Podcasts about Corps

   This episode of WarDocs features Dr. David Tate, a clinical neuropsychologist and lead author of the 2025 Military Medicine Article of the Year. The discussion centers on a groundbreaking study utilizing the LIMBIC-CENC cohort—a massive data set of over 3,000 participants—to investigate persistent brain changes in mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI). Dr. Tate explains that traditional MRI scans often show normal results in patients with invisible symptoms because researchers often oversimplify patient groupings. By digging into more refined clinical characteristics, such as the mechanism of injury and number of exposures, his team identified unique physical signatures in the brain. Specifically, blast exposures were linked to changes in central white matter, while repetitive traumatic hits impacted more peripheral gray matter structures.    The conversation highlights the critical importance of neuroimaging techniques like diffusion tensor imaging, which is more sensitive to structural white matter changes than standard hospital sequences. Dr. Tate emphasizes that these findings provide vital validation for service members and veterans, demonstrating that their ongoing symptoms are rooted in physical, biological changes rather than purely psychological or "imagined". For clinicians, the episode serves as a call to action to move beyond simplistic interpretations of "normal" imaging and to prioritize exhaustive injury histories that include the physics of every exposure event.    By combining a deep dive into advanced neuroimaging with a focus on personalized medicine, this episode provides a comprehensive look at the future of TBI diagnosis and treatment. Listeners will learn how high-resolution volumetric data and detailed clinical info—including loss of consciousness and post-traumatic amnesia markers—are used to improve prognostic accuracy. Ultimately, Dr. Tate's work demonstrates that injury history matters even years later, pointing researchers and clinicians toward a more precise approach to studying and treating the diverse landscape of mild traumatic brain injuries in the military population. Chapters (00:00-01:30) Introduction to the 2025 Military Medicine Article of the Year (01:30-06:17) Dr. David Tate's Professional Background and Career Evolution (06:17-08:04) Understanding the LIMBIC-CENC Cohort and Consortium Research (08:04-12:44) Methodology: Advanced Neuroimaging and Detailed Clinical Variables (12:44-17:03) Key Findings: Heterogeneity of mTBI and Mechanism-Specific Signatures (17:03-22:15) The Bottom Line: Validating Veteran Experiences and Clinical Takeaways Chapter Summaries (00:00-01:30) Introduction to the 2025 Military Medicine Article of the Year   MG(R) Jeff Clark introduces guest Dr. David Tate and recognizes his team for winning the 2025 Military Medicine Article of the Year. The article focuses on persistent MRI findings unique to blast and repetitive mild traumatic brain injury within the LIMBIC-CENC cohort. (01:30-06:17) Dr. David Tate's Professional Background and Career Evolution   Dr. Tate shares his journey from growing up on a farm in Mississippi to becoming a leading researcher in academic neuropsychology. He discusses his mentorship under Erin Bigler and his favorite career experiences working directly with service members at Brooke Army Medical Center. (06:17-08:04) Understanding the LIMBIC-CENC Cohort and Consortium Research   The discussion explores the advantages of using a large consortium dataset that includes over 3,000 participants across the United States. This prospective study enables leading scientists and clinicians to collaborate on well-characterized, long-term functional outcomes following brain injury. (08:04-12:44) Methodology: Advanced Neuroimaging and Detailed Clinical Variables Dr. Tate explains the use of high-resolution volumetric MRI data and diffusion tensor imaging to map brain structural connections. Researchers combined these images with a plethora of clinical data, including lifetime exposure histories, demographics, and specific injury markers like loss of consciousness. (12:44-17:03) Key Findings: Heterogeneity of mTBI and Mechanism-Specific Signatures The study reveals that mild TBI is extremely heterogeneous and simplistic group comparisons often obscure meaningful findings. Findings showed that blast exposures leave signatures in central white matter, while repetitive traumatic injuries more specifically affect gray matter structures. (17:03-22:15) The Bottom Line: Validating Veteran Experiences and Clinical Takeaways The bottom line is that persistent brain changes can be detected if clinicians look at the right variables and mechanism of injury. This research validates the lived experiences of veterans, proving their symptoms are not imagined and emphasizing the need for detailed injury histories. Article Reference Persistent MRI Findings Unique to Blast and Repetitive Mild TBI: Analysis of the CENC/LIMBIC Cohort Injury Characteristics Open Access David F Tate, PhD , Benjamin S C Wade, PhD , Carmen S Velez, MS ,  Erin D Bigler, PhD , Nicholas D Davenport, PhD , Emily L Dennis, PhD ,  Carrie Esopenko, PhD , Sidney R Hinds, MD , Jacob Kean, PhD , Eamonn Kennedy, PhD  Military Medicine, Volume 189, Issue 9-10, September/October 2024, Pages e1938–e1946, https://doi.org/10.1093/milmed/usae031   Take Home Messages Heterogeneity of Mild TBI: Mild traumatic brain injury is not a single, uniform condition, and simplistic groupings can obscure meaningful characteristics of an injury. Clinicians must recognize that "if you've seen one mild TBI, you've seen one mild TBI," requiring a more personalized approach to diagnosis. Mechanism-Specific Signatures: The physical signature left on the brain depends heavily on the mechanism of injury, with blast exposures typically affecting central white matter and repetitive traumatic hits impacting peripheral gray matter. Understanding these distinctions helps explain why different patients experience different functional outcomes even with the same diagnosis. Sensitivity of Advanced Neuroimaging: Standard MRI sequences often fail to detect injuries in mTBI patients, but advanced techniques like diffusion tensor imaging are highly sensitive to structural white matter changes. Relying solely on basic imaging can lead to an over-simplistic interpretation that overlooks persistent brain changes. Validation of Lived Experiences: Research into persistent brain changes provides vital biological validation for veterans and service members who struggle with ongoing symptoms. These findings support the idea that invisible wounds have a physical basis and are not simply psychological or imagined. Importance of Detailed Injury Histories: For clinicians, the most critical takeaway is the necessity of capturing a detailed lifetime injury history, including the number of exposures and specific physics of each event. This detailed clinical information is essential for improving prognostic accuracy and understanding a patient's long-term health trajectory.   Episode Keywords Military Medicine, WarDocs Podcast, Traumatic Brain Injury, TBI Diagnosis, Blast Exposure, Neuropsychology, Persistent MRI Findings, Veteran Healthcare, Brain Imaging, Mild TBI, LIMBIC-CENC Cohort, Neuroimaging Research, AMSUS, Combat Injury, White Matter Change, Brain Health, Dr. David Tate, Military Health System, Invisible Injuries, Medical Podcast, Concussion Recovery, Gray Matter, MRI Scans, AMSUS Article of the Year, Veteran Support, Brain Mapping Hashtags #MilitaryMedicine, #WarDocs, #BrainHealth, #Veterans, #Neuroscience, #MildTBI, #BlastInjury, #MedicalResearch   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission is to honor the legacy, preserve the oral history, and showcase career opportunities, unique expeditionary experiences, and achievements of Military Medicine. We foster patriotism and pride in Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoD, and Our Nation.   Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield,demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast          

In this powerful episode of Meech Speaks, I sit down with my brother, GySgt Lexus Schaeffer — a Marine, a father, a leader, and one of the sharpest minds I've ever met in the MCMAP community.Together, we break down the uncomfortable truth most Marines never hear:

Hour 2: D-Pop and J.D. dive into the San Francisco 49ers' offseason moves. They discuss the recent trade of Jermaine Johnson to the Tennessee Titans and whether the 49ers missed out on a potential opportunity to acquire him. The guys also weigh in on the team's wide receiver needs, including the possibility of signing Jauan Jennings or Deebo Samuel. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Bienvenue dans La Leçon, le podcast sur l'art d'échouer. Cette semaine, je suis heureuse de recevoir Julie Pujols, la coach de la plus bonne de tes copines ! Julie, journaliste est devenue l'une des figures emblématiques du pilate et du coaching. C'est un accident domestique, terrible, qui va la plonger dans une traversée de 18 mois d'hospitalisation à domicile et changer radicalement sa vision de la vie. Julie Pujols, derrière la femme sublime et qui cartonne sur les réseaux, c'est surtout une histoire de résilience comme on en entend peu.Bonne écoute

Your All-Access Pass to the Marching Arts.This week on On A Water Break, Whitney Stone, Sadie Wallace, and Jeremy Svoboda (Drum Corps Today) break down major marching arts updates—plus a Water We Doing?! debate that belongs on a medal podium: should color guard be an Olympic sport?PanelWhitney Stone — Instagram (@dancerwhit)Sadie Wallace — Instagram (@m.sadiewallace)Jeremy Svoboda (Drum Corps Today) — Instagram (@drumcorpstoday)Links mentionedWGI Terrace Suites (UD Arena): https://www.wgi.org/suiteexperience/Disney Boo To You Parade Flag Corps info (audition listing coverage): https://blogmickey.com/2026/02/popular-entertainment-returning-for-2026-mickeys-not-so-scary-halloween-party-confirmed/Guard Closet Shout-OutFollow @guardcloset for gear tips and season-ready essentials.Follow OAWBInstagram •TikTok •YouTube00:03 Marching Arts News00:04 DCI x Conn-Selmer00:06 WGI Terrace Suites (UD Arena)00:09 Disney Flag Corps Auditions00:11 60-Second Tech Block00:17 Water We Doing?!00:18 Guard in the Olympics?00:22 Camp Info Posted Late00:26 Audience Etiquette Reset00:31 Gush & Go00:37 Outro + Follow

Hour 2: D-Pop and J.D. dive into the San Francisco 49ers' offseason moves. They discuss the recent trade of Jermaine Johnson to the Tennessee Titans and whether the 49ers missed out on a potential opportunity to acquire him. The guys also weigh in on the team's wide receiver needs, including the possibility of signing Jauan Jennings or Deebo Samuel. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Le président de la refondation de Madagascar a quitté Paris mercredi 25 février soir. Le colonel Michaël Randrianirina a rencontré Emmanuel Macron, à l'Élysée. Auparavant, il était reçu avec les honneurs par Vladimir Poutine à Moscou. Depuis la chute de l'ex-président Andry Rajoelina en octobre dernier, le commandant du Corps d'armée des personnels et des services administratifs et techniques montre des signes de rapprochement avec la Russie, mais sa visite parisienne dans la foulée montre que Madagascar ne veut pas rompre avec son partenaire historique. La politologue Christiane Rafidinarivo est chercheuse associée au Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po. Elle est la Grande invitée Afrique de Sidy Yansané.    RFI :  Le président de la Refondation, Michaël Randrianirina, achève une tournée qui l'a successivement mené à Moscou, où il a rencontré Vladimir Poutine, puis à Paris aux côtés d'Emmanuel Macron. « Grand écart diplomatique, numéro d'équilibriste », disent déjà les commentaires… Vous partagez cette analyse ?  Christiane Rafidinarivo : Le président de la Refondation de la République de Madagascar a toujours affirmé qu'il voulait mener une ligne diplomatique qui ne discrimine personne, qui ne cherche pas à rejeter d'emblée, par idéologie ou tout autre considération, un partenaire potentiel qui peut apporter quelque chose pour satisfaire les besoins de la population malgache, que l'on sait être dans une situation difficile. Il est vrai que Madagascar a toujours entretenu une relation privilégiée avec la France, mais la Russie est aussi un vieux partenaire. Finalement, voyez-vous vraiment une rupture dans la nouvelle diplomatie malgache ? En termes de partenariat, non, car la France est un partenaire de toujours. Et la Russie est un partenaire très ancien. Il me semble que Madagascar s'apprête à commémorer 55 ans de relation avec la Russie. Mais ce qui peut être qualifié de rupture, c'est ce recentrement de la diplomatie malgache sur les besoins immédiats des Malgaches. La vraie nouveauté est internationale, c'est le nouveau contexte géopolitique. Et c'est sans doute là que l'on peut mieux comprendre pourquoi on parle de renouvellement de partenariat. D'un côté, Madagascar affirme de nouvelles priorités tournées vers sa population, et d'un autre côté, tout cela se fait dans un contexte géopolitique qui a considérablement changé ces cinq dernières années justement. De son côté, la Gen Z, la société civile qui a principalement contribué à renverser l'ancien président Andry Rajoelina, dénonce une mise en scène diplomatique pour décrire la rencontre entre les présidents français et malgache à l'Elysée. Cette Gen Z, qui s'estime mise de côté, ne lui a-t-on pas volé sa révolution finalement, comme cela s'est vu dans d'autres pays d'Afrique où les militaires ont pris le pouvoir ?  Ce que je constate et que j'observe en tant que chercheuse, c'est que la Gen Z est en dialogue avec le ministère chargé de la Refondation, qui est un ministère d'Etat, et même avec le président de la Refondation lui-même. Certains éléments très connus de la Gen Z sont dans les cabinets ministériels et la Gen Z continue effectivement à avoir une participation politique très intéressante dans l'espace public, de façon à avoir une forme de politisation qui puisse lui permettre de participer à la concertation nationale qui est en cours, certes, mais également au débat public de façon constructive. Et c'est ce qu'elle fait. Ce qui est très nouveau, c'est la liberté d'expression, d'opinion, de manifestation. Il y a un renouveau de la participation démocratique à Madagascar. Pour la première fois de son histoire, et si cela se concrétise, la Grande Île aura une constitution qui n'aura pas été parachutée par des experts extérieurs et avec une poignée de Malgaches. Est-ce une vraie coopération ou un rapport de force masqué ? Auquel cas, il y aurait une forme de démocratie de façade. Le moratoire sur les permis miniers a été levé. Désormais, excepté pour l'or, les entreprises extractives ont le droit d'exploiter les richesses minières malgaches. Que dire de cette nouvelle politique industrielle et minière ? Constatez-vous de nouveaux partenaires ou des partenaires anciens signer des contrats ? Ce que les autorités disent souhaiter, c'est l'ouverture à la concurrence, et surtout que ce soit un marché ouvert aux Malgaches mêmes, chose rare auparavant. L'or a été mis de côté car le président de la Refondation a expliqué, au retour de ses voyages aux Émirats arabes unis notamment, qu'il souhaitait organiser un comptoir de l'or avec une régulation beaucoup plus institutionnalisée du secteur, qu'il ne soit pas un secteur réservé aux grands acteurs en oligarchie, et surtout préempté par les trafiquants. Quand on sait que la Banque centrale malgache a très peu de réserves d'or dans ses coffres, on comprend à quel point ce pays a été pillé.

    In this episode of War Docs, we speak with retired Army Colonel Dr. Robert Mabry, a figure whose career trajectory from an 18 Delta Special Forces medic to a senior physician-leader has shaped the face of modern military medicine. Dr. Mabry recounts his harrowing experience during the Battle of Mogadishu, where he provided care for 15 hours under intense fire. He reflects on how those "blood-written" lessons exposed the flaws of applying civilian EMS standards to the battlefield, eventually leading to his involvement as a founding member of the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC). The conversation moves from the tactical to the systemic, as Dr.Mabry discusses his pivotal role in upgrading Army flight medics to critical care paramedics and his advocacy for the "Mission Zero Act," which integrates military surgical teams into civilian trauma centers to maintain clinical readiness during the interwar period.     Dr. Mabry also addresses the looming challenges of Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). He warns that the "Golden Hour" luxury enjoyed in Iraq and Afghanistan will likely vanish in future peer-on-peer conflicts due to the lack of air superiority and the threat of mass casualties from advanced weaponry. To prepare, he proposes a radical overhaul of the medical career pathway, advocating for a "Battlefield Medical Specialist" track that allows medics to advance into high-level operational roles without losing their tactical expertise. By embedding military teams into a nationalized mesh network of civilian hospitals, Mabry envisions a "Team America" approach that ensures the military is never again forced to relearn life-saving lessons at the start of a new conflict. This episode is a masterclass in operational medicine, leadership, and the persistent need for innovation within the military health system bureaucracy.   Chapters (00:00-01:30) Introduction to Retired Colonel Dr. Robert Mabry (01:30-05:37) From Small-Town Oklahoma to Army Ranger (05:37-10:51) The Path to Special Forces Medic and 18 Delta Training (10:51-18:54) 15 Hours Under Fire: The Battle of Mogadishu (18:54-25:03) Transitioning from NCO to Physician at USUHS (25:03-31:15) Founding TCCC and the Joint Trauma System (31:15-39:54) Revolutionizing Flight Medic Training and Evidence-Based Reform (39:54-48:00) Prolonged Field Care and the Reality of Future Conflict (LSCO) (48:00-56:17) Mission Zero and Embedding Military Teams in Civilian Centers (56:17-1:03:40) Designing the Future Battlefield Medical Specialist Career Track (1:03:40-1:05:42) Legacy and Closing Remarks   Chapter Summaries (00:00-01:30) Introduction to Retired Colonel Dr. Robert Mabry Host Dr. Doug Soderdahl introduces Dr. Robert Mabry, highlighting his journey from the Battle of Mogadishu to his role as a founding member of the Committee on TCCC. The introduction sets the stage for a discussion on overhauling military medical training and preparing for future high-casualty conflicts. (01:30-05:37) From Small-Town Oklahoma to Army Ranger Dr. Mabry shares his early motivations for enlisting, citing a family tradition of military service and a desire to escape his small town. He explains how a recruiter's pitch led him to the Army over the Marine Corps, eventually landing him in the newly formed 3rd Ranger Battalion. (05:37-10:51) The Path to Special Forces Medic and 18 Delta Training Inspired by a mentor, Mabry pursued the rigorous Special Forces Medic (18 Delta) pathway, known for its high attrition rate and intense training. He discusses the 1.5-year pipeline and how his early marriage provided the stability needed to succeed in the academically and physically demanding course. (10:51-18:54) 15 Hours Under Fire: The Battle of Mogadishu Mabry provides a first-hand account of the "Black Hawk Down" mission, detailing the chaos of the crash site and the makeshift bunker he used to treat casualties overnight. He reflects on the realization that contemporary medical protocols, like C-spine immobilization under fire, were dangerously ill-suited for combat. (18:54-25:03) Transitioning from NCO to Physician at USUHS Inspired by clinical encounters as a medic, Mabry discusses the arduous process of completing medical school prerequisites while on active duty, including retaking organic chemistry after returning from Somalia. He details his experience at USUHS, balancing family life with the challenges of the basic science curriculum. (25:03-31:15) Founding TCCC and the Joint Trauma System Mabry explains the "grassroots" origins of the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) and the later development of the Joint Trauma System (JTS). He critiques the military's initial lack of a data-driven trauma system and the years it took to improve survivability during the Global War on Terror. (31:15-39:54) Revolutionizing Flight Medic Training and Evidence-Based Reform Mabry recounts the struggle to convince the Army to upgrade flight medics from EMT-Basics to Critical Care Paramedics. He highlights a landmark study that proved a 15% improvement in survival for the most critically injured patients when treated by higher-trained providers. (39:54-48:00) Prolonged Field Care and the Reality of Future Conflict (LSCO) Drawing from experiences on the Afghan-Pakistan border, Mabry demystifies prolonged field care as essential nursing care. He warns that future conflicts (LSCO) will lack air superiority, requiring medics to manage mass casualties at the point of injury for days rather than hours. (48:00-56:17) Mission Zero and Embedding Military Teams in Civilian Centers Mabry advocates for a nationalized "Team America" strategy to embed military surgical teams in busy civilian level-one trauma centers. He discusses his work on the Mission Zero Act to ensure military providers maintain their trauma skills during periods of peace. (56:17-1:03:40) Designing the Future Battlefield Medical Specialist Career Track Mabry proposes a new career pathway for operational medicine that allows experienced medics to transition into specialized Physician Assistant roles. This track would keep tactical expertise in the field and provide a long-term career for those dedicated to battlefield care. (1:03:40-1:05:42) Legacy and Closing Remarks In the final segment, Mabry reflects on his legacy, hoping his work inspires future medical leaders to have the courage to innovate. The episode concludes with a tribute to his contributions to saving lives on and off the battlefield.   Take Home Messages Combat Medicine Requires Tactical Adaptation: Medical protocols designed for civilian settings, such as C-spine immobilization or the avoidance of tourniquets, are often counterproductive in high-threat environments. True innovation in combat casualty care comes from acknowledging that the tactical situation dictates the medical intervention, a realization that led to the birth of TCCC. Data Drives Survival in Trauma Systems: The military health system cannot rely on luck or anecdotal evidence to improve clinical outcomes. Establishing a robust trauma registry and a continuous quality improvement process, as seen with the Joint Trauma System, is essential to bending the survival curve and preventing the repetition of past mistakes. Advanced Training is Non-Negotiable for Flight Medics: Moving from an "evacuation only" mindset to a "critical care in the air" model significantly improves survival rates for the most severely injured. Investing in high-level paramedic and nursing certification for flight crews ensures that the aircraft serves as a mobile ICU rather than just a transport vehicle. Preparing for Large-Scale Combat Requires Triage Mastery: In future peer-on-peer conflicts where medical evacuation may be delayed for days, military providers must be trained to manage expecting casualties and perform complex triage. This requires a shift in focus toward prolonged field care and the psychological readiness to make difficult resource-allocation decisions. Civilian-Military Integration is Essential for Readiness: To maintain the surgical skills necessary for war, military teams must be permanently embedded in high-volume civilian trauma centers. A nationalized strategy like the Mission Zero Act ensures that the nation's medical assets are integrated and ready to handle a sudden surge of casualties in a "Team America" approach.   Episode Keywords Military Medicine, Tactical Combat Casualty Care, TCCC, Battle of Mogadishu, Black Hawk Down, Army Rangers, Special Forces Medic, 18 Delta, Joint Trauma System, Flight Medic, Critical Care Paramedic, Mission Zero Act, Large Scale Combat Operations, LSCO, Prolonged Field Care, Combat Surgeon, USUHS, Medical Readiness, Trauma Surgery, Battlefield Medicine, Veteran Stories, Army Medical Department, AMEDD, Medevac, Operational Medicine   Hashtags #MilitaryMedicine, #WarDocs, #TCCC, #CombatMedic, #TraumaCare, #SpecialOperations, #VeteranLeadership, #BattlefieldMedicine   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission is to honor the legacy, preserve the oral history, and showcase career opportunities, unique expeditionary experiences, and achievements of Military Medicine. We foster patriotism and pride in Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoD, and Our Nation. Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield,demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast        

C'est ici: https://lnk.bio/pointnemo_editions_BD/laurent-turcot

Dans ce Pas de côté, on s'arrête un instant pour approfondir ce que la conversation avec Raïssa Lei a ouvert.Danseuse amazighe, elle nous a parlé de transmission, de deuil, d'identité.Mais au-delà de son parcours personnel, une question plus large apparaît :Que transmet-on quand tout vacille ? Comment le corps devient-il un lieu de mémoire ?À travers son récit, c'est toute la notion d'héritage culturel qui se dessine — non pas comme folklore figé, mais comme mouvement vivant.Ce Pas de côté propose une réflexion sur :– la mémoire incarnée– la transmission intergénérationnelle– le rôle du corps dans la construction identitaireParce que la danse n'est pas seulement un art.Elle est aussi un langage. Et parfois, un refuge.

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

The Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps dropped one of the realest suicide-prevention messages we've ever seen — no uniform, no script, no cameras — just a Marine speaking from the heart. And while the entire Corps stopped to share his words… too many leaders stopped right there.In this episode, GySgt Demetrius “Meech” Thigpen digs into the uncomfortable truth:Sharing the message is easy.Living the message is where most leaders fail.Meech breaks down how performative leadership, toxic habits, and emotional neglect continue to push Marines into isolation while leaders hide behind perfect uniforms and motivational catchphrases. He exposes the gap between “check on your Marines” and actually giving a damn. And he shares raw personal stories — alcoholism, emotional collapse, a junior Marine who told him “I'm getting out because of you,” and the parking-lot moment that forced him to change.This episode challenges SNCOs, influencers, and leaders at every level to stop posting for optics and start leading with honesty, humility, and humanity. Because Marines don't need another shareable message. They need leaders who live it.In this episode:The impact of SgtMaj Ruiz's suicide-prevention messageWhy young Marines don't seek helpPerformative leadership vs. real leadershipWeaponizing mental-health resourcesEmotional responsibility as a leaderListening without minimizing someone's painTaking care of your Marines by taking care of yourself firstIf you're a Marine, a leader, or someone who's tired of hollow words and fake online “motivation,” this episode will hit you in the chest.Don't just share the message.Be the message.Follow @MeechSpeaks on Instagram.New episodes every Monday.

durée : 00:03:34 - Un monde connecté - par : Olivier Tesquet - Aux États-Unis, l'ICE achète des entrepôts pour les transformer en centres de détention, appliquant à la politique migratoire les logiques de l'économie numérique. Entre rentabilité, contrôle et symbolique, cette stratégie soulève des questionnements sur l'État.

U.S. Tech Corps announced by White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Maryland Tech Council to host 7th Annual Technology Transformation Conference  Listen to my latest podcast here  

REDIFF - Déjà, sachez que vos lèvres sont uniques, si vous les imprimez sur une feuille après leur avoir mis du rouge à lèvre, l'empreinte qu'elles feront seront uniques au monde. Un peu comme vos empreintes digitales, personne au monde n'a les mêmes que vous. Mais d'où vient cette couleur rosée différente de celle du reste de notre peau. Eh bien de son épaisseur ! C'est le seul endroit de notre corps où la peau est si fine. Sur le reste de notre visage, par exemple, elle peut compter jusqu'à 16 couches cellulaires. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

-Tech Corps volunteers will be placed in Peace Corps countries that are part of the American AI Exports Program, which was created last year from an executive order from President Trump as a way to bolster the US' grip on the AI market abroad. -Colorado's proposed law would "prohibit the use of a three-dimensional printer, or similar technology, to make a firearm or a firearm component." -A recent Amazon Web Services outage that lasted 13 hours was reportedly caused by one of its own AI tools, according to reporting by Financial Times. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

✨ Ce dimanche, je partage avec vous un extrait avec le docteur Marc Naett. Il explique simplement le rôle de la thyroïde, cette petite glande qui agit comme le “chauffage central” de notre corps. Quand elle fonctionne au ralenti, tout ralentit : énergie, humeur, concentration. Un échange pour mieux comprendre des symptômes que beaucoup ressentent… sans toujours savoir d'où ils viennent.La suite dès lundi matin !Vous pouvez consulter notre politique de confidentialité sur https://art19.com/privacy ainsi que la notice de confidentialité de la Californie sur https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Merci à Patricia Vanderlinden d'être venue sur LegendPatricia est spécialiste DVI (Disaster Victim Identification), l'identification des victimes depuis 20 ans. Attentats, incendies, crash d'avions…elle intervient dans les pires catastrophes. Elle a travaillé sur de nombreuses identifications, sur des scènes où les corps sont méconnaissables. Pour Legend, elle raconte les histoires les plus folles de sa carrière.Retrouvez toutes les informations concernant notre invitée par ici ⬇️Son compte Instagram ➡️ https://www.instagram.com/patvdl.dvi.belgium/Son livre "Donner un nom aux morts: Sur les traces d'une experte DVI en identification de victimes" ➡️ https://amzn.to/4cAP0VJ Retrouvez toutes les émissions avec Philippe Boxho par ici ➡️ https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL3uuF0jWuXXYwyzwUWUOSURhu2MFEHOUmRetrouvez l'émission avec Dr Never par ici ➡️ https://youtu.be/DQitKDi0BowPour prendre vos billets pour le LEGEND TOUR c'est par ici ➡️ https://www.legend-tour.fr/Retrouvez la boutique LEGEND ➡️ https://shop.legend-group.fr/Pour toutes demandes de partenariats : legend@influxcrew.com Retrouvez-nous sur tous les réseaux LEGEND !Facebook : https://www.facebook.com/legendmediafr Instagram : https://www.instagram.com/legendmedia/ TikTok : https://www.tiktok.com/@legend Twitter : https://twitter.com/legendmediafr Snapchat : https://www.snapchat.com/@legendcm75017 Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Join Las Vegas Raiders on Senior SI Beat Writer Hondo Carpenter and family as they discuss the Silver and Black on the most recent Ridin' with the Carpenters on PFI, Pro Football Insiders. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

L'Effet du Sucre sur ton Corps L'Ennemi du Ramadan

Marching band, drum corps, and DCI history—this Black History Month bonus is a “cookout-style” conversation about the African American Legacy Corps and the history it's honoring.Your All-Access Pass to the Marching Arts.Featuring:Ricardo Robinson-ShinallNicole YoungerErrick Prince (@talldarkandfrozen)Tony Lymon (@tony_lymon)Wayne HarrisHighlights:• Wayne Harris' history focus on Black drum corps roots and how the activity shifted over time• The “why” behind African American Legacy Corps and how the team talks about purpose and participation• Water We Doing + Gush & Go to wrap with real talk and shoutoutsMore info:Instagram: @africanamericanlegacycorps  Facebook Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/1136665747980471/DCI announcement: https://www.dci.org/news/african-american-legacy-corps-sets-sights-on-2027-world-championship-appearance/  Contact Wayne Harris: https://www.wayneharris.net/  Find On A Water Break:https://www.onawaterbreak.com/https://www.youtube.com/@OnAWaterBreakPodcastonawaterbreakpodcast@gmail.comGuest Form: https://form.jotform.com/253235189587065

This episode of Vermont Viewpoint was published 02/19/2026.

Jay Cormier from Off the Page Games returns to the podcast to talk about the current Kickstarter campaign for Corps of Discovery. This 2nd edition improves upon the earlier version of the game. Plus there's also a new stand alone 2-player game: DUO. Jay tells us all about the improvements and gives us the scoop on Duo. Don't worry if you backed the 1st edition, the new campaign will let you pick up the fix-it packs for about $15. Jay and Jimmy talk about the inspiration for the game, Manifest Destiny, plus the games Grendel, The Creeps, and hint at a new game in development. This campaign will only last 10 days so don't miss out! Back the Kickstarter for Corps of Discovery Follow Off the Page Games on Bluesky Go to Off the Page Games' website Late Pledge for Grendel Follow Comic Book Yeti

La skieuse Lindsey Vonn a pris le départ de la descente des JO de Milan-Cortina quelques jours seulement après une rupture du ligament croisé antérieur. Et au-delà du ski, il n'est pas rare de voir des athlètes blessé·es s'aligner lors de grands rendez-vous. Est-ce le prix à payer pour tenter de gagner ? Les explications d'Amélie Ammann, spécialiste en médecine du sport, médecine physique et réadaptation à Lausanne. Journalistes: Jessica Vial et Arsène Passamani Réalisation: Jonah Dubois >> Pour aller plus loin: - Jonas Ruffieux, "La banalisation des antidouleurs dans le sport d'élite, un engrenage dangereux", La Liberté, 1er mai 2025 (disponible en ligne) Nous écrire ou nous proposer des questions: pointj@rts.ch ou +41 79 134 34 70

Merci à Maël d'être venu témoigner dans Legend Story À 19 ans, il est atteint d'un retard de croissance et paraît adolescent voire enfant. Pour Legend, il se confie sur les tentatives d'enlèvement qu'il a subies, les messages de pédoph*les qu'il reçoit tous les jours, ses relations amoureuses, l'infantilisation au quotidien… Retrouvez toutes les informations concernant notre invité par ici ⬇️Son compte instagram ➡️ mael_snam Son compte Tiktok ➡️ snam_jvPour prendre vos billets pour le LEGEND TOUR c'est par ici ➡️ https://www.legend-tour.fr/Retrouvez la boutique LEGEND ➡️ https://shop.legend-group.fr/Retrouvez-nous sur tous les réseaux LEGEND !Facebook : https://www.facebook.com/legendmediafrInstagram : https://www.instagram.com/legendmedia/TikTok : https://www.tiktok.com/@legendTwitter : https://twitter.com/legendmediafrSnapchat : https://t.snapchat.com/CgEvsbWV Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

INÉDIT - Julita Bénard, 26 ans, disparait dans l'un des décors les plus vertigineux de la Réunion. Le gouffre de l'Etang-Salé. Son corps ne sera jamais retrouvé. Sa compagne, Marie-Claudia Lauret est la dernière personne a l'avoir vue vivante. Sans preuve, sans aveux, elle sera condamnée à 30 ans de prison, dont quinze années de peine de sûreté. Maitre Hélène Andriot est l'avocate de la famille de Julita Bénard. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

L'histoire d'Herbert Baumeister, un tueur en série américain resté sous les radars pendant des années.1.500 abonnements à -40% pour SAUVER LA REVUE AFFAIRES CRIMINELLES ici https://www.affaires-criminelles.fr/ ! Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Episode 271 - Jay Cormier of Off The Page Games joins the Crowdfunding Nerds to discuss the making of Corps of Discovery and the origins of Mind MGMT. Corps of Discovery on Kickstarter https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/mindmgmt/corps-of-discovery-2nd-ed-duo?ref=2e98qa Must Watch Episodes

➡️ DESCRIPTION: Dans cet épisode de Coram Deo, nous recevons Vincent Beaulac pour réfléchir en profondeur à la relation entre la foi chrétienne et les technologies numériques. Vincent nous invite à un discernement théologique enraciné dans le grand récit biblique, de l'Éden à la Nouvelle Jérusalem. Nous explorerons quelques questions essentielles : le numérique est-il neutre? Comment influence-t-il notre spiritualité? Comment l'Église peut-elle former des croyants lucides, libres et fidèles dans un monde façonné par les écrans et les algorithmes? TABLE DES MATIÈRES 00:00 - Intro 01:09 - Présentation de Vincent et de son intérêt pour le sujet 06:09 - Le numérique est-il un outil neutre? 11:56 - Qui est maître: nous ou l'algorithme? 22:58 - Les chrétiens sont-ils plus avisés aux dangers du numérique? 27:19 - Peut-on utiliser le numérique pour la gloire de Dieu? 35:42 - Est-il préférable de renoncer aux ressources spirituelles internet? 43:52 - L'enjeu: Ne pas négliger le monde réel 47:33 - Le numérique à partir de la théologie biblique 01:00:36 - Recommandations finales aux parents Conclusion - 01:04:26 -

Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss of the Long War Journal discuss a sophisticated Islamic State drone attack on an airfield in Niger, highlighting security failures by the Russian Africa Corps that replaced US forces.1949 NIGERIA

Arthur a 38 ans. Depuis toujours, il vit avec une forme sévère de la maladie de Crohn qui l'a conduit à subir une ablation d'une partie de son système digestif et à porter aujourd'hui une poche de stomie.Dans cet épisode, Arthur partage une parole rare. Introverti, peu habitué à parler de lui, il raconte avec pudeur l'isolement qui s'est peu à peu installé dans sa vie : la difficulté à conserver des liens amicaux, la peur du regard des autres, puis l'éloignement progressif de toute intimité affective, sensuelle et sexuelle.Il raconte aussi le chemin qui l'a conduit à franchir une étape décisive en faisant appel à une accompagnatrice sexuelle via une association, une première expérience vécue quelques mois avant notre enregistrement. Avec beaucoup de douceur et d'émotion, il décrit cette rencontre qui lui a permis de se réconcilier en partie avec son corps et de retrouver, l'espace d'un moment, la possibilité d'un contact simple, humain et tendre.Un témoignage sensible sur la solitude, la vulnérabilité, la dignité et le besoin universel de lien et de toucher. Une conversation précieuse avec un homme discret qui accepte, le temps d'un épisode, d'ouvrir une porte très intime pour nous rappeler combien la sexualité fait aussi partie de la santé et de la vie. Merci à Victor de l'épisode 71 d'avoir motivé Arthur pour qu'il se livre.TW : détails de la stomie (opération consistant à créer une ouverture dans le côlon ou l'intestin grêle à travers l'abdomen pour évacuer les selles lorsqu'elles ne peuvent plus l'être par les voies naturelles.)

Ce sont des images que les télévisions du monde ont diffusées en boucle : le 20 février 1998, sur la glace des Jeux Olympiques de Nagano, au Japon, la Française Surya Bonaly crée l'événement. À la fin de son programme de 4 minutes, elle saute, se renverse en arrière, comme suspendue dans les airs, et atterrit sur le pied droit. Le public du stade et les commentateurs du monde entier en restent bouche bée. Elle est la première patineuse de l'histoire à avoir osé réaliser un salto arrière en compétition. La figure est considérée comme trop dangereuse par la Fédération, et donc officiellement interdite. Aujourd'hui encore, Surya reste la seule athlète à réussir cette figure, hommes et femmes confondus.Que s'est-il passé dans les patins de Surya Bonaly quand elle a décidé de réaliser ce geste fou devant le monde entier ? Quand elle a décidé de ne pas respecter un programme pourtant millimétré et minutieusement répété pendant 2 ans ? Quand elle a décidé de risquer sa santé, voire sa vie, pour quelques secondes de spectacle ?CRÉDITSUn podcast d'Anne-Cécile Genre, réalisé par Theo Boulenger. Musique originale, montage et mixage : Théo Boulenger. Direction artistique : Julien Cernobori. Prise de son : Quentin Bresson. Identité graphique : Thomas Steffen et Manon Louvard (Upian). Chargée de production : Juliette Livartowski et Manon Racz. Chargée d'édition : Camille Regache. Direction des programmes : Joël Ronez. Direction de la rédaction : David Carzon. Direction générale : Gabrielle Boeri-Charles. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Ce sont des images que les télévisions du monde ont diffusées en boucle : le 20 février 1998, sur la glace des Jeux Olympiques de Nagano, au Japon, la Française Surya Bonaly crée l'événement. À la fin de son programme de 4 minutes, elle saute, se renverse en arrière, comme suspendue dans les airs, et atterrit sur le pied droit. Le public du stade et les commentateurs du monde entier en restent bouche bée. Elle est la première patineuse de l'histoire à avoir osé réaliser un salto arrière en compétition. La figure est considérée comme trop dangereuse par la Fédération, et donc officiellement interdite. Aujourd'hui encore, Surya reste la seule athlète à réussir cette figure, hommes et femmes confondus.Que s'est-il passé dans les patins de Surya Bonaly quand elle a décidé de réaliser ce geste fou devant le monde entier ? Quand elle a décidé de ne pas respecter un programme pourtant millimétré et minutieusement répété pendant 2 ans ? Quand elle a décidé de risquer sa santé, voire sa vie, pour quelques secondes de spectacle ?CRÉDITSUn podcast d'Anne-Cécile Genre, réalisé par Theo Boulenger. Musique originale, montage et mixage : Théo Boulenger. Direction artistique : Julien Cernobori. Prise de son : Quentin Bresson. Identité graphique : Thomas Steffen et Manon Louvard (Upian). Chargée de production : Juliette Livartowski et Manon Racz. Chargée d'édition : Camille Regache. Direction des programmes : Joël Ronez. Direction de la rédaction : David Carzon. Direction générale : Gabrielle Boeri-Charles. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Since the last time he was on, a lot has changed. Dagan launched the Nomadic Research podcast out of Dixon, Illinois and went all in on building something of his own. Rural northwest Illinois, limestone bluffs, the Rock River, big whitetails, and just enough distance from Chicago to keep your sanity intact. Not a bad place to build a studio and start the next chapter. Evan and Dagan get into the why behind it. Why Illinois. Why leave a long career. Why step out and start talking publicly after years of working inside one of the largest and most misunderstood organizations in the country. Dagan walks through his background growing up in a Marine family, doing 12 years in the Corps across infantry and reconnaissance billets, then making the jump to the Agency where he and Evan worked together for years. They talk candidly about the difference between the tactical side of the house and where the real strategic decisions get made, the infamous seventh floor, and what it is like to be a small cog inside a 23,000 person machine. There is humor, a few shots at California, some perspective on career pivots, and a real look at professional evolution from Marine to operator to podcaster and business owner. This one is about reinvention, loyalty to where you came from, and figuring out what comes next when you have already done a few lifetimes worth of work. Grab a cup of coffee and settle in.

Ludovic Leroux, coach et expert en régulation du système nerveux.Dans cet épisode, nous parlons de la différence cruciale entre savoir et intégrer. J'ai questionné Ludovic sur les chemins concrets d'incarnation du développement personnel, en partant de sa vision de sportif : pourquoi est-ce que tant de gens connaissent les outils… sans jamais les utiliser ?Il explique avec clarté et bienveillance les 4 voies d'accès au système nerveux, en montrant que le retour au calme et à la présence n'est pas un luxe spirituel, mais une hygiène quotidienne, aussi concrète que de se brosser les dents.Un moment fort, dense et utile — à écouter, et surtout à pratiquer.Citations marquantes« La vraie question, ce n'est pas “est-ce que tu sais ?”, mais “est-ce que tu le fais ?” »« Utiliser la respiration seulement quand ça ne va pas, c'est comme s'entraîner la veille d'une compétition. »« Notre système nerveux ne fait pas la différence entre le réel et l'imaginaire. »« Trois soupirs intentionnels suffisent parfois à retrouver un état de calme. »« La douche froide, c'est une agression choisie pour reprendre le contrôle. »Idées centrales discutées (Big Ideas)

In this episode Maj Alexxa Pritchett is joined by Maj Aniesha Bell, Chief of Recruiting for the Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps, for a look at the various accession programs available to civilians, law students, and current service members, including the Direct Appointment Program (DAP), the Funded Legal Education Program (FLEP), and the Educational Delay program. Major Bell also provides valuable tips for submitting a strong application and highlights the significant financial incentives offered, such as the Student Loan Repayment Program and JAG Continuation Pay. Have questions about these programs or the application process? Please reach out to Recruiting at 1 (800) JAG-USAF or (703) 614-2385 or send an email to af.jag.recruiting@us.af.mil. Online application can be found here: https://jagusaf.jag.af.mil/. Follow us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/USAFJAG Follow us on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/airforcejagcorps

Ce sont des images que les télévisions du monde ont diffusées en boucle : le 20 février 1998, sur la glace des Jeux Olympiques de Nagano, au Japon, la Française Surya Bonaly crée l'événement. À la fin de son programme de 4 minutes, elle saute, se renverse en arrière, comme suspendue dans les airs, et atterrit sur le pied droit. Le public du stade et les commentateurs du monde entier en restent bouche bée. Elle est la première patineuse de l'histoire à avoir osé réaliser un salto arrière en compétition. La figure est considérée comme trop dangereuse par la Fédération, et donc officiellement interdite. Aujourd'hui encore, Surya reste la seule athlète à réussir cette figure, hommes et femmes confondus.Que s'est-il passé dans les patins de Surya Bonaly quand elle a décidé de réaliser ce geste fou devant le monde entier ? Quand elle a décidé de ne pas respecter un programme pourtant millimétré et minutieusement répété pendant 2 ans ? Quand elle a décidé de risquer sa santé, voire sa vie, pour quelques secondes de spectacle ?CRÉDITSUn podcast d'Anne-Cécile Genre, réalisé par Theo Boulenger. Musique originale, montage et mixage : Théo Boulenger. Direction artistique : Julien Cernobori. Prise de son : Quentin Bresson. Identité graphique : Thomas Steffen et Manon Louvard (Upian). Chargée de production : Juliette Livartowski et Manon Racz. Chargée d'édition : Camille Regache. Direction des programmes : Joël Ronez. Direction de la rédaction : David Carzon. Direction générale : Gabrielle Boeri-Charles. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Ce sont des images que les télévisions du monde ont diffusées en boucle : le 20 février 1998, sur la glace des Jeux Olympiques de Nagano, au Japon, la Française Surya Bonaly crée l'événement. À la fin de son programme de 4 minutes, elle saute, se renverse en arrière, comme suspendue dans les airs, et atterrit sur le pied droit. Le public du stade et les commentateurs du monde entier en restent bouche bée. Elle est la première patineuse de l'histoire à avoir osé réaliser un salto arrière en compétition. La figure est considérée comme trop dangereuse par la Fédération, et donc officiellement interdite. Aujourd'hui encore, Surya reste la seule athlète à réussir cette figure, hommes et femmes confondus.Que s'est-il passé dans les patins de Surya Bonaly quand elle a décidé de réaliser ce geste fou devant le monde entier ? Quand elle a décidé de ne pas respecter un programme pourtant millimétré et minutieusement répété pendant 2 ans ? Quand elle a décidé de risquer sa santé, voire sa vie, pour quelques secondes de spectacle ?CRÉDITSUn podcast d'Anne-Cécile Genre, réalisé par Theo Boulenger. Musique originale, montage et mixage : Théo Boulenger. Direction artistique : Julien Cernobori. Prise de son : Quentin Bresson. Identité graphique : Thomas Steffen et Manon Louvard (Upian). Chargée de production : Juliette Livartowski et Manon Racz. Chargée d'édition : Camille Regache. Direction des programmes : Joël Ronez. Direction de la rédaction : David Carzon. Direction générale : Gabrielle Boeri-Charles. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Tout le monde dit "une cerne", mais en fait "cerne", c'est un mot masculin donc faut dire "un cerne". Ces cernes viennent généralement d'un manque de sommeil. Quand on ne reste pas assez allongé longtemps, les petits vaisseaux sanguins qu'on a sous les yeux ne sont pas bien irrigués et le sang circule mal. Et comme la peau à cet endroit-là est très fine, quatre fois moins épaisse que celle du reste du corps, eh bien cet afflux de sang se voit par quasi-transparence. Dans "Ah Ouais ?", Florian Gazan répond en une minute chrono à toutes les questions essentielles, existentielles, parfois complètement absurdes, qui vous traversent la tête. Un podcast RTL Originals.Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Ce sont des images que les télévisions du monde ont diffusées en boucle : le 20 février 1998, sur la glace des Jeux Olympiques de Nagano, au Japon, la Française Surya Bonaly crée l'événement. À la fin de son programme de 4 minutes, elle saute, se renverse en arrière, comme suspendue dans les airs, et atterrit sur le pied droit. Le public du stade et les commentateurs du monde entier en restent bouche bée. Elle est la première patineuse de l'histoire à avoir osé réaliser un salto arrière en compétition. La figure est considérée comme trop dangereuse par la Fédération, et donc officiellement interdite. Aujourd'hui encore, Surya reste la seule athlète à réussir cette figure, hommes et femmes confondus.Que s'est-il passé dans les patins de Surya Bonaly quand elle a décidé de réaliser ce geste fou devant le monde entier ? Quand elle a décidé de ne pas respecter un programme pourtant millimétré et minutieusement répété pendant 2 ans ? Quand elle a décidé de risquer sa santé, voire sa vie, pour quelques secondes de spectacle ?CRÉDITSUn podcast d'Anne-Cécile Genre, réalisé par Theo Boulenger. Musique originale, montage et mixage : Théo Boulenger. Direction artistique : Julien Cernobori. Prise de son : Quentin Bresson. Identité graphique : Thomas Steffen et Manon Louvard (Upian). Chargée de production : Juliette Livartowski et Manon Racz. Chargée d'édition : Camille Regache. Direction des programmes : Joël Ronez. Direction de la rédaction : David Carzon. Direction générale : Gabrielle Boeri-Charles. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Ce sont des images que les télévisions du monde ont diffusées en boucle : le 20 février 1998, sur la glace des Jeux Olympiques de Nagano, au Japon, la Française Surya Bonaly crée l'événement. À la fin de son programme de 4 minutes, elle saute, se renverse en arrière, comme suspendue dans les airs, et atterrit sur le pied droit. Le public du stade et les commentateurs du monde entier en restent bouche bée. Elle est la première patineuse de l'histoire à avoir osé réaliser un salto arrière en compétition. La figure est considérée comme trop dangereuse par la Fédération, et donc officiellement interdite. Aujourd'hui encore, Surya reste la seule athlète à réussir cette figure, hommes et femmes confondus.Que s'est-il passé dans les patins de Surya Bonaly quand elle a décidé de réaliser ce geste fou devant le monde entier ? Quand elle a décidé de ne pas respecter un programme pourtant millimétré et minutieusement répété pendant 2 ans ? Quand elle a décidé de risquer sa santé, voire sa vie, pour quelques secondes de spectacle ?CRÉDITSUn podcast d'Anne-Cécile Genre, réalisé par Theo Boulenger. Musique originale, montage et mixage : Théo Boulenger. Direction artistique : Julien Cernobori. Prise de son : Quentin Bresson. Identité graphique : Thomas Steffen et Manon Louvard (Upian). Chargée de production : Juliette Livartowski et Manon Racz. Chargée d'édition : Camille Regache. Direction des programmes : Joël Ronez. Direction de la rédaction : David Carzon. Direction générale : Gabrielle Boeri-Charles. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

durée : 00:05:19 - C'est une chanson - par : Frédéric Pommier - Humoriste, à l'affiche du one-woman-show "Ca va bien se passer", Camille Giry a choisi d'évoquer son attachement à la chanson "Corps", qu'elle a (re)découverte en cours de chant, et à la portée de cette chanson, interprétée par Yseult. Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

Aujourd'hui, je reçois Mohamed Toukabri, danseur et chorégraphe belgo-tunisien.
Il découvre la danse à travers la culture hip-hop, avant de se former à la danse contemporaine, notamment au Centre Méditerranéen de Danse Contemporaine à Tunis, puis à P.A.R.T.S. en Belgique.Sa danse s'est construite entre différentes esthétiques et territoires.
Son corps en porte la mémoire.Depuis 2018, il développe sa propre voix chorégraphique, en mêlant les mots au langage du corps.
En questionnant les héritages culturels et les hiérarchies esthétiques, il poursuit une quête à la fois intime et universelle, celle de se rencontrer.On l'écoute avec joie. Mohamed Toukabri présente Every-Body-Knows-What-Tomorrow-Brings-And-We-All-Know-What-Happened-Yesterday, sa dernière pièce au Théâtre de la Bastille du 17 au 20 février dans le cadre du festival Faits d'hiver. 
Ce podcast a été réalisé en partenariat avec les équipes du festival.

Avec Caroline Wallet et Inès Pélissié du Rausas, docteur en philosophie de l'université de la Sorbonne

Last time we spoke about The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow. Following the brutal 1938 capture of Wuhan, Japanese forces aimed to solidify their hold by launching an offensive against Chinese troops in the 5th War Zone, a rugged natural fortress in northern Hubei and southern Henan. Under General Yasuji Okamura, the 11th Army deployed three divisions and cavalry in a pincer assault starting May 1, 1939, targeting Suixian and Zaoyang to crush Nationalist resistance and secure flanks. Chinese commander Li Zongren, leveraging terrain like the Dabie and Tongbai Mountains, orchestrated defenses with over 200,000 troops, including Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group. By May 23, they recaptured Suixian and Zaoyang, forcing a Japanese withdrawal with heavy losses, over 13,000 Japanese casualties versus 25,000 Chinese, restoring pre-battle lines. Shifting south, Japan targeted Shantou in Guangdong to sever supply lines from Hong Kong. In a massive June 21 amphibious assault, the 21st Army overwhelmed thin Chinese defenses, capturing the port and Chao'an despite guerrilla resistance led by Zhang Fakui. Though losses mounted, Japan tightened its blockade, straining China's war effort amid ongoing attrition.   #188 From Changkufeng to Nomonhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Well hello again, and yes you all have probably guessed we are taking another detour. Do not worry I hope to shorten this one a bit more so than what became a sort of mini series on the battle of Changkufeng or Battle of Lake Khasan. What we are about to jump into is known in the west as the battle of khalkin Gol, by the Japanese the Nomohan incident. But first I need to sort of set the table up so to say. So back on August 10th, 1938 the Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement established a joint border commission tasked with redemarcating the disputed boundary between the Soviet Union and Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. However, this commission never achieved a mutually agreeable definition of the border in the contested area. In reality, the outcome was decided well before the group's inaugural meeting. Mere hours after the cease-fire took effect on the afternoon of August 11, General Grigory Shtern convened with a regimental commander from Japan's 19th Division to coordinate the disengagement of forces. With the conflict deemed "honorably" concluded, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters mandated the swift withdrawal of all Japanese troops to the west bank of the Tumen River. By the night of August 13, as the final Japanese soldier crossed the river, it effectively became the de facto border. Soviet forces promptly reoccupied Changkufeng Hill and the adjacent heights—a move that would carry unexpected and profound repercussions. Authoritative Japanese military analyses suggest that if negotiations in Moscow had dragged on for just one more day, the 19th Division would likely have been dislodged from Changkufeng and its surrounding elevations. Undoubtedly, General Shtern's infantry breathed a sigh of relief as the bloodshed ceased. Yet, one can't help but question why Moscow opted for a cease-fire at a juncture when Soviet troops were on the cusp of total battlefield triumph. Perhaps Kremlin leaders deemed it wiser to settle for a substantial gain, roughly three-quarters of their objectives, rather than risk everything. After all, Japan had mobilized threatening forces in eastern Manchuria, and the Imperial Army had a history of impulsive, unpredictable aggression. Moreover, amid the escalating crisis over Czechoslovakia, Moscow may have been wary of provoking a broader Asian conflict. Another theory posits that Soviet high command was misinformed about the ground situation. Reports of capturing a small segment of Changkufeng's crest might have been misinterpreted as control over the entire ridge, or an imminent full takeover before midnight on August 10. The unexpected phone call from Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to the Japanese embassy that night—proposing a one-kilometer Japanese retreat in exchange for a cease-fire along existing lines—hints at communication breakdowns between Shtern's headquarters and the Kremlin. Ironically, such lapses may have preserved Japanese military honor, allowing the 19th Division's evacuation through diplomacy rather than defeat. Both sides endured severe losses. Initial Japanese press reports claimed 158 killed and 740 wounded. However, the 19th Division's medical logs reveal a grimmer toll: 526 dead and 914 injured, totaling 1,440 casualties. The true figure may have climbed higher, possibly to 1,500–2,000. Following the armistice, the Soviet news agency TASS reported 236 Red Army fatalities and 611 wounded. Given Shtern's uphill assaults across open terrain against entrenched positions, these numbers seem understated. Attackers in such scenarios typically suffered two to three times the defenders' losses, suggesting Soviet casualties ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. This aligns with a Soviet Military Council investigation on August 31, 1938, which documented 408 killed and 2,807 wounded. Japanese estimates placed Soviet losses even higher, at 4,500–7,000. Not all victims perished in combat. Marshal Vasily Blyukher, a decorated Soviet commander, former warlord of the Far East, and Central Committee candidate, was summoned to Moscow in August 1938. Relieved of duty in September and arrested with his family in October, he faced charges of inadequate preparation against Japanese aggression and harboring "enemies of the people" within his ranks. On November 9, 1938, Blyukher died during interrogation a euphemism for torture-induced death.Other innocents suffered as well. In the wake of the fighting, Soviet authorities deported hundreds of thousands of Korean rice farmers from the Ussuri region to Kazakhstan, aiming to eradicate Korean settlements that Japanese spies had allegedly exploited. The Changkufeng clash indirectly hampered Japan's Wuhan offensive, a massive push to subdue China. The influx of troops and supplies for this campaign was briefly disrupted by the border flare-up. Notably, Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group, slated for Wuhan, was retained due to the Soviet threat. Chiang Kai-shek's drastic measure, breaching the Yellow River dikes to flood Japanese advance routes—further delayed the assault. By October 25, 1938, when Japanese forces captured Hankow, Chiang had relocated his capital to distant Chungking. Paradoxically, Wuhan's fall cut rail links from Canton inland, heightening Chiang's reliance on Soviet aid routed overland and by air from Central Asia. Japan secured a tactical win but missed the decisive blow; Chinese resistance persisted, pinning down a million Japanese troops in occupation duties. What was the true significance of Changkufeng? For General Koiso Suetaka and the 19th Division, it evoked a mix of bitterness and pride. Those eager for combat got their share, though not on their terms. To veterans mourning fallen comrades on those desolate slopes, it might have felt like senseless tragedy. Yet, they fought valiantly under dire conditions, holding firm until a retreat that blended humiliation with imperial praise, a bittersweet inheritance. For the Red Army, it marked a crucial trial of resolve amid Stalin's purges. While Shtern's forces didn't shine brilliantly, they acquitted themselves well in adversity. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow observed that any purge-related inefficiencies had been surmounted, praising the Red Army's valor, reliability, and equipment. His counterpart in China, Colonel Joseph Stilwell, put it bluntly: the Soviets "appeared to advantage," urging skeptics to rethink notions of a weakened Red Army. Yet, by World War II's eve, many British, French, German, and Japanese leaders still dismissed it as a "paper tiger." Soviet leaders appeared content, promoting Shtern to command the Transbaikal Military District and colonel general by 1940, while honoring "Heroes of Lake Khasan" with medals. In a fiery November 7, 1938, speech, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov warned that future incursions would prompt strikes deep into enemy territory. Tokyo's views diverged sharply. Many in the military and government saw it as a stain on Imperial Army prestige, especially Kwantung Army, humiliated on Manchukuo soil it swore to protect. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji Inada, however, framed it as a successful reconnaissance, confirming Soviet border defense without broader aggression, allowing the Wuhan push to proceed safely. Critics, including Major General Gun Hashimoto and historians, questioned this. They argued IGHQ lacked contingency plans for a massive Soviet response, especially with Wuhan preparations underway since June. One expert warned Japan had "played with fire," risking Manchuria and Korea if escalation occurred. Yet, Japanese commanders gleaned few lessons, downplaying Soviet materiel superiority and maintaining disdain for Red Army prowess. The 19th Division's stand against outnumbered odds reinforced this hubris, as did tolerance for local insubordination—attitudes that would prove costly. The Kremlin, conversely, learned Japan remained unpredictable despite its China quagmire. But for Emperor Hirohito's intervention, the conflict might have ballooned. Amid purges and the Czech crisis, Stalin likely viewed it as a reminder of eastern vulnerabilities, especially with Munich advancing German threats westward. Both sides toyed with peril. Moderation won in Tokyo, but Kwantung Army seethed. On August 11, Premier Fumimaro Konoye noted the need for caution. Kwantung, however, pushed for and secured control of the disputed salient from Chosen Army by October 8, 1938. Even winter's chill couldn't quench their vengeful fire, setting the stage for future confrontations. A quick look at the regional map reveals how Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic each jut into the other's territory like protruding salients. These bulges could be seen as aggressive thrusts into enemy land, yet they also risked encirclement and absorption by the opposing empire. A northward push from western Manchuria through Mongolia could sever the MPR and Soviet Far East from the USSR's heartland. Conversely, a pincer movement from Mongolia and the Soviet Maritime Province might envelop and isolate Manchukuo. This dynamic highlights the frontier's strategic volatility in the 1930s. One particularly tense sector was the broad Mongolian salient extending about 150 miles eastward into west-central Manchukuo. There, in mid-1939, Soviet-Japanese tensions erupted into major combat. Known to the Japanese as the Nomonhan Incident and to the Soviets and Mongolians as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, this clash dwarfed the earlier Changkufeng affair in scale, duration, and impact. Spanning four months and claiming 30,000 to 50,000 casualties, it amounted to a small undeclared war, the modern era's first limited conflict between great powers. The Mongolian salient features vast, semiarid plains of sandy grassland, gently rolling terrain dotted with sparse scrub pines and low shrubs. The climate is unforgivingly continental: May brings hot days and freezing nights, while July and August see daytime highs exceeding 38°C (100°F in American units), with cool evenings. Swarms of mosquitoes and massive horseflies necessitate netting in summer. Rainfall is scarce, but dense morning fogs are common in August. Come September, temperatures plummet, with heavy snows by October and midwinter lows dipping to –34°C. This blend of North African aridity and North Dakotan winters supports only sparse populations, mainly two related but distinct Mongol tribes. The Buriat (or Barga) Mongols migrated into the Nomonhan area from the northwest in the late 17th to early 18th centuries, likely fleeing Russian expansion after the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Organized by Manchu emperors between 1732 and 1735, they settled east of the river they called Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian for "river"), in lands that would later become Manchukuo. The Khalkha Mongols, named for the word meaning "barrier" or "shield," traditionally guarded the Mongol Empire's northern frontiers. Their territories lay west of the Buriats, in what would become the MPR. For centuries, these tribes herded livestock across sands, river crossings, and desert paths, largely oblivious to any formal borders. For hundreds of years, the line dividing the Mongolian salient from western Manchuria was a hazy administrative divide within the Qing Empire. In the 20th century, Russia's detachment of Outer Mongolia and Japan's seizure of Manchuria transformed this vague boundary into a frontline between rival powers. The Nomonhan Incident ignited over this contested border. Near the salient's northeastern edge, the river, called Khalkhin Gol by Mongols and Soviets, and Halha by Manchurians and Japanese, flows northwest into Lake Buir Nor. The core dispute: Was the river, as Japan asserted, the historic boundary between Manchukuo and the MPR? Soviet and MPR officials insisted the line ran parallel to and 10–12 miles east of the river, claiming the intervening strip. Japan cited no fewer than 18 maps, from Chinese and Japanese sources, to support the river as the border, a logical choice in such barren terrain, where it served as the sole natural divider. Yet, Soviets and Mongolians countered with evidence like a 1919 Chinese postal atlas and maps from Japanese and Manchukuoan agencies (1919–1934). Unbeknownst to combatants, in July 1939, China's military attaché in Moscow shared a 1934 General Staff map with his American counterpart, showing the border east of the river. Postwar Japanese studies of 18th-century Chinese records confirm that in 1734, the Qing emperor set a boundary between Buriat and Khalkha Mongols east of the river, passing through the hamlet of Nomonhan—as the Soviets claimed. However, Kwantung Army Headquarters dismissed this as non-binding, viewing it as an internal Qing affair without Russian involvement. Two former Kwantung Army officers offer a pragmatic explanation: From 1931 to 1935, when Soviet forces in the Far East were weak, Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities imposed the river as the de facto border, with MPR acquiescence. By the mid- to late 1930s, as Soviet strength grew, Japan refused to yield, while Mongolians and Soviets rejected the river line, sparking clashes. In 1935, Kwantung Army revised its maps to align with the river claim. From late that year, the Lake Buir Nor–Halha sector saw frequent skirmishes between Manchukuoan and MPR patrols. Until mid-1938, frontier defense in northwestern Manchukuo fell to the 8th Border Garrison Unit , based near Hailar. This 7,000-man force, spread thin, lacked mobility, training, and, in Kwantung Army's eyes, combat readiness. That summer, the newly formed 23rd Division, under Kwantung Army, took station at Hailar, absorbing the 8th BGU under its command, led by Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara. At 52, Komatsubara was a premier Russian specialist in the Imperial Army, with stints as military attaché in the USSR and head of Kwantung's Special Services Agency in Harbin. Standing 5'7" with a sturdy build, glasses, and a small mustache, he was detail-oriented, keeping meticulous diaries, writing lengthy letters, and composing poetry, though he lacked combat experience. Before departing Tokyo in July 1938, Komatsubara received briefings from Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations Section chief. Amid planning for Changkufeng, Inada urged calm on the Manchukuo-MPR border given China's ongoing campaigns. Guidelines: Ignore minor incidents, prioritize intelligence on Soviet forces east of Lake Baikal, and study operations against the Soviet Far East's western sector. Familiar with the region from his Harbin days, Komatsubara adopted a low-key approach. Neither impulsive nor aggressive, he kept the green 23rd Division near Hailar, delegating patrols to the 8th BGU. An autumn incident underscores his restraint. On November 1, 1938, an 8th BGU patrol was ambushed by MPR forces. Per Japanese accounts, the three-man team, led by a lieutenant, strayed too close to the border and was attacked 50 meters inside Manchukuo. The lieutenant escaped, but his men died. Komatsubara sent an infantry company to secure the site but forbade retaliation. He pursued body recovery diplomatically, protested to MPR and Soviet officials, and disciplined his officers: garrison leaders got five days' confinement for poor troop training, the lieutenant thirty days. Despite this caution, pressures at AGS and KwAHQ were mounting, poised to thrust the 23rd Division into fierce battle. Modern militaries routinely develop contingency plans against potential adversaries, and the mere existence of such strategies doesn't inherently signal aggressive intentions. That said, shifts in Japan's operational planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may have inadvertently fueled the Nomonhan Incident. From 1934 to 1938, Japanese war scenarios emphasized a massive surprise assault in the Ussuri River region, paired with defensive holding actions in northwestern Manchuria. However, between mid-1938 and early 1939, a clandestine joint task force from the Army General Staff  and Kwantung Army's Operations Departments crafted a bold new blueprint. This revised strategy proposed containing Soviet forces in the east and north while unleashing a full-scale offensive from Hailar, advancing west-northwest toward Chita and ultimately Lake Baikal. The goal: sever the Transbaikal Soviet Far East from the USSR's core. Dubbed Plan Eight-B, it gained Kwantung Army's endorsement in March 1939. Key architects—Colonels Takushiro Hattori and Masao Terada, along with Major Takeharu Shimanuki—were reassigned from AGS to Kwantung Army Headquarters to oversee implementation. The plan anticipated a five-year buildup before execution, with Hattori assuming the role of chief operations staff officer.  A map review exposes a glaring vulnerability in Plan Eight-B: the Japanese advance would leave its southern flank exposed to Soviet counterstrikes from the Mongolian salient. By spring 1939, KwAHQ likely began perceiving this protrusion as a strategic liability. Notably, at the outbreak of Nomonhan hostilities, no detailed operational contingencies for the area had been formalized. Concurrently, Japan initiated plans for a vital railroad linking Harlun Arshan to Hailar. While its direct tie to Plan Eight-B remains unclear, the route skirted perilously close to the Halha River, potentially heightening KwAHQ's focus on the disputed Mongolian salient. In early 1939, the 23rd Division intensified reconnaissance patrols near the river. Around this time, General Grigory Shtern, freshly appointed commander of Soviet Far Eastern forces, issued a public warning that Japan was gearing up for an assault on the Mongolian People's Republic. As Plan Eight-B took shape and railroad proposals advanced, KwAHQ issued a strikingly confrontational set of guidelines for frontier troops. These directives are often cited as a catalyst for the Nomonhan clash, forging a chain linking the 1937 Amur River incident, the 1938 Changkufeng debacle, and the 1939 conflict.Resentment had festered at KwAHQ over perceived AGS meddling during the Amur affair, which curtailed their command autonomy. This frustration intensified at Changkufeng, where General Kamezo Suetaka's 19th Division endured heavy losses, only for the contested Manchukuoan territory to be effectively ceded. Kwantung Army lobbied successfully to wrest oversight of the Changkufeng salient from Chosen Army. In November 1938, Major Masanobu Tsuji of KwAHQ's Operations Section was sent to survey the site. The audacious officer was dismayed: Soviet forces dominated the land from the disputed ridge to the Tumen River. Tsuji undertook several winter reconnaissance missions. His final outing in March 1939 involved leading 40 men to Changkufeng's base. With rifles slung non-threateningly, they ascended to within 200 yards of Soviet lines, formed a line, and urinated in unison, eliciting amused reactions from the enemy. They then picnicked with obentos and sake, sang army tunes, and left gifts of canned meat, chocolates, and whiskey. This theatrical stunt concealed Tsuji's real aim: covert photography proving Soviet fortifications encroached on Manchukuoan soil. Tsuji was a singular figure. Born of modest means, he embodied a modern samurai ethos, channeling a sharp intellect into a frail, often ailing body through feats of extraordinary daring. A creative tactician, he thrived in intelligence ops, political scheming, aerial scouting, planning, and frontline command—excelling across a tumultuous career. Yet, flaws marred his brilliance: narrow bigotry, virulent racism, and capacity for cruelty. Ever the ambitious outsider, Tsuji wielded outsized influence via gekokujo—Japan's tradition of subordinates steering policy from below. In 1939, he was a major, but his pivotal role at Nomonhan stemmed from this dynamic. Back in Hsinking after his Changkufeng escapade, Tsuji drafted a response plan: negotiate border "rectification" with the Soviets; if talks failed, launch an attack to expel intruders. Kwantung Army adopted it. Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Otozaburo Yano flew to Tokyo with Tsuji's photos, seeking AGS approval. There, he was rebuffed—Changkufeng was deemed settled, and minor violations should be overlooked amid Tokyo's aversion to Soviet conflict. Yano's plea that leniency would invite aggression was countered by notes on Europe's tensions restraining Moscow. Yano's return sparked outrage at KwAHQ, seen as AGS thwarting their imperial duty to safeguard Manchukuo. Fury peaked in the Operations Section, setting the stage for Tsuji's drafting of stringent new frontier guidelines: "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes." The core tenet: "If Soviet troops transgress the Manchukuoan frontiers, Kwantung Army will nip their ambitions in the bud by completely destroying them." Specific directives for local commanders included: "If the enemy crosses the frontiers … annihilate him without delay, employing strength carefully built up beforehand. To accomplish our mission, it is permissible to enter Soviet territory, or to trap or lure Soviet troops into Manchukuoan territory and allow them to remain there for some time… . Where boundary lines are not clearly defined, area defense commanders will, upon their own initiative, establish boundaries and indicate them to the forward elements… . In the event of an armed clash, fight until victory is won, regardless of relative strengths or of the location of the boundaries. If the enemy violates the borders, friendly units must challenge him courageously and endeavor to triumph in their zone of action without concerning themselves about the consequences, which will be the responsibility of higher headquarters." Major Tsuji Masanobu later justified the new guidelines by pointing to the "contradictory orders" that had hamstrung frontier commanders under the old rules. They were tasked with upholding Manchukuo's territorial integrity yet forbidden from actions that might spark conflict. This, Tsuji argued, bred hesitation, as officers feared repercussions for decisive responses to incursions. The updated directives aimed to alleviate this "anxiety," empowering local leaders to act boldly without personal liability. In truth, Tsuji's "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes" were more incendiary than conciliatory. They introduced provocative measures: authorizing commanders to unilaterally define unclear boundaries, enforce them with immediate force "shoot first, ask questions later", permit pursuits into enemy territory, and even encourage luring adversaries across the line. Such tactics flouted both government policy and official army doctrine, prioritizing escalation over restraint. The proposals sparked intense debate within Kwantung Army's Operations Section. Section chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and Colonel Masao Terada outranked Tsuji, as did Major Takeharu Shimanuki, all recent transfers from the Army General Staff. Tsuji, however, boasted longer tenure at Kwantung Army Headquarters since April 1936 and in Operations since November 1937, making him the de facto veteran. Hattori and Terada hesitated to challenge the assertive major, whose reputation for intellect, persuasion, and deep knowledge of Manchuria commanded respect. In a 1960 interview, Shimanuki recalled Tsuji's dominance in discussions, where his proactive ideas often swayed the group. Unified, the section forwarded Tsuji's plan to Kwantung Army Command. Commander Lieutenant General Kenkichi Ueda consulted Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai and Vice Chief General Otozaburo Yano, seasoned leaders who should have spotted the guidelines' volatility. Yet, lingering grudges from AGS "interference" in past incidents like the Amur River and Changkufeng clouded their judgment. Ueda, Isogai, and Tsuji shared history from the 1932 Shanghai Incident: Tsuji, then a captain, led a company in the 7th Regiment under Colonel Isogai, with Yano as staff officer and Ueda commanding the 9th Division. Tsuji was wounded there, forging bonds of camaraderie. This "clique," which grew to include Hattori, Terada, and Shimanuki, amplified Tsuji's influence. Despite Isogai's initial reservations as the group's moderate voice, the guidelines won approval. Ueda issued them as Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488 on April 25, 1939, during a division commanders' conference at KwAHQ. A routine copy reached AGS in Tokyo, but no formal reply came. Preoccupied with the China War and alliance talks with Germany, AGS may have overlooked border matters. Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations head, later noted basic acceptance of Order 1488, with an informal expectation—relayed to Hattori and Terada—of prior consultation on violations. KwAHQ dismissed this as another Tokyo intrusion on their autonomy. Some Japanese analysts contend a stern AGS rejection might have prevented Nomonhan's catastrophe, though quelling Kwantung's defiance could have required mass staff reassignments, a disruptive step AGS avoided. Tsuji countered that permitting forceful action at Changkufeng would have deterred Nomonhan altogether, underscoring the interconnectedness of these clashes while implicitly critiquing the 1939 battle's location. Undeniably, Order 1488's issuance on April 25 paved the way for conflict three weeks later. Japanese records confirm that Khalkha Mongols and MPR patrols routinely crossed the Halha River—viewed by them as internal territory, 10 miles from the true border. Such crossings passed uneventfully in March and April 1939. Post-Order 1488, however, 23rd Division commander General Michitaro Komatsubara responded aggressively, setting the stage for escalation. The Nomonhan Incident ignited with a border clash on May 11–12, 1939, that rapidly spiraled into a major conflict. Over a dozen "authoritative" accounts exist, varying in viewpoint, focus, and specifics. After cross-referencing these sources, a coherent timeline emerges. On the night of May 10–11, a 20-man Mongolian People's Republic border patrol crossed eastward over the Halha River (known as Khalkhin Gol to Mongols and Soviets). About 10 miles east, atop a 150-foot sandy hill, lay the tiny hamlet of Nomonhan, a cluster of crude huts housing a few Mongol families. Just south flowed the Holsten River, merging westward into the broader Halha. By morning on May 11, Manchukuoan forces spotted the MPR patrol north of the Holsten and west of Nomonhan. In the MPR/Soviet perspective, Nomonhan Hill marked the Mongolia-Manchuria border. To Manchukuoans and Japanese, it sat 10 miles inside Manchukuo, well east of the Halha. A 40-man Manchukuoan cavalry unit repelled the Mongolians back across the river, inflicting initial casualties on both sides—the Manchukuoans drawing first blood. The MPR patrol leader exaggerated the attackers as 200 strong. The next day, May 12, a 60-man MPR force under Major P. Chogdan evicted the Manchukuoans from the disputed zone, reestablishing positions between the Halha and Nomonhan. The Manchukuoans, in turn, reported facing 700 enemies. Sporadic skirmishes and maneuvering persisted through the week. On May 13, two days post-clash, the local Manchukuoan commander alerted General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division headquarters in Hailar. Simultaneously, Major Chogdan reported to Soviet military command in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital. What began as a Mongolian-Manchukuoan spat was poised to draw in Soviet and Japanese patrons. Attributing the May 10–11 violation hinges on border interpretations: both sides claimed the Halha-Nomonhan strip. Yet, most accounts concur that Manchukuoan forces initiated the fighting. Post-May 13 notifications to Moscow and Tokyo clarify the record thereafter. Midday on May 13, Komatsubara was leading a staff conference on the newly issued Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488—Major Tsuji Masanobu's aggressive border guidelines. Ironically, the first Nomonhan combat report arrived mid-discussion. Officers present recall Komatsubara deciding instantly to "destroy the invading Outer Mongolian forces" per Order 1488. That afternoon, he informed Kwantung Army Headquarters of the incident and his intent to eradicate the intruders, requesting air support and trucks. General Kenkichi Ueda, Kwantung commander, approved Komatsubara's "positive attitude," dispatching six scout planes, 40 fighters, 10 light bombers, two anti-aircraft batteries, and two motorized transport companies. Ueda added a caveat: exercise "extreme caution" to prevent escalation—a paradoxical blend of destruction and restraint, reflective of KwAHQ's fervent mood. Ueda relayed the details to Tokyo's Army General Staff, which responded that Kwantung should handle it "appropriately." Despite Kwantung's impulsive reputation, Tokyo deferred, perhaps trusting the northern strategic imbalance, eight Japanese divisions versus 30 Soviet ones from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, would enforce prudence. This faith proved misguided. On May 14, Major Tsuji flew from KwAHQ for aerial reconnaissance over Nomonhan, spotting 20 horses but no troops. Upon landing, a fresh bullet hole in his plane confirmed lingering MPR presence east of the Halha. Tsuji briefed 23rd Division staff and reported to Ueda that the incident seemed minor. Aligning with Order 1488's spirit, Komatsubara deployed a force under Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma: an armored car company, two infantry companies, and a cavalry troop. Arriving at Nomonhan on May 15, Azuma learned most MPR forces had retreated westward across the Halha the prior night, with only token elements remaining, and those withdrawing. Undeterred, he pursued. The advance met scant resistance, as foes had crossed the river. However, Japanese light bombers struck a small MPR concentration on the west bank, Outpost Number 7, killing two and wounding 15 per MPR reports; Japanese claimed 30–40 kills. All agree: the raid targeted undisputed MPR territory. Hearing of May 15's events, Komatsubara deemed the Mongolians sufficiently rebuked and recalled Azuma to Hailar on May 16. KwAHQ concurred, closing the matter. Soviet leaders, however, saw it differently. Mid-May prompted Soviet support for the MPR under their 1936 Mutual Defense Pact. The Red Army's 57th Corps, stationed in Mongolia, faced initial disarray: Commander Nikolai Feklenko was hunting, Chief of Staff A. M. Kushchev in Ulan Ude with his ill wife. Moscow learned of clashes via international press from Japanese sources, sparking Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov's furious inquiry. Feklenko and Kushchev rushed back to Ulaanbaatar, dispatching a mixed force—a battalion from the 149th Infantry Regiment (36th Division), plus light armor and artillery from the 11th Tank Brigade—to Tamsag Bulak, 80 miles west of the Halha. Led by Major A. E. Bykov, it bolstered the MPR's 6th Cavalry Division. Bykov and Cavalry Commander Colonel Shoaaiibuu inspected the site on May 15, post-Azum's departure. The cavalry arrived two days later, backed by Bykov (ordered to remain west of the river and avoid combat if possible). Some MPR troops recrossed, occupying the disputed zone. Clashes with Manchukuoan cavalry resumed and intensified. Notified of renewed hostilities, Komatsubara viewed it as defiance, a personal affront. Emboldened by Order 1488, he aimed not just to repel but to encircle and annihilate. The incident was on the verge of major expansion. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ghosts of the Changufeng incident have come back to haunt both the USSR and Japan. Those like Tsuji Masanobu instigated yet another border clash that would erupt into a full blown battle that would set a precedent for both nations until the very end of WW2. 

Anne Ghesquière reçoit Clarisse Ernoux, prof de yoga et de Pilates. Elles parlent du superpouvoir du périnée. Mais que savons-nous vraiment du périnée ? Quel est son impact sur corps ? Qu'est-ce qui peut l'altérer ? Comment éviter les fuites urinaires, la descentes d'organes ou les rapports douloureux ? Comment en faire un allié du quotidien, au service du bien-être, de la sexualité, de la confiance et du mouvement ? Clarisse Ernoux nous invite à le comprendre, à l'écouter et à en prendre soin grâce à des gestes simples, une respiration juste et une meilleure conscience corporelle. Son livre Périnée, votre superpouvoir, ma méthode pour reprendre le contrôle de votre corps est publié aux éditions Albin Michel. Épisode #665Erratum : Anne évoque un kinésiologue ; il s'agit en réalité d'un kinésithérapeute. Résidant en Suisse, où cette profession est désignée sous le terme de physiothérapeute, cette différence de vocabulaire est à l'origine de la confusion en français.Quelques citations du podcast avec Clarisse Ernoux :"Le périnée est le miroir de notre histoire.""On doit s'occuper du périnée à chaque étape de notre vie. Il ne concerne pas que la grossesse. ""Il n'est jamais trop tôt ni jamais trop tard pour prendre soin du périnée."Recevez chaque semaine l'inspirante newsletter Métamorphose par Anne GhesquièreDécouvrez Objectif Métamorphose, notre programme en 12 étapes pour partir à la rencontre de soi-même.Suivez nos RS : Insta, Facebook & TikTokAbonnez-vous sur Apple Podcast /Spotify / Deezer / CastBox / YoutubeSoutenez Métamorphose en rejoignant la Tribu MétamorphoseThèmes abordés lors du podcast avec Clarisse Ernoux :00:00 Introduction01:30 L'invitée02:37 Qu'est-ce que le périnée ?04:01 Un sujet méconnu05:09 Le plancher pelvien06:56 Comment savoir si notre périnée fonctionne bien ?07:56 Qui consulter ?09:47 Attention aux mauvais exercices12:41 L'impact de la posture14:18 L'exercice de l'ascenseur15:26 Périnée hyper-tonique et détente18:31 Les fuites urinaires20:11 Le poids des émotions21:47 Périnée masculin / féminin23:33 L'importance de la sensibilisation chez les jeunes23:37 Que faire pendant le sport ?25:55 Routine matinale27:06 L'impact positif du mouvement grâce aux myokines28:56 Quelle position aux toilettes ?29:55 Qu'est-ce qui le fragilise au quotidien ?30:46 En cas de césarienne31:52 Descente d'organes, un sujet tabou35:05 L'incontinence anale36:42 Périnée et ménopause40:42 Le pessaire : un outil efficace41:18 Périnée et sexualité42:35 Que sont les dyspareunies ?45:32 Jamais trop tôt, jamais trop tardAvant-propos et précautions à l'écoute du podcast Photo DR Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Anne Ghesquière reçoit le Dr Gabor Maté, médecin, conférencier et auteur à succès de renommée mondiale. Le Dr Gabor Maté nous invite à cesser de nous demander « Qu'est-ce qui ne va pas chez moi ? » et à commencer à se poser la question : « Que m'est-il arrivé ? ». Et si ce que nous appelons la « normalité » était en réalité profondément déséquilibrée? Pourquoi y a-t-il tant de souffrances psychologiques et physiques dans les sociétés dites développées ? Et si bon nombre de maladies, angoisses, traumatismes et addictions d'aujourd'hui n'étaient pas des échecs personnels mais des réponses intelligentes à un monde qui nous déconnecte de nous-mêmes ? Comment comprendre les liens profonds entre les traumatismes, le corps, les émotions et le comportement ? Gabor Maté explore une vision radicalement différente de la santé et des êtres humains et nous invite à changer de perspective. Son dernier livre, Le Mythe de la normalité, est publié en français aux éditions Guy Trèdaniel. Découvrez son approche psychothérapeutique sur son site. Épisode #664Quelques citations tirées du podcast avec le Dr Gabor Maté :"Le corps se souvient de ce que l'esprit a dû oublier pour survivre.""Vous ne pouvez pas guérir le passé, mais vous pouvez guérir les effets du passé que vous portez encore en vous.""Personne n'est cassé. Personne n'est au-delà de la transformation."Recevez chaque semaine l'inspirante newsletter Métamorphose par Anne GhesquièreDécouvrez Objectif Métamorphose, notre programme en 12 étapes pour partir à la rencontre de soi-même.Suivez nos RS : Insta, Facebook & TikTokAbonnez-vous sur Apple Podcast / Spotify / Deezer / CastBox / YoutubeThèmes abordés lors du podcast avec le Dr Gabor Maté :00:00 Introduction01:30 Présentation de l'invité02:15 L'impact des traumatismes infantiles05:46 Qu'est-ce que la normalité ?10:11 Une autre vision du traumatisme15:55 L'humanité est-elle blessée par nature ?18:58 La dimension transgénérationnelle22:37 Adaptation, maladie et déclic 26:49 Le conflit attachement / authenticité 35:29 Les femmes et les maladies auto-immunes37:38 Le mécanisme de la dépendance 42:10 Mémoires explicites et implicites47:01 L'autorégulation49:25 Quelles thérapies ?54:06 Le processus pour traverser nos traumatismes58:48 Spiritualité et guérison 01:05:46 TDAH et stress01:13:11 Souffrance et créativité01:15:16 Personne n'est briséAvant-propos et précautions à l'écoute du podcastPhoto © Gurudayal Khalsa Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

     In this episode of WarDocs, we sit down with Dr. Franklin Sechriest, a former US Navy   Commander and orthopedic surgeon, to explore the high-stakes world of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions. Drawing from his extensive experience, Dr. Sechriest details the unique challenges of performing complex surgeries aboard naval vessels while responding to some of the most devastating natural disasters of the 21st century, including the 2004 Indonesian tsunami and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. He provides a fascinating comparison between the capabilities of massive hospital ships like the USNS Mercy—floating Level 1 trauma centers—and the tactical agility of amphibious assault ships like the USS Bataan.     Dr. Sechriest shares gripping personal anecdotes, including the life-saving resuscitation and surgery of a young Indonesian boy, which highlight the profound human impact of military medicine. Beyond the operating room, the conversation delves into the strategic importance of these missions. Dr. Sechriest explains how medical teams project "soft power," strengthening diplomatic ties and winning hearts and minds in regions where traditional military force is not the answer. He also discusses his collaboration with the Naval Health Research Center to analyze surgical data, revealing how past missions have reshaped current staffing models to better care for pediatric and geriatric populations often found in disaster zones.      Looking ahead, the discussion covers the potential of Artificial Intelligence to reduce provider burnout and the advent of smart orthopedic implants. Finally, Dr. Sechriest offers timeless advice on leadership, emphasizing that the most effective leaders in chaotic environments are those who view themselves primarily as servants to their team and their patients. This episode offers a comprehensive look at how Navy Medicine combines compassion, logistics, and surgical excellence to bring hope to the darkest corners of the globe.   Chapters (00:00-04:46) Introduction to Dr. Sechriest and the Path to Navy Orthopedics (04:46-14:55) Hospital Ships, Warships, and Life-Saving Stories from the Tsunami (14:55-27:14) Logistical Challenges, Ethical Dilemmas, and Data-Driven Improvements (27:14-36:12) Medical Diplomacy as Soft Power and Training for Future Conflicts (36:12-48:29) The Future of AI in Medicine and Leadership Advice for Aspiring Officers   Chapter Summaries (00:00-04:46) Introduction to Dr. Sechriest and the Path to Navy Orthopedics The episode begins with Dr. Sechriest explaining his motivation for combining a medical career with military service, viewing it as the ultimate form of servant leadership. He describes his journey from general surgery to becoming an "accidental orthopedic surgeon" and how he found himself deployed on major humanitarian missions shortly after joining the Navy. (04:46-14:55) Hospital Ships, Warships, and Life-Saving Stories from the Tsunami This section distinguishes the medical capabilities between the massive USNS Mercy hospital ship and the tactical USS Bataan amphibious assault ship. Dr. Sechriest shares a moving anecdote about a young Indonesian boy who was airlifted to the ship in critical condition, illustrating how Navy assets can provide hope and advanced trauma care where absolutely none existed. (14:55-27:14) Logistical Challenges, Ethical Dilemmas, and Data-Driven Improvements The conversation shifts to the complexities of operating in disaster zones, including language barriers, continuity of care, and resource allocation. Dr. Sechriest details his work with the Naval Health Research Center to analyze mission data, which helped transition staffing models from World War II-era combat configurations to robust teams capable of treating diverse pediatric and geriatric populations. (27:14-36:12) Medical Diplomacy as Soft Power and Training for Future Conflicts Dr. Sechriest explains how humanitarian missions serve as a vital tool for "soft power" in the post-9/11 era, using compassion to improve global security and international relations. He also discusses how the chaotic, resource-constrained environments of natural disasters provide unparalleled training for medical officers preparing for combat operations. (36:12-48:29) The Future of AI in Medicine and Leadership Advice for Aspiring Officers In the final segment, the discussion explores how Artificial Intelligence can reduce administrative burdens for physicians and how smart implants will revolutionize orthopedic recovery. Dr. Sechriest concludes with advice for the next generation of military medical professionals, encouraging them to seek out tough assignments and lead with humility. Take Home Messages Medical Diplomacy as Soft Power: Humanitarian assistance missions are a critical strategic tool that allows the military to project goodwill and strengthen international alliances without firing a shot. By providing high-level medical care to foreign populations during crises, military medicine acts as a stabilizing force that can improve global security and alter negative perceptions of the United States in sensitive geopolitical regions. Data-Driven Operational Readiness: The analysis of surgical logs and patient encounters from previous disaster relief missions is essential for modernizing military medical responses. Research has shown that historical staffing models based on combat trauma were often insufficient for natural disasters, leading to a new focus on deploying with the right mix of pediatric and geriatric resources to match the actual needs of the affected population. The Distinction Between Naval Medical Assets: Understanding the difference between Echelon 3 hospital ships and Echelon 2 casualty receiving and treatment ships is vital for logistical success. While hospital ships offer comprehensive, prolonged care similar to a land-based trauma center, amphibious warships provide essential damage control surgery and superior air and sea transport capabilities to move casualties efficiently. Servant Leadership in Chaos: Leading effectively in the high-stress, chaotic environment of a disaster zone requires a mindset of humility and service rather than authority. The most successful medical officers are those who maintain focus on the mission, prioritize the well-being of their team, and acknowledge that they must rely on the collective expertise of others to solve complex logistical and ethical problems. AI and the Future of Orthopedics: Advanced technologies, particularly Artificial Intelligence and smart implants, are poised to revolutionize military and federal medicine by improving efficiency and outcomes. AI has the potential to alleviate provider burnout by automating non-clinical tasks, while sensor-embedded implants will provide objective data on patient recovery, allowing for proactive interventions and better long-term care.   Episode Keywords WarDocs, Military Medicine, Navy Medicine, Orthopedic Surgery, Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, USNS Mercy, USS Bataan, Tsunami Relief, Haiti Earthquake, Medical Diplomacy, Naval Health Research Center, Trauma Surgery, Global Health, Military Leadership, Soft Power, Navy Doctor, Hospital Ship, Warship Medicine, AI in Healthcare, Disaster Medicine, Servant Leadership Hashtags #MilitaryMedicine, #NavyDoctor, #OrthopedicSurgery, #DisasterRelief, #HumanitarianAid, #USNavy, #MedicalLeadership, #WarDocs   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission is to honor the legacy, preserve the oral history, and showcase career opportunities, unique expeditionary experiences, and achievements of Military Medicine. We foster patriotism and pride in Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoD, and Our Nation.   Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield, demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast