Podcasts about Corps

Quand on a une envie plus que pressante, c'est au moment où l'on arrive devant sa porte qu'elle devient encore plus forte alors que paradoxalement on est sur le point d'être libéré, délivré et d'aller enfin vider notre vessie. Dans "Ah Ouais ?", Florian Gazan répond en une minute chrono à toutes les questions essentielles, existentielles, parfois complètement absurdes, qui vous traversent la tête. Un podcast RTL Originals.Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

durée : 00:03:08 - Avec philosophie - par : Géraldine Muhlmann, Nassim El Kabli - Estelle Ferrarese nous plonge au cœur de la pensée d'Habermas en mettant en lumière son inébranlable confiance en la raison, même face aux tragédies de l'histoire qui la fragilisent et la mettent au défi. - réalisation : Nicolas Berger

À l'automne 1984, l'Inde est traversée par de profondes tensions religieuses et politiques. Dans ce climat explosif, les dernières heures d'Indira Gandhi prennent une dimension tragique.Rejoignez Franck Ferrand dans cet épisode captivant des Grands dossiers de l'Histoire, alors qu'il plonge dans la vie et la mort d'Indira Gandhi, l'emblématique première ministre indienne.En octobre 1984, Indira Gandhi, âgée de 66 ans, est au cœur d'une crise politique majeure. Fille de Jawaharlal Nehru, premier chef du gouvernement indien après l'indépendance, elle a su s'imposer comme une figure politique de premier plan, capable de décisions parfois jugées brutales mais toujours guidées par un dévouement sans faille à son peuple.Indira Gandhi fait face à la menace permanente d'un assassinat, suite à l'assaut mené par l'armée indienne sur le Temple d'Or d'Amritsar, haut lieu sacré de la religion sikhe. Cet épisode douloureux a profondément choqué la communauté sikhe et engendré de vives tensions, menaçant directement la sécurité de la Première ministre.Alors que la campagne électorale bat son plein, Indira Gandhi accueille l'acteur britannique Peter Ustinov, venu pour tourner un documentaire sur sa personnalité. Mais dans les jardins de sa résidence officielle, un drame va se jouer, bouleversant à jamais l'histoire de l'Inde.Plongez dans les coulisses de cet assassinat qui a marqué la fin d'une ère. Découvrez les enjeux politiques et religieux qui ont conduit à ce tragique événement, et laissez-vous captiver par le récit passionnant de Franck Ferrand, qui vous fera revivre les dernières heures d'Indira Gandhi, cette femme d'État hors du commun.

À l'automne 1984, l'Inde est traversée par de profondes tensions religieuses et politiques. Dans ce climat explosif, les dernières heures d'Indira Gandhi prennent une dimension tragique.Rejoignez Franck Ferrand dans cet épisode captivant des Grands dossiers de l'Histoire, alors qu'il plonge dans la vie et la mort d'Indira Gandhi, l'emblématique première ministre indienne.En octobre 1984, Indira Gandhi, âgée de 66 ans, est au cœur d'une crise politique majeure. Fille de Jawaharlal Nehru, premier chef du gouvernement indien après l'indépendance, elle a su s'imposer comme une figure politique de premier plan, capable de décisions parfois jugées brutales mais toujours guidées par un dévouement sans faille à son peuple.Indira Gandhi fait face à la menace permanente d'un assassinat, suite à l'assaut mené par l'armée indienne sur le Temple d'Or d'Amritsar, haut lieu sacré de la religion sikhe. Cet épisode douloureux a profondément choqué la communauté sikhe et engendré de vives tensions, menaçant directement la sécurité de la Première ministre.Alors que la campagne électorale bat son plein, Indira Gandhi accueille l'acteur britannique Peter Ustinov, venu pour tourner un documentaire sur sa personnalité. Mais dans les jardins de sa résidence officielle, un drame va se jouer, bouleversant à jamais l'histoire de l'Inde.Plongez dans les coulisses de cet assassinat qui a marqué la fin d'une ère. Découvrez les enjeux politiques et religieux qui ont conduit à ce tragique événement, et laissez-vous captiver par le récit passionnant de Franck Ferrand, qui vous fera revivre les dernières heures d'Indira Gandhi, cette femme d'État hors du commun.

Le conflit au Moyen-Orient replonge le Liban dans une spirale de violence, marquée par des bombardements et des échanges de tirs entre Israël et le Hezbollah, qui frappent de plein fouet les civils, en particulier les enfants. Selon l'UNICEF, plus de 820.000 personnes ont été déplacées en quelques semaines, dont près de 300.000 enfants, contraints de fuir dans la panique, souvent sans rien emporter.Beaucoup ont passé leurs premières nuits dans la rue avant de trouver refuge dans des abris surpeuplés ou chez des proches. Le bilan est déjà lourd : plus d'une centaine d'enfants tués et des centaines blessés en quelques semaines seulement.Certains, gravement blessés, se réveillent après une intervention médicale pour apprendre que leurs parents, leurs frères ou leurs sœurs ont été tués.« Ce qu'il faut bien comprendre, c'est qu'il y a des explosions du matin au soir au Liban, y compris à Beyrouth… Et c'est la deuxième fois en 18 mois », explique Christophe Boulierac, porte-parole de l'UNICEF, dans un entretien à ONU Info Genève.« Ils ont besoin de tout. En fait, ils n'ont plus rien », souligne-t-il, décrivant une situation où les besoins vitaux — eau, soins, éducation — se doublent d'un traumatisme profond, dans un pays à nouveau secoué par des explosions quotidiennes.(Interview : Christophe Boulierac, porte-parole de l'UNICEF ; propos recueillis par Nancy Sarkis, ONU Info Genève)

The Rocklopedia joins a cast of thousands at Podcasthon.org, a weeklong collaboration between podcasts and the charities and nonprofit they support.  We're celebrating Student Diplomacy Corps (https://sdcorps.org/) and talking fake bands that might be near the incredible SDC offerings.

Voici un lien pour vous demander une petite contribution afin de m'encourager ou me remercier de créer ce genre d'épisodes qui j'espère vous aident

Ça nous ramène à l'époque de Napoléon et de ses guerres aussi nombreuses que meurtrières. Il fallait donc régulièrement enrôler de nouveaux soldats pour renflouer les troupes décimées. Et c'est au moment du recrutement qu'avoir un diastème pouvait s'avérer précieux...Ah oui, pardon, un diastème, c'est le terme savant pour dire qu'on a un écart important entre les deux dents de devant. D'ailleurs "diastema" en latin, ça veut dire "intervalle". Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

durée : 01:28:48 - Les Nuits de France Culture - par : Mathias Le Gargasson - En octobre 2000, un numéro de "Surpris par la nuit" se consacre au philosophe Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Cette exploration de sa pensée interroge les raisons de sa mise en retrait partielle, à partir des année 1970, pour revenir en force sur le devant de la scène intellectuelle à partir des années 1990. - réalisation : Emily Vallat - invités : Jean-Bertrand Pontalis Philosophe et psychanalyste; Vincent Peillon Philosophe et homme politique; Roger Grenier Écrivain; Renaud Barbaras Professeur de philosophie contemporaine à l'université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne et membre de l'Institut Universitaire de France.

So far on this podcast we've generally used the noun "sediment" to describe sand, gravel, and maybe cobbles and boulders. But the same word also gets used for silts, clays, and muds - materials that behave so differently that lumping them together as "sediment" can blur important distinctions.  This podcast was overdue for a conversation about fine sediment, and I knew exactly who I wanted to talk to.In the notebook where I track episode ideas, I labeled this one the “ERDC Cohesive Brain Trust.” I wanted to sit down with the team for the Corps of Engineers that I call when I have questions about "very small sediment", and the team I point engineers toward when they need cohesive measurements or insight for a project or model.That team is Dr. Dave Perkey, Dr. Jarrell Smith, and Dr. Danielle Tarpley, all based at the USACE Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory (CHL) at the Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC) in Vicksburg. A lot of the Corps' sediment expertise lives there. We've had several guests from ERDC over the years, and I've spent a lot of my own career collaborating with sediment specialists there. But Dave, Jarrell, and Danielle work on a part of the sediment world that is very different from the sand-and-gravel problems that dominate a lot of my work.Their focus is sediment that is finer - often much finer - than about 60 to 70 microns, roughly the diameter of a human hair. In the first half of this conversation, they lay out the basic properties and processes of cohesive sediment. Then we move into the research they've done to push that science forward. So whether mud is new territory for you or already part of your world, I think there's a lot here that you will find useful.Dave Perkey has spent nearly two decades at ERDC studying cohesive sediment properties and processes, especially erosion, transport, and geochemical composition. He also manages the Regional Sediment Management program - the RSM behind the title of this podcast - and it is not much of a stretch to say this season would not exist without him.Jarrell Smith has been a research engineer at ERDC since 1994, working on sediment transport, hydrodynamics, cohesive and mixed beds, and sediment-vegetation-turbulence interactions. We also talk about one of the tools he's especially known for, the Particle Imaging Camera System, or PICS, which I recently recommended on one of our own reservoir projects.Danielle Tarpley is a research oceanographer whose work spans sediment transport and hydrodynamics in inland and coastal settings. She works across field data collection, analysis, and modeling, and brings a great project-grounded perspective to the conversation.Dave, Jarrell, and Danielle took different paths through the Carolinas for their master's work, but all earned PhDs through VIMS at William & Mary.And watch the HEC sediment YouTube channel for some videos illustrating the fine-sediment measurement techniques they describe.This series was funded by the Regional Sediment Management (RSM) program.Mike Loretto edited the first three seasons and created the theme music.Tessa Hall is editing most of Season 4.Stanford Gibson (HEC Sediment Specialist) hosts.Video shorts and other bonus content are available at the podcast website:https://www.hec.usace.army.mil/confluence/rasdocs/rastraining/latest/the-rsm-river-mechanics-podcast...but most of the supplementary videos are available on the HEC Sediment YouTube channel:https://www.youtube.com/user/stanfordgibsonIf you have guest recommendations or feedback you can reach out to me on LinkedIn or ResearchGate or fill out this recommendation and feedback form: https://forms.gle/wWJLVSEYe7S8Cd248

In 1775, George Washington appointed Colonel Richard Gridley as his first chief engineer and gave him two assistants. Congress formally created the United States Army Corps of Engineers on this date in 1779. The Corps included several French officers and played an instrumental role in Revolutionary War battles, including Battle of Bunker Hill, Battles of Saratoga, and the final victory at Siege of Yorktown.

Nous sommes à Genève, en 1926. C'est lors d'une assemblée de la Société des Nations, que le médecin chinois Wu Liande, diplômé de Cambridge, déclare à propos du traitement de la peste pulmonaire ayant sévi, au début des années 1910, en Mandchourie : « Il faut toujours garder à l'esprit le danger présenté par les patients qui s'échappent. Nous en avons vu certains tenter de le faire sous le coup du délire ; plus fréquemment, des patients et des suspects essaient de s'enfuir tant qu'ils sont encore en état de le faire. Pour plus de sûreté, le périmètre [des bâtiments dédiés à] la peste doit être entouré de hauts murs et attentivement gardé. Autant que faire se peut, toute tentative d'évasion doit être mise en échec par les plans des salles et leur aménagement, afin d'éviter que ne se reproduisent les tristes événements rapportés par les autorités locales, au cours desquels des patients ont été abattus par les gardes alors qu'ils essayaient de s'enfuir. » Quels ont été les enjeux politiques derrière la gestion des épidémies en Chine ? Comment le pouvoir a-t-il utilisé la médecine comme outil de gouvernement ? De quelles manières la perception du corps et de la maladie a-t-elle évolué, passant d'un corps en osmose avec le cosmos à un objet de contrôle étatique ? Avec Françoise Lauwaert, sinologue et anthropologue, autrice de « Gouverner le peuple et soigner les corps » ; Académie royale de Belgique. Merci pour votre écoute Un Jour dans l'Histoire, c'est également en direct tous les jours de la semaine de 13h15 à 14h30 sur www.rtbf.be/lapremiere Retrouvez tous les épisodes d'Un Jour dans l'Histoire sur notre plateforme Auvio.be :https://auvio.rtbf.be/emission/5936 Intéressés par l'histoire ? Vous pourriez également aimer nos autres podcasts : L'Histoire Continue: https://audmns.com/kSbpELwL'heure H : https://audmns.com/YagLLiKEt sa version à écouter en famille : La Mini Heure H https://audmns.com/YagLLiKAinsi que nos séries historiques :Chili, le Pays de mes Histoires : https://audmns.com/XHbnevhD-Day : https://audmns.com/JWRdPYIJoséphine Baker : https://audmns.com/wCfhoEwLa folle histoire de l'aviation : https://audmns.com/xAWjyWCLes Jeux Olympiques, l'étonnant miroir de notre Histoire : https://audmns.com/ZEIihzZMarguerite, la Voix d'une Résistante : https://audmns.com/zFDehnENapoléon, le crépuscule de l'Aigle : https://audmns.com/DcdnIUnUn Jour dans le Sport : https://audmns.com/xXlkHMHSous le sable des Pyramides : https://audmns.com/rXfVppvN'oubliez pas de vous y abonner pour ne rien manquer.Et si vous avez apprécié ce podcast, n'hésitez pas à nous donner des étoiles ou des commentaires, cela nous aide à le faire connaître plus largement. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

    This episode of WarDocs features an in-depth conversation with LTG Mary K. Izaguirre, DO, the 46th Army Surgeon General and Commanding General of U.S. Army Medical Command. LTG Izaguirre shares her personal journey from a residency at Madigan Army Medical Center to serving in a tent in Bagram, Afghanistan, during the early stages of the war. She discusses how these early experiences shaped her understanding of the "why" behind military medicine: maintaining the trust of the American soldier by providing world-class care shoulder-to-shoulder on the battlefield. A central theme of the interview is the fundamental difference between civilian and military healthcare; while civilian systems often optimize for profit or specific health outcomes, military medicine must optimize for the mission, sometimes reprioritizing traditional medical metrics to ensure the Army remains effective in dangerous and dynamic environments.  The discussion also explores the evolving role of the Army Surgeon General as an "integrator," a position codified to synchronize medical capabilities across the entire Army and joint force. LTG Izaguirre highlights the 250-year heritage of the Army Medical Department and the 125th anniversary of the Army Nurse Corps, emphasizing that this history of overcoming "hard things" provides the foundation for today's leaders to tackle modern challenges. Looking toward the future, she identifies artificial intelligence as a current tool rather than a distant prospect, advocating for "human-machine teaming" to decrease cognitive loads and improve clinical decision-making for medics in the field. By combining these technological advancements with a flexible mindset and a commitment to people, LTG Izaguirre outlines a vision for an Army health system that is lethal, cohesive, and consistently ready to support the nation's heroes. Chapters (01:21-06:35) Path to Army Medicine (06:36-15:42) Lessons from the Front Lines (15:43-21:03) Leadership and the 250-Year Heritage (21:04-32:07) Transforming the Army Health System (32:08-41:30) AI and the Future of Combat Care   Chapter Summaries (01:21-06:35) Path to Army Medicine: LTG Izaguirre discusses her early interest in biology and how her path led from veterinary aspirations to human medicine within the U.S. Army. She explains how the Army's broad range of opportunities and scholarship programs provided a meaningful way to serve something bigger than herself. (06:36-15:42) Lessons from the Front Lines: This chapter details LTG Izaguirre's deployment to Afghanistan in 2002 and how it shifted her focus from academics to the practical realities of operational medicine. She reflects on the critical "why" of her service: providing shoulder-to-shoulder support to maintain the faith and trust of the American soldier. (15:43-21:03) Leadership and the 250-Year Heritage: LTG Izaguirre reflects on the 250-year history of Army Medicine and the 125th anniversary of the Army Nurse Corps as sources of inspiration for today's challenges. She describes her role as an "integrator," tasked with synchronizing medical capabilities across the entire Army to support the joint force. (21:04-32:07) Transforming the Army Health System: The discussion focuses on how military medicine differs from civilian systems by optimizing specifically for the mission and operational outcomes. LTG Izaguirre emphasizes the need for a flexible mindset and curiosity as the Army undergoes significant structural changes to reflect the National Security Strategy. (32:08-41:30) AI and the Future of Combat Care: LTG Izaguirre identifies artificial intelligence as a current tool that can decrease cognitive loads and assist with clinical decision-making in austere environments. She concludes with a vision for the future of Army Medicine that focuses on vibrant training, strengthened partnerships, and an unwavering commitment to the soldiers and civilians who serve.   Take Home Messages Optimizing for the Mission: The fundamental difference between military and civilian healthcare lies in what the system is optimized for: military medicine prioritizes mission readiness and operational outcomes over profit or standard health metrics. This may require reprioritizing certain medical strategies to ensure the soldier is best postured for the fight and the joint force remains effective. The Role of the Integrator: Modern medical leadership in the Army requires serving as an integrator who synchronizes capabilities across diverse commands and joint partners. This role extends beyond direct command and control to influence the entire Army health system, ensuring it is properly postured to support national defense strategies. The Power of Trust and Heritage: A 250-year heritage of overcoming difficult challenges provides the foundation for today's medical leaders to build trust within their communities and with the soldiers they serve. This trust is maintained by acting in ways consistent with the identity of both a soldier and a clinician, ensuring that the best possible care is always available on the battlefield. Human-Machine Teaming in Medicine: Artificial intelligence is a present-day tool that should be utilized through human-machine teaming to improve decision-making and reduce the mental burden on medical personnel. While technology can get a clinician to the starting line, human judgment and the "human voice" remain essential to successfully providing care in complex environments. Learning Through Listening: Effective leadership during periods of intense transformation requires being a good listener who is willing to hear difficult or differing perspectives. By understanding these viewpoints before attempting to "explain away" problems, leaders can foster curiosity and synchronization throughout their organizations.   Episode Keywords Military Medicine, Army Surgeon General, Lieutenant General Mary K. Izaguirre, WarDocs Podcast, Combat Casualty Care, Army Medicine History, Healthcare Transformation, Medical Leadership, AI in Medicine, Military Healthcare, Army Nurse Corps, Veteran Health, Bagram Afghanistan, Medical Residency, Physician Leadership, Integrated Healthcare, Medical Technology, Trauma Care, Clinical Decision Support, Human-Machine Teaming, Military Strategy, National Security Strategy, Healthcare Trust. Hashtags #MilitaryMedicine, #ArmyMedicine, #Leadership, #WarDocs, #ArmySurgeon General, #MedicalInnovation, #HealthcareLeadership, #CombatMedic   LTG Izaguirre Biography Lieutenant General Izaguirre serves as the 46th Surgeon General of the U.S. Army and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Medical Command. A career physician and leader, she previously commanded Medical Readiness Command, East, and Tripler Army Medical Center.  Commissioned in 1991, LTG Izaguirre earned her Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine from the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine. She is board-certified in Family Medicine with advanced degrees in Public Health, Military Arts, and National Security Strategy. Her distinguished service includes deployments to Iraq (4th Infantry Division) and Afghanistan, as well as key leadership roles at the Pentagon and various Army medical centers.   A recipient of the Army Distinguished Service Medal and the Bronze Star, LTG Izaguirre is also an Army Flight Surgeon and a member of the Order of Military Medical Merit. She remains dedicated to the health, readiness, and resilience of the Total Army Force   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission is to honor the legacy, preserve the oral history, and showcase career opportunities, unique expeditionary experiences, and achievements of Military Medicine. We foster patriotism and pride in Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoD, and Our Nation.   Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield,demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast  

The U.S. Army Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps – or Army JROTC – program offers amazing and life-changing experiences for America's youth AND for our Soldiers for Life (including eligible veterans, Retired Soldiers, and currently-serving Reserve Component Soldiers) who can continue their service outside of uniform and give back to their communities as JROTC instructors. Learn more about everything that Army JROTC has to offer on this week's Soldier for Life Podcast episode as COL Sam Frazier and Maria Bentinck sit down with COL Lee Evans, the Director of the Army JROTC program. And learn more about Army JROTC at https://usarmyjrotc.army.mil!

Avec Caroline Wallet et Céline Guillaume, auteur de: - "Chercher la femme" (éditions du Cerf) - "Mener le bon combat" (éditions du Cerf) - "Dieu est passé par là" (éditions du Cerf)

Hour 3: Silver & JD continue reacting to Mike Evans agreeing to a three-year, $60 million deal to join the 49ers and weigh in on the implications of how it affects the team's wide receiver room. The guys also ask if the Evans signing should affect how they approach Trent Williams's situation if the team seems more committed to winning immediately. JD shares his thoughts on the 49ers' draft strategy and the importance of developing young players like Jordan Watkins and Ricky Pearsall.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Text a Message to the ShowThis is Part 2 of our interview with Dennis Kleyh, Jr.  Part 1 was about defensive tactics and the differences in mindsets between veterans and the police recruits who have never been punched in the face.  But in putting that episode together, I was left with an equal portion of the interview where Dennis talked about his careers in the Marine Corps and law enforcement. Military careers and law enforcement careers can seem pretty random.  It's only the recruiters who have a clear idea of what your future will be like, your actual mileage may vary. But right here is some interesting wisdom, for good or ill, you don't know exactly where your military or police service may take you.  So let's use Dennis' story to look at that.CORRECTION: After I finished the first episode I discovered that I made a mistake, Dennis said Fourth Recon and I said Force Recon, and over the internet, neither of us heard the difference.  But I should have double checked, especially since it's clear as a bell now that I listen back to it.  Sorry about that!  Music is by the Mini VandalsHey Chaplain Podcast Episode 135 Part 2Tags:Career, Leadership, Marines, Military Service, Police, Training, USMC, Veterans, Missouri, Afghanistan, IraqSupport the showThanks for Listening! And, as always, pray for peace in our city.Subscribe/Follow here: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/hey-chaplain/id1570155168 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/2CGK9A3BmbFEUEnx3fYZOY Email us at: heychaplain44@gmail.comYou can help keep the show ad-free by buying me a virtual coffee!https://www.buymeacoffee.com/heychaplain

durée : 00:03:21 - Un monde connecté - par : François Saltiel - Deux journaux suédois, le "Svenska Dagbladet" et le "Göteborgs-Posten", viennent de sortir une enquête commune où ils recueillent les témoignages au Kenya d'annotateurs de l'IA qui révèlent être, malgré eux, spectateurs de la vie privée de nombreux utilisateurs.

Nous sommes le 13 octobre 1929, à Kaboul, en Afghanistan. Andrée Viollis, 59 ans, envoyée spéciale du Petit Parisien, pose le pied dans une ville exsangue, dévastée par les pillages des brigands, aux rues jonchées de cadavres mêlés à des carcasses d'animaux. Avant elle aucun reporter n'a pu parvenir jusque-là. Sous le titre « Les dramatiques événements de Kaboul », son journal présente en une, sur deux colonnes, l'exploit accompli par sa journaliste et on la voit poser aux côtés des deux membres d'équipage, au pied d'un petit avion. Le quotidien salue le courage et la témérité dont elle a fait preuve. Quatre ans, plus tard, la journaliste encensée par l'illustre Albert Londres, icône du grand reportage, écrit : « L'enquête, d'abord à l'état d'embryon, se développe peu à peu en vous-même, prend une forme, une vie propre, s'agite, vous entraîne, vous domine. Il arrive qu'elle vous conduise où vous ne pensiez pas arriver, vous surprenne, et contraste non seulement avec les idées reçues, mais avec celles que vous aviez avant le départ. Cette difficile, cette fiévreuse et douloureuse poursuite de la vérité, ou de ce qu'on croit être la vérité, avec ce qu'elle comporte de doutes, de scrupules et de combats intérieurs, c'est là ce qui attache passionnément à son métier le véritable reporter. » Partons sur les traces de celle qui déclarait aimer « le départ, l'aventure et les ciels nouveaux », une audacieuse et intrépide, travailleuse infatigable et baroudeuse aux allures de « petite dame aux gants blancs ». Revenons à Andrée Viollis… Merci pour votre écoute Un Jour dans l'Histoire, c'est également en direct tous les jours de la semaine de 13h15 à 14h30 sur www.rtbf.be/lapremiere Retrouvez tous les épisodes d'Un Jour dans l'Histoire sur notre plateforme Auvio.be :https://auvio.rtbf.be/emission/5936 Intéressés par l'histoire ? Vous pourriez également aimer nos autres podcasts : L'Histoire Continue: https://audmns.com/kSbpELwL'heure H : https://audmns.com/YagLLiKEt sa version à écouter en famille : La Mini Heure H https://audmns.com/YagLLiKAinsi que nos séries historiques :Chili, le Pays de mes Histoires : https://audmns.com/XHbnevhD-Day : https://audmns.com/JWRdPYIJoséphine Baker : https://audmns.com/wCfhoEwLa folle histoire de l'aviation : https://audmns.com/xAWjyWCLes Jeux Olympiques, l'étonnant miroir de notre Histoire : https://audmns.com/ZEIihzZMarguerite, la Voix d'une Résistante : https://audmns.com/zFDehnENapoléon, le crépuscule de l'Aigle : https://audmns.com/DcdnIUnUn Jour dans le Sport : https://audmns.com/xXlkHMHSous le sable des Pyramides : https://audmns.com/rXfVppvN'oubliez pas de vous y abonner pour ne rien manquer.Et si vous avez apprécié ce podcast, n'hésitez pas à nous donner des étoiles ou des commentaires, cela nous aide à le faire connaître plus largement. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Hour 3: Silver & JD continue reacting to Mike Evans agreeing to a three-year, $60 million deal to join the 49ers and weigh in on the implications of how it affects the team's wide receiver room. The guys also ask if the Evans signing should affect how they approach Trent Williams's situation if the team seems more committed to winning immediately. JD shares his thoughts on the 49ers' draft strategy and the importance of developing young players like Jordan Watkins and Ricky Pearsall.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Cette semaine, je reçois l'ex-skieuse para-alpine Frédérique Turgeon, Alexia DeMacar, nutritionniste et docteure en nutrition sportive, ainsi que Karah Stanworth Belleville, cheffe de projets chez Équilibre et à l'origine de l'initiative Corps et sports.  On parle de la pression attribuée au corps dans un contexte sportif et de la façon dont celle-ci évacue de la conversation plusieurs déterminants de la performance.

Australie. Mai 1999.Des policiers se rendent dans un bâtiment désaffecté. Et là ils trouvent d'énormes barils remplis d'acide. Et à l'intérieur : des corps humains. Que font ces restes humains dans des barils ? Qui a fait ça et surtout pourquoi ?Voici l'affaire des crimes de Snowtown. ❤️ Soutenez La Petite Histoire sur Patreon!

Aujourd'hui, Antoine Diers, consultant, Barbara Lefebvre, enseignante, et Jérôme Marty, médecin généraliste, débattent de l'actualité autour d'Alain Marschall et Olivier Truchot.

When the ground seems to shift under our feet, what holds? We open with Psalm 46 and the charge to “be still and know,” then follow that thread through the grit of daily life, the discipline of Titus 2, and the disruptive authority of Mark 11. Our goal is simple and demanding: anchor trust in God, live with visible integrity, and let forgiveness clear the runway for bold prayer.We talk candidly about representation and witness: how a single life can shape someone's view of an entire faith, much like one Marine can frame a town's view of the Corps. That idea expands into practical discipleship—older believers mentoring the young, homes that train courage, and speech that stands up to scrutiny. From the triumphal entry to overturned tables, Jesus dismantles fruitless religion and calls us back to a house of prayer for all nations. The fig tree warns against show without substance; the command to forgive reminds us that prayer loses power when we clutch old debts.History adds weight to the reflection. We remember the USS Cole, honor sacrifice through the story of a Medal of Honor recipient, and confront violence with moral clarity rather than rage. Then we look to leadership through President Taft's oath on 1 Kings 3, returning to Solomon's wiser request: an understanding heart to discern justice. That prayer still lights the path for families, churches, and public servants who want to do good in a fractured world. We close with the Lord's Prayer as our pattern—God's name first, God's kingdom near, daily bread received with open hands.If this conversation strengthens your faith or sharpens your resolve, subscribe, share it with a friend, and leave a review so more people can find the show. What verse are you leaning on today?#WilliamHowardTaft #DailyScripture #NotreDameBasilica Support the showThe American Soul Podcasthttps://www.buzzsprout.com/1791934/subscribe Countryside Book Series https://www.amazon.com/Countryside-Book-J-T-Cope-IV-ebook/dp/B00MPIXOB2

The show breaks down the first teaser for HBO Max's Lanterns and why it's intentionally more grounded than many fans expected. Frank digs into the detective story setup in the American heartland, the Hal Jordan and John Stewart dynamic, why the teaser keeps the ring powers mostly off screen, and how the muted visuals feel closer to Green Lantern: Earth One than classic cosmic spectacle. The conversation also branches into what this approach could mean for future DCU projects if Lanterns sticks the landing.00:00 First impressions: a grounded teaser and the early backlash00:13 What the case looks like: a heartland murder mystery and the local sheriff factor00:27 How this could pivot to the cosmic side and potential DCU connections00:40 The real hook: Hal vs. John, training, testing, and trust00:54 Visual choices: muted powers, dirtier suit, “old beaten up cop” energy01:08 Music choice: “State Trooper” and the cop story signal01:15 Quick cosmic nods: Lantern Corps distance and the “squirrel” line01:22 Bigger takeaway: could this open the door for other grounded DC charactersThe teaser is clearly positioning Lanterns as a detective story first, cosmic superhero story secondThe restraint on ring powers reads like a tone choice, and a budget choice, not a lack of ambitionHal and John's push and pull feels like the engine of the show, with both characters having valid pointsThe suit and overall palette look intentionally worn and lived in, matching the older, battered Hal framingThe teaser leaves breadcrumbs for the wider Corps, while keeping the focus on this case and this partnershipIf this tone works, it could become a template for other DCU characters who thrive in smaller, moodier stories“They told you so early on. It's going to be a grounded detective story.”“The dynamic is the real hook on this one.”“All the visuals are very muted.”“He's like that old beaten up cop you see from Lethal Weapon.”“One of them is a squirrel, so they can't really hold a conversation.”If you dug this breakdown, subscribe to Geek Freaks Headlines and leave a quick review. Share the episode with the hashtag #GeekFreaksHeadlines and tell us what you think of the teaser's grounded approach.For all the news we discuss on the show, our home base is GeekFreaksPodcast.com.Instagram: @geekfreakspodcastTwitter: @geekfreakspodThreads: @geekfreakspodcastFacebook: Geek Freaks PodcastPatreon: Geek Freaks PodcastWhat's your read on the teaser's tone so far, and what's the one Lantern moment you're hoping they save for the full trailer? Send your thoughts and we'll feature a few on an upcoming episode.Lanterns, Green Lantern, Hal Jordan, John Stewart, DCU, DC Studios, HBO Max, James Gunn, Green Lantern Corps, Superhero TV, Comic Book News, TV Trailers, True Detective, DC Comics, Geek Freaks HeadlinesTimestamps and TopicsKey TakeawaysMemorable QuotesCall to ActionLinks and ResourcesFollow UsListener QuestionsApple Podcast Tags

Être une femme et avoir une île dans sa vie. C'est le thème de cette 4ème saison de Murmures en partenariat avec la Fondation Carmignac et le Parc national de Port-Cros. Je suis allée à la rencontre de femmes qui entretiennent un lien particulier avec leur île. Elles sont artiste, productrice, scénariste, gardiennes de la nature… Je leur ai demandé en quoi l'île travaille leur féminité, si l'île révèle, façonne les femmes qu'elles sont devenues ? Bernard Pesce les a photographiées. De cette collaboration sont nés des portraits sonores regroupés dans cette série intitulée Archipelles, un archipel visuel et sonore qui révèle l'île en elles.Les témoignages que vous allez entendre explorent des territoires intimes tels que l'amour, le rapport au corps, au vivant, au sacré, la sauvagerie, la création, la liberté, le désir, la sensualité A travers la parole de ces femmes, se pose une question qui nous concerne tous : en quoi les lieux nous constituent, comment les endroits où l'on a grandi, où l'on a fait notre vie, par hasard ou par nécessité, contribue à construire notre identité ?Découvrez cette semaine le témoignage de Julie. Julie est enseignante en arts visuels, artiste et praticienne en éco rituels. Porquerolles est entrée dans sa vie dans un moment de grande vulnérabilité. Avec Julie on a parlé de lignée paysanne, de lisière, de dessin, de questions transgénérationnelles, de douceur abrasive, de poème en mouvement, de réitération, d'amour sous les oliviers, de dialogue poétique, de trésors, d'ormeaux, de désir de vivre, de cycles féminins, de rituels, d'enfance, de maternité, de marche, de sorcière, de transmission, de cercles de femmes, de souveraineté, de pensée circulaire, de sanctuaire, d'étincelle, de fil de la merveille, de chambre à soi et d'île intérieure…Références et bibliographie :Clarissa Pinkola Estés -  Femmes qui courent avec les loupsMona Chollet - Sorcières, la puissance invaincue des femmesChristiane Singer - Une vie sur le fil de la merveille Jeanne Benameur – Notre nom est une îleCamille Sfez – Psychologue, Cercles de femmes, autrice de Vulnérables et La puissance du fémininGabrielle Filteau-Chiba, autrice de la trilogie Encabanée, Sauvagines, BivouacEdouard Glissant – La théorie de l'archipel Le visuel du podcast est une création de Mona Cara et l'habillage sonore a été réalisé par Hubert Artigue.  Découvrez le portrait sonore et toutes les notes de cet entretien iciSupport the show Me suivre sur instagram : https://www.instagram.com/fragile_porquerolles/ Me soutenir sur Tipeee : https://fr.tipeee.com/fragile-porquerolles-1 Vous pouvez me laisser des étoiles et un avis sur Apple Podcasts et Spotify, ça aide ! Si vous souhaitez m'envoyer un mail: fragileporquerolles@gmail.com

Merci à Havaa d'être venue sur Legend. Elle vit avec une trentaine d'identités dans son corps, qu'on appelle trouble dissociatif de l'identité. Des "alters" aux âges, idées politiques et religions parfois différents et qui coexistent au quotidien. Pour Legend, elle nous a partagé son parcours et expliqué comment, chaque jour, elle apprend à vivre avec ce trouble hors du commun.Merci également à Coraline Hingray, médecin psychiatre, de nous avoir expliqué l'histoire et la définition de la dissociation traumatique.Retrouvez toutes les informations concernant nos invitées par ici ⬇️HavaaSon adresse mail ➡️ havapsypro@gmail.comSon compte YouTube ➡️ https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjP7Te8fwDe8bfQvmYtVfUgSon compte TikTok ➡️ https://www.tiktok.com/@havapsy?lang=frSon compte Instagram ➡️ https://www.instagram.com/havapsy/Coraline HingraySon adresse mail ➡️ coraline.hingray@cpn-laxou.comPour soutenir les actions de la Maison de la Résilience et la recherche au bénéfice des victimes de violences sexuelles ainsi que des personnes souffrant de troubles dissociatifs, vous pouvez nous contacter par mail ➡️ maisondelaresilience@chru-nancy.frPour toute demande de renseignements concernant la prise en soin sur notre territoire d'intervention (Meurthe-et-Moselle, Vosges, sud Meuse), vous pouvez consultez la page ➡️ Maison de la résilience / CUMP 54 / Centre de psychotraumatisme (CPT) - EpsyteraSi vous résidez en dehors de ce territoire, vous pouvez trouver la structure la plus proche de chez vous sur la page suivante ➡️ Cartographie des centres régionaux du psychotraumatisme CRPEn savoir plus sur le TDI ➡️ Le trouble dissociatif de l'identité (TDI) - EpsyteraDemande de partenariat ➡️ clemence.masson@cpn-laxou.comDemande presse ➡️ communication@cpn-laxou.comDirection de la communication : Cloé Bragard ➡️ Cloe.BRAGARDNOIRE@cpn-laxou.comPour prendre vos billets pour le LEGEND TOUR c'est par ici ➡️ https://www.legend-tour.fr/ Retrouvez la boutique LEGEND ➡️ https://shop.legend-group.fr/Pour toutes demandes de partenariats : legend@influxcrew.com Retrouvez-nous sur tous les réseaux LEGEND !Facebook : https://www.facebook.com/legendmediafr Instagram : https://www.instagram.com/legendmedia/ TikTok : https://www.tiktok.com/@legend Twitter : https://twitter.com/legendmediafr Snapchat : https://www.snapchat.com/@legendcm75017 Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

   This episode of WarDocs features Dr. David Tate, a clinical neuropsychologist and lead author of the 2025 Military Medicine Article of the Year. The discussion centers on a groundbreaking study utilizing the LIMBIC-CENC cohort—a massive data set of over 3,000 participants—to investigate persistent brain changes in mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI). Dr. Tate explains that traditional MRI scans often show normal results in patients with invisible symptoms because researchers often oversimplify patient groupings. By digging into more refined clinical characteristics, such as the mechanism of injury and number of exposures, his team identified unique physical signatures in the brain. Specifically, blast exposures were linked to changes in central white matter, while repetitive traumatic hits impacted more peripheral gray matter structures.    The conversation highlights the critical importance of neuroimaging techniques like diffusion tensor imaging, which is more sensitive to structural white matter changes than standard hospital sequences. Dr. Tate emphasizes that these findings provide vital validation for service members and veterans, demonstrating that their ongoing symptoms are rooted in physical, biological changes rather than purely psychological or "imagined". For clinicians, the episode serves as a call to action to move beyond simplistic interpretations of "normal" imaging and to prioritize exhaustive injury histories that include the physics of every exposure event.    By combining a deep dive into advanced neuroimaging with a focus on personalized medicine, this episode provides a comprehensive look at the future of TBI diagnosis and treatment. Listeners will learn how high-resolution volumetric data and detailed clinical info—including loss of consciousness and post-traumatic amnesia markers—are used to improve prognostic accuracy. Ultimately, Dr. Tate's work demonstrates that injury history matters even years later, pointing researchers and clinicians toward a more precise approach to studying and treating the diverse landscape of mild traumatic brain injuries in the military population. Chapters (00:00-01:30) Introduction to the 2025 Military Medicine Article of the Year (01:30-06:17) Dr. David Tate's Professional Background and Career Evolution (06:17-08:04) Understanding the LIMBIC-CENC Cohort and Consortium Research (08:04-12:44) Methodology: Advanced Neuroimaging and Detailed Clinical Variables (12:44-17:03) Key Findings: Heterogeneity of mTBI and Mechanism-Specific Signatures (17:03-22:15) The Bottom Line: Validating Veteran Experiences and Clinical Takeaways Chapter Summaries (00:00-01:30) Introduction to the 2025 Military Medicine Article of the Year   MG(R) Jeff Clark introduces guest Dr. David Tate and recognizes his team for winning the 2025 Military Medicine Article of the Year. The article focuses on persistent MRI findings unique to blast and repetitive mild traumatic brain injury within the LIMBIC-CENC cohort. (01:30-06:17) Dr. David Tate's Professional Background and Career Evolution   Dr. Tate shares his journey from growing up on a farm in Mississippi to becoming a leading researcher in academic neuropsychology. He discusses his mentorship under Erin Bigler and his favorite career experiences working directly with service members at Brooke Army Medical Center. (06:17-08:04) Understanding the LIMBIC-CENC Cohort and Consortium Research   The discussion explores the advantages of using a large consortium dataset that includes over 3,000 participants across the United States. This prospective study enables leading scientists and clinicians to collaborate on well-characterized, long-term functional outcomes following brain injury. (08:04-12:44) Methodology: Advanced Neuroimaging and Detailed Clinical Variables Dr. Tate explains the use of high-resolution volumetric MRI data and diffusion tensor imaging to map brain structural connections. Researchers combined these images with a plethora of clinical data, including lifetime exposure histories, demographics, and specific injury markers like loss of consciousness. (12:44-17:03) Key Findings: Heterogeneity of mTBI and Mechanism-Specific Signatures The study reveals that mild TBI is extremely heterogeneous and simplistic group comparisons often obscure meaningful findings. Findings showed that blast exposures leave signatures in central white matter, while repetitive traumatic injuries more specifically affect gray matter structures. (17:03-22:15) The Bottom Line: Validating Veteran Experiences and Clinical Takeaways The bottom line is that persistent brain changes can be detected if clinicians look at the right variables and mechanism of injury. This research validates the lived experiences of veterans, proving their symptoms are not imagined and emphasizing the need for detailed injury histories. Article Reference Persistent MRI Findings Unique to Blast and Repetitive Mild TBI: Analysis of the CENC/LIMBIC Cohort Injury Characteristics Open Access David F Tate, PhD , Benjamin S C Wade, PhD , Carmen S Velez, MS ,  Erin D Bigler, PhD , Nicholas D Davenport, PhD , Emily L Dennis, PhD ,  Carrie Esopenko, PhD , Sidney R Hinds, MD , Jacob Kean, PhD , Eamonn Kennedy, PhD  Military Medicine, Volume 189, Issue 9-10, September/October 2024, Pages e1938–e1946, https://doi.org/10.1093/milmed/usae031   Take Home Messages Heterogeneity of Mild TBI: Mild traumatic brain injury is not a single, uniform condition, and simplistic groupings can obscure meaningful characteristics of an injury. Clinicians must recognize that "if you've seen one mild TBI, you've seen one mild TBI," requiring a more personalized approach to diagnosis. Mechanism-Specific Signatures: The physical signature left on the brain depends heavily on the mechanism of injury, with blast exposures typically affecting central white matter and repetitive traumatic hits impacting peripheral gray matter. Understanding these distinctions helps explain why different patients experience different functional outcomes even with the same diagnosis. Sensitivity of Advanced Neuroimaging: Standard MRI sequences often fail to detect injuries in mTBI patients, but advanced techniques like diffusion tensor imaging are highly sensitive to structural white matter changes. Relying solely on basic imaging can lead to an over-simplistic interpretation that overlooks persistent brain changes. Validation of Lived Experiences: Research into persistent brain changes provides vital biological validation for veterans and service members who struggle with ongoing symptoms. These findings support the idea that invisible wounds have a physical basis and are not simply psychological or imagined. Importance of Detailed Injury Histories: For clinicians, the most critical takeaway is the necessity of capturing a detailed lifetime injury history, including the number of exposures and specific physics of each event. This detailed clinical information is essential for improving prognostic accuracy and understanding a patient's long-term health trajectory.   Episode Keywords Military Medicine, WarDocs Podcast, Traumatic Brain Injury, TBI Diagnosis, Blast Exposure, Neuropsychology, Persistent MRI Findings, Veteran Healthcare, Brain Imaging, Mild TBI, LIMBIC-CENC Cohort, Neuroimaging Research, AMSUS, Combat Injury, White Matter Change, Brain Health, Dr. David Tate, Military Health System, Invisible Injuries, Medical Podcast, Concussion Recovery, Gray Matter, MRI Scans, AMSUS Article of the Year, Veteran Support, Brain Mapping Hashtags #MilitaryMedicine, #WarDocs, #BrainHealth, #Veterans, #Neuroscience, #MildTBI, #BlastInjury, #MedicalResearch   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission is to honor the legacy, preserve the oral history, and showcase career opportunities, unique expeditionary experiences, and achievements of Military Medicine. We foster patriotism and pride in Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoD, and Our Nation.   Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield,demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast          

Dans cet épisode du podcast La Pause Fitness nous allons parler de l'impact de l'ultra-trail sur votre sang au rôle protecteur du foie pour le cerveau, en passant par la supériorité de l'étirement sous charge pour vos tendons. NOUVEAU : Et si l'hormèse était la clé d'un corps plus solide Au programme : Courir un ultra, […] The post Ce que le sport fait à votre corps : Cerveau, Sang et Tendons appeared first on Fitnessmith.

Today in 1855 US lawmakers approved $30,000 in funding for “the purchase of camels and the importation of dromedaries, to be employed for military purposes." We had our own "Camel Corps"! Plus: today in 1875, the first indoor game of hockey took place in Montreal, and it ended in a not that surprising way. The U.S. Army's “Camel Corps” Experiment (Army Historical Foundation)First indoor game ended in melee (ESPN)Ride on over to our Patreon page to back this show today

durée : 00:10:18 - Le Point culture - par : Marie Sorbier - Accusé de romantiser des scènes pédocriminelles, le roman auto-édité "Corps à cœur" a déclenché une polémique nationale avant d'être retiré d'Amazon. - réalisation : Laurence Malonda - invités : Magali Bigey Maîtresse de conférences en Sciences de l'Information et de la Communication à l'Université de Franche-Comté

In this powerful episode of Meech Speaks, I sit down with my brother, GySgt Lexus Schaeffer — a Marine, a father, a leader, and one of the sharpest minds I've ever met in the MCMAP community.Together, we break down the uncomfortable truth most Marines never hear:

Ma nouvelle invitée sur le podcast est Sabine Valens, l'autrice de « Aimer sans posséder », un essai qui vient de sortir aux Éditions Textuel. J'ai découvert ce livre par hasard et je l'ai dévoré d'une traite. Ce livre a bousculé toutes mes idées reçues sur le couple et la fidélité. Et c'est justement ça que je trouve intéressant : quand une œuvre arrive à nous faire bouger dans une nouvelle direction. Pourquoi sommes-nous si attaché·e·s au concept de fidélité dans le couple ?Est-ce parce que nous souhaitons réellement nous couper de toute les rencontres et connexions que nous pourrions faire dans une vie ? Ou ne serait-ce pas plutôt pour essayer de contrôler le corps et les désirs de notre partenaire ? Pourquoi avons-nous tant de mal à nous défaire de cet idéal d'amour exclusif ? Ne devrions-nous pas plutôt pouvoir être toutes et tous souverain·e·s de notre corps, que l'on soit en couple ou célibataire ? En quoi la question de la fidélité est-elle un enjeu féministe ? Est-ce vrai que seuls les hommes bénéficieraient d'ouvrir une relation ?Dans ce 1er essai, Sabine Valens explore ces questions avec lucidité et pertinence.Bonne écoute !Sources :Livres« Aimer sans posséder », de Sabine Valens, Éditions Textuel« Ne plus tomber (en amour) », de Majé, Éditions iXe« Enfin seule », de Lauren Bastide, Éditions AllarySéries« En thérapie » de Toledano et Nakache, ArteHébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

Hour 2: D-Pop and J.D. dive into the San Francisco 49ers' offseason moves. They discuss the recent trade of Jermaine Johnson to the Tennessee Titans and whether the 49ers missed out on a potential opportunity to acquire him. The guys also weigh in on the team's wide receiver needs, including the possibility of signing Jauan Jennings or Deebo Samuel. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Bienvenue dans La Leçon, le podcast sur l'art d'échouer. Cette semaine, je suis heureuse de recevoir Julie Pujols, la coach de la plus bonne de tes copines ! Julie, journaliste est devenue l'une des figures emblématiques du pilate et du coaching. C'est un accident domestique, terrible, qui va la plonger dans une traversée de 18 mois d'hospitalisation à domicile et changer radicalement sa vision de la vie. Julie Pujols, derrière la femme sublime et qui cartonne sur les réseaux, c'est surtout une histoire de résilience comme on en entend peu.Bonne écoute

Your All-Access Pass to the Marching Arts.This week on On A Water Break, Whitney Stone, Sadie Wallace, and Jeremy Svoboda (Drum Corps Today) break down major marching arts updates—plus a Water We Doing?! debate that belongs on a medal podium: should color guard be an Olympic sport?PanelWhitney Stone — Instagram (@dancerwhit)Sadie Wallace — Instagram (@m.sadiewallace)Jeremy Svoboda (Drum Corps Today) — Instagram (@drumcorpstoday)Links mentionedWGI Terrace Suites (UD Arena): https://www.wgi.org/suiteexperience/Disney Boo To You Parade Flag Corps info (audition listing coverage): https://blogmickey.com/2026/02/popular-entertainment-returning-for-2026-mickeys-not-so-scary-halloween-party-confirmed/Guard Closet Shout-OutFollow @guardcloset for gear tips and season-ready essentials.Follow OAWBInstagram •TikTok •YouTube00:03 Marching Arts News00:04 DCI x Conn-Selmer00:06 WGI Terrace Suites (UD Arena)00:09 Disney Flag Corps Auditions00:11 60-Second Tech Block00:17 Water We Doing?!00:18 Guard in the Olympics?00:22 Camp Info Posted Late00:26 Audience Etiquette Reset00:31 Gush & Go00:37 Outro + Follow

Hour 2: D-Pop and J.D. dive into the San Francisco 49ers' offseason moves. They discuss the recent trade of Jermaine Johnson to the Tennessee Titans and whether the 49ers missed out on a potential opportunity to acquire him. The guys also weigh in on the team's wide receiver needs, including the possibility of signing Jauan Jennings or Deebo Samuel. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Le président de la refondation de Madagascar a quitté Paris mercredi 25 février soir. Le colonel Michaël Randrianirina a rencontré Emmanuel Macron, à l'Élysée. Auparavant, il était reçu avec les honneurs par Vladimir Poutine à Moscou. Depuis la chute de l'ex-président Andry Rajoelina en octobre dernier, le commandant du Corps d'armée des personnels et des services administratifs et techniques montre des signes de rapprochement avec la Russie, mais sa visite parisienne dans la foulée montre que Madagascar ne veut pas rompre avec son partenaire historique. La politologue Christiane Rafidinarivo est chercheuse associée au Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po. Elle est la Grande invitée Afrique de Sidy Yansané.    RFI :  Le président de la Refondation, Michaël Randrianirina, achève une tournée qui l'a successivement mené à Moscou, où il a rencontré Vladimir Poutine, puis à Paris aux côtés d'Emmanuel Macron. « Grand écart diplomatique, numéro d'équilibriste », disent déjà les commentaires… Vous partagez cette analyse ?  Christiane Rafidinarivo : Le président de la Refondation de la République de Madagascar a toujours affirmé qu'il voulait mener une ligne diplomatique qui ne discrimine personne, qui ne cherche pas à rejeter d'emblée, par idéologie ou tout autre considération, un partenaire potentiel qui peut apporter quelque chose pour satisfaire les besoins de la population malgache, que l'on sait être dans une situation difficile. Il est vrai que Madagascar a toujours entretenu une relation privilégiée avec la France, mais la Russie est aussi un vieux partenaire. Finalement, voyez-vous vraiment une rupture dans la nouvelle diplomatie malgache ? En termes de partenariat, non, car la France est un partenaire de toujours. Et la Russie est un partenaire très ancien. Il me semble que Madagascar s'apprête à commémorer 55 ans de relation avec la Russie. Mais ce qui peut être qualifié de rupture, c'est ce recentrement de la diplomatie malgache sur les besoins immédiats des Malgaches. La vraie nouveauté est internationale, c'est le nouveau contexte géopolitique. Et c'est sans doute là que l'on peut mieux comprendre pourquoi on parle de renouvellement de partenariat. D'un côté, Madagascar affirme de nouvelles priorités tournées vers sa population, et d'un autre côté, tout cela se fait dans un contexte géopolitique qui a considérablement changé ces cinq dernières années justement. De son côté, la Gen Z, la société civile qui a principalement contribué à renverser l'ancien président Andry Rajoelina, dénonce une mise en scène diplomatique pour décrire la rencontre entre les présidents français et malgache à l'Elysée. Cette Gen Z, qui s'estime mise de côté, ne lui a-t-on pas volé sa révolution finalement, comme cela s'est vu dans d'autres pays d'Afrique où les militaires ont pris le pouvoir ?  Ce que je constate et que j'observe en tant que chercheuse, c'est que la Gen Z est en dialogue avec le ministère chargé de la Refondation, qui est un ministère d'Etat, et même avec le président de la Refondation lui-même. Certains éléments très connus de la Gen Z sont dans les cabinets ministériels et la Gen Z continue effectivement à avoir une participation politique très intéressante dans l'espace public, de façon à avoir une forme de politisation qui puisse lui permettre de participer à la concertation nationale qui est en cours, certes, mais également au débat public de façon constructive. Et c'est ce qu'elle fait. Ce qui est très nouveau, c'est la liberté d'expression, d'opinion, de manifestation. Il y a un renouveau de la participation démocratique à Madagascar. Pour la première fois de son histoire, et si cela se concrétise, la Grande Île aura une constitution qui n'aura pas été parachutée par des experts extérieurs et avec une poignée de Malgaches. Est-ce une vraie coopération ou un rapport de force masqué ? Auquel cas, il y aurait une forme de démocratie de façade. Le moratoire sur les permis miniers a été levé. Désormais, excepté pour l'or, les entreprises extractives ont le droit d'exploiter les richesses minières malgaches. Que dire de cette nouvelle politique industrielle et minière ? Constatez-vous de nouveaux partenaires ou des partenaires anciens signer des contrats ? Ce que les autorités disent souhaiter, c'est l'ouverture à la concurrence, et surtout que ce soit un marché ouvert aux Malgaches mêmes, chose rare auparavant. L'or a été mis de côté car le président de la Refondation a expliqué, au retour de ses voyages aux Émirats arabes unis notamment, qu'il souhaitait organiser un comptoir de l'or avec une régulation beaucoup plus institutionnalisée du secteur, qu'il ne soit pas un secteur réservé aux grands acteurs en oligarchie, et surtout préempté par les trafiquants. Quand on sait que la Banque centrale malgache a très peu de réserves d'or dans ses coffres, on comprend à quel point ce pays a été pillé.

    In this episode of War Docs, we speak with retired Army Colonel Dr. Robert Mabry, a figure whose career trajectory from an 18 Delta Special Forces medic to a senior physician-leader has shaped the face of modern military medicine. Dr. Mabry recounts his harrowing experience during the Battle of Mogadishu, where he provided care for 15 hours under intense fire. He reflects on how those "blood-written" lessons exposed the flaws of applying civilian EMS standards to the battlefield, eventually leading to his involvement as a founding member of the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC). The conversation moves from the tactical to the systemic, as Dr.Mabry discusses his pivotal role in upgrading Army flight medics to critical care paramedics and his advocacy for the "Mission Zero Act," which integrates military surgical teams into civilian trauma centers to maintain clinical readiness during the interwar period.     Dr. Mabry also addresses the looming challenges of Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). He warns that the "Golden Hour" luxury enjoyed in Iraq and Afghanistan will likely vanish in future peer-on-peer conflicts due to the lack of air superiority and the threat of mass casualties from advanced weaponry. To prepare, he proposes a radical overhaul of the medical career pathway, advocating for a "Battlefield Medical Specialist" track that allows medics to advance into high-level operational roles without losing their tactical expertise. By embedding military teams into a nationalized mesh network of civilian hospitals, Mabry envisions a "Team America" approach that ensures the military is never again forced to relearn life-saving lessons at the start of a new conflict. This episode is a masterclass in operational medicine, leadership, and the persistent need for innovation within the military health system bureaucracy.   Chapters (00:00-01:30) Introduction to Retired Colonel Dr. Robert Mabry (01:30-05:37) From Small-Town Oklahoma to Army Ranger (05:37-10:51) The Path to Special Forces Medic and 18 Delta Training (10:51-18:54) 15 Hours Under Fire: The Battle of Mogadishu (18:54-25:03) Transitioning from NCO to Physician at USUHS (25:03-31:15) Founding TCCC and the Joint Trauma System (31:15-39:54) Revolutionizing Flight Medic Training and Evidence-Based Reform (39:54-48:00) Prolonged Field Care and the Reality of Future Conflict (LSCO) (48:00-56:17) Mission Zero and Embedding Military Teams in Civilian Centers (56:17-1:03:40) Designing the Future Battlefield Medical Specialist Career Track (1:03:40-1:05:42) Legacy and Closing Remarks   Chapter Summaries (00:00-01:30) Introduction to Retired Colonel Dr. Robert Mabry Host Dr. Doug Soderdahl introduces Dr. Robert Mabry, highlighting his journey from the Battle of Mogadishu to his role as a founding member of the Committee on TCCC. The introduction sets the stage for a discussion on overhauling military medical training and preparing for future high-casualty conflicts. (01:30-05:37) From Small-Town Oklahoma to Army Ranger Dr. Mabry shares his early motivations for enlisting, citing a family tradition of military service and a desire to escape his small town. He explains how a recruiter's pitch led him to the Army over the Marine Corps, eventually landing him in the newly formed 3rd Ranger Battalion. (05:37-10:51) The Path to Special Forces Medic and 18 Delta Training Inspired by a mentor, Mabry pursued the rigorous Special Forces Medic (18 Delta) pathway, known for its high attrition rate and intense training. He discusses the 1.5-year pipeline and how his early marriage provided the stability needed to succeed in the academically and physically demanding course. (10:51-18:54) 15 Hours Under Fire: The Battle of Mogadishu Mabry provides a first-hand account of the "Black Hawk Down" mission, detailing the chaos of the crash site and the makeshift bunker he used to treat casualties overnight. He reflects on the realization that contemporary medical protocols, like C-spine immobilization under fire, were dangerously ill-suited for combat. (18:54-25:03) Transitioning from NCO to Physician at USUHS Inspired by clinical encounters as a medic, Mabry discusses the arduous process of completing medical school prerequisites while on active duty, including retaking organic chemistry after returning from Somalia. He details his experience at USUHS, balancing family life with the challenges of the basic science curriculum. (25:03-31:15) Founding TCCC and the Joint Trauma System Mabry explains the "grassroots" origins of the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) and the later development of the Joint Trauma System (JTS). He critiques the military's initial lack of a data-driven trauma system and the years it took to improve survivability during the Global War on Terror. (31:15-39:54) Revolutionizing Flight Medic Training and Evidence-Based Reform Mabry recounts the struggle to convince the Army to upgrade flight medics from EMT-Basics to Critical Care Paramedics. He highlights a landmark study that proved a 15% improvement in survival for the most critically injured patients when treated by higher-trained providers. (39:54-48:00) Prolonged Field Care and the Reality of Future Conflict (LSCO) Drawing from experiences on the Afghan-Pakistan border, Mabry demystifies prolonged field care as essential nursing care. He warns that future conflicts (LSCO) will lack air superiority, requiring medics to manage mass casualties at the point of injury for days rather than hours. (48:00-56:17) Mission Zero and Embedding Military Teams in Civilian Centers Mabry advocates for a nationalized "Team America" strategy to embed military surgical teams in busy civilian level-one trauma centers. He discusses his work on the Mission Zero Act to ensure military providers maintain their trauma skills during periods of peace. (56:17-1:03:40) Designing the Future Battlefield Medical Specialist Career Track Mabry proposes a new career pathway for operational medicine that allows experienced medics to transition into specialized Physician Assistant roles. This track would keep tactical expertise in the field and provide a long-term career for those dedicated to battlefield care. (1:03:40-1:05:42) Legacy and Closing Remarks In the final segment, Mabry reflects on his legacy, hoping his work inspires future medical leaders to have the courage to innovate. The episode concludes with a tribute to his contributions to saving lives on and off the battlefield.   Take Home Messages Combat Medicine Requires Tactical Adaptation: Medical protocols designed for civilian settings, such as C-spine immobilization or the avoidance of tourniquets, are often counterproductive in high-threat environments. True innovation in combat casualty care comes from acknowledging that the tactical situation dictates the medical intervention, a realization that led to the birth of TCCC. Data Drives Survival in Trauma Systems: The military health system cannot rely on luck or anecdotal evidence to improve clinical outcomes. Establishing a robust trauma registry and a continuous quality improvement process, as seen with the Joint Trauma System, is essential to bending the survival curve and preventing the repetition of past mistakes. Advanced Training is Non-Negotiable for Flight Medics: Moving from an "evacuation only" mindset to a "critical care in the air" model significantly improves survival rates for the most severely injured. Investing in high-level paramedic and nursing certification for flight crews ensures that the aircraft serves as a mobile ICU rather than just a transport vehicle. Preparing for Large-Scale Combat Requires Triage Mastery: In future peer-on-peer conflicts where medical evacuation may be delayed for days, military providers must be trained to manage expecting casualties and perform complex triage. This requires a shift in focus toward prolonged field care and the psychological readiness to make difficult resource-allocation decisions. Civilian-Military Integration is Essential for Readiness: To maintain the surgical skills necessary for war, military teams must be permanently embedded in high-volume civilian trauma centers. A nationalized strategy like the Mission Zero Act ensures that the nation's medical assets are integrated and ready to handle a sudden surge of casualties in a "Team America" approach.   Episode Keywords Military Medicine, Tactical Combat Casualty Care, TCCC, Battle of Mogadishu, Black Hawk Down, Army Rangers, Special Forces Medic, 18 Delta, Joint Trauma System, Flight Medic, Critical Care Paramedic, Mission Zero Act, Large Scale Combat Operations, LSCO, Prolonged Field Care, Combat Surgeon, USUHS, Medical Readiness, Trauma Surgery, Battlefield Medicine, Veteran Stories, Army Medical Department, AMEDD, Medevac, Operational Medicine   Hashtags #MilitaryMedicine, #WarDocs, #TCCC, #CombatMedic, #TraumaCare, #SpecialOperations, #VeteranLeadership, #BattlefieldMedicine   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission is to honor the legacy, preserve the oral history, and showcase career opportunities, unique expeditionary experiences, and achievements of Military Medicine. We foster patriotism and pride in Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoD, and Our Nation. Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield,demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast        

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

The Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps dropped one of the realest suicide-prevention messages we've ever seen — no uniform, no script, no cameras — just a Marine speaking from the heart. And while the entire Corps stopped to share his words… too many leaders stopped right there.In this episode, GySgt Demetrius “Meech” Thigpen digs into the uncomfortable truth:Sharing the message is easy.Living the message is where most leaders fail.Meech breaks down how performative leadership, toxic habits, and emotional neglect continue to push Marines into isolation while leaders hide behind perfect uniforms and motivational catchphrases. He exposes the gap between “check on your Marines” and actually giving a damn. And he shares raw personal stories — alcoholism, emotional collapse, a junior Marine who told him “I'm getting out because of you,” and the parking-lot moment that forced him to change.This episode challenges SNCOs, influencers, and leaders at every level to stop posting for optics and start leading with honesty, humility, and humanity. Because Marines don't need another shareable message. They need leaders who live it.In this episode:The impact of SgtMaj Ruiz's suicide-prevention messageWhy young Marines don't seek helpPerformative leadership vs. real leadershipWeaponizing mental-health resourcesEmotional responsibility as a leaderListening without minimizing someone's painTaking care of your Marines by taking care of yourself firstIf you're a Marine, a leader, or someone who's tired of hollow words and fake online “motivation,” this episode will hit you in the chest.Don't just share the message.Be the message.Follow @MeechSpeaks on Instagram.New episodes every Monday.

durée : 00:03:34 - Un monde connecté - par : Olivier Tesquet - Aux États-Unis, l'ICE achète des entrepôts pour les transformer en centres de détention, appliquant à la politique migratoire les logiques de l'économie numérique. Entre rentabilité, contrôle et symbolique, cette stratégie soulève des questionnements sur l'État.

U.S. Tech Corps announced by White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Maryland Tech Council to host 7th Annual Technology Transformation Conference  Listen to my latest podcast here  

✨ Ce dimanche, je partage avec vous un extrait avec le docteur Marc Naett. Il explique simplement le rôle de la thyroïde, cette petite glande qui agit comme le “chauffage central” de notre corps. Quand elle fonctionne au ralenti, tout ralentit : énergie, humeur, concentration. Un échange pour mieux comprendre des symptômes que beaucoup ressentent… sans toujours savoir d'où ils viennent.La suite dès lundi matin !Vous pouvez consulter notre politique de confidentialité sur https://art19.com/privacy ainsi que la notice de confidentialité de la Californie sur https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Merci à Patricia Vanderlinden d'être venue sur LegendPatricia est spécialiste DVI (Disaster Victim Identification), l'identification des victimes depuis 20 ans. Attentats, incendies, crash d'avions…elle intervient dans les pires catastrophes. Elle a travaillé sur de nombreuses identifications, sur des scènes où les corps sont méconnaissables. Pour Legend, elle raconte les histoires les plus folles de sa carrière.Retrouvez toutes les informations concernant notre invitée par ici ⬇️Son compte Instagram ➡️ https://www.instagram.com/patvdl.dvi.belgium/Son livre "Donner un nom aux morts: Sur les traces d'une experte DVI en identification de victimes" ➡️ https://amzn.to/4cAP0VJ Retrouvez toutes les émissions avec Philippe Boxho par ici ➡️ https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL3uuF0jWuXXYwyzwUWUOSURhu2MFEHOUmRetrouvez l'émission avec Dr Never par ici ➡️ https://youtu.be/DQitKDi0BowPour prendre vos billets pour le LEGEND TOUR c'est par ici ➡️ https://www.legend-tour.fr/Retrouvez la boutique LEGEND ➡️ https://shop.legend-group.fr/Pour toutes demandes de partenariats : legend@influxcrew.com Retrouvez-nous sur tous les réseaux LEGEND !Facebook : https://www.facebook.com/legendmediafr Instagram : https://www.instagram.com/legendmedia/ TikTok : https://www.tiktok.com/@legend Twitter : https://twitter.com/legendmediafr Snapchat : https://www.snapchat.com/@legendcm75017 Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Join Las Vegas Raiders on Senior SI Beat Writer Hondo Carpenter and family as they discuss the Silver and Black on the most recent Ridin' with the Carpenters on PFI, Pro Football Insiders. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss of the Long War Journal discuss a sophisticated Islamic State drone attack on an airfield in Niger, highlighting security failures by the Russian Africa Corps that replaced US forces.1949 NIGERIA

Since the last time he was on, a lot has changed. Dagan launched the Nomadic Research podcast out of Dixon, Illinois and went all in on building something of his own. Rural northwest Illinois, limestone bluffs, the Rock River, big whitetails, and just enough distance from Chicago to keep your sanity intact. Not a bad place to build a studio and start the next chapter. Evan and Dagan get into the why behind it. Why Illinois. Why leave a long career. Why step out and start talking publicly after years of working inside one of the largest and most misunderstood organizations in the country. Dagan walks through his background growing up in a Marine family, doing 12 years in the Corps across infantry and reconnaissance billets, then making the jump to the Agency where he and Evan worked together for years. They talk candidly about the difference between the tactical side of the house and where the real strategic decisions get made, the infamous seventh floor, and what it is like to be a small cog inside a 23,000 person machine. There is humor, a few shots at California, some perspective on career pivots, and a real look at professional evolution from Marine to operator to podcaster and business owner. This one is about reinvention, loyalty to where you came from, and figuring out what comes next when you have already done a few lifetimes worth of work. Grab a cup of coffee and settle in.