Podcasts about Corps

Alice Desbioles est médecin, je l'avais reçu en 2021 sur le sujet de l'anco-anxiété sur lequel elle a écrit un livre dans lequel elle documente, preuves scientifiques à l'appui, les effets de notre environnement sur notre santé physique et mentale.Je l'ai connu à travers ce livre et j'ai adoré cette conversation, pas sur les chiffres de la crise écologique comme la canicule que l'on traverse, mais sur ce qu'elle nous fait, à nous, en tant qu'êtres humains. Ce qu'elle révèle de nos contradictions. Et de notre incapacité collective à nous fixer des limites — alors que ces limites sont, littéralement, la condition de notre survie.Dans cet épisode, nous parlons de l'effet rebond technologique (plus de routes, plus de voitures ; plus de 5G, plus de temps sur l'écran), du sens des limites en médecine, de la métaphore des 24 heures de la Terre, de la liberté mal posée comme argument, de l'éco-anxiété comme signe de solidité psychique, du stress aigu versus chronique, et de la manière de repeindre nos villes en vert plutôt que de les fuir. J'ai aussi questionné Alice sur ce que la science documente sur les effets des forêts sur la santé. La réponse est vertigineuse.CITATIONS MARQUANTES"On est aussi, finalement, des grands enfants. Et là, il n'y a plus personne pour nous fixer de limites. Mais pourtant, ces limites, elles sont indispensables à notre survie."— Alice Desbioles"Ô liberté, que de crimes on commet en ton nom."— Alice Desbioles"Le progrès, pour moi, c'est maximiser le bien-être. Et le bien-être, ce n'est pas que l'accumulation de technologies et de biens."— Alice Desbioles"L'éco-anxiété traduit déjà un certain courage, une certaine force de caractère, une certaine solidité qui nous permet d'avancer malgré toutes ces informations."— Alice Desbioles"Si on reprend à l'échelle des 24 heures, l'espace des 150 dernières années, c'est même pas un clignement d'œil. On a tout cramé, comme des ados."— Gregory PouyIDÉES CENTRALES (BIG IDEAS)1. L'effet rebond : la technologie ne résout jamais le problème qu'elle prétend résoudre (00:21)Plus tu rajoutes des routes, plus il y a de voitures. Plus la 5G est rapide, plus les gens passent de temps sur leur téléphone. L'innovation réplique la demande au lieu de la satisfaire. C'est une des lois les moins enseignées de notre rapport à la technique.2. Le sens des limites comme condition de survie collective (01:03)Alice le constate en réanimation : on va toujours plus loin, parfois contre la volonté des patients eux-mêmes. La même logique du "toujours plus" s'applique à la société entière. Les limites ne sont pas une contrainte : elles sont ce qui rend la vie possible. Les 9 limites planétaires existent pour cette raison.3. La métaphore des 24 heures : on a brûlé en un clin d'œil ce qui s'est construit en presque toute l'histoire de la Terre (02:53)Si l'existence de la planète = 24h, l'humain est arrivé à la dernière minute et demie. Les énergies fossiles se sont formées pendant les 23h58 où on n'était pas là. Et on les a consommées en quelques secondes à peine. Tout est là.4. La liberté comme argument mal posé (03:22)La liberté de rouler à 130 km/h sur autoroute opposée à la liberté d'un enfant de grandir sans asthme chronique. Ce n'est pas la même liberté. Et quand on ne le dit pas clairement, le débat est perdu d'avance.5. L'éco-anxiété comme signe de bonne santé mentale (07:26)C'est une question que je pose et qui mérite d'être posée : est-ce que ne pas être éco-anxieux en 2021, c'est pas un peu inquiétant ? Alice confirme : l'éco-anxiété traduit une solidité psychique, pas une fragilité. C'est le déni qui devrait inquiéter.6. Stress aigu vs. stress chronique : ce que le corps absorbe et ce qu'il ne peut pas absorber (08:20)Le stress aigu est physiologique, il sert à agir. Le stress chronique, lui, détruit. Et notre société — vitesse, notifications, bruit, pollution — est une machine à fabriquer du stress chronique.7. Repeindre les villes en vert plutôt que les fuir (12:51)La dichotomie ville-campagne est un faux débat. La vraie question, c'est comment faire entrer la nature dans les espaces urbains : cours d'école végétalisées, mobilités actives, espaces verts. L'OMS et la science le documentent. Les effets sont cardiaques, mentaux, immunitaires.QUESTIONS POSÉES DANS L'INTERVIEWEst-ce que l'innovation technologique résout vraiment les problèmes qu'elle prétend résoudre ?Comment as-tu constaté, en médecine, cette incapacité collective à se fixer des limites ?Qu'est-ce que les 9 limites planétaires nous disent de notre rapport au monde ?En quoi l'argument de la liberté est-il souvent mal posé dans les débats environnementaux ?Comment réinventer les récits collectifs pour donner envie de changer ?Est-ce que l'éco-anxiété n'est pas, finalement, un signe de bonne santé mentale ?Peux-tu nous expliquer comment fonctionne le stress, physiologiquement ?Quelle est la différence entre le stress et l'angoisse ?Est-ce que le meilleur acte écologique reste de vivre en ville ?Comment intégrer davantage de nature dans nos environnements urbains sans opposer ville et campagne ?RÉFÉRENCES CITÉES DANS L'ÉPISODEConcepts scientifiques et institutionnelsLes 9 limites planétaires (cadre scientifique de Rockström et al.) — (01:40)Recommandations de l'OMS sur les espaces verts et la santé — (05:37)Revue scientifique sur les effets des forêts sur la santé physique et mentale (citée dans le livre d'Alice Desbioles) — (12:03)Politiques publiquesLa Convention citoyenne pour le climat (proposition de limitation de vitesse à 110 km/h sur autoroute) — (03:22)Condamnations de la France par la Commission européenne pour non-respect des seuils de pollution de l'air — (04:33)Références culturelles et linguistiquesÉtymologie de "écologie" (discours sur la maison) et "économie" (gestion de la maison) — (02:11)Citation "Ô liberté, que de crimes on commet en ton nom" — (03:22)Les écoles en forêt en Allemagne et dans les pays scandinaves — (13:33)LivreLe livre d'Alice Desbioles (non titré dans cet extrait, mais mentionné avec bibliographie) — (12:03)À venir dans l'émissionMention d'un futur épisode avec un expert du low-tech — (06:12)TIMESTAMPS CLÉS (OPTIMISÉS YOUTUBE)00:00 – Introduction du "moment" Greg présente le format : un extrait d'épisode qui a marqué les esprits. 00:21 – L'effet rebond : pourquoi la tech ne résout pas ce qu'elle promet Plus de routes = plus de voitures. Plus de 5G = plus de temps sur l'écran. L'innovation amplifie la demande au lieu de la satisfaire. 01:03 – Alice : le sens des limites, ce que la réanimation nous apprend Témoignage fort : une patiente âgée réanimée contre sa volonté fait scandale auprès du médecin. Jusqu'où va-t-on ? Les 9 limites planétaires posent la même question. 02:11 – Écologie, économie : retour à la racine des mots L'écologie, c'est le "discours sur la maison". L'économie, c'est la "gestion de la maison". Et la maison est mal gérée. 02:53 – La métaphore des 24h : on a tout brûlé en un clignement d'œil Si la vie de la Terre = 24h, l'humain arrive à 1 minute 30. Les fossiles se sont formés pendant les 23h58 où on était absents. On les a consommés en quelques secondes. 03:22 – Liberté vs. limites : le débat mal posé La liberté de rouler à 130 km/h contre la liberté d'un enfant de grandir sans asthme. Ce ne sont pas les mêmes libertés. 05:37 – Redéfinir le progrès : pas plus vite, mais mieux vivre Le vrai progrès, c'est maximiser le bien-être — espaces verts, mobilités actives, contact avec la nature. L'OMS le documente. 07:26 – L'éco-anxiété, signe de bonne santé mentale ? Être éco-anxieux en 2021, c'est regarder la réalité en face. C'est le déni qui devrait inquiéter. 08:20 – Stress aigu vs. stress chronique : ce que le corps supporte ou pas Explication claire et pédagogique : le stress aigu est physiologique et bénéfique. Le stress chronique, lui, détruit — sommeil, digestion, santé cardiovasculaire. 09:56 – Stress vs. angoisse : quelle différence ? Le stress a une cause identifiable. L'angoisse est diffuse, globale, sans objet clair. C'est souvent ça qui la rend plus difficile à traverser. 12:03 – La science des forêts : effets cardiaques, immunitaires, mentaux Des études documentent les effets positifs de la nature sur la santé. Ce n'est pas une intuition — c'est de la recherche. 12:51 – Repeindre les villes en vert plutôt que les fuir La vraie question n'est pas ville vs. campagne. C'est comment faire entrer la nature là où vivent les gens. Suggestion d'épisode à écouter : #167 Comment gérer l'anxiété due au réchauffement climatique avec Alice Desbiolles (https://audmns.com/Wucmnld)Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

In this episode, Lee returned to the Dad Edge Alliance for an exclusive live Q&A with members asking real-time questions about raising kids to think like value creators. The conversation covers everything from how to engage a four-year-old in family finances to what to do when a capable adult son is drifting in a digital fog. If you've ever wanted to raise kids who don't just follow rules but genuinely understand why building a life of meaning matters, this one delivers. Most parenting conversations focus on values, the character traits we want our kids to have. Lee draws a sharp distinction: having a values list is fine, but the real work is teaching kids to create value, holistically, across three buckets: material (money and lifestyle), positive emotional energy (how alive you feel going through life), and spiritual connectedness (family, community, and purpose). That framework, combined with one simple question (how would you like to create value in the world?), is the thread that runs through every answer Lee gives, whether he's talking to a dad with four-year-old twins, a dad with checked-out teenagers, or a dad watching a 20-year-old spend six hours a day alone in his room. This is especially powerful for any dad who has felt the frustration of talking at his kids instead of being with them, who wants to make family meetings something his kids actually look forward to, or who is watching a young adult drift and wondering when to push harder versus when to change the environment instead.   Timeline Summary [1:02] Larry introduces Lee Benson: Wall Street Journal bestselling author, founder of Dinner Table (impacting 50,000-plus families), serial entrepreneur with eight companies and a nine-figure exit, back for a second exclusive Alliance Q&A [3:31] Lee's entrepreneurial origin story: pulling weeds at age 6 for $0.25 an hour, playing over 1,000 shows in a band in the early 80s, and launching his first actual business in 1993 after a lifetime of learning to trust the struggle [5:36] Coming home at 17 to find his clothes in paper grocery sacks on the porch and the locks changed, and why getting forced out of a toxic, dangerous home was one of the best things that ever happened to him [10:23] The Dinner Table framework: the critical difference between having a values list and intentionally creating holistic value across three buckets, material, positive emotional energy, and spiritual connectedness, and why keeping all three in balance is the whole game [12:41] How the monthly family meeting works: setting shared goals, defining what leadership looks like in the family, reviewing the household budget as a team sport, and why a six-year-old can absolutely have her own line item [16:19] Tommy's follow-up on his 23-year-old daughter who comes to him for financial advice but won't take it, and the one question Lee says works better than any advice you could give [19:18] Luke's question: his family used to have a dinner table culture, but phones and teenage independence have caused it to drift, what's the one actionable thing he can take into tomorrow? [21:23] The loneliness epidemic Lee witnessed firsthand: speaking to six groups of high school seniors in a single day, he watched every group melt when asked what it actually feels like to be more digitally connected and lonelier than ever [24:03] The statistic that stops the room: only 18% of American families are traditional nuclear families with two biological parents and kids under 18 at home, and why it means anyone can build the family culture they want, regardless of where they started [27:02] Larry's raw personal question: his 20-year-old son is a great kid headed for the fire academy, but right now he's spending five to six hours a day on screens, physically declining, and stuck in a liminal space with no clear purpose, and Larry doesn't know how to get through to him [32:49] Lee's answer: environment shapes human nature more reliably than any conversation, and the story of his own brother whose entire trajectory changed when the Marine Corps changed his surroundings, and reversed the moment it was gone [35:31] Lee pushes back hard on the "kids can't do it today" narrative: two grown men agree they would crush the exact same challenges facing young people right now, so why do adults keep having conversations that tell kids they can't? [39:36] The digital isolation question: why providing basic needs without accountability for how hours are spent creates the exact environment that enables drift, and what rules of engagement actually look like when you apply them clearly and without flinching [43:56] Lee flips the table and asks Larry a question: in his entire life, across thousands of leaders he has studied and worked with, only two people have ever been truly "with" him, not talking at, over, or down to him, and what does Larry think most dads are missing? [45:29] Larry's honest answer: 80% generative questions and psychological safety, 20% intense and emotion-driven lectures, and why that 20% probably feels like the majority of the experience for his son [48:42] Lee reframes the whole conversation: planting seeds takes time, and being frustrated that a 20-year-old hasn't learned what took you 30 years to figure out is a form of unfairness, the job is to keep planting, not to demand the harvest [53:06] Lee and Luke on using a hard childhood as rocket fuel: it took Lee 17 years to fully separate from a toxic family situation, and the shift that freed him was realizing it was never about him, it was about people who couldn't even raise themselves   Five Key Takeaways There is a critical difference between having values and intentionally creating value. Values are character traits on a list. Value creation is an active, daily practice across three buckets: material (money and the lifestyle your family needs), positive emotional energy (how alive and energized you feel going through life), and spiritual connectedness (your bonds with family, community, and purpose). Families that confuse the two drift. Families that focus on all three build something that compounds over decades. The one question that works at every age is: how would you like to create value in the world? For a four-year-old it plants a seed. For a teenager it opens a door that lectures can't. For a 23-year-old in "I Know Everything Syndrome," it bypasses the defense wall entirely and invites her into a real conversation about who she wants to become. Lee uses it with 3-year-olds and 80-year-old CEOs because it is never about telling someone what to do, it is about making the conversation theirs. The environment shapes human nature more reliably than any conversation. If you make it easy to drift, human nature says they'll drift. Lee has seen this in a brother who became a model Marine the moment the Corps changed his surroundings, and unraveled the moment it was gone. For any dad watching a young adult spiral, the most powerful lever is not a harder talk. It is changing the rules of engagement in the home, clearly and without negotiation, so that moving forward becomes the path of least resistance. Only 18% of American families are traditional nuclear families, and households with two parents where one stays home represent just 7%. Lee's point is not that the numbers are discouraging, it is that they are liberating. The vast majority of families are navigating this in some non-traditional structure, which means there is no inherited blueprint you are obligated to follow. You can build exactly the family you want to lead, and you can start that process at any age. Most adults talk at, over, or down to kids. Almost no one is truly with them, with their potential, with their future self, with who they are still becoming. In Lee's entire life, across thousands of leaders he has studied, only two people showed up for him that way. The dads in this community have the chance to be that person. Getting curious, asking generative questions, and sitting beside a kid instead of facing off against him is not just a communication tactic. It is the whole relationship.   Links & Resources   Dinner Table Community: https://dinnertable.com Execute to Win (CEO Mastermind Groups): https://etw.com Value Creation Family by Lee Benson: https://www.amazon.com/Value-Creation-Family-Playbook-Setting/dp/1636805981 The Dad Edge Alliance: https://thedadedge.com/join Episode Shownotes: https://thedadedge.com/1495 http://thedadedge.com/kidquestions   Closing What Lee brought to this Q&A is not a framework you need a consultant to implement. It is one question, how would you like to create value in the world?, and the willingness to ask it and actually listen to the answer. Try it this week with one of your kids. And if Larry's raw honesty about talking at his son instead of being with him hit close to home, share this episode with a dad who needed to hear it. If you're not yet part of the Alliance where conversations like this happen live every month, head over to thedadedge.com. Follow the show, leave a rating and review, and help us get this in front of the dads who need it most. Go out and live legendary.

    Few careers in military medicine trace an arc as wide as that of CAPT (Ret) Kimberly Elenberg, DNP, RN. In this episode she sits down with WarDocs to map a journey that began as an ROTC cadet who joined because she saw students rappelling down a building in Philadelphia, and that has since carried her from the bedside at Walter Reed Army Medical Center to the role of principal investigator on a Carnegie Mellon University team competing in the DARPA Triage Challenge. Along the way she changed uniforms, disciplines, and altitudes of responsibility, but never lost the thread that ties it all together: people first, and the relationships that make hard things possible.     CAPT (Ret) Elenberg describes how early mentors shaped her. Colonel Graham showed her that putting people first is a practice, not a slogan. Major McGee backed her instinct for innovation, and as a young nurse on Ward 51 she built one of the first patient education centers in a military treatment facility, learned to set up networks and hardware, and pursued nursing informatics before the field was common. She recounts moving to research at NIH, where her work on TPA for clearing central line catheters was later adopted as best clinical practice, and her decision to volunteer as an EMT and medic so she would understand field medicine as well as hospital medicine.       From there the conversation follows her into the U.S. Public Health Service, where after 9/11 the Surgeon General asked her to help build the nation's deployable response teams from concept to operation, training them in real communities facing real crises. She explains how anthrax and zoonotic disease drew public health into agriculture and food security, how her long relationship with Carnegie Mellon's Auton Lab began with a bus trip and a phone call, and how that mathematical grounding in probabilistic modeling resurfaced when she was asked to model the effects of policy during COVID and, later, to track military security assistance flowing to Ukraine.     The episode closes on the present and the future: autonomous triage payloads that can read a casualty's physiological state without touching them, robotic snakes that might pack non-compressible hemorrhage, swarms of drones and ground robots that find the wounded and feed the right information to the right echelon. Throughout, CAPT (Ret) Elenberg returns to her core lessons — trust your chain of command, define what success really looks like, build on small wins, and never limit yourself to your military occupational specialty. From an orphanage and a food-service background to teaching at the National Defense University, hers is a story about doors held open and relationships that endure. Chapters (00:54-07:11) From Rappelling Cadet to Innovating Army Nurse (07:11-16:48) Building the Nation's Public Health Response Teams (16:48-22:24) Biosurveillance Modeling COVID and Ukraine Aid (22:24-32:32) The Power of Relationships Across a Career (32:32-37:37) Autonomy Confidence and Knowing When to Explore (37:37-51:33) The DARPA Triage Challenge and Lessons That Last Chapter Summaries (00:54-07:11) From Rappelling Cadet to Innovating Army Nurse The guest traces her start as an ROTC cadet drawn in by students rappelling down a Philadelphia building, her commissioning as an Army nurse, and her first duty station at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Early mentors, including Colonel Graham and Major McGee, taught her that people truly come first and backed her instinct for innovation. On Ward 51 she built one of the first patient education centers in a military treatment facility while teaching herself websites, networking, and nursing informatics.   (07:11-16:48) Building the Nation's Public Health Response Teams Her NIH research on TPA for central line catheters was later adopted as best clinical practice, and she volunteered as an EMT and medic to learn field medicine. After moving to the U.S. Public Health Service for family stability, she answered the Surgeon General's call following 9/11 to build the nation's deployable response teams from concept to operation. Anthrax and zoonotic disease pulled public health into agriculture and food security across the federal enterprise.   (16:48-22:24) Biosurveillance Modeling COVID and Ukraine Aid Tasked to advise on detecting events and discerning intent, she leaned into probabilistic modeling and a long relationship with Carnegie Mellon's Auton Lab that began with a bus trip and a phone call. As Director of Population Health at the Defense Health Agency she modeled total force fitness, then was asked to model the effects of policy during COVID rather than the disease itself. The work forced coordination across agencies, departments, and services on a scale not seen since World War II.   (22:24-32:32) The Power of Relationships Across a Career Describing herself as an introvert, she explains why relationships are the engine of accomplishment, recalling a Ranger literally pushing her up a mountain during advanced camp after a car accident. Those bonds endured and resurfaced decades later in Texas during the DARPA Triage work. She recounts retiring out of Poland after 28 years, where she stood up a secure network to coordinate 26 non-doctrinal partners supporting aid to Ukraine.   (32:32-37:37) Autonomy Confidence and Knowing When to Explore She makes the case for military service as a path to clinical autonomy and the chance to think, decide, and do research that civilian roles often do not allow. She reflects on how to know when to pursue a new opportunity: trust your chain of command, negotiate and listen when you are the one in charge, and act on principles of doing no harm. Confidence, she says, means not being afraid to fail.   (37:37-51:33) The DARPA Triage Challenge and Lessons That Last She gives a plain-language tour of her team's autonomous triage work — payloads that read physiological state without touching a casualty, visual reasoning models tempered by Bayesian rigor, and platforms that deliver the right information to each echelon. Using a DoD-wide tobacco policy as a case study, she explains the art of the doable and building success on small wins. She closes with advice on confidence, integrity, and holding doors open for the next generation.   Take Home Messages Cross disciplines to scale care: The greatest gains often come from teaming up outside your own specialty. Pairing clinical insight with engineering, informatics, and operations lets a single provider extend capability and capacity far beyond what one profession can deliver alone. People first is a practice, not a slogan: Leaders who genuinely put people first earn the trust that makes hard missions possible. The example of a leader who recognized her team while facing her own serious illness shows that the principle is proven in action, not in words. Relationships are the engine of accomplishment: No one knows everything, and progress depends on the people willing to push you up the mountain. Networks built early endure for decades and can be called on when the mission needs them most. Define what success really looks like: Insisting on the perfect outcome can stall progress entirely; agreeing on the art of the doable moves the mission forward. Real success is often a series of small wins that build on one another over time. Confidence means not being afraid to fail: Growth lives outside the comfort zone, and everyone fails sometimes. Acting with honesty, integrity, and your best effort each day — then trusting tomorrow brings another chance — is what builds lasting confidence. Episode Keywords military medicine, Army nurse, military nursing, WarDocs, military medicine podcast, public health service, USPHS, DARPA Triage Challenge, autonomous triage, battlefield medicine, combat casualty care, Carnegie Mellon University, Auton Lab, nursing informatics, biosurveillance, COVID modeling, population health, Defense Health Agency, Walter Reed, military innovation, medical robotics, drone medicine, military mentorship, veteran leadership, military medical research Hashtags #MilitaryMedicine, #WarDocs, #ArmyNurse, #PublicHealth, #BattlefieldMedicine, #DARPA, #MilitaryInnovation, #VeteranLeadership   Biography Dr. Kimberly Elenberg, a retired USPHS Captain, is the Director of Data and Mission Partner Sharing at ECS. A distinguished leader in biosurveillance and emergency response, she applies data science to enhance national security. Notably, she served as the incident response commander for modeling and analytics for the Secretary of Defense COVID Task Force. Previously, as a principal scientist at Carnegie Mellon University, she advanced autonomous systems for biosurveillance. Dr. Elenberg consistently bridges theoretical research with practical healthcare delivery, leveraging her clinical expertise and military discipline to safeguard public health. Her exceptional contributions have earned her several highly prestigious awards, including the 2022 Defense Superior Service Medal, the 2022 USPHS Distinguished Service Medal, and the 2020 National Emergency Preparedness Award for her outstanding operational acumen.         Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission- WarDocs exists to honor the legacy of Military Medicine, preserve its history, and inspire every generation — across all Services, Corps, and Ranks — to serve with excellence and pride. Through mentorship, coaching, and education, we equip those considering, entering, and serving in military medicine with the knowledge, connections, and community they need to thrive. We celebrate Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoW, and Our Nation.   Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield, demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast    

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Today, Hunter was joined by Salil Dudani and Carson White from the Civil Rights Corps. Since they were founded, the Civil Rights Corps has been one of the leaders in the fight to end cash bail. Today, Carson and Salil joined to explain the recent California Supreme Court Case, In re Gerald Kowalczyk, and what it means for the fight against cash bail.       Guest: Carson White, Supervising Attorney, Civil Rights Corps Salil Dudani, Senior Attorney, Civil Rights Corps   Resource: More from Civil Rights Corps Here https://civilrightscorps.org/case/kowalczyk-california-bail-pretrial-detention/   Read the Case Here https://courts.ca.gov/opinion/published/2026-04-30/s277910     Contact Hunter Parnell:      Publicdefenseless@gmail.com  Instagram @PublicDefenselessPodcast Twitter                                                                 @PDefenselessPod www.publicdefenseless.com  Subscribe to the Patreon www.patreon.com/PublicDefenselessPodcast  Donate on PayPal https://www.paypal.com/donate/?hosted_button_id=5KW7WMJWEXTAJ Donate on Stripe https://donate.stripe.com/7sI01tb2v3dwaM8cMN Trying to find a specific part of an episode? Use this link to search transcripts of every episode of the show! https://app.reduct.video/o/eca54fbf9f/p/d543070e6a/share/c34e85194394723d4131/home **** ALL OPINONS SHARED BY HOST HUNTER PARNELL DO NOT REFLECT THE THOUGHTS OR OPINIONS OF THE AURORA MUNICIPAL PUBLIC DEFENDER****  

Où s'arrête Tapas, ce feu sacré de la discipline, et où commence la maltraitance ? Dans cet épisode de Bla Bla Yoga, on pose une question éthique essentielle mais encore trop souvent taboue. Il y a 10, 20 ou 30 ans, le milieu du yoga acceptait des colères, des gestes limites ou des exigences physiques extrêmes sous prétexte qu'il s'agissait de la "personnalité" d'un enseignant ou d'une méthode traditionnelle. Aujourd'hui, à l'ère post-#MeToo et de la libération de la parole, les choses changent et les attentes ne sont plus les mêmes. Les pratiquants veulent comprendre, savoir, et être respectés.En tant que professeurs, comment faire la part des choses entre l'enseignement rigoureux que l'on a reçu et ce qui relève de l'emprise ou de la violence ? Comment éviter de reproduire des schémas toxiques en se disant simplement "c'est comme ça que je l'ai appris et c'est comme ça qu'on transmet" ?Au programme de cet épisode :- Le poids de l'histoire- Le piège psychologique de la souffrance- L'éthique d'Ahimsa (la non-violence)- La posture de l'enseignantParce qu'un enseignant n'est pas un maître absolu à qui l'on doit soumission, mais un compagnon de route qui nous accompagne vers notre propre autonomie.Bonne écoute, et c'est parti pour une exploration sans filtre pour un yoga libre et décomplexée !⭐️ Vous aimez le podcast ?Pensez à laisser 5 étoiles sur Spotify ou Apple Podcasts et à partager cet épisode en story pour soutenir le podcast !Pour poursuivre l'aventure, rejoignez la Newsletter qui s'adresse aux profs de Yoga.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Shanggao. From late March to early April 1940, Japanese forces attacked Shanggao in Jiangxi with a multi‑pronged offensive. Chinese commanders used elastic defense and coordinated counter-moves, trading space for time through layered positions until the Japanese advanced into prepared strongpoints. As the 34th Division moved toward the town, assaults repeatedly hit ridges and bridge lines held by the 74th Corps. Heavy air strikes caused chaos, but timely flank redeployments prevented a decisive breakthrough. During the crisis around March 21–24, Chinese units maneuvered an encirclement and executed a controlled breakout at the critical moment. After intense fighting and bombing, the Japanese were routed and fell back to their original positions. The wider war did not change, yet Shanggao proved that disciplined Chinese planning could reverse Japanese offensives against superior initiative and numbers.   #207 Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By the spring of 1941, the War of Resistance against Japan had been grinding for nearly four years, and the map of China looked increasingly like a wound. Japan controlled the coastal cities, the major river valleys, and most of the productive lowland plains of the north and east. The Nationalist government had retreated far inland to Chongqing, governing a rump state of mountainous hinterland, foreign sympathies, and diminishing resources. The war had long since ceased to look like a conventional conflict between organized fronts and had settled into something grimmer and more ambiguous — a slow war of attrition fought in the mud and rocks of the Chinese interior, punctuated by Japanese offensives designed not to end the war but to compress it, to squeeze the Nationalists tighter with each season until surrender became a rational calculation rather than a humiliation. Japan had tried other methods first. In the late 1930s, Tokyo made serious overtures to Chiang Kai-shek's government, proposing a negotiated settlement that would see China aligned with Japan and the puppet Wang Jingwei government elevated as the vehicle for that arrangement. Chiang refused. He had gambled, and would continue to gamble, that the war in Europe would eventually draw in the Western powers, that American patience with Japanese aggression would run out, and that time was ultimately on China's side. The strategy required suffering in the present to buy survival in the future. Germany's invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the subsequent expansion of war across Europe only reinforced Japan's desire to accelerate its operations in China before the international situation made them impossible. By 1940, Japan signaled it intended to resolve the "China Incident" — the bureaucratic euphemism it used to avoid officially acknowledging that it was fighting a full-scale war — once and for all. The question was where. The front was hundreds of miles long. The Japanese army in China was stretched thin despite its nominal strength. Spectacular victories in the lowlands had failed to produce the political capitulation Tokyo expected. And in the mountains of Shanxi Province, a particular irritant had been festering for three years — one that the Japanese could neither ignore nor seem to dislodge. The Zhongtiao Mountains rise along the southern edge of Shanxi Province, running roughly east to west for some two hundred miles, forming a natural wall between the loess plateaus of Shanxi and the plains of northern Henan below. The range is not dramatic by Chinese standards — it is not the soaring, cloud-piercing landscape of Sichuan or Yunnan — but it is rugged, deeply ridged, and extraordinarily difficult to move through quickly. For a defending army with knowledge of the terrain, the Zhongtiao range was close to ideal. For an attacker, especially one dependent on mechanized firepower and coordinated logistics, it was a nightmare. Chinese forces had occupied the Zhongtiao Mountains since 1938, following the fall of Taiyuan and the retreat of Nationalist forces from the broader Shanxi campaign. At a moment when much of northern China was collapsing around them, the garrison there dug in and refused to move. Over the following three years, the Japanese Army mounted thirteen separate offensives against the Zhongtiao position. All thirteen failed. The mountains held. Chinese soldiers would later call it the "Eastern Maginot Line," a nickname that was simultaneously a boast and, in retrospect, a warning — the original Maginot Line, after all, had also been considered impregnable until the enemy simply went around it. But the strategic importance of Zhongtiao went beyond prestige. The mountains commanded the northern approach to the Yellow River crossings — the great geographic boundary that separated Japanese-controlled northern China from the Nationalist-held central and western regions. From their positions in the mountains, Chinese troops could threaten Japanese supply lines, protect their own river logistics, and maintain at least a symbolic presence north of the Yellow River. As long as the Zhongtiao garrison held, Japan could not claim complete control of northern China. It was also a potential launching point for a Chinese counteroffensive, should one ever become possible. The Japanese understood this perfectly. By 1940, eliminating the Zhongtiao position had become not merely desirable but strategically necessary. The First War Zone command responsible for the Zhongtiao garrison was, at least on paper, an imposing force. Between 170,000 and 180,000 men were deployed across the mountain range and its approaches, drawn from multiple armies and organized into several large groupings. The 5th Army Group under Zeng Wanzhong held the central area. The 14th Army Group under Liu Maoen operated in the eastern sector. The 4th Army Group, known as the "Iron Pillar of Zhongtiao" for its tenacious defense of the position over three years, was stationed as the backbone of the force. Individual armies were spread across specific nodes: Pei Changhui's 9th Army at Jiyuan in northern Henan; Zhao Shiling's 43rd Army at Yuanqu at the southernmost tip of Shanxi; Tang Huaiyuan's 3rd Army and Kong Lingxun's 80th Army in the Wenxi and Xiaxian areas; Wu Shimin's 98th Army at Dongfeng Town; Wu Tinglin's 15th Army near Gaoping. The man responsible for holding all of this together was Wei Lihuang, a gifted commander and one of Chiang Kai-shek's most capable generals. Wei had organized the Zhongtiao defense from the beginning, and his strategic instincts were widely respected. He was, by most accounts, the indispensable figure in the garrison's survival. The problem was that Wei had made powerful enemies. His refusal to participate in anti-Communist friction operations — at a time when the Nationalist government was increasingly focused on neutralizing the Communists even at the cost of Japanese resistance — had alienated him from a circle of powerful rivals, including the influential Hu Zongnan. Outmaneuvered at court, Wei was summoned to Chongqing in early 1941 and, under the pretext of strategic consultations, was effectively detained at Mount Emei. He never returned to his command in the Zhongtiao Mountains. The army he had built was left without its architect. The garrison that remained was compromised far beyond its missing commander, however. Three years of static defense had created conditions that corroded military discipline in predictable and insidious ways. Supply lines were unreliable, rations were short, and the soldiers garrisoning remote mountain positions had turned, by necessity and then by habit, to the local economy to sustain themselves. A bustling illicit trade in grain and opium had sprung up across the mountain zone, with Chinese troops selling what they could and buying what they needed from merchants who operated equally comfortably on both sides of the Japanese-Chinese frontier. This was not merely a logistical failure. It meant that Japanese intelligence had abundant commercial cover to infiltrate the garrison area, that security was a fiction, and that the defensive posture of the entire force had quietly shifted from warlike readiness to something closer to bureaucratic occupation. The Japanese had not missed any of this. For months before the offensive, Japanese intelligence agents had worked their way into the garrison's supply networks, trading relationships, and eventually its command structure itself. Japanese special forces had identified key headquarters positions. Informants had mapped the positions of individual units, traced the routes between them, and assessed the readiness of the men holding them. By the spring of 1941, Japanese planners believed, with considerable justification, that they could paralyze the entire Chinese command system within an hour of opening fire. This was not boasting. It was reconnaissance. Back in Chongqing, the intelligence picture was worse than unclear — it was actively distorted. The Nationalist intelligence apparatus issued warnings about Japanese troop movements near the Zhongtiao perimeter in April 1941, but the warnings were partial, their significance disputed, and the political will to act on them absent. A series of conferences were convened at Luoyang, the regional headquarters. Fortification orders were issued. Additional supplies were promised. Almost none of the follow-through actually materialized. The garrison's most powerful formation, the 4th Army Group, had already been transferred away from the area. Its absence left a hole in the defensive line that no amount of paper orders could fill. On the Japanese side, the operation that would eliminate the Zhongtiao garrison was carefully and systematically prepared. It was codenamed the "Central Plains Campaign" — a name that reflected its true ambition, which was not merely to take a mountain range but to reshape the strategic geography of the entire region. The operation was assigned to the North China Area Army under Lieutenant General Tada Shun, an experienced commander who had studied the Zhongtiao problem for years and had a clear understanding of why previous offensives had failed. The core of the attacking force was seven divisions: the 33rd, 35th, 36th, 37th, 41st, and 21st Divisions, along with several independent mixed brigades, puppet Chinese formations, cavalry, and a substantial artillery and air component. The 3rd Air Group, operating from airfields at Yuncheng and Xinxiang, would provide tactical air support throughout the operation. In total, the frontline assault force numbered approximately 100,000 men. This was not a repeat of the previous thirteen offensives, in which the Japanese had probed and pressed at the mountains frontally. This was a comprehensive annihilation plan. Tada's design exploited the geographic shape of the Zhongtiao position itself. The Chinese garrison occupied a roughly crescent-shaped area, with its back to the Yellow River and its front facing north and east into Japanese-held territory. The obvious previous approach — attacking from the north — had failed repeatedly because the terrain favored the defenders. Tada's solution was to attack from three directions simultaneously, with the town of Yuanqu on the Yellow River as the primary objective. Yuanqu was the hinge of the entire Chinese position: it controlled the main river crossings, served as the central supply point for the garrison, and sat at the narrowest point between the mountains and the water. If Yuanqu fell, the Chinese would be cut off from their supply line and divided into two separate pockets. Then each pocket could be destroyed at leisure. To execute this, Tada organized his forces into three attack groups. The eastern group, built around Lieutenant General Harada Yukichi's 35th Division with elements of the 21st Division and the 4th Independent Cavalry Brigade — totaling roughly 25,000 men with armor, artillery, and supporting puppet forces — would drive westward along the Daoqing Road, pushing through Jiyuan and Mengxian toward the eastern flank of the Chinese position. The northeastern group, under Lieutenant General Shozo Sakurai commanding the 33rd Division and an Independent Mixed Brigade, would descend from Yangcheng southward, striking at the middle of the Chinese line. The western and northwestern group, the largest, comprising the 36th, 37th, and 41st Divisions along with the 9th and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades, would push southward from multiple points between Sangchi and Zhangdian, driving straight for Yuanqu. The final element of the plan was the most audacious. Japanese special forces and paratroopers were to land behind Chinese lines on the opening night of the offensive, targeting the Chinese headquarters and communications nodes. If the Chinese command could be blinded and paralyzed in the first hours of the battle, resistance would collapse before it could organize. Given the penetration of the garrison by Japanese intelligence, the paratroopers knew precisely where to go. From late April, Japanese forces quietly moved into their assault positions. Supply dumps were stocked. Artillery was registered on Chinese positions. The attack was set for the morning of May 7, 1941. Everything was ready. The battle opened before dawn on May 7, and it opened everywhere at once. On the eastern front, Harada's 35th Division and its attached formations crossed the start line and drove westward in three parallel columns along the Daoqing Road. More than 5,000 infantrymen, 1,000 cavalry, dozens of artillery pieces, over 100 tanks and armored vehicles, and the supporting puppet troops of Zhang Lanfeng and Liu Yanfeng poured into the Chinese-held area around Jiyuan and Mengxian. The assault had an almost mechanical quality — it moved at the pace of its armor and artillery, methodically grinding through whatever lay in its path. On the northeastern front, Sakurai's 33rd Division descended from Yangcheng with more than 10,000 men, striking at Wu Shimin's 98th Army at Dongfeng Town. Wu was one of the more aggressive Chinese commanders in the garrison, and he did not wait to be overwhelmed. He threw his forces into active resistance on multiple axes, contesting each Japanese advance rather than simply absorbing it. In the fighting around Wangcun, his troops achieved one of the campaign's rare Chinese tactical successes, routing approximately 2,000 Japanese attackers and killing more than 700, including Colonel Hamada, a Japanese regimental commander. It was a genuine local victory, but it could not change the larger picture. On the western and northwestern front, the main Japanese force pushed south with its eyes fixed on Yuanqu. The coordinated weight of three divisions and two independent brigades, all moving along converging axes, was designed to be overwhelming. Individually, a Chinese unit might hold a ridge or a pass for a day. Collectively, there was no way to stop what was coming. And that same night, as the Chinese scrambled to respond to attacks on every side, Japanese paratroopers landed near Chinese headquarters positions. They found what intelligence had promised: a command system already in disarray, staffed by officers who had received no coherent orders and had lost communications with most of their subordinate units. The Japanese were not wrong when they predicted they could paralyze the Chinese command within hours. By the morning of May 8, the Chinese First War Zone headquarters had effectively ceased to function as a coordinating body. Individual armies would fight on, but they would fight alone. The second day of the battle brought the decisive blow. On the afternoon of May 8, the 9th Army under Pei Changhui — already reeling from the pressure of the eastern Japanese columns — abandoned the cities of Ji and Meng and fell back westward. The withdrawal opened a path through the Chinese line, and the Japanese exploited it immediately. That evening, with the assistance of paratroopers who had secured key access routes overnight, Japanese forces reached Yuanqu on the Yellow River's northern bank and took it. The fall of Yuanqu changed everything. At a single stroke, the Chinese garrison's supply line from the south bank of the Yellow River was severed. The main crossing points were in Japanese hands. The two halves of the Chinese position — those to the east of Yuanqu and those to the west — were now separated, unable to reinforce one another. The double encirclement that Tada had designed on paper became a physical reality on the ground. The trap had closed. May 9 brought further disaster. Japanese forces captured Wufujian, another significant point in the Chinese rear. And on this day the battle's human cost began to register in the most stark terms possible. Wang Jun, commander of the newly formed 27th Division of Kong Lingxun's 80th Army, was killed in action fighting in the southern Shanxi mountains. Major General Chen Wenqi, deputy commander of the 24th Division, died in fierce combat near Taizhai Village. And Major General Liang Xixian, having retreated with the remnants of his force to Taizhai and found every route blocked — his options reduced to surrender or death — walked into the Yellow River and drowned himself. He was not the last Chinese officer to choose death over capture. The loss of three generals in a single day was not merely tragic. It reflected something about the nature of the battle that the casualty statistics alone could not capture: the Chinese officers who fought most fiercely and refused to abandon their positions were precisely the men dying, while the broader institutional structure that should have supported them had already failed. The garrison was being consumed from its fighting edge inward. Over the following two days, the Japanese methodically tightened the ring. The eastern column, having taken Yuanqu, split into two prongs: one drove eastward, capturing Shaoyuan by the morning of May 12 and linking up with the forces that had been pressing westward from Jiyuan; the other drove westward to Wufujian, joining with the troops already there. The inner encirclement was now complete and continuous. The Yellow River crossings along the entire Chinese front were blocked. There was no route south that wasn't already under fire or in Japanese hands. The fighting in the mountain passes was, by all accounts, ferocious. At Fengmenkou — a critical pass that both sides recognized as a key chokepoint — the Chinese 9th Army committed the main force of its newly formed 24th Division along with elements of the 54th Division, fighting for every ridge and ravine. The Japanese sent reinforcements and simply absorbed the punishment, pressing forward until numbers and artillery told. By May 12, the position at Jianshan had been surrounded as well, and the outer ring of encirclement had sealed. The Chinese armies in the Zhongtiao Mountains were now divided into isolated pockets, each fighting separately, each trying to find a gap in the Japanese lines that simply wasn't there. Beyond the mountains, the Chinese high command in Luoyang was issuing desperate orders. Units that had already been overrun were instructed to hold positions they no longer occupied. Army commanders who had lost contact with their corps were told to coordinate with formations they couldn't reach. The gap between the orders flowing from headquarters and the reality on the ground had become absolute. The First War Zone command was, in practical terms, a spectator to the destruction of its own army. Of all the days in the three-week battle, May 13 was perhaps the most devastating for Chinese morale. At Cunbu, in the western sector, the 3rd Army under Lieutenant General Tang Huaiyuan had been surrounded and cut off. Tang was among the finest officers in the Nationalist army — a career soldier of exceptional ability, admired by subordinates and superiors alike, the kind of commander who by his personal presence could steady troops on the edge of breaking. He had led the 3rd Army in continuous fighting since May 7, conducting a fighting retreat that had preserved more of his force than most. But there was nowhere left to retreat to. Cunbu was surrounded on all sides. The Yellow River was behind him. The Japanese were in front. Tang Huaiyuan sat with his surviving officers and told them that he would not surrender. Then he shot himself. He was fifty-seven years old. On the same day, Cun Xingqi, commander of the 12th Division, was hit eight times during close combat and died on the field. The tally of dead general officers had now reached five in the space of a week. Tang Huaiyuan's death, unlike the others, resonated as something more than a military loss. He was a symbol of what the Zhongtiao defense had once represented: the possibility that courage and skill could compensate for disadvantages in firepower and logistics. His death seemed to say, loudly, that that possibility was exhausted. Chiang Kai-shek, when news reached him in Chongqing, personally ordered that Tang Huaiyuan be posthumously promoted and honored. The gesture was well-intentioned and entirely beside the point. Tang was dead. His army was destroyed. The gesture could not undo either fact. With the double encirclement complete and the primary Chinese resistance broken, the Japanese Army entered the second and less dramatic but equally brutal phase of its operation: the systematic clearance of what remained. Beginning around May 15, Japanese units shifted from the headlong offensive drives of the first week to methodical sweep operations, moving through the mountain terrain in organized formations, pressing into each remaining pocket and eliminating whatever resistance they found. The Yellow River's northern bank was secured by Japanese forces who established posts at the crossing points, blocking retreat and interdicting any resupply attempt. From the western front, sweep operations continued in a series of movements that lasted until well into June, each one driving Chinese remnants further into smaller and more untenable positions. Japanese after-action reports from this period read with the clinical detachment of men doing carpentry rather than fighting: so many positions cleared, so many prisoners taken, so many bodies counted. For the surviving Chinese forces, this period was one of desperate improvisation. With coordinated resistance impossible and every organized position either taken or surrounded, the remnant armies broke up into smaller columns and attempted to find their own routes out of the encirclement. Their experiences varied enormously depending on their starting position, the initiative of their commanders, and fortune. The remnants of the 3rd Army and 15th Army, under Zeng Wanzhong of the 5th Army Group, managed to push through to Yellow River crossings in the west and get their men across to the south bank, eventually reorganizing at Luoyang and Xin'an. The 93rd Army, which had occupied positions in the northeast, shook off the Japanese pursuit with sufficient speed and organization to cross at Yumenkou and escape into Hancheng County in Shaanxi Province, preserving more of its fighting strength than most. Wu Shimin's 98th Army — whose fighting at Wangcun had been one of the campaign's genuine bright spots — was pushed northward into the Taiyue Mountains, conducting guerrilla operations as it went. Wu himself was wounded during the withdrawal and would spend months recovering; he never fully recovered his health, and would die by suicide the following year. The 43rd Army under Zhao Shiling, which had held Yuanqu before its fall, managed a fighting withdrawal toward Fushan and Yicheng in the north. Pei Changhui's 9th Army conducted several days of guerrilla operations along the Daoqing Road before finding crossings at Xiaodukou and Guanyangdukou and getting across the Yellow River to safety. By May 27, the great majority of the Zhongtiao Mountain garrison had either been destroyed, captured, or withdrawn. The mountains that had held for three years were in Japanese hands. The battle, for all practical purposes, was over. The two sides emerged from the battle with starkly different accounts of what had happened, and the gap between those accounts is itself revealing. Japanese operational records claimed that their forces had killed approximately 42,000 Chinese soldiers on the battlefield, taken around 35,000 prisoners, captured enormous quantities of weapons and supplies, and inflicted total Chinese casualties exceeding 100,000. Against this, Japanese headquarters reported their own losses as 673 killed and 2,292 wounded — a ratio so lopsided that it seemed to describe a completely different kind of warfare. Whether or not the precise numbers are accurate, Japanese sources were consistent in portraying the battle as a catastrophic one-sided rout. The Chinese government's official figures, presented to the public and to allied nations, told a very different story. Nationalist records acknowledged approximately 13,751 officers and soldiers killed, wounded, gassed, or missing, while claiming Japanese casualties of around 9,900. These numbers, by the standards of the actual fighting and the geographic scale of the defeat, strained credulity. They were the numbers of a government that needed, for political and morale reasons, to minimize a disaster it could not afford to fully acknowledge. What is beyond dispute is the strategic result. The Zhongtiao garrison, which had held for three years against thirteen prior offensives, had been destroyed in twenty days. The last significant Nationalist Chinese presence north of the Yellow River in the region had been eliminated. Japan now controlled the northern bank of the river for a substantial stretch, had secured its supply lines through southern Shanxi, and had opened the door for future pressure on Luoyang and ultimately Xi'an. The mountain barrier that had allowed Chinese forces to threaten Japanese logistics was gone. It would not be rebuilt. Six senior Chinese generals had died in the battle: Wang Jun, Chen Wenqi, Liang Xixian, Tang Huaiyuan, Cun Xingqi, and others in the fighting. Their deaths were individually remarkable — men choosing death over surrender at rate that reflected both the desperate conditions of the battle and a code of honor that many of them explicitly invoked in their final moments. They were also, in aggregate, a measure of how completely the officer corps had been consumed. In the decades since the battle, historians have returned repeatedly to the question of why a position held for three years collapsed so completely in three weeks. The answers are neither simple nor flattering to the Nationalist government, and they were debated with bitter intensity in Chongqing even while the battle was still being fought. The most immediate cause was the removal of Wei Lihuang. This was not merely the loss of a capable general — it was the destruction of the institutional knowledge and personal relationships that had made the defense function. The Zhongtiao garrison was not simply a collection of soldiers in mountain positions; it was a system, carefully constructed over three years, that depended on specific command relationships, established logistics arrangements, and particular allocation of resources. Wei had built that system. Without him, and without any adequate replacement, it became something far more brittle than it appeared. Below the level of high command, the garrison's gradual corruption was an equally powerful factor. The trading networks, the opium commerce, the penetration by Japanese intelligence — these were not incidental problems but symptoms of a deeper institutional failure. An army that has spent three years in static defensive positions, chronically undersupplied and without a meaningful offensive mission, tends toward exactly this kind of decay. The Nationalist government's decision to prioritize anti-Communist friction operations over Zhongtiao's fighting readiness had removed the 4th Army Group — the backbone of the defense — and had consumed Wei Lihuang's attention and political capital at the worst possible moment. The Japanese plan, too, deserves credit it rarely receives in Chinese accounts of the battle. The three-pronged converging attack on Yuanqu was not simply overwhelming force applied to an obvious target. It was an elegant solution to the genuine tactical puzzle that the Zhongtiao mountains presented, exploiting the garrison's geographic vulnerability with a precision that turned the defenders' mountain terrain from an asset into a trap. The use of paratroopers to decapitate the Chinese command in the opening hours was a sophisticated operational concept that worked almost exactly as designed. Tada Shun was not lucky. He was thorough. Finally, there is the question of Chiang Kai-shek's own priorities. His reported weeping upon receiving news of the defeat was genuine, in the sense that the loss clearly shocked and grieved him. But the decisions that led to the defeat — Wei Lihuang's removal, the transfer of the 4th Army Group, the neglect of fortification and resupply in the months preceding the battle — had been made in Chongqing, not in the mountains. The Zhongtiao garrison had been strategically sacrificed, piece by piece, for political calculations in the internal factional struggle between Nationalists and Communists. Whether Chiang understood the cost of those choices before May 7, 1941, is debatable. After that date, it was difficult to pretend otherwise. The fall of the Zhongtiao Mountains did not end the War of Resistance, but it substantially worsened China's strategic position in the north. Over the following months, Japan used its consolidated control of southern Shanxi to increase pressure on the Yellow River line and probe toward Luoyang. The surviving Chinese armies, reorganized south of the river, were in no position to counterattack. The mountains themselves, stripped of their garrison and secured by Japanese occupation troops, became part of the extended Japanese occupation zone — a territory to be administered and exploited rather than contested. For the men who had fought there, the battle left wounds that went beyond the physical. Entire armies had to be rebuilt from remnants. Officers who had retreated, whether under orders or on their own initiative, faced boards of inquiry in an atmosphere of recrimination and blame-seeking. Some were cashiered. Some faced criminal proceedings. The search for culpability — which was genuine enough, since the failure was genuine — tended to fall on those least able to defend themselves rather than on the senior commanders and political figures whose decisions had created the conditions for defeat. The posthumous honors awarded to Tang Huaiyuan, Liang Xixian, Wang Jun, and the other officers who died in battle were heartfelt, and they were also convenient. The heroic dead could be elevated without requiring the living to answer uncomfortable questions. Their sacrifice was real. The system that wasted it was also real. In the broader history of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain tends to be overshadowed by more famous engagements — Shanghai, Nanjing, Taierzhuang, the later battles along the Salween. This is partly because the Chinese side lost comprehensively and had little interest in memorializing the loss, and partly because the battle's significance was more strategic than dramatic. There was no great last stand, no single moment of heroism sufficient to redeem the catastrophe. There were only men dying in mountain passes, generals walking into rivers, and an entire defensive system disintegrating under the weight of its own contradictions. What the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain represents, in the end, is a case study in how military positions are really lost. They are rarely lost on the battlefield alone. They are lost in the staff meetings where capable commanders are removed for political reasons. They are lost in the supply depots that never get restocked. They are lost in the informal economies that grow up when institutions stop functioning. They are lost in the intelligence assessments that are written and ignored. They are lost, finally and irreversibly, in the early morning hours when the guns open simultaneously on three sides and the men at the radios discover that no one is answering.     I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On May 7, 1941, Japan opened a three-front assault on Zhongtiao Mountains; paratroopers disrupted command night. With the 9th Army withdrawing, Yuanqu fell on May 8, severing supply and trapping the garrison. Fighting raged through May 13, costing generals, until Japanese sweeps cleared pockets; survivors escaped south of Yellow River.

Face au virus du Nil occidental, le Tessin renforce sa surveillance Les brèves du jour L'étude de la vie dans l'espace "La Drôle d'histoire du corps": une BD qui se penchent sur les gestes qu'on pense naturels

Cette semaine, nous avons rendez-vous avec le Colonel Jean-Hugues Delhumeau, chef de corps du 4e Régiment Étranger basé à Castelnaudary. Avec lui, nous allons découvrir les coulisses de la formation des légionnaires.Pour info, dans le numéro papier de notre magazine actuellement en kiosque, nous consacrons notre dossier à cette école de la Légion : https://defense-zone.com/products/magazine-defense-zone-22À noter que cette émission est disponible sur toutes les plateformes audio (Spotify, Deezer, Apple et Google Podcast), ainsi que sur YouTube.Pensez à vous abonner et à laisser une note de 5 étoiles pour aider à la faire connaître.Et si vous souhaitez soutenir notre média indépendant, vous pouvez également rejoindre notre espace premium sur defense-zone.com et mettre la main sur du contenu inédit ainsi que nos magazines papier !Nous vous souhaitons une bonne écoute.Hébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Salut les sportifs intelligents ! Cette semaine on va parler d'une vérité qui dérange : transpirer ne fait pas maigrir.

Deux ans après notre première rencontre, Rana Gorgani est de retour dans Les Sens de la Danse.Lorsque nous avions échangé pour la première fois, nous parlions de spiritualité, de transmission et de danse soufie. Depuis, le monde a changé. Et son travail aussi.Née en Allemagne d'une mère iranienne et d'un père kurde d'Iran, Rana Gorgani est aujourd'hui l'une des rares femmes au monde à se revendiquer derviche tourneur.Aujourd'hui, nous revenons sur les bouleversements de ces deux dernières années : la guerre, le mouvement Femme, Vie, Liberté, les spectacles annulés, la calligraphie, la notion de trace et la naissance d'Operation Epic Fury, création présentée le 11 juillet 2026 lors de La Nuit de l'Année aux Rencontres d'Arles.Une conversation sur la foi, l'engagement, les femmes, l'art et le pouvoir de la danse lorsqu'elle devient une manière de répondre au monde.Je suis Myriam Sellam, journaliste et créatrice du podcast Les Sens de la Danse.

Bienvenue dans un nouvel épisode de Corps & Esprit, le podcast qui muscle ton corps et renforce ton esprit.Aujourd'hui, Flavio et Meryl reçoivent Mary Delberghe, naturopathe spécialisée en santé de la femme — troubles hormonaux, endométriose, SOPK, ménopause... Un épisode dense, bienveillant et qui dit beaucoup de choses qu'on n'entend pas assez. Parce qu'une femme qui a les hormones qui fonctionnent bien, ça existe. Et ça ne devrait pas être une exception. Ebook récapitulatif de l'épisode : https://go.nutripreneur.com/e-book-corps-et-esprit-episode-special-sante-feminine Dans cet épisode, Mary explique :- Pourquoi souffrir pendant ses règles n'est pas normal et ce que ça dit vraiment de ta santé- Ce qu'est un cycle menstruel sain, et comment les 4 phases changent tout à la façon de vivre et de travailler- SOPK, endométriose, hypothyroïdie : les différences, les signaux d'alerte et ce qu'on peut vraiment faire naturellement- Pourquoi la pilule est trop souvent prescrite comme un pansement et ce qu'on rate en faisant ça- Le lien entre stress chronique, système nerveux et déséquilibre hormonal Un épisode pour toutes les femmes, et pour les hommes qui vivent, aiment ou travaillent avec elles. Épisode sponsorisé par Nutripreneur : -20% sur l'une de tes commandes avec le code "CORPSETESPRIT20" (valable une seule fois, que ce soit ta première commande ou non !)

dans cet épisode, Camille nous partage son histoire avec l'anorexie, ses premiers pas vers les soins ainsi que toute l'ambivalence entre l'envie de guérir et la peur de lâcher le trouble . un témoignage touchant, qui nous montre les TCA vus de l'intérieur et surtout un témoignage qui nous montre qu'il est possible de guérir des troubles des conduites alimentaires. le compte instagram de Camille : @laissetoi.vivre____Pour me soutenir et si vous avez apprécié l'épisode, n'hésitez pas à noter le podcast et même le partager autour de vous

A single night of terror in the mountains of Haiti in 1791 ignites a slave revolution that forever alters America's destiny.  This episode follows the astonishing chain of events leading to the Louisiana Purchase, the greatest land deal in American history.  Napoleon's collapsing Caribbean empire, Thomas Jefferson's constitutional dilemma, and Robert Livingtson's high-stakes negotiations all collide in a moment that doubles the size of the United States overnight.  Then, follow Meriwether Lewis, William Clark, Sacagawea, and the “Corps of Discovery” on their 8,000-mile expedition into the unknown.  It's a story of ambition, survival, discovery, and the complicated growth of a continental nation. GLENN'S SPONSORS: American Giant: We desperately need to get back to the independent spirit of American manufacturing – and American Giant is doing their part. Get 20% off your first order by going to ⁠AmericanGiant.com/Glenn⁠. Relief Factor: If you're living with aches and pains, see how Relief Factor, a daily drug-free supplement, could help you feel better and live better. Try the three-week QuickStart for just $19.95 by visiting ⁠https://ReliefFactor.com⁠. Byrna: Not every threat requires lethal force. Byrna's less-lethal launchers give you the ability to stop an aggressor from a safe distance. Save $100 on the Byrna L.E. Gen 2 launcher, while supplies last, by going to ⁠Byrna.com⁠ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Christian; Follower of GOD Servant of CHRIST       Patreon https://bit.ly/3jcLDuZBio:Combat Veteran; U.S. Marine Corps Urban Warfare Instructor;       S.R.T. Commander Active Shooter Response Team Law Enforcement Los Angeles Police (L.A.P.D.) Police Officer / Fugitive RecoveryF.B.I. Instructor N.R.A Instructor Competition Shooter; Multi Time State Rifle Pistol Champion Hunting; Life Long Hunter Professional Hunter and Guide Private Security Contractor; Several Agencies,  Current.Patreon https://bit.ly/3jcLDuZBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/gunfighter-life-survival-guns-ammo-hunting-defense-tactics--4187306/support.Have a Blessed Day 

i know we're not the only ones that have felt very very VERY lost at some point in our lives. no school to guide us, no passion to follow, just an empty canvas for us to fill. that first streak can feel so daunting so how are we supposed to get on with it? what kind of live are we trying to live? how are we supposed to know? in this episode we chat about how maybe the answer is service and well... play! because to be in service of others, to commit yourself to a cause bigger than yourself, it is how you find a deep sense of fulfillment. and play is the other little secret to this. because you need to play and explore and do many many things to get the inspiration you need for a good life. so if you're feeling lost maybe the answer is simple: go serve, go play.  cunt asf no? follow us: @grownk1d @gaelaitor @_kaylasuarez join our social club: https://grownkid.typeform.com/to/eZhvsKGH?typeform-source=grownkid.com overshare with us: grownkid.com About our Partners: GrownKid is made in partnership with Joy Coalition where purpose driven content meets powerful storytelling. From 13 Reasons Why to Unprisoned, Joy Coalition projects are made to bridge generations and drive groundbreaking conversations. For more on the Youth Mental Health Corps and how you can get involved in your state, go to youthmentalhealthcorps.org. This episode of GrownKid is sponsored by the Schultz Family Foundation, whose mission is to create greater opportunity accessible to all. Today, 45% of young people report mental health challenges, yet 62% of those who have struggled aren't getting the complete care they need. To address this crisis, the Foundation, in partnership with Pinterest, launched the Youth Mental Health Corps. The Corps trains and places young adults as mental health supporters in schools and communities in 16 states so far.  These Corps members, who are close in age to the young people they serve, are having a real impact. Schools where they serve have seen fewer behavioral incidents and better attendance, and an increase in young people seeking help proactively. The Youth Mental Health Corps is continuing to expand-- helping thousands of young people get the support they need while also building careers in behavioral health. Learn more about the Youth Mental Health Corps in your state and how you can get involved at youthmentalhealthcorps.org. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

(00:00:00) Welcome to Philosophy from the Frontline (00:01:04) A Farm Boy's Journey to the Marines (00:06:34) The Fateful Night in Ocean Side (00:11:48) The Aftermath and Medical Miracle (00:16:51) The Importance of Action in Trauma (00:19:59) The Lost Art of Problem-Solving (00:24:06) The Marine Corps' Unique Identity (00:25:24) The Struggle for Veterans' Benefits (00:37:12) The Power of Perseverance and Resilience (00:39:18) Entrepreneurship and Transition Challenges Jay Setchell, a former Marine and author, shares his compelling life story on the Philosophy from the Frontline podcast. Jay recounts his upbringing on a farm, his enlistment in the Marines, and his traumatic experiences in Vietnam, including a near-death accident and a subsequent 17-year fight for full disability retirement. He emphasizes the importance of resilience, community, and continuous improvement. Jay also discusses his transition to entrepreneurship, highlighting his work with a small-owned business focused on training and simulation, and his recent successes with DARPA and Saab. He stresses the significance of doing one's best for others and the strength within each individual.As mentioned in the podcast -  https://neverquittrying.com/Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/philosophy-from-the-front-line--4319845/support.Disclaimer: The content of the "Philosophy From the Front Line" podcast is intended for informational and educational purposes only. The views and opinions expressed by the hosts and guests are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of any affiliated organizations or sponsors. This podcast does not offer legal, financial, or professional advice. Listeners are encouraged to consult appropriate professionals before making decisions based on the content presented. "Philosophy From the Front Line" assumes no responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions in the content or for actions taken based on the information provided during the podcast episodes. Fair Use Statement: This podcast may contain copyrighted material not specifically authorized by the copyright owner. "Philosophy From the Front Line" is making such material available to educate, inform, and provide commentary under the "Fair Use" provisions of U.S. copyright law (Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act). We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as it is:Used for non-commercial, educational, or research purposes.Critically analyzed, reviewed, or discussed.Used in a transformative way that adds new meaning or message to the original work.If you own any content used and believe it infringes on your copyright, please contact us directly, and we will address the matter promptly. 

Christian; Follower of GOD Servant of CHRIST       Patreon https://bit.ly/3jcLDuZBio:Combat Veteran; U.S. Marine Corps Urban Warfare Instructor;       S.R.T. Commander Active Shooter Response Team Law Enforcement Los Angeles Police (L.A.P.D.) Police Officer / Fugitive RecoveryF.B.I. Instructor N.R.A Instructor Competition Shooter; Multi Time State Rifle Pistol Champion Hunting; Life Long Hunter Professional Hunter and Guide Private Security Contractor; Several Agencies,  Current.Patreon https://bit.ly/3jcLDuZBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/gunfighter-life-survival-guns-ammo-hunting-defense-tactics--4187306/support.Have a Blessed Day 

Ted's an ex-Marine. I guess once a Marine, always a Marine. Right? You know — halls of Montezuma, shores of Tripoli, and semper fi. Since his days in the Corps, Ted's gone on to become very successful in business, but he keeps getting invited back to talk to Marine recruits as an inspirational speaker. And in the process, he tells them about a rescuer who came for him in the Marines and saved him — Jesus Christ. And I love what he tells them — “One thing about Marines — we always go back for our own, and that's why I'm here today. I'm going back for my own.” I'm Ron Hutchcraft and I want to have A Word With You today about “Leaving No One Behind.” Those Marines really listen to Ted, because he's one of their own. That's sort of a law of life, isn't it? We tend to listen to our own kind; maybe when we would listen to no one else. Especially when it comes to the rescuer that my friend tells the Marines about. More and more, people aren't going to listen to some “Christian professional” tell them about Jesus. No, even though their lives depend on understanding Jesus. They're not likely to go to one of those meetings that we have. It's probably going to have to be one of their own…like you. Jesus understood that approach to rescuing spiritually dying people. He used that approach Himself in our word for today from the Word of God. Here's the deal: Jesus has gone into Samaria to reach the Samaritans, and since the Jews and Samaritans basically couldn't stand each other, how is this Jewish rabbi going to reach them? He's going to send one of their own to go back and get her own — even though she is probably known for her immorality, her relationships with many men, her string of marriages and divorces. First, she meets Jesus at a well where she discovers who He really is. Then in John 4, beginning with verse 28, the Bible says, “Leaving her water jar, the woman went back to the town and said to the people, ‘Come, see a man who told me everything I ever did. Could this be the Christ?' They came out of the town and made their way toward Him…Many of the Samaritans believed in Him because of the woman's testimony…” Well, they listened to her when she talked about Jesus because she was one of their own. That's what makes you so eternally important to your coworkers, your fellow students, your neighbors, your teammates — you're one of them. They'll be more likely to listen to you talking about a personal relationship with Jesus than to any preacher or evangelist or radio or TV guy. Well, you may say, “but I'm not trained…I've got a lot of problems…I don't know enough.” Excuse me, but have you thought about the one Jesus sent as His ambassador to the Samaritans? See, what qualifies you is two things: you've met Jesus, and you're one of them. He's placed you where you are not just to get grades or get paid or get comfy. He's put you there to take some of those people to heaven with you! So, how are you doing? The best one to reach a lost farmer is another farmer…the best one to reach a lost mom is another mom. a lost teacher, a teacher. How about a lost businessman? It will take a businessman, and so on. But so many people die without ever knowing what Jesus could have done for them. They die without a chance at heaven — because the Christian close to them never told what they knew. That's a death sentence by silence. You don't have to tell them about Christianity, about church, about your religion or a list of Christian beliefs. Just do what the Samaritan woman did — stick to Jesus. She just said, “Come, see a Man!” But don't take them to a well — take them to the Cross and show them how much Jesus loves them. Their best hope is you, because you are already there. Of all the New Year's resolutions you could make, could there be a better one than to say, “I will finally tell the lost people in my world about my Jesus.” You're in their world. You're their spiritual “Marine.” Go back for your own, and don't leave any of them behind.

Tout commence par la disparition d'une femme près d'Angers, en 2023 : Anne Barbot, la trentaine. Un matin comme un autre, elle ne se présente pas au supermarché où elle travaille. Convaincu du pire, Didier, son mari organise battues et marches blanches pour tenter de retrouver sa femme. Il en veut aux gendarmes de ne pas avancer plus vite, et il faut bien reconnaître que l'enquête piétine… Jusqu'au jour où le coupable ou plutôt Les coupables sont découverts… Des coupables au-dessus de tout soupçon.  Un corps calciné dans les bois Dans le coffre du véhicule gisent les restes d'un cadavre recroquevillé et un crâne. À côté, une agrafe de soutien-gorge, et une alliance à l'intérieur de laquelle est gravée la mention : « Didier et Anne. » Une autopsie est réalisée à l'institut médico-légal d'Angers et le 3 avril les résultats tombent : il s'agit sans surprise du corps d'Anne Barbot. Un podcast Bababam Originals Ecriture : Camille Anseaume Voix : Caroline Nogueras Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Christian; Follower of GOD Servant of CHRIST        Patreon https://bit.ly/3jcLDuZ Bio: Combat Veteran; U.S. Marine Corps Urban Warfare Instructor;        S.R.T. Commander Active Shooter Response Team  Law Enforcement Los Angeles Police (L.A.P.D.) Police Officer / Fugitive Recovery F.B.I. Instructor N.R.A Instructor  Competition Shooter; Multi Time State Rifle Pistol Champion  Hunting; Life Long Hunter Professional Hunter and Guide  Private Security Contractor; Several Agencies,  Current. Patreon https://bit.ly/3jcLDuZBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/gunfighter-life-survival-guns-ammo-hunting-defense-tactics--4187306/support.Have a Blessed Day 

Carolyn Woodard covers Anthropic's announcement of Claude Corps, a $150 million national fellowship program placing trained AI fellows inside nonprofit organizations, and gives a quick regulatory update on AI liability and state-level regulation.Claude Corps will train 1,000 early-career fellows on Claude and embed them full-time, in-person at host nonprofits for 12 months. Fellows are employed by CodePath, paid $85,000 plus benefits, and supported by Anthropic and Social Finance, which will handle measurement and evaluation. The first cohort of 100 fellows begins in October 2026, with applications closing July 17th. Host organization applications are also open, and at least 400 nonprofits will participate over the coming years. Carolyn reflects on what this kind of embedded AI capacity could mean for chronically under-resourced nonprofits, while also noting the program's strategic timing ahead of Anthropic's anticipated IPO.On the regulatory front, a German regional court issued a preliminary injunction finding Google liable for false claims in its AI Overview search results, treating AI-generated summaries as the company's own speech rather than protected third-party content. Meanwhile, California's No Robo Bosses Act is advancing through the legislature again after being vetoed earlier, with legislation that would require human oversight when AI is used in workplace discipline and termination decisions. And a federal rule requiring energy and water efficiency assessments for data centers expires in September with no replacement in sight.This episode covers:What Claude Corps is, who can apply as a fellow or host, and what genuine AI capacity-building at a nonprofit could look like in practice.Why Anthropic's investment in the nonprofit sector is both a real opportunity and a strategic brand play, and why that tension doesn't cancel either side out.The German court ruling that could make AI companies liable for hallucinated search results, and what it means for the "just verify everything" standard nonprofits already practice.California's renewed push to regulate AI in the workplace, and the expiring federal rule on data center efficiency.Resources Mentioned:Claude Corps announcement – Anthropic – https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-corpsClaude Corps fellow application – Anthropic – https://www.anthropic.com/claude-corps/fellowClaude Corps host organization application – Anthropic – https://www.anthropic.com/claude-corps/hostGerman court ruling on Google AI Overviews – The Decoder – https://the-decoder.com/landmark-german-ruling-declares-googles-ai-overviews-are-googles-own-words-and-makes-it-liable-for-false-answers/No Robo Bosses Act of 2026 (SB 947) – California State Senate – https://sd05.senate.ca.gov/news/ca-senate-approves-no-robo-bosses-act-2026-ensure-human-oversight-ai-workplaceAI Acceptable Use Policy Template – Community IT Innovators – https://communityit.com/template-acceptable-use-of-ai-tools-in-the-nonprofit-workplace/This resource didn't get in the episode but should have! Will talk about it next week: https://fas.org/publication/community-benefit-agreements-data-center-development/New every Tuesday. _______________________________Start a conversation :)Register to attend a webinar in real time, and find all past transcripts at https://communityit.com/webinars/email Carolyn at cwoodard@communityit.comon LinkedIn on reddit/r/nonprofitITmanagementon the Community IT websiteThanks for listening. 

The Chaplains Corps was created to offer comfort, guidance, and moral clarity to soldiers in the hardest moments of their lives. But chaplains also serve inside a system that demands obedience, violence, and silence. In this episode, Ray examines the long arc of the Corps — from its early entanglement with American wars to the modern pressures reshaping its mission today. Drawing on interviews, archival history, and his own years in uniform, Ray asks a deeper question: What does it mean to be a spiritual witness inside an institution that can break the very people it claims to protect? This is a story about faith, duty, and the quiet human cost that rarely makes it into the official record.For more on Ray visit drraychristian.com.

Last time we spoke about the Hubei-Henan Campaign of 1940-1941. In November 1940, a Central Hubei operation using multiple task forces aimed to exploit Chinese dispersal, achieving only local successes and no lasting territorial gains. The Japanese then tried again in late January 1941 with a major offensive into southern Henan. Despite concentrating a large force, the campaign failed strategically. After the Henan failure, Japan attempted to regain momentum in spring 1941 by attacking western Hubei around Yichang on the Yangtze. Despite an initial barrage and rapid early gains, Japanese forces became exposed in a narrow salient. The Chinese reorganized their river defenses and launched a converging counteroffensive, driving the invaders back and ending the engagement where it began, with the Japanese suffering heavy casualties and their westward push thwarted.   #206 The Battle of Shanggao Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The year 1940 had brought a particular humiliation. In August of that year, Communist General Peng Dehuai had launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive — a massive, coordinated assault across North China that shattered Japanese rail and supply lines, embarrassed Imperial General Headquarters, and demonstrated that the Chinese were far from finished. Japan's response had been brutal, the infamous "Three Alls" campaign of reprisals across the countryside. But the damage had been done, and the attention of Imperial General Headquarters shifted northward. The autumn of 1940 had also seen the First Battle of Changsha, where the Japanese 11th Army under General Sonobe Yahachirō pushed south into Hunan Province expecting to overwhelm the Chinese defenders and finally deal a decisive blow to Chiang Kai-shek's armies. Instead, General Xue Yue — the "Tiger of Changsha" — had allowed the Japanese to advance deep into his prepared killing ground before counterattacking from multiple directions. The Japanese had been forced to retreat in disorder, and the front in Hunan and Jiangxi settled once again into sullen stalemate. It was in this atmosphere of frustrated ambition and strategic inertia that the seeds of Shanggao were sown. By February 1941, Imperial General Headquarters had decided to redeploy the 33rd Division — then garrisoned in the town of Anyi, in northwestern Jiangxi — to North China. The transfer was scheduled to begin in early April, and it made strategic sense: the north required reinforcement, and the front in Jiangxi had been quiet enough that one division could be spared. The problem was that the 33rd Division's departure would leave a gap in Japanese dispositions, and no significant offensive operation had yet been conducted to weaken the Chinese forces that would be left facing a thinned-out Japanese line. Lieutenant General Ōga Shigeru, the energetic commander of the Japanese 34th Division, saw opportunity in the window that existed before the 33rd departed. His division was concentrated around Xishan and Wanshou Palace, astride the Xiang–Gan Highway — the main road running westward through Jiangxi — and across that highway lay the town of Shanggao and the Chinese forces defending it. Ōga proposed exploiting the presence of both divisions for a coordinated strike: a sharp, limited offensive to crush Chinese field forces around Nanchang and the Jiangxi interior before the 33rd Division's train north. The 11th Army headquarters, now commanded by General Marube, endorsed a cautious concept — a "quick strike" with limited objectives. But the 34th Division's staff, energized by Ōga's ambition, had already run well ahead of this guidance. Large-scale requisitioning of coolies for logistics was underway; training exercises aimed at the specific terrain around Shanggao had been conducted; planning had progressed in far more detail than a "limited" operation warranted. This eagerness would prove to be the Japanese undoing before the first shot was fired. Chinese intelligence networks, always attentive to the movement of porters and the telltale preparations that preceded a Japanese offensive, quickly detected the scale of these preparations and reported them to General Luo Zhuoying, commander of the Chinese 19th Army Group. By the time the Japanese columns were forming up to march, Luo had already hardened his defenses and laid the groundwork for a trap. General Luo Zhuoying was not a passive commander. He served simultaneously as commander of the 19th Army Group and as Deputy Commander of the 9th War Zone — the latter post placing him directly under General Xue Yue, the victor of Changsha. Luo had spent the lull after Changsha doing what Chinese commanders across the theater had learned was essential: reorganizing, retraining, and above all improving the defensive architecture of his sector. The plan Luo devised for meeting the anticipated Japanese offensive was elegant in its simplicity and demanding in its execution. Rather than contesting the Japanese advance at the frontier, he would allow the enemy to push westward, yielding ground through three successive defensive lines while bleeding the attackers at every step. The first and second lines would slow the Japanese, exact casualties, and stretch their logistics. The third line — anchored at Shanggao itself — would be the killing ground. There, the Chinese forces would hold fast while other formations swung around the Japanese flanks and rear to close the encirclement. The Japanese, having marched deep into Chinese-held territory with their supply lines thinning and their flanks exposed, would find themselves surrounded rather than victorious. For this plan to work, each Chinese formation had to perform its role with discipline. The 70th Corps, deployed in the north along the arc from Shitou Street through Fengxin to Jing'an, would have to conduct a controlled fighting retreat — yielding ground but making the Japanese pay for it, never breaking and running. The 49th Corps would hold the southern flank and create conditions for flanking action. And the 74th Corps — General Wang Yaowu's elite formation, comprising the 51st, 57th, and 58th Divisions — would hold the final line at Shanggao and serve as the anvil upon which the Japanese advance would shatter. The 74th Corps was by 1941 one of the most battle-hardened formations in the Nationalist Army. It had fought at Shanghai in 1937, at Wuhan in 1938, and in the hills and valleys of Jiangxi through the years since. Its men knew the terrain around Shanggao. They had prepared positions in depth, studied the approaches, and rehearsed the defensive plan Luo had designed. When the Japanese came, they would be ready. Against the Chinese 70,000 — distributed across eleven divisions in four corps, with additional provincial security forces for local coverage — the Japanese would throw roughly 20,000 men: three major formations advancing in coordinated columns. The disparity in numbers was stark, but the Japanese had the advantages of offensive initiative, air superiority, and the formidable fighting quality that the Imperial Army had demonstrated throughout the war in China. The question was whether those advantages would be enough to overcome a prepared defense wielded by a commander who had invited the attack. The operational plan devised by the Japanese 11th Army called for three columns to converge simultaneously on Shanggao from north, center, and south — a classic encirclement concept that, if executed with precision, would catch the Chinese defenders in a tightening vice. In the north, the main force of the 33rd Division under Lieutenant General Sakurai Shōzō would drive westward from its bases around Anyi and Ganzhoujie, descending the Liao River valley to threaten the Chinese right flank and prevent the 70th Corps from interfering with operations in the center.In the center, Ōga's 34th Division would advance along the Xiang–Gan Highway — the direct route from Nanchang toward Shanggao — capturing the town of Gao'an along the way and pressing relentlessly westward until it reached the main defensive positions. This was the principal striking force, the column designed to crack open the Chinese defenses and seize the objective.In the south, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade under Major General Ikeda would cross the Jin River and advance along its south bank, eventually swinging north to link up with the 34th Division and complete the encirclement of whatever Chinese forces remained in the Shanggao area. The plan was coherent on paper. But it contained a structural flaw so serious that, in retrospect, it is difficult to understand how the 11th Army's staff allowed it to proceed uncorrected. The success of any converging operation depends on synchronization — on each column hitting its objectives on schedule and maintaining communication with the others so that each can react to developments on the other prongs. Yet the 11th Army headquarters made no recorded effort to coordinate the 33rd and 34th Divisions before the battle began. There was no forward command post established to oversee the operation. General Marube remained at Hankou, hundreds of miles to the north, throughout the battle — as remote from the fighting as a Tokyo bureaucrat. Operational decisions were left entirely to the individual divisions, with no mechanism to coordinate their actions if something went wrong. Something was going to go wrong. Luo Zhuoying had seen to that. On the morning of March 15, 1941, all three Japanese columns stepped off simultaneously, advancing into the misty hills and rice paddies of northwestern Jiangxi. In the north, Sakurai's 33rd Division moved briskly from Anyi toward Fengxin. The town fell by noon, and the division pressed westward in good order. The Japanese infantry moved confidently along the Liao River valley, experienced soldiers who had fought across China and had no particular reason to expect what was coming. The Chinese 70th Corps gave ground — as it had been ordered to — but did so on its own terms, occupying and then abandoning successive pieces of high ground along both banks of the river, making the Japanese advance uncomfortable and costly. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, the 33rd Division was being drawn forward into terrain that favored the defender. By March 18 and 19, the 33rd Division had pushed all the way to Guzhu'ao and Huamenlo — a considerable advance, but one that had taken the division far from its base at Anyi. And it was here, far from support and with flanks increasingly exposed, that the Chinese blocking forces closed in. Chinese infantry, who had been waiting in prepared positions in the high ground overlooking the river valley, launched coordinated counter-attacks that struck the 33rd Division from multiple directions. The fighting was fierce and costly. In two days of close combat, the division suffered more than 2,500 casualties — a grievous toll that represented a significant fraction of its effective strength. The northern column had been stopped dead. On March 19, Sakurai ordered the 33rd Division to reverse course. By March 23, after four days of painful withdrawal under pressure, it had pulled back to Anyi — the same place it had started. The northern prong of the Japanese offensive had accomplished nothing except the loss of thousands of men. In the south, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade had a rougher start. Its initial attempt to cross the Gan-Jin river junction at noon on March 15 was repulsed by Chinese defenders, and it was only under cover of darkness that the brigade managed to force a crossing. Once across, it moved westward along the south bank of the Jin River, but progress was slow and contested. A detachment — the Gan River Detachment — ran into fierce resistance from the 26th Division of the Chinese 49th Corps on March 19. The brigade's main body meanwhile fought its way through the 51st Division of the 74th Corps, but the 107th Division and elements of the 51st managed to contain the advance at the Laichunling–Zhutoushan line. On the night of March 20, the main body of the 20th Brigade crossed the Jin River at Huifu to link up with the 34th Division — but a portion of its troops, cut off on the south bank, was destroyed by Chinese forces. The southern column was across the Jin River, but it had taken losses and was already engaged in ways its planners had not anticipated. In the center, the 34th Division fared best in the early going. Ōga's division moved westward from Xishan along the Xiang–Gan Highway on March 16, and by the 17th had captured Gao'an — a meaningful early success. The Chinese 74th Corps, executing Luo's plan faithfully, dispatched only screening forces east of the Tangpu River to slow the Japanese advance rather than contesting it decisively. The main body of the 74th Corps fell back to the third-line positions at Sixi, Guanqiao, and Tangpu, preparing the killing ground that Luo had designated. Simultaneously, the 26th Division and most of the 105th Division from the 49th Corps were shifted across the Gan River to operate south of the Jin River on the Japanese left flank, and the 72nd Corps was ordered to maneuver on a wide envelopment around Daxia and south of Ganfang. By March 20–21, the 34th Division had pressed forward to attack the Chinese positions at Sixi and Guanqiao. Ōga's men were confident — they had taken Gao'an, they were moving, and the objective of Shanggao lay within reach. But as the division pushed toward Shangjijia, it ran squarely into the 57th and 58th Divisions of the 74th Corps, fighting with a tenacity that told the Japanese plainly enough: this was where the Chinese intended to stand. The week of March 21–24 brought the battle to its crisis. The 34th Division hammered at the Chinese positions defending Shanggao itself, while on the flanks, the fighting took on a character that neither side had entirely anticipated. On March 21, General Wang Yaowu — commanding the 74th Corps from his headquarters in Shanggao — decided it was time to do more than absorb Japanese blows. He ordered General Li Tianxia to clear Japanese forces from the south bank of the Jin River and advance on Gao'an, with the aim of cutting the 34th Division's supply line and threatening its rear. It was an aggressive move, and if it had worked, it might have produced a decisive result earlier than history would record. It did not work — at least not immediately. That very evening, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade, which had been reorganizing after the chaos of the river crossing, launched a powerful offensive at dawn on the 22nd. Li Tianxia's lead elements had barely set out from Shitou Street when they collided head-on with the main force of the 20th Brigade, which had crossed back from the north bank of the Jin River. The Japanese thrust was coordinated and aggressive: one column circled wide to attack Lazhu Mountain; another swung south of Hu Family west of Shitou Street to strike Li's division in the flank and rear; and nine aircraft with four artillery pieces bombarded the Chinese positions from north to south. Li's division could not hold against this convergent assault and fell back to the high ground southwest of Shitou Street. Wang Yaowu reacted quickly. He ordered Li's main body to wheel left to face the new threat and simultaneously dispatched the Army's Field Supplementary Regiment — held in reserve near Yintang — on a forced march to Huayang to block the Japanese westward drive. This regiment, racing down roads strafed by nine enemy aircraft, covered 15 li per hour and seized Huayang and the high ground to its northeast by around seven in the morning. By nine, the 20th Brigade arrived in strength and — supported by more than ten aircraft — launched a fierce assault on the regiment's positions. The regiment's officers and men held firm, taking heavy casualties but refusing to break. Frustrated at Huayang, the 20th Brigade shifted its effort to the Kuang Family area, linking up with over a thousand men who had crossed from Baichetou to the south bank and pushing along the river toward Xiongfang in an attempt to outflank the Chinese left wing. The Supplementary Regiment sent its 1st Battalion with a mortar company to meet this threat, and the two forces met in a fierce engagement. When the Japanese reinforced their assault and deployed incendiary bombs and poison gas, Xiongfang fell by early afternoon — but Li Tianxia immediately sent two regiments from his right flank to take it back, and by midnight the position was in Chinese hands again. Shitou Street and Jigong Ridge were simultaneously recaptured. The Independent Mixed 20th Brigade now found itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position, fighting with the Jin River at its back and the initiative slipping away. Meanwhile, the main event was being fought in the rubble and ridgelines around Shanggao itself. From March 22 to 25, the 34th Division and whatever remnants of the 20th Brigade could contribute threw themselves repeatedly at the defensive line anchored on Stone Arch Bridge, Xia Po Bridge, Xu Lou, Pan Family Bridge, Cloud Head Mountain, and Lei Family Mountain. This was not the fluid, mobile warfare that the Japanese had envisioned but brutal, grinding attritional combat for individual strongpoints and ridgelines, with positions changing hands multiple times in a single day. The Japanese air arm was deeply involved. Ōga's division had close air support that could operate even in poor weather, and Group 3 of the Japanese Air Force hammered the Chinese positions with sustained effort. On the morning of March 24, after the 34th Division fed in more than 3,000 additional troops transferred across the Jin River, the Air Force dispatched over seventy aircraft that dropped more than 1,700 bombs, largely destroying the defensive positions of Liao Lingqi's division. The Japanese exploited the resulting chaos and twice broke through gaps in the line — but were driven out each time by Chinese counterattacks. At noon, enemy aircraft bombarded in relays and Japanese infantry broke through at Xia Po Bridge. It was at this moment that Li Hanqing, commanding the Chinese infantry defense in that sector, did what officers throughout history have done when systems fail and only personal example can stem the tide: he personally led his officer cadre in repeated counter-attacks, hand-to-hand fighting in the rubble until the Japanese were finally expelled. By this point, the 34th Division's offensive capacity was nearly spent. At the same time — and this was the critical shift that would determine the battle's outcome — General Luo Zhuoying recognized that the moment to spring the trap had arrived. The northern column had already been broken and sent reeling back toward Anyi. The southern column was pinned against the Jin River with its back to the water. The central column was bled white against the defenses of Shanggao. Luo now ordered all his armies to close in from multiple directions. On the morning of March 22, he had already begun revising his orders; by noon on the 23rd, the forces of Liu Duoquan and Li Jue had occupied Shitou Street, Guanqiao Street, and Yanggong Market, pressing on Huifu and Gaoyao. The encirclement of the 34th Division was not yet complete, but its shape was unmistakably forming. By March 25, the 34th Division knew it was in mortal danger. Surrounded on three sides, its ammunition running low and its casualty lists growing by the hour, the division urgently appealed to the 11th Army for rescue. The message that arrived in Hankou was a shock. General Marube and his staff, who had remained at their distant headquarters throughout the battle without establishing a forward command post, had not properly grasped the scale of the disaster unfolding in Jiangxi. The lack of coordination between the 33rd and 34th Divisions — the structural flaw that had been built into the operation from its conception — had allowed Luo Zhuoying to defeat each column separately, and now the central column faced annihilation. The 11th Army responded in a scramble. Chief of Staff Kinoshita was dispatched by aircraft to Nanchang with Operations Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Yamaguchi and Captain Ōne to organize a relief operation. The 33rd Division — barely recovered from its own battering in the north — was ordered to sortie immediately and fight its way to the 34th Division's relief. Sakurai organized his battered 33rd Division into three rescue columns. Infantry Brigade Commander Araki Shōji took the right column, leading Infantry Regiment 215 with one mountain artillery battalion. Infantry Regiment 214 formed the left column. The divisional commander himself led the central column with the main divisional force. On March 24 and 25, all three columns sortied from strongpoints at Niuxing, Fengxin, and other positions, attacking across the Wuqiao River and through Cunqian Street toward Tangpu and Guanqiao. The relief operation brought the battle to its most complicated moment. On the morning of March 25, the 33rd Division launched a fierce assault on the forces that Luo Zhuoying had positioned to tighten the encirclement from the north — striking Zhang Yanchuan's division at Kengkou Leng, Jiezipo, and Nancha Luo. Zhang's division, struck simultaneously from the front and rear, withdrew at dusk to near Tu Di Wang Temple, where it linked up with Tang Boyin's division. What happened next became one of the most controversial decisions of the entire battle. Zhang Yanchuan was serving as deputy army commander in the absence of Li Jue from the front. Surveying the situation — his own division under heavy pressure, the 33rd Division's relief columns pushing aggressively — Zhang concluded that the position was untenable. On his own authority, without authorization from Luo Zhuoying or any superior commander, he withdrew both his own and Tang Boyin's divisions to Fenghuang Market and Zhuangfang. The consequence was immediate and severe. The withdrawal opened a corridor through which the 33rd Division entered Guanqiao and linked up with the encircled 34th Division. An encirclement that had taken days of blood and sacrifice to construct was torn open by a single unauthorized decision. Luo Zhuoying, when he received word of Zhang's withdrawal the following morning, was furious — but he could not change what had already happened. He could only adapt. The breakout itself was an ordeal. A portion of the 34th Division that attempted to escape to the east was intercepted near Huifu by a division of the 49th Corps and lost roughly half its strength before being compelled to turn back. The main body ultimately broke out on March 27, withdrawing in march order that told its own story of disaster: headquarters, baggage, artillery, casualties, field hospital, rear guard — all moving in what the records describe as "a wretched state." On the night of March 27, Japanese troops escorting the 34th Division's field hospital — a field artillery company of the 8th Battery — were completely annihilated in a Chinese night attack. When the division reached Longtuan Xu on March 28, the stretcher-bearer column carrying the wounded stretched some seven to eight kilometers along the road. That same day, the 33rd Division's Infantry Regiment 214 finally made contact with the 34th Division's headquarters, completing what amounted to a rescue of men who had already endured their defeat. The 33rd Division's mountain artillery batteries exhausted their entire ammunition supply covering the retreat and required emergency aerial resupply drops to continue. The 34th Division limped back to its original garrison on April 2. Despite the setback caused by Zhang Yanchuan's unauthorized withdrawal, Luo Zhuoying did not abandon his design. Assessing his situation on the morning of March 26, he found reason for cautious optimism: Wang Yaowu's army was still making progress at Shanggao; the Japanese south of the Jin River had largely been cleared; and Sichuan Army and Northeastern Army units that had been moving to reinforce the battle had now reached the field, meaning Chinese forces retained significant numerical superiority. He resolved to execute a second encirclement. At nine in the morning of March 26, Luo issued strict orders: Zhang Yanchuan's and Tang Boyin's divisions were to immediately comply with their original orders and block the enemy near Guanqiao; Yu Chengwan's division was to attack northward via Pan Family Bridge; Liao Lingqi's and Song Yingzhong's divisions were to press toward Guanqiao with full force; Wang Kejun's division was to strike the enemy's flank and rear east of Guanqiao; Fu Yi's division was to advance south of Jiang Family Isle; and Chen Liangji's division was to swing southeast via Changpu to complete the enemy's destruction. The second ring was being drawn. On March 28, as the 34th Division's battered column trudged eastward toward survival, Wang Kejun's division advancing from Yanggong Market moved to intercept it. The Chinese occupied high ground north and south of Yanggong Market and along Mozi Ridge, and what followed was a grinding all-day battle that fixed the Japanese column at the Xiama Bei–Huxing Ridge line. Part of the 20th Brigade, moving up from Gao'an to assist the withdrawing 34th Division, was blocked near Long Tu Market. Liao Lingqi's division pursued the enemy rear guard to the Changling–Manmei high ground, where the fighting erupted with renewed intensity. At noon, part of Li Tianxia's division arrived and deployed along the Shangluoxiang–Shanyuan–Fangtounao line to harass the Japanese right flank; part of Yu Chengwan's division reached Longxing Mountain and outflanked Guanqiao Street from the south. The surviving Japanese defenders in Guanqiao withdrew into the town for a last stand, and after Liao's division pressed the assault, street fighting raged until five in the afternoon, when over 600 defenders were annihilated. Over 2,000 troops of the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade conducted a fighting withdrawal from Long Tu Market and Yanggong Market, covered by Japanese aircraft bombing to shield the 34th Division's retreat. By noon on March 30, the Japanese had abandoned both strongpoints and scattered northeastward. One group of over 600 men fled directly into the main positions of Zhang Yanchuan's division — an ironic fate, given Zhang's earlier withdrawal — and were largely annihilated. The encircling forces had been essentially dispersed, and the two pursuit columns now pressed forward under the overall direction of General Xue Yue, who had assumed personal coordination of the chase. On March 27, Luo Zhuoying — confident that victory was secured — issued a general order for a final offensive and announced substantial cash rewards to his troops: prizes offered for the capture of Japanese officers, artillery pieces, regimental colors, and other materiel. The rewards were both a practical incentive and a mark of how far the battle had tipped. By midnight on March 31, Chen Hongshi's advance column had recovered Gao'an; Wang Tiehan's division had recovered Xiangfu Guan. On April 2, the divisions of Zhang Yanchuan and Song Yingzhong recovered Fengxin; that afternoon Wang Tiehan's division took back Xishan and Wanshou Palace — the very base from which the 34th Division had launched its offensive. By April 3, the pursuing armies had reached the vicinity of Dacheng and Ganzhoujie. On April 8 and 9, the 70th Corps recovered the outpost strongpoints around Anyi before halting operations. The Japanese had retreated into their original positions and were defending from prepared terrain. The pursuit was over. The Battle of Shanggao had lasted nineteen days and nights. No battle of the Second Sino-Japanese War was ever free of the fog of competing claims, and Shanggao was no exception. On March 29, before the pursuit had even concluded, Luo Zhuoying telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek with his accounting of the victory. His numbers were dramatic: Major General Iwanaga, the Japanese infantry commander, killed; regimental commander Colonel Hamada, killed; over 15,000 Japanese killed or wounded in total. Chinese losses, Luo reported, exceeded 20,000. Ten guns, over a thousand rifles, and numerous machine guns had been captured. His superior, General Xue Yue, was skeptical. In a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek on April 5, Xue reduced Luo's numbers by twenty percent, reporting 12,520 Japanese killed or wounded and 14 prisoners captured. The discrepancy between two Chinese commanders reporting on the same battle speaks to the difficulty of battlefield accounting in any era, and suggests something of the competitive pressures that shaped how Chinese commanders reported their victories to Chongqing. The official Chinese histories, compiled after the war in the History of the War of Resistance, reported approximately 15,000 Japanese killed or wounded, 17 prisoners taken, and significant quantities of captured materiel: 6 mountain guns, 1 mortar, 24 light machine guns, 408 rifles, 24 grenade launchers, and over 111,717 rounds of various ammunition. Chinese casualties, by the same records, were 17,119 killed or wounded and 2,814 missing. Japanese records for the battle do not survive — a consequence of the wholesale destruction of Imperial Army documentation at the war's end. Contemporary scholars, working from other sources, estimate actual Japanese combat losses at approximately 5,500 killed and wounded. This is substantially lower than the Chinese claims, as was nearly always the case in the war, but represents a significant defeat by any measure: roughly a quarter of the force committed, many of them veterans impossible to replace. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently awarded the victorious Chinese units a commendation prize of 150,000 yuan — a substantial sum that marked the battle's significance in Nationalist eyes. The outcome at Shanggao was not accidental. Several interlocking factors combined to produce a Chinese victory, and each deserves consideration. The most fundamental was Luo Zhuoying's defensive plan. The decision to trade space for time — to absorb the Japanese advance through three successive defensive lines rather than contest the frontier — required both tactical confidence and a willingness to accept initial setbacks that could easily be misread as defeat. Chinese forces had to give ground, and they did. They had to suffer through the early days of Japanese advance without breaking and running, drawing the enemy forward and allowing the encirclement to take shape. That they largely succeeded in executing this plan reflects the improving quality of the Nationalist Army by 1941: better trained, better led at the operational level, and — critically — equipped with a strategic design that matched the actual balance of forces. The defeat in detail of the Japanese columns was equally important. By neutralizing the 33rd Division in the north before it could contribute to the central effort, and by pinning the 20th Brigade against the Jin River with its back to the water, Luo's forces ensured that the 34th Division faced the third-line defenses essentially alone — outnumbered, overextended, and unsupported. The Japanese operational concept had been a three-pronged convergence; what actually materialized was a single exhausted division hammering at a prepared defense while two other columns were rendered ineffective. The absence of coordination within the Japanese 11th Army was a gift that kept giving throughout the battle. No forward command post. No mechanism for the divisions to adjust their operations in response to each other's situations. No ability to recognize, in real time, that the northern column was being destroyed and redirect resources accordingly. General Marube's decision to remain at Hankou while his men died in Jiangxi was not merely an administrative failure; it was an operational catastrophe. Japanese commanders acknowledged this failing explicitly after the battle, but the acknowledgment changed nothing for the dead. Zhang Yanchuan's unauthorized withdrawal — the single most consequential individual decision of the battle — ultimately prevented a complete annihilation of the 34th Division rather than affecting the battle's outcome. The 34th Division escaped; but it did so in a "wretched state," having lost enormous numbers of men and equipment. It broke out, not triumphed. The encirclement Luo had constructed was torn open, but the Japanese paid dearly for the breach. The consequences of Shanggao rippled outward in ways that shaped the subsequent course of the war in central China. The transfer of the 33rd Division to North China — the original logistical rationale for the entire operation — was delayed by the division's involvement and subsequent losses at Shanggao. When it finally arrived at the Battle of Central Plains  the following month, it did so on the eve of battle with no time for preparation or orientation, entering combat under severely disadvantaged conditions. The operation that was supposed to facilitate a smooth redeployment had instead damaged one of the two units involved and delayed the other. For the Chinese 74th Corps, Shanggao had an ironic consequence. The Japanese 11th Army, following the battle, formally designated the 74th Corps as a priority target — a "standing enemy" and directed its forces to seek out and destroy it in future operations. At the First Battle of Changsha that September, the 11th Army specifically oriented its forces against the 74th Corps, a testament to the lasting impression that corps's fierce resistance at Shanggao had made on its adversaries. The compliment of being specifically targeted by the enemy was one the 74th Corps had earned in blood at Shanggao's ridgelines and shattered bridges. More broadly, the battle was widely regarded at the time, and has been regarded since, as one of the most significant Chinese tactical victories of the first four years of the War of Resistance. Its significance lay not only in the casualties inflicted — those were contested and probably inflated in the Chinese records — but in what it demonstrated. The improving tactical and operational competence of the Nationalist Army was on display. The deliberate defense, the layered withdrawal, the coordinated encirclement — these were not the operations of an army that had been fighting desperately for survival since 1937 and had learned nothing. They were the operations of an army that had studied its defeats and adapted. Shanggao did not change the strategic situation in China. The front in Jiangxi remained where it had been; the Japanese still occupied Nanchang and the major cities; Chiang Kai-shek was still in Chongqing and the war was still far from over. But it demonstrated something important: that the Chinese Army, given capable commanders, a sound plan, and the discipline to execute it, could do more than survive Japanese offensives. It could reverse them, encircle them, and pursue them back to where they came from. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In March–April 1940, Japanese forces attacked Shanggao with a limited, multi-pronged plan. Chinese troops used elastic defense and coordinated counter-moves, turning initial advantages into a trap. After intense fighting and air strikes, a coordinated encirclement and timely breakout routed the Japanese, forcing retreat despite their numbers in a costly battle.

Un journaliste entre dans la maison du 55 boulevard Schuman à Nantes — la maison Dupont de Ligonnès. Son dictaphone sera retrouvé 72 heures plus tard, encore dans sa main. Les yeux ouverts. Pas de la peur sur son visage — de la compréhension. Puis un parking forestier au-dessus du lac d'Annecy. Quatre exécutés. Vingt-cinq balles. Aucun témoin. Douze ans plus tard, l'enquête est toujours ouverte. Deux lieux. Deux massacres. Zéro réponse.

Send us Fan MailWhat's the Scuttlebutt Podcast – Episode 226This week on What's the Scuttlebutt, Don and Dennis discuss how a simple idea that began with the creation of the Rooftop Oath event unexpectedly opened the door to an incredible opportunity for Dennis.Dennis shares the story of being selected to attend the United States Marine Corps Educators Workshop, an immersive week-long program hosted at Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego. Designed for educators, community leaders, coaches, counselors, and other influential professionals, the workshop provides participants with a firsthand look at how the Marine Corps transforms civilians into Marines.Throughout the week, attendees experience many aspects of Marine Corps life, including recruit training demonstrations, physical fitness events, leadership exercises, classroom instruction, and direct interaction with Marines at various stages of their careers. The program aims to demystify military service while educating participants on Marine Corps training, career opportunities, educational benefits, and the values of honor, courage, and commitment that define the Corps.Dennis discusses how the invitation came about, what he hopes to learn from the experience, and why programs like the Educators Workshop play an important role in building understanding between the military and the communities it serves. He also shares his thoughts on representing the living history and veteran communities while gaining a unique behind-the-scenes look at one of the most respected military training organizations in the world.Join Don and Dennis as they explore this exciting opportunity, reflect on the connections that made it possible, and discuss what listeners can expect to hear when Dennis returns from San Diego with stories and insights from inside the Marine Corps experience.Support the show

Salut les sportifs intelligents ! Cette semaine on va parler du marqueur que tout le monde ignore et qui décide réellement de ta capacité à perdre du poids : la VO2 max. Tu fais du sport presque tous les jours. Tu fais attention à ton assiette. Tu coches toutes les cases… et la balance ne bouge pas. Et cette petite voix qui te répète que c'est de ta faute, que tu n'en fais pas assez. Dans cet épisode, je vais te prouver que c'est faux — et te donner la vraie raison. Parce que ton corps ne résiste pas par manque de volonté. Il résiste parce que ses hormones lui ordonnent de stocker, et parce que son « moteur » est devenu moins bon pour aller puiser dans tes graisses. La bonne nouvelle ? Ça, ça se rééduque. Au programme : Pourquoi deux femmes avec la même assiette et le même déficit obtiennent des résultats opposés Ce qu'est vraiment la flexibilité métabolique, et pourquoi ton corps brûle du sucre au lieu de tes graisses Pourquoi surveiller obsessionnellement ta glycémie te fait regarder au mauvais endroit Les 2 étages pour relancer la machine : agrandir le moteur (NEAT + cardio) et desserrer le frein à main (sommeil, stress, nutrition) Comment réveiller ton métabolisme sans te priver davantage ni te tuer à la salle

Modern warfare is no longer defined by who has the biggest force, but by who can adapt the fastest. The battlefield is changing in real time through artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, and the speed of information. But even in the most advanced operating environments, victory still comes down to disciplined leaders, trusted teams, and soldiers prepared to make decisions under pressure when everything is on the line.The responsibility for America's rapid response to any crisis belongs to the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps.From their headquarters at Fort Bragg, NC, Fran Racioppi sat down with Lieutenant General Greg Anderson, Commanding General of the XVIII Airborne Corps, to discuss how he is preparing America's Contingency Corps for combat in an increasingly dangerous world.Leading more than 80,000 soldiers across the 3rd Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, 82nd Airborne Division, and 101st Airborne Division, and other subordinate commands, LTG Anderson explains how the Corps balances readiness, speed, and innovation while maintaining the fundamentals that have always defined military success.Our conversation explores the role of Noncommissioned Officer, the importance of mastering the basics, and why leadership development remains America's greatest asymmetric advantage. We also discuss the integration of conventional and special operations forces, the concept of compound warfare, and the difference between interoperability and true integration on the battlefield.LTG Anderson breaks down the Corps' push toward innovation through initiatives like the Joint Innovation Outpost and experimental exercises that incorporate artificial intelligence, machine learning, and data-driven decision-making into operational planning. But even as technology changes warfare, he makes one thing clear; there must always be a human in the loop.Highlights0:00 Introduction2:17 Welcome to the Jedburgh Podcast4:01 The role of XVIII Airborne Corps9:57 Empowering NCOs14:58 Joint Innovation Outpost19:00 Speeding the Acquisition Timeline22:53 Keeping A Human in the Loop25:41 Integration vs Interoperability29:13 Guiding the Tactical Level Leader32:48 Compound Warfare Today37:22 Generational Warfighting Differences42:00 The XVIII Airborne Corps Formation45:04 Daily HabitsQuotes“What operational problems do they expect us to solve for them?”“If I've got a strong team…we'll typically prevail.”“Certainly what I've learned of any value has come from non-commissioned officers that raised me up.”“The role of the non-commissioned officer is to become the technical tactical experts in the application of violence at the tactical level.”“What are we doing to get the NCO corps to that point where they are the Army?”“How do we use advanced computing to allow us to make decisions more informed and faster than our opponents?”“The advantage of war fighting is not replacing humans with machine decision making. It's now creating superhumans that are enabled by it.”“Interoperability is our ability to work together in an efficient, effective manner.”“Compound Warfare is the blending of regular and irregular capabilities to create a host of dilemmas for your enemy.”“You'll never be able to tell that tactical level leader when things are going to change and shift if you haven't done the operational level rigor.”“My role as the general is not to solve the problem or be the hero that comes in, but to think and understand the problem we're trying to solve.”The Jedburgh Podcast is brought to you by OneBrief; enabling military leaders to make innovative, informed and deliberate decisions faster than ever before. Superhuman command wins wars.Follow the Jedburgh Podcast and the Green Beret Foundation on social media. Listen on your favorite podcast platform, read on our website, and watch the full video version on YouTube as we show why America must continue to lead from the front, no matter the challenge.

On the phone-in: Gardening expert Niki Jabbour answers listeners' questions. And off the top of the show, we hear about the Annual Ceremonial Review of the 560 Moncton Army Cadet Corps. The corps recently held an event to celebrate the end of the program's season.

Il est trois heures du matin. Vous êtes allongé sur le dos, les yeux grands ouverts, le ventre tendu comme une cornemuse écossaise. Vous avez bu, mais raisonnablement – à peine plus de trois verres, peut-être quatre – et, pourtant, votre œsophage vous fait passer un message qui ressemble fort à une mise en demeure. La bonne nouvelle : ce n'est pas votre faute. La mauvaise nouvelle : vous auriez pu l'éviter.Dans ce nouvel épisode de Parlons Vin, la journaliste Alicia Dorey explique la raison pour laquelle certains vins se digèrent mieux que d'autres.Et n'oubliez pas : parlons peu mais Parlons Vin !Vous pouvez écouter cet épisode sur Figaro Radio, le site du Figaro et sur toutes les plateformes d'écoutes.Chronique et rédaction : Alicia DoreyMontage : Antoine Lion-RantyPrise de son : Louis ChabainProduction exécutive : Aude Sérès, rédactrice en chef, pôle audio Le FigaroCoordination de production : Pôle audio Le FigaroCommunication : Réseaux sociaux Le FigaroVisuel & habillage : Studio design Le FigaroHébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

durée : 00:05:16 - Dans la playlist de France Inter - par : Marion Guilbaud - Folk et transmission dans les nouvelles chansons d'Alela Diane en Playlist sur France Inter Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France

   In this episode of WarDocs, Army Deputy Surgeon General Dr. Lance Raney discusses the past, present, and future of military medicine. The conversation begins with Dr. Raney's early journey from a collegiate scholarship athlete to a Family Medicine physician, exploring how his clinical roots in "small-town" Army medicine established the decision-making framework necessary for high-level strategic leadership. Drawing on his experience as a Brigade Surgeon with the 172nd Stryker Combat Team in Iraq, Dr. Raney emphasizes the life-saving importance of empowering medics at the point of injury and the necessity of critical thinking in the face of unexpected clinical challenges.    The dialogue then shifts to the complexities of the current military healthcare landscape, particularly the transition to the Defense Health Agency and the integration of medical readiness with healthcare delivery. Dr. Raney provides a candid look at the challenges of navigating systemic changes during the COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation of MHS GENESIS, noting that leadership through influence is now more vital than ever. He shares a personal and powerful account of his time at Womack Army Medical Center, discussing how patience and trust in the military justice system reinforced his commitment to servant leadership and organizational resilience.    A major focus of the episode is the Army's strategic pivot toward Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). Dr. Raney details how the "Golden Hour" of evacuation is being replaced by the reality of prolonged field care, requiring a fundamental overhaul of medical training. He explains the expansion of the Army paramedic program and the development of high-tech solutions like Artificial Intelligence for triage and decision support. These innovations are designed to augment the front-line provider's ability to manage casualties in austere, communication-denied environments where resources are strictly limited.    Finally, Dr. Raney offers profound career advice for the next generation of healthcare professionals. He encourages students and young officers to become the experts their patients expect and to seek "Purpose Plus"—the unique fulfillment found in serving the extended family of the American soldier. By focusing on legacy and the impact left in others, Dr. Raney illustrates why military medicine remains one of the most rewarding paths a clinician can choose. Chapters (00:00-06:28) Foundations of a Career in Army Medicine (06:29-11:04) The Clinical Roots of Strategic Leadership (11:05-17:40) Lessons in Combat Casualty Care (17:41-31:35) Command Philosophy and Navigating Systemic Transitions (31:36-45:47) Preparing for Large-Scale Combat Operations and the Role of AI (45:48-50:52) Advice for the Next Generation and Finding Your Purpose Chapter Summaries (00:00-06:28) Foundations of a Career in Army Medicine: Dr. Raney details his path from a lifeguard and ROTC cadet to becoming a Family Medicine physician. He shares how he came to view the Army as his "small town" where everyone shares a common mission and community. (06:29-11:04) The Clinical Roots of Strategic Leadership: The discussion centers on how high-volume primary care at Fort Sill developed the critical decision-making skills needed for senior leadership. Dr. Raney explains how clinical encounters taught him to synthesize information and negotiate solutions under pressure. (11:05-17:40) Lessons in Combat Casualty Care: Reflecting on his deployment to Iraq, Dr. Raney emphasizes the life-saving impact of well-trained medics at the point of injury. He recounts a specific junctional injury save that demonstrated the importance of critical thinking over rote skill repetition. (17:41-31:35) Command Philosophy and Navigating Systemic Transitions: This segment covers Dr. Raney's experience commanding large medical centers and his time as a liaison during the Defense Health Agency transition. He discusses the challenges of separating healthcare from readiness and the personal lessons learned while trusting the system during a difficult investigation. (31:36-45:47) Preparing for Large Scale Combat Operations and the Role of AI: The conversation shifts to the strategic preparations for LSCO, where the traditional "Golden Hour" may no longer exist. Dr. Raney explores the expansion of paramedic training and the potential for AI to assist in triage and clinical decision support on the battlefield. (45:48-50:52) Advice for the Next Generation and Finding Your Purpose: To conclude, Dr. Raney offers career advice focused on achieving clinical expertise and finding "Purpose Plus" within the military. He shares his hope of leaving a legacy through the people he has trained and the lives he has touched. Take Home Messages Master Your Craft: Becoming an expert in your specific clinical field is the fundamental requirement for all military medical professionals. True education happens after residency when you apply your skills to real-world patient outcomes and learn from continuity of care. Lead to Purpose: Leadership should not be about the commander but about enabling others to own their piece of the mission. When a team understands their purpose, they move from just doing a job to providing meaningful interventions that change lives. Prepare for Prolonged Care: In future conflicts, the luxury of rapid evacuation will be limited, requiring medical teams to hold patients for much longer durations. Success will depend on the individual's ability to think critically and utilize limited resources in the face of unsolvable problems. Embrace Systemic Ownership: Tactical problems are often best solved by those at the tactical level rather than waiting for higher headquarters to provide a solution. Understanding that resources are finite at the strategic level empowers local leaders to take initiative and resolve issues independently. Seek Purpose Plus: Serving in the military provides a unique opportunity to practice medicine on an "extended family" that shares your core values. This sense of shared purpose turns the daily grind into a lifelong mission of service to the nation and its warriors.   Episode Keywords Army Medicine, Dr. Lance Raney, Military Medicine, WarDocs Podcast, LSCO, Large Scale Combat Operations, Combat Casualty Care, Prolonged Field Care, Army Surgeon General, Defense Health Agency, DHA Transition, Medical Readiness, Combat Medic Training, Paramedic Program, TCCC, Leadership Philosophy, Army Family Medicine, Battlefield Trauma, Medical AI, Triage Technology, Military Healthcare, Army ROTC, HPSP, Tactical Medicine, Operational Readiness, Clinical Excellence, MHS Governance. Hashtags #MilitaryMedicine, #ArmyStrong, #WarDocs, #Leadership, #CombatCasualtyCare, #MedicalReadiness, #LSCO, #MedEd   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission- WarDocs exists to honor the legacy of Military Medicine, preserve its history, and inspire every generation — across all Services, Corps, and Ranks — to serve with excellence and pride. Through mentorship, coaching, and education, we equip those considering, entering, and serving in military medicine with the knowledge, connections, and community they need to thrive. We celebrate Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoW, and Our Nation.   Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield, demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast        

As the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers releases its 20-year dredging plan for the Columbia River, tribes say they want more of a say in how the operation affects their fishing and cultural priorities. The Corps acknowledges that its ongoing work to maintain the 43-foot deep channel is detrimental to salmon and other species. The Trump administration, which cancelled a historic river co-management agreement with tribes, now wants to facilitate larger, more powerful shipping barges on the river that already transports more than 26 million tons of grain a year. But the Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, the Cowlitz Tribe, and others say the waterway is more than just a highway for agricultural exports. They want their voices reflected in future river dredging decisions. GUESTS Roger Amerman (Choctaw), geologist and ethnogeologist Virgil Lewis (Yakama), fish commissioner for Yakama Nation with the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission Erik Holt (Nez Perce), chairman of the Nez Perce Tribe Fish and Wildlife Commission Break 1 Music: To Keep the World We Know (song) Bruce Cockburn (artist) O Sun O Moon (album) Break 2 Music: Beauty Way (song) Summit Dub Squad (artist) The Beauty Way (album)

Rediffusion Il est reconnu d'avoir assassiné dans les années 80 et 90 de manière sanglante au moins 49 femmes dans l'État de Washington. Au fil des ans, les gens du coin commencent à connaître le tueur pour son mode de fonctionnement et le surnomment le Green River Killer. Il évite plusieurs fois, de justesse, la police, mais en 2003, il est condamné à 49 peines de réclusion à perpétuité. Un amas de corps  Gary Ridgway, homme ordinaire aux yeux de tous, cache un visage bien plus sombre. Derrière sa façade de banalité, il s'attaque aux plus vulnérables, laissant derrière lui une traînée de disparitions inexpliquées. Pour la brigade de la Rivière Verte, il devient une obsession insaisissable. Jusqu'à ce qu'une survivante réapparaisse, et donne des pistes plus concrètes à la police… Crédits : Production : Bababam  Textes : Capucine Lebot Voix : Anne Cosmao, Aurélien Gouas Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode of the Tax Smart REI Podcast, Thomas Castelli and Justin Shore break down some of the most common entity structure mistakes they see with real estate investors. They discuss when S corporations make sense (and when they don't), why rental properties generally shouldn't be held in S corps, the pitfalls of creating property management companies for your own rentals, and how multiple partnerships can dramatically increase tax preparation costs. They also cover important updates to Tennessee's FONCE exemption, explain accidental partnerships and joint ventures, and share practical ways to simplify your structure while maintaining legal protections. To become a client, request a consultation from Hall CPA, PLLC at go.therealestatecpa.com/3KSEev6 Get the FREE Ultimate STR Tax Strategy Bundle: go.therealestatecpa.com/strbundle Register for the FREE Investing Debate: go.therealestatecpa.com/debate Submit your question for Tom & Nathan: go.therealestatecpa.com/question The Tax Smart Real Estate Investors podcast is for general information purposes only and is not intended to provide, and should not be relied on for, tax, legal, or accounting advice. Information on the podcast may not constitute the most up-to-date legal or other information. No reader, user, or listener of this podcast should act or refrain from acting on the basis of information on this podcast without first seeking legal and tax advice from counsel in the relevant jurisdiction. Only your individual attorney and tax advisor can provide assurances that the information contained herein – and your interpretation of it – is applicable or appropriate to your particular situation. Use of, and access to, this podcast or any of the links or resources contained or mentioned within the podcast show and show notes do not create a relationship between the reader, user, or listener and podcast hosts, contributors, or guests. Any mention of third-party vendors, products, or services does not constitute an endorsement or recommendation. You should conduct your own due diligence before engaging with any vendor.

In this conversation, Laura Hayes discusses her role as the Director of Chef Corps at World Central Kitchen, emphasizing the organization’s mission to provide meals in disaster situations. She highlights the importance of cultural relevance in meal preparation, the role of local chefs in disaster response, and the need for community engagement. The conversation also touches on the challenges of mapping regions for future responses, recruiting chefs, and navigating politically fragile contexts. In this conversation, Laura Hayes discusses the mission and operations of World Central Kitchen (WCK), emphasizing the importance of empathy in disaster relief efforts. She addresses common misconceptions about disaster response, the founding philosophy of WCK, and the critical role of chefs and cooks in providing food relief. Laura shares insights into the challenges faced during disaster responses, the mental health support provided to team members, and the various ways individuals can contribute to WCK’s mission. The conversation also touches on personal connections to comfort food and the importance of building relationships within the culinary community. What you’ll learn from Laura Hayes World Central Kitchen has served over 600 million meals globally. The organization prioritizes speed and urgency in disaster response. Cultural relevance is crucial in meal preparation for affected communities. Local chefs act as trusted sources and connectors in their communities. Partnerships with local restaurants help keep money in the local economy. The Chef Corps program has grown to include 580 chefs worldwide. Mapping regions for response is based on research and disaster patterns. Recruiting chefs involves looking for specific traits and community connections. The mission of World Central Kitchen is to provide dignity through food. Navigating conflict zones requires working closely with vetted local partners. Empathy drives the mission of World Central Kitchen. Cooks and chefs play a vital role in disaster response. Misconceptions about disaster relief often overlook the complexity of the work. Building community resilience is essential in disaster-prone areas. Mental health support is crucial for those working in crisis situations. Every individual can contribute to disaster relief efforts in meaningful ways. The founding philosophy of WCK continues to shape its operations today. Personal connections to food can provide comfort and healing. Expansion and scalability are key for WCK’s future. Highlighting unsung culinary heroes enriches the narrative of food relief. 00:00 Introduction to World Central Kitchen02:57 The Role of Chef Corps in Disaster Response06:04 Cultural Relevance in Meal Preparation08:56 Local Partnerships and Community Engagement11:47 Mapping Regions for Future Responses14:50 Recruiting and Engaging Chefs18:05 Traits of Effective Chef Corps Members21:08 Global Outreach and Building Connections23:59 Navigating Conflict Zones and Political Fragility30:44 Misconceptions in Disaster Relief32:06 Founding Philosophy of World Central Kitchen34:40 The Power of Cooks in Crisis36:48 Challenges in Disaster Response39:31 Mental Health and Recovery in Crisis Work42:30 Supporting World Central Kitchen46:29 Personal Connections to Comfort Food51:34 Empathy as a Core Quality in Chefs54:54 Highlighting Unsung Culinary Heroes56:30 Future Expansion of World Central Kitchen Beyond the Mic: My Stories in Print A Taste of Madagascar: Culinary Riches of the Red Island invites readers to join me on his unforgettable journey across the island of Madagascar, where a vibrant culture and stunning ecosystem intertwine to create an extraordinary culinary experience. Explore the unique ingredients and traditions that define Madagascar and discover their profound impact on the global culinary landscape. Alongside the captivating stories, the book presents a collection of exciting recipes that showcase the incredible flavors and ingredients of Madagascar. Publication date: Tuesday, January 27, 2026 Pre-order the book here! “Conversations Behind the Kitchen Door” is my debut book, published in Fall 2022. It features insights from chefs and culinary leaders interviewed on the Flavors Unknown podcast, offering a behind-the-scenes look at creativity, culture, and the future of the hospitality industry. Get the book here! Links to most downloaded episodes (click on any picture to listen to the episode) Chef Sheldon Simeon Chef Andy Doubrava Chef Nina Compton Chef Jacques Pepin Social media Laura Hayes Instagram Facebook Social media World Central Kitchen Instagram Facebook Links mentioned in this episode World Central Kitchen Official Website The World Central Kitchen Cookbook   SUBSCRIBE TO THE ‘FLAVORS UNKNOWN' NEWSLETTER

Avec Caroline Wallet

It is time for LAST TIME ON! The podcast for everyone who wants to watch all those great television shows out there, but who has the time for that? Turns out we do, as we talk about Attack on Titan!This week on LTO: The boys talk Subs vs Dubs, Xhafer only gives the smallest spoilers, Ben digs Patrick Ewing and Victor learns about the connection between TMNT and Daredevil.Discord: https://discord.gg/MUHKDDk6TNMerch: https://www.etsy.com/shop/WhatHappenedHerePods

Last time we spoke about the One Hundred Regiment Offensive. During Phase Three of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive, CCP forces in the Taihang/Jizhong area emphasized strongpoint attacks and transportation warfare. Rather than trying to defeat Japanese units head-on, they used tactics such as night raids and ambushes to disrupt Japanese supply routes and communications. The underlying goal was to make Japanese logistics unstable, weakening their ability to maintain control and conduct effective operations. After CCP successes, the Japanese responded with large-scale "mopping-up" operations beginning October 6. As the Eighth Route Army continued resisting, it adopted flexible methods to counter the Japanese sweeps, especially rapid repositioning and targeted ambushes. One notable action described involves an ambush of a Japanese convoy that caused substantial enemy losses, demonstrating how disrupting enemy mobility could blunt the effectiveness of larger Japanese operations. Overall, the situation remained fluid, with both sides continually adapting their tactics in an ongoing contest for control across occupied North China.   #205 The Hubei-Henan Campaign of 1940-1941 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By 1940, the war had settled into a grueling stalemate, with Japanese troops occupying vast swathes of central China, including parts of Hubei, but facing persistent Chinese guerrilla and conventional resistance that prevented total consolidation. In the aftermath of the Battle of Zaoyang in the summer of 1940, Japanese forces had secured the key cities of Yichang and Shashi along the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. Yet Chinese Nationalist troops of the Fifth War Area retained firm control over the vital territories east and west of the Xiang River. Their defensive lines formed a broad arc stretching from the southwest of Yuan'an through Jingmen, north of Zhongxiang, and the rugged foothills of the Dahong Mountains, extending northwest to Suixian. These positions straddled both banks of the Xiang River, anchored on the right by the Wudang Mountains and on the left by the Tongbai range. Working in close coordination with guerrilla detachments operating in the southeast, Chinese units repeatedly harassed the Japanese garrisons that had pushed into Yichang. The constant pressure on the enemy's flanks left the Japanese forces in Yichang and Shashi dangerously exposed and hemmed in, unable to expand or consolidate their gains. To the Japanese high command, this situation had become an intolerable thorn that demanded immediate removal.   Under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist government faced severe strains as the war with Japan escalated. Its problems were not only military, but also political and economic. Deep ideological and territorial rivalries with the CCP meant that efforts to present a single front were constantly undermined. Although the two sides officially formed a United Front in 1937, earlier violence and competition, such as the 1927 Shanghai Massacre and the CCP's Long March of 1934 – 1935 had left distrust and strategic differences in place. As a result, Nationalist resistance was harder to coordinate than it would have been under full unity. Meanwhile, the CCP strengthened its position in northern China by expanding rural strongholds. Through land reforms and the use of guerrilla warfare, the communists were able to win local support and apply pressure to Japanese forces in ways that often did not require large, conventional armies. This strategy also drew influence and manpower away from the Nationalists' more traditional, state-centered military structure.   Economically, the Nationalists were squeezed from multiple directions. The loss of China's coastal industrial regions to Japanese occupation forced the government to rely heavily on the interior, with Chongqing becoming a key base. That geographic shift left the administration more vulnerable to shortages of critical supplies, especially raw materials, fuel, and modern weapons. On top of wartime disruption, the global Great Depression intensified fiscal and logistical difficulties, limiting how quickly and effectively the Nationalists could mobilize resources for large-scale operations. By late November 1940, these weaknesses intersected with renewed Japanese pressure. Japanese commanders were also concerned about the possibility of a major Nationalist push, particularly fears of a counteroffensive by the Thirty-first Army Group under General Tang Enbo.    Determined to break the stalemate, the Japanese launched a major offensive in late November 1940. Preparations had begun in earnest early that month. Engineers repaired and expanded highways and bridges, constructed new defensive works and airfields, and stockpiled vast quantities of rations, ammunition, steel-hulled boats, and rubber rafts in the Zhongxiang area. Five regiments were concentrated near Zhongxiang, while additional troops east and west of the Xiang River brought the total strength to more than three divisions. Along the Suixian–Xiangyang Highway, Japanese forces were reinforced to divisional strength, supported by increased artillery and tank detachments. These meticulous measures left no doubt that the enemy was ready for a large-scale operation.   By 23 November the Japanese had completed their deployments and moved into assault positions. The Japanese forces assigned to the Central Hubei Operation were placed under the overall command of Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe, who directed the campaign from his headquarters in Wuhan. Sonobe's 11th Army drew on a broad mix of formations, combining units from the 3rd, 4th, 15th, 17th, 39th, and 40th Divisions. The offensive backbone for the thrust into central Hubei province was reinforced by the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, which helped supply the infantry strength needed for sustained fighting across difficult ground. In practice, this multi-division structure reflected the 11th Army's key mission in the region, acting as the main Japanese formation after the earlier Battle of Zaoyang and it emphasized coordinated divisional advances supported by attached brigades and specialized elements, including limited armored capabilities.   In terms of manpower, the Japanese force is commonly estimated at roughly 40,000 to 50,000 troops. This strength included several infantry regiments and artillery batteries, along with only limited armored elements rather than a fully armored formation. Because the operation depended on finding and exploiting opportunities quickly, it was supported by aerial reconnaissance and bombing carried out by the 3rd Air Brigade operating in central China. Infantry units formed the majority of the fighting power, while artillery was used to provide suppressive fire during advances. Air support, meanwhile, was intended to help identify and target Chinese positions—particularly along important riverine and rail corridors, where disruptions could slow resistance and complicate Chinese reinforcement or retreat.   To manage the operation across varied terrain and combat tasks, Sonobe's command used smaller combined formation often described as task forces, that could operate with some flexibility. Among them were the Kayashima Force, commanded by Major General Koichi Kayashima of the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, consisting of the entire brigade reinforced by elements of the 40th Division. The Muragami Force, under Lieutenant General Keisaku Muragami, commander of the 39th Division, which included the full division plus supporting non-infantry units. The Hirabayashi Force, led by Lieutenant General Morito Hirabayashi of the 17th Division, formed from detachments of the 17th and 15th Divisions.The Kitana Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Kenzo Kitana of the 4th Division, incorporating portions of the 4th Division and the Kususe Armored Force. These four groups were deployed in parallel around Tangyang, Jingmen, Zhongxiang, and north of Jingshan. The Hanjima Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division, positioned near Suixian along the Xiangyang–Hua Highway. This task-force approach helped tailor combat power to specific mission profiles—such as flanking movements, raids, or pressure on Chinese defensive lines—while keeping the overall campaign plan under a unified command.   Equipment choices also reflected the tactical environment of Hubei. The Japanese units made use of Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks for reconnaissance and for anti-infantry roles, typically best suited to the reconnaissance, pursuit, and screening functions that were available even with constrained armor numbers. For fire support, the force relied on conventional artillery, including 75mm Type 90 guns for field engagements and 105mm howitzers for heavier bombardment where stronger explosive impact was needed. Together, these assets were intended to allow Japanese formations to maneuver around Chinese positions and apply pressure in rugged landscapes where rivers, roads, and rail lines often determined the rhythm of battle.   Logistics were a decisive factor in whether the operation could sustain momentum. Sonobe's army depended heavily on existing transportation infrastructure, particularly rail lines radiating from the Wuhan hub toward forward areas such as Suizhou and Zaoyang. These routes were critical for moving ammunition, replacements, and other supplies closer to the front as the Japanese advanced. The campaign also used river transport along the Yangtze River, including motorized barges and steamers, to deliver supplies to units operating near waterways. However, reliance on these corridors came with risks: Chinese interdiction raids could disrupt shipments, forcing convoys to be escorted and increasing the time and resources required to keep the forward units supplied. Overall, this dependence on both rail and fluvial networks highlighted a central operational challenge, maintaining secure access to transportation arteries in contested territory so that the Japanese could keep fighting effectively rather than stalling as supplies dwindled.   The Central Hubei Operation was driven by an intelligence assessment that Chinese troop movements were signaling preparations for a Nationalist counteroffensive. Acting on that interpretation, the Japanese began tightening plans and positioning forces early in the final days of November 1940. On 23 November 1940, the Japanese 11th Army under Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe began organizing for the offensive in central Hubei. In order to conduct a coordinated advance across the Han River, the army arranged its forces into five groups, each tasked with moving in a way that supported the broader pincer-style pressure on Chinese positions. The approach also reflected lessons drawn from the earlier Zaoyang–Yichang campaign earlier in 1940, when Japanese divisions had been able to cross the Han River at multiple points, such as Dangyang, Jiukouzhen, and Shayangzhen—to help secure access toward Yichang and the Yangtze route. Logistics were built around infrastructure the Japanese had already established during prior operations. The Hankou hub supported the 11th Army through arrangements that included munitions storage, medical facilities, and transport coordination. Supplies and reinforcements were moved using truck convoys and river crossings, while forward depots—such as those at Shayangzhen northwest of Hankou—provided additional capacity, including freight handling and field hospitals. Because the area was not secure, these supply points were also guarded against threats from guerrilla activity, which could disrupt communications and threaten personnel and equipment.   Operationally, the offensive used limited artillery and air support, reflecting Japanese constraints and directives aimed at keeping the campaign short and avoiding commitments that could stretch units beyond their logistical reach. Instead of trying to grind down Chinese defenses through prolonged bombardment, the plan prioritized speed, reconnaissance, and focused disruption. Japanese intelligence preparation relied heavily on aerial reconnaissance over the Han River valley to locate Chinese positions and infer where resistance would likely concentrate. That information enabled Japanese units to coordinate select maneuvers, including converging pressure from different directions. Where river transport mattered, coordination with naval or riverine elements supported movement and resupply, with overall oversight connected to the China Expeditionary Army.   Anticipating the coming assault, the Chinese Fifth War Area headquarters acted swiftly on instructions from the National Military Council. Orders were issued to the River West Army Group (30th and 77th Corps), the Right Army Group (44th and 67th Corps), and the Central Army Group (41st and 45th Corps) to employ a flexible defensive strategy: hold key positions firmly while committing the main strength to strike the enemy's outer flanks at the decisive moment. The 59th Corps was directed to advance toward the Xiangfan area, ready to reinforce operations on either bank of the river as the situation developed.   As commander of the Fifth War Area, Li Zongren arranged the defense to meet a likely Japanese thrust along the Han River, particularly in the approaches to Wuhan and Yichang, following the wider stalemate that settled in after the 1938 fall of Wuhan. The Fifth War Area could draw on roughly 300,000 troops, though many units were understrength, and the overall readiness varied by locality. Among the formations Li Zongren placed in the most sensitive sectors was the 31st Army Group under General Tang Enbo, which Japanese planners had identified as a potential threat to Japanese intentions in the region. In keeping with the terrain and the limits on manpower, Li's defensive design relied heavily on natural barriers—most importantly the Han River itself—and on the defensibility of rugged ground. Forces were arrayed to hold or contest riverbank positions, supported by fortifications, trenches, and smaller auxiliary elements. Divisions such as the 44th were positioned with an eye toward slowing an enemy crossing and forcing the Japanese to fight for difficult approaches rather than moving rapidly. At the same time, irregular forces and prepared defensive works were used to complicate Japanese reconnaissance and to make it harder for the attacker to coordinate a clean operational flow. Strategically, Li Zongren leaned on elastic defense rather than attempting to win decisive battles at fixed lines. Regular units were supported by guerrilla-style harassment intended to strike Japanese vulnerabilities, especially supply and transportation, between forward bases and the front. Local operations, including actions coming from areas such as Xinyang, were designed to disrupt Japanese logistics in periods when the Nationalists were still managing shortages of ammunition and medical supplies. Militias in the inter-mountainous regions further reinforced this approach: instead of seeking costly frontal engagements, they concentrated on disruption, delaying movements, and making Japanese operations slower and more expensive.   At dawn on 25 November the Japanese offensive began, with columns advancing along multiple axes. On the western Xiangyang front, more than 1,000 troops from Tangyang and over 3,000 from Jingmen struck Hengdian and Yanzhimiao, shattering the positions of the Chinese 30th Corps. Simultaneously, a column moving from Zhujiafu toward Tunglinling split into several detachments and drove deep northward into Liangshuijing, Xiajiazi, and Kuaihuopu. By nightfall the River West Army Group had regrouped along the line from Hengdian through Yanzhimiao to Kuaihuopu. On 26 November the Japanese reached Xianzhu. The following day they assaulted Liuhouji and Lijiatang in a day-long battle that ended in stalemate. At dusk the 30th Corps launched a powerful counterattack; the 27th and 31st Divisions dispatched raiding parties into the enemy's rear. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese fell back toward Jingmen and Zhongxiang, pursued by Chinese forces that inflicted heavy losses.   Along the Jingmen–Zhongxiang Highway the Japanese massed more than 3,000 troops to attack Changshoutian and Wangjiatian, encircling Changjiachi and Shahetian. The Chinese 149th Division withdrew in good order to the stronger Wangjiahe–Wulongguan line. On 26 November enemy strength grew to 4,000–5,000. One column advanced on Sanligang while the main body assaulted Peizhai, Wangjiahe, and Yunanmen. Fighting continued until dark without decisive result. On 27 November the main force of the 44th Corps counterattacked from Wangjiahe, converging with the 67th Corps advancing from the northwest. The coordinated assault inflicted severe casualties, yet the Japanese continued to fight stubbornly. On the Suixian front, more than 2,000 Japanese troops reached Liangshuikou on the morning of 25 November and launched a violent attack against the 123rd Division at Lishan. Two additional columns, each exceeding 1,000 men, pushed westward toward Hoyuantian and Qingmingpu; their numbers swelled steadily as darkness fell. On 26 November fierce combat raged against the 124th and 127th Divisions at Jinjishan and Qingmingpu. A separate force of 700–800 men advanced from Xihe via Langhetian to Tangjiafan. After clashing with the 41st Corps, the Japanese near Qingmingpu linked up with those at Jinjishan and moved toward Hoyuantian on 27 November. That night the detachment at Tangjiafan reached the vicinity of Huantan Zhen, confronting the 125th Division. Recognizing that the enemy had become dangerously dispersed, the War Area Command ordered its units to hold critical localities while the main forces exploited the mountainous terrain for ambushes. The tactic proved effective. Heavy fighting continued until 28 November, when the Japanese, unable to achieve their objectives, began a general withdrawal. Chinese forces west of Xiangyang immediately took up the pursuit. The enemy opposing the Right Army Group was routed and retreated along several routes. In the Suixian sector, Japanese units at Hoyuantian and Huantan Zhen were caught in converging attacks by the Central Army Group, driven back to high ground, and encircled. In a desperate attempt to relieve the trapped forces, the Japanese rushed 1,500–1,600 infantry and cavalry troops from Suixian and Yingshan through Shangshitian and Shatian in a flanking maneuver—only to be ambushed once more. Covered by aircraft and armor, the enemy withdrew toward Suixian and Xihe as Chinese troops pressed forward along the line from Chunchuan to Anchu, Lishan, and Gaocheng. By 30 November all Chinese Army Groups had restored their original positions.   The Central Hubei Operation produced uneven battlefield outcomes, particularly in reported casualties. Japanese accounts describe relatively limited losses, just 132 killed and 445 wounded attributed to advantages in air superiority, artillery, and armored support, even though the advance was complicated by difficult terrain. At the same time, Japanese forces faced persistent Chinese counterattacks along the Han River, which contributed to localized pressure and eventual withdrawal. The Japanese reported 6,439 Chinese killed  and 474 captured, but the evidence base is uncertain and the language of reporting suggests possible exaggeration or propaganda. Conversely, Chinese-era estimates reportedly placed Japanese losses at roughly 5,000 killed and 7,000–8,000 wounded, illustrating a substantial gap between competing narratives. Some alternate reconstructions suggest total Chinese casualties in the range of 20,000–30,000, depending on whether wounded and missing personnel are included. However, because wartime reporting was fragmented and inconsistent, there is no fully verifiable casualty ledger for all units involved.   Despite these tolls, the operation did not appear to achieve a decisive Chinese destruction of Japan's intended target force. The Chinese Fifth War Area, including elements associated with the 31st Army Group under Tang Enbo, suffered attrition but generally avoided annihilation. No major command-level losses are indicated in the surviving accounts, and unit formations were not described as collapsing permanently. On the material side, Japan reportedly seized rifles and supplies from positions that Chinese forces had encircled or abandoned in the short term, but overall equipment losses for either side were described as limited, consistent with the operation's restricted intensity.    Strategically, the operation offered Japan short-term tactical advantages—notably through localized envelopments and the temporary pressure of combined-arms support—but it failed to translate these gains into a sustained strategic result. The fighting also strained Japanese logistics in central China, especially given that the offensive was not followed by major reinforcements. At the same time, it exposed continuing vulnerabilities in rugged terrain where Chinese guerrilla activity and organized counteraction could offset superior firepower.   Ultimately, the Central Hubei Operation produced no net territorial gains. By the end of the week, Japanese troops had returned to positions that did not fundamentally alter control in central Hubei. Local clashes may have disturbed formations and disrupted movement temporarily, but the campaign did not create durable forward bases, did not change administrative control meaningfully, and did not permanently disrupt key supply corridors. The territorial status quo largely persisted: Chinese Fifth War Area forces maintained positions north of the Yangtze River, and there was no widespread abandonment of strongholds sufficient to indicate a strategic collapse.   In the months following the Japanese repulse in central Hubei in November 1940, enemy forces remained largely immobilized across the Jing-Xiang plains, their earlier ambitions checked by determined Chinese resistance. Seeking to regain momentum and draw Chinese strength away from other theaters, the Japanese high command prepared a massive offensive into southern Henan in late January 1941. By the end of the month they had concentrated an imposing array of seven infantry divisions, one independent cavalry brigade, three independent armored regiments, and one independent artillery regiment. In all, more than 150,000 infantrymen, over 8,000 cavalry, 550 artillery pieces, 300 tanks, and 200 armored cars stood ready. Over a hundred aircraft were massed at forward bases in Anyang, Xinxiang, Huaiyang, and Xinyang. From early January onward, ammunition and equipment had been laboriously shipped up the Yangtze and moved inland to Xinyang, while Japanese reconnaissance planes repeatedly overflew Chinese rear areas. Additional troops were concentrated in southern Henan itself.   On 20 January, as a preliminary move to pin down Chinese forces and facilitate the main effort in central Henan, the Japanese 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, together with elements of the 39th and 4th Divisions, launched a limited attack against the Chinese 29th and 33rd Army Groups. The principal assault, however, began on 24 January under the overall command of Lieutenant General Katsuichiro Enbu. The Japanese organized their southern Henan forces into three powerful columns: The Left Flank Force, built around the entire 3rd Division reinforced by the 8th Regiment of the 4th Division and the Mizuno Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division. The Central Force, centered on the 17th Division (less one regiment) and strengthened by the 67th Regiment of the 15th Division and the Yoshimatsu Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Amaya of the 40th Division. The Right Flank Force, formed around the main body of the 40th Division, also under Lieutenant General Amaya.   In support of this main thrust, Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan—principally the 4th Cavalry Brigade with the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment—advanced westward from Haozhou toward Woyang. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division pushed west from Suzhou, while the Uguchi and Kobayashi Regiments of the 35th Division, accompanied by engineer, cavalry, artillery, and tank units, moved from Kaifeng, Tongxu, and Zhuxian Zhen along the north bank of the Yellow River and through the flooded areas toward Zhengzhou. These supporting columns were intended to tie down Chinese reserves and prevent reinforcement of the southern front.   The National Military Council in Chongqing correctly assessed the enemy's intention: to drive north along the Beiping-Hankou Railway with their main strength, force a decisive battle against the Chinese field armies, and rely on the northern Anhui–eastern Henan forces to strike westward in coordination. Accordingly, the Council instructed the Fifth War Area to avoid a costly frontal engagement. Instead, a small portion of its troops would offer delaying resistance along the railway, while the main force would maneuver to the enemy's flanks and rear, severing communications and launching devastating counterattacks. In compliance, the Fifth War Area left only a single division near Xiping on the Beiping-Hankou line. The bulk of its strength—carefully concealed in depth on both sides of the enemy's expected axis of advance—remained highly mobile, ready to strike the Japanese flanks or rear the moment the enemy divided his forces or pushed toward Runan, Yancheng, or Wuyang. This elastic strategy proved decisive.   At dawn on 25 January the Japanese southern Henan forces advanced in three columns. The Left Flank Force moved along the line from Xiaolindian to Gucheng and Chashan. The Central Force struck northward from the Minggang area. The Right Flank Force crossed the Huai River between Huaijiao Zhen and Chengyang under heavy air support. Japanese planes bombed Chinese positions relentlessly. True to plan, Chinese units employed only light screening forces to harass the enemy with ambushes and flank attacks, preserving their main strength for the decisive moment.   By 26 January the Japanese had reached the line from Piyang to Gaoyi, Xingtian, and Queshan. On the 27th they pressed on to Chunshui, Shahetian, and Zhumadian. At this point Chinese mobile forces sprang into action. The 13th Corps of the 31st Army Group swung northward toward Xiangheguan, while the main body of the 85th Corps moved toward Shangcai to begin an enveloping maneuver. The 68th Corps of the 11th Army Group struck the enemy rear south of Xiangheguan; the 55th Corps advanced from Tanghe to Piyang; and the 59th Corps of the 33rd Army Group pushed toward Nanyang. On 29 January the 13th Corps attacked the Japanese Left Flank Force near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian south of Wuyang, while the 85th Corps struck the Right Flank Force around Runan, southeast of Shangcai. The enemy's Central Force, advancing along and west of the railway, found the Chinese positions already evacuated and failed to trap any major units. The Japanese columns on the extreme flanks suffered over 3,000 casualties and lost six tanks in the fighting around Jieguanting.   By 31 January the enemy, desperate to rescue his exposed flank columns, reordered his forces. The Central Force executed turning movements on both sides: elements of the 15th Division swung right from Suiping through Shangcai to converge with troops moving north from Runan against the 85th Corps, while the main body of the 17th Division split into two columns and advanced from Suiping through Xiping toward Wuyang. Simultaneously, the main force of the 3rd Division and part of the 4th Division also converged on Wuyang, hoping to link with the 17th Division and crush the 13th Corps near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian. Before the trap could close, however, the Chinese 13th and 85th Corps withdrew in good order to the area north of Ye Xian, between Yancheng and Shangshui, and north of the Sha River. When the Japanese broke through at Wuyang and Shangcai they found no major Chinese forces to destroy.   Meanwhile, Chinese troops from western Henan, the 59th, 55th, and 68th Corps, advanced from Tanghe, Piyang, and points north to strike the enemy rear at Wuyang. On 29 January the 84th Corps and local guerrillas in western Anhui recaptured Chengyang and continued the pursuit. The Japanese, having failed to concentrate superior strength or control the battlefield, now found themselves isolated. Their rear communications were severed, and they were under constant pressure from the 68th, 55th, and 59th Corps. After days of exhausting combat the enemy began to withdraw southward on the night of 2 February. Leaving only rear guards at Wuyang and Baoanzhai to tie down the 13th Corps, the main body of the 3rd Division moved from Fangcheng toward Nanyang and Zhenping. The 13th Corps immediately counterattacked, recaptured Baoanzhai and Wuyang, and pursued the enemy toward Fangcheng.   On the night of 2 February, as the Japanese main force approached Nanyang, the 17th Division together with elements of the 15th and 4th Divisions had already pushed south from Wuyang via Xiangheguan toward Piyang, hoping to link with forces moving east from Nanyang and trap the Chinese 68th, 55th, and 29th Corps. Fierce resistance by the 68th Corps near Xiangheguan inflicted heavy losses and forced the enemy to abandon large quantities of supplies. Further south, the 29th Corps exacted still greater casualties around Piyang. On the night of 7 February the trapped Japanese column split: part retreated along the Tanghe–Piyang highway, while the main body withdrew along the Tongbo–Xinyang highway toward Xinyang, leaving many dead behind. The Chinese 85th Corps pursued southeastward, while elements of the 13th, 29th, 55th, and 59th Corps harried the enemy toward Xinyang. By the time the fighting ended, all Chinese units had regained their original positions.   In coordination with the southern Henan offensive, the Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan advanced westward in four columns on the morning of 25 January. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division struck west from Suzhou. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment, split into three routes from Bozhou to attack Woyang, Shanheji, and Shuangqiao, clashing bitterly with a Chinese cavalry division near Shizihe and Niqiuji. The Uguchi Regiment of the 35th Division advanced through the flooded areas from Tongxu and Zhuxian Zhen, while the Kobayashi Regiment moved westward along the north bank of the Yellow River near Zhengzhou. Japanese aircraft intensified their bombing of Chinese cities and front-line positions, including Zhoujiakou, Zhengzhou, Yancheng, Ye Xian, Xiangcheng, Wuyang, and Luoyang. On 29 January one enemy column reached Santaiji and suffered heavy losses under Chinese attack. Threatened on the left by forces near Huaiyang, two Chinese corps withdrew temporarily to the line from Fuyang to Taihe and Jieshou. On 5 February the Japanese captured Taihe and Jieshou, but a Chinese counterattack on the morning of 6 February regained both towns, forcing the enemy to retreat northeastward.   The Battle of Southern Henan, which opened on 25 January and concluded on 10 February after seventeen days of continuous fighting, ended in a clear Chinese victory. Japanese casualties exceeded 9,000; when the enemy withdrew from Nanyang more than 300 military vehicles were left burning on the battlefield. Large quantities of arms, ammunition, and supplies fell into Chinese hands. Chinese losses were significantly lighter. The enemy had hoped to force a decisive battle along the railway and shatter the Chinese armies of the Fifth War Area. Instead, skillful Chinese maneuver, timely flank attacks, and relentless pressure on the enemy's rear and communications had turned the Japanese offensive into a costly failure. The victory not only preserved the integrity of the central Chinese front but also demonstrated once again the effectiveness of elastic defense and mobile counteroffensive tactics against a numerically superior but overextended foe.   In the wake of their costly repulse in central Hubei the previous November and the even more humiliating defeat in Southern Henan between late January and early February 1941, the Japanese sought once more to regain the initiative in the spring of 1941. Their target was western Hubei, where Chinese forces continued to deny them freedom of movement along the middle Yangtze. The entire Japanese 13th Division garrisoned the Yichang salient. Its regiments were deployed in a defensive arc: the 65th Regiment and the 19th Artillery Regiment held positions east of the city at Longchuanpu, Tumenya, and Yaqueling; the 104th Regiment guarded the northwest approaches; and the 17th Cavalry Regiment patrolled the Yangchalu–Baishanao sector. On the west bank of the Yangtze, the 58th Regiment had constructed strong bridgehead fortifications between Chaojialing and Shangwulongkou, ready to support any renewed thrust westward.   Facing this entrenched enemy was the Chinese 26th Corps, entrusted with the critical mission of river defense on the west bank of the Yangtze opposite Yichang. The corps commander had organized his forces into three sectors. The 41st Division held the right zone, anchoring its line from Mujiatian and Tanjiataizi northward to the vicinity of Fanjiah u. The 32nd Division defended the left zone, stretching from Mujiatian through Ceyang to Xiangzikou. The 44th Division remained in corps reserve near Caojiafan, poised to reinforce either flank or exploit opportunities for counterattack.   On 6 March 1941 the Japanese struck. Having quietly reinforced their forces west of Yichang to more than three regiments, supported by cavalry and artillery, they opened the assault at 5:30 a.m. with a violent artillery barrage, followed immediately by infantry advances under cover of air strikes. Chinese security positions at Tanjiataizi and Chaojiadian were overrun. The enemy then hurled itself against the main line at Changgangling. Simultaneously, 600 to 700 Japanese troops, backed by planes and guns, assaulted Fanjiah u. After hours of bitter fighting both localities fell. On the morning of 7 March, Japanese aircraft again spearheaded the attack, enabling the capture of positions at Qianjiatai and Wujiaba. The enemy pressed on toward Qianjiachong and Yutaishan but was thrown back. Meanwhile, the force that had taken Fanjiah u clashed fiercely with the Chinese 44th Division around Taipingqiao; although the division was eventually compelled to withdraw to the eastern end of the bridge under relentless air attack, it continued to resist stubbornly. When the enemy seized Hut zeye from the direction of Fanjiah u, the 32nd Division fell back in good order to the line from Tunziqiao to Tuyanzhong, where it beat off further assaults. By this stage the Japanese had driven themselves into a dangerously narrow salient, exposed on both flanks.   Seizing the moment, the River Defense Force reorganized its lines. The 103rd Division of the 8th Corps relieved the sector from Mujiatang through Yingzishan to Chaotianguan, while the 26th Corps consolidated new positions at Yutaishan, Pijiashan, Qingshuiba, Guangongling, and Xiaopingshanba. The plan was clear: hold the enemy east of this line, then launch a converging counterstroke to destroy the invaders and restore the original front. On 8 March two guerrilla columns from the 41st Division struck at Changgangling and Fanjiayuan, while another detachment hit the enemy east of Pifengjian. More than 2,000 Japanese troops assaulted the 44th Division's positions from Gaolingpo and Dajiaobian toward Wanghuzizhong; determined resistance by the 44th Division, supported by elements of the 41st, brought the attack to a standstill. Later that day the enemy managed to penetrate the 32nd Division's line at Tianwangshi, forcing Chinese troops to fight a delaying action along the outskirts of the Shibai Fortress from Mingjiachong to Heitangou.   Dawn on 9 March brought renewed Chinese initiative. The 103rd Division occupied the line from Tutiling to Shizinao and advanced in several columns against the enemy. A portion of the 44th Division waged a grim holding action on the high ground flanking Guojiaba, suffering heavy losses but buying time for the main body to launch a powerful flank attack against the Japanese at Taipingqiao and Xianglingkou. By dusk Chinese forces had captured the enemy strongpoints at Dujiaoba and Dajiaobian along the highway, annihilating numerous enemy troops. The 32nd Division threw its main strength against the area northwest of Dajiaobian; heavy fighting raged around Wanghuzizhong into the afternoon until enemy reinforcements were driven off. The 41st Division, meanwhile, executed effective flank attacks that yielded significant gains. On 10 March the 103rd Division recaptured the high ground at Xiawulongkou and north of Tianzipo, while guerrillas of the 41st Division continued to harass the enemy through every gap in his lines. When positions at Hongshipo and Lungtanping held by the 44th Division were breached, the division withdrew to the western heights of Bomuping and faced the enemy anew.   At dawn on 11 March, after suffering severe casualties, the Japanese resorted to smoke screens and began withdrawing eastward along several routes. Chinese pursuit forces swiftly retook Xianglingkou, Guojiaba, Guangongling, Tianwangshi, and Dajiaobian. By 12 March the enemy had fallen back to a defensive line running from east of Taipingqiao to Hu z'ai and Huangnikeng. On 13 March Chinese units launched general counterattacks. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese retreated to their original positions. The eight-day engagement thus ended exactly where it had begun.   The battle had been fought with only a portion of the available Chinese forces, yet it proved decisive. The Japanese, who had hoped to crack the river defenses and resume their westward drive, instead suffered 4,000 to 5,000 casualties. The swift and skillful Chinese counteroffensive not only restored the front but left the enemy shaken and apprehensive. Their design to push deeper into western Hubei was decisively thwarted, buying precious time for the broader Chinese war effort in the Yangtze theater and demonstrating once again that determined defense, timely reinforcement, and aggressive counteraction could blunt even the most carefully prepared Japanese offensive. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In November 1940, a Central Hubei Operation using five task forces attempted to exploit Chinese dispersal but achieved no territorial gains despite local successes. A larger January 1941 offensive into southern Henan deployed 150,000+ troops but again failed strategically. Despite Japanese tactical advantages and superior firepower, logistical constraints and rugged terrain favored mobile Chinese resistance. Both campaigns ended with Japanese withdrawals and restored Chinese positions, demonstrating that determined defense and timely counteraction could blunt large-scale Japanese operations.

POUR COMMANDER MON LIVRE :https://www.editions-larousse.fr/livre/la-philosophie-cest-pour-vous-aussi-9782036070325/POUR COMMANDER MA BANDE DESSINÉE PHILORAMA : https://www.editions-larousse.fr/livre/philorama-9782036082434/Disponible aussi dans toutes les bonnes librairies !Extrait de mon passage sur la chaîne "Corps & Esprit".

THIS FIELD TALK IS RESERVED FOR AG PATREON MEMBERS ONLY. JOIN OUR PATREON TO PARTICIPATE! - https://www.patreon.com/c/AddressingGettysburg June 20, 2026 – 10:00 a.m. Brigadier General Francis Barlow July 1, 1863 Led by LBG Lewis Trott Did Brigadier General Barlow's movement to Blocher's Knoll unnecessarily endanger the entire 11th Corps position on July 1, 1863? Or was the outcome a forgone conclusion no matter where Barlow placed his men that July afternoon?

Le 19 septembre 1993, Lynn Hill réussissait l'impossible : la première ascension en libre du Nose, une voie de 900 mètres sur El Capitan au Yosemite. Un exploit qui repoussait les limites de l'escalade et redessinait pour toujours la place des femmes sur le granit américain. Trente ans plus tard, la grimpeuse Soline Kentzel arrive à son tour dans la vallée pour tenter seule l'ascension de cette voie considérée comme l'une des plus exigeantes de la planète et écrire sa propre ligne sur le mur.Abonnez-vous à notre newsletter pour ne louper aucun épisode ➡️

In 1806, when Meriwether Lewis and William Clark return from their journey—having led the Corps of Discovery across eight thousand miles of rapids, mountains, forests, and ravines—they bring an incredible tale starring themselves as courageous explorers, skilled survivalists, underrated scientists, and peaceful ambassadors. While there is truth in those descriptions, there is also distortion. From one of the most exciting new historians to emerge in the past decade, This Vast Enterprise: A New History of Lewis & Clark (Simon & Schuster, 2026) offers a novel take on the expedition: a gripping narrative that draws on lost documents, stunning analysis, and Native perspectives. Craig Fehrman spent five years visiting more than thirty archives, interviewing more than a hundred sources, and collecting oral history passed down over centuries. He came to see that the success of Lewis and Clark depended on much more than just Lewis and Clark. We all know Sacajawea, and some of us know York, the Black man Clark enslaved. But here we meet John Ordway, a working-class soldier who fought grizzlies and towed the captains' hulking barge. We hear from Wolf Calf, a Blackfoot teenager who watched his friend die in a battle with Lewis and his men. Each chapter moves to a different person's point of view, describing their desires and contradictions. We see Thomas Jefferson operating in an age of bitter partisan unrest—his secret political maneuvers to fund the expedition, revealed here for the first time, are a case study in presidential power. We witness the strategy and strength of Black Buffalo, completely upending our understanding of Lakota-American diplomacy. York, in his chapters, finds ways to wield power and make choices in an era that didn't allow him much of either. Clark is not a folksy Kentuckian but a student of the Enlightenment. (Fehrman discovered his college notebook; no previous biographer even realized that he went to college.) Lewis is someone willing to sacrifice everything for his country and his mentor, Jefferson. In the end, the captains are men who needed help—from Sacajawea, from the Corps, and from each other. Mile after mile, the expedition pushes on through hailstorms and flash floods, frostbite and infections, rattlesnakes and rabid wolves, with the Spanish cavalry in fierce pursuit. Fehrman balances the story's adventure with the humanity of its protagonists. The result is a thrilling reminder that even the most familiar moments in history can still surprise us. Craig Fehrman is a journalist and historian. He lives in Indiana with his wife and children. Raymond Williams, PhD is a political scientist, blogger, and book club administrator with an interest in American History and Politics. You can find Raymond on Instagram, Threads, and Twitter at @rtwilliams16 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In 1806, when Meriwether Lewis and William Clark return from their journey—having led the Corps of Discovery across eight thousand miles of rapids, mountains, forests, and ravines—they bring an incredible tale starring themselves as courageous explorers, skilled survivalists, underrated scientists, and peaceful ambassadors. While there is truth in those descriptions, there is also distortion. From one of the most exciting new historians to emerge in the past decade, This Vast Enterprise: A New History of Lewis & Clark (Simon & Schuster, 2026) offers a novel take on the expedition: a gripping narrative that draws on lost documents, stunning analysis, and Native perspectives. Craig Fehrman spent five years visiting more than thirty archives, interviewing more than a hundred sources, and collecting oral history passed down over centuries. He came to see that the success of Lewis and Clark depended on much more than just Lewis and Clark. We all know Sacajawea, and some of us know York, the Black man Clark enslaved. But here we meet John Ordway, a working-class soldier who fought grizzlies and towed the captains' hulking barge. We hear from Wolf Calf, a Blackfoot teenager who watched his friend die in a battle with Lewis and his men. Each chapter moves to a different person's point of view, describing their desires and contradictions. We see Thomas Jefferson operating in an age of bitter partisan unrest—his secret political maneuvers to fund the expedition, revealed here for the first time, are a case study in presidential power. We witness the strategy and strength of Black Buffalo, completely upending our understanding of Lakota-American diplomacy. York, in his chapters, finds ways to wield power and make choices in an era that didn't allow him much of either. Clark is not a folksy Kentuckian but a student of the Enlightenment. (Fehrman discovered his college notebook; no previous biographer even realized that he went to college.) Lewis is someone willing to sacrifice everything for his country and his mentor, Jefferson. In the end, the captains are men who needed help—from Sacajawea, from the Corps, and from each other. Mile after mile, the expedition pushes on through hailstorms and flash floods, frostbite and infections, rattlesnakes and rabid wolves, with the Spanish cavalry in fierce pursuit. Fehrman balances the story's adventure with the humanity of its protagonists. The result is a thrilling reminder that even the most familiar moments in history can still surprise us. Craig Fehrman is a journalist and historian. He lives in Indiana with his wife and children. Raymond Williams, PhD is a political scientist, blogger, and book club administrator with an interest in American History and Politics. You can find Raymond on Instagram, Threads, and Twitter at @rtwilliams16 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/native-american-studies

For this episode we learn about the United States Navy youth organization called the United States Naval Sea Cadet Corps.  Joe talks with their National Executive Director, retired US Navy Rear Admiral Andrew Lennon, about their mission to build leaders of character by imbuing in cadets the highest ideals of honor, respect, commitment, and service.  While many details about the program are covered, if you want to learn more, go to SeaCadets.org.Our library of shows can be found at www.veteranscornerradio.comJoin us on Facebook at the page Veterans Corner RadioYou can contact our host Joe Muhlberger at joseph.muhlberger@gmail.com

Col Valerie Sams, MD is an Air Force trauma surgeon, surgical critical care expert, and the Director of the Center for Sustainment of Trauma and Readiness Skills (C-STARS) at the University of Cincinnati. Her path to the operating room was anything but ordinary.   Before medical school, she served as an Air Force line officer in logistics and fuels, learning how the operational side of the service actually works at the flight line. That bilingual fluency in operations and medicine now shapes how she advocates for resources, leads hospitals, and prepares the military health system for the next fight.    In this conversation, she walks through her two tours as the trauma czar at the Bagram role three hospital straight out of fellowship, where she was responsible not only for clinical excellence but for leading every nurse, emergency medicine physician, and surgeon doing trauma care across the theater. She talks honestly about the weight of that role, especially during her second deployment with junior surgeons on their first downrange experience, the rise in U.S. casualties, the green-on-blue threat, and her work standing up Medic-X as a force multiplier for limited deployed medical crews.     Col Sams makes a powerful case for the strategic importance of military-civilian partnerships like C-STARS, the only Air Force critical care air transport advanced training course, and explains how the Air Force, Army, and Navy are converging through the Joint Trauma System, the Mission Zero Act, and the American College of Surgeons Blue Book to professionalize military-civilian integration. She is direct about the skill sustainment crisis inside military treatment facilities, the shift from 65 percent beneficiary care to 20 percent, the urgency of the Military Unique Curriculum, and the need to train outside-the-tent skills deliberately rather than by accident.   Dr. Sams lays out a clear-eyed vision for large-scale combat operations: faster trauma registry feedback loops, autonomous and decision support tools, closed-loop control ventilation, ECMO projected forward, and a hard end to the wax pencil and TCCC card as battlefield documentation. She closes with what should remain the center of gravity for every military medicine decision — the warfighter — and the conviction that they deserve the best clinical care available anywhere in the country.     Chapters (00:47-05:47) From Fuels Officer to Trauma Surgeon (05:47-12:49) Two Tours as Trauma Czar at Bagram (12:49-24:46) ECMO Forward, C-STARS, and the Skill Sustainment Crisis (24:46-35:42) Joint Military-Civilian Integration and the Military Unique Curriculum (35:42-49:26) LSCO Readiness, Force Multiplication, and Battlefield Technology (49:26-58:30) Female Leadership, Clinical Excellence, and Legacy     Chapter Summaries (00:47-05:47) From Fuels Officer to Trauma Surgeon Col Sams describes her unconventional path from Air Force line officer in logistics and fuels to general surgery and trauma fellowship. She credits her operational background with giving her a bilingual fluency between line and medical worlds that strengthens how she advocates for resources, leads hospital operations, and earns credibility with non-medical commanders.   (05:47-12:49) Two Tours as Trauma Czar at Bagram She unpacks the weight of deploying as the trauma czar at the Bagram Role 3 immediately after her fellowship and the lessons that came from leading mass casualty events, debriefing young teams, and dealing with the green-on-blue threat. She explains the stand-up of Medic-X under Lt Gen Hogg as a deliberate force multiplier for limited deployed medical crews.   (12:49-24:46) ECMO Forward, C-STARS, and the Skill Sustainment Crisis Col Sams details her work projecting ECMO capability into austere environments and around the globe, then explains the mission, history, and structure of the three original C-STARS programs. She is direct about the skill sustainment crisis, with beneficiary care in military treatment facilities dropping from roughly 65 percent to 20 percent over two decades.   (24:46-35:42) Joint Military-Civilian Integration and the Military Unique Curriculum She describes the progress driven by the Mission Zero Act, the Joint Trauma System military-civilian work group, and the American College of Surgeons Blue Book. She makes the case for a robust Military Unique Curriculum that develops both surgical fundamentals and the outside-the-tent skills that today's young military surgeons need before they take their first leadership role downrange.   (35:42-49:26) LSCO Readiness, Force Multiplication, and Battlefield Technology Col Sams turns to large-scale combat operations and the blind spots that the counterinsurgency generation may carry into the next fight. She calls for faster trauma registry feedback, autonomous decision support tools, closed-loop ventilation, ECMO projected forward, and a hard end to the TCCC wax pencil as the primary battlefield documentation tool.   (49:26-58:30) Female Leadership, Clinical Excellence, and Legacy She offers candid advice to young female military surgeons on imposter syndrome, unconscious bias, and the discipline of staying clinically excellent. She closes with the conviction that patient-centered leadership, lifelong learning, and protecting clinical talent are the foundations of how military medicine should remember her work.     Take Home Messages Operational Fluency Strengthens Medical Leadership: Time spent on the line side of the military — understanding logistics, fuels, and how the operational force actually fights — builds credibility with non-medical commanders and sharpens advocacy for resources. Surgeons who speak the operational language sit at the right tables and make better decisions for their teams and their patients.   The Trauma Czar Role Demands Leadership Before Stride: Being responsible for an entire theater of combat casualty care immediately after fellowship is a heavy and unforgiving assignment. Clinical excellence is the floor; the real work is leading nurses, emergency medicine physicians, and surgeons through mass casualty events, debriefs, and the green-on-blue threat with junior teammates who have never deployed before.   Skill Sustainment Requires Military-Civilian Partnership: Military treatment facilities now deliver only a fraction of the beneficiary care they once did, and that volume cannot sustain combat-ready trauma teams. Embedded military-civilian partnerships like C-STARS, supported by the Mission Zero Act and the American College of Surgeons Blue Book, are the realistic path to keep wartime skills sharp.   Outside-the-Tent Skills Must Be Deliberately Trained: Today's young military surgeons need more than technical readiness. They need a deliberate Military Unique Curriculum that develops the non-clinical leadership skills required to run a theater trauma system, manage resources, and lead teams under pressure. Picking those skills up on the fly is no longer good enough.   LSCO Will Not Wait on the Wax Pencil: The next fight will not give the medical force three years to figure out what changed or seven years to update clinical practice guidelines. Force multiplication through MedicX, autonomous decision support tools, closed-loop ventilation, ECMO projected forward, and modern battlefield documentation are non-negotiable investments now, before large-scale combat operations force the lesson.   Col Valerie Sams, MD Biography    Colonel Valerie Sams is the Director of the Center for Sustainment of Trauma and Readiness Skills (CSTARS) Cincinnati and serves as Critical Care Air Transport Team (CCAT) Training cadre. Originally from Georgetown, KY, she was commissioned into the Air Force in 2000, initially serving as a supply and logistics officer, which included a deployment supporting Stabilization Forces in the Balkans.    Transitioning to medicine, she earned her medical degree from St. George's University in 2008. Col Sams completed her General Surgery Residency at the University of Tennessee Medical Center (2013) and a Trauma Critical Care fellowship at Brooke Army Medical Center (2015).    As a trauma surgeon and ECMO physician, Col Sams deployed twice as the Trauma Czar for Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. Her extensive leadership roles include Trauma Medical Director, Assistant Chief of Trauma and Surgical Critical Care, Ground Surgical Team Pilot Unit Leader, and director of various military trauma research programs.   Episode Keywords WarDocs, military medicine, military trauma surgery, combat casualty care, trauma czar, Bagram role three, Air Force trauma surgeon, C-STARS Cincinnati, critical care air transport, CCATT, Joint Trauma System, military civilian partnership, Mission Zero Act, military unique curriculum, large scale combat operations, LSCO, prolonged casualty care, MedicX, ECMO in combat, battlefield documentation, TCCC card, closed loop ventilation, military medical leadership   Hashtags #MilitaryMedicine, #WarDocs, #CombatCasualtyCare, #TraumaSurgery, #JointTraumaSystem, #LSCOReadiness, #CSTARS, #MilCivPartnership   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine    WarDocs exists to honor the legacy of Military Medicine, preserve its history, and inspire every generation — across all Services, Corps, and Ranks — to serve with excellence and pride. Through mentorship, coaching, and education, we equip those considering, entering, and serving in military medicine with the knowledge, connections, and community they need to thrive. We celebrate Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoW, and Our Nation. Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield, demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.   Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast  

Laëtitia Milot nous parle de ces douleurs que l'on apprend à taire, de ces corps de femmes auxquels on demande de tenir, sourire, avancer, même lorsqu'ils crient en silence. Derrière l'image lumineuse de la comédienne révélée par Plus belle la vie, il y a l'histoire d'un combat intime contre l'endométriose, une maladie longtemps minimisée, mal comprise, parfois même niée. Comment continuer à croire en soi quand la souffrance devient invisible aux yeux des autres ? Comment ne pas se perdre lorsque son propre corps semble devenir un champ de bataille ? Entre silence, résilience, maternité, renaissance et reconnexion à soi, Laëtitia Milot livre le récit d'une femme qui a choisi de reprendre sa place dans son propre corps. Dans son roman, Sur nos chemins, paru aux éditions Robert Laffont, à travers le personnage de Rose inspiré de faits réels, elle explore avec force ces moments où la vie bascule, où il faut choisir de ne plus subir mais de se relever. Et si écouter son corps devenait finalement le premier pas vers soi-même ? À découvrir dans [VOS MÉTAMORPHOSES] par Marion Duchêne.Quelques citations du podcast avec Laëtitia Milot :"L'endométriose et l'adénomyose peuvent avoir des conséquences tragiques.""On a chacune son endométriose avec ses douleurs, avec sa façon de voir les choses.""L'endométriose vit avec moi, certes, mais elle ne prendra pas le dessus."Recevez chaque semaine l'inspirante newsletter Métamorphose par Anne GhesquièreDécouvrez Objectif Métamorphose, notre programme en 12 étapes pour partir à la rencontre de soi-même.Suivez nos RS : Insta, Facebook et TikTokAbonnez-vous sur Apple Podcasts / Spotify / Deezer / Castbox / YouTubeSoutenez Métamorphose en rejoignant la Tribu MétamorphoseThèmes abordés lors du podcast avec Laëtitia Milot : 00:00Introduction01:30L'invitée, Laëtitia Milot03:01Endométriose : errance médicale et douleur invisible06:28La force de vivre avec11:50Briser le silence sur l'endométriose24:04Tomber enceinte : la naissance miracle de Lyana38:47Faire alliance avec son corps42:32L'objet symbolique de Laëtitia MilotAvant-propos et précautions à l'écoute du podcast Photo © Darius-CMI-Starface Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

In this powerful episode, Jasmin Singer and Mariann Sullivan sit down with Tim Woodward, Executive Director of Animal Rescue Corps (ARC), an organization founded the same year as Our Hen House — 2010 — that has since conducted over 200 large-scale rescue operations saving thousands of animals from neglect, abuse, and crisis situations across the country. Large-scale animal rescue operations: ARC…

AJ Pasciuti grew up in Sunnyvale, California, the son of Italian and Argentine immigrants. After 9/11 reshaped his sense of purpose, he enlisted in the Marine Corps and was assigned to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division — one of the most storied units in the Corps — where he served as a rifleman and team leader. Over twenty-one years of service, he deployed three times to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the Battle of Fallujah. He led a Scout Sniper team that tracked and killed the most lethal enemy sniper in Iraq — a figure known as "Juba" — and recovered a stolen Marine sniper rifle in what was the first mission of its kind by an American service member since Vietnam. He went on to serve with 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion and 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company, deploying to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, during Operation Enduring Freedom and later with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. As an instructor, he taught at the Scout Sniper School at Camp Pendleton, created the Recon Team Leaders Course, and helped develop the Infantry Marine Course at School of Infantry–West, modernizing foundational training for enlisted Marines. Selected for the highly competitive Marine Gunner program, he became an Infantry Weapons Officer and rose to Chief Warrant Officer 3 before retiring from the Marine Corps in 2023. He holds a Master of Business for Veterans from the University of Southern California and a Master of Public Leadership from the University of San Francisco, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Leadership Studies at the University of San Diego. He is the host of the Combat Story podcast and the author of Darkhorse: Harnessing Hidden Potential in War and Life, releasing May 19, 2026. Shawn Ryan Show Sponsors: Go to https://helixsleep.com/SRS for 27% Off Sitewide Find candidates who really want YOUR job on ZipRecruiter. Try it FOR FREE at https://ziprecruiter.com/SRS Our listeners get the Harry's Plus Trial Set for only $10 at https://www.Harrys.com/srs #Harryspod For a limited time, our listeners get 50% off FOR LIFE, Free Shipping, AND 3 Free Gifts at Mars Men at https://Mengotomars.com New customers can save 35% on your first month of Dose for Cholesterol by going to https://dosedaily.co/SRS or entering SRS at checkout. Go to https://meetfabric.com/SHAWN and apply today, risk-free. AJ Pasciuti Links: WEB - https://ajpasciuti.com/about IG - https://www.instagram.com/ajpasciuti YT - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCyApoJr-mNmdMNwdk22xEQ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

>Join Jocko Underground Full Episodes< Ben Ingram was headed toward prison or worse. Drugs, street fights, and survival mode defined his youth—until one decision changed everything: joining the Marines. Warriors In Need