Podcast appearances and mentions of craig watson

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Malacca strait. In the intense Battle of the Malacca Strait, Japanese forces undertook a desperate evacuation amidst relentless attacks by the Allies. After suffering heavy casualties from previous confrontations, the Japanese regrouped and attempted to maintain their defensive positions. However, under the pressure of determined Allied assaults and strategic maneuvers, they faced increasingly fierce resistance. As the Allies advanced, they successfully overwhelmed Japanese defenses, leading to significant losses for the opposing forces. The battle transformed into a pivotal moment in the Pacific War as Japanese resistance crumbled, ultimately shifting the tide toward Allied victory. This clash not only showcased the harsh realities of war but also underscored the relentless determination of both sides as they fought for dominance in the region, marking a crucial step towards the conclusion of the conflict. This episode is the Breakthrough on Okinawa Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As of mid-May, General Buckner's forces had made steady, albeit slow, progress against the determined Japanese defenders on the Shuri defensive line. On May 16, the offensive continued. Colonel Schneider's 22nd Marines and Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines launched yet another unsuccessful assault on Sugar Loaf Hill, while Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines exhausted their strength in a failed attempt to seize Wana Ridge. To the east, Colonel Coolidge's 305th Regiment advanced 200 yards closer to Shuri. Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment nearly captured Flattop and Chocolate Drop Hill but was ultimately pushed back. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment successfully cleared Dick Hill but came under intense fire from Oboe Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel May's 383rd Regiment made only minor gains on the southeastern slopes of Conical Hill and Love Hill, even as tanks broke through toward Yonabaru for the first time. The following day, the 383rd Regiment maintained pressure on Conical and Love Hills, prompting General Bradley to commit part of Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment to the attack. To the west, the 382nd Regiment staged a hard-fought advance of 200 yards but was unable to capture Oboe Hill.  Slowly the 77th Division forces between Flattop and Route 5 were reducing enemy positions bearing on the area in front of the 307th Infantry. By 17 May this progress began to show in the advances of the foot troops around Chocolate Drop. Covered by company heavy weapons out on both flanks, infantrymen worked around both sides of the hill to the huge caves on the reverse slope. Inside were 4 antitank guns, 1 field piece, 4 machine guns, 4 heavy mortars, and a American 60-mm. mortars. By nightfall the caves had been partially sealed off. During the night an enemy force launched a counterattack against the American positions around the hill but was repulsed with the loss of twenty-five Japanese killed. On the 17th another bitter struggle raged on Flattop. The struggle swayed back and forth across the narrow crest of the hill. Company K, the assaulting unit, had been reduced to fourteen infantrymen by the end of the day; finally it was forced back off the top. Tanks tried to go through the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill, but two of them were disabled by mines, leaving the cut blocked. The road cut was later blown along its entire length by seven tons of bangalore torpedoes to remove the mines. Company E continued to push toward Ishimmi Ridge, where they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and the rest of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion dug in just a few hundred yards north of Shuri and Ishimmi in the highway valley. Meanwhile, Coolidge's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire from 110 Meter Hill and the extensive fortress houses in Shuri's suburbs. The intense fighting had nearly depleted the 22nd Regiment, prompting General Amamiya to direct the 32nd Regiment to take over the defense of Shuri along a line extending from Ishimmi to Oboe. Meanwhile, on Wana, the 7th Marines launched a renewed attack but were once again repelled. However, the 5th Marines succeeded in advancing to Hill 55. Further west, the bulk of the 29th Marines attacked toward Half Moon Hill, successfully reaching its forward slopes but later having to withdraw to more defensive positions overnight. Whaling's 2nd Battalion also mounted relentless assaults on Sugar Loaf, each time suffering heavy losses in repelled attacks. As dusk fell, Japanese planes targeted American shipping, successfully damaging the destroyer Douglas H. Fox. On May 18, tanks played a crucial role in a successful assault on Sugar Loaf, executing a double envelopment while securing the top of the hill. The 2nd Battalion then advanced to Horseshoe Hill, while the remainder of the 29th Marines managed to secure the forward slopes of Half Moon.After a night of sporadic bombardment from enemy artillery and mortars, 3/7 again attempted to gain a foothold on Wana Ridge. During the morning supporting weapons concentrated their fire on the forward slopes and crest of the objective and at noon Company I, followed by a platoon of Company L, jumped off and fought its way to the ridge. The assault troops' gains "were measured in yards won, lost, and then won again." Finally, mounting casualties inflicted by enemy grenade and mortar fire forced Lieutenant Colonel Hurst to pull back his forward elements and consolidate his lines on positions held the previous night. On the right flank of the division front the isolated platoon from Company E of 2/5 was unsuccessful in exploiting its hold on the western slopes of Hill 55. The men were driven to cover by intense enemy fire, and tanks again had to be called upon to supply ammunition and rations to the outpost. During the morning operations the 5th Marines laid protective fire with tanks and assault guns along Wana Ridge to support 3/7's advance. At noon, under cover of this fire, Company F sent one rifle platoon and an attached platoon of engineers into Wana village to use flame throwers and demolitions against the enemy firing positions in the ruins. Numbers of grenade dischargers, machine guns, and rifles were found in Wana and the tombs behind it and destroyed. Further advance into the draw was not feasible until the 7th Marines could occupy the high ground on the eastern end of the ridge and furnish direct supporting fire to troops advancing in the draw below. At 1700 the troops were ordered to return to their lines for the night. n the center, General Bruce pressed his attack deeper into the Shuri defenses, with Coolidge's 3rd Battalion gaining 150 yards along the Ginowan-Shuri highway and Hamilton's 2nd Battalion advancing up to 300 yards toward Ishimmi, although attacks against 110 Meter Hill and Flattop failed to gain ground. On the morning of 18 May, orders were given to stay at all costs. Lieutenant Bell said firmly, "We stay." The men resigned themselves to a last-ditch stand. Their grenades exhausted and their machine guns and mortars destroyed, the remaining men salvaged every clip of ammunition from the bandoleers of the dead. Spare workable rifles were loaded and bayonets laid alongside. Enemy pressure increased steadily during the day. Some Americans were shot at close range as they darted from hole to hole to escape grenades. At one time eight knee mortars were pounding the ridge, firing in pairs. Friendly artillery could to some extent keep off the charging Japanese but seemed unable to ferret out the enemy mortars, which were well protected. The moans of wounded men, many of whom were in pitiful condition from lack of water and of medical aid, added to the strain. All canteens had been emptied the previous night. Nevertheless, battle discipline remained excellent. The worst problem concerned the replacements, who were courageous but inexperienced. Thrust suddenly into a desperate situation, some of them failed at crucial moments. One man saw two Japanese attacking a sergeant thirty feet away, but his finger froze on the trigger. Another shouted wildly for a comrade to shoot some Japanese while his own rifle lay in his hands. Another saw an enemy soldier a few yards from his hole, pulled the trigger, and discovered that he had forgotten to reload. By the end of the ordeal, however, the replacements who survived were battle-hardened veterans. During the afternoon the 307th attempted to reinforce the small group. Elements of Company C tried to cross the open ground north of Ishimmi Ridge. Only the commander and five men reached Company E. The men scrambled safely into foxholes, but the commander, shot through the head while racing toward the command post, fell dead on the parapet of the command post foxhole. Spirits rose considerably when word came later in the afternoon that a litter-bearing unit of eighty men would try to get through in the evening. Enemy fire slackened after dark, and the first of the litter bearers arrived at about 2200. They immediately started back carrying casualties. Walking wounded accompanied them. The litter bearers moved swiftly and managed to avoid being seen in the light of flares. Through splendid discipline and good luck eighteen men were carried out in two and a half hours, and others walked out. The litter teams had brought some water and ammunition and the troops drank for the first time since the day before. The second sleepless night on the ridge passed. The 382nd Regiment continued to face heavy resistance from Oboe Hill but managed to secure the road cut between Flattop and Dick Hill. Meanwhile, Halloran's 3rd Battalion could only push about 400 yards south due to the relentless mortar and small-arms fire coming from Hogback Ridge. At sea, a low-flying kamikaze aircraft struck LST-808 off Iejima, resulting in the deaths of 17 men. The following day, while the 382nd and 383rd Regiments focused on neutralizing the cave positions and gun emplacements in the uneven terrain between Conical and Dick Hills, Halloran's 3rd Battalion launched an attack to the south and west toward Sugar Hill but made little progress due to the heavy defensive fire. In the center, the 307th Regiment systematically worked to eliminate enemy firing positions on the high ground in front of them, employing every available weapon for the task. Colonel Smith's rehabilitated 306th Regiment began moving up to replace the battered 305th, with its 3rd Battalion relieving Coolidge's 3rd Battalion and portions of Hamilton's 2nd Battalion along the low ground bordering the highway to Shuri, including the isolated men at Ishimmi Ridge.  On 19 May the enemy seemed to intensify his efforts to recapture Ishimmi Ridge. The besieged troops wondered whether his supply of men and ammunition was inexhaustible. The Japanese launched several attacks which were repulsed with great difficulty. Only the support of artillery and mortars, together with self-propelled mounts firing with precision on both flanks of Ishimmi Ridge, prevented the enemy from making an attack in strength which would have overrun the American positions. One enemy attack of platoon strength was dispersed by mortar and machine-gun fire and by a four-battalion time-on-target artillery concentration. Japanese mortar fire continued to fall on Ishimmi, however, and took its toll during the day. A message arrived during the morning that Company E would be relieved that evening. By noon the radio had become so weak that further communication with the company was impossible. The day wore slowly on. By 2100 there was still no sign of the relief. Shortly afterward, however, rifle fire intensified to the rear, a sign of activity there. At 2200 Company L, 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, arrived. The relief was carried out in pitch darkness; each member of Company E left as soon as a replacement reached his position. As the haggard survivors were about to descend the ridge at 0300, a bursting shell hit two of the newcomers; one of them had to be evacuated on a poncho. Carrying its own wounded, Company E followed a white tape to the rear and arrived safely. Of the 204 officers and men of the reinforced company that had made the night attack on Ishimmi, 156 had been killed or wounded. There were 28 privates, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 2 officers left of the original 129 members of Company E. The platoon sent in relief by Company C had gone out with 58 effectives and returned with 13. Of the 17 men in the heavy weapons section only 4 came back. Company E had spearheaded a several-hundred-yard advance toward Shuri, however, and with the help of supporting weapons had killed hundreds of Japanese around Ishimmi. The 7th Marines launched one last unsuccessful assault on Wana Ridge before being relieved by Colonel Mason's rested 1st Marines. Meanwhile, after repelling a strong night counterattack, the exhausted 29th Marines were also relieved by Colonel Shapley's reserve 4th Marines, which made additional advances alongside the 22nd Marines, now under Colonel Harold Roberts. Four new regiments had been committed over the past few days to revitalize the offensive. On May 20, Shapley's assault battalions gained more ground on Horseshoe Hill but were still unable to reach the crest of Half Moon, though they successfully repelled another strong night counterattack. To the east, Mason's 2nd Battalion advanced rapidly to the base of 110 Meter Hill and captured part of Wana Ridge, while his 3rd Battalion secured a firm hold on the northern slope. Concurrently, the 5th Marines attacked southwest along the Naha-Shuri Road and successfully captured the high ground. Meanwhile, in coordination with the 1st Marines, Coolidge's 1st Battalion and Smith's 3rd Battalion made a slow, grinding advance of about 150 yards, positioning themselves within 200 yards of the outskirts of Shuri in the highway valley. At the same time, the 382nd Regiment expanded its hold on the reverse slope of Dick Hill but remained unable to penetrate Oboe Hill. The 307th Regiment consolidated and expanded its positions around Chocolate Drop, finally seizing Flattop. Reducing the tiny hill continued to be ticklish work because enemy positions to the south still overlooked the area. The fighting was still so confused that three wounded Americans lay south of Chocolate Drop for two days before relief arrived. By that time two had died and the third was so delirious that he thought he was still fighting Japanese and had to be forcibly subdued. By 20 May the caves were completely sealed off. The enemy made a final attempt to retake Chocolate Drop, attacking in company strength, but was repelled with the loss of half his force. On the same day the 3d Battalion, using tanks, flame throwers, and demolition teams, finally secured the crest of Flattop. The final American attack started with a saturation shower of grenades. A chain of men extending from the base of Flattop passed hand grenades to the troops lined up along the crest, who threw the missiles as fast as they could pull out the pins. Having seized the advantage, the infantry moved down the reverse slope blasting caves with satchel charges and flame throwers. Tanks along the road cut accounted for many of the Japanese. BY 1545 Flattop had fallen. More than 250 enemy bodies lay on the crest and reverse slope of the hill. Further east, Halloran's 3rd Battalion made a slow but steady advance down the eastern slopes of Hogback, reaching the foot of Sugar Hill despite constant grenade duels with an enemy fighting desperately to hold every inch of ground. Additionally, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 383rd Regiment fought their way to jump-off positions within 300 yards of Love Hill, destroying enemy strongpoints that had obstructed their advance for a week. Meanwhile, back at sea, Japanese aircraft managed to damage two destroyers and three transports. The following day, the 383rd again attacked Love Hill but was ultimately forced to withdraw from its base due to fierce defensive fire. Despite this setback, May's 2nd Battalion successfully supported the 381st Regiment in clearing Hogback and pushing to the top of Sugar Hill. To the west, the 382nd advanced quickly against moderate opposition toward Oboe Hill and Hen Hill, encountering retreating enemy units moving toward the high ground at Shuri. Concurrently, the 307th pushed 350 yards south of Flattop before being halted by enemy forces at the Three Sisters, while the 306th completed the relief of the 305th, with its 3rd Battalion advancing 200 yards unopposed to the eastern slopes of 110 Meter Hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Marines continued their assault along Wana Ridge, making only limited gains at the Draw, where the 5th Marines held out and aggressively patrolled forward. The 4th Marines began their push toward the Asato River, achieving a costly advance of about 200 yards on Horseshoe. By nightfall, heavy rains began to fall, significantly impeding efforts to resupply assault troops and replenish forward ammunition dumps. Amidst this torrential downpour on May 22, Shapley's 1st and 3rd Battalions slogged through the "gooey slick mud" to reach the bank of the rain-swollen river. This prompted the Japanese to evacuate Naha and establish new defensive positions on the Kokuba Hills. To the east, the continuous rain flooded Wana Draw with mud and water, transforming it into a makeshift lake. For the next few days, General Del Valle's Marines were forced to attack without support, leading to aggressive patrolling rather than organized assaults. The prospects of success for the infantry alone, slogging through the mud without the support of other arms, were not encouraging. Tanks bogged down, helplessly mired. Amphibian tractors were unable to negotiate the morass, and front-line units, which had depended on these vehicles for carrying supplies forward in bad weather, now had to resort to hand carrying of supplies and of the wounded. These were back breaking tasks and were performed over areas swept by enemy fire. Mortar and artillery smoke was used as far as possible to give concealment for all movement. Litter cases were carried back through knee-deep mud. Living conditions of front-line troops were indescribably bad. Foxholes dug into the clay slopes caved in from the constant soaking, and, even when the sides held, the holes had to be bailed out repeatedly. Clothes and equipment and the men's bodies were wet for days. The bodies of Japanese killed at night lay outside the foxholes, decomposing under swarms of flies. Sanitation measures broke down. The troops were often hungry. Sleep was almost impossible. The strain began to take a mounting toll of men. Under these conditions the Marine attack against Wana Ridge was soon at a standstill. The action degenerated into what was called in official reports "aggressive patrolling." Despite inactivity, enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to play against the American front lines, especially at dusk and at night. In the center, Bruce's 77th Division faced similar challenges, with the 306th Regiment stalled and the 307th Regiment again unsuccessfully attacking the Three Sisters. There, Company A became isolated at the base of the forward slope of Jane Hill, nearly cut off by intense enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. For the following week, the 382nd Regiment struggled to make headway on Hen and Oboe Hills, where fierce hand-to-hand combat erupted. Similarly, all attempts by the 383rd Regiment to breach the defenses of Love Hill on the western side of Conical failed, as the 381st was also unable to make any progress against Cutaway. General Hodge had also moved General Arnold's rehabilitated 7th Division to assembly areas just north of Conical Hill to spearhead the advance toward Yonabaru and the high ground south of the village. Strengthened by 1,691 replacements and 546 men returned to duty from hospitals since it left the lines on 9 May, the 7th Division moved up to forward assembly areas just north of Conical Hill and prepared to make the dash through the corridor. At 1900 on 21 May the 184th Infantry, chosen by General Arnold to lead the way, was in place at Gaja Ridge, at the northern base of Conical. The initial move of the envelopment was to be made in the dead of the night and in stealth. General Buckner felt that "if the 7th can swing round, running the gauntlet, it may be the kill." As part of this operation, the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment moved out from Gaja Ridge during the night, swiftly and silently passing through Yonabaru in the early morning hours to capture Spruce Hill and Chestnut Hill in a surprise attack. Colonel Green's 3rd Battalion then followed the 2nd Battalion through Yonabaru, but their assault on Juniper and Bamboo Hills was unsuccessful as the surprised defenders regrouped. The following day, Green's two battalions continued to push toward these initial objectives, ultimately securing a solid line that stretched from the coastline across the southern slopes of Chestnut, and then over to Juniper and Bamboo by day's end. This success allowed Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment to pass through Yonabaru and advance westward along the Naha-Yonabaru valley to assault the enemy's western hill defenses focused around Oak Hill.On the west coast, after a successful night reconnaissance of the Asato River, the 4th Marines rapidly crossed the river under cover of smoke, beginning their advance toward a low ridge 500 yards south of the Asato. However, as previously noted, the torrential rain had turned every draw and gully into a sticky morass of knee- and thigh-deep mud in the center. The steep slopes of the hills and ridges, treacherous under the best of conditions, became virtually unassailable. Consequently, full-scale coordinated attacks had to be canceled, and only localized gains could be achieved. Despite the breakthrough in the center, the Japanese command remained concerned about the threat posed to the flanks of the Shuri bastion by American advances along both coasts. While they believed the Naha breakthrough could be contained, every available soldier was deployed to establish a defensive line stretching from the southwest slopes of Conical Hill through Yonawa to the road junction village of Chan, aiming to eliminate Arnold's spearhead that had penetrated into the Naha-Yonabaru valley. General Ushijima feared that his forces were being gradually encircled in the Shuri fortress, where they would become “easy prey” to overwhelming American firepower. In light of this situation, Ushijima began planning a withdrawal to the Chinen Peninsula or the southernmost part of the island, the Kiyamu Peninsula. This decision was met with resistance from General Fujioka, who expressed concern that thousands of severely wounded men would have to be abandoned during the retreat.  Although the holding of the heights surrounding the city had been the keystone of the Japanese preferred plan, several factors now militated against its retention. There were an estimated 50000 surviving officers and men to be crammed into a final defense zone less than a mile in diameter. Once these troops were surrounded, the Japanese believed that they would be rendered ineffectual and become "easy prey" to overwhelming American fire superiority. In addition, Japanese long-range artillery pieces, many of which were still intact, could not be effectively utilized within the limited space that would be available. The best chance of prolonging the battle for Okinawa seemed to rest in defending the Kiyamu Peninsula region which was dominated by the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Natural and artificial caves, sufficient to accommodate the whole of the surviving army, abounded in the area. The 24th Division, which had organized the terrain, had left a considerable amount of ammunition and weapons there when it moved north to the Shuri lines. The principal roads in southern Okinawa led directly to the proposed position, thus facilitating the movement of large bodies of men in the shortest possible time. These roads also gave American tanks an excellent route of advance, but only to the outposts of the defensive zone where cliffs, hills, and precipitous ridges barred the way. To add weight to his argument, General Amamiya indicated that his 24th Transport Regiment had preserved enough trucks to move the Shuri munitions reserve to the new position within five nights if weather conditions permitted. General Ushijima, after considering the respective positions of his staff and commanders, decided to order the move to Kiyamu.  Although General Suzuki preferred the Chinen Peninsula, which his brigade had fortified, most officials supported a move to the Kiyamu Peninsula, where Amamiya's 24th Division had previously established defenses in the natural and artificial caves of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Thus, transportation of wounded personnel and munitions reserves to the south commenced at midnight on May 23, with the bulk of the 32nd Army scheduled to begin their withdrawal six days later.  On the night of 25 May, the remnants of the 62d Division were to pull out of the Shuri line and move through Tsukasan to counterattack the Americans. The relatively strong 22d Independent Infantry Battalion, which had been in reserve throughout most of the fighting in April and May, was directed to hold the Shuri front in place of the division. The orders to General Fujioka were "to annihilate the enemy rushing from the Yonabaru area." Failing this, the division was at least to stop the American advance long enough to allow the main body of the Thirty-second Army to retire. In order to gain time to organize the new positions, the holding force left on the Shuri front was to fight on until 31 May. Withdrawing units were to leave behind strong rearguards which would defend a line along the Kokuba Gawa to the hills north of Tsukasan and Chan and then south through Karadera to the east coast until the night of 2 June. Then a second line centered on Tomusu, approximately 2,000 yards farther south, would be held until the night of 4 June. By that time the Thirty-second Army would be firmly set up within its Itoman-Yunagusuku-Gushichan outpost zone. Admiral Ota's naval force was directed to hold the west flank of the withdrawal corridor and begin its own retreat when ordered by 32nd Army. During the night, Admiral Ugaki initiated his seventh mass Kikisui attack, launching 165 kamikaze aircraft that inflicted only light damage on landing craft. On May 24, while engineers constructed a bridge over the Asato River to facilitate vehicle movement, the 4th Marines suffered heavy casualties as they attempted to advance through the muddy, flooded valley and low clay hills. Simultaneously, Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company crossed the lower Asato and roamed the streets of northwestern Naha without encountering any resistance. To the east, Dill's 1st Battalion faced a brutal counterattack that inflicted significant casualties and nearly drove the Americans from Oboe Hill. Following Ushijima's directives, the 32nd and 184th Regiments began to encounter increasing resistance as they sought to expand their control over the valley and the high ground to the south. This culminated in a series of aggressive nighttime counterattacks that ultimately slowed and halted the western advance of the 7th Division. During the night, Japanese forces conducted heavy raids on American airfields at Kadena, Yontan, and Iejima. However, these attacks were merely a diversion for Operation Gi-Gou, a suicide raid against Kadena and Yontan. In this operation, twelve Ki-21 heavy bombers, carrying Giretsu Kuteitai special airborne assault troops, aimed to crash land on the airfields to deploy commandos tasked with destroying aircraft stationed there.  After the start of B-29 attacks on Tokyo from bases in the Mariana Islands, the 1st Raiding Brigade of the Teishin Shudan was ordered to form a commando unit for a "special operations" mission to attack and destroy the bombers on the Aslito Airfield on Saipan. Captain Okuyama Michiro, commander of the brigade's engineering company and trained in sabotage and demolition was selected as mission leader. He selected an additional 126 men from his own team, the 4th Company of the 1st Raiding Regiment, to form the first Giretsu Airborne Unit. It was initially organized with a command section and five platoons and one independent squad, based at the Imperial Japanese Army's air academy at Saitama. The group unit also included eight intelligence officers and two radio men from the Nakano School. Giretsu operations were to be undertaken at night, beginning with air strikes by bombers. After this, commando units would be inserted onto the target airfield by crash landing their transports. The fact that there was no provision for extraction of the strike force, along with the rejection of surrender in Japanese military doctrine at the time, meant that the Giretsu ground operations were effectively suicide attacks. Though the Saipan attack was eventually cancelled, the 6th Air Army ultimately requested the deployment of the Giretsu Special Forces to neutralize the Okinawa airfields. The 6th Air Army accordingly began preparations for the attack in early May. Led by Captain Okuyama, the raid force moved from Nishitsukuba to Kumamoto as it continued to prepare for the assault, codenamed Operation Gi-Gou. Aircraft for the raid came from the 3rd Independent Air Unit based in the vicinity of Hamamatsu. The raid force consisted of 120 commandos broken up into a headquarters section and five flights, each containing twenty men. They were to be transported by twelve Mitsubishi Ki-21s stripped of their guns and with additional forward and rear exits added to assist raiders with exiting. The timing of the raid was also meant to coincide with the withdrawal of the 32nd Army from the Shuri Line in southern Okinawa. Of the twelve bombers dispatched, four encountered engine trouble and returned to base, while three were intercepted by American night fighters en route to Okinawa. The remaining five Ki-21 bombers approached Yontan Airfield at low altitude and engaged Marine anti-aircraft gunners from the 1st Provisional Anti-aircraft Artillery Group. As a result, four of the bombers were shot down or crash-landed; however, a small number of Giretsu commandos survived this wave and commenced their mission to attack aircraft on the airfield. The fifth bomber, however, successfully evaded anti-aircraft fire and belly-landed approximately 100 meters from the control tower. About 10 commandos disembarked and attacked aircraft and air personnel with grenades. In the ensuing chaos, the Japanese commandos killed two Americans, wounded 18, destroyed nine aircraft, damaged 29 more, and set a fuel dump ablaze, destroying 70,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. After twelve hours of mayhem, however, American troops hunted down the commandos and exterminated them to a man. Despite this partial success, the Japanese operation occurred against a backdrop of heavy losses, with American fighters and anti-aircraft fire claiming a total of 150 Japanese planes on May 24. During the course of three days, Ugaki committed a total of 387 Navy planes and 174 Army planes to his kamikaze attacks, which continued through May 25. These attacks successfully sank the destroyer Bates, one transport, and one landing craft, while further damaging two destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, one minesweeper, one transport, and one Liberty ship. On the same day, Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57 launched its final strikes in the Okinawa area before retiring late on May 25, having completed the Royal Navy's Iceberg mission. On land, while Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company occupied the deserted ruins of Naha, the 4th Marines fought to seize Machisi Ridge and continued pushing into the eastern outskirts of Naha. However, across the remainder of the 10th Army front, assault units struggled to make progress due to the havoc wreaked by the rain and the stiffened Japanese resistance. That night, in accordance with the withdrawal plan, the 62nd Division began moving its remaining 3,000 men to counter the advance of the 7th Division, hoping to delay the American advance long enough for the main body of the 32nd Army to retreat. The arrival of additional forces on the Ozato-Mura front had little significant impact, primarily serving to strengthen the covering and holding force. On May 26, the 184th Regiment successfully cleared the Hemlock-Locust Hill Escarpment. Meanwhile, the 32nd Regiment was brought nearly to a standstill in front of the Japanese defensive line across the Yonabaru valley. Looking west, Del Valle's Marines observed large numbers of enemy troops withdrawing from Shuri and were able to pinpoint their location for naval guns, artillery, and aircraft to bombard. However, despite penetrating the Shuri defensive line on both flanks, the day yielded minimal progress. At sea, further kamikaze attacks caused damage to one destroyer, one destroyer minesweeper, and a subchaser. In total, Ugaki's raids over the past three days resulted in the deaths of 103 sailors.  Believing the fast carriers' continued value off Okinawa had become dubious, back on May 18 Mitscher had requested that TF 58 be relieved from its Okinawa station. Spruance regretfully declined. A week later an increasingly weary Mitscher reported: “For two and a half months [Task Force 58] operated daily in a 60nm square area East of Okinawa, less than 350nm from Kyushu. This was necessitated by the restricted area available and the necessity for being able to cover [the] Amami Gunto airfields, intercept air raids before they could reach Okinawa, and still furnish air support to ground forces. There was no other location from which all these things could be done.” Reflecting on the months of unrelenting stress, tedium, and fatigue, TG 58.1's screen commander, Captain Tom Hederman, signaled Rear Admiral J.J. Jocko Clark: “See Hebrews 13, verse 8.” Consulting his Bible aboard Hornet, Clark read: “Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and today, and forever.” Amused, Clark forwarded the verse to his entire Task Group, adding, “No disrespect intended.” Clark then signaled Mitscher, “What the hell are we doing out here, anyway?” Mitscher's response: “We are a highspeed stationary target for the Japanese air force.” Indeed, TF 58 had already suffered over 2,000 Iceberg fatalities. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The brutal Battle of Okinawa was reaching a critical point as General Buckner's forces pressed against fierce Japanese defenses. Struggles unfolded over Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, with Marines suffering heavy casualties but slowly gaining ground. By late May, the dire situation prompted Japanese commanders to plan a retreat to more defensible positions as American forces closed in. Despite challenging conditions, the Allies pushed forward, marking a decisive breakthrough in the Pacific War.

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

20250518AM - Ministered in the morning service at ‘Incite Church', Pastor Craig Watson ministered on, ‘What are you Hearing?'.

Last time we spoke about the second Okinawa Offensive. In the brutal Second Okinawa Counteroffensive, American forces confronted staunch Japanese defenses, with Captain Ryan leading a valiant charge for territory. Despite fierce resistance and heavy casualties, his troops managed to seize crucial ground, enduring intense hand-to-hand combat atop Ryan Ridge. The battle raged on, with American forces fighting through exhaustion and dwindling supplies, while the Japanese, though determined, faced declining morale as they lost ground. The relentless struggle exemplified extraordinary sacrifice on both sides, but it foreshadowed a turning point in the Pacific campaign. As American advances continued, the tide shifted, marking the beginning of the end for Japanese dominance in the region, ultimately paving the way for Allied victory. This episode is the Battle of the Malacca Strait Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  After the failure of their second offensive, the Japanese turned all their energies toward waging a prolonged battle of attrition. Their losses did not impair immediately their defensive capacities; thus the 24th Corps found no weak point in the Shuri defenses resulting from the ill-starred offensive. By throwing fresh troops into the attack of 4 May Ushijima had been able to maintain his strength all along the line. Nor was there any breakdown in his command and staff operation. Front-line units were reorganized without seeming loss of effectiveness; available reinforcements were carefully allotted to existing regiments; local counterattacks were timed for maximum effect. General Ushijima's chief task now was to keep sufficient combat troops at the front to man his Shuri defenses. It was apparent by 7 May that the strength of the remaining regular infantry was not great enough for this task. Consequently, Ushijima converted service units into infantry combat groups. By mixing service troops with the "regulars," he exacted from them their maximum combat effectiveness. "One man in ten will continue with his rear-echelon duties. The remaining nine men will devote themselves to antitank combat training," one order stated. The reorganization of the 32d Regiment, 24th Division, was typical of the resourcefulness of the Japanese. The regimental headquarters received 5 men from the 24th Transport Regiment. The 1st Battalion kept its own surviving members and was allotted all the survivors of the 2d Battalion, 20 men from the 7th Shipping Depot, 90 from the 24th Transport Regiment, and y from the 26th Sea Raiding Squadron. The 2d Battalion was totally reconstituted from the 29th Independent Infantry Battalion and other units. The 3d Battalion was reorganized in a manner similar to that used with the 1st. It was by this process of piecing units together that the 32d Army was able to stay intact long after the original combat units had been virtually destroyed, a capability which at the time American intelligence officers found "baffling." After his offensive failed, the enemy formed a line in which the relative position of the major units was to remain roughly the same until the end of the battle. On the east the 24th Division, reinforced by two independent battalions, held the line as far as Shuri, with its 89th Regiment on the east, its 22d in the center, and its 32d on the west. The remnants of the battered 62d Division were stretched from a point north of Shuri almost to the west coast, holding about one-third of the line. Along the Asa River estuary was a battalion of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The Japanese husbanded their remaining heavy weapons, especially their artillery, as carefully as they meted out their manpower. On 6 May the Japanese 5th Artillery Command directed its units to "revert to the [defensive] situation which held prior to the attack situation of 3 May." Once again the protection of individual pieces was a cardinal feature of enemy operations. Artillery units were ordered to "use ammunition with the utmost economy" and to "wait and fire for effect against vital targets." Along the west coast, preliminary plans were underway for the deployment of General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division to the front lines, while General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division continued its assault on the Dakeshi-Awacha hill complex. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines secured the coastal flank after capturing the north bank of the Asa River. Meanwhile, Colonel Arthur Mason's 1st Marines focused their efforts on the western approaches to the Dakeshi hill defenses, but they were ultimately repulsed by the tenacious Japanese defenders around Hill 60. In the Awacha Pocket, Colonel Griebel's 5th Marines faced fierce opposition, resulting in only modest territorial gains. To the east, after successfully fending off multiple strong enemy counterattacks, General Bruce's 77th Division advanced 800 yards south toward Hill 187, establishing control over the southern slope of the Maeda Escarpment. Finally, operations in General Arnold's 7th Division area were confined to robust patrols aimed at securing the approaches to Conical Hill and eliminating the remaining fragments of the failed Japanese counteroffensive. Convinced that the Japanese had nearly exhausted their fresh reserves, General Buckner began planning a comprehensive assault on the Shuri defenses with his two corps. On May 7, General Geiger was assigned to command the 1st Marine Division within the 24th Corps front and oversee the southern movement of the 6th Marine Division, with General Buckner taking direct tactical control of the two-corps assault. Heavy rains on the morning of 7 May delayed the projected IIIAC advance until tanks were able to negotiate the muddy terrain. In the 1st Marines' zone, the new regimental commander, Colonel Arthur T. Mason, ordered 3/1 to support the attack of the 2d Battalion on Hill 60 with all available weapons (four battalions of artillery, a fire support ship, and 81-mm. and 60-mm. mortars) by firing into the enemy reverse slope defenses. All morning long the regiment's mortars concentrated on the enemy position, and at 1400 when tanks finally reached the front lines the battalion attacked with Company E in assault. Artillery fire covered the foot of the objective while mortars and assault guns blanketed the crest and reverse slopes. The company swept to the top of Hill 60 by 1422 in a vivid demonstration of "the effect of properly massed, supporting fires in front of assault troops." Once the company entered the impact zone, however, and supporting fires were shifted to other targets the enemy defenders emerged from their caves and engaged the Marines in hand grenade duels. The fighting was at such close range that it was impossible to keep enough grenades on the line, and the marines used rifle butts against Japanese who tried to storm their position. Gradually the volume of Japanese fire of all types "grew noticeably stronger and progressively more intense so that it was evident that the enemy was receiving large reinforcements." The troops lost their hold at one point, then fought their way to the top again, yet the continuing Japanese fire from the reverse slope of Nan Hill was the decisive factor. The threat of a strong counterattack measured against the dwindling strength of Company E forced Lieutenant Colonel Magee to adjudge the company's advanced position untenable and to order a withdrawal to the previous night's lines. To the west, the 5th Marines steadily advanced approximately 400 yards in the Awacha Pocket, while the 77th Division gained up to 500 yards of enemy territory despite increasingly fierce resistance. By the end of the day, Colonel Coolidge's 305th Regiment had relieved the weary 307th. On the east coast, Colonel Green's 184th Regiment resumed its southward push, quickly capturing Gaja Ridge and William Hill, but faced greater opposition as they approached the western flanks of Conical Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment continued its assault toward Zebra Hill but could only secure How Hill and make incremental gains on Kochi Ridge, depleting their strength. The following day, as General Bradley's replenished 96th Division prepared to relieve the 7th, the 184th Regiment managed to occupy the forward slope of Easy Hill near Kibara without armored support. Throughout the rest of the 10th Army front, relentless cold rain effectively canceled planned offensive operations, leading the 1st Marines to focus on dismantling enemy positions on Nan Hill. Colonel Schneider's 22nd Marines took over from the 7th Marines along the Asa River just as news of the victory in Europe reached the infantry units, prompting a somewhat indifferent reaction from the rain-soaked soldiers preoccupied with the ongoing fighting in Okinawa. Exactly at 1200 every available artillery piece and naval gun fired three volleys at vital enemy targets to apprise the Japanese of the defeat of their Axis partner. On May 9, Japanese kamikaze pilots launched a series of scattered attacks, damaging the carrier Formidable and two destroyers. In preparation for Buckner's general offensive, the 22nd Marines patrolled their front to identify suitable crossing sites over the Asa River. Meanwhile, with Nan Hill fully cleared, Mason's 2nd Battalion renewed its assault on Hill 60, while the 1st Battalion advanced into the high ground to the east, successfully capturing their objective this time. Reinforced by elements of the 7th Marines, the 5th Marines also launched another attack on the Awacha Pocket but continued to encounter fierce resistance. In response, Griebel was tasked with reducing the Awacha defenses using two battalions, while Snedeker's reinforced 7th Marines pressed the offensive southward. To the east, General Bruce focused his efforts on the 305th Regiment's sector, resulting in the 3rd Battalion securing a foothold on Hill 187. The 17th Regiment, which had fought tenaciously to capture Kochi Ridge and the high ground west of Conical Hill, was relieved by Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment. Concurrently, Colonel May's 383rd Regiment moved into forward assembly areas behind the 184th and on May 10, took over the positions north of Conical Hill. Both fresh regiments of the 96th Division were then able to destroy enemy strongpoints that had impeded the progress of the weary 7th Division and capture key hills that protected the approaches to Conical. On the west coast, after stealthily constructing a footbridge across the Asa during the night, three companies of the 22nd Marines successfully crossed the river. However, two Japanese "human demolition charges" emerged from hiding and rushed the south end of the footbridge, destroying it. Despite the challenges, the attack south toward the town of Asa continued, successfully establishing a bridgehead that stretched 1,400 yards long and 350 yards deep by the end of the day. To the east, the 1st Marines launched an assault on the western end of Dakeshi but were pushed back by intense enfilading fire from the ridge. Similarly, although the 7th Marines initially advanced rapidly against scattered opposition, they were ultimately forced to withdraw under heavy Japanese fire. Behind them, after fending off two fierce night counterattacks, the 5th Marines failed to isolate the Awacha Pocket but made significant strides, penetrating deep into the heart of the Awacha defenses. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment captured additional high ground leading toward the crucial road junction north of Shuri, where the reorganized and reinforced 32nd Regiment had established its primary defenses. The remnants of the 62nd Division were gradually being withdrawn toward Shuri, with General Suzuki's fresh 44th Independent Mixed Brigade taking over the western sector. On May 11, General Buckner initiated his general offensive against Shuri, planning to envelop the town from both the west and east. However, this offensive was preceded by Admiral Ugaki's sixth mass Kikisui strike, during which 150 kamikazes launched successful attacks on American shipping. That morning, the 721st Kokutai's Sub-Lieutenant Yasunori Seizo led six kamikazes out of Kanoya. By 10:02, Admiral Mitscher was informed of possible bogeys infiltrating the returning TF 58 strike to reach the US carriers. Two minutes later came an overhead Corsair's sudden frantic warning: “Alert! Alert! Two planes diving on the Bunker Hill!” Almost immediately, Yasunori's Zero dove out of low overcast toward Bunker Hill and released its payload. The 550lb bomb pierced the flight deck, exited the side of the hull, and exploded above water. Simultaneously, Yasunori's Zero caromed into the center of Bunker Hill's flight deck, its gas tank exploding among 34 manned, armed, and fully fueled US fighters, before careening blazing over the side. One minute later, Yasunori's wingman Ensign Ogawa Kiyoshi roared past Bunker Hill, climbed steeply into a roll, and then dove straight at the carrier. Ogawa released his 550lb bomb, which scored amidships and exploded in the gallery deck, slaughtering much of Mitscher's staff. Simultaneously, Ogawa deliberately slammed his Zero into Bunker Hill's island just 100ft from Mitscher. Mitscher's operations officer, Commander Jimmy Flatley, had just left the gallery deck when Ogawa's bomb struck, searing his back. Mitscher had observed the entire attack in silence, and just then emerged from the bridge to gaze at the blazing flight deck. The Flag Plot was choked with billowing smoke and Mitscher's chief-of-staff, a gasping, wheezing Commodore Arleigh Burke, ordered it evacuated. A third Zero then dove on Bunker Hill, but anti-aircraft fire sent it blazing into the sea close aboard. Aboard Bunker Hill, a cascade of gasoline explosions erupted from burning planes aft, while tracers sprayed haphazardly from detonating machine gun ammunition. Speed fell to 10kts and as the crew began intensive firefighting efforts, a slight list developed. Cruiser Wilkes-Barre and three destroyers came alongside to fight fires and rescue 300 men forced overboard, yet most of Bunker Hill's fighter pilots had been asphyxiated in their ready room. By 11:30, however, damage was largely stabilized. Nevertheless, Bunker Hill had lost 393 men killed and 264 wounded. Although horribly outnumbered, the Americans' Corsair CAP shot down 50 attackers before the Japanese got through at 0800hrs. Over the next 90 minutes the two violently maneuvering destroyers would claim a combined 42 kills before Evans was disabled by four kamikaze hits. Minutes later Hugh W. Hadley was knocked out by her third kamikaze hit. With his ship dead in the water and blazing uncontrollably, Hugh W. Hadley's Commander Mullaney ordered all available colors hoisted: “If this ship is going down, she's going down with all flags flying.” Escorting the destroyers were three LCS(L)s and one LSM(R), who themselves combined to splash 14 Japanese planes before the action mercifully ended. All six ships survived, but the destroyers were towed to Kerama Retto, having suffered a combined 60 killed and 94 wounded. East of Okinawa, a G4M Betty bomber and four Ki-43 Oscars attacked RPS-5 at 0800hrs. One plane crashed destroyer-minelayer Harry F. Bauer (DM-26)'s stern, the kamikaze miraculously “plowing through the rack of depth charges and shoving them into the sea with none of them exploding.” Escorting LCS(L)-88 splashed two Oscars, the second scoring a posthumous 220lb bomb hit on her which killed nine and wounded seven. Back on the west coast, supported by tanks and artillery, the 22nd Marines advanced toward Amike. Their 3rd Battalion established control of the high ground overlooking Naha after an 800-yard advance, while the 1st Battalion gained the coral ridge in front after a series of costly assaults. The 2nd Battalion further extended the line to connect with the 1st Marine Division. Del Valle's advance was spearheaded by Mason's 2nd Battalion, which successfully secured a foothold on the high ground west of Wana despite a heavy artillery bombardment. In constructing the Wana position the Japanese had "taken advantage of every feature of a terrain so difficult it could not have been better designed if the enemy himself had the power to do so." With this natural advantage, the enemy had so organized the area that in order to crack the main line of resistance it was necessary for the 1st Marine Division to wheel towards Shuri and attack directly into the heart of the city's powerful defenses. Any attempt to drive past Shuri and continue the attack to the south would mean unacceptable losses inflicted by artillery, mortar, automatic-weapons, and rifle fire coming from the heights that commanded the division's flank and rear areas. The southernmost branch of the Asa Kawa wandered across the gently rising floor of Wana Draw and through the northern part of Shuri. The low rolling ground bordering the insignificant stream was completely exposed to enemy fire from positions along the reverse slope of Wana Ridge and the military crest of the ridge to the south. At its mouth Wana Draw was approximately 400 yards wide, but it narrowed drastically as it approached the city and the ridge walls closed on the stream bed. Guarding the western end of the draw was Hill 55, rugged terminus of the southern ridge line. The hill bristled with enemy guns whose fields of fire included the whole of the open ground leading to the draw. Defending the Wana position was the 64th Brigade of the 62d Division with remnants of the 15th, 23d, and 273d Independent Infantry Battalions, the 14th Independent Machine Gun Battalion, and the 81st Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion under its command. The 7th Marines advanced approximately 800 yards, establishing a firm hold on Dakeshi Ridge, while the 5th Marines eliminated the last organized resistance in the Awacha Pocket. In the center of the front, Bruce's two regiments needed to coordinate more closely with neighboring divisions than with one another. As a result, the 305th Regiment advanced up to 500 yards against fierce resistance, while Colonel Smith's 306th Regiment struggled to make headway against the formidable defenses of Chocolate Drop Hill and Wart Hill. To the east, after repelling a series of night counterattacks, the 382nd Regiment consolidated its positions on Zebra Hill and continued probing toward the Dick Hills area and the ridges northwest of Kuhazu. The 383rd Regiment quickly secured Easy and Fox Hills, subsequently capturing the summit of Charlie Hill. However, over the next two days, efforts by the 1st Battalion to dislodge the defenders from the top would be thwarted by withering fire from King Hill, while the 2nd Battalion cleared Gaja Ridge and the twin villages of Tobaru and Amaru. On May 12, Dill's 3rd Battalion executed a successful assault, capturing Baker Hill, although the 1st Battalion's attack on Dick Baker was repelled by the defenders. To the west, the 306th Regiment only provided support for the advance of the 305th, which faced difficult terrain in the broken ground west of Route 5, managing to gain about 500 yards. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines solidified their hold on Dakeshi Ridge against sporadic opposition, but the 1st Marines found themselves pinned down while trying to improve their positions west of Wana. The vulnerability of the 6th Marine Division to direct fire from the western slopes of the Shuri massif resulted in significant losses for Schneider's 2nd Battalion as it fought to seize the high ground overlooking Naha, ultimately being repelled from Sugar Loaf Hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion advanced steadily in the center, capturing the high ground north of Asato, while the 3rd Battalion secured commanding positions and conducted patrols through the suburbs of Naha. At sea, scattered kamikaze attacks damaged Admiral Spruance's flagship, the battleship New Mexico, and inflicted further damage on two additional destroyers the following day. In retaliation, Mitscher directed Task Force 58 to strike Kyushu once again. Back on Okinawa, as Schneider's 3rd Battalion reconnoitered the northern suburbs of Naha, the 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack on Sugar Loaf Hill. In light of this resistance and the heavy casualties suffered by the 22nd Marines, Shepherd ordered Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines to reinforce the effort, but they could only position themselves northwest of Makabe. To the east, while the 1st Marines faced heavy losses and were repelled at the mouth of Wana Draw, the 7th Marines finally secured Dakeshi Ridge. In the center, the 305th Regiment continued its determined advance into the extremely rugged terrain north and northeast of Shuri, whereas the 306th Regiment once again failed to capture Chocolate Drop Hill and Wart Hill. Coordinated with this, the 382nd Regiment attacked the Dick Hills, successfully securing Dick Baker and Dick Able against light opposition, but ultimately being pushed back from the latter. Further east, May's 2nd Battalion launched a frontal assault on Conical Hill, successfully reaching the northeast crest of the ridge, where it repelled several heavy Japanese counterattacks. Back at sea, Task Force 58 launched another strike on Kyushu during the early hours of May 14. In response, the Japanese dispatched 28 kamikazes alongside 40 escorts, inflicting heavy damage on Mitscher's new flagship, the carrier Enterprise, in what would become known as the last action of the Gray Ghost.  At 05:25, some 28 Zeros, armed with 1100lb bombs, sortied from Kanoya towards Mitscher's carriers cruising 130nm southeast of Kyushu. 40 fighters escorted them. Around 06:45 Enterprise detected 4 incoming bogies. 3 were shot down over TF 58, but the fourth, flown by Sub-Lieutenant Tomiyasu Shunsuke, continued closing. Using clouds for cover, Tomiyasu approached Enterprise from astern. Already struck by flak, at 06:57 Tomiyasu's blazing Zero suddenly appeared 200ft above Enterprise, which erupted with anti-aircraft fire. Although seeming to have overflown his target, Tomiyasu suddenly snap-rolled his burning Zero onto its back and dove almost vertically into Enterprise's flight deck. Observing from Enterprise's exposed bridge wing, Flatley rushed back inside and shouted to take cover just as Tomiyasu's kamikaze hit. The thunderous explosion blew Enterprise's forward elevator 400ft in the air, rattled the carrier's bridge, and flung shrapnel against her island. As Flatley emerged from cover he observed an unsmiling Mitscher, arms crossed, standing amid the smoking wreckage. “Jimmy,” Mitscher growled, “tell my Task Group commanders that if the Japs keep this up they're going to grow hair on my head yet.” Enterprise remained on station, but her flight deck was out of action. TF 58 splashed 3 more planes before Japanese attacks ended at 08:00. That evening TF 58 retired from Kyushu. The following morning, May 15, Mitscher transferred to carrier Randolph, his third flagship in 5 days. Enterprise would detach for repairs in the United States on May 16, having lost 14 dead and 68 wounded. Her war too was over. Honestly for those of you who might not know, the USS Enterprise is the most decorated ship of all time, an absolutely insane history. She was so impressive, my patreons voted for me to do an exclusive episode on her and it took two full episodes to do. If you are interested in the history of the USS Enterprise, please check out my exclusive podcast. At Okinawa, as positions on Conical Hill were being consolidated, May's 1st Battalion renewed its attack on Charlie Hill, successfully securing a foothold at its northern end, which was later extended down the southern slope. Simultaneously, Company L launched an assault on King Hill, managing to capture the entire crest. To the west, Dill's 1st Battalion attacked and captured Dick Able and Dick Right, although they had to relinquish Dick Right after a vigorous Japanese counterattack. The 3rd Battalion also advanced toward Dick Right, establishing a tenuous hold on the position. Further west, the 306th Regiment committed its last remaining strength, a composite battalion, to advance beyond Wart Hill, but it was quickly cut down by overwhelming flanking fire. Similarly, the battered 305th Regiment made little progress in the rugged terrain. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines advanced to within 100 yards of the ridge crest north of Wana, where they were ultimately pinned down by heavy fire. Concurrently, the depleted 1st Marines launched an assault that captured the western tip of Wana Ridge, aided by tanks and artillery, though a fierce night counterattack forced them to withdraw before being relieved by the fresh 5th Marines. Along the coast, the 22nd Marines successfully pushed toward the north bank of the Asato River, but the main action was poised to occur at Sugar Loaf Hill. Though Schneider's 2nd Battalion successfully seized the forward slopes of the protective hills north of Sugar Loaf, including Queen Hill, they faced intense enemy fire whenever they attempted to maneuver around or over these hills to launch an attack on Sugar Loaf itself. Nevertheless, the Marines pressed on, and by nightfall, a group of about 40 men under Major Henry Courtney managed to storm the hill, throwing grenades ahead of them and subsequently digging in at the summit to withstand a night of heavy mortar fire and constant counterattacks. This attack was further supported by the 29th Marines, which, after overcoming initial hardships, secured the forward slopes of the hill northeast of Sugar Loaf. During the early hours of May 15, the embattled group atop Sugar Loaf gratefully welcomed the arrival of reinforcements, though it was not before Major Courtney heroically fell while leading a grenade assault against the defenders on the reverse slope. Despite the reinforcements, enemy pressure on Sugar Loaf intensified, ultimately forcing the battered Marines off the hill. This triggered a fierce Japanese counterattack across a 900-yard front, compelling Schneider's 2nd Battalion to relinquish the ground immediately north of Sugar Loaf. Fearing a breakthrough, elements of his 1st Battalion seized the hill northwest of Sugar Loaf to help blunt the force of the enemy counterattacks, while the 3rd Battalion relieved the exhausted 2nd across the line. Additionally, the 29th Marines not only played a significant role in repulsing the enemy counterattack but also effectively strengthened its hold on the high ground north of Half Moon Hill.  To the east, while the 7th Marines reorganized and cleared out Dakeshi, the 5th Marines launched their first tank-infantry assault against Wana Draw. At 0630 on 15 May the 5th Marines completed the relief of the 1st, and Colonel Griebel assumed command of the zone of action west of Wana. The 2d Battalion was in assault with the 3d in close support and the 1st in reserve. On the recommendation of the regimental and battalion commanders of both the 1st and 5th Marines, the division decided to subject the high ground on both sides of Wana Draw to a thorough processing by tanks and self-propelled 105mm howitzers before 2/5 attempted to advance across the open ground at the mouth of the draw. With Company F of 2/5 providing fire teams for protection against suicide attackers, nine tanks from Company B, 1st Tank Battalion spent the morning working on the positions at the mouth of the draw. The tanks drew heavy small-arms, mortar, artillery, and AT fire, and accompanying infantry was dispersed to reduce casualties. Because of the open area of operation, the fire teams were still able to cover the tanks at relatively long-ranges. Both sides of the draw were honeycombed with caves and the tanks received intense and accurate fire from every sector at their front. During the morning one 47mm AT gun scored five hits on the attacking armor before NGF silenced it. About noon the tanks withdrew to allow an air strike to be placed in the draw and then return to the attack in reinforced strength. Naval gunfire again silenced a 47mm gun that took the tanks under fire, this time before any damage was done. With the approach of darkness the tanks pulled out of the draw pursued by a fury of enemy fire. The 5th Marines, convinced "that the position would have to be thoroughly pounded before it could be taken," scheduled another day of tank-infantry processing for Wana Draw before making its assault. In the center, the battered 305th Regiment continued its relentless advance through the irregular terrain west of the main Ginowan-Shuri highway. Simultaneously, Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment finally relieved the exhausted 306th and launched simultaneous attacks on Flattop and Chocolate Drop Hill. The 3rd Battalion slowly maneuvered toward the northern base of the Drop and the north slopes of Flattop, while the 2nd Battalion advanced toward Ishimmi Ridge through the open highway valley. Concurrently, the 382nd Regiment supported the assault on Flattop with its own attack against Dick Hill, successfully capturing its crest but failing to cross the skyline. Meanwhile, the 383rd Regiment struggled to make progress against intense enemy fire from the hill complex southwest of Conical's peak, although some elements managed to advance up the northwest spur from King Hill amid thick mortar fire.  Now, it's time to shift our focus from Okinawa to the sea, where we will cover the last destroyer actions of the Second World War. At the beginning of February, with the Southwest Area Fleet staff isolated in the Philippines, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru formed the 10th Area Fleet to defend the shores of Indonesia and Indochina. The 10th Area Fleet was comprised of the remnants of the 2nd Striking Force. This consisted of the two converted battleship/aircraft carriers Ise and Hyuga, forming the carrier squadron, and the two heavy cruisers Ashigara and Haguro, forming the 5th Cruiser Division. Two more heavy cruisers, Takao and Myoko, were at Singapore where both had reached sanctuary after being badly damaged in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Myoko had made one attempt to escape back to Japan in December 1944, but had been torpedoed by the US submarine Bergol on the 13th, and had then returned to Singapore. The cruiser Oyodo joined the fleet from February 5 to 20 and a fourth cruiser, Isuzu, joined on March 25 but lasted barely a fortnight before being sunk, on April 7, in a coordinated attack by the US submarines Charr, Gabilan and Besugo, with peripheral assistance from the British submarine Spark. In February Ise and Hyuga were also recalled and sailed on the 10th from Singapore, bound for Japan, carrying aviation spirit and other war materials. With such valuable cargoes the Japanese took great care to safeguard their passage and, by a combination of good luck and bad weather, both evaded numerous attacks by air and by submarine and reached Moji on the 19th. Haguro and Ashigara, and one old destroyer, Kamikaze, were now the only sizable warships left in the 10th Area Fleet to protect the troop evacuations. At this stage, the Japanese aimed to hold Java, Borneo, and Sumatra for as long as possible while planning their main defensive efforts in Malaya and Indochina. Consequently, they began withdrawing their garrisons from the outlying islands of the Moluccas, Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and the scattered islands of the Panda and Arafura Seas. Anticipating a similar evacuation of Japanese garrisons in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Admiral Arthur Power's East Indies Fleet had dispatched destroyers on a series of anti-shipping sweeps in the Andaman Sea, successfully destroying several relief convoys. On May 10, Fukudome decided to commence the evacuation of the Andaman Islands, dispatching Vice-Admiral Hashimoto Shintaro's heavy cruiser Haguro and destroyer Kamikaze to deliver supplies to the islands and return with troops back to Singapore. Additionally, a secondary convoy consisting of one auxiliary vessel and one subchaser was organized to perform the same mission for the Nicobar Islands. As Allied intelligence uncovered these plans, Vice-Admiral Harold Walker's Force 61, primarily composed of the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Richelieu and four escort carriers, sailed from Trincomalee to intercept the Japanese ships. However, the Japanese were unwilling to risk a battle, and upon receiving an air reconnaissance warning, they returned to Singapore. Nonetheless, Walker decided to remain in the area, awaiting reinforcements in case the enemy regained the confidence to launch another sortie. On May 14, Fukudome finally resolved to carry out the evacuation again, this time first sending forward his secondary convoy to the Nicobars. This force managed to reach the islands unmolested during the day and successfully embarked 450 troops before setting sail for Penang, although they were later spotted by a patrolling Liberator. In response, Walker dispatched the 21st Aircraft Carrier Squadron and the 26th Destroyer Flotilla to conduct an air and sea sweep off Diamond Point aimed at intercepting and destroying the enemy. On the morning of May 15, some Avengers encountered Haguro and Kamikaze as they returned to the Malacca Strait. As Captain Manley Power's destroyers rushed to the area, three Avengers launched by the escort carrier Shah attacked Haguro with bombs in the afternoon, causing minimal damage that only compelled Haguro to alter its course eastward. However, this diversion effectively allowed the destroyer force to intercept Hashimoto's convoy during the night. As the flotilla closed in on the enemy during the early hours of May 16, Hashimoto reacted desperately by fleeing at full speed to the north, thwarting Power's carefully laid ambush. Soon after, however, Haguro turned to port, crossing paths with the destroyer Venus, which was closing in at full speed from the west. Surprisingly, Venus failed to launch its torpedoes, prompting Hashimoto to turn south and back into Power's trap.  Haguro's violent turn away changed the situation dramatically. Saumarez now found the enemy racing down towards her port side at a relative speed of nearly 60 MPH. Kamikaze, following astern of Haguro, passed so close in front of Saumarez from starboard to port that Captain Power had to swing his ship hard to starboard and back to port again to avoid her. Kamikaze passed very close down Saumarez' port side and was taken under fire by both main and close range armament. Opening with star-shell, Saumarez shifted fire to Haguro herself at 0108, the enemy replying with main and secondary armament. The two enemy ships could now be clearly identified from Saumarez' bridge, Haguro at about 5,000 yards and Kamikaze about 2,200 yards range. ‘We had a glimpse of the cruiser by starshell, but now it was dark. She looked pretty big and her direction easy to see by her bow-wave and wash. Inclination vague but obviously broad. I thought she was going very fast. Her side was shining like a wet wall, with the reflection of her own starshell from behind us, I think.' To Lt. Reay Parkinson, also in Saumarez, Haguro ‘seemed to tower above us like a sky-scraper and her guns were depressed to their lowest angle'. Haguro's fire was accurate and splashes from near misses drenched the bridge personnel, binoculars and sound-powered telephones. But, as Captain Power philosophically remarked, ‘if you are only getting wet there is nothing to worry about'. However, Saumarez was unfortunately not merely getting wet. At about 0111, when Captain Power was just considering turning to fire, ‘one boiler got hit. There was a lot of steam and smoke amidships and a sort of queer silence. The ship was obviously slowing down and I thought she was going to stop.' Saumarez' torpedo tubes had been trained to starboard, ready for the bow attack, with torpedoes angled to run 70° left. There was no time to train the tubes to port. Captain Power swung his ship to port ‘like a shotgun' and at 0113, as Saumarez was slowing down but still swinging hard to port, a salvo of eight torpedoes was fired at Haguro's beam, at a range of 2,000 yards. Still under heavy fire, Saumarez continued her turn to port to open the range, telegraphs being put to ‘Full Ahead' to get the utmost speed from whatever engine power remained. A minute after Saumarez' attack, Verulam made an unmolested attack from 2,000 yards on Haguro's port bow, firing eight torpedoes. Saumarez and Verulam were rewarded by three hits, shared between them  ‘very distinct, three gold-coloured splashes like a Prince of Wales' feathers, more than twice as high as her bridge'. Now Haguro was under fire from the destroyers and everywhere she turned there was another destroyer waiting. At 0125 Venus fired six torpedoes and scored one hit. Two minutes later Virago, ordered by Captain (D) to ‘Finish her off', fired a salvo of eight torpedoes and obtained two hits. She reported that the cruiser's upper deck was now awash. Missed torpedoes were racing all over the battle scene; in Venus, at the height of the action, the Engineer Officer and the Chief ERA in the engine-room actually heard the whirring sound of two torpedoes passing very close along the ship's side. Saumarez had retired some five miles to the north-west to collect herself and examine damage. The engine telegraphs were still at ‘Full Ahead', and Saumarez withdrew further than Captain Power had intended. Vigilant had been rather ‘left in the cold' and squeezed out by the other destroyers and was not able to attack until 0151 when she fired eight torpedoes, with one probable hit. Haguro was lying motionless in the water, in her last throes. ‘The rest of the flotilla were snarling round the carcass like a lot of starving wolves round a dying bull. I was too far away to make out what was going on and told them all except Vigilant (who I knew had torpedoes) to come away and join me, with a view to getting formed up and the situation in hand. Of course they did nothing of the sort. I should not have done myself.' Venus was ordered to ‘Close and make a job of it' and at 0202 administered the coup de grace with her two remaining torpedoes. At 0206 Venus signalled that the cruiser had sunk. Haguro had gone, in a position about forty-five miles south-west of Penang. Fifty miles away, Cumberland and Richelieu had had tantalising glimpses of starshell and lights but were too late to take part. Saumarez transmitted Vs for Victory and Captain Power signalled: ‘Pick up survivors. Stay no more than ten minutes.' Kamikaze sustained slight damage from the gunfire but managed to escape, returning the following day to rescue approximately 320 survivors. Nevertheless, over 900 Japanese soldiers lost their lives in the battle, including Vice-Admiral Hashimoto and Rear-Admiral Sugiura Kaju. While the evacuation of the Nicobar Islands was successful, the evacuation of the Andaman Islands proved to be a resounding failure. By the end of the war, with the food situation in the islands becoming critical, the Japanese committed several atrocities against the civilian population. This included the transportation of 300 so-called “useless mouths” to the uninhabited Havelock Island, off South Andaman, where all but eleven of them perished. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. During the intense Battle of the Malacca Strait, Japanese forces attempted a desperate evacuation, facing relentless Allied attacks. Despite fierce resistance, the Allies advanced strategically, leading to significant Japanese losses. Caught in critical confrontations, the Japanese ultimately succumbed, marking a pivotal moment in the Pacific war and shifting the tide toward Allied victory.

Last time we spoke about Operation Chahar. In the turbulent year of 1935, tensions surged in North China as the Kwantung Army defied Tokyo's orders, encroaching deeper into Chahar province. This period was marked by widespread anti-Japanese sentiments, fueled by local revolts and the assassination of pro-Japanese figures, which infuriated Japanese authorities. On May 20, the Kwantung Army launched an offensive against a bandit group led by Sun Yungqin, seeking to exert control over the demilitarized regions established by earlier agreements. Their swift victory forced the resignation of local officials opposing Japanese interests. As chaos escalated, the Chinese government, under pressure to appease Japan, dismantled anti-Japanese factions and dismissed key leaders. The climax in this saga came with the signing of the He-Umezu Agreement, stripping China of authority in Hubei and Chahar, signaling Japan's increasing dominance and setting the stage for further exploitation of the region.   #150 The February 26 Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. While this podcast is supposed to be given through the Chinese perspective, I apologize but yet again I need to jump over to the Japanese side. You see, a very pivotal moment during the Showa era would occur in the year of 1936. I think it's crucial to understand it, and the underlying issues of it, to better understand what we will be stuck in for the unforeseeable future, the Second Sino-Japanese War. I've briefly mentioned the two factions within the Japanese military at this time, but now I'd really like to jump into them, and a major incident that made them collide. In the aftermath of WW1, 2 prominent factions emerged during this tumultuous period: the Kodoha, or Imperial Way Faction, and the Toseiha, or Control Faction. Each faction represented distinct visions for Japan's future, deeply influencing the nation's course leading up to World War II. The Kodoha rose to prominence in the 1920s, driven by a fervent belief in Japan's divine destiny and its right to expand its imperial reach across Asia. This faction was characterized by its adherence to traditional Japanese values, rooted in the samurai ethos. They viewed the Emperor as the embodiment of Japan's spirit and sought to return to the moral foundations they believed had been eroded by “Western influence”. The Kodoha was often critical of the West, perceiving the encroachment of Western thought and culture as a threat to Japan's unique identity. Their ideology emphasized a robust military force, advocating for aggressive campaigns in regions like Manchuria and China to assert Japan's dominance. Contrasting sharply with the Kodoha, the Toseiha began to emerge as a more dominant political force in the late 1930s. The Toseiha embraced a pragmatic approach, advocating for a disciplined military that could engage effectively with the complexities of modern warfare. They recognized the importance of retaining some traditional values while also integrating Western military techniques. Rather than rejecting Western influence entirely, the Toseiha believed in adapting to global shifts to ensure Japan's strength and security. The Toseiha's moderation extended to their governance strategies, as they prioritized political stability and control over radical ideology. They saw this approach as crucial for creating a robust state capable of managing Japan's expansionist ambitions without provoking the backlash that Kodoha tactics elicited. Their more calculated approach to military expansion included securing partnerships and pursuing diplomatic solutions alongside military action, thereby presenting a less confrontational image to the world. Now after Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in, many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. Both factions aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What really separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to make ends meet, whereas the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up mostly of junior and youthful officers, typically country boys as we would call them. These were young men whose families were not the blue bloods, farmer types. They viewed the dramatic changes of Japan in light of their own family experiences, many were impoverished by the dramatic changes. A very specific thing these Kodoha boys hated were the Zaibatsu. The Zaibatsu were large Japanese business conglomerates, primarily active from the Meiji period until WW2. They combined various industries, including banking, manufacturing, and trading. Prominent examples included Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. The reason they hated the Zaibatsu was because they believed they were influenced by western thought and that they super succeeded the authority of the emperor. More or less you can think of it as “we hate the fat cats who are really running things”.   Now the Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Basically they believed them to just be a necessary evil, you had to play ball to get things rolling. Random note, Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Now I cant go through the entire history of it, but this time period is known as the “government by assassination” period for Japan. Military leaders in the IJA, IJN and from within the Kodoha and Toseiha factions kept assassinating politicians and senior officers to push envelopes forward. Stating all of that, I now want to talk about the February 26th incident and I will add I am using a specific source, simply because it's my favorite. That is Herbert P Bix's Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. In late 1934, several officers from the Imperial Way faction at the Army Cadet School were arrested for plotting a coup. Although there were no immediate repercussions, the following year, two of the same Kodoha officers, named Isobe Asaichi and Muranaka Takaji were arrested again for distributing a document accusing Toseiha faction officers, like Major General Nagata Tetsuzan, of previously drafting coup plans against the government. This time, the army's upper echelons responded firmly, condemning Isobe and Muranaka's accusations as acts of disloyalty, resulting in both officers losing their commissions. Meanwhile, other Imperial Way officers sought retaliation against Nagata, who was rumored to be planning a major purge to eliminate factionalism within the army. Tatsukichi Minobe was a Japanese statesman and scholar of constitutional law and in the 1930s he began a movement bringing up the very real issue with the Meiji constitution in relation to the role of the emperor. In August 1935, amid a populist movement denouncing Minobe's interpretation of the constitution, Lt colonel Aizawa Saburo from Kodoha faction entered Nagata's office and fatally attacked him with his katana. This marked a significant escalation in the military struggle over state reform and the push for increased military funding, which was intertwined with the movement against Minobe. Meanwhile anti- Prime Minister Okada factions within the army, continuing to use slogans like “kokutai clarification” and “denounce the organ theory,” intensified their attacks on the emperor's advisers and hereditary peers. Senior generals from the Kodoha faction arranged a public court-martial for Aizawa, held by the 1st Division, a group heavily populated by Kodoha officers based in Tokyo. When Aizawa's trial commenced on January 12, 1936, his defense team transformed it into an emotional condemnation of the Okada cabinet, the court entourage, and Minobe's constitutional theories. This strategy garnered support across the nation, even reaching unexpected places like the imperial palace, where Dowager Empress Teimei Kogo, a staunch rightist, expressed sympathy for Aizawa. However, before the trial could progress, a military mutiny disrupted proceedings in the capital. Shockwaves rippled through the army after Army Minister Hayashi dismissed Kodoha member General Mazaki from his position overseeing military education and ordered the transfer of the 1st Division to Manchuria, which ignited the largest army uprising in modern Japanese history. The uprising was orchestrated through a series of meetings held from February 18 to 22 by key individuals including Nishida, Yasuhide Kurihara, Teruzō Andō, Hisashi Kōno, Takaji Muranaka, and Asaichi Isobe. Their plan was relatively straightforward: the officers would assassinate the most prominent adversaries of the kokutai, seize control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace, and present their demands, which included the dismissal of certain officials and the establishment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki. They did not establish long-term goals, believing that those should be determined by the Emperor. However, it is suspected that they were prepared to replace Hirohito with Prince Chichibu if necessary. The young Kodoha officers felt they had at least implicit support from several influential Imperial Japanese Army officers after making informal inquiries. This group included figures such as Araki, Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima, Jinzaburō Mazaki, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Kanji Ishiwara, Shigeru Honjō, as well as their immediate superiors, Kōhei Kashii and Takeo Hori. Later, Kawashima's successor as Minister of War remarked that if all the officers who had endorsed the rebellion were forced to resign, there would not have been enough high-ranking officers left to replace them. To articulate their intentions and grievances, the young officers prepared a document titled "Manifesto of the Uprising" “Kekki Shuisho”, which they intended to present to the Emperor. Although the document was authored by Muranaka, it was written under the name of Shirō Nonaka, the highest-ranking officer involved in the plot. The document aligned with Kokutai Genri-ha ideals, criticizing the genrō, political leaders, military factions, zaibatsu, bureaucrats, and political parties for jeopardizing the kokutai with their selfishness and disregard for the Emperor, and emphasized the need for direct action: “Now, as we face immense foreign and domestic challenges, if we do not eliminate the disloyal and unjust who threaten the kokutai, if we do not remove the villains obstructing the Emperor's authority and hindering the Restoration, the Imperial vision for our nation will come to naught [...] Our duty is to purge the malevolent ministers and military factions surrounding the Emperor and eradicate their influence; we shall fulfill this mission.” Seven targets were selected for assassination for "threatening the kokutai". Keisuke Okada served as Prime Minister, where he notably advocated for the London Naval Treaty and supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai. His actions reflect a commitment to international agreements and specific ideological principles at the time. Saionji Kinmochi, a Genrō and former Prime Minister, also supported the London Naval Treaty. However, his influence extended further, as he played a role in prompting the Emperor to establish inappropriate cabinets, impacting political stability. Makino Nobuaki, the former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Foreign Minister, was another key figure who supported the London Naval Treaty. He notably prevented Prince Fushimi from voicing protests to the Emperor during this period, and he established a court faction in collaboration with Saitō, further entrenching political alliances. In his capacity as Grand Chamberlain, Kantarō Suzuki supported the London Naval Treaty but faced criticism for "obstructing the Imperial virtue," suggesting tensions between political decisions and traditional values. Saitō Makoto, who served as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and former Prime Minister, was involved in advocating for the London Naval Treaty and played a significant role in Mazaki's dismissal. He, too, formed a court faction with Makino, indicating the intricacies of court politics. Takahashi Korekiyo, as Finance Minister and former Prime Minister, engaged in party politics with the aim of diminishing military influence. His approach was focused on maintaining the existing economic structure amid the shifting political landscape. Finally, Jōtarō Watanabe, who replaced Mazaki as Inspector General of Military Education, supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai yet faced criticism for refusing to resign, despite being considered unsuitable for his position. On the night of February 25, Tokyo experienced a heavy snowfall, which uplifted the rebel officers as it evoked memories of the 1860 Sakuradamon Incident. During this event, political activists known as shishi assassinated Ii Naosuke, the chief advisor to the Shōgun, in the name of the Emperor. The rebel forces, organized into six groups, began mobilizing their troops and departing from their barracks between 3:30 and 4:00 AM. At 5:00 AM, they launched simultaneous attacks on key targets, including Okada, Takahashi, Suzuki, Saito, the Ministry of War, and the headquarters of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. At around five o'clock on the morning of February 26, 1936, a rebellion erupted, fueled by the long-standing tensions surrounding the kokutai issues that had plagued 1935. Twenty-two junior officers led over 1,400 armed soldiers and non-commissioned officers from three regiments of the 1st Division and an infantry unit of the Imperial Guards in a mutiny in snow-covered Tokyo. The attack on Okada involved a contingent of 280 men from the 1st Infantry Regiment, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Yasuhide Kurihara. The troops encircled the Prime Minister's Residence and compelled its guards to open the gates. Upon entering the compound, they attempted to locate Prime Minister Okada but were met with gunfire from four policemen stationed there. All four policemen were killed, wounding six rebel soldiers in the process. However, the shots served as a warning for Okada, prompting his brother-in-law, Colonel Denzō Matsuo, to help him find refuge. Matsuo, who closely resembled Okada, was eventually discovered by the soldiers and killed. After comparing Matsuo's wounded face to a photograph of the prime minister, the attackers mistakenly believed they had accomplished their mission. Okada managed to escape the following day, but this information was kept confidential, and he did not play any further role in the events. After Matsuo's death, Kurihara's men took up guard positions around the compound, reinforced by sixty soldiers from the 3rd Imperial Guard. In another key operation, Captain Kiyosada Kōda led a group of 160 men to seize control of the Minister of War's residence, the Ministry of War, and the General Staff Office. Upon entering the Minister's residence at 6:30 AM, they demanded to see Minister Kawashima. Once admitted, they read their manifesto aloud and presented a document detailing several demands, including: A prompt resolution to the situation that would further "advance the cause of the Restoration." A call to prevent the use of force against the Righteous Army. The arrest of Kazushige Ugaki (Governor-General of Korea), Jirō Minami (commander of the Kwantung Army), Kuniaki Koiso (commander of the Korean Army), and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa for their roles in undermining military command. The immediate dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Akira Mutō, Colonel Hiroshi Nemoto, and Major Tadashi Katakura from the Imperial Japanese Army for promoting "factionalism." The appointment of Araki as the new commander of the Kwantung Army. Ugaki, who served as Minister of War during two separate terms, had overseen significant reductions and modernization efforts within the army. He had also failed to support the March Incident plotters, who had hoped to install him as Prime Minister. Minami, Mutō, Nemoto, and Katakura were all influential members of the Tōsei-ha faction; Katakura had been partly responsible for reporting on the Military Academy Incident. Later that morning, Isobe encountered Katakura outside the Ministry of War and shot him non-fatally in the head. During this tumultuous period, several officers sympathetic to the rebels, including General Mazaki, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, and General Ryū Saitō, joined the uprising. Saitō praised the young officers' spirit and encouraged Kawashima to accept their demands. Shortly before 9:00 am, Kawashima indicated he needed to speak with the Emperor and left for the Imperial Palace. Meanwhile, Captain Hisashi Kōno led a team of seven, comprised mostly of civilians, to attack Makino Nobuaki, who was staying at Kōfūsō, part of the ryokan Itōya in Yugawara, Kanagawa Prefecture, with his family. Arriving at 5:45 am, they stationed two men outside while entering the inn with weapons drawn. Inside, policemen opened fire, leading to a lengthy exchange of gunfire. A policeman managed to alert Makino and his party of the danger, guiding them to a rear exit. Although the assassins fired at the escaping group, Makino successfully evaded capture. Kōno sustained a gunshot wound to the chest, and one policeman, Yoshitaka Minagawa, was killed. As Kōno was evacuated from the scene, the assailants set fire to the building. Hearing a gunshot, Kōno assumed that Makino had shot himself inside. After his recovery at a nearby military hospital, Kōno and his team were arrested by military police. Around 10:00 am, Kurihara and Nakahashi loaded a fleet of three trucks with sixty men and drove from the Prime Minister's Residence to the offices of the Asahi Shimbun, a significant liberal newspaper. They stormed the building, ordering the evacuation of employees and declaring their actions as "divine retribution for being an un-Japanese newspaper." The rebels then overturned and scattered the newspaper's type trays, containing 4,000 different characters, temporarily halting its publication. Following this attack, the men distributed copies of the uprising's manifesto to nearby newspapers before returning to the Prime Minister's Residence. On another front, 1st Lieutenant Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard gathered 135 men and, under the pretext of paying respects at Yasukuni Shrine, marched to Takahashi Korekiyo's residence. There, he divided his forces, sending one group to attack while the other remained to guard the entrance. After breaking into the compound, Nakahashi and Lieutenant Kanji Nakajima found Takahashi in bed, where Nakahashi shot him while Nakajima delivered a fatal sword strike. Takahashi died without waking. Once his target was eliminated, Nakahashi regrouped with the soldiers and proceeded to the Imperial Palace, aiming to secure it. Entering through the western Hanzō Gate at 6:00 am, Nakahashi informed Major Kentarō Honma, the palace guard commander, that he had been dispatched to reinforce the gates due to earlier attacks. Honma, already aware of the uprisings, accepted Nakahashi's arrival. He was assigned to help secure the Sakashita Gate, the primary entrance to the Emperor's residence. Nakahashi planned to signal nearby rebel troops at police headquarters once he controlled access to the Emperor. However, he struggled to contact his allies, and by 8:00 am, Honma learned of his involvement in the uprising and ordered him, at gunpoint, to vacate the palace grounds. Nakahashi complied and returned to join Kurihara at the Prime Minister's Residence, while his soldiers remained at the gate until relieved later that day, preventing their inclusion in the government's official count of rebel forces. Elsewhere, 1st Lieutenant Naoshi Sakai led a detachment of 120 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Saitō Makoto's home in Yotsuya. After surrounding the policemen on guard, five soldiers entered the residence and found Saitō and his wife, Haruko, in their bedroom. They shot Saitō dead, prompting Haruko to plead for her life, saying, "Please kill me instead!" While they pulled her away, she was unwittingly wounded by stray gunfire. Following Saitō's assassination, two officers directed another group to target General Watanabe, while the remaining men moved to strategically position themselves northeast of the Ministry of War. In Kōjimachi, Captain Teruzō Andō commanded 200 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to assault Suzuki's residence across from the Imperial Palace. After disarming the police on duty, they located Suzuki in his bedroom and shot him twice. When Andō moved to deliver the coup de grâce with his sword, Suzuki's wife implored to be allowed to do it herself, believing her husband to be fatally wounded. Andō obliged and, apologizing for the act, explained it was for the nation's sake. After saluting Suzuki, the soldiers left to guard the Miyakezaka junction north of the Ministry of War. Following the assault on Saitō, a party of twenty men, led by 2nd Lieutenants Tarō Takahashi and Yutaka Yasuda, headed to Watanabe's residence in Ogikubo after 7:00 AM. Despite the two-hour delay since previous attacks, no measures had been taken to alert Watanabe. As they attempted to storm the front entrance, military police inside opened fire, wounding Yasuda and another soldier. The troops then gained entry through the rear, confronting Watanabe's wife outside their bedroom. After shoving her aside, they found Watanabe using a futon as cover. He opened fire, prompting one soldier to retaliate with a light machine gun. Takahashi then rushed in and fatally stabbed Watanabe, witnessed by his nine-year-old daughter, Kazuko, who hid nearby. The soldiers departed, taking their wounded to a hospital before positioning themselves in northern Nagatachō. In a significant move, Captain Shirō Nonaka led nearly a third of the rebel forces, comprising 500 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, to assault the Tokyo Metropolitan Police headquarters. Their objective was to secure communication equipment and prevent dispatch of the police's Emergency Service Unit. Meeting no resistance, they quickly occupied the building, possibly due to a strategic decision to leave the situation in the military's hands. After securing the police headquarters, 2nd Lieutenant Kinjirō Suzuki led a small group to attack Fumio Gotō's residence, the Home Minister's, but found that Gotō was not home, thus allowing him to escape. This attack appeared to result from Suzuki's independent decision, rather than a coordinated effort among the officers. Despite all of these actions, the Kodoha boys had failed to secure the Sakashita Gate to the palace, which allowed the palace to maintain communication with the outside world, and they neglected to address potential naval interventions. At the Yokosuka naval base, Rear Adm. Yonai Mitsumasa and his chief of staff, Inoue Shigeyoshi, positioned marines to defend the Navy Ministry and prepared warships in Tokyo Bay to suppress the rebellion. By the morning of February 28, after unsuccessful negotiations through sympathetic officers at army headquarters, the commander under martial law transmitted an imperial order to disperse. Most troops returned to their barracks, one officer committed suicide, and the remaining leaders surrendered, resulting in the uprising ending with minimal further violence. Nevertheless, martial law in Tokyo continued for nearly five months. The rebel officers had initially planned for General Kawashima, a staunch ally of the Kodoha, to relay their intentions to the emperor, who they assumed would issue a decree for a “Showa restoration.” Despite their radical objectives of overthrowing the political order, the mutineers, like other military and civilian extremists of the 1930s, sought to operate within the imperial framework and maintain the kokutai. They believed the emperor was under the control of his advisers and lacked a genuine will of his own. Once the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain were removed, they expected the emperor to appoint General Mazaki as prime minister, a leader they believed would reinforce the military and effectively address the China issue. At the onset of the insurrection, they had a real chance of success. The Tokyo military police commander, General Kashii Kohei, sympathized with their cause, and the emperor's chief aide, General Honjo, was related to rebel officer Capain Yamaguchi Ichitaro. Support for the mutineers was present at military bases nationwide. Historian Hata Ikuhiko notes that the rebels contacted General Honjo by both phone and written message before attacking the Okada cabinet. As the first in the imperial entourage to learn of the mutiny, Honjo could have warned the intended targets but chose not to do so. By the time he arrived at court at 6:00 am. on the 26th, key advisors like Chief Secretary Kido, Imperial Household Minister Yuasa Kurahei, and Vice Grand Chamberlain Hirohata Tadakata were already aware of the potential danger. Suzuki was murdered, and the emperor was deeply affected, awakening to the news at 5:40 am from the chamberlain on night duty, Kanroji Osanaga. He learned that his old ministers had been attacked and a coup was underway. Upon receiving this information, Hirohito resolved to suppress the uprising. He was outraged by the killing of his ministers and feared that the rebels might use his brother, Prince Chichibu, to force him to abdicate. He donned his army uniform and summoned Honjo, ordering him to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing.” Hirohito adopted a strategy proposed by Kido, who had acted swiftly earlier that morning, instructing Honjo to assess the Imperial Guard Division's potential actions if the mutineers advanced on the Palace. Kido aimed to prevent the establishment of a new provisional cabinet until the mutiny was fully quelled. At 9:30 am Army Minister Kawashima, who had previously met with one of the rebel officers, arrived at court. He urged the emperor to form a cabinet that would “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life, and fulfill national defense.” Surprised by Kawashima's tone, Hirohito reprimanded him for not prioritizing the suppression of the mutiny. He also expressed his frustration to Chief of the Navy General Staff Prince Fushimi, dismissing him when he inquired about forming a new cabinet. Later that day, Kawashima met with the Supreme Military Council, consisting mainly of army officers sympathetic to the rebels. The council decided to attempt persuasion before relaying the emperor's orders a move contrary to Hirohito's directive. According to historian Otabe Yuji, an “instruction” was issued to the rebel officers at 10:50 am, acknowledging their motives and suggesting the emperor might show them leniency. This message was communicated to the ringleaders by martial law commander General Kashii. That evening, when members of the Okada cabinet came to submit their resignations, Hirohito insisted they remain in power until the mutiny was resolved. On February 27, the second day of the uprising, Hirohito announced “administrative martial law” based on Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution. This invoked his sovereign powers to address the crisis while freeing him from needing cabinet approval for his actions. Hirohito displayed remarkable energy throughout the subsequent days, sending chamberlains to summon Honjo for updates and threatening to lead the Imperial Guard Division himself when dissatisfied with the reports. Honjo, however, resisted the emperor's demands and exhibited sympathy for the rebels. During the uprising, Hirohito met with Prince Chichibu, who had recently returned from Hirosaki. Their discussions reportedly led Chichibu to distance himself from the rebels. However, rumors of his sympathy for them persisted, leading to concerns about potential conflicts within the imperial family. On the second day, Rear Admiral Yonai and his chief of staff demonstrated their loyalty to Hirohito. By February 29, the fourth day of the uprising, Hirohito had reasserted his authority, troops were returning to their barracks, and most rebel leaders were captured. Seventeen of these leaders were court-martialed and executed in July without legal representation. Shortly after, during the obon festival, Hirohito allegedly instructed a military aide to secure seventeen obon lanterns for the palace. This action, though secret, may have provided him some personal comfort amidst the turmoil. An investigation following the mutiny revealed that the rebels' sense of crisis was amplified by the recent general elections, which had shown an anti-military sentiment among voters. Despite their populist rhetoric, most ringleaders were not motivated by the agricultural depression; their goal was to support the kokutai by advocating for increased military rearmament. During this period, military spending steadily rose from 3.47% of GNP in 1931 to 5.63% in 1936. Intriguingly, the ringleaders and their senior commanders shared a desire for state control over production to mobilize resources fully for total war. While united in this goal, their ideas about how to achieve a “Showa restoration” varied greatly, with some leaders, like Isobe, calling for complete economic consolidation and a return to strong state power. The February mutiny reinforced Hirohito's belief in the constitutional framework that underpinned his military authority. He became increasingly cautious about decisions that could compromise his command and developed closer ties to the army's Control faction, justifying military spending increases. Yet, the memory of the mutiny left him feeling uncertain about the throne's stability. Now you know me, whenever I can bring up Hirohito's involvement in the war related times I gotta do. After WW2, in an apparent effort to downplay his role as supreme commander, Hirohito provided a deliberately distorted account of the February events. “I issued an order at that time for the rebel force to be suppressed. This brings to mind Machida Chuji, the finance minister. He was very worried about the rebellion's adverse effect on the money market and warned me that a panic could occur unless I took firm measures. Therefore I issued a strong command to have [the uprising] put down. As a rule, because a suppression order also involves martial law, military circles, who cannot issue such an order on their own, need the mutual consent of the government. However, at the time, Okada's whereabouts were unknown. As the attitude of the Army Ministry seemed too lenient, I issued a strict order. Following my bitter experiences with the Tanaka cabinet, I had decided always to wait for the opinions of my advisers before making any decision, and not to go against their counsel. Only twice, on this occasion and at the time of the ending of the war, did I positively implement my own ideas. Ishiwara Kanji of the Army General Staff Office also asked me, through military aide Chojiri [Kazumoto], to issue a suppression order. I don't know what sort of a person Ishiwara is, but on this occasion he was correct, even though he had been the instigator of the Manchurian Incident. Further, my chief military aide, Honjo, brought me the plan drafted by Yamashita Hobun, in which Yamashita asked me to please send an examiner because the three leaders of the rebel army were likely to commit suicide. However, I thought that sending an examiner would imply that they had acted according to their moral convictions and were deserving of respect. . . . So I rejected Honjo's proposal, and [instead] issued the order to suppress them. I received no report that generals in charge of military affairs had gone and urged the rebels to surrender.”  On February 26, when Hirohito ordered the immediate suppression of the rebels, his anger was directed not only at the insurgents who had assassinated his closest advisors but also at senior army officers who were indecisive in executing the crackdown. The following day, in addition to his role as Minister of Commerce and Industry, Machida took on the responsibilities of finance minister. Concerns over economic panic and confusion contributed to the emperor's sense of urgency, despite not being the primary motivation for his actions. Hirohito believed that every hour of delay tarnished Japan's international reputation. Since the Manchurian Incident, the emperor had frequently clashed with the military regarding encroachments on his authority, though never about fundamental policy issues. At times, he had managed to assert his political views during policy discussions, similar to his earlier influence under the Hamaguchi cabinet. The February 26 mutiny highlighted to Hirohito and Yuasa his privy seal from March 1936 to June 1940, and the first lord keeper of the privy seal to attend court regularly the necessity of fully exercising the emperor's supreme command whenever the situation demanded it. Even when faced with opposition from Honjo, Hirohito managed to gain support and assert his authority through a decisive approach. His resolution marked the end of a period during which alienated “young officers” attempted to leverage his influence as a reformist figure to challenge a power structure they could not manipulate effectively. However, Hirohito learned how to adeptly manage that establishment in most situations. The decision-making process within the government was characterized by secrecy, indirect communication, vague policy drafting, and information manipulation, creating a landscape of confusion, misunderstanding, and constant intrigue aimed at achieving consensus among elites. This was the modus operandi in Tokyo and a reflection of how the emperor operated. Once again, Hirohito reminded the tightly-knit elite that he was essential to the functioning of the system. On May 4, 1936, during his address at the opening ceremony of the Sixty-ninth Imperial Diet, while Tokyo remained under martial law, Hirohito closed the chapter on the February mutiny. Initially, he contemplated sending a strong message of censure to the military, but after considerable deliberation over three months, he ultimately chose to issue a brief, innocuous statement: “We regret the recent incident that occurred in Tokyo.” The response from his audience of Diet members and military officials was one of startled awe, with some privately expressing disappointment. Once again, at a critical juncture, Hirohito avoided an opportunity to publicly rein in the military through his constitutional role. Nonetheless, due to his behind-the-scenes actions, the drift in domestic policy that had characterized Japan since the Manchurian Incident came to an end. In the following fourteen months, the emperor and his advisors largely aligned with the army and navy's demands for increased military expansion and state-driven industrial development. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. So some very unruly young Japanese officers got the bright idea of forcing a showa restoration by killing all the culprits they believed held their emperor hostage. Little did they know, this event spelt the end of the Kodoha faction and rise of the Toseiha faction. Henceforth the military was even more in charge and would get even more insane.   

Last time we spoke about the Allied invasion of Borneo. The Allies initiated the invasion of Borneo, commanded by General Morshead. The operation, known as Operation Oboe, aimed to reclaim vital oilfields from the demoralized Japanese forces. Despite their fierce resistance, American troops swiftly captured strategic locations on the island. The Japanese, already struggling with low morale and supply shortages, were unable to mount an effective defense. Amid the intense fighting, Air Commodore Cobby's forces conducted air assaults on key targets, weakening Japanese positions. As American troops landed on Tarakan Island on May 1, they faced heavy fire but managed to gain significant territory by nightfall. By early May, despite the loss of ground, Japanese forces continued to resist fiercely. This victory in Borneo marked a turning point in the Pacific campaign, ultimately foreshadowing the decline of Japanese influence in the region and paving the way for further Allied advances. This episode is the Second Okinawa Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we left off, by April 24, General Ushijima's 32nd Army had chosen to abandon the first line of Shuri defenses, with the exception of the extreme right in the Item Pocket area. However, the weary Japanese troops merely withdrew to the next line of prepared positions within the Shuri defense zone, ready to make the American invaders pay for every inch of territory gained. Observing this, General Hodge promptly ordered the 7th, 27th, and 96th Divisions to regroup and enhance their positions through aggressive maneuvers, seizing strategic ground in front of them and pushing back enemy outposts. His forces were also heavily depleted and exhausted, prompting him to plan a final offensive on April 26 before rotating in the relatively fresh 77th Division and the 1st Marine Division for support. Unbeknownst to him, the 62nd Division had suffered significant losses, nearly losing half of its original strength on the left flank. In response, Ushijima decided to move the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade north to reinforce the Shuri defense zone, establishing a fallback position for retreating forces.This shift also meant that the southern areas were defended only by a hastily assembled Shimajiri Security Force of 5,500 men, drawn from rear-area supply units tasked with delaying any American advances from the south until the main infantry units could return.  The question of a second landing in southern Okinawa was considered by 10th Army most seriously before April 22. General Bruce, commander of the 77th Division, knew that his division would be committed in the Okinawa fighting as soon as lejima was secured. At Leyte the amphibious landing of the 77th Division behind the Japanese line at Ormoc had been spectacularly successful. General Bruce and his staff wished to repeat the move on Okinawa and urged it on the 10th Army command even before the division sailed from Leyte. As the Iejima fighting drew to a close, General Bruce pressed his recommendation to land his division on the southeast coast of Okinawa on the beaches just north of Minatoga. He believed that it would be necessary to effect a juncture with American forces then north of Shuri within ten days if the venture was to be successful. His plan was either to drive inland on Iwa, a road and communications center at the southern end of the island, or to push north against Yonabaru. General Buckner rejected the idea. His assistant chief of staff, G-4, stated that he could supply food but not ammunition for such a project at that time. The Minatoga beaches had been thoroughly considered in the planning for the initial landings and had been rejected because of the impossibility of furnishing adequate logistical support for even one division. The reefs were dangerous, the beaches inadequate, and the area exposed to strong enemy attack. Although beach outlets existed, they were commanded both by the escarpment to the west and by the plateau of the Chinen Peninsula. The 10th Army intelligence officer reported that the Japanese still had their reserves stationed in the south. Both the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade were still in the area and could move quickly to oppose any landings. Artillery positions on the heights overlooking the beaches were fully manned. The 77th Division would be landing so far south that it would not have the support of the troops engaged to the north or of 24th Corps artillery. The steep terrain near the beaches favored the defense, and any unit there would be isolated. It might be more like Anzio than Leyte, Buckner suggested. Besides that, the three divisions on the line needed to be relieved, and Buckner's three unused divisions would all be needed there. On April 25, the main focus of action shifted to the Item Pocket, where Captain Bernard Ryan's Company F of the 165th Regiment surged forward following a 20-minute artillery bombardment to seize the summit of Ryan Ridge. Captain Ryan looked out over the rugged expanse of Ryan Ridge, where the Japanese forces entrenched at the top presented a formidable challenge. They controlled the crucial territory between Ryan and Fox Ridges, creating a dangerous stronghold that threatened his position. For Ryan, the solution lay in artillery fire. He understood that since the supporting fire would fall perpendicular to his attack route, the risk of overshooting or undershooting would be minimal, just a lateral deviation of fifteen yards. With this confidence, he ordered a twenty-minute artillery barrage on the slopes of the ridge.As dawn broke on the morning of the 25th, Ryan gathered his men from Company F. He stressed the importance of a swift ground assault to capitalize on the artillery support. However, this was no easy task; his company was tired, undermanned, and severely low on food and ammunition. Despite these challenges, the two assault platoons sprang into action the moment the first shells began to fall. They charged forward, propelled by the roar of mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns that kept enemy forces at bay.But as they sprinted towards the ridge, the enemy struck back fiercely. Enemy fire and natural obstacles thinned their ranks, yet thirty-one determined soldiers reached the summit. They found themselves standing on a jagged ridge, strewn with rocks and scarred vegetation, a treacherous landscape that added to their struggle. Just as the artillery fire began to fade, the Japanese emerged from their hidden positions: “spider holes,” pillboxes, and tunnels. The Americans stood ready, and for the next twenty minutes, a brutal fight erupted. They engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat, reminiscent of earlier battles on Item Pocket ridge tops. The outcome was grim; thirty-five Japanese soldiers fell, and many more fled in panic. However, the Americans also paid a price, five were killed, and two wounded. Now, the real challenge began: consolidating their hard-won position. Captain Ryan knew that previous units had ascended these ridges only to be pushed back by the enemy. By late afternoon, only twenty-four effective soldiers remained atop the ridge, with each man averaging a mere six rounds of rifle ammunition. Medical supplies had run dry, and all the aid men had become casualties. Communication was severed, and Ryan could sense the tightening noose as the Japanese regrouped for an assault. Understanding the gravitas of their situation, Ryan devised a bold plan. He arranged for Company I to maneuver around to his right flank, hoping to replicate the success of the morning. At 4:05 PM, just fifteen minutes after artillery support resumed, Ryan and his company made their ascent once more, enduring five additional casualties along the route. Unfortunately, Company I struggled to reach the top, cut off by heavy enemy fire on the slopes. In a moment of desperation, Ryan and two men ventured out into the dark to seek reinforcement, a risky endeavor that could easily end in disaster. Although Company I was still bogged down, Captain Betts from Company K recognized the urgency of the situation and quickly mobilized his men. By midnight, all of Company K had reached the ridge, bolstering Ryan's weary but determined troops. As these events unfolded at Ryan Ridge, other companies from the 165th were locked in a brutal struggle at Gusukuma, located southwest of the ridge. Fierce fighting erupted as soldiers moved from wall to wall, tree to tree, fighting for every inch in the rubble of Gusukuma. Company A faced an unrelenting barrage, enduring fire from eight machine guns and a 47-mm antitank gun, much of which came from the yet-untamed eastern slope of Ryan Ridge. Amidst this chaos, Private First Class Richard King from Company A became a beacon of valor. In a remarkable display of courage, he climbed a tree to eliminate a Japanese soldier perched above and, from his vantage point, went on to kill ten more enemies before night fell. The day had been marked by sacrifice and bravery, with Captain Ryan and his men fighting heroically for every inch of ground gained on Ryan Ridge. As the sun set, they prepared for the challenges that lay ahead, their resolve unwavering amid the turmoil of war. Meanwhile, other companies of the 165th Regiment engaged fiercely in assaults against Gusukuma, gradually gaining ground at a high cost to both sides. At the same time, the 96th Division consolidated its position in front of Maeda and Kochi, while Colonel Pachler's 1st Battalion advanced 600 yards with minimal resistance to occupy the slope of Horseshoe Ridge. The following day, April 26, the general offensive resumed, with the bulk of the 165th Regiment continuing its costly advance into the heart of the Item Pocket, successfully clearing Gusukuma as Company F pushed along the crest of Ryan Ridge toward the northern end of the Machinato airstrip. To the east, the 105th Regiment advanced to the southern edge of Nakama, while the 106th Regiment extended the front line toward Yafusu. In the center, Colonel Halloran's 2nd Battalion launched an assault on the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repulsed by a brutal barrage of Japanese fire across the front. However, elements of the 383rd Regiment managed to reach the crests of Hills 150 and 152, securing a strategic position to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy below, as tanks and armored flamethrowers moved to the outskirts of Maeda to wreak havoc. At 4 pm in the afternoon General Ushijima issued a terse order: “The enemy with troops following tanks has been advancing into the southern and eastern sectors of Maeda since about 1 pm. The 62d Division will dispatch local units . . . attack the enemy advancing in the Maeda sector and expect to repulse him decisively.” At the same time, adjacent 24th Division units were ordered to cooperate in this effort regardless of division boundary. Two hours later the Japanese commanding general issued another order: "The army will crush the enemy which has broken through near Maeda. The 24th Division will put its main strength northeast of Shuri this evening." Lastly, Pachler's 1st Battalion attempted to advance along the western flank of Kochi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion moved along the eastern flank. Both battalions were immediately repelled by a barrage of enemy fire. The following day, efforts to establish physical contact between the two units proved costly and futile. Meanwhile, Halloran's 1st Battalion, along with elements of the 383rd Regiment, maneuvered through the saddle between Hills 150 and 152, receiving support from tanks and armored flamethrowers. Although tanks and infantry managed to penetrate to the southern edge of Maeda, the advance was halted by intense enemy fire. Atop the escarpment, an all-out effort was made to reduce a heavily fortified underground pillbox that separated Companies F and G; however, this attempt also failed. Concurrently, as the 105th Regiment organized a defensive line at Nakama, Colonel Stebbins' 2nd Battalion engaged in fierce combat around Yafusu in an effort to straighten their front lines. Meanwhile, the disorganized 165th Regiment continued clearing the Item Pocket, which was finally declared secure, although many Japanese troops remained hidden in deep caves and tunnels. Due to this disorganization and the sluggish progress in securing the pocket, General Griner ultimately decided to relieve Colonel Kelley of his command of the 165th. The regiment would then spend the remaining days of the month patrolling the Kuwan Inlet south of Machinato airfield. Griner's overextended and battered division would not undertake any further offensive actions until being relieved at the end of April. At sea, a Japanese suicide boat successfully dropped a depth charge near the destroyer Hutchins, which had to withdraw due to heavy damage. Additionally, Japanese aircraft reemerged during the night, with a kamikaze crashing into and sinking the ammunition ship Canada Victory, while other planes damaged two destroyers and a transport ship. Random factoid by the way, the SS Canada Victory was among the 531 Victory ships constructed during World War II as part of the Emergency Shipbuilding program. Launched by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation on January 12, 1944, she was completed on February 28, 1944. The ship was designated VC2-S-AP3 by the United States Maritime Commission, with hull number 93 (1009). Following her completion, the Maritime Commission transferred her to the civilian operator Alaska SS Company. This was merely a prelude to Admiral Ugaki's fourth mass Kikisui attack, which launched 115 kamikazes on April 28. While interceptor fighters destroyed most of these aircraft, seven managed to slip past the combat air patrol and crashed into destroyers Daly and Twiggs, the destroyer minesweeper Butler, the evacuation transport Pickney, and the hospital ship Comfort. On the ground, Halloran's Company K attempted to weaken resistance at the escarpment by moving through the 27th Division zone to the west and advancing southeast towards the Apartment House barracks, where they were met with heavy losses and forced to retreat. Meanwhile, on the western side of Kochi Ridge, Pachler's 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion and launched an attack into the gap between the ridge and Zebra Hill. They successfully led Company K through Kochi and into the cut, while Company L moved southward along the western slope. However, upon reaching the cut, both companies were met with a barrage of machine-gun fire, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. To the east, the 32nd Regiment faced delays in initiating their attack due to setbacks around Kochi, despite the successful raids by armored flamethrowers into the heart of Kuhazu. The following day, more kamikaze assaults inflicted additional damage on destroyers Hazelwood and Haggard. By the end of April, American pilots reported 1,216 air-to-air kills, while Japanese sources acknowledged losses exceeding 1,000 aircraft, including 820 destroyed in the first four Kikisui attacks. This left Admiral Ugaki with approximately 370 operational aircraft for future operations. It is also important to note that the Japanese pilots inflicted significant casualties, resulting in Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet suffering the loss of 1,853 sailors killed or missing and 2,650 wounded, averaging one and a half ships hit per day. As April expired, a concerned Nimitz personally visited Okinawa, where Buckner reminded Nimitz that as a land battle, 10th Army operations fell under Army command. “Yes,” Nimitz replied, “but ground though it may be, I'm losing a ship and a half a day. So if this line isn't moving within five days, we'll get someone here to move it so we can all get out from under these stupid air attacks.” Nevertheless, by May, 10th Army had thoroughly bogged down into costly, unimaginative frontal assaults against southern Okinawa's heavily fortified Shuri line. Numerous 10th Army generals urged Buckner to “play the amphib card” and land the reserve 2nd Marine Division in southeastern Okinawa, behind Japanese lines. Buckner ultimately refused, claiming insufficient logistics. Nimitz concurred with Buckner, at least publicly, but few others did. Spruance, Turner, and Mitscher were themselves growing increasingly bitter at 10th Army's lack of progress, as well as USAAF lethargy constructing fighter airfields ashore that could finally relieve the battered carriers. Touring the developing Okinawa airstrips, a 5th Fleet staff officer discovered that General “Hap” Arnold had secretly been writing Okinawa's lead USAAF engineer, urging him to divert assigned fighter strip resources into building B-29 bomber airfields instead. An incredulous Spruance went ashore to investigate and discovered the allegation was true. Stunned, Spruance “turned that situation around in about 15 minutes.” On land, following an unsuccessful tank assault toward Onaga, the 32nd Regiment intensified pressure on enemy positions to the southeast to support operations against Kochi Ridge. However, the 17th Regiment's attacks were still stalled. Meanwhile, after fending off two strong counterattacks that resulted in approximately 265 Japanese casualties, the 383rd Regiment advanced to capture the crest of Hill 318 in fierce close combat. This critical victory finally enabled American forces to direct fire onto Shuri itself. On April 29, the 307th Regiment took over the Maeda Escarpment section of the line from the 381st, and the next morning, the 306th Regiment relieved the 383rd on the left flank of the 96th Division. Simultaneously, the 1st Marines relieved the 165th on the west coast, while the 5th Marines took over the line held by the 105th and 106th Regiments on May 1. Despite ongoing efforts, attacks against Kochi Ridge on April 30 once again failed. However, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment successfully established Company C on “Chimney Crag” and Company A on the “Roulette Wheel,” located on the ridge southwest of Kuhazu. During the night, large numbers of Japanese infiltrated behind these companies, disrupting the planned relief of the 32nd by the 184th Regiment. This relief, intended to be completed before dawn on May 1, was delayed until late in the afternoon. Despite this setback, Colonel Green's Company L managed to reach Gaja Ridge, positioned just in front of Conical Hill during the night. Concurrently, Colonel Hamilton's Company A attempted to mount ladders at the eastern end of the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repelled by fierce defenders. On the western front, however, Company B successfully captured the edge of the escarpment using cargo nets by nightfall, although they were ultimately forced to withdraw due to heavy counterattacks later that night. Additionally, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion moved behind the escarpment to Nakama village, launching an attack eastward toward the Apartment House barracks area. Meanwhile, on the west coast, the 1st Marines had been attempting to advance south for two days but were repelled each time, suffering significant casualties. However, they did succeed in clearing an enemy pocket at Miyagusuku. On May 2, the 5th Marines finally joined the offensive but encountered stubborn resistance, while the 1st Marines continued to struggle to cross the draw south of Nakanishi village in their effort to reach the Jichaku ridge mass. To the east, Hamilton's Companies A and B positioned troops on the edge of the Maeda Escarpment but made no significant gains due to the enemy's intense machine-gun fire. The 17th Regiment eventually mopped up Onaga village, with the 1st Battalion taking control of the area, although they failed to capture Kochi during their renewed efforts. On May 3, after a dawn artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion on the east and the 3rd Battalion on the west advanced in a coordinated attack, which included a movement by Company C against How Hill on the eastern flank of Kochi Ridge. However, this entire effort was thwarted as heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire halted all progress. During 3 May the 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, fought a desperate grenade battle to win the top of part of the escarpment. The Japanese showered the top with grenades and knee mortars from the reverse slope and with 81-mm. mortar fire from a distance. Men came back across the narrow top of the escarpment to the north side, swearing and crying, saying they would not go back into the fight. "Yet," observed one platoon leader, "in five minutes' time those men would go back there tossing grenades as fast as they could pull the pins."Finally, while the 1st Marines made only limited gains as they pushed toward the Asa River, the 5th Marines successfully cleared the Awacha Pocket and advanced between 300 and 600 yards in their zone. Unbeknownst to the Americans, their slow, incremental advances and the looming threat of a costly, protracted campaign were far from their only concerns. By the 29th General Cho had argued that in the present state of affairs, the Americans had the upper hand. If the status quo continued, the 32nd Army eventually would be wiped out. At this meeting, only Colonel Yahara spoke for continuing the war of attrition and avoiding an offensive. Yahara pointed out that in modern warfare a superiority of 3 to 1 was usually needed for successful attack. "To take the offensive with inferior forces… is reckless and would lead to certain defeat," he said. Second, the high ground around Minami-Uebaru had already fallen into American hands, giving them a major advantage in defensive terrain. Third, Yahara argued, a hasty offensive would fail, with thousands needlessly lost. Then, 32nd Army's reduced forces would be unable to hold Okinawa for a long period and unable to delay the invasion of Japan. A hasty attack would cause 32nd Army to fail in its duty. And yet, the other young staff members were silent. Cho then declared again that he hoped for an attack to snatch life from the midst of death. At this, Yahara left the room. All the other staff members then agreed to launch an offensive. Cho then tried to manage Yahara by sheer emotional force. At dawn on April 30, before Yahara "had time to splash water on his face," Cho appeared at his quarters. Cho squeezed Yahara's hand and said with genuine enthusiasm that there had been nothing but trouble between them in the past and that they would probably both die together on Okinawa. Cho then asked if Yahara, on this one occasion, would go along with the offensive. As Cho spoke, his tears fell abundantly. Yahara was deeply moved, despite his aloof reputation, and before long he was weeping too. He was overcome by Cho's sudden display of emotion and said, "I consent." Again I have to say, in the “battle of Okinawa” by Yahara, basically his memoirs, in which he notably lies a bunch to cover himself, but I digress, this moment amongst others are really interesting, I highly recommend reading the book. Cho's plan outlined that General Amamiya's 24th Division would lead the main effort on May 4, executing a two-pronged attack on the right half of the line. They intended to sweep past the Tanabaru Escarpment toward Minami-Uebaru hill, ultimately reaching the Futema-Atsuta line. Meanwhile, General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was to shift from its reserve position behind the 62nd Division to a location northeast of Shuri and move northwest toward the coastal town of Oyama, effectively cutting off the 1st Marine Division's retreat. In conjunction with this, General Fujioka's battered 62nd Division would hold its position on the left flank and mount an offensive once the attacking units on its right had breached enemy lines. Additionally, the 23rd and 26th Shipping Engineer Regiments were tasked with conducting counterlandings in the American rear on the east and west coasts, respectively. The Japanese reasoned that success depended on the extent to which they could support their frontline troops with artillery, tanks, supplies, and communications. Their plans specified in detail the role that each of the support units was to play in the projected operations. Artillery units were ordered to regroup in preparation for the attack. Guns and howitzers were pulled out of cave positions and set up farther south in more open emplacements for greater flexibility. They were to open fire thirty minutes before the attack. When the infantry had driven through the American front lines, artillerymen were to move their weapons forward. The 27th Tank Regiment, hitherto uncommitted, was ordered to move from its position near Yonabaru during the night over several routes and support the attack in the Maeda area. To support this comprehensive offensive, Ugaki was alerted to prepare for the fifth mass Kikisui attack directed against the enemy's naval forces. Once the plans were finalized and preparations well underway, Ushijima and Cho celebrated with a pre-victory banquet in their chambers at headquarters. Even as Ushijima's banquet was underway, offensive operations had commenced. Japanese troops infiltrated behind American lines during the night while the shipping engineers prepared for their counterlandings. The 26th and 23d Shipping Engineer Regiments set out up the west and east coasts. On beaches south of Naha and Yonabaru, men of the shipping engineer regiments piled into barges and assault boats. Also, small groups of soldiers with light machine guns infiltrated behind U.S. lines on the night of 3 May to attack Americans as they became visible at dawn. Small units of three or four men, variously designated as "reconnaissance raiding" and "rear harassing" teams, proceeded toward the American lines to attack command posts, heavy weapons, communications, and depots and to send back information by means of smoke signals. The 27th Tank Regiment rumbled up to Ishimmi, several of its tanks being severely damaged by American artillery fire en route. Ugaki's fifth Kikisui attack began on the afternoon of May 3, when at least 19 kamikazes sortied from Formosa, stealthily approaching the American convoys. They successfully sank the destroyer Little and one landing craft, while severely damaging two destroyer-minelayers and another landing craft. Additionally, Japanese aircraft targeted shore installations, focusing their efforts on Yontan airfield. In Nakagusuku Bay, a suicide boat further damaged a cargo ship. At 02:00 on May 4, most of the boats from the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment were spotted approaching the heavily defended area of Kuwan. Armed with antitank guns, heavy machine guns, light arms, and thousands of satchel charges, several hundred men of the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment headed under overcast skies for landing places below Yontan and Kadena airfields. They miscalculated their position and turned, into the shore at a point where it was heavily defended. At 0200 riflemen of the 1st Marine Division on the sea wall near Kuwan caught sight of ten barges and opened up with concentrated fire. Naval flares lighted up the area. One company fired 1,100 rounds from 60-mm. mortars. Several enemy barges burst into flames. One platoon of marines used fifty boxes of ammunition and burned out six machine-gun barrels as it sprayed the Japanese trying to cross the reef. Although many of the engineers managed to reach the shore, some fled back to the Japanese lines, while others were trapped in Kuwan, where they were mopped up by the Marines at their leisure. A smaller group of Japanese forces advanced almost as far as Chatan, ultimately landing at Isa, where they were contained without much difficulty and destroyed the following day. The amphibious assault was even less successful on the east coast of Okinawa, as the 25th Shipping Engineer Regiment attempted to land near Ouki. Most of these troops were killed by fire from ships in Buckner Bay or by the 7th Division Reconnaissance Troop on land. As a result, the Japanese suffered losses of 500 to 800 men and nearly all their landing craft during these amphibious assaults. At 05:00, Ugaki initiated his main mass attack, launching 125 kamikazes and 103 escorting fighters from Kyushu to target Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57, which was currently striking the Miyako and Ishigaki airfields. Taking advantage of the weakened anti-aircraft defenses, the kamikazes managed to score hits on the carriers Formidable and Indomitable, though both vessels ultimately survived. They also targeted American shipping, successfully sinking destroyers Morrison and Luce, along with three landing craft. Additionally, they inflicted further damage on the light cruiser Birmingham, the escort carrier Sangamon, the destroyer Ingraham, and two destroyer-minelayers, resulting in a total of 589 sailors killed.   On land, following a heavy artillery bombardment during the night, the 24th Division commenced its main assault. In the pitch darkness Japanese troops made their way toward the American front lines. At 0500 two red flares ordered them to attack. As the artillery fire became heavy, a guard of Company A, 17th Infantry, on a hill just north of Onaga, dropped back below the crest for cover. He thought that the enemy would not attack through his own artillery, but the enemy did just that. A few Japanese appeared on the crest and set up a light machine gun. Pfc. Tillman H. Black, a BAR man, killed the gunner, and as more of the enemy came over the crest he killed four Japanese who tried to man the machine gun. The enemy advanced over the crest in ragged groups, enabling Black to hold his own. Soon the whole company was in action and drove the enemy off the crest. The Japanese abandoned three light machine guns, four mortars, and much ammunition. At another point a surprise attack nearly succeeded. On high ground 1,000 yards east of Onaga a group of Japanese crept up the hill in front of Company I, 184th, commanded by Capt. James Parker. In the sudden onslaught that followed, two heavy machine gun crews abandoned their positions. One of them left its weapon intact, and the Japanese promptly took it over and swung it around on the company. Parker, watching the attack from the ridge, had anticipated the move. The Japanese managed to fire one burst; then Parker destroyed the usurped weapon with his remaining heavy machine gun. For an hour or two longer the Japanese clung to the forward slopes, firing their rifles amid shrill screams, but they made no further progress. By dawn the general pattern of the Japanese attack on the left (east) of the 14th Corps line was becoming clear. In the 184th's sector the enemy's 89th Regiment, following instructions to "close in on the enemy by taking advantage of cover,"had advanced around the east slopes of Conical Hill, crept across the flats, and assembled in force around the "Y ridges" east of Onaga. They had outflanked three companies of the 184th on Chimney Crag and the Roulette Wheel north of Kuhazu, and had also managed to evade the forward battalions of the 17th around Kochi. Another Japanese element had attacked 7th Division lines on the high ground north of Unaha. At dawn 1st Lt. Richard S. McCracken, commanding Company A, 184th, observed 2,000 Japanese soldiers in the open area east and north of Kuhazu. They were perfect "artillery meat." Unable to get through to his artillery support, McCracken called his battalion commander, Colonel Maybury, and described the lucrative targets. Maybury was equally pleased. McCracken suggested, however, that the Colonel should not be too happy--a group of Japanese at that moment was within 100 yards of Maybury's observation post. There was indeed a party of Japanese busily unlimbering two 75-mm, howitzers just below Maybury. But Company C, 17th Infantry, had spotted this activity, and within a few minutes maneuvered tanks into position and scattered the enemy group. Artillery eliminated the Japanese caught in the open. A mortar duel ensued, sometimes at ranges of 250 yards. The 3d Battalion, 32d, also poured fire on the enemy there. After the impetus of the attack was lost, a Japanese officer stood out on open ground and waved his saber to assemble his men for an attack. American mortarmen waited for a worth-while target to develop, then put mortar fire on it. Four times the officer assembled a group, only to have his men killed or scattered, before he was finally killed. While the 7th Division was repelling the Japanese attack in the eastern sector of the 14th Corps line, the 77th Division was blunting the other enemy "spearhead" in the center. Here the Japanese 32d Regiment, supported by tanks and engineers, attacked behind intense artillery fire. This sector was the critical point of attack, for a break-through here would enable the supporting 44th Independent Mixed Brigade to cut west and isolate the 1st Marine Division. Transportation difficulties beset the 32d Regiment almost from the start. During the night light tanks drove out of Shuri up the Ginowan road (Route 5), but American artillery interdicting the road prevented medium tanks from following. The mediums had to take a long detour, which was in such poor condition that only two of the tanks could enter into the attack. Trucks and artillery also were slowed down. Even foot troops had trouble in moving. One Japanese infantryman recorded that his column was shelled on the way and that everyone except himself and one other was wounded. Another wrote of encountering "terrific bombardment" on the way to Kochi. These difficulties severely handicapped the 32d Regiment in ensuing operations. Supported by nine light tanks, the 3d Battalion led the assault of the 32d Regiment against the 306th Infantry, 77th Division, before dawn on 4 May. The enemy mounted his assault from southeast of Hill 187 and hit the 77th where Route 5 curled around the east end of Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The Japanese drove into the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 306th, near Maeda. Shortly before daylight, when the Japanese infantry had failed to take its initial objectives east of Hill 187, Colonel Murakami, commanding the 27th Tank Regiment, became impatient and recklessly committed his own infantry company, a standard element of a Japanese tank regiment. American artillery fire destroyed one platoon, disrupting the attack, and daylight found the surviving troops in a precarious position across from the American lines. Colonel Murakami ordered the company to withdraw, but artillery fire prevented a retreat during the day. When the Japanese used smoke for concealment, the Americans simply blanketed the obscured area with shell fire. The survivors straggled back to their front lines after nightfall. All the light tanks that had supported the attack were lost. By 07:30, the 306th Regiment had effectively repelled the enemy. The Japanese, broken up into small groups, attempted to withdraw across terrain subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire, but few made it through. By 08:00, the 89th Regiment had also been pushed beyond grenade range along the entire front of the 7th Division. Instead of retreating or pressing the assault, however, Kanayama's troops made the critical mistake of milling about in the exposed flatlands, rendering them easy targets for American heavy weaponry. As a result, the 89th Regiment suffered severe losses from concentrated land, naval, and air bombardment, losing half its strength. Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment in the center fared no better; its advance was delayed by the necessity of laying smoke, and it encountered significant hardships when the smoke unexpectedly cleared. In the center of the line the Japanese 22d Regiment was never able to fulfill its role of following up the "successful" advance of flank units, and the regiment spent the day locked in a violent fire fight with men of 3/306, 3/17, and 1/17 holding the Kochi-Onaga area. The Japanese reported the 22d "was not able attain results worth mentioning." Unbeknownst to the Americans, elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment had penetrated more than 1,000 yards behind American lines near Kochi, identifying a significant weak point before pulling back to the regimental line. Nevertheless, due to the overall failure of the 24th Division, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was not even committed to the attack. On the fronts at Maeda and the west coast, American forces made some gains. Hamilton's 1st Battalion successfully executed a complex demolition assault on the extensive cave-tunnel-pillbox network located about 200 feet west of the eastern end of the escarpment, effectively repulsing several subsequent counterattacks and inflicting approximately 600 casualties on the Japanese. The 5th Marines also advanced up to 400 yards through hotly contested terrain during the day. Although pinned down in the coastal area, Colonel Chappell's 1st Battalion managed to break through a defile east of Jichaku, while the 3rd Battalion secured a ridge approximately 400 yards ahead of its position. Despite the apparent failure of the Japanese attack, Amamiya refused to abandon the offensive, ordering a renewed effort during the night. Kitago's uncommitted 1st Battalion, along with the attached 26th Independent Battalion, was directed to penetrate the enemy lines northwest of Kochi in a night attack, aiming to replicate the breakthrough achieved by elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment. Following another artillery bombardment, the Japanese launched their assault against the 306th Regiment at 02:00 on May 5. However, this attack was quickly disrupted by American artillery. Three hours later, the Japanese struck again, this time supported by tanks. They pressed through artillery and mortar fire to engage the 306th in close combat. Fierce firefights erupted along the regiment's entire line, resulting in the Japanese suffering 248 dead during the fighting. Amid the chaos, a significant portion of Kitago's 1st Battalion successfully infiltrated behind American lines, breaching the defenses at a point between Route 5 and Kochi. While approximately 90 of the infiltrators were quickly killed while assaulting the command post of the 306th Regiment, around 450 Japanese troops crossed the divisional boundary and managed to reoccupy the town of Tanabaru and the Tanabaru Escarpment, effectively cutting off the supply road for the 17th Regiment. In response, Pachler sent Company E to eliminate the infiltrators, but they underestimated the enemy's strength and were repelled with heavy losses. With Company E stalled on the eastern slope of the escarpment, Company F, supported by tanks, attempted a broad flanking maneuver. They successfully pushed through Tanabaru, spending the day destroying the enemy's hastily established defenses. Company E then took over the assault, and by nightfall, they had reached the top of the Tanabaru Escarpment following a mortar preparation. The relentless battle for the Tanabaru Escarpment continued for the next two days, resulting in the Japanese losing 462 killed behind American lines. Only a few men managed to escape the Tanabaru death trap and return to the Shuri lines. Made even more desperate by the failure of Amamiya's grand attack, the ragtag battalions of the 62nd Division fought to the death to defend the vital western approaches to Shuri, ensuring that every yard gained came at a steep price in Marine lives. Each pillbox, cave, and tomb became a stronghold that unleashed a torrent of fire against the attacking Marines from all directions. Despite this fierce resistance, Del Valle's units made significant progress on May 5. The 5th Marines advanced their lines by an average of 300 yards, while the 1st Marines seized the high ground along the Asa River. At the Maeda Escarpment, the reverse slope was slowly captured as caves were blasted and sealed off. By midnight, it became clear to Ushijima that the counteroffensive had failed, with the Japanese suffering approximately 6,227 dead and losing 59 artillery pieces. In turn, the 7th and 77th Divisions, which had absorbed the brunt of the enemy counterattack, sustained 714 losses. Despite these heavy casualties, the 1st Marine Division, which continued its push to the south, incurred corresponding losses of 649 men. This indicated that the Americans experienced greater losses due to the Japanese defensive tactics of attrition. However, the morale of the 32nd Army had been shattered, as the Japanese abandoned all hope for a successful outcome from the operation. Nevertheless, the 24th Division and 5th Artillery Command were ordered to reorganize and shift to a holding action. This strategy aimed to bleed American strength by forcing the 10th Army to maintain its slow, deadly, yard-by-yard advance into the fire of prepared positions. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the fierce Second Okinawa Counteroffensive, weary American troops pressed into determined Japanese defenses. Captain Ryan's valor led to hard-won territory despite heavy casualties. As chaos unfolded, Japanese morale waned, marking a turning point. The relentless battle showcased unparalleled sacrifice, foreshadowing the Allies' gradual victory in the Pacific.  

Last time we spoke about the Battle for the Great Wall of China. In 1933, the Kwantung Army faced logistical struggles and sought political deals with Chinese warlords to seize North China. Despite capturing key areas, chaos reigned as their unauthorized operations defied Tokyo's orders. When Emperor Hirohito demanded a withdrawal, the army reluctantly complied, derailing a coup attempt. Though peace talks followed, distrust persisted, and rogue Japanese commanders plotted fresh offensives. Amid international tensions and League of Nations' inaction, chaos loomed over China's battle-scarred plains. As tensions rose in North China, General Muto hesitated to advance without orders from Tokyo. With imperial approval, he launched a renewed offensive on May 3rd, leading the Japanese 6th and 8th Divisions to sweep through Chinese defenses. Despite Chinese concessions led by pro-Japanese Huang Fu, the Japanese pushed toward Peiping. Failed coups and desperate peace talks ensued. By May 25th, ceasefire talks began, but Japan's strengthened position left China scrambling to secure stability.   #148 The Tanggu Truce Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As we last left off the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions had just taken up new positions threatening the Peiping-Tientsin area. Meanwhile the Tientsin Special service Agency had tried every scheme they could think of to establish a coup against Peiping. All of these actions were done to increase Japan's poker hand at the negotiating table. On May 17th Huang Fu arrived at a very panicked Peiping. Two days prior, the Japanese had taken an even harsher stance, demanding the Chinese forces withdraw to a line running between Shunyi, Paoti and Lutai. This demand would send the Chines further west than the line agreed upon for the ceasefire. So the Chinese ignored the demand and this inturn brought the negotiations to a standstill. On the 18th the Army General staff in Tokyo drew up a new draft titled “essentials for the Guidance of North China”. Having been chasing around the Kwantung Army like a dog chasing a car, Tokyo HQ wanted to finally draft some real legislation to reign in their unruly pet. On the 19th the General staff submited an ultimatum instructed the Kwantung Army to withdraw to Manchukuo after it reached an agreement with the Chinese, specifically to obtain the right to garrison specified locations within the Great Wall. On the 21st the Kwantung Army drew up its version of a ceasefire proposal, submitted it to the General staff who approved it. Here is a complete breakdown of it: “1) The cease-fire agreement is of a purely military nature and excludes political factors. For by returning to Manchukuo in general as quickly as possible, the imperial Japanese army will demonstrate that it acts in the cause of justice and fairness and will manifest the essence of the Japanese spirit.  2) The withdrawal line of the Chinese army and the cessation line of the Japanese army should conform generally to that referred to in the "Basic Outline" of the General Staff; that is, it should conform to the policy of the Kwantung Army and to Nagatsu's proposal. However, the return of the Japanese army to Manchukuo will be voluntary, after observance of the cease-fire terms by the Chinese army has been confirmed, and will not be specifically prescribed in the text of the agreement.  3) In order to prevent any delay in the establishment of a ceasefire, the designs of the Tientsin Special Service Agency will be terminated.  4) The site of the cease-fire agreement must be selected with consideration for the issuing of commands to military units in accord with the plans of the Japanese army command with respect to any situation which may necessitate military action at any time during the course of negotiations for cease-fire. Furthermore, a location convenient to the gathering of foreign diplomatic officials and press correspondents and to meddling intervention by third powers must be carefully avoided.” On the 22nd, the Kwantung Army ordered the Tientsin agency to discontinue their activities as the Japanese were now willing to accept a ceasefire. The Japanese and Chinese then agreed on a date and place, that being located along the Peiping-Shanhaiguan railway to sign a ceasefire agreement. For the talks, the Japanese naval attache at Peiping, Lt Commander Fujiwara Kiyoma was chosen who visited Huang Fu's residence on the 22nd. Talks began and by 2am the next day, He Yingqin received a letter officially instructing him to abide by the ceasefire terms. Thus the first step had been taken. On the 25th Chinese officials Li Zuyi and Xu Yenmu rode with Fujiwara to Miyun, then a temporary HQ for the IJA 8th Division. There they passed mounds of dead chinese placed specifically along the roadside, obviously to intimidate them. They arrived to Miyun at 4am to officially show the ceasefire proposal letter to General Nish of the 8th division. Then they got a slap in the face, a new demand was tossed at them.  "As the first step, in order to verify the compliance of the Chinese army, the Japanese army may at any time use airplanes or other means to inspect the withdrawal of the Chinese army. The Chinese authorities shall afford them the necessary protection and facilities."This last minute new demand was imposed because Tokyo HQ believed it was necessary to have aerial observation to make sure both parties did not breach the agreement. The two Chinese officials did not want to devolve the talks so they signed it and returned to Peiping. The official negotiations began on May 30th at Tangu. The Kwantung delegation was led by Major General Okamura Yasuji, their vice chief of staff. He was assisted by Colonel Kita Seiichi, Lt colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, Majors Kono Etsujiro, Endo Saburo and Fujimoto Tetsukuma, Captain Okabe Eiichi and Secretary Hayashide Kenjiro of the Japanese embassy in Manchukuo. The Chinese delegation was led by Lt General Xing Pin and assisted by Chen Zungzu, Xu Yenmu, Chang Xukuang, Li Zeyu and Li Shuzheng. At the offset the Chinese Army declared Tangu under martial law as the Japanese navy dispatched the battleship Kamoi with the 14th destroyer squadron to cruise offshore. The first session of the talks began at 4pm, only lasted some 30 minutes as both sides exchanged formal credentials and such. During that night both sides proded each other trying to figure out what either would accept. Nagatsu decided to show some of the Chinese delegates a document titled “annex document concerning the Organization of Police”. This had been drafted by the Kwantung Army to try establish a demilitarized zone in northeastern Hubei, whose security would be maintained by Chinese police units. The specifics of the document said such a feat would require a force no larger than 20,000 men, with no single units exceeding 200 and they should be armed with nothing stronger than a rifle, pistol or bayont. Nagatsu personally believed this was way to much to ask of the Chinese and advised changing the wording to what the Chinese police could wield as  "shall not be constituted of armed units hostile to Japanese feelings." After seeing the faces of the Chinese upon reading the document, Nagatsu would remark "This evening the Chinese appear to have gained the impression that our proposal will be excessively harsh."  The second session of talks began at 9am the next day whereupon General Okamura presented their draft accord:  “1) The Chinese army shall immediately withdraw to the regions west and south of the line from Yench'ing to Ch'angp'ing, Kaoliying, Shunyi, T'ungchou, Hsiangho, Paoti, Lint'ingk'ou, Ningho, and Lut'ai, and undertakes not to advance beyond that line and to avoid any provocation of hostilities.  2) The Japanese authorities may at any time use airplanes or other means to verify carrying out of the above article. The Chinese authorities shall afford them protection and facilities for such purpose.  3) The Japanese army, after ascertaining the withdrawal of the Chinese army to the line stated in Article 1, undertakes not to cross the said line and not to continue to attack the Chinese troops, and shall voluntarily withdraw, in general, to the Great Wall.  4) In the regions to the south of the Great Wall and to the north and east of the line defined in Article 1, the maintenance of peace and order shall be undertaken by the Chinese police force. The said police force shall not be constituted of armed units hostile to Japanese feelings. feelings.  5) The present agreement shall come into effect upon its signature.” To these demands Xing Pin stated that since the Chinese army had alrady withdrawn to or even beyond what was asked of them, the Japanese forces should respond promptly by withdrawing from the battle zone and to the Great Wall. Xing Pin added that he hoped his Japanese colleagues understood the Chinese Army might be required to help quell bandits that might disturb the vacuum caused by the Japanese withdrawal. To this the Japanese neither agreed nor disagreed and the meeting ended by 9:20. During the interlude the Chinese frantically sought to push further concessions. But the Japanese took a hard stance and stated they would accept nothing until their demands were signed upon. Talks officially resumed at 10:57 and within only 15 minutes both teams signed a truce agreement. Not a single change had been made in the draft the Kwantung Arym had presented. By 2 pm Xing Pin began a request that the Chinese Army be permitted to deal with bandits in the evacuated zone, as police alone most likely would not be enough.  Once the Tangu truce had been signed, the Chinese began to fear rebellious warlord types, particularly Feng Yuxiang might try to exploit the demilitarized region now that the Chinese Central Army had been withdrawn. The Japanese took a solid stance opposing any exceptions to their truce and would never allow Chinese Army units within the demilitarized region. The Japanese in response to the Chinese demands stated "In case there shall be in the Demilitarized Zone armed units disturbing peace and order which the police force shall be unable to cope with, the situation will be dealt with by common accord between the two parties." The Chinese had no choice but to agree to this. The final session resumed at 3:45 pm, whereupon the Chinese tried to obtain agreement on two specific aspects of the truce:  The Japanese reconnaissance aircraft would not conduct inspection flights without giving prior warning The Japanese Army would not misconstrue a move by the Chinese Army which had already withdrawn behind the line established in the truce agreement to return to the authorized line. The Japanese simply refused to even discuss these issues and a 4:05 pm the Chinese simply signed. The Japanese then submitted 4 new demands: 1) Withdraw the two cavalry divisions [formerly of the Northeastern Army] from the area southwest of Fengning in Jehol province.  2) Move the forty divisions of the Chinese Central Army presently in the Peiping-Tientsin region to some other appropriate region for the restoration of peace and order in that region.  3) Remove the entrenchments and military establishments of the Chinese army [used by Yii Hsueh-chung's army] in the area around the mouth of the Pai River.  4) Exercise strict control over anti-Japanese activities, which are the basic cause of Sino-Japanese conflict. To this the Chinese agreed with the last 3 demands and promised to “investigate” the first. At 4:10 the truce talks officially ended. As a consequence of the Tangu Truce, the Japanese Army had gained a foothold in northeastern Hubei. They would press further in the coming years, thus this truce was basically their first step in conquering north China. As you can imagine the Japanese were not done milking every drop from the Chinese. During the entire Tangu treaty talks, the Japanese had intentionally kept everything limited to military matters. The Japanese also sought to deal with what was expected to be a collosal anti-japanese movement in north china. To this end Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya was given a list of demands to press upon the Chinese:   1) The Peiping Political Affairs Council will unreservedly suppress all anti-Japanese movements and other related anti-Japanese activities of the Kuomintang in the area under its jurisdiction.  2) The said Council will unreservedly suppress all activities that disturb the peace in the area along the Great Wall by the use of militia units, or other means, from the area under its jurisdiction.  3) The said Council will unreservedly remove all obstacles to legal peaceful traffic across the Great Wall.  4) The said Council will, with the agreement of the Japanese, establish facilities for the maintenance of order in the cease-fire district.  The Japanese preferred this be met by a written agreement, rather than a formal treaty that would only hurt the face of China further, thus creating even more anti-japanese movements. Real talks began at Dairen on July 3rd, where the Kwantung Army suggested that responsibility for civil administration and maintenance of order in the demilitarized region be transferred from the Hubei provincial government to the Political Affairs Council at Peiping. The reason as to why, because the Japanese believed they could easily control said body. When the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions withdrew from the demilitarized zone, they had left behind small units at Miyun, Chenchangying, Xiachangcheng, Fengtai and Yutien who went to work exerted silent pressure upon the Chinese during these future negotiations happening at Dairen. The Chinese at Dairen were represented by Li Shuzheng, the director of the Peiping-Lioaning Railway; Yin Tung and Xue Qiyen of the Political affairs council and Li Qichen the head of the Mukden-Shanhaiguan Railway Bureau. General Okamura and Colonel Kita came to the meetings, but only in capacity for observation. Included in the agenda of conversation was the disposal of pro-manchukuo militia forces in the demilitarized region and railway service between China proper and Manchukuo. Now the idea to transfer administrative responsibility over the demilitarized region to the Political affairs council in Peiping offered numerous challenges. The council was essentially an organ of the Executive Yuan of the Nanjing government. Their purpose was to overlook negotiations for Nanjing. Moreover their membership lacked prestige and they commanded no military forces, thus had little influence over Northern China. If they tried to influence the demilitarized region, a single army, such as one led by Li Qichen would easily overpower their authority. Northern China was still very much warlord dominated by this period. Li Qichen was a particularly strong warlord in the region. By December of 1932 he had begun recruiting men in the Qinxi district of Liaoning where he was receiving aid from the Japanese. His men assisted the Kwantung Army at Xumenzhai and later fought under the guidance of Captain Okada Kikusaburo at Shanhaiguan. However by Japanese standards, Li Qichengs army was nothing more than a bandit force. Thus after the Tanggu Truce, the Kwantung Army chose to distance itself from Li Qicheng and instead focus all their efforts in cooperating with the Political affairs council.  Ironically one of the first things the Kwantung Army consulted with the council was a new policy to dispose of Li Qichens Army and others. Thus 4000 of Li Qichen's forces were reorganized into a peace preservation corps with the rest simply disbanded. The finer details on how this would occur were negotiated between Li Qichen and the council, meditated by Kwantung officers at Tangshan on July 16th. It was also decided the Kwantung Army would set up an office at Tangshan headed by Li Qichen who would overlook the dispersal of militia units in the demilitarized region. By August 12th, the peace preservation corps was fully established. Many pro-manchukuo militia units were reorganized via the first Dairen conference as it became known. Xu Yuan's army at Qinhuangdao was reorganized into a  reserve peace preservation corps under the direct guidance of Lt Colonel Nakano Hidemitsu. They would be stationed at Yutien. Another force station near Qinhuangdao which had been recruited by the Kwantung army during Operation Nekka was ordered to transfer 2000 of its troops to Manchukuo and have the rest disbanded. Additionally there existed some 15,000 bandits operating in the demilitarized region. The largest of these bands was the East Asia Federation Combined Forces led by Guo Yazhou. He was in league with Xu Yusan and equipped like a regular Chinese Army. Once the ceasefire had been in effect, his men were conscripted in Manchukuo and would be used unofficially by the Kwantung Army. Another large bandit army was led by Lao Haozu, known colloquially as the “old rat”. Many of these bandit groups were made up of discharged troops and deserters from pro-Manchukuo militia units. After much discussion the Political affairs council took over the civil administration for the demilitarized zone, excluding the area consisting of the Great Wall. Another large item of discussion at the first Dairen conference was the restoration of train services between China Proper and Manchukuo. During the conflict the Chinese Army had ripped up a ton of railway track between Peiping and Shanhaiguan. By April 21st trains from Peiping could only operate as far as Tanggu. Meanwhile Mancukuo's Mukden to Shanhaiguan railway was operating 3 trains a day between Shanhaiguan and Tangshan after numerous repair efforts by June 1st. Service between Tanggu and Tangshan was only restored by July 3rd when the Japanese garrison at Tientsin began guarding operations between the two cities. At Dairen both sides agreed to rapidly restore the railway service between Mukden and Peiping while making Tangshan the temporary connecting point.  The section between Shanhaiguan and Tangshan was to be administered by the Mukden- Shanhaiguan railway, thus by Manchukuo while from Peiping to Tangshan would be retained by the Chinese governed Peiping-Liaoning railway. The Chinese argued that once the railway lines were all restored, management over Tangshan to Shanhaiguan should be returned to the Chinese. However the Manchukuo representatives instead argued for joint control over the railway from Peiping to Shanhaiguan.  Despite all the agreements met at Dairen, so much remained unresolved with the demilitarized region. The area immediately adjacent to the Great Wall had not been turned over to the political affairs coucil, the demilitarized region was still infested with bandits, many council members were not keen on any of the ongoings and relations between them and the Kwantung Army were anything but cooperative. Given all of this, in October of 1933, Huang Fu and He Yingqin came to the Japanese asking if they could form more official dialogue to deal with the problems and this led to the Peiping conference of November 1933. The Chinese were led by Huang Fu, He Yingqin, Yin Zung, Yin Juken and Cao Shangming. The Japanese were led by General Okamura, Colonels Kita ad Kikuchi Monya, Lt Colonels Nemoto Hiroshi and Shibayama Kaneshiro and Secretaries Nakayama and Hanawa Yoshitaka of the Peiping Legation. Because the talks had been opened by the Chinese, they had hoped they would control the agenda and in that they were sorely mistaken. The Japanese immediately pounced upon them and brought forth such demands. “1) The Kwantung Army hopes the Political Affairs Council will, as it solidifies its ability to maintain law and order, quickly and 5 safely assume administration in the area south and west of the Great Wall, exclusive of the Great Wall.  2) For the time being, the Political Affairs Council recognizes, in the area under its jurisdiction, the various agencies designated by the Kwantung Army as necessary for the handling of transportation, economic matters, and other affairs. The council will provide assistance in the operation of these agencies.  3) For the time being, the council agrees to lease to the Japanese army the land and buildings in the area under its jurisdiction which are needed for the purpose of stationing Japanese troops.  4) To provide facilities for trade, transportation, and communications in the area south of the Great Wall, the Political Affairs Council will appoint a delegate who will immediately begin consultations with a delegate designated by the Kwantung Army.” The Chinese agreed to the second demand allowing for the establishment by the Kwantung Army at Shanhaiguan, Gubeikou, Xifengkou, Panqiaokou, Lengkou and Qielingkou that Japanese garrisons could be stationed at Shanhaiguan, Xumenzhai, Chenchangying, Taitouying, Lengkou, Xifengkou, Malankuan and Gubeikou. The Chinese also agreed to part 4 in regards to airline connections. Thus with that the Japanese had effectively taken away China's ability to defend the Great Wall. Furthermore on the pretex of guarding said Great Wall, the Kwantung Army had forced the Chinese to recognize its right to garrison troops along the area just inside the Great Wall. Fully satisfied, the Japanese delegation departed Peiping on November 10th. The Kwantung Army still sought to extend the Peiping-Liaoing railway services to Mukden, but this inevitably raised the issue of China Proper recognizing Manchukuo. In December Yin Zung, head of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, traveled to Nanjing to discuss said issue, but would return to Peiping empty handed. Additionally Sun Fu who led a faction within the KMT, began persuading the Central Political Council to pass some legislation specifically withholding Huang Fu from holding authority in handling issues involving North China, because it was feared amongst many it would lead to a mistake that would see recognition of Manchukuo. On April 11th of 1934, Huang Fu attempted a discussion at Nanchang between himself, Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. The result of this discussion was him receiving greater authority over matters involving postal services, train services and tariffs. Despite this, the anti-Japanese part of the Nanjing government continued their efforts to hamper the efforts of Haung Fu and Yin Zung.  In May, Major General Ushiroku Jun of the Kwantung Army, Attache Shibayama and Usami Kanji the chief of the Manchukuo railways Bureau, began secret talks with Yin Zung over at Shanhaiguan. They all agreed to establish a new corporation, the Eastern Travel Bureau, who would receive a million yuan provided in equal shares by the Mukden-Shanhaiguan railway bureau in Manchukuo and the Peiping-Liaoning Railway Bureau. Profits and losses would be shared equally; the general manager would be chosen from one bureau with the assistant manager chosen from the other and trains would run daily from Mukden and Peiping performing a transfer at Shanhaiguan. This idea was bitterly fought over at Nanjing, but after specific amendments would be ratified by July 1st. The first train departed Peiping on July 1st and ironically it would be interrupted midway between Tanggu and Lutai by a bomb explosion on the track. Many Chinese civilians were hurt, but no incident broke out. And we all know that little bomb had to be part of some grand false flag scheme.  The establishment of air services between China Proper and Manchukuo would prove to be the most difficult one to settle. During the talks in Peiping, the Chinese agreed to provide transportation facilities that would include airline connections. But this did not materialize until February of 1935 when the Kwantung Army came up with a draft for a Sino-Japanese corporation. It would be funded equally by both sides, the Chinese would furnish the airfields and facilities, while the Kwantung Army would supply pilots and crews through the Manchukuo Aviation Corporation. The Kwantung Army also had a nefarious plot involved in this deal. By securing the civilian airline service they hoped to provide pilots and crews who at the flip of a coin could become covert military operators, providing direct flights into China Proper.  At first the Chinese showed no interest in such plans, so the Kwantung Army began military transport flights to Peiping from Jinzhou to twist their arm. By June the agreement extended to airfields at Paoting, Xuzhou and Qingdao. The Chinese fought these demands as best they could, but would continuously be outplayed. Still the Kwantung Army was impatient to implement the civilian airline change and presented a new deal in June of 1935 offering to provide 55 percent of the funding from their side. To this the Chinese counter proposed the airfields be located along the border, but the Japanese would not agree to this. By August China sent conditions to ratify the idea: “1) two-thirds of the capital investment would be provided by China and one-third by Japan 2) airport facilities would be restricted to the Peiping-Tientsin region; and  3) flight operations would be entrusted to the aviation department of the Eastern Travel Bureau.” The Japanese still made demands, now seeking flights to all 5 provinces of North China. To this the Chinese officials stated they would await instructions from Nanjing. The Kwantung Army broke off the talks and stated they would do whatever action they considered necessary to resolve the issue. By early September Fu Zuoyi, the governor of Suiyuan province authorized a military flight to Paotou, then on September 28th and October 10th, Japan conducted civilian test flights between Tiantsin, Tsinan and Qingdao.  Following the resolutions over the railway issues, on July 9th of 1934 Yin Zung went to Shanghai with Huang Fu and then to Dairen by July 23rd to meet with General Okumara, Colonel Kita and Attache Shibayama to make deals over other issues. One issue was Japanese control over the entrance of Korean and Japanese into the demilitarized region; the transfer to the Chinese of the Qing Dynasty's mausoleum in Malanyu; the disposition of the peace preservation units and the need for a postal service between China and Manchukuo. While this all sounds perhaps stupid to even mention, every single issue discussed was basically indanger of the Chinese accidentally recognizing Manchukuo, which was the crux of it all. In the end the Japanese made enormous inroads into North China through these negotiations. They forced the accommodation on rail and communication services between China Proper and Manchukuo, to normalize most trade between them and place their loyal proteges within the demilitarized region as so called police units. This was all accomplished through the Peiping Political Affairs Council who de facto had recognized Manchukuo. All of this severely weakened the position of Nanjing in North China and enhanced Japan. But it was not Japan proper, but the Kwantung Army really running the show. However there was absolute chaos going on in Japan during the times, known as “government by assassination”. Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated on May 15th of 1932, leading to the collapse of his cabinet. On May 26th a unity cabinet was formed under Admiral Saito Makoto. Civilian politicians were being knocked out by the military, particularly right-wing military figures. Admiral Saito Makoto selected Uchida Yasuya for foreign minister. At the time he was a retired diplomat and president of the South Manchuria Railway Company. Saito was plunged into the wild times of Kwantung insubordination. To meet the chaos he advocated 3 general principals: “(a) its separation from policy toward Manchukuo and Mongolia (b) an emphasis on economic measures; and  (c) cooperation with the western powers” By reading not so between the lines, you can see the official Japanese policy was basically to let the Kwantung run amok and plan accordingly for what seemed to be an enormous annexation program targeting North China and Inner Mongolia. It was to be an extremely volatile balancing act of encroaching upon Nanjing, but not enough so to bring the wrath of the western great powers down upon Japan. Minister Uchia had served a foreign minister for 4 cabinets. In 1928 he signs the Kellogg-Briand Pact and during the Manchuria crisis he tried to fight the Kwantung Army, pushing them to stop their invasion. Yet it was also he who helped recognize Manchukuo in 1932 and he who withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933. He oversaw Operation Nekka and the resulting Tanggu Truce. All of this spat in the face of international cooperation and basically showcased Japan to be a bully. Thus he was really failing his initial goals and resigned in 1933 due to old age. He was succeeded by Hirota Koki who initially began his tenure advocating for establishing better relations with the US, USSR and China and specifically to normalize Sino-Japanese relations. Hirota was also confronted with a naval disarmament conference scheduled for 1935. There Japan would be asked to make conciliatory moves with the US. Alongside this a lot of problems were brewing with the USSR because of the establishment of Manchukuo. On the other side, Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei continued their appeasement stance, only to see Japan seize more and more from China. Yet Chiang Kai-Shek was adament, they must finish off the internal communist threat before embarking on what seemed to be an existential threat in the form of Japan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Kwantung Army was not only efficient at slicing up China with its dagger, but rather capable with the pen as well. Continuous negotiations were leading the Chinese to hand more and more over to Japan. How long could the Chinese people continue to support their seemingly incapable government during these times of crises?

Last time we spoke about the Battle for the Great Wall of China. In 1933, the Kwantung Army faced logistical struggles and sought political deals with Chinese warlords to seize North China. Despite capturing key areas, chaos reigned as their unauthorized operations defied Tokyo's orders. When Emperor Hirohito demanded a withdrawal, the army reluctantly complied, derailing a coup attempt. Though peace talks followed, distrust persisted, and rogue Japanese commanders plotted fresh offensives. The Tanggu truce was anything but fair to China. The Japanese followed it up with continuous negotiations aimed at slicing more and more out of China. By 1935 North China was practically annexed if but all in official terms. The Japanese seized postal rights, train rights, airline rights, set up puppets to police a new demilitarized zone and seemed never appeased fully. Yet they did not only have their eye on Northern China.    #149 Incidents in North China: Operation Chahar Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. May 1935, marked the peak of Sino-Japanese efforts at reconciliation. Yet this quickly fell apart in June as the Kwantung Army continued to encroach in North China. More specifically they began to look at Chahar province. Between January and May of 1935 some 50 instances of anti-Japanese violence had broken out in North China and behind these outbursts seemed to be Yu Xuecheng, the chairman of Hubei's provincial Government. He was not alone in his efforts as many KMT members, generals in the Central Army and Blue Shirt Society also had helping hands to play. The Japanese were particularly infuriated by incessant attacks from the bandit army led by Sun Yungqin and the assassinations of two pro-Japanese figures operating in Tientsin, Pai Yuhuan and Hu Enpu. Even with th support of the Kwantung Army, maintaining law and order in the demilitarized region established by the Tanggu Trace proved a serious undertaking. The Nanjing government tried exploit the situation, encouraging Sun Yungqin's bandits to create chaos in the demilitarized region. Sun Yungqin's bandit frequently crossed the Great Wall into Rehe in raids. Each time the Kwantung Army attempted to catch them as they fled into the demilitarized region. They particularly liked to do so in the Zunhua district where the official He Xiaoyi supplied the bandits with munitions and provisions. On May 17th, the Kwantung Army was fed up and elected to cross the Great Wall to crush Sun Yungqin once and for all. The Japanese army attache at Peiping, Major Takahasi Tan, notified the Chinese authorities of this decision, claiming the Kwantung Army had the authority to do so under certain provisions within the Tanggu agreement. Beginning on May 20th, the Sugihara Mixed Brigade began its hunt and claimed to have uncovered evidence that Yu Xuecheng had helped guide Sun Yingqin's bandits away from their force. The Japanese also argued the bandits were operating in Manchuria and were calling themselves the “Northeastern Patriotic Volunteers” led by General He Yingqing, the current chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Council.  The bandits were said to have been completely crushed within 5 days by a single brigade. The Japanese also forced the resignation of Yu Xuecheng who refused to organize an anti-chiang kai-shek movement. Shortly before the operation launched, two pro-Japanese newspaper publishers, secretly supported by the Japanese Special Service Agency were assassinated in Tientsin. On May 2nd, Hu Enpu of the Kuochuan pao “national rights” was shot in bed at the Peiyang Hotel in the Japanese concession. That same night, Pai Yuhuan of Chen Pa was murdered in his home. Consul General Kawagoe reported to Tokyo, Hu Enpu and Pai Yuhuan were performing a mission through their newspapers to arouse anti-chiang Kai-shek sentiment in North China. As stated by Kawagoe "Hu and Pai did not have a particularly close personal relationship, but they were regarded with extreme suspicion by the Chinese. Since they were assassinated on the same night, we immediately suspected there was some political intrigue behind these crimes."   Japanese police looked into the matter and discovered the criminals had used a car bearing the plate number 1063 which was owned by Shen Qucheng who was a resident of the Japanese concession. Many suspects were interrogated, and given what they were saying, the Japanese suspected the man behind the assassinations was General Yang Hu, the peace preservation commissioners of Shanghai and an alleged member of the Blue Shirt Society. The Japanese also believed Yang Hu was hiding in the French concessions in Shanghai. In protest of this, the Japanese invoked the Boxer Protocol and Tanggu Truce: “1) The Sun incident and the assassinations of the pro-Japan, proManchukuo newspaperpublishers violated the North China [T'angku] Cease-fire Agreement of May 1933. The North China Cease-fire Agreement stipulated that China would not take any action disturbing the peac e on either side of a line from Lut'ai to Paoti and T'ungchou. The above provision extends to all of China and should of course be applied to any defiant deeds of Chines e officials that threaten the peac e in the Peiping-Tientsin region. The Sun incident and the assassinations of Pai and Hu are clearly contrary to the above agreement.  2) The official note exchanged by China and Japan upon the return of Tientsin in 1902 is applicabl e to the murder of Pai Yühuan. This note stated: "In the event a Chines e national who is employed by a foreign army is accused of disobeying the law, the commander of the army that employs the said Chines e national, in order that the matter may be decided in the most suitable manner has the option of punishing him personally or voluntarily delivering him to the appropriate Chinese authorities. Your government must agree to this arrangement.” Since Pai, as already stated, was in the employ of the Japanese army, his murder is clearly a deed which violates the above note."  Thus the Japanese invoked the right that the commander of the Tientsin garrison had the authority to maintain security and try any criminals. Because the Japanese Army claimed it had authority to conduct investigations, trials and deal punishment within two miles of the Peiping-Shanhaigaun rail line it insisted to do so given the recent events. This actually distorted some of the specifics of the Tanggu Treaty, thus the Japanese were on loose grounds. On May 25th, Tokyo HQ was forewarned of the actions the Kwantung Army would undertake in North China. So Tokyo sent Colonel Sakai Takashi the Tientsin army chief of staff and attache Takahasi Tan called upon Yu Qiaqi, the secretary general of the Political affairs council and General He Yingqin. In fact Sakai backed this up with a threatening public statement: “The execution of anti-Manchukuo plots under the direction of the Chinese authorities, assistance to the "Chinese Patriotic Volunteer Forces," and various acts of terrorism directed against Japan are destructive of the cease-fire agreement. The headquarters for these crimes are in Tientsin and Peiping. Should this state of affairs continue, it will become necessary to incorporate the above two cities in the demilitarized zone. The murders of Hu and Pai are violations of the provisions of the Boxer Settlement and a challenge to Japan. If similar acts hereafter occur, Japan will, on the basis of its treaty rights, be forced to consider what action is necessary for the defense of its rights”. Additionally, Sakai demanded the withdrawal of all KMT aligned units, Blue Shirt Society members, the Political Training Corps of the Peiping Branch Military Council and the 3rd Regiment Military Police from North China. He also wanted Yu Xuecheng dismissed as chairman of Hubei. The next day in a move to intimidate Yu Xuecheng, the Tientsin Army deployed armored vehicles, artillery and machine guns directly in front of his official residence. It seemed now the Japanese sought to incorporate all of Hubei into the new demilitarized region. To make this happen, Sakai had independently put forward these demands, but they were recognized as an ultimatum from Japan, one for which for now had no deadline.  Chiang Kai-Shek, Wang Jingwei, Huang Fu and He Yingqin conferred over the situation and chose to informally talk with the Japanese while they kept the press quiet on the matter. The Chinese took their time, so to pressure them further, the Kwantung Army deployed a infantry battalion and one cavalry brigade at Shanhaiguan, while the Kawaguchi detachment concentrated around Gubeikou and two air force squadrons were brought over to Jinzhou. The Tientsin Army readied two battalions at Tientsin and Tangshan, both prepared to advance to Peiping at a moments notice. After sending numerous orders not to escalate things, Tokyo HQ sent Colonel Kita Seiichi, the chief of its China desk to demand the Kwantung Army not use anymore force. Meanwhile the Imperial Japanese Navy, under the fear of Anglo-American intervention avoided escalating the situation, but kept the 3rd fleet on full alert.  Under immense pressure the Chinese buckled. At 6pm on June 10th, He Yingqin orally advised Major Takahashi that Nanjing would issue a directive ordered the immediate withdrawal of local KMT organs from Hubei; that the 51st NRA Army would depart by rail from Hubei between June 11th and 25th; that the end and 25th NRA divisions of the Central Army would also depart Hubei and that the KMT would issue a directive prohibiting anti-japanese activities throughout China. It was an incredibly embarrassing act and became known as the He-Umezu agreement. Under its provisions the Japanese had expelled the Central Army from North China, Yu Xuecheng's forces, all anti-Japanese organizations of any sort and all anti-Japanese officials were removed. The Japanese had heavily capitalized on the assassinations in Tientsin, however other incidents enabled our good friend Doihara to cause further mayhem.  Following the Tanggu truce, Song Queyuan's 29th Army, consisting of the 37th, 38th and 132nd divisions had been deployed throughout Chahar with his headquarters based at Kalgan. His troops understandably displayed a lot of anti-japanese attitude and behaviors. Like a broken record, it was only a matter of time until an incident organically presented itself. One of the first ones broke out in Changpei. According to the Japanese, so get your grains of salt ready, a group of 8 led by staff officer Kawaguchi Kiyotake of the Tientsin garrison and Ikeda Katsumi of the consulate at Kalga and planned an excursion to Inner Mongolia late October 1934. After completing all the necessary paperwork and procedures, such as securing visas and giving advance notice to the Chinese officials in the areas they would voyage, the Japanese departed Kalgan for Tolun on October 27th. Upon entering Changpei's south gate they were suddenly stopped by troops under Song Queyuans 132nd division alongside some Peace Preservation Corps men. Their commanding officer punched Ikeda as the rest of the party were threatened with Dao swords and rifles. After 40 minutes a Chinese security officer showed up to allow them all to pass through the South Gate.  The Japanese foreign Ministry and Army were obviously outraged by this incident. The vice Consul at Kalgan, Hashimoto Masayasu complained to the chief of staff of the 132nd division and Major Takahasi at Peiping lodged an official complaint with Song Queyuan. On November 25th, Song Queyuan ordered the general commanding the 132nd division, Chao Tengyu, to apologize and dismissed the officer who punched Ikeda. Song Queyuan then guaranteed safe travel for all Japanese throughout Chahar, without any inspection of their possession and he promised to withdraw his troops west of the Great Wall. All of this because a guy was punched, you can really get the sense the Chinese were walking on eggshells. In late 1934, a large contingent of Song Queyuan's cavalry had deployed to the area around Fengning in Rehe. They were defending strategic positions and establishing large peace preservation corps. The Kwantung Army repeatedly demanded they withdraw from the area and the Chinese had made promises as to such by December 31st. Rather than comply, the Chinese launched an offensive and captured 40 Manchukuo militiamen. Song Queyuan rewarded his men with a bounty of 300 silver yuan and ordered the arms of the enemy by handed to the district government of Kuyuan.  On January 17th, the Kwantung Army moved the Nagami detachment of the IJA 8th Division from Chengde to launch a punitive expedition against Song Queyuan's forces in the Kuyuan area. On the 20th the Peiping Branch Military Council informed the Kwantung Army Song Queyuan was already withdrawing his men. Thus the Nagami detachment who had advanced as far as Tat'an turned around for the Great Wall on the 22nd, when they were suddenly attacked by Song Queyuan's troops near Hungnit'an. The Kwantung Army were outraged by what they were calling the first incident in western Rehe. The so-called incident would be resolved on February 2nd nar Ta'an when Zhang Yueting acting on behalf of the NRA 37th division and Major General Tani Hisao on behalf of the IJA 7th division agreed to the following terms: “1) In the future China will strictly prohibit actions that antagonize the Japanese army and will neither move troops into Manchukuo nor adopt a threatening attitude toward Manchukuo. The Chinese will completely suspend their current spying activities, such as scouting the movements of the Kwantung Army.  2) If China violates the above pledges in the future, the Japanese  army will act independently and firmly, but the responsibility will be borne by the Chinese . If the Chinese forces increase their military strength or contemplate strengthening their fortifications, the Japanese army will regard these moves as hostile acts.  3) China is to have the government of Kuyuan district return all arms confiscated (from the Manchukuo militia and turn them over to the Japanese army at Nanweitzu by February 7.  4) The outcome of this conference will be jointly announced on February 4. In particular, the Chinese should be careful that in making their announcement they do not distort the contents of the agreement or engage in counterpropaganda”. Can you imagine there was a second incident at Changpei? 4 members of the Japanese Special Services Agency based out of Abga, some 40 miles northwest of Tolun had come to the same southgate around 4pm on June 5th, traveling to Kalgan. There they were detained by units of the 132nd division who refused to recognize their identification papers. They were apparently held without proper bedding or food, threatened with Dao swords and bayonets. The Japanese claimed it was all done under orders from Song Queyuan's chief of staff and that their officials were interrogated by the chief of military police at Changpei. On June 11th, Lt Colonel Matsui Gennosuke, the head of the Japanese Special Service Agency at Kalgan, demanded an apology from Song Queyuan and for the men responsible to be punished and for further guarantees for safe travel. Matsui also insinuated that unless Song Queyuan severed ties to Nanjing and became Pro-Japanese he might suffer the same fate that had befallen Yu Xuecheng. Clearly the Kwantung Army was looking to remove Song Queyuan's army from Chahar province. There were two major reasons for such a thing, so they could better protect the northwestern flank of Manchukuo and to support Prince De who was attempting a campaign to make Inner Mongolia independent from China.  On June 11th the Kwantung Army directed the Mukden Special Service Agency chief of staff, our old buddy, Doihara, currently in Peiping, to confer with the army attache there and with the Tientsin garrison. They were to push for Song Queyuan's army to be withdrawn south of the Yellow River as rapidly as possible. Tokyo HQ always keeping a close eye on their troublesome Kwantung Officers dispatch this notice to Doihara "Although we desire the evacuation of Song Queyuan's army from Chahar province, we disagree that we should, at this time, demand its withdrawal south of the Yellow River. Rather, its transfer to the Peiping-Hankow Railway line would be advisable." On June 13th, the General Staff advised the Kwantung Army the same message. The General staff then ordered every detachment in North China to act discreetly "If we shun excessive publicity at this time, we should, in view of the present situation, be able to achieve practical results without publicity." Since they were already getting their way in Hubei, Tokyo HQ did not want to risk rocking the boat in Chahar concurrently.  Then came a second western Rehe incident, according to the Chengde Special Service Agency, "On June 11, when a party led by a senior official of Fengning hsien was about to enter the town of Tungchatzu [in Manchukuo, about eight kilometers north of Tushihk'ou], it was attacked by rifle fire from Sung Che-yuan's troops stationed at Tushihk'ou. The next day, June 12, a member of the border police force in Hsiaoch'ang [in Manchukuo, about fifteen kilometers north of Tushihk'ou] was also fired upon by the same troops of Sung in the vicinity of Hsiaoch'ang."  On June 17th, the Kwantung Army General Minami Jiro met with the Tientsin Army chief of staff Sakai and the Special Service Agency chief at Kalgan, Matsui for a full report on the incident. After reviewing it, Minami drafted a policy to guide the Kwantung Army:  “The withdrawal of Sung Che-yuan's army will worsen the confusion in the Peiping-Tientsin region. This incident should be handled separately from the North China problem and should be negotiated locally with Sung Che-yuan. Our demands will be limited to the following:  1) withdrawal of the troops invading Manchukuo, together with their advance unit at Tolun;  2) removal of the forces back to the Kalgan area;  3) an apology by Sung Che-yuan;  4) punishment of those directly responsible for the Changpei incident; and  5) prohibition of anti-Japanese actions in the future.” The Chinese realized they needed to reach a quick settlement with the Kwantung Army. On the 18th He Yingqin met with Consul General Suma over in Nanjing. Suma was presented with a set of harsh demands from the Kwantung Army and that same day reported to the Executive Yuan he had decided to relieve Song Queyuan of his posts as governor and commander of the 29th Army. He then appointed as acting governor and provincial commissioner of civil affairs, Qin Dechun, who would take the 132nd division implicated in the Changpei incident south. The message was relayed to the Japanese military attache in Nanjing, Lt Colonel Amamiya Tatsumi. The man who relayed the message was Vice Foreign Minister Tang Yujen who also stated this "In view of the fact that China has moved voluntarily to dismiss Sung Che-yuan, to transfer his army, and to punish those responsible, we request that we not be confronted with an ultimatum in the form of various demands from the Kwantung Army with a deadline for reply." On June 19th, Nanjing officially implemented the promises made by He Yingqin and Tang Yujen and in turn the Kwantung Army wired Doihara in Peiping to stand down and wait to see if the Chinese did what they said they would. Doihara was probably disappointed he could not perform his 100th false flag operation he must have been cooking up. For any of you who watch my Youtube content, I used clips from the Chinese WW2 Drama series “Young Marshal” that depicts Doihara hilariously. You can check it out in my long format documentary on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, its meme gold Doihara's clips, freaking out and smashing phones and such.  At 10 pm on June 23rd, Doihara, alongside Matsui and Takahasi visited Qin Dechen at his residence to negotiate a final understanding. There Doihara demanded China implement several measures to promote better relations with Japan such as withdrawing Song Queyuan's army southwest; give an apology for the Changpei incident; punish all those responsible; dissolve all the anti-japanese organizations in the region; ban Chinese immigration into Inner Mongolia; cease any oppressive actions against Mongolians and cooperate and encourage trade between Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia, North China; and appoint more Japanese military and political advisers. Just a laundry list he had worked up. So Qin Dechen apologized for the Changpei incident, stated they were already withdrawing Song Queyuan's men and dissolving all the anti-japanese organizations. Now he was orally agreeing to all of this, but he refused to put it in writing, prior to receiving the greenlight from Nanjing. Doihara understood and gave him time to talk to his government. The next day however another incident occurred, this time near Tuxukou. There a contingent of Song Queyuan's withdrawing troops fired upon Manchukuo police forces and in response the Tolun Special Service Agency dispatched a Mongolian unit led by Li Shuxin. It was not really much of an incident, just a minor confrontation all things given, so the Kwantung Army told Doihara to deal with Qin Dechen in private about it.On June 27th, Qin Dechen sent a formal reply to Doihara's demands in what became known as the Qin-Doihara agreement. It conformed with all the demands, seeing Song Queyuan's troops depart southwest while the security of Chahar was entrusted to two peace preservation units. One unit was responsible for the Chinese population, the other over the Mongolian. On August 28th, Song Queyuan was appointed garrison commander over the Peiping-Tientsin region with his 29th division joining Chao Tengyu's 132nd division and Liu Juming's 2nd division. Thus after the He-Umezu and Qin-Doihara agreements the Japanese had now expanded their influence into both Hubei and Chahar. 1935 saw a wave of incidents break out in the demilitarized region, prompting the Japanese to go into numerous negotiations with the Chinese to clamp down on anything they didn't like. Then on October 4th, Japan unleashed a document titled  “Concerning Policy towards China”: “The goal of our foreign policy is the development of East Asia and the maintenance of the security of East Asia through the cooperative concert of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, with Japan as the nucleus; this is likewise the objective of our policy toward China. To realize this objective on the basis of the outline below, the central and regional authorities of China must, by fair and just means, adjust their relations with Japan and Manchukuo so as to bring about an environment favorable to the establishment of basic relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  1) China should adopt a good neighbor policy toward Japan, thoroughly suppress anti-Japanese activities, and abandon its policy of reliance on Europe and the United States. It should put this policy into practice and as a matter of course cooperate with Imperial Japan on practical problems.  2) Although China must eventually extend formal recognition to Manchukuo, until then it must recognize de facto the independence of Manchukuo and abandon its anti-Manchukuo policy. At least in North China, which borders on Manchukuo, the Chinese should promote economic and cultural cooperation with Manchukuo.  3) In view of the Communist threat emanating from Outer Mongolia and posing a common menace to Japan, Manchukuo, and China, China should cooperate in measures aimed at eliminating this menace from the region bordering Outer Mongolia.  4) When the above points have been put into effect and we recognize the good faith of China concerning friendly cooperation with Japan and Manchukuo, we shall first conclude comprehensive agreements on friendly cooperative relations between China and Japan, and thereafter draw up the agreement needed for regulating new relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China” To this Chiang Kai-Shek replied could not recognize Manchukuo but that his government would do whatever it could peacefully to maintain economic activity between the people north and south of the Great Wall. He also stated no other country on earth was more concerned with the Communist menace in Mongolia than China. All of the appeasement efforts had brought Wang Jingwei to his boiling point and on August 8th he departed for Shanghai as he and his entire cabinet resigned. Chiang Kai-Shek personally came over and asked Wang Jingwei to withdraw his resignation given he offered him further support, and Wang Jingwei relented. Then on the morning of November 1st, after attending a meeting, Wang Jingwei was shot by a Chinese reporter for the Chenkuang Press, a company notably associated with Chiang Kai-Shek. Rumors spread the assassination attempt was inspired by anti-japanese elements such as Generals Yang Qi and Tang Shengzhi. With Wang Jingwei in the hospital, Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to take a larger role with the North China situation. Then Wang Jingwei departed for Europe seeking better medical care and wired his resignation on November 29th. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek succeeded him as president of the Executive Yuan and the coalition between him and Wang Jingwei had officially ended. With Chiang Kai-Shek now the only funnel from which action could be directed, the Japanese sent Ambassador Ariyoshi to China to persuade Chiang Kai-Shek to grant some form of autonomy for North China. By this point autonomy for North China had become part of Japan's national policy. Chiang Kai-Shek in response to this growing threat went to Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi, to meet with Yan Xishan. There he proposed that if Yan Xishan could unite the Northern Warlords, Chiang Kai-Shek would appoint him chairman of the political affairs council, with added authority over finances and diplomacy. Chiang Kai-Shek urged him to come attend the 6th plenum of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee scheduled for November 1st. At this time Yan Xishan's Shanxi was struggling financially so he reconciled with Chiang Kai-Shek. To this effect Chiang Kai-Shek sent his vice chief of the Army General Staff Xing Pin to tour the north trying to persuade those like Song Queyuan and Han Fuju to not support the North China autonomy movement. The Japanese interpreted these efforts to thwart the autonomy movement as the underlying cause of all the anti-japanese incidents breaking out continuously. To this the Nanjing government disclaimed no responsibility and insisted they were doing everything the Japanese asked of them.  The Japanese began a massive campaign aimed at all the important leaders in North China. One man they managed to gain influence over was Yin Jukeng who on November 25th at Tungzhou, announced the inauguration of the East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council, claiming autonomy for the entire demilitarized region. Yin Jukeng's council consisted of 9 members whereupon he was chairman and took charge of foreign relations and military affairs. As you can imagine Nanjing immediately labeled him a traitor and ordered his arrest. Chiang Kai-Shek then rapidly sent word to the Japanese an official response to their “Concerning Policy towards China” document:  “To satisfy the various demands from the Japanese side, there should first of all be established in Hopei province an autonomous political administration; ultimately, this administration should be similar to that governing the southwestern region. Whether or not this administration should be extended to other regions will be determined after the results in Hopei have been ascertained.  1) Although the campaign to wipe out the Communists is progressing, the Communist bandits have fled toward Kansu. Since this raises the danger that the Communists may spread into Inner Mongolia, the defense against the Communists in North China should be conducted jointly.  2) Certain aspects of the new monetary system are not suited to North China, and appropriate modifications will be made in this respect.  3) Efforts are to be made to harmonize economic interchange among the people on both sides of the Great Wall.  4) To meet the special needs of the region, the local administration should be given authority to enable it to exercise suitable control over financial matters in North China.  5) Pending issues are to be settled locally in a rational manner.  6) The aim will be to employ talented people to carry out the above tasks and to establish an ideal government.” Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched He Yingqin to reign in the situation at Peiping, but upon his arrival he believed the situation was beyond his control. He Yingqin reported that it was his belief the only way for Nanjing to retain some degree of authority in the region was to create a new political organ to do so. Thus on December 11th, the Nationalist government established the Hubei-Chahar Political Council chaired by Song Queyuan. Song Queyuan declared the new council would assume all responsibility for administering Hubei and Chahar and promised  "to respect the wishes of the people, endeavor in particular to relieve the economic distress of the region, and maintain the peace of East Asia on the basis of Sino-Japanese amity."  Thus within all this madness now two autonomous regimes co-existed in North China. The East Hubei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council would administer 22 prefectures while the Hubei-Chahar Political Council would administer Hubei, Chahar, Peiping and Tientsin. As you might imagine, relations between these two councils was complex and ambiguous. The 22 prefectures the former administered were under the jurisdiction of the other. One was a Japanese puppet, the other was controlled by Nanjing who refused to recognize the other. Japan immediately exploited their newfound chaotic gains in North China. In May of 1936 the 2000 troops of the Tientsin garrison army was boosted to 5600 led by General Tashiro Kan'ichiro. This was done under the guise it was to defend against communists and protect Japanese citizens. The position of the commander of the Tientsin garrison was officially promoted to encompass full responsibility for the situation in North China, exactly the same as the Kwantung Army's role over Manchukuo. Thuse both the Kwantung Army and what was henceforth called the China Garrison had clearly defined roles. One would be responsible for Manchukuo, the other over North China. Japan had neutralized Rehe, Chahar and Hubei, all of whom would fall directly under their influence. But was Japan satisfied?  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Its not always through military means that nations can encroach upon other nations. Japan was showcasing how it could bully away parts of China through threats alone it was working miracles. How long could Chiang Kai-Shek carry on like this? Would it be Japan or his own people that would hang him for losing China?

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindanao. In April 1945, the US launched the invasion of Mindanao under General Eichelberger, focusing on Illana Bay. Initial assaults were swift, and American forces quickly captured vital areas due to the disarray among Japanese troops, who were struggling with low morale and supply shortages. The Japanese were under significant pressure, with commanders ill-prepared to mount a robust defense as American troops advanced toward Davao. Fierce battles unfolded, including attempts to seize key positions, but Japanese forces, that included remnants from earlier campaigns, faced overwhelming and relentless assaults. Despite stiff resistance in some areas, the Americans ultimately made considerable territorial gains, significantly weakening Japanese positions. This successful operation in Mindanao laid crucial groundwork for further advances in the Pacific theater, marking a decisive phase in the war as the tide turned heavily in favor of the Allies. As this chapter closed, it was evident that the end of Japanese resistance in the region was drawing near. This episode is the Allied Invasion of Borneo Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  A long time ago, in a galaxy far away we talked about the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Now it is time to talk about how the Dutch strikes back. . . well not exactly, but I wanted to finish the star wars reference. For an extended period, the Australian forces that had valiantly fought on the island of New Guinea during a crucial phase of the Allied war effort had been assigned to garrison duties in remote areas, conducting minor offensives against a desperate enemy more concerned with obtaining food than engaging in battle. At the same time, General MacArthur deemed it politically unwise for Australians to take a prominent role in reclaiming the Philippines, an American territory, and he also found it politically unfavorable for American troops to participate in restoring Dutch and British authority in the Indies. Recognizing the urgent need to secure the oilfields of British and Dutch Borneo to supply accessible oil for the push toward Japan, Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead's 1st Australian Corps was designated for the operation to retake Borneo, known as Operation Oboe. Should note that after a period of illness, suffering from malaria and a skin condition, the fighting General George Alan Vasey had finally recovered by February 1945. General Blamey, who still had doubts about his physical fitness despite Vasey being given an A by an Army medical board, reluctantly appointed him to command the 6th Division, then in action in the Aitape-Wewak campaign. Vasey then flew north to take up his new command. The aircraft Vasey was travelling in, RAAF Lockheed Hudson A16-118, took off from RAAF Station Archerfield on the afternoon of March 5, 1945. Due to a cyclone that was ravaging the Queensland coast at the time, the aircraft crashed into the sea about 400 metres out from Machans Beach, just north of the mouth of the Barron River, 2 kilometres short of the Cairns Airport. Vasey was killed in the crash along with all those on board. His body was recovered from the crash site and was buried with full military honours in Cairns cemetery along with those of Major-General Rupert Downes and Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bertram. Vasey's concern for his men outlived him. The men called him 'Bloody George', not after his casualties, but after his favourite adjective, and Vasey's personable style of command attracted immense loyalty from them. "Vasey owns the 7th," wrote a Melbourne journalist, "but every man in the division believes he owns Vasey." Thus now it fell to General Steven to retain command of the 6th Division at that time already engaged in combat at Aitape-Wewak, the initial plan was to land Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th Brigade at Tarakan on April 23 to establish an airstrip for supporting aircraft for subsequent operations, specifically an assault on Balikpapan by the remaining forces of Major-General George Wootten's 9th Division on May 18. Following that, ten days later, a brigade was set to land at Bandjarmasin to secure air support for the planned invasion of Java by the entire corps on June 27. Ultimately, the operations at Bandjarmasin and Java were cancelled; the Tarakan landing was postponed to May 1; the Balikpapan invasion would instead be conducted by Major-General Edward Milford's 7th Division on July 1; and the 9th Division was tasked with the invasion of Brunei Bay on June 10. Consequently, by the end of March, Morshead's headquarters and the entire 9th Division had relocated to Morotai, where they would prepare and rehearse for the impending invasion. In March 1944, General Doihara Kenji organized the 7th Area Army to establish a new defensive line across Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. Yes you heard that right, General Doihara Kenji. For those of you who listen to my Fall and Rise of China podcast, this guy is that infamous intelligence officer who worked on nearly all the significant false flag operations during the second sino-Japanese war. Working as an intelligence officer he played a key role in the orchestration of the Huanggutun Incident, Mukden Incident, kidnapping of Emperor Puyi and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, amongst countless other “incidents”. He was a bonafide mastermind behind numerous false flag operations and the Manchurian drug trade earning the moniker Lawrence of Manchuria.  Now, anticipating an impending enemy invasion, Lieutenant-General Yamawaki Masataka reorganized the Borneo Defence Army into the 37th Army in September, placing it directly under General Terauchi's Southern Army. This force gradually received reinforcements from the 56th and 71st Independent Mixed Brigades, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment, and several smaller units. Despite this, the command was understrength and poorly equipped, as most of the available equipment and experienced troops were reassigned to more critical locations in the Southwest Pacific. By the end of the year, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, the 37th Army had stationed the majority of Major-General Nozaki Seiji's 56th Independent Mixed Brigade at Tawau, Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's understrength 71st Independent Mixed Brigade at Kuching, most of Colonel Iemura Shinichi's 25th Independent Mixed Regiment on Tawi-Tawi Island, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Balikpapan, along with three battalions in Sandakan, two battalions and a naval unit in Tarakan, and one battalion each in Kudat, Beaufort, and Miri. However, in 1945, both Baba and Terauchi recognized that the enemy was likely to first target strategic locations on the east coast before establishing a strong presence in western Borneo to prepare for an invasion of Malaya. Consequently, they decided that the majority of the 37th Army should be concentrated around Brunei Bay, leading to orders for the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade to march overland toward northern Borneo. The 370th Independent Battalion remained in Tawau, while the 369th Independent Battalion was sent to garrison Bandjarmasin. Additionally, half of the 454th Independent Battalion was dispatched to Balikpapan, and the other half to Bandjarmasin. This left only the 455th Independent Battalion and part of the 2nd Guard Unit at Tarakan. Early in April the strength of the Japanese force on Tarakan was estimated at about 4000 of whom 2500 were base troops. On the eve of the attack, however, largely because of information indicating that a battalion had been moved from Tarakan to Balikpapan, it was estimated that only 1500 to 2000 troops remained on the island. Aerial photographs showed five gun positions on the south-eastern tip of the island covering the channel along which ships normally entered Tarakan. Round Lingkas and Tarakan there seemed to be 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 9 medium and 5 light anti-aircraft guns seemed to be round the airfield. The whole of Lingkas beach was protected by parallel rows of posts, rails and pipes driven into the mud and extending into the sea to a distance of 125 yards from high-water mark; and between the beach and the road was an anti-tank ditch about 25 feet wide. A group of oil tanks was near the beach and, as it was possible that the Japanese might try to impede an attacker by flooding the oil over the sea and the swamp near the Pamusian River and setting it alight, the air force had taken pains to destroy these tanks. Field works could be seen; there were concrete pill-boxes built by the Dutch; and it was suspected that, here as elsewhere, tunnels had been dug into the hills.  Units stationed at Sandakan were also ordered to move toward Brunei, leaving the 554th Independent Battalion behind. Furthermore, due to the challenges in supplying Tawi-Tawi, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment was withdrawn to Borneo in February and instructed to march toward Jesselton, where it was expected to arrive in May. During this time, little was done to enhance the island's defenses, and the overland marches took a significant toll on the soldiers' stamina. Meanwhile, enemy air raids intensified, severely disrupting communications. Between April 11 and 29, Air Commodore Arthur Harry Cobby's Australian 1st Tactical Air Force, along with Major-General Paul Wurtsmith's 13th Air Force, conducted several air assaults on Tarakan and Tawau, targeting oil storage tanks, artillery positions, radar stations, defenses, and various buildings. On April 27, Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1 departed Morotai, carrying Whitehead's 26th Brigade, protected by Admiral Berkey's cruisers and destroyers. Over the next two days, this force executed a naval bombardment on shore targets while a minesweeping unit cleared and marked the approach route within 800 yards of the beach and Sadau Island. Early on April 30, the 2/4th Commando Squadron landed unopposed on Sadau, where they established an artillery battery to support the engineers in clearing obstacles from the invasion beaches. After successfully completing the task with just a few sniper and mortar attacks, the main convoy reached the southwest coast of Tarakan Island an hour before sunrise on May 1. Following a heavy air and naval bombardment prior to landing, Whitehead's assault waves began their approach to the shore, supported by rocket fire from the LCI gunboats. Around 08:00, the 2/23rd and 2/48th Battalions landed on Green Beach and Red Beach, respectively, without facing any opposition. However, once they moved inland, they encountered intense fire from Lingkas Hill and Roach. The 2/23rd Battalion launched an attack and captured both locations while the 2/48th took the Finch and Parks positions as they advanced to secure the Collins Highway ridge. Throughout the day, the remaining units of the 26th Brigade landed despite poor beach conditions and overcrowding, with the 2/24th Battalion held in reserve along Anzac Highway. By nightfall, the brigade managed to hold an area 2,800 yards wide at the base and up to 2,000 yards deep. Early on May 2, the 2/23rd seized Milko with minimal resistance, advancing further north to the Pages feature and Hospital Spur. Simultaneously, the 2/48th quickly secured Lyons and the junction with Burke Highway, while the 2/24th effectively attacked the Wills, Sturt, and Frank positions with support from aircraft and artillery. In the late afternoon, as one company moved up Anzac Highway toward the airfield, Lieutenant-Colonel George Warfe's other companies converged on the Essex feature, which was captured without opposition during the night. The next morning, the 2/24th attacked the airfield from the south and east; although they successfully took the airfield ridge at a high cost, their late assault on the Rippon position to the north was repelled by determined enemy defenders. At the same time, the 2/48th conducted reconnaissance towards the Peter and Sykes features, while the 2/23rd managed to secure the area between Gleneleg Highway and Pamusian. However, their assaults on Hospital Spur and Tarakan Hill were unsuccessful. Fortunately, Burke Ridge was found abandoned on May 4. By then, Whitehead had already instructed the 2/23rd to advance east and join the 2/24th in their attacks on the airfield, with the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/4th Commando Squadron taking over their positions in the west. The commandos then launched an attack on Tarakan Hill. Despite being initially held down by fierce enemy fire, they eventually forced the defenders off the high ground through sustained pressure, tank support, and a sweeping maneuver to the right. Simultaneously, the 2/48th advanced and successfully took control of the Evans feature, while a company from the 2/24th attacked the Peningkibaru stronghold after an intense artillery barrage, managing to secure the position just in time to fend off the Japanese who had retreated during the bombardment. Additionally, Warfe planned another assault on Rippon, but heavy Japanese shelling ultimately compelled him to call it off. On May 5, as the commandos and pioneers continued to diminish the remaining strongholds on Tarakan Hill, the 2/48th successfully cleared the road north to Otway, although they faced greater resistance near Sykes. Rippon was also discovered to be abandoned and was swiftly captured, though the Japanese still controlled the high ground to the north. Finally, on May 6, the 2/48th launched another attack on Sykes and successfully cleared the hill this time. While capturing the airfield and town accomplished Whitehead's primary objective, the Japanese continued to hold the rugged interior of Tarakan, indicating that much fighting lay ahead until the garrison was completely defeated. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area, 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District 6, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops".The enemy was now directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts.  After the unsuccessful general attack on April 19, which yielded minimal gains, Generals Hodge and Buckner were preparing to push the offensive southward, fully aware that breaching the first Shuri defense ring would be a slow and costly endeavor. On the western front, the primary enemy positions on Kakazu Ridge had been entirely circumvented, with General Griner directing his troops to advance and focus on cleanup later. Consequently, on April 20, the majority of the 165th Regiment secured the coastal region before launching a southern attack that encountered immediate and fierce resistance in the rugged terrain north of Gusukuma, particularly around Item Pocket.  The center of the Japanese resistance lay in the I section of Target Area 7777, which came to be called "Item Pocket", in military terminology I is called Item. Actually, the pocket was the hub of the enemy position; from it, like spokes of a giant wheel, extended four low ridges, separated from each other by ravines and rice paddies. Potter's Ridge ran north from the hub, Charlie Ridge to the northeast, Gusukuma Ridge to the southeast, and Ryan Ridge to the southwest. Lying between Gusukuma and Charlie Ridges and sloping to the east was a cone-shaped hill called by Americans "Brewer's Hill." A gulch ran along each side of the hill Anderson's Gulch on the north and Dead Horse Gulch on the south. Both ran in an easterly direction, crossing Route 1 at small bridges just north of Gusukuma. The ground was superbly suited for active defense. Typical Japanese positions were connected by tunnels along the sides and under the crests of the ridges; Ryan Ridge, in particular, was honeycombed with such defenses. From Item Pocket the enemy had excellent command both of the coastal areas to the north and west and of the open land to the east where Route 1 ran north-south. The Japanese had long been aware of the defensive value of this position against either a beach landing on the northwest or an attack from the north. Months before the Americans landed, Japanese troops and Okinawan laborers were boring tunnels and establishing elaborate living quarters and aid stations. The area was held by two companies of the 21st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 64th Brigade, 62nd Division, supported by an antitank company, a machine gun company, and elements of antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar units. At least 600 Japanese occupied the Pocket, reinforced by several hundred Okinawans. Only through persistent effort was the 1st Battalion able to reach a position east of Gusukuma by nightfall, while the 2nd Battalion successfully took control of Potter's Ridge and Fox Ridge but failed in its attempts against Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket itself. The leading platoon was well up on the slope of Ryan when Japanese on top opened up with mortars, machine guns, and artillery, cutting off the rest of Company E. While the company commander, his clothes torn by bullets, and the rest of the company straggled back to Fox Ridge, the leading platoon continued doggedly ahead. Its leader, T/Sgt. Earnest L. Schoeff, managed to reach the top with eight of his men despite almost constant fire. He was ordered by radio to hold until relief came. The men hugged the ground as darkness slowly descended. Then from three directions from fifty to sixty heavily armed Japanese set upon the Americans. In wild hand-to-hand fighting the nine men beat off the attack. Pfc. Paul R. Cook fired four cases of ammunition into the enemy, shooting down at least ten before he was killed. With grenades, rifle butts, and the enemy's own weapons, Schoeff and his men killed another dozen before the Japanese withdrew. With two of his men killed, another missing, and two wounded, Schoeff led the survivors back to his company during the night. To the east, the 106th and 105th Regiments tried to advance south towards the village of Iso and the Pinnacles but were hindered by heavy enemy gunfire. In response, Colonel Winn dispatched his 2nd Battalion to maneuver around the East Pinnacle to reach the village of Natama, where Companies F and G were ultimately repelled by a strong Japanese counterattack. As they retreated in chaos, they faced an ambush from Japanese infiltrators, resulting in significant casualties. Despite these challenges, the 106th Regiment and Winn's 3rd Battalion managed to bypass the West Pinnacle and advance with relative ease, halting 200 yards southwest of Iso. Additionally, Winn's 1st Battalion fought its way to the western edge of Kakazu village and nearly cleared Kakazu Ridge to its eastern point before being ordered back to the escarpment to support the 2nd Battalion and halt any enemy breakthroughs. At the same time, General Bradley ordered the 381st and 382nd Regiments to advance toward Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment. In response, Colonel Dill's 3rd Battalion moved along Tombstone Ridge, clearing out the enemy from caves and tombs, and reached the southern end just in time to join Colonel Halloran's 1st Battalion for a surprise offensive against Nishibaru. They quickly captured the crest but were ultimately driven back by the determined defenders. However, this partial victory prompted Halloran to deploy the 2nd Battalion in the afternoon for another assault to the south. By day's end, the 381st was entrenched along the northern slope of Nishibaru Ridge, though at a significant cost. Further west, Dill's 2nd Battalion also pushed forward despite persistent fire from the Rocky Crags, where attempts by the 184th and 17th Regiments to attack were unsuccessful. They could not catch up with the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, General Arnold targeted Ouki Hill, but his initial assault was quickly halted by enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Two armored flamethrowers successfully advanced 400 yards ahead of the infantry, neutralizing an enemy mortar position on Ouki Hill's west slope. Consequently, the Americans concentrated their mortars and smoke to cover the enemy positions, allowing a composite company to launch a surprise attack that secured the crest of Ouki Hill, although the isolated troops would soon have to fend off a series of fierce counterattacks. The next morning, the 32nd Regiment launched an attack down Skyline Ridge with two companies. However, they were quickly halted by mortar fire at a deep road cut in the middle of the ridge. Despite this setback, the troops persevered, largely due to Sergeant Theodore MacDonnell's efforts, and eventually gained control of the entire forward face of the ridge. When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a gist Chemical Mortar Company observer, was impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a handful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun, but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest he stood up and fired point-blank into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDonnell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion. Lt. Fred Capp, commanding Company E, sent troops to reinforce MacDonnell immediately, and the position was consolidated. Then Company F, on orders given as a result of this sudden development, pressed the attack down Skyline Ridge, and by 18:00 the entire forward face of the ridge was occupied and only a knob at the lower tip was causing trouble.  To the west, while Colonel Pachler's Company B attempted another attack on Rocky Crags, Dill's 3rd Battalion reorganized and encircled to reach Nishibaru Ridge via the 381st Regiment, launching an eastward assault that made good headway until they were met with fierce enemy counterattacks that forced them to halt. Simultaneously, Halloran coordinated an attack on Nishibaru, which was successfully repelled by the defenders. Colonel May's 3rd Battalion was then deployed to fill the gap at the gorge. Overnight, a large number of Japanese troops had moved from the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment to set up mortars and machine guns in the Kakazu Pocket, prompting the 27th Reconnaissance Troop to advance toward Kakazu, where they became pinned down at the village's edge. As a result, Colonel Stebbins' 3rd Battalion was ordered to position itself on Kakazu West. Looking west, the majority of the 105th and 106th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the Pinnacles, but with little success. They did manage to clear the road to the escarpment's summit of mines and obstructions to facilitate tank movements. Finally, Colonel Kelley's 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack across the mouth of Item Pocket, while Company F attempted to advance along the coast using amphibious tractors but was likewise repelled by intense fire from Ryan Ridge. The 1st Battalion also pushed southwest into Gusukuma, but without armor support, they made minimal progress against the machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket attacking from the right rear. The enemy's defense was very effective on the east. Here the 1st Battalion had a major supply problem on its hands. Two blown bridges along Route 1 east of the Item Pocket were holding up vehicles of support units. During the previous night, fire from the Pocket had driven off an engineer platoon working at the site and killed the platoon leader. Early on the 21st Lieutenant Golden, the Bailey bridge expert, came up with ten truckloads of material. His engineers worked for an hour but had to stop in the face of almost ceaseless fire from the Pocket. Colonel Kelley then ordered scouts to find another stream crossing. A bulldozer cut a bypass around Anderson's Gulch near the railroad, but when, about 10:00, the operator nosed his machine out in the open, he was shot in the ear. General Griner, in Colonel Kelley's observation post at the time, ordered Lt. Col. Walter F. Anderson, commander of the 193rd Tank Battalion, to push the bypass through. Anderson himself climbed into his battalion's sole remaining "tank-dozer" and completed the bypass. A 47-mm. anti-tank gun, hitherto silent, scored a direct hit on Anderson's tank, killing him and a guide. The bypass was now blocked and had to be abandoned. This break-down in supply over Route 1 seriously affected operations east of Gusukuma. Colonel Mahoney's 1st Battalion attacked southwest early on the 21st into Gusukuma, but without tanks or cannon the troops made little ground against machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket on the right rear. Mahoney's left company did reach a point 400 yards north of the village of Yafusu, the farthest advance yet registered by 24th Corps since April 19, but here the troops were stopped by a network of enemy positions. Concerned about the significant vertical separation between his battalions, Kelley decided to deploy his 3rd Battalion in an effort to fill the gap and simultaneously penetrate Item Pocket. Consequently, the American forces advanced through Dead Horse Gulch, with Company K fighting nearly to the center of the pocket. However, they were ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy losses and intense counterattacks. On April 22, Kelley opted to hold and enhance his current positions while conducting extensive patrols. Looking to the east, as the 105th Regiment regrouped following a night counterattack from Kakazu, Stebbins' 1st Battalion systematically located and neutralized enemy positions behind them along the escarpment. Brigadier-General William Bradford also took command in the Kakazu area, bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, and most of the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment, successfully containing the pocket. Further west, the 383rd Regiment replaced the weakened 382nd, while the 2nd Battalion advanced down Nishibaru Ridge to capture the village and higher ground facing Hill 143 to the south. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made minimal progress toward the Gate of the Tanabaru Escarpment. Additionally, Pachler's Company B initiated another attack on the west side of the Rocky Crags, supported by howitzers, tanks, and armored flamethrowers. However, once again, they faced hand grenades and knee mortar shells raining down from above, resulting in heavy casualties and the need to retreat. Finally, the 32nd Regiment maintained control of the forward face of Skyline Ridge but made no attempt to advance, while patrols scoured extensive sections of the southern slope to reach the abandoned eastern face of Hill 178. That night, artillery provided cover to the beleaguered defenders as Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment took over along Skyline Ridge. Following several days of inactivity, 41 kamikaze planes were once again launched on April 22. They successfully sank the minesweeper Swallow and one LCS, while also damaging two destroyers and another minesweeper, resulting in the loss of 25 aircraft. The next day, the 32nd Regiment remained stationed on the north slope of Skyline Ridge, except when conducting patrols or securing caves. This allowed the Japanese defenders to withdraw overnight from their remaining positions around Hill 178. With Company B worn out, the rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment joined the assault on the Rocky Crags, which fell with little resistance. To the west, medium tanks and armored flamethrowers finally launched a direct attack on Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment, successfully destroying most of the enemy positions, although few territorial gains were made. Further west, Winn's 1st Battalion executed a surprise attack on the East Pinnacle, managing to capture the position after fierce hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, the remaining defenders at West Pinnacle initiated a desperate banzai charge towards Iso, where they were ultimately overwhelmed. Kelley then ordered Company I to conduct a probing assault on Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket, while Company C ascended Brewer's Hill but was unable to descend the steep side to join the fight. On April 24, no new attacks were launched due to a confusing mix-up of orders, but preparations were made for an assault the following day. After an artillery barrage, Bradford's task force finally attacked the Kakazu Pocket with four battalions; however, they faced no enemy resistance, as the Japanese had abandoned their positions overnight. To the east, the beleaguered defenders in front of the 96th Division had also retreated, leading to the fall of the Tanabaru Escarpment, its village, Hill 143, and the rest of Nishibaru Ridge without opposition. In a similar manner, the 17th Regiment ascended Hill 178 with only a few scattered artillery rounds landing nearby. The Japanese forces had resisted fiercely for five days, but with the first ring of Shuri defenses breached at multiple points, they chose to withdraw under the cover of heavy mist and light fog the night before. Even so, this advancement was minimal, and it was clear that reaching Shuri would take considerable time given the rate of progress over the first three and a half weeks of the operation. Nonetheless, Buckner believed that any significant landing on the Minatoga beaches or between Machinato airfield and Naha could not be logistically supported and would be vulnerable to strong enemy counterattacks. Therefore, he dismissed proposals to deploy the 77th Division or the 1st Marine Division for these efforts. Instead, it was decided to move the 3rd Marine Corps and the 77th Division from northern Okinawa and Iejima to replace the 24th Corps in the Shuri area. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In April 1945, the Allies launched the invasion of Borneo, led by General Morshead. Swift assaults secured strategic areas against demoralized Japanese troops. Despite fierce resistance, American forces gained ground, crippling Japanese defenses. This victory marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific War, signaling the end of Japanese influence in the region.

Last time we spoke about the First Okinawa Counteroffensive. The US Marines launched a formidable assault on Okinawa, confronting the entrenched Japanese 32nd Army. This dramatic struggle culminated in Operation Ten-Ichi-Go, Japan's final counteroffensive, marked by the ill-fated mission of the battleship Yamato, which met its demise under relentless air attacks. As American forces advanced, they faced significant resistance, particularly at the Shuri fortified zone. Colonel Yahara voiced concerns over a night counterattack planned for April 12, predicting disaster and chaos for disoriented troops unfamiliar with the terrain. Despite his warnings, Japanese forces executed a counteroffensive that faced harsh setbacks. As the Americans consolidated their gains, pressures mounted on their adversaries. Nevertheless, the relentless nature of the battle highlighted the stark contrast between the courage of the soldiers and the emerging futility of their cause, underscoring the inevitable tide of defeat facing Japan at this pivotal moment in history. This episode is the Invasion of Mindanao Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By April 18, significant progress had been made in the offensive operations against Iejima and the Motobu Peninsula, as seen in Iwo Jima; most notably, General Hodge's 24th Corps was prepared to launch a full-scale offensive to the south with three divisions in line. On the morning of April 19, following the successful initial advance of the 106th Regiment, the largest artillery concentration ever used in the Pacific War heralded the dawn attack. Simultaneously, the campaign's most extensive airstrike was carried out, bolstered by the naval bombardment from Admiral Spruance's fleet. The assault teams moved forward, optimistic that the heavy barrage had either destroyed the enemy or left them too dazed to fight back. However, they soon faced disappointment; the Japanese forces, sheltered in their caves, had emerged largely unscathed and quickly took up their positions. To the east, General Arnold's 7th Division launched an attack with the 32nd and 184th Regiments, targeting Skyline Ridge, Ouki Hill, and Hill 178. While most of the 32nd Regiment engaged the entrenched enemy on Skyline Ridge with support from armored flamethrowers, Colonel Finn's 2nd Battalion and Colonel Greene's 2nd Battalion advanced about 500 yards unopposed towards Ouki Hill, only to be halted by a fierce barrage of Japanese fire. As efforts to progress stalled throughout the day, they had to retreat, which also compelled Finn's beleaguered 3rd Battalion to withdraw. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 184th Regiment attempted to advance through the coral formations of the Rocky Crags but was quickly pinned down by the determined defenders. Two medium tanks and three armored flame throwers rumbled southward from the 7th Division's lines on the coastal flats, passed through Ouki, and quickly moved into position at the tip of Skyline Ridge. They poured shot and flame into the cluster of enemy-occupied tombs and emplacements at the lower extremity of the ridge. The long jets of orange flame probed all openings in the face of this part of Skyline, and dark, rolling masses of smoke billowed upward. This was a new spectacle for the waiting infantry, who watched fascinated. For the enemy who died in the searing flame inside their strong points, there was hardly time to become terror-stricken. This phase of the attack lasted fifteen minutes, and then, just after 0700, the infantry moved up. All the Japanese on the forward face of the tip had been killed by the flame, but there were others on the reverse side who denied any advance across the crest. The battle of the infantry quickly erupted and smoldered along the narrow knife-edge line of Skyline Ridge. American troops clung desperately to the forward slope through two Japanese counterattacks, in which the enemy crowded forward into his own mortar fire to hurl grenades and satchel charges. At the same time, General Bradley's 96th Division launched an assault with the 381st and 382nd Regiments advancing side by side, aiming for Nishibaru Ridge, Tombstone Ridge, and the Tanabaru Escarpment. The initial capture of several small hills west of Tombstone Ridge went smoothly, but the 382nd faced stiffer resistance on Tombstone itself, managing to maintain a fragile position along the northwest edge of the ridge and partway down its west slope by nightfall. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 381st Regiment successfully took Kaniku while pushing toward Nishibaru Ridge. However, most of the assault was executed by the 3rd Battalion, which advanced under heavy fire over the ridge crest to the upper part of Nishibaru village, where it was ultimately halted and forced to retreat by resilient defenders. In General Griner's 27th Division sector, the 106th Regiment had already cleared Machinato Inlet and secured a position at the western end of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The 2nd Battalion attempted to push south following a successful night attack but encountered a series of caves, tombs, and tunnels west of Route 1, leading to a stalemate. This marked the beginning of what would later be termed the Item Pocket battle. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 105th Regiment conducted a frontal assault on Kakazu Ridge while Griner executed a sweeping tank maneuver around the east end of the ridge.  The only other 27th Division unit on the front line ready to join in the initial assault was the 1st Battalion of the 105th Infantry. This battalion was deployed along Kakazu Gorge, with Kakazu Ridge, immediately in front, its initial objective. Company C was on the left, next to the Ginowan-Shuri road; Companies B and A, in the order named, were to the west, the latter being initially in reserve. The attack of the 1st Battalion was planned to combine a frontal assault against the ridge with a sweeping tank attack around the east end of Kakazu Ridge. The two forces were to meet behind the ridge near the village of Kakazu and to join in a drive to the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment beyond. The Japanese had guessed that a tank-infantry attack would try to penetrate their lines between Nishibaru Ridge and Kakazu Ridge, and they had prepared carefully for it. Their plan was based on separating the infantry from the tanks. The 272d Independent Infantry Battalion alone devised a fire net of four machine guns, two antiaircraft guns, three regimental guns, and the 81-mm. mortars of the 2d Mortar Battalion to cover the saddle between the two ridges. The machine guns were sited at close range. In addition, two special squads of ten men each were sent forward to the saddle for close combat against the infantry. One group was almost entirely wiped out; the other had one noncommissioned officer wounded and three privates killed. The enemy defense also utilized the 47-mm. antitank guns of the 22d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion and close-quarters suicide assault squads. So thorough were these preparations that the Japanese boasted "Not an infantryman got through." It was here in the Kakazu-Urasoe-Mura Escarpment area that the most extensive reorganization of Japanese units had taken place just before the American attack. The remnants of badly shattered battalions were combined into a composite unit of about 1,400 men that consisted largely of members of the 272d Independent Infantry Battalion but also included elements of the 13th, 15th, and 23d Battalions. The 21st Independent Infantry Battalion stood ready to support the 272d. The 2d Light Machine Gun Battalion added its fire power. Although the infantry soon found themselves pinned down by intense Japanese fire, the tanks managed to reach Kakazu village, which was heavily damaged and set ablaze over the next three hours. Despite their efforts, the failure of the 1st Battalion eventually compelled the tanks to retreat, prompting the 2nd Battalion of the 105th Regiment to attempt an attack towards the eastern end of Kakazu Ridge without success. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion descended from Kakazu West, bypassed Kakazu village, and successfully reached the summit of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. This unexpected achievement led Colonel Winn to decide to reposition the remainder of the 105th around the western end of Kakazu Ridge to join the 3rd Battalion on the escarpment, effectively abandoning the main enemy front. In other areas of the escarpment, the 106th Regiment was unable to advance southward but managed to extend its lines eastward to connect with Winn's 3rd Battalion. Consequently, the major offensive on April 19 failed to produce any significant breakthrough, resulting in 720 casualties. To the north, General Shepherd initiated a final push toward the north coast on the same day, with the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments advancing through complex networks of caves and trenches facing minimal resistance, but they halted at the elevated terrain around Hill 302. Additionally, patrols from the 22nd Marines moved south from Hedo Misaki and successfully captured Aha on the eastern coast. On Iejima, General Bruce also persisted with his main offensive against the Japanese strongholds on Bloody Ridge, as the 3rd Battalion of the 305th Regiment advanced eastward against the northern section of Ie, while Colonel Hamilton's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacked northward. Backed by artillery and mortars, the infantry engaged in fierce skirmishes marked by hand-to-hand combat, moving from one stronghold to another. Following another preparatory bombardment, Colonel Smith initiated a second assault at 14:30, effectively capturing the slopes of the Pinnacle through a series of rushes despite intense machine-gun and mortar fire. Leading elements of the 306th came under intense mortar and small-arms fire as they left the line of departure 600 yards northeast of the base of Iegusugu. The Pinnacle loomed above them, its slopes covered with masses of torn and twisted vegetation. Describing the Pinnacle on the morning of the 20th, General Randle, assistant division commander of the 77th, stated: "It is a damned highly fortified position with caves three stories deep, each house concrete with machine guns in and under. Whole area of village and circumference of mountain a maze of machine gun, mortar, and gun positions little affected by artillery fire we have poured on. Even as this message was on its way to the 77th Division command post, the 306th was winning a hold on the formidable position. By the end of the day, Smith's 1st Battalion was positioned across the northern slopes of Iegusugu; the 3rd Battalion had advanced to within 400 yards of the peak on the eastern side; and the 2nd Battalion had pivoted south to keep pace with the other units of the 306th. Meanwhile, Hamilton's 2nd Battalion succeeded in securing the buildings on Government House Hill; Coolidge's 1st Battalion regained control of the hill from the east; Hamilton's 3rd Battalion established a line at the base of Iegusugu extending to the recently captured Bloody Ridge; and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion made limited progress as it moved slowly eastward. However, during the night, over 400 Japanese troops, including women armed with spears, launched a fierce counteroffensive against Bloody Ridge, nearly forcing the Americans off Government House Hill. By dawn on April 21, as the counterattack diminished, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion was dispatched to relieve the 2nd Battalion, starting the cleanup of the now-secured Bloody Ridge. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion also successfully repelled a strong counterattack from the north before resuming its advance eastward, destroying several enemy positions as it established a line extending south from a small lake at the southwest base of Iegusugu. In the meantime, the 306th Regiment strengthened its hold on Iegusugu throughout the morning, with the 3rd Battalion launching a successful assault on the eastern slopes, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions continued to clear caves and pillboxes on the northern and northwestern slopes. Shortly after noon, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion and Coolidge's 1st Battalion began advancing northward against light resistance to secure the southern slopes of Iegusugu. Simultaneously, Smith's 2nd Battalion and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion launched a coordinated assault to capture the southwest slopes, where they encountered stronger opposition. By mid-afternoon, all units at the Pinnacle were busy mopping up, systematically destroying and sealing the enemy's underground passages and strongholds over the next five days. By midafternoon of April 21 all units on the Pinnacle were engaged in mopping up. The exterior of the Pinnacle was secure, but Japanese still remained in subterranean passages and strongholds from which they made sallies against the troops. The openings were systematically blown out and sealed off. The 307th alone captured or destroyed during the day five 81-mm mortars, five knee mortars, one 75-mm howitzer, and two 47-mm anti-tank guns. These were some of the weapons that had held the Americans off Bloody Ridge for three days. For five days after Ie Shima was declared secure, elements of the 77th Division mopped up remaining groups of the enemy, sealed caves, destroyed pillboxes, marked or removed the thousands of mines that were still on the island, and buried the dead. During this period hundreds of Japanese were killed in and around the Pinnacle, in the town of Ie, and in caves along the coast line. Removal of mines on the airfield and on the roads feeding it was given priority in order to speed up airfield construction. The last noteworthy encounter on Iejima came during the night of April 22-23, when a group of Japanese soldiers and civilians, including women, all armed with rifles, grenades, and demolitions, rushed from caves on Iegusugu toward the lines of the 306th. They were all cut down without loss to American troops. Ultimately, during the six-day battle on Iejima, the Americans killed 4,706 Japanese soldiers and captured 149, suffering 172 killed, 902 wounded, and 46 missing. Meanwhile, on April 20, the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments reached the north coast after eliminating organized resistance on the Motobu Peninsula, resulting in over 2,000 Japanese fatalities, while Shepherd's Marines incurred 207 killed, 757 wounded, and six missing. The Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion seized Yagachi Island on April 21 and occupied Sesoko Island on April 22, with the 6th Reconnaissance Company making the final landing on Kouri Island on April 23. Following a night reconnaissance in rubber boats, the battalion, transported by armored amphibians, seized Yagachi Shima on 21 April. A leper colony of some 800 adults and 50 children was located on this island, but no resistance was encountered. Because aerial reconnaissance had reported Sesoko Shima to be occupied and defended, it was decided to launch an attack on that island with one reinforced regiment. But preliminary to the attack, a native was captured during an amphibious reconnaissance of the objective who revealed that the island was probably not occupied. A successive physical reconnaissance confirmed his statements. Consequently, Major Jones' command was also assigned this mission, and the battalion occupied Sesoko Shima on 22 April. Although no opposition was met, the operation was interfered with by more than 100 civilians, moving by canoe from islands to the west where food was running low, and "considerable difficulty was involved in coralling and controlling" them. On 23 April the 6th Reconnaissance Company, also mounted on and supported by LVT(A)s, executed a daylight landing on Kouri Shima, likewise finding no resistance. Concurrently, while the 29th Marines remained on the Motobu Peninsula, the 4th Marines moved to their designated area in northern Okinawa to assist the 22nd Marines in mopping-up operations, searching the mountainous interior for remnants of the Udo Force and independent guerrilla groups. Finally, on April 28, Colonel Udo's final 200 surviving members were successfully intercepted and eliminated while attempting to flee to the east coast, effectively concluding the northern Okinawa operation. It's now time to leave Okinawa and return to the southern Philippines to oversee the continuation of General Eichelberger's operations. By the end of March, General Arnold's Americal Division had successfully taken control of Cebu City and Lahug Airfield, but was encountering stronger resistance in the northern hills. By the end of March the Americal Division had acquired a good idea of the nature and extent of General Manjome's principal defenses, and had learned that it had already overrun some of the strongpoints along the Japanese outpost line of resistance. On the other hand, the division had not been able to pinpoint the Japanese flanks. With the enemy firmly entrenched and having all the advantages of observation, General Arnold knew that the process of reducing Manjome's positions would be slow and costly no matter what type of maneuver the Americal Division employed. Lacking the strength required for wide envelopments and specific information about the Japanese flanks, Arnold hoped he might achieve decisive results with a single sledgehammer blow against the Japanese center. He therefore decided to use the bulk of his strength in a frontal assault into the hills due north of Cebu City. Consequently, on April 1, the 182nd Regiment, supported by Colonel Cushing's guerrillas, launched a direct assault on the Japanese center, while the 132nd Regiment advanced along the west bank of the Butuanoan River and then moved westward to flank General Manjome's left. Despite slow progress and heavy casualties, by April 11, the 182nd had diminished most of the significant defensive positions along the center of Manjome's second line, and the 132nd had managed to flank the Japanese left, reaching a crucial location on the far left of Manjome's final defensive positions. Additionally, the 164th Regiment had landed to bolster the offensive and was quickly advancing through the Mananga Valley to encircle the Japanese right and rear. By April 13, the 164th reached Babag Ridge, but its surprise attack was promptly repelled by the defenders. Meanwhile, the 132nd and 182nd Regiments resumed their assaults, with the latter capturing the last stronghold along the Japanese second line. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Manjome had already concluded that further resistance was futile and ordered a general withdrawal northward to begin the night of April 16. In the days that followed, Arnold's three regiments engaged in a series of costly small unit attacks, gradually gaining ground, inch by inch. On April 17, organized resistance in the Japanese stronghold began to falter as defenders retreated, and by evening, the Americal Division had neutralized all of Manjome's significant fortifications. In response to the Japanese withdrawal, the Americal Division quickly initiated a pursuit operation, successfully cutting off the retreat route to the remaining forces of the 1st Division in northern Cebu by the end of the month. By the first week of May, the 132nd Regiment launched an offensive to dismantle General Kataoka's organized resistance, aided by guerrilla forces, and largely achieved its objective in a campaign that lasted until the month's end. The Americans and Filipinos then focused on mopping up the remnants of Manjome's forces, effectively eliminating the last pockets of Japanese resistance on Cebu by June 20. Meanwhile, on April 11, the 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on Bohol at beaches already secured by Major Ismael Ingeniero's guerrillas. Patrols soon located the Japanese garrison inland, leading to the battalion's assault on its main positions from April 17 to April 20, culminating in the overrunning of the last organized opposition by April 23. On April 26, the remaining elements of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on southern Negros and moved inland to search for the Japanese garrison. By April 28, they discovered the 174th Independent Battalion, but their initial attacks were successfully thwarted by the defenders. Nonetheless, a coordinated offensive commenced on May 6, which successfully compelled the Japanese to retreat and disperse by the end of the month. The 164th then neutralized a final resistance pocket between June 7 and 12, effectively ending Japanese opposition on Negros and completing the 8th Army's campaign to reclaim the central Visayan Islands. Eichelberger's operations in the southern Philippines were far from over, as Major-General Franklin Sibert's 10th Corps, comprising the reinforced 24th and 31st Divisions, was preparing to launch the invasion of Mindanao, known as Operation Victor V. The initial strategy had Major-General Roscoe Woodruff's 24th Division landing on the shores of Illana Bay on April 17 to quickly secure the Malabang-Cotabato area, followed by Major-General Clarence Martin's 31st Division five days later for the final advance toward Davao.  Illana Bay lies nearly a hundred miles northwest of the main objective in eastern Mindanao, the Davao area, and only a poor road connects its beaches to Davao. Still, 8th Army had ample reason to select Illana Bay as the site of the initial assault. For one thing, the army knew that the Japanese had their main concentrations in the Davao region, where they seemed especially well prepared to repel an amphibious assault. It would be foolish to stick one's hand into a hornet's nest if there were no urgency for such action, and 8th Army could not, of course, avoid the long view that the eastern Mindanao operation was in essence a mopping-up campaign rather than an action of great strategic importance. Second, the Illana Bay area was relatively weakly defended--the 24th Division would have a much better chance to achieve tactical surprise there. Finally, 10th Corps would have to seize and rehabilitate an airstrip quickly so that land-based aircraft could provide proper support for subsequent operations in eastern Mindanao, other air bases being too distant. A reasonably good strip existed at Malabang, on the northwestern shore of Illana Bay. Given the estimate that the Japanese maintained a weak garrison at Illana Bay, Malabang seemed the spot for the main assault. However, by early April, Colonel Wendell Fertig's guerrilla forces had taken control of the entire Malabang region, forcing the Japanese garrison to retreat. Consequently, Sibert adjusted his plan, directing Rear-Admiral Albert Noble's Task Group 78.2 to deploy only one battalion at Malabang, with the remaining forces of the 24th Division landing near Parang. The Japanese forces in Mindanao numbered over 43,000, including troops from Lieutenant-General Morozumi Gyosaku's 30th Division, Lieutenant-General Harada Jiro's 100th Division, and Rear-Admiral Doi Naoji's 32nd Naval Special Base Force. General Suzuki of the 35th Army was in overall command of these troops, but he first needed to escape from Cebu to assert his authority. Thus, Suzuki and his staff departed northern Cebu on April 10, using five landing craft. Unfortunately, the boats became separated, leading to an emergency landing near Dumaguete before they could continue their journey on the night of April 16. Tragically, Suzuki's vessel was intercepted and destroyed by a PT boat off the southern tip of Cebu on April 17. Only his chief of staff, Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, managed to reach Cagayan on the night of April 20 after several days adrift. Nominal command in Mindanao rested with General Morozumi, who became de jure commander of the 35th Army after General Suzuki's death during the latter's voyage from Cebu. But Morozumi chose not to exercise his authority except insofar as to largely ignore advice from General Tomochika, 35th Army chief of staff, who reached Mindanao in late April. Beset with formidable communications difficulties, and realizing that most inhospitable terrain separated the main bodies of the 30th and 100th Divisions, Morozumi believed he could render his best service by staying with the 30th, leaving General Harada and Admiral Doi more or less to their own devices. Neither Harada nor Morozumi had any offensive missions. Rather, in accordance with Yamashita's December 1944 plans, the Japanese on Mindanao were to direct their efforts to pinning down as many American units as possible in order to delay the progress of the war. Harada and Morozumi had little hope of conducting organized, major defensive operations for more than two months. Once American forces had overrun their prepared defenses, the two planned to retreat into largely unexplored mountains of east-central Mindanao, organizing a last-stand area like Yamashita's in the Asin Valley of northern Luzon. The 30th and 100th Divisions were not in good shape to conduct a delaying, defensive operation either. Hopelessly isolated, short of artillery, small arms ammunition, transportation, and communications equipment, they had no chance of obtaining supplies. They had some stocks of food, but their transportation shortage, coupled with the poor condition of eastern Mindanao roads would make it most difficult for the Japanese to move their food from central depots to the mountains. The Japanese commanders thus knew that once an invasion of eastern Mindanao began they would enter upon a battle they could not win, and they definitely had no relish for a defense to the death in place.  After an uneventful journey, Sibert's 10th Corps began landing on Mindanao on the morning of April 17. Troops from the 533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment went ashore on the small Ibus Island, while the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment joined Fertig's guerrillas on the beach near Malabang. Company K secured Bongo Island without opposition. At 09:00, after an unnecessary two-hour bombardment by cruisers and destroyers, the 19th Regiment landed at Parang without encountering any resistance, followed by most of the 21st Regiment. That afternoon, the 19th Regiment secured the entire Parang area, and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop scouted the shores of Polloc Harbor and the northern entrance of the Mindanao River, finding them clear. On April 18, Sibert launched an assault towards Fort Pikit, with the 19th Regiment advancing along Route 1 and the 21st Regiment utilizing the Mindanao River. The 21st's advance was quicker, successfully reaching Paidu-Pulangi the next day. However, the 19th Regiment lagged due to poor road conditions and some enemy resistance, leading Woodruff to order the 21st to withdraw downstream for the night. On April 21, a battalion from the 34th Regiment arrived at Paidu-Pulangi, advancing both overland and along the river to reach Fort Pikit late in the afternoon. The isolated 166th Independent Battalion was ultimately destroyed, with the 19th finally arriving at Fort Pikit on April 23. Meanwhile, the 34th continued to push forward and secured the Kabacan junction of Route 1 and Sayre Highway. This quick capture of the junction effectively separated the 30th and 100th Divisions and opened two routes of attack: north along the Sayre and southeast towards Davao. Consequently, the newly arrived 31st Division was tasked with sending its 124th Regiment to assault the 30th Division's forces in northern Mindanao, while the 34th Regiment continued its advance along Route 1 towards Digos and Davao. In response, Morozumi dispatched reinforcements under Colonel Ouchi Koretake to block any enemy progress past Omonay, while fortifying the Malaybalay area. By this time, General Morozumi had swung into action in an attempt to stem the enemy advance before it moved north into central Mindanao. Colonel Ouchi, commander of the 30th Engineer Regiment, was ordered about April 22 to take command of operations along the southern approaches and to annihilate the enemy south of the east-west line running through Omonay. For this mission he was given command of the South Sector Unit, as well as his engineer units. On April 23, General Tomochika, Chief of Staff of 35th Army, arrived at the 30th Division command post at Impalutao from Agusan, where he had arrived on April 21 from Cebu. Tomochika immediately conferred with Morozumi regarding implementation of the Army policy of protracted resistance. As a result of this discussion, Morozumi concluded that it was necessary to strengthen the Malaybalay area. He therefore ordered the transfer of the 1st Battalion, 77th Regiment from the North Sector Unit to the Central Sector Unit and the movement of this battalion to new positions near Malaybalay. About the same date Morozumi ordered the Surigao Sector Unit to move from Ampayon to the Waloe area, where it was to assist in carrying out the division's self-sufficiency program. Although the 30th Division commander thus adopted measures to strengthen the area of final resistance, he still considered the landing near Parang a secondary invasion and estimated that the main enemy landing would soon be launched in the Macajalar Bay area. The preponderance of division strength was therefore retained in the north.  Led by the 24th Reconnaissance Troop, the 34th Regiment quickly departed from Kabacan on April 24. Although progress was hampered primarily by destroyed bridges and the poor condition of Route 1, the troops successfully arrived at the outskirts of Digos by April 27, where they faced approximately 3,350 enemy troops. The Japanese forces urgently prepared to defend against the 24th Division's assault but could only hold out until the early hours of April 28, when they retreated to the foothills of Mount Apo to the north. Elements of the 34th Regiment pursued the withdrawing Japanese, who maintained their position in the Mount Apo region until May 9, when they retreated north to regroup with the rest of the 100th Division. Meanwhile, other units of the 34th and the guerrilla 108th Division began patrolling the Davao Gulf coast, which they successfully cleared by May 12. Additionally, the 19th Regiment advanced from Kabacan to Digos, passed through the 34th, and started moving north towards Davao. Facing little resistance along Route 1, the 19th Regiment overwhelmed the last opposition in front of the city and successfully occupied Davao by May 3 with minimal opposition. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of April 27, the 124th Regiment departed from Kabacan and quickly confronted the 1st Battalion, 74th Regiment, causing it to retreat in disarray. The 124th then pressed on to the north, facing minimal resistance, and ultimately arrived in Kibawe by May 3. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The US invasion of Mindanao commenced under General Eichelberger. The initial assault targeted Illana Bay, with American forces quickly securing key areas. Japanese troops, suffering from low morale and inadequate supplies, struggled to mount an effective defense. The campaign marked a pivotal advance in the Pacific War, laying groundwork for further operations.

Last time we spoke about Operation Nekka, the Invasion of Rehe Province. In 1932, the Kwantung Army eyed Rehe province as vital for Manchukuo's success. General Tang Yulin, ruling Rehe, initially favored Japanese interests due to economic ties, particularly in opium. Tensions escalated after a Japanese civilian was abducted, prompting military actions that led to skirmishes in Shanhaiguan. Amidst growing conflict, Zhang Xueliang mobilized forces against Tang, who eventually conceded. As Japan prepared for invasion, both sides strategized, with Chiang Kai-Shek reluctant to engage directly, fearing Japanese influence over his rivals. Operation Nekka commenced, showcasing the Kwantung Army's efficiency as they swiftly routed Chinese forces in Rehe. By March 4th, key passes were captured, but fierce resistance emerged. General Nishi faced counterattacks, leading to strategic retreats. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-Shek struggled with internal conflicts while managing the Japanese threat. As the Kwantung Army pushed beyond the Great Wall, logistical issues arose, prompting political maneuvers to secure local warlord alliances. However, plans faltered when Zhang Qingyao, a potential ally, was assassinated.   #147 The Battle for the Great Wall of China Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Thus in the previous episode, Operation Nekka had been unleashed. The Kwangtung Army tossed 2 divisions into Rehe province with the intent of forcing its annexation into Manchukuo. They were under strict orders to not extend operations past the Great Wall of China. However they believed it was necessary to seize the main gateways along the Great Wall of China to establish their new borders, and in order to do so this absolutely required going past them. Yet military operations were not the only means to secure their goals. The Japanese forces faced significant logistical challenges, including a shortage of troops, having advanced into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most resolute general in the Kwantung Army doubted that their military strength could prevail against the vast numbers of Chinese troops in the plains of Hubei. As a result, they needed to supplement their military efforts with political strategies targeting regional warlords. The tactic of bribing local elites had proven highly effective during the pacification of Manchuria, and there was no reason to think it wouldn't work in North China as well. All of these actions were carried out without any oversight from Tokyo headquarters.   On February 13, 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, who was then the head of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any formal announcement of his promotion. He took up a position in Tientsin specifically to initiate political maneuvers in eastern Hubei, leading to the establishment of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially, this agency sought to engage various competing warlords in North China, including Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, and Sun Chuanfang, but eventually focused on Zhang Qingyao. Zhang had previously been a protégé of Duan Qirui, serving as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 before shifting his allegiance to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao again battled Zhang Zuolin, who was then in control of the National Pacification Army. After the Northern Expedition concluded, he allied with Yan Xishan's forces in Shanxi. So yeah it would seem he was not a man of principles nor loyalties of any kind. The Tientsin Special Service Agency initially aimed to approach Zhang Qingyao in hopes that he could orchestrate a coup d'état against Chiang Kai-Shek. They also hoped to persuade other figures such as Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying, and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If successful, this could lead to a swift takeover of North China as they were advancing towards Peiping after taking the Great Wall. However, on May 7, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely derailing their plans. With Zhang Qingyao dead, the agency concentrated their efforts instead to instigate riots in the Peiping-Tientsin region. They also began encouraging and propping up new political organizations that sought to form an independent northern regime. One scheme they were performing was to form a committee composed of Northern Warlords headed by Lu Zengyu, a banker who had studied in Japan. The idea was to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition to carve out north china. The agency received a significant amount of funds to make ends meet. Itagaki alone would spend over 50,000 yen to try and bring about an anti-Chiang regime in the north. Some sources indicated over 3 billion yen being allocated to the IJA to be dished out to various Chinese warlords and elites in the form of bribes.  Meanwhile operations in the district east of the Luan River saw attacks formed against the Xumenzhai and Lengkou gateways. On April 1st, the Kwantung Army issued Order 491, seeing the Iwata detachment of the IJA 6th Division storm through the Xumenzhai gate and succeed in securing a supply route behind the great wall to help with the assaults against the other gateways in the region. By April 10th, the IJA 6th Division was making steady progress against the Lengkou gate. The next day they stormed through and captured Qienqangying, pursuing the retreating Chinese to the banks of the Luan River. Meanwhile the IJA 8th Division were facing a much more difficult situation. On the 12th, they captured Xifengkou, but their assault against Quehlingkou was going nowhere. After repeated assaults, the Chinese finally retreated, allowing the Japanese to focus on Taitouying. Thus from the 10th to the 23rd the gateways in northeastern Hubei were all falling into Japanese hands. The Kawahara Brigade was well on its way towards Nantienmen. The Operations within the Great Wall area had been fully authorized by Generals Nishi and Sakamoto. However there still existed limits upon the operations. For example, Operations order 495 issued by General Muto given on the 11th stated "Without specific orders, pursuit by the main force of ground troops is to be limited to the line connecting Hotung, Chiench'angying, and T'ait'ouying; but air units are to be limited to the Luan River."  Meanwhile the Special Service Agency in Tientsin had reported that Zhang Qingyao would stage a coup on the 21st and this prompted Song Queyuans troops to prevent the Central Army forces from fleeing towards Peiping. The Agency requested that the Kwantung Army not return to the Great Wall and instead perform a feint attack towards Peiping and Tientsin to scare the Chinese. As the plot was reaching its climax, on the 18th the Kwantung Army chief of staff, General Koiso Kuniaki issued a order for the 8th Division to strike in full force against the Gubeikou area. The Kwantung Army's plan was to bomb Miyun while launching their feint attack in combination with an all out effort to break Gubeikou. However on the night of the 18th, all of these plans changed dramatically. Suddenly General Muto issued Operations Order 498, hastily ordering all forces to withdraw to the Great Wall. Emperor Hirohito had decided to put his foot down. In Tokyo the emperor asked the vice chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Mazaki Jinzaburö, "Has the Kwantung Army withdrawn from the Luan River line?" The vice chief retired from the imperial presence with a sense of guilt and wrote a confidential letter to the commander of the Kwantung Army. It was personally carried by Infantry Captain Katö [Michio] of the General Staff, who on April 19 arrived at the capital [of Manchukuo] bearing an imperial rescript. The vice chief also cabled to the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army a highly confidential dispatch, the main point of which stated, "Withdraw your troops immediately, or an imperial command will be issued." Thereupon the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army directed staff officer Endò Saburò to draft the withdrawal order. Thus as a result, the Kwantung Army began a withdrawal on the 21st, the same day the Peiping coup was to be unleashed. Those around Emperor Hirohito at this time have gone on the record to state it seemed to them, the emperor had hesitated heavily on issuing the withdrawal order. His motivations for giving the order are simply, the Kwantung Army had gone against his decrees, it was an identical situation to what had happened at Mukden in 1931. The Kwantung Army had no choice but to submit to what essentially was him “asking them to stop”. With that, operations east of the Luan River were over, for now. The order was certainly a critical blow to the Agency in Tientsin. How did they react? They doubled down on the coup effort. Likewise Koiso did not stop the 8th Division operation at Gubeikou. Instead the 8th Division was given orders "to maintain a menacing attitude toward hostile forces in North China." In accordance, the 3800 man Kawahara Brigade on direct orders from General Nishi, launched an attack against two Central Army Divisions numbered nearly 30,000 men stationed at Nantienmen. After a brutal week of battle the Kawahara Brigade seized the town. Meanwhile a battalion of 280 men led by Colonel Shimmura Eijiro attacked a central army force around 4000 strong at Xinglong. They suffered a 38% rate of casualties by the night of the 27th. The Battalion was nearly annihilated when suddenly the Chinese withdrew enabling the Japanese to slip by. Meanwhile the Piping coup did not materialize as planned on the 21st. Instead a secondary coup was initiated by Zhang Zuoxiang on the 26, but this misfired greatly. Reports began to emerge that troops led by Zhang Tingxu, Sun Tienying, Feng Zhanhai and Xu Yusan were willing to rebel in response to the failed coup attempts, but this proved completely false. A report issued on the 30th stated troops under Fang Chenwu were rebelling against Chiang Kai-Shek. However in reality Fang Chenwu only advanced his force north on May 10th and it was to join the anti-Japanese forces.  From mid April to mid May, the United States, Britain, France and Germany finally entered the fray in North China. It was an extremely chaotic situation for everyone. The Japanese military in Tokyo had no control nor idea what the Kwantung Army was doing, so when they tried to explain their actions to the international community, they continuously were walking over rakes. All the talk from Tokyo seemed incomprehensible to the other great powers. The Chinese were clamouring the entire time for a ceasefire agreement, but lacked the means to force the Japanese to do so. Japan had left the League of Nations, thus was extremely isolated and insecure in regards to foreign relations. Thus if a nation like Britain or the US had actually put their foot down, the Japanese more than likely would have backed off. Another element to this debacle was the stance of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who had made it adamantly clear they had zero intention of fighting off the British or Americans because of their unruly siblings within the Army. However, both Britain and America were too preoccupied with internal strife, mostly the result of the Great Depression, to devote considerable effort to the crisis in China. The League of Nations remained completely useless during the North China incident, similarly to how they were useless with the Manchurian incident. The Lytton Commission had performed an on the spot inquiry, and it did play a role in establishing a ceasefire by the time of the Shanghai incident, but did nothing to really help China. China had begun appealing to the League when Shanhaiguan was attacked and this prompted the nations of the league to rapidly agree to the Lytton Commission report's recommendations. In turn this led Matsuoka Yosuke to walk out on the league. With Japan out of the League, Wellington Koo proposed harsh sanctions upon Japan in response to their invasion of Rehe province. Yet they did nothing. China would continuously make pleas, but it was to no avail.  Rather than rely upon the League, the Chinese began secret talks with Japanese officials aiming first for a ceasefire. Tang Erho, Lee Shuzheng and Wang Komin attempted talks, but failed. Then Chen Yi the political vice minister of military affairs, secretly spoke with Nemoto Hiroshi, an army attache at the Shanghai legation on April 27th. They established negotiations with Nemoto speaking on behalf of the Kwantung Army and Chen Yi on behalf of Ho Yingqin. The Chinese were clearly more eager than the Japanese for a ceasefire, but the Japanese no longer had a rationale to continue their operation. Regardless the Japanese took the victors stance and demanded the Chinese withdraw from the battlefield as a prerequisite to further Japanese advances. In the first meeting, Nemoto told Chen that the Kwantung Army had already withdrawn from the area east of the Luan River to give Ho Yingqin an opportunity to consider a ceasefire. He described the action as a friendly gesture and suggested the Chinese reciprocate it by withdrawing their troops. Chen countered this by claiming Ho Yingqin had shown his own sincerity at the battle of Nantienmen by ordering his troops to withdraw to a second line of defense, hoping this would allow the Japanese to pull away from Nantienmen. However by May 1st, the Japanese claimed they had captured and secured Nantienmen, so Nemoto informed Chen the Chinese forces north of the Great Wall should withdraw to a line connecting Miyun, Pinkou, Yutien and the Luan River. On May 2nd, the Chinese sent a reply to this, completely ignoring the line idea and instead referred to the recent battle at Xinglong and explained the local commander there was eager for a victory and refused to withdraw despite being asked twice to do so. The Chinese also notified Nemoto that a Political affairs council headed by Huang Fu was being established at Peiping, and it should be through that body that further negotiations were held. The Japanese welcomed this development. Just as it seemed the Shanghai talks were paving a way to a ceasefire, the leadership of the Kwantung Army abandoned their political maneuvers in favor of a settlement. On April 30th the Tientsin Special Service Agency insisted to their Japanese colleagues, the Chinese were just buying time and not sincere in their actions. That same day the Army General Staff and Foreign Ministry suddenly refused to initiate a ceasefire on the grounds the Chinese had agreed to an armistice only to save face. Lt Colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, the army attache at Peiping urged the 8th Division to rapidly strike southwards as far as Miyun to annihilate He Yingqin's planned counteroffensive. Such an action would immediately threaten the Peiping-Tientsin region. To push the envelope, the Japanese could toss a new Division into the mix and force further negotiations when the Chinese withdrew south of Miyun. Clearly the Japanese had their eyes set on Miyun now. As such General Nishi was secretly told to capture it without any direction from Tokyo HQ, nor from most of the Kwantung Army leadership. The Operations department of the Kwantung Army also independently elected to move troops east of the Luan River again. They argued "the enemy again advances east of the Luan River and persists in its defiant attitude. Therefore we must again deal them a crushing blow." The IJA 6th Division had been evacuated to the Great Wall back on April 23rd and along the way were closely pursued by Chinese forces. General Sakamoto sent a plan to the Kwantung Army headquarters "to again drive the enemy west of the Luan River,". A lot of chaos was reigning within the Japanese military because they were in echo chambers and not relaying information to another. When the Kwantung Army Operations department suddenly proposed a new advance east of the Luan River, on May 2nd a heated exchange took place between them and the Kwantung Army Intelligence Section: “INTELLIGENCE SECTION: The defiant attitude of the enemy is a matter of degree. While it is indisputable that some of their forces continue defiant, their main force is still stationed west of the Luan River. Therefore, a defiant attitude on the part of the enemy is not sufficient reason to deal them a crushing blow. The Kwantung Army withdrew from the Luan River line only ten days ago. As we understand it, the purpose was to comply with the imperial wish. If the army begins operations on a flimsy pretext at this time, inviting intervention by the central leadership, how can the honor of the commander in chief be maintained? What we should now attack are rather the enemy forces facing the 8th Division. For this, we should employ additional strength. By dealing a severe blow to the Chinese Central Army forces in this area, we can threaten Peiping and the operation should be all the more effective.  OPERATIONS SECTION: Due to the limitations of our supply capacity, we cannot use more than a certain level of forces against the enemy facing the 8th Division. Since the enemy east of the Luan River maintains a defiant attitude, they must be punished regardless of their strength.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: Since the seizure of Nant'ienmen the 8th Division lacks the capability of pursuing the enemy. This is an unavoidable consequence of the small strength of its force from the outset of the operation. Isn't the First [Operations] Section uncertain that the enemy can be defeated even by the main force of the 8th Division, and doesn't it intend ultimately to deploy the 6th Division southward in concert with action by the 8th Division? If this is the case, it is understandable, and this section is not necessarily against it.   OPERATIONS SECTION: That is not what this section is considering.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: In that case, there is no clear justification for launching the operation. The objective of the operation must be plainly spelled out to all concerned, from His Majesty at the top down to the lowest private. There must not be the slightest doubt about it.” After this conversation the Intelligence department debated amongst themselves before relaying another response at midnight, ultimately not approving it. The next day the Operations department sent a telegram to the negotiations team in Peiping: “1) Under present conditions, the Kwantung Army has no intention of accepting a cease-fire proposal for the time being, particularly because there are signs suggesting intervention by third countries in the matter.  2) Previously the Kwantung Army suggested the Miyun-Yiit'ienLuan River line as the retreat line for the Chinese army; but this did not mean it was to be their front line after a cease-fire. It rather indicated a line to which the Chinese army should immediately and voluntarily retreat as evidence of their sincerity. In other words, a cease-fire cannot be negotiated until they retreat to this line and abandon their provocative attitude, and until this is confirmed by the Kwantung Army. Their mere retreat to the indicated line, in today's circumstances, is not sufficient reason for us to respond to the cease-fire proposal. According to Peking telegram 483 [not identified], it appears that the intentions of our army have been somewhat misunderstood. Even if the Chinese retreat to the indicated line and display the sincerity of their intentions, we may possibly demand a retreat line farther south. We believe negotiations in this region should be handled by the central leadership in Tokyo rather than by the Kwantung Army. Act on this understanding.”   So after this message, the Intelligence department accused the Operations department of trying to find any excuse to renew the advance and sent a wire to Nemoto on April 29th "If the Chinese suddenly perceive their mistake, . . . we will not make war for the fun of it." However the Intelligence department was suddenly overruled by Colonel Kita who cabled the negotiators that the Operations department now had full approval from Kwantung Army vice chief of staff Okamura Yasuji. When General Muto received this notice he questioned "This draft order, states that the enemy has moved into the region east of the Luan River and is showing a provocative attitude. I did not receive such a report from the Second [Intelligence] Section before my departure from Hsinching. Does this mean there has been a subsequent change in the situation?" After being informed more so, Muto simply stated he wished to wait until the chief of staff could speak to him. Obviously Muto was getting wet feet and did not want to perform any actions not in accordance with Tokyo HQ, as Emperor Hirohito had put his foot down.  On May 3rd, General Koiso and Operations Department staff officer Endo Saburo spoke with Muto, indicating they had approval of Tokyo HQ general staff and even the Emperor. So Muto relented for a second advance and issued Order 503 on May 3rd to the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions. Now the Army General Staff were dragged into the Kwantung Army's debacle fully. So they drew up an emergency draft plan for measures in North China. To this aim:  “Through continuing pressure by the military might of the Kwantung Army, applied in concert with various political measures in North China, the Chinese forces in North China are to be compelled to make a substantia] surrender or to dissolve, thereby resulting in the withdrawal of the Chinese army along the China-Manchukuo border and in the establishment of peace in this area”.  Added to this the General Staff suggested a large counteroffensive be driven along the Great Wall and a formal truce agreement should be concluded once three conditions had been met: “(a) that Chinese forces had retreated voluntarily south and west of a line connecting Hsuanhua, Shunyi, Sanho, Yüt'ien, Luanchou, and Lot'ing; (b) that anti-Japanese activities had been controlled; and (c) that the preceding had been verified by the Japanese army”. Under immense pressure from the renewed Japanese advance, the Chinese government on May 3rd, had pushed for a new body to tackle the North China situation. That was the Peiping Political Affairs Council. It was composed of 22 members, headed by Huang Fu. Huang Fu was notably a pro-Japanese official, having been a graduate of the Tokyo Land Survey department training institute and had served early as a minister of foreign affairs. Since China had zero faith anymore in the League of Nations and believed if they failed to resolve the North China issue, this all might see a new civil war break out between Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Thus everyone felt the time for active resistance was over and they must place all their effort into negotiations. Chiang Kai-Shek placed a great amount of authority upon Huang Fu and trusted the man. Huang Fu began his new task by speaking with all the political and financial leaders from both sides of the conflict to see how a real ceasefire could be met through dealmaking.  Meanwhile on May 6th the IJA 6th Division unleashed a new offensive south of the Great Wall and were followed by the 8th Division on the 11th. General Muto at this time made public statements blaming the Chinese for the renewed hostilities, making it seem the Japanese had intended to stay within the Great Wall area. The 6th Division swept across the sector east of the Luan River and by the 11th the Chinese defensive line collapsed. On the 12th the 6th Division crossed the Luan River, pursuing Yu Xuechengs 51st Army. In turn this threatened He Yingqin's main force who were facing the 8th Division. In the previous battles, Yu Xuechengs men had performed quite poorly and now even under direct command of He Yingqin were proving themselves helpless against the 6th division. Additionally Itagaki's agency over in Tientsin were using radio facilities to dispatch false directives from Chinese high command, ordering the forces to retreat from the front battle line. Two to three Chinese divisions were neutralized by these fake radio messages and in turn the Chinese became very demoralized at their lines. The 8th division had driven into the Gubeikou area on the 11th and it took them only a day to dislodge the Chinese from their line near Xuxiachen. By the 13th Xuxiachen had fallen completely. On the 11th and 12th, Japanese aircraft began flying over Peiping, as a demonstration of the terror they could deliver to the city at any moment. These developments altogether were pushing the Chinese civilians to demand of their politicians and generals that they appease the Japanese. Huang Fu proposed to Nemoto on the 12th that all Chinese troops could be withdrawn from Miyun to a line extending from Shunyi to Yutien and Tangshan. This was an enormous concession and nearly mirrored the line the Japanese had demanded.  The Japanese however, rejected the concession. To make matters worse for the Chinese, He Yingqin had been notified of the large concession proposal in advance and expected the Japanese to take it. Thus he had refrained from operating in strength at Miyun and did not significantly defend the path towards Peiping. It was the belief of the Japanese commanders, if they performed a full-scale attack towards Peiping now, He Yingqin would have no choice but to withdraw towards Shunyi. With this in mind the Japanese made a proposal on the 14th:  “1) According to the reports of the Peiping military attaché, the 8th Division should be prepared to advance in a single sweep to the southern limit of Miyun, if it is deemed necessary. Preparations for this attack should be expedited.  2) In conjunction with the above, front-line aircraft should take actions implying that a major Japanese offensive is about to begin.  3) In Tokyo, it should be announced publicly, in liaison with the Foreign Ministry, that the security of Jehol province cannot be guaranteed as long as the Chinese army remains in Miyun. Furthermore, every so often Japanese aircraft should make demonstration flights over the Shunyi-T'ungchou area.” Confronted with this, the Chinese were pretty screwed. The Chinese negotiations team were frantically searching for any way to force a ceasefire. Then the secretary of the Shanghai legation, Suma Yakichiro showed up to Peiping, which the Chinese viewed as a golden opportunity. The Chinese complained to him that the Kwantung Army had resumed their offensive and that a political agency in Tientsin were trying to enact coups. Suma bluntly told them the Japanese actions were backed fully by Tokyo and despite the Chinese belief that this was false or that Japan was facing a major financial deficit, this was all untrue.  While the dialogue continued to go nowhere, the 6th division had pursued the Chinese forces to the vicinity of Fengjun. Muto believed this had gone to far so he issued orders on May 13th limiting operations to the area north of a line connecting Miyun, Pingkou, Fegjun and Yungping. Now the 6th and 8th divisions were to assemble around Xuxiachen and Zunhua. Two days later he issued this statement to the public "If the Chinese army immediately abandons its hitherto provocative attitude and withdraws some distance from the border, our army will quickly return to the line of the Great Wall and pursue its regular task of maintaining security in Manchukuo." Likewise Muto ordered the Tientsin group to inform the Chinese that the Kwantung Army would return to the Great Wall if the Chinese forces retreated to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line. Nemoto forwarded all of this to Chen Yi. On May 15th He Yingqin ordered the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to a line between Malanyu, Linnantsang and Pamencheng.  With what seemed a imminent ceasefire at hand, the Kwantung Army HQ ordered the 6th and 8th divisions to take up positions strategically favorable for the negotiations to finally begin in ernest. On the 17th a draft ceasefire plan was drawn up. It envisioned the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line and in return the Japanese would pull back to the Great Wall area. Huang Fu was on his way back to Peiping from Shanghai for probably the 10th time in two weeks, when the Japanese captured Fengjun and Zhunhua, routing the Chinese across the Qi Canal to the right bank of the Pai River. The 6th Division then advanced towards Yutien and Xumenchen as the 8th division stood around Xuxiachn. When the Chinese began retreating from Miyun on May 18th, the 8th division suddenly converged upon Miyun. Muto was of course delighted by their new advantageous position and even briefly began talking to his colleagues about the prospect of just marching upon Peiping. Instead he decided to sweep through Miyun, Pingku and the Qi Canal, going even further west than he had stated he would back on the 13th.  With these new orders in hand, the 6th Division quickly captured Qixien on the 19th and further pursued retreating Chinese forces to Sanho. The 8th Division entered Miyun and two days later began advancing to Huaijou. By the 23rd Huaijou had fallen as the 6th Division reached the Qi Canal. These advances threatened the Peiping-Tientsin region. Both Japanese divisions halted on the 25th as the ceasefire was issued. With that last strike Muto felt he had significantly increased their poker hand going forward. Meanwhile Itagaki's team at Tientsin were still trying to bring about a coup. In tandem with the 8th Divisions attack on Miyun, the agency tried to engineer a revolt by the militia troops led by Song Queyuan, Fang Chenwu, Sun Tienying, amongst others. The idea was for these forces to occupy Peiping while wrecking havoc upon the Chinese central army within th region. The agency had attempting recruiting Wu Peifu, but the old jade marshal was unwilling, so they turned to this former protege, the chairman of Hubei, Yu Xuecheng. However he also declined. Yu Xuecheng was also approached by Hu Hanmin, looking to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek campaign in cooperation with Han Fuqu and Feng Yuxiang. To this Yu Xuecheng declined as well. Itagaki kept searching for disgruntled warlords, and then turned to Li Qiashan and Xu Yusan. Xu Yusan was a former ally to Feng Yuxiang with a history of anti-Chiang Kai-Shek actions. If they got the backing of his personal army, roughly 10,000 men strong at Tangshan they could do some real damage. On May 16th Xu Yusan declared independence and took up the Manchukuo 5 color flag in direct opposition to the Kuomintang. He began issuing the slogan “Hubi for the people of Hubei” as his army marched west along the Peiping-Shanhaiguan railway. His force reached the vicinity of Tangu whereupon they had increased to 30,000 and rumors emerged they would occupy Tientsin. This began a mass panic. . . for literally a day. His army collapsed into nothing more than a rabble as now had the stomach to actually fight their fellow countrymen.  Despite this grand failure, the Tientsin group continued with other plots. At 8 pm on May 19th, a Peiping bound train from Tangu, carrying Chinese soldiers was bombed around Tientsin station. The Japanese love bombing trains as we all know. This resulted in small incidents involving Japanese and Chinese officials, giving precedent for 600 Japanese troops led by Lt General Nakamura Kotaro to reinforce Tientsin on May 23rd. There were a few other incidents were supposedly Chinese agents were tossing grenades at Japanese officials. One of these officials was Major Mori Takeshi of the Japanese Army General Staff who was working in Tientsin. However the grenade thrown at him was a dud, and before the Japanese could seize it, some local Chinese grabbed it, finding a stamp on it bearing “Tokyo Artillery Arsenal”, oops.  These numerous incidents influenced the Chinese who feared Japan was trying to force an invasion into North China. To these rumors, He Yingqin insisted they mount a proper defense of Peiping, but many were arguing they had to further retreat. Meanwhile the Tientsin agency was told to stop performing incidents and instead secure northern warlords to their future cause. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for the Great Wall of China was coming to a bitter end for the Chinese forces. The Japanese were using every deceptive measure to edge further and further into China proper. It seemed clear to the Chinese, nothing would stop Japanese encroachment upon their nation, while the rest of the world simply watched on doing nothing. 

Last time we spoke about Yamato's Last Stand. In the spring of 1945, as WW2 intensified, the US Marines commenced a fierce assault on Okinawa. Amidst heavy bombardment, the Japanese 32nd Army fortified their positions, preparing for a desperate counteroffensive. Codenamed Operation Ten-Ichi-Go, Japan's final bid involved the legendary battleship Yamato, tasked with a suicidal mission to confront the American fleet. On April 7, 1945, as the Yamato sailed towards its fate, American forces were ready. Hundreds of aircraft descended upon the ship in a coordinated attack, unleashing bombs and torpedoes. Despite its infamous firepower, Yamato struggled against the relentless onslaught. With its systems failing, Captain Aruga and Admiral Ito made the agonizing decision to go down with their ship. As the proud battleship sank, it symbolized both Japan's indomitable spirit and the crushing weight of defeat, forever etching its story into the annals of military history. This episode is the First Okinawa Counteroffensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Picking up from last time. The Japanese naval-air counteroffensive against Admiral Spruance's forces at Okinawa had been decisively defeated with minimal losses, allowing General Buckner's 10th Army to proceed with the land offensive largely without interference. While General Geiger's Marines advanced toward the sparse Japanese defenses in northern Okinawa, General Hodge's 24th Corps in the south encountered the main enemy line of resistance centered around the Shuri fortified zone. Initially, the 32nd Army had declined to launch a land counteroffensive in conjunction with Operation Ten-Go and the Yamato's suicide attack, fearing that the Americans might execute another amphibious landing at Machinato while the Japanese wasted their strength in a futile effort to reclaim the airfields. However, pressure from Tokyo and Formosa compelled General Ushijima to resume planning for this operation. Ultimately, it was decided that instead of initiating a broad counterattack, the Japanese would deploy a brigade-strength force overnight on April 12 to breach the American lines and advance approximately six miles. If successful, this would be followed by a general attack. Accordingly, Colonel Yoshida Masaru's 22nd Regiment was assigned to the 62nd Division and assembled northeast of Shuri, tasked with attacking through enemy lines east of the Ginowan Road and advancing toward Shimabuku. To bolster this offensive, General Fujioka was also instructed to deploy three reserve battalions for a three-pronged attack from the west aimed at Chatan. However, Colonel Yahara, 32nd Army operations chief, strongly opposed the counterattack plan, feeling that it was not in keeping with the army's defensive mission and that it would waste men. He succeeded in getting the 1st Battalion of the 22d Regiment and elements of the 23d IIB cut from the counterattack force. He made a dire prediction that the infiltrating units, unfamiliar with the terrain in their attack sectors, would get lost, confused, and cut to pieces during a night assault. Taking a sidenote here, I read Yahara's rather famous novel about his experience of the battle for Okinawa and I highly recommend it to all of you. It's a great insight into the perspective of the Japanese and how the leadership were beginning to change their mind on how to go about the war. Yahara, acting without Ushijima's knowledge, advised Fujioka to commit only four battalions to the attack, predicting it would inevitably fail. Meanwhile, the American offensive was still in progress. On April 9, as Major-General George Griner's 27th Division landed at the Orange Beaches near Kadena, the ships of Colonel Waltern Winn's 105th Regiment met with Admiral Blandy's Eastern Islands Attack and Fire Support Group at the Kerama Islands, preparing to move to Tsugen Island overnight. Following a preliminary air and naval bombardment, which saw some Japanese mortar fire in response, Winn's 3rd Battalion successfully landed on the morning of April 10. The Americans then advanced inland with light resistance, quickly securing the northern part of the island but failing to overrun the entrenched enemy positions in Tsugen village. The assault continued the next day against persistent opposition, but organized resistance gradually diminished, allowing the Americans to secure the rest of the island by nightfall, marking the conclusion of the Eastern Islands operation. On April 11, General Shepherd's Marines continued to probe for the main enemy positions in northern Okinawa; the 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines patrolled eastward from their new base at Shana Wan, while the 29th Marines advanced toward Manna. Due to this progress, Buckner decided to fully merge Phases I and II, ordering the 77th Division to capture Iejima on April 16. To the south, Colonel Albert Stebbins's 106th Regiment was attached to the 96th Division, moving toward that division's reserve area, while Colonel Gerard Kelley's 165th Regiment relieved the 17th Regiment in the corps service area. Most significantly, General Bradley continued his attacks on Kakazu Ridge, with the 1st Battalion, 381st Regiment attempting to assault the western slopes but halted short of the ridge crest by determined defenders. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion, 383rd Regiment pushed up the northwest slopes of Kakazu Ridge but was also pinned down by intense Japanese fire. Simultaneously, following an intense artillery bombardment, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment finally succeeded in breaking into Ouki. However, additional reinforcements were thwarted by heavy Japanese fire, forcing the troops to retreat. With no further advancements, the 7th Division and the 382nd Regiment were relegated to patrolling and mopping up their designated areas over the next few days. At sea, Admiral Ugaki resumed his kamikaze assaults that day, damaging the carriers Essex and Enterprise, the battleship Missouri, and eight destroyers. However, his primary operation commenced on April 12, when he launched approximately 380 aircraft for a second mass Kikisui attack, primarily targeting Admiral Turner's Task Force 51 west of Okinawa. Thanks to cryptanalysis warnings, Turner scrambled his own fighter planes, which successfully shot down 298 Japanese aircraft. Despite attempting numerous missions, Kanoya's specially trained 721st Kokutai Jinrai-Butai “Divine Thunder” unit had so far failed to launch a single Ohka suicide rocket against the Americans. On April 12, however, eight Betty bombers would finally launch six Ohkas against the 5th Fleet, although five Betties never returned. At RPS-14, about 70nm northwest of Okinawa, a Zero plowed into Mannert L. Abele's engine room at 14:40, its 500lb bomb exploding and leaving the destroyer dead in the water. One minute later an Ohka came screaming in at 575mph, slammed into Mannert L. Abele and exploded. She sank in five minutes, losing 97 dead. Mannert L. Abele was the first destroyer hit by an Ohka and the last sunk by one. Destroyer-minesweeper Jeffers, en route to assist Mannert L. Abele, observed a twin-engined bomber eight miles away drop a smoking “belly tank” that suddenly rocketed towards Jeffers “at terrific speed.” Numerous 40mm hits and hard maneuvering saw the Ohka miss Jeffers astern and disintegrate. Additionally 3 battleships, 14 destroyers, 2 destroyer minesweepers, and another landing craft were damaged. Meanwhile, Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57 was ordered to strike the Shinchiku and Matsuyama airfields in northern Formosa, and over the next two days, 48 Avengers and 40 fighters successfully attacked Shinchiku and Kiirun Harbor. On Okinawa, the 6th Reconnaissance Company captured Bise Saki with minimal resistance, while the 29th Marines faced significant opposition southeast of Manna near Mount Yae-Take, indicating where the main enemy forces were located. This prompted Shepherd to reposition the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines to Awa as his new divisional reserve. At the same time, Japanese guerrillas managed to retake Ishikawa, which they would hold for the following two days. Facing south, the 96th Division made another attempt to capture Kakazu but was once again thwarted by the determined defenders. By this time, approximately 5,750 Japanese soldiers were estimated to have been killed in the southern region, while the 24th Corps suffered losses of 451 men killed, 2,198 wounded, and 241 missing. In the afternoon of April 12, 1945, in Warm Springs, Georgia, while sitting for a portrait by Elizabeth Shoumatoff, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said: "I have a terrific headache." He then slumped forward in his chair, unconscious, and was carried into his bedroom. The president's attending cardiologist, Howard Bruenn, diagnosed a massive intracerebral hemorrhage. At 3:35 pm, Roosevelt died at the age of 63. His declining health had been kept secret from the public, leading to shock and sorrow worldwide upon the news of his death. Harry Truman, who was serving as vice president in 1945, succeeded FDR as president. Meanwhile, back in Okinawa, Fujioka initiated his counteroffensive after a heavy artillery bombardment, advancing his four battalions to secretly infiltrate the American lines. On the eastern front, the 22nd Regiment struggled to advance due to becoming disoriented in unfamiliar terrain.  The night attacks suffered from several unexpected problems. Heavy shelling had changed the landscape, blasting away villages and thickets, so that even though night infiltrators knew their maps and thought they knew the terrain, they lacked the landmarks needed to tell them where they actually were. Moreover, frequent illumination shells forced the eyes of night infiltrators to adjust so many times that their capacity to adjust was lost. They became temporarily blinded and so were unable to move. Because of the unfamiliar terrain and flash blindness, the Japanese night fighters had difficulty reaching their assigned objectives. In fact, it was hard for them to reach their jumping-off points. Continuous naval bombardment of crossroads and bridges forced units to rush across in small groups between shells so that the units became strung out on the roads and difficult to control. It was hard to move heavy ammunition and supplies forward because of these interdiction points and the generally churned up roads. Even when units reached their northward assembly points safely by night, they were immediately exposed to aerial observation and artillery fire at dawn, since they lacked enough time to dig in. Units that attacked across American lines safely in darkness had the same problem: they lacked time to dig in and so were utterly exposed to artillery fire at morning light. Night attacks, like flanking maneuvers, were a kind of cure-all in prewar Japanese doctrine. But they failed to provide the expeditious results on Okinawa that IJA doctrine had led the 32d Army Staff to expect. Consequently, Yoshida's four infiltration attempts, each involving about a squad, were effectively repelled by troops from the 32nd, 184th, and 382nd Regiments before midnight. The only significant attack came from around 45 Japanese soldiers against the positions held by Company G of the 184th, which quickly returned fire, forcing the enemy to retreat to their caves and trenches. In contrast, the assault on the 96th Division on the western front was intense, sustained, and well-coordinated. The forward units of Major-General Nakajima Tokutaro's 63rd Brigade launched their own local offensive to maintain pressure on the thin line held by the 382nd and 383rd Regiments, while elements from the 23rd, 272nd, and 273rd Independent Battalions infiltrated the American lines and moved into the Ginowan area. The majority of the 272nd Division launched an assault on American positions at Kakazu Ridge, enduring intense naval and artillery fire but ultimately being repelled by the determined defenders after several hours of combat. By morning, the bodies of 317 enemy soldiers were counted on the ridge, whereas the Americans suffered 50 casualties. Meanwhile, the 273rd Division attacked along the west coast against the recently arrived 2nd Battalion of the 106th Regiment, which decisively repelled the Japanese assault and nearly annihilated the independent battalion. Despite this, some units from the 23rd and 272nd Independent Battalions managed to penetrate approximately 1,000 yards behind American lines between Nishibaru and Kaniku but became isolated after dawn on April 13. Throughout the day, Bradley's troops worked to eliminate these infiltrators, many of whom detonated explosives when trapped. When these units retreated into Japanese lines later that night, only half of their original numbers had survived. Just before midnight, the reserve 9th Company of the 22nd Regiment launched an attack against the 184th Regiment following preparatory artillery fire, but this offensive was quickly disrupted by artillery, mortars, and machine-gun fire. On April 14, Nakajima's forces attempted two more assaults on Kakazu in the early hours, but these attempts were similarly thwarted by artillery and machine-gun fire. Given the failures of the offensives, Ushijima had no choice but to order a suspension of the attack, resulting in a shift to a defensive posture for the Japanese. Over the two days of combat, the 24th Corps reported killing 1,594 Japanese soldiers and capturing four, with losses of fewer than 100 American troops. In the northern region, an extensive air and naval bombardment of Iejima commenced while the Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed on Minna Island, securing it without encountering resistance to position artillery units for General Bruce's upcoming attack, which would involve the 305th and 306th Regiments. Meanwhile, in northern Okinawa, the 29th Marines continued to advance against enemy positions at Yae-Take through vigorous patrolling, preparing for a morning assault the next day. Concerned about the pace of progress, Shepherd relieved Colonel Bleasdale of command, replacing him with veteran Colonel William Whaling. However, Shepherd recognized that taking the 1,200-foot summit would require more than one regiment, so he ordered the 4th Marines to move from the east coast to Yofuke and then to the southwest corner of the Motobu Peninsula. Additionally, Colonel Shapley's 3rd Battalion was tasked with moving to Kawada, while the reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 22nd Marines rapidly advanced up the west coast to secure Hedo Misaki. On April 14, Shepherd initiated a coordinated assault on Yae-Take, with Whaling's 3rd Battalion and Shapley's 2nd Battalion advancing from the area around Toguchi against unexpectedly light resistance, while the rest of the 29th Marines moved out from Itomi to clear the Itomi-Toguchi Road. Although the eastern front faced strong opposition and required a change in strategy to advance southwesterly for better elevation advantage, rapid progress was made on the west, prompting Shapley to commit his reserve 1st Battalion to secure the exposed right flank. At the same time, Whaling's 3rd Battalion and Shapley's 2nd Battalion continued their advance against significantly strengthened enemy resistance, ultimately capturing another ridge located 1,000 yards ahead. Initial opposition consisted of small enemy groups. These hostile covering forces employed every available means to delay and disorganize the advance, and to mislead the attackers as to the location of the battle position. The Japanese would lie in concealment, with weapons zeroed in on a portion of a trail, allowing a considerable number of Marines to pass before opening up on a choice target. An entire platoon was permitted to pass a point on a trail without interference, but when the company commander reached that point with his headquarters section, a burst of machine-gun fire killed him and several others. Officer casualties were excessively high. In an area in which there had been no firing for over half an hour, Major Bernard W. Green, commanding the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, was killed instantly by machine-gun fire. No one else was hurt, although Major Green was standing with his operations and intelligence officers on either side of him. Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, Regimental Executive Officer, assumed command of the battalion. "It was like fighting a phantom enemy." For while the hills and ravines were apparently swarming with Japanese, it was difficult to close with them. The small enemy groups, usually built around a heavy Hotchkiss machine gun augmented by Nambus, would frequently change positions in the dense vegetation. Hostile volleys elicited furious Marine fusillades into the area from whence the firing had come. But after laboriously working their way to the spot, the Marines came upon only an occasional bloodstain on the ground. Neither live nor dead Japanese were to be found. One Marine registered his impression of these tactics by blurting out, "Jeez, they've all got Nambus, but where are they?" Meanwhile, the 29th Marines advanced 800 yards up steep slopes despite facing fierce opposition; however, the 1st Battalion eventually found itself pinned down by intense Japanese gunfire. Additionally, Shapley's 3rd Battalion crossed the island via motor march to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Marines in division reserve, which then returned to its patrol base at Majiya. To the south, Hodge recognized the need for a full-scale effort to penetrate the fortified Shuri area, so he scheduled a corps attack involving three divisions abreast for April 19. In preparation, he dedicated the following four days to organizing the assault, with the 27th Division taking over from the 96th Division in the western region of its zone, while smaller local attacks were conducted to enhance forward positions. Aware of the impending major attack, the Japanese used this preparatory period to bolster their defenses with additional supporting weapons. Back to the north, on April 15, most of the 29th Marines consolidated their defenses on high ground and exerted constant pressure on the rear of the Yae-Take position through vigorous patrols to the west and northwest. On the other hand, Whaling's 3rd Battalion advanced east and south approximately 900 yards amidst heavy machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire before being halted by a strong enemy position on Hill 210. Additionally, the 4th Marines faced fierce resistance as Shapley's battalions finally secured Hill 200 and a critical hill mass just southwest of Yae-Take. Fully aware that his primary positions would soon be overrun, Colonel Udo decided to transition to guerrilla tactics by nightfall, relocating his command to the mountainous regions of northern Okinawa via Itomi. In light of these developments, the 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines was placed into division reserve at Awa to allow Shapley's 3rd Battalion to prepare for the following day's assault. On April 16, the offensive resumed, with Whaling's 3rd Battalion swiftly capturing Hill 210 in conjunction with Shapley's 2nd Battalion. Meanwhile, the rest of the 4th Marines secured a ridge just below Yae-Take by midday, while the 29th Marines applied continuous pressure on the rear of Udo's fortified stronghold. While the 4th Marines was storming the fortified position on Yae-Take, the 29th Marines maintained relentless pressure against its rear. The opposition which faced the 29th was similar to that on the front of the 4th. From log-revetted bunkers and occasional concrete emplacements the enemy resisted the advance with increasing stubbornness, supported by machine-guns, mortars, and artillery concealed in ravines and in caves on the high ground. Rugged terrain and an acute supply situation also contributed to the difficulties confronting the 29th Marines in accomplishing its task of clearing the high ground flanking the Itomi-Toguchi Road. The enemy displayed his usual ability to exploit the terrain and derived the maximum benefit from his weapons emplaced in caves and pits and concealed by natural cover. Particularly noteworthy was his use of 20mm dual-purpose cannon against personnel. Fire from these weapons on battalion CPs was a daily occurrence. All roads and natural avenues of approach were covered. Any attempt to move over the easier routes was met with bitter and effective resistance. Consequently, "the method of reducing the enemy positions followed a pattern of 'ridgehopping'," covered by the fires of all supporting weapons. This tactic enabled the attacker to envelop the hostile defenses and reduce them in detail. Numerous abandoned positions and weapons encountered by the 29th indicated that the determination of the Japanese to resist diminished considerably when they were taken from the flank. In contrast to a coordinated advance with all units in contact across a broad front, the action in the zone of the 29th Marines was characterized by attacks that, even when delivered simultaneously, constituted a series of local patrol actions to seize critical positions, followed by mopping up activity within the area. In the afternoon, Shapley's 1st and 3rd Battalions assaulted the formidable mountain, gradually making their way up the steep slope under light and scattered small-arms fire. However, as the Marines reached the peak, they encountered intense fire at close range, which quickly forced them to pull back. After a fierce and close engagement, the 1st Battalion ultimately regained control of Yae-Take, managing to hold the summit against strong Japanese counterattacks, aided by artillery support and Shapley's 2nd Battalion. Meanwhile, at dawn on April 16, two battleships, four cruisers, and seven destroyers under Rear-Admiral Bertram Rodgers launched a heavy bombardment on Iejima, while aircraft bombed and rocketed the island, dropping tanks of napalm on and behind the beaches. Approximately 2,000 Japanese troops, led by Major Igawa Masashi, had destroyed Iejima's airfields and strengthened the central eastern region of the island in an effort to entice the invaders to approach the vulnerable southeastern beaches. Their aim was to annihilate them with concentrated fire from numerous hidden positions in the Pinnacle and the town of Ie. However, the Americans saw through this strategy. Bruce's plan involved landing Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Coolidge's 305th Regiment on the Red Beaches along the southern coast of Iejima and Colonel Aubrey Smith's 306th Regiment on the Green Beach at the island's southwest tip. The 305th was tasked with advancing eastward to capture additional landing areas, while the 306th was to move north and take control of the airfield. Both regiments would then focus on neutralizing enemy strongholds at the island's eastern end. Following intense air and naval bombardments, amphibious tanks and subsequent waves of amphibious tractors surged toward the landing beaches that morning, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats. At 07:58, the forward elements of the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment successfully landed on the southern coast of Iejima, just south of the airfield, while the 3rd Battalion landed on a different beach, 600 yards to the left, three minutes later. At 08:07, the first waves of the 306th Regiment made landfall on Green Beach. The 305th moved swiftly inland over high dunes and then turned east toward Ie, while the 306th advanced 2,000 yards inland to the airfield's western edge, with the reserve 3rd Battalion securing the island's western end. By the afternoon, the troops advanced rapidly, seizing the airfield with only light resistance, achieving a total gain of about 5,500 yards by nightfall. Conversely, the 305th faced stiffer opposition on its way to Ie, managing to advance only about 800 yards eastward while defending against strong nighttime counterattacks. During the night of 16 April the enemy launched a coordinated attack on the 3d Battalion of the 305th. The attack came with suicidal recklessness. The Japanese were supported by mortars and 70-mm. guns, and were armed with small arms, sharpened stakes, bags of hand grenades, and literally hundreds of satchel charges, some of which had been improvised from mortar shells. Japanese worked up to the perimeters in small groups and either threw their satchel charges at close range or blew themselves up in an effort to take Americans with them. Some of the human bombs were successful, but most of the Japanese were killed before they came within effective range. One American had his arm broken by the flying leg of a Japanese soldier who had blown himself up. After hours of wild fighting in the dark the enemy withdrew, leaving 152 of his dead in and around the 3d Battalion's position.  While back at sea, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 had effectively launched attacks on Amami Oshima, Tokunoshima, Kikaijima, and southern Kyushu over the past four days, the Japanese responded with a series of scattered kamikaze assaults that caused damage to the battleship New York and four destroyers. On April 16, Ugaki initiated his third large-scale Kikisui attack, acutely aware that another failure in the air could spell the doom of Operation Ten-Go. Despite Mitscher's preemptive strikes against Kyushu, where Americans claimed to have destroyed 202 aircraft and damaged 79 at the cost of only nine planes, at least 289 Japanese attackers were still able to launch missions against Spruance's 5th Fleet. Although American interceptors and anti-aircraft fire recorded another 217 kills, the surviving kamikaze pilots managed to sink the destroyer Pringle and inflict damage on the carrier Intrepid, the battleship Missouri, three destroyers, two destroyer minesweepers, and two landing craft. Notably, the destroyer Laffey withstood six kamikaze impacts, four bomb hits, and numerous strafing runs, resulting in 32 fatalities and 71 injuries among its crew. The following day, a smaller attack on April 17 resulted in additional damage to the light carrier Bataan and one destroyer, yet Americans claimed another 49 kills. However, Ugaki had exhausted much of his strength since the invasion began and was left with approximately 598 operational planes. Meanwhile, fighting continued in northern Okinawa, where some surviving troops from Udo advanced toward Nakaoshi to escape the Motobu Peninsula. Supported by heavy artillery barrages and battleship gunfire, the 29th Marines slowly progressed over challenging terrain, encountering only light resistance, as they successfully secured the mountainous area ahead and connected with the 4th Marines. Shapley's 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their push northward toward the Itomi-Toguchi Road, swiftly advancing downhill and completely overwhelming all Japanese defenses in the region. By nightfall, the 4th and 29th Marines had positioned themselves along the elevated terrain overlooking the Itomi-Toguchi Road. The 305th resumed its assault, aiming to capture the high ground behind Red Beaches 3 and 4. The 1st Battalion encountered only minimal resistance along the coast, allowing them to make significant progress, while the 3rd Battalion quickly secured the high ground in its area before being halted by intense machine-gun fire from caves in the coral slopes to the north. A maneuvering strategy followed by an infantry-tank assault eventually neutralized this enemy position, enabling the advance to continue steadily until the 3rd Battalion reached the outskirts of Ie. Due to the strong resistance faced, Bruce opted to deploy Colonel Stephen Hamilton's 307th Regiment on the beaches southwest of Ie. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were subsequently landed there and launched an attack northeast, quickly advancing approximately 400 yards despite increasingly fierce resistance, ultimately being halted by heavy enemy fire from Bloody Ridge and Government House Hill. Meanwhile, the 306th Regiment maintained its defensive position while probing the enemy's fortifications around Iegusugu. The next day, the 306th began to pivot its right flank and launched an attack toward the Pinnacle with two battalions, making notable progress throughout the day. Concurrently, the 307th continued its advance into Ie despite facing heavy resistance, quickly reaching a standstill in front of Government House Hill. As a result, with the 2nd Battalion effectively immobilized, the decision was made to deploy the 3rd Battalion around to the right flank to launch an assault toward the northeast in the eastern part of the town, while the 3rd Battalion of the 305th Regiment advanced eastward toward Iegusugu. After a heavy preparation by the artillery on Minna Shima, the 3d Battalion, 305th, attacked at 1130 on an 800-yard front. A house-to-house fight ensued amid the rubble of Ie. "Every street became a phase line," one observer reported. The necessity of forming a connecting link over the wide area between the 306th and the 307th made the fight harder. Artillery was ineffective against many enemy positions and could not be used freely because other friendly units were so close by. Self-propelled guns were held up by mines and debris in the narrow streets. After working about halfway through the northwestern section of the town, the troops withdrew to a more secure position on the outskirts, their right (south) flank then being 500 yards west of Government House Hill, and their left (north) flank 100 yards west of the base of Iegusugu. They had made a net gain of only about 350 yards for the day. Similarly, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion achieved moderate success, advancing to a position 300 yards north of the village of Agarii-mae. To protect its right flank, the 1st Battalion of the 305th Regiment positioned itself alongside the 3rd Battalion of the 307th Regiment and launched a northern attack, gaining approximately 1000 yards by day's end before withdrawing to a position about 600 yards east of Agarii-mae. Medium tanks and self-propelled guns covered the gap that developed between the two battalions of the 307th. These weapons put direct fire into caves, pillboxes, and enemy gun positions in the town of Ie and the Pinnacle. They could not be moved close to the enemy positions, however; deadly machine-gun and mortar fire held the infantry back and left the armor vulnerable to suicide attacks by Japanese armed with satchel charges, who hid in holes until the tanks and guns came within range. Meanwhile, after four days of intense fighting, activities in the Motobu area on April 18 were limited to reorganization, consolidating the gains from the previous day, patrolling the Itomi-Toguchi Road, and resupplying. Looking south, Griner called for a nighttime preliminary attack to secure the Machinato Inlet and the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. As the area was shrouded in smoke during the afternoon, Company G of the 106th Regiment swiftly crossed the inlet and successfully secured Machinato by nightfall, while bridges were constructed at the inlet. The 106th then moved across the bridges, stealthily advancing toward the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment without encountering opposition. Near the summit, the troops launched a surprise ambush against the defenders, ultimately forcing the Japanese to retreat in chaos. With the escarpment secured by dawn, the 106th was prepared to participate in the general attack to the south. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The first Okinawa counteroffensive, as part of Operation Ten-Ichi-Go was not achieving results. Despite overwhelming sacrifices of men and supplies, it seemed hopeless for the Japanese on Okinawa. Those like Colonel Yahara could see the paint on the wall, much to their growing depression.

Last time we spoke about Manchukuo. In the early 1930s, Ishiwara Kanji sought to dominate Manchuria to secure resources and counter American influence. He envisioned Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian league promoting racial cooperation, despite it being a puppet state under Japan. With Puyi as a figurehead, Ishiwara aimed for autonomy, but his plans faced resistance from the Kwantung Army, which prioritized control. As conflicts arose, Ishiwara's vision of unity clashed with military interests, leading to his eventual isolation and reassignment, marking a tumultuous chapter in Manchukuo's history. In November 1931, Doihara orchestrated the "Tianjin Incident," facilitating the removal of Puyi from his home to establish the puppet state of "Manchukuo." By March 1932, Puyi was declared its ruler, but his authority was merely symbolic, overshadowed by Japanese control. Despite international condemnation, Japan solidified its grip on Manchuria, exploiting its resources and suppressing local resistance. By the late 1930s, Manchukuo became a colonial entity, suffering under harsh economic policies while Puyi's regime served as a facade for Japanese imperial ambitions.   #146 Operation Nekka: the Invasion of Rehe Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. From the very beginning of their consolidation of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army regarded the province of Rehe, today's Jehol province, to be an integral part of it. According to some of the Kwantung Army leadership, all of Rehe would be necessary to consummate Manchukuo. In April of 1932, the IJA 8th Division based at Hirosaki in Aomori prefecture was transferred to Manchukuo under secret orders to prepare for an invasion of Rehe. Now Rehe province covers 160,00 square kilometers and back then held some 2.3 million people. Since 1926 it was ruled by General Tang Yulin. His direct command was over the NRA 36th division, consisting of 13,000 regular troops with a provincial militia of 8500 men. As was the Warlord practice of the time, Tang Yulin exploited his population. Now until July of 1932, Tang Yulin's attitude towards the emerging state of Manchukuo directly to his east was certainly favorable. That is because Tang Yulin favored the Japanese. During the debacle that was the invasion of Manchuria, Tang Yulin had done everything possible to prevent Zhang Xueliang from moving into Rehe whenever he was trying to consolidate forces there. Now Tang Yulin had no greater aspirations, its not like he loved Japan, or believed the Japanese were better leaders for his nation. What he was motivated by was a very practical concern, economics, more precisely the opium trade. Rehe number one source of income was opium, and they number one purchaser of it, was Manchuria. Thus as one can imagine, when Manchukuo was being formed, and the opium door closed on him, well he took heavy financial losses.  On July 17th of 1932, an incident broke out between the towns of Chaoyangxu and Nanling. A Japanese civilian employed by the Kwantung Army, Ishimoto Gonshiro was abducted by a Rehe militia group while taking the train from Jinzhou to Chaoyang. General Nishi Yoshikazu, the commander of the IJA 8th Division stationed at Jizhou, dispatched a small unit to rescue Ishimoto. In doing so they occupied Chaoyangxi, where they also protested the Rehe provincial government. This did not see Ishimoto handed over to them, so General Nishi bombarded Chaoyangxu and then had his forces advance upon Nanling. Even doing so, no Ishimoto to be found. So Nishi withdrew back to Jinzhou. The following year during what would become the invasion of Rehe, Ishimoto's body would be found at Chaoyangxu. Zhang Xueliang utilized this small incident to advance into Rehe. Claiming he was acting upon orders from Nanjing, he moved his Northeastern Army to the border of Rehe, due south of the Great Wall. Zhang Xueliang then threatened Tang Yulin and bribed his subordinates to defect over to him. Consequently, by late July, Tang Yulin tossed the towel and for the first time sanctioned passage of a volunteer army through Rehe. Come August Zhang Xueliang organized a volunteer force 40,000 strong, obviously all from his Northeastern army to advance from Gubeikou into Rehe, where he sought to confront the Kwantung Army if they advanced. Zhang Xueliang was heavily in contact with Chiang Kai-Shek during this period. Zhang Xueliang was making multiple proclamations about retaking Manchuria, and Chiang Kai-Shek was supporting him in that endeavor as best as he could. Meanwhile Tang Yulin was sort of stuck in the middle.  Between October 1932 to January 1933, Shanhaiguan, the strategic gateway and midpoint between Mukden and Beijing became the focal area of 3 major skirmishes.  The Boxer Protocol of 1901 dictated that some of the 8 nation alliance members, notably, France, Italy and Japan were allowed to maintain small contingents at Shanhaiguan. In 1932, the Japanese garrison there was 261, France had 61 men and Italy 69. After the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan had increased its garrison to have some more border guards in the town of Shanhaiguan itself. Of course the Chinese also had local troops, that was the 9th Independent Brigade commanded by Ho Chukuo, a force roughly of 9000 men. The first skirmish at Shanhaiguan broke out on October 1st, between Ho Chukuo's men and an armored train of troops from the IJA 8th Division. Another exact same event occurred on December 8th, both occasions were settled locally and peacefully with the Chinese offering an apology and indemnity payment. Then a third clash broke out on January 1st, but this one got out of hand.  The mastermind behind the third incident was Major Ochiai Jinkuro, the leader of the Japanese garrison at Shanhaiguan. Upon his orders, at 9pm, 3 Japanese soldiers tossed two hand grenades each into the backyard of the Japanese military police detachment and the railway track running in front of the Japanese garrison. This was of course immediately blamed upon the Chinese and at 11:30 pm Ochiai presented the local Chinese with 2 demands. The first was to evacuate the Chinese force and the second to allow the Japanese to occupy their south gate at Shanhaiguan for the time being. Now the Japanese had legitimate pretext for these demands based off the Boxer Protocol. It allowed them the right to ensure the security of the railway and telegraph lines and to defend their citizens and property within two miles of the railway zone. Since Ho Chukuo's troops allegedly disturbed the peace in said zone, the Japanese were in their right to ask them to depart.  According to Japanese sources, the Chinese refused at first then consented at 4:50 am on January 2nd. This effectively saw them surrender the south gate. However at 9:30 am the chief of staff for the Chinese Brigade requested that the takeover of said gate be postponed until the scheduled arrival of Ho Chukuo, coming over from Beiping. Ochiai turned down this request, whereupon the Chinese agreed that the south gate would be included within the area overseen by the Japanese. Yet at 10:50 am Japanese troops went to take over guarding the south gate whence Chinese guards tossed grenades at them. Yes, it is most certainly the Japanese who tossed those grenades. The Chinese account of this event is somewhat different. It asserts the Japanese attacked the gate while the issue of surrender was still being negotiated. By January 11th, China sent a formal appeal to Britain, France, the US and other signatories of the Boxer Protocol charging the Japanese for perverting the treaty to seize the south gate of Shanhaiguan. Meanwhile General Ho Chukuo called Ochiai from Qinhuangdao to tell him he would arrive by 8am on January 3rd to negotiate. But by 10am he failed to show up, as the Chinese and Japanese fired upon another. Ochiai thereupon resolved to take the south gate by force. By that point the IJA 8th Division had strengthened its position in front of Shanhaiguan. Two companies had become 10 and one air force company was made ready to strike. Additionally the commander of the 2nd China Fleet, Tsuda Shizue dispatched Hirado and the 16th Destroyer Squadron to Shanhaiguan and Qinhuangdao “to defend Japanese residents and assist the troops in case of hostilities”. At dawn on January 3rd, the Japanese launched a combined land, sea and air assault and by 2pm had taken Shanhaiguan. Ho Chukuo's forces were pushed to the Shih River where they were reinforced during the night and hastily constructed fortifications against the incoming Japanese. Henceforth a propaganda war emerged over Rehe. Japan charged that Zhang Xueliang was mobilizing large forces to advance into Rehe, while China claimed the same of the Japanese. The Chinese protested the Japanese seizure of Shanhaiguan, but none of the western powers would intervene. However the League of Nations constant condemnation of Japan ever since the Mukden incident provoked the Japanese on march 27th to simply walk out on the league. The ordeal also prompted Prince Saioji Kimmochi to dispatch Major General Umezu Yoshijiro, the chief of General affairs of the army general staff and Consul Tanaka Sotaro of the foreign ministry to go over and restrain the unruly troops at various positions in the Beiping-Tientsin region. Saionji's main concern was elevated by Army Minister Araki Sadao, who on March 6th stated to Harada Kumao “that if Japan were to land about 3 divisions at Qingdao and they strike into the Peiping-Tientsin region via Tsinan, Zhang Xueliang will probably flee even before they reach Tsinan. If we do anything at all, I'd like to act boldly and go that far”. Despite claims by various sources, mostly Chinese, the Shanhaiguan incident as it became known was not actually preplanned by the Kwantung Army, it really was an arbitrary act on the part of the garrison commander. How everything went down at Shanhaiguan provided vital intel on the Northeastern Army, and what to expect in Rehe. In December of 1932, the IJA 6th Division was dispatched to Manchuria and assigned security detail in southern Jilin province. They were given further secret orders to participate in what was going to be an operation in Rehe once they arrived to Manchuria. When the Shanhaiguan incident broke out, the Rehe operation was expedited rapidly. Therefore the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions west of the Liao River were immediately tossed into the operation. Given the foreign and domestic conditions, the Rehe operation was extremely dangerous. Tokyo HQ yet again sought to reign in the men, so they sent General Umezu to Manchuria to talk to the Kwantung leadership. The Kwantung leadership was adamant the operation be unleashed before the spring that, provided the operation did not extend beyond the Great Wall. To this Tokyo HQ yet again relented.  On January 27th of 1933, General Muto Nobuyoshi, then commander of the Kwantung Army, issued the following general order for the Rehe operation designated, Operation Nekka “The situation in Jehol has become increasingly serious day by day and has now developed into a state of affairs necessitating intervention. To strengthen the foundations of Manchukuo, the time is close at hand, as far as military operations by the Kwantung Army are concerned, to put the finishing touch on our sublime task. First, the affairs of Jehol province are unquestionably an internal problem of Manchukuo. They neither embrace nor are accompanied by any international implications. Because subjugation of the province is designed to strike a fatal blow to anti-Manchukuo, anti-Japan elements, these elements purposely confuse the distinction between Jehol and North China. They move troops into the province and, glossing over these matters, raise a loud outcry, propagandizing that Japan harbors designs of territorial aggression. In this manner they have endeavored to draw the restraining attention of the world, and every move of the Kwantung Army in Jehol—even the slightest raising of a hand or the stretching of a leg—is now the object of worldwide surveillance” At this stage the Kwantung Army treated the Rehe Operation as an internal matter of Manchukuo and did not openly talk about extending it beyond the Great Wall into Hubei. But their gunna. On January 26th, General Muto issued Order 466, kinda funny how its almost order 66, but I digress. This order directed the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions to prepare to invade Rehe. On February 9th, Muto drafted the “Rehe Subjugation Plan” to some staff officers. It stated “without specific orders, operations are not to be carid out in Hubei”. It also stipulated they should “foster and promote a climate leading to the downfall of Zhang Xueliang in North China, which is the strategic base for the disturbance of Manchukuo”. On February 27th, Muto issued Order 473 which repeated to the men again not to move into Hubei. On the 29th, Muto issued another  order “The subjugation of Jehol is purely and simply an internal problem of Manchukuo. In the light of our national policy, it must not develop into a provocation for war with China. This is why Kwantung Army Operations Order 473 stipulated that, unless specific orders are issued, operations are not to be conducted beyond the Great Wall in Hopei province. I fully expect you to issue strict orders to the various units under your command that, although our forces may act freely in Jehol, which is a part of Manchukuo, they are not, without an imperial command, allowed to take any action in Hopei province, which is separated from Jehol by the Great Wall. They should be admonished that, even in the light of local circumstances, they must never be blinded by tactical considerations and miss the main point of our national policy. (In particular, the garrison at Shanhaikuan should be doubly careful and not act beyond its authorized limits.) I have learned that His Imperial Majesty, the supreme commander, is gravely concerned about the foregoing and again issue these instructions in awe of His Majesty's concern”. Thus one can read between the lines here. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down and demanded no forces go past the great wall and to this the Kwantung Army obeyed. For Operation Nekka, the IJA 6th and 8th Division would have their own theaters of operation along a line running from Paotzu, the eastern most town in Rehe to Chaoyang. The northern zone was the IJA 6th divisions theater, the southern one was the 8th's. Geneal Sakamoto Masemon led the 6th Division and ordered his forces on February 23rd to advance north along the rail line between Tahushan and Tungliao, then on towards Tienshan, Xiawa and Chaoyang. Afterwards they would carry out operations in the Chifeng-Linxu-Tolun region.  General Nishi ordered his 8th Division, excluding one unit to advance along the border around Peipiao, towards Suichung on the 27th, then into the Lingyuan region. The other unit would secure as fast as possible the important gateways along the Great Wall of China: Qilingkou, Lenkou, Xufengkou, Lowenyukou and Manlankuan to protect their divisions flank. Afterwards they would seie Chengde and Gubeikou. However he also gave explicit orders "Without specific orders, operations must not be extended beyond the Great Wall into Hopei province,". So yeah, while they had direct orders to not advance beyond the Great Wall. . . they were going to basically capture all of the key passes of the Great Wall. Kind of playing with fire.  On the other side, on January 23rd, Zhang Xueliang was meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek and our old friend Duan Qirui to discuss how to prepare for what seemed to be an impending invasion of Rehe. Chiang Kai-Shek politely said to Duan Qirui "I sincerely hope that you will come south and give me your guidance at this time of national crisis,". The real reason he sent this request was because he did not want the Japanese to enlist their former lacky against him. At the meeting, according to a Japanese intelligence report, Zhang Xueliang insisted that Chiang Kai-Shek personally come north and assume direct command of the Northern troops. Chiang Kai-Shek refused on the grounds he had to deal with the communists in Jiangxi and sent in his place Yang Que, the current president of the Army Staff College and a graduate of the Japanese Army War College. Yang would arrive to Peiping with his staff on January 30th, where he devised a plan for joint operations with Zhang Xueliang. They anticipated the Kwantung Army would cross the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan, so their basic strategy was to concentrate a large force in its region, especially east of the Luan River. That forces mission would be to defend at all costs the front line at Qinhuangdao. The Japanese intelligence indicated the Chinese had roughly 50,000 men, including 7700 men of the 25th Division ld by Kuan Lincheng and 12800 men of the 2nd Division led by Yang Que who were sent to Miyun and Gubeikou. There were also reports that ancient art objects and documents from Peiping were being transported to Nanjing, beginning on January 10th. To the Chinese public this was shocking news as one could imagine. Operation Nekka was unleashed and showcased the rapid efficiency of the Kwantung Army. By March 2nd, the IJA 6th Division routed the 41st Army of General Sun Tienying; the IJA 14th Mixed Brigade of the IJA 8th Division captured the Lengkou pass on March 4th; while the Kawahara detachment captured Chengde near the border with Hubei. General Nishi then assembld his main force at Lingyuan as the 14th Mixed Brigade withdrew to Chapeng. On March 4th, Muto issued Order 480, directing the troops "to make preparations for operations in North China, firmly seizing the major passes along the Great Wall, mopping up resistance by remnant troops and bandits, and restoring peace and order in Jehol province." One unit of the IJA 8th Division was given the task of seizing the Gubeikou Pass and advanced to such on the 7th. Within the vicinity of Changshanyu, around 40 kilometers southwest of Chengde, they encountered 5000 advancing Chinese forces. Here one of the first of many fierce battles along the Great Wall came to be. Until roughly March 20th, the Kwantung Army was met with fierce counterattacks, coming from the main gateways of the Great Wall. Initially the fighting went tremendously wall for the Japanese, yet by March 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade had taken Tungqiaku, Tiehmenkuan and Xifengkou. Two days later the IJA 8th Division began an assault upon Gubeikou. Nishi then sent the Hayakawa Brigade to seize Lowenyukou. Then on the 10th, after receiving reports the main passes were secured, General Muto took his HQ from Jinzhu to Changchun, believing everything was already won and done. However he would be very wrong, they had misjudged the Chinese strength.  On the 13th, Muti and Nishi received a report, that on the night of the 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou had come under heavy attack by a Chinese force led by General Song Qeyuang. Reinforcements were rapidly sent over, but they were unable to relieve the trapped brigade. On the 14th, Muto ordered Genera Sakamoto to lead the Mukai unit from the 6th Brigade to help out. With this the Chinese forces were driven off and then the Japanese began assaults upon Lengkou, Lowenyukou and Quehlingkou. On the 16th, the IJA 8th Division took Quehling, but the next day received a vicious counterattack by the NRA 116th Division. At Lowenyukou the Hayakawa Brigade was counterattacked by Song Cheyuan. The Hayakawa Brigade was still able to secure on portion of the Great Wall, it was constantly under attack and unable to progress further.  On the 22nd, Nishi was forced to order his Brigade to pull back to Chengde. Over at Lengkou, the Mukai unit managed to capture the town as the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou was attacked by the NRA 139th Division. Unable to repel the counterattacks, Nishi ordered his forces back 13 kilometers on the 24th. The battles at Quehlingkou and Lowenyukou were very intense. On March 18th, Muto realized the casualties were severe and taking the gateways was not showing progress. He therefore decided to divert the 6th Divisions attention to Lengkou in a flanking maneuver aimed at severing the Chinese supply lines to the gateways and as a result this would extend operations south of the Great Wall into the region east of the Luan River. Thus there we have it, they were going past the Great Wall against Emperor Hirohito's orders.  Operation Nekka, similar to Operation Jinzhou was deemed essential to establish and protect Manchukuo. However while the battles along the Great Wall were deemed necessary to create the borders for Manchukuo, their extension past that boundary literally brought them into the heart of North China. Unlike in Manchuria, the Chinese forces in North China held excellent morale, they were very willing to fight. On top of that, they had better logistics and were fighting on top of the Great Wall, which offered significant advantages. Thus from a tactical standpoint, the Japanese had to seize the gateways and flush out the Chinese from the areas. The Chinese remained defiant. Atop the walls the Chinese defenders would shout at the Japanese waving anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese flags.  Outside the ongoing battle, Chiang Kai-Shek had his own, perhaps in his mind, more important battle, the one with the communists. The encirclement campaigns had all gone to shit thus far. Added to this was the invasion of Manchuria and Shanghai. As Chiang Kai-Shek would later put it "tantamount to subjecting the Government to a pincer attack both from within and without." Basically Chiang Kai-Shek could choose to focus on the Japanese or communists. He figured going into a full war against Japan would be the end of himself and his government. Thus he worked to reach an agreement with the Japanese in May of 1932 which had ended the Shanghai incident. After doing so he released a slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression". Upon doing so he unleashed his full attention upon the communists. As we have seen, Chiang Kai-Sheks last encirclement campaign proved successful. But as he was in the middle of it, Operation Nekka was unleashed. It looked extremely bad for Chiang Kai-Shek, for the KMT and for China in general. On March 20th, as a gesture to indicate to the masses Chiang Kai-Shek was doing his job, he dispatched 5 divisions, roughly 50,000 men from the Central Army north. Chiang Kai-Shek personally traveled north from Hankou to Beiping, but no further than that. Back on the 10th he had received the resignation of Zhang Xueliang, who had publicly been calling for a massive war against Japan so that Manchuria could be recovered. Chiang Kai-Shek had to replace him with General He Yingqin.  Another major development at this time, was our old and dear friend who never causes any trouble, Wang Jingwei returned from I believe his 20th time in exile. He came to resume his post as president of the Executive Yuan. Yet again Wang Jingwei was trying to reconcile with Chiang Kai-Shek. In reality and as many of you might guess, the only reason Chiang Kai-Shek never had this guy shot was because Wang Jingei had the firm backing of the left, thus in order to really grab the majority of the political class he had to play nice with him. For Wang Jingwei's part, much like starscream in transformers, yes I am using this as an analogy, hes just trying to overthrow megatron every chance he gets, but always fails like a dumb idiot. There was also the dichotomy between the two men. Wang Jingwei was seen as a civilian leader while Chiang Kai-Shek was seen as a military leader. So together they seemed like a perfect team, despite the fact they loathed each other. So Wang Jingwei became the civil administrator while Chiang Kai-Shek focused on the military. In regards to Japan, Wang Jingwei was following a conciliatory policy of "resistance on the one hand and negotiation on the other,” based on Chiang Kai-Sheks slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression."  Following a fight with Zhang Xueliang in August of 1932 over the issue of defending Manchuria against the Kwantung Army, Wang Jingwei had resigned, trying to strongarm Chiang Kai-Shek to get rid of the young marshal. Thus like what had happened countless times before, Wang Jingwei said he was out on sick leave, and departed for Europe for supposed treatment. When he returned 6 months later, Operation Nekka had begun, although the Japanese troops had not yet then reached the Great Wall. Wang Jingwei immediately became acting foreign minister in place of Lu Wenkuan, a supporter of Zhang Xueliang, who was notably anti-japanese. Wang Jingwei kicked Lu Wenkuan over to Xinjiang to deal with some conflicts breaking out there, fun times for him as we know.  Meanwhile He Yingqin had been placed as the head of the Peiping branch military council, entrusted with control over all military matters in North China. He Yingqin went to work reorganizing the forces in north china in mid March, forming them into an effective battle order to face the Japanese. By bringing together the local, very disorganized forces into a unified command, He Yingqin hoped they would be capable alone to block the Japanese advance, leaving the central army out of the conflict. This was because Chiang Kai-Shek did not want to risk losing his central army, considered the most elite one in all of china. But Chiang Kai-Shek did come around to the idea of at least testing some units against the Kwantung forces. Above all Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to have his cake and eat it to. He wanted he population of China to think he was actively resisting, while in reality he was biding time. Central army units deployed around Gubeikou, the main gateway leading to the Peiping-Tientsin region. When the Kwantung army leaders were planning operation Nekka, they had believed it would not be necessary to go beyond the Great Wall, but once the fighting around the walls and gateways kicked off, they knew immediately they could not hope to take the wall areas without getting behind the enemy. Particularly they needed to get past the area east of the Luan River. Some 20 Chinese divisions had assembled in the Peiping-Tientsin region and were tossing endless counter attacks along the line of the Great Wall. In the Lengkou region a force of 7000 Central Chinese Army units had penetrated deep into Rehe and smashed the Mukai detachment of the IJA 8th Division. These counterattacks reaffirmed the Kwantung Army leadership it was necessary to go beyond the Great Wall. It should also be noted the Kwantung Army's operations in North China were not just military. The Japanese were plagued with logistical problems. There was a shortage of troops because they had driven into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most determined Kwantung general did not believe their military prowess could overcome the plains of Hubei packed with an immeasurable amount of Chinese troops. Therefore they had to augment this military operation with political schemes aimed at the regional warlords. During the pacification of Manchuria, the tactic of bribing local elites had worked wonders and there was zero reason to believe it would not work in North China. All of this was done without any supervision from Tokyo HQ. On February 13th of 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, at the time chief of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any official announcement of this promotion. He took a post in Tientsin, specifically to begin political maneuvers in eastern Hubei. This saw the birth of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially this agency was attempting to lure all the competing warlords in North China, such as, Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, but then began targeting Zhang Qingyao. Zhang Qingyao had once been the protege of Duan Qirui, acting as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 whereupon his allegiance had shifted over to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao had fought again against Zhang Zuolin, then controlling the National Pacification Army. When the Northern expedition was over, he joined Yan Xishans forces in Shanxi. Thus one could easily see he was not a man of many principals, nor any specific loyalties. The Tientsin Special Service Agency first proposed to reach out to Zhang Qingyao in the hopes he could organize a coup d'etat against Chiang Kai-Shek. It was further hoped he could get Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If they managed this, North China would fall in a single stroke. It was hoped this would be achieved as they were taking the Great Wall and were enroute towards Peiping. However on May 7th, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely ruining the plan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Nekka had been unleashed with a large bang. 20,000 Japanese troops stormed Rehe province under strict orders not to go past the Great Wall of China. So they immediately began planning how to go past the Great Wall of China. Yet what they did not expect was the determination of the Chinese defenders, who were not going to allow them an easy time.

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Iwo Jima. In March 1945, as the Pacific War raged, the US Marines began and invasion of Iwo Jima while Allied forces advanced across the Philippines. The Japanese formed the 32nd Army to defend the island, but faced shortages of supplies and equipment. They mobilized Okinawan civilians for support and constructed extensive fortifications. The Americans launched Operation Iceberg, neutralizing enemy air facilities in the Ryukyus, Kyushu, and Formosa. Task Force 58 and other air forces struck Japanese targets, while Spruance's 5th Fleet prepared to land Buckner's 10th Army. Initial landings occurred in the Kerama Islands, followed by the main assault on April 1 on Okinawa's Hagushi beaches. Despite heavy bombardment, Japanese defenses remained concealed. The Americans encountered minimal resistance initially, but the stage was set for a bloody and brutal battle. This episode is Yamato's Last Stand Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, Admirals Turner and Spruance successfully landed over 60,000 troops from General Buckner's 10th Army on the Hagushi beaches of Okinawa with minimal resistance. In response, General Ushijima's main forces remained inactive in their underground positions in the south, having effectively endured the continuous naval and air assaults from the enemy. However, under pressure from higher authorities in Tokyo and Formosa, the 32nd Army began to develop plans for a general counteroffensive aimed at the Yontan and Kadena airfields, utilizing nighttime infiltration and close combat tactics. The primary response, however, was expected to come from the air. As part of Operation Ten-Go, all Army and Navy air forces stationed in the Home Islands were to focus their efforts in the East China Sea to execute a series of coordinated mass air strikes against enemy transport and carrier task forces, collectively referred to as the Kikisui attacks. Japan's wartime terminology exploited the distinctively poetic and euphemistic nature of the Japanese language. The informal term kamikaze actually means “divine wind.” Specifically, kamikaze refers to the typhoons that miraculously wrecked Kublai Khan's Mongol–Koryo invasion fleets in 1274. Like “blitzkrieg”, the unofficial term “kamikaze” was mostly used by Allied journalists. The IJN and IJA officially called suicide attack units tokubetsu kogekitai, meaning “special attack unit.” This was usually shortened to tokkutai, with tokko both noun and adjective meaning “special” i.e. suicide. Kikisui was the codename for the ten mass kamikaze attacks off Okinawa against the Allied fleet. Kikisui means “floating chrysanthemum,” which was the war emblem of legendary 14th-century samurai Masashige Kusinoke, a national exemplar of sacrificial devotion to the Emperor. Ten-Go had been initiated on March 26, following the initial landings on the Kerama Islands; however, by the time of the invasion, Admiral Toyoda's disorganized Combined Fleet was unable to carry out any large-scale kamikaze attacks, as it was still consolidating approximately 3,000 aircraft in Kyushu. Additionally, encouraged by Emperor Hirohito, Toyoda momentarily sanctioned a dramatic, one-way suicide mission involving the superbattleship Yamato and Rear-Admiral Komura Keizo's 2nd Destroyer Squadron, aimed at destroying Spruance's invasion fleet. This surface attack mission, codenamed Ten-Ichi-Go and led by Vice-Admiral Ito Seiichi of the 2nd Fleet, vaguely suggested that if Yamato reached Okinawa, she would ground herself as an artillery platform while her crew disembarked as naval infantry. Nonetheless, the chances of success for this mission were slim; it was primarily intended for the Imperial Japanese Navy to maintain its honor. On April 2, while General Watson's 2nd Marine Division conducted another demonstration off the southeast beaches, American forces prepared to advance eastward. In the south, benefiting from ideal weather and minimal resistance, the 17th Regiment secured the highlands overlooking Nakagusuku Bay and extended its patrols to the bay's shoreline. The 32nd Regiment eliminated a strongpoint south of Koza using tanks and then aligned with the 17th. The 381st Regiment advanced through Shimabuku but faced enemy resistance in and around Momobaru. Meanwhile, the 383rd Regiment captured a hill just south of Momobaru after a fierce battle and also took a ridge northeast of Futema with support from airstrikes, artillery, and tanks. In the north, however, General Geiger's Marines faced challenging terrain and supply issues. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines moved north to secure the unoccupied Zampa Misaki area, where Turner later established a radar station. The 22nd Marines advanced quickly eastward throughout the day against light opposition, successfully securing the Nagahama beaches alongside the 6th Reconnaissance Company. On the other hand, the 4th Marines met with steadily mounting resistance. At 1100 a platoon of 3/4, entering the mouth of a steep ravine was met by a sharp fusillade of small-arms fire, which revealed a series of mutually supporting caves on both sides of the draw. In the fire fight that ensued, 12 wounded men were isolated and not recovered for four hours. "Every means of painlessly destroying the strongpoint was unsuccessfully tried and it was finally taken by a typical 'Banzai' charge, with one platoon entering the mouth of the draw and one platoon coming down one side of the two noses that formed the pocket."  The 1st Marine Division continued its advance with little resistance to the Ishimmi-Kutoku line, also extending southward to Chatan, while the 1st Marines moved past the 5th Marines toward Chibana. With approximately 6,000 yards separating General Del Valle's main frontline units from the 7th Division, General Arnold decided to send Colonel Roy Greene's 184th Regiment to fill this significant gap. At sea, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 launched a strike against Amami Oshima, sinking three vessels and damaging two others, while also witnessing four warships collide and sustain damage. In retaliation, Admiral Ugaki's Kyushu aircraft force conducted sporadic kamikaze attacks, resulting in damage to five transports. The next day, General Hodge's 24th Corps shifted its focus southward. The 17th Regiment secured the rear areas and captured Awase, while the 32nd Regiment advanced approximately 5,000 yards along Nakagusuku Bay to occupy Kuba and establish its lines in front of Hill 165. The 381st Regiment took control of Kishaba and Atanniya but failed in its assaults on Hill 165 and Unjo. Meanwhile, the 383rd Regiment swiftly occupied Isa, Chiyunna, and the Futema high ground. Looking north, Del Valle dispatched the 1st Reconnaissance Company to scout the area along the corps boundary, sweep the Katchin Peninsula, and patrol back up the east coast to the village of Hizaonna. This maneuver enabled the 1st Marines to advance quickly in formation and reach the sea wall overlooking the northern end of Nakagusuku Bay by nightfall. Concurrently, the 5th Marines moved forward and successfully occupied Agina and Tengan; the 7th Marines gained around 2,700 yards of enemy territory and ultimately reached Hizaonna, although Company K became lost and was ambushed. The 4th Marines navigated the challenging terrain and light enemy resistance to secure the significant hill mass behind Yontan airfield, located 3,000 yards short of the east coast. The 22nd Marines advanced and successfully captured Nakadomari, along with a position 400 yards south of that line. Meanwhile, the 6th Reconnaissance Company, supported by armored units, crossed the Ishikawa Isthmus to the village of Ishikawa, where they faced mortar fire. At sea, Mitscher's aircraft carriers targeted Okinawa, sinking two vessels and damaging two others. In response, Ugaki was finally able to launch a preliminary mass Ten-Go air attack, with 119 aircraft causing damage to the escort carrier Wake Island, the destroyers Bennett, Prichett, and Foreman, the minesweeper Hambelton, and two landing craft. Due to significant advancements, Geiger successfully deployed Colonel Victor Bleasdale's 29th Marines to take control of the Yontan airfield and other rear areas. To the south, Del Valle's units moved toward the eastern shore of Okinawa, with the 1st Marines occupying the Katchin Peninsula without facing any resistance, while the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments secured the coastline in their designated zones. Further south, after splitting the island in two, Hodge began advancing toward Naha, targeting the hill mass stretching from Urasoe-Mura to Hill 178 and Ouki. In response, General Bradley positioned Colonel Macey Dill's 382nd Regiment in front of Nodake, while the 184th Regiment moved through the 381st in the Attaniya-Unjo area. For the initial push toward the Uchitomari-Tsuwa line, the 383rd Regiment advanced quickly from Isa to Mashiki, where they were ultimately halted by heavy fire from the south. The 382nd advanced over two miles south from Nodake along the eastern boundary of the division, while Arnold's forward units lagged about two miles behind due to moderate resistance at a high, wooded ridge parallel to the coastline just west of Kuba. Meanwhile, at sea, Ugaki launched only sporadic kamikaze attacks, which resulted in damage to the destroyer Wilson near the Kerama Islands. Additionally, two American vessels collided while Task Force 58 targeted Okinawa, and later that night, a suicide boat attacked and sank an LCI gunboat. In the Attaniya-Unjo area, the 383rd Regiment made a swift advance from Isa to Mashiki as part of the initial push towards the Uchitomari-Tsuwa line. However, the following day marked the onset of fierce resistance on Okinawa, with the 383rd Regiment struggling to make headway against the formidable Japanese defenses on Cactus Ridge. Meanwhile, the 382nd Regiment continued its advance southward against a series of fortified positions, achieving gains of approximately 400 yards to the east and 900 yards to the west. The 184th Regiment moved through Arakachi but was halted by intense and precise fire from a rocky outcrop located about 1,000 yards southwest. The 32nd Regiment finally managed to capture Castle Hill before pushing more than two miles along the coast to a point east of Ukuma. To the north, while the 1st Marine Division shifted to a primarily defensive posture, the 6th Marine Division conducted active reconnaissance toward the Motobu Peninsula, advancing the front to the Atsutabaru-Chima line. Additionally, a patrol from the 1st Marines on the Katchin Peninsula crossed the reef to seize Yabuchi Island swiftly. At sea, there were no kamikaze attacks that day as Ugaki and Toyoda prepared to launch the main phase of Operation Ten-Go, although an Okinawa shore battery managed to hit the battleship Nevada. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, American intelligence had successfully intercepted Combined Fleet codes, allowing them to anticipate the details of the surface Ten-Ichi-Go attack. Consequently, Spruance's warships were prepared for the imminent departure of Ito's “Surface Special Attack Force,” which was executed a few hours later. Additionally, Ushijima was instructed to initiate a strong counterattack the following day to coincide with Ten-Ichi-Go and the first Kikisui attack, but he firmly rejected this order and called for the cancellation of the unnecessarily suicidal surface attack. During the night, as Admiral Blandy's minesweepers completed the perilous task of clearing the vast areas of Chimu and Nakagusuku Bays, the Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed on the northern coast of Tsugen Island to gather intelligence on enemy positions. Upon their arrival in the early hours of April 6, they encountered machine-gun and mortar fire, which ultimately compelled the battalion to retreat to the beach and reembark. Simultaneously, the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments advanced through the 22nd Marine Regiment, with the 29th Marines moving up the west coast in formation and reaching Chuda by noon, while the 4th Marines progressed along the eastern coastal road, successfully advancing seven miles toward Madaira. Further south, the 383rd Regiment continued its assault on the fortified enemy positions at Cactus Ridge, pushing forward relentlessly until they secured the western half by nightfall. The 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, made frontal assaults through intense mortar fire to gain the ridge. "We figured," S/Sgt. Francis M. Rall later wrote, "that the way to get out of that knee mortar fire was to get to where it was coming from. So we stood up in waves, firing everything we had and throwing hand grenades by the dozen, and charged the Jap position." By such tactics the 2d Battalion gained the western half of Cactus.  Over the next two days, the 382nd Regiment advanced slowly east of the Ginowan road, facing fierce resistance from the Tombstone and Nishibaru Ridges. After a 10-minute artillery bombardment, two companies of the 1st Battalion, 184th Regiment climbed nearly to the summit of the Pinnacle but were ultimately pushed back by strong resistance from caves and underground strongholds. Undeterred, Company B continued frontal assaults while Company C maneuvered up the western approaches to surprise the determined defenders. This strategy proved effective, with Company C reaching the top without sustaining any casualties and then methodically eliminating the remaining Japanese troops using white phosphorus grenades and flamethrowers. As the Pinnacle was being captured, the 32nd Regiment advanced across the coastal flatlands with minimal resistance to maintain contact with the 184th Regiment. On this day, Task Force 58 returned to sea, launching strikes on Okinawa and the Daito Islands, while Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57 targeted the Ishigaki and Miyako Islands. Meanwhile, Japanese aerial reconnaissance identified two American carrier groups near Okinawa, prompting Ugaki to initiate his first mass Kikisui attack, sending hundreds of Japanese aircraft to assault Mitscher's carriers. US carriers unleashed a combined 19 USN and four USMC squadrons to blunt the onslaught. Swirling, running dogfights developed around noon and lasted through sunset. April 6 may have started slow, but by evening it had developed into one of the greatest aerial confrontations of all time. American CAPs overwhelmingly massacred the poorly trained Japanese attackers; Mitscher's Task Force 58 fighters claimed 249 Japanese planes for just two lost—a staggering 125-to-1 kill ratio. Yet the kamikaze pilots' grim determination was chillingly apparent. According to VF-82's action report: “Of all the enemy planes encountered, not one returned fire, all remained on course, boring in toward the surface vessels. The only evasive action offered was jinking, and the majority of the aircraft were obsolete models as can be seen by the list [of] destroyed. Primary danger to our pilots was collision or getting in the path of a friendly plane's fire.” Essex's VF-83 (36 Hellcats) and VBF-83 (36 Corsairs) combined for 69 kills, while Belleau Wood's 24 VF-30 Hellcats shot down 47. Belleau Wood's skipper, Captain Red Tomlinson, duly signaled Task Group 58.1's Rear Admiral Joseph J. Jocko Clark: “Does this exceed the bag limit?” Clark responded, “Negative. There is no limit. This is open season. Well done.” The US carrier fighters' 275 kills was thus the war's 4th-highest 1-day total. 13 US pilots achieved ace status (scored their 5th kill) on April 6, with 4 becoming “ace-in-a-day.” 10 pilots claimed 4 kills, while another 17 shot down 3 each. Combined with anti-aircraft fire, the Americans destroyed 355 Japanese planes. However, even significant aerial victories could not prevent the devastating kamikaze assaults, with approximately 182 Japanese aircraft in 22 groups attacking Spruance's 5th Fleet that afternoon. This led to 24 kamikaze planes sinking the destroyers Bush and Colhoun, as well as three transport ships, and inflicting further damage on the light carrier San Jacinto, 12 destroyers, three destroyer minesweepers, and one minesweeper. Friendly anti-aircraft fire also caused damage to battleship North Carolina, light cruiser Pasadena, and destroyer Hutchins. Despite the extensive damage, four new escort carriers arrived off Okinawa that day, bringing the first 222 fighters of Major-General Francis Mulcahy's Tactical Air Force, stationed at Yontan airfield. Meanwhile, the Yamato force set sail at 15:24 towards Okinawa, but within 45 minutes, a B-29 spotted them in transit. Submarine Threadfin then detected Ito's strike force moving through the Bungo Strait at 17:45. As Ito's force rounded Kyushu to the southwest, it was monitored overnight by submarine Hackleback, which sent four additional contact reports and was pursued three times briefly by one of Yamato's escorting destroyers. Concerned about a potential mass Kikisui attack on April 7, Spruance ordered Mitscher's carriers to concentrate on thwarting Japanese air assaults while tasking Admiral Deyo's Task Force 54 with intercepting Ito's strike force. At 06:20, April 7, six Zeros of the 203rd Kokutai arrived over Yamato as CAP. 14 total Zeros would relay in small groups over the Yamato task force, but all would depart as scheduled by 10:00. The Americans already knew the exact CAP schedule of Yamato's fighters, a later US intelligence memo dryly observing, “They left too soon.” At 08:32, an Essex Hellcat reported the Yamato task force southwest of Koshiki Retto at a heading of 300 degrees. The Yamato group was doing 22kts and deployed in a diamond formation, with Yamato in the center and Yahagi astern. Yamato simultaneously reported that she had been sighted. Visibility was highly variable, with patchy overcast. Within minutes, two VPB-21 PBM-3 Mariner flying boats (based at Kerama Retto with seaplane tender Chandeleur) arrived and began shadowing Yamato and radioing situation reports. Meanwhile, Mitscher duly reported the Yamato sighting to Spruance, before dispatching 16 additional fighters at 09:15 to track Yamato. Shortly after Yamato's CAP had departed, at 10:14, the Japanese discovered the two shadowing PBM-3 Mariners, and simultaneously reported a US submarine stalking the task force—this was Hackleback, which had managed to catch back up with the zig-zagging Japanese. Three minutes later, at 10:17, Yamato turned towards the Mariners and opened fire with her awesome 18.1in. Sanshikidan anti-aircraft shells. Yahagi also opened fire, and additionally began jamming the Mariners' transmissions. The Mariners retreated into the clouds unharmed at 10:18, and Yamato and Yahagi ceased fire. To his chief-of-staff, Commodore Arleigh Burke, Mitscher announced: “Inform Admiral Spruance that I propose to strike the Yamato sortie group at 1200hrs unless otherwise directed.” The grizzled aviator desperately wished to sink Yamato, but he likely suspected that Spruance, riding New Mexico, intended his beloved dreadnoughts claim one last moment of glory. “Will you take them or shall I?” Mitscher pressed. Spruance's response: “You take them.” At 10:00, the carriers of Task Groups 58.1 and 58.3 launched the first wave of 282 aircraft, although only 227 managed to locate Ito's strike force as they navigated through challenging, overcast weather. At 11:07, Yamato's radars detected the large formation approaching from 63 nautical miles away, prompting Ito to increase speed to 25 knots. Within eight minutes, the formation closed to 44 nautical miles, leading the Japanese to initiate sharp evasive maneuvers. Bennington's Lieutenant-Commander Hugh Woods' airborne radar detected the Yamato task force some 25nm away from its predicted location, and the US strike altered course. Five minutes later, the Americans made visual contact through a hole in the patchy 3,000ft overcast, a Hornet pilot recalling, “Yamato looked like the Empire State Building plowing through the water.” Yamato cruised in the center, flanked by destroyers Kasumi, Suzutsuki, Hamakaze, and Yukikaze. Light cruiser Yahagi was in the van, followed by destroyers Hatsushimo, Isokaze, and Fuyutsuki. The first American aviators encountered the destroyer Asashimo, which had been experiencing machinery issues for five hours and had fallen 12 nautical miles behind the main task force to the north. San Jacinto's seven Hellcats dove against Asashimo, but the crippled destroyer threw up notably heavy flak. The Hellcats' 1,000lb bombs closely straddled Asashimo, buckling the destroyer's hull plating. The Hellcats then repeatedly strafed the destroyer, causing large fires that quickly silenced Asashimo's guns. San Jacinto's eight Avengers then made a textbook attack run at 300ft, dropping torpedoes from 1,200 to 1,600yds range. Trailing a wide oil slick, the crippled Asashimo attempted to comb the torpedoes, but one struck beneath her bridge and a second hit near her engine room. Successive explosions blew Asashimo partly out of the water and broke her in half. Asashimo sank at 1213hrs, going down with all 330 men. She had lasted three minutes against San Jacinto's attack. Twelve miles ahead, Yamato lookouts spotted the incoming aircraft at 12:32, which then spent the next five minutes circling just outside the range of Japanese anti-aircraft fire to coordinate their strike plan. Around this time, Yamato also raised Togo's iconic Tsushima flag signal: “On this one battle rests the fate of our nation. Let every man do his utmost.”At 12:37, the circling planes launched their coordinated assault on Yamato and her escorts, focusing on the superbattleship's port side in an attempt to capsize her. US fighters repeatedly strafed Yamato with their 5in. rockets and 0.50cal. machine guns, decimating Japanese antiaircraft batteries and slaughtering exposed antiaircraft crews. The intense carnage and chaos that followed suppressed careful targeting and further ravaged Japanese gunners' morale. Yamato was maneuvering hard at her flank speed of 27kts, when at 1240hrs four Bennington Helldivers from VB-82 delivered two 1,000lb bombs near Yamato's mainmast. The first bomb exploded in Yamato's crew quarters. The second detonated near Yamato's aft command station and caused serious damage, destroying one of Yamato's two air search radars, her after secondary gun director, and several 25mm antiaircraft guns. The subsequent fires shortly reached the powder handling area beneath Yamato's after 6.1in. turret and detonated the readyuse propellant. The resulting conflagration virtually exterminated the 6.1in. turret crew, but flash doors prevented the explosion from reaching the rest of the magazine. Nevertheless, the explosion killed the area's entire damage control party, meaning the resulting fire would rage uncontrolled for the rest of the battle. The Americans lost one Helldiver. At 1243hrs, eight Hornet Avengers launched torpedo attacks against Yamato's port side, covered by 14 Bunker Hill Corsairs strafing Yamato with rockets. Antiaircraft fire hit six Avengers, destroying one, but at least three torpedoes hit the water. The first two torpedoes missed, but at 1245hrs the third torpedo slammed into Yamato's port side, opening her hull to 2,235 tons of seawater. Japanese damage control counterflooded with 604 tons of water to correct the list. Attempting to draw US attackers from Yamato, Hara's light cruiser Yahagi had maneuvered away from the Japanese battleship, steaming hard at 35kts. US strafing had already ricocheted machine gun bullets around Yahagi's bridge, killing a lookout. Watching the attack unfold, Hara admitted, “The spectacle was at once thrilling and terrifying.” Meanwhile, Bennington's Lieutenant-Commander Ed De Garmo led three Avengers against Yahagi. At 1246hrs, De Garmo's Avengers delivered Yahagi her first hit and it was a devastating one. A single torpedo struck Yahagi in the engine room, killing the entire engineering crew. Yahagi was left dead in the water nine minutes into the battle. Destroyer Isokaze subsequently sped towards Yahagi to take off Rear Admiral Komura. Meanwhile, around 56 aircraft targeted Yamato's escorting destroyers, leading to multiple torpedo hits that split Hamakaze in two; Isokaze was bombarded with bombs; Fuyutsuki suffered minor damage from two dud rockets; and Suzutsuki was struck by a bomb that severed her bow. The first wave of attacks concluded at 12:50, as Ito sought to reorganize his forces and evaluate Yahagi's status. Shortly after 13:00, a second wave of 50 aircraft appeared, managing to hit Yamato's port bow with a bomb at 13:23 and inflicting several bomb hits near the battleship's bridge. Additionally, two bomb hits and several near misses critically damaged the destroyer Kasumi, leaving her dead in the water and ablaze. At 1333 the third wave of US attackers arrived, comprising 110 new Yorktown, Intrepid, and Langley aircraft from the delayed TG-58.4 strike. The Americans now overwhelmingly focused on the reeling Yamato. Twenty Avengers attacked Yamato's portside. Around 1337, the third wave saw three confirmed torpedo hits on Yamato's portside, plus a fourth probable hit, increasing her portside list to 15–16 degrees. Stationed on Yamato's bridge, Ensign Mitsuru Yoshida recalled, “I could hear the Captain vainly shouting, ‘Hold on men! Hold on men!'”. Aruga had no option but to flood Yamato's starboard machinery spaces, where hundreds of engineers toiled to keep Yamato underway. Water, both from torpedo hits and the flood valves rushed into these compartments and snuffed out the lives of the men at their posts, several hundred in all. Caught between cold sea water and steam and boiling water from the damaged boilers, they simply melted away.” Aruga's drastic measure reduced Yamato's portside list back to five degrees, but exhausted her last starboard counterflooding capacity. Having lost one shaft and gained 3,000 tons more water, Yamato's speed fell to 12kts. At 1342hrs, TG-58.4 Avengers dropped another four torpedoes. Yoshida marveled, “That these pilots repeated their attacks with such accuracy and coolness, was a sheer display of the unfathomable, undreamed-of strength of our foes!” Yamato shot down one Avenger, but two torpedoes plowed into Yamato's portside, making five torpedo hits in five minutes. The Americans had intentionally targeted Yamato's stern to wreck her steering, and the gamble paid off. Yamato's rudders were now disabled, jamming her in a permanent starboard turn. Any chance of reaching Okinawa was gone. Reduced to a speed of 8 knots and unable to maneuver, the stricken Yamato became an easy target. Around 14:02, Mitscher's relentless carrier planes inflicted at least four more bomb hits, disabling most of Yamato's remaining operational anti-aircraft guns as the battleship helplessly circled. As a result, Ito canceled the Ten-Ichi-Go attack and promptly ordered all his warships to rescue survivors and attempt to retreat to Japan. The sinking battleship was then deserted, except for Ito and Captain Aruga Kosaku, who chose to go down with their ship.  Throughout the battle, a stoic Ito had sat silently with arms crossed on Yamato's bridge, unflinching as bullets ricocheted around him, slaughtering his staff. Ensing Yoshida Mitsuru now observed that Ito “struggled to his feet. His chief of staff then arose and saluted. A prolonged silence followed during which they regarded each other solemnly.” Ito then told his staff, “Save yourselves. I shall stay with the ship.” Ito then shook hands deliberately with his officers, retired to his sea cabin one deck below, and locked it behind him. Meanwhile, with Yamato's pumps no longer functioning, alarms began to blare: temperatures in the 18.1-inch magazines were approaching dangerous levels. By 14:20, the capsizing Yamato's main deck was vertical to the ocean. Captain Aruga, eating a biscuit given to him by a rating, tied himself to a binnacle on Yamato's bridge. As Yamato capsized, surviving men clambered across her keel, a crazed, half-naked officer screaming and brandishing his samurai sword at the Americans.  Meanwhile, the Americans continued pummeling the helpless Yahagi, which “quivered and rocked as if made of paper,” recalled Captain Hara. The stricken Yahagi suffered repeated hits. “My proud cruiser,” Hara brooded, “was but a mass of junk, barely afloat.” Around 1400hrs Yahagi took the decisive torpedo hit, triggering a clearly fatal starboard roll. Hara finally ordered, “Abandon ship.” At 1405hrs, one minute after receiving her last bomb, Yahagi capsized and sank, having somehow absorbed at least 12 bombs and seven torpedoes. Captain Hara and Rear Admiral Komura calmly stepped into the water as Yahagi sank from beneath them, only barely surviving the sinking Yahagi's undertow. Now clinging to floating wreckage, the exhausted Hara observed “scores of planes swarming about [Yamato] like gnats.” By 14:20, the capsizing Yamato's main deck was vertical to the ocean, and three minutes later, the sinking dreadnought exploded catastrophically before finally disappearing beneath the East China Sea. Yamato's capsizing motion had likely forced open her 18.1in. powder room doors, allowing fires into the battleship's magazines. An American gunner described the explosion as “the prettiest sight I've ever seen … A red column of fire shot up through the clouds and when it faded Yamato was gone.” The detonation killed most Yamato survivors still struggling in the water and may have destroyed several US aircraft. The Americans' exact score will never be known, but Yamato had certainly absorbed seven bombs and nine to twelve torpedoes out of 150 torpedoes dropped. The US planes departed at 1443, but not before issuing “a few farewell strafing runs across the Yamato survivors.” Destroyers Suzutsuki, Fuyuzuki, Yukikaze, and Hatsushimo rescued 1,620 men, including Hara and Komura, before successfully returning to Japan. Additionally, the disabled destroyers Isokaze and Kasumi were scuttled by Yukikaze and Fuyuzuki, respectively. By the end of the action, the combined losses for Ten-Ichi-Go totaled 4,242 Japanese lives. Meanwhile, Ugaki had launched a second mass kamikaze attack around noon, sending 132 aircraft towards Task Force 58. Although Mitscher's fighters shot down 54 attackers, the kamikazes managed to damage the fast carrier Hancock, the battleship Maryland, the destroyers Bennett and Wesson, and a motor minesweeper. The initial Kikisui operation resulted in the deaths of 485 Americans and left 582 wounded. The significant losses over the two days hindered Ugaki from launching another large-scale Kikisui attack for five days. Meanwhile, back in Okinawa on April 7 and 8, Hodge continued his offensive in the south. In Bradley's sector, the 383rd Regiment persistently executed banzai charges against the remaining enemy strongholds on Cactus Ridge until the entire area was secured by American forces. They then advanced toward Kakazu Ridge, where they faced even stronger resistance. The 382nd Regiment made a slow but steady push forward, ultimately being halted by intense fire across a broad front just north of Kaniku and Tombstone Ridge.  The fighting in the 7th Division's sector on April 7 centered on a low, bare hill 1000 yards west of the town of Minami-Uebaru, called Red Hill because of its color. The enemy had made a fortress of the hill by constructing his usual system of caves and connecting trenches. A frontal assault on Red Hill by troops of the 3rd Battalion failed in the face of machine-gun and mortar fire. In a 2nd attempt, 3 platoons of tanks supported the attack. 10 medium and 5 light tanks advanced through a cut toward Red Hill; 2 tanks were blown up by mines and 1 was satchel-charged as the column moved toward the hill and up the sides. Intense enemy artillery and machine-gun fire drove the infantry back and disabled more tanks. Japanese swarmed in among the armor and tried to destroy the tanks with satchel charges and flaming rags. 2 medium tanks held off the attackers, the defending crews resorting to hand grenades, while the rest of the operative tanks withdrew. The 14th Independent Battalion headquarters proudly described this action as a perfect example of how to separate troops from tanks and thus break up the American infantry-tank team. The enemy dispatch stated: "The above method of isolating the troops from the tanks with surprise fire followed by close combat tactics is an example in the complete destruction of enemy tanks and will be a great factor in deciding the victories of tank warfare." After these 2 reversals the 3rd Battalion made a wide enveloping maneuver to the right. Behind fire from artillery and supporting weapons, the troops drove toward Red Hill from the west and occupied it, suffering only 2 casualties in the move. Once more a Japanese outpost had shown its strength against a frontal attack and its vulnerability to a flanking maneuver. The capture of Red Hill left another sector of enemy territory open for the taking. The troops advanced 100 yards south before digging in. A platoon of tanks conducted a remarkable 4000-yard foray almost to Hill 178 and withdrew safely, despite a bombing attack by two single-engined Japanese planes. The following day, the 184th continued its advance southward under heavy fire, managing to take Triangulation Hill after two fierce assaults. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment captured Tsuwa as it extended the front along the coastline. By the night of April 8, the 24th Corps had sustained 1,510 battle casualties while inflicting 4,489 Japanese fatalities and capturing 13; they had finally reached the formidable perimeter of the Shuri fortified zone. Looking north, on April 7, the Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed on Ike Island, encountering no opposition. Subsequently, Company B was dispatched to secure Takabanare Island, while Company A took control of Heanza and Hamahika Islands. During the night, Company B reembarked, maneuvered around Tsugen Island, and landed on Kutaka Island, where they also found no enemy presence. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment captured Tsuwa as it expanded the front along the coastline. By the evening of April 8, the 24th Corps had incurred 1,510 battle casualties. On the same day, Shepherd advanced north with minimal resistance, as the 29th Marines successfully reached Nago while the 4th Marines moved through Henoko. Ahead of the division, the 6th Reconnaissance Company traveled up the west coast road to the village of Awa and then crossed the base of the Motobu Peninsula to Nakaoshi, encountering and either destroying or scattering several enemy groups along the way. As the reconnaissance zone was extended westward on April 8, clear signs, confirmed by aerial observations and photographs, indicated that the enemy had chosen the rugged mountains of Motobu as their defensive position. As a result, the 22nd Marines were deployed across the island from Nakaoshi to Ora to protect the right flank and rear of the 29th Marines attacking westward, while the 4th Marines assembled near Ora to support either the 29th on Motobu or the 22nd in the north. The 2nd Battalion, 29th Marines probed westward, moving across the base of Motobu and occupying the village of Gagusuku. Additionally, the reserve 1st Battalion at Yofuke successfully secured Yamadadobaru and Narashido, facing heavy enemy machine-gun and rifle fire at the latter location. The following day, the 29th Marines advanced in three columns to locate the enemy's main force at Motobu; all columns encountered resistance, revealing that a significant enemy force confronted the division in the area stretching from Itomi to Toguchi. On April 10, the 2nd Battalion, 29th Marines captured Unten Ko, where the Japanese had established a submarine and torpedo boat base; the 3rd Battalion took Toguchi and sent patrols into the interior, while the 1st Battalion advanced through Itomi and uncovered well-fortified positions on the high ground north of the village. On April 9, the 184th Regiment successfully captured Tomb Hill in the south following an artillery and air bombardment, while the 32nd Regiment took control of several finger ridges to the east that oversaw the approaches to Ouki. The Japanese-held area in front of the 383rd Regiment offered the enemy an ideal combination of defensive features. A deep moat, a hill studded with natural and man-made positions, a cluster of thick-walled buildings behind the hill; these were the basic elements of Kakazu stronghold. The enemy had exploited each one of them. Moreover, Kakazu, unlike such outposts as the Pinnacle, was an integral element of the Shuri fortified zone and a vital rampart that could expect reinforcements and heavy fire support from within the ring of positions that surrounded the 32nd Army headquarters, only 4000 yards to the south. Between the Americans and Kakazu lay a deep gorge, half hidden by trees and brush, which could be crossed only with difficulty. The Kakazu hill mass itself, which was made up of two hills connected by a saddle, stretched northwest-southeast for 2000 yards, sloping on the west toward the coastal flat and ending on the east at Highway 5. Just below Kakazu Ridge on the southeast was the town of Kakazu, a compact group of tile-roofed structures, each surrounded by hedges and stone walls and somewhat in defilade to the adjoining open fields. In and around the Kakazu hills the Japanese had created one of their strongest positions on Okinawa. Mortars dug in on the reverse slope were zeroed-in on the gorge and on vulnerable areas between the gorge and the crest of Kakazu. Several spigot mortars also protected the hill. In an intricate system of coordinated pillboxes, tunnels, and caves Japanese machine-guns were sited to cover all avenues of approach. The enemy was also supported by many artillery pieces within the Shuri fortified zone. The heavy walls and the hedges of the town of Kakazu-and eventually its rubble-afforded the Japanese countless defensive positions. Concurrently, the 383rd Regiment initiated its first coordinated assault on Kakazu Ridge, with Companies A, C, and L swiftly reaching the summit by dawn without detection. However, the surprised defenders quickly launched a fierce counterattack, ultimately forcing Companies A and C to withdraw. Company L, positioned on Kakazu West, continued to fend off enemy counterattacks alone until late afternoon when the exhausted unit had no choice but to retreat. The next day, Brigadier-General Claudius Easley proposed a "powerhouse attack," where the 381st Regiment would assault Kakazu West from positions south of Uchitomari while the 383rd would press on Kakazu Ridge from positions north of the gorge. Following a heavy artillery bombardment, the assault commenced, with the 2nd Battalion of the 381st Regiment rapidly fighting through strong enemy defenses to secure the crest of Kakazu West. However, the 383rd was struggling to make headway, prompting Colonel May to direct his two battalions to execute flanking maneuvers. Although the eastern encirclement was unsuccessful, May's 3rd Battalion managed to cross the gorge at the northern base of Kakazu West to join Colonel Halloran's 2nd Battalion on the crest. Both units then attempted to advance eastward in heavy rain, but relentless Japanese counterattacks forced them back to Kakazu West. Stalemated, Easley eventually ordered Halloran's 1st Battalion to move through May's 3rd Battalion to attack southeast along Kakazu Ridge, but this assault was also repelled by the determined defenders. At the same time, the 382nd Regiment launched its primary assault on Tombstone Ridge, advancing southwest with three battalions in formation but managing to gain only a few hundred yards to the west as fierce defenders thwarted their main offensives against the hills held by the Japanese. Meanwhile, to the east, the 32nd Regiment attempted to advance into the town of Ouki without success, while the 184th Regiment on the heights defended against minor counterattacks, sealed off caves, and solidified their positions. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Okinawa is really heating up, showcasing to the Americans they would be paying dearly for every foot they took off the island. Meanwhile the last stand of the super battleship Yamato would form a legend encompassing the defiant spirit of Japan as well as producing one of the most bizarre science fiction animes of all time.

Last time we spoke about Operation Jinzhou and the defense of Harbin. In the tumultuous landscape of early 1930s China, Chiang Kai-shek hesitated to engage in combat, fearing internal factions and the looming threat of the CCP. Zhang Xueliang, commanding a substantial force, felt pressure from both the Japanese and his own government. As tensions escalated, the Kwantung Army launched a brutal campaign against Jinzhou, leading to its fall. Amidst chaos, resistance leaders like Ma Zhanshan and Ding Chao emerged, rallying against Japanese aggression, determined to protect their homeland despite limited support. In November, the Jilin Provincial Anti-Japanese Government formed under Cheng Yun, rallying over 3,000 troops led by Feng Zhanhai against Japanese forces. After several battles, including the retaking of Shulan, they faced fierce resistance but ultimately had to retreat. As the Japanese advanced, the Jilin Self-Defense Army was established, but after intense fighting, Harbin fell to the Japanese on February 6. Despite earlier victories, the Chinese resistance crumbled, leading to the establishment of Manchukuo and the end of organized resistance in Manchuria.   #145 What was Manchukuo? Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   To start off this episode I want to turn back to our old friend Ishiwara Kanji. Ishiwara's ambition to dominate Manchuria was primarily a means to an end: to secure resources and a strategic position against America. After gaining control of Manchuria, Ishiwara shifted his focus toward another objective: fostering racial cooperation among Asian peoples. His vision for Manchukuo, or rather his interpretation of it, served as a launching pad for his idea of an East-Asian league, rooted firmly in his Final War theory. During his time in Manchuria in 1932, this Pan-Asian concept of Manchukuo distinguished him from many of his colleagues in the Kwantung Army and marked him as unconventional within the Imperial Japanese Army .   As many of you may know, Manchukuo was a fraudulent puppet state designed to legitimize Japan's takeover of Manchuria. The Japanese high command aimed to disguise their invasion of this part of China as an indigenous independence movement. To achieve this, they installed Puyi, the last Qing emperor, as the figurehead of Manchukuo while promoting ideals of racial harmony. This facade was necessary, as controlling a population that harbored resentment towards them required some effort to win their favor. Fortunately for the Japanese, there were factions in Manchuria that actually desired independence. This region was the heartland of Nurhaci's Manchu people—yes that guy we spoke about all the way back in the beginning of this podcast. The Japanese had considerable leverage, framing their actions as a noble revival of the Qing dynasty or a restoration of power to the Manchu. Additionally, there was a significant Mongolian presence, and Inner Mongolia would soon play a role in these events. Manchuria was reluctantly drawn into the nationalist movement, and it shared Japan's apprehension towards the USSR, having faced its own struggles against it for a long time. Moreover, a large population of Japanese settlers in Manchuria welcomed the takeover, as the Zhang Xueliang regime had not been particularly accommodating to them, implementing various discriminatory measures. Zhang Xueliang's alliance with the Nationalists effectively sealed the fate of the Japanese settlers, who anticipated expulsion.   As military operations progressed, Ishiwara and Itagaki convened with other prominent Kwantung officers to strategize control over Manchuria. They met with Officer Katakura, Chief of Staff Miyake, and Dohihara Kenji from the Mukden special service, reviewing a prior plan by Colonel Dohihara for a multi-ethnic autonomous nation in Manchuria. This entity was to be led by Puyi, possessing complete autonomy in internal matters, while defense and foreign relations would be managed by Japan. Ishiwara drafted the plans by September 22nd, which were sent to Tokyo on October 2nd. Although Tokyo's high command disapproved of the objectives, they collaborated with the Kwantung Army for five months to establish a new state based on two main principles: the purported indigenous movement for Manchurian independence and the administrative framework for Kwantung Army control.   The Kwantung Army proceeded to utilize Manchuria's traditional structure of local self-governing bodies. Throughout 1931, they bribed, persuaded, and threatened local leaders to foster a movement for autonomy against the Kuomintang hardliners. One of their first initiatives was the establishment of the "Jichi Shidobu Self-Government Guidance Board," responsible for coordinating regional independence movements in collaboration with the Kwantung Army to, as Miyake put it, "guide Manchuria to self-government." The board was headed by Yu Ch'ung-han, a Mukden elder statesman educated in Japan and a former advisor to Zhang Zuolin. It comprised 20 Japanese and 10 Manchurian members. Such organizations attracted Japanese civilians in Manchuria, who supported the so-called multiracial political structure, as they could exploit it for their own interests. The Kwantung Army heavily promoted slogans like “racial harmony, racial equality, and the righteous way.” Their control over Manchuria was solidified by placing Japanese advisors in all governmental bodies with ultimate veto power, ensuring that everything was effectively under Japanese control. While it seemed that Ishiwara's vision was unfolding as planned, by 1933, he became a fierce critic of the very system he had helped establish.   It's quite ironic that the man who played a key role in initiating the conquest of Manchuria would be unable to exert his influence in shaping Manchukuo. While Ishiwara Kanji served as the operations officer officially responsible for planning and executing military operations to capture Manchuria, the political arrangements for the new state fell outside his control. Nevertheless, Ishiwara was very vocal about his views on the development of Manchukuo, strongly advocating for racial harmony. He persistently urged his colleagues that the economic growth of Manchukuo should embody the spirit of racial cooperation. Ishiwara believed that the economic interests of Manchukuo would naturally align with those of the Kwantung Army, as both aimed for the unity of Asia against the West. He was gravely mistaken. Ishiwara was driven by his theory of a final war, and everything he did was aimed at preparing for it; thus, his fixation on racial harmony was part of this broader strategy.   In March 1932, the self-government guidance board was dissolved, transferring its functions and regional organizations to newly established bureaus within the Manchukuo government. In April, an organization called the Kyowakai (Concordia Association) was formed, led by Yamaguchi Juji and Ozawa Kaisaku, with the goal of promoting racial harmony. This initiative received support from members of the Kwantung Army, including Ishiwara, Itagaki, and Katakura. The Kwantung Army invested heavily in the organization, which quickly gained traction—at least among the Japanese. General Honjo expressed concerns about the organization's potential political influence in Manchukuo; he preferred it to remain an educational entity rather than evolve into an official political party. By "educational role," he meant it should serve as a propaganda tool for the Kwantung Army, allowing them to exert influence over Manchukuo without significant commitment.   But to Ishiwara the Concordia Association was the logical means to unify the new nation, guiding its political destiny, to be blunt Ishiwara really saw it should have much more authority than his colleagues believed it should. Ishiwara complained in August of 1932, that Manchuria was a conglomerate of conflicting power centers such as the Kwantung army, the new Manchukuo government, the Kwantung government, the Mantetsu, consular office and so on. Under so many hats he believed Manchukuo would never become a truly unified modern state, and of course he was one of the few people that actually wanted it to be so. He began arguing the Kwantung army should turn over its political authority as soon as possible so “Japanese of high resolve should hasten to the great work of the Manchurian Concordia Association, for I am sure that we Japanese will be its leaders. In this way Manchukuo will not depend on political control from Japan, but will be an independent state, based on Japanese Manchurian cooperation. Guided by Japanese, it will be a mode of Sino-Japanese friendship, an indicator of the present trends of world civilization” Needless to say the Concordia Association made little headway with the Chinese and it began to annoy Japanese leaders. The association gradually was bent into a spiritless propaganda and intelligence arm of the IJA, staffed largely by elite Japanese working in the Manchukuo government.  Ishiwara started utilizing the Concordia Association to advocate for various causes, including the return of leased territories like the Railway zone, the abolition of extraterritoriality, and equal pay for different races working in Manchukuo—efforts aimed at fostering racial harmony. However, this advocacy clashed significantly with the Japanese military's interests, damaging Ishiwara's reputation. As a result, the staff of the Kwantung Army began to shift dramatically, leaving Ishiwara increasingly isolated, except for Itagaki and a few loyal supporters. The higher-ups had grown weary of the disruptive Concordia Association and gradually took control, ensuring that discussions about concessions were halted. In August 1932, Ishiwara received a new assignment, and he appeared eager to leave Manchuria. Now that finishes off our story of Ishiwara, he will return later on in future episodes. Again if you want a full sort of biography on him, check out my youtube channel or Echoes of War podcast where I have a 4 part series on him.    Now I want to get more into the specifics of what exactly was this new state known as Manchukuo? During the mayhem that was the invasion of Manchuria, by October 6th of 1931, the Japanese cabinet had finally relented and decided to no longer interfere with the establishment of a new regime in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The remaining disagreement between the Japanese government, Tokyo General HQ and the Kwantung army was not whether or not to establish a new regime, but whether or not to promote the establishment of a new regime. Japan obviously did not want to break the Washington system established by the treaty of Versailles. Yet they of course wanted to expand Japanese interest in Manchuria. So it was to be a delicate game of chess balancing their interests in coordination with the western powers. This was specifically why Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro had opposed direct participation of Japanese soldiers in the establishment of a new regime, because clearly it would open Japan to condemnation from the west.    Over the course of the invasion, Japan managed to occupy the 3 northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang by establishing pro-japanese regimes within each under Zhang Shiyi, Xi Qia and Ma Zhanshan respectively. On September 20, 1931, Jianchuan proposed the establishment of a Japanese-backed regime led by Puyi during a meeting with Honjo Shigeru, the commander of the Kwantung Army. Obviously Jianchuan was in league and under the influence of our old friend Doihara. Two days later, on September 22, the Kwantung Army General Staff developed the "Solution to the Manchuria-Mongolia Issue," based on Doihara's suggestion to create a Five-Nation Republic in Manchuria and Mongolia, with Japan as the "leader." The plan outlined the establishment of a new regime under Puyi, supported by Japan, to govern the 3 northeastern provinces and Mongolia. The new regime would entrust Japan with national defense and diplomacy, as well as the management of key transportation and communication infrastructure. It also proposed appointing Xi Qia, Zhang Haipeng, Tang Yulin, Yu Zhishan, and Zhang Jinghui to oversee garrisons in locations such as Jilin, Taonan, Rehe, Dongbiandao, and Harbin. To execute this plan, the Japanese Kwantung Army, led by Chief of Staff Itagaki, utilized local intelligence agencies and some mainland ronin to initiate a so-called strategic operation. To facilitate the plan's implementation, the Kwantung Army informed the commander of the Japanese Army in Tianjin that afternoon, requesting immediate "protection" for Emperor Xuantong.   After the Kwantung Army took control of Jinzhou, it believed the moment was right to establish the hastily assembled puppet regime. To secure the full backing of the Japanese government and the military leadership, the Kwantung Army decided to send Itagaki back to Tokyo for negotiations. At that time, Itagaki had a fairly detailed plan to present. The proposed "Manchuria-Mongolia Central Government" aimed to create a centralized power structure that would be distinct from mainland China, effectively becoming a truly "independent" nation. They intended to appoint local collaborators as officials at all levels and were prepared to fabricate "public opinion" to obscure global perceptions of Japan's scheme to establish this regime. This of course was highly influenced by the announcement from the League of Nations that they would be investigating the entire incident in what would become known as the Lytton Commission.  Thus they believed it was essential to set up the regime before the League of Nations investigation team arrived in Manchuria. They understood that if these actions were "carried out directly by Japan," they would violate both the Nine-Power Treaty and the League of Nations. However, they reasoned that if the Chinese initiated the separation themselves, it would not contradict the principles of those treaties.   The Kwantung Army established puppet organizations using collaborators, starting with the "Liaoning Provincial Local Maintenance Association," which was formed on September 25, 1931. The association's chairman, Yuan Jinkai, represented the civil governance faction of the Fengtian clique. After the First Zhili-Fengtian War, he was appointed governor of Fengtian Province by the Zhili government, which led to his unpopularity with Zhang Zuolin. At the time of the incident, he was already retired. The association's vice chairman, Kan Chaoxi, had previously served as the governor of Rehe and commander of the Third Division. He fell out of favor with Zhang Zuolin due to his involvement with Guo Songling and subsequently retired. A common characteristic of the puppet organizations created by the Kwantung Army is that they always included Japanese advisors, regardless of their level. The "Liaoning Provincial Local Maintenance Association" was no exception, hiring Kanai Shoji, head of the health section of the local department of the Manchurian Railway and chairman of the Manchurian Youth League, as its top advisor. In the Japanese-occupied Fengtian, this highest advisor effectively became the leader of the maintenance association. While the association was ostensibly responsible for maintaining local order, it actually functioned as a tool for Japan to establish a puppet regime. Recruiting discontented officials and creating puppet institutions was just a minor part of the Kwantung Army's strategy to set up a puppet regime. The crucial factor in this endeavor was gaining the support of influential local warlords. To achieve this, the Japanese Kwantung Army, along with various intelligence agencies, employed a mix of soft and hard tactics, including coercion and incentives. As a result, they successfully pressured figures such as Yu Zhishan, Zhang Haipeng, Zhang Jinghui, Xi Qia, Zang Shiyi, and Ma Zhanshan to defect to the Japanese forces.   Following the Mukden Incident, former Qing nobles who had hoped to restore the Qing Dynasty believed the moment had arrived. Xi Qia, a member of the former Qing royal family and the Chief of Staff of the Jilin Provincial Army at the time, took advantage of the Jilin governor's absence due to his mother's funeral to open the gates of Jilin and surrender to Japan. This made Xi Qia the first Chinese official to collaborate with the Japanese invaders since their invasion of China. He sent a secret letter to the abdicated Qing emperor Puyi, urging him to return to "the birthplace of the ancestors, restore the Qing Dynasty, and rescue the people from their suffering," with the backing of "friendly nations". Xi Qia and the former Manchu nobles, who had elevated him to acting governor of Jilin Province, proposed to the Japanese to invite Puyi to the Northeast to establish a monarchy. The Japanese Kwantung Army had already identified Puyi as a suitable puppet leader. After the 15 year war had concluded, under interrogation, Shirono Hiroshi confessed that the reason why the Japanese chose Puyi was: First, Puyi had “no connection with the Kuomintang in mainland China”; Secondly, "some old classes in the Northeast and Mongolia still have traditional yearnings for the Qing Dynasty"; Third, “the peasants in general… seemed to welcome the kingly political system implemented by the Aisin-Gioro family.”   On November 8th, 1931, Doihara orchestrated the "Tianjin Incident" and covertly removed Puyi from his home in the Japanese Concession in Tianjin. They traveled through Dagukou, Yingkou, and Lushun before arriving in Fushun. By February 5th, 1932, the Japanese army had taken control of Harbin, stabilizing the situation in North Manchuria. Afterwards the Kwantung Army Headquarters organized a series of "National Construction Staff Meetings" to plan for a "National Construction Conference" involving collaborators. On February 16th, leaders from the Northeast provinces, including Zhang Jinghui, Xi Qia, Ma Zhanshan, Zang Shiyi, Xie Jieshi, Yu Chonghan, Zhao Xinbo, and Yuan Jinkai, gathered for the "Northeast Political Affairs Conference" at the Yamato Hotel in Shenyang. The meeting was led by Honjo Shigeru, the commander of the Kwantung Army. They decided to invite Puyi to rule the puppet state of "Manchukuo" and assigned government positions to the attendees. Notably, Itagaki Seishirō was appointed as the head of the Fengtian Special Agency and the chief advisor to the Military and Political Department of Manchukuo.    On February 18th, the "Northeast Administrative Committee" issued a "Declaration of Independence," stating: "From now on, we declare that the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia will be separated from the Chinese central government. Based on the free choice and appeal of the residents of Manchuria and Mongolia, these regions will achieve complete independence and establish a fully independent government." On February 23rd, Itagaki met with Puyi in Fushun to inform him that he would be the "ruler" of Manchukuo. Although Puyi had hoped to reclaim the throne, he was disappointed with the "ruler" designation but felt compelled to accept it. On the 29th, the "All-Manchuria National Construction Promotion Movement Conference" passed a resolution urging Puyi to take on the role of ruler. In February, the Japanese army began its offensive against Rehe. Meanwhile, the League of Nations declared that it would not recognize Manchukuo.   On March 1st, Japan orchestrated the establishment of "Manchukuo," appointing Puyi as its "ruler" under the reign title "Datong." China firmly rejected the notion of Manchukuo's "independence" and lodged a strong protest against Japan on the same day. On March 8th, Puyi officially declared his inauguration as the "ruler of Manchukuo" in Xinjing. Concurrently, officials were appointed to various "offices," "ministerial positions," and "ministries," leading to the formal establishment of Manchukuo. The following day, Puyi conducted an inauguration ceremony, and on March 10th, a secret agreement was signed with Japan. Japanese Ambassador to Manchuria, Nobuyoshi Mutō, and "Prime Minister" Zheng Xiaoxu signed the Japan-Manchuria Agreement in Changchun, with the Japanese government issuing a statement recognizing "Manchukuo."   In October of 1932, the League of Nations Assembly released the Lytton Commission Report.  Alarmed by the Mukden incident, the League of Nations had dispatched a group of investigators, led by British statesman Lord Lytton, to uncover the truth of what was going on. The commission traveled to Manchuria, gathering testimonies and examining evidence. Their task was daunting: Japan insisted its actions were defensive, protecting its economic interests and citizens. Meanwhile, China accused Japan of orchestrating the railway incident as an excuse for invasion. Months later, the Lytton Report emerged, painting a balanced yet damning picture.    On February 24, the commission concluded that the "Mukden Incident" was staged by Japanese troops. It condemned Japan's actions as a violation of Chinese sovereignty, rejecting their claims of self-defense. Moreover, the report did not recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo, established by Japan in Manchuria. Instead, it called for Manchuria's return to Chinese control under an arrangement respecting regional autonomy. Though praised for its fairness, the report lacked teeth. Later on the League urged Japan to withdraw, but Japan walked out of the League instead, solidifying its grip on Manchuria.    Manchukuo's territory would span the former provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, excluding the Kwantung Leased Territory. It would also gradually incorporate eastern parts of Inner Mongolia, Chengde City and Rehe Province. The 1932 "Japan-Manchuria Protocol" established that the sovereignty of the Kwantung Leased Territory belonged to "Manchukuo." This entity acknowledged the Qing Dynasty's agreement to lease the Guandong Territory, which includes Lushun and Dalian, to Japan. As a result, the Guandong Territory remained under direct Japanese control and was not included in the "administrative division of Manchukuo." By 1934 Manchukuo was divided into 14 provinces, 2 special cities and 1 special district: Andong Province , " Fengtian Province ", Jinzhou Province , Jilin Province , Rehe Province , Jiandao Province , Heihe Province , Sanjiang Province , Longjiang Province , Binjiang Province, Xing'an East Province , Xing'an West Province , Xing'an South Province , Xing'an North Province , Xinjing Special City , Harbin Special City , and North Manchuria Special District. By 1939 this would increase to 19 provinces and 1 special city.   Politically, Puyi served as the nominal head of state for "Manchukuo." He took on the role of ruler on March 8, 1932, adopting the reign title "Datong." On March 1, 1934, Puyi conducted a "coronation ceremony" in Xinghua Village, located south of "Xinjing," and renamed "Manchukuo" to the "Great Manchurian Empire." In this capacity, Puyi was designated as the "emperor," with the reign title "Kangde." "Manchukuo's administrative structure was led by the 'State Council,' headed by the 'Premier.' This pseudo 'State Council' included the 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs,' 'Ministry of Civil Affairs,' 'Ministry of Finance,' 'Ministry of Justice,' 'Ministry of Industry,' 'Ministry of Transportation,' 'Ministry of Culture and Education,' and 'Ministry of Military Affairs.' The 'Ministry of Finance' was later renamed the 'Ministry of Economy,' while the 'Ministry of Military Affairs' retained its name. The 'Ministry of Industry' was split into the 'Ministry of Agriculture' and the 'Ministry of Labor,' and additional departments like the 'Ministry of Health and Welfare' were established. Each ministry was led by a 'minister,' but real power rested with the Japanese vice ministers. The head of the 'General Affairs Department of the State Council,' who was also Japanese, effectively served as the 'Premier.' This role was first held by Komai Tokuzo, followed by Hoshino Naoki and Takebe Rokuzo. Every Tuesday, the Japanese vice ministers convened to discuss and make decisions on 'national' policies and various specific matters in a meeting known as the 'Fire Tuesday Meeting.'"   The legislative assembly of "Manchukuo" was known as the "Legislative Yuan," with Zhao Xinbo serving as its first "President." However, true legislative authority rested with the Kwantung Army. Manchukuo operated without a formal constitution, instead relying on a series of special laws. The advisory group was referred to as the "Senate," led by a "Speaker," with Zang Shiyi being the inaugural holder of that position. The highest judicial authority in puppet Manchukuo was the "Supreme Court," with Lin Qi as the first "Supreme Justice" and Li Pan serving as the "Supreme Prosecutor General." The judicial agency was the "Imperial Household Agency," headed by Xi Qia.   Following the September 18th Incident, Zhang Xueliang maintained a policy of "non-resistance." Most of the former Northeastern Army was "ordered" to retreat south of Shanhaiguan without engaging in combat. Those who could not withdraw were split into two factions: one group, motivated by national integrity and a shared animosity toward the enemy, rose to fight against Japan and became a significant part of the renowned Northeast Volunteer Army. The other faction consisted of traitors who surrendered, acknowledged the enemy as their leader, and acted as the enforcers and thugs for the Japanese invaders. These collaborators and the forces they commanded formed the backbone of the puppet Manchukuo army. Simultaneously, they recruited defectors and traitors, as well as bandits and social miscreants, thereby bolstering the ranks of the puppet Manchukuo military. They were under the influence of the highest advisors from the puppet Manchukuo Military and Political Department, which was made up of Japanese military officials. Directly controlled by the Kwantung Army, they served as vassals and accomplices of Japanese imperialism.   "The State Council of Manchukuo" served as the governing body of the puppet state. It functioned as the highest political authority in the region. Structurally, it operated under the direct control of the head of state, Puyi. However, in practice, the State Council was heavily influenced by the Japanese Kwantung Army, with many key positions occupied by Japanese officials. The breakdown of power is as follows: "Head of State": "Emperor" ( before the transition to the imperial system , the ruler) "Emperor's direct agencies": Imperial Household Agency - Shangshufu - Senate - Military Attaché Office - Military Advisory Council - Sacrifice Office "Yuan": State Council - Courts - Legislative Yuan - Control Yuan "National Army": Royal Guards - River Defense Fleet - Flying Squadron - Xing'an Army - Jiandao Special Forces "Police": Maritime Police Force - Security Bureau Other "agencies": General Affairs Department (not official) External Group: Concord Society   To fulfill its goal of annexing Northeast China, Japan initiated a "national policy immigration" campaign under the guise of development, intending to relocate 1 million households and 5 million Japanese citizens from Japan to Northeast China over two decades. Additionally, around 2 million Koreans were moved to the region as political immigrants. In April 1936, the Japanese Kwantung Army convened an "immigration" meeting in Changchun, where they developed the "Manchuria Agricultural Immigration Million Households Migration Plan." By September 1944, there were 1,662,234 Japanese immigrants (including early settlers) residing in various areas of Northeast China. Following 1945, most Japanese immigrants were repatriated, notably during the large-scale repatriation in Huludao, although the issue of Japanese orphans also arose.   After the September 18th Incident, in response to the invasion by Japanese fascists, people from all nationalities and professions in China resisted fiercely. The Japanese fascists employed military forces, police, and special repressive agencies to brutally suppress the anti-Japanese movement, inflicting significant suffering on the Chinese populace. In addition to collaborating with the Kwantung Army for extensive military encirclement and suppression, the Kwantung Military Police Force oversaw other repressive agencies during peacetime and became the primary force behind the implementation of white terror.   As for its economy, Manchuria is rich in natural resources. By 1936 its coal reserves were about 3 billion tons, iron reserves roughly 4 billion and had other minerals including Gold, Magnesite, Bauxite, Oil shale, Diamonds. Its forestry and fishery industry was quit rich as well. During the Zhang Zuolin era, Manchuria's industrial base was already well-developed, and Japan required a robust military industry to support its aggressive war efforts. Steel production was primarily located in Anshan and Benxi, while the chemical industry was centered in Liaoyang. The coal industry was concentrated in Fushun, Benxi, and Fuxin. Oil shale and synthetic fuel production were mainly found in Fushun and Jilin. Magnesite mining took place in Haicheng and Dashiqiao, and hydropower generation was focused in Jilin and along the Yalu River. Fengtian (now Shenyang) served as the hub for machinery, arms, and aircraft industries, whereas light industries, including textiles and food production, were concentrated in cities like Dalian, Dandong, Harbin, and Qiqihar.   The industrial sector of the puppet state was largely controlled by the South Manchuria Railway Company. Following the establishment of the puppet state, investments from various Japanese conglomerates rapidly flowed into Northeast China. After 1937, the puppet state implemented an economic control policy for the industrial sector, adhering to the principle of "one industry, one company," which led to the creation of monopoly companies for each industry. Under this framework, the South Manchuria Railway transferred its industrial operations and reorganized them into a massive conglomerate called the "Manchuria Heavy Industry Development Corporation ," which monopolized all steel, coal, chemical, and electric power industries in the region. Additionally, over 40 specialized companies were established, including the "Manchuria Electric (Telephone and Telegraph) Company," "Manchuria Machinery Manufacturing Company," "Manchuria Mining Company," "Manchuria Airlines," "Manchuria Artificial Oil Company," "Manchuria Textile Company," "Manchuria Wool Textile Company," "Manchuria Chemical Industry Company," "Manchuria Forestry Company," "Manchuria Gold Mining Company," "Manchuria Livestock Company," "Manchuria Fisheries Company," "Manchuria Tobacco Company," "Manchuria Agricultural Commune," and "Manchuria Development Commune." These companies were jointly established by Japanese investors and the "Manchukuo" government, with profits shared according to their respective investments. In case of losses, the Manchukuo government guaranteed 10% of the profits for Japanese investments.   To transform Manchuria into a base for its aggressive expansion against China and the Pacific War, Japan imposed strict control and extensive exploitation of the region's economy and resources. The primary focus of this control and exploitation was on mineral resources such as coal, iron, and oil, as well as essential industries. Under the intense plundering and strict oversight of Japanese imperialism, Northeast China's economy rapidly became colonial, leading to severe hardships for its people. Due to Japan's stringent economic control policies and large-scale colonial exploitation, the local industry and mining sectors suffered, national industries declined, and the rural economy collapsed, resulting in a swift transformation of Northeast China into a colony. To maximize the extraction of colonial resources, the Japanese invaders minimized the consumption levels of the local population. Since 1935, they implemented comprehensive distribution controls on vital strategic materials and everyday necessities. This distribution control policy plunged the people of Northeast China into extreme poverty and suffering.   The 1936 resource survey report from the State Council of the puppet Manchukuo indicated that the region had an arable land area of 40 million hectares (equivalent to 4 billion mu), with 25 million hectares classified as cultivated land. Additionally, the forested area covered 170 million hectares. The annual production figures included 2.5 million tons of soybeans, 2 million tons of wheat, 700,000 tons of rice, 1 million tons of millet, 8 million tons of sorghum, 5 million tons of corn, 600,000 tons of other grains and beans (excluding soybeans), 300,000 tons of cotton, and 160,000 tons of tobacco. The livestock population consisted of 4 million horses, 3 million cattle, 30 million sheep, and 40 million pigs. The total annual grain output in the puppet Manchukuo was approximately 20 million tons. Of this, around 7.5 million tons were consumable grains for local farmers throughout the year, while 4 million tons were designated as seed grains. Furthermore, the region was responsible for supplying rations to Japanese and Korean immigrants. In compliance with the demands of the Kwantung Army, the puppet Manchukuo was obligated to deliver over 1 million tons of grain to Japan annually. The grain collection process commenced in mid-August and concluded at the end of November, imposing a significant burden on farmers. Japanese colonists were exempt from agricultural taxes and received monthly rations.   The puppet state of Manchukuo had a “military force” known as the “Manchukuo Army.” It was divided into three components: "rear security" and "law and order maintenance," all under the control of the Japanese Kwantung Army. Initially, its military capabilities were limited, with the Kwantung Army handling most combat operations. However, as the main forces of the Kwantung Army shifted south and manpower became scarce, the anti-Japanese armed groups in Northeast China were suppressed and weakened. Consequently, the puppet Manchukuo began to assume more military responsibilities on its own, with many of its soldiers being Korean Japanese recruited from the Korean Peninsula. The entire Northeast was segmented into eleven military control zones, each led by an individual known as a commander. The military authority of the puppet state of Manchukuo was under the control of the Japanese Kwantung Army. Any troop movements, training exercises, equipment modifications, or personnel changes required approval from the Kwantung Army Headquarters. The puppet Manchukuo Army had nine ranks: general, colonel, and lieutenant. Upon graduating from the military academy, individuals were promoted to second lieutenant. After two years, they advanced to first lieutenant, and then to captain after another three years. Following that, a captain would be promoted to major after three years, then to lieutenant colonel after another three years. After four years, a lieutenant colonel would become a colonel, who would then be promoted to major general after four years. After three additional years, a major general could rise to the rank of lieutenant general, and finally, after four years, a lieutenant general could achieve the rank of general. The highest military rank was general, which was a lifetime appointment. Above the rank of general was an honorary title modeled after the Japanese marshal. Individuals such as Zhang Jinghui, Zhang Haipeng, Yu Zhishan, and Ji Xing were conferred the title of general. Thus was born a puppet state that would contribute to the 15 year war in Asia.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Yes perhaps this episode was a bit on the boring side of things, but its important to take a critical look at what exactly Manchukuo was. The new puppet state would be used for various means during the 15 year war and would ultimately be the crown jewel in a long list of conquered territories by the Japanese Empire.

Last time we spoke about the Visayas Offensive. In March 1945, the Pacific War raged on. On Iwo Jima, the US Marines, after intense fighting and heavy casualties, declared the island secured. Meanwhile, in northern Luzon, General Clarkson's division advanced towards Baguio, facing fierce Japanese resistance, while General Mullins pushed through Balete Pass. The Japanese army, grappling with severe supply shortages, was forced to evacuate Baguio. In the Visayas, General Eichelberger's forces targeted the Sulu Archipelago and Central Visayan Islands, securing key airfields. The 40th Division landed on Panay, capturing Iloilo, and launched an assault on northern Negros. On Cebu, the Americal Division landed near Talisay, encountering mines but minimal resistance, and secured Cebu City. By April, Allied forces had made strategic advances across the Philippines, overcoming Japanese resistance and establishing crucial airfields. This episode is the Invasion of okinawa Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We have come to the grand final battlefield at last, that of Okinawa. Of course battles are raging in all sorts of other theaters like New Guinea, China, Burma, etc. However as you might imagine its becoming impossible given the week by week format to cover all of this in single episodes. So we are going to hardcore focus on Okinawa for awhile, we will circle back to the other theaters to catch up. Seriously it was the only logical way to do this and honestly in retrospect I wish the entire podcast was campaign by campaign instead of week by week. But I am a mere podcaster following the youtube series of this. But if you want to hear a campaign by campaign series, over at Echoes of War me and my cohost Gaurav are beginning to roll them out. The first series will be the entire Malayan Campaign, and I think after that I might try to do the Philippines. Regardless lets jump into the invasion of Okinawa. As previously noted, the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 3 designated Okinawa as the final target for invasion, following the establishment of air and naval bases in Luzon and Iwo Jima. Capturing this crucial island would bring the conflict to Japan's doorstep, disrupt the enemy's air communications through the Ryukyu Islands, and flank their maritime routes to the south. Consequently, from these newly established air and naval bases in the Ryukyus, American forces would be able to launch attacks on Japan's main islands and implement a more rigorous sea and air blockade, isolating them from Japanese territories to the south. This made it imperative for the Japanese Empire to maintain control over Okinawa and the Ryukyus. To this end, the 32nd Army, led by Lieutenant-General Watanabe Masao, was formed there by late March 1944. Initially, it comprised four companies and one artillery regiment stationed at Amami Oshima; five companies and one artillery regiment at Nakagusuku Bay; four companies and one artillery regiment at Iriomote Island; along with various garrison units from the 19th Air District in Okinawa.  Under Operation Tei-Go, the Ryukyus and Formosa were to form a long zone of interprotective air bases. These bases were expected to defeat any American sea or air forces sent into the region. To avoid destruction from the air, each base was to consist of a cluster of airfields, such that if one were damaged others could be used immediately. Military and civilian crews were promptly set to work building the numerous fields. 13 base clusters had to be created, stretching in a line from Tachiarai in the northern Ryukyus to Pingting on Formosa in the south. The only remaining tasks for ground forces were the defense of these facilities and their support anchorages and the unenviable work of building the fields. Much of the energy of 32nd Army would be absorbed building these air facilities. This was more difficult since 32nd Army had only two bulldozers and one earth roller. Japan had produced dozers in small numbers at its Komatsu plant since 1943, but few had reached the front. Since soldiers were thus obliged to use shovels, hoes, straw baskets, and horse-drawn wagons, construction was slow. Moreover, because of enemy submarine raiders, it was impossible for the Japanese to deliver the large quantities of fuel, ammunition, and anti-aircraft guns needed to operate the bases. Even more seriously, the planes themselves were not available. Between April and June, the 32nd Army received reinforcements, including the 44th and 45th Independent Mixed Brigades, the 21st Independent Mixed Regiment, and the 27th Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, among other air garrison units. From these forces, Watanabe chose to send the 45th Brigade to establish bases on Miyako Island and Ishigaki Island, while the 21st Regiment was tasked with setting up a base on Tokunoshima. On June 27, the 1st and 2nd Infantry Corps (approx. 4100 men) boarded the Toyama Maru and began the voyage to Okinawa. The 44th Brigade HQ, Artillery and Engineer Units meanwhile boarded other vessels of the Taka-412 convoy. Two days later, while the convoy was sailing east of Tokunoshima, the submarine Sturgeon successfully sank the Toyama Maru with two torpedoes, therefore inflicting the loss of 3724 men and much heavy equipment. Because of this, the 1st Corps had to be deactivated.  Following the fall of Saipan, the Japanese Empire rapidly deployed significant ground forces to the 32nd Army, including the 9th, 24th, 28th, and 62nd Divisions, as well as the 59th, 60th, and 64th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 27th Tank Regiment. Additionally, the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment was airlifted to bolster the beleaguered 44th Brigade, which was reorganizing its 2nd Corps with local recruits. The 32nd Army Staff wished to use as much of the indigenous population as it could in direct support of the war effort, so on January 1 1945 it ordered total mobilization. All Okinawan males aged 18 to 45 were obliged to enter the Japanese service. 39000 were drafted, of whom 15000 were used as nonuniformed laborers and 24000 as rear-echelon troops called the Home Guard (Boeitai). Many of the Boeitai replaced sea based battalions and rear-area supply units that had been reorganized and equipped for frontline duty. In addition to these, 1500 of the senior boys of the middle schools on Okinawa were organized into Iron and Blood Volunteer Units and assigned to frontline duty. Some of these students had been tried out in the signal service in the autumn of 1944 with good results, so the program was expanded. Since the fall of 1944, 600 senior students of the girls' middle schools also had been given training in the medical service. While most of these troops were sent to strengthen the main defenses at Okinawa, a large portion of the 28th Division was actually assigned to reinforce the garrisons on the Miyako and Yaeyama Islands. The 36th Regiment was dispatched to support the Daito Islands, the entire 45th Brigade was moved to garrison Ishigaki and the rest of the Yaeyamas, the 59th Brigade was tasked with defending Irabu Island, the 60th Brigade was sent to reinforce Miyako Island, and the 64th Brigade was deployed to the Amami Islands. On August 9, Lieutenant-General Ushijima Mitsuru took command of the 32nd Army. His initial strategy was to occupy all of Okinawa with a strong force and eliminate any invading troops at their landing sites. As fierce fighting began at Leyte, intensive training for the troops commenced, including divisional maneuvers at potential American landing points, artillery bombardments of beachheads, and nighttime assaults on bridges. However, on November 13, Tokyo decided to send the elite 9th Division to Formosa to prepare for a movement to the Philippines that ultimately did not occur. The unexpected withdrawal of the 32nd Army's best division disrupted Ushijima's operational plans. Ironically, this situation improved combat efficiency, as it compelled the army to achieve more with fewer resources. Ushijima chose to concentrate most of his forces in the mountainous and easily defensible Shimajiri area, located in the southern part of the island. This strategic location allowed the Japanese to maintain control over Naha port and target the northern airfields with artillery. Similar to the situation in Iwo Jima, this decision marked a departure from the previously favored strategy of a "decisive battle," opting instead for a war of attrition that had proven effective at Peleliu and Iwo Jima. As a result, Ushijima positioned Lieutenant-General Amamiya Tatsumi's reinforced 24th Division at the southern end of the island, Lieutenant-General Hongo Yoshio's reinforced 62nd Division along the central isthmus, Major-General Suzuki Shigeji's reinforced 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on the Hagushi plain, and Colonel Udo Takehiko's Kunigami Detachment, consisting of two battalions from the 2nd Corps, in northern Okinawa. These troop placements were successfully implemented in December; however, concerns arose that the 32nd Army was spread too thin to effectively counter the anticipated enemy invasion. Consequently, on January 15, Ushijima decided to move the 44th Brigade from the Hagushi plain southward to overlap with the 62nd Division's area on the east, significantly shortening the Japanese front. Additionally, one battalion from the Kunigami Detachment was sent to defend Iejima and its crucial airbase, which necessitated the rest of the unit to consolidate its positions and strengthen defenses on Yaedake Mountain in the Motobu Peninsula. Ushijima also had the support of the brigade-sized 5th Artillery Group, led by Lieutenant-General Wada Kosuke; the 21st Field Anti-Aircraft Artillery Corps; the 11th Shipping Group, which included several shipping engineer regiments and sea-raiding battalions; the 19th Air District overseeing various aviation service units; and Rear-Admiral Ota Minoru's Okinawa Naval Base Force, which comprised nearly 9,000 personnel stationed at the Oroku Naval Air Base near Naha. Ushijima had nearly 100,000 troops at his command, with 29,000 assigned to specialized units for anti-aircraft, sea-raiding, and airfield operations. Anticipating the nature of the impending conflict, these well-staffed service units were reorganized for ground combat. The 19th Air District transformed into the 1st Specially Established Regiment, responsible for defending the Yontan and Kadena airfields it had recently constructed and maintained. Most of the service personnel were integrated into the new 1st Specially Established Brigade in the Naha-Yonabaru area, while the sea-raiding base battalions became independent infantry units. Additionally, the remainder of the 11th Shipping Group was restructured into the 2nd Specially Established Brigade on the southwestern part of Okinawa. This reorganization, completed on March 21, bolstered ground combat strength by 14,000 men, leaving only 10,500 of the 67,000 Army personnel in specialized roles. To protect themselves, the Japanese began constructing robust fortifications, tunnels, and cave systems to shield against anticipated enemy bombardments.  Work on the caves was begun with great vigor. "Confidence in victory will be born from strong fortifications" was the soldiers' slogan. The caves meant personal shelter from the fierce bombardments that were sure to come, and they also offered a shimmering hope of victory. The combination was irresistible, and units began to work passionately on their own caves. Enthusiasm was essential because of the great toil it took to create the caves. Just as 32nd Army had only two bulldozers to make airfields, it had no mechanized tunneling equipment at all. Besides lacking cutting equipment, 32nd Army also lacked construction materials. It had no cement, no ironware, and no dynamite. The units had to rely entirely on wooden beams that they obtained themselves to shore up their shafts. This was not necessarily easy because there were no forests in the south of the island where the troops were now stationed. Pine forests were abundant in the mountainous north, however, so each unit was assigned its own lumbering district in the north. Several hundred men from each division were detailed as its lumbering squad. The problem remained, however, of how to move the several million logs that were needed over the 40 or so miles from the forests to the forts. With no railroads and the use of trucks limited by a shortage of gasoline, the solution was for each unit to cut its own logs, then transport them in small native boats called sabenis. The divisions acquired 70 of these, which then plied the waters steadily from north to south. In January 1945, however, the Leyte-based B-24s that began flying over daily for reconnaissance also began strafing the boats. So the waterborne delivery of logs had to be switched from day to night, greatly lowering efficiency. Ushijima aimed to prolong the fight from these positions and decided to destroy the indefensible Yontan and Kadena airfields to prevent their use by the enemy, effectively ending the ineffective air defense strategy initially devised by Tokyo. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were preparing for Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa. Given the expectation that the capture of Iwo Jima and recent air assaults on Japan would concentrate enemy air power around the Empire's core, which would respond aggressively to any attacks on Okinawa, the Americans needed to first neutralize or eliminate enemy air facilities in the Ryukyus, Kyushu, and Formosa to achieve air superiority over their objective. As a result, all available carrier-based and land-based air forces were tasked with this operation, including Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, General Kenney's Far East Air Forces, Admiral Hoover's Central Pacific Forward Area, and General Arnold's 20th Air Force. From the 20th Air Force, General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command was assigned to attack Okinawa before moving on to Kyushu and other vulnerable locations in the home islands. Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Roger Ramey's 20th Bomber Command, supported by General Chennault's 14th Air Force, focused on neutralizing Formosa. Aircraft from the Southwest Pacific Area were also set to conduct searches and continuous strikes against Formosa as soon as conditions on Luzon allowed. Additionally, the British carriers of Vice-Admiral Bernard Rawlings' Task Force 57 were tasked with neutralizing air installations on the Sakishima Group in the ten days leading up to the landings. Once air superiority was achieved, Spruance's 5th Fleet was to land Lieutenant-General Simon Buckner's 10th Army, which included Major-General John Hodge's 24th Corps and Major-General Roy Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps. The 24th Corps comprised the 7th and 96th Divisions, while the 3rd Amphibious Corps included the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions. As the Commanding General of Expeditionary Troops, Buckner also oversaw the 27th and 77th Divisions and the 2nd Marine Division for special operations and reserve purposes. Furthermore, the 81st Division was held in area reserve. In total, Buckner commanded a force of 183,000 troops, with 116,000 designated for the initial landings. The plan called for Major-General Andrew Bruce's 77th Division to first secure amphibious bases in the Kerama Islands on March 26, with one battalion further securing Keisejima five days later to establish a field artillery group there. On April 1, following a demonstration by the 2nd Marine Division in southern Okinawa, the main landings were set to take place. The 24th Corps and the 3rd Amphibious Corps would land simultaneously on the west coast beaches north and south of Hagushi. After landing, both corps were to quickly advance across the island, capturing the airfields in their designated areas before securing all of southern and central Okinawa. Subsequently, Buckner's forces were to invade and secure Iejima and northern Okinawa. Once this was achieved, there were tentative plans to launch an invasion of Kikaijima with the 1st Marine Division and Miyako Island with the 5th Amphibious Corps. For the invasion, Spruance relied on a Covering Force under his command, along with Admiral Turner's Joint Expeditionary Force. This force included Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force, which comprised minesweepers, UDTs, and escort carriers; Rear-Admiral Morton Deyo's Gunfire and Covering Force, consisting of ten battleships and eight heavy cruisers; Rear-Admiral Lawrence Reifsnider's Northern Attack Force, responsible for landing the 3rd Amphibious Corps; and Rear-Admiral John Hall's Southern Attack Force, tasked with landing the 24th Corps. Similar to Iwo Jima, Okinawa had endured multiple air attacks since October 1944 as part of the preliminary operations for the landings on Leyte, Luzon, and Iwo Jima that we previously discussed. These operations also included air strikes aimed at neutralizing Japanese air power on Formosa. Throughout February and March, Mitscher's carriers and LeMay's B-29s brought the conflict back to the Japanese home islands with a series of strikes that caused significant damage and instilled fear in the population. On March 1, Task Force 58 launched the first strike of the month against the Ryukyus, targeting Amami, Minami, Kume, Tokuno, and Okino, as well as Okinawa. This operation resulted in the destruction of 41 planes, the sinking of eleven vessels, damage to five others, and significant harm to island facilities. In between the main assaults on Japan, the superfortresses frequently targeted key sites in the Ryukyus, leading the beleaguered Japanese forces to refer to these missions as the "regular run." Throughout March, aircraft from the Southwest Pacific and the Marianas conducted nearly daily operations over the Ryukyus and surrounding waters, searching for Japanese shipping and contributing to the isolation of Okinawa by sinking cargo ships, luggers, and other vessels, while American submarines intensified the blockade around the Ryukyus. Meanwhile, after completing extensive training and rehearsals, Task Forces 51 and 55 gathered at Leyte, Task Force 53 assembled in the Guadalcanal-Russells area, and the rest of the 5th Fleet convened at Ulithi. On March 12, Reifsneider's convoy, carrying the 3rd Amphibious Corps, was the first to depart, successfully reaching Ulithi nine days later. On March 18, the tractor group transporting the 77th Division began its journey from Leyte to the Kerama Islands. On the same day, Mitscher's carriers targeted 45 airfields in Kyushu, claiming the destruction of 102 Japanese planes, damaging or destroying 275 on the ground, sinking six vessels, and damaging three more. In response, Admiral Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet launched a counterattack against the carriers Enterprise, Intrepid, and Yorktown, inflicting minor damage while losing 33 aircraft. The next morning, after locating the majority of the Combined Fleet at Kure, Mitscher dispatched 436 aircraft to target naval installations and shore facilities in the Inland Sea. At 06:50 three C6N Saiun “Myrt” recon planes discovered Task Force 58, and by 07:00 Captain Genda Minoru's elite, handpicked 343rd Kokutai had scrambled 63 advanced Kawasaki N1K2-J “George” Shiden-Kai fighters from Shikoku to intercept the Americans. Minutes later, Genda's powerful Shiden-Kais “waded into the Hellcats and Corsairs as if the clock had been turned back to 1942.” Soon the 343rd Kokutai was engaged in a wild maelstrom with 80 US fighters, including VF-17 and VBF-17 Hellcats from Hornet and VMF-112 Corsairs from Bennington. For once the Japanese broke about even, losing 24 fighters and one scout plane to the Americans' 14 fighters and 11 bombers. Nevertheless, Genda's expert but outnumbered 343rd Kokutai proved unable to blunt the American onslaught. Despite facing a formidable intercepting force, they managed to inflict damage on 18 Japanese warships, including the battleships Yamato, Ise, Hyuga, and Haruna, as well as six aircraft carriers. Additionally, one incomplete submarine was destroyed, 97 enemy planes were shot down, and 225 were either destroyed or damaged at Japanese airfields. In response, Ugaki launched a kamikaze counterattack that successfully struck the carriers Wasp and Franklin, causing significant damage and forcing Franklin to head to Pearl Harbor immediately. As Task Force 58 slowly withdrew the afternoon of March 20, a damaged Zero crashed destroyer Halsey Powell, killing 12 and wounding 29. Shortly afterwards friendly anti-aircraft fire started fires aboard Enterprise. At 23:00 eight Japanese torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked the carriers, while three overnight snoopers were splashed by anti-aircraft fire. Between March 17 and March 20 Ugaki had committed 193 aircraft to battle and lost 161. On March 21 Ugaki dispatched a 48-plane strike, including 16 G4M “Betty” bombers, carrying the very first Ohka (“Cherry Blossom”) suicide missiles. However the combat air patrol (CAP) of 150 Hellcats and Corsairs repulsed them. Franklin, Wasp, and Enterprise, all damaged, steamed to Ulithi as a reorganized Task Group 58.2. Except for April 8–17, when Task Group-58.2 was briefly reestablished, Task Force 58 strength would remain at three Task Groups throughout Iceberg's duration. Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet was meanwhile effectively incapacitated for several weeks, but Ugaki nevertheless reported five carriers, two battleships, and three cruisers sunk, which IGHQ found scarcely credible. Meanwhile, the Mine Flotilla departed Ulithi on March 19, followed two days later by the rest of Task Force 52 and Task Force 54 to support the Kerama operation. On March 23, to prepare for the imminent minesweeping operations of Iceberg, Task Force 58 conducted extensive bombing raids on all known installations in Okinawa, resulting in significant damage and the sinking of 24 vessels and damage to three others over the following five days. Furthermore, Admiral Lee's battleships traversed the cleared area and opened fire on Okinawa, sinking an additional two vessels. With this naval and air support, Blandy's minesweepers and UDTs successfully cleared the route for Rear-Admiral Ingolf Kiland's Western Islands Attack Group by nightfall on March 25. Their primary opposition in the following two days consisted of a series of kamikaze attacks, which caused damage to the battleship Nevada, light cruiser Biloxi, four destroyers, two destroyer minelayers, one minesweeper, and two transports, while the destroyer Halligan was sunk by mines. The next morning, supported by naval gunfire and carrier aircraft, Bruce initiated his first landings. The 3rd Battalion, 305th Regiment landed on the southern beaches of Aka Island, facing sporadic resistance. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 306th Regiment landed unopposed on Geruma Island, which was quickly secured. The 2nd Battalion, 306th Regiment achieved even faster success at Hokaji Island, while the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment invaded Zamami Island with light resistance. The 2nd Battalion, 307th Regiment encountered minor opposition as it took Yakabi Island. The Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion scouted Keisejima and found no enemy presence. After encountering some resistance, the units on Aka and Zamami pushed back the enemy garrisons, securing two-thirds of Aka by nightfall and successfully repelling a strong counterattack on Zamami that night. Simultaneously, Deyo's warships and Blandy's carriers began bombarding the demonstration beaches, while minesweepers cleared progressively larger areas around Okinawa, although the minesweeper Skylark was sunk by mines. By March 27, the remaining enemy forces on Aka and Zamami were finally eliminated, and a company took Amuro Island without opposition. Additionally, a company from the 307th moved to Kuba Island, which was quickly secured. At the same time, Bruce continued his main landings, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 306th Regiment landing on the west coast of Tokashiki Island, facing minimal opposition. As the two battalions advanced north along narrow trails toward Tokashiki town, the 3rd Battalion landed to secure the southern part of the island. On March 28, they reached the town, clearing the entire island and concluding the Kerama operation.  In Kerama, "Island Chain between Happiness and Good," the Japanese tradition of self-destruction emerged horribly in the last acts of soldiers and civilians trapped in the hills. Camping for the night of March 28 a mile from the north tip of Tokashiki, troops of the 306th heard explosions and screams of pain in the distance. In the morning they found a small valley littered with more than 150 dead and dying Japanese, most of them civilians. Fathers had systematically throttled each member of their families and then disemboweled themselves with knives or hand grenades. Under one blanket lay a father, two small children, a grandfather, and a grandmother, all strangled by cloth ropes. Soldiers and medics did what they could. The natives, who had been told that the invading "barbarians" would kill and rape, watched with amazement as the Americans provided food and medical care; an old man who had killed his daughter wept in bitter remorse. Only a minority of the Japanese, however, were suicides. Most civilians straggled into American positions, worn and dirty. In all, the 77th took 1,195 civilian and 121 military prisoners. This operation resulted in the deaths of 530 Japanese soldiers, 121 captured, and the neutralization of over 350 suicide boats, with American losses totaling 31 killed and 81 wounded. While this initial operation was underway, the tractor groups of the Southern and Northern Attack Forces left their staging areas in Luzon and Ulithi on March 25, followed by the rest of Spruance's fleet two days later. On March 26 and 27, Rawlings' Task Force 57 conducted a series of strikes on the Sakishima Islands, primarily targeting Miyako. Meanwhile, after a 250-plane raid on the Mitsubishi plant in Nagoya on March 24, LeMay sent 165 B-29s from the 73rd and 314th Bombardment Wings to attack the Kyushu airfields on March 27, facing minimal resistance as they caused significant damage to the Tachiarai Army Airfield, the Oita Naval Airfield, and the Omura aircraft plant. Other bombers from the 313th Bombardment Wing laid aerial mines in the Shimonoseki Strait. The Japanese responded with a raid on Spruance's naval units using aircraft and suicide boats on the night of March 28, resulting in one LCM being destroyed and one cargo ship damaged. On March 29, Mitscher launched another strike against Kyushu, but poor weather conditions led to only minor damage, with 12 vessels sunk and one damaged. By this point, the “largest assault sweep operation ever executed” had cleared the Hagushi beach approaches in 75 sweeps, with minesweepers clearing 3,000 square miles of coastal waters. The following morning, as Task Force 58 once again targeted Okinawa, Deyo's ten battleships and eleven cruisers advanced to bombard Okinawa's defenses and demolish coastal seawalls with increased intensity. At the same time, the 314th sent 12 planes to attack the Mitsubishi engine works in Nagoya overnight. The next day, LeMay dispatched 152 B-29s for his second assault on Kyushu, completely destroying the Tachiarai machine works and heavily damaging the Omura airstrip. On March 31, back in Okinawa, the final underwater demolition operation off the Hagushi beaches was underway while the 420th Field Artillery Group was successfully positioned on Keisejima, prompting a strong reaction from Ushijima's artillery. That morning, a Ki-43 fighter crashed into Admiral Spruance's flagship, the Indianapolis, resulting in the deaths of nine crew members and severely damaging a shaft, which ultimately compelled Spruance to transfer his flag to the battleship New Mexico. Meanwhile, the frogmen completed their last demolition operations at Hagushi, and the final preliminary bombardment of Okinawa and the Sakishima Islands was executed successfully. By the end of the month, over 13,000 large-caliber shells had been fired in the shore bombardment, and approximately 3,095 sorties had been conducted against the Ryukyus. However, effective Japanese concealment prevented significant damage to Ushijima's defenses. As night fell, a vast fleet of transports, cargo ships, landing craft, and warships navigated the final miles of their long journey, successfully meeting off the Hagushi beaches in the East China Sea before dawn on April 1. While Turner's forces prepared for the landing, a fire support group consisting of 10 battleships, 9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 177 gunboats began the pre-landing bombardment of the beaches at 05:30, firing a total of 44,825 rounds of shells, 33,000 rockets, and 22,500 mortar shells. In response, the Japanese launched some scattered kamikaze attacks on the convoys, successfully hitting the transport Hinsdale and LST 884. At 07:45, carrier planes from Task Force 58 and Blandy's carriers targeted the beaches and nearby trenches with napalm. Fifteen minutes later, the first wave of amphibious tanks advanced toward the shore at four knots, followed closely by five to seven waves of assault troops in amphibious tractors. Alongside the primary landings, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division staged a feigned landing on the southeast coast of Okinawa, near Minatoga, aiming to distract the enemy's reserves in that region. Meanwhile, on the main front, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats and artillery fire from Keisejima, a nearly continuous line of landing craft advanced toward the beaches at 08:20. Encountering no resistance, the first waves began to land on their designated beaches at 08:30, with additional troops following closely behind. Within an hour, Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps had successfully landed the assault elements of the 6th and 1st Marine Divisions north of the Bishi River, while Hodge's 24th Corps disembarked the 7th and 96th Divisions to the south of the river. The lack of significant opposition, coupled with the rapid disintegration of the untrained 5473 airfield service troops of the 1st Specially Established Regiment under heavy air and artillery bombardment, created a sense of foreboding among the men, prompting them to scout the area cautiously. As before, the enemy's primary response consisted of kamikaze attacks on naval units, resulting in damage to the battleships West Virginia and Tennessee, the British carrier Indefatigable, destroyers Prichett and Vammen, the British destroyer Ulster, the destroyer minelayer Adams, and four other vessels. Returning to Okinawa, after ensuring they were not walking into a trap, the troops began advancing inland while tanks and other support units were brought to the beaches. In the north, Major-General Lemuel Shepherd's 6th Marine Division deployed Colonel Merlin Schneider's 22nd Marines on the isolated Green Beaches and Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines on the Red Beaches near Yontan Airfield. The 4th Marines advanced toward Yontan, encountering only scattered resistance, and quickly secured the objective east of the airfield by 13:00. Meanwhile, Schneider's 3rd Battalion moved through Hanza without opposition, but the 2nd Battalion's progress was hindered as it needed to protect its exposed flank, prompting the 22nd Marines to quickly commit its reserve battalion to maintain their momentum. To the south, Major-General Pedro Del Valle's 1st Marine Division landed Colonel Edward Snedeker's 7th Marines on the Blue Beaches and Colonel John Griebel's 5th Marines on the Yellow Beaches just north of the Bishi River. By 09:45, the 7th Marines on the left had advanced through the village of Sobe, their primary objective, while the 5th Marines were positioned 1,000 yards inland. At this point, it was decided to land the reserve battalions of both regiments, along with Colonel Kenneth Chappell's 1st Marines. With forces arranged in depth and reserves positioned to the right and left, Del Valle's units continued to advance steadily over the rolling terrain as the 11th and 15th Marines artillery units were also being landed. At 13:30, the 4th Marines resumed their advance, facing light resistance on the left but becoming overextended on the right while trying to maintain contact with the 7th Marines. As a result, Shapley landed his reserve battalion to fill this gap, while Shepherd also deployed his reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, to secure the critical northern flank, allowing the 22nd Marines to keep advancing eastward. Meanwhile, further south, Major-General Archibald Arnold's 7th Division disembarked Colonel Frank Pachler's 17th Regiment on the Purple Beaches just south of the Bishi River and Colonel John Finn's 32nd Regiment on the Orange Beaches in front of Kadena Airfield. Both regiments quickly ascended the gentle hills at the landing sites and began advancing eastward. By 10:00, the 27th Regiment had patrols at Kadena Airfield, which was discovered to be empty; by 10:30, the front line was crossing the airstrip. Moments later, it advanced 200 yards beyond, heading towards Cholon. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment secured the southwestern edge of Kadena and continued along the road to Kozo. To the south, Major-General James Bradley's 96th Division landed Colonel Michael Halloran's 381st Regiment on the White Beaches in front of Sunabe and Colonel Edwin May's 383rd Regiment on the Brown Beaches at the extreme southern flank. Both regiments moved eastward with the same ease as the other units that day, making significant progress towards Momobaru in the north and successfully capturing Chatan in the south. Additionally, all divisional artillery of the 24th Corps landed early; Hodge's reserve regiments and battalions were successfully brought ashore, and by nightfall, direct-support battalions were in position. By the end of the day, over 60,000 men had landed, suffering only 28 dead, 27 missing, and 104 wounded, thereby establishing a beachhead 15,000 yards long and up to 5,000 yards deep in some areas. Shepherd's Marines paused for the night along a line stretching from Irammiya to the division boundary south of Makibaru, which the 1st Marine Division extended further south to Kadena. Meanwhile, the 7th Division advanced nearly three miles inland, destroying several pillboxes but losing three tanks to mines. The 96th Division secured positions along the river south of Chatan, on the elevated ground northwest of Futema, in the outskirts of Momobaru, and in the hills to the northwest and southwest of Shido. Although there were gaps in the lines in several areas, they were filled by reserve units or weaponry before nightfall. Thus, the Battle of Okinawa, seen by most as the final climactic battle of the Pacific War has only just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Gandalf the White once said “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” The battle of Okinawa will become the bloodiest campaign America has ever fought. The soul crushing journey has just begun as the Americans end the last stand of the Japanese in the Pacific War.

Last time we spoke about the January 28th Incident. In January of 1932, tensions escalated in Shanghai as anti-Japanese sentiments surged after Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Orchestrated by Yoshiko Kawashima, a Japanese spy, a provocation led to violence, sparking outrage among Japanese expatriates. Japan demanded apologies and compensation from China, threatening military action if their demands were unmet. As the Japanese military amassed forces in Shanghai, the Chinese 19th Route Army prepared to resist, igniting the conflict known as the January 28th Incident, marking the beginning of a fierce struggle for control. Amidst chaos, the Nanjing government struggled to respond to Japan's escalating aggression in Shanghai. Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized avoiding war, urging a diplomatic approach to protect Shanghai's economy. Despite pressure, the 19th Route Army was ordered to withdraw, but tensions flared when Japan attacked the Chinese garrison. The 19th Route Army fiercely resisted, leading to intense battles. As Japan sent reinforcements, Chiang faced mounting protests and criticism for his passive stance, questioning whether he could maintain his strategy against the encroaching enemy.   #144 The First Battle of Shanghai 1932 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we covered the January 28th Incident. At 11:30 pm on January 28, Japan ordered 2,300 Japanese Marines to advance westward along every branch road on the west side of North Sichuan Road, without waiting for a response. This road, which crosses into the northern area of the International Settlement and has frequently been designated as a Japanese defense zone, includes Target Road (now known as Wujin Road in Hongkou District, Shanghai), Qiujiang Road, and Yokohama Road. Their objective was to seize the Songhu Railway defense line at Tiantong'an Station. They faced strong resistance from the 19th Route Army, further escalating the conflict. In the early hours of the 29th, Japanese aircraft launched from the Notoro seaplane carrier, which was moored on the Huangpu River, attacked the Chinese district of Zhabei. Both the Commercial Press located at No. 584 Baoshan Road and the Oriental Library, the largest private library in China with over 300,000 books, were completely destroyed. That same day the 19th Route Army sent a telegram to the entire nation concerning the situation: Do forgive me it's a rough translation “Urgent. Dear Sir and Madam, the Japanese have occupied our three northeastern provinces, changing the color of our territory and making our nation perish. Recently, they have killed and set fire in Shanghai, and vagrants are everywhere, doing the most despicable and violent things in the world. Gunboats are coming one after another, and the Marines are all landed. At 12:00 a.m. on the 28th, they openly invaded our defense line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and challenged us. Guang Nai and others are soldiers, and they only know that it is their duty to defend themselves and defend their land. They cannot give up even an inch of land or an inch of grass. They resist to save the country and protect the race. Even if they sacrifice only one person and one bullet, they will never retreat and lose the personality of the soldiers of the Republic of China. This thing and this ambition are exposed to the sun and the sun and are known to the world. The spirits of our ancestors in heaven are truly relying on it”. On the morning of January 29, Chiang Kai-shek met with He Yingqin and Zhu Peide to discuss countermeasures. Simultaneously Zhu Peide convened a meeting with He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, Li Jishen, Deng Shizeng, Lin Wei, and others to address issues such as defense deployment, the security of Nanjing and the Yangtze River, and resistance against Japan. Chiang Kai-Shek established the principles going forward for negotiations with Japan, emphasizing the need to prepare for talks while actively resisting. He stated that negotiations must have a clear final line of defense and a maximum limit that would not compromise administrative and territorial integrity, undermine the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, or jeopardize national sovereignty. If these limits were exceeded and unacceptable concessions were made, a decisive battle would be fought, even at the cost of defeat and death.  The defense and military strategy for Beijing and Shanghai included the 19th Route Army defending Shanghai with full strength, while the front guard army consisting of the 87th and 88th divisions would protect Nanjing. He Yingqin would remain in Nanjing, overseeing all party, government, and military personnel left behind. Chiang, along with the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Government, and Chen Mingshu, all expressed their commitment to resisting Japanese aggression. Chiang also sent a telegram to He Chengjun, director of the Hubei Province Pacification Office, and Xu Tingyao, commander of the Fourth Division, stating "Last night, the Japanese invaders attacked our 19th Route Defense Line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and the battle is ongoing. Our army is determined to fight to the death. Their naval forces in Han and Xun will likely engage in military operations. We urge you to remain vigilant and defend yourselves, never yielding to them. The Fourth Division should concentrate on strict defense in Wuhan and avoid dispersal. If military funds become scarce, local governments will need to raise them independently." The National Government Military Committee appointed Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Xueliang as members responsible for mobilizing the army and commanding the Shanghai War. Chiang Kai-Shek officially resumed power after resigning to prevent a surrender and committed to a prolonged resistance. On January 30, the Chinese Nationalist Government announced the relocation of the capital to Luoyang. Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram urging resistance against the Japanese and dispatched the elite Fifth Army to reinforce Shanghai. That night, Dai Ji, the commander of the Songhu Garrison, took charge of military operations in Shanghai, overseeing the 19th Route Army. The commander-in-chief was Jiang Guangnai, with Cai Tingkai as the army commander and division commanders Qu Shounian, Mao Weishou, and Shen Guanghan. Chiang Kai-Shek then issued a telegram to his troops across the nation and again I apologize for the rough translation. "Since the Northeast Incident began, the Central Government has been enduring humiliation and maintaining peace in order to avoid war and protect the lifeline of the country. It hopes to use justice and fairness to awaken the Japanese pirates. Unexpectedly, the more we tolerate, the more arrogant they become. When the Shanghai Incident occurred, we accepted their demands with great pain, but the Japanese pirates still brazenly pressed on, repeatedly attacking our Shanghai Defense Force, bombing civilian houses, throwing bombs on the streets, and our compatriots were ravaged. The country is about to perish. Anyone with blood in his veins would rather endure it. Since the 19th Route Army has risen up to defend itself bravely, our entire army In this time of national destruction and extinction, when the revolutionary soldiers are facing imminent danger, they should fight for the dignity of the country, strive for the survival of the nation, fulfill their responsibilities for the revolution, and be determined to die rather than live in disgrace, so as to deal with the brutal Japan that destroys peace and despises faith and integrity... Chiang Kai-shek and his comrades have shared hardships for a long time. Although I am now in the opposition, I am willing to swear to live and die with the soldiers and fulfill my bounden duty. I am here to inform you in advance with my blood and sincerity, and ask you to be determined and work hard, share the same hatred with the enemy, do not be arrogant, maintain the spirit of sacrifice, stay ready to fight, and save the country from danger." From that day on, the various ministries, commissions and committees of the National Government began to move to Luoyang, but the Military Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained in Nanjing . At the same time, the frontline troops were ordered to be jointly commanded by the Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin and the Chief of the General Staff Zhu Peide.  Typically Chinese sources breakdown what is known as the First Battle of Shanghai into three phases. In the previous episode we looked through the event up until the point of the first phase. After the initial fighting, both the 19th route army and Japanese agreed to a ceasefire so they could strengthen their positions and at least allow some form of diplomacy to occur. This went into effect on the 29th. As we mentioned, immediately afterwards the Japanese rapidly began reinforcing their position in Shanghai. They first sent the Sasebo 26th Squadron on the 30th, bearing 474 troops of the Sasebo 3rd Special Marine Corps alongside supplies. The next day the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho came over with 30 aircraft from the 1st air fleet. Then the cruisers Naka, Yura and Abukuma alongside 4 torpedo boats came bearing another 2000 marines. On February 1st the Terukoku Maru brought over the Yokosuka 1st Special Marine corps, roughly 525 men who landed at Huishan Wharf. With all that said and done, roughly 7000 Japanese troops had been brought over. On February 1st, the IJN warships began bombarding Nanjing from the Yangtze River, prompting Yu Jishi to frantically demand Chiang Kai-Shek transfer more troops to Shanghai. That night the Japanese light cruiser Tenryu, the protected cruisers Hirado and Taima, and the seven ships of the Navy's 23rd Destroyer Squadron fired upon Nanjing using four 140mm guns, 12 152mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns, 12 120mm single-mounted guns, and 20 76mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns. The rich and officials fled the city for refuge, but the Japanese army did not land any men to follow up the attack. Simultaneously 40,000 Shanghai workers from over 20 Japanese owned cotton mills began an anti-Japanese strike, being heavily backed by Communists. The workers began aiding the 19th route army to blockade the Japanese in the factories and streets and sabotage what they could.  On February 2nd, the Japanese army attacked Wusong several times, but was repelled each time. On the 3rd the Japanese expanded their attacks against Zhabei, Baziqiao and other locations, but the Chinese defenders successfully repelled these assaults as well. On the 4th, the Japanese launched their first major offensive, which extended the conflict to Jiangwan and Wusong. Following a day of intense fighting, the Wusong fort was destroyed by enemy bombardment; however, the Japanese army was unable to land due to the determined resistance of the Chinese defenders. The anti-aircraft artillery company from the 88th Division, reassigned to the 4th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, managed to shoot down a Japanese aircraft. After the failure of the general offensive, Yukiichi Shiozawa was dismissed and sent back to Japan. Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, the newly appointed commander of the Third Fleet, succeeded Shiozawa. After Nomura assumed his role, the Japanese army began to bolster its forces. Japan had initially planned to deploy troops when tensions escalated in Shanghai, but the navy had opposed this move. However, as the situation deteriorated, the navy was compelled to seek assistance from the army. On February 2, the Japanese cabinet officially decided to send troops. In response to the urgent circumstances in Shanghai, they resolved to dispatch the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade, led by Brigade Commander Major General Shimomoto Kuma, along with the 9th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Ueda Kenkichi. The Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade and the Second Independent Tank Squadron were prioritized for transport. Concurrently, the Japanese Navy also sent the Yokosuka 2nd Special Marine Corps to Shanghai. The 24th Mixed Brigade landed in Wusong on the afternoon of February 7. By this time, the combined forces of the Japanese navy, army, and air force had exceeded 10,000 personnel. At dawn on February 8, the Japanese Army's 24th Mixed Brigade launched an attack on Zhanghuabang, Yunzaobang, and Wusong Town along three routes, but they were repelled by our forces. Meanwhile on February 4, the National Government Military Commission sent out a telegram that divided the country into four defense zones. The first zone, which includes the area north of the Yellow River, was assigned to Zhang Xueliang as the commander-in-chief. The second zone, covering the area south of the Yellow River, was placed under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. The third zone, encompassing the area south of the Yangtze River as well as Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, was led by He Yingqin. The fourth zone, which includes Guangdong and Guangxi, was commanded by Chen Jitang. The telegram also stated that, aside from maintaining troops for local stability, all commanders were to concentrate their forces within their respective defense zones to confront the aggressive Japanese. Additionally, a directive was issued for the provinces of Sichuan, Hunan, Guizhou, Hubei, Shaanxi, and Henan to send troops to serve as a general reserve. On February 5, upon learning that the Japanese army had been redeployed from mainland China to Shanghai, Chairman of the Military Commission Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram from Luoyang to He Yingqin. He instructed that if the Japanese forces landed, the Chinese Air Force would engage in combat. Additionally, Chiang sent a message of condolence to Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Dai Ji of the 19th Route Army, stating "Brothers, you have been fighting valiantly for a week. Each time I reflect on the tremendous sacrifices made by the soldiers and their dedication, I feel a deep sadness... If necessary, Zhong (Zheng) can come to lead in person. When the Air Force enters the fray, the Army must establish various signals in advance to communicate with it and ensure coordinated efforts..." On the same day, the 88th Division arrived in Suzhou. On February 6, Chiang ordered the 261st Brigade of the 87th Division to move from Nanjing to reinforce Kunshan. The troops reached Kunshan on February 7. On February 8, Chiang directed He Yingqin to transfer an artillery battalion to support the 19th Route Army. Then, on February 9, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the First Division, led by Commander Hu Zongnan, and the Seventh Division, commanded by Wang Jun, to prepare for reinforcement of the 19th Route Army in Shanghai. February 8th marks the second phase of the battle. On the 10th, to ensure that the 88th Division of the Central Army complied with the orders from the 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Army, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Yu Jishi insisting that "your troops must strictly follow the commands of Commander-in-Chief Chiang and coordinate their movements with allied forces." The Japanese Marine Corps, under Yukio Shiozawa, initiated a three-pronged encirclement attack from Hongkou. The National Army mounted a determined defense and ultimately repelled the Japanese forces, pursuing and destroying them, which significantly lowered their morale. On February 11, Chen Cheng, commander of the Central Army's 18th Army, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek from Ji'an, Jiangxi, reporting that the troops had not been paid for nearly two months and were lacking food. At that time, the National Government was planning to redeploy the National Army that had been engaged in suppressing the Communists in Jiangxi to Zhejiang and Shanghai and to relocate the capital to Luoyang.  On February 12, following a battle at Caojiaqiao, the Japanese army's strategy to consolidate their forces was entirely disrupted. The next morning, February 13, the Japanese 24th Mixed Brigade crossed the Caojiaqiao Bridge in Zhuozaobang and engaged with the Nationalist army. Seizing the moment, the 19th Route Army Headquarters aimed to annihilate the Japanese forces. The Nationalist army surrounded the Japanese troops near the Yong'an Cotton Mill. Additionally, 60 members of a suicide squad launched a suicide attack, resulting in the complete destruction of 1,600 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese army faced significant losses, thwarting their attempt to swiftly capture Wusong. On February 14, Chiang ordered the 88th and 87th Divisions, which were already stationed in Nanxiang and Kunshan near Shanghai, to be reorganized into the Fifth Army. He appointed Zhang Zhizhong, a volunteer eager to fight against the Japanese, as the commander of the Fifth Army. This new army was placed under the unified command of the 19th Route Army and took over the defense line stretching from the northern end of Jiangwan through Miaoxing to the western end of Wusong. It served as the left-wing army, while the 19th Route Army acted as the right-wing, tasked with defending Jiangwan, the area south of Dachang, and the urban region of Shanghai. To replenish the 19th Route Army's losses, Chiang repeatedly ordered reinforcements from various locations. For instance, on February 15, Shangguan Yunxiang dispatched 500 active soldiers from Bengbu to the 19th Route Army; on February 17, Liang Guanying sent 500 unarmed soldiers from Qingjiangpu; and on February 19, Liu Zhi contributed 1,000 active unarmed soldiers from Henan. On February 16, Chiang Kai-shek communicated with Finance Minister Song Ziwen via telegram, stating, "Since the Japanese refuse to withdraw their troops from Shanghai, we must resist until the end. ... Food supplies in Jiangxi and Henan will dwindle, and assistance will be completely halted. Please arrange to deposit 10 million yuan in central banknotes in Nanchang and 20 million yuan in Zhengzhou. This will allow the government to continue functioning, the army to be sustained, and perhaps we can navigate this crisis and avert collapse. This is my final request. I hope you can find a way to assist." To prevent any friction between the Fifth Army and the Nineteenth Route Army over competing for military accolades, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Zhang Zhizhong and Yu Jishi on February 18. "The fight against Japan is a matter of national survival and is not a matter of honor for an individual or a certain unit. Our frontline officers and men should fully understand this. Therefore, the honor of the 19th Route Army is the honor of our entire National Revolutionary Army. There is absolutely no distinction between honor and disgrace. The Fifth Army's joining the front line is feared by the enemy and will also be slandered by the reactionaries (those who oppose the Nanjing Central Government). If we can continue to fight in the name of the 19th Route Army, it will be enough to demonstrate the strength of our National Revolutionary Army. We will share life and death, let alone honor and disgrace. I hope that this will be conveyed to the officers and men of the Fifth Army. They must unite and fight with our 19th Route Army and make no sacrifices to complete the revolutionary mission." Over on the other side, following reports of significant losses suffered by the Japanese army in Wusong, Tokyo received an imperial decree from Emperor Hirohito demanding the Shanghai incident get settled quick. In response, Chief of Staff Zairen urgently ordered the 9th Army Division, commanded by Ueda Kenkichi, to swiftly reinforce Shanghai. By the afternoon of February 13, the main contingent of the 9th Division had arrived at Shanghai Port, and by February 16, all personnel had disembarked in Wusong. Consequently, Lieutenant General Ueda took over command from Nomura. At this point, the Japanese invading forces comprised over 30,000 troops from naval, land, and air units, along with 60 to 70 field artillery pieces, more than 60 aircraft, and dozens of ships concentrated at the Wusong mouth. Ueda issued a statement late on the night of the 13th, asserting, "If anyone obstructs our division from fulfilling its mission, we will take decisive action without hesitation." On the 18th, he sent an ultimatum to Cai Tingkai, demanding, "Your army must immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from the following areas by 5:00 p.m. on February 20: on the west bank of the Huangpu River, retreat from areas connecting the western end of the concession, Caojiadu Town, Zhoujiaqiao Town, and Pushong Town to the north; on the east bank, withdraw from areas connecting Lannidu and Zhangjialou Town to the north, and retreat to a zone 20 kilometers away from the border of each concession Additionally, all military installations in the specified areas must be dismantled and no new ones established. If these demands are not met, the Japanese army will have no choice but to act freely against your forces, and your army will bear all resulting consequences." In response to Ueda's ultimatum, Tsai and Chiang ordered their front-line troops to fire heavily at Japanese positions as a warning. On the morning of February 20, Ueda commanded a full-scale attack across the front, employing tactics to break through the center while flanking from both sides. The 9th Division led the assault on the junction of Jiangwan and Miaohang, aiming to encircle Wusong from the north with the Kurume Brigade and Zhabei with the Marine Corps from the south. The Japanese began with artillery bombardments, followed by infantry and tank assaults on the Zhanghuabang and Yangshupu lines, both of which were successfully repelled by Chinese defenders. Over a thousand Japanese soldiers and several tanks in Zhabei were killed or wounded due to landmines. On February 21, Ueda personally directed thousands of infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery, to attack the Chinese defensive positions. Both sides incurred heavy casualties, and the battle continued until dawn on the 23rd. The Japanese forces attempted to encircle Jiangwan Town from Jiangwan Station, but the Chinese defenders fought valiantly, launching multiple charges and capturing Japanese Major Kong Sheng along with hundreds of soldiers. Ultimately, the Japanese army was unable to withstand the resistance and began to retreat. After the Japanese 9th Division arrived in Shanghai, it prepared to initiate a second major assault on the defenders of the city. The strategy involved a comprehensive attack stretching from Zhabei to Wusong to contain the Chinese army's strength, with primary forces concentrated on Jiangwan and Miaohang. The goal was to seize these two strategic points, achieve a breakthrough in the center, sever the link between the 5th Army and the 19th Route Army, and then defeat them individually. At dawn on February 20, the Japanese dispatched over ten aircraft for reconnaissance and bombing missions over the Miaohang area. Naval artillery and heavy army cannons heavily shelled the Miaohang positions. Simultaneously, Japanese artillery bombarded the Yunzaobang area in an effort to force a crossing and facilitate the Miaohang offensive.   By 9 am, part of the Japanese forces advanced towards the Xiaochang Temple and the Maijiazhai position, immediately conducting a fire search on our troops' positions. At noon, 3,000 Japanese soldiers launched an attack against our forces. The officers and soldiers of the 527th Regiment, defending the Maijiazhai and Zhuyuandun positions, mounted a counterattack, marking the beginning of the Battle of Miaohang. After three hours of intense fighting, the Japanese suffered significant casualties and were unable to continue, retreating to their original positions. Following this, over 2,000 Japanese troops attacked the Xiaochang Temple and Jinjiatang positions. The officers and soldiers of the 523rd Regiment, taking cover in the trenches, launched counterattacks and successfully repelled the Japanese forces. As dusk fell, the Japanese infantry halted their assaults, but naval and land artillery continued to bombard our positions in an attempt to weaken our defenses and personnel for a renewed attack the following day. On February 21, Japanese artillery relentlessly shelled the positions of the 88th Division of the Fifth Army in Miaohang. Following this, thousands of Japanese infantry launched an assault on the Yanjiazhai and Miaohang Town front. As the Japanese forces advanced, the officers and soldiers of the 523rd and 524th Regiments bravely counterattacked and successfully repelled them. However, a significant number of enemy troops coordinated a comprehensive assault on the Maijiazhai, Zhuyuandun, Xiaochangmiao, and Yanjiazhai lines south of Miaohang. Our 523rd, 524th, and 527th Regiments engaged in intense combat with the enemy, particularly at the Zhuyuandun front near Maijiazhai and Xu Xu, where the fighting was especially fierce. After a day of conflict, the enemy was temporarily pushed back. On February 22, the Japanese 9th Division launched a full-scale attack on the Miaohang position held by the 88th Division of the Fifth Army. Throughout the day, aircraft bombed the Chinese defenders, and thousands of artillery shells were fired at them. However, under the direct command of Zhang Zhizhong, the enemy faced a devastating defeat due to the coordinated three-pronged assault by the Sun Yuanliang Brigade, the Song Xilian Brigade, and the 61st Division of the 19th Route Army. The Miaohang position was ultimately saved from peril, inflicting heavy casualties on the elite forces of the Japanese 9th Division and the Kurume Mixed Brigade. This victory became known as the "Miaohang Victory." In the days that followed, the enemy continued their bombardment and attacks but were consistently repelled by the defenders. The Japanese army suffered significant losses, shifting from an all-out offensive to a more focused approach before ultimately halting their attacks. By the 25th, Ueda's overall offensive strategy had also failed. On February 24, the Japanese army decided to escalate the conflict once more, transferring the 11th and 14th divisions from Japan to join the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, which included troops already engaged in the war. At that time, the flagship of the Japanese Navy's Third Fleet, the Izumo, sustained damage from a bombing raid carried out by the suicide squad of the 19th Route Army, which sent shockwaves through Japan. Additionally, the large troop presence made a quick resolution to the war impossible. Consequently, on the 23rd, the Japanese cabinet decided to promptly reinforce the army. The General Staff then established the Shanghai Expeditionary Army Command, appointing General Shirakawa Yoshinori, the former Minister of War in the Tanaka Cabinet, to replace Ueda. They dispatched the 11th Division (led by Lieutenant General Atsutarou Atsuto), the 14th Division (led by Lieutenant General Naoaki Matsuki), and over 100 aircraft to China to initiate a larger-scale offensive in Shanghai. After several reinforcements, the Japanese forces in Shanghai, under Shirakawa's command, grew to over 90,000 troops, supported by 80 warships and 300 aircraft, significantly enhancing their combat effectiveness. In contrast, the total strength of the Chinese defenders was less than 50,000, with inadequate equipment. After a month of intense fighting, the Chinese forces had suffered heavy losses, leaving their river defenses in the Taicang Liuhe area vulnerable. Learning from the failures of the previous three commanders' frontal assaults, Shirakawa opted to land at Liuhe and flank the Songhu defenders. He directed the 9th Division and other units to launch a direct attack on Songhu and Shanghai while using the 3rd Fleet to escort the 11th Division into the Yangtze River estuary. They executed surprise landings at Liuhekou, Yanglinkou, and Qiyakou, quickly outflanking the defenders. On March 1, the Japanese forces initiated attacks in Naobei, Jiangwan, and Miaohang, employing heavy artillery, field guns, and aircraft for continuous bombardment. The infantry capitalized on this to engage in close-quarters combat, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Meanwhile, Shirakawa secretly instructed the 11th Division to exploit the weakness of the Chinese troops in Liuhe, forcibly landing at Qiyakou, Yanglinkou, and Liubinkou, ultimately capturing Liuhe. The fall of Liuhe posed a significant threat to the flank and rear of the Chinese army, compelling the entire force to retreat to the second line of defense (the Jiading-Huangdu line) by the evening of March 1.  After 34 days of intense fighting, they were forced to retreat to their second line of defense. At this point, the war had entered its final phase, resulting in a stalemate between the two sides. On the 2nd, the Japanese army seized Shanghai, and by March 3, they occupied Zhenru and Nanxiang, subsequently announcing a ceasefire. Now while we have been focused on the Japanese and Chinese perspectives in this, the international community was also heavily involved in the background. After the outbreak of hostilities, the British and American consuls in Shanghai offered to mediate. However despite a ceasefire being implemented the hostilities continued. So on February 2nd, Britain, America, France, Italy and Germany sent a notice to China and Japan "proposing to stop the conflict; (1) both sides immediately stop all violent acts according to the following conditions; (2) there will be no mobilization or preparation for any hostile acts between the two countries; (3) the Chinese and Japanese combatants in Shanghai will withdraw from the contact points; (4) a neutral zone will be established to separate the combatants of both sides to protect the public concession. The area will be garrisoned by neutral military and police, and various methods will be formulated by the consular corps; (5) once the two countries accept the treaty, they will not make any demands or reservations in advance, but will quickly negotiate with the assistance of neutral observers or participants in accordance with the spirit of the Kellogg-War Pact and the December 9th League of Nations resolution to resolve all outstanding issues..." Nanjing generally accepted the terms, but Japan instead proposed non-military zones be established 20 miles around the major ports of Shanghai, Hankou, Tianjin, Qingdao and Guangzhou as a sort of counter proposal. Meanwhile at the League of Nations, Yan Huiqing was drawing attention to the Shanghai incident, obviously linking it to the Manchuria incident and advocated for Article 10 of the League of Nations Charter, which was in regards to respecting territorial integrity and political independence of league nations. The League of Nations agreed and organized a committee to investigate the Shanghai incident. On February 4th Chiang Kai-Shek would write in his diary "As long as we do not lose our national sovereignty and territory, and the Japanese invaders do not put forward unacceptable conditions, we can take advantage of the opportunity of British and American intervention to negotiate with them; we cannot take a tough stance when other countries intervene, which will lead to adverse effects." By late February US Secretary of State Henry Stimson warned Japan for the second time, that the Nine Power Treaty and other treaties had to be maintained. Then on the 23rd he sent a letter reiterating the nine-power treaty and Kellogg War Pact to the League of Nations in regards to the Shanghai situation. On the 29th, a four-point plan for mediating the Shanghai incident was adopted at the League of Nations. The objective was to swiftly establish a local ceasefire agreement with the assistance of civil and military officials from various countries present in Shanghai. Following this, a round-table meeting was to be convened with representatives from nations with vested interests in Shanghai to discuss security measures for the International Settlement, the French Concession, and the local residents, as well as to address other issues. Subsequently, representatives from Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and other nations unanimously supported the plan, with Chinese representative Yan Huiqing and Japanese representative Sato Naotake also indicating their general agreement in principle. However, on March 2, the situation escalated when the Japanese army compelled the Chinese forces to retreat to their second line of defense. The Japanese side adopted a more aggressive stance, presenting four stringent conditions and insisting that the Chinese army withdraw first before halting their attacks. The Japanese forces were only willing to withdraw to the Shanghai and Wusong areas and refused to do so under the supervision of neutral countries, which the Chinese government firmly rejected. On March 3, the Japanese army launched another offensive. On that same day, U.S. Secretary of State Stimson summoned Japanese Ambassador to the United States Idebuchi, condemning Japan for accepting the League of Nations resolution on February 29 while simultaneously escalating military operations. On March 3rd a ceasefire came into effect as a formal meeting was held at the British consulate. The Chinese delegation was led by Guo Taiqi, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, along with military representatives Dai Ji, Huang Qiang, and seven others. The Japanese delegation included Shigemitsu Mamoru, Minister to China, and military representatives Ueda, Tashiro, and nine others. Officials from Britain, the United States, France, and other nations also participated in the meeting. During the negotiations, numerous contentious issues arose, particularly regarding the timing and location of the Japanese army's withdrawal. It would take until May 5th for a armistice agreement to be signed. The agreement designated Shanghai as a demilitarized zone, prohibiting China from stationing troops in the areas around Shanghai, Suzhou, and Kunshan, while permitting a limited number of Japanese units to remain in the city. China was permitted to maintain only a small police force within Shanghai. According to Chinese war reports, a total of 10,254 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the Battle of Shanghai on January 28. According to Japanese data, a total of 3,091 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the invasion of Shanghai: 620 Japanese soldiers were killed and 1,622 were wounded in the army; 149 Japanese soldiers were killed and 700 were wounded in the navy. Another Chinese report, stated the 19th Route Army and the Fifth Army suffered a total of 14,104 casualties 4,274 killed and 9,830 wounded. Among them, the 19th Route Army suffered 8,792 casualties, while the Fifth Army suffered 5,312 casualties. Shanghai residents faced bombardments from Japanese aircraft and artillery, resulting in over 6,080 fatalities, more than 2,000 injuries, 10,400 missing persons, and property losses totaling 1.6 billion yuan. At the onset of the war, the Japanese military intentionally targeted cultural institutions in Shanghai, such as the Commercial Press and the Oriental Library, leading to the total destruction of the Commercial Press, the oldest and largest publishing house in China. The Oriental Library, which housed millions of volumes, including over 100,000 rare ancient texts from the Song and Yuan dynasties and the Sikuquanshu compiled during the Qianlong era of the Qing Dynasty, was first devastated by artillery fire and then looted by Japanese forces. Reports from that time indicated that the Japanese army used trucks to transport the remaining books for seven consecutive days. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus what became known as the first battle of Shanghai had come to a not so swift end. Was its resolvement a victory for the League of Nations? Or was it just another indicator that the League of Nations was nothing but promises and pieces of paper? One man took notice of the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents, and he would soon bring Europe into a global war.  

Last time we spoke about the fall of Iwo Jima. General Schmidt pushed through Japanese defenses, facing strongholds like Cushman's Pocket and General Senda's positions, with intense fighting and heavy casualties on both sides. Despite stubborn resistance, the Marines gradually advanced, employing tanks and artillery support. The Japanese, under General Kuribayashi, fought tenaciously, culminating in a final assault on March 26. After brutal combat, Iwo Jima was declared secured, but at great cost: 18,000 Japanese and over 6,800 American lives lost. Meanwhile, in New Britain, Australian forces continued their offensive, capturing strategic positions despite fierce enemy resistance. In the midst of a fierce conflict, Australian battalions advanced into enemy territory, capturing strategic positions while facing heavy resistance. Notable victories included the successful ambushes by the 2/7th Battalion and the capture of key locations like the But airfield. Despite facing fierce counterattacks from the Japanese, particularly at Slater's Knoll, the Australians maintained their momentum. As the Japanese command faced internal crises, the Australians continued their relentless push, ultimately leading to significant territorial gains and weakening enemy forces. This episode is the Visayas Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Within northern Luzon, by mid-March, General Clarkson's 33rd Division was exploring the western routes to Baguio. Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla unit had taken control of San Fernando and was engaged in combat around Cervantes. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division had advanced to Putlan, and General Gill's 32nd Division was involved in a fierce battle at Salacsac Pass. Following the capture of Putlan, General Swift instructed Mullins to push through Balete Pass to secure the vital Santa Fe region. On March 12, the 27th and 161st Regiments began advancing north and northwest, successfully clearing the Minuli area and establishing a foothold on Norton Ridge by March 15. At the same time, the 35th Regiment initiated a broad maneuver around Balete Pass via the Old Spanish Road, but this was soon hindered by intense artillery and mortar fire from the positions of the 11th Independent Regiment. The road also required significant engineering efforts to support the outflanking force, leading Mullins to ultimately halt the 35th's assault. However, General Konuma was unaware of this; fearing an outflanking maneuver from Carranglan, he had no choice but to keep around 3,000 of his best troops in this seemingly secure area. On March 15, Mullins ordered the reinforced 161st Regiment to launch a holding attack to the north while the majority of the 27th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver over Myoko Ridge, Mount Myoko, and Lone Tree Hill to encircle Balete Pass from the east. After regrouping at Putlan, the 35th was also tasked with capturing Mount Kabuto to subsequently advance northwest along Balete Ridge and connect with the 27th at Myoko. Mullins launched a renewed offensive on March 16, facing stubborn resistance from the 161st as it gradually advanced toward Norton's Knob, which was successfully captured by the end of the month. On March 22, the 27th began its flanking maneuver, with the 1st Battalion moving east into the elevated terrain south of Kapintalan by March 28, while the 2nd Battalion advanced nearly 3,750 yards up the wooded Myoko Ridge to the east. Meanwhile, the 35th's attempt to encircle the enemy via Kabuto started off well, reaching the northern slope of Balete Ridge on March 22. However, Konuma's recently arrived reinforcements launched a series of strong counterattacks and harassment raids, forcing the 35th to withdraw by March 28. With the other two regiments stretched thin and unable to penetrate the enemy's main defenses, Mullins ordered the 35th to position itself between the 27th and 161st Regiments to assault Highley Ridge from the east. By the end of March, the 161st was advancing northeast along Highley Ridge toward Crump Hill, which finally fell on April 8, bringing the advance to a halt. The 35th supported this effort with an attack on Kapintalan, which was ultimately captured by April 21. Meanwhile, the 27th continued to struggle through the challenging terrain of Myoko Ridge against fierce opposition, not reaching Woody Hill until April 12. This slow progress allowed Konuma to reinforce the Myoko sector with four understrength infantry battalions. Nevertheless, the brave soldiers of the 27th Regiment persevered, securing the Pimple on April 15 and advancing an additional 350 yards northeast by April 21. Looking west, Clarkson aimed to advance battalion combat teams toward Baguio via Route 11, the Galiano road, and the Tuba Trail. However, Swift declined to approve such ambitious plans, limiting the 33rd Division to a more restrained offensive. Although dissatisfied, Clarkson continued the attack along Route 11, managing to reach Camp 3 by the end of March. In the central area, patrols faced no opposition as they approached within a mile of Galiano, but other patrols discovered increasing signs that the Japanese were preparing to defend the Tuba Trail vigorously. Eventually, a robust reconnaissance force secured Bauang on March 19, with patrols then moving east to occupy Naguilan four days later and Burgos by the month's end. Meanwhile, at Salacsac Pass, the 127th Regiment fought from Hill 502 to Hill 504 against fierce resistance, while Gill sent the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment up the trail from Valdez toward Imugan, where they were ultimately halted by vigilant Japanese forces. By March 23, the 1st Battalion of the 127th Regiment reached the crest of Hill 504; the 2nd Battalion advanced past it to Hill 505; and the 3rd Battalion managed to position one company at the base of Hill 507D. However, with its forces stretched thin and dwindling, the 127th was unable to capitalize on its seemingly advantageous position, allowing General Iwanaka to launch a strong counterattack on Hill 507D that successfully repelled the 3rd Battalion. As a result, Gill decided to withdraw that unit and the stalled 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment, while the majority of the 128th relieved the 127th in the Hill 502 sector. Beginning on March 25, the 128th Regiment advanced aggressively eastward, successfully capturing the previously overlooked Hill 503, fully securing Hill 504, and expanding its control over Hill 505 by the month's end. However, on the night of March 31, Iwanaka launched a daring counterattack, reclaiming Hill 504 and nearly taking all the territory east of Hill 502. By April 4, both the 127th and 128th Regiments had sustained significant casualties and could no longer continue the offensive. Consequently, Swift had to order the 33rd Division to relieve the beleaguered 126th Regiment in the Ambayabang and Arboredo River valleys, allowing this unit to reposition north of the Villa Verde Trail to execute a flanking maneuver along the Miliwit River valley. Fortunately for Clarkson, General Krueger persuaded MacArthur to free the 129th Regiment from its duties in Manila, sending it to bolster the now overstretched 33rd Division. Once the rest of the 37th Division arrived at the Baguio front, which Krueger anticipated would happen in early April, Swift could initiate a two-division assault on Baguio. In the meantime, Clarkson promptly dispatched the 129th to Burgos, and by April 1, it had advanced to Salat.  The Japanese opposing the reinforced 33d Division were no longer in the shape they had been at the end of February. The 58th IMB and the 23d Division had both suffered heavy losses during March, losses that probably stemmed largely from lack of food and medical supplies rather than from combat action. By mid-March Japanese supply problems on the Baguio front had progressed from bad through worse to impossible. First, supplies had moved westward over the new Baguio-Aritao supply road far more slowly than anticipated, a development attributable in large measure to Allied Air Forces strikes on that road and along Route 5 north and south of Aritao. Second, operations of the 66th Infantry, along Route 11 north from Baguio, and the activities of the 11th Infantry, , in the Cagayan Valley, had made it virtually impossible for the Japanese to bring any food into the Baguio area from the north. Third, the Japanese tried to do too much with the limited amount of supplies available on the Baguio front. They were attempting to supply 23d Division and 58th IMB troops along the MLR; send certain military supplies north up Route 11 for the 19th Division; feed 14th Area Army headquarters and a large civilian population in Baguio; and establish supply dumps north and east of the city against the time of eventual withdrawal. Almost inevitably the principal sufferers were the front-line troops. By mid-March the best-fed Japanese combat troops on the Baguio front were getting less than half a pound of rice per day as opposed to a minimum daily requirement of nearly two and a half pounds. Before the end of the month the troops on the MLR were down to less than a quarter of a pound of rice a day. Starvation and diet-associated diseases filled hospitals and sapped the strength of the combat units. Generally, effective frontline strength was far lower than reported ration strength indicated. Medical supplies were consumed rapidly, and by the end of March, for example, there was virtually no malaria phophylaxis left in Baguio area hospitals. Looking upon the situation on the Baguio front with frank pessimism, Yamashita in mid-March directed inspection of terrain north, northeast, and east of the city with a view toward preparing a new defense line. His attitude became even plainer when, on or about 30 March, he ordered Japanese civilians and the Filipino puppet government to evacuate Baguio. Indeed, the future on the Baguio front was so bleak by the end of March that almost any other army would have withdrawn to new defenses forthwith, thereby saving troops for future battle. But not so the Japanese. Yamashita decided that the existing MLR would be held until the situation became hopeless. At the end of March that portion of the MLR held by the 23d Division was still intact, and the 58th IMB was busy deploying additional strength along its section of the line. One independent infantry battalion was on high ground north of Route 9 at Sablan; and another held defenses at Sablan. A reinforced company was at Burgos and, less that company, another independent infantry battalion held reserve positions at Calot, a mile and a half southeast of Sablan. One understrength battalion was responsible for defending the rough terrain from Sablan six miles south to Mt. Apni, where a tie-in was made with the right flank of the 23d Division. Maj. Gen. Bunzo Sato, commanding the 58th IMB, expected that the emphasis of any Allied drive in his sector would come along Route 9, but he did not neglect the other approach in his area, the Galiano road. Since the understrength battalion stationed astride the road was not strong enough to withstand a concerted attack, he directed his main reserve force, the 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry, 19th Division, to move west out of Baguio to defenses at Asin. This step left in Baguio a reserve force of roughly three provisional infantry "battalions," which together probably could not muster over 750 effectives. In the Salacsac area, as casualties in the western pass were rapidly increasing and Allied air and artillery strikes made it nearly impossible for the 2nd Tank Division to transport supplies, Iwanaka concluded that his forward positions were nearly untenable. He began planning to redeploy forces to defend the eastern pass. Consequently, when the 126th Regiment launched its new offensive on April 5, it faced unexpectedly light resistance, quickly capturing Hills 518 and 519 within two days and cutting off a Japanese supply route leading north from Hill 504 across the eastern slopes of Hill 519 and up Mount Imugan. However, Iwanaka swiftly recognized the emerging threats and sent reinforcements to intercept the 126th's advance, delaying the capture of Hills 511 and 512 until March 13 and effectively halting further progress. At the same time, the reorganized 128th Regiment resumed its assault eastward on April 7, successfully retaking the Hill 504-505 sector and capturing Hill 506 by April 10. The following week, the 128th fought tenaciously to secure this elevated ground against fierce resistance, managing to push all the way to Hills 506B, 507C, and 507D with their remaining strength, nearly securing the western pass by April 17. Meanwhile, after the fall of San Fernando, General Krueger instructed Volckmann to advance inland along Route 4 toward Bontoc. However, the Provisional Battalion established at Cervantes could only withstand the relentless enemy pressure until April 4, when it was ultimately forced to retreat into the hills northwest of the town. Consequently, Volckmann had to quickly deploy the 121st Regiment to barrio Butac in preparation for an eastward push along Route 4. After a week of intense back-and-forth combat, this elite guerrilla unit succeeded in establishing footholds along the northern parts of Lamagan and Yubo Ridges. Over the next few days, the 121st made slow and arduous progress, ultimately gaining control of Route 4 nearly to the southeastern edge of Bessang Pass by mid-April. Further south, by mid-March, General Wing's 43rd Division had effectively secured the Antipolo sector, while General Hurdis' 6th Division was advancing well toward Mount Baytangan. At this point, General Hall's 11th Corps assumed responsibility for operations against the Shimbu Group, now rebranded as the 41st Army. However, he quickly decided to maintain the offensive against General Yokoyama's left flank, with the 20th and 1st Regiments focusing on an eastward push alongside the 43rd Division. Meanwhile, General Noguchi had completed his withdrawal to the Sugarloaf Hill-Mount Tanauan line, where he would receive reinforcements from elements of the Kogure Detachment. Simultaneously, General Kobayashi was struggling to stabilize his left flank, bolstered by one reserve battalion. On the morning of March 15, the American offensive resumed, with the 103rd Regiment continuing its assaults on Benchmark 7 Hill to secure Route 60-A, while the 172nd Regiment launched its initial attacks toward Sugarloaf Hill, facing fierce resistance. On March 17, the 1st Regiment renewed its advance toward Baytangan, initially making good progress and digging in about a mile west-southwest of the mountain's summit. However, during the night, a barrage of mortar fire followed by an infantry counterattack forced the Americans to retreat in disarray. As a result of this setback, the 1st Division began to advance eastward more cautiously, facing determined resistance and heavy mortar fire. By March 22, it was only slightly closer to Baytangan's crest than it had been five days earlier. The 20th Regiment on the left also encountered strong resistance, managing to reach a point a mile and a half west of Baytangan by March 22. At the same time, a company maneuvering to the north established a foothold on a wooded ridge overlooking the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile the 103d Infantry finally overran the defenses on Benchmark 7 on 18 March, killing about 250 Japanese in the process. The Japanese battalion there had delayed the 103d's attack toward Mt. Tanauan until the morning of 18 March, but by evening of that day the regiment's troops had begun swarming up the bare, rocky, southern and southwestern slopes of the mountain. Over the next three days, American forces slowly advanced through a complex of caves and bunkers until they secured the mountain's summit, while other units captured Benchmark 23 Hill and patrolled northward into the southeastern part of the Bosoboso Valley. By March 19, the 172nd Division was halted, containing Sugarloaf to the west. They bypassed it to the north and east, initiating new assaults toward Mounts Yabang and Caymayuman, making significant progress to the east but less so to the north by March 22. Despite concerns that Hall's four exhausted regiments might lack the strength to turn the 41st Army's left flank, the ongoing pressure and the failure of previous counterattacks ultimately compelled Yokoyama to order his threatened units to withdraw to new positions east of the Bosoboso River. Therefore, when the 6th and 43rd Divisions resumed their attacks on the morning of March 23, the withdrawal was already in full progress. Over the next three days, the 1st and 20th Regiments faced only scattered and disorganized resistance, allowing them to establish positions over a mile north and south of Baytangan along the ridgeline that overlooks the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment successfully captured Mount Yabang and most of Mount Caymayuman, while the 103rd Regiment advanced quickly northward, taking barrio New Bosoboso, Mount Balidbiran, and Benchmark 21 Hill. On March 27, the 1st Regiment secured the crest of Baytangan, and the 172nd Regiment eliminated the last organized opposition at Sugarloaf Hill. With Yokoyama's left flank collapsing, Hall could focus on capturing Wawa Dam and destroying the remaining elements of the Kobayashi Force west of the Bosoboso River, a mission assigned to the 6th Division. During this initial offensive, approximately 7,000 Japanese soldiers were killed since February 20, while American casualties included 435 killed and 1,425 wounded. Hurdis' initial strategy for capturing Wawa Dam involved the 1st and 20th Regiments advancing northward to clear Woodpecker Ridge and Mount Mataba, while the 63rd Regiment conducted diversionary attacks on the western slopes of Mataba. This new offensive began on March 28 but quickly faced intense small arms, machine-gun, and mortar fire, leading to a back-and-forth struggle against fierce enemy resistance. By April 3, the 20th Regiment had advanced less than half a mile toward Mataba, and the 1st Regiment had gained only 250 yards to the north. General Hurdis had hoped his attack, directed against the Kobayashi Force southern flank, would be far more successful, but the Kobayashi Force, rapidly and efficiently, had reoriented its defenses, which it had laid out primarily to face an attack from the west. The force's two remaining provisional infantry regiments, the Central and Right Sector Units, were still relatively intact, and the Central Sector Unit, bearing the brunt of the 6th Division's offensive, had recently been reinforced by remnants of the Left Sector Unit and elements of the Shimbu Group Reserve. Other factors bearing on the 6th Division's slow progress were the declining strength and deteriorating combat efficiency of its infantry regiments. The 20th Infantry could muster only 2,085 effectives on 3 April; some of its rifle companies were reduced to the combat strength of platoons. The situation within the 1st Infantry, with an effective strength of 2,150, was little better. As of 3 April the commanders of both regiments rated their units' combat efficiency only as "fair," the lowest ranking of three terms each had employed since the Lingayen Gulf assault.To bolster protection for Hurdis' right flank, the 103rd Regiment also captured Hill 1200 on the east bank of the Bosoboso River by the end of the month. Due to the slow progress of Hurdis' offensive, on April 5, Hall assigned General Cunningham's Baldy Force, which consisted of the 112th Cavalry Regiment and the recently arrived 169th Regiment, to take control of the area north of Mount Oro. This move would free up most of the 63rd Regiment to support the 20th Regiment and continue the assault north toward Mataba, while the 1st Regiment maintained its position along Woodpecker Ridge. From April 6 to 9, the 63rd made only limited progress to the east; however, on April 10, it shifted its focus to an offensive on the western slopes of Mataba, quickly securing the southwestern quarter of the mountain with minimal resistance. In response, Kobayashi promptly redirected his forces back to Mataba from the north-south ridge to prevent the 63rd from reaching the mountain's summit until April 17. At the same time, the 1st Regiment resumed its advance along Woodpecker Ridge but again faced strong enemy opposition, resulting in only limited gains. Looking further south, by March 23, the 187th Glider Regiment and the 511th Parachute Regiment had advanced to Santo Tomas and Tanauan but were unable to completely clear these areas. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment secured Balayan, Batangas, and the Calumpan Peninsula, pushing toward Mount Macolod, where they were ultimately halted by significant forces from the Fuji Force. At this stage, as Krueger planned to launch an offensive into the Bicol Peninsula using the 158th, he needed to relieve the 11th Airborne Division with the barely rested 1st Cavalry Division. This division quickly took control of the Santo Tomas-Tanauan area, while General Swing's units maneuvered around the west side of Lake Taal to relieve the 158th at Macolod. As a result, General Griswold renewed his offensive on March 24. The 187th attempted to attack Macolod but was unsuccessful. A task force composed of units from Swing's other two regiments advanced quickly north toward Lipa, only to be halted at the hills southeast of the town. The 8th Cavalry captured Santo Tomas after a fierce battle and took Tanauan two days later. The 7th Cavalry advanced about five miles east into the corridor between Mounts Maquiling and Malepunyo, while the 12th Cavalry pushed along Route 21, moving about four miles beyond Los Baños. On March 27, Swing's task force finally overcame the enemy defenses southeast of Lipa, but it was the 8th Cavalry that ultimately secured this strategic town two days later. Griswold's successful offensive also forced around 2,000 troops from the Fuji Force to retreat along Route 21 and through the Santa Maria Valley to join Yokoyama's forces in the mountains east of Manila. In response, Krueger devised a plan to prevent the potential influx of Japanese reinforcements around the eastern and northern shores of Laguna de Bay. He instructed Hall to clear the northern shore of the lake, block the Santa Maria Valley, and secure Route 21. While the 187th continued its assault on Macolod, Griswold ordered his other units to push eastward to secure Laguna de Bay and Tayabas Bay. Accordingly, on March 30, the 103rd Regiment advanced in small increments along the northern shore of Laguna de Bay, reaching Siniloan by April 4. The 12th Cavalry moved to Calauan and then south along a secondary road toward San Pablo, encountering strong enemy positions that wouldn't be overcome until April 5. The 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments fought through the Maquiling-Malepunyo corridor against determined but disorganized Japanese resistance, successfully occupying San Pablo by April 2. Additionally, elements of the 188th Glider Regiment pushed east through the mountain corridors, reaching Tiaong on April 3 and Lucena three days later. By April 6, the 5th Cavalry and the 103rd Regiment had established contact at Pagsanjan, effectively isolating the 41st Army. The next day, patrols from the 11th Airborne Division headed north from Lucena, while 1st Cavalry Division patrols departed from Pagsanjan heading south. They successfully linked up at Lucban by April 10 and then advanced eastward to Mauban. At the same time, a company from the 188th traveled along Route 1 across the Bondoc Isthmus, reaching Atimonan on April 11. Griswold's patrols also moved towards Mount Malepunyo, where the Fuji Force was preparing for its final stand. By April 16, preliminary assaults had concentrated enemy resistance around Mount Mataasna-Bundoc. Meanwhile, after a week of intense aerial bombardment, Brigadier-General Hanford MacNider's 158th Regiment successfully landed at Legaspi Port with minimal opposition on April 1. They quickly secured the port and the nearby airfield, then advanced to Daraga before moving south along Route 1 to occupy the Sorsogon Peninsula, where they encountered machine-gun fire from the Mount Bariway-Busay Ridge. The following morning, the troops had to retreat east of Daraga, and in the coming days, the 158th faced tough fighting in the challenging, jungle terrain to overcome resistance in the Daraga area. Concerned about delays in occupying the Sorsogon Peninsula, MacNider landed his anti-tank company at Bacon on April 6, which occupied Sorsogon without opposition. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion continued its overland advance, reaching Bulan by April 12, where they targeted a significant Japanese concentration. Simultaneously, MacNider's other two battalions attacked Camalig on April 11 and began their unsuccessful assault on enemy positions in the Cituinan Hills. By April 1, the 188th had successfully eliminated the last organized resistance in the rugged hills south of Ternate. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment launched an assault on Caballo Island on March 27 but could not fully dismantle the entrenched enemy positions until April 13. The Japanese in the pits and tunnels created an almost insoluble problem for the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry. The Japanese had so emplaced their weapons, which included machine guns and mortars, that they controlled all approaches to the mortar pits but could not be reached by American artillery or mortar fire. When the 151st Infantry concentrated its mortar fire against the pits' entrances, the Japanese simply withdrew into the tunnels. When the American fire ceased--at the last possible moment before an infantry assault--the Japanese rushed out of the tunnels to man their weapons. Tanks were of no help to the American troops. From positions near the rim of the pits the tanks were unable to depress their guns sufficiently to do much damage to the Japanese. If the tanks tried to approach from above, they started sliding down Hill 2's slopes into the pits. No combination of tank, artillery, and infantry action proved of any avail, and the 151st Infantry had to give up its attempts to take the Japanese positions by assault. On 31 March engineers tried to pour diesel oil into one of the tunnels connecting the mortar pits, employing for this purpose a single ventilator shaft that was accessible to the 151st Infantry. Nothing came of the effort since it was impossible to get enough oil up the steep slopes of the hill to create a conflagration of significant proportions within the tunnels. Nevertheless, burning the Japanese out seemed to promise the only method of attack that would not risk the unduly heavy casualties of a direct infantry assault. No one, of course, wanted to throw away the lives of experienced troops on such an insignificant objective. Finally, the commander of the 113th Engineers, 38th Division, suggested pumping oil up the hill from the beach through a pipeline from a ship or landing craft anchored at the shore line. The Allied Naval Forces happily fell in with this idea and supplied the 151st Infantry with two oil-filled ponton cubes; the Allied Air Forces provided a 110-horsepower pump and necessary lengths of pipeline and flexible hosing; and the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment came through with an LCM to carry the pump and the ponton cubes. On 5 April over 2,500 gallons of diesel fuel were pumped into the pits and tunnels through the ventilator and were then ignited by white phosphorus mortar shells. "Results," the 38th Division reported, "were most gratifying." A huge flash fire ensued, followed by a general conflagration and several explosions. The engineers repeated the process on 6 and 7 April, and on the latter day carefully lowered two large demolition charges through the ventilator shaft and placed another at an accessible tunnel entrance. Set off simultaneously, the three charges caused an enormous volume of flames and several terrific explosions. For the next few days the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry, tried to persuade a few Japanese who had lived through the holocausts to surrender and also executed a few infantry probing attacks. On 13 April a patrol entered the pits and tunnels, killed the lone surviving Japanese, and reported the positions cleared and secured. Following this, El Fraile was targeted, with Company F of the 151st and the 113th Engineers effectively neutralizing Fort Drum using gasoline and explosives. On April 16, troops from the 1st Battalion of the 151st Regiment attacked Carabao Island, facing no opposition. Looking towards the Visayas, after capturing Palawan and Zamboanga, General Eichelberger set his sights on the Sulu Archipelago, where new airfields were to be established. On March 16, a reinforced company from the 162nd Regiment landed unopposed on Basilan Island and spent the next two days searching Basilan and nearby islets, finding no signs of Japanese forces. On April 2, the reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment landed on Sanga Sanga Island, successfully clearing the Tawi Tawi Group by April 6. The remainder of the regiment made an unopposed landing near Jolo Town on April 9. Over the next two days, the Americans drove approximately 2,400 men of the 55th Independent Mixed Brigade from the heights immediately south and southeast of the town to secure a nearby airstrip. However, the Japanese retreated to more fortified hill masses further inland, where they had long prepared their defenses and began to resist fiercely. After initial attacks by Colonel Alejandro Suarez's guerrillas failed to breach the Japanese positions, the 1st Battalion of the 163rd Regiment joined the fight and managed to overrun the enemy defenses by April 22. On April 25, the 3rd Battalion launched an assault on Lieutenant-General Suzuki Tetsuzo's final positions at Mount Tumatangus, which were ultimately subdued by May 2. However, the remaining Japanese forces continued to engage in guerrilla warfare. By this time, airfields in Zamboanga and Sanga Sanga had become operational to support the forthcoming invasion of Borneo.The first field at Zamboanga was a dry-weather strip 5000 feet long, completed on March 15 and immediately put to use by Marine Corps planes. The field, named Calarian Drome, could not answer the need for an all-weather strip 6000 feet long. Accordingly, engineers constructed a new strip, which the Marine aviators based there called Moret Field, about a mile to the east, and had it ready for all-weather operations by May 16. Used primarily by Marine Air Groups 12, 24, and 32, Moret Field was also employed by a 13th Air Force night-fighter squadron, an emergency rescue squadron, and 13th Air Force B-24s and P-38s staging through for strikes against Borneo. Marine Corps planes on March 16 executed the first support mission flown from a field in the Zamboanga area, covering the landing on Basilan Island. Later, Marine Corps planes from Zamboanga flew support for the Tawi Tawi and Jolo operations and undertook pre-assault bombardment and cover for the invasion of eastern Mindanao. While 13th Air Force planes executed most of the support for the invasion of Borneo, Marine Corps B-25s from Zamboanga also flew some missions. At Sanga Sanga Island there was a Japanese coral-surfaced strip about 2800 feet long. Engineers repaired and extended this strip to a length of 5000 feet by May 2, when fighters of the 13th Air Force began moving to Sanga Sanga from Palawan to provide close support for the initial landings on Borneo. These US Army planes were replaced in mid-May by units of the Royal Australian Air Force, which employed the all-weather Sanga Sanga field during later operations on Borneo. Finally, a Japanese field 3800 feet long on Jolo Island was repaired and used for aerial supply and evacuation operations in support of ground troops throughout the Sulu Archipelago. Eichelberger's next target was the Central Visayan Islands. For the Panay-Guimaras-northern Negros operation, codenamed Victor I, he assigned General Brush's 40th Division, excluding the 108th Regiment, which had recently been assigned to Leyte. The 40th Division departed Lingayen Gulf on March 15 aboard ships from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3. After a brief stop at Mindoro, they arrived at Panay before dawn on March 18. Following a short bombardment by destroyers, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 185th Regiment landed unopposed about twelve miles west of Iloilo, where they were joined by Colonel Macario Peralta's guerrillas, who already controlled much of the island. The 185th quickly expanded its beachhead against light, scattered resistance and began advancing along the coastal road toward Iloilo in the afternoon, forcing the 170th Independent Battalion to retreat to the mountainous interior. With Iloilo secured by March 20, G Company of the 185th Regiment successfully captured Inampulugan Island on March 22, while other elements of the regiment cleared the unoccupied Guimaras Island by March 23. Additionally, Brush decided to assign the 2nd Battalion of the 160th Regiment to garrison Panay alongside Peralta's guerrillas. No pursuit of the 170th Independent Battalion was made, allowing the Japanese to continue their guerrilla activities until the end of the war. Meanwhile, for the operation against northern Negros, Brush planned to launch an assault with the 185th Regiment on March 29, followed by the majority of the 160th Regiment the next day, while keeping the 503rd Parachute Regiment in reserve for potential airdrops. Opposing him, Lieutenant-General Kono Takeshi's 77th Brigade had a total of 15,000 troops but was prepared to retreat into the mountains of north-central Negros for a prolonged defense, leaving only token forces in the coastal plain to delay American advances. On March 29, the 185th Regiment landed unopposed near Pulupandan and quickly secured a bridge over the Bago River. The 185th then spread north and east, with the 160th Regiment following, successfully securing nearly the entire coastal plain of northwestern Negros by noon on April 2. As they closed in on Kono's inner fortress, the Americans overran the main Japanese outposts while the 511th was landed to bolster the assault. On April 9, Brush launched his general offensive, with his three regiments advancing slowly into rugged terrain where the Japanese held significant defensive advantages.  On June 4 General Kono, realizing that his remaining forces were incapable of further sustained effort, directed a general withdrawal deep into the mountains behind his broken defensive lines. The surviving Japanese dispersed into small groups seeking food and hideouts and trying to avoid contact with Colonel Abcede's guerrillas who, under the direction of the 503rd Parachute Regiment, took over responsibility for the pursuit of Kono's men. On June 9 the 503rd then relieved all elements of the 40th Division in northern Negros. By that date the Japanese had lost over 4000 men killed. Kono lost another 3350 troops, mainly from starvation and disease, before the end of the war. After the general surrender in August 1945, over 6150 Japanese came down from the mountains to turn themselves in, joining about 350 others who had been captured earlier. In all, about 7100 Japanese lost their lives in northern Negros, pinning down the equivalent of an American infantry division for over two months. The 40th Division's casualties for the operation, including those of the attached 503rd Parachute, totaled approximately 370 men killed and 1035 wounded. Meanwhile, Eichelberger's final objective in the Central Visayas was Cebu, assigned to Major-General William Arnold's Americal Division. For Operation Victor II, Captain Albert Sprague's Task Group 78.2 was set to land the bulk of the division at Cebu City while Colonel James Cushing's guerrillas secured the water sources. Opposing them were Rear-Admiral Harada Kaku's 33rd Naval Special Base Force and Major-General Manjome Takeo's 78th Brigade, which together comprised approximately 14,500 troops, including the 173rd Independent Battalion and the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Cebu City. Additionally, around 750 soldiers from General Kataoka's 1st Division were positioned in northern Cebu. Although the command situation on the island was chaotic, General Suzuki's 35th Army headquarters in Leyte had been evacuated by two large motorized landing barges between March 17 and 25. Taking control of all forces on Cebu, Suzuki appointed Manjome as the de jure commander in the Cebu City area while leaving Kataoka in charge of northern Cebu, as he prepared to retreat to Mindanao. General Manjome designed his defenses so as to control--not hold--the coastal plains around Cebu City, and for this purpose set up defenses in depth north and northwest of the city. A forward line, constituting an outpost line of resistance, stretched across the first rising ground behind the city hills 2.5 to 4 miles inland. A stronger and shorter second line, the main line of resistance, lay about a mile farther inland and generally 350 feet higher into the hills. Back of this MLR were Manjome's last-stand defenses, centering in rough, broken hills 5 miles or so north of the city. Anticipating that American forces would attempt to mount wide envelopments of his defensive lines, Manjome set up one flank protective strongpoint in rugged, bare hills about 3.5 miles north of barrio Talisay, on the coast about 6 miles southwest of Cebu City, to block the valley of the Mananga River, a natural axis of advance for forces enveloping from the south and west. Similarly, he established strongpoints on his left to block the valley of the Butuanoan River, roughly 4 miles northeast of Cebu City. Against the eventuality that the American invading forces might land north of Cebu City and strike into the Butuanoan Valley, Manjome set up another flank protective position in low hills overlooking the beach at Liloan, 10 miles northeast of Cebu City. Manjome did not intend to hold the beaches, but at both Talisay and Liloan, the best landing points in the Cebu City region, he thoroughly mined all logical landing areas. The Japanese also constructed tank barriers along the shore line and planted tank traps and minefields along all roads leading inland and toward Cebu City. The inner defense lines were a system of mutually supporting machine-gun positions in caves, pillboxes, and bunkers. Many of these positions had been completed for months and had acquired natural camouflage. Manjome's troops had an ample supply of machine guns and machine cannon and, like the Japanese on Negros, employed remounted aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. Manjome had some light and heavy mortars, but only a few pieces of light artillery. For the rest, however, Manjome's forces were far better supplied than Kono's troops in northern Negros. After an uneventful journey, Task Group 78.2 and the Americal Division arrived off Cebu in the early hours of March 26. Following an hour of bombardment by three light cruisers and six destroyers from Admiral Berkey's Task Force 74, the leading waves of the 132nd and 182nd Regiments landed unopposed on beaches just north of Talisay at 08:30. However, the landing was chaotic, as Japanese mines just a few yards beyond the surf line disabled ten of the first fifteen LVTs. Fortunately for the Americans, Manjome had chosen to withdraw from the beaches to establish inland defenses, resulting in minimal casualties. Once they cleared the beach minefields by 10:00, Arnold's leading units cautiously advanced through abandoned defenses toward the main highway to Cebu City, ultimately stopping for the night about a mile and a half south of their objective. The following day, the infantry secured Cebu City without opposition and on March 28 proceeded to clear Lahug Airfield and Hill 30 to the north. The Americans began their assault on Go Chan Hill on March 29, during which Company A of the 182nd Regiment was completely annihilated by the explosion of an ammunition dump located in caves along the hill's eastern spur. Fueled by a desire for revenge, nearly the entire 182nd returned to the attack on March 30 and successfully captured Go Chan Hill. Meanwhile, the 132nd Regiment cleared the coastal plains area north to the Butuanoan River, further securing the city's water supply sources by April 2. Unopposed, troops from the 132nd also successfully landed on Mactan Island, quickly securing an airstrip. In the meantime, as guerrillas had already taken control of much of Masbate, the 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment successfully landed on the island by April 7. Facing minimal opposition, the Americans pursued the scattered Japanese remnants through the hills and jungles of Masbate, killing approximately 120 Japanese soldiers by May 4.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On March 29th, the Americans attacked Go Chan Hill, suffering heavy losses. Seeking revenge, they captured it the next day, securing water supplies and defeating Japanese forces in Masbate. Then in April, Allied forces advanced strategically, overcoming fierce Japanese resistance, securing key positions, and establishing airfields, culminating in significant victories across the Philippines.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mandalay. Fierce battles raged over northern Luzon as General Clarkson's forces advanced, capturing key locations while Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas targeted enemy positions. The challenging terrain favored Japanese defenses, creating fierce resistance. Despite this, American troops steadily progressed, securing hills and towns. By mid-March, the 38th Division's relentless push led to significant Japanese losses. The brutal history of POW massacres fueled American resolve, leading to further victories in the region, American forces, led by Major-General Jens Doe were given the task of invading Palawan. Despite facing fortified defenses and rough terrain, the 41st Division advanced under artillery and air support. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces clashed with the Japanese, capturing key positions and repelling assaults. As tensions rose in French Indochina, the Japanese executed a coup, disarming French forces and establishing puppet governments. The conflict intensified, reshaping the region's power dynamics. This episode is the Fall of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are picking up on Iwo Jima. By March 10, General Schmidt's Marine forces had finally breached the determined enemy defenses to reach the northeastern shore of the island. However, there were still some Japanese strongholds to eliminate in the central and southern areas. One of these was Cushman's Pocket, named after the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, and located around a devastated ridge overlooking the sea, which housed the stubborn resistance southwest of Hill 362C. The other stronghold, held by General Senda's remaining troops, was established on March 11 after General Cates initiated his final push southeast toward the sea. Consequently, while Colonel Wensinger's 23rd Marines advanced quickly to the coast, Colonel Lanigan's 25th Marines struggled to make headway, as they were quickly halted by intense rocket, mortar, and small-arms fire from Senda's pocket. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Senda had committed suicide on March 8 following the failure of his banzai counterattack, leaving the disorganized Japanese forces in the pocket without leadership. Meanwhile, General Rockey's 5th Marine Division had advanced all the way to General Kuribayashi's last line of defense in northern Iwo Jima, where the battered defenders were prepared to make their final stand. Following a 50-minute preparation involving air, naval, and artillery support on March 11, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines launched their attack on the left with three battalions in line, while Colonel Wornham's 27th Marines attacked on the right with four battalions. However, fierce resistance soon forced the combat to close quarters, resulting in the Marines advancing only a few yards—up to 50 yards—across the front. To the right, while the 21st Marines advanced northward to connect with the 5th Division, Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines resumed their assaults on Cushman's Pocket. The 1st and 3rd Battalions effectively eliminated all resistance in the eastern sector, completely sealing off the area controlled by the Japanese. On March 12, these battalions launched an attack westward toward Cushman's Pocket, with Colonel Withers' 3rd Battalion serving as a holding force on the opposite flank. However, the Marines faced strong opposition and could only advance slowly against the camouflaged enemy positions. To the north, Rocky's units continued to face intense resistance, with Liversedge making no progress and Wornham achieving only minor advances. An intelligence officer with the 5th Division estimated that a minimum of 1,000 Japanese troops were defending the northern end of the island, and stated ". . . there is no shortage of manpower, weapons, or ammunition in the area the Japanese have left to defend." The entire northern tip of the island seemed to be honeycombed with caves and passageways. When a 500-pound bomb landed in the mouth of a cave near Kitano Pint, a big puff of smoke blew out the side of a cliff over 400 yards away, and another bomb landing in a cave entrance in the same area caused a ring of smoke and dust to come up through the ground for a radius of 200 yards around the point of impact. Meanwhile, to the south, the 25th Marines pressed eastward while Colonel Jordan's 3rd Battalion contained the pocket from the north. Supported by tanks, flamethrowers, bazookas, anti-tank grenades, and 60mm mortars, Lanigan's troops engaged in fierce combat with the heavily fortified Japanese forces in the pocket for four days. During this time, Jordan's 2nd Battalion cleared the beach road, allowing the Shermans to move behind the pocket. On March 13, as Withers' 3rd Battalion returned to the 21st Marines, Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their offensive from the east, making significant gains that reduced Cushman's Pocket to 250 yards. Meanwhile, following a successful water-borne reconnaissance of Kama and Kangoku Rocks the previous afternoon, an armored amphibian company landed on these islets without encountering any resistance. At the same time, Rocky's weary Marines maintained pressure on the ridge above the gorge, achieving only slight gains on the right. Fortunately, by March 14, it seemed that the slow, arduous progress of the past three days had enabled the 27th Marines to push through the last strong enemy positions along the northeastern side of the island. As a result, Liversedge was instructed to hold position while the 26th and 27th Marines advanced north and northwest against lighter resistance, successfully gaining up to 1,000 yards by March 15.After armored dozers hacked paths forward, tanks were able to lend support. The flame tanks were particularly effective during this phase and provided "the one weapon that caused the Japanese to leave their caves and rock crevices and run." Army planes flew the last air support missions of the operation on 14 March when five P-51's dropped fire bombs (gasoline and diesel oil mixture) and strafed in front of 3/27 from 1030 to 1100. From then on, the narrow confines of the area of operations prevented use of those planes that had performed so well in supporting ground troops. Artillery and destroyers continued to furnish limited support, firing a preparation for RCT 26 on 15 March and performing night harassing and illumination missions. Meanwhile, operations against Cushman's Pocket entered their final phase on March 14, when Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions finally breached the last enemy defenses by nightfall and completed the cleanup of the pocket two days later. On March 15, Lanigan redirected the main focus of the attack on Senda's pocket to the south, ordering the two battalions in the center to engage aggressively, resulting in a gain of approximately 200 yards and a deep penetration into the left flank of the Japanese's strongest positions. During the night, enemy forces attempted to infiltrate Marine lines from the south, but each attempt was detected and thwarted. Lanigan launched his final assault on March 16, facing only small, isolated pockets of resistance that were quickly eliminated as his battalions advanced toward the beach road. That day, with organized resistance in the 3rd Division's area of operations coming to an end, the 21st Marines were deployed to relieve the 27th Marines on the right flank to continue the northwest attack. With strong naval and artillery support, Withers' 1st Battalion encountered light resistance in its sector on the right, while the 2nd Battalion faced tougher opposition from scattered enemy positions. Nevertheless, both battalions reached the coastline at Kitano Point by the afternoon and began mopping up. To the left, Colonel Graham's 26th Marines also advanced cautiously northwest, with tanks effectively neutralizing enemy positions as the Marines gained about 400 yards. Despite the presence of 500 determined enemy troops still resisting in the western section of Kitano Point and the draw to the southwest, Iwo Jima was officially declared secured by the end of the day. However, on March 17, the battle for the gorge commenced as the 26th Marines advanced under moderate rifle fire, reaching the northern coast before shifting their focus southwestward to confront the gorge in front of the 28th Marines. The gorge in which the last resisting Japanese were now cornered was rocky and steep-sided, approximately 700 yards long and between 200 and 500 yards wide. Rock outcrops cut this ravine into other minor draws that constituted major obstacles to all types of movement. The entire area was ideally suited to the type of last ditch defense the Japanese had adopted. All routes into the main gorge were swept by heavy and accurate fire from machine guns and rifles concealed in cave positions in the cliffs and outcrops. The plan for attacking this strong point called for the 28th Marines, with attached elements of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and Division Reconnaissance Company, to hold the southern rim along the steep cliffs, while the reinforced 26th Marines worked in from the north and east. For the next nine days exhausted Marines carried out a battle of attrition against the thoroughly entrenched enemy. Advances into the east end of the ravine were measured in yards as each cave had to be sealed off before further progress could be made. Flame-thrower tanks, armored bulldozers, and infantry combined operations to provide the power and teamwork necessary to penetrate the last stronghold. As they gradually pushed down the ravine, resistance concentrated around a large concrete structure built into a knoll near the eastern end. After two days of assaults that silenced the supporting positions, engineers used bulldozers to seal a door on the north side and then demolished the structure with five charges totaling 8,500 pounds of explosives. Nevertheless, the battle of attrition persisted, and it wasn't until the end of March 24 that the pocket was reduced to an area of about 50 by 50 yards at the northwest end of the draw. The following morning, units of the 28th Marines, which had taken full responsibility for the pocket, reached the coastal cliffs to finally eliminate the last remnants of resistance in the gorge. On March 20, the 147th Regiment, set to take over the defense of Iwo Jima, arrived from New Caledonia, and by March 24, it had relieved the 21st Marines to establish night ambushes and patrols. The Japanese defenders fought tenaciously until the very end, choosing death over surrender. However, Kuribayashi had one final assault planned. In the pre-dawn darkness of March 26, the final act of the tragedy was performed. Between 200 and 300 Japanese troops from Death Valley and other scattered positions on the west coast silently crept through the ravines of the 5th Division sector headed for a tented area between Airfield No. 2 and the sea occupied by a mixture of Seabees, Air Force personnel, Shore Parties and AA Gunners. Most of them were sleeping, secure in the knowledge that the battle was virtually over. In a coordinated three-pronged attack against unsuspecting Marines and Air Force ground crews, aiming to create maximum chaos and destruction. Kuribayashi and his men stealthily cut through tents, bayoneted sleeping soldiers, and threw hand grenades, resulting in the deaths of around 44 Airmen and 9 Marines. The noise soon alerted troops from the surrounding area, and Marines from a nearby Pioneer Battalion, african american troops from a Shore Party, and soldiers from the 147th Infantry joined battle in a frenzy of shooting, punching, kicking and stabbing. Once the initial surprise wore off, the defenders retaliated, engaging in a chaotic hand-to-hand combat until the 5th Pioneer Battalion quickly organized a defensive line and halted the attack. Dawn revealed the full extent of the carnage in the ruined encampment: 44 Airman and 9 Marines lay dead with a further 119 wounded; of the attackers 262 were killed and 18 captured. Lt Harry Martin of the 5th Pioneers had hurriedly organized a defense line during the attack and single-handedly killed four enemy machine gunners before dying himself. He was to be Iwo Jima's final Medal of Honor hero, bringing the total to an incredible 27.  The circumstances of General Kuribayashi's death have always been shrouded in mystery. Over the years various sources have suggested that he died in the fighting around Death Valley or that he killed himself in his HQ. According to General Kuribayashi's son, Taro: “It seems that it was after sunset on March 25 to the dawn of the 26th that surviving Imperial Japanese forces were obliged to stand still under the US onslaught and showering shells. Under such circumstances, he had his sword in his left hand and ordered the chief staff officer, Colonel Takaishi, who was beside him, 'Send snipers to shoot'. Sargent Oyama heard the order. Oyama, who was seriously wounded in the last combat, fell unconscious, was hospitalized by the US and after having served as a POW came back and testified the dreadful account of the night to me. My father had believed it shameful to have his body discovered by the enemy even after death, so he had previously asked his two soldiers to come along with him, one in front and the other behind, with a shovel in hand. In case of his death he had wanted them to bury his body there and then. It seems that my father and the soldiers were killed by shells, and he was buried at the foot of a tree in Chidori Village, along the beach near Osaka Mountain. Afterwards General Smith spent a whole day looking for his body to pay respect accordingly and to perform a burial, but in vain.” Following the destruction of this final force, the capture and occupation phase of the Iwo Jima operation was declared complete. Over 34 days of combat, approximately 18,000 Japanese soldiers were killed, and 216 were taken prisoner, while the American side suffered heavy losses: 6,821 killed, 19,217 wounded, and 137 tanks destroyed. On April 4, the 147th Regiment took over full responsibility for the ground defense of Iwo Jima as the Marines were departing the island. Throughout April and May, aggressive patrols and ambushes by infantrymen resulted in an additional 867 prisoners and 1,602 Japanese killed, with the Americans losing 15 killed and 144 wounded. Meanwhile, General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command continued its firebombing campaign against Japan. After the successful Tokyo Great Air Raid and a less effective attack on Nagoya, LeMay decided to send 301 B-29s on the afternoon of March 13 to strike Osaka. Despite having to use radar bombing due to cloud cover, American bombardiers achieved a denser and more uniform bombing pattern than the impressionistic methods employed in Nagoya. This resulted in the destruction of 8.1 square miles in the city's core, including commercial and industrial areas, and caused 13,129 civilian casualties, with the loss of 2 bombers and 13 others damaged. Keeping up the intensity of the firebombing campaign, LeMay dispatched 307 B-29s to attack Kobe on the night of March 16. They faced 314 enemy interceptors, which proved ineffective against the Superfortresses unleashing fire over the port. Consequently, the fire on March 17 spiraled out of control, obliterating the eastern half of the business district and devastating a significant industrial zone to the southeast, including the Kawasaki shipyards. Japanese statistics show that the destruction was appalling. About 500 industrial buildings were destroyed, 162 damaged. The loss of 65,951 houses left 242,468 persons homeless. Police reported 2,669 dead or missing and 11,289 injured. Although the destruction was devastating for the Japanese, LeMay was disheartened to find that only 2.9 square miles of the city had burned. To complete his campaign, LeMay sent 313 bombers back to Nagoya on the night of March 19, utilizing radar techniques to cover a large portion of the city. This resulted in the burning of 3 square miles, including the Nagoya arsenal, freight yards, and Aichi's engine works. With an average of 380 aircraft, the 21st Bomber Command conducted 1,595 sorties over 10 days, dropping a total of 9,365 tons of bombs. The results far exceeded expectations, as the B-29s left a trail of destruction across four major cities, decimating 32 square miles and destroying numerous critical targets. Thus, LeMay's strategy proved successful, leading to incendiary area bombing becoming standard practice in the future. The focus now shifts from the Central Pacific to the South Pacific, where we need to address the ongoing Australian operations in New Britain. Following the capture of Milim and Ea Ea in January, General Ramsay's 5th Division aimed to continue its limited advances to the north. To secure crossings over the Ip River and patrol towards Henry Reid Bay, the entire 6th Brigade began moving to the Kiep-Milim area on January 26, completing this relocation by February 11. Concurrently, the 14th/32nd Battalion had advanced beyond the Ip and was conducting patrols towards Kalai Plantation, where they faced enemy resistance. The 36th Battalion also moved forward to Mavelo Plantation, leading to retaliatory actions against the new Australian outpost at Baia. In response, Ramsay dispatched stronger patrols to the Sai River throughout February, successfully establishing a new defensive line along the Mavelo River by the month's end. Returning to Wide Bay, after a series of aggressive patrols and nighttime ambushes, the 14th/32nd Battalion managed to reach Kamandran Mission by mid-February. The Australians continued to advance, and by the end of the month, the 19th Battalion, which had replaced the 14th/32nd at Gogbulu Creek, secured crossings over the Mevelo River and patrolled east toward the Wulwut River. On March 3, Ramsay ordered the 6th Brigade to cross the Wulwut and capture the Waitavalo Ridge. Two days later, the 19th Battalion initiated the assault but struggled to push more than one company across the river due to fierce enemy resistance. On March 6, following an artillery bombardment, another company successfully crossed and quickly seized Cake Hill. The next day, Lone Tree Hill was taken following another round of artillery bombardment. By March 10, Moose Hill, Young's Hill, and Perry's Knoll had also been captured. In the days that followed, Australian artillery began to suppress enemy mortars as infantry moved toward Kath's Hill. By mid-March, the 14th/32nd Battalion replaced the 19th Battalion, and on March 16, the Australians resumed their offensive, facing fierce resistance but successfully encircling Bacon Hill. The assault continued the next day as the 14th/32nd fought to reach the summit of the hill. On 18th March the mortar fire was intensified from the few remaining enemy positions, and it seemed that the Japanese were firing off their ammunition while they could. The attack was resumed. When Corporal Martin's section was halted on the steep spur by fire from three posts he jumped up shouting, "They can't do that to me", and went on alone, firing posts, killing five, before he himself was hit. The decisive attack was launched through this foothold. By 3 p.m. all the Japanese had been cleared from Bacon Hill; and a patrol from Kath's, under Lieutenant Lamshed,3 penetrated to a knoll 800 yards to the east and found no enemy there. No Japanese now remained in the Waitavalo-Tol area. In the five days from the 16th to the 20th 4 officers and 53 others had been killed or wounded.  In the following days, patrols ventured deep into enemy territory but found few stragglers. On March 21, the 19th Battalion took over again and advanced toward the Bulus and Moondei Rivers. On March 28, Ramsay ordered the 13th Brigade to relieve the 6th Brigade, a transition that was completed by April 12. Following the capture of Waitavalo Ridge, there were four months of infantry patrolling and routine maintenance by other troops, with the 16th Battalion patrolling forward to Jammer Bay in this area. Additionally, looking west, a company from the 36th Battalion successfully landed north of the Sai on March 30 but could not proceed to the Matalaili River due to heavy rains. However, Japanese positions there were heavily bombarded by aircraft and the sloop Swan, prompting the defenders to withdraw to the Toriu River in April. Meanwhile, Brigadier King's 16th Brigade advanced to the Ninahau River by March 12, while Brigadier Moten's 17th Brigade continued its westward push through the Torricelli Mountains, aiming to capture the Japanese base at Maprik. Throughout March, the 2/7th Battalion executed several successful ambushes from their new bases at Ilahop, Balangabadabil, and Bombeta, while Hayforce advanced through Sinahau to the north of Utumugu and eastward to Tatimba. By early March, Moten had cleverly led the enemy to believe that the primary offensive would be launched by the 2/10th Commando Squadron from the north via Ami. As a result, the Japanese bolstered their forces in that area, successfully driving back Australian patrols from Chaulak, Gwanginan, and Wambak. On March 13, the commando outpost at Milak came under attack, with the Japanese gradually encircling the position in the following days but failing to overcome the defenders' steadfast resistance. Fortunately, by March 17, patrols had restored communication lines, and two days later, the enemy pressure finally subsided. During this time, smaller Japanese forces also targeted the commando outposts at Murak and Aupik, but the defenders managed to repel these attacks as well. However, as the 2/10th was completely exhausted, the 2/6th Battalion was dispatched to relieve the commandos in late March amid a new wave of Japanese assaults. Meanwhile, the 2/7th Battalion was engaged in assaults on the fortified enemy positions at Ilaheta, which fell on March 20. The Australians then turned their attention to the Aupik villages, successfully focusing their efforts on the west bank of the Ninab River by the end of March, coinciding with Hayforce's crossing of the Amuk River. In the following three days, the 2/7th Battalion cleared all opposition along the eastern side of the Ninab in preparation for the final push toward Maprik. Consequently, General Miyake's 78th Regiment was ultimately compelled to retreat toward Jamei. Looking further north, King decided to initiate his advance towards But. By mid-March, a company from the 2/2nd Battalion had crossed the Ninahau on March 14 and quickly moved through Bai and Ultan. Although the Australian advance faced a strong enemy position that delayed progress for two days, the 2/2nd ultimately broke through Manib Creek, catching the defenders off guard and swiftly capturing the But airfield on March 17. Following this, the Australians patrolled the foothills and the Old German Road towards the Dagua airfield, encountering minimal resistance. Consequently, on March 21, the 2/2nd advanced rapidly again, successfully taking Dagua while the 2/1st Battalion moved in to secure But. At this stage, Japanese resistance along the coast was light, as General Adachi had focused on the Maprik district, which could produce more food. With the main enemy forces now concentrated in the hills to the south, King directed the 2/2nd to clear the foothills south of Dagua and eliminate the enemy in the Tokoku Pass, while the 2/3rd Battalion launched a flanking attack in the Mabam River-Hamsuk-Yalaminuni area. The 2/2nd then patrolled deep towards Magahen and Wonginara Mission, facing strong resistance at the 1410 Feature. On March 24, they finally captured the feature, while another patrol reached Wonginara without encountering enemy forces. However, in the final days of March, the Australians struggled to advance against the strong resistance of the Japanese defenders on the Wonginara Track, although one patrol successfully probed towards Kauremerak Hill. On April 2, following intense air and artillery bombardments, the 2/2nd Battalion finally managed to break through to Tokoku Pass, which was secured the next day. Meanwhile, another patrol advanced south from Dagua to the Autogi-Walanduum area and then to the coast near Kofi. The 2/3rd Battalion moved south from Feature 1410 towards the Mabam River and Wonginara Mission, successfully eliminating a series of Japanese ridge positions by April 6. The 2/1st Battalion patrolled deep into the hills south and west of But, completely clearing the area by April 1 while also pushing eastward to capture Saburuman. Concurrently, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion advanced to the upper Ninahau, effectively clearing the region up to a north-south line about two miles beyond Muguluwela by the end of March. In early April, the machine-gunners successfully cleared the Marabus area and connected with the 2/1st Battalion. Finally, it was time to shift focus to Bougainville to continue covering the Australian offensives on the island. As previously noted, Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade had secured the Tsimba Ridge area, while Brigadier Field's 7th Brigade was advancing south towards the Puriata River. The swift capture of Mosigetta and the unexpected secondary landing at Toko had already compelled the Japanese to retreat behind the river amid a command crisis. The Japanese policy of resisting the southward advance more strongly even if it entailed heavier casualties failed to impose the hoped-for delay of the Australians. Nevertheless the Japanese leaders considered that the 13th Regiment's "swift damaging hit-and-run tactics" were well executed. However, Mosigetta was at length abandoned and a withdrawal south of the Puriata ordered. The landing at Toko was unexpected and caused an acceleration of this withdrawal. There now occurred a major crisis in the Japanese command. The young reserve officers were highly critical of the conduct of the campaign and blamed the policies of the older professional officers for the constant reverses. This criticism became so outspoken that, in February, a number of the younger officers were relieved of their commands; perhaps partly as an outcome of this crisis, General Hyakutake suffered a paralysis of his left side. General Kanda took command of the 17th Army and Lieutenant-General Akinaga Tsutomu, Chief of Staff of the Army, succeeded him in command of the 6th Division. "This change of command was regarded favourably by the younger officers, but it soon became apparent that Kanda intended to pursue the same policy as Hyakutake. Kanda was a shrewd, hard, fussy little professional soldier of long experience. He was steeped in tradition and a ruthless commander, but even his bitterest critics admitted his capabilities. Akinaga… was a dyed in the wool militarist and a strict disciplinarian. Unused to an active command he was plunged into a situation which was a little out of his depth. One of his staff stated that he spent too much time doing a corporal's job in his forward battalions to be a good divisional commander." In late February, General Bridgeford's forces advanced toward the Puriata, facing only minor rearguard positions. The 25th Battalion captured Barara on February 22 and a five-acre garden two days later, while the 61st Battalion took control of another garden measuring 600 by 400 yards near the river on March 1. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron was sent to secure the Makapeka area, successfully taking Commando Ridge and a ford across the Makapeka River by March 5. With General Savige aiming to reach the Hari River next, Bridgeford promptly ordered the 7th Brigade to move to the Hongorai River line. As a result, Field planned to initiate his main advance on March 11, utilizing the 25th Battalion and the 2/8th Commando Squadron, while the 61st Battalion pushed forward toward Horinu. In response, Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to bolster the 13th at the front, preparing both units for a full-scale counterattack should the Australians cross the Puriata, aiming to delay the enemy long enough to finalize preparations for a decisive battle along the Silibai-Porror Rivers. By March 5, the 25th Battalion had already crossed the river and swiftly captured Slater's Knoll, which soon came under enemy mortar fire. Patrols were sent ahead and found that the 13th Regiment was poised to fiercely contest the Australian advance. Although the northern flank of the 25th Battalion would be effectively contained along the Buin Road on March 11, two Australian companies managed to maneuver through Tokinotu to the south, reaching Hiru Hiru by the end of the day. One of these companies moved along the eastern side of the Buin Road toward Slater's Knoll, but from March 15 to 17, they faced a heavy counterattack that ultimately forced them to withdraw. In response, Field initiated a strong offensive along the Buin Road on March 19, managing to push the Japanese back to some rear positions. Following a significant air and artillery bombardment, the attack resumed on March 22, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance. Meanwhile, the commandos advanced to Nihero, where they began extensive patrols southward towards Unanai, Hari, and the Buin Road. During one of these patrols, they captured detailed orders for a large-scale Japanese offensive planned for early April. As a result, Bridegeford decided to pause his offensive and send the 15th Brigade along with a tank squadron to Toko to reinforce his perimeter. On March 28 and 29, before Akinaga's main assault, the Japanese conducted a series of raids on the Australian lines of communication and rear areas, all of which were successfully repelled by vigilant defenders. On March 30, the 13th Regiment launched several strong attacks against the 25th Battalion, all of which were costly for the attackers and repelled, while the armored squadron advanced toward Tokinotu. Just as the tanks reached the front, the Japanese initiated another wave of fierce attacks against the 25th Battalion on March 31, which were thankfully repelled with the support of the armored units. Consequently, on April 1, two companies advanced again, establishing a perimeter 1,000 yards south of Slater's Knoll. That evening, and for the following three days, Akinaga launched a series of raids to facilitate the arrival of the 23rd Regiment for a renewed assault. In the early hours of April 5, the Japanese began infiltrating the Australian perimeter, launching a vigorous two-pronged assault on Slater's Knoll later that morning. The 23rd Regiment attacked about 1,000 yards to the right of the 13th and north-east of it. The attack failed, Kawano was killed and the regiment withdrew south to the rear of the 13th. The 13th Regiment with 600 men made the main attack from north and east.  Until 6.20 a.m. wave after wave charged forward and was brought low. Some Japanese fell within four yards of the weapon-pits. The artillery sent over accurate defensive fire, registered the previous day. At dawn the surviving Japanese were heard digging in on dead ground. As the light became clearer, the Australians saw that "enemy dead lay, literally, in heaps in front of the wire", and bodies could be seen scattered over an area some 200 yards square. It was gruesome evidence of the efficient siting of weapons and choice of fields of fire in preparation for expected attack. The attackers were ordered to dig in until darkness and make full use of grenades and mortars. However, in the afternoon, tanks and artillery fire drove the Japanese from the positions they had gained, and the Japanese commander accepted defeat. All three battalion commanders in the 13th were killed. After Akinaga had reported his failure Kanda said to his Chief of Staff, Colonel Yoshiyuki Ejima: "It would not have happened if I had been in command. The enemy right flank was wide open. I would have severed his life line and controlled Toko. We could have delayed the enemy for three months."  Concurrently, around 100 Japanese troops attacked the two forward companies along the Buin Road but were similarly repelled with ease. Following the unsuccessful counteroffensive by Akinaga, Slater's Knoll received reinforcements while the remaining Japanese forces were being dealt with, resulting in 620 Japanese fatalities since March 28, compared to 189 Australian casualties. However, Bridgeford could not capitalize on this victory due to the prolonged supply line, which temporarily halted his offensive. As a result, while the 2/8th Commando Squadron moved forward along the Commando Road, the 13th Brigade began to relieve the battered 7th Brigade under Field on April 13. Meanwhile, in the northern sector of the 11th Brigade area, the 26th Battalion launched a significant advance northward on February 21, successfully overrunning the Lalum-Downs' Ridge area by March 8. Two companies then advanced further north to secure the crossing of the Nagam River. On March 13, another company landed near the southern edge of Soraken Plantation and quickly pushed the enemy back behind the Nagam. Australian patrols harassed the Japanese forces at Horseshoe Knoll until March 20, when they finally withdrew. Simultaneously, the 26th Battalion eliminated the remaining enemy positions at the Compton River and secured the Soraken Peninsula, while the Taiof and Saposa Islands were also captured off the coast. The next battalion to take over the forward positions was the 31st/51st Battalion. Perhaps the outstanding patrol leader in the 31st/51st was Lieutenant Reiter, who led out 3 patrols which killed 10 out of the 78 Japanese killed by this battalion's forays. One of these patrols was named by the battalion "the raid on Reiter's Ridge". Reiter and 15 men were given the task of harassing the Japanese occupying a prominent ridge just east of Sisivie and discovering their strength. They departed from Keenan's Ridge at 17:30 on March 27, bivouacked at a former artillery observation post and moved on at 03:00 next morning for a dawn attack. At 06:00 “the patrol moved in, and throwing grenades and firing LMG occupied a small knoll (its report stated). 2 Japanese were killed and 1 pillbox containing LMG destroyed. Patrol raced down narrow neck to a wide clearing in which several huts were sighted. Phosphorus and HE grenades were thrown. In a matter of seconds 4 more Japanese killed (2 in slit trenches, 1 as he ran and another while abluting). 2 were wounded by phosphorus grenades. 3 huts were blazing and 1 (considered to be an ammunition dump) blew up. Enemy opened up with one LMG and 15 rifles and patrol pulled out with 1 man wounded.” Instead of hastening them away Reiter assembled his men nearby in concealment and watched the enemy. At length Japanese began to move about again, and soon they were washing clothes, chopping wood and performing other tasks. There were from 25 to 30 enemy in the post. The Australians watched throughout the morning and at 12:30 opened fire with all their weapons. 2 Japanese were killed and 4 more huts set on fire. The enemy fired back, and at 01:15 Reiter withdrew his men and returned to Keenan's Ridge leaving an ambush on the enemy's track. The ambush party returned later and reported that it had seen no movement.  On the 29th, the day after Reiter's return, a platoon of the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion under Lieutenant Martin set out for Buritsiotorara along the Wakunai River. There they found three huts and a large garden with seven Japanese moving about unarmed. Throwing grenades and firing from the hip the native soldiers attacked and killed all seven. Three more who emerged from a hut were chased and killed. Three of the dead men were found to be lieutenants; three machine-guns were cap-tured. Next day at Aviang, 1,200 yards away, seven more Japanese were seen, of whom three including another lieutenant were killed and the others fled. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima had come to a bitter end. The lessons learnt on Iwo Jima would become guidelines for the Battle of Okinawa in April and would influence allied plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The war planners would later notably take into account that around a third of the troops committed to Iwo Jima, and later again at Okinawa, had been killed or wounded and that they could expect far more in Japan.

Last time we spoke about the Jinzhou Operation and Defense of Harbin. After the Mukden Incident, Zhang Xueliang, despite commanding a large army, was pressured into non-resistance against Japan. As tensions escalated, the Japanese bombed Jinzhou to intimidate Zhang Xueliang and the Kwantung Army prepared to invade. By January 1, 1932, Zhang's forces retreated, marking a significant loss for China. Meanwhile, Ma Zhanshan emerged as a resistance hero, navigating complex alliances against Japanese aggression. In the face of Japanese aggression, Ding Chao rallied forces in Harbin, a crucial city in Northeast China. Together with Ma Zhanshan and other generals, they formed the Kirin self-defense army to resist the Japanese advance. Despite fierce battles, including victories at Shuiqu and Shulan, the Japanese ultimately launched a full-scale assault. After intense fighting, Harbin fell on February 5, 1932. The resistance crumbled, leading to Ma Zhanshan's defection and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo.   #143 The January 28th Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the words of Ron Burgundy, “phew, Boy, that escalated quickly... I mean, that really got out of hand fast”. Ishiwara Kanji unleashed the Mukden Incident, beginning a series of military conflicts. The Kwantung army invaded all three provinces of Manchuria, Ma Zhanshan tried to fight back at Heilongjiang, Ding Chao at Harbin and Zhang Xueliang at Jinhouz. All of this culminated in the conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of the new puppet state of Manchukuo. Yet another significant conflict also broke out in Shanghai of all places.  Now before we start this one I want to point out there are a lot of bias issues with how this incident began. It is known as the January 28th Incident or the First Battle of Shanghai. There are a few arguments as to how exactly it began, but the two main narratives are as such. During the invasion of Manchuria, anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out across China, particularly in large cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou. In most Japanese sources, these demonstrations got out of hand, requiring military action to defend Japanese citizens and property in Shanghai. Now as for Chinese sources, and I will say it here, I place a lot more credibility on the Chinese side on this one, during the Invasion of Manchuria, the League of Nations passed resolutions to get the Japanese to withdraw their troops and many of the members expressed support for China. Although the United States was not a member of the League, Secretary of State Stimson issued a "non-recognition" note in response to Japan's occupation of Jinzhou, aiming to pressure Japan. This isolation in the international arena heightened anxiety within the Japanese government and military, prompting them to seek conflicts in other regions of China to divert attention from their invasion of Manchuria.  Now a lot of trouble had been stirred up in Shanghai ever since the Mukden Incident broke out. Shanghai's business community initiated a boycott of Japanese trade, significantly impacting Japan's coastal and Yangtze River shipping industries. To give one example the "Nissin Steamship Company" halted all operations since the incident. Between July 1931 and the end of March 1932, Japanese merchants in Shanghai reportedly suffered losses amounting to 41,204,000 yen . To give you an idea, in 1930, Japanese goods accounted for 29% of Shanghai's average monthly imports, but by December 1931, this figure had plummeted to 3%. On October 5, 1931, the Japanese government convened a cabinet meeting, resolving that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would issue a stern warning to the National Government, with the Foreign Minister and Navy Minister overseeing the issue of ship deployment. Shanghai was the key hub for Western powers in China. It was here they made significant investments and maintained strong commercial interests in the region. The political and economic dynamics among these powers were intricate. Shanghai held the largest amount of foreign settlements and concessions. Any outbreak of war in Shanghai would inevitably capture international attention and prompt intervention from nations with vested interests, such as Britain, the United States, and France.  On October 1, Tanaka Takayoshi, the assistant military attaché at the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai and head of the Shanghai Secret Service, was summoned to Shenyang by Colonel Seishirō Itagaki who told him "Our next move is to occupy Harbin and make Manchuria independent. We have sent Colonel Doihara to pick up Puyi. If we succeed, the League of Nations will have a big fight and the Tokyo government will have a headache. I want you to do something in Shanghai to divert the attention of other countries. When you cause a commotion, we will take Manchuria." Tanaka promised to complete the task and said that he was "training an excellent spy who can bribe Chinese troublemakers in Shanghai to start this fake war".  Itagaki then withdrew 20,000 yen from the Kwantung Army's secret service funds and provided it to Tanaka for operational purposes. Now here it gets wild. Tanaka took the funds and paid a Japanese female spy named Kawashima Yoshiko, known also as Jin Bihui, but whose birthname was Aisin Giori Xianyu with the courtesy name of Dongzhen, meaning “eastern jewel”. Yes Manchu royalty, to be more precise the 14th daughter of Shanqi a Manchu prince of the Aisin Gioro clan of the former Qing Dynasty. Shanqi was a descendant of Hooge, the eldest son of Hong Taiji, it all comes full circle sometimes. After the Xinhai revolution, Xianyu was given up for adoption in 1915 to her fathers friend Naniwa Kawashima, a Japanese spy and adventurer. Thus here she took the name Yoshiko Kawashima. She was raised in Tokyo and excelled at judo and fencing. In 1922 he biological father Shanqi died and as Manchu royal tradition dictated, her biological mother committed suicide to join her husband in death. On November 22nd of 1925, Yoshiko stated the she “decided to cease being a woman forever”. Henceforth she stopped wearing a kimono, undid her traditional female hair style and took a final photo to commemorate “my farewell to life as a woman”. That same evening she went to a barbershop and got a crew cut and from there went to a men's clothing store. A photo of this dramatic transformation appeared 5 days later in the Asahi Shimbun under the headline "Kawashima Yoshiko's Beautiful Black Hair Completely Cut Off - Because of Unfounded 'Rumors,' Makes Firm Decision to Become a Man - Touching Secret Tale of Her Shooting Herself". This title was in reference to a prior scandal where she allegedly shot herself in the chest with a pistol given to her by Iwata Ainosuke. Historians believe it is much more likely she chose to become a man because of the death of her parents, failed romances or possibly sexual abuse from her foster father. Kawashima would go on to explain to a new reporter two days later "I was born with what the doctors call a tendency toward the third sex, and so I cannot pursue an ordinary woman's goals in life... Since I was young I've been dying to do the things that boys do. My impossible dream is to work hard like a man for China, for Asia." She was in fact something of a tomboy in her youth, despite being quite beautiful.  Now obviously the times being the times, those close to her were, lets just say not very receptive to this dramatic change. Thus in November of 1927, at the age of 20, her brother and adoptive father arranged her marriage in Port Arthur to one Ganjuurjab, the son of the Inner Mongolian Army General Babojab, who had led the Mongolian-Manchurian Independence Movement in 1911. The marriage lasted only three years, ending in divorce. Following this, she left Mongolia and began touring coastal cities of China before adopting a bohemian lifestyle back in Tokyo, where she had relationships with both men and women. She then moved to Shanghai's foreign concession, where she met the Japanese military attaché and intelligence officer Ryukichi Tanaka. This takes us back to our story at hand.  On the afternoon of January 18th, 1932, Yoshiko Kawashima orchestrated an incident by enlisting two Japanese Nichiren monks and three other Japanese supporters to stir up trouble at the Sanyou Industrial Company headquarters on Mayushan Road, located near the East District of the Shanghai International Settlement. The group of five Japanese individuals watched the worker volunteer army training outside the factory and threw stones to provoke a confrontation, intentionally sparking a conflict. Prior to this, Yoshiko Kawashima had also hired thugs disguised as workers to blend in with the crowd. During the altercation, the five Japanese individuals were attacked by unknown assailants. The Japanese Consulate General later reported that one of the Japanese individuals had died and another was seriously injured. However, the police were unable to apprehend the culprits, prompting Japan to accuse the Chinese factory patrol team of being behind the attack. This event became known as the "Japanese monk incident."   At 2:40 am on January 20, following orders from  Yoshiko, the military police captain Chiharu Shigeto led 32 members of the Shanghai "Japanese Youth Comrades Association in China" to sneak into the Sanyou Industrial Company factory. They brought guns, bayonets, and other weapons, along with flammable materials such as saltpeter and kerosene. Dozens of members of the Japanese Youth Association set fire to the Sanyou Industrial Society at night , and hacked to death and injured two Chinese policemen from the Municipal Council who came to organize firefighting. That afternoon, Tanaka Takayoshi instigated 1,200 Japanese expatriates to gather at the Japanese Residents' Association on Wenjianshi Road, and marched along Beichuan Road to the Japanese Marine Corps Headquarters at the north end of the road, demanding that the Japanese Marine Corps intervene. When they reached Qiujiang Road, they started rioting and attacked Chinese shops. In response, Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng formally protested to Japan. Japan in return demanding a formal apology from the mayor and the apprehension of the person responsible for the death of the Japanese monk. Japan also insisted that China pay compensation for medical and funeral expenses, handle the anti-Japanese protests, and immediately disband any groups hostile to Japan. China had the option to firmly reject these unreasonable demands. On the morning of January 21, Japanese Consul General Murai Kuramatsu met with Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng to express regret for the Japanese arson and the killing of Chinese police officers. He promised to arrest the Japanese ronin responsible for the fire. At the same time, he presented a formal protest regarding the "Japanese monk incident" and outlined four demands: (1) The mayor must issue an apology to the Consul General; (2) The authorities should swiftly and effectively search for, arrest, and punish the perpetrators; (3) The five victims should receive medical compensation and consolation money; (4) All illegal actions against Japan should be prohibited, with the Shanghai Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association and other anti-Japanese groups disbanded promptly.  Starting on January 22, Admiral Shiozawa of the Japanese Navy and Consul General Murai demanded that Shanghai Mayor Wu dissolve anti-Japanese groups and halt any boycott activities. Representatives of Japanese business conglomerates also filed complaints with the Shanghai International Settlement's Municipal Council, calling for an official apology from China for the offensive report and attacks on monks, and demanding that the attackers be punished. As tensions rose, the Japanese Residents Association urged Japanese naval forces in Shanghai to take measures to protect their safety. That same day Yukichi Shiozawa, Commander of the 1st Japanese Expeditionary Fleet in Shanghai, made a threatening declaration, stating that if the mayor of Shanghai failed to respond adequately to the four demands presented by Matsui, the Japanese Navy would take "appropriate action." Even before this the Japanese Navy had deployed troops and sent additional warships to Shanghai under the pretext of protecting its citizens In addition to the warships that arrived in Shanghai after the Mukden incident, the Japanese Navy sent the cruiser Oi and the 15th Destroyer Squadron (comprising four destroyers) from the mainland Wu Port on January 21. They carried over 450 personnel from the 1st Special Marine Corps along with a large supply of arms and arrived in Shanghai on January 23. The following day, the Notoro special service ship (an aircraft carrier of 14,000 tons, carrying six aircraft) anchored in Port Arthur, also arrived in Shanghai. On January 22, the Japanese government convened a meeting and decided to take appropriate measures, with Navy Minister Osumi Tsuneo handling the situation as deemed necessary. By January 25, the heads of the Japanese Navy Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a joint session, where they agreed that if the Chinese side failed to demonstrate sincerity or meet Japan's demands, force would be used to ensure compliance. They also agreed on specific “emergency actions." On January 26, the Navy Ministry met again and resolved to demonstrate Japan's military strength within the next day or two. The proposed measures were as follows: (1) If the Shanghai garrison was insufficient, the Second Fleet would be deployed; (2) Japanese citizens in Shanghai would be directly protected; (3) The Japanese Navy would secure the route from Wusong to Shanghai; (4) All Chinese vessels would be detained outside Wusongkou; (5) Additional warships would be sent to ports in Nanjing, Hankou, Guangzhou, Shantou, Xiamen, and other locations, with civil unrest in those areas also being addressed. Emperor Hirohito authorized the Japanese Navy's military actions. On the 26th, Hirohito's military meeting, led by Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in (Prince Zaihito), ordered Yukichi Shiozawa in Shanghai to "exercise the right of self-defense." That same day, the Japanese Navy Ministry urgently deployed the 1st Torpedo Squadron (flagship "Yubari" cruiser, accompanied by the 22nd, 23rd, and 30th Destroyer Squadrons, totaling 12 destroyers), with over 460 personnel from the 2nd Special Marine Corps, which arrived in Shanghai on the afternoon of January 28. By this time, the Japanese military had gathered 24 warships, over 40 aircraft, more than 1,830 marines, and between 3,000 to 4,000 armed personnel in Shanghai, stationed across the Japanese concession and along the Huangpu River. On January 28, the Japanese Navy Ministry instructed the deployment of the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho, the cruisers Naka, Yura, and Abukuma, and four mine carriers from the mainland to Shanghai. Back on the 24th, 1932, Japanese intelligence agents set fire to the residence of the Japanese Ambassador to China, Shigemitsu Mamoru, in Shanghai, falsely accusing the Chinese of the act. On the 27th, Murai issued an ultimatum to the Shanghai authorities, demanding a satisfactory response to four conditions by 18:00 on the 28th, threatening necessary actions if the deadline was not met. Meanwhile, with threats and rumors of a Japanese naval landing circulating in Shanghai, the nearby 19th route army units moved closer to the International Settlement's Little Tokyo. The 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Army was in charge of defending Shanghai at the time, with Jiang Guangnai serving as the commander-in-chief and Cai Tingkai as the commander. Chen Mingshu, the leader of the 19th Route Army and commander of the Beijing-Shanghai garrison, was a strong proponent of responding to the Japanese army's provocations. The Chinese public, along with critics of the Nanjing government, called for punishment of the Manchurian warlord forces who had failed to halt the Kwantung Army's blitzkrieg, which encouraged officers of the 19th Route army to take a firm stance. As the Nanjing government had not enacted any policies, General Cai Tingkai and his colleagues convened an emergency meeting on January 23, pledging to resist any potential Japanese naval invasion of Shanghai at all costs. Now the Nanjing government response to this crisis was quite chaotic as you can imagine. There was still a anti communist campaign going on, Manchuria was being taken over and Chiang Kai-Shek fully understood they could ill afford an all out war with Japan. There was a general feeling things were getting out of hand, the league of nations were failing to do anything. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek retained his passive stance. On January 23rd after extensive consultations with Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek, newly appointed Executive Yuan President Sun Ke urgently telegraphed Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng. "Our priority should be the preservation of Shanghai as the economic center, adopting a moderate stance towards Japan's demands. We must immediately gather all sectors to diplomatically explain our position and avoid conflict to prevent Shanghai from being seized by force." That same day, Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin also sent a telegram to Wu Tiecheng, emphasizing, "Shanghai is our economic hub, and we must continue peaceful negotiations and avoid conflict." On that same day He Yingqin instructed the 19th Route Army to withdraw from Shanghai and relocate west of Nanxiang within five days. Zhang Jingjiang then invited Cai Tingkai to Du Yuesheng's home, where he convinced the 19th Route Army to "withdraw to the Nanxiang area to avoid confrontation with the Japanese." Upon learning of the Nationalist government's position, both Chiang Kai-shek and Cai Ying-ying were disappointed, but they expressed willingness to follow military orders and withdraw from Shanghai. As Chiang Guangnai put it, "We must simply obey the government's orders." On the afternoon of January 27, Chief of Staff Zhu Peide and Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin deployed the 6th Military Police Regiment to assume responsibility for defending the 19th Route Army's positions in the Zhabei area of Shanghai. The regiment departed Nanjing Station at 8 pm on January 27, reaching Zhenru by noon on the 28th. The first battalion arrived at Shanghai North Station that afternoon, preparing to take over defense from the 6th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 78th Division of the 19th Route Army in Zhabei at dawn on January 29. Back on the 27th, after Murai issued an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities in Shanghai, Mayor Wu Tiecheng, responding to a request from both the Nanjing National Government and various sectors of Shanghai, sent a letter on the 28th at 13:45 accepting all the unreasonable demands made by the Japanese. Later, at 11:05 pm the Shanghai Public Security Bureau received a response from Murai, which was directed to both Mayor Wu Tiecheng and the head of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau. In the letter, Murai expressed "satisfaction" with Shanghai's acceptance of Japan's four demands, but also insisted on the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Zhabei, citing the need to protect overseas Chinese. Wu Tiecheng received this response at 11:25 pm At 11:30 pm, without waiting for a reply from the Chinese side, the Japanese military launched an attack on the Chinese garrison in Zhabei. In response, Weng Zhaoyuan's troops from the 156th Brigade of the 78th Division of the 19th Route Army, along with part of the 6th Regiment of the Military Police that had been sent to reinforce the defense, fought back.  During the January 28 Incident, the 19th Route Army, stationed in the Beijing-Shanghai area, was the Chinese military force involved. Following the September 18 Incident, Chiang Kai-shek entered into negotiations with the Guangdong faction. As part of these discussions between Nanjing and Guangdong, the Guangdong side proposed that Chen Mingshu, a Cantonese leader, be appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Beijing-Shanghai garrison. On September 30, 1931, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to this proposal. Consequently, the 19th Route Army, under Chen Mingshu's command, was transferred from Ganzhou, Jiangxi, where it had been stationed after the September 18 Incident (following Chiang's decision to halt "suppressing the Communists"), to defend the Beijing-Shanghai area. By November, the army was fully deployed along the Beijing-Shanghai line. The military leadership included Jiang Guangnai as commander-in-chief, Cai Tingkai as army commander, and Dai Ji as the garrison commander. The army was composed of the 60th Division, led by Shen Guanghan, stationed in Suzhou and Changzhou; the 61st Division, led by Mao Weishou, stationed in Nanjing and Zhenjiang; and the 78th Division, led by Qu Shounian, stationed in Shanghai, Wusong, Kunshan, and Jiading. The total strength of the army was over 33,000 soldiers. By early November, after the 19th Route Army had secured the Beijing and Shanghai areas, the military leadership, influenced by the Shanghai populace's strong anti-Japanese sentiment, resolved to resist the impending Japanese invasion. On January 15th the 19th Route Army assessed intelligence indicating an inevitable Japanese attack and began preparing for defense, less than two weeks before the invasion. On th 19th Jiang Guangnai convened a meeting of the 19th Route Army officers in Shanghai. During the meeting, several strategic policies were decided, as recalled by Cai Tingkai. These included. Maintaining an invisible state of alert in response to potential enemy harassment. Ensuring that frontline units were adequately reinforced, with Qu Shounian's division tasked with holding for at least five days. Rapidly constructing fortifications in each defense zone, while rear units pre-select lines of resistance. Ensuring that the 60th and 61st divisions could reinforce Shanghai within five days of the start of hostilities. Establishing a stance on the Shanghai Concession. Issuing an order that, starting January 20, no officers or soldiers were to remain in the concession unless on official duty. On January 23, 1932, under mounting pressure from Japan, Chen Mingshu, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and others issued a "Letter to All Officers and Soldiers of the 19th Route Army," urging a great spirit of sacrifice. On the same day, the army issued a secret combat order, stating that they must be fully prepared for war to defend the nation. If the Japanese attacked, all efforts should be focused on repelling them. The 19th Route Army was poised to resist the Japanese invasion in the Songhu area.   On January 24, 1932, Cai Tingkai and his colleagues arrived in Suzhou and held an emergency meeting with senior garrison commanders, including Shen Guanghan, to communicate the secret order issued on January 23. The generals unanimously supported the directive. However, under pressure from the National Government to avoid war, Chiang, Cai, and others reluctantly agreed to comply with an order to withdraw from Shanghai. They ordered the Zhabei garrison to exchange duties with the 6th Military Police Regiment on the morning of January 29. Due to the tense situation, the commander of the 156th Brigade of the 78th Division instructed the 6th Regiment at Zhabei to remain on high alert. At 11:00 PM on January 28, Dai Ji also ordered strict vigilance to prevent the Japanese army from occupying Zhabei during the guard change, instructing all units to take their positions and be on high alert. At 11:30 pm on January 28, 1932, Major General Shiozawa and the Japanese Marine Corps unexpectedly attacked the Chinese garrison located on the west side of North Sichuan Road. In response, the 6th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, commanded by Zhang Junsong, promptly initiated a strong counteroffensive. At that moment, the Japanese forces, spearheaded by over 20 armored vehicles, split into five groups and launched assaults from different intersections in Zhabei. Upon receiving news of the Japanese attack, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Dai Ji hurried to Zhenru Station on foot during the night, established a temporary command center, and instructed the rear troops to advance swiftly to Shanghai as per the original plan. At dawn on the 29th, the Japanese forces launched a series of intense assaults, supported by armored vehicles. Aircraft from the carrier "Notoro" bombed the Zhabei and Nanshi districts, leading to rapid escalation of the conflict. The 156th Brigade of the defending forces fiercely resisted the Japanese advances, using cluster grenades against the enemy's armored units and organizing stealth squads to sabotage enemy vehicles. They held their positions and counterattacked at opportune moments under artillery cover, successfully repelling the relentless Japanese assaults. According to Japanese accounts, the battle was described as "extremely fierce, with fires raging everywhere, flames filling the sky, and the battlefield in a state of devastation." At around 10 am, Japanese aircraft dropped bombs, causing the Commercial Press and the Oriental Library to catch fire, resulting in the destruction of over 300,000 books, including many rare ancient texts. More than a thousand Japanese soldiers, shielded by heavy artillery and armored vehicles, launched a vigorous attack at the intersection of Baoshan Road and Qiujiang Road, aiming to seize the Shanghai North Railway Station. This station was a crucial land transport hub, and its control was vital for the safety of the entire Zhabei area. At 2 pm on the 29th, taking advantage of the chaos at the North Station, the Japanese forces mounted a fierce assault. A company from our military police engaged in combat with the Japanese for an hour before withdrawing from the station. By 5 pm on the 29th, the main force of the 156th Brigade entered the fray and launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming both the North Station and Tiantong'an Station. They pressed their advantage and captured the Japanese Shanghai Marine Corps Headquarters, forcing the Japanese troops to retreat east of North Sichuan Road and south of Target Road. The initial Japanese offensive ended in defeat. Following the setback, British and American consuls intervened to mediate in the afternoon of the 29th (the Shanghai government stated it was at the request of the Japanese consuls, while the League of Nations report indicated it was initiated by the mayor of Shanghai). The Chinese and Japanese forces agreed to cease hostilities at 8 pm that night. Although the 19th Route Army recognized this as a delaying tactic, they consented to the ceasefire to allow for troop redeployment. Concurrently, the 19th Route Army strengthened their positions, urgently ordering the 60th Division from east of Zhenjiang to move into Nanxiang and Zhenru, while transferring the 61st Division to Shanghai. The 78th Division, stationed in Shanghai, was fully mobilized to the front lines to bolster defenses and prepare for further combat. Following the ceasefire, the Japanese army made significant efforts to bolster its forces. The Japanese Navy Ministry promptly dispatched four destroyers from the Sasebo 26th Squadron, under the command of the cruiser "Tatsuta," to reach Shanghai on January 30 and dock at Huangpu Wharf. Accompanying the vessels were 474 soldiers from the Sasebo 3rd Special Marine Corps, along with a substantial supply of ammunition. On the morning of January 31, the Japanese aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho reached Shanghai, bringing approximately 30 aircraft from the First Air Fleet. They anchored off the coast of the Ma'an Islands, about 130 kilometers east of Shanghai. By 4 pm, three cruisers Naka , Yura , and Abukuma along with four torpedo boats arrived in Shanghai, transporting over 2,000 marines who disembarked in groups. On February 1, the Japanese cruise ship "Terukoku Maru," carrying the Yokosuka 1st Special Marine Corps 525 men, docked at Shanghai Huishan Wharf. On the 2nd, the Japanese Navy Central Headquarters established the Third Fleet with ships from the First Overseas Fleet in the Yangtze River area, with the Izumo serving as the flagship (the Izumo arrived in Shanghai on February 6) under the command of Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, to execute coordinated military operations. Following the reinforcement of Japanese forces, they resumed attacks on Chinese defenders in Zhabei, Baziqiao, and other locations on February 3 but were still repelled. On February 4, the Japanese launched their first major offensive, expanding the conflict to Jiangwan and Wusong. After a day of intense fighting, the Wusong open-air artillery fort suffered destruction from enemy bombardment, yet the Chinese defenders successfully prevented a Japanese landing. The anti-aircraft artillery unit from the 88th Division, assigned to the 4th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, shot down a Japanese aircraft. Following the failure of the general offensive, Yukiichi Shiozawa was relieved of his command and sent back to Japan. Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, the newly appointed commander of the Third Fleet, took over Shiozawa's position. Upon his appointment, the Japanese military began to bolster its forces. Even before the situation in Shanghai escalated, Japan had planned to deploy ground troops, but this was initially rejected by the navy. However, as the situation deteriorated, the navy had to request assistance from the army. On February 2, the Japanese cabinet officially decided to deploy ground forces. Due to the urgent circumstances in Shanghai, they resolved to send the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade, led by Major General Shimomoto Kuma and the 9th Division, led by Lieutenant General Ueda Kenkichi, with the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade and the Second Independent Tank Squadron being transported first. Concurrently, the Japanese Navy dispatched the Yokosuka 2nd Special Marine Corps to Shanghai. The 24th Mixed Brigade landed in Wusong on the afternoon of February 7.  Now within the backdrop of all of this Nanjing was certainly freaking out. What had started as a small incident, had escalated into a full blown battle. The Japanese were continuously sending reinforcements, and now so was China. Chiang Kai-Shek had recently resigned and came back as Generalissimo ushering in the slogan "first internal pacification, then external resistance." With that he had led a massive campaign against the Jiangxi Soviet, while avoiding a frontal war against Japan. Obviously this led to wide scale protest in China, which in turn contributed to this new incident in Shanghai. The Shanghai incident was certainly disrupting Chiang Kai-Shek's offensives against the communists, allowing those like Hu Hanmin's Guangdong based 19th Route Army to deal with the Japanese at Shanghai. Yet how long could Chiang Kai-Shek keep this up? Should he divert all attention to the Japanese? Will he step down again in shame for not facing the encroaching foreign empire?  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The January 28th Incident was yet another powder keg like moment for the very vulnerable and still fractured Chinese nation. Chiang Kai-Shek had internal enemies left-right and center and now the Empire of Japan was pressing its luck to keep seizing more and more from his nation. What was the Generalissimo to do in the face of these insurmountable odds?   

Last time we spoke about the Great Tokyo Air Raid. Amidst fierce battles, Liversedge's forces captured key hills but faced relentless Japanese machine-gun fire. Despite heavy casualties, the Marines advanced, securing strategic positions. General Kuribayashi recognized their struggle, while the Japanese counterattacks faltered. After 19 grueling days, the last pockets of resistance fell, marking a costly victory for the Americans. Amid the fierce battle of Iwo Jima, General LeMay shifted tactics, launching incendiary raids on Tokyo. On March 9, 1945, 334 B-29s unleashed destruction, igniting widespread fires and devastating neighborhoods. The attack shattered Japanese morale, while LeMay's strategy proved effective, paving the way for further offensives in the Pacific. On March 3, three brigades attacked Meiktila, facing fierce resistance. Tanks overwhelmed Japanese forces, resulting in heavy casualties. As Cowan fortified defenses, Japanese counterattacks intensified. Meanwhile, in Mandalay, British-Indian troops advanced, capturing key positions. Amidst confusion and conflicting orders, the Allies pressed forward, striving for victory in Burma. This episode is the Fall of Mandalay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are first picking up this week with the men fighting over northern Luzon. By March 5, General Clarkson's 33rd Division had advanced to Agoo and Pago while gradually pushing the enemy along Route 11. Meanwhile, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla force was carrying out limited offensives in the Laoag, Cervantes, and San Fernando regions. Coming into Salacsac Pass from the west, the Villa Verde Trail twists up the wooded western slopes of a steep-sided height known to the 32nd Division as Hill 502. Another peak, bare crested, forming part of the same hill mass and named Hill 503, centers 250 yards northeast of the crest of Hill 502, while a similar distance to the southeast is Hill 504. Winding along the southern slopes of Hills 502 and 504, the trail continues eastward through a low saddle about 500 yards long, climbing again up the forested northwestern side of Hill 505. After crossing that hill, the trail follows a twisting course 600 yards--as the crow flies--eastward, hugging the densely wooded northern slopes of Hills 506A and 506B. Off the northeast corner of Hill 506B the trail turns south for 1000 yards--again a straight-line distance--and traverses the east side of the noses of Hill 507, designated from north to south A, B, C and D. Turning sharply east again near Hill 507D, the trail continues east another 700 yards and then enters a deep wooded saddle between Hill 508 on the south and Hill 515 to the north. After passing through this saddle, which is about 250 yards long east to west, the trail goes on eastward, dominated on the north by Hills 516 and 525. Roughly 1250 yards beyond the saddle the trail twists across the northern slopes of Hill 526, which lying about 500 yards southeast of Hill 525, marks the eastern limits of the Salacsac Pass area. A mile and a quarter of less rugged but still forested and difficult terrain lies between Hill 526 and barrio Imugan, in turn two and a quarter miles west of Santa Fe.  Meanwhile General Mullins' 25th Division had successfully taken control of Puncan and Digdig. Due to this unexpectedly swift progress, General Swift instructed Mullins to continue advancing toward Putlan while the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment fought for control of Hill 502, which was secured on March 7. In response, Mullins dispatched the 161st Regiment to attack the high ground west of Route 5, the 27th Regiment to advance along and east of the highway, and the 35th Regiment to execute a wide envelopment to the east. Since this last flank approach to Putlan was completely undefended, the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment quickly occupied Putlan on March 8. The following day, the 27th Regiment also arrived in the area and began clearing Japanese stragglers from the ravines east of Route 5 near the barrio, a task that would not be finished until March 15. Finally, despite facing rough terrain and light resistance, the 161st Regiment reached Putlan on March 10, successfully securing the high ground to the west. To the north, as the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment struggled to make significant progress eastward after capturing Hill 502, Gill decided to send the 3rd Battalion, 127th Regiment to outflank the Salacsac Pass defenses from the south.  Although the extremely rough, precipitous mountain country of the Salacsac Pass area, averaging 4500 feet above sea level, was covered by dense rainforest, from Hill 506B to Hill 526, there was sufficient open ground throughout to provide the defender with excellent observation. It was not too difficult for the Japanese to find positions whence they could cover with fire every square foot of the Villa Verde Trail through the pass area. The twisting of the trail also provided defense opportunities, for in a given 1000 yards of straight-line distance through the pass, the trail might actually cover a ground distance of 3000 yards. Whatever its shortcomings in other fields, the Japanese Army always had a feel for terrain, exploiting to the full every advantage the ground offered. Thus, as it moved up, the 2nd Tank Division set to work to establish a system of mutually supporting defensive positions in order to control every twist of the Villa Verde Trail and every fold in the ground throughout the pass area. Every knoll and hillock on or near the trail was the site of at least one machine gun emplacement; every wooded draw providing a route for outflanking a position was zeroed in for artillery or mortars. The cave, natural or man-made, came to characterize the defenses. Artillery was employed in quantity and quality not often encountered in engagements against the Japanese, who, as usual, made excellent use of their light and medium mortars. Finally, the 2nd Tank Division was overstocked in automatic weapons, evidently having available many more than the 32nd Division could bring to bear. To the west, following recent successes in patrols, Clarkson opted to establish a new "secure line" stretching from Aringay southeast through Pugo to Route 11 at Twin Peaks. Consequently, patrols quickly secured Aringay and Caba without facing any opposition, then advanced east along the trails to Pugo and Galiano, and north to Bauang, where they continued to encounter minimal enemy presence. As a result of these movements, the Hayashi Detachment was ultimately withdrawn to bolster the main defenses at Sablan, enabling Volckman's 121st Regiment to enter San Fernando on March 14. Additionally, elements of the 19th Division began arriving in the Cervantes area from Baguio and successfully expelled the guerrilla company from the town in early March. The Filipinos recaptured Cervantes on March 13 but soon found themselves targeted by Japanese artillery positioned on elevated ground. Meanwhile, looking south, by March 5, General Patrick's 6th Division had commenced unsuccessful assaults on Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, while General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade struggled to advance toward the Antipolo area. Recognizing that the success of his attack required a concentration of forces along a narrower front, General Griswold decided to focus on the Noguchi Force and the left flank of the Kobayashi Force, as the northern area was heavily fortified. He retained only one battalion as an infantry reserve and directed the remainder of his available forces, all of which were understrength, to push eastward. Alongside the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 103rd Regiment reached Taytay on March 7 to serve as the 1st Cavalry Division Reserve, signaling the upcoming relief of the cavalrymen in preparation for their redeployment to southern Luzon. By March 10, General Wing's 43rd Division had been replaced in the Clark Field area by the 38th Division and was en route to the eastern front.  The 38th Division pushed on into the untracked, ill-explored, and worse-mapped wilderness of the central Zambales Range, its progress slowed more by supply problems than Japanese resistance. In early April the division noted that the last vestiges of any controlled defensive effort had disappeared. Unknown to 11th Corps General Tsukada, on April 6, had given up and had ordered his remaining forces to disperse and continue operations, if possible, as guerrillas. For the Japanese remnants, it was a case of sauve qui peut. Some tried to escape to Luzon's west coast, whence 38th Division troops were already patrolling inland; others tried to make their way north through the mountains, only to be cut down by American patrols working southward from Camp O'Donnell. The 38th Division had killed about 8000 of the scattering Japanese by the time it was relieved by units of the 6th Division on May 3. The losses of the 38th totaled approximately 100 men killed and 500 wounded. The 6th Division, elements of which remained in the Kembu area until June 25, limited its operations to patrolling and setting up trail blocks along Japanese routes of escape. Troops of the 38th Division ultimately returned to the region and remained there until the end of the war. Insofar as US forces were concerned, the mop-up period under 11th Corps control was even more costly than had been the 14th Corps' offensive period. From February 21 to the end of June the various elements of 11th Corps committed to action against the Kembu Group lost approximately 550 men killed and 2200 wounded. The Kembu Group, during the same period, lost 12500 killed or dead from starvation and disease. By the end of the war the original 30000 troops of the Kembu Group were reduced to approximately 1500 sorry survivors, about 1000 of them Army personnel. Another 500 had already been taken prisoner. As a result, General Tsukada ordered his remaining troops to scatter and operate as guerrillas. Meanwhile, Griswold resumed his eastern offensive on March 8. In the south, bolstered by artillery and mortars, the battered 2nd Cavalry Brigade continued to advance slowly under heavy artillery fire, reaching a point 440 yards short of Antipolo along Route 60A and overcoming the enemy cave defenses at Benchmark 11. By March 11, patrols had entered Antipolo, discovering the town was devastated and deserted, yet still under the threat of Japanese artillery and mortars positioned in the hills to the north and northeast. Simultaneously, the 1st Cavalry Brigade made significant strides to the north, also coming within 440 yards of Antipolo while clearing Benchmark 9 Hill and Hills 520 and 740. Abandoning the Montalban-San Mateo area, Patrick instructed the 1st and 20th Regiments to advance toward Mounts Baytangan and Yabang. Facing unexpectedly light resistance, the 1st Regiment advanced a mile and a half east by March 11 and secured Benchmark 8 Hill to the south despite encountering stubborn opposition. Recognizing the need to capitalize on this success, Patrick then ordered the 20th Regiment to move through the 1st and attack north toward Wawa Dam while the latter continued its eastward assault. On March 11, the 103rd Regiment took over from the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and quickly began planning to outflank General Noguchi's defenses located southeast of Antipolo. However, due to concerns over American advances, General Yokoyama ordered the Noguchi Force to retreat to secondary defensive positions while preparing for a three-pronged counterattack set for March 12. The primary effort involved four reserve battalions from the Kobayashi Force, which launched an attack southward from Mount Mataba toward Marikina but were quickly halted by intense air and artillery fire, falling far short of their target. Additionally, the 182nd Independent Battalion attempted a counterattack toward Benchmark 8 but was unsuccessful, while the majority of the Kawashima Force advanced south from the Ipo Dam area to assault the rear installations of the 6th Division west of the Marikina River, where they were easily repelled by March 15. During this so-called counterattack, Griswold continued his offensive, with the 103rd Regiment swiftly advancing through the deserted Antipolo to Benchmark 7 Hill, and the 20th Regiment moving over a mile north to secure a position on a grassy ridge less than a mile southeast of Mount Mataba's summit. On March 14, the 1st Regiment resumed its eastern assault, successfully advancing north to a bare peak about a mile southwest of Mount Baytangan, despite facing strong resistance that caused heavy casualties, including the loss of General Patrick, who was succeeded by Brigadier-General Charles Hurdis as commander of the 6th Division. Simultaneously, Wing initiated a coordinated offensive with two regiments toward Mounts Yabang, Caymayuman, and Tanauan, aiming to flank the Shimbu Group's left. Although the 103rd and 179th Regiments achieved significant progress that day, Noguchi's determined defenders managed to maintain control of Benchmark 7. Looking further south, Griswold was preparing to launch a two-pronged offensive in southern Luzon. General Swing's 511th Parachute Regiment and the 187th Glider Regiment were set to advance towards Lipa from the north and northwest, while the 158th Regiment gathered near Nasugbu to attack southeast along Route 17 toward Balayan Bay. In response, Colonel Fujishige's Fuji Force had established several small positions in the area to prevent American forces from flanking the Shimbu Group's main defenses by rounding the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay. Swing's offensive commenced on March 7, with the 187th Glider Regiment descending the steep southern slopes of Tagaytay Ridge to the northern shore of Lake Taal, ultimately stopping at a hill two miles west of Tanauan due to strong resistance. The 511th Parachute Regiment moved out from Real, reaching within a mile of Santo Tomas while launching unsuccessful frontal assaults on Mount Bijiang. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment advanced from Nasugbu, quickly securing Balayan before pushing eastward with little opposition toward Batangas, which fell on March 11. On its eastward path, the regiment bypassed significant elements of the 2nd Surface Raiding Base Force on the Calumpan Peninsula, necessitating that a battalion clear that area by March 16. At the same time, other units of the 158th Regiment encountered robust Japanese defenses blocking Route 417 at Mount Macolod, where their advance came to a halt. Concurrently, General Eichelberger continued his offensive against the central islands of the Visayan Passages, with reinforced companies from the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment successfully landing on Romblon and Simara islands on March 11 and 12, respectively. Most importantly for Eichelberger, he was about to initiate his Visayas Campaign. To disrupt Japanese communication lines across the South China Sea, the 8th Army needed to quickly capture airfields that would allow the Allied Air Forces to project land-based air power over the waters west of the Philippines more effectively than from Clark Field or Mindoro. Consequently, the first target chosen was Palawan, which was defended by only two reinforced companies from the 102nd Division. Additionally, MacArthur's strategy included the eventual reoccupation of the East Indies, starting with the capture of Japanese-controlled oil resources in northern Borneo as soon as land-based air support was available. The Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago were identified as the second targets, although these areas were defended by stronger garrisons from the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. Despite this, Eichelberger tasked Major-General Jens Doe's 41st Division with executing these invasions. For the Palawan invasion, codenamed Operation Victor III, Brigadier-General Harold Haney was appointed to lead a force primarily composed of the 186th Regiment, which would be transported to the island by Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2. The convoy departed from Mindoro on February 26, escorted by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs' cruisers and destroyers. Following a naval bombardment, Haney's Palawan Force successfully landed at Puerto Princesa on February 28 without encountering any opposition. They quickly secured the town and the two airstrips to the east, advancing to the western and southern shores of the harbor by late afternoon to establish a defensive perimeter. As the first day progressed, it became clear to the American troops that the Japanese troops would not put up a fight at Puerto Princesa and had withdrawn into the hills to the northwest. More disturbing was the revelation of a massacre of approximately 140 American prisoners of war the previous December. The presence of a passing Allied convoy made the alarmed Japanese believe that an invasion was imminent and had herded their prisoners into air-raid shelters, subsequently setting the shelters afire and shooting prisoners who tried to escape. Only 11 American prisoners of war miraculously survived immolation and escaped the shooting. Sheltered by natives until the Americans landed, they emerged during the battle to tell their horrifying tale, which only hardened American resolve to end Japanese rule over the island. By March 1, the 186th Regiment had successfully taken control of Irahuan and Tagburos. In the following week, American forces would eliminate two or three heavily defended strongholds located ten miles north-northwest of Puerto Princesa, where the enemy garrison was ultimately defeated. The Palawan Force also conducted reconnaissance of several offshore islets, discovering no Japanese presence on some and swiftly clearing others. However, due to the poorly compacted soil, the new airfield on the island would not be operational until March 20, which was too late for any aircraft based in Palawan to assist with the Zamboanga landings. Consequently, on March 8, two reinforced companies from the 21st Regiment were flown to the airstrip at Dipolog, which had been secured by Colonel Hipolito Garma's guerrilla 105th Division. On the same day, sixteen Marine Corsairs arrived to provide air support for the invasion of Zamboanga, codenamed Operation Victor IV. For this operation, Doe assigned the remainder of his division, which was to be transported by Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1. After three days of pre-assault bombardments and minesweeping, the convoy finally set sail southward and entered Basilan Strait from the west early on March 10. Troops from the 162nd Regiment landed almost without opposition around 09:15 near barrio San Mateo and quickly secured Wolfe Field, while the 163rd Regiment was also landing. Doe's two regiments then began to advance inland, facing minimal resistance as they established a night perimeter. With the Japanese having withdrawn, the 162nd and 163rd Regiments easily secured Zamboanga City, San Roque Airfield, and the rest of the coastal plain by dusk on March 11, with one company extending further to Caldera Bay to the west. To drive the Japanese forces from the elevated positions overlooking the airfield, Doe dispatched the 162nd Regiment towards Mount Capisan and the 163rd Regiment towards Mount Pulungbata. Additionally, the guerrilla 121st Regiment was tasked with blocking the east coast road in the Belong area. Supported by continuous artillery fire and close air support from Marine Corps planes, the two regiments of the 41st Division faced arduous tasks. General Hojo's troops held excellent defenses in depth across a front 5 miles wide, some portions of the line being 3 miles deep. All installations were protected by barbed wire; abandoned ground was thoroughly booby-trapped; mine fields, some of them of the remote-control type, abounded; and at least initially the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade had an ample supply of automatic weapons and mortars. While Japanese morale on the Zamboanga Peninsula was not on a par with that of 14th Area Army troops on Luzon, most of the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade and attached units had sufficient spirit to put up a strong fight as long as they held prepared positions, and Hojo was able to find men to conduct harassing counterattacks night after night. Finally, the terrain through which the 41st Division had to attack was rough and overgrown, giving way on the north to the rain forests of the partially unexplored mountain range forming the backbone of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Only poor trails existed in most of the area held by the Japanese, and the 41st Division had to limit its advance to the pace of bulldozers, which laboriously constructed supply and evacuation roads. Once the American troops entered the peninsula's foothills, tanks could not operate off the bulldozed roads. The next day, the 186th Regiment was deployed to relieve the fatigued 163rd Regiment on the eastern front. By the end of the month, it had expanded the front eastward and northward against diminishing resistance, ultimately forcing Hojo's forces to retreat into the rugged interior of the peninsula. For now, however, we will shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to continue our coverage of the Chinese-British-Indian offensives. As we last observed, General Stopford's 33rd Corps was aggressively advancing into Mandalay against a weakened 15th Army, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division had successfully captured Meiktila and was preparing to withstand the combined assaults of the 18th and 49th Divisions. Cowan's forces conducted a robust defense, managing to delay the arrival of the 49th Division until March 18 and successfully repelling General Naka's initial attacks on Meiktila's main airfield. Furthermore, with the reserve 5th Indian Division moving closer to the front in preparation for an advance towards Rangoon, General Slim decided to airlift the 9th Brigade to reinforce Cowan's troops, which landed on Meiktila's main airfield under enemy fire between March 15 and 17. Due to the slow progress on this front and General Katamura's preoccupation with the battles along the Irrawaddy, he was unable to manage the southern units simultaneously. Consequently, General Kimura decided to assign the 33rd Army to take over the fighting in Meiktila. General Honda promptly moved to Hlaingdet, where he was tasked with overseeing the 18th, 49th, and 53rd Divisions. On March 18, he ordered the 18th Division to secure the northern line of Meiktila and neutralize enemy airfields. He instructed the 49th Division to advance along the Pyawbwe-Meiktila road and directed the 53rd Division to regroup near Pyawbwe. However, on that same day, Cowan launched a counterattack by sending two tank-infantry columns to disrupt Japanese preparations along the Mahlaing road and in the villages of Kandaingbauk and Shawbyugan. They faced heavy resistance at Shawbyugan and ultimately had to withdraw. The relentless air assaults also compelled the Japanese to operate primarily at night, limiting their ability to respond with similar force to British offensives. On the night of March 20, Naka decided to initiate a significant attack on Meiktila's main airfield. However, with the 119th Regiment delayed at Shawbyugan, the 55th Regiment had to proceed alone, supported by some tanks, against the defenses of the 99th Brigade around Kyigon. Heavy artillery and mortar fire ultimately disrupted their assault. Meanwhile, as the 49th Division was consolidating its forces to the southeast, Cowan opted to send two tank-infantry columns to eliminate enemy concentrations at Nyaungbintha and Kinlu. Although the initial sweeps met little resistance, the 48th Brigade encountered strong Japanese positions at Shwepadaing on March 21. The next day, Cowan dispatched two tank-infantry columns to secure the Shwepadaing and Tamongan regions, but the British-Indian forces still struggled to eliminate the enemy defenders. That night, Lieutenant-General Takehara Saburo initiated his first significant assault, with the majority of the 106th Regiment targeting the defensive positions of the 48th Brigade in southeastern Meiktila. Despite the fierce and relentless attacks from the Japanese throughout the night, they were ultimately repelled by artillery and machine-gun fire, suffering heavy casualties. On March 23, Cowan sent another tank-infantry column to chase the retreating Japanese forces; however, the reformed 169th Regiment at Kinde successfully defended against this advance. Meanwhile, on the night of March 24, Naka launched another major offensive with the 55th and 119th Regiments, managing to capture Meiktila's main airfield. In response, Cowan quickly dispatched a tank-infantry column to clear the Mandalay road, successfully securing the area northeast of Kyigon by March 26. At this time, Honda had relocated his headquarters to Thazi to better coordinate the battle, although his troops had already suffered significant losses. For the next three days, Cowan's tanks and infantry continued to advance along the Mandalay road while the 63rd and 99th Brigades worked to eliminate Naka's artillery units south of Myindawgan Lake. By mid-March, Stopford's relentless pressure had forced the 31st and 33rd Divisions to retreat in chaos. On March 20, organized resistance in Mandalay was finally shattered as the 2nd British Division linked up with the 19th Indian Division. Consequently, the beleaguered Japanese units had no option but to withdraw in disarray towards the Shan Hills to the east. Following the collapse of the 15th Army front, the 33rd Army received orders on March 28 to hold its current positions only long enough to facilitate the withdrawal of the 15th Army. Consequently, while Cowan's units cleared the region north of Meiktila, Honda halted all offensive actions and promptly directed the 18th Division to secure the Thazi-Hlaingdet area. Additionally, the weakened 214th Regiment was tasked with moving to Yozon to support the withdrawal of the 33rd Division, while the 49th and 53rd Divisions were assigned to contain Meiktila to the south. As the battles for Mandalay and Meiktila unfolded, the reinforced 7th Indian Division at Nyaungu faced several intense assaults from General Yamamoto's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade throughout March, ultimately advancing to Taungtha and clearing the route to Meiktila by the month's end. Meanwhile, in northern Burma, the 36th British Division advanced toward Mogok, which fell on March 19, while the 50th Chinese Division approached the Hsipaw area. Interestingly, the Japanese abandoned Hsipaw without resistance but launched a fierce counterattack between March 17 and 20. Ultimately, General Matsuyama had no option but to prepare for a withdrawal south toward Lawksawk and Laihka. At this stage, the 38th Chinese Division resumed its advance to Hsipaw; however, facing strong opposition along the route, they did not arrive until March 24, when the entire Burma Road was finally secured. General Sultan believed this was his final maneuver and recommended relocating the Chinese forces back to the Myitkyina area for air transport back to China, except for those needed to secure the Lashio-Hsipaw region. Additionally, the 36th Division continued its eastward push and eventually linked up with the 50th Division in the Kyaukme area by the end of the month before being reassigned to Slim's 14th Army. Looking south, the 74th Indian Brigade and West African forces advanced toward Kolan, while the 26th Indian Division established a new beachhead in the Letpan-Mae region. The 154th Regiment maintained its position near the Dalet River, preventing the remainder of the 82nd West African Division from joining the offensive. On March 23, General Miyazaki decided to launch an attack on Kolan. Although the assault achieved moderate success, Miyazaki soon recognized that he was outnumbered and opted to begin a final withdrawal toward the An Pass, completing this by the end of the month.   Meanwhile, on March 17, the 121st Regiment sent its 3rd Battalion to engage the enemy in the Sabyin area and hold their position along the Tanlwe River for as long as possible. Despite strong resistance from the Japanese, British-Indian forces managed to cross the Tanlwe by March 27 and successfully captured Hill 815 two days later. By March 30, the 22nd East African Brigade had also reached Letpan when High Command decided to relieve the units of the 26th Division and return them to India. In a related development, tensions were rising in French Indochina, where the local government refused to permit a Japanese defense of the colony. By early March, Japanese forces began redeploying around the main French garrison towns in Indochina. The Japanese envoy in Saigon Ambassador Shunichi Matsumoto declared to Governor Admiral Jean Decoux that since an Allied landing in Indochina was inevitable, Tokyo command wished to put into place a "common defence" of Indochina. Decoux however resisted stating that this would be a catalyst for an Allied invasion but suggested that Japanese control would be accepted if they actually invaded. This was not enough and Tsuchihashi accused Decoux of playing for time. On 9 March, after more stalling by Decoux, Tsuchihashi delivered an ultimatum for French troops to disarm. Decoux sent a messenger to Matsumoto urging further negotiations but the message arrived at the wrong building. Tsuchihashi, assuming that Decoux had rejected the ultimatum, immediately ordered commencement of the coup. The 11th R.I.C. (régiment d'infanterie coloniale) based at the Martin de Pallieres barracks in Saigon were surrounded and disarmed after their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Moreau, was arrested. In Hue there was sporadic fighting; the Garde Indochinoise, who provided security for the résident supérieur, fought for 19 hours against the Japanese before their barracks was overrun and destroyed. Three hundred men, one third of them French, managed to elude the Japanese and escape to the A Sầu Valley. However, over the next three days, they succumbed to hunger, disease and betrayals - many surrendered while others fought their way into Laos where only a handful survived. Meanwhile, General Eugène Mordant led opposition by the garrison of Hanoi for several hours but was forced to capitulate, with 292 dead on the French side and 212 Japanese. An attempt to disarm a Vietnamese garrison ended badly for the Japanese when 600 of them marched into Quảng Ngãi. The Vietnamese nationalists had been armed with automatic weapons supplied by the OSS parachuted nearby at Kontum. The Japanese had been led to believe that these men would readily defect but the Vietnamese ambushed the Japanese. Losing only three killed and seventeen wounded they inflicted 143 killed and another 205 wounded on the Japanese before they too were overcome. A much larger force of Japanese came the next day but they found the garrison empty. In Annam and Cochinchina only token resistance was offered and most garrisons, small as they were, surrendered. Further north the French had the sympathy of many indigenous peoples. Several hundred Laotians volunteered to be armed as guerrillas against the Japanese; French officers organized them into detachments but turned away those they did not have weapons for. In Haiphong the Japanese assaulted the Bouet barracks: headquarters of Colonel Henry Lapierre's 1st Tonkin Brigade. Using heavy mortar and machine gun fire, one position was taken after another before the barracks fell and Lapierre ordered a ceasefire. Lapierre refused to sign surrender messages for the remaining garrisons in the area. Codebooks had also been burnt which meant the Japanese then had to deal with the other garrisons by force. In Laos, Vientiane, Thakhek and Luang Prabang were taken by the Japanese without much resistance. In Cambodia the Japanese with 8,000 men seized Phnom Penh and all major towns in the same manner. All French personnel in the cities on both regions were either interned or in some cases executed. The Japanese strikes at the French in the Northern Frontier in general saw the heaviest fighting. One of the first places they needed to take and where they amassed the 22nd division was at Lang Son, a strategic fort near the Chinese border. The defences of Lang Son consisted of a series of fort complexes built by the French to defend against a Chinese invasion. The main fortress was the Fort Brière de l'Isle. Inside was a French garrison of nearly 4000 men, many of them Tonkinese, with units of the French Foreign Legion. Once the Japanese had cut off all communications to the forts they invited General Émile Lemonnier, the commander of the border region, to a banquet at the headquarters of the Japanese 22nd Division. Lemonnier declined to attend the event, but allowed some of his staff to go in his place. They were then taken prisoner and soon after the Japanese bombarded Fort Brière de l'Isle, attacking with infantry and tanks. The small forts outside had to defend themselves in isolation; they did so for a time, proving impenetrable, and the Japanese were repelled with some loss. They tried again the next day and succeeded in taking the outer positions. Finally, the main fortress of Brière de l'Isle was overrun after heavy fighting. Lemonnier was subsequently taken prisoner himself and ordered by a Japanese general to sign a document formally surrendering the forces under his command. Lemonnier refused to sign the documents. As a result, the Japanese took him outside where they forced him to dig a grave along with French Resident-superior (Résident-général) Camille Auphelle. Lemonnier again was ordered to sign the surrender documents and again refused. The Japanese subsequently beheaded him. The Japanese then machine-gunned some of the prisoners and either beheaded or bayoneted the wounded survivors. Lang Son experienced particularly intense fighting, with the 22nd Division relentlessly assaulting the 4,000-strong garrison for two days until the main fortress was captured. The Japanese then advanced further north to the border town of Dong Dang, which fell by March 15. The battle of Lạng Sơn cost the French heavy casualties and their force on the border was effectively destroyed. European losses were 544 killed, of which 387 had been executed after capture. In addition 1,832 Tonkinese colonial troops were killed (including 103 who were executed) while another 1,000 were taken prisoner. On 12 March planes of the US Fourteenth Air Force flying in support of the French, mistook a column of Tonkinese prisoners for Japanese and bombed and strafed them. Reportedly between 400 and 600 of the prisoners were killed or wounded.  Nonetheless, the coup was highly successful, with the Japanese subsequently encouraging declarations of independence from traditional rulers in various regions. On 11 March 1945, Emperor Bảo Đại was permitted to announce the Vietnamese "independence"; this declaration had been prepared by Yokoyama Seiko, Minister for Economic Affairs of the Japanese diplomatic mission in Indochina and later advisor to Bao Dai. Bảo Đại complied in Vietnam where they set up a puppet government headed by Tran Trong Kim and which collaborated with the Japanese. King Norodom Sihanouk also obeyed, but the Japanese did not trust the Francophile monarch. Nationalist leader Son Ngoc Thanh, who had been exiled in Japan and was considered a more trustworthy ally than Sihanouk, returned to Cambodia and became Minister of foreign affairs in May and then Prime Minister in August. In Laos however, King Sisavang Vong of Luang Phrabang, who favoured French rule, refused to declare independence, finding himself at odds with his Prime Minister, Prince Phetsarath Ratanavongsa, but eventually acceded on 8 April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. March 1945, saw US forces advance in Luzon, overcoming Japanese defenses through strategic maneuvers, while guerrilla activities intensified amid challenging terrain and heavy resistance. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces advanced against Japanese troops, capturing key locations and in French Indochina the Japanese unleashed a brutal coup d'etat ushering in independence movements.

Last time we spoke about the first Tientsin Incident. In September 1931, as tensions rose between China and Japan, Commander Zhang Xueliang enjoyed an opera in Beiping, unaware of the impending Mukden Incident. With senior commanders absent, Japanese forces quickly gained local support. Chiang Kai-shek ordered non-resistance, fearing conflict would ruin Northeast China. Meanwhile, Japanese officials plotted to install Puyi as a puppet emperor. Covert riots erupted in Tianjin, orchestrated by the Japanese, leaving the city in chaos as Zhang's forces struggled to maintain order against the well-armed attackers. In a tense standoff at Haiguang Temple, the Japanese military issued an ultimatum to Chinese security forces, citing threats to overseas Chinese. Wang Shuchang ordered a strategic withdrawal, but the Japanese escalated with artillery fire. Despite fierce resistance, the plainclothes attackers regrouped, leading to ongoing skirmishes. Amidst the chaos, Puyi was covertly extracted by Japanese forces, paving the way for the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. Ultimately, Japan's aggression continued, deepening tensions in China.   #142 the Jinzhou Operation  Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. When the Mukden Incident occurred, Zhang Xueliang was in Beiping serving in his capacity as the commander of the North China garrison. On the night of September 18, he was at the opera enjoying a performance by the famous singer Mei Lanfang. His deputies were also away from Shenyang: Wan Fulin was in Beiping, and Zhang Zuoxiang was attending his father's funeral in Jinzhou. With the absence of the senior provincial commanders during the Incident, the Japanese quickly gained cooperation from the acting commanders. In Shenyang, Yu Zhishan, the commander of the Eastern Borders Garrison, and in Changchun, acting provincial forces commander Xi Xia, both swiftly aligned themselves with the Japanese. Although the Northeastern Army had approximately 130,000 troops in the region compared to a Japanese force of 40,000 to 50,000, Chiang Kai-shek urgently issued a non-resistance order to the Northeastern troops, which Zhang Xueliang confirmed. It was actually his stance prior to September 18th, as there had been other incidents such as the Wanbaoshan Incident whereupon Zhang Xueliang sent a secret telegram to his subordinates starting on July 6, "If we go to war with Japan at this time, we will surely be defeated. If we lose, Japan will demand that we cede territory and pay compensation, and Northeast China will be ruined. We should avoid conflict as soon as possible and deal with it in the name of justice." A month after this Chiang Kai-Shek sent a telegram to Zhang Xueliang on August 16th "No matter how the Japanese army seeks trouble in Northeast China in the future, we should not resist and avoid conflict. My brother, please do not act out of anger and disregard the country and the nation. I hope you will follow my instructions." As the tensions between China and Japan increased on September 6th Zhang Xueliang sent this telegram to his subordinates "It has been found that the Japanese diplomatic situation is becoming increasingly tense. We must deal with everything and strive for stability. No matter how the Japanese try to cause trouble, we must be tolerant and not resist them to avoid causing trouble. I hope you will send a secret telegram to all your subordinates to pay close attention to this matter." Thus the Manchurian commanders were already well versed in what their stance would be. Chiang Kai-shek's hesitation to engage in combat is understandable; he was concerned about factions opposing him in South China, the potential reformation of the alliance between Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan in North China, and the threat posed by the CCP in Jiangxi, leaving him unable to confront another adversary. Zhang Xueliang's situation was also not as advantageous as it might seem. Although he commanded nearly 250,000 men, only 100,000 to 130,000 were stationed in the Northeast, with the remainder in Hebei. Both Chiang Kai-Shek and Zhang Xueliang most likely believed the League of Nations or the Wakatsuki government in Tokyo would restrain the occupiers eventually, so they were biding their time. According to Nelson Johnson, the American Minister in China, Counselor Yano of the Japanese Legation in Beiping had informal discussions with Zhang, suggesting that Jinzhou would inevitably succumb to the Japanese and that “the Tokyo Foreign Office would gain prestige and be better able to shape events to China's advantage if the Chinese avoided a clash by withdrawing voluntarily.” It was also implied that some of Zhang's supporters might be reinstated in official roles in the new government in Shenyang. Johnson concluded, “Chang is believed to have been led to his present decision by these inducements, along with the bitter hostility toward him at Nanking and the lack of support from that quarter.” In essence, Zhang was effectively coerced into non-resistance by both sides. Certainly, in December 1931, with no hope for international intervention and the Nanjing government in turmoil following Chiang Kai-shek's temporary resignation, Zhang's options were severely limited. The Kwantung Army received clear instructions not to move beyond the South Manchurian railway zone, which hindered the plans of Lt. Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, the architect of the Manchurian invasion. After securing the region around the South Manchurian railway, Ishiwara focused his attention on Jinzhou. Following the fall of Mukden, Jinzhou became the administrative headquarters and civil government of Zhang Xueliang, making it a focal point for Chinese forces. Jinzhou is the southernmost part of Liaoning province, directly enroute to Shanhaiguan, the critical pass that separates Manchuria from China proper. It was the furthest point Zhang Xueliang could establish an HQ while still holding foot within Manchuria and thus became the defacto “last stand” or “guanwai” outside the Shanhaiguan pass for Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern army. Japanese sources indicate that Zhang Xueliang began covertly instructing local governments in Manchuria to comply with and pay taxes to Jinzhou. He also dispatched spies to Japanese-occupied territories and was conspiring to assassinate Japanese officials and those opposed to Chiang Kai-shek. Obviously Jinzhou had to be seized to control Liaoning and thus all of Manchuria. The Japanese first tried to bully Jinzhou into submission by bombing it. On October 8th, Ishiwara commanded five captured Chinese aircraft from the 10th Independent Air Squadron, flying from Mukden to conduct a raid on Jinzhou, claiming it was merely a reconnaissance mission. They flew over Jinzhou at approximately 1:40 PM and dropped 75 bombs weighing 25 kg each, targeting the barracks of the 28th Division, government buildings, and Zhang Xueliang's residence. Additionally, they took photographs of the Chinese defensive positions. The attack served two main purposes: to intimidate Zhang Xueliang and to send a message to Tokyo HQ. The bombing of Jinzhou caused an uproar in Tokyo and shocked the League of Nations, which had previously been indifferent to the situation. Consequently, Tokyo HQ felt compelled to retroactively approve the Kwantung attacks while simultaneously demanding an end to further actions. Rumors began to circulate that Ishiwara and his associate Itagaki aimed to establish an independent Manchuria as a base for a coup d'état against the Japanese government, intending to initiate a Showa Restoration. On October 18th, War Minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army, ordering them to halt offensives in Manchuria and dispatched Colonel Imamura Hitoshi to ensure Ishiwara and Itagaki ceased their reckless operations. However, when Hitoshi met with the two men at a restaurant in Mukden, they dismissed him. In reality, Ishiwara and Itagaki's plans were in jeopardy, but in early November, they found a pretext for action after Ma Zhanshan's forces damaged the Nenjiang railway bridge. This hostility provided them with justification to invade Heilongjiang alongside their allies, led by General Zhang Haipeng. Following the occupation of the north, a new opportunity arose in the southwest. The "first Tientsin incident" erupted on November 9th, initiated by Colonel Doihara Kenji with assistance from some Anti-Chiang Kai-shek Chinese. A small contingent launched an attack on the peace preservation corps in Tientsin. Doihara devised this plan with the intention of creating chaos to kidnap the former Manchu emperor Puyi, allowing the Kwantung army to later install him as the ruler of a new Manchurian state. Although Doihara sought reinforcements from Tokyo HQ, his request was denied, prompting him to turn to the Kwantung army for support. They agreed to coordinate an attack on Tientsin but insisted that a pretext be established first. To execute this plan, they would need to capture Jinzhou initially. A second Tientsin incident occurred on November 26th, when Chinese soldiers attacked the Japanese barracks in Tientsin at 8:20 PM, marking another false flag operation orchestrated by Doihara. Upon hearing the news, General Honjo Shigeru chose to support the Tientsin army, which they believed was in peril. The 4th Mixed Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the 2nd Division, comprising 10,000 troops, advanced toward 13 armored vehicles stationed along the Peiping-Mukden railway. The Kwantung Army also requested assistance from the Korean Army, and Commander Hayashi organized a mixed brigade to cross the border. Of course in order to provide assistance at Tientsin meant heading through the Shanhaiguan pass and this meant going through Jinzhou. Tokyo General HQ was yet again thrown into consternation by the latest aggravation of the Manchurian crisis. Incensed by the Kwantung Army's “lack of sincerity in submitting to the discipline of Tokyo”. The force got within 30km of Jinzhou when War Minister General Jiro Minami ordered them to immediately withdraw to a line east of the Liao river. Ironically what actually made the Kwantung Army comply was not so much Tokyo's authority but rather the refusal or foot dragging of the Korea Army, who sent a message that they were unwilling to attack Jinzhou. The Kwantung army continued on getting into some skirmishes with Chinese defenders around the Taling River and Takushan as Tokyo HQ sent countless furious messages demanding they withdraw from the Jinzhou area and by the 28th they finally did. Facing the real possibility that the Jinzhou operation might devolve into a fiasco without reinforcements, Ishiwara relented, remarking at the time “Tokyo has collapsed before Jinzhou”. There was another factor at play as well. Some have speculated Ishiwara tossed his hand on the field initiative because he was playing for time, expecting the Japanese government to fall and the substitution of a new team at central army HQ, one perhaps more compliant to the aggressive Kwantung Army.    While the Japanese forces pulled back into the SMR zone, Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro began negotiations with Chiang Kai-Shek's Nanjing government, through the League of Nations, suggesting the Jinzhou area be declared a neutral area. The Chinese initially refused, and while the Kwantung Army declared they would not attack, they still sent aircraft to circle Jinzhou. The Chinese, British, American, and French governments were willing to withdraw their troops from Jinzhou to Shanhaiguan if the Manchurian incident was resolved and Japan committed to not infringing upon the area.    Consequently, Tokyo's headquarters supported this approach and instructed the Kwantung Army to withdraw. Although Zhang Xueliang had assured that his forces would leave Jinzhou by December 7th, this did not occur. As a result, the Japanese began discussions to establish Jinzhou as a neutral zone. The Kwantung army intercepted two Chinese telegrams indicating Zhang Xueliang was strengthening the defenses at Jinzhou and that Nanjing was requesting he not pull his men out. The telegrams were sent to Tokyo HQ who agreed the Chinese were acting in a treacherous manner. The Japanese ambassador then told US Secretary Henry Stimson  “it would be very difficult to withhold the army from advancing again.” Stimson replied “ such actions would convince the American public that Japan's excuse for her incursions, namely that she was combating bandit attacks, was a ruse to destroy the last fragment of Chinese authority in Manchuria. It would be extremely difficult to ask China to withdraw her army from her own territory.” Thus began the Jinzhou Crisis.   On the same day the Japanese ambassador was meeting Stimson in Washington, the Nationalist minister of finance, T.V Soong sent a telegram to Zhang Xueliang advising “any Japanese attack on Jinzhou should be offered utmost resistance.” Also the American Minister in China, Nelson Johnson publicly expressed the view that Zhang Xueliang would resist at Jinzhou if attacked “if only to reassure the students and public in general, some of whom clamor for military action, despite the attitude of his old generals of the Fengtian clique who desire his resignation to enable them to sell out to the Japanese”.   It had become clear to all observers that the Japanese were intent on capturing Jinzhou, whether they were justified to do so or not. Their tactics of intimidation became even bolder as they began dropping air torpedoes on disused sections of railway track on December 10th, disrupting traffic along the Beiping-Shenyang rail route and hinting that the nearby populated areas might be next. Ishiwara's hopes came true on December 13th, whence Prime Minister Wakatsuki resigned on December 11th, having failed to control the Kwantung Army. A new cabinet was formed under Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai, whom resumed negotiations with Nanjing, but then on December 15th, Chiang Kai-Shek resigned as chairman of the Nanjing government, leading Sun Ke to lead a weak interim government. Preoccupied with its own survival, the Nanjing government had no time to deal with the Jinzhou crisis.   Meanwhile War Minister Minami and Chief of staff Kanaya who had tried to moderate the Kwantung Army's aggressive initiatives had been replaced by Araki Sadao, a significantly more aggressive leader who happened to be the leading figure of the Kodoha faction. His counterpart was Prince Kan'in. With these new appointments, the atmosphere in Tokyo general HQ had changed dramatically. The new team elected to change the framing of the situation, they were not performing offensives against Chinese forces, but rather “suppressing bandits”. On December 15th, Tokyo HQ telegraphed Mukden instructing the Kwantung Army to “synchronize an assault on Jinzhou with an attack upon bandits”. Tokyo HQ even agreed to send some reinforcements from Korea and Japan. The 20th IJA division, the 38th mixed brigade of the 19th division crossed the border from Korea and the 8th mixed brigade, 10th division came over from Japan. With this the Kwantung army had been bolstered to around 60,450men.    On December 17th, the Japanese launched attacks on what they referred to as "soldier bandits" in Fak'u and Ch'angtuhsien, which was actually a precursor to their assault on Jinzhou. The following day, December 18th, Japanese aircraft bombed Daonglio, resulting in the deaths of three Chinese civilians and causing widespread panic in the city. The Japanese actions were all the more effective when concentrated with the absolute paralysis that had gripped China. Sun Ke was too preoccupied with the survival of his own government and had neither the time nor resources to spare for Manchuria. In addition, Stimson's strong words in private to the Japanese ambassador belied the State Department's public attitude toward interference in the conflict. On December 21st Hawkling Yen, the Chinese charge in Washington met with Stanley Hornback, the chief of the department of Far Eastern Affairs. Yen told Hornback that a Japanese attack on Jinzhou was imminent and asked the US to “protest in anticipate of it”. Hornbeck refused, stating the State Department was “already publicly on record with regard to the matter”. No other Western power was ready to advocate any strong measures against the Japanese either.   On the 22nd, the Japanese HQ at Shenyang announced they would soon begin an anti-bandit advance west of the Liao River and would remove any who interfered with said operation. They also added that if any Chinese forces at Jinzhou withdrew they would be left unmolested. By December 26th, all preparations for the assault on Jinzhou were finalized. On December 28th, Honjo initiated an "anti-bandit" campaign west of the Liao River. While Honjo publicly claimed they were merely "clearing the country of bandits,”. As the Japanese forces and their collaborationist allies spread across the South Manchurian railway area to eliminate remaining pockets of resistance, the 12th Division, led by Lt. General Jiro Tamon advanced from Mukden toward Jinzhou, supported by numerous bomber squadrons. Japanese intelligence estimated that Zhang Xueliang had 84,000 troops defending the city, along with 58 artillery pieces and two distinct defensive lines. The first line, located 20 miles north of Jinzhou, consisted of trenches designed to impede the Japanese advance at the Taling River Bridge on the Peiping-Mukden Railway. The second line was a series of earthworks and fortifications completely surrounding Jinzhou. The temperature was -30 degrees, and the Imperial Japanese Army troops were dressed in white winter camouflage uniforms. IJA reconnaissance aircraft reported approximately 3,000 Honghuzi were waiting to ambush them in Panshan County. Tamon's forces quickly overcame the alleged Honghuzi in a series of small skirmishes and continued their march toward Goubangzi, 50 km north of Jinzhou. It should be noted, many question whether the Honghuzi were real or simply local Chinese the Japanese coerced into action to justify their advance. By December 31, the Japanese vanguard had reached within 15 km of Jinzhou, along the banks of the Talin River. Tamon paused to allow the rest of the 2nd Division to catch up. Subsequently, Tamon's troops began setting up an intricate system of microphones to broadcast the sounds of the impending battle to Tokyo. This tactic appeared to be an attempt to demoralize the defenders, which proved effective as Zhang Xueliang's forces began to withdraw. On December 30, Zhang Xueliang had issued the order to retreat from Jinzhou. Two days later, the American Minister in China, Nelson Johnson, reported the following scene: “Jinzhou Railway station resembles beehive, every possible car being pressed into service and loaded with troops, animals, baggage, to last inch space.” The last Chinese troop train departed Jingzhou at 11 am on January 1st carrying away the final remnants of Zhang Xueliang's authority in Manchuria. The assault on Jinzhou occurred at a particularly inopportune moment for China. Chiang Kai-shek was temporarily out of office, lacking the full support of the Nanjing government and many generals. It is likely that Chiang Kai-shek understood that Zhang Xueliang's forces in Jinzhou would be significantly outmatched and could be annihilated. His priority was to prevent the situation from escalating into an official war, allowing him to strengthen China's military capabilities for a counteroffensive. Following the fall of Jinzhou, the northern China army retreated south of the Great Wall into Hebei Province. The Japanese then occupied Shanhaiguan, securing complete control over southern Manchuria. Despite the fall of Jinzhou there was still one last holdout in Manchuria. After Ma Zhanshan was driven out of Qiqihar by the Japanese, he led his troops northeast to establish a new HQ in Hailun where he was still technically ruling Heilongjiang province. Ma Zhanshan had gained international recognition as a resistance hero following his ill-fated battle at Qiqihar. The Kwantung Army took note of his fame and adjusted their strategies accordingly. Komai Tokuzo, the head of the Kwantung Board of Control, suggested that bringing Ma Zhanshan into their ranks would provide a significant propaganda advantage. To persuade him to negotiate with the Kwantung Army, they sent a local factory owner, Han Yunje. On December 7th, Colonel Itagaki Seishiro met with Ma Zhanshan in Hailun. Itagaki expressed that the Japanese aimed for two objectives: peace in East Asia and full cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese. He also mentioned that the officers of the Kwantung Army were impressed by Ma's remarkable bravery and were willing to grant him military command over Heilongjiang, provided they reached an agreement. In response, Ma Zhanshan stated that his forces had acted solely in self-defense and that he was bound by the orders of the Nanjing government. Itagaki then suggested Ma Zhanshan might be appointed military commander of the province under the provincial governor in Qiqihar, Zhang Jinghui. To this Ma Zhanshan replied “as Hailun is not very far from Harbin, he could consult with General Zhang Jinghui over the telephone or pay a call on the latter in person, and that a second trip to Hailun by the Japanese representative would not be necessary.” Despite Ma's position, Itagaki felt satisfied with the meeting, believing that Ma Zhanshan might align with them. However, he was constrained by anti-Japanese colleagues like his chief of staff Xie Ke and battalion commander Tang Fengjia. The situation shifted significantly for Ma Zhanshan when Zhang Xueliang withdrew his forces from Jinzhou. On December 7th, Itagaki and Ma met once more, during which Ma expressed his desire to serve as both the military leader and governor of Heilongjiang. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, Ma Zhanshan was secretly in discussions with another resistance leader, General Ding Chao. When Ma Zhanshan initiated his resistance against the Japanese, Ding Chao decided to take similar action in the northern city of Harbin. Harbin serves as the gateway to Northeast China and is the political, economic, and cultural hub of North Manchuria. It functions not only as the center of the Sino-Soviet co-managed Middle East Railway but also as an international marketplace where Chinese and foreigners coexist. The city houses the Special Administrative Region of the Three Eastern Provinces (with Daoli under this region and Daowai belonging to Jilin Province). Following the Mukden Incident, the Japanese army considered attacking Harbin; however, concerns about potential Soviet interference led to the plan being halted by Army Minister Minami Jiro. Harbin had largely remained peaceful, and the Japanese maintained control by appointing the puppet General Xi Qia as the governor of Kirin province. Together with Li Du, Xing Zhangqing, Zhao Yi, and Feng Zhanhai, Ding Chao formed the Kirin self-defense army to thwart the takeover of Harbin and Kirin province. Ma Zhanshan supported Ding Chao, and both generals kept in touch with Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek, who could only offer limited support. In November of the same year, the Jilin Provincial Anti-Japanese Government, chaired by Cheng Yun, was established in Bin County. Feng Zhanhai, the head of the guard regiment at the Northeast Frontier Defense Army's deputy commander-in-chief office in Jilin, refused to surrender to the Japanese forces. He rallied over 3,000 members of his regiment to resist the Japanese and rebel forces. They marched from Yongji County in Jilin Province to Shulan County, where they joined forces with the national salvation armies led by Gong Changhai and Yao Bingqian, which were based on green forest armed groups, to create the Jilin Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army, with Feng as the commander. On November 12, the Jilin Provincial Provisional Government was established in Bin County . Feng Zhanhai was appointed as the garrison commander and commander of the 1st Brigade. The units led by Gong and Yao were reorganized into cavalry brigades under Feng's command. This series of anti-Japanese actions significantly boosted the fighting spirit of the people in Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces. To launch an attack on Harbin, the Japanese Kwantung Army first needed to "punish" the anti-Japanese armed forces by force. To eliminate Feng's anti-Japanese forces, the Japanese puppet authorities dispatched Yu Shencheng, the commander of the Jilin "bandit suppression" unit, to lead the puppet army in an offensive aimed at seizing Harbin as a base to control the Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces. Feng Zhanhai's troops strategically abandoned Shulan City to lure the enemy deeper into the area. The puppet army fell into a trap and launched a major assault on Yao Bingqian's brigade stationed in Shuiquliu, which fiercely resisted the attack. On the same day, Gong Changhai's brigade maneuvered around to the rear of the puppet army for a surprise attack, while Yao's brigade counterattacked from the front. The puppet army's Ma Xilin brigade retreated, unable to be halted by the Japanese supervisory team. At this point, Feng Zhanhai led another brigade into the fray, pursuing Ma's brigade. After another seven hours of intense fighting, Shulan was retaken. In this battle, the garrison inflicted nearly 1,000 casualties on Japanese and puppet troops, captured hundreds, and saw many puppet soldiers defect. The battles of Shuiqu and Shulan were thus victorious. On the 16th, Yu Shencheng's puppet forces were defeated by the 25th Brigade of the Northeast Army in Yushu. Due to the precarious situation in Shulan, Feng Zhanhai had no choice but to abandon Shulan City and retreat his troops north of Wuchang. On the 19th, seeking urgently needed funds for his troops, Feng Zhanhai led a battalion from Acheng to Lalinkang, where they were surrounded by a significant number of Japanese and puppet troops. The following day, with the help of reinforcements, they managed to repel the Japanese and puppet forces. However, the troops suffered over 200 casualties and were compelled to leave Lalinkang and return to Acheng. On the 25th, Feng and Li moved their forces to the eastern suburbs of Harbin, with the 22nd, 26th, and 28th Brigades announcing their support in succession.On the morning of the 26th, Feng and Li entered the city from four directions, forcibly disarming five police brigades and seizing more than 3,000 firearms along with a number of heavy weapons. They stationed the 26th and 28th Brigades and one regiment in the Shanghao area, while Feng Zhanhai's four brigades and two detachments were positioned in the Sankeshu and Nangang areas. The 22nd Brigade was assigned to Shuangchengbao, preparing to defend against a Japanese assault.  Meanwhile the Japanese were still trying to win over Ma Zhanshan. This prompted our old friend Doihara to ask Xi Qia to advance his new “Jilin Army” to Harbin and then to Hailun. However in their way was the Jilin Self-Defense force of General Ding Chao and General Li Du had deployed his forces between Xi Qia and Harbin. On the 24th, representatives from Li Du and Ding Chao participated in a meeting with Ma Zhanshan's officers, convincing them to attempt to retake Qiqihar and defend Harbin for the resistance. When Xiqia's "New Jilin Army" finally advanced to Shuangcheng on the 25th, Zhang Xueliang instructed Ma Zhanshan and Ding Chao to abandon negotiations and begin fighting on the morning of the 26th. Kenji Doihara ultimately failed to intimidate the Chinese further, as his ally Xicha's troops encountered stiff resistance from Ding Chao's troops. Later that afternoon, Japanese aircraft dropped leaflets over Harbin, openly demanding that the anti-Japanese forces withdraw from the city immediately. The Japanese Consulate in Harbin also issued a notice to various foreign consulates, stating that the Japanese army would enter Harbin at 3:00 PM on the 28th. As the New Jilin army advanced towards Shuangcheng, this signaled to the Chinese resistance fighters that an attack was imminent. Zhang Xueliang instructed Generals Ma Zhanshan and Ding Chao to halt negotiations and prepare to make a stand. By late January, the Kirin Self-Defense Corps had grown to 30,000 members, organized into six brigades. Ding Chao fortified defensive positions between General Xi Qia's advancing troops and Harbin. Xi Qia was caught off guard by the well-organized resistance forces, resulting in heavy losses for his army, which was unable to break through. In desperation, Xi Qia sought assistance from the Kwantung Army, but they needed a justification to intervene. Once again, Colonel Doihara Kenji orchestrated a false flag operation. He incited a riot in Harbin that resulted in the deaths of one Japanese individual and three Koreans. Using the pretext that Japanese citizens were in danger, the 2nd Division under Lt. General Jiro Tamon began its advance toward Harbin from Jinzhou on the 28th. However, severe winter weather delayed their transportation. To complicate matters further, the Soviets denied Japanese trains access to Harbin via their section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, citing a breach of neutrality. The entire Manchurian incident had escalated tensions between the USSR and Japan. When they invaded Heilongjiang, there were genuine concerns about potential Soviet intervention, especially with their presence in Harbin. However, at the last moment, the Soviets agreed to allow transit on January 30th. Back on the 26, 1932, Feng Zhanhai and Li Du, the commander of the Yilan garrison, entered Harbin. Early on the 27th, Yu Shencheng, the commander of the puppet Jilin "bandit suppression," ordered two brigades to attack the Shanghao, Sankeshu, and Nangang areas. Japanese aircraft bombed the Sankeshu and Nangang regions. The two brigades tasked with defending the area fought valiantly, resulting in intense combat. Soon after, Feng Zhanhai and his reserve team joined the fray, launching a political offensive alongside their fierce attacks. The puppet army struggled to hold its ground and retreated to Lalincang. The defending troops in Shanghao fought tenaciously, inflicting heavy casualties on both Japanese and puppet forces, shooting down one plane, and attempting to persuade puppet army commander Tian Desheng to lead a revolt. By evening, the puppet army had been driven back. On the morning of the 28th, the anti-Japanese forces advanced to the Jile Temple and Confucian Temple, capturing advantageous positions near Xinfatun with artillery support. The cavalry brigade flanked the puppet army and launched a vigorous assault, leading to the collapse and retreat of the puppet forces towards Acheng. Gong Changhai led the cavalry in pursuit for 15 kilometers, capturing a significant number of puppet troops. After two days of fierce fighting on the 27th and 28th, the initial invasion of Harbin by Japanese and puppet troops was successfully repelled. Due to the defeat of Yu Shencheng and other puppet forces, the Japanese Kwantung Army launched a direct assault on Harbin on the morning of the28th, under the pretext of "protecting overseas Chinese." They ordered Hasebe, commander of the 3rd Brigade of the Kwantung Army, to lead the 4th Regiment, an artillery battalion, and two tanks on a train from Changchun to Harbin for combat. On the29th, another combat order was issued: the 2nd Division was to assemble in Changchun and then be transported to Harbin by truck. Part of the 4th Mixed Brigade was also moved from Qiqihar to Anda and Zhaodong by truck to support the 2nd Division from the north of Harbin. The 1st, 3rd, 8th, and 9th Squadrons of the Kwantung Army Flying Team were tasked with covering the assembly, advance, and attack of the 2nd Division. Hasebe's 4th Regiment departed from Changchun by train, but due to extensive damage to the railway caused by the Northeast Army, their train was attacked by the Northeast Army at dawn on the 29th as it reached the Laoshaogou area on the south bank of the Songhua River. The Japanese forces quickly shifted to an offensive strategy and, despite ongoing resistance, managed to reach Shitouchengzi Village north of the Sancha River that night. On the night of January 29, Zhao Yi's brigade received word of the Japanese assault on Harbin and immediately prepared for battle. At dawn on January 30, Brigade Commander Zhao Yi led six battalions in a light advance, launching a surprise attack on Shilipu, where they decisively defeated the puppet army's Liu Baolin Brigade, capturing over 700 soldiers and seizing more than 600 weapons. They then returned to Shuangchengbao to prepare for the annihilation of the advancing Japanese forces. Around 8:00 PM, the 3rd Brigade of the Japanese Army, along with the Changgu Detachment and two military vehicles, arrived at Shuangcheng Station, intending to camp there and attack Harbin the following day. Zhao Yi's troops set up an ambush in the area. As the Japanese forces disembarked and assembled to plan their attack on Harbin, the ambushing troops took advantage of their unpreparedness, launching a surprise attack from three sides. They unleashed heavy firepower, forcing the enemy back onto the platform before engaging in close combat with bayonets and grenades. The Japanese were caught off guard and suffered significant casualties. The next day, the Japanese dispatched reinforcements from Changchun, supported by aircraft, artillery, and tanks, to assault Shuangchengbao. Brigade Zhao found himself trapped in the isolated city, suffering over 600 casualties, including the regiment commander, and was ultimately forced to abandon Shuangchengbao and retreat to Harbin. With Shuangcheng captured, Harbin was left vulnerable. The Self-Defense Army stationed the majority of its troops in the southern, southeastern, and southwestern regions of Harbin, including Guxiangyuetun, Bingyuan Street, Old Harbin City, and Lalatun. On the same day, several commanders convened: Li Du, the garrison commander of Yilan and leader of the 24th Brigade; Feng Zhanhai, commander of the Jilin Provincial Security Army; Xing Zhanqing, commander of the 26th Brigade; Zhao Yi, commander of the 22nd Brigade; Ding Chao, acting commander of the Railway Protection Army and leader of the 28th Brigade; and Wang Zhiyou, director of the Jilin Police Department. They agreed to establish the Jilin Provincial Self-Defense Army, appointing Li Du as commander, Feng Zhanhai as deputy commander, and Wang Zhiyou as the commander-in-chief of the front line. They decided to utilize the 22nd, 24th, 26th, and 28th Brigades for the defense of Harbin, while Feng Zhanhai would lead the 1st Brigade and other units in a flanking maneuver against Jilin and Changchun to thwart the Japanese advance. On February 3, 1932, various units of the Japanese 2nd Division arrived in the Weitanggou River area. Under the command of Duomen, the division initiated an assault on the Self-Defense Army's outposts located outside Harbin. The 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Division, alongside Yu Shencheng, the commander of the pseudo-Jilin "bandit suppression" forces, led an attack with five brigades as the right flank against Chinese defenders in the Qinjiagang, Nangang, and Shanghao regions. Meanwhile, the 15th Infantry Brigade of the Japanese Army formed the left flank, targeting Guxiangtun via Balibao along the Songhua River. Following the conflict, all outposts of the Self-Defense Army were lost, forcing them to retreat to their primary positions. On the morning of February 4th, the Japanese forces launched a full-scale attack, engaging the Self-Defense Army in battle. By afternoon, the Japanese had positioned themselves on both sides of the railway, south of Guxiang Yuetun, Yongfatun, and Yangmajia. The 3rd Brigade was stationed east of the railway, while the 15th Brigade took position to the west. After a preparatory artillery barrage, the Japanese forces commenced their assault. The Jilin Self-Defense Army defended tenaciously, utilizing fortifications and village structures, and concentrated their artillery fire on the advancing enemy, inflicting significant casualties.   Despite their efforts, the Japanese attack was initially repelled, prompting them to adopt a defensive stance. By 16:00, the area from Yangmajia to Yongfatun had fallen to the Japanese. The Self-Defense Army continued to resist fiercely, but the Japanese intensified their assaults. The left flank launched a vigorous attack on Guxiangtun. The 28th Brigade of the Self-Defense Army, defending this area, utilized civilian structures and walls for their defense. However, brigade commander Wang Ruihua fled under pressure, leading to a loss of command and forcing the troops to abandon their positions and retreat into the city. Simultaneously, the Japanese right flank aggressively targeted the defense of the 26th Brigade of the Self-Defense Army. Despite the desperate efforts of brigade commander Xing Zhanqing and his troops, they were ultimately compelled to retreat to the river dam at Shiliudao Street due to inferior equipment. Around this time, the western and southern defense lines under Wang Zhiyou's command began to fall one after another. In this critical situation, Commander-in-Chief Li Du personally went to the front lines to organize the troops and establish a third defensive line on the city's edge. They fought until nightfall, successfully halting the Japanese advance. At dawn on February 5th the Self-Defense Army initiated a counteroffensive. The artillery first conducted preparatory fire, targeting the positions of the Japanese 3rd Brigade located east of the railway. Following this, the infantry launched their attack. The Japanese troops on the front lines found themselves in a precarious situation. In response, Jiro Tamon, the commander of the 2nd Division, urgently ordered artillery to intercept the Self-Defense Army's counterattack and deployed the tank and reserve units to assist. Four squadrons from the air force took off from a temporary forward airfield in Shuangcheng, alternating between bombing and strafing to support the ground troops. The battle was intensely fierce, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Lacking air support and facing significant threats from Japanese aircraft, the Self-Defense Army retreated to the area east of Harbin by the afternoon of the 5th. The Japanese forces then entered Harbin, leading to its immediate capture. On the 6th, the remaining self-defense forces learned of Harbin's fall and decided to abandon their original plan for a surprise attack against the Japanese army. Instead, they returned to Binxian and Fangzheng. During their retreat, they gathered some stragglers who had fled from Harbin and proceeded to Fangzheng County to regroup with Li Du. General Ding Chao's forces were compelled to retreat northeast along the Sungari River, while Japanese aircraft attacked them from above. After a grueling 17-hour battle, Ding Chao's army ultimately faced defeat. Following this loss, Ma Zhanshan made the decision to defect. On February 16, General Honjo held a conference for the Northeast Political Affairs Committee in Mukden, attended by senior Chinese officials of the new regime, including Zhang Jinghui, Ma Zhanshan, Zang Shiyi, Xi Qia, and others. The conference aimed to assign delegates to roles in the soon-to-be-established “Manchukuo.” On February 14, Ma Zhanshan was appointed governor of Heilongjiang province and received gold worth one million dollars. On February 27th, Ding Chao proposed a ceasefire, marking the official end of Chinese resistance in Manchuria. On March 1st, Puyi would be installed as the ruler of the new state of Manchukuo. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. With the fall of Jinzhou, Zhang Xueliang had effectively been kicked out of Manchuria. With the loss of Harbin, came the loss of any significant resistance to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Japan had conquered the northeast and now would enthrone the last Emperor of the Qing Dynasty forming the puppet state of Manchukuo. 

Last time we spoke about the Fall of Manila. General LeMay's B-29 bombers wreaked havoc on Japan, targeting key factories at a high cost. On February 19, US Marines landed on Iwo Jima, facing fierce Japanese resistance and heavy casualties. By February 23, after relentless fighting and harsh conditions, they raised the American flag atop Mount Suribachi, marking a hard-won victory. This moment inspired a legacy for the Marine Corps, as battles raged on in the Pacific. Meanwhile troops attacked General Kobayashi's defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, struggling to gain ground. Reinforcements arrived, leading to coordinated assaults, but progress was slow. Meanwhile, General Yamashita reorganized his forces in response to increased guerrilla activity. As American divisions advanced, they faced fierce resistance but gradually secured key positions. Guerrilla leader Volckmann disrupted Japanese supply lines, significantly impacting their operations. Amidst the chaos, a daring rescue mission freed over 2,000 internees, though it provoked brutal reprisals against civilians. This episode is the Great Tokyo Air Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are continuing with the ongoing battle over Iwo Jima. By the end of February, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines had successfully secured Mount Suribachi, while the other regiments from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions advanced toward the O-2 Line, situated beyond Airfield No. 2. This location was where General Kuribayashi maintained his primary defensive positions, which were heavily fortified with caves, tunnels, and traps. On March 1, General Rockey continued his offensive on the left flank as the fresh 28th Marines moved through the weary 27th Marines, led by Colonel Wornham, and launched an assault on Hill 362A and its adjacent positions. The corps' 155mm howitzers and 5th Division artillery commenced firing a preparation at K-minus 45 minutes. One battleship and two cruisers from the gunfire and covering force added their heavy fires from 08:00 to 08:30. Aircraft from the support carrier group delivered strikes throughout the day, but did not participate in preparation for the attack. This proved one of the busiest days for Task Force 54 since D-Day as fire support ships dueled with enemy shore batteries until late afternoon. Shortly after dawn enemy guns in the northern part of the island opened up, and at 07:25 the destroyer Terry took a direct hit by a 6-inch shell, suffering heavy casualties. The battleship Nevada immediately engaged these hostile installations, and after completing their mission in support of the landing force, the cruisers Indianapolis and Pensacola shifted to counter battery fire. At 10:25 the destroyer Colhoun was hit by a major-caliber projectile, and soon after this enemy shells straddled the destroyer Stembel. Counter Battery fire continued throughout the day with the Nevada destroying one casemated gun and starting a fire in another emplacement, while the Pensacola's batteries accounted for a third Japanese gun. Following the robust aerial, naval, and artillery bombardment, Liversedge's forces achieved some initial success, including capturing the hilltop, but were ultimately halted by intense machine-gun fire from Nishi Ridge to the north. However, the 3rd Battalion along the coast managed to advance approximately 350 yards against lighter resistance. In the center, General Erskine also pressed forward beyond Airfield No. 2, with Colonel Withers' 21st Marines advancing north and northeast about 500 yards into the incomplete Airfield No. 3. At the same time, General Cates continued to send his troops into the fray. Colonel Jordan's 24th Marines replaced Colonel Wensinger's exhausted 23rd Marines on the left and fought to dislodge the enemy from Hill 382. They succeeded in advancing about 100 yards along the division's left boundary and 50 yards on the right, establishing a foothold on elevated terrain overlooking Minami village. Further south, Colonel Lanigan committed only his 1st Battalion to eliminate the salient around the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, but this assault was again met with fierce Japanese gunfire. This relief enabled Erskine to initiate a late two-regiment offensive, with the 21st Marines on the left and Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines on the right, although this effort did not achieve any significant progress. The following day, the assault persisted, but the 9th Marines made minimal headway against a strong enemy position on the right, while the 21st Marines advanced toward the base of Hill 362B and the southern edge of Airfield No. 3. Concurrently, Liversedge's 28th Marines successfully cleared Hill 362A and moved toward Nishi Ridge, where they repelled a fierce counterattack by 150 Japanese soldiers. Colonel Graham's 26th Marines were once again deployed to fill the gap between the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions, managing to gain approximately 500 yards to the north. Jordan's 24th Marines finally captured Hill 382 and advanced about 300 yards on the left flank. Meanwhile, Lanigan's 1st Battalion made another unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate and take the high ground north of Turkey Knob. As described by an intelligence officer with the 4th Marine Division “As a result of a close study of the enemy's recent defensive action, aided by observation from OP's and air reconnaissance, the following explanation is suggested of the enemy's defense in this Div's Z of A. The enemy remains below ground in his maze of communicating tunnels throughout our preliminary arty fires. When the fire ceases he pushed OP's out of entrances not demolished by our fires. Then choosing a suitable exit he moves as many men and weapons to the surface as he can, depending on the cover and concealment of that area, often as close as 75 yards from our front. As our troops advance toward this point he delivers all the fire at his disposal, rifle, machine-gun, and mortar. When he has inflicted sufficient casualties to pin down our advance he then withdraws through his underground tunnels most of his forces, possibly leaving a few machine gunners and mortars. Meanwhile our Bn CO has coordinated his direct support weapons and delivers a concentration of rockets, mortars and artillery. Our tanks then push in, supported by infantry. When the hot spot is overrun we find a handful of dead Japs and few if any enemy weapons. While this is happening, the enemy has repeated the process and another sector of our advance is engaged in a vicious fire fight, and the cycle continues.”  Meanwhile the remainder of the 25th Marines managed to advance 300 yards along the coast without facing any opposition. On March 3, the capture of Hill 362A enabled flame-thrower tanks to assist in the advance northward. The 5th Marine Division prepared to press on with its assaults through Nishi Ridge and Hill 362B. The majority of the 28th Marines faced strong resistance as they moved forward over 200 yards. Liversedge's 1st Battalion and Graham's 1st Battalion executed a coordinated attack to take the main enemy positions ahead of them. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 26th Marines surged forward, achieving a gain of over 500 yards, which allowed them to relieve Kenyon's 3rd Battalion and secure the summit of Hill 362B. In the center, the 9th Marines remained in a stalemate, while the 21st Marines launched a vigorous attack to the northeast, successfully capturing the summit of Hill 357 at the eastern edge of the Motoyama Plateau. They then attempted another assault southeast toward Hill 362C, which resulted in a modest gain of about 250 yards. Meanwhile, in the 4th Marine Division's sector, Wensinger's 23rd Marines were deployed in the center, where determined Japanese defenders continued to thwart intense American assaults, despite the partial reduction of the Turkey Knob blockhouse. To the left, the 24th Marines resumed their offensive southeast, advancing up to 350 yards in the center. During the eight days of deadlock and fierce conflict in the Hill 382 and Turkey Knob areas, the weather had been generally favorable. Mild temperatures and fair skies predominated, although early in the morning ground haze combined with smoke to limit observation, and on a few days light showers fell in the afternoon. Night temperatures sometimes went below 60°F, and it was then that tired Marines were grateful for the characteristic subterranean heat of the island that warmed their foxholes. The next day, March 4, dawned gray and sullen, and intermittent showers fell from the overcast skies. Visibility was so limited that all air strikes were canceled and aerial observation seriously curtailed. On the right, Cates' Marines pressed the attack southeast but could only gain 150 yards against the defenders' fierce resistance. To the left, after a failed Japanese infiltration attempt overnight to gather food and water, both the 9th and 21st Marines made no progress with their costly eastward assaults. Finally, supported closely by flame-throwing tanks and combat engineers, Rockey's Marines fought fiercely but achieved only minor advances, prompting Wornham's 27th Marines to be thrown back into the battle to reinforce the two battered assault regiments. March 5 was then dedicated to reorganizing and resupplying the three Marine Divisions in preparation for a renewed effort the next day. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Marines, led by Colonel James Stuart, were sent back to Guam without having landed on Iwo Jima. The three divisions accordingly resumed the offensive on March 6 after a terrific artillery and naval gunfire bombardment. First, on the left, Erskine attacked with his three regiments abreast yet failed to make any significant advance. Then, in the center, the 9th and 21st Marines likewise unsuccessfully attacked towards Hill 362C, though the latter managed to clear the entire Hill 357 area. Lastly, Wensinger's 23rd Marines passed through the 24th on the division left and pressed on forward against heavy opposition, successfully gaining between 150 and 350 yards while Jordan's battalions gained up to 150 yards in their front. Additionally, the 25th Marines mopped up in its area and Cates' Provisional Battalion kept hammering against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. In the knowledge that the battle was swinging irrevocably in favor of the Americans, General Kuribayashi radioed Tokyo: "Our strongpoints might be able to fight delaying actions for several more days. I comfort myself a little seeing my officers and men die without regret after struggling in this inch-by-inch battle against an overwhelming enemy...". The General's predictions were, if anything, on the pessimistic side as his garrison would prolong the battle for another three weeks. Although the fighting was dragging terribly, on this day Brigadier-General Ernest Moore successfully landed on Airfield No. 1 alongside 28 P-51s and 12 P-61s of the 15th Fighter Group to take over control of island air activities. The following day, the Island Commander, Major-General James Chaney, assumed responsibility for base development, air defense, and operation of the airfields. Meanwhile, Schmidt was continuing his coordinated offensive, with the 28th Marines meeting only scattered resistance as it pushed 500 yards north; the 26th Marines overrunning the enemy defenses and gaining about 150 yards before resistance stiffened once again; the 27th Marines attacking on a narrow front but likewise gaining only 150 yards; the 21st Marines achieving tactical surprise to reach Hill 331 and then pushing 250 yards more to Hill 362C, which was ultimately seized as well; the 9th Marines ferociously attacking east but gaining only 200 yards before a rain of fire stopped them; the 23rd Marines recovering from a savage Japanese night counterattack and then pushing around 150 yards against strong resistance; the 24th Marines only progressing over 50 yards as it neutralized a number of enemy defenses; and the 25th Marines and the Provisional Battalion continuing secondary operations against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. On March 8, Rockey pressed on toward the northeast coast, with the 28th Marines advancing against minimal resistance, gaining between 300 and 500 yards along the shoreline. Meanwhile, the 26th Marines faced a complete stalemate against the intricate network of pillboxes and interconnected caves that had once comprised the village of Kita. The 27th Marines managed to advance approximately 150 yards with tank support. In the center, the 21st Marines shifted northeast again, successfully gaining 300 yards through the last organized resistance in the area, while the 9th Marines captured Hill 362C and continued their eastward assault, reaching the edge of the plateau overlooking the beach and initiating a flanking maneuver south of Hill 331. On the right flank, the 23rd and 24th Marines continued their attacks but made little headway against the enemy's formidable defenses. That night, General Senda launched a strong counterattack that caught the Americans off guard. Two of Senda's orderlies would survive and report what occurred during the daring counterattack. Many of his troops believed that Inoue was a superior leader who inspired his men to perform outstanding feats of bravery; others thought he was a maniac. The sight of the Stars and Stripes flying on top of Mount Suribachi had filled him with increasing rage. He is quoted as saying: "We shall destroy their banner, we shall replace it with ours in the name of the great Emperor and the great people of Japan." Inoue was in charge of the Naval Guard Force who manned the shore guns that sank and damaged many of the US warships and landing craft, and was described as a bombastic and temperamental character, a fine swordsman, heavy drinker, and womanizer. His bizarre plan almost beggars belief. The Captain was certain that the airfields would be lightly defended by service troops. He and his men would move southward, destroying B29 bombers as they passed; climb Mount Suribachi and tear down the Stars and Stripes; and replace it with the Rising Sun as an inspiration to all Japanese troops on the island.  However this never came to be. The determined defenders, bolstered by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, repelled the assault, resulting in approximately 800 Japanese casualties. Under relentless pressure in a shrinking area where most critical terrain features had been seized, the disorganized Japanese forces saw a fleeting opportunity to escape destruction, raid American-controlled airfields, and reclaim Mount Suribachi with this counterattack. However, its failure effectively depleted Senda's remaining strength and chances for continued resistance. The following day, Cates resumed the offensive, with the 23rd Marines making minor gains along their front, while Jordan's 3rd Battalion achieved a notable breakthrough of 300 yards. Furthermore, the Provisional Battalion was disbanded, and Lanigan's 2nd Battalion assumed control of the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob region. In the center, Erskine persisted in his advance toward the sea, with patrols from the 9th and 21st Marines successfully reaching the beach as American forces continued to secure the area. Meanwhile, to the left, Rockey faced significant resistance, with his troops soon coming under intense and precise fire from elevated positions extending southeast from Kitano Point. Consequently, the 26th and 27th Marines remained in a stalemate while the 28th Marines moved forward. On March 10, Liversedge's men advanced approximately 40 yards across extremely challenging terrain and against fierce opposition, while Graham's 2nd Battalion gained an additional 75 yards, with the rest of the 26th and 27th Marines still held in place. Over the past 14 days, Rockey's 5th Marine Division advanced 3,000 yards along the west coast, ultimately pushing Kuribayashi's forces into a final pocket at the northern tip of the island.  In a dispatch to Tokyo on March 10, General Kuribayashi summed up the Japanese situation in this manner: “Although the attacks of the enemy against our Northern districts are continuing day and night, our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly… 200 or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" all day. The enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers, and aircraft are very severe, especially the bombing and machine-gun fire against Divisional Headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I cannot express nor write here.” Not until 15 bloody days later did Marines eliminate the last pocket of organized enemy resistance in the northern end of the island. By D+19 all that remained for the enemy force was to fight and die for the Emperor. This advance came at a significant cost, with Rockey suffering 1,098 men killed and 2,974 wounded during this time. In the center, the 21st Marines reported that all organized resistance in their area had been eliminated, while the 9th Marines moved toward the beach, facing harassment from enemy fire from a resisting pocket on their right. Nevertheless, Erskine's 3rd Marine Division successfully secured the airfield areas and only needed to eliminate this last remaining pocket in their zone. However, personnel losses during this 14-day campaign were substantial, with Erskine losing 831 men killed and 2,241 wounded. Finally, Cates took over from the 24th Marines as he initiated his final offensive eastward. Consequently, the 23rd Marines advanced southeast with minimal resistance, covering approximately 700 yards before stopping at a strategic high ground about 500 yards from the beach, while patrols moved toward the coast near Tachiiwa Point. Simultaneously, Lanigan's 1st and 3rd Battalions pushed 600 yards southeast against stronger opposition and successfully occupied the key terrain southwest of Higashi. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion advanced northeast to join them, effectively driving the remaining enemy forces into a small pocket in that area. Over the last 14 days, Cates' 4th Marine Division engaged in relentless assaults, fighting fiercely from Charlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Minami, and the formidable defenses northeast of Hill 382, nearly reaching the coast.  The Japanese conducted an astute defense in this sector. General Kuribayashi had planned well, but much credit for execution of the plan in the 4th Marine Division zone must go to General Senda, who commanded the 2nd Mixed Brigade and exercised tactical control during the battle. Enemy weapons and minefields were well placed to take maximum advantage of terrain features, fire control was excellent when judged by Japanese standards, and camouflage discipline outstanding. Machine-gun positions controlled draws, while mortars were disposed to deliver fire on routes of approach, including the crests, forward, and reverse slopes of ridges. The one obvious mistake made by the Japanese in this long, grueling defense to the death was the night counterattack of March 8. This action cost them many lives and gained no advantage. Even this rather hopeless plunge can be somewhat justified, however, when the situation that existed then is seen from the Japanese point of view. By March 8, the enemy was under heavy, constant pressure in an ever-shrinking area where most of the critical terrain features had been captured. He was quickly becoming dispossessed and disorganized, with few courses of action remaining. Because communications were undoubtedly badly disrupted, it is possible that the Japanese facing the 4th Division did not realize just how hopeless his cause appeared and therefore harbored some hope that the counterattack might not be in vain. The cost was significant, with Cates suffering 848 men killed and 2,836 wounded.  While the battle raged on Iwo Jima, General LeMay was also preparing for a major raid on Tokyo, known as Operation Meetinghouse. After a precision strike by 192 B-29 bombers against Musashi on March 4, which resulted in minimal damage due to heavy cloud cover, a decision was made to move away from the 21st Bomber Command's traditional focus on precision bombing. This eighth fiasco at Musashi marked the end of a well-defined phase of 21st Bomber Command's operations. The effort to knock out the Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, daylight precision bombing of carefully selected targets had failed. Production of aircraft engines, not grossly off scheduled programs when 21st Bomber Command came to the Marianas, fell off sharply during the last two months of 1944 and production of aircraft declined slightly during the same period. In neither case, however, could the shortages be accounted for by destruction wrought by the B-29's; indeed, the output of Franks at Ota had decreased from 300 a month to 100 before the first air strike. Not one of the nine high-priority targets had been destroyed, although Akashi had been effectively crippled and production had been slowed down at Mitsubishi's engine and assembly plants at Nagoya and at Nakajima-Ota. Musashi had suffered only 4% damage after 835 B-29 sorties had been sent against it; Navy planes had done more harm in a single strike. Probably the indirect effects of the B-29 raids were most important: with the fall of Saipan, Japanese industrialists had begun to lose confidence in their supposed immunity from air attack. Although under governmental pressure for increased production, they began, with the first attacks on Nakajima and Mitsubishi, to hunt for underground or forest cover, and the official directive for dispersal issued in mid-January merely served to quicken a process already well under way. This radical change in manufacturing techniques, never as efficiently conducted as the similar movement in Germany had been, explains in part the slowdown in production in late 1944 and early 1945.  In 22 missions comprising 2,148 sorties, the command dropped 5,398 tons of bombs on Japan targeting the Imperial aircraft industry, but only about half of the bombers hit primary targets. Losses were substantial, largely due to fierce enemy interceptors and the lengthy overwater journey from the Marianas to Japan, which lacked any friendly bases for refueling or repairs. As a result of the high costs associated with unescorted daylight missions, the susceptibility of Japanese cities to incendiary attacks, and the minimal impact of precision bombing with high explosives, General Arnold ultimately opted for a comprehensive incendiary campaign. In preparation for the forthcoming assault on Okinawa, LeMay was tasked with initiating a series of intensive incendiary strikes from low altitudes. This lower bombing altitude would enhance accuracy, increase bomb load, and prolong the lifespan of B-29 engines. Although this approach carried risks, LeMay believed that the intense Japanese anti-aircraft fire was not overly threatening, as only two B-29s had been lost due to flak alone. He also decided to conduct these missions at night, which would decrease the likelihood of heavy cloud cover and strong winds, simplify navigation, and enable the bombers to reach the two new emergency airstrips at Iwo Jima by dawn. The first mission was set to commence immediately, with 334 B-29s from the 73rd, 313th, and 314th Bombardment Wings taking off in the late afternoon of March 9, carrying approximately 2,000 tons of bombs. The target was a rectangular area in northeastern Tokyo known as Zone I, measuring about 4 by 3 miles and encompassing most of Asakusa, Honjo, and Fukagawa Wards. After a turbulent journey, the initial pathfinders successfully identified their targets under favorable weather conditions and marked them shortly after midnight with fires However LeMay's decision came late. With the first mission set for the night of March 9, the field orders were not cut until the 8th. Although operational details would vary significantly from normal practice, there was no time to consult Washington as was so frequently done. Arnold was not even informed of the revolutionary plans until the day before the mission. The decision to attack at night ruled out the command's standard technique of lead-crew bombing. Formation flying at night was not feasible, and with flak rather than enemy fighters the chief danger, a tight formation would be a handicap rather than a source of defensive strength. With planes bombing individually from low altitudes, bomb loads could be sharply increased, to an average of about six tons per plane. Lead squadron B-29s carried 180 x 70-pound M47s, napalm-filled bombs calculated to start "appliance fires," that is, fires requiring attention of motorized fire-fighting equipment. Other planes, bombing on these pathfinders, were loaded with 24 x 500-pound clusters of M69s. Intervalometers were set at 100 feet for the pathfinders, 50 feet for the other planes. The latter setting was supposed to give a minimum density of 25 tons (8333 M69s) per square mile. Late reports indicated widespread fires that forced formations to search extensively for targets, with visibility severely hampered by smoke and bomb runs complicated by turbulence from intense heat waves. During the three-hour assault, a total of 279 B-29 bombers targeted Tokyo, successfully dropping 1,665 short tons of bombs on the primary objective. Additionally, 19 Superfortresses, unable to reach Tokyo, attacked alternative or last-resort targets. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise by this tactical shift, resulting in only moderate resistance; intense anti-aircraft fire destroyed 14 B-29s and damaged another 42, while enemy interceptors had no significant effect. The fires were so intense that they nearly extinguished themselves by mid-morning, only halted by wide gaps like rivers. Subsequent photographs revealed that 15.8 square miles had been devastated, including 18% of the industrial sector, 63% of the commercial area, and the core of the densely populated residential district. Tokyo's highly effective firefighting system was also caught off guard, leading to the destruction of 95 fire engines and the deaths of 125 firefighters, while lightweight buildings were completely consumed along with their contents. Little rubble remained; only a few fire-resistant structures, marked by heat damage, stood in the devastated areas. In total, 267,171 buildings were destroyed, 83,793 people lost their lives, 40,918 were injured, and 1,008,005 were left homeless. Moreover, it took 25 days to recover all the bodies from the debris. Radio Tokyo referred to the raid as “slaughter bombing,” with one broadcast stating that “the sea of flames engulfing the residential and commercial districts of Tokyo was reminiscent of the holocaust of Rome, caused by Emperor Nero.” The attack significantly undermined the morale of Japanese civilians, and along with other firebombing raids in March, it led many to believe that the war situation was worse than their government had acknowledged. In response, the Japanese government implemented a mix of repression, including severe penalties for those accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and launched an ineffective propaganda campaign aimed at restoring confidence in the nation's air and civil defense efforts. Meanwhile, LeMay and Arnold viewed the operation as a considerable success. As Tokyo mourned its losses, another 313 B-29s were sent on the afternoon of March 11 to execute a similar strike on Nagoya; however, due to minimal wind to spread the fires from the widely dispersed bombs, the results were less impressive. Nonetheless, only one B-29 was lost during the raid, with another 20 sustaining damage. It became evident, as LeMay had predicted, that the Japanese lacked effective tactics for nighttime interception. Now, attention shifts to Burma to report on the ongoing Chinese-British-Indian offensives. On General Slim's primary front, General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued its vigorous advance toward Mandalay, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division successfully made its way to the Meiktila area in the Japanese rear. In response, Generals Kimura and Katamura sent several reinforcements to this crucial area, but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment, led by Colonel Yoshida, managed to arrive in time to establish some defenses in the town, quickly transforming buildings in Meiktila into bunkers and strongpoints. On February 28, Cowan dispatched the 63rd Brigade to launch an attack from the west and the 48th Brigade to advance from the north along the Mahlaing-Meiktila road, while the 255th Tank Brigade executed a wide flanking maneuver to approach from the east. As a result, the 63rd Brigade secured Kyaukpyugon and set up a roadblock southwest of Meiktila; the 48th Brigade advanced to a bridge over a chaung approximately a mile from the town; and the 255th Brigade fought its way to Kyigon and Khanda, successfully destroying several bunkers near Point 860. On March 1, following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, Cowan's three brigades began to push into Meiktila despite fierce resistance. The 48th Brigade, bolstered by a tank squadron, advanced down the Mandalay-Meiktila road, quickly clearing Kyigon before entering the town, where they reached within 100 yards of the railroad line before the attack was halted in the late afternoon. To the east, the majority of the 255th Tank Brigade captured Point 860 and began clearing the camouflaged bunkers along the ridgeline, while a combined force of tanks and grenadiers advanced to within 200 yards of the railroad station before being recalled. Meanwhile, the 63rd Brigade, supported by a tank squadron, cleared the village of Kanna and continued past it to secure the railroad line and the main Kyaukpadaung-Meiktila road. The following day, the 17th Indian Division tightened the encirclement around Meiktila, inflicting significant casualties on the outnumbered defenders and destroying numerous enemy bunkers. On March 3, the three brigades commenced the task of eliminating the last remaining Japanese forces in and around Meiktila. They faced intense sniper and machine-gun fire from every building. However, due to the tanks' superior firepower, the Japanese strongholds were systematically taken down one by one. By the end of the day, the town was cleared, with an estimated 2,000 Japanese troops killed, including Colonel Yoshida. Additionally, 47 field pieces and anti-tank guns were captured, and the supply dumps surrounding Meiktila were secured. Cowan now needed to organize the town's defenses, anticipating a swift and fierce Japanese counterattack. Immediately after the town's capture, Kimura ordered the 18th Division to work with the weakened 49th Division to reclaim Meiktila, while Katamura reinforced General Naka with the majority of the 119th and 214th Regiments, a strong artillery unit, and the battered 14th Tank Regiment. Following the capture of Meiktila, Cowan's forces spent the next few days clearing the area of any remaining snipers and stragglers. For the town's defense, Cowan assigned each brigade and the divisional infantry to four sectors, each featuring a heavily fortified redoubt. He also tasked the 99th Brigade with defending Kyigon and Meiktila's airfield. To maintain the initiative for the 17th Division, Cowan aggressively deployed strong mobile columns of tanks, mechanized artillery, and infantry to disrupt the Japanese formations as they approached Meiktila. Consequently, while the 18th and 49th Divisions advanced, Ywadan and Nyaungaing were secured on March 5. In the following days, the main roads leading to Mahlaing, Kyaukpadaung, Pyawbwe, Thazi, and Mandalay were cleared, and the enemy units of the 214th Regiment at Thangongyi and Yego were successfully repelled on March 8. General Naka was now prepared to initiate his primary assault on Meiktila, instructing his units to concentrate their efforts north of the town, while the 214th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to move southwest to connect with the 49th Division. In response to these movements, on March 10, Cowan sent a robust tank-infantry force along the Mahlaing road to escort a previously dispatched column back to Meiktila, successfully inflicting significant casualties on the 56th Regiment as the British-Indians secured the Leindaw-Kyanngyagon area. However, the troops faced harassment from artillery fire originating from south of Myindawgan Lake, prompting Cowan to launch another armored sweep on March 14 to eliminate this threat. Although the 55th Regiment managed to capture the hill north of Meiktila after Cowan's tanks and infantry withdrew, the Japanese forces were unable to prevent their return, which resulted in further heavy losses. Concurrently, other tank-infantry units disrupted the advance of the 49th Division, effectively delaying the assembly of Japanese forces to the south and east of Meiktila until March 18. Additionally, a strong raid by the Komatsubara Unit was successfully repelled on March 14. In Stopford's sector, the 19th Division was preparing to launch its final offensive southward toward Mandalay, while the 2nd and 20th Divisions, after fierce fighting to expand their bridgeheads, were advancing east to assault the southern approaches to Mandalay. With close support from artillery and aircraft, General Rees' forces successfully breached the primary defenses of Lieutenant-General Yamamoto Kiyoe's 15th Division, reaching the northern outskirts of Mandalay by March 7. As the assault continued, British-Indian forces were set to enter the city on March 9. However, the determined defenders clung to Mandalay Hill and Fort Dufferin, aiming to extend the conflict and fight to the death. While Mandalay was under siege, the 62nd Brigade stealthily advanced east to Maymyo on March 11, catching the garrison off guard. The next day, Mandalay Hill ultimately fell while Fort Dufferin was being heavily bombarded within the city. By mid-March, the 2nd Division was nearing the capture of Ava, and the 20th Division was steadily advancing east to sever the supply routes from Mandalay to the south. In northern Burma, General Sultan was also pursuing his offensive. After establishing a bridgehead at Myitson, General Festing's 36th British Division faced minimal resistance and successfully took Mongmit on March 9 before continuing southward to Mogok. To the east, the 38th Chinese Division encountered only weak delaying positions as it moved towards Lashio, which was successfully occupied by March 7. At this point, the 56th Division, now independently commanding this area, was gradually retreating towards Hsipaw and Kyaukme. Although General Sun paused his advance until the Generalissimo granted permission to resume the offensive later in the month. Mountbatten feared that if more Chinese troops were withdrawn from Burma it might not be possible to take Rangoon before the monsoon rains began. This was an unpleasant prospect, so Mountbatten went to Chungking on March 8 for two days of conference with the Generalissimo. When the conference of March 9 concluded, the Generalissimo, according to the American minutes, said that he would recapitulate his decision of halting the Chinese advance at Lashio. In so doing, he remarked that the details of withdrawal would be settled later and that no final decisions would be made before General Wedemeyer was able to take part in them. Then he stated that unless there was a simultaneous amphibious attack on Rangoon, operations would stop at Lashio and Mandalay and the Allies would assume the defensive. The Chinese would stop at Lashio, but details of their operations between Lashio and Mandalay would be settled later between the staffs. The misunderstanding became quite apparent in mid-March when General Sultan, under whose command the Chinese were, received conflicting orders. Mountbatten ordered Sultan to move his forces southwestward toward Mandalay, yet the Generalissimo directed that the Chinese divisions stay in the Lashio area. As a compromise and to avoid having the Chinese wait idly around Lashio, Sultan suggested that a smaller task force be directed to proceed south. But the Generalissimo and his American advisers stood firm, lest the shift of troops to China be delayed. This in turn caused the British to believe that if the Chinese were not going to advance they should be withdrawn forthwith and end the burden on the line of communications. The 50th Chinese Division began to push south after securing the Namtu region and by mid-March reached Hsipaw. Meanwhile, in South Burma, the 82nd West African Division had taken Dalet, while the 25th Indian Division engaged in a struggle for control of the Ruywa-Tamandu area. Additionally, the 2nd West African Brigade was advancing inland toward An, posing a significant threat to the Japanese rear areas. Due to the rapid advancement of Slim's offensive, Admiral Mountbatten had to prioritize air supply for the 14th Army. This situation soon compelled General Christison to send the 25th Indian Division back to India, as his logistical support was becoming increasingly strained. Capturing Tamandu and establishing a Forward Maintenance Area there became essential. After successfully clearing Dokekan, the 74th Indian Brigade crossed the Me Chaung on March 4 to circumvent the main enemy defenses. The British-Indians pressed on, launching attacks on Tamandu in the following days, but the determined defenders put up strong resistance. Eventually, General Miyazaki withdrew most of the 111th Regiment and ordered it to attack the 2nd West African Brigade from the rear, which was finally contained by March 17. With the 25th Division scheduled to withdraw to Akyab by the end of the month, the 74th was reassigned to the 82nd West African Division and launched a final assault on Tamandu on March 11, successfully capturing the abandoned objective. The British-Indians then began to advance towards Kolan, reaching the vicinity of the town by mid-March. Simultaneously, the 154th Regiment counterattacked the West Africans at Dalet, successfully halting the enemy's advance beyond the river. Meanwhile, the 4th Indian Brigade landed at Mae near Letpan on March 13 from Ramree Island and established a roadblock to prevent enemy escape. In response, the 121st Regiment sent several companies to conduct a delaying action aimed at slowing the enemy's southward advance. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima intensified as the Marines advanced against fortified Japanese positions, facing heavy resistance and suffering significant casualties while capturing key terrain over several weeks of fierce combat. Meanwhile General LeMay shifted from precision bombing to incendiary raids on Tokyo, resulting in significant destruction and civilian casualties, while Japanese morale plummeted amid military setbacks.