderator Ambassador Patrick Theros was joined by Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, Dr. Zaher Sahloul, Mr. Abdulghani Al-Iryani, and Professor David Des Roches. https://gulfif.org/​​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "GCC 41st Summit: Prospects and Challenges for Stalled Crises" Panel moderator Dr. Dania Thafer was joined by Dr. Mohammed Alrumaihi, Dr. Courtney Freer, Dr. Kistian Coates Ulrichsen, and Dr. Abdulla Baabood. https://gulfif.org/​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "Biden, Iran and the JCPOA: A Race to Save Diplomacy" Panel moderator Ambassador Patrick Theros was joined by Dr. Mohsen Milani, Dr. Liora Hendelman-Baavur, and Dr. Albert Wolf. https://gulfif.org/​ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panel 3 at the Third Annual Gulf International Conference, "Between Trump and Biden: What is the Impact on the Gulf?" Panel moderator Ambassador Patrick Theros was joined by Dr. Dania Thafer, Congressman Ted Yoho, Congressman Jim Moran, and Barbara Slavin. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panel 2 at the Third Annual Gulf International Conference, "National Visions: Diversification, Development, and the Future of the Gulf." Panel moderator Rachel Zeimba was joined by Ambassador Anne Paterson, Anthony Livanios, Mr. Adnan Albahar, and Dr. Jaime de Pinies Bianchi. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panel 1 at the Third Annual Gulf International Conference, "The Changing Dynamics of Gulf Security in 2020." The panel started with opening remarks by Dr. Dania Thafer, Executive Director of Gulf International Forum. Panel moderator Professor David Des Roches was joined by Professor Daniel Serwer, Dr. Shafeeq Ghabra, and Dr. Cinzia Bianco. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

استضاف منتدى الخليج الدولي ندوة لمناقشة الانتخابات الأمريكية المقبلة وأجندات دول الخليج أدار النقاش زيد بنيامين مراسل تلفزيون العربي بمشاركة أ.د. عبدالله الشايجي أستاذ العلاقات الدولية ورئيس قسم العلوم السياسية في جامعة الكويت, الدكتور عباس كاظم مدير برنامج العراق في المجلس الأطلسي, الدكتور عبدالله باعبود استاذ زائر في جامعة واسيدا في طوكيو, الدكتورة فاطمة الصمادي باحثا أول في مركز الجزيرة للدراسات, والسيد خليل جهشان المدير التنفيذي للمركز العربي في واشنطن. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's event "Gulf Israeli Relations between Government Normalization and Public Opinion". Panel moderator Ambassador Patrick Theros was joined by Dr. Aaron David Miller, Dr. Mohamed Ghanem Alrumaihi, Dr. Shira Efron, and Dr. Khalid Saffuri. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "Can Academic Freedom Survive Repressive Governance in the Gulf?". Panel moderator Dr. Courtney Freer was joined by Dr. Jessie Moritz, Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Dr. Abdullah Baabood, and Adam Coogle. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "Lebanon's Perfect Storm: Can the Gulf Come to the Rescue?" Panel moderator Giorgio Cafiero was joined by Dr. Randa Slim, Dr. Imad Harb and Dr. Abdullah Alshayji. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "Russia’s Power Projection in the Gulf Region, A Perception or a Reality?" Panel moderator Ambassador Patrick Theros was joined by Samuel Ramani, Nicole Grajewski, and Alexey Khlebnikov. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists remarks during GIF's online panel "From Tweet to Repression: How Gulf States are Cracking Down Online." Panel moderator Tim Constantine hosted Dr. Shafeeq Ghabra, Dr. Marc Owen Jones, and Dr. Sahar Khamis. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

GIF's Executive Director Dr. Dania Thafer discussed with Dr. Mehran Kamrava, the editor of "The Routledge Handbook of Persian Gulf Politics" his new book and the ideas presented in the 36 chapters. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "The Gulf Spreads its Tentacles in the Levant and North Africa." Gulf International Forum's Non-Resident Senior Fellow Dr. Gawdat Bahgat was joined by H.E. Yaşar Yakış Former Turkish Foreign Minister, Dr. Steven A. Cook, Betul Dogan-Akkas, and Quentin de Pimodan. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists Remarks during GIF's online panel "Sociopolitical and Systemic Dynamics of Race & Privilege in the GCC". GIF's Executive Director Dr. Dania Thafer was joined by Dr. Haneen Ghabra, Dr. Clemens Chay, and Abrar Alshammari. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists' remarks during GIF's online panel "Aftermath of 2020 Crises: Can China Advance Gulf Stability?" Panel moderator Ambassador Patrick Theros was joined by Lucille Greer, Professor NIU Xinchun, and Camille Lons. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists remarks during GIF & LSE joint panel, "The Impact of Reform and Austerity on the Social Contract of the GCC States." Panel's moderator Dr. Courtney Freer was joined by Dr. Dania Thafer, Dr. Justin Gengler, and Dr. Steffen Hertog. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Panelists remarks during GIF's panel "From Mega Reform Plans to Budget Cuts, What does the Future Hold for the Saudi Economy?" Panel's moderator David Rundell was joined by Dr. Bessma Momani, Dr. Hani K. Findakly, and Dr. Ghiyath Nakshbendi. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum Facebook: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum

Gulf International Forum hosted Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen to discuss with him his new book "Qatar and the Gulf Crisis." A timely discussion taking place a few days before the third anniversary of the Gulf crisis. https://gulfif.org/ Twitter: @GulfIntlForum LinkedIn: @GulfIntlForum