Podcasts about regiments

Last time we spoke about the fall of Shuri. In the unforgiving terrain of Okinawa during May 1945, American Marines confronted fierce resistance from entrenched Japanese forces. Amidst heavy rain and dwindling supplies, General Buckner's 10th Army battled uphill toward Shuri, a critical stronghold. With communication crumbling and morale wavering, the Americans pressed on, launching daring patrols. The situation reached a turning point when intelligence revealed the Japanese withdrawal plans. Buckner ordered continuous pressure, leading to the capture of significant strategic points like Shuri Castle, which was relentlessly bombarded prior to the Marine assault. On May 29, as the last remnants of Japanese forces fled south, American soldiers swept through Shuri, which lay in utter ruin, a testament to the devastating power of the campaign.  This episode is the Liberation of Mindanao Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last week we covered the fall of Shuri and today we continue the brutal brawl for Okinawa and the liberation of Mindanao. As we last saw, the Japanese retreat from the Shuri line opened the path for General Buckner's 10th Army to move southward, with only General Fujioka's 62nd Division and a few minor rearguards standing in their way. On June 3, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its offensive to the south. Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment successfully secured the area of Itokazu. Meanwhile, Colonel Green's 184th Regiment pushed toward the coast to completely cut off the Chinen Peninsula. Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment was diverted into the rugged hills nearby to clean up any remaining resistance. To the west, despite persistent bad weather and challenging supply conditions, General Bradley's 96th Division also achieved success. Colonel May's 383rd Regiment secured the locations of Kamizato and Tera against relatively light resistance. At the same time, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment advanced to seize the entire Inasomi area. Looking northwest, General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division encountered stronger opposition. The bulk of the 5th Marines managed to push only as far as Tsukasa before being pinned down. In a strategic move, Colonel Griebel's 2nd Battalion executed a wide swing through May's rear area to capture the Gisushi region. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines made steady progress through the Kokuba Valley, facing small enemy blocking forces, in order to extend the line held by the 5th Marines. Meanwhile, at sea, Admiral Ugaki launched his 9th mass Kikisui attack. This operation, featuring just 50 kamikaze aircraft, faced heavy obstacles due to Typhoon Viper but still managed to damage 2 vessels. In another development, after successfully occupying Torishima Island on May 12, Colonel Clarence Wallace's 8th Marines landed on Iheyajima without encountering any opposition. In addition, preparations for the shore-to-shore assault of General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division were completed. Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines were set to land on the Nishikoku beaches before securing the Oroku Peninsula and its airfield. Consequently, during the early hours of June 4, Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company successfully assaulted Ono-Yama Island, while Shapley's assault battalions began the shore-to-shore movement to Nishikoku under the cover of artillery and naval bombardment. Despite some mechanical failures on the LVTs, the Marines successfully landed at 06:00 under sporadic machine-gun fire and then pushed onto the high ground 300 yards inland against minor resistance. After securing the initial foothold, the attack slowed against increasing resistance on the left flank. Because of this, the reserve 3rd Battalion was landed at 08:45 and subsequently advanced to the edge of the airdrome.  During the day development of the enemy's defense had revealed an inordinate number of automatic weapons, ranging in various calibers up to 40mm. Subsequently, it was disclosed that the Japanese had stripped the armament from the air defenses and damaged aircraft in the area and integrated these weapons into the ground fortifications to stiffen materially the resistance on Oroku. Besides meeting with the most extensive mine fields yet encountered during the campaign, on this day the 6th Division had its first contact with an awesome weapon: an 8-inch rocket that exploded with terrific concussion. However, there was little fragmentation and accuracy was poor. While the noise the huge projectiles made, tumbling through the air end over end, sounded "like a locomotive from hell" to the troops, the rockets were mainly a source of annoyance and caused few casualties. Rockets continued to fall in the rear areas during the night, snipers and infiltrators were active, and the entire front came under intermittent heavy mortar fire. This landing allowed Shepherd to bring in Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines by midday, which then secured the Kikibana area of Naha Bay, while the 4th Marines captured one-third of Naha's airfield. To the east, the Americans encountered less resistance than before, as the 62nd Division and other minor rearguards completed their withdrawal from the intermediate lines south of Shuri to a reserve area south of the new Kiyamu Peninsula lines. Recognizing this change, Buckner shifted the corps boundary to the west, assigning General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps the task of isolating the Oroku Peninsula and occupying the Itoman-Kunishi sector, while General Hodge's 24th Corps advanced toward the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake escarpment.  As a result, the 7th Marines were able to move south to seize Takanyuta and isolate Admiral Ota's forces on the Oroku Peninsula. The atrocious weather had converted the already muddy roads to impassable morasses. Transport was hopelessly mired north of the Kokuba Gawa. South of the river the "trails were only negotiable by foot troops, vehicles could not have been used" even if it had been possible to bring them across the inlet. The 5th Marines managed to secure the Hill 107 area without opposition before being relieved by Colonel Mason's 1st Marines. However, the 1st Marines were unable to continue their push south toward Shindawaku Ridge due to a flooded stream. Meanwhile, Mason's 3rd Battalion attempted a wide envelopment through the 96th Division zone but was quickly halted in front of Tera. Food was scarce, but through the wholehearted cooperation of the 96th Division the Marines procured two meals of K rations per man. It was the considered opinion of at least one member of 3/1 that "this day probably was the most miserable spent on Okinawa by men of this battalion." To compound these problems and discomforts, the 3d Battalion also found itself without a supply route or communications with the regiment 11,000 yards to the rear. Further east, the 383rd Regiment advanced rapidly, engaging isolated but strong enemy delaying groups as they secured the outskirts of Iwa. Matching this progress, the 381st Regiment advanced all the way to the hills north of Aragusuku, facing steadily increasing resistance. Additionally, while the 17th Regiment established positions controlling the Minatoga-Meka road, the 184th Regiment advanced against patchy and ineffective resistance until the Minatoga area was secured. The following morning, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched strikes on Okinawa and Kyushu. Unfortunately, poor situational awareness from Admiral Halsey caused the 3rd Fleet to inadvertently enter Typhoon Viper. This storm inflicted varying degrees of damage to four carriers, two escort carriers, three cruisers, one destroyer, and one tanker, while also destroying 76 planes. Additionally, kamikaze attacks succeeded in damaging the battleship Mississippi and heavy cruiser Louisville. Back on Okinawa, Shepherd's attack on the Oroku Peninsula commenced and progressed slowly but steadily against uniformly stubborn resistance. The 4th Marines secured most of the airfield and the Toma high ground, while the 29th Marines fought laboriously to advance toward Mura and Oroku, gaining up to 1,000 yards. To the east, the 7th Marines advanced to positions just north of Hanja, while the 1st Marines bypassed the inundated area in front of them by swinging east and following their 3rd Battalion toward Iwa. In fact, Mason's 3rd Battalion launched another attack aimed at Shindawaku Ridge, advancing over 3,000 yards to the area west of Iwa. Despite muddy conditions and rainy weather, Hodge's infantrymen continued to penetrate the enemy outpost zone, developing the edges of the main Japanese battle position. The outpost line of Kiyamu Peninsula was fully manned on June 4. Japanese Army headquarters estimated that the strength of its now concentrated forces totaled 30000, distributed as follows: 24th Division and attached units, 12000; 62nd Division and attached units, 7000; 44th IMB and attached units, 3000; 5th Artillery Command and attached units, 3000; and units directly under 32nd Army command, 5000. The difference in total strength between the 50000-man estimate late in May and the 30000 left in Kiyamu Peninsula was attributed to "attrition during retirement operations." Only about 20% of the remaining troops were survivors of the original crack infantry-artillery units; the rest were untrained rear echelon personnel or Boeitai. Most senior commanders at battalion level and above were still alive, however, and capable of bolstering the fighting spirit of their motley collection of men. But the 32nd Army had suffered grievous losses in weapons and equipment since L-Day. Hand grenades and explosives were almost entirely expended. 4 out of every 5 machine guns had been destroyed, and the supply of heavy infantry cannon and mortars had been reduced to the vanishing point. Despite the fact that 2 150mm guns, 16 150mm howitzers, and 10 AAA guns had been successfully withdrawn to the Kiyamu battle position, artillery ammunition levels were insufficient for more than 10 days of sustained firing. General Ushijima's 32nd Army was in desperate straits, its destruction merely a question of time, but the tradition, discipline, and indoctrination of Japanese military forces promised only a violent, last-ditch, man-to-man struggle before the battle for Okinawa was ended. By June 6, the 7th Division reached the outskirts of Gushichan, and the 96th Division advanced toward Shindawaku and Tomui. To the west, the 1st Marines finally captured Shindawaku and cleared the bypassed area behind them. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines attacked toward Hill 108, advancing 1,000 yards before encountering stiff resistance and ultimately dug in around Dakiton. Additionally, Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines arrived to contain the Oroku Peninsula in the Hill 103 sector. Although the 29th Marines and Shapley's 1st Battalion made little progress in the Oroku-Mura area due to strong enemy resistance. Meanwhile the terrain confronting the 3rd Battalion there "consisted of a series of small temple-like hills, each of which had been converted into a fortress . . . from which mutually supporting automatic weapons could cover adjacent positions and deny the open ground between the hills." These gun positions were well dug-in and impervious to artillery fire. Because the narrow roads in the area had been made impassable by mines and shell cratering, tank support was not forthcoming, and a day of bitter fighting netted 3/29 a gain of a scant 150 yards. The remainder of the 4th Marines attacked Naha Airfield where counter fire from tanks, artillery, and support craft was immediately laid down. An urgent call for an air strike on the island was answered in less than half an hour, and "as rack after rack of bombs fell on the Nip positions, the troops stood up and cheered." The artillery piece was soon silenced, but 20mm fire was received spasmodically. Nevertheless, 3/4 pressed forward with its open flank covered by continued air strikes on Senaga Shima and completed the capture of Naha airfield before noon, whence they pushed south toward Gushi. At sea, kamikaze attacks crashed into and damaged two destroyer minesweepers, while also causing further damage to escort carrier Natoma Bay and destroyer Anthony on June 7. That day, Shepherd's Marines faced stiff resistance all along the front. The 4th Marines reduced Little Sugar Loaf where stiff resistance and bitter fighting characterized the action in the center and on the left of the 4th Marines' area. However, the attack forged ahead against machine-gun fire coming "from everywhere," while "countless caves were methodically cleaned out and sealed by the old process of direct fire, flame, and demolitions."Meanwhile the 29th Marines entered Oroku, and the 22nd Marines captured Hill 103 and the area south of Tamigusuki.  To the southeast, the 7th Marines overran Hanja and Hill 108, ultimately digging in just north of Zawa and linking up with the 1st Marines, which also advanced up to 1,200 yards as they secured Hill 75 and pushed toward Yuza. Further east, the primary offensive efforts of the 7th and 96th Divisions on June 7 and 8 were focused on probing enemy defenses and advancing assault battalions to more favorable positions for an attack. Additionally, by the afternoon of June 8, the 32nd Regiment successfully relieved the exhausted 184th in the Gushichan area. On that same day, the 1st Marines pressed forward to the high ground overlooking the Mukue River, while the 7th Marines moved through Zawa and began probing enemy positions in Itoman, encountering stiffened resistance. The first LVT's, supported by LVTa's, arrived at the newly-uncovered beaches at noon on 8 June, and shortly thereafter General Hodge sent General del Valle "congratulations for cutting the island in two." Meanwhile, on Oroku, the 29th Marines made little progress as they stalled at a key ridgeline on the left. The 4th Marines committed all three of their battalions to the attack, successfully securing the areas of Hill 39 and Gushi Ridge. The 22nd Marines continued to pivot on their right, seizing Hill 55 and making good progress along the front toward Chiwa and Tomigusuki. On June 9, although the 22nd Marines managed to secure Hill 55 and push to Hill 28, little advancement was achieved to the north. Concurrently, the 4th Marines were able to slowly push to the outskirts of Chiwa and Uibaru, with patrols clearing out Chiwa and Whaling's 3rd Battalion extending the front to the north. The action in the zone of the 4th Marines on 9 June remained unchanged from that of preceding days: “The advance was still slow and tedious against bitter resistance. Every Jap seemed to be armed with a machine gun, and there was still the same light and heavy mortar fire. Casualties continued to mount and the number of Japs killed soared over the maximum of 1500 which were supposed to be defending and there were still plenty left.” In the meantime, to the south, Del Valle sent strong patrols across the Mukue, which began to encounter significant enemy resistance. Consequently, the 7th Marines were unable to push toward Tera and Itoman. Further east, Hodge finally launched a corps attack to the south. The 96th Division focused its efforts on softening the enemy positions on the escarpment in front of them, while the 7th Division carried out the offensive. The 32nd Regiment attempted to attack the eastern end of Hill 95 but was unsuccessful; however, they managed to locate and identify the most troublesome sources of enemy fire for destruction. On a more positive note, the 17th Regiment gained a precarious foothold on the southern end of Yaeju Dake, just north of Nakaza, where they would withstand several Japanese counterattacks throughout the night. The first and greatest obstacle confronting Wallace's attack was the open ground over which both assault companies had to move. Wallace used all available support and the men camouflaged themselves with grass and rice plants, but enemy fire began almost as soon as the leading platoons moved into the open. The infantrymen crawled through the slimy rice paddies on their stomachs. Within an hour Company I was strung from the line of departure to the base of the objective which two squads had reached. About this time the Japanese opened fire with another machine gun, separating the advance squads with a band of fire. This left one squad to continue the attack; the remainder of the company was unable to move, cut off by fire or strung across the rice paddies. Those men in the squad still free to operate lifted and pulled each other to the edge of the cliff and crawled quietly forward through the high grass on top. Pfc. Ignac A. Zeleski, a BAR man, moved so stealthily that he almost touched the heels of one Japanese. Zeleski killed him, and the other men killed eight more Japanese within the first ten minutes. Another squad reached the top of the escarpment about an hour later but was caught in cross and grazing fire from three machine guns, and the entire 8-man squad was killed. Gradually, however, a few more men reached the top, and by evening there were twenty men from Company I holding a small area at the escarpment rim. Company K had a similar experience. Accurate enemy fire killed one man, wounded two others, and halted the company when it was from 200 to 300 yards from its objective. For forty-five minutes the attack dragged on until S/Sgt. Lester L. Johnson and eight men maneuvered forward through enemy fire, gained the high ground, and concentrated their fire on the enemy machine gun that was firing on the remainder of the company. This did not silence the gun but did prevent the gunner from aiming well, and Johnson waved for the rest of the company to follow. By 1330 of 9 June Company K was consolidated on the southeastern tip of the Yaeju-Dake. That evening, three small but determined counterattacks, with sustained grenade fire between each attempt, hit the small force from Company I, which held off the attackers with a light machine gun and automatic rifles. Additionally, Wallace's 1st Battalion successfully landed unopposed on Aguni Island to establish air warning and fighter director installations.  However, it's now time to leave Okinawa and shift our focus to the Philippines to cover the continuation of General Eichelberger's Mindanao Campaign. As we last saw, by May 3, General Sibert's 10th Corps had successfully invaded the island and secured the key Kabacan road junction. General Woodruff's 24th Division occupied Digos and Davao, while General Martin's 31st Division advanced up the Sayre Highway toward Kibawe. Thanks to the arrival of the 162nd Regiment from Zamboanga, the 31st Division was now able to send another regiment, the 155th, to assist in the push north against General Morozumi's 30th Division. In response to the rapid advance of the 31st Division as far as Kibawe, Morozumi was assembling his units at Malaybalay in preparation for a retreat eastward to the Agusan Valley. He dispatched the 3rd Battalion of the 74th Regiment to the south to delay the Americans in the vicinity of Maramag, at least until May 10. Meanwhile, after capturing Davao, Woodruff's goal was to mop up the sector and destroy General Harada's 100th Division in the mountainous interior. The 100th Division located the southern anchor of its defenses at Catigan, 13 miles southwest of Davao, and the northern anchor in hills some twelve miles north of Davao. The Davao River, flowing generally south-southeast into Davao Gulf at Davao, divided the defensive forces into two groupments. The Right Sector Unit, west of the river, was composed of 5 infantry battalions, 3 regular and 2 provisional. The territory east of the river was the responsibility of the Left Sector Unit--2 regular infantry battalions, 2 provisional battalions, and the Air Force's Hosono Unit of ill-armed service personnel. The Right and Left Sector Units had a little artillery attached, for General Harada kept under his direct control most of the artillery as well as many engineer and service units. As a reserve Harada had about a battalion of regular infantry. The central and strongest portion of Harada's defenses rested its right on rising ground overlooking Libby Airdrome, two miles northwest of Talomo on the coast. From this point the central defenses, along which Harada initially deployed three battalions, extended eastward across the Talomo River and some rough hills to the west bank of the Davao River. The focal point of the central defenses was Mintal, four miles up Route 1-D from Talomo. Anticipating ultimate withdrawal into the mountains via Route 1-D, the southeastern section of the so-called Kibawe-Talomo trail, Harada had prepared defenses in depth along the highway and along ancillary roads paralleling it. Much of the region west of the Davao River from Talomo northwest twelve miles to Calinan was covered with overgrown abaca, or hemp, plantations. Resembling banana plants, and growing to a height of about 20 feet, the abaca plants had originally been planted in rows 10 feet apart, with 10 feet between plants. With harvesting slack during the war, the plantations had become thick with shoots, and older plants had grown to a foot or so in diameter. Plants of various sizes were, in April 1945, scarcely a foot apart. Visibility was virtually nil, and the heat at the hemp plantations was like that of an oven. With the 162nd Regiment taking control of Digos and the area stretching from Illana Bay's shores inland to Kabacan, Woodruff was now free to utilize his entire division to engage the enemy forces in the Davao area. At the start of May, the 21st Regiment had already launched an attack to clear Libby Airdrome, Route 1-D between Mintal and Talomo, and Mintal itself. They successfully reached Mintal by May 3, effectively forcing Harada to reinforce his defenses near the Talomo River. Although the airdrome was cleared two days later, subsequent efforts up Route 1-D toward Mintal were repelled by fiercely defending Japanese forces. Due to this resistance, elements of the 34th Regiment attempted to drive north along the high ground on the east bank of the Talomo River to bypass the Japanese defenses on Route 1-D. On May 8, the 21st Regiment finally crossed to the east side at Mintal; however, in the face of Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, they had to withdraw back to the west bank two days later. At the same time, the 19th Regiment was expanding its hold in the Davao area, striking into the high ground controlling the coast road immediately west of the Davao River on May 10. They also cleared scattered Japanese strongpoints on hills just north of Davao and on Samal Island. Two days later, the 21st Regiment again attacked northward along the east bank of the Talomo, successfully clearing out numerous positions from which the Japanese had directed fire on Route 1-D. By May 14, the highway all the way north to Mintal was finally secured. In the meantime, the 124th Regiment started north from Kibawe on May 6. However, the recently arrived Japanese defenders at Maramag managed to delay the occupation of this town until May 12, thus accomplishing their task more than adequately. Despite this success, Eichelberger had shrewdly sensed that Morozumi would attempt to make a last stand in the hills northwest of Davao. Therefore, he decided to land the 108th Regiment behind enemy lines in the Macajalar Bay area to expedite the conquest of Mindanao and open a new supply route to the 31st Division. Accordingly, on May 10, the 108th Regiment landed unopposed along the southeastern shore of Macajalar Bay, making contact almost immediately with guerrilla units operating in the region. This regiment then drove down the Sayre Highway to meet the 31st Division advancing from the south, encountering no significant resistance until May 13, when it faced strong Japanese defenses near Dalirig. With its rear protected by the recently landed 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment, the 108th proceeded to attack the enemy positions with great intensity, finally forcing the Japanese to retreat to the area east of Malaybalay by May 16. Concurrently, on May 13, the 155th Regiment passed through the 124th Regiment to continue the drive northward, meeting little opposition but facing supply problems. By May 20, the Americans finally reached the outskirts of Malaybalay, where fire from remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment halted their advance. Realizing that the regiment could not haul its weapons into the mountains east of Malaybalay, Morozumi had left the unit at Malaybalay to fight a rear-guard action, which was successful in keeping the 155th Infantry out of the town until late on 21 May. On 22 and 23 May the 155th continued up Sayre Highway, encountering elements of Morozumi's Northern Sector Unit that had not learned that American troops had reached Malaybalay and were still withdrawing southward to join the 30th Division's main body. Pressed by troops of the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, which had already landed at Macajalar Bay, the retreating forces gave the 155th Infantry little trouble and, about 1400 on 23 May, the 155th made contact with the 108th Infantry near Impalutao, twelve miles northwest of Malaybalay. Its share in the task of clearing Sayre Highway cost the 31st Division approximately 90 men killed and 250 wounded, while the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, lost roughly 15 men killed and 100 wounded. Together, the two units killed almost 1,000 Japanese during their operations along the highway, and captured nearly 25 more. Nevertheless, the 30th Division had managed to escape east this time to establish new positions near Silae. Back in Davao, on May 15, Woodruff directed the 21st and 34th Regiments to attack abreast to the north and northwest, targeting the Japanese center. Meanwhile, the 19th Regiment advanced north to clear the northeastern shores of Davao Gulf, link up with the guerrilla forces north of the gulf, and ultimately swing westward against the 100th Division's left flank forces. Surprised by the lack of enemy attacks against his flanks, Harada concluded that the American forces intended to neglect his flanks in favor of a frontal assault on his center. As a result, he weakened the defenses of the Left Sector Unit to reinforce the Mintal line, leaving only Admiral Doi's air-naval troops to defend his left flank. On May 17, Woodruff renewed his offensive. The 19th Regiment struck north to establish contact with the guerrilla 107th Division, while the 34th Regiment began clearing the coastal hills between the Talomo and Davao Rivers and attacked northwest toward Tugbok. The 21st Regiment also drove north toward Tugbok in the face of determined opposition. Progress in the following days was slow due to intense artillery, machine-gun, rocket, mortar, and rifle fire. However, by May 27, the 21st Regiment seized the Tugbok area, with the 34th Regiment arriving the next day to relieve them. As Harada's strongest defenses had been breached, he ordered a general withdrawal to a hastily established second line crossing Route 1-D in the vicinity of Ula. Furthermore, the 19th Regiment managed to establish contact with the guerrillas by May 24 as it secured Route 1 north of Davao. On May 29, the 19th Regiment struck westward toward Doi's Mandog defenses, closing in two days later to engage the naval troops in fierce combat. Concurrently, on May 30, the 34th Regiment attacked toward Ula, which fell easily the following day, though progress then slowed in the face of fanatic resistance. Reinforced by the recently arrived 3rd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment on June 4, the 34th began to make headway beyond Ula on the secondary road, gaining one mile by June 6 before swinging east toward Mandog. The next day, having overrun Doi's outer defenses, the 19th Regiment advanced steadily into the main positions near Mandog, which ultimately fell by June 9, just as the 34th was reaching the area. Continuing northward, the 34th was almost three miles north of Ula along both roads and found few signs of organized Japanese resistance by June 11. However, the 19th Regiment would not clear the hills north of Mandog until June 15. In the meantime, the 21st Regiment struck north from Lamogan on May 31 along secondary roads west of Route 1-D, ultimately seizing Wangan on June 16 and forcing Harada's battered forces to commence a full retreat northward in disarray. After the fall of Culanan three days later, Harada finally decided to retreat to a new line near the Bannos River. Yet Woodruff's troops continued to pursue them, rapidly crossing the Tamogan River and inflicting heavy casualties on the retreating enemy until they reached the mountain barrio of Kibangay on June 26, where the pursuit was finally halted. Looking back to the north, with Sayre Highway cleared, the 124th Regiment began probing into the mountains to the east in late May, encountering heavy resistance, rough terrain, bad weather, and supply problems. Nevertheless, by June 5, Morozumi abandoned his plan to hold the Silae area for a month and slowly began moving his best troops eastward toward Waloe in the Agusan River valley, harassed by Filipino guerrillas along the way. In the end, Silae was finally occupied on June 9, with troops of the 108th Regiment pushing further to the Bobonawan River four days later. Additionally, the 155th Regiment arrived on the Pulangi River on June 12, while elements of the 162nd Regiment struck twenty miles into the mountains east from Maramag by June 26. On June 25, the 1st Battalion of the 155th Regiment successfully landed on Butuan Bay and managed to reach Waloe before the Japanese on June 27, dispersing the 3rd Battalion of the 41st Regiment that was holding the area. However, the Japanese retreat was so slow that Morozumi was still assembling his forces about seven miles up the Agusan from Waloe by the end of the war.  Far to the northwest, units of the 31st Division had been probing southeast along the upper section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail ever since early May, and on the 11th of that month a battalion combat team of the 167th Infantry launched the reconnaissance-in-force directed by General Sibert.  Japanese along this section of the trail, about 1,000 men in all, comprised a conglomerate mass of service troops with a small leavening of infantry. Control was vested in General Tomochika, chief of staff of the 35th Army, who had set up a small headquarters groupment near barrio Pinamola, about twenty miles southeast of Kibawe. The Japanese force had a defensive potential far greater than its strength and nature would indicate, for the terrain gave the Japanese every conceivable advantage. Bounded on both sides by dense jungle and thick rain forest, the trail as far as Pinamola ran up and down steep ridges and was scarcely jeep-wide. Rains of late May soon rendered all sections of the trail completely impassable to wheeled vehicles, and supplies had to come in by airdrop, supplemented when possible by hand-carrying parties and laden Carabaos. The mud was so deep that often troops had to pull, push, or even jack the Carabaos out of gooey holes. Delayed by the Japanese, the terrain, and the weather, the 167th Infantry's battalion did not reach the Pulangi River, thirteen miles southeast of Kibawe, until 29 May.  Then, although the Japanese from the trail could no longer offer any threat to the 31st Division, the battalion continued south toward Pinamola, aided considerably by guerrillas. The remnants of the 1st Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the South Sector Unit, 30th Division, which had been driven into the mountains along Highway 3 by the swift American advance in central Mindanao had meanwhile been attached to Tomochika's forces early in June. Troops of the 167th Infantry finally reached Pinamola on 30 June as the remaining Japanese were withdrawing southward another eight miles to the crossing of the Kuluman River. Progress as far as Pinamola had cost the 167th Infantry approximately 60 men killed and 180 wounded, while the Japanese had lost almost 400 killed along the same section of the trail. Elements of the 167th Infantry held along the northwestern section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail until the end of the war, and as of 15 August the regiment was preparing to send troops across the Kuluman River to continue the advance southeastward. On that date nearly 30 miles of Japanese-improved trail, only 19 air miles--still separated the 167th Infantry from guerrilla units operating in the vicinity of Kibangay. Organized remnants of Harada's 100th Division holed up until the end of the war in rugged terrain north of this 30-mile stretch of the trail. Finally, the 24th Reconnaissance Troop successfully landed on the southeastern shore of Sarangani Bay on July 4 to establish contact with the guerrilla 116th Regiment, subsequently clearing the bay's shores against negligible resistance. On July 12, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment landed on the northwest shore, just as two provisional battalions were arriving in the area from different directions. The three forces began to clear the area, successfully locating and destroying the only Japanese unit in the region by July 25. This concluded the campaign in Mindanao, during which the Americans suffered 820 men killed and 2,880 wounded. In turn, almost 10,540 Japanese were killed in eastern Mindanao by June 30, with the pursuing Filipino-American units killing another 2,325 Japanese by the war's end. Roughly 600 Japanese prisoners were captured, over 250 of whom were civilians, before August. After the war, about 22,250 Japanese troops and 11,900 civilians turned themselves in. It is also estimated that an additional 8,235 Japanese lost their lives due to starvation and disease between April and the war's end. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the spring of 1945, the fierce battle for Okinawa escalated as General Buckner's troops captured crucial strongholds, pushing the Japanese forces into retreat. Meanwhile the liberation of Mindanao was kicking up. American forces launched a rapid invasion, confronting Japanese defenders who were heavily fortified in the mountainous regions. Despite the stubborn resistance, American troops relentlessly battled, ultimately culminating in significant victories and paving the way for liberation.

Last time we spoke about the breakthrough on Okinawa. Despite relentless attacks on critical positions like Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, American Marines encountered heavy casualties. Yet, they persisted, inching forward against tenacious resistance. As mid-May approached, the situation for Japanese commanders deteriorated. Encircled and suffering significant losses, they began plotting a retreat to more defensible positions. On the ground, Marines battled through mud and enemy fire, showcasing incredible resolve amidst dire circumstances. Communication crumbled, supplies dwindled, and morale waned, yet the determination of both sides was undeniable. By late May, the tides shifted further in favor of the Allies, marking pivotal breakthroughs despite the challenges. Amidst ruin and chaos, the relentless struggle for control over Okinawa symbolized the brutal nature of war and the unwavering spirit of those fighting on both sides, setting the stage for an eventual Allied victory.  This episode is the Fall of Shuri Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, the battle for Okinawa was reaching a critical juncture. General Buckner's 10th Army had made significant gains, successfully breaking through the fortified Japanese defenses on both flanks. The 6th Marine Division, under General Shepherd, had effectively established control over the Naha area, while General Arnold's 7th Division achieved an impressive penetration at Yonabaru. However, despite these advancements, the remainder of the American forces faced formidable obstacles. They were grappling with relentless rain, fierce enemy resistance, and severe supply shortages, which left them effectively stalled in front of Shuri. In response to the encroaching American forces, General Ushijima had dispatched General Fujioka's 62nd Division to launch a counter-offensive aimed at driving the invaders out of Yonabaru. Meanwhile, Ushijima was preparing his 32nd Army for a strategic withdrawal south to the Kiyamu Peninsula. Fortunately for the Americans, they had caught wind of the defenders' intentions. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, on May 27, General Buckner ordered his troops to apply strong and unrelenting pressure on the enemy. The goal was clear: keep the Japanese forces off balance and prevent an easy transition to new defensive positions. Although the continuing downpour hindered the possibility of a large-scale, coordinated army-wide attack, it did not deter Buckner's strategy. Instead, he initiated a series of strong combat patrols along the front lines, which immediately encountered stiff resistance from Japanese troops that had not yet begun their withdrawal. On the west coast, as patrols from Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines scouted the area, they discovered that the Japanese had largely abandoned Naha. This news spurred the 2nd Battalion into action. They crossed the Asato River, moved through the lines established by Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company, and pressed deeper into the western part of Naha. Simultaneously, Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines made their last desperate push to extend American control into eastern Naha, fighting valiantly against the entrenched enemy. Farther east, Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment once again faced fierce resistance from the hastily committed 62nd Division, which staunchly defended its position. However, not all was lost; patrols from Colonel Green's 184th Regiment managed to reach Inasomi, meeting only scattered resistance. This breakthrough provided a crucial indication that the enemy had no intention of withdrawing into the Chinen Peninsula. As the clocks struck midnight, a significant yet largely unnoticed transition occurred in the waters off Okinawa: Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet relieved Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet. For the troops ashore, this change in command went by without a hint of recognition. The same ships and task groups continued their crucial support for ground operations, now operating under new numerical designations and leadership. However, Halsey faced an immediate challenge as Admiral Ugaki launched an extensive Kikisui attack, a large-scale kamikaze assault involving 110 enemy aircraft. The day of May 27 proved costly, with three destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, two transports, one subchaser, and two auxiliary ships all suffering damage. The following morning brought clear skies, which only heightened the danger for American naval forces. Several kamikaze aircraft succeeded in sinking the destroyer USS Drexler, while also inflicting damage on a transport ship, three freighters, and a landing craft throughout the day. Meanwhile, on land, Colonel Whaling's rehabilitated 29th Marines took over from the battered 4th Marines along the west coast. The 1st Battalion executed a concerted attack alongside the 22nd Marines, advancing successfully by 250 yards through the rubble-strewn city of Naha. In an impressive display of momentum, Roberts' men pushed forward unopposed toward the Kokuba estuary, eventually encountering resistance near Ono-Yama Island. To the east, the improvement in weather allowed Colonel Mason's 1st Marines to launch a coordinated offensive. The 2nd Battalion fought valiantly, climbing to the peak of 110 Meter Hill. The forward elements of Company E gained the hill crest but were forced to withdraw by vicious enemy fire which raked their positions. Lieutenant Colonel Magee felt that his depleted battalion, down to a total strength of 277 men in the rifle companies, might recapture the hill, but "it could not possibly hold it against a strong enemy counterattack." Although new replacements were available to regiments for training or other use, a division order prevented their being sent to front line units during a battle situation that called for the utmost in skill and knowledge of veterans. Throughout most of the morning and all of the afternoon, 2/1 concentrated the fire of its supporting weapons on the reverse slopes of 110 Meter Hill and engaged the Japanese in a fierce and continuous fire fight. Nightfall brought no cessation of enemy resistance, and many infiltrators were killed in the battalion's lines. In contrast, the 3rd Battalion experienced relatively little opposition, allowing some patrols to penetrate into Wana Draw. At the same time, Colonel Griebel's 3rd Battalion effectively moved its front line to the Asato River, while his 1st Battalion achieved a significant milestone by capturing Beehive Hill. However, despite the break in the rain, the conditions on the ground rendered large-scale movements impractical, stalling further advances across the battlefield. Despite Arnold's determined efforts to push west through Fujioka's blocking positions, progress was minimal. Nevertheless, he was able to consolidate his grip on the Ozato hill mass as Green's 2nd Battalion advanced to a position within 1,000 yards of Shinazato, strategically located at the neck of the Chinen Peninsula. The lack of success from the 62nd Division in driving back the breaching American forces reinforced General Ushijima's resolve to evacuate Shuri while the opportunity still existed. In light of this, he ordered the withdrawal to commence the following evening. On May 29, while the 7th Reconnaissance Troop managed to scout a significant portion of the Chinen Peninsula without incident, the 7th and 96th Divisions faced fierce resistance as they attacked toward the road network south of Shuri. The enemy's resolute defense resulted in only minimal gains for the American assault units. General Bruce's 77th Division, after what can be described as "a day almost entirely spent in hand-to-hand combat," found itself unable to penetrate the intense cordon of defensive fire that protected the Japanese positions. In stark contrast, to the west, Griebel's 1st Battalion made a rapid advance, quickly gaining the crest of Shuri Ridge. They launched a bold assault on Shuri Castle. On May 25, as part of the final stages of the Okinawa campaign, the American battleship USS Mississippi bombarded the castle for three days, and by May 27, it was engulfed in flames. That night, the Japanese forces retreated, abandoning Shuri while US troops pursued them southward. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines had started its attack on 29 May with Companies B and C in assault and Company A following in trace of Company C. The Marines quickly gained the crest of Shuri Ridge and Lieutenant Colonel Shelburne requested permission for one of his companies to storm Shuri Castle which commanded his position. Although the castle was in the zone of action of the 77th Infantry Division, General del Valle gave his assent to the request in view of the great danger of enemy action from the strong point. The 1st Marine Division commander felt that "at that time the position of the 77th Division was such that it would have taken several hard day's fighting through enemy resistance" before the castle could be taken. Company A drove east along the muddy ridge line, overwhelming the few Japanese in its path, and by 1015 the castle, core of the Shuri bastion, had been secured. The Marine unit entered Shuri through a gap in the covering forces caused by the withdrawal of the 3d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, in the course of the Japanese retreat from Shuri. This seems to have been the only notable instance of confusion and mistake in the Japanese withdrawal operation as a whole. Everywhere else around Shuri the Japanese still held their covering positions in the front lines. The 77th Division, which had scheduled air strikes and a heavy artillery bombardment on the castle heights for 29 May, received little prior warning of the Marines' assault and "was barely able to avert [its] called strikes in time." Without taking any credit away from Company A of the 5th Marines for its feat of capturing Shuri Castle, its success was clearly the result of the combined effort of all the assault and support troops of Tenth Army which had maintained relentless pressure on the enemy defenses and paved the way for the breakthrough.  Capitalizing on this momentum, General Del Valle swiftly reorganized his forces to bypass Wana Draw and consolidate these crucial gains. Meanwhile, Griebel's 3rd Battalion maneuvered down the division boundary, reaching a position just 2,000 yards from the village of Kokuba, prompting Whaling's 3rd Battalion to push their lines forward by approximately 600 yards. In a coordinated effort, the 29th Marines executed a wheeling assault on 29 May with 1/29 pivoting on 3/29 and attacking south and then east to bring the regiment on line with the 22d Marines. The ultimate objective of the 1st Battalion's attack was the high ground northwest of Shichina. The approach to the objective was over low and open terrain which drew the comment from regiment that it was "about as suitable to fighting as a billiard table." Fire from strong points in tombs and caves on the small hills and ridges to the front kept the advance to a slow pace, and the assault companies, A and C, dug in slightly to the left rear of the positions of the 22d Marines at nightfall. On another front, Roberts' 1st Battalion successfully crossed the Kokuba River and advanced toward Telegraph Hill in east Naha. However, despite their efforts, intense fighting erupted throughout the day without yielding any significant gains. Back at sea, the threat of kamikaze attacks returned with ferocity, yet this time, American defenses held strong, resulting in only a single destroyer and one transport sustaining damage. As night fell, the Japanese began their long-anticipated withdrawal. General Amamiya's 24th Division commenced disengagement, moving southward while leaving a small force, including the 22nd Independent Battalion, to cover their retreat at Shuri. Meanwhile, General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade held their defensive lines outside Naha, and the 62nd Division maintained its positions near Chan and Karadera. By dawn on May 30, the bulk of the 32nd Army had successfully evacuated the Shuri lines, slipping away from the flanking maneuvers of Buckner's 10th Army. Thanks to a continuous curtain of rain, General Ushijima executed a meticulously planned "properly deft withdrawal." His covering forces were strategically positioned to provide him with the necessary time to organize a defensive stance on the Kiyamu Peninsula. However, the Americans, ever vigilant, were quick to capitalize on the enemy's disarray, maintaining relentless pressure on the faltering Japanese front. On the west coast, Roberts' 2nd and 3rd Battalions crossed the canal, seamlessly moving through the 1st Battalion to take up the assault. They pushed forward tenaciously until they captured the entire area encompassing Telegraph Hill and Hill 27. A network of Japanese machine gun positions hidden in the clusters of tombs on the low hills to the Marines' front made progress slow and costly. Enemy machine guns emplaced in burial tombs on Hill 27 in east Naha temporarily checked the infantry. Heavy sniper fire whipped the lines and killed Lieutenant Colonel Woodhouse of 2/22 who was forward controlling his battalion's attack. Major John G. Johnson, the executive officer, took command immediately and continued a steady pressure. During most of the day tanks were unable to reach the position, but in the afternoon three worked their way along the road north of the hill, and their direct fire enabled the marines to seize it. The advance consisted of a series of local assaults and mop-up actions that brought the battalion to secure hill positions overlooking the Kokuba Estuary and the rail line leading to the north by nightfall. Lieutenant Colonel Shisler's 3d Battalion passed through 1/22 during the morning's attack and behind a screen of artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, and rockets drove onto the high ground at the eastern outskirts of Naha. By means of a series of holding attacks and flank assaults, Shisler was able to move his companies into the maze of enemy defenses where close quarter grenade and small-arms exchanges decided the issue. Once the dominating ground was won, the battalion was subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire. At the same time, Whaling's 1st Battalion joined the offensive, encountering fierce resistance as they pressed through 600 yards of enemy territory. To the east, the Marines under Del Valle shifted their focus to vigorous patrolling, as the supply situation gradually improved thanks to dedicated carrying parties and aerial air drops. Despite their efforts, the 306th Regiment's assault on 110 Meter Hill encountered heavy opposition once again. However, Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment finally achieved a breakthrough, seizing the strategic Three Sisters. Dorothy Hill, a fortress directly east of Shuri and a tower of strength in the enemy's inner line for the past two weeks, was attacked by the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, 77th Division. The first platoon to reach the base of the hill was pinned down by heavy fire, the platoon leader and all noncommissioned officers being wounded. Other platoons maneuvered into position and finally one squad reached the crest at the right end. This entering wedge enabled two companies to reach the top, from which they discovered three levels of caves on the reverse slope. They went to work methodically, moving from right to left along the top level, burning and blasting each cave and dugout, the flame-thrower and satchel-charge men covered by riflemen. When work on the top level was finished, the second level of caves and tunnels received similar treatment, and then the third and lowest level. That night fifteen Japanese who had survived the day's fighting crawled out of the blasted caves and were killed by Americans from their foxholes. A great amount of enemy equipment, including ten destroyed 150-mm- guns and twenty-five trucks, was found on the south (reverse) side of Dorothy Hill, testifying to the enemy fire power at this strong point. On 30 May, the 77th Division also took Jane Hill on its left flank and then almost unopposed took Tom Hill, the highest point of ground in the Shuri area, by 1700. This critical victory paved the way for Colonel Smith's forces to advance into the northern outskirts of Shuri through Ishimmi. In a remarkable display of coordination, Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment finally secured the strategic Hen Hill and Oboe Hill areas, while also capturing Hector Hill on their left flank. For nine days elements of the 96th Division had been stalemated at the base of Hen Hill, just northeast of Shuri. On the 30th, Company F and one platoon of Company G, 382d Infantry, resumed the attack on Hen Hill. Pfc. Clarence B. Craft, a rifleman from Company G, was sent out ahead with five companions to test the Japanese positions. As he and his small group started up the slope, they were brought under heavy fire from Japanese just over the crest, and a shower of grenades fell on them. Three of the men were wounded and the other two were stopped. Craft, although a new replacement and in his first action, kept on going, tossing grenades at the crest. From just below the crest he threw two cases of grenades that were passed up to him from the bottom, those of the enemy going over his head or exploding near him. He then leaped to the crest and fired at point-blank range into the Japanese in a trench a few feet below him. Spurred by Craft's example, other men now came to his aid. Reloading, Craft pursued the Japanese down the trench, wiped out a machine gun nest, and satchel-charged the cave into which the remaining Japanese had retreated. Altogether, in the taking of Hen Hill as a result of Craft's action, about seventy Japanese were killed, at least twenty-five of whom were credited to Craft himself. This daring action won him the Congressional Medal of Honor. To the left (east), Company F at the same time engaged in a grenade battle for Hector Hill, using ten cases of grenades in the assault on the crest. It was finally won after a satchel charge was hurled over the top and lit in the enemy trench on the other side, parts of Japanese bodies and pieces of enemy equipment hurtling into the sky in the blast. Hen and Hector Hills had fallen by 1400. Southeast of their position, Colonel May's 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, reached Love Hill and dug in, although scattered fire was still received from a machine gun in a nook of Charlie Hill and there were a few live Japanese on Love itself. In the afternoon the 3d Battalion, 383d Infantry, left its foxholes on Oboe, where it had experienced so great an ordeal, and proceeded down the reverse slope of the hill, finding only a few scattered Japanese. That night the 383d Infantry expressed a heartfelt sentiment when it reported "infinite relief to have Conical Hill behind us." Although there had been suicidal stands in a few places by the last of the holding force, the advances had been rapid. Simultaneously, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment effectively reduced the Conical Hill-Cutaway area and seized Roger Hill, both regiments then advancing toward the vital Naha-Yonabaru road. At the same time, the 32nd Regiment launched a coordinated offensive that allowed them to successfully capture Oak, Ella, and June Hills. This advance brought Finn's troops directly into confrontation with Mabel and Hetty Hills, facing the formidable defenses of Chan. Meanwhile, strong patrols from the 184th Regiment ventured into the Chinen Peninsula's strongholds, encountering only light enemy resistance, a turn of events that buoyed American morale. As night fell, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 24th Division began their long-anticipated evacuation from Shuri. They pulled back behind the second line of blocking positions north of Tsukasan, executing their withdrawal amidst a progressively decreasing barrage of artillery and mortar fire. Consequently, when Buckner's assault troops launched their offensive against the Shuri positions on the morning of May 31, they were met with an eerie silence, the stillness only interrupted by sporadic sniper fire and the distant crack of machine guns.The 77th Division swiftly took 110 Meter Hill and advanced into Shuri with little to no resistance. Concurrently, Mason's units surrounding Shuri Castle moved north unopposed, aiding in the occupation of the battered ruins and the troublesome Wana Draw.  Shuri, the second town of Okinawa, lay in utter ruin. There was no other city, town, or village in the Ryukyus that had been destroyed so completely. Naha too had been laid waste. Certain villages which had been strong points in the enemy's defense, such as Kakazu, Dakeshi, Kochi, Arakachi, and Kunishi, had been fought over and leveled to the ground. But none of these compared with the ancient capital of the Ryukyus. It was estimated that about 200000 rounds of artillery and naval gunfire had struck Shuri. Numerous air strikes had dropped 1000-pound bombs on it. Mortar shells by the thousands had arched their way into the town area. Only two structures, both of concrete, the big normal school at the southwestern corner and the little Methodist church, built in 1937, in the center of Shuri, had enough of their walls standing to form silhouettes on the skyline. The rest was flattened rubble. The narrow paved and dirt streets, churned by high explosives and pitted with shell craters, were impassable to any vehicle. The stone walls of the numerous little terraces were battered down. The rubble and broken red tile of the houses lay in heaps. The frame portion of buildings had been reduced to kindling wood. Tattered bits of Japanese military clothing, gas masks, and tropical helmets-the most frequently seen items-and the dark-colored Okinawan civilian dress lay about in wild confusion. Over all this crater of the moon landscape hung the unforgettable stench of rotting human flesh. To  the west, Griebel's 1st Battalion built upon Mason's gains, but it was the 3rd Battalion that led the main effort, successfully pushing to the hills just north of Shichina.Meanwhile, General Bradley's advancing battalions moved rapidly toward their assigned objectives, spending much of the day mopping up isolated enemy holdouts. This relentless advance effectively pinched off the 77th Division, further consolidating American control in the region. On the extreme left flank, Halloran's 1st Battalion faced enemy forces defending the Tsukasan line, marking the only area where the 96th Division failed to reach the corps boundary. However, the Shuri area had now been completely secured, and contact was made with Del Valle's Marines in the center. On the flanks, though, Buckner's units continued to encounter fierce resistance from the tenacious Japanese defenders. The 32nd Regiment, battling bravely through a series of heavily fortified strongpoints held stubbornly by Fujioka's troops, managed to seize Duck Hill, consolidate its positions on Turkey Hill, and capture the forward face of Mabel. Ultimately, they halted their advance just short of Chan. Meanwhile, on the west coast, Shepherd's Marines pushed forward with support from tanks and artillery, targeting the strategic high ground west of Shichina and Kokuba. However, their advance was stalled by intense enemy fire emanating from Hill 46. During the night, the battered 44th Independent Mixed Brigade executed a withdrawal southeast towards the Kiyamu Peninsula, covered by the 62nd Division, which quickly established a new defensive line along the Kokuba River and around Tsukasan. With the fall of Shuri and the withdrawal of Japanese forces, Buckner's troops had emerged victorious in one of the most difficult and bloody battles of the Pacific War. By the end of May, reports indicated that approximately 62,548 Japanese soldiers had been confirmed killed, with another estimated 9,529 thought to have perished, 64,000 of whom were believed to have fallen in the fierce fighting within the Shuri fortified zone alone. While these casualty figures may be somewhat exaggerated, there is little doubt that Japanese forces, especially their infantry combat units, had suffered severe depletion. In contrast, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps recorded significant losses of its own, with 1,718 killed, 8,852 wounded, and 101 missing during the fighting around Shuri. Additionally, the losses for General Hodge's 24th Corps over two months of combat totaled an alarming 26,044 casualties. On June 1, the American forces faced surprisingly little opposition from the enemy. A frustrated General Buckner, who had hoped to trap the defenders at Shuri, ordered his troops to advance rapidly in pursuit of the retreating Japanese units. With the 77th Division methodically mopping up remnants in the Shuri zone, General Hodge made a strategic decision. He shifted the 7th Division toward the east and ordered the 96th Division to move south to relieve the 32nd Regiment, taking up the western end of the Corps line. This strategic relief enabled Arnold to immediately push south with both the 17th and 184th Regiments in assault, managing to advance approximately 1,100 yards toward Okota and Batan despite increasingly stiff resistance from smaller enemy units. To the northwest, a coordinated attack by the Marine divisions successfully secured all high ground overlooking the primary east-west road in the Kokuba Valley. The 5th Marines anchored their position on the hills east of Shichina, while Shepherd's regiments seized the dominating heights north of Kokuba. Recognizing the strategic importance of the Oroku Peninsula, General Geiger planned a shore-to-shore landing there. To gather intelligence, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the peninsula that evening. Their findings confirmed that the peninsula was not fortified with significant enemy strength. The following day, Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines advanced to relieve the 6th Marine Division on the west coast. The 2nd Battalion continued the momentum by crossing the Kokuba River, moving into the hills on the south bank. Meanwhile, to the east, the 5th Marines also crossed the upper branch of the river and pressed forward to secure the ridgeline that controlled the approaches to Tsukasan. This maneuver effectively placed the entire Naha-Yonabaru road firmly in American hands, further tightening their grip on the battlefield. That evening, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the Oroku Peninsula. Their mission revealed that the peninsula was not heavily defended, opening up opportunities for American forces. Further east, the 383rd Regiment successfully cleared out Chan and seized the high ground just north of Tera and Kamizato. Meanwhile, the 381st Regiment conducted repeated assaults on hill positions that impeded its advance, ultimately managing to penetrate to Karadera. The 7th Division maintained relentless pressure on the retreating garrison of the Chinen Peninsula, advancing its lines by 2,400 yards toward Itokazu and Kerabaru. Now, it's time to shift our focus away from Okinawa and examine the latest operations of General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command. Since the invasion of Okinawa, Admiral Nimitz had requested that the B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers assist his naval forces in countering the deadly kamikaze attacks. In response, LeMay dispatched 53 bombers to target airfields at Kanoya on April 8, although the city of Kagoshima ended up being bombed instead. On April 17, 134 B-29s were sent against Kyushu, successfully neutralizing enemy airfield operations for 18 hours. However, as we've observed, the Japanese continued to launch both scattered and mass kamikaze attacks. To address this ongoing threat, the 21st Bomber Command, bolstered by the arrival of Brigadier General Roger Ramey's 58th Bombardment Wing, dedicated 75% of its combat effort to providing direct tactical support for the Okinawa campaign up to May 11. During this period, they flew a total of 2,104 sorties against 17 airfields in Kyushu and Shikoku. Although they did not fully neutralize these targets, significant damage was inflicted on enemy storage, maintenance, and repair facilities. The bombers also served to keep the Japanese off balance, significantly disrupting their ability to plan and execute large, coordinated attacks. In total, 24 B-29s were destroyed and 233 damaged during these operations, while 134 enemy interceptors were shot down. Between the strikes on Kyushu, General LeMay managed to fit in several medium-strength precision attacks against the Japanese aircraft industry, along with two large-scale night incendiary missions in the Tokyo Bay area. The first of these missions took place on April 13, when 327 B-29s dropped an impressive 2,139 tons of ordnance on the arsenal district of Tokyo, located northwest of the Imperial Palace. The resulting fires consumed 11.4 square miles of this crucial industrial zone, destroying arsenal plants responsible for manufacturing and storing small arms, machine guns, artillery, bombs, gunpowder, and fire-control mechanisms. Just two nights later, on April 15, 303 bombers executed another incendiary attack, dropping 1,930 tons of explosives with equal success. This raid devastated 6 square miles in Tokyo, 3.6 square miles in Kawasaki, and 1.5 square miles in Yokohama, which suffered collateral damage from the fire spills. Cumulatively, these two raids resulted in the destruction of 217,130 buildings in Tokyo and Yokohama and 31,603 in Kawasaki. On April 24, 131 B-29s conducted a highly successful precision strike against the Tachikawa plant of the Hitachi Aircraft Corporation. Although the next planned attack was thwarted by inclement weather, 148 B-29s struck Kure on May 5, delivering devastating damage. After being relieved from support for the Okinawa operation on May 11, LeMay initiated a month of heavy fire raids to complete the campaign that had begun in March, while also addressing top-priority precision targets as opportunities arose. Accordingly, on May 14, 529 B-29s were dispatched to strike northern Nagoya, with 472 successfully dropping 2,515 tons of munitions, resulting in the burning of 3.15 square miles and inflicting significant damage to Mitsubishi's No. 10 engine works. Just two nights later, 522 bombers returned to Nagoya, with 457 of them effectively delivering 3,609 tons over the dock and industrial areas in the southern part of the city, burning 3.82 square miles and causing extensive damage to Mitsubishi's No. 5 aircraft works. These two incendiary attacks finished Nagoya as an objective for area attacks. Good targets remained in the city, and the command was to return six more times for precision attacks before V-J Day. But the industrial fabric of the city had been ruined in the earlier precision attacks and in the fire raids that had burned out twelve square miles of a total built-up urban area of about forty square miles. In all, 113460 buildings had been destroyed, 3866 persons had been killed and 472701 rendered homeless. The displacement of workers aggravated the difficulties caused by physical damage and had an important effect on civilian morale.  After a week of respite, temporarily interrupted by a 318-plane precision attack on the Tachikawa Aircraft Company, 562 B-29s were dispatched to strike Tokyo once more on May 23. Out of these, 520 bombers reached their target, dropping an impressive 3,646 tons of explosives over the district stretching southward from the Imperial Palace along the west side of Tokyo Harbor. Despite encountering strong opposition, this attack resulted in the destruction of 5.3 square miles of area. Two nights later, 502 B-29s returned to Tokyo, targeting the area just north of their previous hit. They faced heavy resistance again, dropping 3,262 tons of incendiaries on the city, which resulted in the destruction of 16.8 square miles, marking the largest area devastated in a single Tokyo raid. In light of the heavy casualties suffered during these last two strikes, General LeMay decided to assign P-51s from Iwo Jima to escort future attacks. As a result, on May 29, 517 B-29s were escorted by 101 P-51 fighters during an assault on Yokohama. These bombers successfully dropped 2,570 tons of munitions, burning out 6.9 square miles while the escorting fighters engaged in fierce battles against about 150 aggressive interceptors. Meanwhile, General Whitehead's 5th Air Force was conducting an extensive program of area bombing against Formosa, experimenting with various types of bombs and tactics in preparation for future attacks on the Japanese mainland. Taihoku, the capital and political and financial center of Taiwan, was subjected to constant aerial bombardment. The largest strike against modern-day Taipei, known as the Taihoku Air Raid, occurred on May 31, when units of the Fifth Air Force consisting of 117 Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy bombers were sent to conduct the largest air raid ever on Taiwan. The bombing began from around ten o'clock in the morning and lasted until one o'clock in the afternoon, during which the attack was non-stop. The Americans met virtually no resistance from the Japanese, mainly due to the attrition the Japanese air forces had suffered in the Aerial Battle of Taiwan-Okinawa, which completely exhausted Japan's fighter units in Taiwan. They successfully dropped approximately 3,800 bombs targeting military units and governmental facilities. The Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan suffered a direct hit, in spite of the building being heavily camouflaged to avoid being targeted. The building suffered extensive damage from fire caused by the bombs and almost collapsed on itself; it was rendered unoccupiable and was not repaired until the Nationalist Chinese takeover. Other facilities hit during the bombing included the residence of the Assistant Governor-General, Taiwan Railway Hotel, Office of Governor-General Library, Army Headquarters, Taihoku Imperial University, Taihoku Station, Bank of Taiwan, Taihoku High Court, Taihoku New Park, and many other facilities. Many civilian installations were damaged, including Taihoku Prefectural Taihoku First Girls' High School, Huashan Catholic Church of Taihoku, and the famous Lungshan Temple of Manka, which was hit in the main building and the left corridor; many precious artifacts and art works in the temple were lost in the ensuing fire. As a result of the extensive bombing campaigns, more than 3,000 civilians lost their lives. Tens of thousands were displaced or left homeless, and countless buildings were destroyed, either directly by the attacks or by the fires they ignited. This devastation left a profound impact on the local population and infrastructure, marking yet another tragic chapter in the toll of the war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the midst of the brutal Battle of Okinawa, American Marines faced relentless resistance as they pushed towards Shuri. Despite heavy casualties and daunting conditions, the tide turned when General Buckner ordered aggressive assaults that outmaneuvered the encircled Japanese forces. After days of relentless combat, they captured the stronghold, leading to the collapse of Japanese defenses. As the dust settled, Shuri lay in ruins, marking a pivotal moment in the Pacific War and showcasing the indomitable spirit of both American and Japanese soldiers.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Malacca strait. In the intense Battle of the Malacca Strait, Japanese forces undertook a desperate evacuation amidst relentless attacks by the Allies. After suffering heavy casualties from previous confrontations, the Japanese regrouped and attempted to maintain their defensive positions. However, under the pressure of determined Allied assaults and strategic maneuvers, they faced increasingly fierce resistance. As the Allies advanced, they successfully overwhelmed Japanese defenses, leading to significant losses for the opposing forces. The battle transformed into a pivotal moment in the Pacific War as Japanese resistance crumbled, ultimately shifting the tide toward Allied victory. This clash not only showcased the harsh realities of war but also underscored the relentless determination of both sides as they fought for dominance in the region, marking a crucial step towards the conclusion of the conflict. This episode is the Breakthrough on Okinawa Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As of mid-May, General Buckner's forces had made steady, albeit slow, progress against the determined Japanese defenders on the Shuri defensive line. On May 16, the offensive continued. Colonel Schneider's 22nd Marines and Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines launched yet another unsuccessful assault on Sugar Loaf Hill, while Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines exhausted their strength in a failed attempt to seize Wana Ridge. To the east, Colonel Coolidge's 305th Regiment advanced 200 yards closer to Shuri. Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment nearly captured Flattop and Chocolate Drop Hill but was ultimately pushed back. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment successfully cleared Dick Hill but came under intense fire from Oboe Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel May's 383rd Regiment made only minor gains on the southeastern slopes of Conical Hill and Love Hill, even as tanks broke through toward Yonabaru for the first time. The following day, the 383rd Regiment maintained pressure on Conical and Love Hills, prompting General Bradley to commit part of Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment to the attack. To the west, the 382nd Regiment staged a hard-fought advance of 200 yards but was unable to capture Oboe Hill.  Slowly the 77th Division forces between Flattop and Route 5 were reducing enemy positions bearing on the area in front of the 307th Infantry. By 17 May this progress began to show in the advances of the foot troops around Chocolate Drop. Covered by company heavy weapons out on both flanks, infantrymen worked around both sides of the hill to the huge caves on the reverse slope. Inside were 4 antitank guns, 1 field piece, 4 machine guns, 4 heavy mortars, and a American 60-mm. mortars. By nightfall the caves had been partially sealed off. During the night an enemy force launched a counterattack against the American positions around the hill but was repulsed with the loss of twenty-five Japanese killed. On the 17th another bitter struggle raged on Flattop. The struggle swayed back and forth across the narrow crest of the hill. Company K, the assaulting unit, had been reduced to fourteen infantrymen by the end of the day; finally it was forced back off the top. Tanks tried to go through the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill, but two of them were disabled by mines, leaving the cut blocked. The road cut was later blown along its entire length by seven tons of bangalore torpedoes to remove the mines. Company E continued to push toward Ishimmi Ridge, where they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and the rest of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion dug in just a few hundred yards north of Shuri and Ishimmi in the highway valley. Meanwhile, Coolidge's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire from 110 Meter Hill and the extensive fortress houses in Shuri's suburbs. The intense fighting had nearly depleted the 22nd Regiment, prompting General Amamiya to direct the 32nd Regiment to take over the defense of Shuri along a line extending from Ishimmi to Oboe. Meanwhile, on Wana, the 7th Marines launched a renewed attack but were once again repelled. However, the 5th Marines succeeded in advancing to Hill 55. Further west, the bulk of the 29th Marines attacked toward Half Moon Hill, successfully reaching its forward slopes but later having to withdraw to more defensive positions overnight. Whaling's 2nd Battalion also mounted relentless assaults on Sugar Loaf, each time suffering heavy losses in repelled attacks. As dusk fell, Japanese planes targeted American shipping, successfully damaging the destroyer Douglas H. Fox. On May 18, tanks played a crucial role in a successful assault on Sugar Loaf, executing a double envelopment while securing the top of the hill. The 2nd Battalion then advanced to Horseshoe Hill, while the remainder of the 29th Marines managed to secure the forward slopes of Half Moon.After a night of sporadic bombardment from enemy artillery and mortars, 3/7 again attempted to gain a foothold on Wana Ridge. During the morning supporting weapons concentrated their fire on the forward slopes and crest of the objective and at noon Company I, followed by a platoon of Company L, jumped off and fought its way to the ridge. The assault troops' gains "were measured in yards won, lost, and then won again." Finally, mounting casualties inflicted by enemy grenade and mortar fire forced Lieutenant Colonel Hurst to pull back his forward elements and consolidate his lines on positions held the previous night. On the right flank of the division front the isolated platoon from Company E of 2/5 was unsuccessful in exploiting its hold on the western slopes of Hill 55. The men were driven to cover by intense enemy fire, and tanks again had to be called upon to supply ammunition and rations to the outpost. During the morning operations the 5th Marines laid protective fire with tanks and assault guns along Wana Ridge to support 3/7's advance. At noon, under cover of this fire, Company F sent one rifle platoon and an attached platoon of engineers into Wana village to use flame throwers and demolitions against the enemy firing positions in the ruins. Numbers of grenade dischargers, machine guns, and rifles were found in Wana and the tombs behind it and destroyed. Further advance into the draw was not feasible until the 7th Marines could occupy the high ground on the eastern end of the ridge and furnish direct supporting fire to troops advancing in the draw below. At 1700 the troops were ordered to return to their lines for the night. n the center, General Bruce pressed his attack deeper into the Shuri defenses, with Coolidge's 3rd Battalion gaining 150 yards along the Ginowan-Shuri highway and Hamilton's 2nd Battalion advancing up to 300 yards toward Ishimmi, although attacks against 110 Meter Hill and Flattop failed to gain ground. On the morning of 18 May, orders were given to stay at all costs. Lieutenant Bell said firmly, "We stay." The men resigned themselves to a last-ditch stand. Their grenades exhausted and their machine guns and mortars destroyed, the remaining men salvaged every clip of ammunition from the bandoleers of the dead. Spare workable rifles were loaded and bayonets laid alongside. Enemy pressure increased steadily during the day. Some Americans were shot at close range as they darted from hole to hole to escape grenades. At one time eight knee mortars were pounding the ridge, firing in pairs. Friendly artillery could to some extent keep off the charging Japanese but seemed unable to ferret out the enemy mortars, which were well protected. The moans of wounded men, many of whom were in pitiful condition from lack of water and of medical aid, added to the strain. All canteens had been emptied the previous night. Nevertheless, battle discipline remained excellent. The worst problem concerned the replacements, who were courageous but inexperienced. Thrust suddenly into a desperate situation, some of them failed at crucial moments. One man saw two Japanese attacking a sergeant thirty feet away, but his finger froze on the trigger. Another shouted wildly for a comrade to shoot some Japanese while his own rifle lay in his hands. Another saw an enemy soldier a few yards from his hole, pulled the trigger, and discovered that he had forgotten to reload. By the end of the ordeal, however, the replacements who survived were battle-hardened veterans. During the afternoon the 307th attempted to reinforce the small group. Elements of Company C tried to cross the open ground north of Ishimmi Ridge. Only the commander and five men reached Company E. The men scrambled safely into foxholes, but the commander, shot through the head while racing toward the command post, fell dead on the parapet of the command post foxhole. Spirits rose considerably when word came later in the afternoon that a litter-bearing unit of eighty men would try to get through in the evening. Enemy fire slackened after dark, and the first of the litter bearers arrived at about 2200. They immediately started back carrying casualties. Walking wounded accompanied them. The litter bearers moved swiftly and managed to avoid being seen in the light of flares. Through splendid discipline and good luck eighteen men were carried out in two and a half hours, and others walked out. The litter teams had brought some water and ammunition and the troops drank for the first time since the day before. The second sleepless night on the ridge passed. The 382nd Regiment continued to face heavy resistance from Oboe Hill but managed to secure the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill. Meanwhile, Halloran's 3rd Battalion could only push about 400 yards south due to the relentless mortar and small-arms fire coming from Hogback Ridge. At sea, a low-flying kamikaze aircraft struck LST-808 off Iejima, resulting in the deaths of 17 men. The following day, while the 382nd and 383rd Regiments focused on neutralizing the cave positions and gun emplacements in the uneven terrain between Conical and Dick Hills, Halloran's 3rd Battalion launched an attack to the south and west toward Sugar Hill but made little progress due to the heavy defensive fire. In the center, the 307th Regiment systematically worked to eliminate enemy firing positions on the high ground in front of them, employing every available weapon for the task. Colonel Smith's rehabilitated 306th Regiment began moving up to replace the battered 305th, with its 3rd Battalion relieving Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and portions of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion along the low ground bordering the highway to Shuri, including the isolated men at Ishimmi Ridge.  On 19 May the enemy seemed to intensify his efforts to recapture Ishimmi Ridge. The besieged troops wondered whether his supply of men and ammunition was inexhaustible. The Japanese launched several attacks which were repulsed with great difficulty. Only the support of artillery and mortars, together with self-propelled mounts firing with precision on both flanks of Ishimmi Ridge, prevented the enemy from making an attack in strength which would have overrun the American positions. One enemy attack of platoon strength was dispersed by mortar and machine-gun fire and by a four-battalion time-on-target artillery concentration. Japanese mortar fire continued to fall on Ishimmi, however, and took its toll during the day. A message arrived during the morning that Company E would be relieved that evening. By noon the radio had become so weak that further communication with the company was impossible. The day wore slowly on. By 2100 there was still no sign of the relief. Shortly afterward, however, rifle fire intensified to the rear, a sign of activity there. At 2200 Company L, 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, arrived. The relief was carried out in pitch darkness; each member of Company E left as soon as a replacement reached his position. As the haggard survivors were about to descend the ridge at 0300, a bursting shell hit two of the newcomers; one of them had to be evacuated on a poncho. Carrying its own wounded, Company E followed a white tape to the rear and arrived safely. Of the 204 officers and men of the reinforced company that had made the night attack on Ishimmi, 156 had been killed or wounded. There were 28 privates, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 2 officers left of the original 129 members of Company E. The platoon sent in relief by Company C had gone out with 58 effectives and returned with 13. Of the 17 men in the heavy weapons section only 4 came back. Company E had spearheaded a several-hundred-yard advance toward Shuri, however, and with the help of supporting weapons had killed hundreds of Japanese around Ishimmi. The 7th Marines launched one last unsuccessful assault on Wana Ridge before being relieved by Colonel Mason's rested 1st Marines. Meanwhile, after repelling a strong night counterattack, the exhausted 29th Marines were also relieved by Colonel Shapley's reserve 4th Marines, which made additional advances alongside the 22nd Marines, now under Colonel Harold Roberts. Four new regiments had been committed over the past few days to revitalize the offensive. On May 20, Shapley's assault battalions gained more ground on Horseshoe Hill but were still unable to reach the crest of Half Moon, though they successfully repelled another strong night counterattack. To the east, Mason's 2nd Battalion advanced rapidly to the base of 110 Meter Hill and captured part of Wana Ridge, while his 3rd Battalion secured a firm hold on the northern slope. Concurrently, the 5th Marines attacked southwest along the Naha-Shuri Road and successfully captured the high ground. Meanwhile, in coordination with the 1st Marines, Coolidge's 1st Battalion and Smith's 3rd Battalion made a slow, grinding advance of about 150 yards, positioning themselves within 200 yards of the outskirts of Shuri in the highway valley. At the same time, the 382nd Regiment expanded its hold on the reverse slope of Dick Hill but remained unable to penetrate Oboe Hill. The 307th Regiment consolidated and expanded its positions around Chocolate Drop, finally seizing Flattop. Reducing the tiny hill continued to be ticklish work because enemy positions to the south still overlooked the area. The fighting was still so confused that three wounded Americans lay south of Chocolate Drop for two days before relief arrived. By that time two had died and the third was so delirious that he thought he was still fighting Japanese and had to be forcibly subdued. By 20 May the caves were completely sealed off. The enemy made a final attempt to retake Chocolate Drop, attacking in company strength, but was repelled with the loss of half his force. On the same day the 3d Battalion, using tanks, flame throwers, and demolition teams, finally secured the crest of Flattop. The final American attack started with a saturation shower of grenades. A chain of men extending from the base of Flattop passed hand grenades to the troops lined up along the crest, who threw the missiles as fast as they could pull out the pins. Having seized the advantage, the infantry moved down the reverse slope blasting caves with satchel charges and flame throwers. Tanks along the road cut accounted for many of the Japanese. BY 1545 Flattop had fallen. More than 250 enemy bodies lay on the crest and reverse slope of the hill. Further east, Halloran's 3rd Battalion made a slow but steady advance down the eastern slopes of Hogback, reaching the foot of Sugar Hill despite constant grenade duels with an enemy fighting desperately to hold every inch of ground. Additionally, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 383rd Regiment fought their way to jump-off positions within 300 yards of Love Hill, destroying enemy strongpoints that had obstructed their advance for a week. Meanwhile, back at sea, Japanese aircraft managed to damage two destroyers and three transports. The following day, the 383rd again attacked Love Hill but was ultimately forced to withdraw from its base due to fierce defensive fire. Despite this setback, May's 2nd Battalion successfully supported the 381st Regiment in clearing Hogback and pushing to the top of Sugar Hill. To the west, the 382nd advanced quickly against moderate opposition toward Oboe Hill and Hen Hill, encountering retreating enemy units moving toward the high ground at Shuri. Concurrently, the 307th pushed 350 yards south of Flattop before being halted by enemy forces at the Three Sisters, while the 306th completed the relief of the 305th, with its 3rd Battalion advancing 200 yards unopposed to the eastern slopes of 110 Meter Hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Marines continued their assault along Wana Ridge, making only limited gains at the Draw, where the 5th Marines held out and aggressively patrolled forward. The 4th Marines began their push toward the Asato River, achieving a costly advance of about 200 yards on Horseshoe. By nightfall, heavy rains began to fall, significantly impeding efforts to resupply assault troops and replenish forward ammunition dumps. Amidst this torrential downpour on May 22, Shapley's 1st and 3rd Battalions slogged through the "gooey slick mud" to reach the bank of the rain-swollen river. This prompted the Japanese to evacuate Naha and establish new defensive positions on the Kokuba Hills. To the east, the continuous rain flooded Wana Draw with mud and water, transforming it into a makeshift lake. For the next few days, General Del Valle's Marines were forced to attack without support, leading to aggressive patrolling rather than organized assaults. The prospects of success for the infantry alone, slogging through the mud without the support of other arms, were not encouraging. Tanks bogged down, helplessly mired. Amphibian tractors were unable to negotiate the morass, and front-line units, which had depended on these vehicles for carrying supplies forward in bad weather, now had to resort to hand carrying of supplies and of the wounded. These were back breaking tasks and were performed over areas swept by enemy fire. Mortar and artillery smoke was used as far as possible to give concealment for all movement. Litter cases were carried back through knee-deep mud. Living conditions of front-line troops were indescribably bad. Foxholes dug into the clay slopes caved in from the constant soaking, and, even when the sides held, the holes had to be bailed out repeatedly. Clothes and equipment and the men's bodies were wet for days. The bodies of Japanese killed at night lay outside the foxholes, decomposing under swarms of flies. Sanitation measures broke down. The troops were often hungry. Sleep was almost impossible. The strain began to take a mounting toll of men. Under these conditions the Marine attack against Wana Ridge was soon at a standstill. The action degenerated into what was called in official reports "aggressive patrolling." Despite inactivity, enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to play against the American front lines, especially at dusk and at night. In the center, Bruce's 77th Division faced similar challenges, with the 306th Regiment stalled and the 307th Regiment again unsuccessfully attacking the Three Sisters. There, Company A became isolated at the base of the forward slope of Jane Hill, nearly cut off by intense enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. For the following week, the 382nd Regiment struggled to make headway on Hen and Oboe Hills, where fierce hand-to-hand combat erupted. Similarly, all attempts by the 383rd Regiment to breach the defenses of Love Hill on the western side of Conical failed, as the 381st was also unable to make any progress against Cutaway. General Hodge had also moved General Arnold's rehabilitated 7th Division to assembly areas just north of Conical Hill to spearhead the advance toward Yonabaru and the high ground south of the village. Strengthened by 1,691 replacements and 546 men returned to duty from hospitals since it left the lines on 9 May, the 7th Division moved up to forward assembly areas just north of Conical Hill and prepared to make the dash through the corridor. At 1900 on 21 May the 184th Infantry, chosen by General Arnold to lead the way, was in place at Gaja Ridge, at the northern base of Conical. The initial move of the envelopment was to be made in the dead of the night and in stealth. General Buckner felt that "if the 7th can swing round, running the gauntlet, it may be the kill." As part of this operation, the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment moved out from Gaja Ridge during the night, swiftly and silently passing through Yonabaru in the early morning hours to capture Spruce Hill and Chestnut Hill in a surprise attack. Colonel Green's 3rd Battalion then followed the 2nd Battalion through Yonabaru, but their assault on Juniper and Bamboo Hills was unsuccessful as the surprised defenders regrouped. The following day, Green's two battalions continued to push toward these initial objectives, ultimately securing a solid line that stretched from the coastline across the southern slopes of Chestnut, and then over to Juniper and Bamboo by day's end. This success allowed Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment to pass through Yonabaru and advance westward along the Naha-Yonabaru valley to assault the enemy's western hill defenses focused around Oak Hill.On the west coast, after a successful night reconnaissance of the Asato River, the 4th Marines rapidly crossed the river under cover of smoke, beginning their advance toward a low ridge 500 yards south of the Asato. However, as previously noted, the torrential rain had turned every draw and gully into a sticky morass of knee- and thigh-deep mud in the center. The steep slopes of the hills and ridges, treacherous under the best of conditions, became virtually unassailable. Consequently, full-scale coordinated attacks had to be canceled, and only localized gains could be achieved. Despite the breakthrough in the center, the Japanese command remained concerned about the threat posed to the flanks of the Shuri bastion by American advances along both coasts. While they believed the Naha breakthrough could be contained, every available soldier was deployed to establish a defensive line stretching from the southwest slopes of Conical Hill through Yonawa to the road junction village of Chan, aiming to eliminate Arnold's spearhead that had penetrated into the Naha-Yonabaru valley. General Ushijima feared that his forces were being gradually encircled in the Shuri fortress, where they would become “easy prey” to overwhelming American firepower. In light of this situation, Ushijima began planning a withdrawal to the Chinen Peninsula or the southernmost part of the island, the Kiyamu Peninsula. This decision was met with resistance from General Fujioka, who expressed concern that thousands of severely wounded men would have to be abandoned during the retreat.  Although the holding of the heights surrounding the city had been the keystone of the Japanese preferred plan, several factors now militated against its retention. There were an estimated 50000 surviving officers and men to be crammed into a final defense zone less than a mile in diameter. Once these troops were surrounded, the Japanese believed that they would be rendered ineffectual and become "easy prey" to overwhelming American fire superiority. In addition, Japanese long-range artillery pieces, many of which were still intact, could not be effectively utilized within the limited space that would be available. The best chance of prolonging the battle for Okinawa seemed to rest in defending the Kiyamu Peninsula region which was dominated by the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Natural and artificial caves, sufficient to accommodate the whole of the surviving army, abounded in the area. The 24th Division, which had organized the terrain, had left a considerable amount of ammunition and weapons there when it moved north to the Shuri lines. The principal roads in southern Okinawa led directly to the proposed position, thus facilitating the movement of large bodies of men in the shortest possible time. These roads also gave American tanks an excellent route of advance, but only to the outposts of the defensive zone where cliffs, hills, and precipitous ridges barred the way. To add weight to his argument, General Amamiya indicated that his 24th Transport Regiment had preserved enough trucks to move the Shuri munitions reserve to the new position within five nights if weather conditions permitted. General Ushijima, after considering the respective positions of his staff and commanders, decided to order the move to Kiyamu.  Although General Suzuki preferred the Chinen Peninsula, which his brigade had fortified, most officials supported a move to the Kiyamu Peninsula, where Amamiya's 24th Division had previously established defenses in the natural and artificial caves of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Thus, transportation of wounded personnel and munitions reserves to the south commenced at midnight on May 23, with the bulk of the 32nd Army scheduled to begin their withdrawal six days later.  On the night of 25 May, the remnants of the 62d Division were to pull out of the Shuri line and move through Tsukasan to counterattack the Americans. The relatively strong 22d Independent Infantry Battalion, which had been in reserve throughout most of the fighting in April and May, was directed to hold the Shuri front in place of the division. The orders to General Fujioka were "to annihilate the enemy rushing from the Yonabaru area." Failing this, the division was at least to stop the American advance long enough to allow the main body of the Thirty-second Army to retire. In order to gain time to organize the new positions, the holding force left on the Shuri front was to fight on until 31 May. Withdrawing units were to leave behind strong rearguards which would defend a line along the Kokuba Gawa to the hills north of Tsukasan and Chan and then south through Karadera to the east coast until the night of 2 June. Then a second line centered on Tomusu, approximately 2,000 yards farther south, would be held until the night of 4 June. By that time the Thirty-second Army would be firmly set up within its Itoman-Yunagusuku-Gushichan outpost zone. Admiral Ota's naval force was directed to hold the west flank of the withdrawal corridor and begin its own retreat when ordered by 32nd Army. During the night, Admiral Ugaki initiated his seventh mass Kikisui attack, launching 165 kamikaze aircraft that inflicted only light damage on landing craft. On May 24, while engineers constructed a bridge over the Asato River to facilitate vehicle movement, the 4th Marines suffered heavy casualties as they attempted to advance through the muddy, flooded valley and low clay hills. Simultaneously, Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company crossed the lower Asato and roamed the streets of northwestern Naha without encountering any resistance. To the east, Dill's 1st Battalion faced a brutal counterattack that inflicted significant casualties and nearly drove the Americans from Oboe Hill. Following Ushijima's directives, the 32nd and 184th Regiments began to encounter increasing resistance as they sought to expand their control over the valley and the high ground to the south. This culminated in a series of aggressive nighttime counterattacks that ultimately slowed and halted the western advance of the 7th Division. During the night, Japanese forces conducted heavy raids on American airfields at Kadena, Yontan, and Iejima. However, these attacks were merely a diversion for Operation Gi-Gou, a suicide raid against Kadena and Yontan. In this operation, twelve Ki-21 heavy bombers, carrying Giretsu Kuteitai special airborne assault troops, aimed to crash land on the airfields to deploy commandos tasked with destroying aircraft stationed there.  After the start of B-29 attacks on Tokyo from bases in the Mariana Islands, the 1st Raiding Brigade of the Teishin Shudan was ordered to form a commando unit for a "special operations" mission to attack and destroy the bombers on the Aslito Airfield on Saipan. Captain Okuyama Michiro, commander of the brigade's engineering company and trained in sabotage and demolition was selected as mission leader. He selected an additional 126 men from his own team, the 4th Company of the 1st Raiding Regiment, to form the first Giretsu Airborne Unit. It was initially organized with a command section and five platoons and one independent squad, based at the Imperial Japanese Army's air academy at Saitama. The group unit also included eight intelligence officers and two radio men from the Nakano School. Giretsu operations were to be undertaken at night, beginning with air strikes by bombers. After this, commando units would be inserted onto the target airfield by crash landing their transports. The fact that there was no provision for extraction of the strike force, along with the rejection of surrender in Japanese military doctrine at the time, meant that the Giretsu ground operations were effectively suicide attacks. Though the Saipan attack was eventually cancelled, the 6th Air Army ultimately requested the deployment of the Giretsu Special Forces to neutralize the Okinawa airfields. The 6th Air Army accordingly began preparations for the attack in early May. Led by Captain Okuyama, the raid force moved from Nishitsukuba to Kumamoto as it continued to prepare for the assault, codenamed Operation Gi-Gou. Aircraft for the raid came from the 3rd Independent Air Unit based in the vicinity of Hamamatsu. The raid force consisted of 120 commandos broken up into a headquarters section and five flights, each containing twenty men. They were to be transported by twelve Mitsubishi Ki-21s stripped of their guns and with additional forward and rear exits added to assist raiders with exiting. The timing of the raid was also meant to coincide with the withdrawal of the 32nd Army from the Shuri Line in southern Okinawa. Of the twelve bombers dispatched, four encountered engine trouble and returned to base, while three were intercepted by American night fighters en route to Okinawa. The remaining five Ki-21 bombers approached Yontan Airfield at low altitude and engaged Marine anti-aircraft gunners from the 1st Provisional Anti-aircraft Artillery Group. As a result, four of the bombers were shot down or crash-landed; however, a small number of Giretsu commandos survived this wave and commenced their mission to attack aircraft on the airfield. The fifth bomber, however, successfully evaded anti-aircraft fire and belly-landed approximately 100 meters from the control tower. About 10 commandos disembarked and attacked aircraft and air personnel with grenades. In the ensuing chaos, the Japanese commandos killed two Americans, wounded 18, destroyed nine aircraft, damaged 29 more, and set a fuel dump ablaze, destroying 70,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. After twelve hours of mayhem, however, American troops hunted down the commandos and exterminated them to a man. Despite this partial success, the Japanese operation occurred against a backdrop of heavy losses, with American fighters and anti-aircraft fire claiming a total of 150 Japanese planes on May 24. During the course of three days, Ugaki committed a total of 387 Navy planes and 174 Army planes to his kamikaze attacks, which continued through May 25. These attacks successfully sank the destroyer Bates, one transport, and one landing craft, while further damaging two destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, one minesweeper, one transport, and one Liberty ship. On the same day, Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57 launched its final strikes in the Okinawa area before retiring late on May 25, having completed the Royal Navy's Iceberg mission. On land, while Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company occupied the deserted ruins of Naha, the 4th Marines fought to seize Machisi Ridge and continued pushing into the eastern outskirts of Naha. However, across the remainder of the 10th Army front, assault units struggled to make progress due to the havoc wreaked by the rain and the stiffened Japanese resistance. That night, in accordance with the withdrawal plan, the 62nd Division began moving its remaining 3,000 men to counter the advance of the 7th Division, hoping to delay the American advance long enough for the main body of the 32nd Army to retreat. The arrival of additional forces on the Ozato-Mura front had little significant impact, primarily serving to strengthen the covering and holding force. On May 26, the 184th Regiment successfully cleared the Hemlock-Locust Hill Escarpment. Meanwhile, the 32nd Regiment was brought nearly to a standstill in front of the Japanese defensive line across the Yonabaru valley. Looking west, Del Valle's Marines observed large numbers of enemy troops withdrawing from Shuri and were able to pinpoint their location for naval guns, artillery, and aircraft to bombard. However, despite penetrating the Shuri defensive line on both flanks, the day yielded minimal progress. At sea, further kamikaze attacks caused damage to one destroyer, one destroyer minesweeper, and a subchaser. In total, Ugaki's raids over the past three days resulted in the deaths of 103 sailors.  Believing the fast carriers' continued value off Okinawa had become dubious, back on May 18 Mitscher had requested that TF 58 be relieved from its Okinawa station. Spruance regretfully declined. A week later an increasingly weary Mitscher reported: “For two and a half months [Task Force 58] operated daily in a 60nm square area East of Okinawa, less than 350nm from Kyushu. This was necessitated by the restricted area available and the necessity for being able to cover [the] Amami Gunto airfields, intercept air raids before they could reach Okinawa, and still furnish air support to ground forces. There was no other location from which all these things could be done.” Reflecting on the months of unrelenting stress, tedium, and fatigue, TG 58.1's screen commander, Captain Tom Hederman, signaled Rear Admiral J.J. Jocko Clark: “See Hebrews 13, verse 8.” Consulting his Bible aboard Hornet, Clark read: “Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and today, and forever.” Amused, Clark forwarded the verse to his entire Task Group, adding, “No disrespect intended.” Clark then signaled Mitscher, “What the hell are we doing out here, anyway?” Mitscher's response: “We are a highspeed stationary target for the Japanese air force.” Indeed, TF 58 had already suffered over 2,000 Iceberg fatalities. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The brutal Battle of Okinawa was reaching a critical point as General Buckner's forces pressed against fierce Japanese defenses. Struggles unfolded over Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, with Marines suffering heavy casualties but slowly gaining ground. By late May, the dire situation prompted Japanese commanders to plan a retreat to more defensible positions as American forces closed in. Despite challenging conditions, the Allies pushed forward, marking a decisive breakthrough in the Pacific War.

Last time we spoke about the Allied invasion of Borneo. The Allies initiated the invasion of Borneo, commanded by General Morshead. The operation, known as Operation Oboe, aimed to reclaim vital oilfields from the demoralized Japanese forces. Despite their fierce resistance, American troops swiftly captured strategic locations on the island. The Japanese, already struggling with low morale and supply shortages, were unable to mount an effective defense. Amid the intense fighting, Air Commodore Cobby's forces conducted air assaults on key targets, weakening Japanese positions. As American troops landed on Tarakan Island on May 1, they faced heavy fire but managed to gain significant territory by nightfall. By early May, despite the loss of ground, Japanese forces continued to resist fiercely. This victory in Borneo marked a turning point in the Pacific campaign, ultimately foreshadowing the decline of Japanese influence in the region and paving the way for further Allied advances. This episode is the Second Okinawa Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we left off, by April 24, General Ushijima's 32nd Army had chosen to abandon the first line of Shuri defenses, with the exception of the extreme right in the Item Pocket area. However, the weary Japanese troops merely withdrew to the next line of prepared positions within the Shuri defense zone, ready to make the American invaders pay for every inch of territory gained. Observing this, General Hodge promptly ordered the 7th, 27th, and 96th Divisions to regroup and enhance their positions through aggressive maneuvers, seizing strategic ground in front of them and pushing back enemy outposts. His forces were also heavily depleted and exhausted, prompting him to plan a final offensive on April 26 before rotating in the relatively fresh 77th Division and the 1st Marine Division for support. Unbeknownst to him, the 62nd Division had suffered significant losses, nearly losing half of its original strength on the left flank. In response, Ushijima decided to move the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade north to reinforce the Shuri defense zone, establishing a fallback position for retreating forces.This shift also meant that the southern areas were defended only by a hastily assembled Shimajiri Security Force of 5,500 men, drawn from rear-area supply units tasked with delaying any American advances from the south until the main infantry units could return.  The question of a second landing in southern Okinawa was considered by 10th Army most seriously before April 22. General Bruce, commander of the 77th Division, knew that his division would be committed in the Okinawa fighting as soon as lejima was secured. At Leyte the amphibious landing of the 77th Division behind the Japanese line at Ormoc had been spectacularly successful. General Bruce and his staff wished to repeat the move on Okinawa and urged it on the 10th Army command even before the division sailed from Leyte. As the Iejima fighting drew to a close, General Bruce pressed his recommendation to land his division on the southeast coast of Okinawa on the beaches just north of Minatoga. He believed that it would be necessary to effect a juncture with American forces then north of Shuri within ten days if the venture was to be successful. His plan was either to drive inland on Iwa, a road and communications center at the southern end of the island, or to push north against Yonabaru. General Buckner rejected the idea. His assistant chief of staff, G-4, stated that he could supply food but not ammunition for such a project at that time. The Minatoga beaches had been thoroughly considered in the planning for the initial landings and had been rejected because of the impossibility of furnishing adequate logistical support for even one division. The reefs were dangerous, the beaches inadequate, and the area exposed to strong enemy attack. Although beach outlets existed, they were commanded both by the escarpment to the west and by the plateau of the Chinen Peninsula. The 10th Army intelligence officer reported that the Japanese still had their reserves stationed in the south. Both the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade were still in the area and could move quickly to oppose any landings. Artillery positions on the heights overlooking the beaches were fully manned. The 77th Division would be landing so far south that it would not have the support of the troops engaged to the north or of 24th Corps artillery. The steep terrain near the beaches favored the defense, and any unit there would be isolated. It might be more like Anzio than Leyte, Buckner suggested. Besides that, the three divisions on the line needed to be relieved, and Buckner's three unused divisions would all be needed there. On April 25, the main focus of action shifted to the Item Pocket, where Captain Bernard Ryan's Company F of the 165th Regiment surged forward following a 20-minute artillery bombardment to seize the summit of Ryan Ridge. Captain Ryan looked out over the rugged expanse of Ryan Ridge, where the Japanese forces entrenched at the top presented a formidable challenge. They controlled the crucial territory between Ryan and Fox Ridges, creating a dangerous stronghold that threatened his position. For Ryan, the solution lay in artillery fire. He understood that since the supporting fire would fall perpendicular to his attack route, the risk of overshooting or undershooting would be minimal, just a lateral deviation of fifteen yards. With this confidence, he ordered a twenty-minute artillery barrage on the slopes of the ridge.As dawn broke on the morning of the 25th, Ryan gathered his men from Company F. He stressed the importance of a swift ground assault to capitalize on the artillery support. However, this was no easy task; his company was tired, undermanned, and severely low on food and ammunition. Despite these challenges, the two assault platoons sprang into action the moment the first shells began to fall. They charged forward, propelled by the roar of mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns that kept enemy forces at bay.But as they sprinted towards the ridge, the enemy struck back fiercely. Enemy fire and natural obstacles thinned their ranks, yet thirty-one determined soldiers reached the summit. They found themselves standing on a jagged ridge, strewn with rocks and scarred vegetation, a treacherous landscape that added to their struggle. Just as the artillery fire began to fade, the Japanese emerged from their hidden positions: “spider holes,” pillboxes, and tunnels. The Americans stood ready, and for the next twenty minutes, a brutal fight erupted. They engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat, reminiscent of earlier battles on Item Pocket ridge tops. The outcome was grim; thirty-five Japanese soldiers fell, and many more fled in panic. However, the Americans also paid a price, five were killed, and two wounded. Now, the real challenge began: consolidating their hard-won position. Captain Ryan knew that previous units had ascended these ridges only to be pushed back by the enemy. By late afternoon, only twenty-four effective soldiers remained atop the ridge, with each man averaging a mere six rounds of rifle ammunition. Medical supplies had run dry, and all the aid men had become casualties. Communication was severed, and Ryan could sense the tightening noose as the Japanese regrouped for an assault. Understanding the gravitas of their situation, Ryan devised a bold plan. He arranged for Company I to maneuver around to his right flank, hoping to replicate the success of the morning. At 4:05 PM, just fifteen minutes after artillery support resumed, Ryan and his company made their ascent once more, enduring five additional casualties along the route. Unfortunately, Company I struggled to reach the top, cut off by heavy enemy fire on the slopes. In a moment of desperation, Ryan and two men ventured out into the dark to seek reinforcement, a risky endeavor that could easily end in disaster. Although Company I was still bogged down, Captain Betts from Company K recognized the urgency of the situation and quickly mobilized his men. By midnight, all of Company K had reached the ridge, bolstering Ryan's weary but determined troops. As these events unfolded at Ryan Ridge, other companies from the 165th were locked in a brutal struggle at Gusukuma, located southwest of the ridge. Fierce fighting erupted as soldiers moved from wall to wall, tree to tree, fighting for every inch in the rubble of Gusukuma. Company A faced an unrelenting barrage, enduring fire from eight machine guns and a 47-mm antitank gun, much of which came from the yet-untamed eastern slope of Ryan Ridge. Amidst this chaos, Private First Class Richard King from Company A became a beacon of valor. In a remarkable display of courage, he climbed a tree to eliminate a Japanese soldier perched above and, from his vantage point, went on to kill ten more enemies before night fell. The day had been marked by sacrifice and bravery, with Captain Ryan and his men fighting heroically for every inch of ground gained on Ryan Ridge. As the sun set, they prepared for the challenges that lay ahead, their resolve unwavering amid the turmoil of war. Meanwhile, other companies of the 165th Regiment engaged fiercely in assaults against Gusukuma, gradually gaining ground at a high cost to both sides. At the same time, the 96th Division consolidated its position in front of Maeda and Kochi, while Colonel Pachler's 1st Battalion advanced 600 yards with minimal resistance to occupy the slope of Horseshoe Ridge. The following day, April 26, the general offensive resumed, with the bulk of the 165th Regiment continuing its costly advance into the heart of the Item Pocket, successfully clearing Gusukuma as Company F pushed along the crest of Ryan Ridge toward the northern end of the Machinato airstrip. To the east, the 105th Regiment advanced to the southern edge of Nakama, while the 106th Regiment extended the front line toward Yafusu. In the center, Colonel Halloran's 2nd Battalion launched an assault on the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repulsed by a brutal barrage of Japanese fire across the front. However, elements of the 383rd Regiment managed to reach the crests of Hills 150 and 152, securing a strategic position to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy below, as tanks and armored flamethrowers moved to the outskirts of Maeda to wreak havoc. At 4 pm in the afternoon General Ushijima issued a terse order: “The enemy with troops following tanks has been advancing into the southern and eastern sectors of Maeda since about 1 pm. The 62d Division will dispatch local units . . . attack the enemy advancing in the Maeda sector and expect to repulse him decisively.” At the same time, adjacent 24th Division units were ordered to cooperate in this effort regardless of division boundary. Two hours later the Japanese commanding general issued another order: "The army will crush the enemy which has broken through near Maeda. The 24th Division will put its main strength northeast of Shuri this evening." Lastly, Pachler's 1st Battalion attempted to advance along the western flank of Kochi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion moved along the eastern flank. Both battalions were immediately repelled by a barrage of enemy fire. The following day, efforts to establish physical contact between the two units proved costly and futile. Meanwhile, Halloran's 1st Battalion, along with elements of the 383rd Regiment, maneuvered through the saddle between Hills 150 and 152, receiving support from tanks and armored flamethrowers. Although tanks and infantry managed to penetrate to the southern edge of Maeda, the advance was halted by intense enemy fire. Atop the escarpment, an all-out effort was made to reduce a heavily fortified underground pillbox that separated Companies F and G; however, this attempt also failed. Concurrently, as the 105th Regiment organized a defensive line at Nakama, Colonel Stebbins' 2nd Battalion engaged in fierce combat around Yafusu in an effort to straighten their front lines. Meanwhile, the disorganized 165th Regiment continued clearing the Item Pocket, which was finally declared secure, although many Japanese troops remained hidden in deep caves and tunnels. Due to this disorganization and the sluggish progress in securing the pocket, General Griner ultimately decided to relieve Colonel Kelley of his command of the 165th. The regiment would then spend the remaining days of the month patrolling the Kuwan Inlet south of Machinato airfield. Griner's overextended and battered division would not undertake any further offensive actions until being relieved at the end of April. At sea, a Japanese suicide boat successfully dropped a depth charge near the destroyer Hutchins, which had to withdraw due to heavy damage. Additionally, Japanese aircraft reemerged during the night, with a kamikaze crashing into and sinking the ammunition ship Canada Victory, while other planes damaged two destroyers and a transport ship. Random factoid by the way, the SS Canada Victory was among the 531 Victory ships constructed during World War II as part of the Emergency Shipbuilding program. Launched by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation on January 12, 1944, she was completed on February 28, 1944. The ship was designated VC2-S-AP3 by the United States Maritime Commission, with hull number 93 (1009). Following her completion, the Maritime Commission transferred her to the civilian operator Alaska SS Company. This was merely a prelude to Admiral Ugaki's fourth mass Kikisui attack, which launched 115 kamikazes on April 28. While interceptor fighters destroyed most of these aircraft, seven managed to slip past the combat air patrol and crashed into destroyers Daly and Twiggs, the destroyer minesweeper Butler, the evacuation transport Pickney, and the hospital ship Comfort. On the ground, Halloran's Company K attempted to weaken resistance at the escarpment by moving through the 27th Division zone to the west and advancing southeast towards the Apartment House barracks, where they were met with heavy losses and forced to retreat. Meanwhile, on the western side of Kochi Ridge, Pachler's 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion and launched an attack into the gap between the ridge and Zebra Hill. They successfully led Company K through Kochi and into the cut, while Company L moved southward along the western slope. However, upon reaching the cut, both companies were met with a barrage of machine-gun fire, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. To the east, the 32nd Regiment faced delays in initiating their attack due to setbacks around Kochi, despite the successful raids by armored flamethrowers into the heart of Kuhazu. The following day, more kamikaze assaults inflicted additional damage on destroyers Hazelwood and Haggard. By the end of April, American pilots reported 1,216 air-to-air kills, while Japanese sources acknowledged losses exceeding 1,000 aircraft, including 820 destroyed in the first four Kikisui attacks. This left Admiral Ugaki with approximately 370 operational aircraft for future operations. It is also important to note that the Japanese pilots inflicted significant casualties, resulting in Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet suffering the loss of 1,853 sailors killed or missing and 2,650 wounded, averaging one and a half ships hit per day. As April expired, a concerned Nimitz personally visited Okinawa, where Buckner reminded Nimitz that as a land battle, 10th Army operations fell under Army command. “Yes,” Nimitz replied, “but ground though it may be, I'm losing a ship and a half a day. So if this line isn't moving within five days, we'll get someone here to move it so we can all get out from under these stupid air attacks.” Nevertheless, by May, 10th Army had thoroughly bogged down into costly, unimaginative frontal assaults against southern Okinawa's heavily fortified Shuri line. Numerous 10th Army generals urged Buckner to “play the amphib card” and land the reserve 2nd Marine Division in southeastern Okinawa, behind Japanese lines. Buckner ultimately refused, claiming insufficient logistics. Nimitz concurred with Buckner, at least publicly, but few others did. Spruance, Turner, and Mitscher were themselves growing increasingly bitter at 10th Army's lack of progress, as well as USAAF lethargy constructing fighter airfields ashore that could finally relieve the battered carriers. Touring the developing Okinawa airstrips, a 5th Fleet staff officer discovered that General “Hap” Arnold had secretly been writing Okinawa's lead USAAF engineer, urging him to divert assigned fighter strip resources into building B-29 bomber airfields instead. An incredulous Spruance went ashore to investigate and discovered the allegation was true. Stunned, Spruance “turned that situation around in about 15 minutes.” On land, following an unsuccessful tank assault toward Onaga, the 32nd Regiment intensified pressure on enemy positions to the southeast to support operations against Kochi Ridge. However, the 17th Regiment's attacks were still stalled. Meanwhile, after fending off two strong counterattacks that resulted in approximately 265 Japanese casualties, the 383rd Regiment advanced to capture the crest of Hill 318 in fierce close combat. This critical victory finally enabled American forces to direct fire onto Shuri itself. On April 29, the 307th Regiment took over the Maeda Escarpment section of the line from the 381st, and the next morning, the 306th Regiment relieved the 383rd on the left flank of the 96th Division. Simultaneously, the 1st Marines relieved the 165th on the west coast, while the 5th Marines took over the line held by the 105th and 106th Regiments on May 1. Despite ongoing efforts, attacks against Kochi Ridge on April 30 once again failed. However, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment successfully established Company C on “Chimney Crag” and Company A on the “Roulette Wheel,” located on the ridge southwest of Kuhazu. During the night, large numbers of Japanese infiltrated behind these companies, disrupting the planned relief of the 32nd by the 184th Regiment. This relief, intended to be completed before dawn on May 1, was delayed until late in the afternoon. Despite this setback, Colonel Green's Company L managed to reach Gaja Ridge, positioned just in front of Conical Hill during the night. Concurrently, Colonel Hamilton's Company A attempted to mount ladders at the eastern end of the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repelled by fierce defenders. On the western front, however, Company B successfully captured the edge of the escarpment using cargo nets by nightfall, although they were ultimately forced to withdraw due to heavy counterattacks later that night. Additionally, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion moved behind the escarpment to Nakama village, launching an attack eastward toward the Apartment House barracks area. Meanwhile, on the west coast, the 1st Marines had been attempting to advance south for two days but were repelled each time, suffering significant casualties. However, they did succeed in clearing an enemy pocket at Miyagusuku. On May 2, the 5th Marines finally joined the offensive but encountered stubborn resistance, while the 1st Marines continued to struggle to cross the draw south of Nakanishi village in their effort to reach the Jichaku ridge mass. To the east, Hamilton's Companies A and B positioned troops on the edge of the Maeda Escarpment but made no significant gains due to the enemy's intense machine-gun fire. The 17th Regiment eventually mopped up Onaga village, with the 1st Battalion taking control of the area, although they failed to capture Kochi during their renewed efforts. On May 3, after a dawn artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion on the east and the 3rd Battalion on the west advanced in a coordinated attack, which included a movement by Company C against How Hill on the eastern flank of Kochi Ridge. However, this entire effort was thwarted as heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire halted all progress. During 3 May the 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, fought a desperate grenade battle to win the top of part of the escarpment. The Japanese showered the top with grenades and knee mortars from the reverse slope and with 81-mm. mortar fire from a distance. Men came back across the narrow top of the escarpment to the north side, swearing and crying, saying they would not go back into the fight. "Yet," observed one platoon leader, "in five minutes' time those men would go back there tossing grenades as fast as they could pull the pins."Finally, while the 1st Marines made only limited gains as they pushed toward the Asa River, the 5th Marines successfully cleared the Awacha Pocket and advanced between 300 and 600 yards in their zone. Unbeknownst to the Americans, their slow, incremental advances and the looming threat of a costly, protracted campaign were far from their only concerns. By the 29th General Cho had argued that in the present state of affairs, the Americans had the upper hand. If the status quo continued, the 32nd Army eventually would be wiped out. At this meeting, only Colonel Yahara spoke for continuing the war of attrition and avoiding an offensive. Yahara pointed out that in modern warfare a superiority of 3 to 1 was usually needed for successful attack. "To take the offensive with inferior forces… is reckless and would lead to certain defeat," he said. Second, the high ground around Minami-Uebaru had already fallen into American hands, giving them a major advantage in defensive terrain. Third, Yahara argued, a hasty offensive would fail, with thousands needlessly lost. Then, 32nd Army's reduced forces would be unable to hold Okinawa for a long period and unable to delay the invasion of Japan. A hasty attack would cause 32nd Army to fail in its duty. And yet, the other young staff members were silent. Cho then declared again that he hoped for an attack to snatch life from the midst of death. At this, Yahara left the room. All the other staff members then agreed to launch an offensive. Cho then tried to manage Yahara by sheer emotional force. At dawn on April 30, before Yahara "had time to splash water on his face," Cho appeared at his quarters. Cho squeezed Yahara's hand and said with genuine enthusiasm that there had been nothing but trouble between them in the past and that they would probably both die together on Okinawa. Cho then asked if Yahara, on this one occasion, would go along with the offensive. As Cho spoke, his tears fell abundantly. Yahara was deeply moved, despite his aloof reputation, and before long he was weeping too. He was overcome by Cho's sudden display of emotion and said, "I consent." Again I have to say, in the “battle of Okinawa” by Yahara, basically his memoirs, in which he notably lies a bunch to cover himself, but I digress, this moment amongst others are really interesting, I highly recommend reading the book. Cho's plan outlined that General Amamiya's 24th Division would lead the main effort on May 4, executing a two-pronged attack on the right half of the line. They intended to sweep past the Tanabaru Escarpment toward Minami-Uebaru hill, ultimately reaching the Futema-Atsuta line. Meanwhile, General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was to shift from its reserve position behind the 62nd Division to a location northeast of Shuri and move northwest toward the coastal town of Oyama, effectively cutting off the 1st Marine Division's retreat. In conjunction with this, General Fujioka's battered 62nd Division would hold its position on the left flank and mount an offensive once the attacking units on its right had breached enemy lines. Additionally, the 23rd and 26th Shipping Engineer Regiments were tasked with conducting counterlandings in the American rear on the east and west coasts, respectively. The Japanese reasoned that success depended on the extent to which they could support their frontline troops with artillery, tanks, supplies, and communications. Their plans specified in detail the role that each of the support units was to play in the projected operations. Artillery units were ordered to regroup in preparation for the attack. Guns and howitzers were pulled out of cave positions and set up farther south in more open emplacements for greater flexibility. They were to open fire thirty minutes before the attack. When the infantry had driven through the American front lines, artillerymen were to move their weapons forward. The 27th Tank Regiment, hitherto uncommitted, was ordered to move from its position near Yonabaru during the night over several routes and support the attack in the Maeda area. To support this comprehensive offensive, Ugaki was alerted to prepare for the fifth mass Kikisui attack directed against the enemy's naval forces. Once the plans were finalized and preparations well underway, Ushijima and Cho celebrated with a pre-victory banquet in their chambers at headquarters. Even as Ushijima's banquet was underway, offensive operations had commenced. Japanese troops infiltrated behind American lines during the night while the shipping engineers prepared for their counterlandings. The 26th and 23d Shipping Engineer Regiments set out up the west and east coasts. On beaches south of Naha and Yonabaru, men of the shipping engineer regiments piled into barges and assault boats. Also, small groups of soldiers with light machine guns infiltrated behind U.S. lines on the night of 3 May to attack Americans as they became visible at dawn. Small units of three or four men, variously designated as "reconnaissance raiding" and "rear harassing" teams, proceeded toward the American lines to attack command posts, heavy weapons, communications, and depots and to send back information by means of smoke signals. The 27th Tank Regiment rumbled up to Ishimmi, several of its tanks being severely damaged by American artillery fire en route. Ugaki's fifth Kikisui attack began on the afternoon of May 3, when at least 19 kamikazes sortied from Formosa, stealthily approaching the American convoys. They successfully sank the destroyer Little and one landing craft, while severely damaging two destroyer-minelayers and another landing craft. Additionally, Japanese aircraft targeted shore installations, focusing their efforts on Yontan airfield. In Nakagusuku Bay, a suicide boat further damaged a cargo ship. At 02:00 on May 4, most of the boats from the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment were spotted approaching the heavily defended area of Kuwan. Armed with antitank guns, heavy machine guns, light arms, and thousands of satchel charges, several hundred men of the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment headed under overcast skies for landing places below Yontan and Kadena airfields. They miscalculated their position and turned, into the shore at a point where it was heavily defended. At 0200 riflemen of the 1st Marine Division on the sea wall near Kuwan caught sight of ten barges and opened up with concentrated fire. Naval flares lighted up the area. One company fired 1,100 rounds from 60-mm. mortars. Several enemy barges burst into flames. One platoon of marines used fifty boxes of ammunition and burned out six machine-gun barrels as it sprayed the Japanese trying to cross the reef. Although many of the engineers managed to reach the shore, some fled back to the Japanese lines, while others were trapped in Kuwan, where they were mopped up by the Marines at their leisure. A smaller group of Japanese forces advanced almost as far as Chatan, ultimately landing at Isa, where they were contained without much difficulty and destroyed the following day. The amphibious assault was even less successful on the east coast of Okinawa, as the 25th Shipping Engineer Regiment attempted to land near Ouki. Most of these troops were killed by fire from ships in Buckner Bay or by the 7th Division Reconnaissance Troop on land. As a result, the Japanese suffered losses of 500 to 800 men and nearly all their landing craft during these amphibious assaults. At 05:00, Ugaki initiated his main mass attack, launching 125 kamikazes and 103 escorting fighters from Kyushu to target Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57, which was currently striking the Miyako and Ishigaki airfields. Taking advantage of the weakened anti-aircraft defenses, the kamikazes managed to score hits on the carriers Formidable and Indomitable, though both vessels ultimately survived. They also targeted American shipping, successfully sinking destroyers Morrison and Luce, along with three landing craft. Additionally, they inflicted further damage on the light cruiser Birmingham, the escort carrier Sangamon, the destroyer Ingraham, and two destroyer-minelayers, resulting in a total of 589 sailors killed.   On land, following a heavy artillery bombardment during the night, the 24th Division commenced its main assault. In the pitch darkness Japanese troops made their way toward the American front lines. At 0500 two red flares ordered them to attack. As the artillery fire became heavy, a guard of Company A, 17th Infantry, on a hill just north of Onaga, dropped back below the crest for cover. He thought that the enemy would not attack through his own artillery, but the enemy did just that. A few Japanese appeared on the crest and set up a light machine gun. Pfc. Tillman H. Black, a BAR man, killed the gunner, and as more of the enemy came over the crest he killed four Japanese who tried to man the machine gun. The enemy advanced over the crest in ragged groups, enabling Black to hold his own. Soon the whole company was in action and drove the enemy off the crest. The Japanese abandoned three light machine guns, four mortars, and much ammunition. At another point a surprise attack nearly succeeded. On high ground 1,000 yards east of Onaga a group of Japanese crept up the hill in front of Company I, 184th, commanded by Capt. James Parker. In the sudden onslaught that followed, two heavy machine gun crews abandoned their positions. One of them left its weapon intact, and the Japanese promptly took it over and swung it around on the company. Parker, watching the attack from the ridge, had anticipated the move. The Japanese managed to fire one burst; then Parker destroyed the usurped weapon with his remaining heavy machine gun. For an hour or two longer the Japanese clung to the forward slopes, firing their rifles amid shrill screams, but they made no further progress. By dawn the general pattern of the Japanese attack on the left (east) of the 14th Corps line was becoming clear. In the 184th's sector the enemy's 89th Regiment, following instructions to "close in on the enemy by taking advantage of cover,"had advanced around the east slopes of Conical Hill, crept across the flats, and assembled in force around the "Y ridges" east of Onaga. They had outflanked three companies of the 184th on Chimney Crag and the Roulette Wheel north of Kuhazu, and had also managed to evade the forward battalions of the 17th around Kochi. Another Japanese element had attacked 7th Division lines on the high ground north of Unaha. At dawn 1st Lt. Richard S. McCracken, commanding Company A, 184th, observed 2,000 Japanese soldiers in the open area east and north of Kuhazu. They were perfect "artillery meat." Unable to get through to his artillery support, McCracken called his battalion commander, Colonel Maybury, and described the lucrative targets. Maybury was equally pleased. McCracken suggested, however, that the Colonel should not be too happy--a group of Japanese at that moment was within 100 yards of Maybury's observation post. There was indeed a party of Japanese busily unlimbering two 75-mm, howitzers just below Maybury. But Company C, 17th Infantry, had spotted this activity, and within a few minutes maneuvered tanks into position and scattered the enemy group. Artillery eliminated the Japanese caught in the open. A mortar duel ensued, sometimes at ranges of 250 yards. The 3d Battalion, 32d, also poured fire on the enemy there. After the impetus of the attack was lost, a Japanese officer stood out on open ground and waved his saber to assemble his men for an attack. American mortarmen waited for a worth-while target to develop, then put mortar fire on it. Four times the officer assembled a group, only to have his men killed or scattered, before he was finally killed. While the 7th Division was repelling the Japanese attack in the eastern sector of the 14th Corps line, the 77th Division was blunting the other enemy "spearhead" in the center. Here the Japanese 32d Regiment, supported by tanks and engineers, attacked behind intense artillery fire. This sector was the critical point of attack, for a break-through here would enable the supporting 44th Independent Mixed Brigade to cut west and isolate the 1st Marine Division. Transportation difficulties beset the 32d Regiment almost from the start. During the night light tanks drove out of Shuri up the Ginowan road (Route 5), but American artillery interdicting the road prevented medium tanks from following. The mediums had to take a long detour, which was in such poor condition that only two of the tanks could enter into the attack. Trucks and artillery also were slowed down. Even foot troops had trouble in moving. One Japanese infantryman recorded that his column was shelled on the way and that everyone except himself and one other was wounded. Another wrote of encountering "terrific bombardment" on the way to Kochi. These difficulties severely handicapped the 32d Regiment in ensuing operations. Supported by nine light tanks, the 3d Battalion led the assault of the 32d Regiment against the 306th Infantry, 77th Division, before dawn on 4 May. The enemy mounted his assault from southeast of Hill 187 and hit the 77th where Route 5 curled around the east end of Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The Japanese drove into the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 306th, near Maeda. Shortly before daylight, when the Japanese infantry had failed to take its initial objectives east of Hill 187, Colonel Murakami, commanding the 27th Tank Regiment, became impatient and recklessly committed his own infantry company, a standard element of a Japanese tank regiment. American artillery fire destroyed one platoon, disrupting the attack, and daylight found the surviving troops in a precarious position across from the American lines. Colonel Murakami ordered the company to withdraw, but artillery fire prevented a retreat during the day. When the Japanese used smoke for concealment, the Americans simply blanketed the obscured area with shell fire. The survivors straggled back to their front lines after nightfall. All the light tanks that had supported the attack were lost. By 07:30, the 306th Regiment had effectively repelled the enemy. The Japanese, broken up into small groups, attempted to withdraw across terrain subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire, but few made it through. By 08:00, the 89th Regiment had also been pushed beyond grenade range along the entire front of the 7th Division. Instead of retreating or pressing the assault, however, Kanayama's troops made the critical mistake of milling about in the exposed flatlands, rendering them easy targets for American heavy weaponry. As a result, the 89th Regiment suffered severe losses from concentrated land, naval, and air bombardment, losing half its strength. Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment in the center fared no better; its advance was delayed by the necessity of laying smoke, and it encountered significant hardships when the smoke unexpectedly cleared. In the center of the line the Japanese 22d Regiment was never able to fulfill its role of following up the "successful" advance of flank units, and the regiment spent the day locked in a violent fire fight with men of 3/306, 3/17, and 1/17 holding the Kochi-Onaga area. The Japanese reported the 22d "was not able attain results worth mentioning." Unbeknownst to the Americans, elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment had penetrated more than 1,000 yards behind American lines near Kochi, identifying a significant weak point before pulling back to the regimental line. Nevertheless, due to the overall failure of the 24th Division, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was not even committed to the attack. On the fronts at Maeda and the west coast, American forces made some gains. Hamilton's 1st Battalion successfully executed a complex demolition assault on the extensive cave-tunnel-pillbox network located about 200 feet west of the eastern end of the escarpment, effectively repulsing several subsequent counterattacks and inflicting approximately 600 casualties on the Japanese. The 5th Marines also advanced up to 400 yards through hotly contested terrain during the day. Although pinned down in the coastal area, Colonel Chappell's 1st Battalion managed to break through a defile east of Jichaku, while the 3rd Battalion secured a ridge approximately 400 yards ahead of its position. Despite the apparent failure of the Japanese attack, Amamiya refused to abandon the offensive, ordering a renewed effort during the night. Kitago's uncommitted 1st Battalion, along with the attached 26th Independent Battalion, was directed to penetrate the enemy lines northwest of Kochi in a night attack, aiming to replicate the breakthrough achieved by elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment. Following another artillery bombardment, the Japanese launched their assault against the 306th Regiment at 02:00 on May 5. However, this attack was quickly disrupted by American artillery. Three hours later, the Japanese struck again, this time supported by tanks. They pressed through artillery and mortar fire to engage the 306th in close combat. Fierce firefights erupted along the regiment's entire line, resulting in the Japanese suffering 248 dead during the fighting. Amid the chaos, a significant portion of Kitago's 1st Battalion successfully infiltrated behind American lines, breaching the defenses at a point between Route 5 and Kochi. While approximately 90 of the infiltrators were quickly killed while assaulting the command post of the 306th Regiment, around 450 Japanese troops crossed the divisional boundary and managed to reoccupy the town of Tanabaru and the Tanabaru Escarpment, effectively cutting off the supply road for the 17th Regiment. In response, Pachler sent Company E to eliminate the infiltrators, but they underestimated the enemy's strength and were repelled with heavy losses. With Company E stalled on the eastern slope of the escarpment, Company F, supported by tanks, attempted a broad flanking maneuver. They successfully pushed through Tanabaru, spending the day destroying the enemy's hastily established defenses. Company E then took over the assault, and by nightfall, they had reached the top of the Tanabaru Escarpment following a mortar preparation. The relentless battle for the Tanabaru Escarpment continued for the next two days, resulting in the Japanese losing 462 killed behind American lines. Only a few men managed to escape the Tanabaru death trap and return to the Shuri lines. Made even more desperate by the failure of Amamiya's grand attack, the ragtag battalions of the 62nd Division fought to the death to defend the vital western approaches to Shuri, ensuring that every yard gained came at a steep price in Marine lives. Each pillbox, cave, and tomb became a stronghold that unleashed a torrent of fire against the attacking Marines from all directions. Despite this fierce resistance, Del Valle's units made significant progress on May 5. The 5th Marines advanced their lines by an average of 300 yards, while the 1st Marines seized the high ground along the Asa River. At the Maeda Escarpment, the reverse slope was slowly captured as caves were blasted and sealed off. By midnight, it became clear to Ushijima that the counteroffensive had failed, with the Japanese suffering approximately 6,227 dead and losing 59 artillery pieces. In turn, the 7th and 77th Divisions, which had absorbed the brunt of the enemy counterattack, sustained 714 losses. Despite these heavy casualties, the 1st Marine Division, which continued its push to the south, incurred corresponding losses of 649 men. This indicated that the Americans experienced greater losses due to the Japanese defensive tactics of attrition. However, the morale of the 32nd Army had been shattered, as the Japanese abandoned all hope for a successful outcome from the operation. Nevertheless, the 24th Division and 5th Artillery Command were ordered to reorganize and shift to a holding action. This strategy aimed to bleed American strength by forcing the 10th Army to maintain its slow, deadly, yard-by-yard advance into the fire of prepared positions. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the fierce Second Okinawa Counteroffensive, weary American troops pressed into determined Japanese defenses. Captain Ryan's valor led to hard-won territory despite heavy casualties. As chaos unfolded, Japanese morale waned, marking a turning point. The relentless battle showcased unparalleled sacrifice, foreshadowing the Allies' gradual victory in the Pacific.  

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindanao. In April 1945, the US launched the invasion of Mindanao under General Eichelberger, focusing on Illana Bay. Initial assaults were swift, and American forces quickly captured vital areas due to the disarray among Japanese troops, who were struggling with low morale and supply shortages. The Japanese were under significant pressure, with commanders ill-prepared to mount a robust defense as American troops advanced toward Davao. Fierce battles unfolded, including attempts to seize key positions, but Japanese forces, that included remnants from earlier campaigns, faced overwhelming and relentless assaults. Despite stiff resistance in some areas, the Americans ultimately made considerable territorial gains, significantly weakening Japanese positions. This successful operation in Mindanao laid crucial groundwork for further advances in the Pacific theater, marking a decisive phase in the war as the tide turned heavily in favor of the Allies. As this chapter closed, it was evident that the end of Japanese resistance in the region was drawing near. This episode is the Allied Invasion of Borneo Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  A long time ago, in a galaxy far away we talked about the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Now it is time to talk about how the Dutch strikes back. . . well not exactly, but I wanted to finish the star wars reference. For an extended period, the Australian forces that had valiantly fought on the island of New Guinea during a crucial phase of the Allied war effort had been assigned to garrison duties in remote areas, conducting minor offensives against a desperate enemy more concerned with obtaining food than engaging in battle. At the same time, General MacArthur deemed it politically unwise for Australians to take a prominent role in reclaiming the Philippines, an American territory, and he also found it politically unfavorable for American troops to participate in restoring Dutch and British authority in the Indies. Recognizing the urgent need to secure the oilfields of British and Dutch Borneo to supply accessible oil for the push toward Japan, Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead's 1st Australian Corps was designated for the operation to retake Borneo, known as Operation Oboe. Should note that after a period of illness, suffering from malaria and a skin condition, the fighting General George Alan Vasey had finally recovered by February 1945. General Blamey, who still had doubts about his physical fitness despite Vasey being given an A by an Army medical board, reluctantly appointed him to command the 6th Division, then in action in the Aitape-Wewak campaign. Vasey then flew north to take up his new command. The aircraft Vasey was travelling in, RAAF Lockheed Hudson A16-118, took off from RAAF Station Archerfield on the afternoon of March 5, 1945. Due to a cyclone that was ravaging the Queensland coast at the time, the aircraft crashed into the sea about 400 metres out from Machans Beach, just north of the mouth of the Barron River, 2 kilometres short of the Cairns Airport. Vasey was killed in the crash along with all those on board. His body was recovered from the crash site and was buried with full military honours in Cairns cemetery along with those of Major-General Rupert Downes and Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bertram. Vasey's concern for his men outlived him. The men called him 'Bloody George', not after his casualties, but after his favourite adjective, and Vasey's personable style of command attracted immense loyalty from them. "Vasey owns the 7th," wrote a Melbourne journalist, "but every man in the division believes he owns Vasey." Thus now it fell to General Steven to retain command of the 6th Division at that time already engaged in combat at Aitape-Wewak, the initial plan was to land Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th Brigade at Tarakan on April 23 to establish an airstrip for supporting aircraft for subsequent operations, specifically an assault on Balikpapan by the remaining forces of Major-General George Wootten's 9th Division on May 18. Following that, ten days later, a brigade was set to land at Bandjarmasin to secure air support for the planned invasion of Java by the entire corps on June 27. Ultimately, the operations at Bandjarmasin and Java were cancelled; the Tarakan landing was postponed to May 1; the Balikpapan invasion would instead be conducted by Major-General Edward Milford's 7th Division on July 1; and the 9th Division was tasked with the invasion of Brunei Bay on June 10. Consequently, by the end of March, Morshead's headquarters and the entire 9th Division had relocated to Morotai, where they would prepare and rehearse for the impending invasion. In March 1944, General Doihara Kenji organized the 7th Area Army to establish a new defensive line across Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. Yes you heard that right, General Doihara Kenji. For those of you who listen to my Fall and Rise of China podcast, this guy is that infamous intelligence officer who worked on nearly all the significant false flag operations during the second sino-Japanese war. Working as an intelligence officer he played a key role in the orchestration of the Huanggutun Incident, Mukden Incident, kidnapping of Emperor Puyi and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, amongst countless other “incidents”. He was a bonafide mastermind behind numerous false flag operations and the Manchurian drug trade earning the moniker Lawrence of Manchuria.  Now, anticipating an impending enemy invasion, Lieutenant-General Yamawaki Masataka reorganized the Borneo Defence Army into the 37th Army in September, placing it directly under General Terauchi's Southern Army. This force gradually received reinforcements from the 56th and 71st Independent Mixed Brigades, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment, and several smaller units. Despite this, the command was understrength and poorly equipped, as most of the available equipment and experienced troops were reassigned to more critical locations in the Southwest Pacific. By the end of the year, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, the 37th Army had stationed the majority of Major-General Nozaki Seiji's 56th Independent Mixed Brigade at Tawau, Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's understrength 71st Independent Mixed Brigade at Kuching, most of Colonel Iemura Shinichi's 25th Independent Mixed Regiment on Tawi-Tawi Island, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Balikpapan, along with three battalions in Sandakan, two battalions and a naval unit in Tarakan, and one battalion each in Kudat, Beaufort, and Miri. However, in 1945, both Baba and Terauchi recognized that the enemy was likely to first target strategic locations on the east coast before establishing a strong presence in western Borneo to prepare for an invasion of Malaya. Consequently, they decided that the majority of the 37th Army should be concentrated around Brunei Bay, leading to orders for the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade to march overland toward northern Borneo. The 370th Independent Battalion remained in Tawau, while the 369th Independent Battalion was sent to garrison Bandjarmasin. Additionally, half of the 454th Independent Battalion was dispatched to Balikpapan, and the other half to Bandjarmasin. This left only the 455th Independent Battalion and part of the 2nd Guard Unit at Tarakan. Early in April the strength of the Japanese force on Tarakan was estimated at about 4000 of whom 2500 were base troops. On the eve of the attack, however, largely because of information indicating that a battalion had been moved from Tarakan to Balikpapan, it was estimated that only 1500 to 2000 troops remained on the island. Aerial photographs showed five gun positions on the south-eastern tip of the island covering the channel along which ships normally entered Tarakan. Round Lingkas and Tarakan there seemed to be 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 9 medium and 5 light anti-aircraft guns seemed to be round the airfield. The whole of Lingkas beach was protected by parallel rows of posts, rails and pipes driven into the mud and extending into the sea to a distance of 125 yards from high-water mark; and between the beach and the road was an anti-tank ditch about 25 feet wide. A group of oil tanks was near the beach and, as it was possible that the Japanese might try to impede an attacker by flooding the oil over the sea and the swamp near the Pamusian River and setting it alight, the air force had taken pains to destroy these tanks. Field works could be seen; there were concrete pill-boxes built by the Dutch; and it was suspected that, here as elsewhere, tunnels had been dug into the hills.  Units stationed at Sandakan were also ordered to move toward Brunei, leaving the 554th Independent Battalion behind. Furthermore, due to the challenges in supplying Tawi-Tawi, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment was withdrawn to Borneo in February and instructed to march toward Jesselton, where it was expected to arrive in May. During this time, little was done to enhance the island's defenses, and the overland marches took a significant toll on the soldiers' stamina. Meanwhile, enemy air raids intensified, severely disrupting communications. Between April 11 and 29, Air Commodore Arthur Harry Cobby's Australian 1st Tactical Air Force, along with Major-General Paul Wurtsmith's 13th Air Force, conducted several air assaults on Tarakan and Tawau, targeting oil storage tanks, artillery positions, radar stations, defenses, and various buildings. On April 27, Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1 departed Morotai, carrying Whitehead's 26th Brigade, protected by Admiral Berkey's cruisers and destroyers. Over the next two days, this force executed a naval bombardment on shore targets while a minesweeping unit cleared and marked the approach route within 800 yards of the beach and Sadau Island. Early on April 30, the 2/4th Commando Squadron landed unopposed on Sadau, where they established an artillery battery to support the engineers in clearing obstacles from the invasion beaches. After successfully completing the task with just a few sniper and mortar attacks, the main convoy reached the southwest coast of Tarakan Island an hour before sunrise on May 1. Following a heavy air and naval bombardment prior to landing, Whitehead's assault waves began their approach to the shore, supported by rocket fire from the LCI gunboats. Around 08:00, the 2/23rd and 2/48th Battalions landed on Green Beach and Red Beach, respectively, without facing any opposition. However, once they moved inland, they encountered intense fire from Lingkas Hill and Roach. The 2/23rd Battalion launched an attack and captured both locations while the 2/48th took the Finch and Parks positions as they advanced to secure the Collins Highway ridge. Throughout the day, the remaining units of the 26th Brigade landed despite poor beach conditions and overcrowding, with the 2/24th Battalion held in reserve along Anzac Highway. By nightfall, the brigade managed to hold an area 2,800 yards wide at the base and up to 2,000 yards deep. Early on May 2, the 2/23rd seized Milko with minimal resistance, advancing further north to the Pages feature and Hospital Spur. Simultaneously, the 2/48th quickly secured Lyons and the junction with Burke Highway, while the 2/24th effectively attacked the Wills, Sturt, and Frank positions with support from aircraft and artillery. In the late afternoon, as one company moved up Anzac Highway toward the airfield, Lieutenant-Colonel George Warfe's other companies converged on the Essex feature, which was captured without opposition during the night. The next morning, the 2/24th attacked the airfield from the south and east; although they successfully took the airfield ridge at a high cost, their late assault on the Rippon position to the north was repelled by determined enemy defenders. At the same time, the 2/48th conducted reconnaissance towards the Peter and Sykes features, while the 2/23rd managed to secure the area between Gleneleg Highway and Pamusian. However, their assaults on Hospital Spur and Tarakan Hill were unsuccessful. Fortunately, Burke Ridge was found abandoned on May 4. By then, Whitehead had already instructed the 2/23rd to advance east and join the 2/24th in their attacks on the airfield, with the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/4th Commando Squadron taking over their positions in the west. The commandos then launched an attack on Tarakan Hill. Despite being initially held down by fierce enemy fire, they eventually forced the defenders off the high ground through sustained pressure, tank support, and a sweeping maneuver to the right. Simultaneously, the 2/48th advanced and successfully took control of the Evans feature, while a company from the 2/24th attacked the Peningkibaru stronghold after an intense artillery barrage, managing to secure the position just in time to fend off the Japanese who had retreated during the bombardment. Additionally, Warfe planned another assault on Rippon, but heavy Japanese shelling ultimately compelled him to call it off. On May 5, as the commandos and pioneers continued to diminish the remaining strongholds on Tarakan Hill, the 2/48th successfully cleared the road north to Otway, although they faced greater resistance near Sykes. Rippon was also discovered to be abandoned and was swiftly captured, though the Japanese still controlled the high ground to the north. Finally, on May 6, the 2/48th launched another attack on Sykes and successfully cleared the hill this time. While capturing the airfield and town accomplished Whitehead's primary objective, the Japanese continued to hold the rugged interior of Tarakan, indicating that much fighting lay ahead until the garrison was completely defeated. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area, 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District 6, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops".The enemy was now directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts.  After the unsuccessful general attack on April 19, which yielded minimal gains, Generals Hodge and Buckner were preparing to push the offensive southward, fully aware that breaching the first Shuri defense ring would be a slow and costly endeavor. On the western front, the primary enemy positions on Kakazu Ridge had been entirely circumvented, with General Griner directing his troops to advance and focus on cleanup later. Consequently, on April 20, the majority of the 165th Regiment secured the coastal region before launching a southern attack that encountered immediate and fierce resistance in the rugged terrain north of Gusukuma, particularly around Item Pocket.  The center of the Japanese resistance lay in the I section of Target Area 7777, which came to be called "Item Pocket", in military terminology I is called Item. Actually, the pocket was the hub of the enemy position; from it, like spokes of a giant wheel, extended four low ridges, separated from each other by ravines and rice paddies. Potter's Ridge ran north from the hub, Charlie Ridge to the northeast, Gusukuma Ridge to the southeast, and Ryan Ridge to the southwest. Lying between Gusukuma and Charlie Ridges and sloping to the east was a cone-shaped hill called by Americans "Brewer's Hill." A gulch ran along each side of the hill Anderson's Gulch on the north and Dead Horse Gulch on the south. Both ran in an easterly direction, crossing Route 1 at small bridges just north of Gusukuma. The ground was superbly suited for active defense. Typical Japanese positions were connected by tunnels along the sides and under the crests of the ridges; Ryan Ridge, in particular, was honeycombed with such defenses. From Item Pocket the enemy had excellent command both of the coastal areas to the north and west and of the open land to the east where Route 1 ran north-south. The Japanese had long been aware of the defensive value of this position against either a beach landing on the northwest or an attack from the north. Months before the Americans landed, Japanese troops and Okinawan laborers were boring tunnels and establishing elaborate living quarters and aid stations. The area was held by two companies of the 21st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 64th Brigade, 62nd Division, supported by an antitank company, a machine gun company, and elements of antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar units. At least 600 Japanese occupied the Pocket, reinforced by several hundred Okinawans. Only through persistent effort was the 1st Battalion able to reach a position east of Gusukuma by nightfall, while the 2nd Battalion successfully took control of Potter's Ridge and Fox Ridge but failed in its attempts against Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket itself. The leading platoon was well up on the slope of Ryan when Japanese on top opened up with mortars, machine guns, and artillery, cutting off the rest of Company E. While the company commander, his clothes torn by bullets, and the rest of the company straggled back to Fox Ridge, the leading platoon continued doggedly ahead. Its leader, T/Sgt. Earnest L. Schoeff, managed to reach the top with eight of his men despite almost constant fire. He was ordered by radio to hold until relief came. The men hugged the ground as darkness slowly descended. Then from three directions from fifty to sixty heavily armed Japanese set upon the Americans. In wild hand-to-hand fighting the nine men beat off the attack. Pfc. Paul R. Cook fired four cases of ammunition into the enemy, shooting down at least ten before he was killed. With grenades, rifle butts, and the enemy's own weapons, Schoeff and his men killed another dozen before the Japanese withdrew. With two of his men killed, another missing, and two wounded, Schoeff led the survivors back to his company during the night. To the east, the 106th and 105th Regiments tried to advance south towards the village of Iso and the Pinnacles but were hindered by heavy enemy gunfire. In response, Colonel Winn dispatched his 2nd Battalion to maneuver around the East Pinnacle to reach the village of Natama, where Companies F and G were ultimately repelled by a strong Japanese counterattack. As they retreated in chaos, they faced an ambush from Japanese infiltrators, resulting in significant casualties. Despite these challenges, the 106th Regiment and Winn's 3rd Battalion managed to bypass the West Pinnacle and advance with relative ease, halting 200 yards southwest of Iso. Additionally, Winn's 1st Battalion fought its way to the western edge of Kakazu village and nearly cleared Kakazu Ridge to its eastern point before being ordered back to the escarpment to support the 2nd Battalion and halt any enemy breakthroughs. At the same time, General Bradley ordered the 381st and 382nd Regiments to advance toward Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment. In response, Colonel Dill's 3rd Battalion moved along Tombstone Ridge, clearing out the enemy from caves and tombs, and reached the southern end just in time to join Colonel Halloran's 1st Battalion for a surprise offensive against Nishibaru. They quickly captured the crest but were ultimately driven back by the determined defenders. However, this partial victory prompted Halloran to deploy the 2nd Battalion in the afternoon for another assault to the south. By day's end, the 381st was entrenched along the northern slope of Nishibaru Ridge, though at a significant cost. Further west, Dill's 2nd Battalion also pushed forward despite persistent fire from the Rocky Crags, where attempts by the 184th and 17th Regiments to attack were unsuccessful. They could not catch up with the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, General Arnold targeted Ouki Hill, but his initial assault was quickly halted by enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Two armored flamethrowers successfully advanced 400 yards ahead of the infantry, neutralizing an enemy mortar position on Ouki Hill's west slope. Consequently, the Americans concentrated their mortars and smoke to cover the enemy positions, allowing a composite company to launch a surprise attack that secured the crest of Ouki Hill, although the isolated troops would soon have to fend off a series of fierce counterattacks. The next morning, the 32nd Regiment launched an attack down Skyline Ridge with two companies. However, they were quickly halted by mortar fire at a deep road cut in the middle of the ridge. Despite this setback, the troops persevered, largely due to Sergeant Theodore MacDonnell's efforts, and eventually gained control of the entire forward face of the ridge. When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a gist Chemical Mortar Company observer, was impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a handful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun, but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest he stood up and fired point-blank into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDonnell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion. Lt. Fred Capp, commanding Company E, sent troops to reinforce MacDonnell immediately, and the position was consolidated. Then Company F, on orders given as a result of this sudden development, pressed the attack down Skyline Ridge, and by 18:00 the entire forward face of the ridge was occupied and only a knob at the lower tip was causing trouble.  To the west, while Colonel Pachler's Company B attempted another attack on Rocky Crags, Dill's 3rd Battalion reorganized and encircled to reach Nishibaru Ridge via the 381st Regiment, launching an eastward assault that made good headway until they were met with fierce enemy counterattacks that forced them to halt. Simultaneously, Halloran coordinated an attack on Nishibaru, which was successfully repelled by the defenders. Colonel May's 3rd Battalion was then deployed to fill the gap at the gorge. Overnight, a large number of Japanese troops had moved from the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment to set up mortars and machine guns in the Kakazu Pocket, prompting the 27th Reconnaissance Troop to advance toward Kakazu, where they became pinned down at the village's edge. As a result, Colonel Stebbins' 3rd Battalion was ordered to position itself on Kakazu West. Looking west, the majority of the 105th and 106th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the Pinnacles, but with little success. They did manage to clear the road to the escarpment's summit of mines and obstructions to facilitate tank movements. Finally, Colonel Kelley's 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack across the mouth of Item Pocket, while Company F attempted to advance along the coast using amphibious tractors but was likewise repelled by intense fire from Ryan Ridge. The 1st Battalion also pushed southwest into Gusukuma, but without armor support, they made minimal progress against the machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket attacking from the right rear. The enemy's defense was very effective on the east. Here the 1st Battalion had a major supply problem on its hands. Two blown bridges along Route 1 east of the Item Pocket were holding up vehicles of support units. During the previous night, fire from the Pocket had driven off an engineer platoon working at the site and killed the platoon leader. Early on the 21st Lieutenant Golden, the Bailey bridge expert, came up with ten truckloads of material. His engineers worked for an hour but had to stop in the face of almost ceaseless fire from the Pocket. Colonel Kelley then ordered scouts to find another stream crossing. A bulldozer cut a bypass around Anderson's Gulch near the railroad, but when, about 10:00, the operator nosed his machine out in the open, he was shot in the ear. General Griner, in Colonel Kelley's observation post at the time, ordered Lt. Col. Walter F. Anderson, commander of the 193rd Tank Battalion, to push the bypass through. Anderson himself climbed into his battalion's sole remaining "tank-dozer" and completed the bypass. A 47-mm. anti-tank gun, hitherto silent, scored a direct hit on Anderson's tank, killing him and a guide. The bypass was now blocked and had to be abandoned. This break-down in supply over Route 1 seriously affected operations east of Gusukuma. Colonel Mahoney's 1st Battalion attacked southwest early on the 21st into Gusukuma, but without tanks or cannon the troops made little ground against machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket on the right rear. Mahoney's left company did reach a point 400 yards north of the village of Yafusu, the farthest advance yet registered by 24th Corps since April 19, but here the troops were stopped by a network of enemy positions. Concerned about the significant vertical separation between his battalions, Kelley decided to deploy his 3rd Battalion in an effort to fill the gap and simultaneously penetrate Item Pocket. Consequently, the American forces advanced through Dead Horse Gulch, with Company K fighting nearly to the center of the pocket. However, they were ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy losses and intense counterattacks. On April 22, Kelley opted to hold and enhance his current positions while conducting extensive patrols. Looking to the east, as the 105th Regiment regrouped following a night counterattack from Kakazu, Stebbins' 1st Battalion systematically located and neutralized enemy positions behind them along the escarpment. Brigadier-General William Bradford also took command in the Kakazu area, bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, and most of the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment, successfully containing the pocket. Further west, the 383rd Regiment replaced the weakened 382nd, while the 2nd Battalion advanced down Nishibaru Ridge to capture the village and higher ground facing Hill 143 to the south. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made minimal progress toward the Gate of the Tanabaru Escarpment. Additionally, Pachler's Company B initiated another attack on the west side of the Rocky Crags, supported by howitzers, tanks, and armored flamethrowers. However, once again, they faced hand grenades and knee mortar shells raining down from above, resulting in heavy casualties and the need to retreat. Finally, the 32nd Regiment maintained control of the forward face of Skyline Ridge but made no attempt to advance, while patrols scoured extensive sections of the southern slope to reach the abandoned eastern face of Hill 178. That night, artillery provided cover to the beleaguered defenders as Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment took over along Skyline Ridge. Following several days of inactivity, 41 kamikaze planes were once again launched on April 22. They successfully sank the minesweeper Swallow and one LCS, while also damaging two destroyers and another minesweeper, resulting in the loss of 25 aircraft. The next day, the 32nd Regiment remained stationed on the north slope of Skyline Ridge, except when conducting patrols or securing caves. This allowed the Japanese defenders to withdraw overnight from their remaining positions around Hill 178. With Company B worn out, the rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment joined the assault on the Rocky Crags, which fell with little resistance. To the west, medium tanks and armored flamethrowers finally launched a direct attack on Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment, successfully destroying most of the enemy positions, although few territorial gains were made. Further west, Winn's 1st Battalion executed a surprise attack on the East Pinnacle, managing to capture the position after fierce hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, the remaining defenders at West Pinnacle initiated a desperate banzai charge towards Iso, where they were ultimately overwhelmed. Kelley then ordered Company I to conduct a probing assault on Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket, while Company C ascended Brewer's Hill but was unable to descend the steep side to join the fight. On April 24, no new attacks were launched due to a confusing mix-up of orders, but preparations were made for an assault the following day. After an artillery barrage, Bradford's task force finally attacked the Kakazu Pocket with four battalions; however, they faced no enemy resistance, as the Japanese had abandoned their positions overnight. To the east, the beleaguered defenders in front of the 96th Division had also retreated, leading to the fall of the Tanabaru Escarpment, its village, Hill 143, and the rest of Nishibaru Ridge without opposition. In a similar manner, the 17th Regiment ascended Hill 178 with only a few scattered artillery rounds landing nearby. The Japanese forces had resisted fiercely for five days, but with the first ring of Shuri defenses breached at multiple points, they chose to withdraw under the cover of heavy mist and light fog the night before. Even so, this advancement was minimal, and it was clear that reaching Shuri would take considerable time given the rate of progress over the first three and a half weeks of the operation. Nonetheless, Buckner believed that any significant landing on the Minatoga beaches or between Machinato airfield and Naha could not be logistically supported and would be vulnerable to strong enemy counterattacks. Therefore, he dismissed proposals to deploy the 77th Division or the 1st Marine Division for these efforts. Instead, it was decided to move the 3rd Marine Corps and the 77th Division from northern Okinawa and Iejima to replace the 24th Corps in the Shuri area. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In April 1945, the Allies launched the invasion of Borneo, led by General Morshead. Swift assaults secured strategic areas against demoralized Japanese troops. Despite fierce resistance, American forces gained ground, crippling Japanese defenses. This victory marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific War, signaling the end of Japanese influence in the region.

Last time we spoke about the First Okinawa Counteroffensive. The US Marines launched a formidable assault on Okinawa, confronting the entrenched Japanese 32nd Army. This dramatic struggle culminated in Operation Ten-Ichi-Go, Japan's final counteroffensive, marked by the ill-fated mission of the battleship Yamato, which met its demise under relentless air attacks. As American forces advanced, they faced significant resistance, particularly at the Shuri fortified zone. Colonel Yahara voiced concerns over a night counterattack planned for April 12, predicting disaster and chaos for disoriented troops unfamiliar with the terrain. Despite his warnings, Japanese forces executed a counteroffensive that faced harsh setbacks. As the Americans consolidated their gains, pressures mounted on their adversaries. Nevertheless, the relentless nature of the battle highlighted the stark contrast between the courage of the soldiers and the emerging futility of their cause, underscoring the inevitable tide of defeat facing Japan at this pivotal moment in history. This episode is the Invasion of Mindanao Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By April 18, significant progress had been made in the offensive operations against Iejima and the Motobu Peninsula, as seen in Iwo Jima; most notably, General Hodge's 24th Corps was prepared to launch a full-scale offensive to the south with three divisions in line. On the morning of April 19, following the successful initial advance of the 106th Regiment, the largest artillery concentration ever used in the Pacific War heralded the dawn attack. Simultaneously, the campaign's most extensive airstrike was carried out, bolstered by the naval bombardment from Admiral Spruance's fleet. The assault teams moved forward, optimistic that the heavy barrage had either destroyed the enemy or left them too dazed to fight back. However, they soon faced disappointment; the Japanese forces, sheltered in their caves, had emerged largely unscathed and quickly took up their positions. To the east, General Arnold's 7th Division launched an attack with the 32nd and 184th Regiments, targeting Skyline Ridge, Ouki Hill, and Hill 178. While most of the 32nd Regiment engaged the entrenched enemy on Skyline Ridge with support from armored flamethrowers, Colonel Finn's 2nd Battalion and Colonel Greene's 2nd Battalion advanced about 500 yards unopposed towards Ouki Hill, only to be halted by a fierce barrage of Japanese fire. As efforts to progress stalled throughout the day, they had to retreat, which also compelled Finn's beleaguered 3rd Battalion to withdraw. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 184th Regiment attempted to advance through the coral formations of the Rocky Crags but was quickly pinned down by the determined defenders. Two medium tanks and three armored flame throwers rumbled southward from the 7th Division's lines on the coastal flats, passed through Ouki, and quickly moved into position at the tip of Skyline Ridge. They poured shot and flame into the cluster of enemy-occupied tombs and emplacements at the lower extremity of the ridge. The long jets of orange flame probed all openings in the face of this part of Skyline, and dark, rolling masses of smoke billowed upward. This was a new spectacle for the waiting infantry, who watched fascinated. For the enemy who died in the searing flame inside their strong points, there was hardly time to become terror-stricken. This phase of the attack lasted fifteen minutes, and then, just after 0700, the infantry moved up. All the Japanese on the forward face of the tip had been killed by the flame, but there were others on the reverse side who denied any advance across the crest. The battle of the infantry quickly erupted and smoldered along the narrow knife-edge line of Skyline Ridge. American troops clung desperately to the forward slope through two Japanese counterattacks, in which the enemy crowded forward into his own mortar fire to hurl grenades and satchel charges. At the same time, General Bradley's 96th Division launched an assault with the 381st and 382nd Regiments advancing side by side, aiming for Nishibaru Ridge, Tombstone Ridge, and the Tanabaru Escarpment. The initial capture of several small hills west of Tombstone Ridge went smoothly, but the 382nd faced stiffer resistance on Tombstone itself, managing to maintain a fragile position along the northwest edge of the ridge and partway down its west slope by nightfall. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 381st Regiment successfully took Kaniku while pushing toward Nishibaru Ridge. However, most of the assault was executed by the 3rd Battalion, which advanced under heavy fire over the ridge crest to the upper part of Nishibaru village, where it was ultimately halted and forced to retreat by resilient defenders. In General Griner's 27th Division sector, the 106th Regiment had already cleared Machinato Inlet and secured a position at the western end of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The 2nd Battalion attempted to push south following a successful night attack but encountered a series of caves, tombs, and tunnels west of Route 1, leading to a stalemate. This marked the beginning of what would later be termed the Item Pocket battle. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 105th Regiment conducted a frontal assault on Kakazu Ridge while Griner executed a sweeping tank maneuver around the east end of the ridge.  The only other 27th Division unit on the front line ready to join in the initial assault was the 1st Battalion of the 105th Infantry. This battalion was deployed along Kakazu Gorge, with Kakazu Ridge, immediately in front, its initial objective. Company C was on the left, next to the Ginowan-Shuri road; Companies B and A, in the order named, were to the west, the latter being initially in reserve. The attack of the 1st Battalion was planned to combine a frontal assault against the ridge with a sweeping tank attack around the east end of Kakazu Ridge. The two forces were to meet behind the ridge near the village of Kakazu and to join in a drive to the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment beyond. The Japanese had guessed that a tank-infantry attack would try to penetrate their lines between Nishibaru Ridge and Kakazu Ridge, and they had prepared carefully for it. Their plan was based on separating the infantry from the tanks. The 272d Independent Infantry Battalion alone devised a fire net of four machine guns, two antiaircraft guns, three regimental guns, and the 81-mm. mortars of the 2d Mortar Battalion to cover the saddle between the two ridges. The machine guns were sited at close range. In addition, two special squads of ten men each were sent forward to the saddle for close combat against the infantry. One group was almost entirely wiped out; the other had one noncommissioned officer wounded and three privates killed. The enemy defense also utilized the 47-mm. antitank guns of the 22d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion and close-quarters suicide assault squads. So thorough were these preparations that the Japanese boasted "Not an infantryman got through." It was here in the Kakazu-Urasoe-Mura Escarpment area that the most extensive reorganization of Japanese units had taken place just before the American attack. The remnants of badly shattered battalions were combined into a composite unit of about 1,400 men that consisted largely of members of the 272d Independent Infantry Battalion but also included elements of the 13th, 15th, and 23d Battalions. The 21st Independent Infantry Battalion stood ready to support the 272d. The 2d Light Machine Gun Battalion added its fire power. Although the infantry soon found themselves pinned down by intense Japanese fire, the tanks managed to reach Kakazu village, which was heavily damaged and set ablaze over the next three hours. Despite their efforts, the failure of the 1st Battalion eventually compelled the tanks to retreat, prompting the 2nd Battalion of the 105th Regiment to attempt an attack towards the eastern end of Kakazu Ridge without success. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion descended from Kakazu West, bypassed Kakazu village, and successfully reached the summit of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. This unexpected achievement led Colonel Winn to decide to reposition the remainder of the 105th around the western end of Kakazu Ridge to join the 3rd Battalion on the escarpment, effectively abandoning the main enemy front. In other areas of the escarpment, the 106th Regiment was unable to advance southward but managed to extend its lines eastward to connect with Winn's 3rd Battalion. Consequently, the major offensive on April 19 failed to produce any significant breakthrough, resulting in 720 casualties. To the north, General Shepherd initiated a final push toward the north coast on the same day, with the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments advancing through complex networks of caves and trenches facing minimal resistance, but they halted at the elevated terrain around Hill 302. Additionally, patrols from the 22nd Marines moved south from Hedo Misaki and successfully captured Aha on the eastern coast. On Iejima, General Bruce also persisted with his main offensive against the Japanese strongholds on Bloody Ridge, as the 3rd Battalion of the 305th Regiment advanced eastward against the northern section of Ie, while Colonel Hamilton's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacked northward. Backed by artillery and mortars, the infantry engaged in fierce skirmishes marked by hand-to-hand combat, moving from one stronghold to another. Following another preparatory bombardment, Colonel Smith initiated a second assault at 14:30, effectively capturing the slopes of the Pinnacle through a series of rushes despite intense machine-gun and mortar fire. Leading elements of the 306th came under intense mortar and small-arms fire as they left the line of departure 600 yards northeast of the base of Iegusugu. The Pinnacle loomed above them, its slopes covered with masses of torn and twisted vegetation. Describing the Pinnacle on the morning of the 20th, General Randle, assistant division commander of the 77th, stated: "It is a damned highly fortified position with caves three stories deep, each house concrete with machine guns in and under. Whole area of village and circumference of mountain a maze of machine gun, mortar, and gun positions little affected by artillery fire we have poured on. Even as this message was on its way to the 77th Division command post, the 306th was winning a hold on the formidable position. By the end of the day, Smith's 1st Battalion was positioned across the northern slopes of Iegusugu; the 3rd Battalion had advanced to within 400 yards of the peak on the eastern side; and the 2nd Battalion had pivoted south to keep pace with the other units of the 306th. Meanwhile, Hamilton's 2nd Battalion succeeded in securing the buildings on Government House Hill; Coolidge's 1st Battalion regained control of the hill from the east; Hamilton's 3rd Battalion established a line at the base of Iegusugu extending to the recently captured Bloody Ridge; and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion made limited progress as it moved slowly eastward. However, during the night, over 400 Japanese troops, including women armed with spears, launched a fierce counteroffensive against Bloody Ridge, nearly forcing the Americans off Government House Hill. By dawn on April 21, as the counterattack diminished, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion was dispatched to relieve the 2nd Battalion, starting the cleanup of the now-secured Bloody Ridge. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion also successfully repelled a strong counterattack from the north before resuming its advance eastward, destroying several enemy positions as it established a line extending south from a small lake at the southwest base of Iegusugu. In the meantime, the 306th Regiment strengthened its hold on Iegusugu throughout the morning, with the 3rd Battalion launching a successful assault on the eastern slopes, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions continued to clear caves and pillboxes on the northern and northwestern slopes. Shortly after noon, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion and Coolidge's 1st Battalion began advancing northward against light resistance to secure the southern slopes of Iegusugu. Simultaneously, Smith's 2nd Battalion and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion launched a coordinated assault to capture the southwest slopes, where they encountered stronger opposition. By mid-afternoon, all units at the Pinnacle were busy mopping up, systematically destroying and sealing the enemy's underground passages and strongholds over the next five days. By midafternoon of April 21 all units on the Pinnacle were engaged in mopping up. The exterior of the Pinnacle was secure, but Japanese still remained in subterranean passages and strongholds from which they made sallies against the troops. The openings were systematically blown out and sealed off. The 307th alone captured or destroyed during the day five 81-mm mortars, five knee mortars, one 75-mm howitzer, and two 47-mm anti-tank guns. These were some of the weapons that had held the Americans off Bloody Ridge for three days. For five days after Ie Shima was declared secure, elements of the 77th Division mopped up remaining groups of the enemy, sealed caves, destroyed pillboxes, marked or removed the thousands of mines that were still on the island, and buried the dead. During this period hundreds of Japanese were killed in and around the Pinnacle, in the town of Ie, and in caves along the coast line. Removal of mines on the airfield and on the roads feeding it was given priority in order to speed up airfield construction. The last noteworthy encounter on Iejima came during the night of April 22-23, when a group of Japanese soldiers and civilians, including women, all armed with rifles, grenades, and demolitions, rushed from caves on Iegusugu toward the lines of the 306th. They were all cut down without loss to American troops. Ultimately, during the six-day battle on Iejima, the Americans killed 4,706 Japanese soldiers and captured 149, suffering 172 killed, 902 wounded, and 46 missing. Meanwhile, on April 20, the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments reached the north coast after eliminating organized resistance on the Motobu Peninsula, resulting in over 2,000 Japanese fatalities, while Shepherd's Marines incurred 207 killed, 757 wounded, and six missing. The Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion seized Yagachi Island on April 21 and occupied Sesoko Island on April 22, with the 6th Reconnaissance Company making the final landing on Kouri Island on April 23. Following a night reconnaissance in rubber boats, the battalion, transported by armored amphibians, seized Yagachi Shima on 21 April. A leper colony of some 800 adults and 50 children was located on this island, but no resistance was encountered. Because aerial reconnaissance had reported Sesoko Shima to be occupied and defended, it was decided to launch an attack on that island with one reinforced regiment. But preliminary to the attack, a native was captured during an amphibious reconnaissance of the objective who revealed that the island was probably not occupied. A successive physical reconnaissance confirmed his statements. Consequently, Major Jones' command was also assigned this mission, and the battalion occupied Sesoko Shima on 22 April. Although no opposition was met, the operation was interfered with by more than 100 civilians, moving by canoe from islands to the west where food was running low, and "considerable difficulty was involved in coralling and controlling" them. On 23 April the 6th Reconnaissance Company, also mounted on and supported by LVT(A)s, executed a daylight landing on Kouri Shima, likewise finding no resistance. Concurrently, while the 29th Marines remained on the Motobu Peninsula, the 4th Marines moved to their designated area in northern Okinawa to assist the 22nd Marines in mopping-up operations, searching the mountainous interior for remnants of the Udo Force and independent guerrilla groups. Finally, on April 28, Colonel Udo's final 200 surviving members were successfully intercepted and eliminated while attempting to flee to the east coast, effectively concluding the northern Okinawa operation. It's now time to leave Okinawa and return to the southern Philippines to oversee the continuation of General Eichelberger's operations. By the end of March, General Arnold's Americal Division had successfully taken control of Cebu City and Lahug Airfield, but was encountering stronger resistance in the northern hills. By the end of March the Americal Division had acquired a good idea of the nature and extent of General Manjome's principal defenses, and had learned that it had already overrun some of the strongpoints along the Japanese outpost line of resistance. On the other hand, the division had not been able to pinpoint the Japanese flanks. With the enemy firmly entrenched and having all the advantages of observation, General Arnold knew that the process of reducing Manjome's positions would be slow and costly no matter what type of maneuver the Americal Division employed. Lacking the strength required for wide envelopments and specific information about the Japanese flanks, Arnold hoped he might achieve decisive results with a single sledgehammer blow against the Japanese center. He therefore decided to use the bulk of his strength in a frontal assault into the hills due north of Cebu City. Consequently, on April 1, the 182nd Regiment, supported by Colonel Cushing's guerrillas, launched a direct assault on the Japanese center, while the 132nd Regiment advanced along the west bank of the Butuanoan River and then moved westward to flank General Manjome's left. Despite slow progress and heavy casualties, by April 11, the 182nd had diminished most of the significant defensive positions along the center of Manjome's second line, and the 132nd had managed to flank the Japanese left, reaching a crucial location on the far left of Manjome's final defensive positions. Additionally, the 164th Regiment had landed to bolster the offensive and was quickly advancing through the Mananga Valley to encircle the Japanese right and rear. By April 13, the 164th reached Babag Ridge, but its surprise attack was promptly repelled by the defenders. Meanwhile, the 132nd and 182nd Regiments resumed their assaults, with the latter capturing the last stronghold along the Japanese second line. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Manjome had already concluded that further resistance was futile and ordered a general withdrawal northward to begin the night of April 16. In the days that followed, Arnold's three regiments engaged in a series of costly small unit attacks, gradually gaining ground, inch by inch. On April 17, organized resistance in the Japanese stronghold began to falter as defenders retreated, and by evening, the Americal Division had neutralized all of Manjome's significant fortifications. In response to the Japanese withdrawal, the Americal Division quickly initiated a pursuit operation, successfully cutting off the retreat route to the remaining forces of the 1st Division in northern Cebu by the end of the month. By the first week of May, the 132nd Regiment launched an offensive to dismantle General Kataoka's organized resistance, aided by guerrilla forces, and largely achieved its objective in a campaign that lasted until the month's end. The Americans and Filipinos then focused on mopping up the remnants of Manjome's forces, effectively eliminating the last pockets of Japanese resistance on Cebu by June 20. Meanwhile, on April 11, the 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on Bohol at beaches already secured by Major Ismael Ingeniero's guerrillas. Patrols soon located the Japanese garrison inland, leading to the battalion's assault on its main positions from April 17 to April 20, culminating in the overrunning of the last organized opposition by April 23. On April 26, the remaining elements of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on southern Negros and moved inland to search for the Japanese garrison. By April 28, they discovered the 174th Independent Battalion, but their initial attacks were successfully thwarted by the defenders. Nonetheless, a coordinated offensive commenced on May 6, which successfully compelled the Japanese to retreat and disperse by the end of the month. The 164th then neutralized a final resistance pocket between June 7 and 12, effectively ending Japanese opposition on Negros and completing the 8th Army's campaign to reclaim the central Visayan Islands. Eichelberger's operations in the southern Philippines were far from over, as Major-General Franklin Sibert's 10th Corps, comprising the reinforced 24th and 31st Divisions, was preparing to launch the invasion of Mindanao, known as Operation Victor V. The initial strategy had Major-General Roscoe Woodruff's 24th Division landing on the shores of Illana Bay on April 17 to quickly secure the Malabang-Cotabato area, followed by Major-General Clarence Martin's 31st Division five days later for the final advance toward Davao.  Illana Bay lies nearly a hundred miles northwest of the main objective in eastern Mindanao, the Davao area, and only a poor road connects its beaches to Davao. Still, 8th Army had ample reason to select Illana Bay as the site of the initial assault. For one thing, the army knew that the Japanese had their main concentrations in the Davao region, where they seemed especially well prepared to repel an amphibious assault. It would be foolish to stick one's hand into a hornet's nest if there were no urgency for such action, and 8th Army could not, of course, avoid the long view that the eastern Mindanao operation was in essence a mopping-up campaign rather than an action of great strategic importance. Second, the Illana Bay area was relatively weakly defended--the 24th Division would have a much better chance to achieve tactical surprise there. Finally, 10th Corps would have to seize and rehabilitate an airstrip quickly so that land-based aircraft could provide proper support for subsequent operations in eastern Mindanao, other air bases being too distant. A reasonably good strip existed at Malabang, on the northwestern shore of Illana Bay. Given the estimate that the Japanese maintained a weak garrison at Illana Bay, Malabang seemed the spot for the main assault. However, by early April, Colonel Wendell Fertig's guerrilla forces had taken control of the entire Malabang region, forcing the Japanese garrison to retreat. Consequently, Sibert adjusted his plan, directing Rear-Admiral Albert Noble's Task Group 78.2 to deploy only one battalion at Malabang, with the remaining forces of the 24th Division landing near Parang. The Japanese forces in Mindanao numbered over 43,000, including troops from Lieutenant-General Morozumi Gyosaku's 30th Division, Lieutenant-General Harada Jiro's 100th Division, and Rear-Admiral Doi Naoji's 32nd Naval Special Base Force. General Suzuki of the 35th Army was in overall command of these troops, but he first needed to escape from Cebu to assert his authority. Thus, Suzuki and his staff departed northern Cebu on April 10, using five landing craft. Unfortunately, the boats became separated, leading to an emergency landing near Dumaguete before they could continue their journey on the night of April 16. Tragically, Suzuki's vessel was intercepted and destroyed by a PT boat off the southern tip of Cebu on April 17. Only his chief of staff, Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, managed to reach Cagayan on the night of April 20 after several days adrift. Nominal command in Mindanao rested with General Morozumi, who became de jure commander of the 35th Army after General Suzuki's death during the latter's voyage from Cebu. But Morozumi chose not to exercise his authority except insofar as to largely ignore advice from General Tomochika, 35th Army chief of staff, who reached Mindanao in late April. Beset with formidable communications difficulties, and realizing that most inhospitable terrain separated the main bodies of the 30th and 100th Divisions, Morozumi believed he could render his best service by staying with the 30th, leaving General Harada and Admiral Doi more or less to their own devices. Neither Harada nor Morozumi had any offensive missions. Rather, in accordance with Yamashita's December 1944 plans, the Japanese on Mindanao were to direct their efforts to pinning down as many American units as possible in order to delay the progress of the war. Harada and Morozumi had little hope of conducting organized, major defensive operations for more than two months. Once American forces had overrun their prepared defenses, the two planned to retreat into largely unexplored mountains of east-central Mindanao, organizing a last-stand area like Yamashita's in the Asin Valley of northern Luzon. The 30th and 100th Divisions were not in good shape to conduct a delaying, defensive operation either. Hopelessly isolated, short of artillery, small arms ammunition, transportation, and communications equipment, they had no chance of obtaining supplies. They had some stocks of food, but their transportation shortage, coupled with the poor condition of eastern Mindanao roads would make it most difficult for the Japanese to move their food from central depots to the mountains. The Japanese commanders thus knew that once an invasion of eastern Mindanao began they would enter upon a battle they could not win, and they definitely had no relish for a defense to the death in place.  After an uneventful journey, Sibert's 10th Corps began landing on Mindanao on the morning of April 17. Troops from the 533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment went ashore on the small Ibus Island, while the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment joined Fertig's guerrillas on the beach near Malabang. Company K secured Bongo Island without opposition. At 09:00, after an unnecessary two-hour bombardment by cruisers and destroyers, the 19th Regiment landed at Parang without encountering any resistance, followed by most of the 21st Regiment. That afternoon, the 19th Regiment secured the entire Parang area, and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop scouted the shores of Polloc Harbor and the northern entrance of the Mindanao River, finding them clear. On April 18, Sibert launched an assault towards Fort Pikit, with the 19th Regiment advancing along Route 1 and the 21st Regiment utilizing the Mindanao River. The 21st's advance was quicker, successfully reaching Paidu-Pulangi the next day. However, the 19th Regiment lagged due to poor road conditions and some enemy resistance, leading Woodruff to order the 21st to withdraw downstream for the night. On April 21, a battalion from the 34th Regiment arrived at Paidu-Pulangi, advancing both overland and along the river to reach Fort Pikit late in the afternoon. The isolated 166th Independent Battalion was ultimately destroyed, with the 19th finally arriving at Fort Pikit on April 23. Meanwhile, the 34th continued to push forward and secured the Kabacan junction of Route 1 and Sayre Highway. This quick capture of the junction effectively separated the 30th and 100th Divisions and opened two routes of attack: north along the Sayre and southeast towards Davao. Consequently, the newly arrived 31st Division was tasked with sending its 124th Regiment to assault the 30th Division's forces in northern Mindanao, while the 34th Regiment continued its advance along Route 1 towards Digos and Davao. In response, Morozumi dispatched reinforcements under Colonel Ouchi Koretake to block any enemy progress past Omonay, while fortifying the Malaybalay area. By this time, General Morozumi had swung into action in an attempt to stem the enemy advance before it moved north into central Mindanao. Colonel Ouchi, commander of the 30th Engineer Regiment, was ordered about April 22 to take command of operations along the southern approaches and to annihilate the enemy south of the east-west line running through Omonay. For this mission he was given command of the South Sector Unit, as well as his engineer units. On April 23, General Tomochika, Chief of Staff of 35th Army, arrived at the 30th Division command post at Impalutao from Agusan, where he had arrived on April 21 from Cebu. Tomochika immediately conferred with Morozumi regarding implementation of the Army policy of protracted resistance. As a result of this discussion, Morozumi concluded that it was necessary to strengthen the Malaybalay area. He therefore ordered the transfer of the 1st Battalion, 77th Regiment from the North Sector Unit to the Central Sector Unit and the movement of this battalion to new positions near Malaybalay. About the same date Morozumi ordered the Surigao Sector Unit to move from Ampayon to the Waloe area, where it was to assist in carrying out the division's self-sufficiency program. Although the 30th Division commander thus adopted measures to strengthen the area of final resistance, he still considered the landing near Parang a secondary invasion and estimated that the main enemy landing would soon be launched in the Macajalar Bay area. The preponderance of division strength was therefore retained in the north.  Led by the 24th Reconnaissance Troop, the 34th Regiment quickly departed from Kabacan on April 24. Although progress was hampered primarily by destroyed bridges and the poor condition of Route 1, the troops successfully arrived at the outskirts of Digos by April 27, where they faced approximately 3,350 enemy troops. The Japanese forces urgently prepared to defend against the 24th Division's assault but could only hold out until the early hours of April 28, when they retreated to the foothills of Mount Apo to the north. Elements of the 34th Regiment pursued the withdrawing Japanese, who maintained their position in the Mount Apo region until May 9, when they retreated north to regroup with the rest of the 100th Division. Meanwhile, other units of the 34th and the guerrilla 108th Division began patrolling the Davao Gulf coast, which they successfully cleared by May 12. Additionally, the 19th Regiment advanced from Kabacan to Digos, passed through the 34th, and started moving north towards Davao. Facing little resistance along Route 1, the 19th Regiment overwhelmed the last opposition in front of the city and successfully occupied Davao by May 3 with minimal opposition. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of April 27, the 124th Regiment departed from Kabacan and quickly confronted the 1st Battalion, 74th Regiment, causing it to retreat in disarray. The 124th then pressed on to the north, facing minimal resistance, and ultimately arrived in Kibawe by May 3. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The US invasion of Mindanao commenced under General Eichelberger. The initial assault targeted Illana Bay, with American forces quickly securing key areas. Japanese troops, suffering from low morale and inadequate supplies, struggled to mount an effective defense. The campaign marked a pivotal advance in the Pacific War, laying groundwork for further operations.

Last time we spoke about Yamato's Last Stand. In the spring of 1945, as WW2 intensified, the US Marines commenced a fierce assault on Okinawa. Amidst heavy bombardment, the Japanese 32nd Army fortified their positions, preparing for a desperate counteroffensive. Codenamed Operation Ten-Ichi-Go, Japan's final bid involved the legendary battleship Yamato, tasked with a suicidal mission to confront the American fleet. On April 7, 1945, as the Yamato sailed towards its fate, American forces were ready. Hundreds of aircraft descended upon the ship in a coordinated attack, unleashing bombs and torpedoes. Despite its infamous firepower, Yamato struggled against the relentless onslaught. With its systems failing, Captain Aruga and Admiral Ito made the agonizing decision to go down with their ship. As the proud battleship sank, it symbolized both Japan's indomitable spirit and the crushing weight of defeat, forever etching its story into the annals of military history. This episode is the First Okinawa Counteroffensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Picking up from last time. The Japanese naval-air counteroffensive against Admiral Spruance's forces at Okinawa had been decisively defeated with minimal losses, allowing General Buckner's 10th Army to proceed with the land offensive largely without interference. While General Geiger's Marines advanced toward the sparse Japanese defenses in northern Okinawa, General Hodge's 24th Corps in the south encountered the main enemy line of resistance centered around the Shuri fortified zone. Initially, the 32nd Army had declined to launch a land counteroffensive in conjunction with Operation Ten-Go and the Yamato's suicide attack, fearing that the Americans might execute another amphibious landing at Machinato while the Japanese wasted their strength in a futile effort to reclaim the airfields. However, pressure from Tokyo and Formosa compelled General Ushijima to resume planning for this operation. Ultimately, it was decided that instead of initiating a broad counterattack, the Japanese would deploy a brigade-strength force overnight on April 12 to breach the American lines and advance approximately six miles. If successful, this would be followed by a general attack. Accordingly, Colonel Yoshida Masaru's 22nd Regiment was assigned to the 62nd Division and assembled northeast of Shuri, tasked with attacking through enemy lines east of the Ginowan Road and advancing toward Shimabuku. To bolster this offensive, General Fujioka was also instructed to deploy three reserve battalions for a three-pronged attack from the west aimed at Chatan. However, Colonel Yahara, 32nd Army operations chief, strongly opposed the counterattack plan, feeling that it was not in keeping with the army's defensive mission and that it would waste men. He succeeded in getting the 1st Battalion of the 22d Regiment and elements of the 23d IIB cut from the counterattack force. He made a dire prediction that the infiltrating units, unfamiliar with the terrain in their attack sectors, would get lost, confused, and cut to pieces during a night assault. Taking a sidenote here, I read Yahara's rather famous novel about his experience of the battle for Okinawa and I highly recommend it to all of you. It's a great insight into the perspective of the Japanese and how the leadership were beginning to change their mind on how to go about the war. Yahara, acting without Ushijima's knowledge, advised Fujioka to commit only four battalions to the attack, predicting it would inevitably fail. Meanwhile, the American offensive was still in progress. On April 9, as Major-General George Griner's 27th Division landed at the Orange Beaches near Kadena, the ships of Colonel Waltern Winn's 105th Regiment met with Admiral Blandy's Eastern Islands Attack and Fire Support Group at the Kerama Islands, preparing to move to Tsugen Island overnight. Following a preliminary air and naval bombardment, which saw some Japanese mortar fire in response, Winn's 3rd Battalion successfully landed on the morning of April 10. The Americans then advanced inland with light resistance, quickly securing the northern part of the island but failing to overrun the entrenched enemy positions in Tsugen village. The assault continued the next day against persistent opposition, but organized resistance gradually diminished, allowing the Americans to secure the rest of the island by nightfall, marking the conclusion of the Eastern Islands operation. On April 11, General Shepherd's Marines continued to probe for the main enemy positions in northern Okinawa; the 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines patrolled eastward from their new base at Shana Wan, while the 29th Marines advanced toward Manna. Due to this progress, Buckner decided to fully merge Phases I and II, ordering the 77th Division to capture Iejima on April 16. To the south, Colonel Albert Stebbins's 106th Regiment was attached to the 96th Division, moving toward that division's reserve area, while Colonel Gerard Kelley's 165th Regiment relieved the 17th Regiment in the corps service area. Most significantly, General Bradley continued his attacks on Kakazu Ridge, with the 1st Battalion, 381st Regiment attempting to assault the western slopes but halted short of the ridge crest by determined defenders. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion, 383rd Regiment pushed up the northwest slopes of Kakazu Ridge but was also pinned down by intense Japanese fire. Simultaneously, following an intense artillery bombardment, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment finally succeeded in breaking into Ouki. However, additional reinforcements were thwarted by heavy Japanese fire, forcing the troops to retreat. With no further advancements, the 7th Division and the 382nd Regiment were relegated to patrolling and mopping up their designated areas over the next few days. At sea, Admiral Ugaki resumed his kamikaze assaults that day, damaging the carriers Essex and Enterprise, the battleship Missouri, and eight destroyers. However, his primary operation commenced on April 12, when he launched approximately 380 aircraft for a second mass Kikisui attack, primarily targeting Admiral Turner's Task Force 51 west of Okinawa. Thanks to cryptanalysis warnings, Turner scrambled his own fighter planes, which successfully shot down 298 Japanese aircraft. Despite attempting numerous missions, Kanoya's specially trained 721st Kokutai Jinrai-Butai “Divine Thunder” unit had so far failed to launch a single Ohka suicide rocket against the Americans. On April 12, however, eight Betty bombers would finally launch six Ohkas against the 5th Fleet, although five Betties never returned. At RPS-14, about 70nm northwest of Okinawa, a Zero plowed into Mannert L. Abele's engine room at 14:40, its 500lb bomb exploding and leaving the destroyer dead in the water. One minute later an Ohka came screaming in at 575mph, slammed into Mannert L. Abele and exploded. She sank in five minutes, losing 97 dead. Mannert L. Abele was the first destroyer hit by an Ohka and the last sunk by one. Destroyer-minesweeper Jeffers, en route to assist Mannert L. Abele, observed a twin-engined bomber eight miles away drop a smoking “belly tank” that suddenly rocketed towards Jeffers “at terrific speed.” Numerous 40mm hits and hard maneuvering saw the Ohka miss Jeffers astern and disintegrate. Additionally 3 battleships, 14 destroyers, 2 destroyer minesweepers, and another landing craft were damaged. Meanwhile, Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57 was ordered to strike the Shinchiku and Matsuyama airfields in northern Formosa, and over the next two days, 48 Avengers and 40 fighters successfully attacked Shinchiku and Kiirun Harbor. On Okinawa, the 6th Reconnaissance Company captured Bise Saki with minimal resistance, while the 29th Marines faced significant opposition southeast of Manna near Mount Yae-Take, indicating where the main enemy forces were located. This prompted Shepherd to reposition the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines to Awa as his new divisional reserve. At the same time, Japanese guerrillas managed to retake Ishikawa, which they would hold for the following two days. Facing south, the 96th Division made another attempt to capture Kakazu but was once again thwarted by the determined defenders. By this time, approximately 5,750 Japanese soldiers were estimated to have been killed in the southern region, while the 24th Corps suffered losses of 451 men killed, 2,198 wounded, and 241 missing. In the afternoon of April 12, 1945, in Warm Springs, Georgia, while sitting for a portrait by Elizabeth Shoumatoff, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said: "I have a terrific headache." He then slumped forward in his chair, unconscious, and was carried into his bedroom. The president's attending cardiologist, Howard Bruenn, diagnosed a massive intracerebral hemorrhage. At 3:35 pm, Roosevelt died at the age of 63. His declining health had been kept secret from the public, leading to shock and sorrow worldwide upon the news of his death. Harry Truman, who was serving as vice president in 1945, succeeded FDR as president. Meanwhile, back in Okinawa, Fujioka initiated his counteroffensive after a heavy artillery bombardment, advancing his four battalions to secretly infiltrate the American lines. On the eastern front, the 22nd Regiment struggled to advance due to becoming disoriented in unfamiliar terrain.  The night attacks suffered from several unexpected problems. Heavy shelling had changed the landscape, blasting away villages and thickets, so that even though night infiltrators knew their maps and thought they knew the terrain, they lacked the landmarks needed to tell them where they actually were. Moreover, frequent illumination shells forced the eyes of night infiltrators to adjust so many times that their capacity to adjust was lost. They became temporarily blinded and so were unable to move. Because of the unfamiliar terrain and flash blindness, the Japanese night fighters had difficulty reaching their assigned objectives. In fact, it was hard for them to reach their jumping-off points. Continuous naval bombardment of crossroads and bridges forced units to rush across in small groups between shells so that the units became strung out on the roads and difficult to control. It was hard to move heavy ammunition and supplies forward because of these interdiction points and the generally churned up roads. Even when units reached their northward assembly points safely by night, they were immediately exposed to aerial observation and artillery fire at dawn, since they lacked enough time to dig in. Units that attacked across American lines safely in darkness had the same problem: they lacked time to dig in and so were utterly exposed to artillery fire at morning light. Night attacks, like flanking maneuvers, were a kind of cure-all in prewar Japanese doctrine. But they failed to provide the expeditious results on Okinawa that IJA doctrine had led the 32d Army Staff to expect. Consequently, Yoshida's four infiltration attempts, each involving about a squad, were effectively repelled by troops from the 32nd, 184th, and 382nd Regiments before midnight. The only significant attack came from around 45 Japanese soldiers against the positions held by Company G of the 184th, which quickly returned fire, forcing the enemy to retreat to their caves and trenches. In contrast, the assault on the 96th Division on the western front was intense, sustained, and well-coordinated. The forward units of Major-General Nakajima Tokutaro's 63rd Brigade launched their own local offensive to maintain pressure on the thin line held by the 382nd and 383rd Regiments, while elements from the 23rd, 272nd, and 273rd Independent Battalions infiltrated the American lines and moved into the Ginowan area. The majority of the 272nd Division launched an assault on American positions at Kakazu Ridge, enduring intense naval and artillery fire but ultimately being repelled by the determined defenders after several hours of combat. By morning, the bodies of 317 enemy soldiers were counted on the ridge, whereas the Americans suffered 50 casualties. Meanwhile, the 273rd Division attacked along the west coast against the recently arrived 2nd Battalion of the 106th Regiment, which decisively repelled the Japanese assault and nearly annihilated the independent battalion. Despite this, some units from the 23rd and 272nd Independent Battalions managed to penetrate approximately 1,000 yards behind American lines between Nishibaru and Kaniku but became isolated after dawn on April 13. Throughout the day, Bradley's troops worked to eliminate these infiltrators, many of whom detonated explosives when trapped. When these units retreated into Japanese lines later that night, only half of their original numbers had survived. Just before midnight, the reserve 9th Company of the 22nd Regiment launched an attack against the 184th Regiment following preparatory artillery fire, but this offensive was quickly disrupted by artillery, mortars, and machine-gun fire. On April 14, Nakajima's forces attempted two more assaults on Kakazu in the early hours, but these attempts were similarly thwarted by artillery and machine-gun fire. Given the failures of the offensives, Ushijima had no choice but to order a suspension of the attack, resulting in a shift to a defensive posture for the Japanese. Over the two days of combat, the 24th Corps reported killing 1,594 Japanese soldiers and capturing four, with losses of fewer than 100 American troops. In the northern region, an extensive air and naval bombardment of Iejima commenced while the Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed on Minna Island, securing it without encountering resistance to position artillery units for General Bruce's upcoming attack, which would involve the 305th and 306th Regiments. Meanwhile, in northern Okinawa, the 29th Marines continued to advance against enemy positions at Yae-Take through vigorous patrolling, preparing for a morning assault the next day. Concerned about the pace of progress, Shepherd relieved Colonel Bleasdale of command, replacing him with veteran Colonel William Whaling. However, Shepherd recognized that taking the 1,200-foot summit would require more than one regiment, so he ordered the 4th Marines to move from the east coast to Yofuke and then to the southwest corner of the Motobu Peninsula. Additionally, Colonel Shapley's 3rd Battalion was tasked with moving to Kawada, while the reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 22nd Marines rapidly advanced up the west coast to secure Hedo Misaki. On April 14, Shepherd initiated a coordinated assault on Yae-Take, with Whaling's 3rd Battalion and Shapley's 2nd Battalion advancing from the area around Toguchi against unexpectedly light resistance, while the rest of the 29th Marines moved out from Itomi to clear the Itomi-Toguchi Road. Although the eastern front faced strong opposition and required a change in strategy to advance southwesterly for better elevation advantage, rapid progress was made on the west, prompting Shapley to commit his reserve 1st Battalion to secure the exposed right flank. At the same time, Whaling's 3rd Battalion and Shapley's 2nd Battalion continued their advance against significantly strengthened enemy resistance, ultimately capturing another ridge located 1,000 yards ahead. Initial opposition consisted of small enemy groups. These hostile covering forces employed every available means to delay and disorganize the advance, and to mislead the attackers as to the location of the battle position. The Japanese would lie in concealment, with weapons zeroed in on a portion of a trail, allowing a considerable number of Marines to pass before opening up on a choice target. An entire platoon was permitted to pass a point on a trail without interference, but when the company commander reached that point with his headquarters section, a burst of machine-gun fire killed him and several others. Officer casualties were excessively high. In an area in which there had been no firing for over half an hour, Major Bernard W. Green, commanding the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, was killed instantly by machine-gun fire. No one else was hurt, although Major Green was standing with his operations and intelligence officers on either side of him. Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, Regimental Executive Officer, assumed command of the battalion. "It was like fighting a phantom enemy." For while the hills and ravines were apparently swarming with Japanese, it was difficult to close with them. The small enemy groups, usually built around a heavy Hotchkiss machine gun augmented by Nambus, would frequently change positions in the dense vegetation. Hostile volleys elicited furious Marine fusillades into the area from whence the firing had come. But after laboriously working their way to the spot, the Marines came upon only an occasional bloodstain on the ground. Neither live nor dead Japanese were to be found. One Marine registered his impression of these tactics by blurting out, "Jeez, they've all got Nambus, but where are they?" Meanwhile, the 29th Marines advanced 800 yards up steep slopes despite facing fierce opposition; however, the 1st Battalion eventually found itself pinned down by intense Japanese gunfire. Additionally, Shapley's 3rd Battalion crossed the island via motor march to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Marines in division reserve, which then returned to its patrol base at Majiya. To the south, Hodge recognized the need for a full-scale effort to penetrate the fortified Shuri area, so he scheduled a corps attack involving three divisions abreast for April 19. In preparation, he dedicated the following four days to organizing the assault, with the 27th Division taking over from the 96th Division in the western region of its zone, while smaller local attacks were conducted to enhance forward positions. Aware of the impending major attack, the Japanese used this preparatory period to bolster their defenses with additional supporting weapons. Back to the north, on April 15, most of the 29th Marines consolidated their defenses on high ground and exerted constant pressure on the rear of the Yae-Take position through vigorous patrols to the west and northwest. On the other hand, Whaling's 3rd Battalion advanced east and south approximately 900 yards amidst heavy machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire before being halted by a strong enemy position on Hill 210. Additionally, the 4th Marines faced fierce resistance as Shapley's battalions finally secured Hill 200 and a critical hill mass just southwest of Yae-Take. Fully aware that his primary positions would soon be overrun, Colonel Udo decided to transition to guerrilla tactics by nightfall, relocating his command to the mountainous regions of northern Okinawa via Itomi. In light of these developments, the 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines was placed into division reserve at Awa to allow Shapley's 3rd Battalion to prepare for the following day's assault. On April 16, the offensive resumed, with Whaling's 3rd Battalion swiftly capturing Hill 210 in conjunction with Shapley's 2nd Battalion. Meanwhile, the rest of the 4th Marines secured a ridge just below Yae-Take by midday, while the 29th Marines applied continuous pressure on the rear of Udo's fortified stronghold. While the 4th Marines was storming the fortified position on Yae-Take, the 29th Marines maintained relentless pressure against its rear. The opposition which faced the 29th was similar to that on the front of the 4th. From log-revetted bunkers and occasional concrete emplacements the enemy resisted the advance with increasing stubbornness, supported by machine-guns, mortars, and artillery concealed in ravines and in caves on the high ground. Rugged terrain and an acute supply situation also contributed to the difficulties confronting the 29th Marines in accomplishing its task of clearing the high ground flanking the Itomi-Toguchi Road. The enemy displayed his usual ability to exploit the terrain and derived the maximum benefit from his weapons emplaced in caves and pits and concealed by natural cover. Particularly noteworthy was his use of 20mm dual-purpose cannon against personnel. Fire from these weapons on battalion CPs was a daily occurrence. All roads and natural avenues of approach were covered. Any attempt to move over the easier routes was met with bitter and effective resistance. Consequently, "the method of reducing the enemy positions followed a pattern of 'ridgehopping'," covered by the fires of all supporting weapons. This tactic enabled the attacker to envelop the hostile defenses and reduce them in detail. Numerous abandoned positions and weapons encountered by the 29th indicated that the determination of the Japanese to resist diminished considerably when they were taken from the flank. In contrast to a coordinated advance with all units in contact across a broad front, the action in the zone of the 29th Marines was characterized by attacks that, even when delivered simultaneously, constituted a series of local patrol actions to seize critical positions, followed by mopping up activity within the area. In the afternoon, Shapley's 1st and 3rd Battalions assaulted the formidable mountain, gradually making their way up the steep slope under light and scattered small-arms fire. However, as the Marines reached the peak, they encountered intense fire at close range, which quickly forced them to pull back. After a fierce and close engagement, the 1st Battalion ultimately regained control of Yae-Take, managing to hold the summit against strong Japanese counterattacks, aided by artillery support and Shapley's 2nd Battalion. Meanwhile, at dawn on April 16, two battleships, four cruisers, and seven destroyers under Rear-Admiral Bertram Rodgers launched a heavy bombardment on Iejima, while aircraft bombed and rocketed the island, dropping tanks of napalm on and behind the beaches. Approximately 2,000 Japanese troops, led by Major Igawa Masashi, had destroyed Iejima's airfields and strengthened the central eastern region of the island in an effort to entice the invaders to approach the vulnerable southeastern beaches. Their aim was to annihilate them with concentrated fire from numerous hidden positions in the Pinnacle and the town of Ie. However, the Americans saw through this strategy. Bruce's plan involved landing Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Coolidge's 305th Regiment on the Red Beaches along the southern coast of Iejima and Colonel Aubrey Smith's 306th Regiment on the Green Beach at the island's southwest tip. The 305th was tasked with advancing eastward to capture additional landing areas, while the 306th was to move north and take control of the airfield. Both regiments would then focus on neutralizing enemy strongholds at the island's eastern end. Following intense air and naval bombardments, amphibious tanks and subsequent waves of amphibious tractors surged toward the landing beaches that morning, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats. At 07:58, the forward elements of the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment successfully landed on the southern coast of Iejima, just south of the airfield, while the 3rd Battalion landed on a different beach, 600 yards to the left, three minutes later. At 08:07, the first waves of the 306th Regiment made landfall on Green Beach. The 305th moved swiftly inland over high dunes and then turned east toward Ie, while the 306th advanced 2,000 yards inland to the airfield's western edge, with the reserve 3rd Battalion securing the island's western end. By the afternoon, the troops advanced rapidly, seizing the airfield with only light resistance, achieving a total gain of about 5,500 yards by nightfall. Conversely, the 305th faced stiffer opposition on its way to Ie, managing to advance only about 800 yards eastward while defending against strong nighttime counterattacks. During the night of 16 April the enemy launched a coordinated attack on the 3d Battalion of the 305th. The attack came with suicidal recklessness. The Japanese were supported by mortars and 70-mm. guns, and were armed with small arms, sharpened stakes, bags of hand grenades, and literally hundreds of satchel charges, some of which had been improvised from mortar shells. Japanese worked up to the perimeters in small groups and either threw their satchel charges at close range or blew themselves up in an effort to take Americans with them. Some of the human bombs were successful, but most of the Japanese were killed before they came within effective range. One American had his arm broken by the flying leg of a Japanese soldier who had blown himself up. After hours of wild fighting in the dark the enemy withdrew, leaving 152 of his dead in and around the 3d Battalion's position.  While back at sea, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 had effectively launched attacks on Amami Oshima, Tokunoshima, Kikaijima, and southern Kyushu over the past four days, the Japanese responded with a series of scattered kamikaze assaults that caused damage to the battleship New York and four destroyers. On April 16, Ugaki initiated his third large-scale Kikisui attack, acutely aware that another failure in the air could spell the doom of Operation Ten-Go. Despite Mitscher's preemptive strikes against Kyushu, where Americans claimed to have destroyed 202 aircraft and damaged 79 at the cost of only nine planes, at least 289 Japanese attackers were still able to launch missions against Spruance's 5th Fleet. Although American interceptors and anti-aircraft fire recorded another 217 kills, the surviving kamikaze pilots managed to sink the destroyer Pringle and inflict damage on the carrier Intrepid, the battleship Missouri, three destroyers, two destroyer minesweepers, and two landing craft. Notably, the destroyer Laffey withstood six kamikaze impacts, four bomb hits, and numerous strafing runs, resulting in 32 fatalities and 71 injuries among its crew. The following day, a smaller attack on April 17 resulted in additional damage to the light carrier Bataan and one destroyer, yet Americans claimed another 49 kills. However, Ugaki had exhausted much of his strength since the invasion began and was left with approximately 598 operational planes. Meanwhile, fighting continued in northern Okinawa, where some surviving troops from Udo advanced toward Nakaoshi to escape the Motobu Peninsula. Supported by heavy artillery barrages and battleship gunfire, the 29th Marines slowly progressed over challenging terrain, encountering only light resistance, as they successfully secured the mountainous area ahead and connected with the 4th Marines. Shapley's 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their push northward toward the Itomi-Toguchi Road, swiftly advancing downhill and completely overwhelming all Japanese defenses in the region. By nightfall, the 4th and 29th Marines had positioned themselves along the elevated terrain overlooking the Itomi-Toguchi Road. The 305th resumed its assault, aiming to capture the high ground behind Red Beaches 3 and 4. The 1st Battalion encountered only minimal resistance along the coast, allowing them to make significant progress, while the 3rd Battalion quickly secured the high ground in its area before being halted by intense machine-gun fire from caves in the coral slopes to the north. A maneuvering strategy followed by an infantry-tank assault eventually neutralized this enemy position, enabling the advance to continue steadily until the 3rd Battalion reached the outskirts of Ie. Due to the strong resistance faced, Bruce opted to deploy Colonel Stephen Hamilton's 307th Regiment on the beaches southwest of Ie. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were subsequently landed there and launched an attack northeast, quickly advancing approximately 400 yards despite increasingly fierce resistance, ultimately being halted by heavy enemy fire from Bloody Ridge and Government House Hill. Meanwhile, the 306th Regiment maintained its defensive position while probing the enemy's fortifications around Iegusugu. The next day, the 306th began to pivot its right flank and launched an attack toward the Pinnacle with two battalions, making notable progress throughout the day. Concurrently, the 307th continued its advance into Ie despite facing heavy resistance, quickly reaching a standstill in front of Government House Hill. As a result, with the 2nd Battalion effectively immobilized, the decision was made to deploy the 3rd Battalion around to the right flank to launch an assault toward the northeast in the eastern part of the town, while the 3rd Battalion of the 305th Regiment advanced eastward toward Iegusugu. After a heavy preparation by the artillery on Minna Shima, the 3d Battalion, 305th, attacked at 1130 on an 800-yard front. A house-to-house fight ensued amid the rubble of Ie. "Every street became a phase line," one observer reported. The necessity of forming a connecting link over the wide area between the 306th and the 307th made the fight harder. Artillery was ineffective against many enemy positions and could not be used freely because other friendly units were so close by. Self-propelled guns were held up by mines and debris in the narrow streets. After working about halfway through the northwestern section of the town, the troops withdrew to a more secure position on the outskirts, their right (south) flank then being 500 yards west of Government House Hill, and their left (north) flank 100 yards west of the base of Iegusugu. They had made a net gain of only about 350 yards for the day. Similarly, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion achieved moderate success, advancing to a position 300 yards north of the village of Agarii-mae. To protect its right flank, the 1st Battalion of the 305th Regiment positioned itself alongside the 3rd Battalion of the 307th Regiment and launched a northern attack, gaining approximately 1000 yards by day's end before withdrawing to a position about 600 yards east of Agarii-mae. Medium tanks and self-propelled guns covered the gap that developed between the two battalions of the 307th. These weapons put direct fire into caves, pillboxes, and enemy gun positions in the town of Ie and the Pinnacle. They could not be moved close to the enemy positions, however; deadly machine-gun and mortar fire held the infantry back and left the armor vulnerable to suicide attacks by Japanese armed with satchel charges, who hid in holes until the tanks and guns came within range. Meanwhile, after four days of intense fighting, activities in the Motobu area on April 18 were limited to reorganization, consolidating the gains from the previous day, patrolling the Itomi-Toguchi Road, and resupplying. Looking south, Griner called for a nighttime preliminary attack to secure the Machinato Inlet and the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. As the area was shrouded in smoke during the afternoon, Company G of the 106th Regiment swiftly crossed the inlet and successfully secured Machinato by nightfall, while bridges were constructed at the inlet. The 106th then moved across the bridges, stealthily advancing toward the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment without encountering opposition. Near the summit, the troops launched a surprise ambush against the defenders, ultimately forcing the Japanese to retreat in chaos. With the escarpment secured by dawn, the 106th was prepared to participate in the general attack to the south. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The first Okinawa counteroffensive, as part of Operation Ten-Ichi-Go was not achieving results. Despite overwhelming sacrifices of men and supplies, it seemed hopeless for the Japanese on Okinawa. Those like Colonel Yahara could see the paint on the wall, much to their growing depression.

Last time we spoke about the January 28th Incident. In January of 1932, tensions escalated in Shanghai as anti-Japanese sentiments surged after Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Orchestrated by Yoshiko Kawashima, a Japanese spy, a provocation led to violence, sparking outrage among Japanese expatriates. Japan demanded apologies and compensation from China, threatening military action if their demands were unmet. As the Japanese military amassed forces in Shanghai, the Chinese 19th Route Army prepared to resist, igniting the conflict known as the January 28th Incident, marking the beginning of a fierce struggle for control. Amidst chaos, the Nanjing government struggled to respond to Japan's escalating aggression in Shanghai. Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized avoiding war, urging a diplomatic approach to protect Shanghai's economy. Despite pressure, the 19th Route Army was ordered to withdraw, but tensions flared when Japan attacked the Chinese garrison. The 19th Route Army fiercely resisted, leading to intense battles. As Japan sent reinforcements, Chiang faced mounting protests and criticism for his passive stance, questioning whether he could maintain his strategy against the encroaching enemy.   #144 The First Battle of Shanghai 1932 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we covered the January 28th Incident. At 11:30 pm on January 28, Japan ordered 2,300 Japanese Marines to advance westward along every branch road on the west side of North Sichuan Road, without waiting for a response. This road, which crosses into the northern area of the International Settlement and has frequently been designated as a Japanese defense zone, includes Target Road (now known as Wujin Road in Hongkou District, Shanghai), Qiujiang Road, and Yokohama Road. Their objective was to seize the Songhu Railway defense line at Tiantong'an Station. They faced strong resistance from the 19th Route Army, further escalating the conflict. In the early hours of the 29th, Japanese aircraft launched from the Notoro seaplane carrier, which was moored on the Huangpu River, attacked the Chinese district of Zhabei. Both the Commercial Press located at No. 584 Baoshan Road and the Oriental Library, the largest private library in China with over 300,000 books, were completely destroyed. That same day the 19th Route Army sent a telegram to the entire nation concerning the situation: Do forgive me it's a rough translation “Urgent. Dear Sir and Madam, the Japanese have occupied our three northeastern provinces, changing the color of our territory and making our nation perish. Recently, they have killed and set fire in Shanghai, and vagrants are everywhere, doing the most despicable and violent things in the world. Gunboats are coming one after another, and the Marines are all landed. At 12:00 a.m. on the 28th, they openly invaded our defense line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and challenged us. Guang Nai and others are soldiers, and they only know that it is their duty to defend themselves and defend their land. They cannot give up even an inch of land or an inch of grass. They resist to save the country and protect the race. Even if they sacrifice only one person and one bullet, they will never retreat and lose the personality of the soldiers of the Republic of China. This thing and this ambition are exposed to the sun and the sun and are known to the world. The spirits of our ancestors in heaven are truly relying on it”. On the morning of January 29, Chiang Kai-shek met with He Yingqin and Zhu Peide to discuss countermeasures. Simultaneously Zhu Peide convened a meeting with He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, Li Jishen, Deng Shizeng, Lin Wei, and others to address issues such as defense deployment, the security of Nanjing and the Yangtze River, and resistance against Japan. Chiang Kai-Shek established the principles going forward for negotiations with Japan, emphasizing the need to prepare for talks while actively resisting. He stated that negotiations must have a clear final line of defense and a maximum limit that would not compromise administrative and territorial integrity, undermine the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, or jeopardize national sovereignty. If these limits were exceeded and unacceptable concessions were made, a decisive battle would be fought, even at the cost of defeat and death.  The defense and military strategy for Beijing and Shanghai included the 19th Route Army defending Shanghai with full strength, while the front guard army consisting of the 87th and 88th divisions would protect Nanjing. He Yingqin would remain in Nanjing, overseeing all party, government, and military personnel left behind. Chiang, along with the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Government, and Chen Mingshu, all expressed their commitment to resisting Japanese aggression. Chiang also sent a telegram to He Chengjun, director of the Hubei Province Pacification Office, and Xu Tingyao, commander of the Fourth Division, stating "Last night, the Japanese invaders attacked our 19th Route Defense Line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and the battle is ongoing. Our army is determined to fight to the death. Their naval forces in Han and Xun will likely engage in military operations. We urge you to remain vigilant and defend yourselves, never yielding to them. The Fourth Division should concentrate on strict defense in Wuhan and avoid dispersal. If military funds become scarce, local governments will need to raise them independently." The National Government Military Committee appointed Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Xueliang as members responsible for mobilizing the army and commanding the Shanghai War. Chiang Kai-Shek officially resumed power after resigning to prevent a surrender and committed to a prolonged resistance. On January 30, the Chinese Nationalist Government announced the relocation of the capital to Luoyang. Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram urging resistance against the Japanese and dispatched the elite Fifth Army to reinforce Shanghai. That night, Dai Ji, the commander of the Songhu Garrison, took charge of military operations in Shanghai, overseeing the 19th Route Army. The commander-in-chief was Jiang Guangnai, with Cai Tingkai as the army commander and division commanders Qu Shounian, Mao Weishou, and Shen Guanghan. Chiang Kai-Shek then issued a telegram to his troops across the nation and again I apologize for the rough translation. "Since the Northeast Incident began, the Central Government has been enduring humiliation and maintaining peace in order to avoid war and protect the lifeline of the country. It hopes to use justice and fairness to awaken the Japanese pirates. Unexpectedly, the more we tolerate, the more arrogant they become. When the Shanghai Incident occurred, we accepted their demands with great pain, but the Japanese pirates still brazenly pressed on, repeatedly attacking our Shanghai Defense Force, bombing civilian houses, throwing bombs on the streets, and our compatriots were ravaged. The country is about to perish. Anyone with blood in his veins would rather endure it. Since the 19th Route Army has risen up to defend itself bravely, our entire army In this time of national destruction and extinction, when the revolutionary soldiers are facing imminent danger, they should fight for the dignity of the country, strive for the survival of the nation, fulfill their responsibilities for the revolution, and be determined to die rather than live in disgrace, so as to deal with the brutal Japan that destroys peace and despises faith and integrity... Chiang Kai-shek and his comrades have shared hardships for a long time. Although I am now in the opposition, I am willing to swear to live and die with the soldiers and fulfill my bounden duty. I am here to inform you in advance with my blood and sincerity, and ask you to be determined and work hard, share the same hatred with the enemy, do not be arrogant, maintain the spirit of sacrifice, stay ready to fight, and save the country from danger." From that day on, the various ministries, commissions and committees of the National Government began to move to Luoyang, but the Military Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained in Nanjing . At the same time, the frontline troops were ordered to be jointly commanded by the Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin and the Chief of the General Staff Zhu Peide.  Typically Chinese sources breakdown what is known as the First Battle of Shanghai into three phases. In the previous episode we looked through the event up until the point of the first phase. After the initial fighting, both the 19th route army and Japanese agreed to a ceasefire so they could strengthen their positions and at least allow some form of diplomacy to occur. This went into effect on the 29th. As we mentioned, immediately afterwards the Japanese rapidly began reinforcing their position in Shanghai. They first sent the Sasebo 26th Squadron on the 30th, bearing 474 troops of the Sasebo 3rd Special Marine Corps alongside supplies. The next day the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho came over with 30 aircraft from the 1st air fleet. Then the cruisers Naka, Yura and Abukuma alongside 4 torpedo boats came bearing another 2000 marines. On February 1st the Terukoku Maru brought over the Yokosuka 1st Special Marine corps, roughly 525 men who landed at Huishan Wharf. With all that said and done, roughly 7000 Japanese troops had been brought over. On February 1st, the IJN warships began bombarding Nanjing from the Yangtze River, prompting Yu Jishi to frantically demand Chiang Kai-Shek transfer more troops to Shanghai. That night the Japanese light cruiser Tenryu, the protected cruisers Hirado and Taima, and the seven ships of the Navy's 23rd Destroyer Squadron fired upon Nanjing using four 140mm guns, 12 152mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns, 12 120mm single-mounted guns, and 20 76mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns. The rich and officials fled the city for refuge, but the Japanese army did not land any men to follow up the attack. Simultaneously 40,000 Shanghai workers from over 20 Japanese owned cotton mills began an anti-Japanese strike, being heavily backed by Communists. The workers began aiding the 19th route army to blockade the Japanese in the factories and streets and sabotage what they could.  On February 2nd, the Japanese army attacked Wusong several times, but was repelled each time. On the 3rd the Japanese expanded their attacks against Zhabei, Baziqiao and other locations, but the Chinese defenders successfully repelled these assaults as well. On the 4th, the Japanese launched their first major offensive, which extended the conflict to Jiangwan and Wusong. Following a day of intense fighting, the Wusong fort was destroyed by enemy bombardment; however, the Japanese army was unable to land due to the determined resistance of the Chinese defenders. The anti-aircraft artillery company from the 88th Division, reassigned to the 4th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, managed to shoot down a Japanese aircraft. After the failure of the general offensive, Yukiichi Shiozawa was dismissed and sent back to Japan. Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, the newly appointed commander of the Third Fleet, succeeded Shiozawa. After Nomura assumed his role, the Japanese army began to bolster its forces. Japan had initially planned to deploy troops when tensions escalated in Shanghai, but the navy had opposed this move. However, as the situation deteriorated, the navy was compelled to seek assistance from the army. On February 2, the Japanese cabinet officially decided to send troops. In response to the urgent circumstances in Shanghai, they resolved to dispatch the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade, led by Brigade Commander Major General Shimomoto Kuma, along with the 9th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Ueda Kenkichi. The Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade and the Second Independent Tank Squadron were prioritized for transport. Concurrently, the Japanese Navy also sent the Yokosuka 2nd Special Marine Corps to Shanghai. The 24th Mixed Brigade landed in Wusong on the afternoon of February 7. By this time, the combined forces of the Japanese navy, army, and air force had exceeded 10,000 personnel. At dawn on February 8, the Japanese Army's 24th Mixed Brigade launched an attack on Zhanghuabang, Yunzaobang, and Wusong Town along three routes, but they were repelled by our forces. Meanwhile on February 4, the National Government Military Commission sent out a telegram that divided the country into four defense zones. The first zone, which includes the area north of the Yellow River, was assigned to Zhang Xueliang as the commander-in-chief. The second zone, covering the area south of the Yellow River, was placed under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. The third zone, encompassing the area south of the Yangtze River as well as Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, was led by He Yingqin. The fourth zone, which includes Guangdong and Guangxi, was commanded by Chen Jitang. The telegram also stated that, aside from maintaining troops for local stability, all commanders were to concentrate their forces within their respective defense zones to confront the aggressive Japanese. Additionally, a directive was issued for the provinces of Sichuan, Hunan, Guizhou, Hubei, Shaanxi, and Henan to send troops to serve as a general reserve. On February 5, upon learning that the Japanese army had been redeployed from mainland China to Shanghai, Chairman of the Military Commission Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram from Luoyang to He Yingqin. He instructed that if the Japanese forces landed, the Chinese Air Force would engage in combat. Additionally, Chiang sent a message of condolence to Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Dai Ji of the 19th Route Army, stating "Brothers, you have been fighting valiantly for a week. Each time I reflect on the tremendous sacrifices made by the soldiers and their dedication, I feel a deep sadness... If necessary, Zhong (Zheng) can come to lead in person. When the Air Force enters the fray, the Army must establish various signals in advance to communicate with it and ensure coordinated efforts..." On the same day, the 88th Division arrived in Suzhou. On February 6, Chiang ordered the 261st Brigade of the 87th Division to move from Nanjing to reinforce Kunshan. The troops reached Kunshan on February 7. On February 8, Chiang directed He Yingqin to transfer an artillery battalion to support the 19th Route Army. Then, on February 9, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the First Division, led by Commander Hu Zongnan, and the Seventh Division, commanded by Wang Jun, to prepare for reinforcement of the 19th Route Army in Shanghai. February 8th marks the second phase of the battle. On the 10th, to ensure that the 88th Division of the Central Army complied with the orders from the 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Army, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Yu Jishi insisting that "your troops must strictly follow the commands of Commander-in-Chief Chiang and coordinate their movements with allied forces." The Japanese Marine Corps, under Yukio Shiozawa, initiated a three-pronged encirclement attack from Hongkou. The National Army mounted a determined defense and ultimately repelled the Japanese forces, pursuing and destroying them, which significantly lowered their morale. On February 11, Chen Cheng, commander of the Central Army's 18th Army, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek from Ji'an, Jiangxi, reporting that the troops had not been paid for nearly two months and were lacking food. At that time, the National Government was planning to redeploy the National Army that had been engaged in suppressing the Communists in Jiangxi to Zhejiang and Shanghai and to relocate the capital to Luoyang.  On February 12, following a battle at Caojiaqiao, the Japanese army's strategy to consolidate their forces was entirely disrupted. The next morning, February 13, the Japanese 24th Mixed Brigade crossed the Caojiaqiao Bridge in Zhuozaobang and engaged with the Nationalist army. Seizing the moment, the 19th Route Army Headquarters aimed to annihilate the Japanese forces. The Nationalist army surrounded the Japanese troops near the Yong'an Cotton Mill. Additionally, 60 members of a suicide squad launched a suicide attack, resulting in the complete destruction of 1,600 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese army faced significant losses, thwarting their attempt to swiftly capture Wusong. On February 14, Chiang ordered the 88th and 87th Divisions, which were already stationed in Nanxiang and Kunshan near Shanghai, to be reorganized into the Fifth Army. He appointed Zhang Zhizhong, a volunteer eager to fight against the Japanese, as the commander of the Fifth Army. This new army was placed under the unified command of the 19th Route Army and took over the defense line stretching from the northern end of Jiangwan through Miaoxing to the western end of Wusong. It served as the left-wing army, while the 19th Route Army acted as the right-wing, tasked with defending Jiangwan, the area south of Dachang, and the urban region of Shanghai. To replenish the 19th Route Army's losses, Chiang repeatedly ordered reinforcements from various locations. For instance, on February 15, Shangguan Yunxiang dispatched 500 active soldiers from Bengbu to the 19th Route Army; on February 17, Liang Guanying sent 500 unarmed soldiers from Qingjiangpu; and on February 19, Liu Zhi contributed 1,000 active unarmed soldiers from Henan. On February 16, Chiang Kai-shek communicated with Finance Minister Song Ziwen via telegram, stating, "Since the Japanese refuse to withdraw their troops from Shanghai, we must resist until the end. ... Food supplies in Jiangxi and Henan will dwindle, and assistance will be completely halted. Please arrange to deposit 10 million yuan in central banknotes in Nanchang and 20 million yuan in Zhengzhou. This will allow the government to continue functioning, the army to be sustained, and perhaps we can navigate this crisis and avert collapse. This is my final request. I hope you can find a way to assist." To prevent any friction between the Fifth Army and the Nineteenth Route Army over competing for military accolades, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Zhang Zhizhong and Yu Jishi on February 18. "The fight against Japan is a matter of national survival and is not a matter of honor for an individual or a certain unit. Our frontline officers and men should fully understand this. Therefore, the honor of the 19th Route Army is the honor of our entire National Revolutionary Army. There is absolutely no distinction between honor and disgrace. The Fifth Army's joining the front line is feared by the enemy and will also be slandered by the reactionaries (those who oppose the Nanjing Central Government). If we can continue to fight in the name of the 19th Route Army, it will be enough to demonstrate the strength of our National Revolutionary Army. We will share life and death, let alone honor and disgrace. I hope that this will be conveyed to the officers and men of the Fifth Army. They must unite and fight with our 19th Route Army and make no sacrifices to complete the revolutionary mission." Over on the other side, following reports of significant losses suffered by the Japanese army in Wusong, Tokyo received an imperial decree from Emperor Hirohito demanding the Shanghai incident get settled quick. In response, Chief of Staff Zairen urgently ordered the 9th Army Division, commanded by Ueda Kenkichi, to swiftly reinforce Shanghai. By the afternoon of February 13, the main contingent of the 9th Division had arrived at Shanghai Port, and by February 16, all personnel had disembarked in Wusong. Consequently, Lieutenant General Ueda took over command from Nomura. At this point, the Japanese invading forces comprised over 30,000 troops from naval, land, and air units, along with 60 to 70 field artillery pieces, more than 60 aircraft, and dozens of ships concentrated at the Wusong mouth. Ueda issued a statement late on the night of the 13th, asserting, "If anyone obstructs our division from fulfilling its mission, we will take decisive action without hesitation." On the 18th, he sent an ultimatum to Cai Tingkai, demanding, "Your army must immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from the following areas by 5:00 p.m. on February 20: on the west bank of the Huangpu River, retreat from areas connecting the western end of the concession, Caojiadu Town, Zhoujiaqiao Town, and Pushong Town to the north; on the east bank, withdraw from areas connecting Lannidu and Zhangjialou Town to the north, and retreat to a zone 20 kilometers away from the border of each concession Additionally, all military installations in the specified areas must be dismantled and no new ones established. If these demands are not met, the Japanese army will have no choice but to act freely against your forces, and your army will bear all resulting consequences." In response to Ueda's ultimatum, Tsai and Chiang ordered their front-line troops to fire heavily at Japanese positions as a warning. On the morning of February 20, Ueda commanded a full-scale attack across the front, employing tactics to break through the center while flanking from both sides. The 9th Division led the assault on the junction of Jiangwan and Miaohang, aiming to encircle Wusong from the north with the Kurume Brigade and Zhabei with the Marine Corps from the south. The Japanese began with artillery bombardments, followed by infantry and tank assaults on the Zhanghuabang and Yangshupu lines, both of which were successfully repelled by Chinese defenders. Over a thousand Japanese soldiers and several tanks in Zhabei were killed or wounded due to landmines. On February 21, Ueda personally directed thousands of infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery, to attack the Chinese defensive positions. Both sides incurred heavy casualties, and the battle continued until dawn on the 23rd. The Japanese forces attempted to encircle Jiangwan Town from Jiangwan Station, but the Chinese defenders fought valiantly, launching multiple charges and capturing Japanese Major Kong Sheng along with hundreds of soldiers. Ultimately, the Japanese army was unable to withstand the resistance and began to retreat. After the Japanese 9th Division arrived in Shanghai, it prepared to initiate a second major assault on the defenders of the city. The strategy involved a comprehensive attack stretching from Zhabei to Wusong to contain the Chinese army's strength, with primary forces concentrated on Jiangwan and Miaohang. The goal was to seize these two strategic points, achieve a breakthrough in the center, sever the link between the 5th Army and the 19th Route Army, and then defeat them individually. At dawn on February 20, the Japanese dispatched over ten aircraft for reconnaissance and bombing missions over the Miaohang area. Naval artillery and heavy army cannons heavily shelled the Miaohang positions. Simultaneously, Japanese artillery bombarded the Yunzaobang area in an effort to force a crossing and facilitate the Miaohang offensive.   By 9 am, part of the Japanese forces advanced towards the Xiaochang Temple and the Maijiazhai position, immediately conducting a fire search on our troops' positions. At noon, 3,000 Japanese soldiers launched an attack against our forces. The officers and soldiers of the 527th Regiment, defending the Maijiazhai and Zhuyuandun positions, mounted a counterattack, marking the beginning of the Battle of Miaohang. After three hours of intense fighting, the Japanese suffered significant casualties and were unable to continue, retreating to their original positions. Following this, over 2,000 Japanese troops attacked the Xiaochang Temple and Jinjiatang positions. The officers and soldiers of the 523rd Regiment, taking cover in the trenches, launched counterattacks and successfully repelled the Japanese forces. As dusk fell, the Japanese infantry halted their assaults, but naval and land artillery continued to bombard our positions in an attempt to weaken our defenses and personnel for a renewed attack the following day. On February 21, Japanese artillery relentlessly shelled the positions of the 88th Division of the Fifth Army in Miaohang. Following this, thousands of Japanese infantry launched an assault on the Yanjiazhai and Miaohang Town front. As the Japanese forces advanced, the officers and soldiers of the 523rd and 524th Regiments bravely counterattacked and successfully repelled them. However, a significant number of enemy troops coordinated a comprehensive assault on the Maijiazhai, Zhuyuandun, Xiaochangmiao, and Yanjiazhai lines south of Miaohang. Our 523rd, 524th, and 527th Regiments engaged in intense combat with the enemy, particularly at the Zhuyuandun front near Maijiazhai and Xu Xu, where the fighting was especially fierce. After a day of conflict, the enemy was temporarily pushed back. On February 22, the Japanese 9th Division launched a full-scale attack on the Miaohang position held by the 88th Division of the Fifth Army. Throughout the day, aircraft bombed the Chinese defenders, and thousands of artillery shells were fired at them. However, under the direct command of Zhang Zhizhong, the enemy faced a devastating defeat due to the coordinated three-pronged assault by the Sun Yuanliang Brigade, the Song Xilian Brigade, and the 61st Division of the 19th Route Army. The Miaohang position was ultimately saved from peril, inflicting heavy casualties on the elite forces of the Japanese 9th Division and the Kurume Mixed Brigade. This victory became known as the "Miaohang Victory." In the days that followed, the enemy continued their bombardment and attacks but were consistently repelled by the defenders. The Japanese army suffered significant losses, shifting from an all-out offensive to a more focused approach before ultimately halting their attacks. By the 25th, Ueda's overall offensive strategy had also failed. On February 24, the Japanese army decided to escalate the conflict once more, transferring the 11th and 14th divisions from Japan to join the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, which included troops already engaged in the war. At that time, the flagship of the Japanese Navy's Third Fleet, the Izumo, sustained damage from a bombing raid carried out by the suicide squad of the 19th Route Army, which sent shockwaves through Japan. Additionally, the large troop presence made a quick resolution to the war impossible. Consequently, on the 23rd, the Japanese cabinet decided to promptly reinforce the army. The General Staff then established the Shanghai Expeditionary Army Command, appointing General Shirakawa Yoshinori, the former Minister of War in the Tanaka Cabinet, to replace Ueda. They dispatched the 11th Division (led by Lieutenant General Atsutarou Atsuto), the 14th Division (led by Lieutenant General Naoaki Matsuki), and over 100 aircraft to China to initiate a larger-scale offensive in Shanghai. After several reinforcements, the Japanese forces in Shanghai, under Shirakawa's command, grew to over 90,000 troops, supported by 80 warships and 300 aircraft, significantly enhancing their combat effectiveness. In contrast, the total strength of the Chinese defenders was less than 50,000, with inadequate equipment. After a month of intense fighting, the Chinese forces had suffered heavy losses, leaving their river defenses in the Taicang Liuhe area vulnerable. Learning from the failures of the previous three commanders' frontal assaults, Shirakawa opted to land at Liuhe and flank the Songhu defenders. He directed the 9th Division and other units to launch a direct attack on Songhu and Shanghai while using the 3rd Fleet to escort the 11th Division into the Yangtze River estuary. They executed surprise landings at Liuhekou, Yanglinkou, and Qiyakou, quickly outflanking the defenders. On March 1, the Japanese forces initiated attacks in Naobei, Jiangwan, and Miaohang, employing heavy artillery, field guns, and aircraft for continuous bombardment. The infantry capitalized on this to engage in close-quarters combat, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Meanwhile, Shirakawa secretly instructed the 11th Division to exploit the weakness of the Chinese troops in Liuhe, forcibly landing at Qiyakou, Yanglinkou, and Liubinkou, ultimately capturing Liuhe. The fall of Liuhe posed a significant threat to the flank and rear of the Chinese army, compelling the entire force to retreat to the second line of defense (the Jiading-Huangdu line) by the evening of March 1.  After 34 days of intense fighting, they were forced to retreat to their second line of defense. At this point, the war had entered its final phase, resulting in a stalemate between the two sides. On the 2nd, the Japanese army seized Shanghai, and by March 3, they occupied Zhenru and Nanxiang, subsequently announcing a ceasefire. Now while we have been focused on the Japanese and Chinese perspectives in this, the international community was also heavily involved in the background. After the outbreak of hostilities, the British and American consuls in Shanghai offered to mediate. However despite a ceasefire being implemented the hostilities continued. So on February 2nd, Britain, America, France, Italy and Germany sent a notice to China and Japan "proposing to stop the conflict; (1) both sides immediately stop all violent acts according to the following conditions; (2) there will be no mobilization or preparation for any hostile acts between the two countries; (3) the Chinese and Japanese combatants in Shanghai will withdraw from the contact points; (4) a neutral zone will be established to separate the combatants of both sides to protect the public concession. The area will be garrisoned by neutral military and police, and various methods will be formulated by the consular corps; (5) once the two countries accept the treaty, they will not make any demands or reservations in advance, but will quickly negotiate with the assistance of neutral observers or participants in accordance with the spirit of the Kellogg-War Pact and the December 9th League of Nations resolution to resolve all outstanding issues..." Nanjing generally accepted the terms, but Japan instead proposed non-military zones be established 20 miles around the major ports of Shanghai, Hankou, Tianjin, Qingdao and Guangzhou as a sort of counter proposal. Meanwhile at the League of Nations, Yan Huiqing was drawing attention to the Shanghai incident, obviously linking it to the Manchuria incident and advocated for Article 10 of the League of Nations Charter, which was in regards to respecting territorial integrity and political independence of league nations. The League of Nations agreed and organized a committee to investigate the Shanghai incident. On February 4th Chiang Kai-Shek would write in his diary "As long as we do not lose our national sovereignty and territory, and the Japanese invaders do not put forward unacceptable conditions, we can take advantage of the opportunity of British and American intervention to negotiate with them; we cannot take a tough stance when other countries intervene, which will lead to adverse effects." By late February US Secretary of State Henry Stimson warned Japan for the second time, that the Nine Power Treaty and other treaties had to be maintained. Then on the 23rd he sent a letter reiterating the nine-power treaty and Kellogg War Pact to the League of Nations in regards to the Shanghai situation. On the 29th, a four-point plan for mediating the Shanghai incident was adopted at the League of Nations. The objective was to swiftly establish a local ceasefire agreement with the assistance of civil and military officials from various countries present in Shanghai. Following this, a round-table meeting was to be convened with representatives from nations with vested interests in Shanghai to discuss security measures for the International Settlement, the French Concession, and the local residents, as well as to address other issues. Subsequently, representatives from Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and other nations unanimously supported the plan, with Chinese representative Yan Huiqing and Japanese representative Sato Naotake also indicating their general agreement in principle. However, on March 2, the situation escalated when the Japanese army compelled the Chinese forces to retreat to their second line of defense. The Japanese side adopted a more aggressive stance, presenting four stringent conditions and insisting that the Chinese army withdraw first before halting their attacks. The Japanese forces were only willing to withdraw to the Shanghai and Wusong areas and refused to do so under the supervision of neutral countries, which the Chinese government firmly rejected. On March 3, the Japanese army launched another offensive. On that same day, U.S. Secretary of State Stimson summoned Japanese Ambassador to the United States Idebuchi, condemning Japan for accepting the League of Nations resolution on February 29 while simultaneously escalating military operations. On March 3rd a ceasefire came into effect as a formal meeting was held at the British consulate. The Chinese delegation was led by Guo Taiqi, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, along with military representatives Dai Ji, Huang Qiang, and seven others. The Japanese delegation included Shigemitsu Mamoru, Minister to China, and military representatives Ueda, Tashiro, and nine others. Officials from Britain, the United States, France, and other nations also participated in the meeting. During the negotiations, numerous contentious issues arose, particularly regarding the timing and location of the Japanese army's withdrawal. It would take until May 5th for a armistice agreement to be signed. The agreement designated Shanghai as a demilitarized zone, prohibiting China from stationing troops in the areas around Shanghai, Suzhou, and Kunshan, while permitting a limited number of Japanese units to remain in the city. China was permitted to maintain only a small police force within Shanghai. According to Chinese war reports, a total of 10,254 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the Battle of Shanghai on January 28. According to Japanese data, a total of 3,091 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the invasion of Shanghai: 620 Japanese soldiers were killed and 1,622 were wounded in the army; 149 Japanese soldiers were killed and 700 were wounded in the navy. Another Chinese report, stated the 19th Route Army and the Fifth Army suffered a total of 14,104 casualties 4,274 killed and 9,830 wounded. Among them, the 19th Route Army suffered 8,792 casualties, while the Fifth Army suffered 5,312 casualties. Shanghai residents faced bombardments from Japanese aircraft and artillery, resulting in over 6,080 fatalities, more than 2,000 injuries, 10,400 missing persons, and property losses totaling 1.6 billion yuan. At the onset of the war, the Japanese military intentionally targeted cultural institutions in Shanghai, such as the Commercial Press and the Oriental Library, leading to the total destruction of the Commercial Press, the oldest and largest publishing house in China. The Oriental Library, which housed millions of volumes, including over 100,000 rare ancient texts from the Song and Yuan dynasties and the Sikuquanshu compiled during the Qianlong era of the Qing Dynasty, was first devastated by artillery fire and then looted by Japanese forces. Reports from that time indicated that the Japanese army used trucks to transport the remaining books for seven consecutive days. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus what became known as the first battle of Shanghai had come to a not so swift end. Was its resolvement a victory for the League of Nations? Or was it just another indicator that the League of Nations was nothing but promises and pieces of paper? One man took notice of the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents, and he would soon bring Europe into a global war.  

Last time we spoke about the fall of Iwo Jima. General Schmidt pushed through Japanese defenses, facing strongholds like Cushman's Pocket and General Senda's positions, with intense fighting and heavy casualties on both sides. Despite stubborn resistance, the Marines gradually advanced, employing tanks and artillery support. The Japanese, under General Kuribayashi, fought tenaciously, culminating in a final assault on March 26. After brutal combat, Iwo Jima was declared secured, but at great cost: 18,000 Japanese and over 6,800 American lives lost. Meanwhile, in New Britain, Australian forces continued their offensive, capturing strategic positions despite fierce enemy resistance. In the midst of a fierce conflict, Australian battalions advanced into enemy territory, capturing strategic positions while facing heavy resistance. Notable victories included the successful ambushes by the 2/7th Battalion and the capture of key locations like the But airfield. Despite facing fierce counterattacks from the Japanese, particularly at Slater's Knoll, the Australians maintained their momentum. As the Japanese command faced internal crises, the Australians continued their relentless push, ultimately leading to significant territorial gains and weakening enemy forces. This episode is the Visayas Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Within northern Luzon, by mid-March, General Clarkson's 33rd Division was exploring the western routes to Baguio. Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla unit had taken control of San Fernando and was engaged in combat around Cervantes. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division had advanced to Putlan, and General Gill's 32nd Division was involved in a fierce battle at Salacsac Pass. Following the capture of Putlan, General Swift instructed Mullins to push through Balete Pass to secure the vital Santa Fe region. On March 12, the 27th and 161st Regiments began advancing north and northwest, successfully clearing the Minuli area and establishing a foothold on Norton Ridge by March 15. At the same time, the 35th Regiment initiated a broad maneuver around Balete Pass via the Old Spanish Road, but this was soon hindered by intense artillery and mortar fire from the positions of the 11th Independent Regiment. The road also required significant engineering efforts to support the outflanking force, leading Mullins to ultimately halt the 35th's assault. However, General Konuma was unaware of this; fearing an outflanking maneuver from Carranglan, he had no choice but to keep around 3,000 of his best troops in this seemingly secure area. On March 15, Mullins ordered the reinforced 161st Regiment to launch a holding attack to the north while the majority of the 27th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver over Myoko Ridge, Mount Myoko, and Lone Tree Hill to encircle Balete Pass from the east. After regrouping at Putlan, the 35th was also tasked with capturing Mount Kabuto to subsequently advance northwest along Balete Ridge and connect with the 27th at Myoko. Mullins launched a renewed offensive on March 16, facing stubborn resistance from the 161st as it gradually advanced toward Norton's Knob, which was successfully captured by the end of the month. On March 22, the 27th began its flanking maneuver, with the 1st Battalion moving east into the elevated terrain south of Kapintalan by March 28, while the 2nd Battalion advanced nearly 3,750 yards up the wooded Myoko Ridge to the east. Meanwhile, the 35th's attempt to encircle the enemy via Kabuto started off well, reaching the northern slope of Balete Ridge on March 22. However, Konuma's recently arrived reinforcements launched a series of strong counterattacks and harassment raids, forcing the 35th to withdraw by March 28. With the other two regiments stretched thin and unable to penetrate the enemy's main defenses, Mullins ordered the 35th to position itself between the 27th and 161st Regiments to assault Highley Ridge from the east. By the end of March, the 161st was advancing northeast along Highley Ridge toward Crump Hill, which finally fell on April 8, bringing the advance to a halt. The 35th supported this effort with an attack on Kapintalan, which was ultimately captured by April 21. Meanwhile, the 27th continued to struggle through the challenging terrain of Myoko Ridge against fierce opposition, not reaching Woody Hill until April 12. This slow progress allowed Konuma to reinforce the Myoko sector with four understrength infantry battalions. Nevertheless, the brave soldiers of the 27th Regiment persevered, securing the Pimple on April 15 and advancing an additional 350 yards northeast by April 21. Looking west, Clarkson aimed to advance battalion combat teams toward Baguio via Route 11, the Galiano road, and the Tuba Trail. However, Swift declined to approve such ambitious plans, limiting the 33rd Division to a more restrained offensive. Although dissatisfied, Clarkson continued the attack along Route 11, managing to reach Camp 3 by the end of March. In the central area, patrols faced no opposition as they approached within a mile of Galiano, but other patrols discovered increasing signs that the Japanese were preparing to defend the Tuba Trail vigorously. Eventually, a robust reconnaissance force secured Bauang on March 19, with patrols then moving east to occupy Naguilan four days later and Burgos by the month's end. Meanwhile, at Salacsac Pass, the 127th Regiment fought from Hill 502 to Hill 504 against fierce resistance, while Gill sent the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment up the trail from Valdez toward Imugan, where they were ultimately halted by vigilant Japanese forces. By March 23, the 1st Battalion of the 127th Regiment reached the crest of Hill 504; the 2nd Battalion advanced past it to Hill 505; and the 3rd Battalion managed to position one company at the base of Hill 507D. However, with its forces stretched thin and dwindling, the 127th was unable to capitalize on its seemingly advantageous position, allowing General Iwanaka to launch a strong counterattack on Hill 507D that successfully repelled the 3rd Battalion. As a result, Gill decided to withdraw that unit and the stalled 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment, while the majority of the 128th relieved the 127th in the Hill 502 sector. Beginning on March 25, the 128th Regiment advanced aggressively eastward, successfully capturing the previously overlooked Hill 503, fully securing Hill 504, and expanding its control over Hill 505 by the month's end. However, on the night of March 31, Iwanaka launched a daring counterattack, reclaiming Hill 504 and nearly taking all the territory east of Hill 502. By April 4, both the 127th and 128th Regiments had sustained significant casualties and could no longer continue the offensive. Consequently, Swift had to order the 33rd Division to relieve the beleaguered 126th Regiment in the Ambayabang and Arboredo River valleys, allowing this unit to reposition north of the Villa Verde Trail to execute a flanking maneuver along the Miliwit River valley. Fortunately for Clarkson, General Krueger persuaded MacArthur to free the 129th Regiment from its duties in Manila, sending it to bolster the now overstretched 33rd Division. Once the rest of the 37th Division arrived at the Baguio front, which Krueger anticipated would happen in early April, Swift could initiate a two-division assault on Baguio. In the meantime, Clarkson promptly dispatched the 129th to Burgos, and by April 1, it had advanced to Salat.  The Japanese opposing the reinforced 33d Division were no longer in the shape they had been at the end of February. The 58th IMB and the 23d Division had both suffered heavy losses during March, losses that probably stemmed largely from lack of food and medical supplies rather than from combat action. By mid-March Japanese supply problems on the Baguio front had progressed from bad through worse to impossible. First, supplies had moved westward over the new Baguio-Aritao supply road far more slowly than anticipated, a development attributable in large measure to Allied Air Forces strikes on that road and along Route 5 north and south of Aritao. Second, operations of the 66th Infantry, along Route 11 north from Baguio, and the activities of the 11th Infantry, , in the Cagayan Valley, had made it virtually impossible for the Japanese to bring any food into the Baguio area from the north. Third, the Japanese tried to do too much with the limited amount of supplies available on the Baguio front. They were attempting to supply 23d Division and 58th IMB troops along the MLR; send certain military supplies north up Route 11 for the 19th Division; feed 14th Area Army headquarters and a large civilian population in Baguio; and establish supply dumps north and east of the city against the time of eventual withdrawal. Almost inevitably the principal sufferers were the front-line troops. By mid-March the best-fed Japanese combat troops on the Baguio front were getting less than half a pound of rice per day as opposed to a minimum daily requirement of nearly two and a half pounds. Before the end of the month the troops on the MLR were down to less than a quarter of a pound of rice a day. Starvation and diet-associated diseases filled hospitals and sapped the strength of the combat units. Generally, effective frontline strength was far lower than reported ration strength indicated. Medical supplies were consumed rapidly, and by the end of March, for example, there was virtually no malaria phophylaxis left in Baguio area hospitals. Looking upon the situation on the Baguio front with frank pessimism, Yamashita in mid-March directed inspection of terrain north, northeast, and east of the city with a view toward preparing a new defense line. His attitude became even plainer when, on or about 30 March, he ordered Japanese civilians and the Filipino puppet government to evacuate Baguio. Indeed, the future on the Baguio front was so bleak by the end of March that almost any other army would have withdrawn to new defenses forthwith, thereby saving troops for future battle. But not so the Japanese. Yamashita decided that the existing MLR would be held until the situation became hopeless. At the end of March that portion of the MLR held by the 23d Division was still intact, and the 58th IMB was busy deploying additional strength along its section of the line. One independent infantry battalion was on high ground north of Route 9 at Sablan; and another held defenses at Sablan. A reinforced company was at Burgos and, less that company, another independent infantry battalion held reserve positions at Calot, a mile and a half southeast of Sablan. One understrength battalion was responsible for defending the rough terrain from Sablan six miles south to Mt. Apni, where a tie-in was made with the right flank of the 23d Division. Maj. Gen. Bunzo Sato, commanding the 58th IMB, expected that the emphasis of any Allied drive in his sector would come along Route 9, but he did not neglect the other approach in his area, the Galiano road. Since the understrength battalion stationed astride the road was not strong enough to withstand a concerted attack, he directed his main reserve force, the 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry, 19th Division, to move west out of Baguio to defenses at Asin. This step left in Baguio a reserve force of roughly three provisional infantry "battalions," which together probably could not muster over 750 effectives. In the Salacsac area, as casualties in the western pass were rapidly increasing and Allied air and artillery strikes made it nearly impossible for the 2nd Tank Division to transport supplies, Iwanaka concluded that his forward positions were nearly untenable. He began planning to redeploy forces to defend the eastern pass. Consequently, when the 126th Regiment launched its new offensive on April 5, it faced unexpectedly light resistance, quickly capturing Hills 518 and 519 within two days and cutting off a Japanese supply route leading north from Hill 504 across the eastern slopes of Hill 519 and up Mount Imugan. However, Iwanaka swiftly recognized the emerging threats and sent reinforcements to intercept the 126th's advance, delaying the capture of Hills 511 and 512 until March 13 and effectively halting further progress. At the same time, the reorganized 128th Regiment resumed its assault eastward on April 7, successfully retaking the Hill 504-505 sector and capturing Hill 506 by April 10. The following week, the 128th fought tenaciously to secure this elevated ground against fierce resistance, managing to push all the way to Hills 506B, 507C, and 507D with their remaining strength, nearly securing the western pass by April 17. Meanwhile, after the fall of San Fernando, General Krueger instructed Volckmann to advance inland along Route 4 toward Bontoc. However, the Provisional Battalion established at Cervantes could only withstand the relentless enemy pressure until April 4, when it was ultimately forced to retreat into the hills northwest of the town. Consequently, Volckmann had to quickly deploy the 121st Regiment to barrio Butac in preparation for an eastward push along Route 4. After a week of intense back-and-forth combat, this elite guerrilla unit succeeded in establishing footholds along the northern parts of Lamagan and Yubo Ridges. Over the next few days, the 121st made slow and arduous progress, ultimately gaining control of Route 4 nearly to the southeastern edge of Bessang Pass by mid-April. Further south, by mid-March, General Wing's 43rd Division had effectively secured the Antipolo sector, while General Hurdis' 6th Division was advancing well toward Mount Baytangan. At this point, General Hall's 11th Corps assumed responsibility for operations against the Shimbu Group, now rebranded as the 41st Army. However, he quickly decided to maintain the offensive against General Yokoyama's left flank, with the 20th and 1st Regiments focusing on an eastward push alongside the 43rd Division. Meanwhile, General Noguchi had completed his withdrawal to the Sugarloaf Hill-Mount Tanauan line, where he would receive reinforcements from elements of the Kogure Detachment. Simultaneously, General Kobayashi was struggling to stabilize his left flank, bolstered by one reserve battalion. On the morning of March 15, the American offensive resumed, with the 103rd Regiment continuing its assaults on Benchmark 7 Hill to secure Route 60-A, while the 172nd Regiment launched its initial attacks toward Sugarloaf Hill, facing fierce resistance. On March 17, the 1st Regiment renewed its advance toward Baytangan, initially making good progress and digging in about a mile west-southwest of the mountain's summit. However, during the night, a barrage of mortar fire followed by an infantry counterattack forced the Americans to retreat in disarray. As a result of this setback, the 1st Division began to advance eastward more cautiously, facing determined resistance and heavy mortar fire. By March 22, it was only slightly closer to Baytangan's crest than it had been five days earlier. The 20th Regiment on the left also encountered strong resistance, managing to reach a point a mile and a half west of Baytangan by March 22. At the same time, a company maneuvering to the north established a foothold on a wooded ridge overlooking the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile the 103d Infantry finally overran the defenses on Benchmark 7 on 18 March, killing about 250 Japanese in the process. The Japanese battalion there had delayed the 103d's attack toward Mt. Tanauan until the morning of 18 March, but by evening of that day the regiment's troops had begun swarming up the bare, rocky, southern and southwestern slopes of the mountain. Over the next three days, American forces slowly advanced through a complex of caves and bunkers until they secured the mountain's summit, while other units captured Benchmark 23 Hill and patrolled northward into the southeastern part of the Bosoboso Valley. By March 19, the 172nd Division was halted, containing Sugarloaf to the west. They bypassed it to the north and east, initiating new assaults toward Mounts Yabang and Caymayuman, making significant progress to the east but less so to the north by March 22. Despite concerns that Hall's four exhausted regiments might lack the strength to turn the 41st Army's left flank, the ongoing pressure and the failure of previous counterattacks ultimately compelled Yokoyama to order his threatened units to withdraw to new positions east of the Bosoboso River. Therefore, when the 6th and 43rd Divisions resumed their attacks on the morning of March 23, the withdrawal was already in full progress. Over the next three days, the 1st and 20th Regiments faced only scattered and disorganized resistance, allowing them to establish positions over a mile north and south of Baytangan along the ridgeline that overlooks the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment successfully captured Mount Yabang and most of Mount Caymayuman, while the 103rd Regiment advanced quickly northward, taking barrio New Bosoboso, Mount Balidbiran, and Benchmark 21 Hill. On March 27, the 1st Regiment secured the crest of Baytangan, and the 172nd Regiment eliminated the last organized opposition at Sugarloaf Hill. With Yokoyama's left flank collapsing, Hall could focus on capturing Wawa Dam and destroying the remaining elements of the Kobayashi Force west of the Bosoboso River, a mission assigned to the 6th Division. During this initial offensive, approximately 7,000 Japanese soldiers were killed since February 20, while American casualties included 435 killed and 1,425 wounded. Hurdis' initial strategy for capturing Wawa Dam involved the 1st and 20th Regiments advancing northward to clear Woodpecker Ridge and Mount Mataba, while the 63rd Regiment conducted diversionary attacks on the western slopes of Mataba. This new offensive began on March 28 but quickly faced intense small arms, machine-gun, and mortar fire, leading to a back-and-forth struggle against fierce enemy resistance. By April 3, the 20th Regiment had advanced less than half a mile toward Mataba, and the 1st Regiment had gained only 250 yards to the north. General Hurdis had hoped his attack, directed against the Kobayashi Force southern flank, would be far more successful, but the Kobayashi Force, rapidly and efficiently, had reoriented its defenses, which it had laid out primarily to face an attack from the west. The force's two remaining provisional infantry regiments, the Central and Right Sector Units, were still relatively intact, and the Central Sector Unit, bearing the brunt of the 6th Division's offensive, had recently been reinforced by remnants of the Left Sector Unit and elements of the Shimbu Group Reserve. Other factors bearing on the 6th Division's slow progress were the declining strength and deteriorating combat efficiency of its infantry regiments. The 20th Infantry could muster only 2,085 effectives on 3 April; some of its rifle companies were reduced to the combat strength of platoons. The situation within the 1st Infantry, with an effective strength of 2,150, was little better. As of 3 April the commanders of both regiments rated their units' combat efficiency only as "fair," the lowest ranking of three terms each had employed since the Lingayen Gulf assault.To bolster protection for Hurdis' right flank, the 103rd Regiment also captured Hill 1200 on the east bank of the Bosoboso River by the end of the month. Due to the slow progress of Hurdis' offensive, on April 5, Hall assigned General Cunningham's Baldy Force, which consisted of the 112th Cavalry Regiment and the recently arrived 169th Regiment, to take control of the area north of Mount Oro. This move would free up most of the 63rd Regiment to support the 20th Regiment and continue the assault north toward Mataba, while the 1st Regiment maintained its position along Woodpecker Ridge. From April 6 to 9, the 63rd made only limited progress to the east; however, on April 10, it shifted its focus to an offensive on the western slopes of Mataba, quickly securing the southwestern quarter of the mountain with minimal resistance. In response, Kobayashi promptly redirected his forces back to Mataba from the north-south ridge to prevent the 63rd from reaching the mountain's summit until April 17. At the same time, the 1st Regiment resumed its advance along Woodpecker Ridge but again faced strong enemy opposition, resulting in only limited gains. Looking further south, by March 23, the 187th Glider Regiment and the 511th Parachute Regiment had advanced to Santo Tomas and Tanauan but were unable to completely clear these areas. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment secured Balayan, Batangas, and the Calumpan Peninsula, pushing toward Mount Macolod, where they were ultimately halted by significant forces from the Fuji Force. At this stage, as Krueger planned to launch an offensive into the Bicol Peninsula using the 158th, he needed to relieve the 11th Airborne Division with the barely rested 1st Cavalry Division. This division quickly took control of the Santo Tomas-Tanauan area, while General Swing's units maneuvered around the west side of Lake Taal to relieve the 158th at Macolod. As a result, General Griswold renewed his offensive on March 24. The 187th attempted to attack Macolod but was unsuccessful. A task force composed of units from Swing's other two regiments advanced quickly north toward Lipa, only to be halted at the hills southeast of the town. The 8th Cavalry captured Santo Tomas after a fierce battle and took Tanauan two days later. The 7th Cavalry advanced about five miles east into the corridor between Mounts Maquiling and Malepunyo, while the 12th Cavalry pushed along Route 21, moving about four miles beyond Los Baños. On March 27, Swing's task force finally overcame the enemy defenses southeast of Lipa, but it was the 8th Cavalry that ultimately secured this strategic town two days later. Griswold's successful offensive also forced around 2,000 troops from the Fuji Force to retreat along Route 21 and through the Santa Maria Valley to join Yokoyama's forces in the mountains east of Manila. In response, Krueger devised a plan to prevent the potential influx of Japanese reinforcements around the eastern and northern shores of Laguna de Bay. He instructed Hall to clear the northern shore of the lake, block the Santa Maria Valley, and secure Route 21. While the 187th continued its assault on Macolod, Griswold ordered his other units to push eastward to secure Laguna de Bay and Tayabas Bay. Accordingly, on March 30, the 103rd Regiment advanced in small increments along the northern shore of Laguna de Bay, reaching Siniloan by April 4. The 12th Cavalry moved to Calauan and then south along a secondary road toward San Pablo, encountering strong enemy positions that wouldn't be overcome until April 5. The 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments fought through the Maquiling-Malepunyo corridor against determined but disorganized Japanese resistance, successfully occupying San Pablo by April 2. Additionally, elements of the 188th Glider Regiment pushed east through the mountain corridors, reaching Tiaong on April 3 and Lucena three days later. By April 6, the 5th Cavalry and the 103rd Regiment had established contact at Pagsanjan, effectively isolating the 41st Army. The next day, patrols from the 11th Airborne Division headed north from Lucena, while 1st Cavalry Division patrols departed from Pagsanjan heading south. They successfully linked up at Lucban by April 10 and then advanced eastward to Mauban. At the same time, a company from the 188th traveled along Route 1 across the Bondoc Isthmus, reaching Atimonan on April 11. Griswold's patrols also moved towards Mount Malepunyo, where the Fuji Force was preparing for its final stand. By April 16, preliminary assaults had concentrated enemy resistance around Mount Mataasna-Bundoc. Meanwhile, after a week of intense aerial bombardment, Brigadier-General Hanford MacNider's 158th Regiment successfully landed at Legaspi Port with minimal opposition on April 1. They quickly secured the port and the nearby airfield, then advanced to Daraga before moving south along Route 1 to occupy the Sorsogon Peninsula, where they encountered machine-gun fire from the Mount Bariway-Busay Ridge. The following morning, the troops had to retreat east of Daraga, and in the coming days, the 158th faced tough fighting in the challenging, jungle terrain to overcome resistance in the Daraga area. Concerned about delays in occupying the Sorsogon Peninsula, MacNider landed his anti-tank company at Bacon on April 6, which occupied Sorsogon without opposition. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion continued its overland advance, reaching Bulan by April 12, where they targeted a significant Japanese concentration. Simultaneously, MacNider's other two battalions attacked Camalig on April 11 and began their unsuccessful assault on enemy positions in the Cituinan Hills. By April 1, the 188th had successfully eliminated the last organized resistance in the rugged hills south of Ternate. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment launched an assault on Caballo Island on March 27 but could not fully dismantle the entrenched enemy positions until April 13. The Japanese in the pits and tunnels created an almost insoluble problem for the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry. The Japanese had so emplaced their weapons, which included machine guns and mortars, that they controlled all approaches to the mortar pits but could not be reached by American artillery or mortar fire. When the 151st Infantry concentrated its mortar fire against the pits' entrances, the Japanese simply withdrew into the tunnels. When the American fire ceased--at the last possible moment before an infantry assault--the Japanese rushed out of the tunnels to man their weapons. Tanks were of no help to the American troops. From positions near the rim of the pits the tanks were unable to depress their guns sufficiently to do much damage to the Japanese. If the tanks tried to approach from above, they started sliding down Hill 2's slopes into the pits. No combination of tank, artillery, and infantry action proved of any avail, and the 151st Infantry had to give up its attempts to take the Japanese positions by assault. On 31 March engineers tried to pour diesel oil into one of the tunnels connecting the mortar pits, employing for this purpose a single ventilator shaft that was accessible to the 151st Infantry. Nothing came of the effort since it was impossible to get enough oil up the steep slopes of the hill to create a conflagration of significant proportions within the tunnels. Nevertheless, burning the Japanese out seemed to promise the only method of attack that would not risk the unduly heavy casualties of a direct infantry assault. No one, of course, wanted to throw away the lives of experienced troops on such an insignificant objective. Finally, the commander of the 113th Engineers, 38th Division, suggested pumping oil up the hill from the beach through a pipeline from a ship or landing craft anchored at the shore line. The Allied Naval Forces happily fell in with this idea and supplied the 151st Infantry with two oil-filled ponton cubes; the Allied Air Forces provided a 110-horsepower pump and necessary lengths of pipeline and flexible hosing; and the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment came through with an LCM to carry the pump and the ponton cubes. On 5 April over 2,500 gallons of diesel fuel were pumped into the pits and tunnels through the ventilator and were then ignited by white phosphorus mortar shells. "Results," the 38th Division reported, "were most gratifying." A huge flash fire ensued, followed by a general conflagration and several explosions. The engineers repeated the process on 6 and 7 April, and on the latter day carefully lowered two large demolition charges through the ventilator shaft and placed another at an accessible tunnel entrance. Set off simultaneously, the three charges caused an enormous volume of flames and several terrific explosions. For the next few days the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry, tried to persuade a few Japanese who had lived through the holocausts to surrender and also executed a few infantry probing attacks. On 13 April a patrol entered the pits and tunnels, killed the lone surviving Japanese, and reported the positions cleared and secured. Following this, El Fraile was targeted, with Company F of the 151st and the 113th Engineers effectively neutralizing Fort Drum using gasoline and explosives. On April 16, troops from the 1st Battalion of the 151st Regiment attacked Carabao Island, facing no opposition. Looking towards the Visayas, after capturing Palawan and Zamboanga, General Eichelberger set his sights on the Sulu Archipelago, where new airfields were to be established. On March 16, a reinforced company from the 162nd Regiment landed unopposed on Basilan Island and spent the next two days searching Basilan and nearby islets, finding no signs of Japanese forces. On April 2, the reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment landed on Sanga Sanga Island, successfully clearing the Tawi Tawi Group by April 6. The remainder of the regiment made an unopposed landing near Jolo Town on April 9. Over the next two days, the Americans drove approximately 2,400 men of the 55th Independent Mixed Brigade from the heights immediately south and southeast of the town to secure a nearby airstrip. However, the Japanese retreated to more fortified hill masses further inland, where they had long prepared their defenses and began to resist fiercely. After initial attacks by Colonel Alejandro Suarez's guerrillas failed to breach the Japanese positions, the 1st Battalion of the 163rd Regiment joined the fight and managed to overrun the enemy defenses by April 22. On April 25, the 3rd Battalion launched an assault on Lieutenant-General Suzuki Tetsuzo's final positions at Mount Tumatangus, which were ultimately subdued by May 2. However, the remaining Japanese forces continued to engage in guerrilla warfare. By this time, airfields in Zamboanga and Sanga Sanga had become operational to support the forthcoming invasion of Borneo.The first field at Zamboanga was a dry-weather strip 5000 feet long, completed on March 15 and immediately put to use by Marine Corps planes. The field, named Calarian Drome, could not answer the need for an all-weather strip 6000 feet long. Accordingly, engineers constructed a new strip, which the Marine aviators based there called Moret Field, about a mile to the east, and had it ready for all-weather operations by May 16. Used primarily by Marine Air Groups 12, 24, and 32, Moret Field was also employed by a 13th Air Force night-fighter squadron, an emergency rescue squadron, and 13th Air Force B-24s and P-38s staging through for strikes against Borneo. Marine Corps planes on March 16 executed the first support mission flown from a field in the Zamboanga area, covering the landing on Basilan Island. Later, Marine Corps planes from Zamboanga flew support for the Tawi Tawi and Jolo operations and undertook pre-assault bombardment and cover for the invasion of eastern Mindanao. While 13th Air Force planes executed most of the support for the invasion of Borneo, Marine Corps B-25s from Zamboanga also flew some missions. At Sanga Sanga Island there was a Japanese coral-surfaced strip about 2800 feet long. Engineers repaired and extended this strip to a length of 5000 feet by May 2, when fighters of the 13th Air Force began moving to Sanga Sanga from Palawan to provide close support for the initial landings on Borneo. These US Army planes were replaced in mid-May by units of the Royal Australian Air Force, which employed the all-weather Sanga Sanga field during later operations on Borneo. Finally, a Japanese field 3800 feet long on Jolo Island was repaired and used for aerial supply and evacuation operations in support of ground troops throughout the Sulu Archipelago. Eichelberger's next target was the Central Visayan Islands. For the Panay-Guimaras-northern Negros operation, codenamed Victor I, he assigned General Brush's 40th Division, excluding the 108th Regiment, which had recently been assigned to Leyte. The 40th Division departed Lingayen Gulf on March 15 aboard ships from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3. After a brief stop at Mindoro, they arrived at Panay before dawn on March 18. Following a short bombardment by destroyers, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 185th Regiment landed unopposed about twelve miles west of Iloilo, where they were joined by Colonel Macario Peralta's guerrillas, who already controlled much of the island. The 185th quickly expanded its beachhead against light, scattered resistance and began advancing along the coastal road toward Iloilo in the afternoon, forcing the 170th Independent Battalion to retreat to the mountainous interior. With Iloilo secured by March 20, G Company of the 185th Regiment successfully captured Inampulugan Island on March 22, while other elements of the regiment cleared the unoccupied Guimaras Island by March 23. Additionally, Brush decided to assign the 2nd Battalion of the 160th Regiment to garrison Panay alongside Peralta's guerrillas. No pursuit of the 170th Independent Battalion was made, allowing the Japanese to continue their guerrilla activities until the end of the war. Meanwhile, for the operation against northern Negros, Brush planned to launch an assault with the 185th Regiment on March 29, followed by the majority of the 160th Regiment the next day, while keeping the 503rd Parachute Regiment in reserve for potential airdrops. Opposing him, Lieutenant-General Kono Takeshi's 77th Brigade had a total of 15,000 troops but was prepared to retreat into the mountains of north-central Negros for a prolonged defense, leaving only token forces in the coastal plain to delay American advances. On March 29, the 185th Regiment landed unopposed near Pulupandan and quickly secured a bridge over the Bago River. The 185th then spread north and east, with the 160th Regiment following, successfully securing nearly the entire coastal plain of northwestern Negros by noon on April 2. As they closed in on Kono's inner fortress, the Americans overran the main Japanese outposts while the 511th was landed to bolster the assault. On April 9, Brush launched his general offensive, with his three regiments advancing slowly into rugged terrain where the Japanese held significant defensive advantages.  On June 4 General Kono, realizing that his remaining forces were incapable of further sustained effort, directed a general withdrawal deep into the mountains behind his broken defensive lines. The surviving Japanese dispersed into small groups seeking food and hideouts and trying to avoid contact with Colonel Abcede's guerrillas who, under the direction of the 503rd Parachute Regiment, took over responsibility for the pursuit of Kono's men. On June 9 the 503rd then relieved all elements of the 40th Division in northern Negros. By that date the Japanese had lost over 4000 men killed. Kono lost another 3350 troops, mainly from starvation and disease, before the end of the war. After the general surrender in August 1945, over 6150 Japanese came down from the mountains to turn themselves in, joining about 350 others who had been captured earlier. In all, about 7100 Japanese lost their lives in northern Negros, pinning down the equivalent of an American infantry division for over two months. The 40th Division's casualties for the operation, including those of the attached 503rd Parachute, totaled approximately 370 men killed and 1035 wounded. Meanwhile, Eichelberger's final objective in the Central Visayas was Cebu, assigned to Major-General William Arnold's Americal Division. For Operation Victor II, Captain Albert Sprague's Task Group 78.2 was set to land the bulk of the division at Cebu City while Colonel James Cushing's guerrillas secured the water sources. Opposing them were Rear-Admiral Harada Kaku's 33rd Naval Special Base Force and Major-General Manjome Takeo's 78th Brigade, which together comprised approximately 14,500 troops, including the 173rd Independent Battalion and the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Cebu City. Additionally, around 750 soldiers from General Kataoka's 1st Division were positioned in northern Cebu. Although the command situation on the island was chaotic, General Suzuki's 35th Army headquarters in Leyte had been evacuated by two large motorized landing barges between March 17 and 25. Taking control of all forces on Cebu, Suzuki appointed Manjome as the de jure commander in the Cebu City area while leaving Kataoka in charge of northern Cebu, as he prepared to retreat to Mindanao. General Manjome designed his defenses so as to control--not hold--the coastal plains around Cebu City, and for this purpose set up defenses in depth north and northwest of the city. A forward line, constituting an outpost line of resistance, stretched across the first rising ground behind the city hills 2.5 to 4 miles inland. A stronger and shorter second line, the main line of resistance, lay about a mile farther inland and generally 350 feet higher into the hills. Back of this MLR were Manjome's last-stand defenses, centering in rough, broken hills 5 miles or so north of the city. Anticipating that American forces would attempt to mount wide envelopments of his defensive lines, Manjome set up one flank protective strongpoint in rugged, bare hills about 3.5 miles north of barrio Talisay, on the coast about 6 miles southwest of Cebu City, to block the valley of the Mananga River, a natural axis of advance for forces enveloping from the south and west. Similarly, he established strongpoints on his left to block the valley of the Butuanoan River, roughly 4 miles northeast of Cebu City. Against the eventuality that the American invading forces might land north of Cebu City and strike into the Butuanoan Valley, Manjome set up another flank protective position in low hills overlooking the beach at Liloan, 10 miles northeast of Cebu City. Manjome did not intend to hold the beaches, but at both Talisay and Liloan, the best landing points in the Cebu City region, he thoroughly mined all logical landing areas. The Japanese also constructed tank barriers along the shore line and planted tank traps and minefields along all roads leading inland and toward Cebu City. The inner defense lines were a system of mutually supporting machine-gun positions in caves, pillboxes, and bunkers. Many of these positions had been completed for months and had acquired natural camouflage. Manjome's troops had an ample supply of machine guns and machine cannon and, like the Japanese on Negros, employed remounted aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. Manjome had some light and heavy mortars, but only a few pieces of light artillery. For the rest, however, Manjome's forces were far better supplied than Kono's troops in northern Negros. After an uneventful journey, Task Group 78.2 and the Americal Division arrived off Cebu in the early hours of March 26. Following an hour of bombardment by three light cruisers and six destroyers from Admiral Berkey's Task Force 74, the leading waves of the 132nd and 182nd Regiments landed unopposed on beaches just north of Talisay at 08:30. However, the landing was chaotic, as Japanese mines just a few yards beyond the surf line disabled ten of the first fifteen LVTs. Fortunately for the Americans, Manjome had chosen to withdraw from the beaches to establish inland defenses, resulting in minimal casualties. Once they cleared the beach minefields by 10:00, Arnold's leading units cautiously advanced through abandoned defenses toward the main highway to Cebu City, ultimately stopping for the night about a mile and a half south of their objective. The following day, the infantry secured Cebu City without opposition and on March 28 proceeded to clear Lahug Airfield and Hill 30 to the north. The Americans began their assault on Go Chan Hill on March 29, during which Company A of the 182nd Regiment was completely annihilated by the explosion of an ammunition dump located in caves along the hill's eastern spur. Fueled by a desire for revenge, nearly the entire 182nd returned to the attack on March 30 and successfully captured Go Chan Hill. Meanwhile, the 132nd Regiment cleared the coastal plains area north to the Butuanoan River, further securing the city's water supply sources by April 2. Unopposed, troops from the 132nd also successfully landed on Mactan Island, quickly securing an airstrip. In the meantime, as guerrillas had already taken control of much of Masbate, the 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment successfully landed on the island by April 7. Facing minimal opposition, the Americans pursued the scattered Japanese remnants through the hills and jungles of Masbate, killing approximately 120 Japanese soldiers by May 4.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On March 29th, the Americans attacked Go Chan Hill, suffering heavy losses. Seeking revenge, they captured it the next day, securing water supplies and defeating Japanese forces in Masbate. Then in April, Allied forces advanced strategically, overcoming fierce Japanese resistance, securing key positions, and establishing airfields, culminating in significant victories across the Philippines.

In this episode of Aethercast we discuss some of the best regiments of renown available to Kharadron Overlords and the pros and cons of using them. 00:00:00 - Intro 00:08:45 - Elthwin's Thorns, Sylvaneth 00:16:06 - Saviours of Cinderfall (Callis & Toll), Cities of Sigmar Humans 00:28:55 - Norgrimm's Rune Throng, Cities of Sigmar Duardin 00:38:45 - The Blacktalons, Stromcast Eternals 00:53:15 - Valnir's Stormwing, Stromcast Dragons 01:07:00 - The Horizon Seekers, more Stormcast 01:19:05 - Enforcers of the Tithe, Ossiarch Bonereapers 01:38:05 - Honourable mentions (Bundo Whalebiter, Fyreslarers, Gotrek, and Nurgle's Gift) 01:49:50 - Do you need any?   Support the show! https://ko-fi.com/aethercast Also available as a podcast; arkanaut.podbean.com   Get 10% discount at pro Painted Studios with the code "AETHERCAST10" https://www.propaintedstudios.co.uk/discount/AETHERCAST10?rs_ref=wAmCck6U   Checkout the KO Facebook Group; facebook.com/groups/kharadron.overlords   Join the conversation on the KO Discord Group; https://discord.gg/84JCasfE5Y

Last time we spoke about the Great Tokyo Air Raid. Amidst fierce battles, Liversedge's forces captured key hills but faced relentless Japanese machine-gun fire. Despite heavy casualties, the Marines advanced, securing strategic positions. General Kuribayashi recognized their struggle, while the Japanese counterattacks faltered. After 19 grueling days, the last pockets of resistance fell, marking a costly victory for the Americans. Amid the fierce battle of Iwo Jima, General LeMay shifted tactics, launching incendiary raids on Tokyo. On March 9, 1945, 334 B-29s unleashed destruction, igniting widespread fires and devastating neighborhoods. The attack shattered Japanese morale, while LeMay's strategy proved effective, paving the way for further offensives in the Pacific. On March 3, three brigades attacked Meiktila, facing fierce resistance. Tanks overwhelmed Japanese forces, resulting in heavy casualties. As Cowan fortified defenses, Japanese counterattacks intensified. Meanwhile, in Mandalay, British-Indian troops advanced, capturing key positions. Amidst confusion and conflicting orders, the Allies pressed forward, striving for victory in Burma. This episode is the Fall of Mandalay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are first picking up this week with the men fighting over northern Luzon. By March 5, General Clarkson's 33rd Division had advanced to Agoo and Pago while gradually pushing the enemy along Route 11. Meanwhile, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla force was carrying out limited offensives in the Laoag, Cervantes, and San Fernando regions. Coming into Salacsac Pass from the west, the Villa Verde Trail twists up the wooded western slopes of a steep-sided height known to the 32nd Division as Hill 502. Another peak, bare crested, forming part of the same hill mass and named Hill 503, centers 250 yards northeast of the crest of Hill 502, while a similar distance to the southeast is Hill 504. Winding along the southern slopes of Hills 502 and 504, the trail continues eastward through a low saddle about 500 yards long, climbing again up the forested northwestern side of Hill 505. After crossing that hill, the trail follows a twisting course 600 yards--as the crow flies--eastward, hugging the densely wooded northern slopes of Hills 506A and 506B. Off the northeast corner of Hill 506B the trail turns south for 1000 yards--again a straight-line distance--and traverses the east side of the noses of Hill 507, designated from north to south A, B, C and D. Turning sharply east again near Hill 507D, the trail continues east another 700 yards and then enters a deep wooded saddle between Hill 508 on the south and Hill 515 to the north. After passing through this saddle, which is about 250 yards long east to west, the trail goes on eastward, dominated on the north by Hills 516 and 525. Roughly 1250 yards beyond the saddle the trail twists across the northern slopes of Hill 526, which lying about 500 yards southeast of Hill 525, marks the eastern limits of the Salacsac Pass area. A mile and a quarter of less rugged but still forested and difficult terrain lies between Hill 526 and barrio Imugan, in turn two and a quarter miles west of Santa Fe.  Meanwhile General Mullins' 25th Division had successfully taken control of Puncan and Digdig. Due to this unexpectedly swift progress, General Swift instructed Mullins to continue advancing toward Putlan while the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment fought for control of Hill 502, which was secured on March 7. In response, Mullins dispatched the 161st Regiment to attack the high ground west of Route 5, the 27th Regiment to advance along and east of the highway, and the 35th Regiment to execute a wide envelopment to the east. Since this last flank approach to Putlan was completely undefended, the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment quickly occupied Putlan on March 8. The following day, the 27th Regiment also arrived in the area and began clearing Japanese stragglers from the ravines east of Route 5 near the barrio, a task that would not be finished until March 15. Finally, despite facing rough terrain and light resistance, the 161st Regiment reached Putlan on March 10, successfully securing the high ground to the west. To the north, as the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment struggled to make significant progress eastward after capturing Hill 502, Gill decided to send the 3rd Battalion, 127th Regiment to outflank the Salacsac Pass defenses from the south.  Although the extremely rough, precipitous mountain country of the Salacsac Pass area, averaging 4500 feet above sea level, was covered by dense rainforest, from Hill 506B to Hill 526, there was sufficient open ground throughout to provide the defender with excellent observation. It was not too difficult for the Japanese to find positions whence they could cover with fire every square foot of the Villa Verde Trail through the pass area. The twisting of the trail also provided defense opportunities, for in a given 1000 yards of straight-line distance through the pass, the trail might actually cover a ground distance of 3000 yards. Whatever its shortcomings in other fields, the Japanese Army always had a feel for terrain, exploiting to the full every advantage the ground offered. Thus, as it moved up, the 2nd Tank Division set to work to establish a system of mutually supporting defensive positions in order to control every twist of the Villa Verde Trail and every fold in the ground throughout the pass area. Every knoll and hillock on or near the trail was the site of at least one machine gun emplacement; every wooded draw providing a route for outflanking a position was zeroed in for artillery or mortars. The cave, natural or man-made, came to characterize the defenses. Artillery was employed in quantity and quality not often encountered in engagements against the Japanese, who, as usual, made excellent use of their light and medium mortars. Finally, the 2nd Tank Division was overstocked in automatic weapons, evidently having available many more than the 32nd Division could bring to bear. To the west, following recent successes in patrols, Clarkson opted to establish a new "secure line" stretching from Aringay southeast through Pugo to Route 11 at Twin Peaks. Consequently, patrols quickly secured Aringay and Caba without facing any opposition, then advanced east along the trails to Pugo and Galiano, and north to Bauang, where they continued to encounter minimal enemy presence. As a result of these movements, the Hayashi Detachment was ultimately withdrawn to bolster the main defenses at Sablan, enabling Volckman's 121st Regiment to enter San Fernando on March 14. Additionally, elements of the 19th Division began arriving in the Cervantes area from Baguio and successfully expelled the guerrilla company from the town in early March. The Filipinos recaptured Cervantes on March 13 but soon found themselves targeted by Japanese artillery positioned on elevated ground. Meanwhile, looking south, by March 5, General Patrick's 6th Division had commenced unsuccessful assaults on Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, while General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade struggled to advance toward the Antipolo area. Recognizing that the success of his attack required a concentration of forces along a narrower front, General Griswold decided to focus on the Noguchi Force and the left flank of the Kobayashi Force, as the northern area was heavily fortified. He retained only one battalion as an infantry reserve and directed the remainder of his available forces, all of which were understrength, to push eastward. Alongside the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 103rd Regiment reached Taytay on March 7 to serve as the 1st Cavalry Division Reserve, signaling the upcoming relief of the cavalrymen in preparation for their redeployment to southern Luzon. By March 10, General Wing's 43rd Division had been replaced in the Clark Field area by the 38th Division and was en route to the eastern front.  The 38th Division pushed on into the untracked, ill-explored, and worse-mapped wilderness of the central Zambales Range, its progress slowed more by supply problems than Japanese resistance. In early April the division noted that the last vestiges of any controlled defensive effort had disappeared. Unknown to 11th Corps General Tsukada, on April 6, had given up and had ordered his remaining forces to disperse and continue operations, if possible, as guerrillas. For the Japanese remnants, it was a case of sauve qui peut. Some tried to escape to Luzon's west coast, whence 38th Division troops were already patrolling inland; others tried to make their way north through the mountains, only to be cut down by American patrols working southward from Camp O'Donnell. The 38th Division had killed about 8000 of the scattering Japanese by the time it was relieved by units of the 6th Division on May 3. The losses of the 38th totaled approximately 100 men killed and 500 wounded. The 6th Division, elements of which remained in the Kembu area until June 25, limited its operations to patrolling and setting up trail blocks along Japanese routes of escape. Troops of the 38th Division ultimately returned to the region and remained there until the end of the war. Insofar as US forces were concerned, the mop-up period under 11th Corps control was even more costly than had been the 14th Corps' offensive period. From February 21 to the end of June the various elements of 11th Corps committed to action against the Kembu Group lost approximately 550 men killed and 2200 wounded. The Kembu Group, during the same period, lost 12500 killed or dead from starvation and disease. By the end of the war the original 30000 troops of the Kembu Group were reduced to approximately 1500 sorry survivors, about 1000 of them Army personnel. Another 500 had already been taken prisoner. As a result, General Tsukada ordered his remaining troops to scatter and operate as guerrillas. Meanwhile, Griswold resumed his eastern offensive on March 8. In the south, bolstered by artillery and mortars, the battered 2nd Cavalry Brigade continued to advance slowly under heavy artillery fire, reaching a point 440 yards short of Antipolo along Route 60A and overcoming the enemy cave defenses at Benchmark 11. By March 11, patrols had entered Antipolo, discovering the town was devastated and deserted, yet still under the threat of Japanese artillery and mortars positioned in the hills to the north and northeast. Simultaneously, the 1st Cavalry Brigade made significant strides to the north, also coming within 440 yards of Antipolo while clearing Benchmark 9 Hill and Hills 520 and 740. Abandoning the Montalban-San Mateo area, Patrick instructed the 1st and 20th Regiments to advance toward Mounts Baytangan and Yabang. Facing unexpectedly light resistance, the 1st Regiment advanced a mile and a half east by March 11 and secured Benchmark 8 Hill to the south despite encountering stubborn opposition. Recognizing the need to capitalize on this success, Patrick then ordered the 20th Regiment to move through the 1st and attack north toward Wawa Dam while the latter continued its eastward assault. On March 11, the 103rd Regiment took over from the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and quickly began planning to outflank General Noguchi's defenses located southeast of Antipolo. However, due to concerns over American advances, General Yokoyama ordered the Noguchi Force to retreat to secondary defensive positions while preparing for a three-pronged counterattack set for March 12. The primary effort involved four reserve battalions from the Kobayashi Force, which launched an attack southward from Mount Mataba toward Marikina but were quickly halted by intense air and artillery fire, falling far short of their target. Additionally, the 182nd Independent Battalion attempted a counterattack toward Benchmark 8 but was unsuccessful, while the majority of the Kawashima Force advanced south from the Ipo Dam area to assault the rear installations of the 6th Division west of the Marikina River, where they were easily repelled by March 15. During this so-called counterattack, Griswold continued his offensive, with the 103rd Regiment swiftly advancing through the deserted Antipolo to Benchmark 7 Hill, and the 20th Regiment moving over a mile north to secure a position on a grassy ridge less than a mile southeast of Mount Mataba's summit. On March 14, the 1st Regiment resumed its eastern assault, successfully advancing north to a bare peak about a mile southwest of Mount Baytangan, despite facing strong resistance that caused heavy casualties, including the loss of General Patrick, who was succeeded by Brigadier-General Charles Hurdis as commander of the 6th Division. Simultaneously, Wing initiated a coordinated offensive with two regiments toward Mounts Yabang, Caymayuman, and Tanauan, aiming to flank the Shimbu Group's left. Although the 103rd and 179th Regiments achieved significant progress that day, Noguchi's determined defenders managed to maintain control of Benchmark 7. Looking further south, Griswold was preparing to launch a two-pronged offensive in southern Luzon. General Swing's 511th Parachute Regiment and the 187th Glider Regiment were set to advance towards Lipa from the north and northwest, while the 158th Regiment gathered near Nasugbu to attack southeast along Route 17 toward Balayan Bay. In response, Colonel Fujishige's Fuji Force had established several small positions in the area to prevent American forces from flanking the Shimbu Group's main defenses by rounding the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay. Swing's offensive commenced on March 7, with the 187th Glider Regiment descending the steep southern slopes of Tagaytay Ridge to the northern shore of Lake Taal, ultimately stopping at a hill two miles west of Tanauan due to strong resistance. The 511th Parachute Regiment moved out from Real, reaching within a mile of Santo Tomas while launching unsuccessful frontal assaults on Mount Bijiang. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment advanced from Nasugbu, quickly securing Balayan before pushing eastward with little opposition toward Batangas, which fell on March 11. On its eastward path, the regiment bypassed significant elements of the 2nd Surface Raiding Base Force on the Calumpan Peninsula, necessitating that a battalion clear that area by March 16. At the same time, other units of the 158th Regiment encountered robust Japanese defenses blocking Route 417 at Mount Macolod, where their advance came to a halt. Concurrently, General Eichelberger continued his offensive against the central islands of the Visayan Passages, with reinforced companies from the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment successfully landing on Romblon and Simara islands on March 11 and 12, respectively. Most importantly for Eichelberger, he was about to initiate his Visayas Campaign. To disrupt Japanese communication lines across the South China Sea, the 8th Army needed to quickly capture airfields that would allow the Allied Air Forces to project land-based air power over the waters west of the Philippines more effectively than from Clark Field or Mindoro. Consequently, the first target chosen was Palawan, which was defended by only two reinforced companies from the 102nd Division. Additionally, MacArthur's strategy included the eventual reoccupation of the East Indies, starting with the capture of Japanese-controlled oil resources in northern Borneo as soon as land-based air support was available. The Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago were identified as the second targets, although these areas were defended by stronger garrisons from the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. Despite this, Eichelberger tasked Major-General Jens Doe's 41st Division with executing these invasions. For the Palawan invasion, codenamed Operation Victor III, Brigadier-General Harold Haney was appointed to lead a force primarily composed of the 186th Regiment, which would be transported to the island by Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2. The convoy departed from Mindoro on February 26, escorted by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs' cruisers and destroyers. Following a naval bombardment, Haney's Palawan Force successfully landed at Puerto Princesa on February 28 without encountering any opposition. They quickly secured the town and the two airstrips to the east, advancing to the western and southern shores of the harbor by late afternoon to establish a defensive perimeter. As the first day progressed, it became clear to the American troops that the Japanese troops would not put up a fight at Puerto Princesa and had withdrawn into the hills to the northwest. More disturbing was the revelation of a massacre of approximately 140 American prisoners of war the previous December. The presence of a passing Allied convoy made the alarmed Japanese believe that an invasion was imminent and had herded their prisoners into air-raid shelters, subsequently setting the shelters afire and shooting prisoners who tried to escape. Only 11 American prisoners of war miraculously survived immolation and escaped the shooting. Sheltered by natives until the Americans landed, they emerged during the battle to tell their horrifying tale, which only hardened American resolve to end Japanese rule over the island. By March 1, the 186th Regiment had successfully taken control of Irahuan and Tagburos. In the following week, American forces would eliminate two or three heavily defended strongholds located ten miles north-northwest of Puerto Princesa, where the enemy garrison was ultimately defeated. The Palawan Force also conducted reconnaissance of several offshore islets, discovering no Japanese presence on some and swiftly clearing others. However, due to the poorly compacted soil, the new airfield on the island would not be operational until March 20, which was too late for any aircraft based in Palawan to assist with the Zamboanga landings. Consequently, on March 8, two reinforced companies from the 21st Regiment were flown to the airstrip at Dipolog, which had been secured by Colonel Hipolito Garma's guerrilla 105th Division. On the same day, sixteen Marine Corsairs arrived to provide air support for the invasion of Zamboanga, codenamed Operation Victor IV. For this operation, Doe assigned the remainder of his division, which was to be transported by Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1. After three days of pre-assault bombardments and minesweeping, the convoy finally set sail southward and entered Basilan Strait from the west early on March 10. Troops from the 162nd Regiment landed almost without opposition around 09:15 near barrio San Mateo and quickly secured Wolfe Field, while the 163rd Regiment was also landing. Doe's two regiments then began to advance inland, facing minimal resistance as they established a night perimeter. With the Japanese having withdrawn, the 162nd and 163rd Regiments easily secured Zamboanga City, San Roque Airfield, and the rest of the coastal plain by dusk on March 11, with one company extending further to Caldera Bay to the west. To drive the Japanese forces from the elevated positions overlooking the airfield, Doe dispatched the 162nd Regiment towards Mount Capisan and the 163rd Regiment towards Mount Pulungbata. Additionally, the guerrilla 121st Regiment was tasked with blocking the east coast road in the Belong area. Supported by continuous artillery fire and close air support from Marine Corps planes, the two regiments of the 41st Division faced arduous tasks. General Hojo's troops held excellent defenses in depth across a front 5 miles wide, some portions of the line being 3 miles deep. All installations were protected by barbed wire; abandoned ground was thoroughly booby-trapped; mine fields, some of them of the remote-control type, abounded; and at least initially the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade had an ample supply of automatic weapons and mortars. While Japanese morale on the Zamboanga Peninsula was not on a par with that of 14th Area Army troops on Luzon, most of the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade and attached units had sufficient spirit to put up a strong fight as long as they held prepared positions, and Hojo was able to find men to conduct harassing counterattacks night after night. Finally, the terrain through which the 41st Division had to attack was rough and overgrown, giving way on the north to the rain forests of the partially unexplored mountain range forming the backbone of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Only poor trails existed in most of the area held by the Japanese, and the 41st Division had to limit its advance to the pace of bulldozers, which laboriously constructed supply and evacuation roads. Once the American troops entered the peninsula's foothills, tanks could not operate off the bulldozed roads. The next day, the 186th Regiment was deployed to relieve the fatigued 163rd Regiment on the eastern front. By the end of the month, it had expanded the front eastward and northward against diminishing resistance, ultimately forcing Hojo's forces to retreat into the rugged interior of the peninsula. For now, however, we will shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to continue our coverage of the Chinese-British-Indian offensives. As we last observed, General Stopford's 33rd Corps was aggressively advancing into Mandalay against a weakened 15th Army, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division had successfully captured Meiktila and was preparing to withstand the combined assaults of the 18th and 49th Divisions. Cowan's forces conducted a robust defense, managing to delay the arrival of the 49th Division until March 18 and successfully repelling General Naka's initial attacks on Meiktila's main airfield. Furthermore, with the reserve 5th Indian Division moving closer to the front in preparation for an advance towards Rangoon, General Slim decided to airlift the 9th Brigade to reinforce Cowan's troops, which landed on Meiktila's main airfield under enemy fire between March 15 and 17. Due to the slow progress on this front and General Katamura's preoccupation with the battles along the Irrawaddy, he was unable to manage the southern units simultaneously. Consequently, General Kimura decided to assign the 33rd Army to take over the fighting in Meiktila. General Honda promptly moved to Hlaingdet, where he was tasked with overseeing the 18th, 49th, and 53rd Divisions. On March 18, he ordered the 18th Division to secure the northern line of Meiktila and neutralize enemy airfields. He instructed the 49th Division to advance along the Pyawbwe-Meiktila road and directed the 53rd Division to regroup near Pyawbwe. However, on that same day, Cowan launched a counterattack by sending two tank-infantry columns to disrupt Japanese preparations along the Mahlaing road and in the villages of Kandaingbauk and Shawbyugan. They faced heavy resistance at Shawbyugan and ultimately had to withdraw. The relentless air assaults also compelled the Japanese to operate primarily at night, limiting their ability to respond with similar force to British offensives. On the night of March 20, Naka decided to initiate a significant attack on Meiktila's main airfield. However, with the 119th Regiment delayed at Shawbyugan, the 55th Regiment had to proceed alone, supported by some tanks, against the defenses of the 99th Brigade around Kyigon. Heavy artillery and mortar fire ultimately disrupted their assault. Meanwhile, as the 49th Division was consolidating its forces to the southeast, Cowan opted to send two tank-infantry columns to eliminate enemy concentrations at Nyaungbintha and Kinlu. Although the initial sweeps met little resistance, the 48th Brigade encountered strong Japanese positions at Shwepadaing on March 21. The next day, Cowan dispatched two tank-infantry columns to secure the Shwepadaing and Tamongan regions, but the British-Indian forces still struggled to eliminate the enemy defenders. That night, Lieutenant-General Takehara Saburo initiated his first significant assault, with the majority of the 106th Regiment targeting the defensive positions of the 48th Brigade in southeastern Meiktila. Despite the fierce and relentless attacks from the Japanese throughout the night, they were ultimately repelled by artillery and machine-gun fire, suffering heavy casualties. On March 23, Cowan sent another tank-infantry column to chase the retreating Japanese forces; however, the reformed 169th Regiment at Kinde successfully defended against this advance. Meanwhile, on the night of March 24, Naka launched another major offensive with the 55th and 119th Regiments, managing to capture Meiktila's main airfield. In response, Cowan quickly dispatched a tank-infantry column to clear the Mandalay road, successfully securing the area northeast of Kyigon by March 26. At this time, Honda had relocated his headquarters to Thazi to better coordinate the battle, although his troops had already suffered significant losses. For the next three days, Cowan's tanks and infantry continued to advance along the Mandalay road while the 63rd and 99th Brigades worked to eliminate Naka's artillery units south of Myindawgan Lake. By mid-March, Stopford's relentless pressure had forced the 31st and 33rd Divisions to retreat in chaos. On March 20, organized resistance in Mandalay was finally shattered as the 2nd British Division linked up with the 19th Indian Division. Consequently, the beleaguered Japanese units had no option but to withdraw in disarray towards the Shan Hills to the east. Following the collapse of the 15th Army front, the 33rd Army received orders on March 28 to hold its current positions only long enough to facilitate the withdrawal of the 15th Army. Consequently, while Cowan's units cleared the region north of Meiktila, Honda halted all offensive actions and promptly directed the 18th Division to secure the Thazi-Hlaingdet area. Additionally, the weakened 214th Regiment was tasked with moving to Yozon to support the withdrawal of the 33rd Division, while the 49th and 53rd Divisions were assigned to contain Meiktila to the south. As the battles for Mandalay and Meiktila unfolded, the reinforced 7th Indian Division at Nyaungu faced several intense assaults from General Yamamoto's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade throughout March, ultimately advancing to Taungtha and clearing the route to Meiktila by the month's end. Meanwhile, in northern Burma, the 36th British Division advanced toward Mogok, which fell on March 19, while the 50th Chinese Division approached the Hsipaw area. Interestingly, the Japanese abandoned Hsipaw without resistance but launched a fierce counterattack between March 17 and 20. Ultimately, General Matsuyama had no option but to prepare for a withdrawal south toward Lawksawk and Laihka. At this stage, the 38th Chinese Division resumed its advance to Hsipaw; however, facing strong opposition along the route, they did not arrive until March 24, when the entire Burma Road was finally secured. General Sultan believed this was his final maneuver and recommended relocating the Chinese forces back to the Myitkyina area for air transport back to China, except for those needed to secure the Lashio-Hsipaw region. Additionally, the 36th Division continued its eastward push and eventually linked up with the 50th Division in the Kyaukme area by the end of the month before being reassigned to Slim's 14th Army. Looking south, the 74th Indian Brigade and West African forces advanced toward Kolan, while the 26th Indian Division established a new beachhead in the Letpan-Mae region. The 154th Regiment maintained its position near the Dalet River, preventing the remainder of the 82nd West African Division from joining the offensive. On March 23, General Miyazaki decided to launch an attack on Kolan. Although the assault achieved moderate success, Miyazaki soon recognized that he was outnumbered and opted to begin a final withdrawal toward the An Pass, completing this by the end of the month.   Meanwhile, on March 17, the 121st Regiment sent its 3rd Battalion to engage the enemy in the Sabyin area and hold their position along the Tanlwe River for as long as possible. Despite strong resistance from the Japanese, British-Indian forces managed to cross the Tanlwe by March 27 and successfully captured Hill 815 two days later. By March 30, the 22nd East African Brigade had also reached Letpan when High Command decided to relieve the units of the 26th Division and return them to India. In a related development, tensions were rising in French Indochina, where the local government refused to permit a Japanese defense of the colony. By early March, Japanese forces began redeploying around the main French garrison towns in Indochina. The Japanese envoy in Saigon Ambassador Shunichi Matsumoto declared to Governor Admiral Jean Decoux that since an Allied landing in Indochina was inevitable, Tokyo command wished to put into place a "common defence" of Indochina. Decoux however resisted stating that this would be a catalyst for an Allied invasion but suggested that Japanese control would be accepted if they actually invaded. This was not enough and Tsuchihashi accused Decoux of playing for time. On 9 March, after more stalling by Decoux, Tsuchihashi delivered an ultimatum for French troops to disarm. Decoux sent a messenger to Matsumoto urging further negotiations but the message arrived at the wrong building. Tsuchihashi, assuming that Decoux had rejected the ultimatum, immediately ordered commencement of the coup. The 11th R.I.C. (régiment d'infanterie coloniale) based at the Martin de Pallieres barracks in Saigon were surrounded and disarmed after their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Moreau, was arrested. In Hue there was sporadic fighting; the Garde Indochinoise, who provided security for the résident supérieur, fought for 19 hours against the Japanese before their barracks was overrun and destroyed. Three hundred men, one third of them French, managed to elude the Japanese and escape to the A Sầu Valley. However, over the next three days, they succumbed to hunger, disease and betrayals - many surrendered while others fought their way into Laos where only a handful survived. Meanwhile, General Eugène Mordant led opposition by the garrison of Hanoi for several hours but was forced to capitulate, with 292 dead on the French side and 212 Japanese. An attempt to disarm a Vietnamese garrison ended badly for the Japanese when 600 of them marched into Quảng Ngãi. The Vietnamese nationalists had been armed with automatic weapons supplied by the OSS parachuted nearby at Kontum. The Japanese had been led to believe that these men would readily defect but the Vietnamese ambushed the Japanese. Losing only three killed and seventeen wounded they inflicted 143 killed and another 205 wounded on the Japanese before they too were overcome. A much larger force of Japanese came the next day but they found the garrison empty. In Annam and Cochinchina only token resistance was offered and most garrisons, small as they were, surrendered. Further north the French had the sympathy of many indigenous peoples. Several hundred Laotians volunteered to be armed as guerrillas against the Japanese; French officers organized them into detachments but turned away those they did not have weapons for. In Haiphong the Japanese assaulted the Bouet barracks: headquarters of Colonel Henry Lapierre's 1st Tonkin Brigade. Using heavy mortar and machine gun fire, one position was taken after another before the barracks fell and Lapierre ordered a ceasefire. Lapierre refused to sign surrender messages for the remaining garrisons in the area. Codebooks had also been burnt which meant the Japanese then had to deal with the other garrisons by force. In Laos, Vientiane, Thakhek and Luang Prabang were taken by the Japanese without much resistance. In Cambodia the Japanese with 8,000 men seized Phnom Penh and all major towns in the same manner. All French personnel in the cities on both regions were either interned or in some cases executed. The Japanese strikes at the French in the Northern Frontier in general saw the heaviest fighting. One of the first places they needed to take and where they amassed the 22nd division was at Lang Son, a strategic fort near the Chinese border. The defences of Lang Son consisted of a series of fort complexes built by the French to defend against a Chinese invasion. The main fortress was the Fort Brière de l'Isle. Inside was a French garrison of nearly 4000 men, many of them Tonkinese, with units of the French Foreign Legion. Once the Japanese had cut off all communications to the forts they invited General Émile Lemonnier, the commander of the border region, to a banquet at the headquarters of the Japanese 22nd Division. Lemonnier declined to attend the event, but allowed some of his staff to go in his place. They were then taken prisoner and soon after the Japanese bombarded Fort Brière de l'Isle, attacking with infantry and tanks. The small forts outside had to defend themselves in isolation; they did so for a time, proving impenetrable, and the Japanese were repelled with some loss. They tried again the next day and succeeded in taking the outer positions. Finally, the main fortress of Brière de l'Isle was overrun after heavy fighting. Lemonnier was subsequently taken prisoner himself and ordered by a Japanese general to sign a document formally surrendering the forces under his command. Lemonnier refused to sign the documents. As a result, the Japanese took him outside where they forced him to dig a grave along with French Resident-superior (Résident-général) Camille Auphelle. Lemonnier again was ordered to sign the surrender documents and again refused. The Japanese subsequently beheaded him. The Japanese then machine-gunned some of the prisoners and either beheaded or bayoneted the wounded survivors. Lang Son experienced particularly intense fighting, with the 22nd Division relentlessly assaulting the 4,000-strong garrison for two days until the main fortress was captured. The Japanese then advanced further north to the border town of Dong Dang, which fell by March 15. The battle of Lạng Sơn cost the French heavy casualties and their force on the border was effectively destroyed. European losses were 544 killed, of which 387 had been executed after capture. In addition 1,832 Tonkinese colonial troops were killed (including 103 who were executed) while another 1,000 were taken prisoner. On 12 March planes of the US Fourteenth Air Force flying in support of the French, mistook a column of Tonkinese prisoners for Japanese and bombed and strafed them. Reportedly between 400 and 600 of the prisoners were killed or wounded.  Nonetheless, the coup was highly successful, with the Japanese subsequently encouraging declarations of independence from traditional rulers in various regions. On 11 March 1945, Emperor Bảo Đại was permitted to announce the Vietnamese "independence"; this declaration had been prepared by Yokoyama Seiko, Minister for Economic Affairs of the Japanese diplomatic mission in Indochina and later advisor to Bao Dai. Bảo Đại complied in Vietnam where they set up a puppet government headed by Tran Trong Kim and which collaborated with the Japanese. King Norodom Sihanouk also obeyed, but the Japanese did not trust the Francophile monarch. Nationalist leader Son Ngoc Thanh, who had been exiled in Japan and was considered a more trustworthy ally than Sihanouk, returned to Cambodia and became Minister of foreign affairs in May and then Prime Minister in August. In Laos however, King Sisavang Vong of Luang Phrabang, who favoured French rule, refused to declare independence, finding himself at odds with his Prime Minister, Prince Phetsarath Ratanavongsa, but eventually acceded on 8 April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. March 1945, saw US forces advance in Luzon, overcoming Japanese defenses through strategic maneuvers, while guerrilla activities intensified amid challenging terrain and heavy resistance. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces advanced against Japanese troops, capturing key locations and in French Indochina the Japanese unleashed a brutal coup d'etat ushering in independence movements.

Last time we spoke about the Fall of Manila. General LeMay's B-29 bombers wreaked havoc on Japan, targeting key factories at a high cost. On February 19, US Marines landed on Iwo Jima, facing fierce Japanese resistance and heavy casualties. By February 23, after relentless fighting and harsh conditions, they raised the American flag atop Mount Suribachi, marking a hard-won victory. This moment inspired a legacy for the Marine Corps, as battles raged on in the Pacific. Meanwhile troops attacked General Kobayashi's defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, struggling to gain ground. Reinforcements arrived, leading to coordinated assaults, but progress was slow. Meanwhile, General Yamashita reorganized his forces in response to increased guerrilla activity. As American divisions advanced, they faced fierce resistance but gradually secured key positions. Guerrilla leader Volckmann disrupted Japanese supply lines, significantly impacting their operations. Amidst the chaos, a daring rescue mission freed over 2,000 internees, though it provoked brutal reprisals against civilians. This episode is the Great Tokyo Air Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are continuing with the ongoing battle over Iwo Jima. By the end of February, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines had successfully secured Mount Suribachi, while the other regiments from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions advanced toward the O-2 Line, situated beyond Airfield No. 2. This location was where General Kuribayashi maintained his primary defensive positions, which were heavily fortified with caves, tunnels, and traps. On March 1, General Rockey continued his offensive on the left flank as the fresh 28th Marines moved through the weary 27th Marines, led by Colonel Wornham, and launched an assault on Hill 362A and its adjacent positions. The corps' 155mm howitzers and 5th Division artillery commenced firing a preparation at K-minus 45 minutes. One battleship and two cruisers from the gunfire and covering force added their heavy fires from 08:00 to 08:30. Aircraft from the support carrier group delivered strikes throughout the day, but did not participate in preparation for the attack. This proved one of the busiest days for Task Force 54 since D-Day as fire support ships dueled with enemy shore batteries until late afternoon. Shortly after dawn enemy guns in the northern part of the island opened up, and at 07:25 the destroyer Terry took a direct hit by a 6-inch shell, suffering heavy casualties. The battleship Nevada immediately engaged these hostile installations, and after completing their mission in support of the landing force, the cruisers Indianapolis and Pensacola shifted to counter battery fire. At 10:25 the destroyer Colhoun was hit by a major-caliber projectile, and soon after this enemy shells straddled the destroyer Stembel. Counter Battery fire continued throughout the day with the Nevada destroying one casemated gun and starting a fire in another emplacement, while the Pensacola's batteries accounted for a third Japanese gun. Following the robust aerial, naval, and artillery bombardment, Liversedge's forces achieved some initial success, including capturing the hilltop, but were ultimately halted by intense machine-gun fire from Nishi Ridge to the north. However, the 3rd Battalion along the coast managed to advance approximately 350 yards against lighter resistance. In the center, General Erskine also pressed forward beyond Airfield No. 2, with Colonel Withers' 21st Marines advancing north and northeast about 500 yards into the incomplete Airfield No. 3. At the same time, General Cates continued to send his troops into the fray. Colonel Jordan's 24th Marines replaced Colonel Wensinger's exhausted 23rd Marines on the left and fought to dislodge the enemy from Hill 382. They succeeded in advancing about 100 yards along the division's left boundary and 50 yards on the right, establishing a foothold on elevated terrain overlooking Minami village. Further south, Colonel Lanigan committed only his 1st Battalion to eliminate the salient around the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, but this assault was again met with fierce Japanese gunfire. This relief enabled Erskine to initiate a late two-regiment offensive, with the 21st Marines on the left and Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines on the right, although this effort did not achieve any significant progress. The following day, the assault persisted, but the 9th Marines made minimal headway against a strong enemy position on the right, while the 21st Marines advanced toward the base of Hill 362B and the southern edge of Airfield No. 3. Concurrently, Liversedge's 28th Marines successfully cleared Hill 362A and moved toward Nishi Ridge, where they repelled a fierce counterattack by 150 Japanese soldiers. Colonel Graham's 26th Marines were once again deployed to fill the gap between the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions, managing to gain approximately 500 yards to the north. Jordan's 24th Marines finally captured Hill 382 and advanced about 300 yards on the left flank. Meanwhile, Lanigan's 1st Battalion made another unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate and take the high ground north of Turkey Knob. As described by an intelligence officer with the 4th Marine Division “As a result of a close study of the enemy's recent defensive action, aided by observation from OP's and air reconnaissance, the following explanation is suggested of the enemy's defense in this Div's Z of A. The enemy remains below ground in his maze of communicating tunnels throughout our preliminary arty fires. When the fire ceases he pushed OP's out of entrances not demolished by our fires. Then choosing a suitable exit he moves as many men and weapons to the surface as he can, depending on the cover and concealment of that area, often as close as 75 yards from our front. As our troops advance toward this point he delivers all the fire at his disposal, rifle, machine-gun, and mortar. When he has inflicted sufficient casualties to pin down our advance he then withdraws through his underground tunnels most of his forces, possibly leaving a few machine gunners and mortars. Meanwhile our Bn CO has coordinated his direct support weapons and delivers a concentration of rockets, mortars and artillery. Our tanks then push in, supported by infantry. When the hot spot is overrun we find a handful of dead Japs and few if any enemy weapons. While this is happening, the enemy has repeated the process and another sector of our advance is engaged in a vicious fire fight, and the cycle continues.”  Meanwhile the remainder of the 25th Marines managed to advance 300 yards along the coast without facing any opposition. On March 3, the capture of Hill 362A enabled flame-thrower tanks to assist in the advance northward. The 5th Marine Division prepared to press on with its assaults through Nishi Ridge and Hill 362B. The majority of the 28th Marines faced strong resistance as they moved forward over 200 yards. Liversedge's 1st Battalion and Graham's 1st Battalion executed a coordinated attack to take the main enemy positions ahead of them. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 26th Marines surged forward, achieving a gain of over 500 yards, which allowed them to relieve Kenyon's 3rd Battalion and secure the summit of Hill 362B. In the center, the 9th Marines remained in a stalemate, while the 21st Marines launched a vigorous attack to the northeast, successfully capturing the summit of Hill 357 at the eastern edge of the Motoyama Plateau. They then attempted another assault southeast toward Hill 362C, which resulted in a modest gain of about 250 yards. Meanwhile, in the 4th Marine Division's sector, Wensinger's 23rd Marines were deployed in the center, where determined Japanese defenders continued to thwart intense American assaults, despite the partial reduction of the Turkey Knob blockhouse. To the left, the 24th Marines resumed their offensive southeast, advancing up to 350 yards in the center. During the eight days of deadlock and fierce conflict in the Hill 382 and Turkey Knob areas, the weather had been generally favorable. Mild temperatures and fair skies predominated, although early in the morning ground haze combined with smoke to limit observation, and on a few days light showers fell in the afternoon. Night temperatures sometimes went below 60°F, and it was then that tired Marines were grateful for the characteristic subterranean heat of the island that warmed their foxholes. The next day, March 4, dawned gray and sullen, and intermittent showers fell from the overcast skies. Visibility was so limited that all air strikes were canceled and aerial observation seriously curtailed. On the right, Cates' Marines pressed the attack southeast but could only gain 150 yards against the defenders' fierce resistance. To the left, after a failed Japanese infiltration attempt overnight to gather food and water, both the 9th and 21st Marines made no progress with their costly eastward assaults. Finally, supported closely by flame-throwing tanks and combat engineers, Rockey's Marines fought fiercely but achieved only minor advances, prompting Wornham's 27th Marines to be thrown back into the battle to reinforce the two battered assault regiments. March 5 was then dedicated to reorganizing and resupplying the three Marine Divisions in preparation for a renewed effort the next day. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Marines, led by Colonel James Stuart, were sent back to Guam without having landed on Iwo Jima. The three divisions accordingly resumed the offensive on March 6 after a terrific artillery and naval gunfire bombardment. First, on the left, Erskine attacked with his three regiments abreast yet failed to make any significant advance. Then, in the center, the 9th and 21st Marines likewise unsuccessfully attacked towards Hill 362C, though the latter managed to clear the entire Hill 357 area. Lastly, Wensinger's 23rd Marines passed through the 24th on the division left and pressed on forward against heavy opposition, successfully gaining between 150 and 350 yards while Jordan's battalions gained up to 150 yards in their front. Additionally, the 25th Marines mopped up in its area and Cates' Provisional Battalion kept hammering against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. In the knowledge that the battle was swinging irrevocably in favor of the Americans, General Kuribayashi radioed Tokyo: "Our strongpoints might be able to fight delaying actions for several more days. I comfort myself a little seeing my officers and men die without regret after struggling in this inch-by-inch battle against an overwhelming enemy...". The General's predictions were, if anything, on the pessimistic side as his garrison would prolong the battle for another three weeks. Although the fighting was dragging terribly, on this day Brigadier-General Ernest Moore successfully landed on Airfield No. 1 alongside 28 P-51s and 12 P-61s of the 15th Fighter Group to take over control of island air activities. The following day, the Island Commander, Major-General James Chaney, assumed responsibility for base development, air defense, and operation of the airfields. Meanwhile, Schmidt was continuing his coordinated offensive, with the 28th Marines meeting only scattered resistance as it pushed 500 yards north; the 26th Marines overrunning the enemy defenses and gaining about 150 yards before resistance stiffened once again; the 27th Marines attacking on a narrow front but likewise gaining only 150 yards; the 21st Marines achieving tactical surprise to reach Hill 331 and then pushing 250 yards more to Hill 362C, which was ultimately seized as well; the 9th Marines ferociously attacking east but gaining only 200 yards before a rain of fire stopped them; the 23rd Marines recovering from a savage Japanese night counterattack and then pushing around 150 yards against strong resistance; the 24th Marines only progressing over 50 yards as it neutralized a number of enemy defenses; and the 25th Marines and the Provisional Battalion continuing secondary operations against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. On March 8, Rockey pressed on toward the northeast coast, with the 28th Marines advancing against minimal resistance, gaining between 300 and 500 yards along the shoreline. Meanwhile, the 26th Marines faced a complete stalemate against the intricate network of pillboxes and interconnected caves that had once comprised the village of Kita. The 27th Marines managed to advance approximately 150 yards with tank support. In the center, the 21st Marines shifted northeast again, successfully gaining 300 yards through the last organized resistance in the area, while the 9th Marines captured Hill 362C and continued their eastward assault, reaching the edge of the plateau overlooking the beach and initiating a flanking maneuver south of Hill 331. On the right flank, the 23rd and 24th Marines continued their attacks but made little headway against the enemy's formidable defenses. That night, General Senda launched a strong counterattack that caught the Americans off guard. Two of Senda's orderlies would survive and report what occurred during the daring counterattack. Many of his troops believed that Inoue was a superior leader who inspired his men to perform outstanding feats of bravery; others thought he was a maniac. The sight of the Stars and Stripes flying on top of Mount Suribachi had filled him with increasing rage. He is quoted as saying: "We shall destroy their banner, we shall replace it with ours in the name of the great Emperor and the great people of Japan." Inoue was in charge of the Naval Guard Force who manned the shore guns that sank and damaged many of the US warships and landing craft, and was described as a bombastic and temperamental character, a fine swordsman, heavy drinker, and womanizer. His bizarre plan almost beggars belief. The Captain was certain that the airfields would be lightly defended by service troops. He and his men would move southward, destroying B29 bombers as they passed; climb Mount Suribachi and tear down the Stars and Stripes; and replace it with the Rising Sun as an inspiration to all Japanese troops on the island.  However this never came to be. The determined defenders, bolstered by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, repelled the assault, resulting in approximately 800 Japanese casualties. Under relentless pressure in a shrinking area where most critical terrain features had been seized, the disorganized Japanese forces saw a fleeting opportunity to escape destruction, raid American-controlled airfields, and reclaim Mount Suribachi with this counterattack. However, its failure effectively depleted Senda's remaining strength and chances for continued resistance. The following day, Cates resumed the offensive, with the 23rd Marines making minor gains along their front, while Jordan's 3rd Battalion achieved a notable breakthrough of 300 yards. Furthermore, the Provisional Battalion was disbanded, and Lanigan's 2nd Battalion assumed control of the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob region. In the center, Erskine persisted in his advance toward the sea, with patrols from the 9th and 21st Marines successfully reaching the beach as American forces continued to secure the area. Meanwhile, to the left, Rockey faced significant resistance, with his troops soon coming under intense and precise fire from elevated positions extending southeast from Kitano Point. Consequently, the 26th and 27th Marines remained in a stalemate while the 28th Marines moved forward. On March 10, Liversedge's men advanced approximately 40 yards across extremely challenging terrain and against fierce opposition, while Graham's 2nd Battalion gained an additional 75 yards, with the rest of the 26th and 27th Marines still held in place. Over the past 14 days, Rockey's 5th Marine Division advanced 3,000 yards along the west coast, ultimately pushing Kuribayashi's forces into a final pocket at the northern tip of the island.  In a dispatch to Tokyo on March 10, General Kuribayashi summed up the Japanese situation in this manner: “Although the attacks of the enemy against our Northern districts are continuing day and night, our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly… 200 or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" all day. The enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers, and aircraft are very severe, especially the bombing and machine-gun fire against Divisional Headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I cannot express nor write here.” Not until 15 bloody days later did Marines eliminate the last pocket of organized enemy resistance in the northern end of the island. By D+19 all that remained for the enemy force was to fight and die for the Emperor. This advance came at a significant cost, with Rockey suffering 1,098 men killed and 2,974 wounded during this time. In the center, the 21st Marines reported that all organized resistance in their area had been eliminated, while the 9th Marines moved toward the beach, facing harassment from enemy fire from a resisting pocket on their right. Nevertheless, Erskine's 3rd Marine Division successfully secured the airfield areas and only needed to eliminate this last remaining pocket in their zone. However, personnel losses during this 14-day campaign were substantial, with Erskine losing 831 men killed and 2,241 wounded. Finally, Cates took over from the 24th Marines as he initiated his final offensive eastward. Consequently, the 23rd Marines advanced southeast with minimal resistance, covering approximately 700 yards before stopping at a strategic high ground about 500 yards from the beach, while patrols moved toward the coast near Tachiiwa Point. Simultaneously, Lanigan's 1st and 3rd Battalions pushed 600 yards southeast against stronger opposition and successfully occupied the key terrain southwest of Higashi. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion advanced northeast to join them, effectively driving the remaining enemy forces into a small pocket in that area. Over the last 14 days, Cates' 4th Marine Division engaged in relentless assaults, fighting fiercely from Charlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Minami, and the formidable defenses northeast of Hill 382, nearly reaching the coast.  The Japanese conducted an astute defense in this sector. General Kuribayashi had planned well, but much credit for execution of the plan in the 4th Marine Division zone must go to General Senda, who commanded the 2nd Mixed Brigade and exercised tactical control during the battle. Enemy weapons and minefields were well placed to take maximum advantage of terrain features, fire control was excellent when judged by Japanese standards, and camouflage discipline outstanding. Machine-gun positions controlled draws, while mortars were disposed to deliver fire on routes of approach, including the crests, forward, and reverse slopes of ridges. The one obvious mistake made by the Japanese in this long, grueling defense to the death was the night counterattack of March 8. This action cost them many lives and gained no advantage. Even this rather hopeless plunge can be somewhat justified, however, when the situation that existed then is seen from the Japanese point of view. By March 8, the enemy was under heavy, constant pressure in an ever-shrinking area where most of the critical terrain features had been captured. He was quickly becoming dispossessed and disorganized, with few courses of action remaining. Because communications were undoubtedly badly disrupted, it is possible that the Japanese facing the 4th Division did not realize just how hopeless his cause appeared and therefore harbored some hope that the counterattack might not be in vain. The cost was significant, with Cates suffering 848 men killed and 2,836 wounded.  While the battle raged on Iwo Jima, General LeMay was also preparing for a major raid on Tokyo, known as Operation Meetinghouse. After a precision strike by 192 B-29 bombers against Musashi on March 4, which resulted in minimal damage due to heavy cloud cover, a decision was made to move away from the 21st Bomber Command's traditional focus on precision bombing. This eighth fiasco at Musashi marked the end of a well-defined phase of 21st Bomber Command's operations. The effort to knock out the Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, daylight precision bombing of carefully selected targets had failed. Production of aircraft engines, not grossly off scheduled programs when 21st Bomber Command came to the Marianas, fell off sharply during the last two months of 1944 and production of aircraft declined slightly during the same period. In neither case, however, could the shortages be accounted for by destruction wrought by the B-29's; indeed, the output of Franks at Ota had decreased from 300 a month to 100 before the first air strike. Not one of the nine high-priority targets had been destroyed, although Akashi had been effectively crippled and production had been slowed down at Mitsubishi's engine and assembly plants at Nagoya and at Nakajima-Ota. Musashi had suffered only 4% damage after 835 B-29 sorties had been sent against it; Navy planes had done more harm in a single strike. Probably the indirect effects of the B-29 raids were most important: with the fall of Saipan, Japanese industrialists had begun to lose confidence in their supposed immunity from air attack. Although under governmental pressure for increased production, they began, with the first attacks on Nakajima and Mitsubishi, to hunt for underground or forest cover, and the official directive for dispersal issued in mid-January merely served to quicken a process already well under way. This radical change in manufacturing techniques, never as efficiently conducted as the similar movement in Germany had been, explains in part the slowdown in production in late 1944 and early 1945.  In 22 missions comprising 2,148 sorties, the command dropped 5,398 tons of bombs on Japan targeting the Imperial aircraft industry, but only about half of the bombers hit primary targets. Losses were substantial, largely due to fierce enemy interceptors and the lengthy overwater journey from the Marianas to Japan, which lacked any friendly bases for refueling or repairs. As a result of the high costs associated with unescorted daylight missions, the susceptibility of Japanese cities to incendiary attacks, and the minimal impact of precision bombing with high explosives, General Arnold ultimately opted for a comprehensive incendiary campaign. In preparation for the forthcoming assault on Okinawa, LeMay was tasked with initiating a series of intensive incendiary strikes from low altitudes. This lower bombing altitude would enhance accuracy, increase bomb load, and prolong the lifespan of B-29 engines. Although this approach carried risks, LeMay believed that the intense Japanese anti-aircraft fire was not overly threatening, as only two B-29s had been lost due to flak alone. He also decided to conduct these missions at night, which would decrease the likelihood of heavy cloud cover and strong winds, simplify navigation, and enable the bombers to reach the two new emergency airstrips at Iwo Jima by dawn. The first mission was set to commence immediately, with 334 B-29s from the 73rd, 313th, and 314th Bombardment Wings taking off in the late afternoon of March 9, carrying approximately 2,000 tons of bombs. The target was a rectangular area in northeastern Tokyo known as Zone I, measuring about 4 by 3 miles and encompassing most of Asakusa, Honjo, and Fukagawa Wards. After a turbulent journey, the initial pathfinders successfully identified their targets under favorable weather conditions and marked them shortly after midnight with fires However LeMay's decision came late. With the first mission set for the night of March 9, the field orders were not cut until the 8th. Although operational details would vary significantly from normal practice, there was no time to consult Washington as was so frequently done. Arnold was not even informed of the revolutionary plans until the day before the mission. The decision to attack at night ruled out the command's standard technique of lead-crew bombing. Formation flying at night was not feasible, and with flak rather than enemy fighters the chief danger, a tight formation would be a handicap rather than a source of defensive strength. With planes bombing individually from low altitudes, bomb loads could be sharply increased, to an average of about six tons per plane. Lead squadron B-29s carried 180 x 70-pound M47s, napalm-filled bombs calculated to start "appliance fires," that is, fires requiring attention of motorized fire-fighting equipment. Other planes, bombing on these pathfinders, were loaded with 24 x 500-pound clusters of M69s. Intervalometers were set at 100 feet for the pathfinders, 50 feet for the other planes. The latter setting was supposed to give a minimum density of 25 tons (8333 M69s) per square mile. Late reports indicated widespread fires that forced formations to search extensively for targets, with visibility severely hampered by smoke and bomb runs complicated by turbulence from intense heat waves. During the three-hour assault, a total of 279 B-29 bombers targeted Tokyo, successfully dropping 1,665 short tons of bombs on the primary objective. Additionally, 19 Superfortresses, unable to reach Tokyo, attacked alternative or last-resort targets. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise by this tactical shift, resulting in only moderate resistance; intense anti-aircraft fire destroyed 14 B-29s and damaged another 42, while enemy interceptors had no significant effect. The fires were so intense that they nearly extinguished themselves by mid-morning, only halted by wide gaps like rivers. Subsequent photographs revealed that 15.8 square miles had been devastated, including 18% of the industrial sector, 63% of the commercial area, and the core of the densely populated residential district. Tokyo's highly effective firefighting system was also caught off guard, leading to the destruction of 95 fire engines and the deaths of 125 firefighters, while lightweight buildings were completely consumed along with their contents. Little rubble remained; only a few fire-resistant structures, marked by heat damage, stood in the devastated areas. In total, 267,171 buildings were destroyed, 83,793 people lost their lives, 40,918 were injured, and 1,008,005 were left homeless. Moreover, it took 25 days to recover all the bodies from the debris. Radio Tokyo referred to the raid as “slaughter bombing,” with one broadcast stating that “the sea of flames engulfing the residential and commercial districts of Tokyo was reminiscent of the holocaust of Rome, caused by Emperor Nero.” The attack significantly undermined the morale of Japanese civilians, and along with other firebombing raids in March, it led many to believe that the war situation was worse than their government had acknowledged. In response, the Japanese government implemented a mix of repression, including severe penalties for those accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and launched an ineffective propaganda campaign aimed at restoring confidence in the nation's air and civil defense efforts. Meanwhile, LeMay and Arnold viewed the operation as a considerable success. As Tokyo mourned its losses, another 313 B-29s were sent on the afternoon of March 11 to execute a similar strike on Nagoya; however, due to minimal wind to spread the fires from the widely dispersed bombs, the results were less impressive. Nonetheless, only one B-29 was lost during the raid, with another 20 sustaining damage. It became evident, as LeMay had predicted, that the Japanese lacked effective tactics for nighttime interception. Now, attention shifts to Burma to report on the ongoing Chinese-British-Indian offensives. On General Slim's primary front, General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued its vigorous advance toward Mandalay, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division successfully made its way to the Meiktila area in the Japanese rear. In response, Generals Kimura and Katamura sent several reinforcements to this crucial area, but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment, led by Colonel Yoshida, managed to arrive in time to establish some defenses in the town, quickly transforming buildings in Meiktila into bunkers and strongpoints. On February 28, Cowan dispatched the 63rd Brigade to launch an attack from the west and the 48th Brigade to advance from the north along the Mahlaing-Meiktila road, while the 255th Tank Brigade executed a wide flanking maneuver to approach from the east. As a result, the 63rd Brigade secured Kyaukpyugon and set up a roadblock southwest of Meiktila; the 48th Brigade advanced to a bridge over a chaung approximately a mile from the town; and the 255th Brigade fought its way to Kyigon and Khanda, successfully destroying several bunkers near Point 860. On March 1, following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, Cowan's three brigades began to push into Meiktila despite fierce resistance. The 48th Brigade, bolstered by a tank squadron, advanced down the Mandalay-Meiktila road, quickly clearing Kyigon before entering the town, where they reached within 100 yards of the railroad line before the attack was halted in the late afternoon. To the east, the majority of the 255th Tank Brigade captured Point 860 and began clearing the camouflaged bunkers along the ridgeline, while a combined force of tanks and grenadiers advanced to within 200 yards of the railroad station before being recalled. Meanwhile, the 63rd Brigade, supported by a tank squadron, cleared the village of Kanna and continued past it to secure the railroad line and the main Kyaukpadaung-Meiktila road. The following day, the 17th Indian Division tightened the encirclement around Meiktila, inflicting significant casualties on the outnumbered defenders and destroying numerous enemy bunkers. On March 3, the three brigades commenced the task of eliminating the last remaining Japanese forces in and around Meiktila. They faced intense sniper and machine-gun fire from every building. However, due to the tanks' superior firepower, the Japanese strongholds were systematically taken down one by one. By the end of the day, the town was cleared, with an estimated 2,000 Japanese troops killed, including Colonel Yoshida. Additionally, 47 field pieces and anti-tank guns were captured, and the supply dumps surrounding Meiktila were secured. Cowan now needed to organize the town's defenses, anticipating a swift and fierce Japanese counterattack. Immediately after the town's capture, Kimura ordered the 18th Division to work with the weakened 49th Division to reclaim Meiktila, while Katamura reinforced General Naka with the majority of the 119th and 214th Regiments, a strong artillery unit, and the battered 14th Tank Regiment. Following the capture of Meiktila, Cowan's forces spent the next few days clearing the area of any remaining snipers and stragglers. For the town's defense, Cowan assigned each brigade and the divisional infantry to four sectors, each featuring a heavily fortified redoubt. He also tasked the 99th Brigade with defending Kyigon and Meiktila's airfield. To maintain the initiative for the 17th Division, Cowan aggressively deployed strong mobile columns of tanks, mechanized artillery, and infantry to disrupt the Japanese formations as they approached Meiktila. Consequently, while the 18th and 49th Divisions advanced, Ywadan and Nyaungaing were secured on March 5. In the following days, the main roads leading to Mahlaing, Kyaukpadaung, Pyawbwe, Thazi, and Mandalay were cleared, and the enemy units of the 214th Regiment at Thangongyi and Yego were successfully repelled on March 8. General Naka was now prepared to initiate his primary assault on Meiktila, instructing his units to concentrate their efforts north of the town, while the 214th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to move southwest to connect with the 49th Division. In response to these movements, on March 10, Cowan sent a robust tank-infantry force along the Mahlaing road to escort a previously dispatched column back to Meiktila, successfully inflicting significant casualties on the 56th Regiment as the British-Indians secured the Leindaw-Kyanngyagon area. However, the troops faced harassment from artillery fire originating from south of Myindawgan Lake, prompting Cowan to launch another armored sweep on March 14 to eliminate this threat. Although the 55th Regiment managed to capture the hill north of Meiktila after Cowan's tanks and infantry withdrew, the Japanese forces were unable to prevent their return, which resulted in further heavy losses. Concurrently, other tank-infantry units disrupted the advance of the 49th Division, effectively delaying the assembly of Japanese forces to the south and east of Meiktila until March 18. Additionally, a strong raid by the Komatsubara Unit was successfully repelled on March 14. In Stopford's sector, the 19th Division was preparing to launch its final offensive southward toward Mandalay, while the 2nd and 20th Divisions, after fierce fighting to expand their bridgeheads, were advancing east to assault the southern approaches to Mandalay. With close support from artillery and aircraft, General Rees' forces successfully breached the primary defenses of Lieutenant-General Yamamoto Kiyoe's 15th Division, reaching the northern outskirts of Mandalay by March 7. As the assault continued, British-Indian forces were set to enter the city on March 9. However, the determined defenders clung to Mandalay Hill and Fort Dufferin, aiming to extend the conflict and fight to the death. While Mandalay was under siege, the 62nd Brigade stealthily advanced east to Maymyo on March 11, catching the garrison off guard. The next day, Mandalay Hill ultimately fell while Fort Dufferin was being heavily bombarded within the city. By mid-March, the 2nd Division was nearing the capture of Ava, and the 20th Division was steadily advancing east to sever the supply routes from Mandalay to the south. In northern Burma, General Sultan was also pursuing his offensive. After establishing a bridgehead at Myitson, General Festing's 36th British Division faced minimal resistance and successfully took Mongmit on March 9 before continuing southward to Mogok. To the east, the 38th Chinese Division encountered only weak delaying positions as it moved towards Lashio, which was successfully occupied by March 7. At this point, the 56th Division, now independently commanding this area, was gradually retreating towards Hsipaw and Kyaukme. Although General Sun paused his advance until the Generalissimo granted permission to resume the offensive later in the month. Mountbatten feared that if more Chinese troops were withdrawn from Burma it might not be possible to take Rangoon before the monsoon rains began. This was an unpleasant prospect, so Mountbatten went to Chungking on March 8 for two days of conference with the Generalissimo. When the conference of March 9 concluded, the Generalissimo, according to the American minutes, said that he would recapitulate his decision of halting the Chinese advance at Lashio. In so doing, he remarked that the details of withdrawal would be settled later and that no final decisions would be made before General Wedemeyer was able to take part in them. Then he stated that unless there was a simultaneous amphibious attack on Rangoon, operations would stop at Lashio and Mandalay and the Allies would assume the defensive. The Chinese would stop at Lashio, but details of their operations between Lashio and Mandalay would be settled later between the staffs. The misunderstanding became quite apparent in mid-March when General Sultan, under whose command the Chinese were, received conflicting orders. Mountbatten ordered Sultan to move his forces southwestward toward Mandalay, yet the Generalissimo directed that the Chinese divisions stay in the Lashio area. As a compromise and to avoid having the Chinese wait idly around Lashio, Sultan suggested that a smaller task force be directed to proceed south. But the Generalissimo and his American advisers stood firm, lest the shift of troops to China be delayed. This in turn caused the British to believe that if the Chinese were not going to advance they should be withdrawn forthwith and end the burden on the line of communications. The 50th Chinese Division began to push south after securing the Namtu region and by mid-March reached Hsipaw. Meanwhile, in South Burma, the 82nd West African Division had taken Dalet, while the 25th Indian Division engaged in a struggle for control of the Ruywa-Tamandu area. Additionally, the 2nd West African Brigade was advancing inland toward An, posing a significant threat to the Japanese rear areas. Due to the rapid advancement of Slim's offensive, Admiral Mountbatten had to prioritize air supply for the 14th Army. This situation soon compelled General Christison to send the 25th Indian Division back to India, as his logistical support was becoming increasingly strained. Capturing Tamandu and establishing a Forward Maintenance Area there became essential. After successfully clearing Dokekan, the 74th Indian Brigade crossed the Me Chaung on March 4 to circumvent the main enemy defenses. The British-Indians pressed on, launching attacks on Tamandu in the following days, but the determined defenders put up strong resistance. Eventually, General Miyazaki withdrew most of the 111th Regiment and ordered it to attack the 2nd West African Brigade from the rear, which was finally contained by March 17. With the 25th Division scheduled to withdraw to Akyab by the end of the month, the 74th was reassigned to the 82nd West African Division and launched a final assault on Tamandu on March 11, successfully capturing the abandoned objective. The British-Indians then began to advance towards Kolan, reaching the vicinity of the town by mid-March. Simultaneously, the 154th Regiment counterattacked the West Africans at Dalet, successfully halting the enemy's advance beyond the river. Meanwhile, the 4th Indian Brigade landed at Mae near Letpan on March 13 from Ramree Island and established a roadblock to prevent enemy escape. In response, the 121st Regiment sent several companies to conduct a delaying action aimed at slowing the enemy's southward advance. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima intensified as the Marines advanced against fortified Japanese positions, facing heavy resistance and suffering significant casualties while capturing key terrain over several weeks of fierce combat. Meanwhile General LeMay shifted from precision bombing to incendiary raids on Tokyo, resulting in significant destruction and civilian casualties, while Japanese morale plummeted amid military setbacks.  

Last time we spoke about the invasion of iwo jima. General LeMay's B-29 bombers targeted Japan, inflicting heavy damage on Kobe and Ota's Nakajima factory, though at a cost of lost aircraft. Meanwhile, U.S. forces prepared for the Iwo Jima assault. On February 19, Marines landed amid intense bombardment, facing fierce Japanese resistance. Progress was slow, with heavy casualties. By February 21, they fought to capture Mount Suribachi. Amidst the chaos, kamikaze attacks struck American carriers, causing significant losses and foreshadowing the brutal battles ahead. In the midst of a relentless rain on February 22, Colonel Liversedge led the 28th Marines in a fierce assault on Mount Suribachi, facing determined Japanese resistance. Despite harsh conditions and significant casualties, the Marines pushed forward. On February 23, they reached the summit, raising the American flag to symbolize their hard-fought victory. The Secretary of the Navy, inspired by the moment, declared it would ensure the Marine Corps' legacy for centuries. As battles continued, the Marines faced heavy losses but remained resolute in their mission. This episode is the fall of Manila Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last observed in Manila, General Griswold's forces had effectively confined the remnants of Admiral Iwabuchi's troops to Intramuros, the South Port Area, and the Philippine Commonwealth Government buildings located at the southeastern edge of the Walled City. Available information led to the conclusion that the Japanese defenses were strongest on the southern and eastern sides of the Walled City and that the Japanese expected attack from these, the most logical directions. Japanese garrisons in the Legislative, Finance, and Agriculture Buildings just across Padre Burgos Street southeast of Intramuros could cover these approaches. The 37th Division could, of course, take the government buildings before launching an assault on Intramuros, but it would be easier to attack the government buildings after Intramuros fell. Conversely, planners deemed it feasible to strike into Intramuros from the west, since Japanese defenses along the west wall, across Bonifacio Street from the Manila Hotel and the South Port Area, appeared weak. But in this case, American troops would first have to clear the South Port Area and then, advancing from the west, would have to attack toward much of their own supporting artillery. The artillery's best positions for close support were on the north and northeast, across the Pasig, and on the east, in the area south from the General Post Office to the City Hall, and much of the artillery ultimately did fire from these areas. About halfway from the northeast to the northwest corner of Intramuros the ancient wall ended, providing direct access into the Walled City at the Government Mint. The only other obstacle on the north was a low sea wall running along the south bank of the Pasig, and Japanese defenses along the north face appeared weak except at the northeast corner. Planners therefore decided that there would be an excellent chance to execute a successful amphibious assault from the north bank of the Pasig against the north-central side of the Walled City.  Given that the Japanese defenses were strongest on the southern and eastern sides of the Walled City, and that the ancient wall ended at the Government Mint between the northeast and northwest corners of Intramuros, it was decided to initiate an amphibious attack from the north bank of the Pasig River targeting the north-central section of the Walled City, executed by the 129th Regiment with close artillery support. However, aware that the Japanese had established a complex tunnel system for rapid troop movement within Intramuros, General Beightler deemed it essential to conduct a secondary assault on Quezon Gate near the northeastern entrance to keep the Japanese forces off balance and to split their attention. Since the Japanese had fortified this area with strong pillboxes just inside the walls, the division concluded that heavy artillery would be required to create an additional breach in the thick wall just south of Quezon Gate, where the 145th Regiment would launch its attack. Furthermore, as the Japanese could target the advancing troops with enfilade fire from the three government buildings to the south, Allied artillery would need to neutralize these buildings during the assault on Intramuros. Lastly, the 1st Cavalry Brigade positioned to the west and southwest of Intramuros would block any potential escape routes for Japanese forces from the Walled City. So far, General MacArthur had severely restricted the employment of air in the metropolitan area. In late January and early February Marine Corps SBDs had bombed or strafed a few pinpointed targets in the North and South Port Areas and had also hit some obvious Japanese gun positions in the open areas of Luneta Park and Burnham Green. One or two strikes may also have taken place against specific targets within Intramuros, but all in all it appears that planes of the Allied Air Forces flew no more than ten or twelve individual sorties against targets within the city after February 3. Before that time both carrier-based and land-based aircraft had presumably limited their strikes to targets within the port areas and to oil storage facilities in Pandacan and Paco Districts. Of course some bombs had gone astray during these strikes and had caused damage within Intramuros, while additional damage within the Walled City had resulted from both American and Japanese artillery fire the first two weeks of the battle for Manila. When approached with General Griswold's plan to carry out an intensive aerial bombardment against the Walled City, MacArthur once again objected: “The use of air on a part of a city occupied by a friendly and allied population is unthinkable. The inaccuracy of this type of bombardment would result beyond question in the death of thousands of innocent civilians. It is not believed moreover that this would appreciably lower our own casualty rate although it would unquestionably hasten the conclusion of the operations. For these reasons I do not approve the use of air bombardment on the Intramuros district.” However, General MacArthur had previously issued orders limiting air operations in the metropolitan area, leading him to reject this proposal. Not wanting to rely solely on infantry for the assault, Griswold and Beightler decided to organize a significant artillery preparation, as they were not explicitly prohibited from using artillery. After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Japanese in Intramuros to surrender or release the numerous Filipino civilians they were holding hostage, Griswold initiated the bombardment of Intramuros on February 17, creating several breaches in the east wall. On February 22, Allied artillery began targeting the north wall to breach it and eliminate a Japanese stronghold at the Government Mint, while additional guns took up positions for the final barrage before the infantry assault the following morning. Between 07:30 and 08:30 on February 23, the Americans executed the last preparatory bombardment, effectively damaging the walls of Intramuros and covering much of the interior. Once the supporting fire ceased, the infantry assault commenced, with the 3rd Battalion, 129th Regiment swiftly crossing the Pasig River without opposition and advancing through the Government Mint into Intramuros. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 145th Regiment climbed over the breach south of Quezon Gate and entered through the gate unopposed, quickly moving southwest toward Letran University. Ten minutes into the assault, Griswold's artillery resumed fire for the next half hour, deploying high explosives, smoke, and white phosphorus across a 100-yard-wide area between the east and west walls. This aimed to seal off the southern third of Intramuros, preventing the Japanese forces there from observing movements to the north or sending reinforcements. The total artillery and mortar fire supporting the assault amounted to 230 tons, equivalent to over 11,650 rounds. By 08:50, the 129th and 145th Regiments connected at Letran University, with the 129th advancing toward Beaterio Street and Fort Santiago against minimal resistance, while the 145th cleared Letran University and secured the first two blocks southwest of Quezon Gate. At 10:45, the 1st Battalion of the 145th Regiment moved through Parian Gate and headed south. As American troops pushed deeper into Intramuros, the Japanese began to recover from the artillery bombardment, offering sporadic resistance from isolated machine-gun and rifle positions. Nonetheless, the 129th successfully cleared the west wall north of Beaterio Street and captured Fort Santiago in the afternoon. However, the 145th had to halt its advance about four blocks southwest of Quezon Gate as the Japanese started releasing nearly 3,000 civilian hostages from San Augustin and Del Monico Churches. Once the civilian evacuation was complete, American tanks and self-propelled artillery targeted Japanese positions within those churches and other strongholds in the southwestern section of Intramuros. Despite the efforts, the troops were unable to reach the south or west walls before nightfall due to fierce resistance. Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, along with the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, began clearing the South Port Area, facing relatively light opposition except at one strongpoint. Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, and elements of the 148th Regiment contained the enemy at the government buildings. On February 24, while the 129th was finishing operations at Fort Santiago, the 145th continued its offensive, successfully cornering the last pockets of resistance in its area into the Aquarium, situated in a bastion at the southwest corner of Intramuros. Although the resistance was fierce in this location, a tunnel linking the bastion to the main wall was unexpectedly left unguarded, allowing Company C to break through into the Aquarium with ease. The final assault commenced in the afternoon, resulting in 115 Japanese casualties as the last organized resistance within Intramuros was overcome. In total, approximately 1,000 Japanese were killed, and 25 were captured during the assault on Intramuros, with the Americans suffering 25 killed and 265 wounded. Concurrently, the cavalrymen completed the clearing of the South Port Area and turned their attention to the government buildings, which would necessitate another intensive preparatory bombardment.  The imposing, columned façade of the Philippine Commonwealth's Legislative Building--the Philippine Capitol--fronted on Padre Burgos Street opposite the southeast corner of Intramuros and lay 150 yards south of the City Hall. About 100 yards south of the Legislative Building was the Bureau of Finance, and another 250 yards to the south-southeast, near the intersection of General Luna and San Luis Streets, lay the main building of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce. Architecturally similar to the old Senate and House Office Buildings in Washington DC, the three government structures were modern, earthquake-proof edifices constructed of heavily reinforced concrete. The oblong Legislative Building, with wings four stories high and a central portion rising another two and a half floors, was constructed around two open courtyards. The Finance and Agriculture Buildings, both five-story trapezoids, each featured a central courtyard. The buildings were strong not only by virtue of their construction but because all approaches to them led across wide open ground. Sandbag emplacements and barricades of other types blocked all readily accessible doors and windows, and window-emplaced machine guns covered all approaches. Despite the fact that the Japanese in the three buildings had advantages of position and elevation that permitted them to endanger American and Filipino movements over large areas of Manila, the 14th Corps and the 37th Division at first considered starving the Japanese garrison out. But the two headquarters soon decided this would take too long. Information from prisoners and Filipino hostages who had escaped from the buildings indicated that the Japanese garrisons in the three structures had sufficient strength, ammunition, food, and water to withstand a protracted siege. On February 26, after an hour of final artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion, 148th Regiment entered the ground floor of the Legislative Building from the rear, while the 5th Cavalry attacked the Agriculture Building; however, both units were successfully repelled by the determined defenders. The following day, after a failed attempt to smoke the Japanese out of the Legislative Building, heavy artillery was used to demolish the north and south wings, leaving only the damaged central section, which was subsequently cleared by the infantry. At the same time, the 5th Cavalry cleared out the apartment building and several nearby structures in preparation for another attack on the Agriculture Building, which commenced on February 28 following a three-hour artillery bombardment that caused significant portions of the building to collapse. Facing no initial resistance, the cavalrymen quickly accessed the remnants of the first floor but soon encountered strong opposition from pockets of resistance at the northwest and southeast corners. With support from tanks and armed with small arms, bazookas, and portable flamethrowers, the 5th Cavalry managed to clear the above-ground debris by nightfall, although a few Japanese soldiers remained hidden in basement areas. Ultimately, on March 1, after a failed appeal for surrender, demolitions along with burning gasoline and oil eliminated the last of the Japanese resistance. During this time, artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers relentlessly bombarded the Finance Building from various angles. Eventually, the 1st Battalion of the 148th Regiment would clear the remnants of this building during their final assaults on March 2 and 3. Late on March 3, Griswold joyfully informed Krueger that organized resistance in the Manila area had come to an end. The cost of reclaiming Manila was significant, with over 1,000 Americans killed and 5,500 wounded in the metropolitan area between February 3 and March 3. In contrast, the Japanese suffered approximately 16,000 fatalities in and around Manila. During periods of calm in the fighting, Japanese troops often vented their anger and frustration on the city's civilians, committing acts of violent mutilation, rape, and massacres in schools, hospitals, and convents. This led to the deaths of at least 100,000 Filipino civilians, both from deliberate actions by the Japanese during the Manila massacre and from artillery and aerial bombardments by American and Japanese forces. If you listened to the very first episode of this podcast series, I actually began it with what is known as the Manila massacre. During lulls in the battle for control of Manila, Japanese troops took their anger and frustration out on the civilians in the city. Violent mutilations, rapes, and massacres occurred in schools, hospitals and convents, including San Juan de Dios Hospital, Santa Rosa College, Santo Domingo Church, Manila Cathedral, Paco Church, St. Paul's Convent, and St. Vincent de Paul Church. The Bayview Hotel was used as a designated "rape center". General Yamashita was convicted as a war criminal for the Manila massacre, although Admiral Iwabuchi's marines had committed the atrocities and Yamashita had earlier ordered him to evacuate Manila.  By the end of the Battle of Manila, the public transportation system no longer existed; the water supply and sewage systems needed extensive repairs; the electric power facilities did not function; most of the streets needed repaving; and 39 out of 100 or more large and small bridges had been destroyed, including the 6 over the Pasig River. The University of the Philippines and the Philippine General Hospital were largely irreparable. Lower class residential districts north of the Pasig and upper class apartments south of the river had been destroyed; the Philippine Commonwealth's government's center had been wiped out; the 400-year-old landmark of Intramuros had been nearly razed; severe damage had been inflicted on the economically important installations in the North and South Port Areas; and the industrialized Paco and Pandacan Districts had been badly battered. Many buildings still standing would ultimately have to be torn down as unsafe for occupancy. Millions upon millions of dollars' worth of damage had been done and, as a final shocking note of tragedy, an estimated 100000 Filipino civilians had lost their lives during the battle. However, Manila was officially liberated, marking the end of nearly three years of Japanese military occupation in the Philippines. Following Manila's fall, Krueger aimed to eliminate the Shimbu and Shobu Groups to finalize the liberation of Luzon. Meanwhile, MacArthur deemed it crucial to establish a safe, direct shipping route through the central Philippines to support the creation of large air, naval, and logistical bases on Luzon. Consequently, he instructed the 6th Army to secure southern Luzon and the Bicol Peninsula while also ordering General Eichelberger's 8th Army to seize the islands in the Visayan Passages and the northern part of Samar. To facilitate the southern Philippines Campaign, MacArthur reassigned the 40th and 41st Divisions, the 19th and 34th Regiments of the 24th Division, and the 503rd Parachute Regiment back to the 8th Army. Additionally, he designated the 37th Division to garrison Manila. With the 43rd Division sent south to replace the 40th at Clark Field, Krueger assigned the recently arrived 33rd Division, led by Major-General Percy Clarkson, to take control of the Damortis-Rosario sector. Meanwhile, as the 188th Glider Regiment cleared Ternate Island, Krueger also decided to deploy the 11th Airborne Division and the 158th Regiment to secure the northern shores of the Visayan Passages and open Batangas and Balayan Bays. However, this left only the 1st Cavalry Division and the 112th Cavalry Regiment available for operations against the Shimbu Group, leading Krueger to reluctantly redeploy the 6th Division south to reinforce the 14th Corps, leaving just the 25th, 32nd, and 33rd Divisions under the 1st Corps for operations in northern Luzon. After making these adjustments, Krueger and Griswold began strategizing their offensive eastward against General Yokoyama's Shimbu Group, which had recently received the Noguchi Detachment from the Bicol Peninsula. To ensure the security and recovery of the Manila Bay area, General Patrick's 6th Division was tasked with first capturing Wawa Dam and its pipeline connections, followed by securing Ipo Dam and its related facilities, essential for meeting Manila's water needs. Meanwhile, General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade was assigned to secure the Antipolo-Tagig region. Between February 20 and 22, even before the fierce fighting in Manila began to ease, the 7th Cavalry crossed the Marikina River to take control of Taytay and then ventured into the Sierra Madre foothills. The 8th Cavalry followed suit, crossing the river to secure Tagig. On February 23, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade advanced east toward Antipolo, but General Noguchi effectively utilized artillery and conducted small-scale nightly infiltration attacks, successfully harassing and delaying the cavalrymen, who could only measure their progress in feet. Noguchi's effective passive defense meant that by March 4, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was still a mile and a half from Antipolo, having incurred heavy casualties during this frustrating advance. Among the wounded was General Mudge, who was temporarily replaced by Hoffman as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. On February 22, the 6th Division also began crossing the Marikina River, with the 20th Regiment fording at Marikina town and the 63rd Regiment crossing at Montalban and San Mateo. Facing no resistance, the 20th Regiment advanced a mile into the steep, grassy hills northeast of Marikina, while the 63rd probed into the high ground east of San Mateo by the evening of February 23. The troops initiated an assault on General Kobayashi's primary defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, but made minimal progress before the 1st Regiment arrived from Bataan on February 25. With this new reinforcement, Patrick launched a coordinated attack involving three regiments against Pacawagan and Mataba. However, by March 4, they had only secured a tenuous foothold on the northern crest of Pacawagan, as the efforts of the 1st and 20th Regiments were entirely unsuccessful.   Meanwhile, noticing an uptick in guerrilla activity in the Bontoc and Baguio areas, which indicated a potential major enemy offensive on Baguio, and considering the possibility of an airborne assault in the Cagayan Valley, General Yamashita began reorganizing his forces while preparing the defenses of the triangular redoubt in northern Luzon. He kept most of the 103rd Division stationed in the Aparri and Vigan sectors, assigned the 177th Independent Battalion to secure the naval air base at Tuguegarao, and started organizing eight provisional companies from the remnants of the 2nd Parachute Group at Echague. He tasked the 10th Division with defending the Salacsac-Balete Pass sector to the last man, gathered the remnants of the 2nd Tank Division at Dupax to reform as an understrength infantry division, and relocated the 105th Division to Bagabag, where it would be bolstered by the 10th Regiment. Additionally, he assigned these three divisions to Major-General Konuma Haruo's self-sufficient Bambang Branch, transferred the 19th Division to the Bontoc area to combat the enemy guerrillas, tasked the Hayashi Detachment with holding San Fernando, began moving the worn-out 58th Independent Mixed Brigade north to defend Route 9, and ordered the fatigued 23rd Division to continue containing the enemy in the Rosario-Baguio sector. General Swift's 1st Corps, which had recently lost two divisions, was focusing its main efforts against Baguio. Clarkson's 33rd Division was set to advance north along Route 11, while General Gill's 32nd Division would move northwest through the Ambayabang, Agno, and Arodogat valleys from the south and southeast. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division planned to launch a holding attack on the Bambang front. However, in mid-February, as Clarkson's forces continued to pressure Japanese troops entrenched along the Hill 600-Hill 1500 ridgeline, they learned that General Sato's withdrawal to the north was already in progress to bolster the San Fernando front. Additionally, the 130th and 136th Regiments successfully cleared the last Japanese forces from the north-central part of the ridgeline by February 22, although they were unable to capture the Hill 600 complex. At the same time, the 32nd and 25th Divisions conducted extensive patrols in their areas, discovering that the Japanese were guarding every approach to the north as various units made contact with Japanese outposts. During this period, the Americans also identified the Baguio-Aritao supply road. Severing this link in the Japanese defensive network would provide the 1st Corps with a significant tactical advantage. Given that the Baguio end of the supply road was more heavily defended and that breaking through to Aritao would threaten the critical Bambang and Bagabag positions, Krueger and Swift decided that the 25th and 32nd Divisions would concentrate their efforts on the Bambang front, while the Baguio front would be maintained in a holding capacity. Volckmann's missions as assigned by 6th Army, which assumed control of USAFIP(NL) on January 13, were to gather intelligence, ambush Japanese patrols, seize or destroy Japanese supplies, disrupt Japanese lines of communication, and block Japanese routes of withdrawal into and exit from the Cagayan Valley. It was not, apparently, initially intended that Volckmann's force would engage in sustained efforts against major Japanese units, and there seems to have been little hope that Volckmann's, or any other guerrilla unit, would ever become effective combat organizations. The most help General MacArthur and Krueger probably expected was in the form of harassing raids, sabotage, and intelligence. But Volckmann--and other guerrilla leaders on Luzon as well--interpreted his missions as broadly as his strength and armament permitted. By the end of February USAFIP(NL) had cleared much of the west coast of Luzon north of San Fernando and also controlled the north coast west of Aparri. Volckmann had rendered Route 11 between Baguio and Tuguegarao and Route 4 from Libtong to Bagabag virtually impassable to the Japanese. Indeed, one of the main reasons that Yamashita moved the 19th Division north had been to regain control over the two vital highways so that supplies could continue moving into the final redoubt. While USAFIP(NL) did not possess sufficient strength to attack major Japanese concentrations or to hold out against large-scale punitive expeditions, it had diverted and pinned down Japanese forces that could undoubtedly have been used to better advantage elsewhere. It would appear that by mid-February USAFIP(NL) had accomplished far more than MacArthur or Krueger had either expected or hoped. Meanwhile, the 121st Regiment secured the highway from Vigan south to Libtong, with Company L capturing Cervantes and pushing the 357th Independent Battalion into the Bessang Pass. Elements of the 121st then shifted their focus to San Fernando, which they attempted to attack unsuccessfully in late February and early March. Following Swift's new strategies, the 33rd Division began patrolling the approaches to Baguio in the last week of February, successfully overrunning the last Japanese positions on Hill 600 and in the Arodogat Valley. Along Route 11, the 71st Regiment executed a successful fighting withdrawal, while American patrols along the coast occupied Agoo and advanced to Pugo with minimal resistance, only to encounter the first sections of the Tuba Trail defended by elements of the 64th Regiment. On the main front, the 25th Division commenced its advance to Puncan on February 21, while the 32nd Division began its push up the Villa Verde Trail toward Santa Fe. The 127th Regiment broke through the trail's outpost line on February 24; the 35th Regiment advanced unopposed along Route 100, reaching Carranglan on February 26; the 161st Regiment targeted high ground overlooking Puncan from the west and successfully secured the trail junction on February 28, diverting the enemy's attention; and the 27th Regiment pushed north along Route 5, facing fierce resistance while clearing the Lumboy area on February 27. On Villa Verde, the 127th Regiment advanced to the Cabalisiaan River crossing by March 1, where they once again defeated the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment. After leaving one battalion to secure the crossing, the 127th continued their advance and encountered the weakened Japanese defenders on March 3. Recognizing the threat to the Salacsac Pass, Konuma promptly sent reinforcements to the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment and ordered General Iwanaka's recently reorganized 2nd Tank Division to prepare for deployment to the Salacsac Pass, taking command of all troops along the Villa Verde Trail. While these reinforcements were en route, the 127th Regiment continued to assault the remaining positions of the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment, ultimately reaching the western entrance of Salacsac Pass on March 5. Meanwhile, to the south, a battalion from the 35th Regiment descended a rugged trail into Puncan from the northeast and secured the heights overlooking the damaged town on March 1. The next day, as patrols entered the deserted Puncan, the rest of the regiment cautiously advanced west along Route 100 from Carranglan, occupying Digdig without resistance on March 3. Over the following two days, organized resistance began to crumble throughout the Lumboy-Puncan area, with Mullins' three regiments successfully connecting at Puncan and Digdig after the encirclement of a 1,250-man enemy force. Concerned about these developments, Konuma quickly decided to bolster the 10th Division with the Takachiho Unit and the majority of the 10th Regiment. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion of the 126th Regiment began its advance up the Ambayabang Valley on February 25, successfully reaching Lawican by March 5. In response to this new threat, Yamashita swiftly directed his reserve 16th Reconnaissance Regiment to secure the upper reaches of the Ambayabang. Finally, to the south, the Americal and 24th Divisions were tasked with initiating operations to secure the Visayan Passages. Consequently, on February 19, the 1st Battalion of the 182nd Regiment landed on Capul Island and launched an assault on Biri Island the next day. After discovering other unoccupied islets near Samar, the battalion established a base at the northwestern tip of Samar, ultimately defeating the last organized resistance in that region by March 1. Meanwhile, elements of the 19th Regiment landed on Verde Island on February 23, managing to secure the island by March 3. The 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment made an unopposed landing on Lubang Island on February 28, and the 1st Battalion of the 132nd Regiment successfully captured Ticao and Burias Islands on March 3. Additionally, on the morning of February 23, a task force comprising the 1st Battalion of the 188th Glider Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Regiment, a Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon from the 11th Airborne Division, several guerrilla groups led by Lieutenant-Colonel Honorio Guerrero, along with supporting artillery, tank destroyers, and amphibious tractors, executed a carefully coordinated rescue of 2,147 internees from an internment camp near Los Baños on Laguna de Bay. The 1st Battalion of the 188th Glider Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Soule, launched a diversionary ground attack from the west, while the majority of the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Regiment crossed Laguna de Bay using amphibious tractors. Company B of the 511th Parachute Regiment parachuted directly into the camp, and the Reconnaissance Platoon along with the guerrillas, who had already infiltrated the area, created chaos throughout the camp. The task force eliminated the Japanese garrison of about 250 guards and managed to escape through enemy-held territory before the Fuji Force could mount a counterattack. The casualties were minimal: only 3 Americans and 2 Filipinos lost their lives, while 2 Americans and 4 Filipinos were injured. However, starting two nights after the raid, the 17th Regiment, along with Kempeitai police and Filipino Ganaps, began terror raids in the surrounding barrios, resulting in the deaths of up to 1,500 Filipino civilians over the next few nights. It was now time to leave the Philippines and return to New Guinea to support the ongoing Australian campaign in Aitape-Wewak. Previously, Brigadier Martin's 19th Brigade had fought its way to Malin and Abau, while Colonel Buttrose's 2/5th Battalion secured Perembil, Asiling, Samisai, and Maharingi. On January 12, Brigadier Moten directed the battalion to initiate a three-pronged offensive toward Luwaite, Bulamita, and Bombisima. The advance was rapid, as patrols encountered only small enemy groups, and all three objectives were successfully captured by the end of January. After the capture of Malin, the 2/8th Battalion and the 2/9th Commando Squadron patrolled the rugged terrain between Nimbum Creek and the upper Danmap for three weeks, facing some resistance on Long Ridge. Due to this pressure, General Aotsu's force received additional reinforcements in the latter half of January before withdrawing to join the defenses of the 20th Division, while General Mano's 41st Division retreated to Balif and Salata. Meanwhile, General Stevens had ordered Brigadier Roy King's 16th Brigade to relieve the 19th at the Danmap, but catastrophic floods hindered the completion of this relief in the south before the month ended. In the north, the 2/1st Battalion took over from the 2/11th Battalion on January 24 and began advancing patrols along Nambut Hill, where they faced significant resistance. Due to these patrols, the Australians launched a company attack on February 4, which the defenders easily repelled. Following a heavy air bombardment, the enemy stronghold was captured on February 7, and another company took McNeil's Creek four days later. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Battalion initiated an assault on Long Ridge, inflicting considerable casualties on the enemy at Cory's Spur. At this juncture, Stevens decided to sequentially capture But, Dagua, and Wewak, as well as Maprik in the mountains, and to push eastward. The 16th Brigade was the first to advance to Wank Creek and then to the Anumb River. King promptly sent the 2/1st Battalion to secure Nambut Creek while the 2/3rd Battalion moved to the Wolhuk Creek-Una Creek line. By February 18, the 2/1st Battalion had fully secured Nambut Hill, with one company advancing along the coast and pushing the Japanese across the creek the next day. By February 22, the area up to Balam Creek was occupied, and barges had delivered supplies at Wank Creek for four days. The following day, they reached the Anumb River and began patrolling toward Sowom while a sloop bombarded enemy positions along the coast. Finally, on February 28, the 2/2nd Battalion relieved the weary 2/1st Battalion and started preparing for operations against But. Simultaneously, the 2/3rd Battalion successfully established the Wolhuk Creek-Una Creek line and sent patrols northward to connect with both the 2/1st and 2/2nd Battalions. In early February, the 2/5th Battalion launched an attack on Salata, Balif, and Balaga, sending three companies southward. Salata and Bombeta were captured on February 3, followed by Balif three days later, while Balaga remained successfully defended. The 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment was tasked with supporting Moten's advance toward Maprik, prompting the 2/10th Commando Squadron to move to Ami. After the Australians secured the Balaga-Numango area on February 13, Buttrose dispatched two companies to capture Barangabandangi and Malahun, which fell by February 17. At this time, the 2/10th Commando Squadron had also advanced northeast of Ami to Walahuta, Kualigem, and Amahaur, resulting in several Japanese casualties. Meanwhile, the 2/7th Commando Squadron conducted patrols deep into the Atob River and the headwaters of the Screw River. The 2/5th Battalion was preparing for relief by the 2/7th Battalion but first needed to fend off a strong counterattack at Malahun on February 23. During the 2/5th's advance, most of the 40th Division withdrew south into a densely populated garden area bordered by the Nanu and Amuk Rivers. This southern flank could not be overlooked as the Australians moved toward Maprik, so Moten sent a company from the 2/6th Battalion to advance through M'Bras, Asanakor, Yubanakuor, and then east to the heavily fortified Sinahau villages, pushing the enemy toward Maprik for destruction. Additionally, a rumor was spread among the locals that the commandos would advance on Maprik via Ami, which successfully prompted the Japanese to reposition most of their forces to the north and northeast. Meanwhile, by early March, the 2/7th Battalion had completed the relief of the 2/5th Battalion and successfully occupied Asanakor on March 7, followed by Inimbi on March 8, Yubanakuor on March 9, and Balangabadabil, Ilahop, and Armimin on March 10. To the north, the 2/2nd Battalion also finished its relief at the Anumb. Additionally, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion and the 2/9th Commando Squadron took over from the 2/3rd Battalion in the mountainous region. The latter began advancing towards Arohemi on March 4, where they encountered a strong Japanese force that resisted for three days. After a significant airstrike, the Australians managed to clear the area west of the Anumb River by March 9. Simultaneously, the 2/2nd Battalion pushed forward to Simbi Creek, successfully clearing the area and reaching the Ninahau River by March 12. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Manila is finally over. The capital of the Philippines came at a terrible cost for the Americans, Japanese and innocent Filipino civilians. It would be only a matter of time until the Americans moped up the Philippines and continued onwards to the Japanese home islands.

Send us a text message and tell us your thoughts.Join Strictly Facts as we uncover the hidden stories of the Caribbean's military past, featuring the intriguing West India Regiments established by the British Army. Our guest, Isaac Crichlow, a graduate student from the University College of London, helps us explore the paradoxical roles of these soldiers, who found themselves fighting both for and against colonial powers, shedding light on their complex identities and the duality of their existence.We delve into the precarious position of enslaved African soldiers within the British Empire, where promises of freedom often clashed with the harsh reality of servitude. Additionally, we highlight the tensions between allegiance to the British Empire and racial identity, illustrating how these men navigated their challenging roles, sometimes embracing British military ideology and other times resisting it. Our conversation culminates in a discussion about the enduring legacy of the West India Regiments and their significant, yet frequently overlooked, contributions to global conflicts like the Napoleonic Wars. We celebrate WIR soldiers' diverse backgrounds and shared experiences and amplify their impact on both Caribbean and world histories.Isaac Crichlow is a PhD student researching Caribbean history at UCL. He is primarily interested in the transference of African culture to the Caribbean through transatlantic enslavement, and it's use by the enslaved in new contexts as a tool for resistance and survival. His research, funded through a studentship with the Centre for the Study of the Legacies of British Slavery (CSLBS) focuses on the West India Regiments, units of formerly enslaved African soldiers. It examines the core function of the regiments, analyses the treatment of the soldiers by the British Army, and looks at how the soldiers reacted to their treatment by military. Through this approach he creates a different interpretation of the provenance of the WIRs, their role in Caribbean slave society and relationship with the British Army. Sign up for Sendwave and you will receive a $20 credit for your first transfer! To receive the credit sign up for Sendwave, click this link to download the app up.The value may change to $10, $15 and up to $20 at any time. Support the showConnect with Strictly Facts - Instagram | Facebook | Twitter | LinkedIn | YouTube | Website Looking to read more about the topics covered in this episode? Subscribe to the newsletter at www.strictlyfactspod.com to get the Strictly Facts Syllabus to your email!Want to Support Strictly Facts? Rate & Leave a Review on your favorite platform Share this episode with someone or online and tag us Send us a DM or voice note to have your thoughts featured on an upcoming episode Donate to help us continue empowering listeners with Caribbean history and education Produced by Breadfruit Media

Last time we spoke about the battle of Manila. In early February, General Iwanaka's 2nd Tank Division faced encirclement as American forces advanced. General Griswold's 14th Corps captured Clark Field, while the 8th Cavalry liberated 4,000 internees at Santo Tomas University. Amid fierce fighting, Japanese defenses crumbled, and by February 9, American troops secured key districts in Manila. Despite heavy resistance, they pressed on, clearing areas and establishing a foothold across the Pasig River. In the wake of Pearl Ridge's capture, Australian brigades advanced through Bougainville, engaging Japanese forces along the Jaba and Tavera rivers. Brigadier Monaghan's troops secured strategic positions, while the 2/8th Commandos aided local guerrillas. In January, significant battles unfolded at Tsimba Ridge, where fierce resistance led to an encirclement of Japanese troops. Meanwhile, in Burma, Allied forces executed deceptive maneuvers and launched offensives, as General Aung San's Burma National Army prepared to switch sides, signaling a shift in the war's momentum. This episode is the Liberation of Bataan and Corregidor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we previously noted, General Griswold had three divisions stationed in Manila, which had achieved significant advancements by February 10. Estimating the strength of the Americans in the Manila area at little more than a regiment, General Yokoyama apparently felt that he had a good opportunity to cut off and isolate the Allied force. Conversely, he was also interested in getting the Manila Naval Defense Force out of the city quickly, either by opening a line of retreat or by having Iwabuchi co-ordinate a breakthrough effort with a Shimbu Group counterattack, scheduled for the night of February 16. Not knowing how far the situation in Manila had deteriorated--communications were faulty and Admiral Iwabuchi had supplied Yokoyama with little information--Yokoyama at first directed the Manila Naval Defense Force to hold fast. The question of a general withdrawal, he told Iwabuchi, would be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the counterattack. There is no indication that the Shimbu Group commander intended to reinforce or retake Manila. Rather, his primary interest was to gain time for the Shimbu Group to strengthen its defenses north and northeast of the city and to move more supplies out of the city to its mountain strongholds, simultaneously creating a good opportunity for the Manila Naval Defense Force to withdraw intact. However, the commander of the Shimbu Group was simultaneously orchestrating a large-scale, coordinated raid on northern Manila, intending to weaken the enemy's offensive capability by targeting their vulnerable eastern flank before they could solidify their positions. Therefore, on the night of February 16, the majority of the 31st Regiment was set to assault Caloocan Airfield, while three provisional battalions of the Kobayashi Force would attack Quezon, Banlat Airfield, and the surrounding areas of Rosario. This meant that Iwabuchi's forces would need to withstand the unyielding American assaults for another week before receiving support. Meanwhile, Griswold was strategizing to cut off the last remaining routes for withdrawal and reinforcement available to Iwabuchi. To achieve this, the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments were tasked with advancing southwest toward Manila Bay to make contact with the 11th Airborne Division, effectively encircling the city. Thus, Griswold continued his offensive on February 11, with Company E of the 129th Regiment successfully clearing Provisor Island without resistance and further establishing a presence on the mainland, west across Estero Provisor. Other elements of the 37th Division were gradually advancing across the Estero de Paco despite heavy enemy fire, while the 5th Cavalry made limited progress at Nielson Field. The 8th Cavalry pushed nearly to the Estero de Paco along the division boundary against scattered opposition, the 511th Parachute Regiment advanced north toward Libertad Avenue, and the 187th Glider Regiment secured the southeast corner and southern runway of Nichols Field. The next day, to complete the encirclement of Manila, the 5th Cavalry swiftly advanced across Nielson Field, facing sporadic rifle fire, and successfully connected with the 511th at Libertad Avenue before reaching the shores of Manila Bay. Simultaneously, the 12th Cavalry Regiment relieved the 8th and rapidly moved westward to establish contact with the 5th at Villarruel Street. Further south, following intense artillery and air bombardment, the 187th and 188th Glider Regiments finally breached the Japanese defenses at Nichols Field. The attack was preceded by artillery and mortar concentrations and by an air strike executed by Marine Corps SBD's from the Lingayen Gulf fields, support that succeeded in knocking out many Japanese artillery positions. The 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry, attacked generally east from the northwest corner of the field; the 188th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, drove in from the south and southeast. By dusk the two regiments had cleared most of the field and finished mopping up the next day. The field was, however, by no means ready to receive Allied Air Force planes. Runways and taxiways were heavily mined, the runways were pitted by air and artillery bombardments, and the field was still subjected to intermittent artillery and mortar fire from the Fort McKinley area. With the seizure of Nichols Field, the 11th Airborne Division substantially completed its share in the battle for Manila. Since its landing at Nasugbu the division had suffered over 900 casualties. Of this number the 511th Infantry lost approximately 70 men killed and 240 wounded; the 187th and 188th Infantry Regiments had together lost about 100 men killed and 510 wounded, the vast majority in the action at Nichols Field. The division and its air and artillery support had killed perhaps 3,000 Japanese in the metropolitan area, destroying the 3d Naval Battalion and isolating the Abe Battalion. From then on the division's activities in the Manila area would be directed toward securing the Cavite region, destroying the Abe Battalion, and, in co-operation with the 1st Cavalry Division, assuring the severance of the Manila Naval Defense Force's routes of escape and reinforcement by clearing Fort McKinley and environs.  Meanwhile, at ZigZag Pass, General Chase's 38th Division had begun to make headway against the strong defenses of the Nagayoshi Detachment, with the 152nd and 149th Regiments set to launch a coordinated attack from the east and west on February 12. It wasn't until the afternoon of February 13 that the 149th and 152nd made their first brief contact from their respective sides of ZigZag. The 149th then captured the last organized Japanese stronghold on February 14, and the following day both regiments completed their mopping-up operations. Nearly 2,400 Japanese soldiers were killed at the pass during this battle, though about 300 men under Colonel Nagayoshi managed to escape south into Bataan. The 38th Division and the 34th Regiment, in turn, suffered around 1,400 casualties, including 250 killed. Meanwhile, General Brush's 40th Division continued its offensive against the Kembu Group. By February 12, the 185th Regiment had successfully secured Snake Hill North with minimal resistance, while also capturing Hills 810 and 1000. Meanwhile, the 160th Regiment made significant advances against Snake Hill West and Scattered Trees Ridge. The 108th Regiment, after neutralizing the Japanese strongholds on the hill, began attacking the remnants of the Eguchi and Yanagimoto Detachments at Hill 7. On February 15, the 185th captured Hill 1500, coinciding with the 160th clearing Snake Hill West and preparing to advance toward Object Hill. The next day, Hill 7 fell to the 108th, while the 160th reached the summit of Object Hill and broke through Scattered Trees Ridge. By February 20, the 160th had cleared the rest of Object Hill and established a foothold on Sacobia Ridge. Whatever the costs, the 40th Division's advances to February 20 marked the end of the Kembu Group as a threat to 6th Army and 14th Corps. Clark Field, Route 3, and the army and corps right were now secure beyond all shadow of doubt. The Kembu Group had defended its ground well since January 24, when 14th Corps had first gained contact, and had inflicted nearly 1500 casualties upon 14th Corps units--roughly 285 men killed and 1180 wounded--but had itself lost around 10000 men killed. The 20000 troops General Tsukada still commanded were hardly in good shape. Supplies of all kinds were dwindling rapidly, morale was cracking, and centralized control was breaking down. The only defenses still intact were those held by the naval 13th and 17th Combat Sectors, and those had been heavily damaged by air and artillery bombardments. Troops of the 6th Army would continue to fight the Kembu Group, but after February 20 operations in the Kembu area were essentially mop-ups. 11th Corps, not 14th, would be in charge of the final mop-up operations in the Kembu area. Under General Hall's leadership, the 40th Division resumed the mop-up operation on February 23, but was replaced by elements of the 43rd Division just five days later. In the following ten days, this division would ultimately eliminate General Tsukada's last defensive position, pushing the Kembu Group further into the Zambales Range. Back in Manila, on February 13, chaos erupted as Iwabuchi's forces prepared for their final stand in the Filipino capital. After February 12th the 14th Corps troops found themselves in a steady war of attrition. Street-to-street, building-to-building, and room-to-room fighting characterized each day's activity. Progress was sometimes measured only in feet; many days saw no progress at all. The fighting became really "dirty." The Japanese, looking forward only to death, started committing all sorts of excesses, both against the city itself and against Filipinos unlucky enough to remain under Japanese control. As time went on, Japanese command disintegrated. Then, viciousness became uncontrolled and uncontrollable; horror mounted upon horror. The men of the 37th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division witnessed the rape, sack, pillage, and destruction of a large part of Manila and became reluctant parties to much of the destruction. Although the 14th Corps placed heavy dependence upon artillery, tank, tank destroyer, mortar, and bazooka fire for all advances, cleaning out individual buildings ultimately fell to individual riflemen. To accomplish this work, the infantry brought to fruition a system initiated north of the Pasig River. Small units worked their way from one building to the next, usually trying to secure the roof and top floor first, often by coming through the upper floors of an adjoining structure. Using stairways as axes of advance, lines of supply, and routes of evacuation, troops then began working their way down through the building. For the most part, squads broke up into small assault teams, one holding entrances and perhaps the ground floor--when that was where entrance had been gained--while the other fought through the building. In many cases, where the Japanese blocked stairways and corridors, the American troops found it necessary to chop or blow holes through walls and floors. Under such circumstances, hand grenades, flame throwers, and demolitions usually proved requisites to progress. In response to the encirclement of Manila, Yokoyama concluded that the situation in the city was irreparable and ordered Iwabuchi to relocate to Fort McKinley and begin withdrawing his troops immediately, without waiting for the Shimbu Group's counterattack. However, Iwabuchi did not receive this order until two days later, by which time he and his troops were determined to fight to the death, taking as many enemies with them as possible. The 129th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to assault the New Police Station and the Manila Club. Meanwhile, the 148th Regiment reached Taft Avenue but could not launch an attack on the Philippine General Hospital and the University of the Philippines. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments turned north, taking two days to fight through the Pasay suburb to Vito Cruz Street. On February 14, although the 148th Regiment struggled to make any headway against Iwabuchi's strong defenses, the 129th, supported by tanks, managed to break through to the Manila Club and the New Police Station. However, the Japanese quickly regrouped at the latter location and began throwing hand grenades from the second floor, forcing the Americans to retreat. Simultaneously, a battalion-sized guerrilla force led by Major John Vanderpool was dispatched to contain the Abe Provisional Battalion at Mabato Point, while elements of the 11th Airborne Division and the 1st Cavalry Division began clearing the routes to Fort McKinley. On February 15 and 16, the 129th conducted probing attacks on the New Police Station, the shoe factory, and Santa Teresita College, while tanks and artillery maintained consistent fire on all buildings still held by the Japanese. The 3rd Battalion of the 148th Regiment reached Manila Bay via Herran Street and then turned to assault the hospital from the south, while the 2nd Battalion made limited progress against the main hospital structures. The 12th Cavalry successfully entered La Salle University and the Japanese Club, and the 5th Cavalry pushed through Harrison Park, clearing Rizal Stadium, with the entire area being secured by February 18. In the early hours of February 16, Yokoyama initiated his limited offensive, with the 31st Regiment advancing toward Novaliches while General Kobayashi's three battalions attacked Marikina.The 112th Cavalry RCT, which had replaced the 12th Cavalry along the 1st Cavalry Division's line of communications, broke up the northern wing's counterattack between 15 and 18 February. In the Novaliches-Novaliches Dam area, and in a series of skirmishes further west and northwest, the 112th Cavalry RCT dispatched some 300 Japanese, losing only 2 men killed and 32 wounded. Un-co-ordinated from the start, the northern counterattack turned into a shambles, and the northern attack force withdrew in a disorganized manner before it accomplished anything. The Kobayashi Force's effort was turned back on the morning of the 16th, when American artillery caught this southern wing as it attempted to cross the Marikina River. During the next three days all Japanese attacks were piecemeal in nature and were thrown back with little difficulty by the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments, operating east and northeast of Manila. By 19 February, when the southern counterattack force also withdrew, the 2d Cavalry Brigade and support artillery had killed about 650 Japanese in the area west of the Marikina from Novaliches Dam south to the Pasig. The brigade lost about 15 men killed and 50 wounded. Consequently, Yokoyama's only achievement was the escape of the remnants of the 3rd and 4th Naval Battalions from the Fort McKinley area, which was later occupied by American forces. Additionally, from February 15 to 20, the 511th Parachute Regiment thoroughly searched the Cavite Peninsula and the adjacent mainland but encountered only a few Japanese stragglers. Meanwhile, to secure the Bataan Peninsula, Hall divided his forces into two groups: East Force and South Force. The East Force, consisting of the recently arrived 1st Regiment and led by Brigadier-General William Spence, was tasked with advancing down the east coast to divert Japanese attention from the Mariveles landing, which was to be executed by Chase's 151st Regiment. Accordingly, the 151st Regiment boarded Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3 vessels at Olongapo just as the 1st Regiment was passing through Orani and beginning its southward advance, reaching Pilar by the end of February 14. The following day, after conducting minesweeping and bombardment operations—during which the destroyers La Vallette and Radford were unfortunately disabled by mines—Struble successfully landed the 151st at Mariveles under machine-gun and rifle fire. The Americans found no Japanese forces before sunset, but during the night, they had to fend off a counterattack by approximately 100 enemy troops. During the night of 15-16 February an estimated 300 Japanese attacked the 1st Infantry's perimeter near Orion, but the U.S. regiment, losing 11 killed and 15 wounded, beat off the Japanese and killed 80 of them in a melee of confused, sometimes hand-to-hand fighting. The incident marked the end of organized Japanese resistance in southern Bataan. The 151st spent the following days securing the Mariveles area while simultaneously sending patrols northward along both sides of the Bataan Peninsula. They connected with the 1st Regiment at Limay on February 18. By February 21, the Americans had advanced across Bataan to Bagac, encountering only abandoned defensive positions and a few Japanese stragglers. However, Nagayoshi's remaining 1,000 troops managed to take refuge in the jungled slopes of Mount Natib, where elements of the 38th Division, the 6th Division, and Filipino guerrillas systematically hunted them down. While Bataan was being cleared, Generals MacArthur and Krueger were also planning the invasion of Corregidor Island. The assault plan involved Colonel George Jones' 503rd Parachute Regiment airdropping onto the island, supported by a nearly simultaneous shore-to-shore operation conducted by the reinforced 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, from the recently secured Mariveles.  The decision to employ paratroopers to make the principal assault against an objective of Corregidor's size and terrain merits attention. Shaped like a tadpole, with its bulbous head pointing west toward the South China Sea, Corregidor is but three and a half miles long and one and a half miles across at its point of greatest width. The prospective cost of amphibious assault was, indeed, one of the chief factors that led to a decision to use paratroopers. Planners saw the obvious risks in sending parachute troops against such a small and rough target, but in view of the GHQ SWPA estimate that the Japanese garrison numbered only 850 men, the cost of the airborne operation promised to be less than that involved in an amphibious attack. Krueger intended to land almost 3,000 troops on Corregidor on 16 February, over 2,000 of them by parachute. Another 1,000 men or more would come in by parachute or landing craft the next day. Planners hoped that such preponderant strength, combined with intensive air and naval bombardment, might render the seizure of the island nearly bloodless. An equally important (if not even more decisive) factor leading to the decision to employ paratroops was the desire to achieve surprise. GHQ SWPA and Sixth Army planners hoped that the Japanese on Corregidor would judge that no one in his right mind would even consider dropping a regiment of parachutists on such a target. The defenses, the planners thought, would probably be oriented entirely toward amphibious attack. The attack was scheduled for February 16, with paratroopers set to land on a parade ground and a golf course at Topside. They would then immediately assault Malinta Hill before the Japanese garrison could recover from the shock of the preparatory air and naval bombardment and the surprise of the parachute drop, with the amphibious troops launching their attack two hours after the paratroopers began jumping. Although Corregidor had been under attack by Allied Air Forces since January 22, General Kenney's forces intensified their assaults at the start of February. By February 16, the 5th and 13th Air Force planes had dropped approximately 3,125 tons of bombs on the island. Naval bombardment also commenced on February 13, in conjunction with the bombardment and minesweeping in preparation for the capture of Mariveles. On the morning of February 16, air and surface forces conducted their final preliminary bombardment before the paradrop. Launching from Mindoro, the 317th Troop Carrier Group transported the first wave of the 503rd Parachute Regiment in two columns of C-47s, swiftly dropping them over Corregidor at 08:30. Encountering only sporadic Japanese rifle and machine-gun fire, the paratroopers successfully secured the Topside drop zones by 09:45. However, approximately 25% of the paratroopers were injured, and many others failed to land on Topside. One unexpected blessing resulted from the scattered drop of paratroopers in the 0830 lift. Captain Itagaki, having been informed that landing craft were assembling off Mariveles, had hurried with a small guard to an observation post near Breakwater Point, obviously more concerned with the imminent amphibious assault than with the possibility that paratroopers might drop out of the C-47's already in sight of Corregidor. Suddenly, his attention was rudely diverted as twenty-five to thirty paratroopers who had been blown over the cliffs near the point began pelting down around the observation post. Fired on by the Japanese, the small American group quickly assembled and attacked. In the ensuing skirmish eight Japanese, including Captain Itagaki, were killed. Effective control among the Japanese units, already rendered practically impossible by the destruction of the communications center during the preassault air and naval bombardment, now ceased altogether. Leaderless, the remaining Japanese were no longer capable of coordinated offensive or defensive efforts. Each group would fight on its own from isolated and widely separated strongpoints. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment departed Mariveles Harbor on 25 LCMs and made their way to the western end of Corregidor, landing on the south beach at 10:28. Contrary to expectations, the first four waves faced no opposition as they came ashore. However, as the fifth wave arrived, Japanese machine-guns opened fire from Ramsay Ravine, Breakwater Point, and the cliffs at San Jose Point. Despite this, Companies K and L advanced quickly and established a strong position on top of Malinta Hill by 11:00. This ensured total surprise, as the paradrop effectively drew Japanese attention away from the amphibious craft approaching Corregidor. At 12:40, the second wave of the 503rd began to land successfully on the drop zones, facing only limited fire from Japanese automatic weapons. With these reinforcements, the paratroopers were positioned to secure the remainder of Topside by the end of the day. However, during the night, the infantrymen would need to fend off a series of small but determined Japanese counterattacks along the northern side of Malinta Hill. For eight consecutive days leading up to February 23, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment successfully defended against relentless banzai charges, mortar assaults, and a suicide squad of soldiers equipped with explosives, resulting in approximately 300 Japanese casualties. On the afternoon of 17 February the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, and other reinforcements reached Bottomside by landing craft. Japanese rifle and machine gun fire, most of which passed overhead, "expedited" the movement ashore, and the battalion soon joined the rest of the regiment on Topside. The troops already on Topside had spent the day expanding their hold, systematically reducing the first of the many Japanese bunkers, pillboxes, and underground defenses they were to encounter, and had developed a pattern for the destruction of the Japanese installations. First, aircraft or naval fire support ships--the air arm using napalm extensively--were called upon to strike positions accessible to these types of bombardment; then the infantry attacked almost as the last shell or bomb burst. When this method failed, the 503d's own 75-mm. pack howitzers and lesser weapons were brought forward for direct fire. Next, having stationed men with submachine guns and rifles at advantageous points to cover approaches to a Japanese position, infantry assault teams moved forward behind white phosphorus hand grenades and the extremely close support of flame thrower teams. To avoid backflash and assure the deepest possible penetration of cave defenses, flame thrower operators often projected their fuel unignited, and then used white phosphorus grenades to fire it. If the Japanese within the caves still could not be induced to give up the fight, engineer demolition experts blocked the cave entrances. One Japanese tactic was both advantageous and disadvantageous to the 503d Infantry. Each night small groups of Japanese would attempt to reoccupy positions cleared during the previous day. To the 503d, this often meant some dirty, repetitive work, and additional casualties. On the other hand, the Japanese sometimes reoccupied tactically indefensible positions that proved easy to take out. The 503d Infantry seems to have been happy to let the Japanese occasionally return to such positions, secure in the knowledge that the only result would be more Japanese killed at no cost to the attackers. The only way to keep the Japanese from reoccupying less vulnerable positions was to stop night infiltration, a process that in turn required the blocking of the underground passageways that abounded on Topside. By these methods Japanese casualties began to mount rapidly. On the 17th, for example, over 300 Japanese were killed; nearly 775 were killed the next day. In the same two days Rock Force's casualties were approximately 30 killed and 110 wounded. The Japanese resistance at Topside finally crumbled two days later after the Americans effectively repelled a fierce counterattack. The last significant opposition, concentrated at Wheeler Point, concluded with a small-scale banzai charge on the morning of February 23. By the end of that day, the 503rd had largely cleared the western section of Corregidor. Following intense air and naval bombardments, the paratroopers launched a final assault on the eastern end of the island on February 24, systematically destroying several strongholds over the next two days. Shortly after 1100 on 26 February the Japanese on Corregidor executed their final, suicidal tour de force, blowing an underground arsenal at Monkey Point amid scenes of carnage on both sides. As the dust from terrific explosions settled, a hollow appeared where a small knoll had previously stood. Debris had flown as far as Topside where one man, almost a mile from the explosion, was injured by flying rock. Other debris hit a destroyer 2,000 yards offshore. A medium tank was hurled 50 yards through the air, most of its crew killed. Bits and pieces of American and Japanese troops splattered the ground; rock slides buried alive other men of both forces. Over 200 Japanese were killed outright, while Rock Force lost some 50 men killed and 150 wounded. This explosion signified the end of organized resistance on Corregidor, and by 16:00, elements of the 503rd Parachute Regiment had reached the island's eastern tip. Mopping-up operations continued until March 2, when Hall and Jones determined that the island was secure. Ultimately, by the conclusion of the battle, the Americans had suffered approximately 215 killed and 790 wounded, while the Japanese losses were estimated at 5,200 killed and 20 captured. On February 17, in Manila, the 129th Regiment secured the damaged shoe factory and cleared several buildings along the south bank of the Pasig River before being relieved by the 145th Regiment. During 17 February, with the aid of support fires from the 1st Battalion, now on the south side of Herran Street, the 2d Battalion smashed its way into the two most easterly of the hospital's four wings and overran the last resistance in the Nurses' Dormitory and the Science Building. The advance might have gone faster had it not been necessary to evacuate patients and other Filipino civilians from the hospital. By dusk over 2,000 civilians had come out of the buildings; the 148th Infantry conducted 5,000 more to safety that night. At the end of the 17th the 148th had overcome almost all opposition except that at the Medical School and in a small group of buildings facing Padre Faura Street at the northwestern corner of the hospital grounds. The next day, the 145th cleared Santa Teresita College but could not establish a presence inside the New Police Station. Meanwhile, the 148th consolidated its gains before being relieved by the 5th Cavalry. The 11th Airborne Division began besieging the Abe Provisional Battalion at Mabato Point, ultimately destroying this unit by February 23. On February 19, the 5th Cavalry launched an assault on and cleared the Medical School and Assumption College, while the 1st Squadron of the 12th Cavalry advanced north along the bay, facing strong opposition, and successfully reached Padre Faura Street. At the same time, the police station and San Pablo Church underwent intense artillery and tank bombardment, with the church eventually falling to the 145th by nightfall. After further artillery and tank fire nearly leveled the police station, American forces secured its ruins on February 20. The 145th also began attacking City Hall and the General Post Office, making minimal progress in the initial days. Supported by heavy bombardment, the 5th Cavalry managed to capture Rizal Hall and the Administration Building but was eventually forced to withdraw after the Japanese detonated significant explosives. The 12th Cavalry overcame the last resistance at the High Commissioner's residence and pressed onward to San Luis Street. The next day, the 12th swiftly entered the Manila Hotel and successfully took control of the area after a fierce battle. Meanwhile, the 5th Cavalry captured the Administration Building with minimal resistance, but they did not secure Rizal Hall and University Hall until February 24. During this time, the 145th Regiment continued its assault on City Hall and the General Post Office, which ultimately fell by February 22. As a result, Griswold's forces had effectively confined the remnants of Iwabuchi's troops to Intramuros, the South Port Area, and the Philippine Commonwealth Government buildings at the southeastern edge of the Walled City, leaving behind a trail of destroyed and damaged public and private structures. The fall of Manila was imminent; however, we must now shift our focus away from the Philippines to cover the Burma offensives. As we last reported, by mid-February, General Messervy's 4th Corps had successfully established a bridgehead over the Irrawaddy River at Nyaungu, while General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued to advance towards Mandalay, with the 19th Indian Division moving toward Madaya by the end of the month. Concerned about the bridgehead established by the 20th Indian Division, General Kimura decided to withdraw the main force of the 18th Division, which was engaged with the 36th British Division at Myitson. Consequently, after leaving the 114th Regiment at Mongmit, General Naka began relocating the majority of his division to Hsumhsai and then to Mandalay. In addition to the 18th Division, Kimura assigned the Kanjo Force to the 15th Army, further instructing General Katamura to prepare a general offensive aimed at destroying Stopford's bridgeheads while the reinforced 31st Division continued its counterattacks against the 20th Division. As attention turned to Nyaungu, a flurry of activity ensued to transport supplies to the 255th Indian Tank Brigade and the 48th and 63rd Indian Motorized Brigades across the river using boats and barges. General Cowan devised a plan for these units to gather at Mahlaing, capture the Thabutkon airstrip, where the air-transportable 99th Indian Brigade would land, and ultimately encircle and take Meiktila. With all his units successfully across by February 21, Cowan launched his advance towards Meiktila, quickly taking Seywa and Ngathayauk with minimal resistance. The following day, British-Indian forces attacked Taungtha from two fronts, with the southern group facing some opposition at the village of Oyin. Despite the Japanese putting up fierce and determined resistance, they were ultimately overwhelmed by the superior firepower of the British tanks. Upon realizing this new threat to his rear, Kimura halted his previous offensive and swiftly redirected the 53rd Division to Taungtha to block the enemy's advance towards Meiktila. Meanwhile, to bolster Kimura's focus on Mandalay, the 2nd British Division crossed the Irrawaddy near Ngazun on the night of February 24, encountering heavy opposition but managing to secure a bridgehead two days later. Nonetheless, by February 24, the 48th Brigade reached Taungtha ahead of Kimura's reinforcements and captured the town with light resistance. In the afternoon, the 63rd Brigade and the tanks moved through and continued towards Mahlaing, arriving on February 25. The next day, the Mahlaing area was completely cleared, and the Thabutkon airstrip was successfully captured. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, Kimura quickly dispatched the 18th and 49th Divisions along with the remaining forces of the 53rd Division towards Meiktila,  but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment under Colonel Yoshida would arrive in time. At Meiktila, Major-General Kasuya Tomekichi, commander of No. 2 Field Transport, which had responsibility for all the transport units supporting the 15th and 33rd Armies, was put in charge of the defense of the town. Kasuya had approximately 2500 administrative and line of communications troops available, and another 2000 from various Japanese Army Air Force units, including the 52nd and 84th Airfield Battalions and the 36th Anti-Aircraft Battalion. The administrative and line of communications troops were hastily organized into three emergency infantry companies and a mobile reserve force. Any hospital patient who could walk or shoot was sent out to man a bunker. Kasuya set up a western and eastern sector for the defense of the town, with the dividing line being Meiktila's northern and southern artificial lakes. The troops in Meiktila hurriedly prepared bunkers throughout the town and laid mines and booby traps along the approaches. Kasuya opened up the ordnance depots around the town and ensured that all units were well supplied with medium and light machine-guns, and had plenty of ammunition. Cowan quickly began airlifting troops from the 99th Brigade to Thabutkon on February 27, with the operation expected to conclude by March 2. During the airlift, armored car patrols advanced along the main road to Meiktila, where they encountered a formidable Japanese roadblock that the 63rd Brigade later destroyed. That evening, advance patrols observed fires in Meiktila as the Japanese started to destroy their supply depots. The Battle for Meiktila was imminent; however, while General Slim's 14th Army continued its Extended Capital offensive, new developments were also occurring in northern and southern Burma. In the north, the 36th Division finally secured Myitson following the withdrawal of the 18th Division and began moving toward Mongmit. The 50th Chinese Division, bolstered by the 1st Chinese Separate Regiment, crossed the Myitnge River at Namtu but encountered fierce resistance, with the 113th Regiment launching nine separate counterattacks before relinquishing the bridgehead. Meanwhile, the 30th Chinese Division advanced toward Lashio, supported by Kachin guerrillas. However, General Wedemeyer and the Generalissimo decided to withdraw all Chinese-American troops back to China once Lashio was captured, allowing them to prepare for a potential offensive toward Canton and Hong Kong. In the south, the 82nd West African Division continued its push toward An, facing strong opposition from General Koba's forces at the Dalet River, while the 63rd Indian Brigade readied for an amphibious assault on Ruywa. Additionally, with a robust garrison in the Tamandu sector, General Miyazaki planned to gather his remaining units at An and launch a counteroffensive to eliminate all enemy forces west of the pass. Before he could proceed, the 53rd successfully landed at Ruywa on February 16 with minimal opposition. In the following days, British-Indian forces quickly secured the area. By February 22, the 2nd West African Brigade had also arrived at the beachhead and immediately began a swift advance eastward toward An, while the 74th Indian Brigade was being deployed. The 74th then launched an attack toward Tamandu and, on February 28, began assaulting the main defenses of the 111th Regiment. However, upon learning of the enemy's approach to Meiktila, General Sakurai ordered the 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade to attack the Nyaungu bridgehead after some earlier probing attacks had failed. He also instructed Miyazaki to send the Koba Detachment, primarily composed of the 154th Regiment, to reinforce Yenangyaung. Consequently, facing less resistance in the north, Dalet would ultimately fall to the West Africans by the end of the month. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In Manila, General Yokoyama planned a counterattack to isolate Allied forces, but chaos ensued as American troops advanced. Fierce street fighting within Manila led to significant casualties, marking a brutal struggle for control. Paratroopers launched a surprise assault on Corregidor, overwhelming Japanese defenses, but taking significant losses in the process. Despite injuries and challenges, they secured the island, leading to significant enemy casualties and the end of organized resistance.

Last time we spoke about the return to Bataan. In late January, the 43rd Division secured the Rosario region, while the 25th and 6th Divisions eliminated enemy detachments and advanced towards Manila. General Krueger received reinforcements and planned a coordinated attack. On January 28, an assault began, with guerrillas aiding American forces in capturing strategic locations. A daring raid freed 522 POWs, while MacArthur planned further landings to cut off Japanese retreat. By January's end, American forces were poised for a final offensive, pushing closer to victory in Luzon. The ZigZag Pass became a fierce battleground, where Colonel Nagayoshi's well-camouflaged defenses faced relentless assaults from American forces. Despite challenges, the 129th and 20th Regiments made strategic gains, while the 35th Regiment maneuvered through treacherous terrain. Meanwhile, paratroopers from the 511th struggled with scattered landings but secured key positions. As the fighting intensified, the Allies prepared for a decisive invasion of Iwo Jima, aiming to establish a stronghold for future operations against Japan. This episode is the Battle of Manila Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last observed, by February 3, General Iwanaka's 2nd Tank Division was fending off assaults from the 6th and 25th Divisions in the San Jose area but was on the verge of being encircled. Meanwhile, General Griswold's 14th Corps had successfully taken control of Clark Field and was reorganizing for a final offensive against the Kembu Group. General Hall's 11th Corps had landed on the Bataan Peninsula and was engaged in combat with the Nagayoshi Detachment at ZigZag Pass. Additionally, General Swing's 11th Airborne Division had landed at Nasugbu and had successfully captured Tagaytay Ridge in preparation for an advance toward Manila from the south. The 37th and 1st Cavalry Divisions were advancing on Manila from the north, with the latter's two Flying Columns reaching the outskirts of the Filipino capital. At this stage, the capital was defended by Admiral Iwabuchi's Manila Naval Defense Force, which had consolidated its forces into three primary operational sectors: the Northern Force, led by Colonel Noguchi Katsuzo, responsible for Intramuros on the south bank and all areas of the city north of the Pasig; the Central Force, commanded by Iwabuchi himself, encompassing all of metropolitan Manila south of the Pasig River and extending inland to Guadalupe; and the Southern Force, under Captain Furuse Takesue, covering the Nichols Field and Fort McKinley sectors, as well as the Hagonoy Isthmus. Iwabuchi intended for the Noguchi Force to retreat to Intramuros after disabling the Pasig bridges, while other units carried out extensive demolitions of military infrastructure, including the port area, bridges, transportation systems, water supply, and electrical installations. However, since the Japanese did not anticipate the Americans' arrival for another two weeks, they were ill-prepared to execute these missions or launch any significant counterattacks. Recognizing that the cavalry units were twelve hours ahead of the 148th Regiment, Griswold authorized General Mudge to enter the city. Consequently, late in the afternoon, the 8th Cavalry's Flying Column encountered minimal resistance as it crossed the city limits and advanced towards the gates of Santo Tomas University, where nearly 4,000 American and Allied civilian internees were being held, facing severe shortages of food and medical supplies. Upon their arrival at Santo Tomas, the advance elements of the 8th Cavalry, a medium of the 44th Tank Battalion serving as a battering ram, broke through the gates of the campus wall. Inside, the Japanese Army guards--most of them Formosans--put up little fight and within a few minutes some 3500 internees were liberated amid scenes of pathos and joy none of the participating American troops will ever forget. But in another building away from the internees' main quarters some sixty Japanese under Lt. Col. Hayashi Toshio, the camp commander, held as hostages another 275 internees, mostly women and children. Hayashi demanded a guarantee for safe conduct from the ground for himself and his men before he would release the internees. General Chase, who had come into the university campus about an hour after the 8th Cavalry entered, had to accept the Japanese conditions. In the end, Hayashi obtained permission to lead his unit out with what arms they could carry in exchange for the release of the Allied internees held as hostages. They were then taken by the Americans to the outskirts of Manila early on February 5 and released. Meanwhile, Hayashi was subsequently killed in action. While General Chase worked to secure the release of the internees, Troop G of the 8th Cavalry continued its march south towards the Pasig River but was ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy fire from the Far Eastern University. Meanwhile, frustrated with the slow progress of General Jones' 38th Division, Hall ordered the 34th Regiment to move past the 152nd and press the attack eastward. Unfortunately, Colonel William Jenna's enveloping assault with the 1st Battalion also failed to penetrate Colonel Nagayoshi's robust defenses. As a result, Jenna opted to deploy his entire regiment in a coordinated three-pronged attack, which commenced on February 4. Initially, the attack, supported by the 1st Battalion of the 152nd Regiment, showed promise; however, due to ongoing strong resistance, including intense mortar and artillery fire, the 34th Regiment had to relinquish much of the territory it had captured by dusk. To the north, the 149th Regiment resumed its advance along the bypass trail and successfully made contact with patrols from the 40th Division near Dinalupihan by the end of February 4, having already reached the town. Looking northeast, with enemy armored units at Muñoz and Lupao effectively contained, the 161st Regiment successfully established roadblocks on Route 8 southeast of San Isidro. Most notably, the 1st Regiment entered San Jose in the morning with little resistance and quickly secured the area, thereby completely isolating the majority of the 2nd Tank Division before it could receive orders to withdraw. As a result, the 6th and 25th Divisions were able to methodically eliminate the enemy's isolated strongholds at their convenience. Further south, by the end of the day, the 8th Cavalry liberated 4,000 internees at Santo Tomas; Troop F also secured Malacañan Palace; the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry advanced toward Quezon Bridge but faced strong resistance at Far Eastern University, where the enemy successfully destroyed the bridge before retreating; and the 148th Regiment entered Manila, moving south through the Tondo and Santa Cruz Districts to reach the northwest corner of Old Bilibid Prison, where they freed 800 prisoners of war and 530 civilian internees. Finally, to the south, the 2nd Battalion, 511th Parachute Regiment departed from Tagaytay Ridge along Route 17, swiftly passing through Imus and Zapote to secure the Las Piñas River bridge. The 1st Battalion followed in the late afternoon but was ultimately halted by mortar and artillery fire at Parañaque. On February 5, the paratroopers managed to cross the Parañaque and began advancing north along Route 1, engaging in house-to-house and pillbox-to-pillbox combat as they moved 2,000 yards north over the next two days. Simultaneously, the majority of the 145th Regiment commenced operations in the densely populated Tondo District along the bay, while other units advanced into the San Nicolas and Binondo Districts to combat the fires ignited by Noguchi's demolitions. Throughout February 5 the 37th Division's men had heard and observed Japanese demolitions in the area along and just north of the Pasig in the Binondo and San Nicolas Districts as well as in the North Port Area, on the 145th's right front. The Northern Force was firing and blowing up military stores and installations all through the area and, as these tasks were completed, was withdrawing south across the river. Insofar as 14th Corps observers could ascertain, there was no wanton destruction, and in all probability the fires resulting from the demolitions would have been confined to the North Port Area and the river banks had not an unseasonable change in the wind about 20:30 driven the flames north and west. The 37th Division, fearing that the flames would spread into residential districts, gathered all available demolitions and started destroying frame buildings in the path of the fire. The extent of these demolitions cannot be ascertained--although it is known that the work of destruction continued for nearly 24 hours--and is an academic point at best since the demolitions proved largely ineffectual in stopping the spread of the flames. The conflagration ran north from the river to Azcarraga Street and across that thoroughfare into the North Port Area and Tondo District. The flames were finally brought under control late on February 6 along the general line of Azcarraga Street, but only after the wind again changed direction. The 148th Regiment fought its way to the Santa Cruz District but was unable to reach the bridges before they were destroyed. The 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments cleared the eastern part of the city north of the Pasig with minimal resistance, and the 7th Cavalry secured the Novaliches Dam and the Balara Water Filters, which were found intact but rigged for demolition. To the northwest, the battle for ZigZag Pass continued. Dissatisfied with his progress, Hall had previously informed Jones that the exhibition of his division was the worst he had ever seen--a rather severe indictment of an entire division, as only the 152nd Regiment had yet seen any real action on Luzon. Furthermore, the 152nd was a green unit that had been in combat scarcely 48 hours by February 2. Nevertheless, as he believed that the 152nd had at most encountered only an outpost line of resistance, that the principal Japanese defenses lay a mile or so east of the horseshoe, and that the 152nd had found "nothing that an outfit ready to go forward could not overcome quickly", Hall assumed direct control over the 34th Regiment for the main assault and left only the 152nd under Jones' command, which was to follow the 34th through the ZigZag to mop up bypassed pockets of Japanese resistance. Yet the fighting at the horseshoe on February 3 and 4 was equally disappointing, costing the 34th some 41 men killed, 131 wounded, and 6 missing while on the same days the 152nd lost 4 men killed, 48 wounded, and 1 missing. The 34th had extended the front a little to the north of the horseshoe and a bit east of the eastern leg, but neither the 34th nor the 152nd had made any substantial gains beyond the point the 152nd had reached on February 2. The Japanese still held strong positions north of the horseshoe and they still controlled the northeastern corner and about half the eastern leg. The 34th's greatest contribution during the two days, perhaps, was to have helped convince Hall that the Japanese had strong defenses throughout the ZigZag area and that the regiment had indeed reached a Japanese main line of resistance. It had not been until evening on February 4 that Hall was convinced that the 34th and 152nd Regiments had encountered a well-defended Japanese line. Hall instructed Jones to launch an eastward attack with all available forces. Although the initial phase of the attack was promising, the 2nd Battalion of the 34th Regiment became trapped and had to retreat. After sustaining significant casualties, Jenna ordered the 1st Battalion to fall back as well and halted the 3rd Battalion's advance. This left the 152nd Regiment, which achieved considerable progress and cleared much of the northern and central sections of the ridge; however, its 1st Battalion was ultimately ambushed at close range and forced to retreat in chaos during the night. The following day, due to heavy losses, the 34th Regiment was withdrawn from combat, and the reserve 151st Regiment was deployed to support the 152nd. The 2nd Battalion of the latter was also pulled back from the southeastern corner of the horseshoe as artillery focused on Nagayoshi's defenses. Nevertheless, at noon, Hall called for another assault, prompting Jones to reluctantly advance the 152nd Regiment, with only its 3rd Battalion making significant headway against the northeast corner of the horseshoe. Hall had already made his decision; he relieved Jones and appointed Brigadier-General Roy Easley to take temporary command, with General Chase scheduled to arrive on February 7 to lead the 38th Division. Looking westward, after a week of securing previously held areas, General Brush had positioned the 185th Regiment in the north and the 108th Regiment in the south, while the 160th Regiment maintained its positions at Storm King Mountain in preparation for a renewed assault on the Kembu Group. However, before the divisional attack could resume, the 160th Regiment became engaged in a fierce battle for McSevney Point, which was finally secured by dusk on February 8. After fending off several banzai-style counterattacks, the Americans learned on February 10 that the Takaya Detachment had retreated. Meanwhile, the 185th began its advance toward Snake Hill North on February 7, taking three days of intense fighting to capture half the ground leading to this objective. The 108th also moved westward on February 8, making slow progress as it cleared the paths to the Japanese hill strongholds. Further northwest, the 6th and 25th Divisions were conducting mop-up operations in the San Jose sector. By February 6, the 20th Regiment's pressure on Muñoz had resulted in the destruction of nearly 35 tanks, although another 20 remained operational. The next morning, Colonel Ida finally attempted to escape via Route 5; however, the entire Japanese column was successfully destroyed while the 20th Regiment secured Muñoz. At Lupao, the 35th Regiment continued to push the Japanese garrison into an increasingly confined area. As a result, on the night of February 7, the defenders attempted to flee, with five tanks successfully breaking through the 35th's perimeter. The dismounted Japanese forces in the town dispersed, and by noon on February 8, the 35th had taken control of Lupao with minimal resistance. Meanwhile, the Japanese garrison at San Isidro had retreated before the 161st Regiment could capture the town on February 6. The 63rd Regiment successfully took Rizal on February 7, while the 20th Regiment secured Bongabon and cleared the route to Cabanatuan on February 8. Strong patrols were then dispatched toward Dingalen and Baler Bays, which were found deserted by February 12. Back in Manila on February 7, the 37th Division assumed control of the eastern part of the city, while cavalry units advanced beyond the city limits to clear the suburbs east of the San Juan River, with the 8th Cavalry pushing toward San Juan del Monte despite heavy resistance. Most notably, under a strong artillery barrage, the 148th Regiment crossed the Pasig River in assault boats, facing intense machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. Despite this fierce opposition, two battalions managed to assemble in the Malacañan Gardens area by the end of the day. Further south, the 511th Parachute and the reinforced 188th Glider Regiment launched an unsuccessful coordinated attack on Nichols Field. Over the next two days, the 511th secured a narrow strip of land between the Parañaque River and the western runway of the airfield, overrunning some defenses at the northwest corner, while the 188th struggled to gain ground in the south and southeast. On ZigZag, Chase managed to deploy three regiments for his initial assaults, with the 151st and 152nd Regiments attacking from the west, while the 149th Regiment advanced from the east. The 5th Air Force initiated an extensive bombing and strafing campaign against the pass, and corps and division artillery increased their support fire. Despite this, the Japanese stubbornly held their ground, and it wasn't until the evening of February 8 that the 151st and 152nd Regiments overcame the last significant defenses near the horseshoe area. On that day, the 7th Cavalry captured San Juan Reservoir, and the 8th Cavalry successfully attacked San Juan del Monte, completing the area's reduction as the defenders retreated toward Montalban. The 145th Regiment launched a final assault on the Tondo District pocket, which would be completely eliminated the following day, while the 148th Regiment cleared the Pandacan District with minimal resistance. The 129th Regiment crossed the Pasig River in the afternoon and moved west toward Provisor Island but was halted by heavy fire at the Estero de Tonque. On February 9, the 8th Cavalry secured El Deposito, an underground reservoir supplied by artesian wells, and advanced south to reach the north bank of the Pasig River. The 148th Regiment began clearing the Paco District but failed to eliminate a strongpoint at Paco Railroad Station and the nearby Concordia College and Paco School buildings. Meanwhile, Company G of the 129th Regiment managed to cross to Provisor and entered the boiler plant, only to be quickly repelled by a Japanese counterattack. After an improvised evacuation overnight, tith close support--so close that the fifteen survivors had to keep prone--from the 2nd Battalion's mortars, Company G's isolated group hung on for the rest of the day while the battalion made plans to evacuate them so that artillery could again strike the island. After dark Company G's commander, Captain George West, swam across the Estero de Tonque dragging an engineer assault boat behind him. Although wounded, he shuttled his troops back to the east bank in the dim light of flames from burning buildings on and south of the island. When a count was taken about midnight, Company G totaled 17 casualties--6 men killed, 5 wounded, and 6 missing--among the 18 men, including Captain West, who had reached Provisor Island during the previous eighteen hours. Despite facing strong resistance, Company E successfully crossed and captured the eastern half of the boiler plant. The Americans gradually cleared the remainder of the boiler house, but every attempt to venture outside drew fire from all available Japanese weapons in range of Provisor Island. At the same time, the 148th Regiment finally secured the Paco District after the enemy abandoned their stronghold during the night, allowing the Americans to gain control of the east bank of the Estero de Paco. The 1st Battalion of the 129th Regiment advanced to both this estero and the Estero de Tonque. The 8th Cavalry crossed the Pasig, establishing a bridgehead about 1,000 yards deep in the Philippine Racing Club area, while the 5th Cavalry moved south alongside the 8th, encountering only scattered resistance as they also crossed the Pasig at Makati. Swing's forces consolidated their gains and established a solid line from the northwest corner to the southwest corner of Nichols Field, eliminating the last Japanese resistance on the western side, while elements of the 511th Parachute Regiment advanced along Route 1 nearly a mile beyond the field's northwest corner. On this day, the 11th Airborne Division came under the control of the 14th Corps, with Griswold ordering Swing to maintain pressure on Nichols Field without launching a general assault toward Manila. Now, however, it was time to leave the Philippines and shift focus to Bougainville to cover the ongoing Australian offensive. Following the capture of Pearl Ridge, Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade assumed control of the central and northern sectors, while General Bridgeford's 3rd Division focused its efforts in the Jaba River region to prepare for an offensive southward. By the end of December, the 15th Battalion had landed in the Tavera River area, and the 47th Battalion launched an attack up the Jaba River to disrupt enemy forces. In the first week of January, Brigadier Monaghan redeployed his troops, with the 42nd Battalion and 2/8th Commando Squadron taking over from the 47th to enable its movement down the coast to support the 15th Battalion. As a result, the Australians swiftly occupied the mouth of the Adele River and secured the Tavera area. By January 12, the 47th Battalion had advanced to the mouth of the Hupai River; however, with the Japanese seemingly reinforcing the Kupon-Nigitan-Mendai area on the Australian flank, Monaghan decided to slow his advance while the 2/8th Commandos conducted reconnaissance toward the Pagana River. With no threats emerging, the 42nd Battalion relieved the 47th on January 17 and advanced unopposed to Mawaraka. In the subsequent days, a long-range patrol from the New Guinea Battalion landed by sea and moved forward to Motupena Point, where they caught a Japanese listening post by surprise. While Monaghan awaited relief from Brigadier Field's 7th Brigade in late January, patrols ventured deep into the Sisiruai area and continued to scout beyond Mawaraka. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commandos moved to Sovele Mission and patrolled the mountains toward Kieta, occasionally assisting the Kapikavi people in their guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. While the 11th Brigade concentrated in its northern operations, patrols generally guided by native police were sent out for from 1 day to 6 days to probe forward through the bush. The 11th Battery relieved the 10th and it replaced its short 25-pounders with long 25-pounders, with their greater range, in order to support these deep patrols more effectively; from posts on Pearl Ridge and Keenan's Ridge observers directed the bombardment of the Japanese positions on the slopes beyond. The firing of the guns, far below at the foot of the Laruma escarpment, could not be heard at Pearl Ridge and the only warning that the Japanese had was the brief whistle of the approaching shells. Partly as a result of the skilful guidance of the native police the patrols killed many Japanese and suffered relatively small losses. The 26th Battalion, the first to do a tour of duty here, suffered its first death in action on January 7 when a patrol led by Lieutenant Davis met an enemy patrol. Private Smith died of wounds and three corporals were wounded as a result, so the hill where the clash occurred was then named Smith's Hill. As the 26th Battalion advanced toward Smith's Hill, Stevenson had assembled Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Kelly's 31st/51st Battalion at Sipaai by January 7. The strategy involved moving towards Soraken Harbour through extensive inland patrols designed to drive the enemy back to the coastal area, where they could be decisively defeated. Consequently, the main contingent of the 31st/51st began its advance along the coastal route, while a long-range patrol headed inland via Totokei towards Lalum. By January 16, the Australians reached Rakussia without any issues; however, in the following days, they would need to fight their way to Puto, as the flanking force was also advancing towards Kunamatoro. On January 21, the 31st/51st launched an assault on Tsimba Ridge, where the Japanese had set up their primary defensive positions. The determined defenders successfully repelled several attacks over the next few days, prompting the Australians to attempt an outflanking maneuver on January 25, with a company moving inland to cross the Genga River and attack Tsimba from the north. For the next six days, the Japanese launched strong counterattacks against this bridgehead but suffered significant losses. Ultimately, after a heavy artillery bombardment on February 6, the Australians were able to advance to the western end of the northern side of Tsimba, completely encircling the Japanese forces. The following day, the defenders counterattacked but were pushed back, yet they stubbornly held onto their remaining position at the western tip of the ridge. After an air and mortar assault, Tsimba was finally cleared on February 9, as the Japanese retreated towards the harbour during the night. In the subsequent two weeks, the Australians secured Lalum and the Gillman River, while another flanking force took control of Kunamatoro. On February 22, the 31st/51st Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion. Subsequently, the 55th/53rd Battalion took over at Pearl Ridge, where it continued to advance along the Numa Numa trail to engage the majority of the 81st Regiment. The nature of the deep patrols may be illustrated by drawing on the report of the one which killed the largest number of Japanese (26 confirmed kills). Lieutenant Goodwin and 10 infantrymen of the 55th/53rd, with an artillery observer (Lieutenant Ford) and his team, a native police boy and 2 native scouts, set out on March 2 to gain topographical information and information about the enemy, and find suitable supply-dropping points. They were out for 5 days. On the first morning they saw signs of a Japanese patrol of 3 some 45 minutes ahead of them and traced their movements. The Australians moved 5400 yards that day. Next morning near the Numa Numa trail one of the natives reported that Japanese were nearby. Goodwin detailed 3 men to block the track and led 3 others in from the side to deal with the enemy. They crept stealthily forward and found 6 Japanese in a lean-to. Goodwin gave each man a target and all 6 of the enemy were killed. While Goodwin was examining the bodies there was a burst of fire from a ridge overlooking them. The Australians withdrew to dead ground, circled the enemy and marched on into his territory, the Japanese fire continuing for 15 minutes after they had gone. They travelled 7600 yards that day. The 4th was spent reconnoitring the area they had then reached. Next day they had moved some 5000 yards on the return journey when scouts reported Japanese round the junction of their native pad and a creek that lay ahead. Goodwin moved the patrol to a ridge overlooking the Japanese and sent 3 men to cover the track to the west. After killing 15 Japanese and throwing 15 grenades into the area, the patrol then moved 700 yards and bivouacked for the night. Next day—the 6th—6 hours of marching brought them back to their starting point.  Meanwhile, in the south, Field initiated his own offensive by deploying the 61st Battalion to capture the Kupon-Nigitan-Mosina area, which was successfully taken by February 9. Concurrently, the 25th Battalion advanced along the Tavera despite facing strong resistance, eventually connecting with the 61st Battalion in the Mendai-Sisiruai area. The 9th Battalion also progressed along the Hupai, successfully occupying Makotowa by the end of January and then embarking on a challenging march toward Mosigetta, which was captured on February 16. The following day, a company from the 61st Battalion linked up with the 9th Battalion from the north. Additionally, after quickly securing the Sovele area, the 2/8th Commandos began reconnoitering the Sisiruai-Birosi area on February 2. By February 13, they had established a new base at Opai and discovered that the gardens north of the Puriata River were free of enemy forces. Furthermore, a detached company of the 25th Battalion traveled by barge from Motupena Point to Toko and began pushing inland toward Barara, with the remainder of the battalion expected to arrive shortly to support this advance. However, it is now time to shift focus from Bougainville to the ongoing Burma offensives. Initially, in the north, General Matsuyama's 56th Division began its retreat towards Hsenwi and Lashio, successfully breaching the roadblocks established by the 114th Regiment in late January. Meanwhile, the Mars Task Force struggled to dislodge the determined defenders at Namhpakka. Despite capturing Hpa-pen and executing a clever encirclement against Loikang in early February, they managed to take the ridge only after the Japanese had already completed their withdrawal to Hsenwi on February 4. The 56th Division then focused its efforts on the Lashio region, while the 4th, 55th, and 168th Regiments returned to their original divisions, with the 168th specifically tasked with defending Meiktila. On that same day, the first official convoy from the India-Burma Theater reached Kunming via the Ledo Road, which would later be renamed the Stilwell Road in honor of the individual who initiated this ambitious endeavor. Meanwhile, on February 1, General Festing's 36th Division attempted to cross the Shweli River at Myitson but was met with heavy small arms fire from the Japanese. As a result, the British opted to mislead the enemy, stationing the 72nd Brigade, which included the 114th Regiment, on a small island while the 26th Brigade crossed downstream on February 8, successfully capturing Myitson two days later. In the following days, the 26th Brigade fortified its positions; however, General Naka decided to go on the offensive, deploying his 56th Regiment in increments as it advanced north from Mongmit. Consequently, the 114th and 56th Regiments launched a series of intense counterattacks against the 26th Brigade's foothold, effectively containing the British-Indian forces, although they were unable to push them back across the river. Simultaneously, the Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group, leading the 30th Chinese Division southward, fought its way to Hsenwi on February 19. The 50th Chinese Division, which crossed the Shweli River without opposition, reached the significant nonferrous Bawdwin mines on February 20. Meanwhile, General Slim continued his Extended Capital offensive, with General Stopford's 33rd Corps advancing towards Mandalay, while General Messervy's 4th Corps quietly maneuvered through the Myittha valley toward the Irrawaddy River in the Chauk-Pakokku region. In early February, Stopford made persistent and determined attempts from the north to seize Mandalay, reinforcing the perception that this was Slim's primary focus. By February 12, General Gracey's 20th Indian Division had also arrived at Allagappa, where the 80th Brigade promptly began crossing the Irrawaddy. In the following days, the British-Indian forces would need to defend this bridgehead against fierce counterattacks from the 33rd Division. Additionally, negotiations began to persuade General Aung San's Burma National Army to join the Allies.  In Burma, one man above all others could see the writing on the wall for the Japanese. The Allies received news on January 1 that the Burmese military leader General Aung San and his Burma National Army (BNA) would be prepared to switch sides. An operation by Special Operations Executive (SOE) – codenamed Nation – was launched to liaise with the BNA and the leadership of another group, the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO), and so facilitate this delicate transfer of loyalties. The first parachute drop of agents was to Toungoo on January 27 and comprised an all-Burma force. It reported that the BNA – or significant parts of it – was ready to turn, but that the AFO needed arming. A team parachuted into Burma on March 20 reported that action by the BNA would begin in a week.  At the same time, General Evans' 7th Indian Division was advancing toward the Irrawaddy, aiming to cross the river at Nyaungu. Comprehensive deception tactics, known as Operation Cloak, were implemented to disguise the Nyaungu crossings. The 28th East African Brigade feigned a southward movement to reclaim the Chauk and Yenangyaung oilfields, and dummy parachute drops were carried out east of Chauk to support this ruse. The 114th Indian Brigade also exerted significant pressure on Pakokku to create the impression that crossings were planned there as well. While the 33rd Indian Brigade stealthily approached Nyaungu via Kanhla, the 48th and 63rd Brigades of the 17th Indian Division, reorganized as motorized units, departed from Imphal and began their descent down the Myitha valley. Worried about the enemy buildup near Nyaungu and Pakokkku, General Tanaka opted to send one battalion from the 215th Regiment to bolster defenses in Nyaungu and Pagan. From February 10 to 12, the 114th Brigade successfully captured Pakokku, while the 28th Brigade took control of Seikpyu. Although the 114th Brigade managed to fend off strong enemy counterattacks, elements of the 153rd Regiment recaptured Seikpyu after several days of intense fighting. On the morning of February 14, the 2nd Battalion of the South Lancashire Regiment crossed the Irrawaddy, landing on a beach a mile northeast of Nyaungu and quickly securing the high ground above, followed shortly by the rest of the 33rd Brigade. The next day, the 89th Indian Brigade began crossing the river, with Evans' forces advancing outward and successfully clearing the Nyaungu area by the end of February 16. Meanwhile, to the south, General Christison's 15th Corps continued its offensive in Arakan in early February. General Wood's 25th Indian Division repelled fierce counterattacks from the 154th Regiment, while General Stockwell's 82nd West African Division pursued the retreating Japanese forces. General Lomax's 26th Indian Division chose to bypass the enemy stronghold at Yanbauk Chaung to the northeast, moving swiftly through Sane and engaging some delaying forces at Namudwe. Additionally, due to the perceived weakness in the boundary between the 28th and 15th Armies, General Sakurai had to send the Kanjo Force, centered around the 112th Regiment, to reinforce Yenangyaung. At this point, most of the 2nd Division had also been dispatched to Saigon to stage a coup against the French government in Indochina, leaving Sakurai with only the depleted 49th Division and 16th Regiment in reserve. By 1944, with the war going against the Japanese after defeats in Burma and the Philippines, they then feared an Allied offensive in French Indochina. The Japanese were already suspicious of the French; the liberation of Paris in August 1944 raised further doubts as to where the loyalties of the colonial administration lay. The Vichy regime by this time had ceased to exist, but its colonial administration was still in place in Indochina, though Admiral Jean Decoux had recognized and contacted the Provisional Government of the French Republic led by Charles de Gaulle. Decoux got a cold response from de Gaulle and was stripped of his powers as governor general but was ordered to maintain his post with orders to deceive the Japanese. Instead Decoux's army commander General Eugène Mordant secretly became the Provisional Government's delegate and the head of all resistance and underground activities in Indochina. Following the South China Sea Raid in January 1945, six US navy pilots were shot down but were picked up by French military authorities and housed in the central prison of Saigon for safe keeping. The French refused to give the Americans up and when the Japanese prepared to storm the prison the men were smuggled out. The Japanese then demanded their surrender but Decoux refused, so Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu, the Japanese commander of the 38th Army, decided to begin preparations for a coup against the French colonial administration in Indochina. As a result, he chose to send the Kamui Detachment, centered around the 55th Cavalry Regiment, to Letpadan to bolster his reserve forces, which also welcomed the arrival of the Sakura Detachment in Prome. Meanwhile, Lomax's troops successfully captured Ramree village on February 8, forcing the Japanese defenders to retreat chaotically to the mainland. The remainder of the month was spent clearing the rest of the island. Consequently, Stockwell was instructed to bypass Kangaw and initiate an advance toward An. However, by February 15, the 154th Regiment had started to withdraw to positions west and north of the Dalet River, while the Matsu Detachment hurried toward Tamandu, the next target for an amphibious assault. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Manila was just kicking up. Over 4000 internees at Santo Tomas had been rescued and hard earned victories were being won over the formidable ZigZag Pass. Meanwhile the efforts on Bougainville continued against fierce and stubborn Japanese resistance.

Last time we spoke about the Mandalay Offensive. In the midst of intense warfare, General Krueger positioned his troops strategically to bolster the assault at Rosario. As the American forces repelled counterattacks and advanced, they faced fierce Japanese resistance, particularly at Binalonan and Hill 600. Despite heavy casualties, the Americans gradually gained ground, clearing key areas and preparing for further offensives. Meanwhile, Japanese defenses were fortified but weakened by shortages. As battles raged, both sides braced for decisive confrontations in the ongoing struggle for control of Luzon. In a fierce battle across the hills of Luzon, the 103rd Regiment aimed to secure key positions but faced heavy resistance, capturing Hill 800 by nightfall. The 172nd Regiment achieved surprise at Hill 900, while other regiments advanced under relentless fire. Meanwhile, in Burma, the British-Indian forces captured Shwebo, pushing deeper against Japanese defenses. The Mars Task Force disrupted supply lines, leading to a Japanese retreat. Amidst the chaos, both sides suffered heavy losses, marking a pivotal moment in the campaign. This episode is the Return to Bataan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By the end of January, as previously noted on Luzon, the 43rd Division had secured most of the Rosario region and Route 3 from Pozorrubio to the crucial junction with Route 11. The 25th Division had successfully eliminated the Shigemi Detachment at San Manuel, while the 6th Division had cleared the Cabaruan Hills and established outposts between Balungao and Guimba. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps had advanced to Clark Field, where it was engaged in a fierce battle with the Kembu Group. By January 27, the 40th Division had breached General Tsukada's northern defensive line, and the 37th Division had fortified Mabalacat, Angeles, and Runway No. 1 in preparation for the final push toward Manila. On that same day, General Krueger received significant reinforcements, with the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 32nd Division, and the 112th Cavalry Regiment at Lingayen Gulf. He planned to gather the cavalry division at Guimba to launch a coordinated advance toward the capital along the eastern side of the Central Plains via Route 5. After returning the reserve 35th Regiment to General Mullins, Krueger intended to deploy the 32nd Division, minus the 126th Regiment in Army Reserve, to the San Manuel-Asingan area. This would allow the 25th and 6th Divisions to narrow their fronts and continue south and southeast toward the Licab-Lupao line with reduced risk of exposing the 1st Corps' flank. Additionally, this strategy would enable the 37th Division to resume its advance toward Manila. However, General Griswold wanted to push Tsukada's forces further into the Zambales Mountains first, directing General Beightler to assault the enemy's southern defensive line centered around Fort Stotsenburg, while only the 148th Regiment and the 37th Reconnaissance Troop moved south along Route 3 to San Fernando. On January 28, the attack commenced as planned, with the 129th Regiment advancing westward through Runway No. 2, but it was quickly halted by the formidable forward defenses of the Eguchi Detachment. Meanwhile, with the assistance of Filipino guerrillas, reconnaissance units from the 37th Division successfully secured the San Fernando bridges intact. To the north of the Bamban River, the 160th Regiment faced unexpectedly light resistance as it moved along its ridge line to capture open-crested Hill 620, although it would later encounter stronger opposition when it reached the main defenses of the Takaya Detachment. At the same time, General Patrick began gathering the 1st and 20th Regiments at Guimba and Victoria, while the 6th Reconnaissance Troop advanced toward Cabanatuan, where they identified a significant Japanese concentration. Further north, the 35th Regiment advanced unopposed to barrio Gonzales, while the 27th Regiment moved overland and successfully dislodged a Japanese outpost from barrio Pemienta. Meanwhile, MacArthur was planning a secondary landing on the Zambales coast of Luzon, assigning Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps, which included the 38th Division and the 34th Regiment, to land at San Antonio and quickly advance across the base of Bataan to prevent any significant Japanese retreat into the peninsula. He also aimed to divert the Kembu Group's attention to relieve some pressure on the 14th Corps. However, General Yamashita had no intention of retreating to Bataan and had only dispatched Colonel Nagayoshi Sanenobu's 39th Regiment to defend the peninsula and the Kembu Group's right flank. On January 26, Hall's 11th Corps had departed Leyte Island aboard vessels from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, heading directly to Luzon for the San Antonio landing, codenamed Operation Mike 7. The convoy reached its destination on the morning of January 29. After receiving reports from Filipino guerrillas indicating that there were no Japanese forces in the landing area, Struble decided to cancel the planned pre-assault bombardment. Instead, he ordered Hall's four regiments to land simultaneously across a nearly six-mile stretch of coastline from San Antonio. Upon landing, the 151st Regiment secured San Felipe and San Antonio, while the 149th Regiment quickly moved inland to capture the San Marcelino Airstrip. However, they discovered that guerrillas led by Captain Ramon Magsaysay had already taken control of the airstrip three days prior. Before nightfall, the 34th Regiment and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop advanced south along Route 7 to the northern shore of Subic Bay. To the east, the 160th Regiment made significant progress, advancing nearly two miles southwest and breaching a stronghold at the center of the Takaya Detachment. The 129th Regiment also managed to penetrate enemy defenses into Fort Stotsenburg but was halted at barrio Tacondo by six tanks from the Yanagimoto Detachment. Despite this setback, the inability of the Japanese counterattacks to reclaim lost territory compelled Tsukada to order the Eguchi and Yanagimoto Detachments to retreat to their main line of resistance. Meanwhile, further north, units from the 1st and 20th Regiments successfully captured Licab and Talavera, cutting off the road between Cabanatuan and Muñoz. The 27th Regiment engaged a small tank-artillery force from the 2nd Tank Division that had become trapped along the highway between Gonzales and Pemienta.  With the rapid advances of the 6th and 25th Divisions, the 2nd Tank Division main strength in the Tayug-Triangle Hill area was in danger of being cut off from its sole remaining escape route into the northern bastion via San Jose and Highway 5. To meet the new situation, General Iwanaka was directed to pull back all remaining division strength from the Tayug-Umingan and Triangle Hill sectors with the exception of small outpost forces to be left at Gonzales and Umingan to delay an enemy advance from the northwest. The division was instead to concentrate the bulk of its forces in a triangular-shaped area bounded by Lupao, Muñoz and Rizal. These new dispositions had barely been effected when enemy elements swept around the outpost force at Gonzales and cut its withdrawal route to Umingan, forcing the detachment to withdraw through the hills after destroying most of its tanks and all of its mechanized artillery. From 20:00 on the 29th until 04:30 the next morning the force tried unsuccessfully to break through the Pemienta perimeter, against a sharp enemy. By the time the action had ended the 27th Regiment had killed 125 Japanese and had destroyed 8 tanks, 8 artillery prime movers, 4 tractors, 8 105-mm howitzers and 5 trucks, while only losing about 15 men killed and 45 wounded. Only four tanks succeeded in breaking through the enemy encirclement and escaped along the highway to Umingan. The next day, the 27th Regiment began positioning itself to attack Umingan from the north and northwest, while the 35th Regiment started preparations for a holding attack from the west and southwest. In an effort to avert the mass execution of prisoners of war at Cabanatuan, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mucci led a contingent of approximately 233 men, composed of Filipino guerrillas, soldiers from the Alamo Scouts, and Mucci's 6th Ranger Battalion. They traversed 30 miles cross-country between January 28 and 30 to liberate 522 weakened prisoners during the night. Most of the prisoners had vacated the camp by 2010 hours. Rangers and guerrillas had to carry most, piggy-backing them or making hasty litters from rifles and shirts. It was 2 miles to the Pampanga River, where carts waited to take them to Platero to be treated, fed, and organized. Many were still in shock and had not yet fully understood that they were free. At 2040 hours, Capt Prince was at the Pampanga River supervising the loading of stumbling prisoners into 25 carts as Rangers and prisoners trickled in. The rest of the Scouts established an ambush at the crossing site. At 2045 hours, one hour after the raid was launched, Prince fired the third red flare and departed for Balangkare. The loaded carabao carts were ordered on their way to Balangkare at 2145 hours.  Meanwhile Major Robert Lapham's guerrilla forces provided cover for their escape, successfully returning them to Allied lines on January 31. During this operation, around 270 Japanese soldiers were killed at the camp, with an additional 900 casualties along the Cabu River. Over 270 Japanese lay dead or dying in the smoldering camp; most of the wounded dying by dawn as no aid was forthcoming. Japanese bodies were literally stacked at the Cabu bridge and scores more littered the riverside woods. The 359th Battalion had ceased to exist. In the morning, battalion commander Capt Oyanu was still alive, but most of his officers were dead. Only 255 men of 1,200 survived and most were wounded.   In contrast, the Americans suffered only 2 fatalities and 7 wounded, along with 12 wounded Filipinos and 2 dead prisoners. Fortunately, the anticipated retaliation against the Filipino population did not occur, as the Japanese retreated from the area within a day of the raid, while the 20th Regiment secured the road junction barrio of Baloc and began advancing toward Muñoz. On January 30, Griswold continued his vigorous offensive against Clark Field; the 129th Regiment cleared the hills near Dolores and took control of the abandoned Fort Stotsenburg area, while the 160th Regiment made only 500 yards of progress against the determined Takaya Detachment. The 108th Regiment finally captured Hill 5 and Thrall Hill. Further south, patrols from the 37th Division reached within a mile of Calumpit and the Pampanga River, and on Bataan, the 34th Regiment took Olongapo after a fierce skirmish, while the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment captured Grande Island at the entrance to Subic Bay. At the same time, MacArthur was strategizing another secondary landing on Luzon, this time utilizing General Swing's 11th Airborne Division to assault Nasugbu, located 45 miles southwest of Manila. With this operation, MacArthur aimed to initiate a southern advance toward Manila while simultaneously hindering Japanese forces in southern Luzon from moving north to challenge Krueger's main offensive. General Eichelberger intended to deploy the 187th and 188th Glider Regiments and advance them approximately twenty miles along Route 17 to Tagaytay Ridge. There, the 511th Parachute Regiment would conduct an airdrop to secure the ridge for the ground troops and capture adjacent sections of Route 17 before the Japanese could regroup to defend the highway. In opposition, General Yokoyama had assigned only the Fuji Force to defend the area south of Manila. This force, centered around Colonel Fujishige Masatoshi's reinforced 17th Regiment, had only deployed the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment in the Tagaytay Ridge region, with a small outpost at Nasugbu and its main defenses positioned on Mounts Cariliao and Batulao. At this stage, Yokoyama was nearing completion of the organization of the diverse Shimbu Group forces east of Manila into a cohesive combat task force. To the north, near Ipo, he had stationed the Kawashima Force, which was composed of the 82nd Brigade and the 31st Regiment. To the south, the main contingent of the former Manila Defense Force had been relocated from the Philippine capital and renamed the Kobayashi Force, guarding the Wawa-Montalban area. However, the departure of General Tsuda's 105th Division to the northern stronghold had created a significant gap in the Shimbu Group's defenses. Although Yokoyama intended to address this vulnerability with the Noguchi Detachment, Major-General Noguchi Susumu's troops were still in the midst of a lengthy march from the Bicol Peninsula by the end of January. As a temporary solution, the Okita Detachment, a composite force consisting of five battalions centered around the 186th Independent Battalion, and the Kuromiya Detachment, a three-battalion unit based on the 181st Independent Battalion, were deployed in the Bosoboso-Antipolo region. Meanwhile, the Kogure Detachment, organized around the 1st Surface Raiding Base Force, was stationed at Lamon Bay. Manila was entrusted to Rear-Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji's Manila Naval Defense Force, which included approximately 13,700 naval personnel from the 31st Special Base Force responsible for defending the islands of Manila Bay and the capital, along with some Army reinforcements. On January 27, Swing's 11th Airborne Division departed from Leyte Island aboard ships from Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2, heading directly to Nasugbu Bay to carry out Operation Mike 6. Following an uneventful journey and a brief preliminary bombardment on January 31, the 188th Glider Regiment successfully landed with minimal resistance and quickly advanced inland toward the Palico River, aiming for the section of Route 17 that leads to Tagaytay Ridge. Pleased with the initial landing, Swing subsequently deployed the 187th Glider Regiment and the division artillery, which began to relieve the rear elements of the 188th by midday. At the same time, the majority of the 188th secured the Palico bridge and crossed the river to reach Route 17. Further north, under pressure from MacArthur and Krueger, the 148th Regiment successfully crossed the Pampanga River and captured Calumpit, just as Beightler was dispatching the 145th Regiment along Route 3 to assist in the advance toward Manila. At Clark Field, the 108th Regiment was patrolling forward, while the 160th Regiment faced challenges in breaking through enemy defenses. Meanwhile, the 129th Regiment launched an attack on the main positions of the Eguchi Detachment at Top of the World hill, successfully securing its steep, grassy southern and southeastern slopes. On Bataan, General Jones sent the 152nd Regiment to travel through Olongapo and advance east along Route 7, while the 149th Regiment moved east toward Dinalupihan via a challenging trail located about 1,200 yards north of the highway. By the end of January, the 32nd Division had successfully taken control of the recently vacated Tayug area. The 6th and 25th Divisions reorganized in preparation for their final push towards San Jose, and the 1st Cavalry Division gathered at Guimba. The World War II brigade structure of Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge's dismounted 1st Cavalry Division differed greatly from that of the triangular infantry division of the period. Instead of three infantry regiments the 1st Cavalry Division had four cavalry regiments--the 5th and 12th in the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 7th and 8th in the 2d Cavalry Brigade. Each regiment had two cavalry squadrons, each smaller than an infantry battalion, as opposed to the three battalions of an infantry regiment. Each cavalry regiment contained a weapons troop armed with 81-mm. mortars, .30-caliber and .50-caliber machine guns, and bazookas, but there was no heavy weapons troop within each squadron. The cavalry regiments lacked the antitank and cannon companies of an infantry regiment. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery was composed of one 75-mm. howitzer battalion, three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, and, for obvious reasons, an attached 155-mm. howitzer battalion. Reinforcing combat and service attachments brought the division's strength up to nearly 15,000 men, somewhat less than the strength of the reinforced 37th Division at the same time. On paper, each of the four cavalry regiments numbered 1,750 men--in contrast to the 3,000-odd of an infantry regiment--but none of the 1st Cavalry Division's regiments was up to strength. The division had received few replacements since entering combat on Leyte in October, and it had come to Luzon after very little rest from its arduous campaign through Leyte's mountains. The 1st Cavalry division was ready to advance towards Cabanatuan as General Mudge dispatched two reinforced motorized squadrons. On February 1, the Flying Columns, led by General Chase, crossed the Pampanga River and began their southern march with minimal resistance. As a result, Cabanatuan and Gapan were quickly captured, although some opposition was encountered south of the Peñaranda River. Meanwhile, the 188th Glider Regiment continued its advance towards Tagaytay Ridge, facing heavy enemy fire from Mount Cariliao but still managing to secure the important Mount Aiming. The 148th Regiment swiftly moved down Route 3 and captured Malolos with little resistance. However, the 152nd Regiment faced increasingly strong resistance at ZigZag Pass. While more rugged terrain than the ZigZag Pass area is to be found on Luzon, few pieces of ground combine to the same degree both roughness and dense jungle. Route 7 twists violently through the pass, following a line of least terrain resistance that wild pigs must originally have established. The jungle flora in the region is so thick that one can step 5 yards off the highway and not be able to see the road. The Japanese had honeycombed every hill and knoll at the ZigZag with foxholes linked by tunnels or trenches; at particularly advantageous points they had constructed strongpoints centered on log and dirt pillboxes. All the defenses were well camouflaged, for rich jungle foliage covered most positions, indicating that many had been prepared with great care and had been constructed well before Colonel Nagayoshi's 39th Regiment had reached the area in December. Colonel Nagayoshi had plenty of food and ammunition for a prolonged stand, and he also possessed numerous mortars and machine-guns. His artillery, however, was inadequate for the task at hand and he lacked certain types of medical supplies, especially malaria preventatives and cures. He had so scattered his mortars and artillery in order to protect them against American artillery and air strikes that his troops would often have difficulty massing their fires. Finally, his defensive line was scarcely 2000 yards wide northwest to southeast, thus rendering his whole position susceptible to vigorous outflanking maneuvers. On the other hand, he had good troops, well-prepared positions, and excellent defensive terrain. The 129th Regiment secured the summit of Top of the World hill, effectively ensuring Clark Field's protection from all but long-range artillery fire. The 20th Regiment launched its initial attack on Muñoz, which was thwarted by Colonel Ida Kumpei's tanks fortified as pillboxes. Additionally, the 27th Regiment attempted to advance towards Umingan but was unable to break through, while elements of the 35th Regiment bypassed this area and occupied barrio San Roque. February 2 mirrored the previous day in the San Jose sector, as the 20th and 27th Regiments continued their battle against the determined Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, Mullins dispatched the 35th Regiment in a two-pronged maneuver towards Umingan, successfully clearing most of the town by noon. In an effort to recover lost time, Mullins then directed the 35th toward Lupao in the afternoon, but its leading battalion was ultimately halted by intense Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. With their forward units stalled at Muñoz and Lupao, Patrick and Mullins resorted to flanking tactics. Accordingly, Patrick sent the 1st Regiment along the Talavera River to attack San Jose from the southeast, while the 63rd Regiment attempted to bypass Muñoz to the east and rejoin Route 5 north of the town. In turn, Mullins ordered the 161st Regiment to move cross-country to positions on Route 99 south of Lupao, then advance to Route 8 between San Isidro and San Jose while the 35th surrounded and cleared Lupao. However, on this day, the 105th Division successfully evacuated San Jose along with its stockpiled ammunition, regrouping north at Puncan and rendering the entire San Jose offensive ineffective. Simultaneously, Chase's Flying Columns passed through Gapan and entered Sabang, fording the Angat River to launch two simultaneous advances to the south and east. The 148th Regiment secured Plaridel after a brief but fierce skirmish, while the 152nd Regiment faced setbacks in the ZigZag Pass due to nighttime Japanese counterattacks and artillery fire. The 149th Regiment became disoriented and had to return to Olongapo, and the 188th Glider Regiment managed to break through to barrio Aga amidst heavy resistance, while the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment moved forward to begin the assault toward Tagaytay. On February 3, Swing's glider infantry launched an assault on the western end of Tagaytay, while paratroopers from the 511th Parachute Regiment began to drop along the ridge in a rather scattered manner. The first echelon of the 511th, about 915 in all, had come to Tagaytay Ridge aboard 48 C-47 aircraft of the 317th Troop Carrier Group. The planes had flown north from Mindoro to approach Tagaytay Ridge from the northeast in order to avoid fire from Japanese anti-aircraft weapons west of the drop zone. The first 18 planes, carrying about 345 troops, dropped over the assigned area. At this juncture, planes from succeeding flights were nearly 6 miles and 3 minutes behind the lead aircraft. About 08:20 one of these later planes dumped out a couple of bundles of supplies. Taking this as a signal that they were over the proper drop zone, 'troopers of the succeeding 30 planes began jumping. Aircraft pilots, realizing they had not yet reached the proper point, attempted to halt the jumping, but the 511th's jump-masters continued sending the paratroopers out. Most of them landed almost 5 miles east-northeast of the assigned drop zone. A second group of 51 C-47s began approaching the drop area about 12:10. Some 80 men from the first 5 aircraft of this group landed in the proper place. The rest started out of their planes when they saw on the ground the collapsed chutes of the first misplaced jump. In the end, only 425 men landed on the assigned drop zone; the others, about 1325 in all, made scattered landings 4.5 to 6 miles to the east and northeast. The 11th Airborne Division, blaming the 317th Troop Carrier Group for the premature dropping, reported that the "true reason was the refusal of the Air Force to cooperate in a combined training program for Airborne and Air Force troops." In any event, it appears that some lack of jump discipline within the 511th contributed to the scattered, premature jumping. Fortunately for them, they encountered minimal resistance as they secured the unoccupied ridge. To the north, the 148th Regiment continued its advance southward, facing delays at several tidal streams that were unbridged and unfordable, but managed to reach a point two miles south of Marilao by day's end. At the same time, the 5th Cavalry's Flying Column destroyed a Japanese outpost at Angat and moved through the guerrilla-held Norzagaray before crossing the Santa Maria River to join the 8th Cavalry's Flying Column, which had already progressed to Talipapa and was nearing the outskirts of Manila. Meanwhile, the 27th Regiment successfully eliminated the remaining enemy pockets at Umingan; the 3rd Battalion of the 35th Regiment, advancing over elevated terrain northeast of Lupao, established a position on Route 8 approximately 1500 yards southeast of Lupao, while the rest of the regiment continued to launch unsuccessful frontal assaults on the town. The 20th Regiment managed to overrun a few Japanese strongholds at Muñoz but was unable to break through. On 3 February the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, moved in on the northwest, but could not reach Route 99 in its sector. The 3d Battalion pushed across that road at the southwest corner of Muñoz, but gained only half a block into the main section of the town. The 1st Battalion, on the south side of Muñoz, made negligible progress. By dusk, the 20th Infantry had overrun a few Japanese strongpoints, but in order to hold its gains had had to destroy completely and physically occupy every position it had reached so far. Muñoz, General Patrick had begun to realize, was going to be a costly, hard, and time-consuming nut to crack. The 20th Infantry had not yet closed with the main Japanese defenses, but had spent most of the last three days pinned down by Japanese artillery, tank, and machine gun fire. Only by hugging the ground and taking advantage of the little cover even shattered tree stumps afforded had the regiment kept its casualties down to 15 men killed and 90 wounded. Meanwhile the 63rd Regiment successfully bypassed Muñoz and advanced up Route 5 toward Caanawan; and the 1st Regiment similarly advanced along the San Jose-Rizal road, assembling at two points 1000 yards south and 1500 yards east of San Jose. Now, however, it is time to leave Luzon and head toward the Central Pacific. Following the successful capture of the Marianas and the establishment of B-29 Superfortress air bases on these islands, the Allies were finally able to conclude Operation Matterhorn and cease using bases in China and India for conducting raids on the Japanese mainland and other targets in East Asia. Between June 5, 1944, and January 17, 1945, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command executed a total of 29 combat missions, inflicting significant damage on key military installations in southern Japan, Manchuria, Formosa, and Indochina, with a total loss of 73 B-29s. Meanwhile, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command, reinforced by the 313th Bombardment Wing, struggled to achieve similar outcomes in both daylight precision bombing and area incendiary bombing, with the first three missions of January yielding the same disappointing results as those in December and November.  On January 3rd, Norstad's incendiary test mission was run on 3 January, when ninety-seven B-29's got off for Nagoya. Each plane carried a mixed load of bombs -14 x 350-pound M18 IB clusters fuzed to open at 8,000 feet and one 420-pound fragmentation cluster fuzed to open 1,000 feet below releasing altitude. What with aborts and planes straying from course, only fifty-seven bombed the urban area designated as primary target, most of them releasing visually though cloud cover was rated as 6/10. Some fires were started but there was no holocaust. Smoke rising to 20,000 feet combined with cloud to make observation of results impossible for the attackers. As a test, then, the mission was inconclusive. To the citizens of Nagoya, who were better informed than intelligence officers of 21st Bomber Command, the damage seemed slight. On January 9th, having satisfied Norstad's requirement, the command returned to its program of precision bombing against aircraft factories. Performance for the most part was of a piece with what had gone before. On 9 January 1945 seventy-two B-29's were sent against Musashino near Tokyo. High winds broke up the formations so that only eighteen planes were able to bomb the target; twenty-four bombs, widely scattered in the plant area, destroyed one warehouse and damaged two others-a slight return for the effort expended and the six B-29's lost. On January 14th, at the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works at Nagoya on the 14th, precision bombing was again less than precise. Seventy-three B-29's were airborne and forty bombed, getting four GP's-one ton-into the No. 5 Works area and damaging three buildings. Frustrated by this, Hansell increasingly blamed his crews for the unsatisfactory outcomes. Remarkably, he would only achieve his first fully successful B-29 attack on his final mission of the war. The target for the January 19 strike was virgin, a plant of the Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company located 2 miles northwest of Akashi, a village on the Inland Sea some 12 miles west of Kobe. The Akashi works housed Kawasaki's general headquarters and one of the company's two large production units, which built the twin-engine fighters Nick and Randy and engines for Tony, Oscar and Frank fighters. Smaller than Nakajima and Mitsubishi, Kawasaki in 1944 delivered 17% of Japan's combat airframes and 12% of its combat engines. Against Akashi, Hansell sent 77 B-29s, plus 3 others in a diversionary strike. With good weather, 62 bulled it through to the Kawasaki factory, dumped 155 tons of GPs, and then returned with no losses. Interpreting strike photos, intelligence officers estimated that 38% of the roofed area showed major damage. This was an understatement. Every important building in both the engine and airframe branches had been hit and production was cut by 90%. Indeed, the Kawasaki Company liquidated the combined plant and dispersed the machine tools, which had suffered only slightly, to other sites. The Akashi shops were given temporary repairs at the cost of 226 tons of critical materials and over 9000000 yen, but the installation was used thereafter only for limited assembly jobs. It is a pity that the full results of this mission could not have been known to Hansell. His first completely successful B-29 attack, Akashi seemed to epitomize the doctrines of precision bombardment he had championed-and it was his last strike of the war. Unaware of this success, Hansell was replaced the following day as head of the 21st Bomber Command by the determined LeMay, who immediately suggested a shift to firebombing Japan's major cities at low altitude during nighttime, marking a stark departure from Hansell's previous strategies. However, the only obstacle in the flight path was Iwo Jima, which could alert the Japanese to an impending raid and still had operational airfields capable of launching intercepting fighters. These airfields had also been used for sporadic air assaults on the Marianas, although few attacks were actually carried out in January. Capturing Iwo Jima would resolve these issues, and Admiral Nimitz aimed to establish emergency landing facilities for B-29s based in Saipan, as well as a base for their fighter escorts targeting Japan. Consequently, he decided to proceed with the invasion, codenamed Operation Detachment. After this operation, Nimitz planned to invade Okinawa to secure and develop a robust air and naval base for the assault on the Japanese home islands, which we will discuss further later. For the Iwo Jima operation, Admiral Spruance was once again given overall command of the "big blue fleet," which was re-designated as the 5th Fleet. Under his command, Vice-Admiral Richmond Turner led Task Force 51, the Joint Expeditionary Force, responsible for landing Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's Expeditionary Troops. Turner was supported by Rear-Admiral William Blandy's Task Force 52, the Amphibious Support Force, which included ten escort carriers; Rear-Admiral Harry Hill's Task Force 53, comprising all transports and landing craft; Rear-Admiral Bertram Rodgers' Task Force 54, which had six battleships and five cruisers for shore bombardment; and Vice-Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58, the Fast Carrier Force. For the amphibious invasion, Major-General Harry Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps would deploy the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, planning to land the 4th and 5th Divisions side by side with two regiments each along the two-mile stretch of beach between Mount Suribachi and the East Boat Basin on the island's southeast coast. Smith and Schmidt also decided to limit corps artillery to two battalions of 155mm howitzers, organized as the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, due to the limited space available for emplacements on the island. After landing, Major-General Clifton Cates' 4th Marine Division would take control of the Motoyama Plateau and its airfields, while also capturing the O-1 Line on the corps' right flank. Meanwhile, Major-General Keller Rockey's 5th Marine Division would secure the Mount Suribachi region before advancing northeast to capture the O-1 Line on the corps' left flank. They would then push forward across the island until Iwo Jima was fully secured. At the same time, Major-General Graves Erskine's 3rd Marine Division would remain in reserve, with only its 21st Marine Regiment deployed as the corps reserve. To aid in this effort, the 7th Air Force, under Generals Harmon and Hale, had been consistently targeting Iwo Jima's facilities since August 1944. Following intense attacks in December, which included bombardments by Rear-Admiral Allan Smith's 5th Cruiser Division against Iwo Jima, Haha Jima, and Chichi Jima were again struck on January 5, but the next bombardment wouldn't occur until January 25.  A fighter sweep by 28 P-38s opened the attack at 0945; 62 B-29s bombed at 1100 and 102 B-24s at noon; Crudiv 5 (Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith), comprising heavy cruisers Chester, Pensecola and Salt Lake City with six destroyers, arrived off Iwo at 1330 and opened bombardment at 1347. "Hoke" Smith approached the island from the west, rounded Mount Suribachi and then reversed track in a half-circle. Unfortunately the sky was so heavily overcast as to force the planes to bomb by radar and to hamper ships' spotting. Surface visibility was good enough to enable the island to be well covered by a naval bombardment, which lasted for 70 minutes and expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch and 5334 rounds of 5-inch shell. The bombers dropped 814 tons of bombs. Photographs, taken three days later, showed that both airfields on Iwo were wholly or in part operational, but no more enemy air raids hit the Marianas until Christmas Day. The job of keeping Iwo airfields neutralized was now turned over to B-24s of VII A.A.F. Between 8 December 1944 and 15 February 1945 they flew at least one strike daily over the island. The day before Christmas, Rear Admiral Smith's heavy cruisers, together with five destroyers, delivered a second bombardment, coordinated with a B-24 strike. This strike was slightly more eventful than the initial one in December, but even less effective. The bombardment, which expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch, provoked return fire from a 6-inch coast defense battery (designated "Kitty" on the target maps) in the northeast part of the island, but "Kitty's" claws managed to strike no closer than 200 yards. As proof of the slight damage inflicted by this bombardment, the Japanese were able to pay a vicious return visit to Saipan on Christmas Eve, a raid of 25 planes which destroyed one B-29 and damaged three more beyond repair. Crudiv 5 returned 27 December for a repeat performance, lighter than the others; and a fourth bombardment was set up for 5 January 1945. While fighter planes and B-24s hit Iwo Jima the same cruisers and six destroyers bombarded Chichi Jima, 145 northward, and the slightly nearer Haha Jima. Their hope was to catch a convoy bringing Japanese supplies to these islands, whence they were forwarded to Iwo by small craft at night. Destroyer Fanning, steaming ahead of the group as radar picket, encountered at 0206 a surface target, later identified as LSV-102, which she sank. At 0700 Admiral Smith's group opened a one hour and 49 minutes' bombardment of Chichi Jima. During it, destroyer David W. Taylor suffered an underwater explosion, probably from a mine, which flooded her forward magazine. The Haha Jima bombardment by Salt Lake City and two destroyers lasted for an hour. Crudiv 5 then pounded Iwo Jima for another hour and three quarters. The reply was negligible, and a few aircraft which made passes at the cruisers were easily driven off. Starting on the last day of January and continuing for two weeks, 7th Air Force aircraft bombed the island day and night, occasionally joined by LeMay's Superfortresses. For ten weeks, Iwo Jima faced near-daily bombardments from land-based aircraft, with nearly 6,800 tons of bombs dropped. Additionally, there were five naval bombardments that fired 203 rounds of 16-inch shells, 6,472 rounds of 8-inch shells, and 15,251 rounds of 5-inch shells. Under normal circumstances, such a heavy and sustained bombardment would have been more than enough to devastate an island of that size. However, the Japanese managed to restore the airfields on Iwo Jima just hours after each attack and continued to strengthen their defenses on the island. Following the fall of Saipan, the Japanese appointed Lieutenant-General Kuribayashi Tadamichi to oversee the defenses of the Bonin Islands, renaming the Ogasawara District Group as the 109th Division. Kuribayashi stationed Major-General Tachibana Yoshio's 1st Mixed Brigade and most of Colonel Iida Yusuke's 17th Independent Mixed Regiment on Chichi Jima, along with several other units across the islands. He accurately predicted that Iwo Jima would be the target for an Allied landing and took measures to make it virtually indestructible. To this end, he coordinated with Major-General Senda Sadasue's 2nd Mixed Brigade, Colonel Ikeda Masuo's 145th Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Nishi Takeishi's severely weakened 26th Tank Regiment, which had sustained heavy losses from American submarines at sea. Additionally, Major Fujiwara Tamachi's 3rd Battalion of the 17th Independent Mixed Regiment and a robust artillery unit led by Colonel Kaido Chosaku were included in the defense. Rear-Admiral Ichimaru Toshinosuke also provided a significant naval garrison on the island, centered around the 27th Air Flotilla, bringing Kuribayashi's total forces to approximately 21,060 men, far exceeding the American estimate of 13,000. Aware that the beaches would be vulnerable to enemy naval and air assaults, Kuribayashi opted to strengthen the Mount Suribachi and Motoyama Plateau areas. The Mount Suribachi area was made a semi-independent defense sector, its heavily fortified positions bristling with weapons of all types, ranging from casemated coast-defense guns and artillery to automatic weapons emplaced in mutually supporting pillboxes. The narrow isthmus connecting Suribachi to the rest of the island was lightly held by infantry, but heavily defended by enfilade fire from artillery, rockets, and mortars emplaced on both the high ground in the south (Suribachi area) and the northern portion of the island. The main defense line was a belt of mutually supporting positions organized in depth, running generally northwest-southeast across the island. It stretched from the cliffs north of the western beaches south to include Airfield Number 2; then, turning eastward through Minami, terminated at the rugged coast north of the eastern beaches. Pillboxes, blockhouses, bunkers, and dug-in tanks strengthened the defenses in the naturally formidable terrain everywhere throughout this belt. The second defense line generally bisected the remaining area in the northern portion of the island. It began several hundred yards below Kitano Point on the northwest coast, cut through Airfield Number 3 and the Motoyama area in the center, and terminated between Tachiiwa Point and the East Boat Basin on the eastern coast. Man-made emplacements were not as numerous in this second line, but natural caves and other covered positions afforded by the fantastically rugged terrain were skillfully organized for the defense. The beaches would be lightly defended but would receive fire support from the elevated positions. A substantial reserve force, including tanks, was also prepared to counterattack and push the Americans back into the sea if they managed to establish a foothold. In a shift from traditional Japanese defensive strategies, Kuribayashi moved away from full-scale counterattacks and suicidal banzai charges, instead instructing his troops to hold their mutually supportive positions to the last and to carry out small unit counterattacks at cutoff points. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allied forces continued their advance through Luzon, battling Japanese defenses, liberating prisoners, and securing key locations, paving the way for a final push toward Manila. Meanwhile, on Iwo Jima, General Kuribayashi was preparing for a final stand, hoping beyond hope to make the Americans pay so dearly they might end the war.

In this episode we're talking about building that local community. It's the question we get asked the most - "how do I build a scene, or run something inq28". Instead of our normal answer of "DIY or die," we thought we'd come up with some strategies for you, and talk about ways to introduce your freak little indie games to friends and strangers. On top of this Gage ponders the origins of the miniature carry cases in the grimdark scene, and explains his new love for gouache. Terry brings up breaking away from Instagram and the pros and cons of deleting the app, and Steve shares his experiences so far running the Regiments campaign and finishing up the Flames of Orion book. Local inq28 freaks are dying to meet you! Big shout out to all those Scumbags that decided to join our Patreon, you are the reason we can keep on keeping on - thank you! Hang up a flyer and Bash the Planet! We have sick merch! ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Hive Scum Big Cartel⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Check out Knuckbones Miniatures' (@knucklebones_miniatures) Hive Scum and Ratmen models and print out and paint up your favorite: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Knucklebones Patreon⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Join the In Rust We Trust discord here: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠IRWT Discord⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ If you'd like to support us further, take a look at our Patreon! We'd love to have you: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Hive Scum Patreon⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Buy all of the Under the Dice Merch here: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Under the Dice⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ We are on IG: Steve: @sovthofheaven Gage: @noclearcoat Terry: @stone.jaw

Last time we spoke about the South China Sea Raid. In January, General Krueger reinforced the American beachhead at Lingayen Gulf while Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting enemy ships based on faulty intelligence. Despite not finding the expected battleships, American forces decimated a Japanese convoy, sinking numerous vessels and claiming 113 enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, on Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite fierce resistance. As both sides prepared for counteroffensives, the battle intensified, marking a pivotal moment in the Philippines campaign. On January 17, the 58th Brigade and supporting regiments launched a daring operation to destroy enemy positions. As American forces advanced, they faced fierce resistance, but some regiments achieved notable successes. Task Force 38 executed airstrikes on Formosa and Hong Kong, inflicting damage despite heavy losses. Meanwhile, Japanese forces struggled to regroup amid American pressure. General Suzuki devised a plan to fortify Leyte, but ongoing air raids hampered supply efforts. Tensions escalated as both sides prepared for decisive confrontations in the ongoing battle for control. This episode is the Mandalay Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with, General Krueger strategically positioned General Mullins' 25th Division on the right flank of the 43rd Division to bolster the assault forces at the Rosario front. This maneuver was also intended to facilitate the continuation of the 14th Corps' advance to the south. Following the successful repulsion of General Nishiyama's local counterattack, General Wing ordered the 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments, which had been stalled, to launch an offensive from the west along the Damortis-Rosario road. Simultaneously, the 103rd and 169th Regiments were tasked with advancing northward along Route 3, originating from Pozorrubio. In contrast, while the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 23rd Division worked to contain General Swift's 1st Corps, General Yamashita was reinforcing the San Jose sector. He further instructed the Shigemi Detachment to maintain a defensive position in Binalonan. Although the 27th and 161st Regiments had successfully relieved the 103rd Regiment in the Binalonan area, Major-General Shigemi Isao ultimately opted to halt further troop movements. He decided to leave only a small garrison in Binalonan while the majority of his forces prepared for a decisive stand at San Manuel.   As the situation unfolded, the 3rd Battalion of the 161st Regiment encountered minimal resistance, allowing them to advance into the northern half of Binalonan by nightfall on January 17. In a parallel effort, General Patrick directed the 1st Regiment towards Urdaneta, where they successfully eliminated a small outpost belonging to the Shigemi Detachment. Additionally, he dispatched the 20th Regiment to the Cabaruan Hills, where they achieved their objective by reaching Lunec and securing the central area of the hills by the end of the day. On January 18, the offensive momentum of the 6th and 25th Divisions persisted. The 20th Regiment advanced to a low ridge approximately 2,500 yards west of Cabaruan, where American forces identified the primary defenses of the 2nd Battalion, 71st Regiment. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment successfully cleared Binalonan, and the 27th Regiment moved forward to seize control of the Bactad area, further consolidating their gains in the region. Simultaneously, Wing's units were gearing up for a significant new offensive. In line with this strategy, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment advanced along Route 3, deftly circumventing the town of Sison, and finally reached a crucial road junction located to the northeast of the town. Meanwhile, to the north, the 172nd Regiment executed a successful nighttime ambush against a Japanese artillery battalion. Following this victory, they dispatched a company to seize control of a strategically important hill, rising 600 feet and situated approximately 1,000 yards north of Rosario. This position enabled American forces to exert control over a substantial portion of the surrounding area. By the conclusion of the day, the 158th and 63rd Regiments established contact through patrols about a mile south of Amlang, as they prepared for a coordinated assault that was set to launch on January 19. This offensive culminated in the collapse of the last Japanese defenses just two days later. Concurrently, the 172nd Regiment successfully established a patrol base on Hill 606. From this vantage point, patrols ventured into Rosario, discovering the town was heavily mined, riddled with booby traps, and defended by concealed machine-gunners and riflemen hiding amidst the rubble of the buildings. On January 19, the 103rd Regiment initiated an assault on Hill 600, located at the southern end of the ridge line east of Route 3. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment faced several intense counterattacks from retreating Japanese forces that had been bypassed at Mount Alava and Sison. Despite the fierce resistance, the relentless pressure from Japanese troops and increasingly heavy artillery fire ultimately compelled the battalion to withdraw by noon. Nevertheless, the American operations succeeded in diminishing the Japanese presence in the region. Looking southward, the 161st Regiment cautiously advanced toward San Manuel, while the 27th Regiment effectively moved into Asingan, successfully cutting off Shigemi's escape route. Further south, the 1st Regiment rapidly progressed along Route 3 toward the Agno River, capturing the towns of Villasis, Carmen, and Rosales. Meanwhile, the 20th Regiment commenced an assault on the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment stationed in the Cabaruan Hills. On the front commanded by General Griswold, the 14th Corps was in the process of mobilizing along the Camiling-Anao line, preparing to initiate an advance toward the Tarlac-Victoria line. The 160th Regiment began its march, covering seven miles southward from Camiling along Route 13, while the 129th Regiment took a strong position in Anao, establishing vital contact with other outposts of the 37th Division stationed at Paniqui. The advances made on January 20 were notably swift, with the 148th Regiment successfully capturing the towns of Gerona and Pura. Meanwhile, the 37th Reconnaissance Troop made significant progress by entering the guerrilla-occupied area of Victoria, and units from the 40th Division advanced to within four miles of Tarlac, signaling a promising push toward their objectives. In the area around Cabaruan, the Japanese forces had sustained heavy losses during the initial attack. In response, Colonel Patrick made the strategic decision to withdraw two battalions from the hills to reinforce the southern advance. Probing slowly through the roughest ground in the Cabaruan Hills on January 20 and 21, the 20th Regiment's reinforced battalion jumped off in the morning of the 22nd in what was expected to be the last attack, its way paved by an especially heavy artillery and air bombardment. But from the start, operations did not go as planned. The air strike, conducted by Fifth Air Force A-20s was four hours late, subjecting the infantry to "a nerve racking wait," and did not include requested napalm. Air and artillery concentrations were, however, well placed, and it seemed improbable to the waiting infantry that many Japanese could have lived through them. A combined tank-infantry assault began about 12:30 and proceeded slowly but steadily for almost two hours. Then the attackers were stopped cold by a tremendous burst of rifle, machine-gun, and light artillery fire from the very hillsides that had received the weight of the bombardments. Company E, in the lead, fell back; Company G's officers were all either killed or wounded, and the company was temporarily scattered; Company F was pinned in place; and two supporting tanks were knocked out. Casualties mounted quickly to 10 men killed and 35 wounded. As a consequence, Patrick found it necessary to redirect one battalion from the 1st Regiment to support the ongoing attack. Simultaneously, the remainder of the 20th Regiment pressed forward toward Cuyapo, while the bulk of the 1st Regiment continued its eastward movement toward the guerrilla-held Balungao. Additionally, the 6th Reconnaissance Troop reached Guimba, successfully establishing contact with patrols from the 14th Corps, which was crucial for coordinating their efforts. On another front, with Mount Alava now vulnerable, the 169th Regiment launched a vigorous assault on January 20, managing to secure the summit of the mountain by nightfall. In contrast, the 103rd Regiment continued to face heavy casualties during their frontal assaults against Hill 600, ultimately gaining only a precarious foothold on the exposed southern slopes. Meanwhile, in a significant naval development, Admiral Halsey's Task Force 38 exited the South China Sea through the Balintang Channel on January 20. The task force was poised to execute further strikes against Formosa, aiming to disrupt enemy operations and bolster the Allied offensive in the region. The following day, with significantly improved weather conditions, Admiral McCain's aircraft carriers launched a coordinated series of airstrikes targeting Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the southern Ryukyu Islands. These operations resulted in the destruction of 104 Japanese aircraft on the ground, the sinking of seven oil tankers, and the loss of seven transport ships, along with additional damage inflicted on another seven vessels.  For the first time since November 1944, TF 38 felt the sting of kamikazes. Operating just 100nm east of Formosa, TF 38 was not difficult to find. Just after noon, a single aircraft appeared to conduct a conventional bombing attack on TG 38.3's light carrier Langley. One bomb hit forward. Personnel casualties were light, but the carrier was conducting flight operations three hours later. Within minutes, another aircraft also evaded radar detection and the CAP to commence a suicide dive against Ticonderoga. The kamikaze struck the flight deck and penetrated where its bomb exploded. An impending strike was spotted and ready to launch; now these aircraft provided fuel for the fire which was quickly spreading. Just before 1300hrs, another group of eight kamikazes and five escorts resumed the attack on TG 38.3. Only two suicide aircraft survived the CAP to dive on the wounded Ticonderoga. One was sent spinning into the water by antiaircraft fire, but the final attacker crashed into the carrier's island. More fires were started. The crew succeeded in putting out the flames by 1415hrs and correcting a nine-degree list by 1800hrs. Though the ship was saved, the cost was high. Some 143 men were killed and 202, including her captain, were wounded. In addition, the air group lost 36 aircraft. As a final farewell, kamikazes attacked the two destroyers on picket duty just 65nm off Formosa at 1310hrs. A single Zero had joined a returning strike. Before it could be identified as enemy, it dove on destroyer Maddox, striking her amidships. This and the explosion of the bomb aboard created a fire that was quickly extinguished. After a final day of strikes on January 22 against the Ryukyus, during which eight ships were sunk, Task Force 38 set course for Ulithi. Upon arrival, Admiral Halsey transferred command of the Fast Carrier Force to Admiral Spruance, who would lead the final offensives in the Central Pacific.  Meanwhile, back on Luzon, on January 21, the 160th Regiment swiftly cleared the town of Tarlac and began its advance toward San Miguel. Simultaneously, the 145th and 148th Regiments moved unopposed toward La Paz. The speed of 14th Corps' advance had stretched Griswold's supply lines abnormally and had exposed his left from Cuyapo to La Paz, a distance of nearly 25 miles. He had no definite information about suspected Japanese concentrations in the vicinity of Cabanatuan, on Route 5 just 15 miles east of La Paz. His worries about the security of his flank were hardly put to rest by reports of new contacts with Japanese forces at Moncada, now 20 miles behind the front, and at La Paz. Elements of the 129th and 145th Regiments easily took care of the Japanese in the Moncada area; but during the night of January 21, a pitched battle developed at La Paz when a platoon of Japanese infantry, supported by one tank, attacked a 148th Regiment perimeter at a road junction a mile west of town. The Japanese finally withdrew after destroying a bridge that carried a secondary road across a river a mile east of La Paz; but because of this, Griswold reported to General Krueger that it would be impossible to extend 14th Corps' left any further south until he had more information about Japanese forces east of La Paz. To mitigate this risk, he decided to keep General Beightler's 37th Division positioned in reserve while General Brush's 40th Division continued its advance southward along Route 3 toward Bamban. As a result, elements of the 160th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop reached Capas and conducted patrols toward Camp O'Donnell on January 22. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment began probing the defenses established by Japanese forces under Shigemi. The 103rd Regiment faced severe losses during their assault on Hill 600, necessitating a withdrawal to reorganize. Concurrently, the 169th Regiment launched an attack on Hill 355, making slow and costly progress against fierce resistance on the steep, barren slopes. By January 24, most of Hill 355 had been cleared, allowing the 3rd Battalion of the 103rd Regiment to move in and conduct mop-up operations in the area. As the 158th Regiment looked northward and secured the area around Amlang, they initiated an eastward push towards the positions held by the 172nd Regiment. However, their advance was slow, with only a modest gain of 500 yards achieved. Over the next two days, the 158th faced a grueling battle, making painstaking progress as they advanced foot by foot across exposed hills and ridges, all while enduring relentless machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It wasn't until January 26 that they successfully broke through to Cataguintingan, where they provided much-needed support to the 172nd Regiment's ongoing assaults into Rosario. Meanwhile, by the evening of January 23, the 161st Regiment had managed to secure the southern slopes of the barren ridge north of San Manuel. They established trail blocks in the Aboredo Valley, effectively controlling movement in the area. To the south, the 108th Regiment had taken control of the Capas region, while the 160th Regiment successfully captured Bamban. However, it became increasingly evident that the American forces were now confronting the well-fortified and organized defenses of the Kembu Group. The Kembu Group's strength lay in the terrain it held, in the depth of its defenses, and in the great number of automatic weapons (aircraft and anti-aircraft) it possessed. Its major weaknesses were its immobility; the inadequate training and armament of the bulk of its troops; shortages of food, ammunition, and field artillery; and the rudimentary state of many defensive installations, a state deriving from the late start in establishing the positions at and west of Clark Field. The health of the command was poor from the start, and medical supplies were short. Morale was not of the highest order, and many of the troops were easily disaffected Formosan, Okinawan, and Korean labor personnel. In brief, the Kembu Group was the poorest armed, prepared, and supplied of Yamashita's three defense commands. On the other hand, as the 40th Division was soon to learn, even poor service troops, whatever their state of training and armament, can put up stiff resistance in good defensive terrain.  In preparation for the defense of Clark Field, General Tsukada assembled a diverse array of forces, totaling approximately 30,000 troops, although the majority consisted of air and naval personnel. He strategically divided his Army units into four distinct detachments. The Takayama, Takaya, and Eguchi Detachments were positioned along the first and second lines of defense, facing eastward toward Highway 3. Their defensive line extended from the hills west of Bamban to the vicinity of Fort Stotsenburg. In contrast, the Yanagimoto Detachment maintained its mobile units at Angeles and Porac, ready to respond to any potential enemy paratrooper landings on the southern flank of the Clark Field defenses. Additionally, Rear-Admiral Sugimoto Ushie commanded naval units comprising about 15,000 men, tasked with defending positions behind the two forward lines. In light of this formidable opposition, General Griswold made the strategic decision to utilize January 24 for consolidation and regrouping. This involved preparing for further advances southward while also probing into the enemy defenses that had already been uncovered. The 160th Regiment was able to secure Lafe Hill, although they were unable to establish a foothold on Hill 500, highlighting the challenges that lay ahead. To the north, American forces initiated another offensive against the Cabaruan Hills. The units of the 1st Regiment made only modest progress, yet they managed to advance closer to the main defensive positions as night fell. Meanwhile, at San Manuel, the 161st Regiment launched its first assault against the Shigemi Detachment, which encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance. As a result, the Americans were only able to establish a fragile foothold in the northern section of the town. Further north, Wing directed the 103rd Regiment to set up a line of departure along Route 3, aiming to strike eastward at the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. At the same time, they were tasked with advancing up the southwestern slopes of the exposed Hill 700 to secure that strategic location, as well as Hill 800 to the northwest. The 169th Regiment, advancing to the left of the 103rd, was assigned to capture Question Mark Hill. Concurrently, the 63rd and 172nd Regiments were ordered to launch simultaneous assaults on Hills 900 and 1500, respectively, while the reserve 3rd Battalion of the 63rd Regiment was also committed to clear Benchmark Hill. This coordinated attack was scheduled for January 25. The initial phases of the assault showed promise, with the supporting forces making significant headway. However, the 103rd Regiment faced considerable difficulties, managing to secure Hill 800 only by nightfall. Notably, the 172nd Regiment achieved tactical surprise, successfully clearing most of Hill 900. Over the next two days, the 63rd Regiment regrouped around Hill 1500 in preparation for its own offensive. Simultaneously, the 161st Regiment continued its slow advance southward through San Manuel, facing intense opposition. Patrick's units on the Cabaruan Hills managed to gain a mere 300 yards against determined resistance. Meanwhile, Brush pressed his attack on Clark Field, with the 160th Regiment clearing Hill 500 and advancing nearly a mile along the ridge from Lafe Hill, while the 108th Regiment secured Hills E and G. The following day, the 40th Division continued its southward maneuver. Any movement by American troops along the generally open ridges west of Route 3 inevitably brought down Japanese machine-gun and mortar fire, often augmented by fire from the dismounted aircraft automatic weapons, anti-aircraft guns, and light artillery. Seeking cover and usually pinned in place, the American infantry would call for close-in mortar and artillery support, wait for the concentrations to be fired, and then drive forward a few yards, when the process had to be repeated. Each time, the Americans managed to overrun a few Japanese machine-gun or rifle strongpoints. There was little choice of routes of advance. Draws, providing some concealment in scrub growth or bamboo thickets, were usually covered by well-emplaced Japanese weapons both within the draws and on the ridges to each side. Possession of the high ground, as ever, was essential. Yet the troops had to employ draws whenever possible to outflank Japanese ridgeline strongpoints, and often draws and ravines proved to be the only routes by which tanks, tank destroyers, and cannon company self-propelled mounts could get to the front to fire against Japanese cave positions along the sides of the ridges. The capture of one Japanese-held cave served only to disclose another, and one machine-gun position was overrun only to provide access to the next. Dislodging the Kembu Group from such defenses in depth was to prove a slow, laborious, and costly process, demanding the closest teamwork between the infantry and its supporting arms. Casualties, as a rule, would not be heavy on any one day--progress would be too slow and the troops would spend too much of their time pinned down awaiting fire from supporting weapons. But a daily attrition rate of about 5 men killed and 15 wounded for each battalion engaged would soon begin to have its effect. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment swiftly captured Hills 636 and 600 in rapid succession. However, the 108th Regiment lost control of Hill G during the engagement. On January 26, Griswold committed the 37th Division to the fight, with the 145th Regiment successfully capturing Mabalacat and Mabalacat East Airfield. They then shifted westward across Route 3, overrunning Clark Field Runway Number 1. In the Cabaruan Hills, American forces gained only 150 yards at a considerable cost. In response, Patrick decided to deploy another battalion from the 1st Regiment to eliminate this pocket of resistance. The following day, this two-battalion assault proved successful, resulting in the destruction of an entire battalion of Japanese troops, with over 1,400 enemy soldiers killed. Further north, the 161st Regiment finally broke through the main defenses of Shigemi's forces. Before dawn most of the Japanese left in San Manuel scrambled across the draw on the east side of town and fled to join the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment north of San Nicolas, but not before launching a final counterattack to cover their escape. At 0930 the 161st Infantry's two battalions resumed the drive southward through the town, and by 1330 San Manuel was clear. In a heroic but tactically unimportant stand the Shigemi Detachment had virtually fulfilled its self-imposed desire for annihilation in place. The detachment had lost 750 men killed; all its tanks, artillery, trucks, machine guns, and mortars had been either captured or destroyed. Probably no more than 250 troops escaped, and many of them were unarmed and wounded. The 161st Infantry and attached units had lost approximately 60 men killed and 200 wounded; the 716th Tank Battalion lost 3 tanks. Meanwhile, Wing's offensive continued on January 27, with the 103rd Regiment successfully reaching the crest of Hill 700 and the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. Unfortunately, they lost both positions to a brutal Japanese counterattack amidst a violent tropical downpour. On January 28, the 172nd Regiment captured Rosario, while the 63rd secured the southern crest of Hill 1500. Both regiments completed the capture of this strategic feature by January 30, thereby finalizing the occupation of the crucial road junction area. Further south, on January 27, the 160th Regiment advanced only 500 to 800 yards to the west and southwest. The 108th Regiment made a more substantial advance of about 1,000 yards southwest from Hills E and G but failed to reach Hill 5. The 145th Regiment pushed south along Route 3 for an additional three miles, reaching Culayo and Dau before taking control of the guerrilla-occupied Angeles, which had recently been abandoned by the retreating Yanagimoto Detachment. In a similar vein, the 148th Regiment secured Magalang without encountering any resistance. As we shift our focus from Luzon, we turn our attention to Burma, where we will delve into the ongoing developments of Operation Capital. Picking up from our previous discussions, we find ourselves in Central Burma, where the 2nd British Division and the 19th Indian Division are making significant strides toward Shwebo. The 2nd British Division successfully captured Ye-u on January 2, followed by the establishment of a crucial bridgehead across the Mu River just three days later. Meanwhile, the 19th Indian Division also advanced, reaching the Shwebo area by January 5. On January 8, a coordinated assault was launched by units from both divisions, culminating in the capture of Shwebo after two days of intense and brutal combat. To the west, General Festing's 29th Brigade began probing the northern flank of the 15th Division at Twinnge. Concurrently, other elements of the 19th Division worked to solidify their positions by establishing additional bridgeheads over the Irrawaddy River at Thabeikkyin and Kyaukyaung. On January 10, the 20th Indian Division captured Budalin and subsequently pushed towards Monywa, where the 33rd Division had only left a small contingent to serve as a rearguard. However, the campaign faced unexpected challenges; heavy rainfall during the first week of January brought all transport operations of the 4th Corps to a standstill, significantly hampering the Lushai Brigade's planned assault on Gangaw. After enduring a heavy aerial bombardment, the attack on Gangaw finally commenced on January 10. The Lushai Brigade managed to overpower the limited defending forces, forcing them to retreat after a brief skirmish. With Gangaw now under their control, the Lushai Brigade refocused their efforts on reconnaissance, monitoring the flanks of the 7th Indian Division. Meanwhile, the 28th East African Brigade took the lead in the advance, successfully displacing a Japanese garrison at Tilin on January 22. By this time, the 114th Brigade had begun to follow in the wake of the East Africans, while the 89th Brigade executed a long maneuver to the left, advancing toward Pauk in parallel with the other offensives. Although General Kimura was aware of some movements on his southern flank, he perceived these as mere feints by minor forces intended to divert his attention southward. Following a relentless barrage of artillery and air strikes, the 20th Division launched its offensive against Monywa on January 20. This assault faced fierce resistance, and it took two days of intense and bloody combat before the division was able to secure control of the town. After capturing Monywa, the 80th Brigade advanced towards Myaung, while the 110th Brigade shifted its focus to Ayadaw before launching an attack on Myinmu. By January 25, they had successfully established a bridgehead in that area. Meanwhile, to the east, the 2nd Division commenced its assault on Sagaing on January 14. They made significant headway against the forward defenses of the 31st Division, with other units managing to secure a bridgehead at Ywathitgyi. General Katamura, concerned about the expanding bridgeheads established by the 19th Division across the Irrawaddy River, ordered the 15th and 53rd Divisions to neutralize these positions before they could become fortified. As a result, during the last week of January, the Japanese forces executed a series of coordinated night attacks on Kyaukmyaung. By this time, British-Indian troops had dug in deeply, supported by formidable artillery and machine-gun positions. The ensuing conflict was marked by brutal carnage, with the 15th Division suffering a staggering loss of one-third of its personnel, while the 53rd Division was compelled to withdraw to Kyaukse after incurring heavy casualties. In parallel, the 89th Brigade successfully occupied Pauk on January 28, as General Messervy's forces geared up for a decisive push towards Meiktila. Looking northward, General Sultan was also advancing his own offensive aimed at reopening the Burma Road to China. He ordered the 50th Chinese Division to move towards Lashio and deployed the Mars Task Force to Hosi. Additionally, he dispatched the 36th British Division towards Mongmit, although the British advance was expected to be slow until additional forces could be brought into alignment for a more coordinated effort. General Sun's newly established 1st Army initiated a delayed offensive against Namhkam, which resumed in early January. This resurgence was marked by the 90th Regiment's strategic capture of the hill that overlooks the southwestern entrance to the Shweli River valley. Concurrently, the 112th Regiment advanced through Loiwing, subsequently crossing the river to approach Namhkam from the northeast. Meanwhile, the 88th Regiment entered the valley via the main road, making a direct push across the small plain toward Namhkam. The 89th and 114th Regiments executed a broader maneuver around the southern end of the Shweli valley; the 89th crossed the river on January 7 and advanced northward toward Namhkam, while the 114th crossed three days later, navigating through the hills toward the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail. To the south, the 475th Regiment progressed through Mong Hkak and reached Mong Wi on January 6, preparing for another challenging march across the hilly terrain toward Hosi, with the 124th Cavalry Regiment following closely behind. So close is Tonkwa to the mountains that the 475th found the trail rising steeply on the 1st day's march east. Like a crazily twisted drill it bored its way farther east and ever higher. In some places it was 15 to 20 feet across; in others, just wide enough for a man and a mule. As they rounded the turns, the men would peer ahead and look out across the valleys to where lay row on row of hills. Trees were everywhere. In flat places carved by erosion, the Burmese had cut and farmed terraces, and little villages clung to the mountains like limpets to a rock. Because existing maps were unreliable, so that map reconnaissance could not locate water and bivouac areas, and because the sheer fatigue of climbing the steeper slopes was formidable, march schedules went down the mountain side, with quite a few steel helmets and an occasional mule. Halts were a matter of common sense leadership at platoon or company level. The march was tactical but no Japanese were encountered, though rumor of their nearness kept the men alert. The Chinese had passed that way before, while a screen of Kachin Rangers was preceding the American column. Speaking the local dialects and carrying radios and automatic weapons, the Kachins were an excellent screen which masked the MARS Task Force while reporting anything that might be suspicious. Despite the difficult march, crossing the 400-foot wide Shweli was not too hard. The bridge built by the Chinese some weeks before still stood, a triumph of Oriental ingenuity, with bundles of bamboo for pontons and vines for cable. The Shweli was beginning to tear it apart, but work parties from the 475th kept it operable.  Meanwhile, spurred into action by General Wedemeyer after a month of inactivity, General Wei's Y-Force finally resumed its offensive operations in late December. They promptly dispatched the 2nd, 6th, and 71st Armies to launch an assault on the forward positions of the 56th Division at Wanting. Simultaneously, the 53rd Army executed a wide flanking maneuver to the west, aiming to encircle and attack the Japanese forces from the rear. Faced with the intense pressure of this four-pronged offensive, General Matsuyama was compelled to withdraw the 148th Regiment to a position north of Mongyu. He also ordered the Yoshida Force to mount a counteroffensive toward Muse and committed the reserve 2nd Regiment to secure Namhpakka. On January 5, the 53rd Army reached the vicinity of Muse and began crossing the river; however, they were met with fierce resistance from Matsuyama's timely counterattack, which thwarted their advance. Ten days later, Sun's forces initiated a well-coordinated offensive against Namhkam, which ultimately succumbed on January 16 as the 55th Regiment retreated toward Khonung. With the Shweli Valley now firmly under Allied control, Matsuyama began to tighten his defensive perimeter in anticipation of a final withdrawal toward Hsenwi. On January 17, the Mars Task Force made significant progress by reaching the Hosi sector, where they immediately engaged Japanese outposts. The 475th Regiment successfully secured the advantageous high ground near Nawhkam village. Over the next two days, American forces clashed with the 4th Regiment, capturing the strategically important Loikang Ridge and the elevated terrain overlooking Namhpakka. On January 19, the Mars Task Force attempted to disrupt Japanese supply lines by blocking the Burma Road through demolition and artillery bombardment, coinciding with the arrival of the 55th Regiment, which was sent to bolster the defenders. In a parallel effort, the 114th Regiment managed to sever the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail at Loilawn on the same day. Faced with this escalating threat from the south and the intensifying Chinese assaults on Wanting, the 56th Division was compelled to further contract its defensive perimeter. As a result, Wanting fell on January 20. Fortunately for Matsuyama, General Wei received orders from the Generalissimo to conclude the Salween campaign immediately, which meant that the Chinese forces would remain in their positions until they could be relieved by Sultan's units. Over the course of nearly nine months of intense combat, Wei's Y-Force had successfully reoccupied an impressive 24,000 square miles of Chinese territory and had defeated one of the most elite divisions of the Japanese army, along with elements from two additional divisions. However, the fighting was far from over. Sun continued to dispatch the 112th and 113th Regiments toward Wanting and Mongyu, aiming to clear the final stretch of the road leading to China. Meanwhile, the 89th and 114th Regiments pressed eastward to cut off the Burma Road north of Namhpakka, further complicating the situation for the Japanese forces. In the southern region, from January 20 to January 24, the Mars Task Force continued its strategic operations, executing ambushes and demolition missions while successfully repelling several intense counterattacks from enemy forces. By late January, pressure by MARS Task Force and that of the Chinese forces in the north began to register on the Japanese. The soldiers of the 4th Regiment could see the aerial activity that kept MARS supplied. Not recognizing what they saw, they were so impressed by a big supply drop on the 24th that they sent a report to the 56th Division of a large airborne force being landed along the Burma Road. Accepting this report, General Matsuyama decided to destroy his ammunition and retreat south. His superiors on January 24 agreed to let him retreat, but only after he had evacuated casualties and ammunition. Forty vehicles with gasoline accompanied by a Major Kibino of the 33rd Army staff were sent north to support the 56th in its withdrawal. The Japanese truck convoy made its run north the night of January 24. The trucks were heard, and the Americans placed heavy fire on the road. Kibino had been making the trip in a tankette. Hit by a 4.2-inch mortar shell, it burst into flames clearly visible from the American lines. Kibino clambered out, jumped on a truck, and succeeded in getting his convoy through to the 56th Division. Next day the derelict tankette was credited to the 2nd Battalion, 475th Regiment. But  Encouraged by the additional supplies of gasoline and inspired by the heroic examples of Major Kibino and the personnel of the truck companies, the 56th Division renewed its efforts and, during the next four days effected the evacuation of over 1000 casualties and moved several tons of ammunition to Hsenwi.  Meanwhile, General Matsuyama began to systematically reposition his forces toward Namhpakka, a strategic maneuver that would enable Chinese troops to occupy Mongyu on January 27. In a broader context, by the end of January, the 36th and 50th Divisions were also engaged in crossing the Shweli River, preparing to advance their offensives further southward. In the Arakan region, Operation Romulus exceeded expectations. The 1st Battalion of the 111th Regiment had been defending Akyab. On December 31, as the rear guard of the Sakura Detachment crossed the Kaladan River and moved eastward the Battalion was ordered to withdraw to Ponnagyun. As intelligence suggested very few Japanese were left on Akyab island, a recce aeroplane reported the locals showing no anxiety and on January 2 messages were dropped in Urdu and Burmese asking them to sit on the ground if the island was still occupied or stand with their hands in the air if not. Captain Jimmy Jarrett of ‘C' Flight, 656 AOP Squadron, then landed to a rousing reception and found the Japanese had quit on December 31, although nobody believed him until a senior officer flew in to confirm it. This prompted General Christison to swiftly initiate an amphibious invasion. Notably, this operation was executed without the anticipated naval bombardment and without deploying the reserve 26th Indian Division. As a result, the 3rd Commando Brigade successfully captured Akyab on January 3, facing no resistance, and the 25th Indian Division soon followed, reinforcing the area. From Akyab, the 9th York and Lancasters were transported by boat to establish a strategic blockade along the Yo River at Ponnagyun. There, they encountered significant Japanese forces. After a fierce engagement, however, the Japanese defenders were compelled to retreat toward Myohaung by January 11. In response to the evolving situation, Admiral Mountbatten devised a plan to land the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 25th Division on the Myebon Peninsula. This operation aimed to sever the primary lines of communication for Japanese forces, while preparations were made for the 26th Division to conduct a landing on Ramree Island. In response to the urgent military situation, Operation Passport was swiftly conceived and executed on January 12. British-Indian forces successfully landed at the southern tip of the peninsula, supported by both air and naval operations. Once ashore, the commandos advanced inland, facing intense resistance from fortified hill positions. Their efforts culminated in the capture of Pagoda Hill and the village of Myebon. However, as they pushed forward, opposition intensified, making it increasingly difficult for the British-Indian troops to reach Hill 831. Simultaneously, the 82nd West African Division, now commanded by Major-General Hugh Stockwell, entered the Kaladan Valley to relieve the 81st Division, which had been engaged in combat for over a year. The West African forces began to apply pressure against the Matsu Detachment units stationed at Myohaung and Minbya, although these Japanese forces managed to maintain their positions despite the mounting assaults. Meanwhile, planning was underway for the deployment of the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 51st Indian Brigade to land at Kangaw, coinciding with General Lomax's invasion of Ramree Island.  Early on January 21 the naval bombardment group opened fire. Christison and the other Force Commanders were watching through field glasses from the bridge of HMS Queen Elizabeth in her first engagement since the Dardanelles in 1915. Christison later said: ‘Some shells fell on a marsh behind the Jap defences, and I saw a number of duck spring up. “Duck”, I shouted. “The Royal Navy never ducks”, said the Admiral.' With her second salvo Queen Elizabeth scored a direct hit on the Japanese ammunition depot, which facilitated the landing operations. The 71st Indian Brigade successfully captured Kyaukpyu with minimal resistance. This victory enabled them to advance toward Minbyin and Kyaupyauk, both of which fell into their hands by January 23. In the subsequent days, the brigade continued its advance toward the Yanbauk Chaung, where they encountered fierce Japanese defenses. At the same time, other elements of the division worked to secure Cheduba and Sagu Kyun Islands, further consolidating their strategic position in the region. On January 22, the commandos and the 51st Brigade successfully landed in the Kangaw area near the Min River. However, they faced violent and frequent counterattacks from Japanese forces, which hindered their ability to expand their beachhead. Despite these challenges, the intense pressure from the commandos ultimately forced the Japanese defenders at Hill 831, Myohaung, and Minbya to retreat toward Kani, marking a significant shift in the operational landscape. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite heavy resistance and casualties. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian troops advanced, seizing key locations despite heavy resistance. Both fronts faced intense combat, leading to significant territorial gains against Japanese forces by the end of January.

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Luzon. As Operation Mike 1 commenced, General Swift's 1st Corps prepared to assault Lingayen Gulf while General Griswold's 14th Corps rehearsed at Huon Gulf. Despite successful diversionary strikes, Japanese forces anticipated an invasion. On January 2, enemy ships were spotted heading towards Luzon, confirming fears of a large-scale operation. Kamikaze attacks intensified, damaging Allied vessels, including the USS Long, which sank after being hit. Amidst bombardments, Filipino citizens demonstrated resilience despite the destruction, reflecting their loyalty and hope during the turmoil. As dawn broke on January 9, Kinkaid's amphibious convoys approached Lingayen Gulf, initiating a fierce assault. Preceded by heavy bombardments, American forces landed on the beaches, facing minimal resistance. The 14th Corps advanced toward key locations, while the 1st Corps secured strategic positions despite enduring sniper fire. By nightfall, they established a significant beachhead. Despite sporadic Japanese counterattacks, American troops pressed forward, and reinforcements were deployed to maintain momentum. The stage was set for a crucial campaign in Luzon. This episode is the South China Sea Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, the 1st and 14th Corps had just successfully established a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf. On January 11, General Krueger further reinforced his position by landing additional reserves, aiming to effectively confront the formidable enemy forces entrenched in the eastern hills. Concurrently, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet units made their entrance into the South China Sea to execute an ambitious raid known as Operation Gratitude. This operation was prompted by misleading intelligence reports suggesting that the hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. In response, Halsey ordered Admiral Bogan's Task Group 38.2 to launch an assault on these supposed targets. This task group was primarily composed of the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin, which were directed to bombard the bay and eliminate any Japanese vessels that had sustained damage from prior airstrikes. To enhance their operational capabilities, Halsey established Task Group 38.5, specifically designed for night operations, which included the night-capable carriers Enterprise and Independence. On January 12, aircraft from these carriers were deployed for a predawn reconnaissance mission over Cam Ranh Bay and its adjacent waters in search of enemy targets. Despite their efforts, the search yielded no results, indicating that the earlier intelligence had been inaccurate. Nevertheless, all three carrier groups proceeded with their planned strikes at 07:30, while the surface action group advanced toward Cam Ranh. Halsey's strategic gamble proved to be remarkably successful. Although the Ise and Hyuga were not present in the bay, American aviators discovered a wealth of enemy shipping, including three significant Japanese convoys. Sherman's TG 38.3 encountered the most valuable target off Qui Nhon north of Cam Ranh. This was convoy Hi-86 with nine merchants and a heavy escort. The convoy had departed Cape St Jacques on January 9 and was headed north. The escort comprised light cruiser Kashii and five kaibokan. Late on January 11, it reached Qui Nhon Bay and anchored. After leaving Qui Nhon Bay, it was discovered by TG 38.3. In two large attacks, aircraft from Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley, and San Jacinto laid waste to the convoy. None of the nine merchant ships in the convoy survived this onslaught. Cargo ships Yoshu Maru and Eiman Maru (loaded with bauxite and raw rubber), along with tanker San Luis Maru, were sunk. The other six ships were damaged and forced to beach. Otsusan Maru (a cargo ship converted to tanker), passenger-cargo ship Tatebe Maru, cargo ship Kyokuun Maru, cargo ship Yusei Maru, ore carrier Tatsubato Maru, and cargo ship Banshu Maru No. 63 all became constructive total losses. The escort for this large convoy met a similar fate. Light cruiser Kashii was hit amidships by a torpedo in the early afternoon. This was followed by two bomb hits aft that detonated her depth-charge magazine. Kashii sank stern first with 621 members of her crew; only 19 survived. CD-23 was attacked north of Qui Nhon and sunk with her entire crew of 155 officers and men. CD-51 suffered the same fate. After she blew up and sank, her depth charges detonated with fatal consequences for any survivors; 159 men were lost. From the entire convoy, only kaibokans Daito and Ukuru, and corvette CD-27 survived, albeit in a damaged state. As a result, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 conducted an impressive total of 984 strike missions throughout the day. This relentless assault led to the sinking of the light cruiser Kashii, two minesweepers, eight kaibokans, two subchasers, five transport ships, fourteen cargo vessels, and nine oilers. Additionally, four kaibokans, one subchaser, three transports, four cargo ships, and two oilers were damaged. This operation marked the highest number of ships sunk by airstrikes in a single day during the war, showcasing the effectiveness of the American air campaign and the critical role of intelligence in naval warfare. In addition to inflicting significant damage on Japanese shipping, the aviators under Admiral Halsey achieved remarkable success by claiming the destruction of 113 enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground, while sustaining the loss of 23 American aircraft. The impact of these operations extended beyond aerial engagements; critical infrastructure was also targeted. Airfields, docks, and oil storage facilities located between Tourane and Saigon suffered considerable damage. Notably, the railway station in Nha Trang and a vital bridge on the route connecting Saigon to Bien Hoa were also affected, disrupting transportation and supply lines.   Meanwhile, Bogan's surface strike group was unable to locate any Japanese vessels during their operations and instead focused their firepower on bombarding Cam Ranh Bay, further demonstrating the ongoing conflict's intensity. Turning to the situation in Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps were poised to advance their offensives. To the west, the 185th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop initiated a push toward the recently vacated Port Sual. The 160th Regiment maintained a watchful presence at Aguilar, while patrols from the 148th Regiment ventured into towns occupied by guerrilla forces, specifically Urbiztondo and Bayambang. In the eastern sector, the 6th Division was temporarily held back to prevent the creation of a potentially hazardous gap along the front of the 1st Corps. However, the reinforced 43rd Division continued its advance against the most formidable Japanese defenses encountered on Luzon to date. Along the coastline, the 158th Regiment dispatched patrols into Damortis, discovering the town largely deserted. The 172nd Regiment attempted an attack on Hill 580, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, while the 63rd Regiment was deployed to close the widening gap between the 158th and 172nd Regiments. The primary objective of these coordinated efforts was to defeat Major-General Sato Bunzo's 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and secure control of the Damortis-Rosario road. The Damortis-Rosario road, a 2-lane, concrete-paved section of Route 3, led east from the junction of Route 3 and the coast road at Damortis, about 8 miles north of San Fabian, to the junction of Routes 3 and 11, 8 miles inland and a mile east of Rosario. Seizure of the Damortis-Rosario stretch of Route 3 would present 1st Corps with an easy means of access to Route 11, in turn providing a 2-lane asphalt-paved axis of advance toward Baguio along the deep valley of the Bued River. Equally important, if the 1st Corps could quickly gain control over the Damortis-Rosario road and the Routes 3-11 junction, the corps could largely overcome the threat of counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. The Damortis-Rosario road ran sometimes across wooded ravines and sometimes over ridge tops for 3/4 of the way to Rosario, and then continued across open farm land and through Rosario to a junction with Route 11. The road was dominated by broken ridges and steep-sided hills to both the north and the south for the first 5 miles inland. South of the road the hills and ridges were grass-covered; to the north many of the draws and ravines contained thick scrub growth. Bare, steep heights north, northeast, and east of Rosario controlled the Routes 3-11 junction. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, defending the Damortis-Rosario road, had all the advantages of observation, while the relatively soft rock and dirt mixture of the hills and ridges gave the brigade ample opportunity to indulge in what was soon to appear to the 1st Corps as the Japanese Army's favorite occupation--digging caves and tunnels. Achieving this would mitigate the threat of a counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. With the security of its left flank assured, the 14th Corps could then accelerate its advance toward General Krueger's main objective: the Central Plains-Manila Bay region. This strategic maneuvering was crucial for consolidating American forces and ensuring a successful campaign in the Philippines. At the same time, the 169th Regiment faced ongoing challenges at Hill 318 and the southern part of the Japanese-held third ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment made unsuccessful attempts to advance toward the Hill 200 complex, which was firmly defended by the 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment. Meanwhile, General Tominaga executed his final large-scale kamikaze attack during the Philippines Campaign, successfully damaging two destroyer escorts, one destroyer transport, and five merchant ships. The final attacks were recorded on January 13. Only two suicide aircraft were dispatched, both IJA Ki-84 Franks. One surprised the crew of escort carrier Salamaua. Unengaged by antiaircraft fire, the Frank hit amidships. One of the aircraft's bombs exploded on the hangar deck and the second passed through the ship creating a hole near the waterline. The carrier was left without power while major fires took hold. Damage control was ultimately successful, but not before 15 were killed and 88 wounded. Salamaua was out of the war until April. Also on this day, attack transport Zeilin was hit by a probable IJN aircraft conducting an impromptu suicide attack. Ultimately, the 4th Air Army was scheduled to evacuate to Formosa on January 15, marking the end of the threat from Japanese air power in the Philippines, although the Allies were not yet aware of this. Since the initial kamikaze assault on the Mindoro-bound convoys on December 13, Japanese aircraft had sunk 24 vessels and damaged 67 others. Casualties from these air attacks aboard ships were approximately 1,230 men killed and 1,800 wounded, while the Allies estimated they had destroyed around 600 Japanese aircraft during the same timeframe. Back in Lingayen Gulf on January 13, the 172nd Regiment once again advanced up the grassy, steep slopes of Hill 580, successfully securing most of the area against fierce resistance. Simultaneously, the 63rd Regiment attacked north from Hill 247 and captured Hill 363, despite lacking artillery support. Artillery support was to have been provided by the 43rd Division's 155-mm. howitzer battalion, the 192nd Field Artillery Battalion, since the 63rd Regiment's own 105-mm. battalion had been sent south with the rest of the 6th Division. Unfortunately, the 192nd Field Artillery did not learn it was to support the 63rd until after dark on January 12, and could not start moving to good close support positions until daylight on the 13th, after the 63rd had started its attack. Unlike a 105-mm. battalion, the 192nd did not normally operate in direct support roles and lacked the forward observers and communications the lighter battalions possessed. The 192nd might therefore have been expected to take some time to prepare for its direct support mission, but the battalion reported it could have provided some support--with at least one battery--by noon on the 13th had not Colonel Ralph C. Holliday, commanding the 63rd Regiment, insisted that wire be laid for artillery liaison officers and forward observers, a job that was not completed for almost 36 hours. Colonel Holliday may have been influenced in his decision by the fact that the artillery's SCR-610 radio did not work efficiently in the broken terrain of the middle ridge line where the 63rd was attacking. It was not, indeed, until the 43rd Division had supplied the 192nd Field Artillery with infantry SCR-300 sets that the battalion was able to establish satisfactory radio communications. Then, on January 14, the first radio brought up to the battalion's forward observers was promptly destroyed by Japanese artillery, which also cut wire that had already been laid. Support was again delayed, so the entire battalion was not in position and ready to give the 63rd Regiment the support it needed until midafternoon on January 15. Meanwhile the 169th Regiment completed the clearing of the southern end of the ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment continued its unsuccessful efforts to take Hill 200. To the west, the 6th Division established a fortified line extending from Malasiqui to Manaoag. They promptly dispatched reconnaissance units to the east and south to gather intelligence on enemy movements. The 185th Regiment achieved a significant victory by successfully assaulting Port Sual, while the 160th Regiment engaged in several skirmishes with the reinforced 23rd Reconnaissance Regiment, which had retreated from Port Sual at the onset of the conflict. Meanwhile, patrols from the 148th Regiment advanced into Wawa, strategically located between Bayambang and Urbiztondo. The following day, the 185th Regiment continued its momentum by capturing the crucial road junction town of Alaminos on the Bolinao Peninsula. Some of its elements also pushed northward toward Cabalitan Bay, where they discovered that Allied Naval Forces had already landed to establish a seaplane base, enhancing their operational capabilities in the region. Looking to the east, the 103rd Regiment made gradual but consistent progress along Hill 200, while the 169th Regiment executed a costly frontal assault to clear Hill 318, suffering significant casualties in the process. The 172nd Regiment advanced north along the third ridge, successfully seizing Hill 565 despite facing scattered resistance. The 63rd Regiment continued its slow advance northward, persistently harassed by Japanese artillery and mortar fire, which impeded their progress. Additionally, the 158th Regiment initiated an offensive toward Rosario but was quickly compelled to retreat due to intense Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire. In contrast, General Yamashita, while cautious about launching a major counteroffensive, recognized the necessity of limited offensive actions to regain the initiative. He believed that such actions would effectively disrupt the enemy's advance inland. Consequently, he ordered General Nishiyama's 23rd Division to conduct a robust raiding attack against the San Fabian-Alacan sector during the night of January 16. This strategic decision aimed to exploit the element of surprise and inflict damage on the enemy forces, thereby buying time for his troops to regroup and fortify their positions. In a strategic initiative aimed at maximizing the destruction of enemy weaponry, supplies, and critical base installations, the 58th Brigade, along with the 71st and 72nd Regiments, was instructed to assemble specialized "suicide" raiding units. These units comprised carefully selected soldiers, heavily armed with automatic firearms and supported by demolition teams trained for explosive operations. In addition, a fourth unit was to be formed from the Shigemi Detachment of the 2nd Armored Division, which had recently positioned itself on the southern flank of the 23rd Division. This unit would consist of a mobile infantry company and a medium tank company. The operational plan called for these units to breach the enemy's beachhead perimeter simultaneously at various locations on January 17. Their objective was to swiftly execute their missions and then withdraw to safety. As preparations for this limited counteroffensive unfolded, the American forces continued their own offensive operations, which had commenced on January 15. In this context, the 158th Regiment launched an eastward assault, successfully advancing approximately 1,000 yards. Meanwhile, the 63rd Regiment cautiously pushed forward over a mile and a half northward from Hill 363. The 172nd Regiment made a rapid advance to the Cataguintingan road junction, effectively establishing a battalion at the edge of Route 3, about a mile and a half west of Rosario. In contrast, the 169th Regiment encountered challenges during a two-pronged attack on Hill 355, leading General Wing to order the regiment to bypass the hill to the south and reposition overland to Route 3 at barrio Palacpalac. Conversely, the 103rd Regiment achieved significant success in their assault on the Hill 200 complex. Further to the west, patrols from the 185th Regiment advanced westward, successfully reaching Dasol Bay. Additionally, a battalion from the 129th Regiment crossed the Agno River at Wawa and continued south along a dusty gravel road toward Camiling. Other elements of the 160th Regiment also moved down from Aguilar to Camiling, consolidating their position in the area. After completing refueling operations over the previous days, Task Force 38 resumed its northern advance to launch an assault on Formosa on January 15. Despite Admiral McCain's recommendation to cancel the strike due to inclement weather conditions, Admiral Halsey opted to proceed with the operation. As a result, a series of airstrikes were executed against Formosa and the Pescadores Islands throughout the day. The 16 fighter sweeps conducted during this operation managed to destroy only 16 Japanese aircraft in the air and an additional 18 on the ground. However, the bombing missions targeting enemy shipping proved more effective, leading to the sinking of the destroyers Hatakaze and Tsuga, along with one transport vessel and two merchant ships, albeit at the cost of losing 12 American aircraft. Following these strikes, Task Force 38 redirected its course toward Hong Kong, which came under attack on January 16. Unfortunately, the American forces encountered severe weather conditions and faced intense anti-aircraft fire. This resulted in a limited success, with the Americans sinking just one transport ship, five oilers, one cargo vessel, and one guardboat. Additionally, they inflicted damage on the destroyer Hasu, three destroyer escorts, one corvette, one transport, and one oiler. The strikes also caused significant destruction to key infrastructure, including Kai Tak Airport, the Kowloon and Taikoo docks, the Aberdeen dockyard, the Kowloon-Canton railway, and the Macau Naval Aviation Center. In a broader campaign, the Americans executed secondary strikes against Canton and Hainan Island, as well as targeting several airfields along the Chinese coast, particularly between the Leizhou Peninsula and Swatow. However, this ambitious operation came at a steep cost, with Task Force 38 suffering a total loss of 49 aircraft—27 due to operational issues and 22 as a result of enemy action. With the South China Sea Raid concluded, Admiral Halsey directed his fleet toward the Luzon Strait, adhering to Admiral Nimitz's request. Ultimately, Halsey's aggressive campaign resulted in the destruction of approximately 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping and an estimated 615 Japanese aircraft, all at the expense of 201 American planes. Returning to the Lingayen Gulf, Wing's offensive operations persisted on January 16. The 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments continued their assaults toward the town of Rosario. However, they encountered fierce resistance from the determined Japanese defenders, which significantly hampered their progress. In contrast, the 169th Regiment achieved a notable advancement by reaching Palacpalac, while the 103rd Regiment successfully captured the strategically important Hill 200 complex. From their newly secured positions, elements of the 103rd Regiment pursued the retreating Japanese forces toward Pozorrubio. Meanwhile, two reinforced companies advanced toward Potpot, and both towns ultimately fell into American hands on January 17. In a broader strategic context, General Krueger directed General Griswold to dispatch additional troops south of the Agno River in preparation for a decisive push toward Manila. By January 17, the 14th Corps had established outposts at key locations including Moncada, Nampicuan, Anao, and Paniqui, solidifying their control over the area. Simultaneously, Japanese General Nishiyama was preparing to initiate a local counteroffensive by nightfall on January 16. However, the 72nd Regiment's raiding unit was unable to participate due to enemy penetrations disrupting their plans. On the northern front, Sato's raiding unit conducted a minor raid against an artillery position held by the 158th Regiment, but this attack proved largely inconsequential. In contrast, the raiding unit from the 71st Regiment executed a more impactful maneuver by advancing down the Bued River valley. They successfully infiltrated the rear installations of the 172nd Regiment, where they ignited a gasoline dump, damaging several trucks in the process. This raid resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and injuries to eight others. At Palacpalac, confusion reigned as the retreating 2nd Battalion of the 64th Regiment inadvertently engaged with the perimeter of the 1st Battalion of the 169th Regiment. This chaotic encounter cost the Japanese approximately 100 men before they retreated in disarray, further illustrating the tumultuous nature of the battlefield. In a dramatic turn of events, the tank raiding unit launched a surprise attack on the newly established outpost at Potpot. Initially, the first two tanks managed to breach the perimeter, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire in all directions as they sped away down the road toward Manaoag. However, the remaining tanks, along with their infantry support, encountered fierce resistance from determined defenders, leading to a sharp and intense fire fight that lasted two hours. Despite their initial success, the attackers were ultimately repelled. As dawn broke, the two tanks that had previously penetrated the defenses returned down the Manaoag road, but this time they met their demise, successfully destroyed by the defenders who had regrouped and fortified their positions. Since the onset of the invasion, the 1st Corps had suffered significant casualties, with approximately 220 men killed and 660 wounded. In stark contrast, Griswold's forces experienced far lighter losses, with only 30 killed and 90 wounded. With the enemy's counterattack thwarted, the 43rd Division managed to secure positions that effectively reduced the likelihood of another large-scale surprise offensive from the Japanese forces. However, to completely eliminate the remaining threats, Commander Wing recognized the necessity of securing control over the Rosario junction and establishing a solid hold on Route 3 to the south of this critical point. The challenge was considerable, as Japanese artillery, mortars, and machine guns positioned on the surrounding high ground commanded all approaches to Rosario. Consequently, Wing had no choice but to restrict the 172nd Regiment to a defensive holding action on its left flank while directing its right flank to seize the high ground immediately to the north and northwest of Rosario. In addition, the 63rd and 158th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the enemy stronghold along the Rosario-Damortis road. To expedite the capture of the road junction, Wing also planned for the 103rd and 169th Regiments to launch an offensive drive north along Route 3. This coordinated effort aimed to strengthen their strategic position and diminish the Japanese threat in the region, ultimately paving the way for a more secure and stable front. In response to the evolving battlefield situation, General Krueger ultimately ordered General Mullins' 25th Division to secure the right flank previously held by Wing's forces. This strategic move prompted the 27th and 161st Regiments to begin the process of relieving the 103rd and 169th Regiments. By doing so, the 6th Division would be able to resume its advance, now directed towards Urdaneta and the Cabaruan Hills, critical areas for the ongoing campaign. To the west, Krueger aimed to maintain the 14th Corps along the Agno River line until General Swift's 1st Corps could effectively neutralize the enemy resistance stretching from Damortis to Urdaneta. This would enable Swift's forces to maneuver southward alongside Griswold's corps. However, General MacArthur was eager to initiate a southern advance toward Manila as soon as possible. Consequently, he instructed the 14th Corps to reposition its main forces back to their previous outpost line south of the Agno by January 20. Following this, the corps was to launch an offensive towards Tarlac and Victoria. Once they established a presence along the Tarlac-Victoria line, the corps would prepare to advance toward Clark Field, a vital objective necessary for the successful neutralization of Japanese strongholds at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. To bolster this offensive, MacArthur also planned to deploy the 11th Corps on the western coast of Luzon, just north of the Bataan Peninsula. This amphibious operation aimed to disrupt Japanese defensive strategies in the Clark Field area, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of the Allied campaign. In contrast, in reaction to the loss of the Hill 200 complex, Japanese General Yamashita ordered the 2nd Tank Division to advance immediately into the Tayug sector. There, Lieutenant-General Iwanaka Yoshiharu would take command of the 10th Division forces already stationed in the region. The armored units were tasked with positioning themselves along the trail north of San Nicolas and on both sides of the Ambayabang River, with the objective of containing any potential enemy advances to the east. Additionally, the Shigemi Detachment received orders to move its main forces from San Manuel to Binalonan, where they were to defend the town resolutely, prepared to hold their ground against any assault. In addition, General Okamoto was tasked with positioning his main forces to secure the immediate approaches to San Jose. Meanwhile, General Tsuda's 105th Division was instructed to advance northward through Cabanatuan as quickly as possible to establish defensive positions behind the 10th Division, specifically at Minuli and north of Carranglan. However, not all of these strategic plans could be effectively executed. By January 17, Yamashita discovered that the Villa Verde Trail was impassable for tanks and trucks, rendering it unusable for the planned armored movements. Furthermore, the terrain in the Tayug-San Nicolas area proved to be unsuitable for armored operations, complicating the situation further. On January 17 the 14th Area Army commander belatedly learned that the 10th Division had never concentrated at San Jose and that it had made no real effort to dispose itself along the entire Tayug-Umingan-Lupao-San Jose defense line for which it was responsible. General Okamoto, the division commander, had decided that he did not have sufficient strength to hold the relatively open ground assigned to him. Most of his 39th Regiment was with the Kembu Group; the bulk of the 10th Regiment, greatly understrength, was attached to the 103rd Division for the defense of northern Luzon; and, at least as late as of January 15, he had received no word as to when he might expect the attached Tsuda Detachment to arrive in the San Jose area from the east coast. He had therefore withdrawn most of his troops up Route 5 from San Jose and had started disposing them along the line Yamashita had intended the 105th Division to hold; leaving behind only a reinforced infantry company and two artillery battalions to secure the all-important railhead. Okamoto had directed the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment to remain in the San Nicolas area, and he stationed three or four rifle companies of his 63rd Regiment along the Tayug-Lupao line and in rising ground to the southwest. Confronted with these unexpected developments, Yamashita concluded that he had no choice but to accept the redeployment of the 10th Division as an established fact. Consequently, he ordered the 2nd Tank Division, which had already begun its movement toward Tayug, to concentrate its main forces southeast of Tayug to safeguard the immediate approaches to San Jose. Additionally, the 6th Tank Regiment was assigned to position itself in Muñoz to cover the southwestern approach to the area. To further bolster defenses, Tsuda was instructed to deploy two of his five advance battalions to San Jose. However, as these tactical adjustments were being made, it became necessary to shift focus away from Luzon and turn attention toward Leyte, where the final operations on the island were unfolding. It is important to note that the majority of General Suzuki's forces had successfully retreated to the Villaba-Mount Canguipot region, although some strong elements remained isolated further to the east. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army assuming control of the island, American forces commenced the final phase of operations to secure Leyte, methodically working to eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance. From January 1 to February 15, the 11th Airborne Division conducted patrols in the Burauen area, where they engaged and successfully eliminated a well-entrenched enemy force positioned on the southern slopes of Mount Majunag. Meanwhile, the 96th Division carried out extensive patrols in the eastern mountainous regions before taking over from the 11th Airborne Division. In the southern part of the island, the 7th Division launched numerous patrols and deployed a reinforced battalion that effectively neutralized all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. Additionally, the 77th Division focused on clearing various pockets of enemy resistance located in northwestern Leyte. By late January, the Americal Division arrived to assist in the cleanup operations in Samar and Leyte, a mission that was successfully completed by February 24, with support from the 1st Filipino Regiment. However, during this time, Japanese General Suzuki was formulating his strategy for Operation Chi-Go. This operation involved the amphibious movement of several military units to different islands within the Visayas using large motorized landing barges. Suzuki's initial plan entailed deploying the majority of the 1st Division to establish a garrison on Cebu Island, while the headquarters of the 35th Army was to relocate to Davao. This strategic move would enable him to take direct command of military operations on Mindanao. Following this, he intended to dispatch the 41st and 77th Regiments to Mindanao, assign the 26th Division to the Bacolod area on Negros Island, and send the 5th Regiment along with units from the 102nd Division to Cebu. Furthermore, the 16th Division and the 68th Brigade, commanded by General Makino, were to remain in Leyte to engage in guerrilla warfare tactics.  The 102nd Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of 40 to 50 deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with General Fukei, the commanding general of the 102nd Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukei was planning to evacuate to Cebu. Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukei "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He therefore ordered Fukei to remain at Leyte. Fukei did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukei and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukei, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. The sequel to these events was that Suzuki relieved Fukei of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukei was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. Suzuki asked IGHQ in Tokyo for authority to court-martial Fukei but no reply was forthcoming. In the end, Fukei was released and later returned to command of the 102nd Division. In the midst of ongoing military operations, Suzuki implemented measures to ensure that the forces stationed on Leyte could sustain themselves. He instructed his troops to make the most of local resources by utilizing available food and materials. This included directives to cultivate sweet potatoes and Indian corn, with the hope of sourcing all necessary provisions from the surrounding areas outside their operational base. However, the Japanese forces faced significant challenges due to relentless American air raids and mop-up operations, which severely hindered their ability to procure supplies. The hostile environment made it difficult for them to plant and harvest the crops they had intended to grow. Despite these obstacles, the Japanese managed to capitalize on the conclusion of the harvest season. They were able to secure substantial amounts of food that had been stored by local Filipinos, including a considerable quantity of coconuts and sweet potatoes. By early January, the 1st Division began its gradual movement toward Cebu, successfully transporting around 800 men to the island by mid-January. Unfortunately, the situation worsened as enemy PT boats established a stringent sea blockade, rendering maritime transportation impractical until mid-March. This blockade left approximately 2,000 men from the 1st Division, along with other units of the 35th Army, stranded on Leyte. Simultaneously, the Imahori Detachment, alongside the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the 77th Regiment, advanced to the southern Matag-ob area and subsequently moved toward Villaba, reaching their destination in early February. The majority of the 26th Division also made progress, arriving in the region north of Ormoc in mid-January before commencing a northwestward movement. By February, they successfully established contact with the rest of the 35th Army. Meanwhile, the remnants of the 16th Division could only reach the Valencia area in February, where they would remain until the end of the month. For the foreseeable future, the Japanese units left behind on Leyte faced the daunting task of defending against the advancing Americal Division and the 1st Filipino Regiment, which were steadily gaining ground.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting Japanese shipping. Despite misleading intel, they decimated enemy convoys, showcasing the effectiveness of airstrikes and securing strategic advances in Luzon. American forces advanced through Luzon while Task Force 38 struck Formosa and Hong Kong. Despite fierce Japanese resistance and challenging weather, the Allies steadily gained ground, though both sides suffered significant losses in the campaign.

Last time we spoke about the Aitape-Wewak Campaign. General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro, establishing airfields to support operations on Luzon. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army and General Krueger's 6th Army poised to capture Lingayen Gulf, guerrilla forces on Luzon provided crucial intelligence. As plans for the Luzon invasion solidified, General Yamashita prepared defenses, predicting an assault between January 10 and 20. Despite dwindling resources, he aimed to delay the enemy's advance. Meanwhile, Allied forces readied for a swift amphibious attack to secure Manila and restore the Philippine government. In December, Australian forces established outposts at Yasile and Yambes, successfully repelling Japanese attacks. After fierce clashes, they advanced 40 miles along the coast. Meanwhile, the U.S. military bolstered defenses in Saipan and launched bombing raids on Japanese facilities, achieving mixed results. Despite heavy losses, they began to impact Japanese production capabilities. As the month ended, the Japanese launched a final assault on the Marianas, but the Allies continued their strategic advances, setting the stage for future operations. This episode is the Invasion of Luzon Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with the plans for Operation Mike 1 being finished. General Swift's 1st Corps was ready to land on the eastern beaches of Lingayen Gulf, while General Griswold's 14th Corps prepared to go ashore on the western beaches. Additionally, successful diversionary operations had been conducted on Mindoro, and Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 executed several moderately successful strikes against Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands in early January. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps elements staging at New Britain completed loading on 10 December; those mounting at Bougainville finished two days later. On the 17th all groups of the III Amphibious Force rendezvoused at Huon Gulf, eastern New Guinea, to rehearse the Lingayen assault. General Griswold felt that the 37th Division's rehearsal was satisfactory but had much fault to find with the 40th Division, remarking upon a "general failure to observe the spirit of the rehearsal." As a result, further training was conducted at Manus Island in the Admiralties, where the convoy reassembled on 22 December. On December 27, Admiral Wilkinson dispatched his LSTs and LSMs, followed by the remainder of Task Force 79 four days later. On the same day, Admiral Barbey's convoy, which included Major-General Leonard Wing's 43rd Division, loaded at Aitape before proceeding to Sansapor to load Major-General Edwin Patrick's 6th Division. Task Force 78 departed Sansapor on December 30, heading to a rendezvous point with other elements of Admiral Kinkaid's Luzon Attack Force. By January 4, all components of Task Force 77 had successfully gathered at Leyte Gulf, with MacArthur personally boarding the light cruiser Boise. Kinkaid's minesweepers, Admiral Oldendorf's Bombardment and Fire Support Group, and most of Admiral Durgin's escort carriers had already left the gulf on January 2 to conduct preliminary operations off Luzon. By January 6, the rest of the Luzon Attack Force began moving toward Lingayen Gulf, led by Admiral Berkey's light cruisers. As Mindoro-based aircraft significantly increased the intensity of their assaults during the last week of December—sinking seven transports and two escorts, and destroying over 140 aircraft. General Yamashita's tense and expectant forces were still racing against time to complete,their battle preparations when the first warnings came that the enemy was again on the move. At 1322 on 2 January, a naval lookout post on Surigao Strait reported that a long train of about 80 enemy ships, screened by destroyers, was moving through the strait into the Mindanao Sea. Other reports which followed immediately warned that large numbers of invasion craft were gathered in the Leyte, Palau and Marianas areas, and that enemy submarines had appeared in force off the west coast of Luzon. At first it was thought that the enemy convoy was merely a reinforcement and resupply group destined for Mindoro. On 3 January, however, developments began to point more conclusively toward a full-scale amphibious operation against Luzon. In the afternoon, just as the initially sighted enemy group passed into the Sulu Sea, a large enemy naval task force, including 12 escort carriers, four battleships and eight cruisers, was reported following in its wake through Surigao Strait. Another delayed report stated that an enemy transport convoy of 90 ships, under strong naval escort, had been spotted the previous day northwest of Palau, heading in the direction of Leyte Gulf. General Yamashita grew concerned that a large-scale amphibious operation against Luzon was imminent. Consequently, he decided to relocate his headquarters to Baguio. These concerns were validated in early January when Japanese lookouts spotted Kinkaid's warships and transports approaching the island. In response, General Tominaga ordered aggressive kamikaze attacks on the Allied vessels, with a major assault on January 4 causing severe damage to the escort carrier Ommaney Bay, which ultimately had to be scuttled. The following day, Japanese attacks persisted, damaging two escort carriers, two cruisers, and three destroyers, among other ships. In retaliation, Durgin's carrier aircraft launched strikes on Manila Bay, successfully sinking the destroyer Momi and damaging the Hinoki. On January 6, McCain's carriers joined the effort, with American pilots tasked with targeting air facilities at Manila and Clark Field. Despite adverse weather conditions limiting the effectiveness of the strike, they succeeded in sinking one transport and six oilers, as well as destroying 32 Japanese aircraft. Meanwhile, as Oldendorf's warships commenced their bombardment and minesweeping operations, kamikaze attacks continued. The destroyer minesweeper USS Long (DD-209/DMS-12) missed the attack on Pearl Harbor by about two days, but then immediately started anti-submarine patrols and escort missions. Its long trajectory in the Pacific War saw it make escort runs to Midway, Palmyra and Canton; participate in the invasions of Amchitka, Attu and Kiska in Alaskan waters; escort reinforcements to Roi and Namur in the Marshalls; participate in the invasions of the Admiralties, Hollandia, Saipan and Palau; and be one of the first vessels to enter into Leyte Gulf back in October. During the invasion of Lingayen Gulf, Long began mine sweeps on January 6, evading and firing upon Japanese aircraft as she carried out her intricate mission. Shortly after noon, beginning her second run, Long spotted two Zeros heading for her. Long went to 25 knots and opened fire, but a kamikaze crashed into her portside below the bridge about 1 foot above the waterline. With fires and explosions amidships, Long lost power and internal communications, and was unable to fight fires forward. Her commanding officer, Lieutenant Stanley Caplan, fearing an explosion in the forward magazine, gave permission for men trapped on the forecastle to leave the ship; but through a misunderstanding the crew abandoned ship. Later that afternoon a second plane attacked Long and exploded at the same spot, destroying the bridge and breaking the ship's back. Long finally capsized and sank the following morning. Alongside the Long, battleships California and New Mexico, along with the cruisers Columbia, Australia, and Louisville, five destroyers, another minesweeper, and one transport were damaged. Admiral Oldendorf was worried with good reason. Previously, kamikaze operations against his ships and those of other naval commands, though dangerous, had generally been executed by relatively untrained pilots who had taken few precautions to avoid detection and anti-aircraft fire and who often appeared to be flying partially damaged, lightly armored planes carrying little ordnance. In January the kamikazes had been operating in a far different manner. There was now a definite program of kamikaze operations, for the vast majority of the perhaps 100 Japanese aircraft that had attacked the forces under Admiral Oldendorf's command since January 2 had at least attempted kamikaze crashes. In addition, the pilots seemed to be more skilled. They took every advantage of radar-blanketing terrain, especially in the Lingayen Gulf area, and flew toward target ships at extremely low altitudes, thus helping to avoid both radar and visual detection. Flight tactics included radical maneuvering designed not only to avoid anti-aircraft fire and Allied planes but also to confuse observers as to which ship was the actual target. Finally, many of the kamikaze planes were heavily armored and armed. The Allies had expected great results from the relatively new proximity fuze for shipboard 5-inch antiaircraft weapons, but the Japanese planes usually appeared so suddenly and took such violent evasive action that 5-inch batteries could seldom track properly. The employment of the expensive special ammunition was, therefore, generally useless, and was sometimes even dangerous to friendly ships. Having missed approaching kamikazes by such distances that fuzes were not activated, shells sometimes sailed on to explode on or near Allied vessels, thereby causing some damage and many casualties.  Concerned about the effectiveness of the kamikaze attacks and recognizing that achieving air superiority did not prevent the enemy's suicide planes, Oldendorf opted for a psychological strategy. He ordered the minesweeper and bombardment groups to persist with their operations, even while sustaining damage, to convince the Japanese that their suicide missions were failing. Kinkaid shared these concerns and requested the cessation of all diversionary air operations to concentrate the main air offensive on Luzon. As a result, Admiral Halsey's carrier-based aircraft and General Kenney's ground forces were tasked with neutralizing all Japanese airfields in Luzon, supported by Durgin's escort carriers. On January 7, McCain's strikes on Luzon and Oldendorf's bombardment of the Lingayen beaches continued, while underwater demolition teams entered the gulf to undertake the dangerous mission of dismantling beach obstacles. Again contrary to expectations, no beach obstacles were found. The "frog men" encountered only a little rifle and machine gun fire, and the few beach defenses they observed appeared to be unoccupied. Their tasks and those of hydrographic ships were completed on the 8th. In retaliation, 20 to 25 kamikazes targeted various segments of the Luzon Attack Force, managing to sink two minesweepers and damage one LST. That night, Kinkaid's destroyers successfully sank the Hinoki off Manila Bay. However, on January 8, the 3rd Fleet units began advancing towards Formosa, as MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz suspected that the kamikazes were launching from there. Without Halsey's additional air support, the Japanese suicide planes once again attacked the Luzon Attack Force, this time damaging the cruiser Australia and the escort carriers Kitkun Bay and Kardashan Bay, as well as inflicting damage on an LSI, an LST, and an APA. Due to significant losses, by the end of the day, the 2nd Air Fleet and the 1st Combined Base Air Force headquarters were disbanded. The 1st Air Fleet received orders to withdraw to Formosa for reorganization, while the severely weakened units of the 4th Air Army were set to continue limited attack operations for a short time until a final evacuation could be carried out. Returning on the morning of the 8th to resume bombardment about 08:00, one section again hit the Lingayen area. About ten minutes later a destroyer standing close inshore and a spotting plane from a battleship reported that Filipinos were forming a parade, complete with United States and Philippine flags, in the town of Lingayen. The fire was shifted to more westerly targets while leaflets were quickly prepared instructing the Filipinos to clear the area. A spotting plane dropped the leaflets and the paraders dispersed. Bombardment started again as soon as the area seemed vacated. The reasons for resuming the bombardment of Lingayen and its environs in the face of this friendly demonstration ashore are unknown, especially since neither underwater demolition teams nor spotting planes had discovered any signs of Japanese activity in the area. The town, at least, seemed safely in the hands of the Filipinos. The most obvious explanation is that erroneous intelligence, having indicated that strong defenses would be encountered in the area, made it incumbent upon Admiral Oldendorf to continue the bombardment whether he wanted to or not. Too much was at stake to take a chance. The Filipinos in the Lingayen area could hardly have been pleased as they saw their homes and public buildings damaged or destroyed by what to them must have seemed an unnecessary bombardment. It seems a tribute both to the Filipinos and to the prewar administration of the United States in the islands--as well as a severe and obvious indictment of Japanese occupation policies--that the people of the Philippines took such adversities in their stride, not permitting personal resentments to overcome judgment and loyalty. Throughout the rest of 8 January, bombardment of the landing beach areas continued without incident. Practically no military installations or targets were found in the Lingayen town and airstrip area, and relatively few were discovered in the San Fabian region. The San Fabian bombardment vessels ran out of targets by 1530 and moved back up the gulf to strike the San Fernando area for another forty-five minutes, completing the task that the Japanese kamikazes had interrupted on the 6th. The Lingayen area ships had long since ceased their firing for the day. Thus ended preliminary bombardment operations. The heavy bombardment of the San Fernando sector on the 6th aroused great anxiety in General Yamashita's headquarters. An enemy landing in that sector would fall north of the main positions of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and create serious danger of a thrust toward Baguio over the Bauang-Naguilian Highway. The only means of meeting this potential threat was to change the planned employment of the 19th Division. The division was still in the San Fernando-Naguilian area due to postponement of its scheduled movement inland, and intense enemy air activity over the whole Lingayen area made it improbable that it could move in any case. Consequently, on 7 January, the Area Army ordered the division to assume responsibility for the defense of the sector north of a line running through Santiago, Magungunay, Mt. Bilbil, and Asin. Its main strength was to be concentrated between Naguilian and Baguio. With preliminary operations finished, Kinkaid's amphibious attack convoys arrived at the entrance to Lingayen Gulf around 04:00 on January 9. As the amphibious ships began landing operations, the fire support vessels of Admirals Barbey and Wilkinson positioned themselves for final pre-assault bombardment. In support of these efforts, McCain struck Formosa, destroying 47 Japanese aircraft, sinking seven ships, and damaging eleven others. Throughout the week, the fast carriers conducted a total of 3,030 offensive sorties, dropping approximately 700 tons of bombs at the cost of 86 aircraft. Pleased with the results of the anti-kamikaze operation, Nimitz finally permitted Halsey to launch a major raid into the South China Sea, codenamed Operation Gratitude. Meanwhile, back in Luzon, the pre-assault bombardment commenced at 07:00, gradually shifting fire from the landing beaches to the flanks of the assault area. At 09:00, the first amphibious vehicles began their approach from a departure line about 4,500 yards offshore, while rocket-armed landing craft and aircraft bombarded the beaches. The landing beaches of the 14th Corps were located across the middle of Lingayen Gulf's southern shores and centered on Lingayen airstrip and the nearby grounds of the capitol of Pangasinan Province. In peacetime one would have considered the shore line a beautiful swimming beach, a magnificent strand of firm sand stretching eastward almost 9 miles from the mouth of the Calmay River to the mouth of the Dagupan. The east bank of the Dagupan, which enters the gulf midway between Lingayen and San Fabian, delineated the boundary between the 14th and the 1st Corps, and bridges over the Dagupan were expected to provide the first easy means of contact between the two corps. Since there was a gap of over 6 miles between the 1st Corps' westernmost beaches and the 14th Corps' easternmost, it was imperative that the Dagupan crossings be seized without delay. Planners anticipated that inasmuch as 1st Corps troops would be a mile or so closer to the river at the moment of landing they would be the first to reach the bridges, but it was 14th Corps' responsibility to relieve 1st Corps at the crossings as soon as possible. The 37th Division was to drive toward the Dagupan, while the 40th Division would make a quick thrust west and northwest to Port Sual and Alaminos. Port Sual, located at the southwestern corner of Lingayen Gulf, and at the western extremity of the Army Beachhead Line, possessed some importance as the site of minor port facilities. Alaminos, about twelve miles northwest of Port Sual, lay inland on the Bolinao Peninsula. Early capture of road junctions at Alaminos would help forestall Japanese attempts to organize counterattacks against the 6th Army's right flank. In contrast, the beaches assigned to the 1st Corps were more widely spaced. The units of the 6th Division were scheduled to land on the Blue Beaches, located midway between the Dagupan River mouth and that of the Bued River. The 103rd Regiment was to land on White Beach 3 at San Fabian, while the 169th Regiment would land on White Beach 2, nearly two miles to the northeast. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment was set to land on the nearby White Beach 3. Fortunately for the American forces, they encountered minimal resistance as the initial waves approached the shore, facing only some challenges from the ebb tide. Shortly after 09:30, the 1st and 20th Regiments landed on the Blue Beaches, with the 1st Regiment quickly securing the mouth of the Bued River and advancing three miles inland to Mangaldan, while the 20th Regiment moved toward Dagupan. Meanwhile, Wing's regiments landed on their designated beaches to the northeast but faced harassment from snipers, artillery, and mortar fire from Lieutenant General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division. However, the assault waves of the 14th Corps moved more slowly than expected, reaching the western beaches only by 09:40. The 185th Regiment captured Orange Beach, the 160th Regiment took Green Beach, the 148th Regiment secured Yellow Beach, and the 129th Regiment landed unopposed on Crimson Beach. After landing on the beaches, the 1st Battalion of the 185th Regiment marched to the Agno River's mouth. Meanwhile, the 40th Reconnaissance Troop established a roadblock on the main road, just three miles east of Port Sual. The 2nd Battalion of the 185th Regiment advanced directly inland through Lingayen, successfully crossing the Calmay River and an east-west segment of the Agno River. Similarly, the 160th Regiment crossed the Calmay and assembled nearly four miles inland. The reserve 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment landed at Lingayen, while the 148th Regiment moved straight inland, crossing both the Calmay and Dagupan Rivers toward San Carlos. The 129th Regiment entered Dagupan and crossed the Patan River to reach Calasiao, with its 3rd Battalion eventually extending the line to connect with the 148th. By the end of the day, Griswold had established a beachhead stretching northwestward from Calasiao for nearly twenty miles to the outpost near Port Sual. At the same time, Wing's units encountered the most significant resistance from three tiers of ridges that overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east.  The 43rd Division had the most hazardous and difficult S-day tasks. On the division's left low hills lay scarcely three-quarters of a mile inland from WHITE Beaches 1 and 2. Stretching northward, and coming still closer to Lingayen Gulfs eastern shore, a first line of low, grass-covered hills formed a somewhat broken ridge line, the seaward slopes of which grew steeper as the hills proceeded north along the coast. Beyond this first range, which averaged less than 250 feet in height, lay another, more irregular north-south ridge that rose to 350 feet. Still further east--a little over three miles inland--was yet a third steep-sided, grass-covered ridge line, this one averaging around 600 feet high. The three tiers of ridges overlooked the 43rd Division's beaches from the north, northeast, and east. They provided the Japanese with natural defensive terrain, excellent observation, good positions from which to deliver direct fire on the beaches, and cover behind which there was protection from the essentially flat trajectory of naval support fires. Moreover, the ridges were close to assembly areas further inland that could provide large Japanese forces with cover and concealment. In a single night the Japanese could move considerable strength from these assembly points into the tiers of hills to launch a counterattack against the 6th Army's left. While the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment advanced toward Hill 247, the 169th Regiment moved eastward, successfully reaching Binday and extending its lines north along the gentle slopes leading to Hill 470. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 172nd Regiment quickly secured the barrios of Mabilao and Alacan, ultimately capturing Hill 247 despite scattered resistance. As small arms and mortar fire intensified, combat patrols advanced toward Hill 385, coinciding with the remainder of the 172nd coming ashore. Finally, the 103rd Regiment took control of San Fabian without facing any opposition and then advanced generally south and southeast toward Hill 200, halting just north of San Jacinto by the end of the day. While the assault units of the 1st Corps successfully landed by dusk on January 9, Swift's advance was not as deep as Griswold's, leaving several dangerous gaps between his units. Throughout the day, the Japanese launched sporadic kamikaze attacks on the Luzon Attack Force, causing significant damage to the battleship Mississippi, hitting the cruisers Columbia and Australia again, and damaging one destroyer escort. Meanwhile, friendly anti-aircraft fire resulted in numerous casualties aboard the battleship Colorado. In response to the enemy landings, Yamashita decided to deploy the 2nd Tank Division to the Agno River line near Tayug, where the armored units were to execute a counterattack from the northern flank if the enemy overextended. He also sent five battalions under Lieutenant-General Tsuda Yoshitake to secure the Cabanatuan area, ordered Lieutenant-General Okamoto Yasuyuki's 10th Division to position elements in the Triangle Hill and Tayug sectors to counter a potential enemy advance from Lingayen toward San Jose, stationed the majority of the 11th Independent Regiment at Bongabong, and directed the Noguchi Detachment to move from Bicol to the Manila area. During the night, the 12th Surface Raiding Regiment, based at Port Sual, attempted to disrupt further enemy landings with a full-scale suicide boat attack on ships near the beachhead. Taking advantage of the element of surprise, the small explosive-laden boats approached undetected but only succeeded in sinking one LCI and damaging eight other vessels. In other areas, increased guerrilla activities and Allied airstrikes in northern Luzon had nearly stopped the Japanese from collecting and transporting vital food supplies to the critical defense zones within the Baguio-Mankayan-Bambang triangle. This disruption would hinder the 14th Area Army's capacity to conduct a prolonged defensive campaign. Although plans for a desperate, full-scale counteroffensive were developed, Yamashita decisively rejected this strategy, instead ordering the 2nd Tank Division to cancel its intended counterattack and regroup at Lupao, approximately eight miles northwest of San Jose. Meanwhile, on January 10, Griswold's forces continued their advance inland: the 185th Regiment moved west toward Port Sual; the 160th Regiment progressed southward about eight miles; the 148th Regiment quickly advanced to San Carlos; and the 129th Regiment pushed forward to Malasiqui, where the 14th Corps faced enemy resistance for the first time since the landing. Additionally, the reserve 108th and 145th Regiments successfully landed on the Lingayen beaches. To the north, the 6th Division shifted generally south and southeast, covering about four miles across flat, dry, open farmland, and by nightfall, it secured a front of approximately seven miles from west to east. As they continued northeast, the 103rd Regiment expanded its front, with its 2nd Battalion advancing toward Manaoag while the other two battalions moved to the area northwest of Hill 200. Lastly, the 169th and 172nd Regiments encountered the most intense resistance thus far, providing an early glimpse of the challenges that would impede the 43rd Division for the upcoming month. The 1st Battalion, 169th Regiment, supported by close artillery and mortar fire, engaged in combat along the steep, grassy slopes of Hill 470, ultimately capturing the summit by nightfall. Meanwhile, the rest of the regiment advanced across the Bued River toward Hills 355 and 318, but halted near the river due to heavy artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. To the north, the 172nd Regiment cleared Hill 385 and then moved toward Hills 351 and 580, gradually advancing along the southern section of the third ridge line, which was located inland from the beaches. Additionally, its 1st Battalion progressed two miles along the graveled coastal road and conducted patrols along the ridge crest. By nightfall, Krueger had determined that the 6th Army Reserve should be deployed in the 1st Corps' area, as outlined in the pre-assault plans, due to the significant resistance faced by the 43rd Division. He suspected that the apparent lack of enemy resistance to the west was a trap, designed to lure the 6th Army into overextending its lines, making its flanks susceptible to a counterattack from the east. Fortunately for the Americans, Tominaga's kamikaze attacks began to diminish in the days following the landing, with an attack on January 10 resulting in damage only to the destroyer escort LeRay Wilson and one transport ship. The next day, the 43rd Division continued to face challenges in Luzon. The Japanese mortar and artillery fire along the 172nd's eastern front was so severe that Wing decided to shift the regiment's attack direction from east to north, resulting in minimal progress as they redeployed to strike toward Hills 351 and 580 from Hill 470. Additionally, the reserve 158th Regiment was landed to relieve the 1st Battalion, 172nd Regiment, on the coastal road. Looking southeast, the 169th Regiment nearly encircled Hill 318. However, despite receiving maximum support from Durgin's carrier aircraft, naval gunfire, and division artillery, they were unable to dislodge the Japanese forces, who had entrenched themselves in the hillside. Meanwhile, Griswold's advance inland to secure the Army Beachhead Line continued to progress well on January 11. On the 11th the 185th Infantry patrolled and consolidated its positions on the west flank, suffered no casualties, killed 5 Japanese, and captured another. Early in the morning a Chevrolet sedan of 1940 or 1941 vintage, occupied by two Japanese, came calmly down the coast road from the direction of Port Sual. Obviously unaware that Company C, 185th Infantry, maintained a roadblock on the highway, the Japanese practically ran into the American outpost before they realized their situation. Before they could recover from their surprise and consternation, both Japanese were dead, and Company C had acquired some luxurious transportation. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment reached Aguilar, a road junction already held by Filipino guerrillas. The 108th Regiment closely followed the 160th, and the 148th Regiment established a line from Dumpay westward for four miles to Bacnar, with patrols extending further south to Urbiztondo and Bayambang. By the end of the day, the 14th Corps had either occupied or outposted nearly all the territory within the Army Beachhead Line in its sector. However, with Swift's units unable to keep up with the advance southward, Griswold faced the risk of exposing his eastern flank if he continued to push forward. Therefore, the 1st Corps needed reinforcement to prevent widening the gap along the corps boundary. As a result, the reserve 63rd Regiment and the 13th Armored Group were deployed in the San Fabian area, while the 6th Ranger Battalion, which had landed at Blue Beaches the previous day, moved to the Dagupan area. Additionally, Major-General Charles Mullins' 25th Division began to assemble between the Agoi and Patalan Rivers. Despite these developments, casualties had been significantly lower than expected, with 55 men killed and around 185 wounded, primarily from the 43rd Division. Japanese casualties in ground operations were also relatively low, with American estimates suggesting between 150 and 200 Japanese killed. Meanwhile, Task Force 38 made its way into the South China Sea via the Luzon Strait on January 10, accompanied by the refueling group. Although poor weather conditions thwarted a scheduled refueling on that day, Task Force 38 was completely fueled by noon on January 11 and prepared to carry out Halsey's ambitious raid. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Allied forces prepared for a major assault on Luzon, kamikaze attacks intensified, leading to fierce battles and unexpected challenges, but Filipino resilience shone through despite devastation. On the shores of Lingayen Gulf, American forces launched a strategic landing, facing minimal resistance, but soon encountered fierce Japanese counterattacks as they advanced inland.

Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops.  By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region.  In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang.  In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command.  The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya.  The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured.  For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464.  On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.

Last time we spoke about the third arakan campaign. In December, General Bruce's forces advanced through Leyte, securing Ormoc and preparing for a decisive push toward Valencia.. The 305th and 306th Regiments steadily overcame enemy positions, while the 307th secured the airstrip. As Japanese forces began to retreat, the 12th Cavalry captured Kananga, opening Highway 2. Meanwhile, in Burma, General Slim devised Operation Extended Capital, aiming to outmaneuver the Japanese and cut off their supply lines, setting the stage for a crucial battle. As Admiral Mountbatten pivoted from Operation Dracula to launch Operation Romulus in Arakan, General Christison devised a three-pronged assault on Akyab. Facing fierce Japanese resistance, Private Kweku Pong displayed extraordinary bravery amidst chaos, earning recognition for his valor. Meanwhile, the 28th Army struggled to defend its positions, ultimately retreating under pressure. Amidst strategic deceptions, the Allies advanced through challenging terrain, culminating in significant victories that shifted the tide in Burma, showcasing courage and tactical ingenuity in the face of adversity. This episode is the Victory at Leyte  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, General Krueger's forces had effectively secured the Ormoc Valley, prompting many Japanese units to begin a challenging retreat toward Palompon. From that point, the best General Suzuki's troops could manage was to hold their positions for as long as possible. The Japanese had pockmarked Matagob and the area surrounding it with foxholes and emplacements and had dug spider holes under the houses. South of Matagob, where the road climbed into the hills, the enemy had utilized natural caves, gullies, and ridges on both sides of the road and dug many deep defensive positions. Some of these were eight feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and widened to six feet at the bottom. The Japanese had emplaced machine guns in culverts and had constructed several well-camouflaged coconut log pillboxes on the forward slopes of the ridges. An excellent, almost invisible installation, which served as an observation post, was dug in on the forward slope of a ridge about three miles north of San Miguel. It had a concealed entrance on the reverse slope. From this post eight miles of the road to the north and east could be observed.  Meanwhile, eager to deliver a decisive blow, Krueger organized his forces for a four-division assault along a wide front toward the west coast. General Bruce's 77th Division was tasked with advancing west along the Palompon road, while the three divisions of General Sibert's 10th Corps embarked on a difficult trek across the mountains to reach the northwest coast. The northwestern mountains of Leyte west of Ormoc Bay provided a difficult barrier to any movement toward the northwest coast. The area was the last one available to the Japanese either for escaping from Leyte or for staging defensive actions. In general, the terrain was rough, increasing in altitude from broken ground and low hills in the north to steep rocky ridges and high hills in the south. The northern part was either under cultivation or covered with cogon grass. Toward the south, the cultivated fields and grasslands were gradually supplanted by dense forests. Palompon had been extensively used by the Japanese as an auxiliary port of entry to Leyte. The town was the western terminus of the road that ran north and eastward across the northwestern hills to join Highway 2 near Libongao. It was this road junction that the 10th and 24th Corps had seized. The Palompon road, as it was called, followed the lower slopes of the hills until the flat interior valley floor was reached. The confining hills were steep-sided with many knife-edged crests. Such was the area into which the forces of the 6th Army had driven remnants of the Japanese 35th Army. To facilitate the capture of Palompon, Bruce planned to land the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment near the port, while the other two battalions advanced westward on the Palompon road. To support this operation, Admiral Kinkaid would provide amphibious vehicles, LCMs, and a PT escort. However, while preparations for the amphibious assault were underway, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment departed from Valencia on December 22, quickly crossing the Togbong and Pagsangahan Rivers without encountering any opposition, and eventually halting just beyond the Humaybunay barrio.  The 302nd Engineer Battalion, which followed behind the assault battalions, fought the "battle of bridges." The engineers worked around the clock, frequently without any infantry protection, to restore the bridges as soon as possible. The bridges were to be sufficiently strengthened initially to support 2.5-ton truck traffic for infantry supply, then they were to be reinforced to carry 20 tons in order to bring M8's forward, and eventually to 36-ton capacity to carry the M10's. General Bruce had hoped that sufficient Bailey bridges could be made available for important crossings to carry traffic while engineers built wooden bridges under the Bailey bridges. Only a limited number of Bailey bridges were furnished, however, and engineer progress to the west was slowed down. At the same time, patrols from the 128th Regiment successfully eliminated the last enemy strongholds in the Limon area, while the 127th Regiment advanced to Lonoy, where the 1st Cavalry Division was gearing up for its westward push. Finally, the 24th Division, now under Major General Roscoe Woodruff, dispatched the 34th Regiment to launch an attack toward Tuktuk. On December 23, as aircraft bombed Palompon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment resumed their advance. The Americans steadily progressed along the road, successfully forcing the Takahashi Detachment to retreat to the mountains northwest of Matag-ob, where they had to fend off a series of strong night counterattacks. That same morning, the assault units of the 1st Cavalry Division moved out from the highway, facing no resistance as they advanced west through the mountains. This initial day of marching established the pattern for the following days, with the cavalry regiments continuing to push forward through challenging terrain, encountering only sporadic resistance. Additionally, from December 23 to 26, the 34th Regiment conducted extensive patrols along the west coast of the Leyte peninsula. Meanwhile, the advance echelon of the 1st Division successfully linked up with the 68th Brigade, reaching the Bagacay sector the next day. However, the main body of the division had to carve its way through dense jungle on its way to Bagacay. The 102nd Division was also advancing toward the area south of Matag-ob, but after failing to make contact with the 35th Army or the Takahashi Detachment, its units began to retreat to Villaba in the following days. On December 24, while the 1st Battalion was boarding at Ormoc, the remainder of the 305th Regiment launched another offensive. At 1000 on 24 December the assault troops jumped off. The Japanese resistance was light and intermittent, but American progress was slow because of the rough, irregular hills in which the enemy had established positions in foxholes, spider holes, and caves. Since it was not possible to bypass these positions, the regiment had to clear each one before the advance could continue. The force received some artillery fire but a mortar platoon from Company A, 88th Chemical Weapons Battalion, silenced the enemy guns. At 1500 the battalions set up their night perimeter 500 yards short of the road bend. During the night a Japanese force of twenty men, which tried to penetrate the defenses of the 3d Battalion, was killed. Both the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments sent out patrols on December 23 to reconnoiter the terrain. At 08:00 on December 24 the two regiments started for the west coast. Throughout the march to the sea, they encountered only small parties of the enemy, who put up no effective resistance, but heavy rains, dense, almost impassable forests, and steep craggy hills slowed the advance. The commanding officer of the 127th Infantry said of the hills encountered on December 24: “The morning was spent in climbing to the top of a mountain ridge. The climbing was difficult but as we later found out, the descent was much worse. The trail led almost perpendicular down the side. After reaching the bottom, another ridge was encountered, this almost straight up, everyone had to use hand holds to pull themselves up. All in all there were seven ridges from the bottom of the first descent to the first possible bivouac area.” The hills were less rugged from then on. Throughout the march both regiments also received supplies by airdrop, which was not completely satisfactory since none of the drops was made at the requested time and frequently there was a wide scattering of supplies. On December 25, the 1st Battalion of the former unexpectedly came across the remnants of the 1st and 57th Regiments. The Japanese forces suffered significant casualties and were compelled to disperse, but they eventually managed to reach Bacacay later that night. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment made slow progress along the Palompon road against a well-entrenched enemy. However, the crucial development was that its 1st Battalion successfully landed at Buaya without facing any opposition.  A light fast armored column moved north to clear the road and to forestall any Japanese counterattack from that direction as the rest of the task force went rapidly south through the barrio of Look to Palompon, which fell at 1206. This closed the last main port of entrance on the island to the Japanese. Within four hours after hitting the beaches the battalion had secured the barrios of Buaya and Look as well as Palompon, and had strong patrols operating to the northeast and south. The troops met no opposition at any point. It was doubtless with great satisfaction that General Bruce sent the following message to the Commanding General, 14th Corps: "The 77th Infantry Division's Christmas contribution to the Leyte Campaign is the capture of Palompon, the last main port of the enemy. We are all grateful to the Almighty on this birthday of the Son and on the Season of the Feast of Lights." The 1st Battalion occupied a defensive position in the vicinity of Look on 25 December, and rested on 26 December, which was Christmas Day back home. It spent the next five days sending out patrols and awaiting the arrival through the mountains of the rest of the 305th Infantry. Once again, Suzuki's plans were thoroughly disrupted. Palompon was to have been used as the rear center of the line of communications and the army headquarters was to have been established at Kompisao, but the seizure of Palompon on 25 December by the 77th Division forced Suzuki to change the location of his army headquarters. He then selected as a base of operations an area in the vicinity of Ginabuyan that overlooked Silad Bay and was about three kilometers north of Villaba. The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet, heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western slopes that made it "a natural fortress." From it one could command a view of Ormoc Valley to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu to the west. There were a few Filipino huts, and cultivated fields and coconut groves, interspersed with salt beds, lay along the beach. The area "was admirably suited for an extended period of defensive action." General Suzuki ordered the units of the 35th Army that were retreating westward to repair to the vicinity of the new base of operations.  He sent orders for his retreating units to gather there instead of in Palompon. Although Suzuki anticipated being able to support 15,000 men in this self-sufficient area, an assessment of the available resources revealed that they would only last for two weeks. Consequently, the Japanese began preparations for Operation Chi-Go, which involved the amphibious movement of several units, including the 35th Army headquarters and the majority of the 1st Division, to other islands in the Visayas. At the same time, on December 26, the 34th Regiment received orders to capture San Isidro. The next day, its 1st Battalion left Calubian and moved to the high ground overlooking the port, while Companies F and G conducted amphibious landings at Gigantangan Island and Taglawigan before securing Daha. The reinforced Company G then re-embarked on the landing craft and proceeded toward the San Isidro Bay area, where they encountered heavier resistance than anticipated and were ultimately forced to retreat. At the same time that the 2nd Battalion, 305th Regiment was being withdrawn for an overwater movement to Palompon, the 3rd Battalion continued its advance along the road, successfully covering over 1,000 yards by December 28. That day the foremost elements of the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments broke out of the mountains and reached the barrio of Tibur on the west coast, about 2,800 yards north of Abijao. By nightfall on the following day, the 7th Cavalry was also on the west coast but farther north. In its advance it had encountered and destroyed many small, scattered groups of the enemy, most of whom showed little desire to fight. The regiment arrived at Villaba, two and one-half miles north of Tibur, at dusk, and in securing the town killed thirty-five Japanese. Additionally, the 34th Regiment launched a coordinated assault on San Isidro, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance and capturing the port. In the following days, the troops moved south along the coast, eliminating small, poorly equipped Japanese units. Looking south on December 29, the 128th Regiment reached the high ground overlooking Tabango and Campopo Bays, while the 127th Regiment secured the high ground overlooking Antipole Point, completing the advance of the 32nd Division. Further south, the 3rd Battalion, 305th Regiment continued its push along the Palompon road despite strong resistance, while Company B secured the barrio of San Miguel. At 0930 on 30 December the 305th Infantry struck along the Palompon road, the 3d Battalion driving west, and the Provisional Mountain Force attacking east. The Mountain Force encountered only scattered resistance until 0930, when the Japanese, from well-entrenched positions in the precipitous sides of the road at a point about four miles east of Palompon, directed strong machine gun fire along the road. The Mountain Force dug in for the night on high ground overlooking the point at which its advance had been halted. The 3d Battalion succeeded in overcoming the opposition which had halted it the previous day, and pushed forward to a point about 1,000 yards southwest of Tipolo. The Japanese had emplaced artillery on curves in the road and could fire directly on the advancing American troops. Although the 305th Infantry lost one tank to enemy artillery fire, it was able to destroy three 75-mm. guns and capture two others intact. Meanwhile, Company C conducted a reconnaissance in force and executed an amphibious landing at Abijao, advancing 1,300 yards north to establish contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division near Villaba. By this time, most of the Japanese forces had successfully regrouped in the Villaba-Mount Canguipot area. Consequently, on December 31, Suzuki launched four strong counterattacks against the forces at Villaba; however, enemy artillery disrupted most of these assaults before elements of the 77th Division arrived to relieve the cavalrymen. With the westward advance to the coast complete, General Eichelberger's 8th Army officially took command of all units on Leyte Island, following MacArthur's announcement that organized resistance had ceased. As a result, on January 1, the 77th Division was instructed to relieve the 32nd and 24th Divisions, while the divisions of the 10th Corps moved to staging areas in preparation for upcoming operations. The 8th Army also assumed control of operations on Samar Island, which had similarly been secured against enemy forces. Units from the 1st Cavalry Division had pushed through heavy resistance to reach the strategic Taft-Wright Highway that runs through central Samar. On December 8, the cavalry successfully captured Wright, the western end of the highway, and then moved east to connect with friendly guerrilla forces advancing from Taft on the opposite coast, thereby securing control of the highway. Meanwhile, following the successful invasion of Mindoro, American forces continued their efforts on Hill Drome and Ellmore Field, with General Dunckel's troops conducting extensive patrols to locate enemy stragglers while awaiting the arrival of the 21st Regiment. The only opposition faced came from the persistent assaults of the 4th Air Army and the 1st Combined Base Force. On December 21 and 22, the 1st Resupply Echelon was attacked by enemy aircraft. About twenty kamikazes attacked the convoy, so damaging two LST's that they later had to be abandoned, and inflicting lesser damage on two destroyers and a Liberty ship. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, en route to Mindoro in this convoy lost 6 men killed and 32 wounded; U.S. Navy losses were about 70 men killed or wounded; the Japanese lost 7 planes in kamikaze attacks and 3 others to shipboard antiaircraft fire. Then, from December 28 to December 30, Task Unit 18.3.15 was also attacked by kamikazes. Meanwhile, Admiral Okawachi was getting Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force ready for a hit-and-run surface attack on enemy invasion ships near San Jose, known as Operation Rei-Go. However, a proposed counter-landing on Mindoro, which was supported by Marshal Terauchi, Admiral Fukudome, and General Tominaga, faced strong opposition from General Yamashita and his 14th Area Army. The Area Army staff adamantly maintained that it would be impossible to move any sizeable forces to Mindoro but agreed to dispatch a small raiding unit to hamper enemy development of airfields in the San Jose area. On or about 24 December, an order was issued to the 8th Division to organize a task unit for this mission as soon as possible. Ultimately, a reluctant compromise was reached, allowing a small raiding unit from the 8th Division to be sent to disrupt enemy airfield development in the San Jose region. The raiding detachment was a specially organized provisional unit which included a small number that originally belonged to the Gi-Go Airborne Raiding Unit. It assembled at Batangas and prepared to embark for Mindoro. While this unit was being organized, Shima's warships left Camranh Bay on December 24. However, as they approached Mindoro on December 26, a lone PBY reconnaissance plane spotted them. In response, 105 aircraft were sent to conduct low-level attacks on the Japanese force.  At 19:40 the first wave of planes found the vessels just offshore. Before the wild engagement was over, the full wing strength had attacked every ship at least once. "When I saw a solid sheet of flame," reported one pilot in describing the AA, "I knew I was over the vessel." While wheeling away from the target, each pilot flashed on his running lights to avoid collision. Some planes landing in the Mindoro blackout for rearming, made as many as three strikes against the enemy vessels. Although PT boats, lurking close to shore, fired torpedoes at the silhouetted Japanese targets, only the destroyer Kiyoshimo went down, and the fleet persisted toward the beachhead, where at 22:40 it fired star shells which began an ineffective 40-minute bombardment. Only one Liberty ship, which had not sought refuge behind Ilin Island as directed, was sunk. Naval gunfire and simultaneous Japanese air attacks caused little damage at Hill, but made it difficult for the airmen aloft to land. With gasoline running short, most of the pilots made as many attacks as possible and then headed through the night and bad weather for Leyte, a flight more dangerous than the Japanese AA had been. When a full count was made, losses during the engagement totaled 26 aircraft. For the force engaged this was a heavy loss, but it was not in vain, for several Japanese survivors attributed the amazingly poor bombardment by their fleet to the aerial clawing which had demolished main batteries and killed a majority of the gun crews. Dunckel thought that without a doubt the airmen had saved the beachhead from serious losses: "The action of our Air Units on that night," he wrote, "will stand forever… as one of the most gallant deeds to be established in the traditions of American fighting men." On 26 December 1944, then with the San Jose bombardment force, Kiyoshimo was crippled by two direct bomb hits in attacks by U.S. Army bombers during the approach to Mindoro, Philippines. The ship was then finished off by a torpedo from U.S. PT-223, 145 miles south of Manila ; 82 were killed and 74 injured. The destroyer Asashimo rescued 169 survivors, including ComDesDiv 2, Captain Shiraishi Nagayoshi, and Lieutenant Commander Kajimoto; U.S. PT boats rescued five others.Despite this, Shima pressed on toward his target, entering the anchorage area at 23:00 to commence bombardment of San Jose. After approximately forty minutes of shelling, during which one auxiliary vessel and a PT boat were sunk, the Japanese ships withdrew northwest at high speed, still under fire from enemy planes. Although Shima's force ultimately managed to escape, the air attacks resulted in the sinking of the Kiyoshimo and damage to the Ashigara, the light cruiser Oyodo, and three destroyers, with a loss of 26 aircraft. The bombardment prevented landings at the Mindoro strips and many pilots, finding their planes running low on fuel, headed through the darkness and heavy weather toward Leyte fields only to crash on the way. Following this unsuccessful operation, on December 31, the raiding unit from the 8th Division finally crossed the Verde Island Passage by landing craft to reach Calapan in northeastern Mindoro, and then proceeded to Pinamalayan, arriving there on January 5. We must now depart from the Philippines and proceed to Bougainville to report on the preparations for a new Australian offensive.  Previously, we observed that General Savige's 2nd Corps had successfully relieved the American troops stationed at the Cape Torokina perimeter.  The Australians had now reached the conclusion that the Japanese had disbanded depleted units to reinforce others and were maintaining a well- disciplined and efficient force. They decided that, at the end of November, the force included the 38th Independent Mixed Brigade, built round the 81st Regiment, and the 6th Division with three depleted infantry regiments -13th, 23rd and 45th. Of these the 38th Brigade was believed to be chiefly concentrated at Numa Numa, with part of the 81st Regiment forward on the trail; most of the 13th Regiment was believed to be round the Jaba River-Gazelle Harbour area, with the 23rd farther south, and the 45th round Kieta on the east coast. The Allied Intelligence estimates of the whereabouts of the main Japanese forma- tions on Bougainville proved accurate. The main shortcoming was that the strength of the naval troops was underestimated. At the time of the arrival of the Aus- tralians there were about 11,000 naval men, including 3,500 civilian workers, on the island; the 87th Garrison Force, about 4,000 strong, was in the Buka area, and in the south were two strong forces of marines: the 6th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force (about 2,000) and the 7th Kure Special Naval Landing Force (about 1,500). Indeed the naval forces were about as strong in fighting men as the 6th Division. The successful attack on Little George by the 9th Battalion on 29th November, six weeks before it was expected, surprised the enemy commanders and convinced them that the Australians were determined to open an offensive. Reinforcements numbering 450 were hurried into the central area (there were 2,000 troops deployed in or forward of Numa Numa) and Colonel Kaneko Atsushi of the 81st Regiment took command. A further 1,000 troops were sent from Kieta and the north to Numa Numa. Hyakutake was convinced that the attack on the Numa Numa trail would be accompanied by a landing at its eastern end with the object of severing his force. The quantity of artillery used in the attack on Little George and later Arty Hill convinced the Japanese that a determined thrust was being made. Arty Hill was defended by men of the 5th and 11th Companies of the 81st Regiment. Meanwhile the 13th Regiment was attacked on the Jaba River. Lieut-General Kanda of the 6th Division did not propose to contest the south bank of the river, considering that the crossing was merely a feint and the principal offensive would be made by sea; the main body of the defending force-1,500 men-was retained in the Mosigetta area. By January Kanda estimated that one Australian division, its name yet unknown, was south of the Jaba, with 25 guns. From 23rd to 26th November the 9th Battalion, with the 12th Field Battery and other detachments under command, took over this sector. The 9th Battalion's first task was actively to reconnoitre the Sisivie area with a view to attacking it later; and to secure ground from which such an attack could be launched. It had been believed that the main supply route from Numa Numa passed through Sisivie, but captured docu- ments and interrogation of prisoners revealed that Sisivie was merely an outpost and that the Piaterapaia area was the terminus of the enemy's line of communication; consequently the battalion's efforts were con- centrated in that direction. At 1.50 p.m. on the 24th one rifle shot was fired from Little George into the battalion's area the first shot in the Australian operations on Bougainville. On the 25th a small patrol moved stealthily to the rear of Little George and was fired on, two men being wounded. On the morning of the 29th the battery in the Doiabi Valley fired high-explosive and smoke shells on to Arty Hill, mortars fired smoke bombs on to Little George, and into the smoke a single platoon attacked. At the run the men reached the top of Little George before the Japanese emerged from shelter, opened fire with machine-guns and threw grenades. The attackers did not falter but worked their way forward in pairs, one man firing on a post while the other moved close and threw in grenades. Lieutenant Deacon, the commander, was 3 wounded but carried on. In about half an hour the position was gained. Two Australians had been killed and six wounded, of whom three remained on duty. Twenty Japanese dead lay on the hill, in- cluding a lieutenant and a sergeant. The expected enemy counter-attack was made in the evening by about 40 Japanese. It was a frontal thrust and gained no ground. Until dawn the enemy tried in vain to infiltrate. While these operations were in progress on the Numa Numa trail, the 2/8th Commando, next on the right, had taken over responsibility for the tangled mountain area rising to an altitude of 4,000 feet south and south-east of Mount Bagana, and known as the Hanemo sector. When the commando squadron took over from a company of the 164th American Regiment there had been no contact with the enemy for several weeks, and it was believed that only a handful of Japanese were in the neighbourhood. For five weeks from 24th November, when the relief was completed, a commando troop patrolled but met Japanese only twice, killing two and capturing another. By 27th December, when the 61st Battalion relieved the troop, it was considered that the area was clear and the flank of a force advancing down the coast would be safe. Additionally, Brigadier Raymond Monaghan's 29th Brigade was deployed to the southwestern edge of the perimeter, and a company from New Guinea was assigned to scout the Jaba River area. On December 3, Matthews sent a platoon to Sisivie, but the defenders were able to pin down the Australians with intense fire. After successfully repelling a strong enemy counterattack, the 9th Battalion advanced on Bawabu Ridge toward Pearl Ridge, with Matthews' C Company ordered to capture Arty Hill on December 18.  Matthews planned an attack on Arty Hill by a full company. At 7 a.m. on 18th December Major Blanch's C Company formed up on the sheltered side of George and Little George, on top of which men of a supporting company were walk- ing about nonchalantly to mislead the enemy into thinking that it was to be another uneventful day. Twelve New Zealand Corsairs at- tacked the Japanese positions; the battery of the 4th Field Regiment opened fire from its positions in the Laruma River Valley; medium machine-guns fired from Mount Deacon and Bawabu Ridge that is, from each flank-on to the reverse slope of Arty Hill at ranges up to 1,000 yards. After thirteen minutes of bombardment, the attackers advanced through the smoke along the razor-back ridge which was the only means of approach to the bare hill. Months of intermittent shelling had destroyed the bush and so loosened the soil on the steep slopes that the men had difficulty in scrambling up them. By 8.10 the leading troops were near the crest of Banyan Knoll and were meeting sharp small arms fire from Japanese in covered weapon-pits. Grenades were hurled down on them. They pressed on. Sergeant Allan, commanding the right platoon, led the way to the top of Banyan Knoll, shot a Japanese machine-gunner and himself fell dead. His men carried on up the slopes of Arty Hill. As at Little George, the attackers worked in pairs, one man covering an enemy post with fire while the other attacked from a flank with grenades. After more than an hour of close fighting the position was won and the defenders were digging in and setting up wire in preparation for the probable counter-attack. There was none: a prisoner said that there were not enough men left to attack. Five Australians were killed and 12 wounded of whom 4 remained on duty. Twenty-five Japanese dead were counted, 2 Japanese were taken prisoner, and from 10 to 20 recently-buried bodies were found. Two days later, Lieutenant-Colonel John McKinna's 25th Battalion began to relieve the exhausted 9th Battalion and was immediately tasked with taking Pearl Ridge, although its initial probing attacks were met with fierce resistance from the determined defenders. Meanwhile, Monaghan had deployed Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert McDonald's 15th Battalion to the Jaba River area, where they effectively cleared out enemy outposts. By the fourth week of December, the unofficial ceasefire on Bougainville had collapsed. Intense fighting erupted in two of the three main sectors, resulting in the deaths of over 100 Japanese soldiers, with their forward positions in each area being captured. The Australians were also bringing in additional reinforcements to sustain their offensive. According to Savige's strategy, Brigadier John Field's 7th Brigade was to be replaced by elements of Brigadier John Stevenson's 11th Brigade in the central sector, with orders to move south and join the rest of Major-General William Bridgeford's 3rd Division for an assault toward the Puriata River. Additionally, a strong contingent from the 11th Brigade was set to advance along the northwest coast of the island toward Soraken Harbour, aiming to push the northern enemy forces into the confined Bonis Peninsula. However, before these plans could be executed, McKinna was intent on capturing Pearl Ridge and aimed to launch one final attack with all his companies by the end of the month. Unbeknownst to the Australians, the few defenders in the area had recently received reinforcements in the form of a battalion under the direct command of Major-General Kijima Kesao, which significantly strengthened the ridge. Nevertheless, on the morning of December 30, aircraft bombarded the Japanese positions for about 40 minutes. At 08:00, the infantry advanced under the cover of artillery and machine-gun fire, with A Company facing heavy resistance just in front of Pear Hill that they could not overcome. Due to this setback on the right flank, McKinna ordered D Company to undertake a challenging climb along Pear Hill instead of the narrow spur where the attack had failed. Meanwhile, C Company made slow progress through dense brush but eventually managed to cut the enemy's track to the west. After repelling several enemy counterattacks during the night, the four companies renewed their assault on December 31. Although the march over Arty Hill and through thick underbrush was physically demanding, D Company managed to approach Pear Hill undetected. With A Company drawing enemy fire, D Company launched a powerful attack following an artillery bombardment that successfully pushed back the Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, B Company captured Baker's Brow to the west, and C Company held its position along the western track. However, by nightfall, Kijima's troops began testing the defenses established by C Company. In the early morning, the Japanese launched a fierce counterattack from the south and southeast, managing to penetrate two forward Australian positions. After an hour of intense hand-to-hand combat, the assault was ultimately repelled with the help of artillery support, and Australian patrols later found that Pearl Ridge had been abandoned by the enemy. Throughout the morning and into the early afternoon, the Australians conducted mopping-up operations until the ridge was completely cleared. With control of Pearl Ridge secured, the Australians gained a strategic vantage point that allowed them to observe from one side of Bougainville to the other, aiding future operations. During the battle, the Australians suffered 10 killed and 25 wounded, while the Japanese lost 34 killed and 1 captured. Shortly after taking Pearl Ridge, the 11th Brigade assumed control of the central sector as per Savige's orders, while the rest of the 7th Brigade began moving south. In conclusion, Major-General Percy Clarkson's 33rd Division began its deployment to Morotai in late December, with Colonel Ray Cavenee's 136th Regiment landing on the island's west coast on December 22. Four days later, the regiment advanced into Japanese-controlled territory to engage Colonel Kisou's 211th Regiment, receiving support from elements of the 130th Regiment moving overland from the Doroeba Plain and the 3rd Battalion of the 137th Regiment marching from Morotai's southern coast into the interior. This coordinated effort aimed to prevent the Japanese from dispersing into smaller groups in the island's mountainous regions. On January 3, the 136th Regiment located and attacked the 211th Regiment at Hill 40, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions advancing from the southwest while the 3rd Battalion approached from the north. After two days of intense combat, the Americans successfully captured Hill 40, inflicting significant casualties on the enemy, and then began pursuing the retreating Japanese forces to the north. Two thousand yards to the north, the 3d Battalion was settling down for the night. Its march from Radja had started badly. From the beginning the battalion had been harried by the enemy. On the nights of December 26-27 and 27-28, its perimeter had been attacked viciously by an estimated enemy battalion. (The 3d Battalion of the Jap 211th Infantry. It had been detached from the 211th for a special mission to Radja to await and guide reinforcements from Halmahera. The five reinforcing barges were ambushed after slipping through the Navy PT screen, and were destroyed along with fifty tons of food and supplies.) The battalion had experienced the hardest march of its history. The jungle was more difficult than that encountered by the Pilowo column. Moreover, to join the Hill 40 battle it had to abandon trails for cross-country movements. Although the battalion had marched and fought its way forward for ten days it was still in fighting trim. The number of Japs killed and found buried along the trail indicated terrible losses for the Japs. The battalion commander, Major Ralph Pate, attributed the lack of enemy resistance during the past two days to the withdrawal of the enemy. Actually, as he learned later, the 3d Battalion, Jap 211th Infantry Regiment, had been destroyed as a military force. By January 14, when the 136th Regiment was finally withdrawn to the main perimeter, the Americans reported having killed 870 Japanese soldiers and captured 10, suffering 46 men killed and 127 wounded in the process. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces captured Palompon, disrupting Japanese plans, while American troops advanced through challenging terrain, overcoming resistance and securing key locations. Japanese forces planned a counter-landing on Mindoro, but faced fierce opposition. Meanwhile, Australians advanced on Bougainville, capturing strategic positions amid heavy fighting.

„Es klingt kaum glaubhaft, was ich euch jetzt berichte, ist aber pure Wahrheit. Kaum fing es an Tag zu werden, erschienen schon die Engländer und winkten uns zu, was unsere Leute erwiderten. Allmählich gingen sie ganz heraus aus den Gräben, unsere Leute zündeten einen mitgebrachten Christbaum an, stellten ihn auf den Wall und läuteten mit Glocken. Alles bewegte sich frei aus den Gräben, und es wäre nicht einem in den Sinn gekommen zu schießen. Was ich vor ein paar Stunden noch für Wahnsinn hielt, konnte ich jetzt mit eigenen Augen sehen... war dies etwas Ergreifendes: Zwischen den Schützengräben stehen die verhasstesten und erbittertsten Gegner um den Christbaum und singen Weihnachtslieder. Diesen Anblick werde ich mein Leben lang nicht vergessen. Man sieht bald, dass der Mensch weiterlebt, auch wenn er nichts mehr kennt in dieser Zeit als Töten und Morden...Weihnachten 1914 wird mir unvergesslich sein."Aus einem Brief an seine Eltern Ende Dezember 1914 des Gefreiten Josef Wenzl vom Königlich Bayerischen 16. Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment in das bayrische Schwandorf........Das Folgenbild zeigt möglicherweise die Soldaten Andrew (Mitte) und Grigg (zweiter von rechts im Hintergrund) der London Rifle Brigade mit Truppen des 104. und 106. Sächsischen Regiments am 25. Dezember 1914. Das Foto ist von Grenadier Turner........WERBUNGDu willst dir die Rabatte unserer Werbepartner sichern? Hier geht's zu den Angeboten!.......Tolle Vorteile und Unterstützung des Podcasts über Steady!.......Zur Doku und Interviews der IWM:https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-real-story-of-the-christmas-truce.......LITERATURCrocker, Theresa B., "The Christmas Truce: Myth, Memory, and the First World War", 2016.https://uknowledge.uky.edu/history_etds/42Jürgs, Michael: Der kleine Frieden im Großen Krieg. Westfront 1914. Als Deutsche, Franzosen und Briten gemeinsam Weihnachten feierten, 2. Auflage, München 2014. …….COPYRIGHTMusic from https://filmmusic.io: “Sneaky Snitch” by Kevin MacLeod and "Plain Loafer" by Kevin MacLeod (https://incompetech.com) License: CC BY....... !Neu! Jetzt hier His2Go unterstützen, Themen mitbestimmen und Quiz2Go mit Moderatorin Chiara erleben! https://plus.acast.com/s/his2go-geschichte-podcast. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindoro. Ormoc fell on December the 10th. The 149th Regiment cleared the airstrip at Buri, while the Japanese launched a desperate attack on airfields, only to be repelled by American forces. Amid chaotic battles, the Japanese attempted maritime reinforcements, but their vessels were met with devastating American fire, sinking transports and crippling their efforts. By December 13, the American advance continued through heavy resistance, leading to intense skirmishes, showcasing bravery and the struggles faced on both sides during the conflict. On December 14, US troops of the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, advanced against stubborn Japanese defenses near Limon. While under fire, they strategically pushed forward, capturing enemy positions and equipment. Despite heavy artillery, Troop G utilized flamethrowers and close combat, overcoming formidable foxholes, helping to secure vital ground. Meanwhile, Admiral Nimitz prepared for future invasions, and General MacArthur postponed operations to protect his forces. The successful landings on Mindoro marked a pivotal moment, signaling the approaching assault on Luzon. This episode is the Third Arakan Offensive  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we left off last week, General Bruce's 77th Division had effectively advanced to Linao and Cogon, securing Ormoc. Meanwhile, General Sibert's 10th Corps had pushed the weary Japanese forces in the north back to the Lonoy area, with both divisions preparing to continue their assaults through the Ormoc Valley toward Valencia, in line with General Krueger's strategy. To address the emerging situation, the 68th Brigade was mobilizing to support the 1st Division, while the 5th and 77th Regiments were making their way to Huaton to participate in a counteroffensive against Ormoc; however, only the 77th Regiment would reach its destination in time. Concurrently, the isolated 16th Division in the central Leyte mountains was gradually withdrawing from the Burauen front, losing strength with each passing day, and the 26th Division was gathering north of Talisanyan to prepare for the final retreat to Ormoc. On December 16, with the port secured, Bruce's forces were poised for the next stage of their advance north along the Ormoc corridor. Given that his patrols reported minimal enemy resistance west of Highway 2, Bruce aimed to encircle the Japanese forces from the east with the 306th and 307th Regiments, while the 305th would advance along the highway. Following this plan, the 305th Regiment quickly eliminated the remaining enemy positions in Cogon and proceeded 400 yards north of the road junction toward Tambuco. Meanwhile, the 307th swiftly moved through the neighborhoods of Jalubon, Liloan, Bao, and Catayom to San Jose, where they encountered and defeated two platoons of paratroopers. The 306th Regiment also advanced to Jalubon but then shifted north toward Tipic to bypass Huaton and directly assault Valencia. Looking north, while the 126th and 127th Regiments fought bravely against an enemy that restricted the division's progress to just a few dozen yards each day, the 12th Cavalry Regiment continued its advance toward Lonoy. Ultimately, the successful American assault on December 16 left the Japanese defenses exposed, prompting General Suzuki to alter his offensive strategy once more, immediately directing his forces to conduct a delaying action to facilitate a final retreat toward Libongao. Meanwhile, Bruce intensified his attack on December 17. As a result, the 305th Regiment encountered stiff resistance while attempting to reach Tambuco. The Japanese had constructed defensive positions along Highway 2 in the southern part of Ormoc Valley. At the road junction of Highway 2 with the road to Liloan were many trenches three to four feet deep and parallel to the highway. Trenches had also been dug along the sides of a machine gun emplacement that occupied a slight elevation commanding Highway 2 both to the north and to the south. On both sides of the road from Cogon to Catayom foxholes lined Highway 2, in the ditches and under the shacks. Some of these positions were dug on a slant and were six to seven feet deep. At Tambuco the foxholes extended along the highway for 400 yards, with machine gun emplacements on the sides of the foxholes. Other positions along Highway 2 consisted of poorly integrated foxholes and machine guns that covered the road. The field artillery pieces between Tambuco and Catayom were placed along the highway, with the exception of a 75-mm. gun that guarded a bridge and was well concealed inside a roadside shack. At 0830 on 17 December the 305th Infantry moved out along Highway 2. At 1000 the 1st Battalion reported that it was advancing at the rate of 100 yards every ten minutes against light opposition. By 1145 the 305th Infantry was fighting through Tambuco. At a road junction just north of Tambuco, it eliminated some enemy resistance and the advance slowed down. The regiment moved forward to a point about 300 yards north of the road junction and established its night perimeter, which extended 300 yards to the northeast along the Tambuco-Dolores road in order to forestall any Japanese counterattacks from that direction. On the same day the 306th Infantry pushed its attack northeast at 0800. The advancing troops almost immediately encountered Japanese who, apparently taken by surprise, were unable to offer organized resistance. At 1040, when the forward elements were 1,000 yards southwest of Cabulihan, the opposition stiffened and the regimental commander therefore committed the 3d Battalion on the left of the 2d Battalion. The advance continued. As the regiment neared Highway 2, resistance became more intense. The 306th Infantry encountered the Japanese who were fleeing northwest from the assault of the 305th Infantry and the heavy artillery that accompanied it. (Unknown to the Americans, General Suzuki and his staff were among the retreating Japanese. Suzuki succeeded in escaping to Libongao, where he established a new headquarters for the 35th Army.) At 1440 the 306th Infantry reached Highway 2 between Catayom and Cabulihan and proceeded north toward Cabulihan, its objective. Advance elements of the 3d Battalion reached the outskirts of the town but withdrew three or four hundred yards to take advantage of more commanding terrain. After combat patrols had cleared the area, the 306th Infantry established its night perimeter five hundred yards south of Cabulihan at 1600.  General Bruce had ordered the 307th Infantry to remain in San Jose until further notice. Since the guerrilla forces had reported a large number of Japanese in the area, General Bruce had made arrangements to soften the sector with an aerial bombardment and artillery fire before the infantry attack. In response to Bruce's request, fifteen P-40's from the V Fighter Command had been made available by General Whitehead for an air strike against the Valencia area. The 155-mm. guns of the 226th Field Artillery Battalion at Daro began firing on Valencia and the airstrip on the morning of 17 December and hit a Japanese ammunition dump. At 1245 the artillery fire was halted for the air strike, and for fifty minutes the area was bombed and strafed. With the conclusion of the air attack, at 1335, the artillery began anew to pound the area. "The medium artillery . . . reached out from Ormoc and the 'Long Toms' . . . from Daro joined in the fighting." In the meantime the 902d Field Artillery Battalion moved forward to a point from which it could support the advance of the 307th Infantry. At 1415 the artillery fire stopped and the 307th Infantry moved out astride the San Jose-Valencia road toward Valencia. Though the artillery fire and aerial bombardment had driven some of the Japanese from the area, a strong well-equipped force, including a number of paratroopers, remained to oppose the 307th Infantry. The regiment pushed forward, however, and at 1640 its leading elements were on the southwestern edge of the airstrip and within 1,000 yards of Valencia. The 307th Infantry formed its night perimeter on the edge of the airfield and made preparations to continue the attack on 18 December. During 17 December, despite the disorganization of the Japanese forces, Colonel Imahori of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment tried to reach Ormoc, but he was unsuccessful. A few enemy artillery shells landed in the Ormoc area but that was all. General Bruce wrote later: "The men got a laugh because the General's latrine, unoccupied, was struck. He wished about that time that he had remained up front which he had reached by landing in a cub plane on an unimproved jungle road." The following morning, as supplies and ammunition for the 306th and 307th Regiments were running dangerously low, Bruce dispatched an armored column through the 305th's lines, which bypassed enemy strongholds and successfully delivered supplies to both regiments. The 305th Regiment then faced minimal resistance as it advanced toward Huaton, with its 3rd Battalion decisively eliminating all enemy opposition along the Dolores road. Simultaneously, the 306th Regiment steadily pushed toward Valencia, successfully reaching the southern edge of the town, while the 307th secured the airstrip without any resistance. As General Gill directed his forces northward, the 126th Regiment successfully seized a ridge east of the road, advancing closer to the main enemy defensive line located north of Lonoy. On the morning of December 19, the 126th launched another offensive, overrunning numerous enemy positions and advancing 200 yards before being replaced by fresh troops the following day. Meanwhile, the 12th Cavalry encountered only light and sporadic resistance in its efforts to secure Lonoy, although its 2nd Squadron faced tougher opposition while assaulting a knoll southeast of the barrio. To the south, following the fall of Valencia, the 5th Regiment reached Libongao just as Bruce prepared to press forward in the northern campaign. Thus, the 307th Regiment steadily advanced north along Highway 2, engaging an advanced battalion from the Takahashi Detachment, while the 306th moved successfully northwest across the terrain to a position 300 yards south of the Palompon road. On this day, Suzuki received news of the enemy's invasion of Mindoro, along with General Yamashita's orders to conduct a strategic delay on Leyte. In response, he commanded all his forces to begin a gradual withdrawal towards Palompon, leaving Libongao for Matag-ob. On December 20, the 306th Regiment reached the Palompon road and dispatched its 1st Battalion west towards the Togbong River, while the 3rd Battalion turned east towards Highway 2. At the same time, the 307th Regiment launched an assault on the Libongao positions and successfully defeated the 5th Regiment, compelling the Takahashi Detachment to retreat towards Matag-ob, where they established Suzuki's final delaying position. Additionally, as the exhausted 126th Regiment was relieved, the 12th Cavalry began moving south from Lonoy to intercept the enemy's retreat route at Kananga. On December 21, as the 1st and 102nd Divisions began their withdrawal towards Palompon, the 12th Cavalry successfully captured Kananga and established contact with patrols from the 77th Division. Consequently, Highway 2 was finally open from Ormoc to Pinamopoan, and the Ormoc Valley, where the Japanese had fiercely resisted the American advance, was now firmly under the control of the 6th Army. General Mudge, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, said of the 12th Cavalry: “As a result of the stout-hearted efforts of the 12th Cavalry Regiment, elements of the Division are within 2500 yards of making contact with forward elements of the 77th Division. Considering the fact that the regiment has been reduced to 50% strength by the rigors and deprivations of 40 days in the mountains, the display of courage, stamina, and drive on the part of the 12th Cavalry is a credit to the best traditions of the United States Cavalry.” However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to follow the progress of Operation Capital.  Previously, while General Sultan's offensive in the north was advancing well, General Slim's eastern push, led by General Rees' 19th Indian Division, encountered less resistance than anticipated. This indicated that the enemy was rapidly retreating to stronger defensive positions behind the Irrawaddy River. As a result, Slim's strategy to encircle General Katamura's 15th Army on the Shwebo Plain was compromised, necessitating a significant adjustment to his offensive. His forces, stretched from Tamu, were at risk of counterattack while attempting to cross one of the most formidable river barriers. Therefore, Slim aimed to find a way to not only cross his troops over the Irrawaddy without major issues or interference but also to gain the decisive advantage needed to engage the Japanese on his terms, targeting them where their defenses were weakest. In just a few days, Slim and his team devised a new strategy known as Operation Extended Capital. The objective was to convince the Japanese that nothing had altered and that the 14th Army's advance was still primarily directed toward Mandalay, with its two corps crossing the Irrawaddy to the northwest of the city. The core of Slim's revised plan involved General Stopford's 33rd Corps, which, bolstered by the 19th Division and the 268th Tank Brigade, would maintain its planned crossing of the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay. Meanwhile, General Messervy's restructured 4th Corps would tactically cross the river much farther south in Pakokku, allowing them to launch attacks on Meiktila and Thazi, crucial points along General Kimura's communication lines that supported both the 33rd and 15th Armies. The towns of Meiktila and Thazi represented ground that was vital to the enemy defense, a concept 14th Army had first learned painfully in Arakan. The railway and main road from Rangoon ran through Meiktila before bending north on their way to Mandalay, and the town formed a natural location for supply and ammunition dumps, airfields and hospitals. If Slim could cut off both Honda and Katamura's corps from this vital logistical center, the Japanese ability to resist General Stopford's inexorable pressure in the north around Mandalay would be fatally weakened. Slim recognized that without Meiktila, Kimura could not hope to sustain a prolonged battle for Mandalay. Indeed, it might even prove to be the decisive act in the destruction of the whole of Kimura's army. Thus, the northern advance by 33rd Corps would be a deception to hide the decisive strike by 4th Corps to the south. If Slim could attract the greatest possible number of enemy divisions towards the northern crossing points (where, after all, Kimura expected him to strike), he could minimize opposition to the real focus of his attack in the south. This would provide Slim with, as he put it, ‘not only the major battle I desired, but the chance to repeat our old hammer and anvil tactics: 33rd Corps the hammer from the north against the anvil of 4th Corps at Meiktila – and the Japanese between.' Simultaneously, a new offensive was gearing up in the south. Unable to execute Operation Dracula, an intended amphibious assault on Rangoon, Admiral Mountbatten was resolved to initiate an offensive in the Arakan region. Codenamed Operation Romulus, it aimed for General Christison's 15th Corps to again attack Akyab, marking the third attempt to regain Arakan since the war began. Christison's strategy involved a three-pronged attack into northern Arakan, with Major-General George Wood's 25th Indian Division advancing on the right along the coast, Major-General George Bruce's 82nd West African Division in the center within the valley of the Mayu river, and Major-General Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's 81st West African Division on the left in the Kaladan river valley. Expecting heightened Japanese resistance along the Donbaik-Rathedaung-Myohaung line, Christison suggested that while his three frontline divisions engaged the Japanese forces with aggressive attacks, Brigadier Peter Young's 3rd Commando Brigade would land in the Japanese rear on the Myebon peninsula, followed closely by Major-General Cyril Lomax's 26th Indian Division, in a bid to finally capture Akyab. Facing them was General Sakurai's 28th Army, which included the Sakura Detachment, organized around three infantry battalions from the 55th Division along with the 55th Reconnaissance Regiment, stationed along the Godusara-Buthidaung-Kindaung line and the Kaladan Valley. Lieutenant-General Miyazaki Shigesaburo's 54th Division was responsible for defending the remainder of the Mayu Peninsula and the coastal area extending to Taungup. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Sakuma Ryozo's diminished 55th Division occupied the Irrawaddy Delta region, and Major-General Yamamoto Tsunoru's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade was positioned near the oilfields at Yenangyaung. Additionally, the Katsu Force, centered around the 153rd Regiment, was near Yenangyaung, while the Rangoon Defense Unit, which included the Rangoon Anti-Aircraft Unit and various logistical elements, was tasked with protecting Burma's primary port. Sakurai's strategy, known as Operation Kan, entailed a defensive stance on the Mayu Peninsula and Yenangyaung, along with safeguarding the southwestern coast near Bassein against potential amphibious assaults. As the defenders slowed the enemy's progress towards their fortified positions, the 54th Division would be promptly sent to launch a counteroffensive. Depending on the nature of the attack, units from the 55th Division and Katsu Force would also participate in this counterattack. If a significant battle erupted near Rangoon, the reserve 2nd and 49th Divisions would be deployed without delay. Meanwhile, with the 26th Division being withdrawn for rest, the 25th Division preparing to move towards Rathedaung, and the 82nd Division advancing into the Kalapanzin Valley, the 81st Division was dispatched on October 1 to progress through the Mowdok Mountain Range toward Kyauktaw. As they moved southward across challenging and nearly impassable terrain, the West Africans expected to capture Mowdok by October 18, effectively eliminating the last Japanese forces from Indian territory before progressing through the Kaladan Valley. The 55th Reconnaissance Regiment stationed at Paletwa endured multiple assaults until early November, at which point they received orders to retreat to the Kaladan line. On December 15 the Japanese launched a strong attack with artillery support against the 6th (West African) Brigade. Private Kweku Pong, number two on a Bren, was wounded and separated from his section. Well armed with 12 magazines, he engaged the Japanese with short bursts for hours as they searched for him, until he eventually lost consciousness from loss of blood. Havildar Umrao Singh's gun section of the 30th Mountain Regiment was supporting the brigade when it was overrun and his officer badly wounded. With two other men he defended the position with rifles, bayonets and grenades until they were rushed and he defended it by swinging a rammer until borne down and bayoneted. The Japanese were eventually driven off when both men were found; Singh was awarded a VC and Pong an MM. Slim never changed his view that Africans would be ‘lost' without British guidance; but he probably never heard of Kweku Pong, who found himself alone, badly wounded in the middle of the night with Japanese rampaging through the bush around him and a battle going on behind. No white man was there to tell him what to do, no African NCO nor any other African for that matter. Nobody would have blamed him for lying doggo, but instead he showed considerable courage and good tactical sense. For this action, the 5th Gold Coast Regiment was awarded the unique honor ‘Tinma'.  Meanwhile, by late November, Wood had sent the 51st Indian Brigade to assist the African offensive in the Kalapanzin Valley. After successfully completing this mission, the 25th and 82nd Divisions launched their assault on Buthidaung on December 12. Wood's strategy involved a series of coordinated moves, with units leapfrogging one another, while the pace of the advance depended on how fast the sappers could repair the routes for the subsequent vehicles. Significantly outnumbered, Major-General Sakurai Tokutaro's troops were ultimately forced to evacuate Buthidaung on December 14. In response to the escalating enemy pressure in both the Kaladan and Mayu regions, the 28th Army ordered the Matsu Detachment, consisting of three battalions from the 54th Division, to take over control of the Kaladan front, while Major-General Koba Tomotoki's forces advanced toward Tinma. However, Loftus-Tottenham wisely decided to outflank this position, compelling the recently arrived detachment to withdraw, while other African units successfully made their way to Kyauktaw by the month's end. At the same time, the 53rd Indian Brigade progressed along the Kalapanzin River, and the 82nd Division managed to overcome strong resistance at Kindaung village in late December. On the night of December 21, the 6th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Regiment undertook a night march exceeding 20 miles to capture Donbaik, which was taken without resistance. It was only at this point that the remains of the Valentine tanks and crews lost two years prior were discovered. The Sakura Detachment, having reached its limit, had no option but to retreat towards Myohaung, where they would be supported by the Matsu Detachment during their final withdrawal to Prome. With no opposition encountered, the two West African divisions successfully made contact on January 4, resulting in the complete clearance of the Kalapanzin valley. Meanwhile, looking north, Slim had initiated Operation Extended Capital on December 19. In line with this, Stopford instructed the 19th Division to advance along the west bank of the Irrawaddy to launch an attack on Shwebo from the east, while the 2nd British Division, having crossed the Chindwin at Kalewa, approached Shwebo from the west. After capturing Shwebo, the 19th Division was to pivot eastward to secure bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay, while the 2nd Division continued south towards the Irrawaddy bend near Sagaing. Slim aimed to create the impression that the entire 14th Army was advancing on Mandalay by associating the 19th Division with the 4th Corps. Additionally, the 20th Indian Division was tasked with crossing the Chindwin at Kalewa and moving downstream to capture Monywa. Meanwhile, Messervy was organizing his dispersed divisions to commence their advance down the Gangaw valley, from Tamu to Pakokku. In the lead would be the Lushai Brigade and the 28th East African Brigade, tasked with clearing the enemy from Gangaw and subsequently advancing to Pakokku. The tour de force of deceptions against the Japanese would aid the crossing of the Irrawaddy. Slim's intention behind the plan, known as Cloak, was to conceal the main crossing until the last possible moment by persuading the Japanese to believe that the force preparing to move down the Gangaw valley to cross the river near Pakokku and seize Meiktila was merely making a feint to distract attention from the attack on Mandalay by 33rd Corps from the north. Until now 14th Army's commanders had been reluctant to use any but the simplest signals deceptions, but now they were enthusiastic even to the detriment of operational communications. Thus, three schemes were adopted: Pippin, which covered the withdrawal of the 5th Indian and 11th East African Divisions; Stencil, which created a dummy 4th Corps Headquarters that appeared to control formations under 33rd Corps; and Cloak, which was designed to give a false impression of the forces operating – that the forcing of the Irrawaddy would take place away from the real main effort, and that any movement the Japanese saw in the Gangaw valley was itself only a diversion. There is no doubt the speed the advance into central Burma achieved was in no small measure due to this deception scheme, which also used political channels, displays and deception devices dropped by Mosquitos and Beaufighters. Following them, the 7th Indian Division aimed to capture Pakokku, secure the west bank of the Irrawaddy, and establish a bridgehead across the river. Once this bridgehead was established, the 17th Indian Division and the 255th Tank Brigade would cross the Irrawaddy and race towards Meiktila. However, before initiating this advance, Messervy needed to enhance the pathway through the valley to facilitate the movement of his artillery and armored units. The Lushai Brigade, already forward, also needed artillery support before launching their assault on Gangaw. Therefore, while Messervy's engineers promptly began upgrading the road and track south of Kalemyo, only Stopford's units would engage in combat in late December. Moving swiftly, the advance elements of the 2nd Division, along with the tanks from the 254th Brigade, passed through Pyingaing on December 23 and continued towards Paga, successfully overcoming several rearguard positions held by elements of the retreating 33rd Division, which eventually reached Monywa in early January. At the same time, the 19th Division captured Wuntho and began its advance southward towards Shwebo. In the meantime, Messervy's engineers worked diligently for two weeks to prepare the track, and by the end of the month, his field artillery was en route to Gangaw. The 28th East African Brigade departed Imphal on December 22, followed by the 7th Division four days later. However, in the northeast, Sultan continued his northern offensive with minimal success. With the Ledo Road now extended from Kamaing to connect with the Myitkyina-Bhamo road, the 112th and 113th Chinese Regiments received orders to eliminate the Japanese rear guards along the final segment of the road to China. In the period between the split of the CBI Theater in October 1944 and the fall of Bhamo on 15 December, the Ledo Road engineers under General Pick brought the survey of the Ledo Road from a point just below and east of Kamaing, 211 miles from Ledo, to a juncture with the Myitkyina-Bhamo road. The Ledo Road was to bypass Myitkyina, for there was no point to running heavy traffic through an inhabited place, and Myitkyina's supply needs could be served by an access road. Metaling and grading were complete almost to Mogaung. The Mogaung River had been bridged near Kamaing, and a temporary bridge placed across the Irrawaddy. Tonnage carried on the road for use within Burma was steadily rising. In early October it had carried 275 tons a day; by the latter part of the month the rate was twice that. Immediately after Bhamo's capture, the advance headquarters of the road engineers was moved to that town. A combat supply road was made from Mogaung, below Myitkyina, to a point just ten miles west of Namhkam. The 113th Regiment advanced up the valley along the established road from Panghkam, while the 112th proceeded through the hills. The primary assault was to be led by the 30th Chinese Division, with its 90th Regiment advancing straight along the road toward Namhkam, while the 88th and 89th Regiments executed a shallow envelopment to the south of the road. Although conditions were favorable for a rapid advance into the Shweli valley, the commander of the 90th Regiment hesitated, causing delays along the flanks, as they formed the center of the Chinese line. Concurrently, Sultan ordered the Mars Task Force to embark on a challenging march through the hill country to the Mong Wi area, aiming to cut off the Burma Road near Hosi and effectively encircle the enemy 33rd Army. The 50th Chinese Division, which had been following the 36th British Division down the Railway Corridor, was set to occupy the vacated positions at Tonkwa and Si-u. Its objective was to cross the Shweli near Molo and proceed southeast to capture Lashio. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amidst fierce battles, General Bruce's troops advanced against Japanese forces in Leyte, securing key positions and paving the way for further assaults amid strategic retreats. In a strategic deception, Slim's forces advanced on multiple fronts, aiming to outmaneuver the Japanese, ultimately leading to decisive victories in Burma and weakening enemy defenses.

The British army of the Napoleonic wars - probably the most effective force we've ever deployed. Time and time again our small expeditionary army took on and beat the mighty French. But what was our secret? Well today, we are looking at one important aspect - the British regiment. . . how were our infantry and cavalry units organised? What is a troop? A squadron? A company and a platoon? What was different about the elite flank companies? In this episode I am joined by the incredible historian Steve Brown. His latest book can be pre-ordered here - https://amzn.to/4imBup6 If you are interested in the Zulu War, then please sign up for my mailing list to receive my free book on the subject: https://redcoathistory.com/newsletter/ You can also get early, ad-free access to my videos and podcasts by joining my patreon page - https://www.patreon.com/RedcoatHistory