Podcasts about sadf

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has come under fire from opposition parties for what they term ‘reckless' foreign mission deployments. This follows an incident where two soldiers were killed and three injured by a mortar bomb at their base in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where they are part of a peacekeeping force. Currently, 2900 South African soldiers are engaged in combat against M23 rebels in the country. Reports have also surfaced in recent days of an expired Denel contract for helicopter maintenance. In an interview with Biznews, the DA Shadow minister for Defence and Military Veterans Kobus Marais emphasised the “irresponsible” deployment of soldiers in the Eastern DRC citing an overstretched and underfunded SANDF with outdated prime mission equipment. Marais exposed challenges in maintaining essential equipment, particularly helicopters, and raised concerns about SANDF's financial constraints, including the unfunded R2 billion for the DRC mission. Marais suggested withdrawing troops from the DRC to focus on upgrading equipment and prioritising national interests, particularly in Mozambique due to potential security threats. He criticised the lack of clarity on responsibility for troop deployment and the deadlock between Denel and the government. Marais also expressed concerns about our porous borders and the heavy reliance on an ageing reserve force. It is, he says, “like sending guys from the old SADF from an old age home with a R1 rifle” into combat.

This is episode 113, we're wrapping up the series with the final days of South West Africa as the country became Namibia. I'll talk about the SADF's departure later in this episode. First we need to go over the events in early April 1989 that almost put paid to the peace agreement. As you heard last week, SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma had ordered his military wing, PLAN to invade Namibia starting on April 1st. We've spent time hearing about the diplomatic fallout — now for some details about what happened on the ground. Constable Sakkie Jooste for example, group leader of Koevoets Zulu Five Juliet, who was based on high ground overlooking the Kunene River — a hotspot for SWAPO crossings west of Ruacana. There had been no reports of anything untoward overnight, but that was not surprising because the night had been dark, no moonlight. Excellent for anyone moving around and at first light Jooste's radio crackled with the report that spoor of about 50 insurgents had been found. Jooste thought they were mistaken, and went to check the signs himself. IT was true, so he reported this to Ruacana police control. The war was supposed to be over, so he didn't want to make himself look foolish, he didn't want to appear jittery. Just in case, he called his men together and headed off to track the spoor about 15 km west of Ruacana. It was clear a large number of insurgents had crossed, map reference VL0873, Chevron boots, SWAPO, and some barefoot. Oshakati was contacted, General Dreyer was in command, and Inspector Nick Peens who was commander of Kaokaland police radio'd Jooste back. Mobile Air operations head Captain Keith Fryer was called in, to request a bosbok spotter plane to be despatched to Opuwo so Peens could go see for himself what was going on. He also asked Fryer to organise a few Alouette gunships. “Why should I put gunships on standby?” Asked Fryer, “There's been no infiltration..” “But there has,” answered police comms control room sergeant Rassie Ras. Then at 08h05 another unit Zulu Hotel commanded by Constable Danie Fourie reported they'd found tracks of insurgents near the others. Most of Zulu's team, inlcuding /yankee, Hotel, Oscar, were on their way to chase the insurgents while one of the team members radio'd back “April fool, April Foo, the whole lot of us…” He was cut short by Warrant Officer Fanna du Rand On the mountain, Koevoet commanders said a small war had broken out. SWAPO was firing downhill and missing, while the police fired back. The insurgents fled, heading towards the northern slope of the hill, and were spotted by the Captain Slade. Still the police on board didn't open fire. What was going on? SWAPO was supposed to be moving north inside Angola, towards bases where the UN would be counting them and disarming the fighters. Instead, here they were inside Namibia, shooting at the security forces.

This is episode 111, in cricket the number is known as Nelson, it's unlucky for the batting side, and players are expected to stand on one leg as the bowler launches his ball. It's perhaps symbolic that we get to episode 111 at precisely the moment that the South Africans agree to peace after 23 years of fighting over South West Africa. Within a few months the country will officially be known as Namibia, and soon all SADF troops will have been withdrawn. I was working as a journalist starting in 1987 and had the honour to attend the tripartite signing ceremony in Brazzaville in the Congo, an experience that was strange, weird, otherworldly. The Cubans, South Africans and Angolans signed the Accord, observed by the Americans and the Russians, afterwards everyone drank vodka and mampoer The Russians brought the Vodka, and threw away the bottle caps, the South Africans brought the Mampoer and did the same. Chester Crocker had managed the impossible, but as he told people afterwards, the Cubans and the South Africans were like two scorpions in a bottle — both sides circling each other but not prepared to strike the killer blow. More about this peace in a moment, but first the fallout from the terrible MiG-23 attack on Calueque Dam that killed 11 8SAI troops on 27th June 1988. We ended last episode hearing how the MiGs had easily overcome the South African anti-aircraft defences, and damaged the Calueque Dam wall, hitting it with six 250 kilogramme bombs. As the recriminations and finger pointing followed the blowing up of the Buffel near the dam that led to the deaths of so many young South Africans, Commandant Mike Muller of 61 Mech had a challenge. His tanks and Ratels were stuck on the north side of the Kunene River, the earth ramp that had been built up to the Dam wall to allow the tanks to cross had been destroyed. But just before midnight on Monday June 27 1988, Muller was ordered to withdraw all his forces from Angola. Commandant Jan Hougaard was also ordered to pull all his 32 Battalion units back to South West. That was a surprise. Suddenly, it was over. This 23 year war that had started in Ovamboland, ended with the announcement that a peace agreement had been signed. Sixteen days later on an island in New York harbour, South Africa, Angola and Cuba agreed on the terms of peace, with both the Cubans and the South Africans withdrawing troops from the region.

When we left off last episode, the Cubans and Angolans were gearing up to face another invasion by 61 Mech and 4SAI, Operation Excite as it was to become known. But for once, the Cubans had decided that they'd seize the initiative and were about to launch a two pronged assault towards the South Africans from Xangongo. Just a quick recap, 61 Mech had arrived in the eastern theatre with a tank squadron, four more motorised infantry companies from 32 Battalion, including their anti-tank troop in four Ratel 90s and four more ZT3s, 3 motorised companies from 101 Battalion in Casspirs, one motorised company each from 1 parachute, 202 and 701 Battalions who were in Buffels. The SADF artillery support was also significant, a battery each of G-5s, G-2s, Valkiri rocket launchers and 120mm mortars. This was task force Zulu under command of Colonel Michael Delport. The South Africans had built an approach ramp up to Calueque Dam which allowed the Olifants and the Ratels to cross over for the invasion. Ostensibly the plan was to flush out the SAM-6 missile stations which were based around Techipa then hit them with artillery, but also to push the Cubans back from the dam which provided water and power to Ovamboland. It was a key point in the war. On the 23 June 1988, reconnaissance units reported a heavy Cuban artillery bombardment ahead of the dust cloud, it appeared an attack force was heading south and was eventually spotted on the 24th by members of 32 Battalion. Reccies also spotted Cuban columns moving southwards from Techipa towards Calueque, with this stop-start advance the technique preferred by the Russians. Bombard, move, dig in, bombard, move, dig in. There appeared to be a two-pronged assault under way. It was to be a furious battle, one which ended when MiG-23s bombed Calueque Dam, killing 11 8SAI soldiers - the worst single incident for the SADF in the entire 23 year war.

We left off last week hearing that the Cuban 50th Division had been moved towards the SWA Border, a clear message to Pretoria that Fidel Castro was no longer going to tolerate the losses that he and FAPLA had endured in southern Angola. All this as the South Africans, Cubans, Angolans, Americans and Russians were negotiating the future of Namibia. Time was running out. And in particular for a small group of men, a platoon if you like, that was going to take the brunt of a MiG bombing raid close to the Calueque Dam, just across the cutline. ‘Sent to deal with this threat was Commandant Jan Hougaard who by how had discovered that the biggest threat seemed to lie around the small town of Techipa around 50kilometers inside Angola. Besides thousands of Cuban soldiers, it had also begun to spout radio antennas and what appeared to be anti-aircraft positions. Because the South Africans were stretched so thinly, the SADF top brass could only send 500 soldiers for a planned assault on the town, all 32 Battalion men. Then the idea was a second conventional force would be setup and moved to Ruacana for a much larger incursion. On the 30 May and 1 June, operational instructions for Operation Hilti were released to the officers who'd be planning South Africa's invasion. The op was to be enamed Operation Prone later - development of a conventional and counterinsurgency plan for north-west South-West Africa and south-western Angola. The instructions called for a sub-phase called Operation Excite to regain military control of south-west Angola by August 1988.

Operation Hooper had ended in failure for the SADF and back in Pretoria, it was time to reassess the political and military situation. What had been achieved after 23 years of war - fighting ostensibly to stop SWAPO from seizing control of Namibia but really a war to buffer the apartheid state from the sweeping post-colonial independence movements. This was no longer possible in 1988 because the Cold War was rapidly coming to an end. The Soviet Union experiment in communism has failed as an experiment, ironically it was failing at precisely the moment that the whites-only lunacy in South Africa was failing. These two countries, Russia and South Africa, shared a common dawn. It was a moment that was to change both, and to alter world history. While Russia and South Africa were indulging in this long term military dance across southern Africa, the Americans and the Cubans hadn't been far away. Perhaps its more accurate to say that both Havana and Washington had been directly involved in these distant wars, both had ideological reasons to send their advisors and troops, their operators and specialists into the region. Propaganda and hoopla replaced a proper analysis. On the Cuban and Angolan side, they trumpeted what they called a great victory at Cuito Cuanavale. The only problem was there was never a battle of Cuito Cuanavale. It wasn't like Stalingrad, fighting in the streets. But it was like the Battle of Moscow in the Second World War. There the Germans never reached the city, fighting for months outside the western edges, never defeating the Russians. The battles around Cuito Cuanavale were a bit like this. Now that the fighting had subsided, both sides licked their wounds. Behind the scenes, however, diplomacy was the real game. The soviet Union's deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin had been meeting both Cuban and Angolan leaders and pressurising them to talk peace. The USSR was bankrupt and could no longer send men and weapons to their satellite states.

More than two decades of conflict in Ovamboland and southern Angola had worn down South African military domination - tactical superiority was no longer certain. The initial approach which had been innovative and inspirational, fast, seat of the pants and smart, had slumped into attritional raging bull blow for blow brutality. It was March 1988, time for one last push by the SADF against their FAPLA enemy and their Cuban and Russian allies. As you heard last episode, Commandant Gerhard Louw and most experienced officers of the Border War thought the overall plan to attack the Tumpo Triangle for the third time was a bad idea. Jan Breytenbach called it truly misguided. Cuban president Fidel Castro had made it very clear that he wanted the East bank of the Cuito River held at all costs. As long as the Cubans, Angolans and Russians held the bridgehead, it meant the SADF could not attack the town directly. Not that this was the South African's aim - at least not their official aim. The plan was merely to seize the east bank, cross over to the West side, blow up the bridge which would put an end to FAPLAs assaults on the UNITA held towns of Mavinga and Jamba. However, the Angolans thought that Cuito Cuanavale was the main target and so did many South African troops fighting against FAPLA. I mean, there was the strategic town right in front of them, do you seriously think that had the Angolan army broken and run, that the SADF would have stopped across the Cuito River? So with that small diversion as a way of introduction, we rejoin Commandant Gerhard Louw and his ou-manne. IT's Four pm on Tuesday 22nd March 1988, and the attackers were heading towards FAPLAs well defended positions on the east bank of the Cuito River 32 Battalion and Groot Karoo Regiment troops were joined by UNITAs 4th Regular Battalion on the western slope of the Chambinga High ground sweeping the area and trying to blunt any FAPLA reconnaissance from moving east of the Amhara Lipanda flatlands. UNITA spent a lot of time lifting mines, but it wasn't enough, more than 15 000 landmines awaited the SADF and this was going to lead to a lot of trouble for the Olifant tanks. Laid in layers, the Cubans had doubled up the fields of death by laying anti-tank mines along with 130mm shells, when these detonated, the effect would be biblical.

The Third Battle of the Tumpo Triangle was about to begin - the date - 23rd March 1988. The weary 61 Mechanised battalion had withdrawn, the men exhausted after 4 months of shifting about and fighting FAPLA, while their equipment was in worse shape. By 13th March the tattered 20 Brigade of which 61 Mech was part had arrived back at Rundu across the Kunene River and for the third and final attack on the Triangle, Pat McLoughlin had returned command to Colonel Paul Fouche. IF you remember last episode, he'd been sent back to the Republic to try and drum up another Brigade which he'd found difficult. So he'd turned to the ou-manne - the campers or the Citizen Force as it was known. Fresh troops were brought in from South Africa, mostly from 82 Mechanised Brigade and this would be the first time since 1984 that the Citizen Force would furnish most of the troops of the upcoming Operation Packer. When you hear the makeshift formation you'll understand that this operation was not going to be easy for any commander, however motivated the men were. The reality was these were soldiers who were part-timers, they may have been excellent as National Servicemen, but now they were back in civvie street, mentally they had to now contend with wives and children far away, they were accountants and teachers. Helping Fouche put together a viable force was commandant Gerhard Louw, the tank and armoured car instructor at the South African Battle School based at Lohatla in the northern Cape. The haphazard nature of Pretoria's tactical planning and strategic understanding of how the fight a mobile war with tanks and infantry in thick bush was going to upend another group of tough South African soldiers. The Generals who were now interfering in all decisions, along with Cabinet members, were a hindrance to the officers on the ground, at least according to their accounts. The West Bank of the Cuito River was bristling with artillery of all kinds, massed in places to provide truly phenomenal fire-power. There were batteries of the D-30 122mm guns, M-46 or 130mm heavy artillery, BM-21 122mm rockets, and BM-14 140mm multiple rocket launchers. Protecting these from the Recces and SADF forward Artillery observers, A battalion of 36 Brigade was stationed between the Cuito and Cuanavale Rivers to protect the Angolan artillery from the Recces and SADF forward Artillery observers, while another battalion from 36 Brigade had moved west of the Cuito River. Russian advisors were making a big difference by now, along with the Cubans. They were adding a great deal of skill to FAPLAs basic fighting capacity. They'd shown the Angolans how to survive being hit by an anti-tank mine by leaving the hatches of their armoured personnel carriers open. Battening down the hatches meant that the blast wave inside the vehicle had no-where to go and flattened those inside. “If you leave it open, you might get away with concussion and perhaps some shrapnel wounds…” wrote translator Igor Zhdarkin. They had taken to brewing rice vodka and the Russians said afterwards they'd listen to the Voice of Moscow, Voice of America, BBC and the South African Broadcasting Corporation - the SABC. They spent a lot of time drinking, as Russian advisor Vyacheslav Barabulya explains in the book Bush War published in 2007. They were experiencing daily bombardments by the SADF artillery and said that they'd managed to tap into the almost 100 percent proof alcohol used in the Pechora anti-aircraft system.

Last episode we heard about the failed first battle of the Tumpo Triangle, officially known as Tumpo one which took place on February 25th 1988. You know that things aren't going well when battles are numbered, and there would be three attempts at overrunning FAPLA in its defensive positions east of the Cuito River, outside Cuito Cuanavale. Still, some good news had filtered in a few days after the audacious attack on SWAPO facilities in Lubango. This was a town that lies nearly 300 kilometers north of the cutline, in the Angolan highlands, a jump off point for FAPLA as it sent its soldiers into the fighting in the south east, along the South West African border. A bomb had exploded at Oshikati First National Bank in Ovamboland on the 19th February, killing 20 people, wounding six. The South Africans wanted revenge, and decided to target SWAPOS training base at Lubango. Planning for the raid began immediately after the blast, and continued all the way through until the next morning, led by Colonel John Church of the SA Air Force. The Mirages were refuelled while the men were briefed, and at 08h00 they took off from Ondangwa, heading north west towards Lubango. Major Norman Minne led this attack flying F1AZ 218. It had the most accurate navigation system, errors were less than a mile at way points. As they flew low level from the southeast, the compact warning receiver or CRWS began picking up signals from the Soviet Barlock search radar - they had been spotted. Minne descended lower and lower, only a few feet off the deck by this stage, but his navigation system was spot on so he folded his map confident he'd find the target. Back on the eastern front, outside Cuito Cuanavale, Colonel Pat McLoughlin had decided to launch the next assault on the Tumpo Triangle at night. Unlike the first attempt to take Tumpo, this time 61 Mech's Mike Muller planned to use the northern route through the Chambinga high Ground, then down the tricky Heartbreak hill steep drop into the Anhara Lipanda - and then to charge directly at FAPLA positions. The night of February 29th was chosen, with the battle set to continue into Tuesday 1st March if necessary. While the final plans were being checked and double checked, on the other side of the River, the Cubans had sent combat engineers to re-mine the route in the north, and these men ran into a reconnaissance patrol - either it was the South Africans or UNITA. The SADF didn't report this anywhere, so it was probably UNITA. Their patrol apparently turned and fled into the darkness, and FAPLA engineers laid another 150 mines - there were now 15 000 in total across this part of eastern Cuito Cuanavale. But now the Angolans were almost certain the next attack was going to come from the north East. The SADF did not know that the Angolans knew with almost 100 certainty the direction of the next South African attack.

It was D-Day for the next attack across the open ground east of the Tumpo Triangle, just outside Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola. The town was now regarded as a moral prerequisite rather than strategic necessity, Luanda's position here was no surrender, while in Pretoria, the political leadership knew that they could not take the town. This would have prompted an escalation which the National Party could not afford at this moment in their history. The South African economy was weakening, and the public support for this long war in Angola had ebbed significantly. As you've heard, the Cubans and Angolans with the Russian advisors were dug in and ready to the east of Cuito Cuanavale, dozens of tanks, thousands of men, covered by Su-22 and MiG fighter jets and ground support aircraft, M-46 heavy artillery ranged and ready, the terrifying Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns horizontal, ready to pound the Ratels. Mike Muller's 61 Mech was going to launch itself into this flatland on 25th February 1988, a direct assault on a heavily fortified position with fewer men. Not what the military handbook says - as we all know. If you do not have the element of surprise, then you need 3 to 1 odds in your favour, however poorly trained you believe the other side may be. The Angolans by now were not as poorly trained as the SADF liked to think. FAPLA been fighting the South Africans since 1975 and had learned a great deal over the past 13 years.

The South Africans were attacking FAPLA's 59 Brigade, but had run into an ambush - Cubans operating Soviet tanks had laid up waiting for 4SAI to cut across their hull down positions. These were the T55s of the 3rd Battalion — the commanders and the gunners were Cuban, while the drivers were Angolan. As the SADF had found out earlier on the 14th February 1988, Cubans were also operating as spotters. Mike Muller of 61 Mech was now trying to capture a Cuban, but the last he'd seen had been shot down right in front of him, while trying to surrender, by UNITA troops who's blood was up. When we left off last, it was afternoon - and the SADF had just won a victory over 59 Brigade and 3rd Battalion - the Angolans and their Cuban allies were in full retreat towards the Tumpo Triangle, that y junction in the road south east of Cuito Cuanavale, and just north of the Tumpo River. This retreat was a rout in many ways, with FAPLA officers only managing to halt the retreating 59th Brigade 120 kilometers north east of Cuito Cuanavale. 21 and 25 Brigades were also pulling back along with the 3rd tank Battalion. They left behind 14 destroyed T55s, eight armoured cars, one BM-21 Stalin Organ, one mobile radar guided SAM13 missile system, and seven ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns. 400 FAPLA were dead, hundreds more wounded so far on the battle on Valentines' Day. Meanwhile, what was called a sideshow had been underway far to the north west of this battle ground. To coincide with the big attack by 4SAI and 61 Mech against 59 Brigade on Sunday 14 February 1988, Deon Ferreira wanted 32 Battalion to strike the Menongue Airbase. This was to hamper the Angolans as they dispatched their attack helicopters and ground support MiGs - and the plans had been under way since the 6th February . It may have been a sideshow, but it was extremely daring - a one-off event in the entire Border War in terms of its conventional style plan. The idea was to launch from a small stream called the Cuma, which was 20 kilometers south east of Menongue. One Friday 19th February, four Mirage F1AZs took off from Grootfontein in Northern SWA, their target was a FAPLA convoy expected to pass through Cuartir, 40 kilometers east of Menongue. The last plane out that day was flown by Major Ed Every, known to all at the base as Never Ready because he often forgot things - like his gloves, maps, or flight documents - but on this day he forgot nothing.

It's the second week of January 1988 and FAPLAs 21st, 59th and 25th Brigades had taken up the front line in what was to be a three layered defenses ahead of the Tumpo Triangle, where two roads joined just north of the Tumpo River. That was aeast of Cuito Cuanavale. Behind these three Brigades, 16th and 66th hunkered down in expectation of an SADF follow up attack which had started ended on the 14th January. The third Angolan line of defence was just west of the Cuito River, manned by the 13th Brigade joined by a Cuban battalion. By now FAPLA was communicating by fixed telephone line, going back to an earlier technology which made it much more difficult for the South Africans to intercept their messages. From the beginning of January 1988 to the end of March, the SADF was going to make six frontal attacks on these well-entrenched FAPLA positions and now the Generals in Pretoria were almost literally breathing down the necks of the tactical commanders. 61 Mech, 4SAI and UNITA had been repulsed after taking ground, the South African troops disgusted as they watched the land they'd fought to seize being retaken by Angolan units around the Chambinga High Ground. The haphazard nature of the SADF's attack - part of Operation Hooper - was caused by the territory and by a confused series of orders. I recently attended talks at Voortrekkehoogte by high ranking generals of this period, they defended their decisions and made some pointed comments about false information, but I'm afraid to say that the facts speak for themselves. Let's go over a few of these and consider for yourself what was going on in these final days of South Africa's Border War. After the attack on 21 Brigade some of the Recce observation teams were moved to positions between the Cuito and Cuanavale Rivers, well behind enemy lines, north of Cuito Cuanavale. From here, the observers could see the airfield and the Cuito Bridge. The main danger for these specialists were the crocodiles, the Cuanavale River teemed with them, but after some scouring of the banks, one team led by Justin Vermaak spotted two Makoros, or canoes made from a hollowed tree trunk, and crossed over after dark. They were prepping for the next major assault which SADF HQ had indicated was supposed to take place by end January, but ended up starting almost a month after their first assault on 21st Brigade. One of the strategic weaknesses plaguing the SADF now was the slow response and planning, logistics was a big problem here hundreds of kilometers away from their bases at Rundu and Oshikati. Eventually Vermaak and his OP team found an excellent spot behind some of FAPLAs brigades, and watched 21 Brigade reorganised, digging their trenches in the same area that 4SAI had freed only a few days before. The Recces were also in a good spot to warn their 20 Brigade HQ back in Rundu when they spotted MiGs, being behind enemy lines. That would buy the South Africans a couple of minutes. They were also being warned 200km further west, teams of Recces under Johnny de Gouveia and Buks van den Burg were watching Menongue airport spotting the MiGs and choppers taking off heading towards Cuito Cuanavale. Pretoria was dithering. They eventually decided on January 25th that the rearming and new plans were ready and the nest target was not 21 Brigade, it was 59th. 61 Mech lieutenant Clive Holt explained how they all knew that 59 Brigade was the key to the FAPLA defences. FAPLAs 3 Tank Battalion was waiting in support, so this was not going to be easy. Because 59th Brigade was FAPLAs strongest, the aim was to hit them until they collapsed, then 21 and 25 Brigades would fall back towards the town - hopefully without much fight left.

We're approaching the date of Operation Hooper, but first a bit of bad news for the SADF regarding disease. The heavy rains through November and December of 1987 had created a perfect breeding ground for the flies and mosquitoes that carried hepatitis and malaria. This was impacting the morale let alone the operational capacity of the army. The replacement troopies were on their way by the 19th November but they had to receive additional training on the border before they were let loose on FAPLA. FAPLA too was rearming itself, and new recruits were also arriving at 21 Brigade and other units stationed around Cuito Cuanavale. There was a real expectation building on both sides that something significant was going to happen over the next few months. This kind of war couldn't continue, it had mutated from a low intensity guerrilla war ostensibly fought though Ovamboland to a conventional war fought exclusively in southern Angola. The troops arriving to replace die the national servicemen had no idea what they were in for. This was an old trick of the SADF, most of these men only realised they were going into Angola once they were inside the country. The law stated that they had to volunteer to fight outside the country, but the SADF top brass had got around this by asking if the men were prepared to volunteer once they had crossed the border. Had these troops not "volunteered", they would have left their brothers to fight with fewer hands. So it was a contorted and rather malicious psychological trick these blokes played on the minds of these youngsters - most of them 18 or 19 years old. AS the SADF prepared for Operation Hooper, the SA Air Force was testing a new top secret weapon system on the Buccaneer S Mk 50, known as the H2, built by Kentron, a subsidiary of Armscor. It was a 460 kilogram pre-fragmented, folding winged glide-bomb, controlled by a TV link between the bomb and the aircraft. It was a simple form of missile, with a guidance unit in its nose with its own power generator, driven by a small impeller at the back of the bomb. An impeller is something like the rotating component of a centrifugal pump. A comms pod was carried under the opposite wing of the Buccaneer which setup the TV link - and the weapon could controlled after launch by its parent aircraft.

When we left off last episode it was the end of Operation Moduler, and Cuban Leader Fidel Castro had begun to consider a negotiated solution to the Namibian and Angolan war. There was a side-show planned before the next major op in Angola. The SADF top brass had finally decided to try and cut off the logistics route west of Cuito Cuanavale through to Menongue. This was also a period in the war where the generals began to get more and more involved in the tactical decisions. Some of the upcoming battles were going to involve the SADF forces creeping ahead, similar to the fighting in World War One. FAPLA had not folded and run, commanders on the ground said that the enemy had often fought with a degree of determination that drew grudging respect from the South Africans. It's time to consider Jan Hougaard's Marauders and an approach that perhaps in hindsight, was about two months too late but better late than never. The commandant had been sent back to Rundu in late October to put together a secret mission to head west of Cuito Cuanavale, where the road runs east west but the rivers run north south. That means there's quite a few points that are strategic because they're bridges or drifts, at least five places where a motivated and well structured team of saboteurs or attackers could cause mayhem. Convoys of vehicles were arriving in Cuito virtually daily, some with 300 or more trucks, tankers and support machines, bringing supplies and equipment. Each convoy that made the trip safely from Menongue 200 km to the west was greeted by cheers, and each was a knife in the back of the SADF morale. He had to begin destabilising FAPLAs routes by early December, so he turned to 120 men from 101 Battalion made up of soldiers from Ovamboland. The mobile rocket Launcher battery was shifted from Hartslief to Hougaard. He scouted around Fort Buffalo, 32 Battalion's headquarters, and managed to pull together a special support company with 81mm mortars, jeep mounted 106 mm anti-tank guns and Milan anti-tank missiles. The Angolans had been forced to recruit more troops and rush them south, many had not been trained properly and the calibre of fighting man on FAPLAs side had dropped. But offsetting this was a far cleverer approach to fighting the South Africans. FAPLA had already shown some steel in previous confrontations, they had deployed their mechanised units in a more mobile fashion, moving them around the battlefield. The Cubans and Russian advisors were more hands on as well.

We're wrapping up Operation Moduler this episode and throwing forward to the next assault on Cuito Cuanavale which was to fixate the South African political leadership at a time when the Cold War was melting away. This was to have a direct effect on the satellite wars such as those in Angola. Assessing this stage of the conflict it all appeared to be in South Africa's favour - on the surface. Combat Groups Alpha, Bravo and Charlie had fought running battles against FAPLAs 21/25 Brigade, 66 Brigade and 59th Brigade for weeks pushing them back to close to where they'd started the own Operation October. Instead of overcoming UNITA at Mavinga and taking their HQ at Jumba, FAPLA had been defeated. Between July and 18th November 1987 FAPLA had lost 1 059 dead, more than 2000 wounded, 61 tanks were blown up along with 84 armoured cars and 20 artillery pieces. Some have suggested that if 4SAI and the tank squadron of 12 Olifants from the start of Moduler, they would have overrun the Angolans with ease. That is I'm afraid, an incorrect assessment for two main reasons. The first was the SA Air Force did not control the air war. The Angolans did. And anyone who understands modern warfare knows that those who control the air, particularly these days of missiles and drones, controls the battle. Russia has failed to take complete control of the airspace over Ukraine since their invasion in February 2022 - and has paid the price for that failure. Unlike the UN and American force that overran Iraq in Desert Storm after decimating and completely destroying the Iraqi air Force and bludeoning it's anti-aircraft system into dust. The war was lost from then on for Saddam Hussein whatever his Revolutionary Guard thought. Secondly, the SADF was attacking entrenched defensive positions without the advantage of the element of surprise and numerically weaker. Tactical college interns at military school will tell you that's not a blueprint for success. Even if 4SAI and the tanks had arrived earlier, they would still have had to face MiGs that were spending more time over the ground forces than the Mirages. Perhaps the SADF would have managed to overcome FAPLAs 21 and 25 Brigade, but then they would face four more Brigades. Two east of Cuito and two others in reserve. And if you check the facts, 59 Brigade fought well and in fact, deflected an Olifant attack on the days before 16th November 1987. By now Cuba's Fidel Castro had lost over 10 000 and some say closer to 20 000 troops as casualties of this never ending war across the Atlantic from his small island nation. Initially, he had supported the war, sending his men and women in to fight. It's not well known, but Cuban women for example made up most of the anti-aircraft battery crews around some of the towns of Angola. He began to think about negotiating a solution rather than fighting to the death against the SADF, and sent his diplomats to the United Nations along with Angolan MPLA officials to contact the South African mission in New York. Castro was wanting out of Angola.

FAPLAs 21 and 25 Brigades were manoeuvring around the western edge of the 1370 meter high Viposto high ground which lay south of the Hube and Chambinga Rivers before dawn on the 16th November 1987- and those rivers flowed in an almost direct east to west direction. That meant the Angolan Brigades were now squeezed between the high ground and the river, heading towards the Hube's source. Their plan was to circle around the east side of the source, then head back westerly along the right bank of the river, eventually reaching the strategic Chambinga River bridge - and then escaping back towards Cuito Cuanavale. At 06h00 the 21 and 25 Brigades were refuelling before the next quick push for the headwaters of the Hube, with the Russian advisors team leader Lieutenant colonel Anatoly Artiomenko standing on the top of his troop carrier. The SADF's Alpha, Bravo and Charlie Battle groups were thundering north, trying to cut them off on the east side - the right - of the Viposto high ground. During the night of the 15th, SADF Recces and spotters were on the move ahead of the advancing Battle Groups and despite the Angolans determination to co-ordinate their next moves, the next few hours were going to be grim. And Battle Group Charlie wasn't hard to spot - FAPLA recon teams heard them miles away because the commander Leon Marais had decided to breach a large minefield using the Ploffadder explosives - fired from a rocket they landed on the minefield in a long strand, detonating loudly and also detonating mines. They did not always work and this time, they worked well enough to signal Charlie's presence to advancing FAPLA Brigades. Because both sides had driven into the same area at night, the South Africans had further compounded their own lack of quick quiet action by firing mortar shell illuminating flares before dawn. They gave their positions away in both cases long before FAPLA actually spotted their forward Ratels and Buffels. The South Africans were also traveling very slowly as the commanders fretted about the exact location of the minefields, even despite having maps they'd seized in the attacks on the 16 Brigade two weeks earlier. Lieutenant Koos Breytenbach was the SADF forward artillery observer at strategic Bridge and he became known as the Murderer of the Chambinga after what happened next. He was extremely accurate in his distance measurements and timing, bringing down constant G-5 shells, rockets and 120mm mortars on the Angolans crossing the bridge. **This episode has been re-edited to include comments from Paul Gladwin who kindly provided a more accurate rendition of a casevac that led to an Honoris Crux for Sergeant Labuschagne.

FAPLAs 21 and 25 Brigades were manoeuvring around the western edge of the 1370 meter high Viposto high ground which lay south of the Hube and Chambinga Rivers before dawn on the 16th November 1987- and those rivers flowed in an almost direct east to west direction. That meant the Angolan Brigades were now squeezed between the high ground and the river, heading towards the Hube's source. Their plan was to circle around the east side of the source, then head back westerly along the right bank of the river, eventually reaching the strategic Chambinga River bridge - and then escaping back towards Cuito Cuanavale. At 06h00 the 21 and 25 Brigades were refuelling before the next quick push for the headwaters of the Hube, with the Russian advisors team leader Lieutenant colonel Anatoly Artiomenko standing on the top of his troop carrier. The SADF's Alpha, Bravo and Charlie Battle groups were thundering north, trying to cut them off on the east side - the right - of the Viposto high ground. During the night of the 15th, SADF Recces and spotters were on the move ahead of the advancing Battle Groups and despite the Angolans determination to co-ordinate their next moves, the next few hours were going to be grim. And Battle Group Charlie wasn't hard to spot - FAPLA recon teams heard them miles away because the commander Leon Marais had decided to breach a large minefield using the Ploffadder explosives - fired from a rocket they landed on the minefield in a long strand, detonating loudly and also detonating mines. They did not always work and this time, they worked well enough to signal Charlie's presence to advancing FAPLA Brigades. Because both sides had driven into the same area at night, the South Africans had further compounded their own lack of quick quiet action by firing mortar shell illuminating flares before dawn. They gave their positions away in both cases long before FAPLA actually spotted their forward Ratels and Buffels. The South Africans were also traveling very slowly as the commanders fretted about the exact location of the minefields, even despite having maps they'd seized in the attacks on the 16 Brigade two weeks earlier. Lieutenant Koos Breytenbach was the SADF forward artillery observer at strategic Bridge and he became known as the Murderer of the Chambinga after what happened next. He was extremely accurate in his distance measurements and timing, bringing down constant G-5 shells, rockets and 120mm mortars on the Angolans crossing the bridge.

We're into the final phase of Operation Moduler in November 1987, and the SADF was lining up FAPLAs 16 Brigade after giving them a bloody nose on the 9th. Combat Group Bravo was going to draw FAPLAs attention between the Mianei and Vimpula Rivers, south east of Cuito Cuanavale, but that was a diversion. 59 Brigade was based here, and moving slowly in a northerly direction to support 16 Brigade almost due east of the town. The are a series of short rivers that rise to the north, east and south of Cuito Cuanavale, most flow west and join the Quito River - and it was along these rivers that most of the next phase of Operation Modular would be fought. The Recces spotted T54/55 tanks heading towards the source of the Hube River and the South African commander Commandant Deon Ferreira was weighing up neutralising these heavy weapons before continuing with the attack on 16h Brigade. The South Africans were still not fully aware of what 59 Brigade was doing, although they had a better idea about 16 Brigade. During the night of the 10th, the SADF pulled of a switcheroo, moving Combat Group Alpha to the south of 16th Brigade, combat Group Charlie was now slightly north. Early on the morning of the 11th, Combat Group Alpha was in position and began to fire their Ratel 90 guns along with the Ratel 81 mortars towards FAPLA trenches. The G-5s also began to pepper 16 Brigade along with the Multiple Rocket launchers, the Valkiris. ON the same day, the Angolans were celebrating their independence but as the Russian advisors met with their African colleagues for muted festivities, Mirages flew overhead, and began to bomb the Angolan positions. “Something quite unimaginable is happening now …” wrote Russian translator Igor Zhdarkin, “The Angolan troops are almost completely demoralised the brigades are on average at 45 percent strength. For every 10 or 15 shells launched by the enemy the Angolans are able to send only one…” The SADFs rate of fire was wearing FAPLA down while the Recces and artillery spotters were passing on information constantly and then picked up 59th Brigade's shifting position. The Russians reported that the Angolans had spotted what they called “their buffalo” - that was 32 Battalion and the advisors reported that “the Angolans fear the South Africans like fire…”. As both sides picked up their pieces, an incredible casualty evacuation was about to take place. 32's Piet Van Zyl realised that one of the Battalion's troops was missing - and was told that the infantryman was last seen lying dead in a FAPLA trench 800m away.

It's early morning November 9th 1987 and the SADF was advancing towards FAPLAs 16th Brigade based at the source of the Chambinga River. The Angolan brigade had received orders to shift eastwards, and the units were about to move when the SADF launched their attack. The first sign of the impending assault was an artillery bombardment and SAAF bombing raid on the eve of the assault. Commandant Deon Ferreira was OC of Task Force 10 as it was known although the main battle plans had been drawn up by Roland de Vries, his 2 IC. It was a plan that was based on the principles of fluid operations, with the South African mobility exploited to the full. De Vries had also decided that one of the main aims was to destabilise the enemies logistics and communications, disrupting their plans and likely counter attack. Robbie Hartslief's Combat Group Bravo unleashed on 59th Brigade to the south, creating a diversion. But when his units overran the position, the south African commander was surprised to find the brigade's positions were empty, it had already withdrawn north towards the 16th Brigade. The Angolans counter attacked with tanks, and Bravo retreated, Hartslief's actions had confused the enemy and he didn't want to continue a needless fight against FAPLA which was using heavy weapons, including the T54 and 55s. The Soviet advisors thought they had won a victory and began exchanging congratulations. Little did they know that the main SADF assault was going to take place further north close to the source of the Chambinga River. That's where Commandant Deon MArais led Combat Group Charlie towards 16th Brigade, although the going was slow, hampered by the thick bush around the river. By 06h57 on the morning of 9th November, Recces posted near the 16th Brigade radio to say that could hear FAPLAs tank engines start up - moments later a G-5 bombardment hit one of FAPLAs ammunition dumps, which exploded. Marais' Charlie Group approached in close formation, with 4 SAIs two mechanised infantry companies of Ratel 20s on both sides in the front, and an armoured car squadron of Ratel 90s as well as a platoon of 32 Battalion troops between them. Piet van Zyl's company of 32 infantrymen were all black, led by four white officers. “We moved 30 km west from the lagoon, riding on Ratels,” said van Zyl quoted by author Fred Bridgeland. “We passed the tank squadron and its support Ratels under the command of major Andre Retief of 4SAI, That man really knew how to look after his troops…” Retief had brought a refrigerated canteen truck all the way from South Africa, and van Zyl organised a raid on the truck when 4SAI was looking the other way - liberating two cases of ice cold beer. “Man that was nectar from heaven” said van Zyl. The Angolans still believed that the SADF was attacking 59 Brigade further south, but that all changed just after 7.30 when 16 Brigade comms reports that South African tanks appeared to be about to overrun their positions.

Colonel Deon Ferreira was putting the final touches together for the next phase of Operation Moduler, in late October 1987. The South Africans had reorganised themselves into three combat groups for the upcoming push against FAPLA north of the Lomba River. Combat Group Alpha was initially led by Kobus Smit of 61 Mech, but he was about to be rotated out to be replaced by Commandant Mike Muller, it was basically 61 Mech minus a mechanised infantry group, Combat Group Bravo led by Robbie Hartslief, two motorised infantry companies from 32 Battalion and 101 Battalion each, as well as 32s anti-tank squadron and support company, with a mechanised infantry company seconded from 61 Mech. Combat Group Charlie was headed up by Leon Marais and comprised of 4SAI infantry, a tank squadron of Olifants, plus a motorised company from 32 Battalion. Along side these was 20 Artillery regiment under Colonel Jean Lausberg. Sierra Battery retained their G-5 Guns and turned their 120mm mortars over to Romeo battery. So this regiment had two G-5 batteries, one Valkiri MRL Battery, along with a 120mm mortar battery and a troop of G-6s. That meant there were 3000 South African soldiers in this brigade - and no reinforcements. The artillery was going to be based south east of the Mianei river, which itself is south east of Cuito Cuanavale. From now on Cuito Cuanavale would be in range, along with its crucial airstrip. But the Angolans had withdrawn their MiGs and attack helicopters from the town, aware that the SADF long-range G-5s and G-6 could strike their expensive machines. Colonel Ferreira based himself at the tactical HQ near Mavinga leaving Roland de Vries back in Rundu to draw up the main plan for the assault on Cuito Cuanavale. After a day or so, De Vries and Colonel Fred Oelschig and Jean Lausberg flew to Mavinga to discuss the plan with UNITAs Jonas Savimbi. FAPLAs forces were arraigned in an arc mainly to the south east of Cuito Cuanavale. 16 Brigade was at the source of the Chambinga River - the furthest north of the Angolan brigades, while 66 Brigade was close to the main road bridge over the river. This was one of the key points that the SAAF had been hitting, it was the only route FAPLA Brigades further south could use to escape. 59 Brigade was below the 16th Brigade, while to their west, at the confluence of the Cuito and Mianei Rivers, an infantry battalion of the 66 Brigade was waiting. Nearby was an infantry battalion of the 25th Brigade, at the source of the Mianei River. Further towards the Cuito River, 21 Brigade based behind the 25th Brigade, and 21 was also arraigned along the Mianei River. Then the Russians claimed the SADF fired chemical weapons...

At the beginning of October 1987 One Recce moved into the southern Angolan region replacing Five Recce and by the time the SADF top brass had decided the final course of action, a group of 30 Recces flew by C-130 from Durban Air Force base to Rundu It was at Rundu where a critically important meeting had taken place on the 15th October when Army Chief General Kat Liebenberg had arrived to attend a briefing by staff officers. They had developed two alternatives. Either prevent FAPLA from withdrawing over the Chambinga River towards Cuito Cuanavale until the SADF reinforcements showed up in early November and destroy them. Not much chance of that succeeding, the South Africans were too thin on the ground. Option two was really an extension of option one - the first part of the plan was the same, to trap FAPLA, but then to send 4SAI and the tank squadron west of the Cuito River and take the town of Cuito Cuanavale from the north west. Outflank FAPLAs Brigades in other words and hit their rear. The SADF Battle Group would then advance north and destroy the FAPLA Brigades based east of Cuito Cuanavale - the 16th, 59th, 21st and 25th. Liebenberg preferred option two and that was why the Recces were flying in from Durban. There is an excellent book called “Bush War, the road to Cuito Cuanavale” edited by Gennady Shubin and Andrei Tokarev, all about Soviet Soldiers accounts of the Angolan War. I'm using these accounts in the next few podcasts because they are unfettered diary entries which offset some of the more prosaic commentary by both sides. They were excellent observers of warfare, monitoring the SADF and FAPLA as well as SWAPO. This book is full of illuminating descriptions of what went on in FAPLAs trenches between 1987 and 1989. So, on the 15th October, some of these Russians had taken up their new positions north east of Cuito alongside FAPLAs 21 Brigade which had been so badly mauled trying to cross the Lomba River bridge.

FAPLA had taken a battering at the Battle of the Lomba River on 3rd October 1987 - the SADF had crushed 47 Brigade, and they had also dealt t21 Brigade a serious blow earlier as you've heard. Operation Modular had led to a mauling - and the Angolans began withdrawing northwards. The South Africans had been victorious despite being hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, the Ratels had somehow defeated the T54s and T55s. The cabinet was delighted back in Pretoria - but now faced a serious question that had not been fully addressed before the Lomba bloodletting. Now what? FAPLA was withdrawing but they weren't defeated. Furthermore, FAPLA's logistic centre at Cuito Cuanavale was untouched and operating. The bridge the Recces had destroyed was up and running once more. IT was almost immediately that folks like the chief of the SADF Jannie Geldenhuys knew consolidation of the gains was crucial, along with preventing the enemy from regrouping. By now, the political leadership had decided that they'd throw everything they could at this invasion into Angola - they'd gone too far to pull back. They'd grabbed a Tiger by the tail, and couldn't let go. For the Angolans, it was a bitter defeat, and the end of FAPLAs Operation Saludando a Octobre, Salute to October, their grand offensive of four main Brigades which were supposed to seize Mavinga from UNITA then push on to UNITAS HQ at Jamba - and destroy the rebel movement once and for all. Not this time. Russian advisors who were part of the FAPLA Brigades on the Lomba, and based in Cuito, confirmed just how badly the Angolan army had been mauled. Igor Anatoliyevich Zhdarkin was on the ground in Cuito when the battered 21st and 47th Brigades staggered back into the town. “There on the Lomba, misfortune had befallen them…” he wrote in his journal “…They had been battered with shells from the rapid firing guns of the South Africans.” On the ground, 20 SA Brigade was joined by 4 SAI Battalion, a fully mechanised unit with extra G-5 batteries, four self propelled G6 guns - although one broke down and most important, a squadron of 13 Olifant tanks. Because these were to play such a significant role in the upcoming battles, I'll spend a few minutes talking about their production.

FAPLA had taken a battering at the Battle of the Lomba River on 3rd October 1987 - the SADF had crushed 47 Brigade, and they had also dealt t21 Brigade a serious blow earlier as you've heard. Operation Modular had led to a mauling - and the Angolans began withdrawing northwards. The South Africans had been victorious despite being hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, the Ratels had somehow defeated the T54s and T55s. The cabinet was delighted back in Pretoria - but now faced a serious question that had not been fully addressed before the Lomba bloodletting. Now what? FAPLA was withdrawing but they weren't defeated. Furthermore, FAPLA's logistic centre at Cuito Cuanavale was untouched and operating. The bridge the Recces had destroyed was up and running once more. IT was almost immediately that folks like the chief of the SADF Jannie Geldenhuys knew consolidation of the gains was crucial, along with preventing the enemy from regrouping. By now, the political leadership had decided that they'd throw everything they could at this invasion into Angola - they'd gone too far to pull back. They'd grabbed a Tiger by the tail, and couldn't let go. For the Angolans, it was a bitter defeat, and the end of FAPLAs Operation Saludando a Octobre, Salute to October, their grand offensive of four main Brigades which were supposed to seize Mavinga from UNITA then push on to UNITAS HQ at Jamba - and destroy the rebel movement once and for all. Not this time. Russian advisors who were part of the FAPLA Brigades on the Lomba, and based in Cuito, confirmed just how badly the Angolan army had been mauled. Igor Anatoliyevich Zhdarkin was on the ground in Cuito when the battered 21st and 47th Brigades staggered back into the town. “There on the Lomba, misfortune had befallen them…” he wrote in his journal “…They had been battered with shells from the rapid firing guns of the South Africans.” On the ground, 20 SA Brigade was joined by 4 SAI Battalion, a fully mechanised unit with extra G-5 batteries, four self propelled G6 guns - although one broke down and most important, a squadron of 13 Olifant tanks. Because these were to play such a significant role in the upcoming battles, I'll spend a few minutes talking about their production.

One of the most crucial periods of the Border War was under way - although military strategists didn't realise this until a little later. It was imperative for FAPLA to take Mavinga, this would have pushed the South Africans much further south - and factored into Luanda's plan along with the Cubans to begin building longer runways for bombers and fighter aircraft to take control of southern Angola. I'll get to some of the Russians views as we go - they were aware of this ultimate plan to set up a possible jump off point to invade Ovamboland should this war continue interminably. While Moscows original strategy was to avoid this kind of incursion, by 1987 the Soviet Union was under huge pressure economically and really wanted the War of independence in Namibia to end asap. FAPLAs 21st Brigade had been stopped twice from crossing the Lomba River, this was very important and had a bearing on the rest of the Battle which lasted almost three months in total. An entry in 20 SA Brigade's war diary for the 29th September contains three phases for the upcoming offensive - One that the enemy must be prevented from taking Mavinga, two that the SADF would conduct operations north of the Lomba river - in other words they should chase FAPLAs 4 main brigades, the 21st, 16th, 47 and 59th and third the advance on Cuito Cuanavale. That order was rescinded on 1st October and 47 Brigade was told to finish building a temporary TMM bridge over the Lomba, then to withdraw to the north and join up with other FAPLA forces. Back at SADF Mavinga HQ, Commandant Deon Ferreira was receiving radio intercept updates - they were listening in to FAPLAs calls. It so happened that FAPLA using their Russian, Cuban and East German comms experts, had also broken UNITAs code by now and were doing the same. Early on Saturday 3rd October, Combat Group Alpha began advancing from the east to the west, following the wide Lomba Flood plain. There were three lines of 61 Mech's armoured car squadron leading this assault - all from Charlie Squadron with 12 Ratel 90s. Behind them was UNITA in a light infantry screen, and their task was to winkle out enemy units that would be hit by the South African infantry. After this group passed, then the armoured cars of Alpha company mechanised infantry, supported by 81mm and 60mm mortars. 32 Battalion's Golf company would mop up after the battle. To the south, or the left, Combat Group Charlie would shadow Alpha as they headed west, with a force of 61 MEchs Bravo Company, 8 Ratel 90s which were going to focus on the tanks. They were a reserve force in the main, to cover Alpha Group from a counter attack by 47 Brigade from their main defensive position a few kilometers further south east. Another company of UNITA troops was assigned to track Bravo on their left - shadowing the shadow group so to speak. The only problem with this plan was 47 Brigade was not where the South Africans thought they were. Everyone thought the bulk of 47 had remained behind to the south, that they hadn't moved up to the TMM bridges. Everyone was wrong.

One of the most crucial periods of the Border War was under way - although military strategists didn't realise this until a little later. It was imperative for FAPLA to take Mavinga, this would have pushed the South Africans much further south - and factored into Luanda's plan along with the Cubans to begin building longer runways for bombers and fighter aircraft to take control of southern Angola. I'll get to some of the Russians views as we go - they were aware of this ultimate plan to set up a possible jump off point to invade Ovamboland should this war continue interminably. While Moscows original strategy was to avoid this kind of incursion, by 1987 the Soviet Union was under huge pressure economically and really wanted the War of independence in Namibia to end asap. FAPLAs 21st Brigade had been stopped twice from crossing the Lomba River, this was very important and had a bearing on the rest of the Battle which lasted almost three months in total. An entry in 20 SA Brigade's war diary for the 29th September contains three phases for the upcoming offensive - One that the enemy must be prevented from taking Mavinga, two that the SADF would conduct operations north of the Lomba river - in other words they should chase FAPLAs 4 main brigades, the 21st, 16th, 47 and 59th and third the advance on Cuito Cuanavale. That order was rescinded on 1st October and 47 Brigade was told to finish building a temporary TMM bridge over the Lomba, then to withdraw to the north and join up with other FAPLA forces. Back at SADF Mavinga HQ, Commandant Deon Ferreira was receiving radio intercept updates - they were listening in to FAPLAs calls. It so happened that FAPLA using their Russian, Cuban and East German comms experts, had also broken UNITAs code by now and were doing the same. Early on Saturday 3rd October, Combat Group Alpha began advancing from the east to the west, following the wide Lomba Flood plain. There were three lines of 61 Mech's armoured car squadron leading this assault - all from Charlie Squadron with 12 Ratel 90s. Behind them was UNITA in a light infantry screen, and their task was to winkle out enemy units that would be hit by the South African infantry. After this group passed, then the armoured cars of Alpha company mechanised infantry, supported by 81mm and 60mm mortars. 32 Battalion's Golf company would mop up after the battle. To the south, or the left, Combat Group Charlie would shadow Alpha as they headed west, with a force of 61 MEchs Bravo Company, 8 Ratel 90s which were going to focus on the tanks. They were a reserve force in the main, to cover Alpha Group from a counter attack by 47 Brigade from their main defensive position a few kilometers further south east. Another company of UNITA troops was assigned to track Bravo on their left - shadowing the shadow group so to speak. The only problem with this plan was 47 Brigade was not where the South Africans thought they were. Everyone thought the bulk of 47 had remained behind to the south, that they hadn't moved up to the TMM bridges. Everyone was wrong.

We heard last episode how Operation Modular had begun, and how FAPLAs 21st Brigade had been stopped from crossing the Lomba River by Major Hannes Nortmann and his squadron of Ratels using the experimental ZRT3 rockets in early September 1987. This was happening along a river where the approaches were a mix of tropical grasslands and riverine bush that was almost impenetrable. Despite a raid by MiGs which bombarded the area shortly afterward the failed ground assault by the 21st Brigade, the SADF had managed to drive back FAPLAs attempt at reaching the south bank of the Lomba. But a bigger challenge lay west, where FAPLAs 47th Brigade had managed to circumvent the river and the wetlands, and had turned to eastwards face Mavinga, and the SADF. The date was September 11 1987. South Africa's artillery kept up constant fire towards the retreating 21st Brigade and FAPLAs commander could be heard on radio ordering a general withdrawal - along with phrases like annihilation when he referred to his condition of his men. The SADF artillery had managed to hold up 47 Brigade after they'd wheeled east from their southwards march. FAPLA then sent a vanguard of PT-76 amphibious light tanks forward in a reconnaissance mission, while half a dozen T54/55s hung around between this advance recon party and their brigade headquarters further west. This was learning on the job stuff - as the battle developed inside this dense bush, Ratels began to out turn the T54/55s. The tactic deployed was jaw dropping - the Ratel would turn past the tanks but too close for proper firing, then turn and attack them from the rear. The T54/55s rear armour was 20mm thick, whereas it was more like 80mm at the front, that's almost a meter of iron and the 90mm canon could not penetrate. FAPLA also began to turn leading to a kind of heavy metal pirouette between these two major tools of war - the Ratel and the T54/55, a kind of terrible battle tango to the death. Jan Breytenbach called this the dance of death. The SAAF had conducted their first sortie at 05h45 - opening their air offensive with a combined air strike against 47 Brigade's presumed position - dropping 100 mark 82 pre-fragmentation devices. These are a hefty 250kg each and were modified American Mark 82 bombs. The casing had been altered to allow larger-diameter ball-bearings to be squeezed in, and these balls could penetrate lightly armoured personnel carriers. Commandant Johan Rankin led one of these attacks, and he was weary because by now reconnaissance and drone flights had picked out Russian SA6 and SA8 missiles in the area. Despite this, Rankin hurtled in for the vergooi, the far throw technique bomb run, low level, rise to release the ordinance, sink back to low level and the bomb arcs across the sky like deadly sine wave. After the release, the Mirages would pull a 130 degree bank dropping down to low level to avoid missiles. Rankin duly released his bombs and rolled back towards ground, then heard on his radio that a number of the missiles were heading his way. IT was only a few days before this operation that the SA Air force pilots were going to receive a clear indication that the Angolan Air Force had changed their modus operandi, they were both hunting each other. A few days before this assault, SA AF Commandant Carlo Gagiano and Captain Anton van Rensburg had found themselves in a dogfight against two MiGs in their Mirages.

We heard last episode how Operation Modular had begun, and how FAPLAs 21st Brigade had been stopped from crossing the Lomba River by Major Hannes Nortmann and his squadron of Ratels using the experimental ZRT3 rockets in early September 1987. This was happening along a river where the approaches were a mix of tropical grasslands and riverine bush that was almost impenetrable. Despite a raid by MiGs which bombarded the area shortly afterward the failed ground assault by the 21st Brigade, the SADF had managed to drive back FAPLAs attempt at reaching the south bank of the Lomba. But a bigger challenge lay west, where FAPLAs 47th Brigade had managed to circumvent the river and the wetlands, and had turned to eastwards face Mavinga, and the SADF. The date was September 11 1987. South Africa's artillery kept up constant fire towards the retreating 21st Brigade and FAPLAs commander could be heard on radio ordering a general withdrawal - along with phrases like annihilation when he referred to his condition of his men. The SADF artillery had managed to hold up 47 Brigade after they'd wheeled east from their southwards march. FAPLA then sent a vanguard of PT-76 amphibious light tanks forward in a reconnaissance mission, while half a dozen T54/55s hung around between this advance recon party and their brigade headquarters further west. This was learning on the job stuff - as the battle developed inside this dense bush, Ratels began to out turn the T54/55s. The tactic deployed was jaw dropping - the Ratel would turn past the tanks but too close for proper firing, then turn and attack them from the rear. The T54/55s rear armour was 20mm thick, whereas it was more like 80mm at the front, that's almost a meter of iron and the 90mm canon could not penetrate. FAPLA also began to turn leading to a kind of heavy metal pirouette between these two major tools of war - the Ratel and the T54/55, a kind of terrible battle tango to the death. Jan Breytenbach called this the dance of death. The SAAF had conducted their first sortie at 05h45 - opening their air offensive with a combined air strike against 47 Brigade's presumed position - dropping 100 mark 82 pre-fragmentation devices. These are a hefty 250kg each and were modified American Mark 82 bombs. The casing had been altered to allow larger-diameter ball-bearings to be squeezed in, and these balls could penetrate lightly armoured personnel carriers. Commandant Johan Rankin led one of these attacks, and he was weary because by now reconnaissance and drone flights had picked out Russian SA6 and SA8 missiles in the area. Despite this, Rankin hurtled in for the vergooi, the far throw technique bomb run, low level, rise to release the ordinance, sink back to low level and the bomb arcs across the sky like deadly sine wave. After the release, the Mirages would pull a 130 degree bank dropping down to low level to avoid missiles. Rankin duly released his bombs and rolled back towards ground, then heard on his radio that a number of the missiles were heading his way. IT was only a few days before this operation that the SA Air force pilots were going to receive a clear indication that the Angolan Air Force had changed their modus operandi, they were both hunting each other. A few days before this assault, SA AF Commandant Carlo Gagiano and Captain Anton van Rensburg had found themselves in a dogfight against two MiGs in their Mirages.

The first phase of Operation Modular has begun. 32 Battalion, the Recces and UNITA are facing 8 FAPLA Brigades in southern Angola, four of these have advanced towards Mavinga. As you hear last episode, FAPLas 21 and 47 Brigade of about 3000 men were on their way to the Lomba River, north west of Mavinga. Chief of the Army Lieutenant General Kat Liebenberg had written in his report before August 1987 that a physical attack on Menongue by the SADF would probably solve the problem of the FAPLA attack. But he also wrote that because of the SA Army's manpower shortage, this was not feasible. To buttress Unita then, the initial group of 80 special force soldiers had been deployed along with anti-tank weapons to form tank hunting teams. This largely failed because the Angolans always deployed company's of men as screens around their precious tanks. Colonel Jock Harris who was OC of 32 Battalion was writing furious notes about what he called the foolish proposals being adopted by Defence force top brass. At one minute to midnight on 19th August, the SADF began fighting back with heavier stuff - firing a ripple of 96 Valkiri rockets at the FAPLA forces who were occupying a place called the Catado Woods. 32 Battalion's Harris had seen enough of this war, along with Jan Breytenbach who was now advising UNITA, to know a full-scale mechanised assault by an enemy when he saw one. After the slow going of early August, FAPLA suddenly surged and the lead elements reached the Lomba River in early September. The scene was set for the Operation Modular showdown.

The first phase of Operation Modular has begun. 32 Battalion, the Recces and UNITA are facing 8 FAPLA Brigades in southern Angola, four of these have advanced towards Mavinga. As you hear last episode, FAPLas 21 and 47 Brigade of about 3000 men were on their way to the Lomba River, north west of Mavinga. Chief of the Army Lieutenant General Kat Liebenberg had written in his report before August 1987 that a physical attack on Menongue by the SADF would probably solve the problem of the FAPLA attack. But he also wrote that because of the SA Army's manpower shortage, this was not feasible. To buttress Unita then, the initial group of 80 special force soldiers had been deployed along with anti-tank weapons to form tank hunting teams. This largely failed because the Angolans always deployed company's of men as screens around their precious tanks. Colonel Jock Harris who was OC of 32 Battalion was writing furious notes about what he called the foolish proposals being adopted by Defence force top brass. At one minute to midnight on 19th August, the SADF began fighting back with heavier stuff - firing a ripple of 96 Valkiri rockets at the FAPLA forces who were occupying a place called the Catado Woods. 32 Battalion's Harris had seen enough of this war, along with Jan Breytenbach who was now advising UNITA, to know a full-scale mechanised assault by an enemy when he saw one. After the slow going of early August, FAPLA suddenly surged and the lead elements reached the Lomba River in early September. The scene was set for the Operation Modular showdown.

The SADF was now facing a crisis as the MPLA government in Angola was growing increasingly determined to crush UNITA in the south east. The Apartheid government was also facing an internal uprising and new organisations had been developed to deal with these. In this episode we hear about Colonel Piet Muller who commanded Sector 20 in SWA. He had considered the threat posed by FAPLA which was now attacking UNITA head-on at Mavinga and the Angolan rebel movement led by Jonas Savimbi was wilting. Muller had a plan involving a Brigade-sized force and a three pronged attack. First he thought that FAPLA should be hit behind the lines so to speak, by ignoring their advance east of the Cuito River and focus on the West, hitting the Cubans and Russian support at Menongue. That would halt the supply of heavy weapons streaming eastwards. This implied something else. Quito Cuanavale needed to be attacked and subdued, even further north west because it was the fulcrum, a point through which everything heading towards UNITA was now moving. It was a strategic target that was also juicy. And third, was to create some kind of direct head-on clash further east of the Quito River at some point after the supply lines had bee cut, which would give the Angolans a bloody nose. Colonel Jock Harris who commanded 32 Battalion thought this an excellent idea. It conformed to SADF tactical doctrine, using the mechanised brigades, punching first, using the troops directly to take on the Cubans and FAPLA driving their armoured vehicles and tanks towards UNITA forces. We are moving inexorably towards the battle for Quito Cuanavale, and this period has been debated particularly hotly by military historians so I'm going to tread very carefully indeed. I also have some excellent source material from the Russians - so unlike some of the other battles, I'll be able to tell you what was going on day to day from both sides. One of the Russians is Vyacheslave Aleksandrovich Mityaev, who was in Angola between 1986 and 1989, advising FAPLA reconnaissance units. He was stationed in the 6th Military district in Manongue and Quito Cuanavale and had a great deal of experience facing 32 Battalion, the Recces and 61 Mech.

The SADF was now facing a crisis as the MPLA government in Angola was growing increasingly determined to crush UNITA in the south east. The Apartheid government was also facing an internal uprising and new organisations had been developed to deal with these. In this episode we hear about Colonel Piet Muller who commanded Sector 20 in SWA. He had considered the threat posed by FAPLA which was now attacking UNITA head-on at Mavinga and the Angolan rebel movement led by Jonas Savimbi was wilting. Muller had a plan involving a Brigade-sized force and a three pronged attack. First he thought that FAPLA should be hit behind the lines so to speak, by ignoring their advance east of the Cuito River and focus on the West, hitting the Cubans and Russian support at Menongue. That would halt the supply of heavy weapons streaming eastwards. This implied something else. Quito Cuanavale needed to be attacked and subdued, even further north west because it was the fulcrum, a point through which everything heading towards UNITA was now moving. It was a strategic target that was also juicy. And third, was to create some kind of direct head-on clash further east of the Quito River at some point after the supply lines had bee cut, which would give the Angolans a bloody nose. Colonel Jock Harris who commanded 32 Battalion thought this an excellent idea. It conformed to SADF tactical doctrine, using the mechanised brigades, punching first, using the troops directly to take on the Cubans and FAPLA driving their armoured vehicles and tanks towards UNITA forces. We are moving inexorably towards the battle for Quito Cuanavale, and this period has been debated particularly hotly by military historians so I'm going to tread very carefully indeed. I also have some excellent source material from the Russians - so unlike some of the other battles, I'll be able to tell you what was going on day to day from both sides. One of the Russians is Vyacheslave Aleksandrovich Mityaev, who was in Angola between 1986 and 1989, advising FAPLA reconnaissance units. He was stationed in the 6th Military district in Manongue and Quito Cuanavale and had a great deal of experience facing 32 Battalion, the Recces and 61 Mech.

It's early 1986 and the SADF had learned a great deal through 1985, particularly what FAPLA were up to. In the time of the Joint Commission you heard about, both sides were actively collecting intelligence about each other - their operating procedure, their weaknesses and their strengths. After years of strategy and diplomacy, the protagenists in this war had moved firmly from attacking the opponents strategy and diplomacy as the first phase to a new phase where victory apparently lay in only one outcome - destroying the enemy's army. More material, more heavy weapons, actions and reactions. Things were becoming more bitter, and the South African government was up against the wall. They had decided to take a few leaves out of the books of dictatorships like General Galtieri's Argentina and developed death squads and torturers comprised of police and civilians. They were known as the Civil Cooperation Bureau and some would join SADF Special Force Operations from the end of 1985. As you're going to hear, the professional soldiers in the Recces and 32 Battalion regarded these civilians and police as amateurs in the art of war. Particularly as the ANC's MK were now targeting white civilians for special attention. The PAC were also changing their targets. In October 1985 a chicken farm near Bushbuck Ridge in the eastern Transvaal, today's Mpumalanga, was attacked by men armed with AK47s. Landmines were being laid by the dozen inside South Africa. In December a bakkie carrying families was traveling on the Farm Chatsworth, 45 km west of Messina, when it hit a landmine. Six died, four children and two adults, two children and three adults were injured. A farmer and his wife were shot dead in a night of attacks outside Uitenhague in the Eastern Cape. The PACs armed wing APLA claimed responsibility. But first, back to the ground war in the western theatre, Angola. FAPLA supported by the Russians and Cubans, began their annual attack on UNITA in early 1986 and South African special forces were on the ground working with the rebel movement monitoring and sabotaging. One of the Recces was Koos Stadler, who's book on Small Team missions behind enemy lines is an exceptional document. It was first published in 2016 and for training and operational insights, it's first class. In the western Theatre, 32 Battalion launched Operation Gomma on 18th March 1986, where four reconnaissance teams were sent to gather information about the bridge at Cuito Cuanavale and the surrounding area.

It's early 1986 and the SADF had learned a great deal through 1985, particularly what FAPLA were up to. In the time of the Joint Commission you heard about, both sides were actively collecting intelligence about each other - their operating procedure, their weaknesses and their strengths. After years of strategy and diplomacy, the protagenists in this war had moved firmly from attacking the opponents strategy and diplomacy as the first phase to a new phase where victory apparently lay in only one outcome - destroying the enemy's army. More material, more heavy weapons, actions and reactions. Things were becoming more bitter, and the South African government was up against the wall. They had decided to take a few leaves out of the books of dictatorships like General Galtieri's Argentina and developed death squads and torturers comprised of police and civilians. They were known as the Civil Cooperation Bureau and some would join SADF Special Force Operations from the end of 1985. As you're going to hear, the professional soldiers in the Recces and 32 Battalion regarded these civilians and police as amateurs in the art of war. Particularly as the ANC's MK were now targeting white civilians for special attention. The PAC were also changing their targets. In October 1985 a chicken farm near Bushbuck Ridge in the eastern Transvaal, today's Mpumalanga, was attacked by men armed with AK47s. Landmines were being laid by the dozen inside South Africa. In December a bakkie carrying families was traveling on the Farm Chatsworth, 45 km west of Messina, when it hit a landmine. Six died, four children and two adults, two children and three adults were injured. A farmer and his wife were shot dead in a night of attacks outside Uitenhague in the Eastern Cape. The PACs armed wing APLA claimed responsibility. But first, back to the ground war in the western theatre, Angola. FAPLA supported by the Russians and Cubans, began their annual attack on UNITA in early 1986 and South African special forces were on the ground working with the rebel movement monitoring and sabotaging. One of the Recces was Koos Stadler, who's book on Small Team missions behind enemy lines is an exceptional document. It was first published in 2016 and for training and operational insights, it's first class. In the western Theatre, 32 Battalion launched Operation Gomma on 18th March 1986, where four reconnaissance teams were sent to gather information about the bridge at Cuito Cuanavale and the surrounding area.

By January 1986 internal unrest in South Africa that had started in 1984 was in full swing – with the security forces hard pressed to cope. The SA Police were largely responsible for dealing with the ANC and PAC internally, although the SADF was going to get much more involved later. The unrest would barely calm down before the SADF was involved in a much bigger war in southern Angola, while special ops were increasing against the ANC MK targets in countries other than Angola during this period. The South African military establishment had drawn clear lines between what they regarded as terror activities and politically motivated unrest that was violent. This is an important distinction and had a bearing on how they'd conduct some of their external attacks on ANC cadres. Terror was defined by the SADF as actions conducted by infiltrators who committed political murders, lay mines on roads, and blew up substations and other infrastructure. Unrest was burning down schools and government buildings, barricading streets, large groups of people on streets who'd attack others, sometimes including the terrifying necklace killing technique which was a car tire filled with fuel thrown around the neck of a victim. IN Ovamboland, SWAPOs armed wing PLAN stepped up attacks on administrative officials. IN March 1986 South African President PW Botha proposed in parliament that Resolution 435 be implemented by August, but wanted the Cubans to withdraw from Angola first. In fact, the opposite was going on as we know. Back in Angola, Russian general Konstantin Kurochkin who was a veteran of Moscow's failed push into Afghanistan had instituted his own set of changes. We heard about some last episode, the improved Russian weapon systems, new aircraft, artillery, anti-aircraft and missile systems. As these built up, the SADF began to focus its attention on FAPLAs logistics and weak points. One of these was the port of Namibe in southern Angola. It lay almost directly due west of the Mavinga and Cuito Cuanavale towns. So the Recces were ordered to Namibe and Lobito to try and find out what kind of equipment was being collected, and to report back on any possible targets. After a thorough debriefing, it was decided that an attack on Namibe was feasible. There were vessels in the harbour that could be mined, this would kill two birds with one stone. If the Recces could sink a number of these ships, then the quayside would be virtually unusable. They'd also go after the fuel depot. Eventually, in May 1986, the SADF gave the warning order for Operation Drosdy planning to go ahead. Pretoria had given up on the latest round of negotiations.

By January 1986 internal unrest in South Africa that had started in 1984 was in full swing – with the security forces hard pressed to cope. The SA Police were largely responsible for dealing with the ANC and PAC internally, although the SADF was going to get much more involved later. The unrest would barely calm down before the SADF was involved in a much bigger war in southern Angola, while special ops were increasing against the ANC MK targets in countries other than Angola during this period. The South African military establishment had drawn clear lines between what they regarded as terror activities and politically motivated unrest that was violent. This is an important distinction and had a bearing on how they'd conduct some of their external attacks on ANC cadres. Terror was defined by the SADF as actions conducted by infiltrators who committed political murders, lay mines on roads, and blew up substations and other infrastructure. Unrest was burning down schools and government buildings, barricading streets, large groups of people on streets who'd attack others, sometimes including the terrifying necklace killing technique which was a car tire filled with fuel thrown around the neck of a victim. IN Ovamboland, SWAPOs armed wing PLAN stepped up attacks on administrative officials. IN March 1986 South African President PW Botha proposed in parliament that Resolution 435 be implemented by August, but wanted the Cubans to withdraw from Angola first. In fact, the opposite was going on as we know. Back in Angola, Russian general Konstantin Kurochkin who was a veteran of Moscow's failed push into Afghanistan had instituted his own set of changes. We heard about some last episode, the improved Russian weapon systems, new aircraft, artillery, anti-aircraft and missile systems. As these built up, the SADF began to focus its attention on FAPLAs logistics and weak points. One of these was the port of Namibe in southern Angola. It lay almost directly due west of the Mavinga and Cuito Cuanavale towns. So the Recces were ordered to Namibe and Lobito to try and find out what kind of equipment was being collected, and to report back on any possible targets. After a thorough debriefing, it was decided that an attack on Namibe was feasible. There were vessels in the harbour that could be mined, this would kill two birds with one stone. If the Recces could sink a number of these ships, then the quayside would be virtually unusable. They'd also go after the fuel depot. Eventually, in May 1986, the SADF gave the warning order for Operation Drosdy planning to go ahead. Pretoria had given up on the latest round of negotiations.

By January 1986 internal unrest in South Africa that had started in 1984 was in full swing – with the security forces hard pressed to cope. The SA Police were largely responsible for dealing with the ANC and PAC internally, although the SADF was going to get much more involved later. The unrest would barely calm down before the SADF was involved in a much bigger war in southern Angola, while special ops were increasing against the ANC MK targets in countries other than Angola during this period. The South African military establishment had drawn clear lines between what they regarded as terror activities and politically motivated unrest that was violent. This is an important distinction and had a bearing on how they'd conduct some of their external attacks on ANC cadres. Terror was defined by the SADF as actions conducted by infiltrators who committed political murders, lay mines on roads, and blew up substations and other infrastructure. Unrest was burning down schools and government buildings, barricading streets, large groups of people on streets who'd attack others, sometimes including the terrifying necklace killing technique which was a car tire filled with fuel thrown around the neck of a victim. IN Ovamboland, SWAPOs armed wing PLAN stepped up attacks on administrative officials. IN March 1986 South African President PW Botha proposed in parliament that Resolution 435 be implemented by August, but wanted the Cubans to withdraw from Angola first. In fact, the opposite was going on as we know. Back in Angola, Russian general Konstantin Kurochkin who was a veteran of Moscow's failed push into Afghanistan had instituted his own set of changes. We heard about some last episode, the improved Russian weapon systems, new aircraft, artillery, anti-aircraft and missile systems. As these built up, the SADF began to focus its attention on FAPLAs logistics and weak points. One of these was the port of Namibe in southern Angola. It lay almost directly due west of the Mavinga and Cuito Cuanavale towns. So the Recces were ordered to Namibe and Lobito to try and find out what kind of equipment was being collected, and to report back on any possible targets. After a thorough debriefing, it was decided that an attack on Namibe was feasible. There were vessels in the harbour that could be mined, this would kill two birds with one stone. If the Recces could sink a number of these ships, then the quayside would be virtually unusable. They'd also go after the fuel depot. Eventually, in May 1986, the SADF gave the warning order for Operation Drosdy planning to go ahead. Pretoria had given up on the latest round of negotiations.

By mid-1985 air traffic between Lubango on the Atlantic coast and Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola had grown exponentially. Since the railway line running east had been rendered useless by UNITA, the MPLA was relying heavily on transport planes to get their logistics to the front. Daily flights of the Soviet Antonovs could be seen carrying troops and material to Menongue in support of the MPLA's war effort. This turned into a veritable flood of planes by late August when the MPLA launched their offensive against UNITA. As you heard last episode, the Russians and Cubans had tired of being forced into defensive positions by the South Africans and UNITA and had decided to launch a two pronged as part of Operation Second Congress. The initial thrust began to the east into the Cazombo salient, while a second thrust turned south east. The SA Air Force was then called in to help ferry UNITA troops as well as their own material in something that the South Africans called Operation Magneto. SA Air Force Mobile Air Operations Teams or MOATs were based at Cago Couthino and Cazombo and they guided the Hercules and Pumas in at night. That was to avoid being shot down by the MiGs which operated only during the day. It was thought that the final phase of the battle for South Africa had begun, at least that's how the hawks inside cabinet regarded this part of the Border War. The Recces moved into Angola in support of UNITA and their mission was to shoot down Antonov and other MPLA transport aircraft using captured Russian SA-9 missile systems. The Angolans were flying aggressive missions daily, resupplying FAPLA on the ground and conducting casevacs. The Mi-25 gunship helicopters, provided flushing fire, air-to-ground support, firing their 57mm rockets at possible UNITA targets, and sometimes, using their cannons. Watching these flights were the Recces and members of 32 Battalion seconded to UNITA. The SADF was monitoring the Angolan army radio and picked up that many of the helicopter flights were used to ferry the all-important Soviet and Cuban advisors around the battle zones. The Angolan push called Second Congress now presented an opportunity for some score settling – Pretoria had always regarded the Soviet presence as a perversion, warning the Russians that playing around in South Africa's back yard would have consquences.

By mid-1985 air traffic between Lubango on the Atlantic coast and Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola had grown exponentially. Since the railway line running east had been rendered useless by UNITA, the MPLA was relying heavily on transport planes to get their logistics to the front. Daily flights of the Soviet Antonovs could be seen carrying troops and material to Menongue in support of the MPLA's war effort. This turned into a veritable flood of planes by late August when the MPLA launched their offensive against UNITA. As you heard last episode, the Russians and Cubans had tired of being forced into defensive positions by the South Africans and UNITA and had decided to launch a two pronged as part of Operation Second Congress. The initial thrust began to the east into the Cazombo salient, while a second thrust turned south east. The SA Air Force was then called in to help ferry UNITA troops as well as their own material in something that the South Africans called Operation Magneto. SA Air Force Mobile Air Operations Teams or MOATs were based at Cago Couthino and Cazombo and they guided the Hercules and Pumas in at night. That was to avoid being shot down by the MiGs which operated only during the day. It was thought that the final phase of the battle for South Africa had begun, at least that's how the hawks inside cabinet regarded this part of the Border War. The Recces moved into Angola in support of UNITA and their mission was to shoot down Antonov and other MPLA transport aircraft using captured Russian SA-9 missile systems. The Angolans were flying aggressive missions daily, resupplying FAPLA on the ground and conducting casevacs. The Mi-25 gunship helicopters, provided flushing fire, air-to-ground support, firing their 57mm rockets at possible UNITA targets, and sometimes, using their cannons. Watching these flights were the Recces and members of 32 Battalion seconded to UNITA. The SADF was monitoring the Angolan army radio and picked up that many of the helicopter flights were used to ferry the all-important Soviet and Cuban advisors around the battle zones. The Angolan push called Second Congress now presented an opportunity for some score settling – Pretoria had always regarded the Soviet presence as a perversion, warning the Russians that playing around in South Africa's back yard would have consquences.

Last episode we covered one of 32 Battalion's darkest days, the mauling they received at the hands of SWAPO on 11th February 1985, where Charlie Company walked straight into one of the better prepared SWAPO bases after taking what some say was a short cut. The death toll on the South African side was heavy, 13 soldiers from 32 Battalion's Charlie company died either during the firefight or of their wounds later, 15 SWAPO were also killed. 32 survivors described what happened that day as a massacre as Charlie Company stumbled upon 100 SWAPO soldiers in trenches who were armed with 82mm mortars and machine guns and proceeded to mow down the soldiers of probably the best known SADF battalion. Thus, Operation Forte came to a bitter end, the Battalion had been operating deep inside Angola in support of UNITA but by the end of May 1985, 32 withdrew from Angola. The Joint Monitoring Commission came to an end at the same time. Normal service resumed as they say. With the JMC done and dusted, the covert war increased in intensity to a full-scaled mechanized war on both sides. In a few months, FAPLA and the Cubans were to launch an attack on UNITA in the south east of the country. But first, 4 Recce found itself embroiled in their next Operation. This was an ambitious project and took the special forces way beyond their normal stomping ground. They were heading to Cabinda Province far to the north, the province that produces most of Angola's oil and gas. It's an enclave inside the DRC, alongside the Congo River. Operation Argon in May 1985 would leave two Recces dead, one captured, and the South African government in a diplomatic pickle. Four Recce were once again the go-to organization seeing that they had already been successful in blowing up a pipeline in Cabinda in June 1984. Captain Wynand du Toit was to be Mission Commander, and Captain Krubert Nel was his 2 IC. I'm going to mention the others involved because this is one of the most viscious face to face fights involving the Recces of the entire war. Staff Sergeant Amilear Queiroz and Maddies Adam were joined by Corporals Michael Hough, Gert Engelbrecht, Toby Tablai, Rowland Liebenberg and Louis van Breda. The medical support were going to be very busy indeed -and it was fortunate for those who were going to return injured that two doctors were on board the sub, with Doctor Deon Erasmus and Frans Verster who were both qualified operators as well as surgeons part of this mission

Last episode we covered one of 32 Battalion's darkest days, the mauling they received at the hands of SWAPO on 11th February 1985, where Charlie Company walked straight into one of the better prepared SWAPO bases after taking what some say was a short cut. The death toll on the South African side was heavy, 13 soldiers from 32 Battalion's Charlie company died either during the firefight or of their wounds later, 15 SWAPO were also killed. 32 survivors described what happened that day as a massacre as Charlie Company stumbled upon 100 SWAPO soldiers in trenches who were armed with 82mm mortars and machine guns and proceeded to mow down the soldiers of probably the best known SADF battalion. Thus, Operation Forte came to a bitter end, the Battalion had been operating deep inside Angola in support of UNITA but by the end of May 1985, 32 withdrew from Angola. The Joint Monitoring Commission came to an end at the same time. Normal service resumed as they say. With the JMC done and dusted, the covert war increased in intensity to a full-scaled mechanized war on both sides. In a few months, FAPLA and the Cubans were to launch an attack on UNITA in the south east of the country. But first, 4 Recce found itself embroiled in their next Operation. This was an ambitious project and took the special forces way beyond their normal stomping ground. They were heading to Cabinda Province far to the north, the province that produces most of Angola's oil and gas. It's an enclave inside the DRC, alongside the Congo River. Operation Argon in May 1985 would leave two Recces dead, one captured, and the South African government in a diplomatic pickle. Four Recce were once again the go-to organization seeing that they had already been successful in blowing up a pipeline in Cabinda in June 1984. Captain Wynand du Toit was to be Mission Commander, and Captain Krubert Nel was his 2 IC. I'm going to mention the others involved because this is one of the most viscious face to face fights involving the Recces of the entire war. Staff Sergeant Amilear Queiroz and Maddies Adam were joined by Corporals Michael Hough, Gert Engelbrecht, Toby Tablai, Rowland Liebenberg and Louis van Breda. The medical support were going to be very busy indeed -and it was fortunate for those who were going to return injured that two doctors were on board the sub, with Doctor Deon Erasmus and Frans Verster who were both qualified operators as well as surgeons part of this mission

It's 1984 and the special forces have been busy as you heard in the last episode. The waterborne operations were on the go, but so too were ops into southern Angola with 32 Battalion changing its colours so to speak. They began to patrol the area dressed in SWAPO uniforms, so much for the SADF's promise to adhere to the terms of a Joint Monitoring Commission where they'd promised to pull all their forces out of the region. It became a game of cat and mouse between the SADF and FAPLA about who'd be tripped up in the lying game first. The special Forces were increasing what were known as pseudo operations – which the Selous Scots had used to great effect during the Rhodesian Bush War, or the Zimbabwean War for independence depending on your political position. A large number of the Scouts had made their way south to join the SADF and were now integrated in different units. By August 1984 SWAPO had declared the far east of Ovamboland as a liberated area, with the cadres roaming around the bush and villages freely, visiting kraals and receiving food and support from the locals. They also collected intelligence from the villagers, and the SADF's hearts and minds campaign which elements of 32 had tried so hard to initiate had failed. The Recces had a new role to play here. The vegetation in this part of the border is extremely dense, with large thickets of acacia thorn trees, and the going was hard. The sand is soft in most places along the rivers, but this also made it far easier to track SWAPO when they crossed the cutline. But what's good for the goose is good for the gander – SWAPO could also track the special forces. Further west, the SADF had setup a special forces area in Ondangwa called Fort Rev, where the pseudo-operations concept was being fully exploited. It was a secret base alongside Ondangwa Air Force Base, and was full of ex-SWAPO soldiers. These men were known as masters of the bush, despite what the SADF soldier thought about them. The Recces had a completely different view of their enemy and were now working with dozens of SWAPO who'd switched sides. These men knew the area intimately and could speak the local dialects. They were smuggled in an out of this secret base for obvious reasons. By September 1984 and the Soviets had just taken over command in Angola from the Cubans, shocked into action by FAPLAs defeat during Operation Askari. The Soviets wanted to start a series of large-scaled offensives with all the firepower at their disposal to crush UNITA in the east. The Cubans preferred the Chinese way, the Vietkong way, to adopt a classic counterinsurgency approach. The Russians began to taunt the Cubans for failing to stand up and fight, always darting about, and avoiding full-scale clashes with the South Africans. Moscow was going to deploy their new air support systems in two phases. Firstly they would support the MPLA more closely, perhaps even using ground support, and second, they would increase air support in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mocambique.

It's 1984 and the special forces have been busy as you heard in the last episode. The waterborne operations were on the go, but so too were ops into southern Angola with 32 Battalion changing its colours so to speak. They began to patrol the area dressed in SWAPO uniforms, so much for the SADF's promise to adhere to the terms of a Joint Monitoring Commission where they'd promised to pull all their forces out of the region. It became a game of cat and mouse between the SADF and FAPLA about who'd be tripped up in the lying game first. The special Forces were increasing what were known as pseudo operations – which the Selous Scots had used to great effect during the Rhodesian Bush War, or the Zimbabwean War for independence depending on your political position. A large number of the Scouts had made their way south to join the SADF and were now integrated in different units. By August 1984 SWAPO had declared the far east of Ovamboland as a liberated area, with the cadres roaming around the bush and villages freely, visiting kraals and receiving food and support from the locals. They also collected intelligence from the villagers, and the SADF's hearts and minds campaign which elements of 32 had tried so hard to initiate had failed. The Recces had a new role to play here. The vegetation in this part of the border is extremely dense, with large thickets of acacia thorn trees, and the going was hard. The sand is soft in most places along the rivers, but this also made it far easier to track SWAPO when they crossed the cutline. But what's good for the goose is good for the gander – SWAPO could also track the special forces. Further west, the SADF had setup a special forces area in Ondangwa called Fort Rev, where the pseudo-operations concept was being fully exploited. It was a secret base alongside Ondangwa Air Force Base, and was full of ex-SWAPO soldiers. These men were known as masters of the bush, despite what the SADF soldier thought about them. The Recces had a completely different view of their enemy and were now working with dozens of SWAPO who'd switched sides. These men knew the area intimately and could speak the local dialects. They were smuggled in an out of this secret base for obvious reasons. By September 1984 and the Soviets had just taken over command in Angola from the Cubans, shocked into action by FAPLAs defeat during Operation Askari. The Soviets wanted to start a series of large-scaled offensives with all the firepower at their disposal to crush UNITA in the east. The Cubans preferred the Chinese way, the Vietkong way, to adopt a classic counterinsurgency approach. The Russians began to taunt the Cubans for failing to stand up and fight, always darting about, and avoiding full-scale clashes with the South Africans. Moscow was going to deploy their new air support systems in two phases. Firstly they would support the MPLA more closely, perhaps even using ground support, and second, they would increase air support in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mocambique.

This is episode 75 and we're covering events in 1984 where various issues had arisen. The South Africans and the Angolans had been jointly patrolling southern Angola in what was supposed to be the preamble to peace in Namibia. But the Joint Monitoring process had failed by July 1984 with SWAPO continuing to occupy the southern region of Angola, and the South Africans continuing to supply UNITA. This JMC process was always doomed some say, but at the start there were signs that FAPLA and the SADF could work together. Unfortunately for the many hundreds who were still to die, that good faith faded away rapidly and there was no chance of a proper cease fire. While the JMC continued operating in name, on the ground things were going from bad to worse. Eventually the whole exercise would be terminated in mid-1985, but before we get there it's important to focus on special operations of 1984. You heard how the SADF special forces, specifically the Recces, had been tasked with disrupting Angolan maritime resources and last episode we covered what happened during Operation Bouganvilia earlier in 1984. The next op was called Nobilis where seaborne operators were going to try and and blow up the ASO 2 Missile boats the Angolan navy had secured from the Russians. Earlier in the war, the SA Navy was somewhat scathing of the Angolan capacity, but everything changed when the OSA 2 missile boats arrived in 1982. They added a new and more deadly dimension to Luanda's capacity. By late 1983 there were six of these vessels deployed to ports like Soyo, Lobito and Mocamedes and Luanda. Eventually, 4 Recce was given the project to sink three OSA missile boats inside Luanda harbour during the dark moon period at the end of July 1984. It was important to allow UNITA to claim the attack, so the mines were going to be attached to these ships at only 1 to 1.5 meters below the surface. The South Africans used sophisticated underwater breathing systems allowing them to approach much deeper, so they hoped the shallow attachment of the mines would convince the Russians and the Angolans that it was the rebel movement and not the SA special Forces.

This is episode 75 and we're covering events in 1984 where various issues had arisen. The South Africans and the Angolans had been jointly patrolling southern Angola in what was supposed to be the preamble to peace in Namibia. But the Joint Monitoring process had failed by July 1984 with SWAPO continuing to occupy the southern region of Angola, and the South Africans continuing to supply UNITA. This JMC process was always doomed some say, but at the start there were signs that FAPLA and the SADF could work together. Unfortunately for the many hundreds who were still to die, that good faith faded away rapidly and there was no chance of a proper cease fire. While the JMC continued operating in name, on the ground things were going from bad to worse. Eventually the whole exercise would be terminated in mid-1985, but before we get there it's important to focus on special operations of 1984. You heard how the SADF special forces, specifically the Recces, had been tasked with disrupting Angolan maritime resources and last episode we covered what happened during Operation Bouganvilia earlier in 1984. The next op was called Nobilis where seaborne operators were going to try and and blow up the ASO 2 Missile boats the Angolan navy had secured from the Russians. Earlier in the war, the SA Navy was somewhat scathing of the Angolan capacity, but everything changed when the OSA 2 missile boats arrived in 1982. They added a new and more deadly dimension to Luanda's capacity. By late 1983 there were six of these vessels deployed to ports like Soyo, Lobito and Mocamedes and Luanda. Eventually, 4 Recce was given the project to sink three OSA missile boats inside Luanda harbour during the dark moon period at the end of July 1984. It was important to allow UNITA to claim the attack, so the mines were going to be attached to these ships at only 1 to 1.5 meters below the surface. The South Africans used sophisticated underwater breathing systems allowing them to approach much deeper, so they hoped the shallow attachment of the mines would convince the Russians and the Angolans that it was the rebel movement and not the SA special Forces.

We just finished hearing about Operation Askari, and a quick note. I said that the Eland armoured would no longer be used for cross -border operations after Askari, but that's incorrect. A listener who was on board an Eland much later in 1987 explained how he was part of an operation called Firewood, where the Eland was used to head across the cutline once more. Apologies for that, and thanks Ian for the correction. FAPLA and the SADF were conducting patrols together as part of the Joint Monitoring Commission or JMC setup after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement in February 1984 – a precursor to a full cease fire. The reality was neither the South Africans nor the Angolans were going to adhere to the agreement terms Pretoria continued to support UNITA, while FAPLA after an intial period of seemingly trying to impose discipline on SWAPO, gave up and allowed their PLAN fighters to continue infiltrating Ovambao. SWAPO mortared the JMC joint patrols a number of times and firefights had developed through March so I'm sure some of the Angolan soldiers were feeling just a tad schizophrenic. Still, the main JMC officials – both the South Africans and the Angolans – gave the impression to each that they were attempting to make this whole cease-fire known as the Lusaka Agreement work. While the SADF and FAPLA were trying to find themselves, the Recces hadn't stopped special operations. In early 1984 and despite discussing land-based cease-fires, the SADF continued to focus on seaborne ops. Their specops operators, the Special Forces were instructed to investigate the destruction of the main water plant supplying the Angolan capital Luanda. This facility was on the south bank of the Bengo River at Quifangonda - Operation Bouganvilia was born.

We just finished hearing about Operation Askari, and a quick note. I said that the Eland armoured would no longer be used for cross -border operations after Askari, but that's incorrect. A listener who was on board an Eland much later in 1987 explained how he was part of an operation called Firewood, where the Eland was used to head across the cutline once more. Apologies for that, and thanks Ian for the correction. FAPLA and the SADF were conducting patrols together as part of the Joint Monitoring Commission or JMC setup after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement in February 1984 – a precursor to a full cease fire. The reality was neither the South Africans nor the Angolans were going to adhere to the agreement terms Pretoria continued to support UNITA, while FAPLA after an intial period of seemingly trying to impose discipline on SWAPO, gave up and allowed their PLAN fighters to continue infiltrating Ovambao. SWAPO mortared the JMC joint patrols a number of times and firefights had developed through March so I'm sure some of the Angolan soldiers were feeling just a tad schizophrenic. Still, the main JMC officials – both the South Africans and the Angolans – gave the impression to each that they were attempting to make this whole cease-fire known as the Lusaka Agreement work. While the SADF and FAPLA were trying to find themselves, the Recces hadn't stopped special operations. In early 1984 and despite discussing land-based cease-fires, the SADF continued to focus on seaborne ops. Their specops operators, the Special Forces were instructed to investigate the destruction of the main water plant supplying the Angolan capital Luanda. This facility was on the south bank of the Bengo River at Quifangonda - Operation Bouganvilia was born.

Operation Askari has ended but not the recriminations. While on the surface the SADF gave off a great deal of positive propaganda, the loss of 21 men and equipment including three Ratels, and the haphazard manner in which the planning had taken place, was a sign that all was not well. The morale of the Citizen Force units was unacceptable said the permanent force officers – and they were right. 61 Mech operation archives have a document which named Battle Group Delta otherwise known as Victor as “the worst battle group in 82 Mechanised Brigade”. The armoured squadron had performed well, but in the eyes of seasoned officers, the rest of the personnel had not. And yet, we also know that the planning for Askari did not follow the comprehensive blueprints of previous ops - battle group Victor had been sent into Cuvelai understrength – sent into a well defended position without superior firepower and without the element of surprise. Pretoria had rushed in where angels feared to tread. Despite the debriefings which were not a happy process for the SADF, there was a silver lining. The Angolans were now in a spot of bother. SWAPOs campaigns into Ovamboland had prompted the SADF invasion, now FAPLAs units needed to recover from the battering they'd taken over the past two months. Cassinga was now the southern point of SWAPO action, and the political commissars were negative about trying to head into Ovamboland for the usual summer invasion. International pressure was also being increased on both the Angolans and the South Africans. By 1984 the American domestic backing for the concept of Constructive Engagement of Pretoria was waning. It is rather ironic then, that at this precise moment, the Angolan government was also pressurizing SWAPO to find a solution. In December 1983 South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha had sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, offering to withdraw all troops from Angola for 30 days.

Operation Askari has ended but not the recriminations. While on the surface the SADF gave off a great deal of positive propaganda, the loss of 21 men and equipment including three Ratels, and the haphazard manner in which the planning had taken place, was a sign that all was not well. The morale of the Citizen Force units was unacceptable said the permanent force officers – and they were right. 61 Mech operation archives have a document which named Battle Group Delta otherwise known as Victor as “the worst battle group in 82 Mechanised Brigade”. The armoured squadron had performed well, but in the eyes of seasoned officers, the rest of the personnel had not. And yet, we also know that the planning for Askari did not follow the comprehensive blueprints of previous ops - battle group Victor had been sent into Cuvelai understrength – sent into a well defended position without superior firepower and without the element of surprise. Pretoria had rushed in where angels feared to tread. Despite the debriefings which were not a happy process for the SADF, there was a silver lining. The Angolans were now in a spot of bother. SWAPOs campaigns into Ovamboland had prompted the SADF invasion, now FAPLAs units needed to recover from the battering they'd taken over the past two months. Cassinga was now the southern point of SWAPO action, and the political commissars were negative about trying to head into Ovamboland for the usual summer invasion. International pressure was also being increased on both the Angolans and the South Africans. By 1984 the American domestic backing for the concept of Constructive Engagement of Pretoria was waning. It is rather ironic then, that at this precise moment, the Angolan government was also pressurizing SWAPO to find a solution. In December 1983 South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha had sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, offering to withdraw all troops from Angola for 30 days.

The Battle of Cuvelai two was a blood letting of note, with FAPLAs 11th Brigade now bottled up in the town, with the SADF Task Force Victor and X-Ray on their doorstep. 32 Battalion had pulled off a bloodless takeover of Techumutete during the last days of 1983, which at the time was regarded as a momentous achievement. However, they'd also doomed some of the Angolans and South Africans because one of the key aims outlined by General Greyling before the start of Operation Askari was to try and force FAPLA units to retreat to take control of the towns like Cuvelai and Cahama. By shutting off their escape route out of Cuvelai, the South Africans had actually created a situation where the Angolans now were going to fight to the death. The premise back at Oshakati was that the Angolans would shatter and run when the mechanized battalions rolled up to their front door but as you know by now, that plan had backfired. The more experienced soldiers fighting in Cuvelai on the SADF side were also extremely upset about the rather haphazard approach to intelligence gathering and tactics. This was now a conventional battle, no longer the flashy fast moving mobile surprise attacks that the SADF had honed – this was bludgeoning frontal assaults. It was on the 3rd January 1984 that one of the hidden SA-9 Strela missiles hit the tail of an Impala jet flown by Captain Joe van den Berg, the senior pilot from Ondangwa. His target had been the Firecan radar-guided 57mm AAA site east of Cuvelai, but during the pull-out after bomb release, he spotted the missile approaching. I explained that the SA-9 was unusual in that it could fire on approaching aircraft, and this missile blew up behind and under the tail section, completely removing the starboard tailplane and elevator.

The Battle of Cuvelai two was a blood letting of note, with FAPLAs 11th Brigade now bottled up in the town, with the SADF Task Force Victor and X-Ray on their doorstep. 32 Battalion had pulled off a bloodless takeover of Techumutete during the last days of 1983, which at the time was regarded as a momentous achievement. However, they'd also doomed some of the Angolans and South Africans because one of the key aims outlined by General Greyling before the start of Operation Askari was to try and force FAPLA units to retreat to take control of the towns like Cuvelai and Cahama. By shutting off their escape route out of Cuvelai, the South Africans had actually created a situation where the Angolans now were going to fight to the death. The premise back at Oshakati was that the Angolans would shatter and run when the mechanized battalions rolled up to their front door but as you know by now, that plan had backfired. The more experienced soldiers fighting in Cuvelai on the SADF side were also extremely upset about the rather haphazard approach to intelligence gathering and tactics. This was now a conventional battle, no longer the flashy fast moving mobile surprise attacks that the SADF had honed – this was bludgeoning frontal assaults. It was on the 3rd January 1984 that one of the hidden SA-9 Strela missiles hit the tail of an Impala jet flown by Captain Joe van den Berg, the senior pilot from Ondangwa. His target had been the Firecan radar-guided 57mm AAA site east of Cuvelai, but during the pull-out after bomb release, he spotted the missile approaching. I explained that the SA-9 was unusual in that it could fire on approaching aircraft, and this missile blew up behind and under the tail section, completely removing the starboard tailplane and elevator.