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Last time we spoke about the reaction after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. After four years of fighting Japan almost alone, China's Chiang Kai-shek learned of Pearl Harbor with profound relief. Japan's attack, meant to neutralize American naval power, instead galvanized the entire Western world against Tokyo. Within hours, Chiang declared war on the Axis powers, transforming China from an isolated nation to a recognized Allied member. The strategic mathematics were clear to Chiang: America's industrial might would ultimately crush Japan. China simply needed to survive long enough. The United States quickly formalized this partnership, pledging military support through Lend-Lease and elevating Chiang to leadership of Allied forces in the China theater. Yet Pearl Harbor brought catastrophe for Western civilians in China. Americans and Britons, previously protected as neutral foreigners, were suddenly rounded up and interned in camps. For many, decades of presence in China ended in hasty evacuation, leaving behind lives built over generations.   #216 The Battle of Hong Kong Part 1: The Approaching Storm Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Japan emerged as a significant threat to British interests during the 1920s following the collapse of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This concern intensified dramatically after Japan's invasion of China, with the ensuing Sino-Japanese War escalating tensions further. British assets in the region came under direct assault, including attacks on Western military and commercial vessels such as HMS Ladybird. Yet despite these provocations, the British Government maintained an inconsistent stance toward Japan, responding with only feeble diplomatic and military countermeasures. This contradiction characterized London's approach: while diplomatic channels remained conciliatory, military planners viewed Japan with genuine apprehension. During the 1930s, Singapore and Malaya represented Britain's most valuable and prosperous holdings in the Far East and consequently received substantial garrison reinforcements. By contrast, Hong Kong was widely acknowledged to be indefensible—a conclusion reached repeatedly by successive military studies. Despite this consensus, the British Government proceeded with the Hong Kong Defence Scheme in 1936, which aimed to transform Hong Kong Island into a fortified redoubt while establishing delaying positions in Kowloon and the New Territories. The Hong Kong Garrison's mandate was straightforward: repel external attacks and prevent enemy use of the harbour and dry dock. The underlying strategy relied on a simple principle: hold Hong Kong Island as an impregnable fortress and await relief from the Royal Navy. Consequently, protecting the harbour became the paramount objective. Japanese strategists were correctly identified as Hong Kong's primary threat, with military planners anticipating attack from the sea rather than overland. To counter such an offensive, the defence scheme incorporated five successive layers of protection: naval mines fitted with indicator nets and anti-submarine booms formed the first barrier; coastal artillery provided the second; beach installations featuring pillboxes, wire entanglements and mines constituted the third; infantry strongpoints positioned on commanding heights guarded against amphibious landings; and finally, a mobile reserve force stood ready to counterattack and eliminate any successful enemy incursion. The 1936 plan also mandated extensive fortification of Kowloon's bottleneck approaches through bunkers, trenches and blocked passages, with a principal defensive line—resembling a miniature Maginot Line—constructed across the mountains immediately north of Kowloon. The garrison structure comprised three infantry battalions plus the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC), a unit approximately regiment-strength equipped with armoured cars, engineers, artillery, anti-aircraft guns and infantry. These forces organized into three brigades: mainland, island, and garrison reserve. The air component was planned to be formidable: a reconnaissance squadron, a fighter-bomber squadron, two torpedo squadrons and a flight of auxiliary spotting aircraft operated by the HKVDC. Naval forces consisted of a modest destroyer contingent, an MTB flotilla, gunboats and patrol vessels. When Japan occupied Guangzhou, Hong Kong found itself effectively encircled. In response, limited conscription was implemented, though restricted to non-Chinese males for HKVDC service. Chinese personnel were largely confined to non-combat positions such as air-raid precautions and medical duties. The expanding Japanese threat prompted a substantial expansion of the Hong Kong Garrison to four regular infantry regiments—two British units (one specializing in medium machine-gun support) and two Indian regiments. Supporting forces included two coastal artillery regiments, a field artillery regiment-plus, and an anti-aircraft regiment. The Royal Navy expanded to include the 2nd MTB flotilla (eight 60-foot, 29-knot motor torpedo boats armed with twin torpedoes and eight Lewis guns each, plus two smaller 55-foot vessels), four shallow-draught river gunboats (HMS Cicala, Tern, Moth and Robin), four aging World War I S-class destroyers (HMS Thracian, Thanet, Scout and Tenedos—the last transferred to Singapore in 1939), HMS Cornflower sloop, and various auxiliary vessels including tugs, boom defence ships and minelayers. The Fleet Air Arm deployed three Supermarine Walruses—single-engine reconnaissance amphibians—at Kai Tak Airport. The Royal Air Force remained the weakest service, equipped with only four Vickers Wildebeest torpedo-bombers and a handful of HKVDC aircraft: one Avro Tutor, two Hornet Moths and two Cadet biplanes. When World War II erupted in Europe, Britain's focus necessarily shifted to national survival, inevitably leaving distant imperial outposts like Hong Kong neglected. Rather than receive reinforcements, Hong Kong actually lost capable personnel; many veteran troops were repatriated to Europe, leaving behind a less proficient garrison. Peacetime duties had proven a poor preparation for combat—officers and men had passed their time socializing rather than maintaining combat readiness. Governor Sir Geoffrey Northcote persistently urged London to adopt a firmer stance against relentless Japanese provocations: aircraft incursions, sinking of junks and fishing vessels, and infiltration by Taiwanese fifth columnists (Japan had colonized Taiwan in 1895). Recognizing the hopelessness of his position, Northcote recommended withdrawal in October 1940, arguing that defending the colony would inevitably result in mass civilian casualties and widespread destruction—a pragmatic assessment given Hong Kong's indefensible state. London categorically rejected this proposal, reasoning that withdrawal would demoralize China, embolden Japan and undermine American confidence in British resolve. Underlying this decision was an additional consideration: the long-standing dispute over Hong Kong's sovereignty. Since Britain acquired Hong Kong in 1841, the prospect of surrendering it, even temporarily, raised fears about reclaiming it afterward. Preserving the appearance of British determination was deemed crucial to demonstrating to Chiang Kai-shek, Nationalist China's leader, that Britain intended to retain the territory. Despite these political calculations, London consistently refused fresh troop deployments. Major-General A. E. Grasett, the China theatre commander, requested reinforcements only to face rejection—London offered only Indian or other colonial forces. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, appointed British commander in the Far East in 1941, likewise pressed for garrison strengthening, to no avail. The situation shifted dramatically after Grasett, a retired Canadian who had recently left his China post, travelled to Britain via Canada. Upon arriving in Canada, he independently approached his former classmate Major-General Crerar, Chief of the Canadian General Staff, and advocated for reinforcement. Grasett argued persuasively that deploying two or more additional battalions would enable the Hong Kong garrison to withstand an extended siege. When Grasett reached London in early September 1941, he presented this case directly to the British Chiefs of Staff, simultaneously proposing that Canada could provide the extra units. His arguments proved persuasive; the Chiefs of Staff altered course and convinced a reluctant Churchill to reconsider. In light of accelerating Japanese pressure, Britain substantially enlarged the Malaysia/Singapore garrison from nine to 32 battalions and despatched two capital ships—HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse—to the region, reasoning that this show of force would deter Japanese aggression against British Far Eastern interests, including Hong Kong. The original defence strategy envisaged holding Hong Kong Island exclusively while denying the harbour to attackers. A single battalion (the Punjabis) would execute delaying actions across the New Territories, followed by a three-battalion defensive stand on the Gin Drinkers Line. This brief mainland resistance would allow time for demolishing stores, power installations, docks and wharves, clearing food stocks and removing vital matériel before withdrawing to Hong Kong Island for a protracted resistance awaiting relief from Singapore or American forces from the Philippines. The Gin Drinkers Line—styled after the French Maginot Line in miniature—ran approximately 18 kilometres south of the Sino-Hong Kong border. Beginning near Gin Drinkers Bay west of Kowloon, it extended 17 kilometres across the Kowloon Peninsula hills toward its eastern extremity. The strategic expectation was that this line would delay the Japanese assault for three weeks or longer, permitting battalion withdrawal to Hong Kong Island for sustained resistance while mainland forces completed evacuation procedures. The 1937 war plan stipulated that four battalions would be necessary for an effective delaying action and seven for an adequate Gin Drinkers Line defence—figures which excluded the aircraft and naval support essential to success. With only a single army brigade available and virtually no air capability, planners abandoned the mainland defence concept, leaving defensive works incomplete and deteriorating under tropical conditions. Chinese personnel were conspicuously absent from initial war preparations and strategic planning, only being incorporated late in the process. The largest Chinese component was the volunteer contingent serving with the HKVDC. On the regular army side, approximately 150 Chinese recruits were enlisted in mid-1941 for the 5th Anti-Aircraft Regiment. The Hong Kong Chinese Regiment, hastily constituted on 3 November 1941, comprised officers borrowed from British and Indian units alongside 52 Chinese junior NCOs and other ranks with minimal training. A Royal Engineers troop staffed entirely by Chinese soldiers saw service, and some Chinese personnel served with the Royal Navy and Dockyard Defence Corps. Chinese participation increased substantially in auxiliary services—air-raid precautions, auxiliary police, nursing, St John Ambulance and fire brigades. This reluctance to fully integrate Chinese forces likely reflected prevailing attitudes of the era. Pre-war British propaganda had frequently mocked Japanese military capability, portraying officers and soldiers as myopic and incompetent. Japanese combat prowess was systematically underestimated; their victories in China were attributed to facing inferior opposition rather than evidence of genuine military strength. Japanese weaponry was dismissed as inferior to European standards. Consequently, British confidence remained high that the colony could hold indefinitely if adequately reinforced. In September 1941, Hong Kong received heartening news: two additional Canadian battalions would be deployed to the garrison. Brigadier John Maltby promptly revived the pre-war plan for defending the Gin Drinkers Line, developing a strategy centred on three mainland battalions (2nd Royal Scots, 5/7 Rajputs and 2/14 Punjab) supported by HKVDC elements and four artillery troop detachments, while three island battalions (1st Middlesex, Royal Rifles of Canada and Winnipeg Grenadiers) bolstered by the bulk of the HKVDC would hold Hong Kong Island. Command responsibility was divided between two brigades: the Island Brigade (Hong Kong Infantry Brigade) under Brigadier Lawson, a recently arrived Canadian, and the mainland Kowloon Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Wallis. The Canadian regiments arrived on 16 November 1941. Maltby was commissioned into the Indian Army in 1911, and  saw extensive service across multiple campaigns: World War I, the Persian Gulf (1913–14), and the North-West Frontier (1923–24). His early promise earned him selection for accelerated advancement through prestigious staff colleges at Quetta and RAF Andover. By 1937, he was again serving on the North-West Frontier, and by 1939 commanded both the 3rd Jhelum Brigade (later the Calcutta Brigade) and the 19th Infantry Brigade in Deccan. In 1940, posted to China, Maltby orchestrated the closure of the North China Command by withdrawing two infantry battalions from Shanghai. Promoted to major-general as GOC China in August 1941, he had only three months to prepare the colony's defenses, a race against time he could not win.  The Gin Drinkers Line occupied a naturally dominant position atop mountains spanning northern Kowloon's breadth, yet possessed inherent weaknesses that would prove fatal. The line lacked defensive depth and remained vulnerable to flanking manoeuvres, with two sectors representing particular danger: Customs Pass and the gap between Golden Hill and Laichikok Peninsula near Gin Drinkers Bay. Given the extended front, each battalion arranged its forces in a string of platoon positions with gaps covered by daytime fire and nighttime patrols. One company per battalion could be held in reserve within prepared positions guarding the most dangerous sectors. The reserve company of the centre battalion (2/14 Punjab) initially advanced as forward troops, screening demolition operations and delaying the enemy's initial thrust. The hasty decision to establish mainland defences meant that essential support systems—communication networks, artillery registrations, mortar calibrations—remained incomplete when combat commenced. Ammunition shortages compounded the problem. For instance, the 2/14 Punjab conducted only a single 3-inch mortar practice session before the attack; adequate ammunition arrived only in November and totalled a mere 70 rounds per battalion for both training and combat. These mortars were registered for the first time in their battle positions, with combat beginning just 12 hours later. The 2-inch mortar situation was even more desperate: troops received live ammunition only as fighting started, making their baptism of fire an actual combat situation. Transportation deficiencies—trucks and animals in short supply—forced manual ammunition transport across Hong Kong's challenging terrain, imposing severe physical demands on already stretched personnel.   On 6 November 1941, Imperial Japanese Headquarters ordered its Commander-in-Chief in China to prepare plans for capturing Hong Kong. The 23rd Army, part of the China Southern Expeditionary Army Group and commanded by Lt. Gen. Sakai Takashi with Maj. Gen. Kuribayashi Tadamichi serving as Chief of Staff, would form the invasion's backbone. All preparations were to be completed by the end of November 1941. The operation, designated 'Operation C', sought to 'seize Hong Kong within ten days'. Takahashi was the son of a factory worker, and rose through the ranks to become a veteran of China campaigns. He was tasked with capturing Hong Kong using the 38th Division normally assigned to the Southern Expeditionary Army Group. Despite setbacks and humiliation over requests for additional resources—particularly following intelligence reports of tanks (actually Bren carriers) in Hong Kong—Sakai remained determined to succeed. He served as Governor of Hong Kong from 26 December 1941 to 20 February 1942. Kuribayashi, best remembered as the Japanese commander at Iwo Jima, graduated from the Army Academy in 1914 specializing in cavalry. He served as deputy military attaché to Washington and Canada and studied at Harvard University. In December 1941, he held the position of Chief of Staff to the 23rd Army during the Hong Kong operation. Operation C followed a straightforward strategic framework. A blocking force would prevent Chinese interference from the rear, while the main invasion force would spearhead the assault. The 23rd Army, comprising four divisions plus a mixed brigade and two infantry regiments, received the assignment to attack Hong Kong. Of these four divisions, only the 38th played a substantive role in the invasion itself. The attack employed a combined-arms approach. Naval forces would establish a blockade and deliver bombardment while aircraft targeted key installations. Ground forces from the 38th Division—specifically the 228th, 229th, and 230th Regiments—would execute the land invasion using a three-pronged strategy. The right column would sweep westward in a wide arc, clearing Castle Peak Road and targeting the western flank of the Gin Drinkers Line near Laichikok Peninsula. The centre force would press directly through the line's middle, while the left column would cross Tidal Cove (Tolo Harbour) toward Kai Tak Airport and eastward toward Devil Peak, a crucial defensive position. The objective was to annihilate British forces on the mainland and compel Hong Kong's surrender through sustained bombardment. Should British forces resist, the island phase of the campaign would commence. Securing the rear against the Chinese National Army of the 7th Military District and Communist guerrillas fell to the 66th Regiment, normally part of the 51st Division but attached to the 38th for this operation. The 66th would simultaneously occupy and secure rear areas throughout the New Territories and Kowloon while the three assault regiments engaged the main defensive forces. This rearguard operation was organised into columns named after their commanding officers: Kitazawa, Kobayashi, Sato, and Araki. The Japanese selected the narrowest approach between Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, targeting the eastern coast near Lyemun Passage where only 410 metres of water separated the mainland from the island. Upon landing, forces would rapidly advance inland to seize the critical junction of Wongneichong Gap, then pivot westward and southward to capture Victoria City and the remainder of Hong Kong. The naval contingent divided into two groups: the Bombardment Group and the Attack Group. Approximately 300 personnel from the Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) were attached to the invasion force. Air support came from the First Air Brigade under Col. Habu Hideharu, which contributed 56 light bombers and fighters. Their mission was to neutralise the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, thereby securing aerial and maritime superiority for the ground campaign.   On the eve of war, the British garrison numbered 13,981 all ranks, including nursing staff and St John Ambulance personnel. Of these, 8,919 were British and Canadian, with 4,402 Indian and Chinese. The core infantry force comprised 5,422 regular soldiers, complemented by approximately 6,000 additional personnel across artillery, engineering, naval, and Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (HKVDC) units. By 1941, the Royal Navy had become a shadow of its former self as the once-dominant China Squadron. Of the three World War I destroyers present on 8 December, two had been sent to Singapore—the third undergoing repairs—by 1930. This redeployment stemmed partly from the futility of defending the colony and partly from a commitment by senior US Navy officers: Britain would reinforce Singapore with Hong Kong's fleet in exchange for four American destroyers at Singapore. This American guarantee, however, never materialized. The defensive infrastructure focused primarily on countering a seaborne attack: twenty-nine coastal guns (9.2in., 6in., 4.7in., and 4in. calibres), ten 18- and 2-pounder beach defense guns, and twenty-eight field guns (60-pounder, 6in., 4.5in., and 3.7in. calibres). The Hong Kong Garrison's infantry comprised four regular army battalions—two British and two Indian—bolstered by five HKVDC infantry companies, each averaging 100 men. The 1st Middlesex Regiment, deployed in August 1937, served as a machine-gun battalion equipped with forty-eight Vickers medium machine guns. Having been abroad since 1931, the regiment had deteriorated through protracted garrison service, Hong Kong being among the softest postings available. From September 1939 onward, all regiments—including the 5/7 Rajputs (arrived June 1937) and the 2/14 Punjab—experienced systematic loss of experienced officers and NCOs to other theaters. The Royal Scots proved particularly hard hit, suffering disciplinary problems and an unusually high court-martial rate. Units like the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery suffered critical leadership gaps that went unaddressed. By December 1941, many formations fielded inexperienced replacement troops, significantly undermining combat readiness. The Punjabis exemplified these deficiencies. Stationed in Hong Kong since November 1940, they received their vehicles and mortars only in August 1941—three months before combat. Compounding this, forty percent of their strength consisted of raw recruits arrived just in October. When war erupted, artillery regiments found themselves relying on junior officers in senior roles, with British commanders unfamiliar with Urdu directing Indian troops, a handicap that severely compromised effectiveness. Deficient equipment compounded leadership shortages. Shells dating from 1918 detonated prematurely upon discharge, while ammunition shortages crippled operations. On 8 December, all field guns deployed with merely 100 rounds apiece, with 200 rounds held in reserve for the entire campaign, and coastal guns received only 25 rounds each. Insufficient cross-training meant many infantrymen failed to understand the artillery "clock face" targeting system, causing them to miss their objectives. Malaria devastated European troops, particularly the Royal Scots. Of approximately 770 personnel, at least 180 suffered recurring malarial episodes from the Shing Mun Redoubt area's notoriously endemic conditions. Staff shortages forced nearly every unit to promote junior officers to positions beyond their rank, exacerbating structural weaknesses. Although the Canadians' arrival bolstered the garrison, significant handicaps undermined their effectiveness. Both battalions carried a C-class designation—deemed unfit for foreign service—having spent years in soft garrison postings without rigorous training. The deficit was stark: each Canadian soldier received only thirty-five rifle practice rounds. The two battalions incorporated 115 men with fewer than sixteen weeks' training, while sixty-two of seventy-five recruits joining the Winnipeg Grenadiers in June came directly from a training depot lacking even basic rifles. Twelve percent of the Canadian force remained untrained. Equipment deficiencies proved even more damaging. A standard 1941 Canadian infantry battalion required 102 motor vehicles—including twenty-two Universal Carriers, thirty-seven ¾-ton trucks, thirteen 1-ton trucks, thirty-one bicycles, and twenty-two Boys anti-tank rifles. When the Canadians landed, logistical failures left them with only six Bren carriers, two water tankers, twelve ¾-ton trucks, and a single Boys anti-tank rifle. Although they carried 3in. mortars, neither ammunition nor radios accompanied them. Canada possessed only 300 3-inch mortar bombs in its entire inventory at that time, making any allocation to Hong Kong impossible. A second vessel, the SS Don Jose, was dispatched with replacement vehicles and equipment but never reached Hong Kong before 8 December. The Japanese seized it en route to Manila. Despite these shortcomings, the force departed on 27 October with 1,975 men and arrived on 16 November. Intelligence estimates regarding Japanese available forces varied widely, ranging from two to four divisions. On 6 December evening, Chinese reports confirmed the previous day's arrival of three Japanese divisions at Buji township, located eight miles from the border in what is now Shenzhen. Earlier, around 1 November, a Japanese deserter provided intelligence of significant troop concentrations north of the frontier, including large-calibre artillery indicative of at least divisional strength.   The Hong Kong invasion force comprised three service branches: the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) deployed the 38th Infantry Division, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) committed the Second China Fleet, and the Imperial Japanese Air Force (IJAF) contributed the 1st Air Group. Command of the ground assault rested with Lieutenant-General Sano Tadayoshi of the 38th Division, supported by Major-General Ito Takeo heading the infantry group, while supporting arms including artillery, engineers, armor, and transport fell under Sano's authority. The main assault force consisted of three infantry regiments from the 38th Division, each led by a colonel: the 228th under Doi Teihichi, the 229th under Tanaka Ryosaburo, and the 230th under Shoji Toshishige. The 38th Division itself was a standard 1940s B-class infantry division of approximately 20,000 troops (ranging from 18,000–21,000 depending on operational requirements), organized into three regiments with three battalions each. Reflecting the Japanese army's reliance on animal and human transport, each regiment fielded roughly 3,800 troops supported by some 700 horses. Battalion strength averaged around 1,071 personnel, with companies numbering approximately 180 men. Japanese infantry battalions of this period featured a distinctive organization: rifle platoons consisted of four sections (three equipped with rifles and light machine guns, one with light mortars and rifles), complemented by an additional heavy machine-gun company fielding twelve Type 92 weapons and a troop of light artillery—likely Type 92 70mm infantry guns. The divisional field artillery regiment operated 75mm Type 41 mountain guns organized into three 688-man battalions, each with two troops of two guns. Mountain artillery units, numbering 36 guns total, carried additional personnel (3,400) and animals (1,400) to navigate the terrain complexities of Hong Kong operations. Recognizing the need for overwhelming firepower to compel Hong Kong's surrender, the IJA augmented the invasion force with heavy artillery—15cm and 24cm howitzers commanded by Major-General Kitashima Kineo. News of the Canadian reinforcements arriving in Hong Kong forced a reassessment. Commander-in-Chief Sakai Takashi of the 23rd Army informed his superiors that the original ten-day timeline was unrealistic and requested additional troops. Although most formations were already committed to other operations, Imperial Headquarters eventually authorized two depot regiments from Japan to support the campaign. Intended for second-line duties rather than frontline combat, these units were to be returned promptly after freeing experienced personnel for Hong Kong operations. This arrangement allowed the 19th and 20th mixed brigades—approximately 6,000 men organized in five infantry battalions, a field artillery battalion, and an engineer battalion—to be released for Hong Kong. However, Sakai's request for reinforcements met with disapproval from Imperial Headquarters, and he received an unmistakable message: a swift, decisive campaign was essential. His situation worsened when Japanese agents mistakenly identified British Bren carriers as tanks, forcing Sakai to improvise armor by raiding the 1st Reserve Tank Battalion and tankette units from infantry depot divisions. In attempting to secure additional armor from the 11th Army's 9th Reconnaissance Regiment, Sakai encountered resistance. General Hata Shunroku lodged sustained complaints with senior officials, and Sakai received a sharp rebuke—further requests would not be entertained, and his replacement would follow if necessary. Stung by this loss of face, Sakai abandoned all additional requests and became even more determined to achieve success. Vice-Admiral Niimi Masaichi, commanding the 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet, oversaw the entire naval element, divided into bombardment and attack groups. His flagship, the light cruiser Isuzu, carried Captain Ura Koichi, who simultaneously commanded the bombardment group. This naval force assembled ships from various China Expeditionary Fleet units, particularly from the Canton Special Base Force, 15 Squadron, and 11 Torpedo Boat Division at Guangzhou. Reflecting Niimi's lack of confidence in the army's air support capabilities, the seaplane tender IJN Kamikawa Maru joined the operation on his insistence, providing organic naval aviation against the threat posed by British Wildebeests. Niimi also petitioned for destroyers IJN Wakaba and Yugure to counter the three British destroyers, though this request was denied. The Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF) were assigned to conduct diversionary attacks south of Hong Kong Island, intended to distract British forces from the main land invasion thrust. The IJAF's 1st Air Brigade, commanded by Colonel Habu Hideharu, centered on the 45th Air Regiment with 34 Kawasaki Ki-32 Type 98 'Mary' light bombers. This composite force drew aircraft and units from airfields across China and Manchuria—Beijing, Shanghai, Taiwan, and Qiqihar—all assembled at Baiyun Aerodrome in Guangzhou on 7 December 1941. Supporting the 1st Air Brigade were the 10th Independent Squadron under Captain Takatsuki Akira with 13 Nakajima Ki-27 Type 97 'Nate' fighters, 3 Mitsubishi Ki-15 Type 97 'Babs' command reconnaissance aircraft from the 18th Independent Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 44th Independent Squadron fielding 6 Tachikawa Ki-36 Type 98 'Ida' observation aircraft. Years before the invasion, the Japanese cultivated an extensive network of agents and sleeper operatives in Hong Kong, methodically gathering intelligence and mapping military installations. This sophisticated network proved remarkably effective: invasion maps carried by IJA officers were actually Hong Kong Government and British military maps, overprinted with Japanese annotations and interpretations. British officers later discovered in captivity that the Peninsula Hotel's regular barber was a Japanese Navy lieutenant-commander who had exploited the intimate setting to extract valuable information about British force dispositions. Intelligence operatives infiltrated every level of Hong Kong society—the garrison tailor and barber both served as spies. This groundwork enabled exceptional accuracy in artillery fire and bombing campaigns. The Japanese further leveraged criminal networks, recruiting gangsters throughout Hong Kong and Guangdong province with money and arms, turning them into irregular auxiliaries supporting the invasion.   On Sunday, 7 December, seven hundred members of the 2nd Royal Scots and Middlesex Regiment marched to St John's Cathedral for the morning service. As Major-General Maltby read a passage from Matthew, his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant I. MacGregor, delivered an urgent message that would change everything. Preparations for conflict had already begun. On 5 December, the HKVDC had mobilized fully, yet Hong Kong's broader population remained unmoved—the Happy Valley racetrack reported record attendance that very day. The contrast was stark: while one institution prepared for war, another celebrated as though nothing threatened. Japanese forces had been positioned advantageously since autumn 1941. The 23rd Army was already stationed west of Guangzhou, with contingents scattered across Foshan Town, Zhuhai, and other locations on the Pearl River delta. Upon orders for war on 1 December, they faced minimal distances to cover. The army regrouped at Humen, Shilong Town, and Guangzhou itself—staging areas for the invasion. The first visible signs arrived on 4–5 December when Japanese forces landed at Mirs Bay; the 228th Regiment moved into its staging area at Buji Town, now part of Shenzhen City. Maltby received these reports and immediately departed the cathedral service to issue urgent stand-to orders. Yet skepticism persisted within military circles. Some dismissed the threat, dismissing such intelligence as "astonishingly erroneous." Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese Navy massed in the waters beyond Hong Kong's horizon. The Kowloon Infantry Brigade held a stretched defensive line: the 5/7 Rajputs anchored the centre, the 2/14 Punjab the east, and the 2nd Royal Scots the west. Forward positions extended far—C Company, 2/14 Punjab, under Major S. Burns ranged along Castle Peak Road toward Yuen Long. The brigade screen, C Company of the 2/14 Punjab, held Shueng Shui and Taipo Market with four Bren carriers and two armoured cars from the HKVDC, backed by engineers and the 22nd Fortress Company. The Hong Kong Infantry Brigade held Hong Kong Island itself. The Winnipeg Grenadiers occupied Victoria City on the north-west coast, while the Royal Rifles of Canada stretched along the north-east shores from Saukiwan to Lyemun. Brigadier Lawson commanded from his headquarters at Wongneichong Gap in the island's centre. At 0355 hours on 8 December, the code word "Blossom Blossom" was transmitted. Eleven minutes later, Lieutenant-General Sakai ordered the invasion to commence. Fifty minutes after that, at 0445 hours, Major Charles Boxer—a fluent Japanese speaker formerly of the Lincolnshire Regiment—was roused by Radio Tokyo announcing that war was imminent. Governor Young and Major-General Maltby were informed at once. By 0500 hours, the forward demolition points had been blown by Major Gray, OC of C Company 2/14 Punjab, and the HKVDC engineers under Major J. H. Bottomley. At 0645 hours, the garrison received formal notification: Britain and Japan were at war. Seventy-five minutes later, air-raid sirens wailed. Within moments, smoke billowed from Kai Tak Airport as Japanese aircraft destroyed virtually the entire air garrison. The Wildebeests, Walruses, HKVDC biplanes, and several civilian planes were engulfed in flames. Only two Ju-52s of the Eurasia Corporation and one CNAC T-32 Condor escaped destruction—dispersal bays had never been built due to lack of funds. The Japanese then turned to secondary targets, bombing Shamshuipo Camp and the neighbouring police station. The Canadians suffered few large-scale casualties in the initial strikes, though Sergeant Routledge and Signalman Fairley of the signal platoon were wounded—the first Canadian soldiers injured in World War II. Remarkably, Hong Kong Island's theatres, cinemas, and restaurants continued operating as though the island faced no peril. Japanese demolition efforts proved only minor obstacles. Bridges blown were quickly replaced. The invasion proceeded on three fronts: the 230th Regiment advanced westward along the northern route toward Yuen Long and Castle Peak, targeting the northern slope of Tai Mo Mountain. The 228th Regiment drove down the centre, following the Sheung Shui–Taipo–Kowloon road toward Grassy Hill north of the Shing Mun Redoubt. The 229th Regiment, crossing at Sha Tau Kok and by boat at Starling Inlet, proceeded via Taipo toward Tai Shui Hang and Ma On Mountain. Whenever confronted with strongly defended positions, the Japanese bypassed them entirely rather than engage. The first day brought scattered but spirited resistance. Around 1300 hours, the Punjabis inflicted the first serious check, drawing blood from advancing Japanese forces. At 1830 hours, they ambushed and decimated several Japanese platoons south of Taipo market town. The HKVDC's armoured cars and Bren carriers struck similar successes nearby. The 2 Royal Scots' reconnaissance platoon clashed with elements of the 229th Regiment around Yuen Long. Despite these minor victories, Japanese momentum continued. Armed with stolen British maps and guided by fifth columnists, they pushed forward relentlessly. By late afternoon on the 8th, the Punjabis withdrew toward Grassy Hill to avoid being outflanked. The artillerymen of the 12th Battery engaged an IJN destroyer and Japanese forces around Taipo, inflicting heavy casualties. Farther south near Shatin, on the Taipo–Kowloon highway, rapidly advancing Japanese troops surprised the defenders and severed the fuse at an HKVDC demolition point. Their triumph proved momentary; the engineers completed the backup circuit and detonated the bridge, destroying it along with the Japanese soldiers crossing it. By early morning on 9 December, orders came to withdraw all mainland units to the Gin Drinkers Line. The Punjabis, already at Shatin Wai overlooking Tide Cove, held their position under pressure and continuous shelling for the next two days. The HKVDC withdrew to Fotan, a village south of Shatin. Maltby ordered D Company, 5/7 Rajputs, under Captain H. R. Newtons to Smuggler's Ridge to close the gap between the 2 Royal Scots and 2/14 Punjab. HKVDC armoured cars and Bren carriers continued patrols along Castle Peak Road while HMS Cicala, having survived two air attacks, maintained station in Castle Peak Bay. Despite an IJN blockade, the destroyers HMS Thanet and Scout slipped anchor and escaped to Singapore around 2130 hours. The surviving CNAC and Eurasia aircraft took off with high-value evacuees: Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's widow and her two equally renowned sisters—the Soong sisters—along with Chinese Finance Minister H. H. Kung. Also departing was Lieutenant-Colonel H. Owen-Hughes of the HKVDC, who carried orders to coordinate with the Chinese Nationalist Army for a rear-guard attack on Japanese forces to relieve the pressure on Hong Kong. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On 8 December 1941, Japan attacked Hong Kong with the 38th Division, supported by naval and air forces. Despite British defenses manned by undertrained, under-equipped troops, Japanese forces advanced rapidly across three fronts. Within hours, the RAF was destroyed, demolitions proved futile, and British units withdrew toward the Gin Drinkers Line facing overwhelming odds.

Cooperative Evangelist: Kagawa Toyohiko and His World, 1888-1960 (University of Hawai'i Press, 2025) by Bo Tao uncovers the extraordinary world of a Japanese man who was once described as the “Saint Francis” or the “Gandhi” of Japan. A renowned religious figure on the world stage, Kagawa Toyohiko (1888–1960) received wide acclaim for his work as a street preacher in the slums of Kobe as well as his espousal of nonviolent methods of social reform. His reputation as a pacifist figure, however, rested uneasily with his wartime actions, which became increasingly supportive of the Japanese government and its expansionist policies. Reluctant to speak up against Japan's increasing aggression in the late 1930s, he emerged as a full-blown apologist during the Pacific War, appearing on several Radio Tokyo broadcasts as a propagandist defending the interests of the state. Adopting a transnational approach that accounts for the rapid flow of information between Japan and the United States, Bo Tao examines the career of Kagawa as it unfolded within the context of the wars, imperialism, and economic depression of the early to mid-twentieth century. Using official documents and personal correspondence that have received scant attention in previous works, Tao reveals, for the first time at this level of detail, the extent of Kagawa's cooperative relationship with the Japanese government, as well as the ways in which his idealized image was carefully constructed by his ardent missionary supporters. This book provides a window into the global dimensions of broader cultural shifts during the interwar period, such as the rise of Christian internationalism and the Depression-era popularity of cooperative economics. Offering a holistic and nuanced exploration of the tensions resulting from Kagawa's hybrid identity as a Japanese Christian, Cooperative Evangelist adds a new layer to our understanding of religion, empire, and politics in the shaping of social and international relations. Bo Tao is Lecturer in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Chiba University in Chiba, Japan. His research interests include global history, U.S.-Japan relations, religion and politics, modern Japanese history, and the history of Christianity. Shatrunjay Mall is a PhD Candidate in the Department of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He works on transnational Asian history, and his dissertation explores intellectual, political, and cultural intersections and affinities that emerged between Indian anti-colonialism and imperial Japan in the twentieth century. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Cooperative Evangelist: Kagawa Toyohiko and His World, 1888-1960 (University of Hawai'i Press, 2025) by Bo Tao uncovers the extraordinary world of a Japanese man who was once described as the “Saint Francis” or the “Gandhi” of Japan. A renowned religious figure on the world stage, Kagawa Toyohiko (1888–1960) received wide acclaim for his work as a street preacher in the slums of Kobe as well as his espousal of nonviolent methods of social reform. His reputation as a pacifist figure, however, rested uneasily with his wartime actions, which became increasingly supportive of the Japanese government and its expansionist policies. Reluctant to speak up against Japan's increasing aggression in the late 1930s, he emerged as a full-blown apologist during the Pacific War, appearing on several Radio Tokyo broadcasts as a propagandist defending the interests of the state. Adopting a transnational approach that accounts for the rapid flow of information between Japan and the United States, Bo Tao examines the career of Kagawa as it unfolded within the context of the wars, imperialism, and economic depression of the early to mid-twentieth century. Using official documents and personal correspondence that have received scant attention in previous works, Tao reveals, for the first time at this level of detail, the extent of Kagawa's cooperative relationship with the Japanese government, as well as the ways in which his idealized image was carefully constructed by his ardent missionary supporters. This book provides a window into the global dimensions of broader cultural shifts during the interwar period, such as the rise of Christian internationalism and the Depression-era popularity of cooperative economics. Offering a holistic and nuanced exploration of the tensions resulting from Kagawa's hybrid identity as a Japanese Christian, Cooperative Evangelist adds a new layer to our understanding of religion, empire, and politics in the shaping of social and international relations. Bo Tao is Lecturer in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Chiba University in Chiba, Japan. His research interests include global history, U.S.-Japan relations, religion and politics, modern Japanese history, and the history of Christianity. Shatrunjay Mall is a PhD Candidate in the Department of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He works on transnational Asian history, and his dissertation explores intellectual, political, and cultural intersections and affinities that emerged between Indian anti-colonialism and imperial Japan in the twentieth century. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Cooperative Evangelist: Kagawa Toyohiko and His World, 1888-1960 (University of Hawai'i Press, 2025) by Bo Tao uncovers the extraordinary world of a Japanese man who was once described as the “Saint Francis” or the “Gandhi” of Japan. A renowned religious figure on the world stage, Kagawa Toyohiko (1888–1960) received wide acclaim for his work as a street preacher in the slums of Kobe as well as his espousal of nonviolent methods of social reform. His reputation as a pacifist figure, however, rested uneasily with his wartime actions, which became increasingly supportive of the Japanese government and its expansionist policies. Reluctant to speak up against Japan's increasing aggression in the late 1930s, he emerged as a full-blown apologist during the Pacific War, appearing on several Radio Tokyo broadcasts as a propagandist defending the interests of the state. Adopting a transnational approach that accounts for the rapid flow of information between Japan and the United States, Bo Tao examines the career of Kagawa as it unfolded within the context of the wars, imperialism, and economic depression of the early to mid-twentieth century. Using official documents and personal correspondence that have received scant attention in previous works, Tao reveals, for the first time at this level of detail, the extent of Kagawa's cooperative relationship with the Japanese government, as well as the ways in which his idealized image was carefully constructed by his ardent missionary supporters. This book provides a window into the global dimensions of broader cultural shifts during the interwar period, such as the rise of Christian internationalism and the Depression-era popularity of cooperative economics. Offering a holistic and nuanced exploration of the tensions resulting from Kagawa's hybrid identity as a Japanese Christian, Cooperative Evangelist adds a new layer to our understanding of religion, empire, and politics in the shaping of social and international relations. Bo Tao is Lecturer in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Chiba University in Chiba, Japan. His research interests include global history, U.S.-Japan relations, religion and politics, modern Japanese history, and the history of Christianity. Shatrunjay Mall is a PhD Candidate in the Department of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He works on transnational Asian history, and his dissertation explores intellectual, political, and cultural intersections and affinities that emerged between Indian anti-colonialism and imperial Japan in the twentieth century. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

Cooperative Evangelist: Kagawa Toyohiko and His World, 1888-1960 (University of Hawai'i Press, 2025) by Bo Tao uncovers the extraordinary world of a Japanese man who was once described as the “Saint Francis” or the “Gandhi” of Japan. A renowned religious figure on the world stage, Kagawa Toyohiko (1888–1960) received wide acclaim for his work as a street preacher in the slums of Kobe as well as his espousal of nonviolent methods of social reform. His reputation as a pacifist figure, however, rested uneasily with his wartime actions, which became increasingly supportive of the Japanese government and its expansionist policies. Reluctant to speak up against Japan's increasing aggression in the late 1930s, he emerged as a full-blown apologist during the Pacific War, appearing on several Radio Tokyo broadcasts as a propagandist defending the interests of the state. Adopting a transnational approach that accounts for the rapid flow of information between Japan and the United States, Bo Tao examines the career of Kagawa as it unfolded within the context of the wars, imperialism, and economic depression of the early to mid-twentieth century. Using official documents and personal correspondence that have received scant attention in previous works, Tao reveals, for the first time at this level of detail, the extent of Kagawa's cooperative relationship with the Japanese government, as well as the ways in which his idealized image was carefully constructed by his ardent missionary supporters. This book provides a window into the global dimensions of broader cultural shifts during the interwar period, such as the rise of Christian internationalism and the Depression-era popularity of cooperative economics. Offering a holistic and nuanced exploration of the tensions resulting from Kagawa's hybrid identity as a Japanese Christian, Cooperative Evangelist adds a new layer to our understanding of religion, empire, and politics in the shaping of social and international relations. Bo Tao is Lecturer in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Chiba University in Chiba, Japan. His research interests include global history, U.S.-Japan relations, religion and politics, modern Japanese history, and the history of Christianity. Shatrunjay Mall is a PhD Candidate in the Department of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He works on transnational Asian history, and his dissertation explores intellectual, political, and cultural intersections and affinities that emerged between Indian anti-colonialism and imperial Japan in the twentieth century. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Cooperative Evangelist: Kagawa Toyohiko and His World, 1888-1960 (University of Hawai'i Press, 2025) by Bo Tao uncovers the extraordinary world of a Japanese man who was once described as the “Saint Francis” or the “Gandhi” of Japan. A renowned religious figure on the world stage, Kagawa Toyohiko (1888–1960) received wide acclaim for his work as a street preacher in the slums of Kobe as well as his espousal of nonviolent methods of social reform. His reputation as a pacifist figure, however, rested uneasily with his wartime actions, which became increasingly supportive of the Japanese government and its expansionist policies. Reluctant to speak up against Japan's increasing aggression in the late 1930s, he emerged as a full-blown apologist during the Pacific War, appearing on several Radio Tokyo broadcasts as a propagandist defending the interests of the state. Adopting a transnational approach that accounts for the rapid flow of information between Japan and the United States, Bo Tao examines the career of Kagawa as it unfolded within the context of the wars, imperialism, and economic depression of the early to mid-twentieth century. Using official documents and personal correspondence that have received scant attention in previous works, Tao reveals, for the first time at this level of detail, the extent of Kagawa's cooperative relationship with the Japanese government, as well as the ways in which his idealized image was carefully constructed by his ardent missionary supporters. This book provides a window into the global dimensions of broader cultural shifts during the interwar period, such as the rise of Christian internationalism and the Depression-era popularity of cooperative economics. Offering a holistic and nuanced exploration of the tensions resulting from Kagawa's hybrid identity as a Japanese Christian, Cooperative Evangelist adds a new layer to our understanding of religion, empire, and politics in the shaping of social and international relations. Bo Tao is Lecturer in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Chiba University in Chiba, Japan. His research interests include global history, U.S.-Japan relations, religion and politics, modern Japanese history, and the history of Christianity. Shatrunjay Mall is a PhD Candidate in the Department of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He works on transnational Asian history, and his dissertation explores intellectual, political, and cultural intersections and affinities that emerged between Indian anti-colonialism and imperial Japan in the twentieth century. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Cooperative Evangelist: Kagawa Toyohiko and His World, 1888-1960 (University of Hawai'i Press, 2025) by Bo Tao uncovers the extraordinary world of a Japanese man who was once described as the “Saint Francis” or the “Gandhi” of Japan. A renowned religious figure on the world stage, Kagawa Toyohiko (1888–1960) received wide acclaim for his work as a street preacher in the slums of Kobe as well as his espousal of nonviolent methods of social reform. His reputation as a pacifist figure, however, rested uneasily with his wartime actions, which became increasingly supportive of the Japanese government and its expansionist policies. Reluctant to speak up against Japan's increasing aggression in the late 1930s, he emerged as a full-blown apologist during the Pacific War, appearing on several Radio Tokyo broadcasts as a propagandist defending the interests of the state. Adopting a transnational approach that accounts for the rapid flow of information between Japan and the United States, Bo Tao examines the career of Kagawa as it unfolded within the context of the wars, imperialism, and economic depression of the early to mid-twentieth century. Using official documents and personal correspondence that have received scant attention in previous works, Tao reveals, for the first time at this level of detail, the extent of Kagawa's cooperative relationship with the Japanese government, as well as the ways in which his idealized image was carefully constructed by his ardent missionary supporters. This book provides a window into the global dimensions of broader cultural shifts during the interwar period, such as the rise of Christian internationalism and the Depression-era popularity of cooperative economics. Offering a holistic and nuanced exploration of the tensions resulting from Kagawa's hybrid identity as a Japanese Christian, Cooperative Evangelist adds a new layer to our understanding of religion, empire, and politics in the shaping of social and international relations. Bo Tao is Lecturer in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Chiba University in Chiba, Japan. His research interests include global history, U.S.-Japan relations, religion and politics, modern Japanese history, and the history of Christianity. Shatrunjay Mall is a PhD Candidate in the Department of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He works on transnational Asian history, and his dissertation explores intellectual, political, and cultural intersections and affinities that emerged between Indian anti-colonialism and imperial Japan in the twentieth century. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/japanese-studies

Cooperative Evangelist: Kagawa Toyohiko and His World, 1888-1960 (University of Hawai'i Press, 2025) by Bo Tao uncovers the extraordinary world of a Japanese man who was once described as the “Saint Francis” or the “Gandhi” of Japan. A renowned religious figure on the world stage, Kagawa Toyohiko (1888–1960) received wide acclaim for his work as a street preacher in the slums of Kobe as well as his espousal of nonviolent methods of social reform. His reputation as a pacifist figure, however, rested uneasily with his wartime actions, which became increasingly supportive of the Japanese government and its expansionist policies. Reluctant to speak up against Japan's increasing aggression in the late 1930s, he emerged as a full-blown apologist during the Pacific War, appearing on several Radio Tokyo broadcasts as a propagandist defending the interests of the state. Adopting a transnational approach that accounts for the rapid flow of information between Japan and the United States, Bo Tao examines the career of Kagawa as it unfolded within the context of the wars, imperialism, and economic depression of the early to mid-twentieth century. Using official documents and personal correspondence that have received scant attention in previous works, Tao reveals, for the first time at this level of detail, the extent of Kagawa's cooperative relationship with the Japanese government, as well as the ways in which his idealized image was carefully constructed by his ardent missionary supporters. This book provides a window into the global dimensions of broader cultural shifts during the interwar period, such as the rise of Christian internationalism and the Depression-era popularity of cooperative economics. Offering a holistic and nuanced exploration of the tensions resulting from Kagawa's hybrid identity as a Japanese Christian, Cooperative Evangelist adds a new layer to our understanding of religion, empire, and politics in the shaping of social and international relations. Bo Tao is Lecturer in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Chiba University in Chiba, Japan. His research interests include global history, U.S.-Japan relations, religion and politics, modern Japanese history, and the history of Christianity. Shatrunjay Mall is a PhD Candidate in the Department of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He works on transnational Asian history, and his dissertation explores intellectual, political, and cultural intersections and affinities that emerged between Indian anti-colonialism and imperial Japan in the twentieth century. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/christian-studies

Last time we spoke about the Fall of Manila. General LeMay's B-29 bombers wreaked havoc on Japan, targeting key factories at a high cost. On February 19, US Marines landed on Iwo Jima, facing fierce Japanese resistance and heavy casualties. By February 23, after relentless fighting and harsh conditions, they raised the American flag atop Mount Suribachi, marking a hard-won victory. This moment inspired a legacy for the Marine Corps, as battles raged on in the Pacific. Meanwhile troops attacked General Kobayashi's defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, struggling to gain ground. Reinforcements arrived, leading to coordinated assaults, but progress was slow. Meanwhile, General Yamashita reorganized his forces in response to increased guerrilla activity. As American divisions advanced, they faced fierce resistance but gradually secured key positions. Guerrilla leader Volckmann disrupted Japanese supply lines, significantly impacting their operations. Amidst the chaos, a daring rescue mission freed over 2,000 internees, though it provoked brutal reprisals against civilians. This episode is the Great Tokyo Air Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are continuing with the ongoing battle over Iwo Jima. By the end of February, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines had successfully secured Mount Suribachi, while the other regiments from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions advanced toward the O-2 Line, situated beyond Airfield No. 2. This location was where General Kuribayashi maintained his primary defensive positions, which were heavily fortified with caves, tunnels, and traps. On March 1, General Rockey continued his offensive on the left flank as the fresh 28th Marines moved through the weary 27th Marines, led by Colonel Wornham, and launched an assault on Hill 362A and its adjacent positions. The corps' 155mm howitzers and 5th Division artillery commenced firing a preparation at K-minus 45 minutes. One battleship and two cruisers from the gunfire and covering force added their heavy fires from 08:00 to 08:30. Aircraft from the support carrier group delivered strikes throughout the day, but did not participate in preparation for the attack. This proved one of the busiest days for Task Force 54 since D-Day as fire support ships dueled with enemy shore batteries until late afternoon. Shortly after dawn enemy guns in the northern part of the island opened up, and at 07:25 the destroyer Terry took a direct hit by a 6-inch shell, suffering heavy casualties. The battleship Nevada immediately engaged these hostile installations, and after completing their mission in support of the landing force, the cruisers Indianapolis and Pensacola shifted to counter battery fire. At 10:25 the destroyer Colhoun was hit by a major-caliber projectile, and soon after this enemy shells straddled the destroyer Stembel. Counter Battery fire continued throughout the day with the Nevada destroying one casemated gun and starting a fire in another emplacement, while the Pensacola's batteries accounted for a third Japanese gun. Following the robust aerial, naval, and artillery bombardment, Liversedge's forces achieved some initial success, including capturing the hilltop, but were ultimately halted by intense machine-gun fire from Nishi Ridge to the north. However, the 3rd Battalion along the coast managed to advance approximately 350 yards against lighter resistance. In the center, General Erskine also pressed forward beyond Airfield No. 2, with Colonel Withers' 21st Marines advancing north and northeast about 500 yards into the incomplete Airfield No. 3. At the same time, General Cates continued to send his troops into the fray. Colonel Jordan's 24th Marines replaced Colonel Wensinger's exhausted 23rd Marines on the left and fought to dislodge the enemy from Hill 382. They succeeded in advancing about 100 yards along the division's left boundary and 50 yards on the right, establishing a foothold on elevated terrain overlooking Minami village. Further south, Colonel Lanigan committed only his 1st Battalion to eliminate the salient around the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, but this assault was again met with fierce Japanese gunfire. This relief enabled Erskine to initiate a late two-regiment offensive, with the 21st Marines on the left and Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines on the right, although this effort did not achieve any significant progress. The following day, the assault persisted, but the 9th Marines made minimal headway against a strong enemy position on the right, while the 21st Marines advanced toward the base of Hill 362B and the southern edge of Airfield No. 3. Concurrently, Liversedge's 28th Marines successfully cleared Hill 362A and moved toward Nishi Ridge, where they repelled a fierce counterattack by 150 Japanese soldiers. Colonel Graham's 26th Marines were once again deployed to fill the gap between the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions, managing to gain approximately 500 yards to the north. Jordan's 24th Marines finally captured Hill 382 and advanced about 300 yards on the left flank. Meanwhile, Lanigan's 1st Battalion made another unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate and take the high ground north of Turkey Knob. As described by an intelligence officer with the 4th Marine Division “As a result of a close study of the enemy's recent defensive action, aided by observation from OP's and air reconnaissance, the following explanation is suggested of the enemy's defense in this Div's Z of A. The enemy remains below ground in his maze of communicating tunnels throughout our preliminary arty fires. When the fire ceases he pushed OP's out of entrances not demolished by our fires. Then choosing a suitable exit he moves as many men and weapons to the surface as he can, depending on the cover and concealment of that area, often as close as 75 yards from our front. As our troops advance toward this point he delivers all the fire at his disposal, rifle, machine-gun, and mortar. When he has inflicted sufficient casualties to pin down our advance he then withdraws through his underground tunnels most of his forces, possibly leaving a few machine gunners and mortars. Meanwhile our Bn CO has coordinated his direct support weapons and delivers a concentration of rockets, mortars and artillery. Our tanks then push in, supported by infantry. When the hot spot is overrun we find a handful of dead Japs and few if any enemy weapons. While this is happening, the enemy has repeated the process and another sector of our advance is engaged in a vicious fire fight, and the cycle continues.”  Meanwhile the remainder of the 25th Marines managed to advance 300 yards along the coast without facing any opposition. On March 3, the capture of Hill 362A enabled flame-thrower tanks to assist in the advance northward. The 5th Marine Division prepared to press on with its assaults through Nishi Ridge and Hill 362B. The majority of the 28th Marines faced strong resistance as they moved forward over 200 yards. Liversedge's 1st Battalion and Graham's 1st Battalion executed a coordinated attack to take the main enemy positions ahead of them. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 26th Marines surged forward, achieving a gain of over 500 yards, which allowed them to relieve Kenyon's 3rd Battalion and secure the summit of Hill 362B. In the center, the 9th Marines remained in a stalemate, while the 21st Marines launched a vigorous attack to the northeast, successfully capturing the summit of Hill 357 at the eastern edge of the Motoyama Plateau. They then attempted another assault southeast toward Hill 362C, which resulted in a modest gain of about 250 yards. Meanwhile, in the 4th Marine Division's sector, Wensinger's 23rd Marines were deployed in the center, where determined Japanese defenders continued to thwart intense American assaults, despite the partial reduction of the Turkey Knob blockhouse. To the left, the 24th Marines resumed their offensive southeast, advancing up to 350 yards in the center. During the eight days of deadlock and fierce conflict in the Hill 382 and Turkey Knob areas, the weather had been generally favorable. Mild temperatures and fair skies predominated, although early in the morning ground haze combined with smoke to limit observation, and on a few days light showers fell in the afternoon. Night temperatures sometimes went below 60°F, and it was then that tired Marines were grateful for the characteristic subterranean heat of the island that warmed their foxholes. The next day, March 4, dawned gray and sullen, and intermittent showers fell from the overcast skies. Visibility was so limited that all air strikes were canceled and aerial observation seriously curtailed. On the right, Cates' Marines pressed the attack southeast but could only gain 150 yards against the defenders' fierce resistance. To the left, after a failed Japanese infiltration attempt overnight to gather food and water, both the 9th and 21st Marines made no progress with their costly eastward assaults. Finally, supported closely by flame-throwing tanks and combat engineers, Rockey's Marines fought fiercely but achieved only minor advances, prompting Wornham's 27th Marines to be thrown back into the battle to reinforce the two battered assault regiments. March 5 was then dedicated to reorganizing and resupplying the three Marine Divisions in preparation for a renewed effort the next day. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Marines, led by Colonel James Stuart, were sent back to Guam without having landed on Iwo Jima. The three divisions accordingly resumed the offensive on March 6 after a terrific artillery and naval gunfire bombardment. First, on the left, Erskine attacked with his three regiments abreast yet failed to make any significant advance. Then, in the center, the 9th and 21st Marines likewise unsuccessfully attacked towards Hill 362C, though the latter managed to clear the entire Hill 357 area. Lastly, Wensinger's 23rd Marines passed through the 24th on the division left and pressed on forward against heavy opposition, successfully gaining between 150 and 350 yards while Jordan's battalions gained up to 150 yards in their front. Additionally, the 25th Marines mopped up in its area and Cates' Provisional Battalion kept hammering against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. In the knowledge that the battle was swinging irrevocably in favor of the Americans, General Kuribayashi radioed Tokyo: "Our strongpoints might be able to fight delaying actions for several more days. I comfort myself a little seeing my officers and men die without regret after struggling in this inch-by-inch battle against an overwhelming enemy...". The General's predictions were, if anything, on the pessimistic side as his garrison would prolong the battle for another three weeks. Although the fighting was dragging terribly, on this day Brigadier-General Ernest Moore successfully landed on Airfield No. 1 alongside 28 P-51s and 12 P-61s of the 15th Fighter Group to take over control of island air activities. The following day, the Island Commander, Major-General James Chaney, assumed responsibility for base development, air defense, and operation of the airfields. Meanwhile, Schmidt was continuing his coordinated offensive, with the 28th Marines meeting only scattered resistance as it pushed 500 yards north; the 26th Marines overrunning the enemy defenses and gaining about 150 yards before resistance stiffened once again; the 27th Marines attacking on a narrow front but likewise gaining only 150 yards; the 21st Marines achieving tactical surprise to reach Hill 331 and then pushing 250 yards more to Hill 362C, which was ultimately seized as well; the 9th Marines ferociously attacking east but gaining only 200 yards before a rain of fire stopped them; the 23rd Marines recovering from a savage Japanese night counterattack and then pushing around 150 yards against strong resistance; the 24th Marines only progressing over 50 yards as it neutralized a number of enemy defenses; and the 25th Marines and the Provisional Battalion continuing secondary operations against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. On March 8, Rockey pressed on toward the northeast coast, with the 28th Marines advancing against minimal resistance, gaining between 300 and 500 yards along the shoreline. Meanwhile, the 26th Marines faced a complete stalemate against the intricate network of pillboxes and interconnected caves that had once comprised the village of Kita. The 27th Marines managed to advance approximately 150 yards with tank support. In the center, the 21st Marines shifted northeast again, successfully gaining 300 yards through the last organized resistance in the area, while the 9th Marines captured Hill 362C and continued their eastward assault, reaching the edge of the plateau overlooking the beach and initiating a flanking maneuver south of Hill 331. On the right flank, the 23rd and 24th Marines continued their attacks but made little headway against the enemy's formidable defenses. That night, General Senda launched a strong counterattack that caught the Americans off guard. Two of Senda's orderlies would survive and report what occurred during the daring counterattack. Many of his troops believed that Inoue was a superior leader who inspired his men to perform outstanding feats of bravery; others thought he was a maniac. The sight of the Stars and Stripes flying on top of Mount Suribachi had filled him with increasing rage. He is quoted as saying: "We shall destroy their banner, we shall replace it with ours in the name of the great Emperor and the great people of Japan." Inoue was in charge of the Naval Guard Force who manned the shore guns that sank and damaged many of the US warships and landing craft, and was described as a bombastic and temperamental character, a fine swordsman, heavy drinker, and womanizer. His bizarre plan almost beggars belief. The Captain was certain that the airfields would be lightly defended by service troops. He and his men would move southward, destroying B29 bombers as they passed; climb Mount Suribachi and tear down the Stars and Stripes; and replace it with the Rising Sun as an inspiration to all Japanese troops on the island.  However this never came to be. The determined defenders, bolstered by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, repelled the assault, resulting in approximately 800 Japanese casualties. Under relentless pressure in a shrinking area where most critical terrain features had been seized, the disorganized Japanese forces saw a fleeting opportunity to escape destruction, raid American-controlled airfields, and reclaim Mount Suribachi with this counterattack. However, its failure effectively depleted Senda's remaining strength and chances for continued resistance. The following day, Cates resumed the offensive, with the 23rd Marines making minor gains along their front, while Jordan's 3rd Battalion achieved a notable breakthrough of 300 yards. Furthermore, the Provisional Battalion was disbanded, and Lanigan's 2nd Battalion assumed control of the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob region. In the center, Erskine persisted in his advance toward the sea, with patrols from the 9th and 21st Marines successfully reaching the beach as American forces continued to secure the area. Meanwhile, to the left, Rockey faced significant resistance, with his troops soon coming under intense and precise fire from elevated positions extending southeast from Kitano Point. Consequently, the 26th and 27th Marines remained in a stalemate while the 28th Marines moved forward. On March 10, Liversedge's men advanced approximately 40 yards across extremely challenging terrain and against fierce opposition, while Graham's 2nd Battalion gained an additional 75 yards, with the rest of the 26th and 27th Marines still held in place. Over the past 14 days, Rockey's 5th Marine Division advanced 3,000 yards along the west coast, ultimately pushing Kuribayashi's forces into a final pocket at the northern tip of the island.  In a dispatch to Tokyo on March 10, General Kuribayashi summed up the Japanese situation in this manner: “Although the attacks of the enemy against our Northern districts are continuing day and night, our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly… 200 or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" all day. The enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers, and aircraft are very severe, especially the bombing and machine-gun fire against Divisional Headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I cannot express nor write here.” Not until 15 bloody days later did Marines eliminate the last pocket of organized enemy resistance in the northern end of the island. By D+19 all that remained for the enemy force was to fight and die for the Emperor. This advance came at a significant cost, with Rockey suffering 1,098 men killed and 2,974 wounded during this time. In the center, the 21st Marines reported that all organized resistance in their area had been eliminated, while the 9th Marines moved toward the beach, facing harassment from enemy fire from a resisting pocket on their right. Nevertheless, Erskine's 3rd Marine Division successfully secured the airfield areas and only needed to eliminate this last remaining pocket in their zone. However, personnel losses during this 14-day campaign were substantial, with Erskine losing 831 men killed and 2,241 wounded. Finally, Cates took over from the 24th Marines as he initiated his final offensive eastward. Consequently, the 23rd Marines advanced southeast with minimal resistance, covering approximately 700 yards before stopping at a strategic high ground about 500 yards from the beach, while patrols moved toward the coast near Tachiiwa Point. Simultaneously, Lanigan's 1st and 3rd Battalions pushed 600 yards southeast against stronger opposition and successfully occupied the key terrain southwest of Higashi. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion advanced northeast to join them, effectively driving the remaining enemy forces into a small pocket in that area. Over the last 14 days, Cates' 4th Marine Division engaged in relentless assaults, fighting fiercely from Charlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Minami, and the formidable defenses northeast of Hill 382, nearly reaching the coast.  The Japanese conducted an astute defense in this sector. General Kuribayashi had planned well, but much credit for execution of the plan in the 4th Marine Division zone must go to General Senda, who commanded the 2nd Mixed Brigade and exercised tactical control during the battle. Enemy weapons and minefields were well placed to take maximum advantage of terrain features, fire control was excellent when judged by Japanese standards, and camouflage discipline outstanding. Machine-gun positions controlled draws, while mortars were disposed to deliver fire on routes of approach, including the crests, forward, and reverse slopes of ridges. The one obvious mistake made by the Japanese in this long, grueling defense to the death was the night counterattack of March 8. This action cost them many lives and gained no advantage. Even this rather hopeless plunge can be somewhat justified, however, when the situation that existed then is seen from the Japanese point of view. By March 8, the enemy was under heavy, constant pressure in an ever-shrinking area where most of the critical terrain features had been captured. He was quickly becoming dispossessed and disorganized, with few courses of action remaining. Because communications were undoubtedly badly disrupted, it is possible that the Japanese facing the 4th Division did not realize just how hopeless his cause appeared and therefore harbored some hope that the counterattack might not be in vain. The cost was significant, with Cates suffering 848 men killed and 2,836 wounded.  While the battle raged on Iwo Jima, General LeMay was also preparing for a major raid on Tokyo, known as Operation Meetinghouse. After a precision strike by 192 B-29 bombers against Musashi on March 4, which resulted in minimal damage due to heavy cloud cover, a decision was made to move away from the 21st Bomber Command's traditional focus on precision bombing. This eighth fiasco at Musashi marked the end of a well-defined phase of 21st Bomber Command's operations. The effort to knock out the Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, daylight precision bombing of carefully selected targets had failed. Production of aircraft engines, not grossly off scheduled programs when 21st Bomber Command came to the Marianas, fell off sharply during the last two months of 1944 and production of aircraft declined slightly during the same period. In neither case, however, could the shortages be accounted for by destruction wrought by the B-29's; indeed, the output of Franks at Ota had decreased from 300 a month to 100 before the first air strike. Not one of the nine high-priority targets had been destroyed, although Akashi had been effectively crippled and production had been slowed down at Mitsubishi's engine and assembly plants at Nagoya and at Nakajima-Ota. Musashi had suffered only 4% damage after 835 B-29 sorties had been sent against it; Navy planes had done more harm in a single strike. Probably the indirect effects of the B-29 raids were most important: with the fall of Saipan, Japanese industrialists had begun to lose confidence in their supposed immunity from air attack. Although under governmental pressure for increased production, they began, with the first attacks on Nakajima and Mitsubishi, to hunt for underground or forest cover, and the official directive for dispersal issued in mid-January merely served to quicken a process already well under way. This radical change in manufacturing techniques, never as efficiently conducted as the similar movement in Germany had been, explains in part the slowdown in production in late 1944 and early 1945.  In 22 missions comprising 2,148 sorties, the command dropped 5,398 tons of bombs on Japan targeting the Imperial aircraft industry, but only about half of the bombers hit primary targets. Losses were substantial, largely due to fierce enemy interceptors and the lengthy overwater journey from the Marianas to Japan, which lacked any friendly bases for refueling or repairs. As a result of the high costs associated with unescorted daylight missions, the susceptibility of Japanese cities to incendiary attacks, and the minimal impact of precision bombing with high explosives, General Arnold ultimately opted for a comprehensive incendiary campaign. In preparation for the forthcoming assault on Okinawa, LeMay was tasked with initiating a series of intensive incendiary strikes from low altitudes. This lower bombing altitude would enhance accuracy, increase bomb load, and prolong the lifespan of B-29 engines. Although this approach carried risks, LeMay believed that the intense Japanese anti-aircraft fire was not overly threatening, as only two B-29s had been lost due to flak alone. He also decided to conduct these missions at night, which would decrease the likelihood of heavy cloud cover and strong winds, simplify navigation, and enable the bombers to reach the two new emergency airstrips at Iwo Jima by dawn. The first mission was set to commence immediately, with 334 B-29s from the 73rd, 313th, and 314th Bombardment Wings taking off in the late afternoon of March 9, carrying approximately 2,000 tons of bombs. The target was a rectangular area in northeastern Tokyo known as Zone I, measuring about 4 by 3 miles and encompassing most of Asakusa, Honjo, and Fukagawa Wards. After a turbulent journey, the initial pathfinders successfully identified their targets under favorable weather conditions and marked them shortly after midnight with fires However LeMay's decision came late. With the first mission set for the night of March 9, the field orders were not cut until the 8th. Although operational details would vary significantly from normal practice, there was no time to consult Washington as was so frequently done. Arnold was not even informed of the revolutionary plans until the day before the mission. The decision to attack at night ruled out the command's standard technique of lead-crew bombing. Formation flying at night was not feasible, and with flak rather than enemy fighters the chief danger, a tight formation would be a handicap rather than a source of defensive strength. With planes bombing individually from low altitudes, bomb loads could be sharply increased, to an average of about six tons per plane. Lead squadron B-29s carried 180 x 70-pound M47s, napalm-filled bombs calculated to start "appliance fires," that is, fires requiring attention of motorized fire-fighting equipment. Other planes, bombing on these pathfinders, were loaded with 24 x 500-pound clusters of M69s. Intervalometers were set at 100 feet for the pathfinders, 50 feet for the other planes. The latter setting was supposed to give a minimum density of 25 tons (8333 M69s) per square mile. Late reports indicated widespread fires that forced formations to search extensively for targets, with visibility severely hampered by smoke and bomb runs complicated by turbulence from intense heat waves. During the three-hour assault, a total of 279 B-29 bombers targeted Tokyo, successfully dropping 1,665 short tons of bombs on the primary objective. Additionally, 19 Superfortresses, unable to reach Tokyo, attacked alternative or last-resort targets. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise by this tactical shift, resulting in only moderate resistance; intense anti-aircraft fire destroyed 14 B-29s and damaged another 42, while enemy interceptors had no significant effect. The fires were so intense that they nearly extinguished themselves by mid-morning, only halted by wide gaps like rivers. Subsequent photographs revealed that 15.8 square miles had been devastated, including 18% of the industrial sector, 63% of the commercial area, and the core of the densely populated residential district. Tokyo's highly effective firefighting system was also caught off guard, leading to the destruction of 95 fire engines and the deaths of 125 firefighters, while lightweight buildings were completely consumed along with their contents. Little rubble remained; only a few fire-resistant structures, marked by heat damage, stood in the devastated areas. In total, 267,171 buildings were destroyed, 83,793 people lost their lives, 40,918 were injured, and 1,008,005 were left homeless. Moreover, it took 25 days to recover all the bodies from the debris. Radio Tokyo referred to the raid as “slaughter bombing,” with one broadcast stating that “the sea of flames engulfing the residential and commercial districts of Tokyo was reminiscent of the holocaust of Rome, caused by Emperor Nero.” The attack significantly undermined the morale of Japanese civilians, and along with other firebombing raids in March, it led many to believe that the war situation was worse than their government had acknowledged. In response, the Japanese government implemented a mix of repression, including severe penalties for those accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and launched an ineffective propaganda campaign aimed at restoring confidence in the nation's air and civil defense efforts. Meanwhile, LeMay and Arnold viewed the operation as a considerable success. As Tokyo mourned its losses, another 313 B-29s were sent on the afternoon of March 11 to execute a similar strike on Nagoya; however, due to minimal wind to spread the fires from the widely dispersed bombs, the results were less impressive. Nonetheless, only one B-29 was lost during the raid, with another 20 sustaining damage. It became evident, as LeMay had predicted, that the Japanese lacked effective tactics for nighttime interception. Now, attention shifts to Burma to report on the ongoing Chinese-British-Indian offensives. On General Slim's primary front, General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued its vigorous advance toward Mandalay, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division successfully made its way to the Meiktila area in the Japanese rear. In response, Generals Kimura and Katamura sent several reinforcements to this crucial area, but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment, led by Colonel Yoshida, managed to arrive in time to establish some defenses in the town, quickly transforming buildings in Meiktila into bunkers and strongpoints. On February 28, Cowan dispatched the 63rd Brigade to launch an attack from the west and the 48th Brigade to advance from the north along the Mahlaing-Meiktila road, while the 255th Tank Brigade executed a wide flanking maneuver to approach from the east. As a result, the 63rd Brigade secured Kyaukpyugon and set up a roadblock southwest of Meiktila; the 48th Brigade advanced to a bridge over a chaung approximately a mile from the town; and the 255th Brigade fought its way to Kyigon and Khanda, successfully destroying several bunkers near Point 860. On March 1, following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, Cowan's three brigades began to push into Meiktila despite fierce resistance. The 48th Brigade, bolstered by a tank squadron, advanced down the Mandalay-Meiktila road, quickly clearing Kyigon before entering the town, where they reached within 100 yards of the railroad line before the attack was halted in the late afternoon. To the east, the majority of the 255th Tank Brigade captured Point 860 and began clearing the camouflaged bunkers along the ridgeline, while a combined force of tanks and grenadiers advanced to within 200 yards of the railroad station before being recalled. Meanwhile, the 63rd Brigade, supported by a tank squadron, cleared the village of Kanna and continued past it to secure the railroad line and the main Kyaukpadaung-Meiktila road. The following day, the 17th Indian Division tightened the encirclement around Meiktila, inflicting significant casualties on the outnumbered defenders and destroying numerous enemy bunkers. On March 3, the three brigades commenced the task of eliminating the last remaining Japanese forces in and around Meiktila. They faced intense sniper and machine-gun fire from every building. However, due to the tanks' superior firepower, the Japanese strongholds were systematically taken down one by one. By the end of the day, the town was cleared, with an estimated 2,000 Japanese troops killed, including Colonel Yoshida. Additionally, 47 field pieces and anti-tank guns were captured, and the supply dumps surrounding Meiktila were secured. Cowan now needed to organize the town's defenses, anticipating a swift and fierce Japanese counterattack. Immediately after the town's capture, Kimura ordered the 18th Division to work with the weakened 49th Division to reclaim Meiktila, while Katamura reinforced General Naka with the majority of the 119th and 214th Regiments, a strong artillery unit, and the battered 14th Tank Regiment. Following the capture of Meiktila, Cowan's forces spent the next few days clearing the area of any remaining snipers and stragglers. For the town's defense, Cowan assigned each brigade and the divisional infantry to four sectors, each featuring a heavily fortified redoubt. He also tasked the 99th Brigade with defending Kyigon and Meiktila's airfield. To maintain the initiative for the 17th Division, Cowan aggressively deployed strong mobile columns of tanks, mechanized artillery, and infantry to disrupt the Japanese formations as they approached Meiktila. Consequently, while the 18th and 49th Divisions advanced, Ywadan and Nyaungaing were secured on March 5. In the following days, the main roads leading to Mahlaing, Kyaukpadaung, Pyawbwe, Thazi, and Mandalay were cleared, and the enemy units of the 214th Regiment at Thangongyi and Yego were successfully repelled on March 8. General Naka was now prepared to initiate his primary assault on Meiktila, instructing his units to concentrate their efforts north of the town, while the 214th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to move southwest to connect with the 49th Division. In response to these movements, on March 10, Cowan sent a robust tank-infantry force along the Mahlaing road to escort a previously dispatched column back to Meiktila, successfully inflicting significant casualties on the 56th Regiment as the British-Indians secured the Leindaw-Kyanngyagon area. However, the troops faced harassment from artillery fire originating from south of Myindawgan Lake, prompting Cowan to launch another armored sweep on March 14 to eliminate this threat. Although the 55th Regiment managed to capture the hill north of Meiktila after Cowan's tanks and infantry withdrew, the Japanese forces were unable to prevent their return, which resulted in further heavy losses. Concurrently, other tank-infantry units disrupted the advance of the 49th Division, effectively delaying the assembly of Japanese forces to the south and east of Meiktila until March 18. Additionally, a strong raid by the Komatsubara Unit was successfully repelled on March 14. In Stopford's sector, the 19th Division was preparing to launch its final offensive southward toward Mandalay, while the 2nd and 20th Divisions, after fierce fighting to expand their bridgeheads, were advancing east to assault the southern approaches to Mandalay. With close support from artillery and aircraft, General Rees' forces successfully breached the primary defenses of Lieutenant-General Yamamoto Kiyoe's 15th Division, reaching the northern outskirts of Mandalay by March 7. As the assault continued, British-Indian forces were set to enter the city on March 9. However, the determined defenders clung to Mandalay Hill and Fort Dufferin, aiming to extend the conflict and fight to the death. While Mandalay was under siege, the 62nd Brigade stealthily advanced east to Maymyo on March 11, catching the garrison off guard. The next day, Mandalay Hill ultimately fell while Fort Dufferin was being heavily bombarded within the city. By mid-March, the 2nd Division was nearing the capture of Ava, and the 20th Division was steadily advancing east to sever the supply routes from Mandalay to the south. In northern Burma, General Sultan was also pursuing his offensive. After establishing a bridgehead at Myitson, General Festing's 36th British Division faced minimal resistance and successfully took Mongmit on March 9 before continuing southward to Mogok. To the east, the 38th Chinese Division encountered only weak delaying positions as it moved towards Lashio, which was successfully occupied by March 7. At this point, the 56th Division, now independently commanding this area, was gradually retreating towards Hsipaw and Kyaukme. Although General Sun paused his advance until the Generalissimo granted permission to resume the offensive later in the month. Mountbatten feared that if more Chinese troops were withdrawn from Burma it might not be possible to take Rangoon before the monsoon rains began. This was an unpleasant prospect, so Mountbatten went to Chungking on March 8 for two days of conference with the Generalissimo. When the conference of March 9 concluded, the Generalissimo, according to the American minutes, said that he would recapitulate his decision of halting the Chinese advance at Lashio. In so doing, he remarked that the details of withdrawal would be settled later and that no final decisions would be made before General Wedemeyer was able to take part in them. Then he stated that unless there was a simultaneous amphibious attack on Rangoon, operations would stop at Lashio and Mandalay and the Allies would assume the defensive. The Chinese would stop at Lashio, but details of their operations between Lashio and Mandalay would be settled later between the staffs. The misunderstanding became quite apparent in mid-March when General Sultan, under whose command the Chinese were, received conflicting orders. Mountbatten ordered Sultan to move his forces southwestward toward Mandalay, yet the Generalissimo directed that the Chinese divisions stay in the Lashio area. As a compromise and to avoid having the Chinese wait idly around Lashio, Sultan suggested that a smaller task force be directed to proceed south. But the Generalissimo and his American advisers stood firm, lest the shift of troops to China be delayed. This in turn caused the British to believe that if the Chinese were not going to advance they should be withdrawn forthwith and end the burden on the line of communications. The 50th Chinese Division began to push south after securing the Namtu region and by mid-March reached Hsipaw. Meanwhile, in South Burma, the 82nd West African Division had taken Dalet, while the 25th Indian Division engaged in a struggle for control of the Ruywa-Tamandu area. Additionally, the 2nd West African Brigade was advancing inland toward An, posing a significant threat to the Japanese rear areas. Due to the rapid advancement of Slim's offensive, Admiral Mountbatten had to prioritize air supply for the 14th Army. This situation soon compelled General Christison to send the 25th Indian Division back to India, as his logistical support was becoming increasingly strained. Capturing Tamandu and establishing a Forward Maintenance Area there became essential. After successfully clearing Dokekan, the 74th Indian Brigade crossed the Me Chaung on March 4 to circumvent the main enemy defenses. The British-Indians pressed on, launching attacks on Tamandu in the following days, but the determined defenders put up strong resistance. Eventually, General Miyazaki withdrew most of the 111th Regiment and ordered it to attack the 2nd West African Brigade from the rear, which was finally contained by March 17. With the 25th Division scheduled to withdraw to Akyab by the end of the month, the 74th was reassigned to the 82nd West African Division and launched a final assault on Tamandu on March 11, successfully capturing the abandoned objective. The British-Indians then began to advance towards Kolan, reaching the vicinity of the town by mid-March. Simultaneously, the 154th Regiment counterattacked the West Africans at Dalet, successfully halting the enemy's advance beyond the river. Meanwhile, the 4th Indian Brigade landed at Mae near Letpan on March 13 from Ramree Island and established a roadblock to prevent enemy escape. In response, the 121st Regiment sent several companies to conduct a delaying action aimed at slowing the enemy's southward advance. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima intensified as the Marines advanced against fortified Japanese positions, facing heavy resistance and suffering significant casualties while capturing key terrain over several weeks of fierce combat. Meanwhile General LeMay shifted from precision bombing to incendiary raids on Tokyo, resulting in significant destruction and civilian casualties, while Japanese morale plummeted amid military setbacks.  

En octubre de 1984 se lanzó el disco “Native sons”, primer álbum de The Long Ryders. Con motivo de su 40 aniversario Cherry Red Records reedita aquel trabajo en una caja de tres discos que incluye sus primeros EP’s, las demos del álbum, unas maquetas de 1982 o un directo registrado en su primera visita a Londres a comienzos de 1985. Excusa perfecta para recordar los inicios de estos padres fundadores de lo que vino a llamarse country rock alternativo, un estilo heredero de las enseñanzas de Gram Parsons o los Byrds, pero empapando aquel sonido con la energía del punk o las esencias psicodélico garageras de Sunset Strip a finales de los 60.Playlist (todas las canciones del box set "Native Sons expanded edition")THE LONG RYDERS “Final wild son” (Native sons)THE LONG RYDERS “Still get by” (Native sons)THE LONG RYDERS “Tell it to the judge on sunday” (Native sons)THE LONG RYDERS “Wreck of the 809” (Native sons)THE LONG RYDERS “Run Dusty run” (Native sons)THE LONG RYDERS “And she rides” (10-5-60 EP)THE LONG RYDERS “The trip” (5x5 sessions)THE LONG RYDERS “10-5-60” (Radio Tokyo demo)THE LONG RYDERS “Ivory tower” (Native sons demo)THE LONG RYDERS “I’ll get out somehow” (Native sons demo)THE LONG RYDERS “I had a dream” (live 1985)THE LONG RYDERS “I can’t hide” (live 1985)THE LONG RYDERS “State of my Union” (live 1985)THE LONG RYDERS “Too close to the light” (Native sons)Escuchar audio

OFFERTA ESCLUSIVA NORDVPN Non perderla: https://nordvpn.com/dentrolastoriaNata in California nel giorno dell'indipendenza americana, Iva Toguri è passata alla storia con l'identità della "più amichevole nemica" delle forze angloamericane nel Pacifico durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale. La gentile voce di Radio Tokyo durante il programma "The Zero Hour" era sua, inconfondibile per il tono gentile e garbato. Ma quella ragazza, accusata dai compatrioti di tradimento, rischiava la vita sabotando le trasmissioni giapponesi e portando di nascosto del cibo ai prigionieri delle terribili carceri del Sol Levante.Il nostro canale Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1vziHBEp0gc9gAhR740fCwSostieni DENTRO LA STORIA su Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/dentrolastoriaAbbonati al canale: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1vziHBEp0gc9gAhR740fCw/joinSostienici su PayPal: https://paypal.me/infinitybeatDentro La Storia lo trovi anche qui: https://linktr.ee/dentrolastoriaBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/racconti-di-storia-podcast--5561307/support.

In World War II, the Japanese military operated a propaganda station called Radio Tokyo. Along with jazz music, the station featured several English-speaking female announcers, who became collectively known as Tokyo Rose. But who was Tokyo Rose? And was she really the treacherous villain that the US government made her out to be? This story comes from the History Daily podcast. Follow the show on Twitter, Facebook, & Reddit. Subscribe to our Youtube channel. Sign up for Twenty Thousand Hertz+ to get our entire catalog ad-free + our bonus show MicroHertz. If you know what this week's mystery sound is, tell us at mystery.20k.org. Subscribe to History Daily wherever you get your podcasts. To learn more about immersive audio production, visit pro.focusrite.com. Get 10% off your first month of online therapy with our sponsor BetterHelp at betterhelp.com/20k. Visit shopify.com/20k to get a free 14-day trial with Shopify's entire suite of features. Try out Harry's with a $3 starter set at harrys.com/20k. Episode transcript, music, and credits can be found here: https://www.20k.org/episodes/tokyorose Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Metaverse NFT art manga drama 3/22 飯沼英樹のポッドキャストHideki iinuma --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/hideki-iinuma/message

Across the Pacific during World War 2, soldiers would tune into Radio Tokyo to hear a seductive female Japanese voice tell them to go home – but who was Tokyo Rose?

Hello Yankee brothers. This week we will dive into the life and story of Iva Toguri, a WWII Japanese-American radio host for Radio Tokyo, which broadcasted to Allied soldiers in the South Pacific during World War II. Toguri quickly became inaccurately identified with the name "Tokyo Rose," an alias coined by Allied soldiers to describe the female broadcaster. Following the end of WWII on the Pacific front, Toguri was detained by the United States military before being released for lack of evidence. When Toguri tried to return to the U.S., she was subjected to a public outcry, prompting the FBI to renew its investigation of Toguri's wartime activities. She was subsequently charged with eight counts of treason. Her 1949 trial resulted in a conviction on one count, for which she spent more than six years out of a ten-year sentence in prison. Years later, investigators pieced together the history of irregularities with the indictment, trial, and conviction. This included confessions from key witnesses who had perjured themselves during their testimonies. Toguri received a pardon in 1977 from U.S. President Gerald Ford.

So excited to share this our first live radio show with ya'll from our monthly spot at @iso.radio. Spent the hour breaking down everything from Naomi Osaka's courage to bring mental health to the forefront, our favourite tv shows, k-drama scandals and other current events that are on top of mind. listen live to our next @iso.radio on Wednesday, Sept. 1st at 5 p.m. ET on iso.fm!  Follow us on Instagram and Twitter @immadein_ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/immadein/message

This episode is obviously rooted firmly in our Should Have Been category. Each of these bands came up through the local Atlanta scene in the mid-to-late 90s, when some rock critics and magazines had predicted that Atlanta would be the next “Seattle” with a hot-bed of talented alternative rock and metal bands. These 3 bands got signed, put out some fantastic albums, and enjoyed some level of mainstream success. We think they SHOULDA BEEN HUGE!!! We hope we either re-introduce you to these bands or turn you on to something new!Songs this week include:Injected – “Bullet” from Burn It Black(2002)Injected – “Death Ray” from The Truth About You (2017)Injected – “Westworld” from The Truth About You Sessions (2006)doubleDrive – “Sacrifice” from 1,000 Yard Stare (1999)doubleDrive - “11:59” from Blue In The Face (2003)Marvelous 3 – “Valium” from Math And Other Problems (1997)Marvelous 3 – “#27” from Hey!Album (1999)Marvelous 3 – “Radio Tokyo” from ReadySexGo (2000)Please subscribe everywhere that you listen to podcasts!Visit us: https://inobscuria.com/https://www.facebook.com/InObscuriahttps://twitter.com/inobscuriahttps://www.instagram.com/inobscuria/Buy cool stuff with our logo on it!: https://www.redbubble.com/people/InObscuria?asc=uCheck out Robert’s amazing fire sculptures and metal workings here: http://flamewerx.com/If you’d like to check out Kevin’s band THE SWEAR, take a listen on all streaming services or pick up a digital copy of their latest release here: https://theswear.bandcamp.com/If you want to hear Robert and Kevin’s band from the late 90s – early 00s BIG JACK PNEUMATIC, check it out here: https://bigjackpnuematic.bandcamp.com/

Learn more about KidfreshSupport the show and even get on monthly mentorship calls with Fabian. Join here.Full Transcript:F Geyrhalter:Welcome to the show, Matt.M Cohen:Thank you. Nice to meet you.F Geyrhalter:Absolutely. So in your bio it states, "As someone who was interested in how brands connect with consumers, Matt was looking to develop a concept that would really connect to people's lives and be meaningful." Now, this statement alone got me so excited to have you on the show. You actually went from being a management consultant at Accenture to a COO at a consulting practice that got sold to Omnicom, which those in the industry know, that's the big one, and now you're hiding veggies in frozen meals for kids with your brand Kidfresh. Tell us a bit how and why you started this brand.M Cohen:Well, I'm still wondering every day. I don't know. I had a career, everything was fine, and then one morning I woke up and I'm like, "What kind of bad food..." excuse my French "... kids are being fed here in the US?" Basically what happened to put it simply is, I became a parent. I became a father. And as such, I started to experience what kids eat in this country, and I was absolutely horrified. So coming from France, I could not understand and even accept that kids were fed with such junk food. That's how it started.F Geyrhalter:And as far as I understand, Kidfresh started as a retail store in New York City, serving freshly prepared wholesome meals for kids, right?M Cohen:That's right. Our initial idea was to create a retail concept, a chain, a little bit like a Starbucks for kids, but with freshly prepared foods and other grocery items for kids, all natural and organic. That was the initial idea, so we created a store in Manhattan on the Upper East Side, initially.F Geyrhalter:And what happened? What happened to the store versus going with frozen food?M Cohen:So what happened basically is that... First of all, the store really established the brand, and it was really great because when I started the business with my partner I was being bombarded by requests for interviews from all over the world because the concept had really resonated everywhere. So, I mean, literally, I was on the phone doing interviews with the Radio Tokyo, and then being interviewed with Canadian newspapers and then Middle Eastern radio, these type of things. I was like, okay, well, maybe that's it. Maybe I made it in America, but more importantly what happened also from a business standpoint is that this attracted a lot of other retailers and other brands that were always coming to the store and exploring what we were doing, right? Essentially the most important one for us initially was Whole Foods.M Cohen:They came to the store, we had a great conversation, they were like, "Okay, hey, why don't we bring your products into our stores?"F Geyrhalter:Interesting.M Cohen:... and, "sure." And so we started doing that in New York City first. First in one store, then in all the stores in New York City, and then we had other states that were interested in carrying our line, and so we quickly realized that the opportunity was actually outside of the store much more than with the store, and that we would have a much greater impact and a much faster impact by going wholesale versus than going retail, one store at a time, brick and mortar and all that, all the capital expenses and resources that it required. Demand came from other retailers and we're like, "Okay, let's flip the switch and go wholesale."F Geyrhalter:And did Kidfresh... was that the brand name for the store that transitioned over to frozen?M Cohen:Yes, absolutely.F Geyrhalter:That's amazing.M Cohen:We kept the same... Yeah. Yeah.F Geyrhalter:And I have the feeling that given your very different background, the management consulting life, it must have shaped your first year running Kidfresh.M Cohen:Oh yeah. I mean, I thought everything happened on PowerPoint and Excel when I came in. [inaudible 00:04:52] consulting and then I realized that real life is somewhat different. So it was a big learning for me, for sure. But what did help me was to at least have some sort of framework of processes and organization and structure that needed to be put in place for any business. Right?F Geyrhalter:Right.M Cohen:... Rules and responsibilities, accountabilities, who reports to whom, systems, structures. So that really gave me a framework that I still carry with me today as I continue to grow the business.F Geyrhalter:And on top of that, it sounds like that your background always flirted with branding, right? I mean, you were always just a degree separated from branding, from marketing, and I'm sure that that influenced you too in finally launching your own brand.M Cohen:Oh, absolutely. I mean, particularly when the company that I worked with before was sold into Omnicom, I was completely immersed with other agencies, and being on the account side, managing accounts, and really looking at it from the branding and communication side of things. So, that brought me even more, a sense of what can make a brand succeed, basically.F Geyrhalter:And coming from that background and working with agencies and being surrounded by agencies, did you invest in branding immediately? When you started the first retail store, did you actually fully invest in, let's get this set up the right way? Or was that something that came a little bit later and you were winging it more in the beginning?M Cohen:It's the former. We really started with branding. We really started with finding the right name, first and foremost, and we did some surveys and we did some analysis and so on and so forth to really find a name that we felt resonated. Right? When you think about Kidfresh, it seems obvious, but it didn't exist. And so we explored lots of different names, and then we hired a branding agency from the get-go to really develop our brand positioning, our identity, and all our entire brand book from logo to colors to fonts and all the other attributes that make a brand as such.F Geyrhalter:That's music to my ears. How do you think that impacted you? How do you think it helped you versus taking it slow and bootstrapping the branding aspect?M Cohen:I think it really helped us get immediate credibility. We looked bigger than we were, and as such we conveyed more credibility and also more trust because it's a business where you provide foods to children, and it was important that we established trust with parents from day one. And so we went very much into branding with a sense of, this is a way for us to get our name and our idea out there in a way that will engage the consumers in a favorable way.F Geyrhalter:Absolutely. Absolutely. What does branding mean to you now that you've been with Kidfresh for a while and given your background, what does that term branding mean to you? Because it's such a misunderstood term. People just think it's a logo, but it's so much more, what does it mean to you?M Cohen:It is several things. It is first of all, an identity, and it's as much an identity for the consumers than it is also for yourself, your employees, your teams, your third party partners, right? You have a name, you have a look and feel, you stand for something. Right? So, that's very important. And then secondly, I think it's also an emotional connection with our consumers, right? We mean something, our name means something. When you buy a product Kidfresh, you know that's not going to be junk food, that it sounds and feels good for you. And that's what we stand for. Right? So it's not a lie. It's actually to the contrary, it's very much all promise. So, an identity and an emotional connection with a promise behind it. That's what branding stands for.F Geyrhalter:Very well put. One comes to think about like, when you started this brand of creating food, in the beginning, regular food and then frozen food once you went past retail into the actual retail stores, not your own store, how do you create food? Someone who doesn't have that background, did you have a co-founder that came from the food background?M Cohen:Yes.F Geyrhalter:Okay. Okay.M Cohen:Yeah. My co-founder had experience at Dannon for many years...F Geyrhalter:Perfect.M Cohen:... [inaudible 00:10:22] surrounded ourselves with experts. We started with a pediatric nutritionist from NYU. We visited childhood obesity pediatric units in hospitals in the Tri-state area in New York just to understand what was going on. We had retail experts. So I think building a team of experts that fill the gaps is also critical. Going back, maybe to your point about management consulting, is really creating an advisory board, helped us a lot initially.F Geyrhalter:That is really, really good to hear, and that's not always the case with today's startups. I absolutely, hundred percent agree with that. I surround myself with experts all the time, because that's why they're experts. And just a couple of minutes with an expert can save us hours and weeks of time, sometimes. So very much [crosstalk 00:11:17]. You're also very data driven. It sounds like you get a lot of input, you do a lot of questionnaires, you get a lot of answers. Was there ever a moment where you got a lot of ideas back and you get a lot of customer data and you felt like, "You know what, thank you for that, but I'm actually going to go a totally different way with this." May it be a certain product launch. Even at the beginning of Kidfresh, was there ever a time where you did a crazy brand move just based on your gut instinct, where you felt, "You know what, this is my brand, this is my baby. I want to go that route even though everyone says go to the other direction."M Cohen:So, it's very interesting because we've been bombarded with ideas and opportunities to go in so many different directions, which in a sense is a good thing because it shows the brand resonates and has legs beyond what we're doing. But one key area where we were really solicited very much by consumers and also retailers to go into snacks, dry snacks, right? So that we had more portability and the Kidfresh brand name could extend in portable, nutritious snacks for kids. And we started to play with it quite frankly, but then we realized that it would be so big and distract us so much from our core, right? Our core being food like meals, cooked meals, that even though there was a legitimate demand and certainly a potential in the business, if we were to go that route, it would be too risky for the overall company as a whole. And so [inaudible 00:13:09] said, "No, not for now, but it's certainly in the back of our mind, but not for now."F Geyrhalter:And I think it all comes back to your positioning and to your purpose, right? Because you can always point back to that and say, well, our purpose is not to have snacks, but our purpose is actually to have real meals that have the hidden veggies [crosstalk 00:13:28] Right. Exactly. So, that's one of those big advantages to have that purpose nailed down early on, and it's kind of like your guiding light that you can always use for a brand and you don't get sidetracked to saying yes to all these amazing opportunities, which they are all amazing opportunities. Right? So on the flip side, was there ever anything that you did with your brand, may it have been a campaign or may it have been a new launch or a change of colors or logos or anything where you felt like, "Oh, that totally went off the rails."M Cohen:I would say... You know what, going back to snacks and handheld products, when we were exploring the snack idea we were like, well, maybe there are some snacks that you can do in frozen. Right? And we tried that, we did some frozen burritos and things like that, but realized that this was too much of a departure for the consumers in terms of their habits and what they knew, and it didn't work out as we had planned. Yeah. That's a line of products that we felt, "Hey, let's try to do some frozen snacks." but were not... It's not what we expected.F Geyrhalter:And it's just a couple of degrees away from what you usually do and it already didn't resonate. Right? It's so interesting how consumers are so... Your brand means something so specific to them, and even if you just go a little bit the other way, it's already too much for them. To me, that's fascinating.M Cohen:It is. But it speaks also to the relationship and the connection we have with the consumers, and that's a great asset for us really. It's a unique element of our business, and we have the highest loyalty in the category. So, our consumers want us and want us to stay who we are.F Geyrhalter:Besides obvious sales, but how do you feel that loyalty? Do you feel it on social media or do people write to you? What are some of those messages you get as a brand that makes you feel like, "You know what, people really have our back. They absolutely love us."M Cohen:Well, we have actual data. We have access to data that shows that a consumer that did not buy Kidfresh before, and that tries it once, will repurchase it over, and over, and over again. We have the data, it's very clear. We have the highest loyalty rate in the industry, over 60%. And then that translates also into messages and things that are more sort of content, if you will. People share stories or they talk to their friends or they refer the brand, but the data is the data.F Geyrhalter:Oh, absolutely. Yeah.M Cohen:It's very clear.F Geyrhalter:Absolutely. So you started your retail store, you got all of this amazing press and suddenly Whole Foods came knocking. Was that the moment where you felt like, "You know what, we have something here." Or was there another big breakthrough moment for the brand where you were in a certain amount of stores, or did something happen where you felt like there was one day where Matt sat back with his glass of Bordeaux and said, "You know what, this is it. We have a brand." ?M Cohen:Well, I mean, certainly the initial conversation with Whole Foods, for sure. But then we started to branch out of the store in different ways. For instance, we had a little refrigerated kiosks to JFK airport at the JetBlue and American Airline terminal [crosstalk 00:17:25] where we were [inaudible 00:17:26] travel lunchboxes for kids. And that was sort of branching out of the store in the first way. Then we had the Whole Foods [inaudible 00:17:40], that was the second thing. And then we were also doing a lot of catering, but branded catering for the FAO Schwarz store in New York [crosstalk 00:17:49], Build-A-Bear store in New York. We were their catering operation.M Cohen:So, at the end of the day, there's a point where you do so much more business outside of the store than in the store that really you understand that that's where you need to go, right?F Geyrhalter:Yeah. Yeah.M Cohen:The store being such an operational sort of weight, if you will, to carry every day, at some point you cannot do both. You'll have to make a decision. Am I a wholesale operation or am I a retail business? Right? And I clearly remember that day. It was like one of these days that is like a total nightmare, you cannot even see the light, and you're like, "Okay, we just cannot do this anymore. We have to pick and decide who we are."F Geyrhalter:Yeah. So instead of this being a celebratory moment, it was actually a moment of anxiety because you had too much going on and too many opportunities, and you just had to create some clarity?M Cohen:In a way. In a way. But after that anxiety came also a relief.F Geyrhalter:Right. Right. Right. Right. Right. Absolutely. If you would look at the Kidfresh brand today, and if you would look at the positioning of the brand, of the values of the brand, of what you really stand for as a brand, you would put this down into one word, I call it your brand DNA. If you would be able to describe Kidfresh in one or two words, what would it be?M Cohen:Two words. You want two words, I'll give you two words. Kid and fresh.F Geyrhalter:That took some pondering.M Cohen:No, but really, I mean, it's really about kids' food. So it's really about children and making sure that they have foods that they like, but they also bring nutrition and taste and value. Right? And then fresh is really the freshness of our product, our ingredients. It's real chicken, it's real tomatoes. Everything is real and fresh. So yeah, kid and fresh.F Geyrhalter:Which I think is amazing after all those years, right? That it goes back right to that name, and that's why it's so crucial to get the name right in the beginning. Right? I mean, that is just so important.M Cohen:So crucial. Absolutely.F Geyrhalter:And something that was in the back of my mind entire time we were talking, and I think now is a good time to ask, obviously, what is so great about Kidfresh is that you're basically tricking these kids of eating mozzarella sticks with a dipping sauce but in reality, there's actually cauliflower in them as well. Right? You hide these vegetables in a smart way, so that kids actually eat healthy, but they feel like it's still fun, and it's still their kind of food. What happens at the time when the kids turn... I don't know, what age do they turn when they suddenly start realizing that they've been fooled all along?F Geyrhalter:And what happens? Is it a revolution?M Cohen:No, but we actually do not recommend to fool the kids. Right? We're sneaking vegetables, yes, but we want vegetables to be part of the conversation as opposed to not. So just to be able to say, "Hey, you like this chicken nugget? Well, hey, there's a little cauliflower that's mixed in. Let's have another one."F Geyrhalter:Yeah, yeah.M Cohen:We want to be honest and transparent. So, my hope is that when kids find out and realize that there's cauliflower or chickpea or butternut squash blended in the product, that they don't see it as a betrayal, but like as a [inaudible 00:22:05] why not actually, as an enhancement.F Geyrhalter:Right, right. And I mean, at that point, you already got them so hooked that they're fine with it anyways.M Cohen:Yeah, it's already too late. It's already too late.F Geyrhalter:It's too late. It's too late.M Cohen:They're going to try another chicken nugget and then they're going to come back to ours. F Geyrhalter:That's right. That's right. That's hilarious. Obviously you've made it as a founder of a very successful startup that's very purposeful. A lot of young founders are looking up to people like you who have achieved what you have achieved. Is there any brand advice that you want to give to kind of finish off our interview, just something that you've learned over the years where you would advise other founders as it relates to your brand, or even just regular entrepreneurial business advice where you say, "Look, here's something that I learned that I think I want to share with other entrepreneurs."?M Cohen:I would say, be patient and determined. It's a lot about being tenacious, fighting every day and believing into your product, into your brand, into your team and resources, being really steadfast into what you're doing. That would be my advice. Sometimes, slow and steady wins the race. We all want to go fast and be the next big thing overnight, well, in most cases it takes time, and that's okay.F Geyrhalter:I like that. I like that. Yeah, absolutely. So listeners who want to turn their kids into Kidfresh fanatics, where can they go? Where can they find your frozen treats?M Cohen:In most grocery stores throughout the nation from Vons in Southern California where you are to Walmart, Target, all the Kroger banners, Publix, Whole Foods, most retailers for the nation.F Geyrhalter:Can they order online too? Or are you in all retailers [crosstalk 00:24:25].M Cohen:Yes.F Geyrhalter:Okay. Okay.M Cohen:No, they can make an order at kidfresh.com or go to Amazon as well.F Geyrhalter:Perfect Matt. Well, listen, thank you for your time. I really appreciate it. This was really educational and appreciate all your insights.M Cohen:Thank you Fabian and take care.F Geyrhalter:Absolutely, you too.

Dr Brendan Nelson AO, Former Director of the Australian War Memorial / former Australian Ambassador to Belgium, the European Union & NATO (2010–12), on the 75th anniversary of the day that Imperial Japan surrendered in World War II, in effect bringing the war to an end.   A little after noon Japan Standard Time on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito's announcement of Japan's acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration was broadcast to the Japanese people over the radio.   Earlier the same day, the Japanese government had broadcast an announcement over Radio Tokyo that "acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation [would be] coming soon", and had advised the Allies of the surrender by sending a cable to U.S. President Harry S Truman via the Swiss diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C. See omnystudio.com/policies/listener for privacy information.

In this episode, we take a look at Radio Tokyo Tapes Vol. 1 with Howie Cohen and Joy Milam.

A Japanese American found herself stranded in Japan after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, unable to return to the United States. To make ends meet, she started working for Radio Tokyo in the early 1940s, broadcasting to American GIs. But did working for the Japanese turn her into a traitor? Sponsors! BetterHelp - Female Criminals listeners get 10% off your first month with discount code CRIMINALS. Go to BetterHelp.com/Criminals. Robinhood - Robinhood is giving listeners of Female Criminals a FREE stock like Apple, Ford, or Sprint to help you build your portfolio. Sign up at Criminals.Robinhood.com.

We got a requested review for an album released in 2000, and since we're not above stretching the rules outside the 90s occasionally, this week we're revisiting the third and final Marvelous 3 album ReadySexGo. Between Butch Walker's stint in late 80s/early 90s glam metal band SouthGang and his current occupation as a successful music producer (who releases solo albums when not working on albums with Katy Perry or Taylor Swift) he fronted this rock trio that scored a hit with Freak of the Week, which sounded suspiciously like another song. We had differing opinions on what we liked and didn't like about this album, about Butch Walker as a songwriter, and the early 2000s pop rock movement he was at the forefront of - give a listen and then let us know what you think. Some links from our requestor Luke: Butch's comments about ReadySexGo at the time of its release. Butch's comments six years later. Songs in this Episode: Intro - Get Over (from ReadySexGo) 5:51 - Freak of the Week (from Hey! Album) / So You Wanna Be A Rock ‘n Roll Star by The Byrds 16:47 - Radio Tokyo (from ReadySexGo) 19:54 - Grant Park 25:33 - Cigarette Lighter Love Song (from ReadySexGo) / All The Young Dudes by Mott The Hoople 28:48 - Better Off Alone (from ReadySexGo) / Movin' Out by Billy Joel Outro - I Could Change Request a 2017 Review / Subscribe at Patreon   Facebook / Twitter / Instagram   Zazzle Merch Store   http://www.digmeoutpodcast.com

We got a requested review for an album released in 2000, and since we’re not above stretching the rules outside the 90s occasionally, this week we’re revisiting the third and final Marvelous 3 album ReadySexGo. Between Butch Walker’s stint in late 80s/early 90s glam metal band SouthGang and his current occupation as a successful music producer (who releases solo albums when not working on albums with Katy Perry or Taylor Swift) he fronted this rock trio that scored a hit with Freak of the Week, which sounded suspiciously like another song. We had differing opinions on what we liked and didn’t like about this album, about Butch Walker as a songwriter, and the early 2000s pop rock movement he was at the forefront of - give a listen and then let us know what you think. Some links from our requestor Luke: Butch’s comments about ReadySexGo at the time of its release. Butch’s comments six years later. Songs in this Episode: Intro - Get Over (from ReadySexGo) 5:51 - Freak of the Week (from Hey! Album) / So You Wanna Be A Rock ‘n Roll Star by The Byrds 16:47 - Radio Tokyo (from ReadySexGo) 19:54 - Grant Park 25:33 - Cigarette Lighter Love Song (from ReadySexGo) / All The Young Dudes by Mott The Hoople 28:48 - Better Off Alone (from ReadySexGo) / Movin’ Out by Billy Joel Outro - I Could Change Request a 2017 Review / Subscribe at Patreon   Facebook / Twitter / Instagram   Zazzle Merch Store   http://www.digmeoutpodcast.com

Media Network Wartime special. Looks at Lord Haw Haw, Liberty from Argentina during Falklands War, Voice of Vietnam's Hanoi Hannah. The rest of the programme then focuses on Tokyo Rose, with an in depth interview with author Russell Warren Howe who has been one of several people to dig deep into the background of Iva Toguri D'Aquino, who broadcast as "Orphan Ann" during the 15-20 minute DJ segment on Radio Tokyo's The Zero Hour program. For more information, check out the wikpedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tokyo_Rose. This programme was first broadcast on 14th June 1990.

I was asked to do a set for J-Wave Radio in Japan and I preferred to send them something that had been done live (I wanted it to be a real moment with people involved. Part two of the previous mix (+ the additional embellishment of an intro and adding the song Friends & Buddies – which is my theme song) is what played in Tokyo and beyond. It's been my myspace intro forever but the sound quality there is like AM radio because I had to squish the 23 minute set into a 7 MB or less file.http://www.j-wave.co.jp/holiday/20060504/guest.htmThanks to Fran (Lil Minx) in Manchester for making this happen! http://www.myspace.com/lilminxproductionshttps://www.youtube.com/channel/UC5gQLsodBsCys1_3Zbm83vghttps://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/qool-dj-marv-aural-memoirs-and-buttamilk-archives/id269880758https://music.apple.com/us/artist/qool-dj-marv/1558418894https://www.instagram.com/qooldjmarv/https://qooldjmarv.bandcamp.com/album/sound-paths-v-1https://tidal.com/browse/artist/23883666https://www.mixcloud.com/qooldjmarv/https://open.spotify.com/artist/48vhJ2d1hVaFHf6gqXeTm0?si=fWO0N456QeWRMWLUtqe4Yghttps://twitter.com/qooldjmarvhttps://www.threads.net/@qooldjmarvhttps://www.facebook.com/MarvJColeman/https://soundcloud.com/qooldjmarvhttps://www.twitch.tv/qooldjmarvhttps://www.paypal.com/paypalme/QoolDJMarvMusic

I was asked to do a set for J-Wave Radio in Japan and I preferred to send them something that had been done live (I wanted it to be a real moment with people involved. Part two of the previous mix (+ the additional embellishment of an intro and adding the song Friends & Buddies – which is my theme song) is what played in Tokyo and beyond. It's been my myspace intro forever but the sound quality there is like AM radio because I had to squish the 23 minute set into a 7 MB or less file. http://www.j-wave.co.jp/holiday/20060504/guest.htm Thanks to Fran (Lil Minx) in Manchester for making this happen! http://www.myspace.com/lilminxproductions