Podcasts about emperor hirohito

I would like to thank Patreon member Xizer for suggesting this one, as Xizer put it    “An in depth look at General Kanji Ishiwara would be interesting. The man was the architect for the Mukden Incident that led to the Second Sino Japanese War, but he was vehemently opposed to the abuse and exploitation Japan's colonialism indulged in. His vocal condemnation of the brutality and excesses of the Imperial Japanese military foreign policy and Tojo in particular led to his removal, but he couldn't be executed for popularity in the rank and file. Even at the trials after the war he remained defiant, declaring that President Truman should be tried alongside the Axis War criminals for firebombing Japanese cities. He was truly a fascinating figure.   Indeed Kanji Ishiwara is a fascinating character and his story has a startling impact on the Pacific War and global history as a whole. Now by the time I am reading this the script got out of hand, its a long one haha, so it might have to be a multi parter, but I want to limit the first part to Ishiwara and how the Mukden Incident occurred first. It might come further down the road but I will finish the story of this fascinating man later on after hitting up more Patrons desired subjects, without further adieu enjoy part one of Kanji Ishiwara.    Kanji Ishiwara was born in Tsuruoka, Yamagata prefecture on January 18th of 1889. He was the second son of a policeman who was a descendent of a samurai family serving the Shonai Domain. His clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War and as a result of their defeat, alongside other Shogunal allied clans would see themselves shut off from larger governmental positions in Meiji Era Japan. Not to go too deep down that rabbit hole, but domains like Choshu and Satsuma would see the lionshare of higher positions, while domains who served on the opposite side would be cast out more.   Ishiware began his army career at the military preparatory school in Sendai at the age of 13, followed up by 2 years at the Central military preparatory school in tokyo. In 1907 he entered the military academy as a member of its 21st class. He left the academy in july of 1909 with the commission of Lieutenant and an assignment as platoon commander of an infantry regiment in Tohoku. After the annexation of Korea in 1910 his regiment was shipped over to the peninsula and he served at Ch'unch'on in a small garrison. After two years of occupation duty, Ishiwara returned to Tohoku and in 1915 passed the examinations necessary to enter the Army Staff college. He held an outstanding record, graduating top of his class in november of 1918 and would be amongst the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, receiving the imperial sword.   Now in 1920 he had a frustrating assignment with the department of military training he applied for service in China and received an assignment to the Central china garrison in Hankow. He spent a year traveling through central china before returning back to Tokyo in 1921 where he worked as a lecturer at the army staff college. He sought another China assignment, but his superiors sent him instead to Europe, as they did with all their promising young officers. He went to Germany for 3 years, studying languages and military history. In 1925, he was now a Major, 36 years of age and he received an assignment to the faculty of the army staff college to lecture about the history of war. Now from the very beginning of his character, Ishiwara proved himself a very unconventional officer. He was on the eccentric side, quite argumentative and burdened with a lot of health problems. He had multiple kidney infections, gastro-intestinal problems, tympanitis and other ailments that clawed at him. You also cant forget his ancestry which was important to the Japanese military even in the 1930s. Many of those that came from a disgraced clan had the habit of going above and beyond in terms of imperial loyalty, sort of like a way to rid themselves of the stigma of distrust that was seen in the early Meiji years.   Ishiwara was a bit bizarre, he was nonconforming, quite an independent spirit you would say. Many biographers of his point out, while he held an outstanding record in his education, this went alongside things like his disregard for military punctilio, such as his dress and appearance. In his early career he spoke out against inequalities he saw within the military such as what he saw as favoritism for staff college graduates. Such talk was quite reckless. He read a lot about politics, religion, history and philosophy, he seemed to have quite the restless mind. His behavior drew attention from his colleagues, many deeming him brilliant.   Now everyone in any military has to learn about military history, but not all seek to learn it outside the required readings and such. Ishiwara is one of those rare individuals who was obsessed with learning more about military history. He read about the Russo Japanese war and took quite a critical look at it. He believed the Japanese victory was due to a large part because of luck. He thought Japan had taken the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but Russia was simply to large to be dislodged from Asia with a swift stroke. If Russia had preserved herself better, he believed Japan would have lost and it was only by a peculiar set of circumstances that Japan had avoided a war of endurance. Ishiwara believed if such a set of circumstance occurred again, Japan defense planning would need to change dramatically to base itself on the realities of modern warfare. This led him to read thoroughly about WW1 in europe and he looked critically at the differences between a short duration vs long duration war. How prolonged conflicts eventually became total wars where politics, economics and social order played larger roles, than just that of the military. This led him to think of categories for different types of war such as “kessenteki senso / decisive war” and “jizokuteki senso / continuous war”. He viewed these two types as flowing back and forth throughout history, in a cyclical rhythm.    While in Germany he studied Clausewitz, von Moltke and the works of Hans Delbruck. He was particularly taken by Delbrucks niederwerfungstragie “strategy of annihilation, the decisive battle” and ermattungsstrategie “the strategy of exhaustion”. He could see his own theorizes more fleshed out in such works and took quite a liking to them. This brought him to analyze the Napoleonic war as the archetype of the war of annihilation and the wars of Frederick the Great as that of a war of exhaustion.    Now further on in his studies, Ishiwara became convinced like many of his colleagues, that Japan and the United States for reasons of power and ideology were on a set course for war. He also concluded such a war would be a protracted one, that of a strategy of exhaustion. But how could Japan prepare for such a protracted war when her natural resources were so clearly inadequate. This led him to think more so about Asia. Ishiwara believed Asia was an entity distinctly different from the west. He held beliefs that Asia should be liberated and unite. During the Xinhai revolution of 1911, as a young cadet in Korea, Ishiwara was quite excited by the idea China might revitalize itself, but he became disillusioned during his time in China later. In the 1920's he dealt with bandits, warlord era conflicts, chaos and disorder, seeing poverty everywhere, all of this shattered his image of China progressing and reforming herself. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite how disappointed he was with the political problems of China, he was likewise disgusted with how his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese. He recalled feelings of shame when he saw fellow colleagues in Hankow descending from rickshaws and tossing coins to the ground at the rickshaw mens feet. He would constantly write of how the Japanese needed to shed their racial superiority feelings, but funny enough he would write this alongside his beliefs it was necessary for Japan to help guide nations like China to their destiny. While he may have held beliefs in racial equality between Japan and China, he certainly did not think the same of China's politics. Like the majority of his colleagues he believed China required reform and modernization that Japan should usher in. To Ishiwara the issue at hand was if Japan did not help China, the west would aggressively do so and thus subjugate her further. To Ishiwara China needed liberation. Ishiwara also linked the incoming war between Japan and the United States to play a large role for what would occur between China and Japan.   Ishiwara like many Japanese officers held beliefs concerning the Kokutai. I will try to summarize exactly what the Kokutai is, but honestly its a unbelievably complex cultural phenomenon. The Kokutai was a spiritual motive force that influenced the Japanese military. It can be viewed as the national character of Japan. Japan was a constitutional monarchy that held the Kokutai (national body or character)  and Seitai (government body/structure). Thus there was in reality two ideologies, one held the traditional belief focusing on that of the emperor and that of the official government. If I were to give you a overly confusing summary, I would tell you “Japan is run by the emperor and the government simultaneously” this of course if confusing as hell, and it should be. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution held “the emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet”. Its like saying you have an absolute monarch, but he will be listening and following the democratically elected people. This contradiction would lead to the Pacific War. A large issue that would emerge is that the constitution literally said the navy and army were controlled by the Emperor and not the political diet. Thus many in the military viewed themselves subject to the Kokutai, which as an ideology would evolve dramatically from the Meiji era to the Showa Era. For example, what if you are a military high ranking officer who views the political elites as nothing more than criminals, taking the emperor hostage against his will and thus against the will of the Japanese people. Well this might lead you to try and overthrow the government to make sure the Emperor was really in charge as you think he should be. A real rabbit hole I could go down.   Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. His issue was how did the Kokutai apply outside Japan? How could its value transcend the national boundaries and interests of Japan? If a Japanese soldier was to sacrifice his life for the Kokutai, how did this take on any meaning for men of all races? How could the kokutai's supra-national value by linked to other outside ideologies?   Ishiwara found some answers to these questions in Nichiren Buddhism. It seems here he was able to combine his conceptions about war, history and national purpose. Now Ishiwara did not come from a religious family. He dabbled in christianity for a bit, but did not pursue it. Shinto likewise did not sufficiently fulfill Shiwara' beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism is strongly patriotic, has a apocalyptic character to it and represents a holy mission to be the religion for all mankind with the center of propagation as Japan. There was this kind of quasi idea of world regeneration behind it with Japan as the moral righteous leader. Thus as you can imagine the Kokutai and Nichiren buddhism sort of fit like a glove in many ways.    Utilizing Nichiren Buddhism, the kokutai could be raised from its purely national dogma and be amplified to the entire world. Ishiwara was introduced to all of this by Tanaka Chigaku who was part of the Kokuchukai “national pillar society” a nichiren nationalist organization with an HQ in tokyo. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism.    One aspect of Kokuchukai's nichirenism that greatly appealed to Ishiwara was its combative passages. Ishiwara would justify and attribute much of the military force Japan used on the asian continent drawing parallels to Nicherns idea of drawing the sword to defend righteousness. He often quoted nichirens statement “that the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law”. Ishiwara become engulfed by the nichiren doctrine and came to believe in its prediction that there would be a “Zendai mimon no dai toso / titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”, something like a global armageddon. After this would come a reign of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law”.   While in Germany Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the US won that war, the kokutai would be destroyed. He took the trans-siberian railway enroute back to Japan and stopped in Harbin. There he met with Nichiren believers and he spoke to them about his idea of “a final war”. He stated he believed it would come through religious prediction and his military analysis. He warned everyone Japan must hasten herself for it and that “the final war is fast approaching”. Ishiwara came back to Japan in 1925 fired up with conviction to lecture at the army staff college about his final war. His audience was the army's bright and youthful officers. He taught them Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke and WW1 and of course his thoughts on the future conflict before them all. The Army staff college continuously called for him to expand his lectures because they were so popular. Then in 1927 he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's present and future national defense”. Here he spoke about the inevitable war between the US and Japan. These were quite provocative and took a hell of a lot of attention from colleagues. Later on in april of 1931, he would brief his fellow Kwantung officers using the essay, arguing the need for decisive action on the asian mainland.   In 1928 he would have given another course on European war, but he came down with influenza and was forced to take leave. As he was getting better he was hit with a case of tympanitis in his ear and had to be hospitalized for 6 months. It was to be one of many ailments that would grind at his health. He eventually was drawn into an elite study circle to talk about war theories led by Major Suzuki. The group consisted of young reformist type officers who talked about political and military issues. He carried on his work on the final war and eventually wrote “Sensoshi taikan / general outline of the history of war” which was delivered as a lecture before Kwantung officers at Changch'un in Manchuria on July 4th of 1929. It would receive revisions in 1931, 1938 and became a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.    Now the 1930's were quite a tense time for Japan. The Japanese leadership saw Marxism everywhere, and believed it was withering away their nation. Japanese liberal types were arguing the military budget was out of hand, many were calling for reduction. To Ishiwara it was insanity, how could Japan not arm itself? Marxists preached communism would save Japan; Liberals preached true democracy would save Japan; Ishiwara and many in the army preached the Kokutai would save Japan. Ishiwara preached his final war theories and that the coming apocalypse would not see an American synthesis, but a supreme victory for the Japanese kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”.   From the offset of his initial theories, Ishiwara believed the final war would be a strategy of exhaustion. But WW1 and the 1920's brought technological advances such as tanks, poison gas and the airplane. The airplane in particular made Ishiwara believe the defensive stalemate seen in WW1 was coming to an end. Airpower could deliver bomb loads past all known defenses such as naval surface units, fortresses, armies with automatic weapons. He believed the final war would see absolute horrors brought upon the greatest cities of the world. London, Shanghai, Paris even Tokyo would be wiped out within a day of the commencement of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”.   Ishiwara argued Japan must directly or indirectly control Manchuria and to a lesser degree over parts of China. He asserted Japan had a moral obligation to the asian continent and a special relationship to Manchuria and China. China must be stabilized, for her people were threatened by turmoil, corruption and conflict. He argued Japan would be eventually obliged for the sake of peace and the welfare of the Chinese people to take a more active effort to stabilize her, particularly in Manchuria. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.    In 1931 he began writing about how China needed to reform and it would be in her best interest to accept Japanese guidance. He saw China as the most valuable ally to be beside Japan in the event of war with the United States. If anything he argued Japan must try to not become involved in a war with China, every effort should be made to avoid provoking such an event. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly.    Now lets talk about Manchuria, specifically Manchuria in the late 1920's. Manchuria was in a huge tug of war between Russia, China and Japan. Her ties to China proper were severed by years of warlordism allowing Japan to grow her position. For Japan, the quote “manchurian problem” as it would be known centered on a single question “how to consolidate and expand it under Japanese influence in the face of an expanding China”. Japan saw 3 viable methods, taking control over the south manchuria railway, using the kwantung army and Japanese colonists, the good old filibuster approach. Each of these 3 methods offered different approaches to the same problem which of course would have very different outcomes.    Controlling the railway allowed quite a lot of control over southern Manchuria. The issue with this of course being Japan having to constantly fight off Chinese political efforts against such control. Zhang Zuolin, the Tiger of Manchuria and arguably greatest of the warlords of China held control over Manchuria and was firmly acting in Japanese interests, but for how long would he play ball? To the Kwantung Army members operating in and around Manchuria, the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek was getting out of hand and threatening Zhang Zuolin and thus their interests as well. Anti-Japanese sentiment was only getting worse as the northern expedition climbed north. The Kwangtung army sought more than anything to assert and retain their control over Manchuria, because it offered a buffer against the USSR. Anything that threatened that control had to be dealt with. Ultimately it was believed by many in the Kwantung Army that Manchuria would have to be separated officially from China and in order for this to occur, Japan would most likely need to use force.    Senior officers of the Kwantung army were invited in June of 1927 for a meeting called upon by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate Japan's policy toward China and Manchuria. A more radical Kwantung army group headed by Colonel Komoto Daisaku sought to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, as he was increasingly being seen as a major obstacle to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Well they would do just that in 1928 when Zhang Zuolin was assassinated via a bomb placed on train tracks known as the Huanggutun incident. The assassination did not work out as the Kwantung Army officers thought it would. Instead of their groomed puppet General Yang Yuting taking up the role as leader of Manchuria, it went instead to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang, who lets just say was not too happy the Japanese had obviously killed his father. Thus the Kwantung Army did not assert the forceful policy they wanted in Manchuria, they had actually made it worse for them.   The half-hearted investigation into those responsible for killing Zhang Zuolin, led to the removal of Colonel Komoto from his post. Tanaka's cabinet was toppled. The Kwantung army were now embarrassed and angry that their stance in Manchuria was weakened. The Japanese colonists within Manchuria felt more threatened and called more so upon the Kwantung army for protection against Chinese nationalists wishing to kick them out. The Kwantung army was grasping at straws trying to think of a way to sever Manchuria from China. In 1928, Ishiwara was a lt colonel and he was consulted in length by Kwantung officers about his views on the Manchurian problem. While he had not fully hashed out his Final War theory by this point, he nonetheless spoke about the fundamentals of it, arguing the necessity of taking action to control Manchuria. For the next few years, all efforts were made by Kwantung officers to influence policy towards Manchuria. Ishiwara's ideas were being stimulated and influencing the debate over Manchuria amongst his high ranking colleagues. In October of 1928, Ishiwara sought and received an appointment to the Kwantung army staff. The assignment was to be as an operations officer and his number one backer was Colonel Komoto Daisaku. It seemed Komoto saw Ishiwara as the firebrand necessary to push the Manchurian policies they wanted.   When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he found the Kwantung Army HQ in a state of confusion and demoralization. This of course was a large part due to the cluster fuck of a failure from the bombing of Zhang Zuolin. The investigation into the assassination led to many shifts within the Kwantung army staff, many quite restrictive. Even though Komoto's career was shattered by the Zhang Zuolin failure, he kept arguing to his colleagues that the Manchurian crisis hamukdend to be resolved by force. Ishiwara it seems agreed with this and during the early months of 1929 worked alongside Komoto, planning operations against Chinese forces in the Mukden area. By spring of 1929, Komoto was officially being kicked out. By May he was relegated to a divisional backwater in Japan and by June he was out of the army. This did not mean however that he lost influence on Manchurian affairs. Komoto's replacement was Lt Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and old comrade of Ishiwara since Sendai military preparatory school.    For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki worked alongside other Kwantung Army staff to solve the Manchurian problem as they saw it. By the mid 1931's the idea Manchuria needed to be seized via force was now the mainstream viewpoint for the Kwantung army in general. Ishiwara believed firmly that Japan could no longer stand idle in Manchuria, because every day that went by saw little by little, Japan relinquishing rights and interests in Manchuria to China, and at some point they would simply be kicked out. To “quit manchuria” would be a national disaster, they would lose their buffer state, the resources and the land for their booming population to emigrate to. Simply put Manchuria was the steroid keeping Japan alive, she needed it to continue to grow. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviethreat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army HQ in Tokyo likewise agreed Manchuria was the vital defensive line against the USSR. But unlike the Kwantung army who sought all of Manchuria, the heads in Tokyo sought to absorb southern Manchuria via the south manchurian railway and did not seek anything north of it. Ishiwara however assumed the only way Japan could prevent the USSR from placing pressure on southern Manchuria was no less that Japan having to occupy northern Manchuria and even further north towards the Amur River so Japan could control the mountain ranges flanking western and eastern frontiers of northern manchuria.  Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”.   Ishiwara took all of this a step further, after Manchuria was conquered, Japan would have to somehow administer and pacify the peoples of it. Ishiwara argued the stability of Manchuria would be developed through the special talents of various races living there. The Chinese would develop the small businesses in the region, the Koreans would use their paddy farming knowledge, etc. These racial ideas would contribute to the development of Manchukuo and the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. But above all else, Manchuria would serve the interests of Japan, many of which would be exploitative and economic in nature.    By early 1930 Ishiwara and Itagaki worked out a plan using the same strategy used during the Russo-Japanese war, a surprise night attack. The Kwantung army would assault the Liaoning area hitting important Chinese garrisons. The plans had to be meticulous as the Kwantung army was severely smaller than most of the Manchurian forces led by Zhang Xueliang. Around Mukden alone Zhang held 20,000 men well equipped with aircraft and tanks. Throughout all of Manchuria, if a war arose, Zhang could assemble roughly 250,000 troops to bear down on an enemy. The Kwantung army meanwhile could muster 10,000 men which were basically garrison units around the railway. They did not have significant aircraft nor mechanized forces at hand, and were pretty poorly equipped to boot. Ishiwara's answer to the disparity in forces called for the use of intelligence and rigorous training. He sought to perfect specific assault techniques so that when the conflict broke out, the Japanese would use lightning speed and effective concentration of force to overwhelm the Chinese. The plan overall was remarkably simplistic, wagering everything on dealing a crushing blow at the center of Zhang Xueliangs military powerbase at the Peitaying barracks at Mukden. If this fell, he predicted the enemy's morale would break, giving the Kwantung the necessary military and psychological momentum to subdue the surrounding areas. If the USSR got involved, the plan would have gone to utter shit.   One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ”. Ishiwara as you can imagine was very bitter about the idea of prolonging for a year and argued the international environment meant they must strike immediately. The Soviet 5 year plan was still in mid course; the US, Britain and France had yet to overcome their financial crisis and could offer limited resistance in the far east and most obviously the Nationalist regime in China was still busy in its unification efforts south of the Great wall, but that would change soon. If they waited a year all of this would change for the worse, the time was now or never to Ishiwara.   In july of 1931 Ishiwara and Itagki organized a final major staff reconnaissance designed to get the newest Kwantung officers up to date with northern Manchuria. To cover for what they were doing they told high command it was a survey against the USSR, but it was of course to investigate the Chinese power in northern manchuria. On their return trip, the party heard of the disappearance of one Kwantung staff officer, captain Nakamura Shintaro. Ishiwara and the others found out when they reached Port Arthur and the rumor spread that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under “mysterious circumstances”. Now over the past few months there had been violent riots, murders, work strikes and other incidents occurring in Manchuria. The Nakamura affair flared all of these tensions up. Seeing the paint on the wall, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries tried to negotiate the issue, but those at the central army HQ like Nagata Tetsuzan who were sympathetic to the impatience of their Kwantung colleagues felt compelled to aid them. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that is just what he did. The Kwantung officers took their forces outside the railway zone, which they had been restricted to and without waiting for approval from Itagaki who was in Japan at the time, initiated the steps to despatch an armored train and a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery forces to go to Mukden to get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance. Tokyo got word of this and dispatched a telegram to stop their departure from the railway and to not use the Nakamura incident as a way to use force to solve the manchurian problem.   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” .   “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. On september 18th, 1931 a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army on the tracks of the south manchuria railway at Liutiaokou and it exploded. Japanese troops under the guise the bomb was a “chinese terrorist attack” moved to swiftly overrun the Peitaying barracks. Ishiwara's plot had finally unfolded. 

Last time we spoke about the Nanjing Massacre. Japanese forces breached Nanjing as Chinese defenders retreated under heavy bombardment, and the city fell on December 13. In the following weeks, civilians and disarmed soldiers endured systematic slaughter, mass executions, rapes, looting, and arson, with casualties mounting rapidly. Among the most brutal episodes were hundreds of executions near the Safety Zone, mass shootings along the Yangtze River, and killings at improvised sites and “killing fields.” The massacre involved tens of thousands of prisoners, with estimates up to 300,000 victims. Women and children were subjected to widespread rape, mutilation, and terror intended to crush morale and resistance. Although the Safety Zone saved many lives, it could not shield all refugees from harm, and looting and arson devastated large parts of the city. Foreign witnesses, missionaries, and diary entries documented the extensive brutality and the apparent premeditated nature of many acts, noting the collapse of discipline among troops and orders that shaped the violence.    #169 Nanjing has Fallen, the War is not Over Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Directly after the fall of Nanjing, rumors circulated among the city's foreigners that Tang Shengzhi had been executed for his inability to hold the city against the Japanese onslaught. In fact, unlike many of his subordinates who fought in the defense, he survived. On December 12, he slipped through Yijiang Gate, where bullets from the 36th Division had claimed numerous victims, and sailed across the Yangtze to safety. Chiang Kai-shek protected him from bearing direct consequences for Nanjing's collapse. Tang was not unscathed, however. After the conquest of Nanjing, a dejected Tang met General Li Zongren at Xuzhou Railway Station. In a brief 20-minute conversation, Tang lamented, “Sir, Nanjing's fall has been unexpectedly rapid. How can I face the world?” Li, who had previously taunted Tang for over-eagerness, offered sympathy. “Don't be discouraged. Victory or defeat comes every day for the soldier. Our war of resistance is a long-term proposition. The loss of one city is not decisive.” By December 1937, the outlook for Chiang Kai-shek's regime remained bleak. Despite his public pledges, he had failed to defend the capital. Its sturdy walls, which had withstood earlier sieges, were breached in less than 100 hours. Foreign observers remained pessimistic about the prospects of continuing the fight against Japan. The New York Times wrote “The capture of Nanking was the most overwhelming defeat suffered by the Chinese and one of the most tragic military debacles in modern warfare. In defending Nanking, the Chinese allowed themselves to be surrounded and then slaughtered… The graveyard of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers may also be the graveyard of all Chinese hopes of resisting conquest by Japan.” Foreign diplomats doubted Chiang's ability to sustain the war, shrinking the question to whether he would stubbornly continue a losing fight or seek peace. US Ambassador Nelson Johnson wrote in a letter to Admiral Yarnell, then commander of the US Asicatic Fleet “There is little left now for the Chinese to do except to carry on a desultory warfare in the country, or to negotiate for the best terms they can get”.  The Japanese, too, acted as if Chiang Kai-shek had already lost the war. They assumed the generalissimo was a spent force in Chinese politics as well, and that a gentle push would suffice to topple his regime like a house of cards. On December 14, Prime Minister Konoe announced that Chiang's losses of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and now Nanjing, had created a new situation. “The National Government has become but a shadow of its former self. If a new Chinese regime emerged to replace Chiang's government, Japan would deal with it, provided it is a regime headed in the right direction.” Konoe spoke the same day as a Liaison Conference in Tokyo, where civilian and military leaders debated how to treat China now that it had been thoroughly beaten on the battlefield. Japanese demands had grown significantly: beyond recognizing Manchukuo, Japan pressed for the creation of pro-Japanese regimes in Inner Mongolia and the north China area. The same day, a puppet government was established in Japanese-occupied Beijing. While these demands aimed to end China as a unitary state, Japanese policy was moving toward the same goal. The transmissions of these demands via German diplomatic channels caused shock and consternation in Chinese government circles, and the Chinese engaged in what many regarded as stalling tactics. Even at this late stage, there was division among Japan's top decision makers. Tada, deputy chief of the Army General Staff, feared a protracted war in China and urged keeping negotiations alive. He faced strong opposition from the cabinet, including the foreign minister and the ministers of the army and navy, and ultimately he relented. Tada stated “In this state of emergency, it is necessary to avoid any political upheaval that might arise from a struggle between the Cabinet and the Army General Staff.” Although he disagreed, he no longer challenged the uncompromising stance toward China. On January 16, 1938, Japan publicly stated that it would “cease henceforth to deal with” Chiang Kai-shek. This was a line that could not be uncrossed. War was the only option. Germany, the mediator between China and Japan, also considered Chiang a losing bet. In late January 1938, von Dirksen, the German ambassador in Tokyo, urged a fundamental shift in German diplomacy and advocated abandoning China in favor of Japan. He warned that this was a matter of urgency, since Japan harbored grudges against Germany for its half-hearted peace efforts. In a report, von Dirksen wrote that Japan, “in her deep ill humor, will confront us with unpleasant decisions at an inopportune moment.” Von Dirksen's view carried the day in Berlin. Nazi Germany and Hirohito's Japan were on a trajectory that, within three years, would forge the Axis and place Berlin and Tokyo in the same camp in a conflict that would eventually span the globe. Rabe, who returned to Germany in 1938, found that his account of Japanese atrocities in Nanjing largely fell on deaf ears. He was even visited by the Gestapo, which apparently pressed him to keep quiet about what he had seen. Ambassador von Dirksen also argued in his January 1938 report that China should be abandoned because of its increasingly friendly ties with the Soviet Union. There was some merit to this claim. Soviet aid to China was substantial: by the end of 1937, 450 Soviet aviators were serving in China. Without them, Japan likely would have enjoyed air superiority. Chiang Kai-shek, it seemed, did not fully understand the Russians' motives. They were supplying aircraft and pilots to keep China in the war while keeping themselves out. After Nanjing's fall, Chiang nevertheless reached out to Joseph Stalin, inviting direct Soviet participation in the war. Stalin politely declined, noting that if the Soviet Union joined the conflict, “the world would say the Soviet Union was an aggressor, and sympathy for Japan around the world would immediately increase.” In a rare moment of candor a few months later, the Soviet deputy commissar for foreign affairs spoke with the French ambassador, describing the situation in China as “splendid.” He expected China to continue fighting for several more years, after which Japan would be too weakened to undertake major operations against the Soviet Union. It was clear that China was being used. Whatever the motive, China was receiving vital help from Stalin's Russia while the rest of the world stood on the sidelines, reluctant to upset Japan. Until Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet Union was forced to the brink by the German Army and could no longer sustain extensive overseas aid, it supplied China with 904 planes, 1,516 trucks, 1,140 artillery pieces, 9,720 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, 31,600 bombs, and more. Despite all of this, all in all, China's position proved less disastrous than many observers had feared. Chinese officials later argued that the battle of Nanjing was not the unmitigated fiasco it appeared to be. Tang Shengzhi had this to say in his memoirs“I think the main purpose of defending Nanjing was to buy time, to allow troops that had just been pulled out of battle to rest and regroup. It wasn't simply because it was the capital or the site of Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum.” Tan Daoping, an officer in Nanjing, described the battle “as a moderate success because it drew the Japanese in land”. This of course was a strategy anticipated by interwar military thinker Jiang Baili. It also allowed dozens of Chinese divisions to escape Shanghai, since the Japanese forces that could have pursued them were tied down with the task of taking Nanjing. Tan Daoping wrote after the war “They erred in believing they could wage a quick war and decide victory immediately. Instead, their dream was shattered; parts of their forces were worn out, and they were hindered from achieving a swift end”. Even so, it was a steep price was paid in Chinese lives. As in Shanghai, the commanders in Nanjing thought they could fight on the basis of sheer willpower. Chinese officer Qin Guo Qi wrote in his memoirs “In modern war, you can't just rely on the spirit of the troops. You can't merely rely on physical courage and stamina. The battle of Nanjing explains that better than anything”. As for the Brigade commander of the 87th division, Chen Yiding, who emerged from Nanjing with only a few hundred survivors, was enraged. “During the five days of the battle for Nanjing, my superiors didn't see me even once. They didn't do their duty. They also did not explain the overall deployments in the Nanjing area. What's worse, they didn't give us any order to retreat. And afterwards I didn't hear of any commander being disciplined for failing to do his job.” Now back in November of 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had moved his command to the great trinity of Wuhan. For the Nationalists, Wuhan was a symbolically potent stronghold: three municipalities in one, Hankou, Wuchang, and Hanyang. They had all grown prosperous as gateways between coastal China and the interior. But the autumn disasters of 1937 thrust Wuhan into new prominence, and, a decade after it had ceased to be the temporary capital, it again became the seat of military command and resistance. Leading Nationalist politicians had been seen in the city in the months before the war, fueling suspicions that Wuhan would play a major role in any imminent conflict. By the end of the year, the generals and their staffs, along with most of the foreign embassies, had moved upriver. Yet as 1937 slipped into 1938, the Japanese advance seemed practically unstoppable. From the destruction of Shanghai, to the massacre in Nanjing, to the growing vulnerability of Wuhan, the NRA government appeared powerless against the onslaught.  Now the Japanese government faced several options: expanding the scope of the war to force China into submission, which would risk further depletion of Japan's military and economic resources; establishing an alternative regime in China as a bridge for reconciliation, thereby bypassing the Nationalist government for negotiations; and engaging in indirect or direct peace negotiations with the Nationalist Government, despite the failure of previous attempts, while still seeking new opportunities for negotiation. However, the Nanjing massacre did not compel the Chinese government and its people to submit. On January 2, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary, “The conditions proposed by Japan are equivalent to the conquest and extinction of our country. Rather than submitting and perishing, it is better to perish in defeat,” choosing to refuse negotiations and continue resistance.  In January 1938 there was a new escalation of hostilities. Up to that point, Japan had not officially declared war, even during the Shanghai campaign and the Nanjing massacre. However on January 11, an Imperial Conference was held in Tokyo in the presence of Emperor Hirohito. Prime Minister Konoe outlined a “Fundamental Policy to deal with the China Incident.”The Imperial Conference was attended by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, Army Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in, Navy Minister Admiral Fushimi, and others to reassess its policy toward China. Citing the Nationalist Government's delay and lack of sincerity, the Japanese leadership decided to terminate Trautmann's mediation. At the conference, Japan articulated a dual strategy: if the Nationalist Government did not seek peace, Japan would no longer regard it as a viable negotiating partner, instead supporting emerging regimes, seeking to resolve issues through incidents, and aiming either to eliminate or incorporate the existing central government; if the Nationalist Government sought reconciliation, it would be required to cease resistance, cooperate with Japan against communism, and pursue economic cooperation, including officially recognizing Manchukuo and allowing Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia, North China, Central China, and co-governance of Shanghai. The Konoe cabinet relayed this proposal to the German ambassador in Japan on December 22, 1937: It called for: diplomatic recognition of Manchukuo; autonomy for Inner Mongolia; cessation of all anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies; cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China against communism; war reparations; demilitarized zones in North China and Inner Mongolia; and a trade agreement among Japan, Manchukuo, and China.  Its terms were too severe, including reparations payable to Japan and new political arrangements that would formalize the separation of north China under Japanese control. Chiang's government would have seventy-two hours to accept; if they refused, Tokyo would no longer recognize the Nationalist government and would seek to destroy it.  On January 13, 1938, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui informed Germany that China needed a fuller understanding of the additional conditions for peace talks to make a decision. The January 15 deadline for accepting Japan's terms elapsed without Chinese acceptance. Six days after the deadline for a Chinese government reply, an Imperial Conference “Gozen Kaigi” was convened in Tokyo to consider how to handle Trautmann's mediation. The navy, seeing the war as essentially an army matter, offered no strong position; the army pressed for ending the war through diplomatic means, arguing that they faced a far more formidable Far Eastern Soviet threat at the northern Manchukuo border and wished to avoid protracted attrition warfare. Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota, however, strongly disagreed with the army, insisting there was no viable path to Trautmann's mediation given the vast gap between Chinese and Japanese positions. A second conference followed on January 15, 1938, attended by the empire's principal cabinet members and military leaders, but without the emperor's presence. The debate grew heated over whether to continue Trautmann's mediation. Hayao Tada, Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, argued for continuation, while Konoe, Hirota, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and War Minister Hajime Sugiyama opposed him. Ultimately, Tada acceded to the position of Konoe and Hirota. On the same day, Konoe conveyed the cabinet's conclusion, termination of Trautmann's mediation, to the emperor. The Japanese government then issued a statement on January 16 declaring that it would no longer treat the Nationalist Government as a bargaining partner, signaling the establishment of a new Chinese regime that would cooperate with Japan and a realignment of bilateral relations. This became known as the first Konoe statement, through which Tokyo formally ended Trautmann's mediation attempt. The Chinese government was still weighing its response when, at noon on January 16, Konoe publicly declared, “Hereafter, the Imperial Government will not deal with the National Government.” In Japanese, this became the infamous aite ni sezu (“absolutely no dealing”). Over the following days, the Japanese government made it clear that this was a formal breach of relations, “stronger even than a declaration of war,” in the words of Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki. The Chinese ambassador to Japan, who had been in Tokyo for six months since hostilities began, was finally recalled. At the end of January, Chiang summoned a military conference and declared that the top strategic priority would be to defend the east-central Chinese city of Xuzhou, about 500 kilometers north of Wuhan. This decision, like the mobilization near Lugouqiao, was heavily influenced by the railway: Xuzhou sat at the midpoint of the Tianjin–Pukou Jinpu line, and its seizure would grant the Japanese mastery over north–south travel in central China. The Jinpu line also crossed the Longhai line, China's main cross-country artery from Lanzhou to the port of Lianyungang, north of Shanghai. The Japanese military command marked the Jinpu line as a target in spring 1938. Control over Xuzhou and the rail lines threading through it were thus seen as vital to the defense of Wuhan, which lay to the city's south. Chiang's defense strategy fit into a larger plan evolving since the 1920s, when the military thinker Jiang Baili had first proposed a long war against Japan; Jiang's foresight earned him a position as an adviser to Chiang in 1938. Jiang had previously run the Baoding military academy, a predecessor of the Whampoa academy, which had trained many of China's finest young officers in the early republic 1912–1922. Now, many of the generals who had trained under Jiang gathered in Wuhan and would play crucial roles in defending the city: Chen Cheng, Bai Chongxi, Tang Shengzhi, and Xue Yue. They remained loyal to Chiang but sought to avoid his tendency to micromanage every aspect of strategy.  Nobody could say with certainty whether Wuhan would endure the Japanese onslaught, and outsiders' predictions were gloomy. As Wuhan's inhabitants tasted their unexpected new freedoms, the Japanese pressed on with their conquest of central China. After taking Nanjing, the IJA 13th Division crossed the Yangtze River to the north and advanced to the Outang and Mingguang lines on the east bank of the Chihe River in Anhui Province, while the 2nd Army of the North China Front crossed the Yellow River to the south between Qingcheng and Jiyang in Shandong, occupied Jinan, and pressed toward Jining, Mengyin, and Qingdao. To open the Jinpu Railway and connect the northern and southern battlefields, the Japanese headquarters mobilized eight divisions, three brigades, and two detachments , totaling about 240,000 men. They were commanded by General Hata Shunroku, commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, and Terauchi Hisaichi, commander of the North China Front Army. Their plan was a north–south advance: first seize Xuzhou, a strategic city in east China; then take Zhengzhou in the west along the Longhai Railway connecting Lanzhou and Lianyungang; and finally push toward Wuhan in the south along the Pinghan Railway connecting Beijing and Hankou. At the beginning of 1938, Japan's domestic mobilization and military reorganization had not yet been completed, and there was a shortage of troops to expand the front. At the Emperor's Imperial Conference on February 16, 1938, the General Staff Headquarters argued against launching operations before the summer of 1938, preferring to consolidate the front in 1938 and undertake a large-scale battle in 1939. Although the Northern China Expeditionary Force and the Central China Expeditionary Force proposed a plan to open the Jinpu Line to connect the northern and southern battlefields, the proposal was not approved by the domestic General Staff Headquarters. The Chinese army, commanded by Li Zongren, commander-in-chief of the Fifth War Zone, mobilized about 64 divisions and three brigades, totaling roughly 600,000 men. The main force was positioned north of Xuzhou to resist the southern Japanese advance, with a portion deployed along the southern Jinpu Railway to block the southern push and secure Xuzhou. Early in the campaign, Chiang Kai-shek redeployed the heavy artillery brigade originally promised to Han Fuju to Tang Enbo's forces. To preserve his strength, Shandong Provincial Governor Han Fuju abandoned the longstanding Yellow River defenses in Shandong, allowing the Japanese to capture the Shandong capital of Jinan in early March 1938. This defection opened the Jinpu Railway to attack. The Japanese 10th Division, under Rensuke Isogai, seized Tai'an, Jining, and Dawenkou, ultimately placing northern Shandong under Japanese control. The aim was to crush the Chinese between the two halves of a pincer movement. At Yixian and Huaiyuan, north of Xuzhou, both sides fought to the death: the Chinese could not drive back the Japanese, but the Japanese could not scatter the defenders either. At Linyi, about 50 kilometers northeast of Xuzhou, Zhang Zizhong, who had previously disgraced himself by abandoning an earlier battlefield—became a national hero for his determined efforts to stop the Japanese troops led by Itagaki Seishirō, the conqueror of Manchuria. The Japanese hoped that they could pour in as many as 400,000 troops to destroy the Chinese forces holding eastern and central China. Chiang Kai-shek was determined that this should not happen, recognizing that the fall of Xuzhou would place Wuhan in extreme danger. On April 1, 1938, he addressed Nationalist Party delegates, linking the defense of Wuhan to the fate of the party itself. He noted that although the Japanese had invaded seven provinces, they had only captured provincial capitals and main transport routes, while villages and towns off those routes remained unconquered. The Japanese, he argued, might muster more than half a million soldiers, but after eight or nine months of hard fighting they had become bogged down. Chiang asserted that as long as Guangzhou (Canton) remained in Chinese hands, it would be of little significance if the Japanese invaded Wuhan, since Guangzhou would keep China's sea links open and Guangdong, Sun Yat-sen's homeland, would serve as a revolutionary base area. If the “woren” Japanese “dwarfs” attacked Wuhan and Guangzhou, it would cost them dearly and threaten their control over the occupied zones. He reiterated his plan: “the base area for our war will not be in the zones east of the Beiping–Wuhan or Wuhan–Guangdong railway lines, but to their west.” For this reason he authorized withdrawing Chinese troops behind the railway lines. Chiang's speech mixed defiance with an explanation of why regrouping was necessary; it was a bold public posture in the face of a developing military disaster, yet it reflected the impossible balance he faced between signaling resolve and avoiding overcommitment of a city that might still fall. Holding Xuzhou as the first priority required Chiang Kai-shek to place a great deal of trust in one of his rivals: the southwestern general Li Zongren. The relationship between Chiang and Li would become one of the most ambivalent in wartime China. Li hailed from Guangxi, a province in southwestern China long regarded by the eastern heartland as half civilized. Its people had rarely felt fully part of the empire ruled from Beijing or even Nanjing, and early in the republic there was a strong push for regional autonomy. Li was part of a cohort of young officers trained in regional academies who sought to bring Guangxi under national control; he joined the Nationalist Party in 1923, the year Sun Yat-sen announced his alliance with the Soviets. Li was not a Baoding Academy graduate but had trained at Yunnan's equivalent institution, which shared similar views on military professionalism. He enthusiastically took part in the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and played a crucial role in the National Revolutionary Army's ascent to control over much of north China. Yet after the Nanjing government took power, Li grew wary of Chiang's bid to centralize authority in his own person. In 1930 Li's so‑called “Guangxi clique” participated in the Central Plains War, the failed effort by militarist leaders to topple Chiang; although the plot failed, Li retreated to his southwest base, ready to challenge Chiang again. The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 reinforced Li's belief that a Japanese threat posed a greater danger than Chiang's centralization. The tension between the two men was evident from the outset of the war. On October 10, 1937, Chiang appointed Li commander of the Fifth War Zone; Li agreed on the condition that Chiang refrain from issuing shouling—personal commands—to Li's subordinates. Chiang complied, a sign of the value he placed on Li's leadership and the caution with which he treated Li and his Guangxi ally Bai Chongxi. As Chiang sought any possible victory amid retreat and destruction, he needed Li to deliver results. As part of the public-relations front, journalists were given access to commanders on the Xuzhou front. Li and his circle sought to shape their image as capable leaders to visiting reporters, with Du Zhongyuan among the most active observers. Du praised the “formidable southwestern general, Li Zongren,” calling him “elegant and refined” and “vastly magnanimous.” In language echoing the era's soldiers' public presentation, Du suggested that Li's forces operated under strict, even disciplined, orders “The most important point in the people's war is that . . . troops do not harass the people of the country. If the people are the water, the soldiers are the fish, and if you have fish with no water, inevitably they're going to choke; worse still is to use our water to nurture the enemy's fish — that really is incomparably stupid”.  Within the southern front, on January 26, 1938, the Japanese 13th Division attacked Fengyang and Bengbu in Anhui Province, while Li Pinxian, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 5th War Zone, directed operations south of Xuzhou. The defending 31st Corps of the 11th Group Army, after resisting on the west bank of the Chi River, retreated to the west of Dingyuan and Fengyang. By February 3, the Japanese had captured Linhuai Pass and Bengbu. From the 9th to the 10th, the main force of the 13th Division forced a crossing of the Huai River at Bengbu and Linhuai Pass respectively, and began an offensive against the north bank. The 51st Corps, reorganized from the Central Plains Northeast Army and led by Commander Yu Xuezhong, engaged in fierce combat with the Japanese. Positions on both sides of the Huai shifted repeatedly, producing a riverine bloodbath through intense hand-to-hand fighting. After ten days of engagement, the Fifth War Zone, under Zhang Zizhong, commander of the 59th Army, rushed to the Guzhen area to reinforce the 51st Army, and the two forces stubbornly resisted the Japanese on the north bank of the Huai River. Meanwhile, on the south bank, the 48th Army of the 21st Group Army held the Luqiao area, while the 7th Army, in coordination with the 31st Army, executed a flanking attack on the flanks and rear of the Japanese forces in Dingyuan, compelling the main body of the 13th Division to redeploy to the north bank for support. Seizing the initiative, the 59th and 51st Armies launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming all positions north of the Huai River by early March. The 31st Army then moved from the south bank to the north, and the two sides faced across the river. Subsequently, the 51st and 59th Armies were ordered to reinforce the northern front, while the 31st Army continued to hold the Huai River to ensure that all Chinese forces covering the Battle of Xuzhou were safely withdrawn. Within the northern front, in late February, the Japanese Second Army began its southward push along multiple routes. The eastern axis saw the 5th Division moving south from Weixian present-day Weifang, in Shandong, capturing Yishui, Juxian, and Rizhao before pressing directly toward Linyi, as units of the Nationalist Third Corps' 40th Army and others mounted strenuous resistance. The 59th Army was ordered to reinforce and arrived on March 12 at the west bank of the Yi River in the northern suburbs of Linyi, joining the 40th Army in a counterattack that, after five days and nights of ferocious fighting, inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese and forced them to retreat toward Juxian. On the western route, the Seya Detachment (roughly a brigade) of the Japanese 10th Division crossed the Grand Canal from Jining and attacked Jiaxiang, meeting stiff resistance from the Third Army and being thwarted, while continuing to advance south along the Jinpu Railway. The Isogai Division, advancing on the northern route without awaiting help from the southeast and east, moved southward from Liangxiadian, south of Zouxian, on March 14, with the plan to strike Tengxian, present-day Tengzhou on March 15 and push south toward Xuzhou. The defending 22nd Army and the 41st Corps fought bravely and suffered heavy casualties in a hard battle that lasted until March 17, during which Wang Mingzhang, commander of the 122nd Division defending Teng County, was killed in action. Meanwhile, a separate Japanese thrust under Itagaki Seishirō landed on the Jiaodong Peninsula and occupied Qingdao, advancing along the Jiaoji Line to strike Linyi, a key military town in southern Shandong. Pang Bingxun's 40th Army engaged the invaders in fierce combat, and later, elements of Zhang Zizhong's 333rd Brigade of the 111th Division, reinforced by the 57th Army, joined Pang Bingxun's forces to launch a double-sided pincer that temporarily repelled the Japanese attack on Linyi. By late March 1938 a frightening reality loomed: the Japanese were close to prevailing on the Xuzhou front. The North China Area Army, commanded by Itagaki Seishirō, Nishio Toshizō, and Isogai Rensuke, was poised to link up with the Central China Expeditionary Force under Hata Shunroku in a united drive toward central China. Li Zongren, together with his senior lieutenants Bai Chongxi and Tang Enbo, decided to confront the invaders at Taierzhuang, the traditional stone-walled city that would become a focal point of their defense. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Nanjing falls after one of humanities worst atrocities. Chiang Kai-Shek's war command has been pushed to Wuhan, but the Japanese are not stopping their advance. Trautmann's mediation is over and now Japan has its sights on Xuzhou and its critical railway junctions. Japan does not realize it yet, but she is now entering a long war of attrition.

Hey guys, what you are about to listen to is an extremely graphic episode that will contain many scenes of gore, rape, human experimentation, honestly it will run the gambit. If you got a weak stomach, this episode might not be for you. You have been warned.  I just want to take a chance to say a big thanks to all of you guys who decided to join the patreon, you guys are awesome! Please leave a comment on this episode to let me know what more you want to hear about in the future. With all of that said and done lets jump right into it.   Where to begin with this one? Let start off with one of the major figures of Unit 731, Shiro Ishii. Born June 25th, 1892 in the village of Chiyoda Mura in Kamo District of Chiba Prefecture, Ishii was the product of his era. He came from a landowning class, had a very privileged childhood. His primary and secondary schoolmates described him to be brash, abrasive and arrogant. He was a teacher's pet, extremely intelligent, known to have excellent memory. He grew up during Japans ultra militarism/nationalism age, thus like any of his schoolmates was drawn towards the military. Less than a month after graduating from the Medical department of Kyoto Imperial University at the age of 28, he began military training as a probation officer in the 3rd regiment of the Imperial Guards division. Within 6 months he became a surgeon 1st Lt. During his postgraduate studies at Kyoto Imperial university he networked successfully to climb the career ladder. As a researcher he was sent out to help cure an epidemic that broke out in Japan. It was then he invented a water filter that could be carried alongside the troops.   He eventually came across a report of the Geneva Protocol and conference reports of Harada Toyoji as well as other military doctors. He became impressed with the potential of chemical and biological warfare. During WW1 chemical warfare had been highly explored, leading 44 nations to pass the Geneva Protocol or more specifically  “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”. Representatives from Japan were present at this conference and were involving in the drafting and signing of the Geneva Protocol, but it was not ratified in Japan at the time. Ishii's university mentor, Kiyano Kenji suggested he travel western countries and he did so for 2 years. Many nations were secretive about their research, but some places such as MIT were quite open. After his visit Ishii came to believe Japan was far behind everyone else in biological warfare research. After returning to Japan Ishii became an instructor at the Imperial Japanese Army Medical School. Japan of course lacked significant natural resources, thus it was a perfect nation to pursue biological weapons research. Ishii began lobbying the IJA, proposing to establish a military agency to develop biological weapons. One of his most compelling arguments was “that biological warfare must possess distinct possibilities, otherwise, it would not have been outlawed by the League of Nations.”   Ishii networked his way into good favor with the Minister of Health, Koizumi Chikahiko who lended his support in August of 1932 to allow Ishii to head an Epidemic Prevention Laboratory. Ishii secured a 1795 square meter complex at the Army Medical College. Yet this did not satisfy Ishii, it simply was not the type of work he wanted to do. The location of Tokyo allowed too many eyes on his work, he could not perform human experimentation. For what he wanted to do, he had to leave Japan, and in the 1930's Japan had a few colonies or sphere's of influence, the most appetizing one being Manchuria. In 1932 alongside his childhood friend Masuda Tomosada, Ishii took a tour of Harbin and he fell in love with the location.   During the 1930's Harbin was quite a cosmopolitan city, it was a major trading port and diverse in ethnicities and religions. Here there were Mongols, Russians, Chinese, Japanese, various other western groups in lesser numbers. Just about every religion was represented, it was a researcher's paradise for subjects. Ishii sought human experimentation and needed to find somewhere covert with maximum secrecy. He chose a place in the Nan Gang District of Beiyinhe village, roughly 70 kms southeast of Harbin. It was here and then he began human experimentation. One day in 1932, Ishii and the IJA entered the village and evacuated an entire block where Xuan Hua and Wu Miao intersected. They began occupying a multi-use structure that had been supporting 100 Chinese vendors who sold clothes and food to the locals. They then began drafting Chinese laborers to construct the Zhong Ma complex to house the “Togo Unit” named after the legendary admiral, Togo Heihachiro. The Chinese laborers were underpaid and under constant watch from Japanese guards, limiting their movement and preventing them from understanding what they were building, or what was occurring within the complex. The complex was built in under a year, it held 100 rooms, 3 meter high brick walls and had an electric fence surrounding the perimeter. One thousand captives at any given time could be imprisoned within the complex. To ensure absolute secrecy, security guards patrolled the complex 24/7. Saburo Endo, director of Operations for the Kwantung Army once inspected the Togo Unit and described it in his book “The Fifteen Years' Sino-Japanese War and Me”, as such:   [It was] converted from a rather large soy sauce workshop, surrounded by high rammed earth wall. All the attending military doctors had pseudonyms, and they were strictly regulated and were not allowed to communicate with the outsiders. The name of the unit was “Tōgō Unit.” One by one, the subjects of the experiments were imprisoned in a sturdy iron lattice and inoculated with various pathogenic bacteria to observe changes in their conditions. They used prisoners on death row in the prisons of Harbin for these experiments. It was said that it was for national defense purposes, but the experiments were performed with appalling brutality.The dead were burned in high-voltage electric furnaces, leaving no trace.    A local from the region added this about the complex “We heard rumors of people having blood drawn in there but we never went near the place. We were too afraid. When the construction started, there were about forty houses in our village, and a lot of people were driven out. About one person from each home was taken to work on the construction. People were gathered from villages from all around here, maybe about a thousand people in all. The only things we worked on were the surrounding wall and the earthen walls. The Chinese that worked on the buildings were brought in from somewhere, but we didn't know where. After everything was finished, those people were killed.”    Despite all the secrecy, it was soon discovered prisoners were being taken, primarily from the CCP and bandits who were being subjected to tests. One such test was to gradually drain a victim of blood to see at what point they would die. The unit drew 500 cc of blood from each prisoner every 3-5 days. As their bodies drew weaker, they were dissected for further research, the average prisoner lasted a maximum of a month. Due to the climate of Manchuria, it was soon established that finding methods to treat frostbite would benefit the Kwantung army. Ishii's team gathered human subjects and began freezing and unfreezing them. Sometimes these experiments included observing test subjects whose limbs had been frozen and severed. The Togo team reported to General Okamura Yasuji, the deputy commander in chief of the Kwantung army from 1933-1934 that the best way to treat frostbite was to soak a limb in 37 degree water. According to the testimony of a witness named Furuichi at trial done in Khabarovsk , “Experiments in freezing human beings were performed every year in the detachment, in the coldest months of the year—November, December, January and February. The experimental technique was as follows: the test subjects were taken out into the frost at about 11 o'clock at night, compelled to dip their hands into a barrel of cold water and forced to stand with wet hands in the frost for a long time. Alternatively, some were taken out dressed, but with bare feet and compelled to stand at night in the frost during the coldest period of the year. When frostbite had developed, the subjects were taken to a room and forced to put their feet in water of 5 degrees Celsius, after which the temperature was gradually increased.”   Sergeant Major Kurakazu who was with Unit 731 later on in 1940 and taken prisoner by the Soviets in 1945 stated during the Khabarovsk trial , “I saw experiments performed on living people for the first time in December 1940. I was shown these experiments by researcher Yoshimura, a member of the 1st Division. These experiments were performed in the prison laboratory. When I walked into the prison laboratory, ve Chinese experimentees were sitting there; two of these Chinese had no fingers at all, their hands were black; in those of three others the bones were visible. They had fingers, but they were only bones. Yoshimura told me that this was the result of freezing experiments.”   According to Major Karasawa during the same trial Ishii became curious about using plague as a weapon of war and captured plague infected mice to test on subjects in the Zhong Ma Complex “Ishii told me that he had experimented with cholera and plague on the mounted bandits of Manchuria during 1933-1934 and discovered that the plague was effective.”   According to Lt General Endo Saburo's diary entry on November 16th of 1933, at the Zhong Ma complex “The second squad which was responsible for poison gas, liquid poison; and the First Squad which was responsible for electrical experiments. Two bandits were used by each squad for the experiments.  Phosgene gas—5-minute injection of gas into a brick-lined room; the subject was still alive one day aer inhalation of gas; critically ill with pneumonia.  Potassium cyanide—the subject was injected with 15 mg.; subject lost consciousness approximately 20 minutes later.  20,000 volts—several jolts were not enough to kill the subject; injection of poison required to kill the subject.  5000 volts—several jolts were not enough; aer several minutes of continuous current, subject was burned to death.”    The Togo Unit established a strict security system to keep its research highly confidential. Yet in 1934, 16 Chinese prisoners escaped, compromising the Zhong Ma location. One of the guards had gotten drunk and a prisoner named Li smashed a bottle over his head and stole his keys. He freed 15 other prisoners and of them 4 died of cold, hunger and other ailments incurred by the Togo unit. 12 managed to flee to the 3rd route army of the Northeast Anti Japanese united Army. Upon hearing the horrifying report, the 3rd route army attacked the Togo unit at Beiyinhe and within a year, the Zhong Ma complex was exploded.    After the destruction of the Zhong Ma complex, Ishii needed a better structure. The Togo unit had impressed their superior and received a large budget. Then on May 30th of 1936 Emperor Hirohito authorized the creation of Unit 731. Thus Ishii and his colleagues were no longer part of the Epidemic Prevention Institute of the Army Medical School, now they were officially under the Kwantung Army as the Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department. Their new HQ was located in Pingfan, closer to Harbin. Their initial budget was 3 million yen for the personnel, 200-300 thousand yen per autonomous unit and 6 million yen for experimentation and research. Thus their new annual budget was over 10 million yen.    Pingfan was evacuated by the Kwantung army. Hundreds of families were forced to move out and sell their land at cheap prices. To increase security this time, people required a special pass to enter Pingfan. Then the airspace over the area became off-limits, excluding IJA aircraft, all violators would be shot down. The new Pingfan complex was within a walled city with more than 70 buildings over a 6 km tract of land. The complex's huge size drew some international attention, and when asked what the structure was, the scientists replied it was a lumber mill. Rather grotesquely, prisoners would be referred to as “maruta” or “logs” to keep up the charade. Suzuki, a Japanese construction company back then, worked day and night to construct the complex.    Now many of you probably know a bit about Unit 731, but did you know it's one of countless units?  The Army's Noborito Laboratory was established (1937) The Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the North China Army/ Unit 1855 was established (1938)  The Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of Central China/ Unit 1644 (1939)  Thee Guangzhou Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of South China Army/ Unit 8604 (1942)  The Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Southern Expeditionary Army/ Unit 9620 (1942).    There were countless others, detachments included Unit 1855 in Beijing, Unit Ei 1644 in Nanjing, Unit 8604 in Guangzhou, and later Unit 9420 in Singapore. All of these units comprised Ishii's network, which, at its height in 1939, oversaw over 10,000 personnel.   Victims were normally brought to Pingfan during the dead of night within crammed freight cars with number logs on top. They were brought into the building via a secret tunnel. According to a witness named Fang Shen Yu, technicians in white lab coats handled the victims who were tied in bags. The victims included anyone charge with a crime, could be anti-japanese activity, opium smoking, espionage, being a communist, homelessness, being mentally handicap, etc. Victims included chinese, Mongolians, Koreans, White Russians, Harbin's jewish population and any Europeans accused of espionage. During the Khabarovsk trial, Major Iijima Yoshia admitted to personally subjecting 40 Soviet citizens to human experimentation. Harbin's diversity provided great research data. Each prisoner was assigned a number starting with 101 and ending at 1500. Onec 1500 was reached, they began again at 101, making it nearly impossible to estimate the total number of victims. Since the complex had been labeled a lumber mill to the locals, most did not worry about it or were too afraid to do so. The prison's warden was Ishii's brother Mitsuo who made sure to keep it all a secret.    Ethics did not exist within Ishii's network of horrors. Everything was done efficiently in the name of science. Pingfang was equipped for disposing the evidence of their work in 3 large incinerators. As a former member who worked with the incinerators recalled “the bodies always burned up fast because all the organ were gone; the bodies were empty”. Human experimentation allowed the researchers their first chance to actually examine the organs of a living person at will to see the progress of a disease. Yeah you heard me right, living person, a lot of the vivisections were done on live people. As one former researcher explained "the results of the effects of infection cannot be obtained accurately once the person dies because putrefactive bacteria set in. Putrefactive bacteria are stronger than plague germs. So, for obtaining accurate results, it is important whether the subject is alive or not." Another former researcher said this “"As soon as the symptoms were observed, the prisoner was taken from his cell and into the dissection room. He was stripped and placed on the table, screaming, trying to fight back. He was strapped down, still screaming frightfully. One of the doctors stuffed a towel into his mouth, then with one quick slice of the scalpel he was opened up." Witnesses of some of these vivisections reported that victims usually let out a horrible scream when the initial cuts were made, but that the voice stops soon after. The researchers often removed the organ of interest, leaving others in the body and the victims usually died of blood loss or because of the removed organ. There are accounts of experiments benign carried out on mothers and children, because yes children were in fact born in the facilities. Many human specimens were placed in jars to be viewed by Tokyo's army medical college. Sometimes these jars were filled with limbs or organs but some giant ones had entire bodies.   Vivisection was conducted on human beings to observe how disease affected each organ once a human dies. According to testimony given by a technician named Ogawa Fukumatsu “I participated in vivisections. I did them every day. I cannot remember the amount of people dissected. At first, I refused to do it. But then, they would not allow me to eat because it was an order; gradually I changed.” Another technician Masakuni Kuri testified  “I did vivisection at the time. Experiments were conducted on a Chinese woman with syphilis. Because she was alive, the blood poured out like water from a tap.”   A report done by Shozo Kondo studied the effects of bubonic plague on humans. The number of subjects was 57 with age ranging from toddlers to 80 years old with mixed gender. The study used fleas carrying plague that were dispersed upon the local population in June of 1940 at Changchun. 7 plague victims were Japanese residents. The report stated the plague spread because of lack of immunity by the townspeople. Subjects' survival time ranged from 2-5 days, with only 3 surviving 12, 18 and 21 days. The subjects were infected with Glandular, Cutaneous or Septicemic plague, but most had the Glandular variety.     In addition to the central units of Pingfang were others set up in Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Singapore. The total number of personnel was 20,000. These satellite facilities all had their own unique horror stories. One was located in Anda, 100km from Pingfang where outdoor tests for plague, cholera and other pathogens were down. They would expose human subjects to biological bombs, typically by putting 10-40 people in the path of a biological bomb. A lot of the research was done to see the effective radius of the bombs, so victims were placed at different distances. At Xinjing was Unit 100 and its research was done against domesticated animals, horses particularly. Unit 100 was a bacteria factory producing glanders, anthrax and other pathogens. They often ran tests by mixing poisons with food and studied its effects on animals, but they also researched chemical warfare against crops. At Guangzhou was unit 8604 with its HQ at Zhongshan medical university. It is believed starvation tests ran there, such as the water test I mentioned. They also performed typhoid tests and bred rats to spread plague. Witness testimony from a Chinese volunteer states they often dissolved the bodies of victims in acid. In Beijing was Unit 1855 which was a combination of a prison and experiment center. They ran plague, cholera and typhus tests. Prisoners were forced to ingest mixtures of germs and some were vaccinated against the ailments. In Singapore after its capture in February of 1942 there was a secret laboratory. One Mr. Othman Wok gave testimony in the 1990s that when he was 17 years old he was employed to work at this secret lab. He states 7 Chinese, Indian and Malay boys worked in the lab, picking fleas from rats and placing them in containers. Some 40 rat catchers, would haul rats to the lab for the boys to do their work. The containers with fleas went to Japanese researchers and Othman says he saw rats being injected with plague pathogens. The fleas were transferred to kerosene cans which contained dried horse blood and an unidentified chemical left to breed for weeks. Once they had plague infected fleas in large quantity Othman said "A driver who drove the trucks which transported the fleas to the railway station said that these bottles of fleas were sent off to Thailand." If this is true, it gives evidence to claims Unit 731 had a branch in Thailand as well. Othman stated he never understood or knew what was really going on at the lab, but when he read in 1944 about biological attacks on Chongqing using fleas, he decided to leave the lab. Othman states the unit was called Unit 9240.  As you can imagine rats and insects played a large role in all of this. They harvested Manchuria rat population and enlisted schoolchildren to raise them. In the 1990s the Asahi Broadcasting company made a documentary titled “the mystery of the rats that went to the continent”. It involved a small group of high school children in Saitama prefecture asked local farmers if they knew anything about rat farming during the war years. Many stated everybody back then was raising rats, it was a major source of income. One family said they had rat cages piled up in a shed, each cage built to carry 6 rat, but they had no idea what the rats were being used for. Now hear this, after the war, the US military kept these same families in business. The US army unit 406 which was established in Tokyo to research viruses wink wink, would often drive out to these farms in their american jeeps collecting rats.  Getting fleas was a much tricker task. One method was taking older Chinese prisoners and quarantining them with clothes carrying flea or flea eggs and allowing them to live in isolated rooms to cultivate more fleas. These poor guys had to live in filth and not shave for weeks to produce around 100 fleas a day. Now Unit 731 dealt with numerous diseases such as Cholera.  Some experiments used dogs to spread cholera to villages. They would steal dogs from villages, feed them pork laced with cholera germs and return them to the villages. When the disease finished incubating the dogs would vomit and other dogs would come and eat the vomit spread it more and more. The dogs were also stricken with diarrhea and the feces spread it to other dogs as well. 20% of the people in villages hit by this died of the disease. Former army captain Kojima Takeo was a unit member involved in a Cholera campaign and added this testimony "We were told that we were going out on a cholera campaign, and we were all given inoculations against cholera ten days before starting out. Our objective was to infect all the people in the area. The disease had already developed before we got there, and as we moved into the village everyone scattered. The only ones left were those who were too sick to move. The number of people coming down with the disease kept increasing. Cholera produces a face like a skeleton, vomiting, and diarrhea. And the vomiting and defecating of the people lying sick brought flies swarming around. One after the other, people died." I've mentioned it a lot, Plague was a staple of Unit 731. The IJA wanted a disease that was fast and fatal, Cholera for instance took about 20 days, plague on the other hand starts killing in 3 days. Plague also has a very long history of use going back to the medieval times. It was one of the very first diseases Ishii focused on. In october of 1940 a plague attack was conducted against the Kaimingjie area in the port city of Ningbo. This was a joint operation with Unit 731 and the Nanjing based Unit 1644. During this operation plague germs were mixed with wheat, corn, cloth scraps and cotton and dropped from the air. More than 100 people died within a few days of the attack and the affected area was sealed off from the public until the 1960s.  Another horrifying test was the frostbite experiments. Army Engineer Hisato Yoshimura conducted these types of experiments by taking prisoners outside, dipping various appendages into water of varying temperatures and allowing the limbs to freeze. Once frozen, Yoshimura would strike their affected limbs with a short stick and in his words “they would emit a sound resembling that which a board gives when it is struck”. Ice was then chipping away with the affected area being subjected to various treatments, such as being doused in water, exposed to heat and so on. I have to mentioned here, that to my shock there is film of these specific frostbite experiments and one of our animators at Kings and Generals found it, I have seen a lot of things in my day, but seeing this was absolute nightmare fuel. If you have seen the movie or series Snowpiercer, they pretty much nail what it looked like.  Members of Unit 731 referred to Yoshimura as a “scientific devil” and a “cold blooded animal” because he would conduct his work with strictness. Naoji Uezono another member of Unit 731, described in a 1980s interview a disgusting scene where Yoshimura had "two naked men put in an area 40–50 degrees below zero and researchers filmed the whole process until [the subjects] died. [The subjects] suffered such agony they were digging their nails into each other's flesh". Yoshimuras lack of any remorse was evident in an article he wrote for the Journal of Japanese Physiology in 1950 where he admitted to using 20 children and 3 day old infant in experiments which exposed them to zero degree celsius ice and salt water. The article drew criticism and no shit, but Yoshimura denied any guilt when contacted by a reporter from the Mainichi Shimbun. Yoshimura developed a “resistance index of frostbite” based on the mean temperature of 5 - 30 minutes after immersion in freezing water, the temperature of the first rise after immersion and the time until the temperature first rises after immersion. In a number of separate experiments he determined how these parameters depended on the time of day a victim's body part was immersed in freezing water, the surrounding temperature and humidity during immersion, how the victim had been treated before the immersion ("after keeping awake for a night", "after hunger for 24 hours", "after hunger for 48 hours", "immediately after heavy meal", "immediately after hot meal", "immediately after muscular exercise", "immediately after cold bath", "immediately after hot bath"), what type of food the victim had been fed over the five days preceding the immersions with regard to dietary nutrient intake ("high protein (of animal nature)", "high protein (of vegetable nature)", "low protein intake", and "standard diet"), and salt intake. Members of Unit 731 also worked with Syphilis, where they orchestrated forced sex acts between infected and noninfected prisoners to transmit the disease. One testimony given by a prisoner guard was as follows “Infection of venereal disease by injection was abandoned, and the researchers started forcing the prisoners into sexual acts with each other. Four or five unit members, dressed in white laboratory clothing completely covering the body with only eyes and mouth visible, rest covered, handled the tests. A male and female, one infected with syphilis, would be brought together in a cell and forced into sex with each other. It was made clear that anyone resisting would be shot.” After victims were infected, they would be vivisected at differing stages of infection so that the internal and external organs could be observed as the disease progressed. Testimony from multiple guards blamed the female victims as being hosts of the diseases, even as they were forcibly infected. Genitals of female prisoners were infected with syphilis and the guards would call them “jam filled buns”. Even some children were born or grew up in the walls of Unit 731, infected with syphilis. One researcher recalled “one was a Chinese women holding an infant, one was a white russian woman with a daughter of 4 or 5 years of age, and the last was a white russian women with a boy of about 6 or 7”. The children of these women were tested in ways similar to the adults.  There was also of course rape and forced pregnancies as you could guess. Female prisoners were forced to become pregnant for use in experiments. The hypothetical possibility of transmission from mother to child of diseases, particularly syphilis was the rationale for the experiments. Fetal survival and damage to the womans reproductive organs were objects of interest. A large number of babies were born in captivity and there had been no accounts of any survivor of Unit 731, children included. It is suspected that the children of the female prisoners were killed after birth or aborted. One guard gave a testimony “One of the former researchers I located told me that one day he had a human experiment scheduled, but there was still time to kill. So he and another unit member took the keys to the cells and opened one that housed a Chinese woman. One of the unit members raped her; the other member took the keys and opened another cell. There was a Chinese woman in there who had been used in a frostbite experiment. She had several fingers missing and her bones were black, with gangrene set in. He was about to rape her anyway, then he saw that her sex organ was festering, with pus oozing to the surface. He gave up the idea, left and locked the door, then later went on to his experimental work.” In a testimony given on December 28 by witness Furuichi during the Khabarovsk Trial, he described how “a Russian woman was infected with syphilis to allow the scientists to and out how to prevent the spread of the disease.  Many babies were born to women who had been captured and become experimental subjects. Some women were kidnapped while pregnant; others became pregnant aer forced sex acts in the prisons, enabling researchers to study the transmission of venereal disease   Initially Unit 731 and Unit 100 were going to support Japan's Kantokuen plan. The Kantokuen plan an operation plan to be carried out by the Kwantung army to invade the USSR far east, capitalizing on the success of operation barbarossa. Unit 731 and 100 were to prepare bacteriological weapons to help the invasion. The plan was created by the IJA general staff and approved by Emperor Hirohito. It would have involved three-steps to isolate and destroy the Soviet Army and occupy the eastern soviet cities over the course of 6 months. It would have involved heavy use of chemical and biological weapons. The Japanese planned to spread disease using three methods; direct spraying from aircraft, bacteria bombs and saboteurs on the ground. This would have included plague, cholera, typhus and other diseases against troops, civilian populations, livestocks, crops and water supplies. The main targets were Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Voroshilov, and Chita. If successful the Soviet Far East would be incorporated into Japan's greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. Within Kantokuen documents, Emperor Hirohtio instructed Ishii to increase production rate at the units, for those not convinced Hirohito was deeply involved in some of the worst actions of the war. Yet in the end both Emperor Hirohito and Hideki Tojo pulled their support for the invasion of the USSR and opted for the Nanshin-ron strategy instead.    On August 9th of 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. In response, the Japanese government ordered all research facilities in Manchuria to be destroyed and to erase all incriminating materials. A skeleton crew began the liquidation of unit 731 on August 9th or 10th, while the rest of the unit evacuated. All test subjects were killed and cremated so no remains would be found. The design of the facilities however, made them hard to destroy via bombing, several parts of the buildings left standing when the Soviets arrived. While most of the unit's staff managed to escape, including Ishii, some were captured by the soviets. Some of these prisoners told the Soviets about the atrocities committed at Pingfang and Changchun. At first the claims seemed so outrageous, the Soviets sent their own Biological Weapons specialists to examine the ruins of Ping Fang. After a thorough investigation, the Soviet experts confirmed the experiments had been done there. The real soviet investigation into the secrets of Unit 731 and 100 began in early 1946, thus information was not readily available during the Tokyo Tribunal. Both the Americans and SOviets had collected evidence during the war that indicated the Japanese were in possession of bacteriological weapons though. Amongst the 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war in the USSR, Major General Kiyoshi Kawashima and Major Tomoio Karasawa would become essential to uncovering the Japanese bacteriological warfare secrets and opening the path to hold the Khabarovsk trial. The Soviets and Americans spent quite a few years performing investigations, many of which led to no arrests. The major reason for this was similar to Operation Paperclip. For those unaware, paperclip was a American secret intelligence program where 1600 German scientists were taken after the war and employed, many of whom were nazi party officials. The most famous of course was Wernher von Braun. When the Americans looked into the Japanese bacteriological work, they were surprised to find the Japanese were ahead of them in some specific areas, notably ones involving human experimentation. General Charles Willoughby of G-2 american intelligence called to attention that all the data extracted from live human testing was out of the reach of the USA. By the end of 1947, with the CCP looking like they might defeat Chiang Kai-Shek and the Soviet Union proving to be their new enemy, the US sought to form an alliance with Japan, and this included their Bacteriological specialists. From October to December, Drs Edwin Hill and Joseph Victor from Camp Detrick were sent to Tokyo to gather information from Ishii and his colleagues. Their final conclusion laid out the importance of continuing to learn from the Japanese teams, and grant them immunity. The British were also receiving some reports from the Americans about the Japanese Bacteriological research and human experimentation. The British agreed with the Americans that the information was invaluable due to the live human beings used in the tests. The UK and US formed some arrangements to retain the information and keep it secret. By late 1948 the Tokyo War Crimes Trial was coming to an end as the cold war tension was heating up in Korea, pushing the US more and more to want to retain the information and keep it all under wraps.  With formal acceptance, final steps were undertaken, much of which was overseen by General Douglas MacArthur. On May 6, 1947, Douglas MacArthur wrote to Washington that "additional data, possibly some statements from Ishii probably can be obtained by informing Japanese involved that information will be retained in intelligence channels and will not be employed as 'War Crimes' evidence.” Ishii and his colleagues received full immunity from the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Ishii was hired by the US government to lecture American officers at Fort Detrick on bioweapons and the findings made by Unit 731. During the Korean War Ishii reportedly traveled to Korea to take part in alleged American biological warfare activities. On February 22nd of 1952, Ishiiwas explicitly named in a statement made by the North Korean FOreign Minister, claiming he along with other "Japanese bacteriological war criminals had been involved in systematically spreading large quantities of bacteria-carrying insects by aircraft in order to disseminate contagious diseases over our frontline positions and our rear". Ishii would eventually return to Japan, where he opened a clinic, performing examinations and treatments for free. He would die from laryngeal cancer in 1959 and according to his daughter became a Roman Catholic shortly before his death.  According to an investigation by The Guardian, after the war, former members of Unit 731 conducted human experiments on Japanese prisoners, babies, and mental patients under the guise of vaccine development, with covert funding from the U.S. government. Masami Kitaoka, a graduate of Unit 1644, continued performing experiments on unwilling Japanese subjects from 1947 to 1956 while working at Japan's National Institute of Health Sciences. He infected prisoners with rickettsia and mentally ill patients with typhus. Shiro Ishii, the chief of the unit, was granted immunity from prosecution for war crimes by American occupation authorities in exchange for providing them with human experimentation research materials. From 1948 to 1958, less than five percent of these documents were transferred to microfilm and stored in the U.S. National Archives before being shipped back to Japan.

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions.   Hey before I begin I just want to thank all of you who have joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please let me know what other figures, events or other things you want to hear about in the future and I will try to make it happen.   So as you can see the title of this episode is, Why did the Japanese perform so many Atrocities during the Pacific War. Phewww, its honestly a difficult one to tackle, for there are countless reasons. I had a university professor who taught; ancient and modern Japanese history, history of the Japanese empire and the Pacific War. He actually answered this very question in a single lecture and in many ways I found it to be one of the most illuminating things I ever learnt about the Pacific War. To truly understand the reasons why they did such horrible things, you actually need to learn the general history of Japan, particularly the changes from Tokugawa, to Meiji, to Showa. I am going to do my very best, but I know many of you might be asking “what were the worst things they did?”, not everyone takes a special interest into such a niche part of history. May I recommend for those with strong stomachs “the knights of Bushido” by Edward Russel that covers pretty much all the atrocities of the Asia-Pacific War. For those of you who like darker things, check out Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II by David Wallace and Peter Williams, absolute nightmare fuel.   I can't go through the entire history of Japan, but I think it's important to start off with the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. This was the first time the Empire of Japan fought a true war with a foreign nation, that being the Qing dynasty. At this point in time, there really emerged a sort of, to be blunt, race war. The Chinese had historically referred to the Japanese as “woren”, a racist term meaning dwarf. Now historically the Japanese had always revered the Chinese, kind of like in the way a little brother looks up to his big brother. In tokugawa Japan they would learn from the Chinese, but as the Meiji restoration began this dramatically changed. Japan watched as the Chinese were humiliating and abused by the western powers and failed to modernize. Meanwhile Japan emulated the best of the west, to modernize and become a great power themselves. In many ways, Japan saw itself become big brother and now China was little brother. The Meiji restoration had an element of nationalism built into it that would explode come the Show era. Japan for its entire history had this belief they were the “Yamato Race” dating back to the 6th century. Now while the Meiji restoration sought to emulate the west, they also emulated racism and propaganda, which in the 19th century was kind of a big deal. The Japanese government gradually began a long term campaign promoting the idea the Japanese, or Yamato people were superior to that of the other asian races. Who was the next big asian boy on the block? China, so it was inevitable they would direct a lot of racist attitudes towards the Chinese. During the first sino-japanese war, the Chinese, particularly Manchu had a habit of performing atrocities upon the Japanese. They would often cut off body parts of Japanese soldiers in grotesque manners and leave them to be found by their comrades. This was honestly a pretty typical thing of war in the region, but it did also have a racist element to it, the Chinese certainly saw the Japanese as lesser people. Just before the battle of Port Arthur, the Japanese found mutilated remains of the comrades, here is a passage from Makio Okabe who was there:   As we entered the town of Port Arthur, we saw the head of a Japanese soldier displayed on a wooden stake. This filled us with rage and a desire to crush any Chinese soldier. Anyone we saw in the town, we killed. The streets were filled with corpses, so many they blocked our way. We killed people in their homes; by and large, there wasn't a single house without from three to six dead. Blood was flowing and the smell was awful. We sent out search parties. We shot some, hacked at others. The Chinese troops just dropped their arms and fled. Firing and slashing, it was unbounded joy. At this time, our artillery troops were at the rear, giving three cheers [banzai] for the emperor.   The Japanese performed a massacre at Port Arthur, butchering perhaps up to 3000 Chinese civilians, some claim 10's of thousands and in full few of western war correspondents. It became a huge controversy that destroyed the image of the IJA internationally and hurt the Japanese governments efforts at riding themselves of unequal treaties with the western powers. The Japanese learnt a hell of a lesson and an Imperial Proclamation was made in 1894 stating that Japanese soldiers should make every effort to win the war without violating international laws. According to Japanese historian Yuki Tanaka, Japanese forces during the First Sino-Japanese War released 1,790 Chinese prisoners without harm, once they signed an agreement not to take up arms against Japan if they were released.   During the next major war the Japanese performed a dramatic 180, well at least to their enemy. During the Russo-Japanese War, over 80,000 Russian POWs were held by the IJA who were treated in accordance with the Hague conventions of 1899. The Japanese paid them for labor, housed them in conventional POW camps, made sure they received good medical treatment, ironically better than the Russians were capable of. The Japanese did all of this, making sure the foreign war correspondents wrote about it. It was a massive PR stunt in many ways. The Japanese were emulating how a world power should act, because they sought to be one. Meanwhile the Japanese swallowed their pride at being called yellow monkeys, as the prevalent Yellow Peril ideology was being pushed by Kaiser Wilhehelm and Tsar Nicholas II heavily. The Japanese treated the entire war like gentlemen and suffered horrific higher casualties than necessary because of it. But something many people don't take much notice of, because the IJA made sure of it, was they horrible treatment of the Chinese during the war.   Now the Russians in Manchuria looted, killed and raped many Chinese, pushed quite a bit by the Yellow Peril. The Chinese, certainly the Honghuzi bandits were working for the Japanese to attack them, so its not like they had no reasons. The IJA was more professional and had orders not to molest the Chinese, as they were helping the war effort, but this did not prevent it. The Japanese also looted, killed and raped Chinese. The Japanese would often wave it off as reprisals against potential spies. I only bring this up as it was very apparent, the Japanese treated the Russians much different than the chinese.   Fast forward to WW1, the Japanese had a battle against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians known in the west as the Siege of Tsingtau. The Japanese took up an identical methodology to the Russo-Japanese war with their approach to the Germans, but even took it a step further. After winning the siege, the Japanese seized nearly 5000 German POW's who were treated with a surreal amount of respect. They were brought back to Japan and housed for the rest of the war in 12 cities around Tokyo and Kumamoto. The POW's enjoyed humane treatment and a rather famous event occurred at the Bando camp where a large orchestra was formed of German POW's who toured the nation performing 100 concerts, lectures and plays. Evidence the Germans were treated well can be seen in the fact 170 prisoners never left Japan and sought wives and lives there. Now is this all a feel good love story, no, just like during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was playing up the PR, for during WW1 they wanted official recognition as a world power and that of being racially equal to the whites.    Japan was officially recognized as a world power during the treaty of Versailles, but when Japan gave its racial equality proposal, President Woodrow Wilson of the US and Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes refused to allow it to pass, even though they received majority votes. Now The Japanese had been for a lack of better words, fucked over, during the first sino-japanese war when the triple intervention of France, Germany and Russia stole away their war earning of the Liaodong peninsula. During the Russo-Japanese war, Theodore Roosevelt limited the Japanese war gains and now here after WW1 the Japanese received another humiliation. To the Japanese, it was the last straw and it was a major reason they went to war with the west, who they viewed, and honestly rightfully so, would never see them as equals.   Ompf, lot of history there, but now we come to the Showa era, which was molded by the feelings of the past decades.   In 1937 Japan and China enter an unofficial war that saw one of the worst wartime atrocities in human history, the rape of Nanjing. It began on December 13th of 1937, lasting 6 or so weeks seeing the murder of possibly 300,000 civilians and pows, the mass rape of 20,000 and untold hardship upon the Chinese people. The Japanese followed this up with numerous other massacres in China such as the Changjiao Massacre claiming possibly 30,000 Chinese civilian lives, the Alexandra Hospital Massacre killing 200 patients and medical staff in Hong Kong, the Laha Massacre on Ambon island where 300 members of the Gull force were executed, the Bangka island massacre where 60 Australian and British soldiers and 22 Australian nurses were murdered, the Parit Sulong massacre in Malay where 150 wounded Australian and Indian POW's were executed, the Bataan Death march where negligence and brutality took the lives of 650 Americans and perhaps a possible 18,000 Filipinos, the Manila massacres claiming the lives of perhaps 54,000 filipinos including women and children in the Philippines, the Balikpapan massacre in the dutch east indies taking the lives of 78 Dutch Civilians, I can keep going and going. Where the Japanese went, massacres and horrors occurred.    Again if you really want to delve into these stories check out “the knights of Bushido”.   The Japanese also had the infamous special units like 731, who conducted horrifying experiments on civilians and POWs like vivisectioning live people without anesthesia, testing biological and chemical weapons on live people, the freezing peoples to study frostbite treatment and giving people sexually transmitted diseases to study. Lt General Shiro Ishii's unit 731 deployed plague infested fleas, cholera, bubonic plague and other nasty weapons upon Chinese civilians killing perhaps up to 500,000. This was seen during the battle of Changde and famously during operation Sei-go also known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign.    The Japanese also enacted the infamous “Sanko Sakusen / three all's policy : kill all, urn all, loot all” in retaliation to the Chinese communists Hundred regiments offensive in December of 1940. Sanctioned by Hirohito personally, it is thought this act resulted in the death of 2.7 million Chinese civilians. According to author Werner Gruhl 8 million Chinese civilian deaths could be attributable to the Japanese.     So then we come back to the big question, why? So now that I've covered the loose history for coherency sake I want to list here the largest reasons for the atrocities and by no means is this official categories or even all of them, I am simply stating kind of my top ones I guess you can say:   Treaties signed or not signed War strategy and indoctrination  Ultra-Nationalism and Racism Surrender & the Bastardization of the Bushido code The Brutality of the Japanese military Treaties signed or not signed   Yes its time to talk about treaties, yawn. Now I said previously Japan did sign the Hague Conventions of 1899 and would ratify them in 1907. The Hague conventions did contain laws for prisoners of war, protection of civilians. Alongside this, in 1894 an imperial proclamation was made stating Japanese soldiers should make every effort to win a war without violating international laws. More significantly Japan “signed” but unlike the majority of other world powers did not ratify the Geneva convention of 1929. Why? To be blunt, the geneva conventions did not really benefit the Japanese military from their point of view.   First the Japanese had a very specific perspective on surrendering, they simply did not do it, so they did not expect many of their soldiers to ever become POW's, so how would it benefit them to ratify such a thing? If they are not going to have many POW's, why would they burden themselves with upholding all the conventional laws for POW's they would obtain during war?  Another glaring reason involved aerial bombing. Many Japanese leaders, like Kanji Ishiwara, believed the home islands would be subjected to massive aerial bombing if a global war broke out. If Japan was subjected to aerial bombing and ratified the geneva convention, this meant they would have to take the pilots who were caught prisoner. The Japanese believed this would encourage further bombing. Lastly the convention had rules for POW treatment that literally contradicted how Japanese soldiers were treated by their own superiors. More about that in the last part about the military's brutality, but summarized, the Japanese army were abusive as hell and to sign such a thing would literally contradict how they did things.   Emperor Hirohito personally ratified a decision to remove certain constraints of the Hague Conventions when it came to the treatment of Chinese POW's in the directive of 5 August 1937. This notification advised staff officers to simply stop using the term "prisoners of war". They would refer to their enemy as bandits, guerillas and such, anything but soldiers so they would not have to take any prisoners, though they typically did not leave anyone alive in China regardless. The Geneva Convention exempted POWs of sergeant rank or higher from manual labor, and stipulated that prisoners performing work should be provided with extra rations and other essentials. The Japanese in the later half of the war would be starved of provisions and resources, thus its to no surprise they could not meet these demands, even if they sought to uphold them. I will note in 1942, Japan indicated they would “follow” the Geneva rules and would observe the Hague Convention of 1907 outlining the laws and customs of war. Yet this is like a verbal confirmation, it had no legal basis, something the Japanese particularly loved to do during the war.   According to Dr. William Skelton III, who produced a document entitled American Ex Prisoners of War for the U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs, more POWs died at the hands of the Japanese in the Pacific theater and specifically in the Philippines than in any other conflict to date. For example in Germany, POWs died at a rate 1.2%. In the Pacific theater the rate was 37%. In the Philippines, POWs died at a rate of 40%.    Now these pieces of paper that were signed or not signed, what does this really matter when it comes to war, its obvious they were not upholding certain rules, but how did this quote en quote make them more brutal and perform more atrocities? Well here is the sticky thing, if you are part of the Japanese military and you know your nation did not ratify certain rules of war, this meant your enemy had no supposed legal basis to follow said rules against you either.    So I want you to think of two aspects of this. If your nation did not sign or ratify certain treaties, then you could not expect the enemy to respect such rules when it comes to you. But more importantly, what if the leader of your nation…just told you to believe that?    In early 1942, Great Britain, the United States of America and other great powers did officially let the Japanese know that they would, on their  part, observe all the provisions of the Convention and requested reciprocity. Japanese foreign minister at the time, Hideki Tojo gave a formal assurance that although Japan was not bound by the Geneva convention, the Japanese would apply it “mutatis mutandis” towards the Americans, British, Canadians, Australians and New Zealander POW's, note he most definitely did not extend this to the asiatic groups, nor the Dutch whom I guess he just forgot about. But this did morally bind Japan to comply with the convention. However the top brass of the Japanese military, notably Hideki Tojo in these cases, went out of his way to instill beliefs within the military as to what they should expect from the enemy. As you will see in the next points, this was basically a type of indoctrination.   War strategy and indoctrination    The leaders of Japan knew full well how unmatched they were in terms of resources and productivity before they began the war with the west. How could they possibly win the war? The IJN was dead set on a decisive naval battle, but for the IJA to compensate for their lack of resources, they believed their “spirit” would overcome the enemy. In many ways this spirit meant going above and beyond normal human endurance, to literally outperform the allies and notably to conduct the war with absolutely zero mercy. Once Japan lost the initiative in the war, after Guadalcanal, the IJA were forced to fight a war of attrition. Now they would prolong and exact maximum casualties upon the allies hoping to force them to the peace table. The idea was quite simple, the IJA would do everything possible to make the allies believe they would never give up and it would far too costly to defeat them. How does one go about achieving these aims? Well the IJA officers would tell you “by steeling your hearts”. To achieve all of this required extreme indoctrination.    Japanese children grew up in regimentation, they were desensitized to violence through tales of martial glory, and were taught that their purpose in life was to serve the emperor. Upon entering  military service, they were trained out of any individualistic spirit, and taught that compassion was a weakness and had no place in the field of war. The soldier's motto was faith equaled strength.  Faith being devotion to duty and service to the Divine Emperor. Apart from ideology and spiritual toughening, training in the Japanese Imperial Army was also extremely harsh and violent. This was not even particularly a special aspect of Showa Japan, it went all the way back to the Meiji era. From a young age children's education directed them, like a pipeline for military duty.   Now at the offset of the war, Hideki Tojo released the “Senjinkun” “instructions for the battlefield”. This was basically a manual for soldiers on how to conduct war. The document was used to establish standards of behavior for Japanese troops and improve discipline and morale within the Army, it also included things like a prohibition against being taken prisoner. It stated if you were captured by the enemy, because Japan did not sign or ratify certain treaties, you would be killed or tortured by the allies, and if you survived you and your family would face shame back home, and punishment resulting typically in 6 months of prison.   Here is a small excerpt from the document Those who know shame are weak. Always think of [preserving] the honor of your community and be a credit to yourself and your family. Redouble your efforts and respond to their expectations. Never live to experience shame as a prisoner. By dying you will avoid leaving a stain on your honor.   The purpose was basically psychological warfare, against their own army. Those like Hideki Tojo believed Japan could only defeat the resource rich Americans with spirit. Thus the manuals like Senjinkun demanded the forces not ever surrender, because the allies would do horrible things, it was shameful to do so and there were disciplinary actions for any who did. In 1942 the Army amended its criminal code to specify that officers who surrendered soldiers under their command faced at least six months imprisonment, regardless of the circumstances in which the surrender took place. This change attracted little attention, however, as the Senjinkun imposed more severe consequences and had greater moral force.   In a report dated June 1945, the U.S. Office of War Information noted that 84 percent of one group of interrogated Japanese prisoners, many of whom had been injured or unconscious when captured stated that they had expected to be killed or tortured by the Allies if taken prisoner. The OWI analysts described this as being typical, and concluded that fear of the consequences of surrender, “rather than Bushido,” was the motivation for many Japanese battle deaths in hopeless circumstances–as much as, and probably more than, the other two major considerations: fear of disgrace at home, and “the positive desire to die for one's nation, ancestors, and god-emperor.”   Something barely talked about in the west, was during the Pacific War, the Americans had a habit of taking human trophies. Human trophies were Japanese skulls, gold teeth, finger bones and such. The famous novel “With the Old Breed” by Eugene Sledge spoke of his personal accounts of these actions, its a rather gruesome and dark part of the war. Now some of these actions were publicized, despite the US military's efforts to quell and hush it down. Time magazine famously had an iconic photo of a woman whose enlisted boyfriend sent her home a Japanese skull. FDR also famously was given a letter opener carved out of Japanese bones. These stories were seized up greedily by the Japanese government who used them as propaganda to prove to their soldiers what would happen if they were captured. It had a profound effect as you can imagine. And this was not limited to Japanese soldiers. The propaganda machine would contribute at the end of the war to mass civilian suicides on Okinawa and Saipan.   Back to the POW subject. When it came to the treatment of POW's, Hideki Tojo began submitting in May of 1942 a series of memorandum, basic orders as to how POW's should be treated. “Prisoners of war can be used for the enlargement of our production and as military labor, white prisoners of war will be confined successively in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria. Superior technicians and high ranking officers -- Colonels and above -- will be included among the prisoners of war confined in Formosa. Those who are not suitable for use in enlargement of our production will be confined in prisoner of war camps which will be built immediately on the spot.Although the working of prisoner of war officers and warrant officers is forbidden by the Regulations of 1903, the policy of the control authorities is that under the situation of our country where not one person now eats without working they want them to set to work. It is desired that you give proper orders on this.The present situation of affairs in this country does not permit anyone to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely. With that in view, in dealing with prisoners of war, I hope you will see that they may be usefully employed. In Japan, we have our own ideology concerning prisoners of war, which should naturally make their treatment more or less different from that in Europe and America. In dealing with them, you should, of course, observe the various Regulations concerned, aim at an adequate application of them . . . At the same time, you must not allow them to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely for even a single day. Their labor and technical skill should be fully utilized for the replenishment of production, and contribution rendered toward the prosecution of the Greater East Asiatic War for which no effort ought to be spared."   Thus in the end as a grunt in the IJA you were led to believe: if I am captured I will be tortured, killed maybe turned into a letter opener, or someone will place my skull on their mantle. If I surrender and survive and make it back home, I will be severely punished and worst of all me and my family will be shamed. I could not expect any humanity from the enemy, because my nation did not sign or ratify treaties like the Geneva convention. More so, because my armies conduct was so unbelievably barbaric, I could only expect the very same from my enemy. It was a vicious cycle. You perform atrocities, expecting the enemy to do the same, and thus it just keeps perpetuating itself. Ultra-Nationalism and Racism   Now we spoke a little bit about the concept of the Yamato race, the Japanese were indoctrinated to believe they were a superior race and that their emperor was something akin to a living god. Until this war, the Japanese empire was on a hell of a winning streak going all the way back to the Meiji Era. For the first half of the Pacific war, the Japanese won nearly every battle. This led to something historians called “victory disease” that made them become somewhat arrogant and cocky, but it also made them feel “superhuman”. The allies' news reporting at the beginning of the war began to frantically refer to the Japanese as “supermen”or  “super jungle fighters”. Particularly because of the Malay campaign, the Japanese soldier just seemed to be tougher, could survive harsher jungle climates, even doing so with less food or war materials. The Japanese read the allied news reports and came to the conclusion that had been driven down their throats by their government, indeed the Japanese spirit was winning the war. The Japanese public ate this up in their propaganda and it perpetuated their ultra-nationalistic beliefs. The Japanese truly came to believe they were destined to rule the asia-pacific. Look at the results in China for example. Within a short amount of time they conquered much of China, though the public really had no idea how bad the China was bottled down by 1940. Then came the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere propaganda, which is an excellent example of their megalomania.    Yet alongside their ultra-nationalism, seen more strongly perpetuated against other Asian groups, the Japanese also indoctrinated their public with racism against them. The Yellow Peril of the 19th century and anti-japanese or anti-asian racism fueled the Japanese soldiers. The Japanese as a people had faced brutal racist hardships historically at the hands of the west, particularly from their point of view from America. There was the slights against them during the first sino-japanese war, the infamous triple intervention of france, germany and Russia stealing away their prize that was the liaodong peninsula. Then during the Boxer rebellion they faced racism, not being allowed to lead mutli national army formations, despite them being the lionshare of said military force. The Russo-Japanese war saw from their point of view, America stealing their war prizes. Last but not least, after WW1 they were told to their faces that they were a world power, but not racially equal. The Japanese faced anti-Japanese and anti-asian immigration laws when it came to America in the form of the gentleman's agreement and Australia's “great white Australia policy”. During the war, the American propaganda machine began pumping out racist caricatures of Japanese as rats, goggle eyed  bucktooth people, literal yellow monkey's.   For the IJA the pacific war in many was a holy war directed at the arrogant whites who had abused them for so long. This will probably sound controversial, but indeed, the pacific war was very much a race war. If you are not convinced of that, I recommend reading “War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War” by John Dower. The human trophy taking, anti-japanese bucktooth, rat people cartoon propaganda, history of racial abuse like the japanese concentration camps, the gentleman's agreement, the stealing of victories during the first sino-japanese war, russo-japanese war and ww1 all plagued the mind of a Japanese soldier. To them in many ways, the “whites had it coming”. Which is rather ironic given how the Japanese would treat the other asian racial groups they came into contact with. But such is the contradictory nature of the Imperial Japanese military.    The Japanese also held racist beliefs about the westerners. The Japanese soldiers were taught the allies were akin to demons or beasts. They were described often as “the hairy ones” or “anglo-American demons”. Taught these men would rape women and girls, stample upon the civilians they captured with the treads of their tanks. The marines were especially dreaded.  According to a story circulated widely among the Japanese on Saipan, all Marine Corps recruits were compelled to murder their own parents before being inducted into service. It was said that Japanese soldiers taken prisoner would suffer hideous tortures—their ears, noses, and limbs would be cut off; they would be blinded and castrated; they could also be cooked and fed to dogs. As silly as this may sound, do remember the Americans were taking human trophies so the Japanese propaganda machine had its evidence. Tons of photos of skulls atop american tanks for example were displayed to the Japanese public. Another famous one was the cartoon appearing in an American servicemen's magazine, which was later reproduced and translated in the Japanese press. It suggested the existence of “Japanese hunting licenses, promising open season on the enemy, complete with free ammunition and equipment—with pay!    In terms of how the Japanese exacted their own racism towards their fellow asians. During the War the Japanese dragged into forced labor, Koreans, Chinese and southeast asians. 670,000 Koreans were brought to Japan to work mines and heavy industry, around 60,000 of them died to harsh conditions. Between April 1943 to May 1945, 41,862 Chinese were sent to Japan to work, 2800 died before even reaching the home islands. 6872 died in the work sites again from brutal conditions. When it comes to southeast asian numbers are hard to pinpoint but its safe to say at least 300,000 Javanese, Malay, Burmese, Tamil and other groups were mobilized to construct the Burma-Siam railroad between October 1942 to november 1943 and 60,000 perished. This all went for the men, for the women, all those racial groups would face the horrors of becoming comfort women, historians estimate there could have been 50-200,000 pressed into it. But for the Japanese, believing their were superior to these other asiatic groups, groups whom they would publicly say were like children, they as the father figure would guide, well they simply abused them.   So in a contradictive fashion, the Japanese believed they were superior and could do horrible things to their Asian neighbors while simultaneously decrying the racism cast towards them by western powers as justification for their brutal actions against them. These types of feelings and perspectives molded the mind of the average Japanese soldier, dehumanizing others has always been a standard military practice afterall.    Surrender & the Bastardization of the Bushido code   I think this is one the vast majority of WW2 history buffs know, the Japanese perspective on surrender and the bushido code. In the book “military trials of war criminals in the Netherlands east indies 1946-1949” Fred Borch had this to say about the variable of bushido for the brutality   As Japan continued its modernization in the early 20th century, her armed forces became convinced that success in battle would be assured if Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen had the "spirit" of Bushido. ... The result was that the Bushido code of behavior "was inculcated into the Japanese soldier as part of his basic training." Each soldier was indoctrinated to accept that it was the greatest honor to die for the Emperor and it was cowardly to surrender to the enemy. ... Bushido therefore explains why the Japanese soldiers who were stationed in the NEI so mistreated POWs in their custody. Those who had surrendered to the Japanese—regardless of how courageously or honorably they had fought—merited nothing but contempt; they had forfeited all honor and literally deserved nothing. Consequently, when the Japanese murdered POWs by shooting, beheading, and drowning, these acts were excused since they involved the killing of men who had forfeited all rights to be treated with dignity or respect. While civilian internees were certainly in a different category from POWs, it is reasonable to think that there was a "spill-over" effect from the tenets of Bushido.   It is very true, the Japanese soldiers and sailors were taught Japan was a sacred nation. Traditional samurai values of bushido were merged with modern training and weaponry. The government propagandized the figure of the Emperor as a living god who embodied the Japanese state, the Kokutai. Emperor Hirohito and his family were the spiritual essence of Japan. To even show your back to the enemy let alone surrender was deemed cowardly and brought dishonor upon your family. As written by Inouye Jukichi in 1910, something read by many Japanese “The Japanese warriors looked upon it as shame to themselves not to die when their Lord was hard pressed . . . their own shame was the shame upon their parents, their family, their house and their whole clan, and with this idea deeply impressed upon their minds, the Samurai, no matter of what rank, held their lives light as feathers when compared with the weight they attached to the maintenance of a spotless name”.    Young men of Japan were taught that "The greatest honor is to die for the Emperor" Additionally precept the Japanese were taught that it is an ignominy to surrender to the enemy. The combined effect of these two precepts was to inculcate in the Japanese soldier a spirit of contempt for Allied soldiers who surrendered, which, in defiance of the rules of war, was demonstrated in their ill-treatment of prisoners. They made no distinction between the soldier who fought honorably and courageously up to an inevitable surrender, and the soldier who surrendered without a fight. All enemy soldiers who surrendered under any circumstance were to be regarded as being disgraced and entitled to live only by the tolerance of their captors.   Surrender was unforgivable under their code, drilled into them through the Imperial Japanese education system and military. When the Japanese would come across vast swathes of the enemy surrendering, particularly if the enemy used up all their ammunition killing their comrades and then surrendered, well it added fuel to their brutality. One only needs to look at the deaths due to Banzai charges, take for example the incredibly massive one at the battle of Saipan seeing around 4000 dead Japanese. IJA officers brought ancestral katana's to the war, the Japanese cut off the heads of the enemies as it was seen to be honorable. When faced with death, many chose to commit seppuku, the bushido propaganda was intense.    A brutal practice emerged in the Pacific island hopping campaign, whereupon wounded Japanese would pretend to be dead or surrender only to explode grenades upon allied forces coming closer. This began to be noticed by US marines during the battle of Guadalcanal and Australians in New Guinea. This began a vicious cycle . There were of course Japanese who would surrender. Hell the Koreans forced into service often did try to surrender, but they would all be hampered by something. Because of the actions of those Japanese feinted death and taking down allied soldiers with them, the allied soldiers gradually began a practice of not bothering to accept surrender. It became a self fulfilling prophecy. Many Japanese made the allies believe all they could expect was a grenade death, thus the allies became more brutal to them. This simply led the Japanese to conclude their government was accurate about how the allies would treat them, so more and more did not surrender. An absolutely horrible cycle that went on to the very end of the war, though the allies did figure out means to get Japanese to surrender more in the last year.    The Brutality of the Japanese military   I think this is probably one of the most important factors, and its also one the “normies” would not know as much about. The Imperial Japanese military, more so the Army, had what I can only describe as a built in system of abuse. As described to me by the same university professor I keep bringing up in podcasts, picture a literal pecking order. Going from the highest ranked general to the very bottom grunt. Imagine each one who is higher than the other, routinely physically abuses them. For example, it was very typical for a colonel to slap a major across the face, the major would then strike one of his captains, and the abuse would continue through the ranks to the grunts who would have no one to abuse, thus they turned to POW's or civilian populations. This was not just an accepted part of the Japanese Imperial Army it was indoctrinated.    From day one of basic training, IJA officers taught their men, races like the Chinese were their blood enemies and racially inferior. These were people the Japanese would rule over one day. The trainers would toss the boys into rigorous training activities involving physical violence towards another alongside the notion any orders given by a higher ranking officer was infallible and to be treated as if the divine emperor himself, the living god was giving it.    The Japanese army even taught methods of torture that would be employed in all areas they occupied. Among these tortures were the water treatment, burning, electric shocks, the knee spread, suspension, kneeling on sharp instruments and flogging. The Kempetai, were the ones doing the lionshare of these tortures. Other Army and Navy units, however, used the same methods as the Kempetai. Camp guards performed similar methods, local police forces organized by the Kempetai in the occupied territories also applied the same methods of torture. The Kempetai were administered by the War Ministry, trained at specialized schools who were maintained and operated by the War Ministry in Japan. Thus the conduct of Kempetai and the camp guards directly reflected the policy of the War Ministry.    The Japanese army leadership made sure recruits were physically and mentally abused, they were given strenuously duty tasks and pushed to their absolute limit. During the war given where they were deployed, take guadalcanal for example, the Japanese soldiers would be facing starvation as well. Being half starved, beaten and suffering the effects of war would drive anyone to perform horrifying acts. The life of a Japanese solider was simply at the whims of an extremely toxic management culture. The lowest ranking echelons received the lionshare of abuse and they took out their frustration with whomever they could find deemed lower than them, ie: POW's, civilians, etc.   All of these variables combined contributed to the creation of a military willing to perform just about any atrocity they thought necessary to win the war. It was a war they could not hope to win, but many of them went to their deaths trying to defeat the hands of fate. There are countless other reasons of course for the atrocities committed in cold or hot blood. Countless books have been written on this subject, please do check out the few I mentioned. With that again, a big thanks to you patreons, you guys are awesome. Please let me know what you think in the comments, and what you want to hear more about in the future. This has been the pacific war channel over and out.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanjing. In December 1937, as the battle for Nanjing unfolded, terror inundated its residents, seeking safety amid the turmoil. General Tang Shengzhi rallied the Chinese forces, determined to defend against the advancing Japanese army. Fierce fighting erupted at the Gate of Enlightenment, where the determined Chinese soldiers resisted merciless assaults while tragedy loomed. By mid-December, the Japanese made substantial advances, employing relentless artillery fire to breach Nanjing's defenses. Leaders called for strategic retreats, yet amid chaos and despair, many young Chinese soldiers, driven by nationalism, continued to resist. By December 13, Nanjing succumbed to the invaders, marking a tragic chapter in history. As destruction enveloped the city, the resilience of its defenders became a poignant tale of courage amidst the horrors of war, forever marking Nanjing as a symbol of enduring hope in the face of despair.   #168 The Nanjing Massacre Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So obvious disclaimer, today we will be talking about, arguably one of if not the most horrific war atrocities ever committed. To be blunt, it may have been worse than some of the things we talked about back during the fall of the Ming Dynasty, when bandit armies raped and pillaged cities. The Nanjing Massacre as its become known is well documented by both Chinese and foreign sources. There is an abundance of primary sources, many well verified. Its going to be extremely graphic, I am going to try and tell it to the fullest. So if you got a weak stomach perhaps sit this one out, you have been warned. Chen Yiding began evacuating his troops from the area surrounding the Gate of Enlightenment before dawn on December 13. En route to Xiaguan, he took the time to visit a dozen of his soldiers housed in a makeshift hospital located in an old cemetery. These men were too severely injured to participate in the evacuation, and Chen had to leave them with only a few words of encouragement. Little did he know, within days, they would all perish in their beds, victims of the Japanese forces. Upon arriving in Xiaguan later that morning, Chen was met with grim news: his divisional commander had crossed the Yangtze River with his chief of staff the previous afternoon. Now, he was on his own. He didn't linger near the riverside chaos, quickly realizing there was nothing he could do there. Instead, he chose to move downstream, hoping to find a secure spot for himself and his soldiers to wait out the next few days before devising an escape from the war zone.  He was fortunate, for soon the Japanese would live up to their notorious reputation developed during their advance from Shanghai; they were not inclined to take prisoners. That afternoon, several hundred Chinese soldiers arrived at the northern end of the Safety Zone. The committee responsible for the area stated that they could offer no assistance. In a misguided attempt to boost morale, they suggested that if the soldiers surrendered and promised not to engage in combat, the Japanese would likely show them "merciful treatment." This optimism was woefully misplaced. Later that same day, Japanese troops entered the zone, dragging out 200 Chinese men, the majority of them soldiers, for execution just outside the city. On December 13, Japanese soldiers started patrolling the riverbank, shooting at anything and anyone floating downstream. Their comrades aboard naval vessels in the river cheered them on, applauding each time they struck another helpless victim in the water. Civilians were not spared either. While traveling through downtown Nanjing as the battle concluded, Rabe observed dead men and women every 100 to 200 yards, most of them shot in the back. A long line of Chinese men marched down the street, numbering in the hundreds, all destined for death. In a cruel twist, they were compelled to carry a large Japanese flag. They were herded into a vacant lot by a couple of Japanese soldiers and as recalled by American correspondent Archibald Steele "There, they were brutally shot dead in small groups. One Japanese soldier stood over the growing pile of corpses, firing into any bodies that showed movement." The killings commenced almost immediately after the fall of Nanjing. The victorious Japanese spread out into the city streets, seeking victims. Those unfortunate enough to be captured faced instant execution or were taken to larger killing fields to meet a grim fate alongside other Chinese prisoners. Initially, the Japanese targeted former soldiers, whether real or imagined, but within hours, the scope of victims expanded to include individuals of all age groups and genders. By the end of the first day of occupation, civilian bodies littered the streets of downtown Nanjing at a rate of roughly one per block. The defenseless and innocent were subjected to murder, torture, and humiliation in a relentless spree of violence that persisted for six harrowing weeks. At the time of the attack, Nanjing felt eerily abandoned, houses stood boarded up, vehicles lay toppled in the streets, and the once-ubiquitous rickshaws had vanished. However, hundreds of thousands remained hidden indoors, seeking refuge. The most visible sign of the city's new rulers was the display of the Japanese flag. On the morning of December 14, the Rising Sun flag was hoisted across the city, seen in front of private homes, businesses, and public buildings. Many of these flags were hastily made, often a simple white sheet with a red rag affixed, hoping to be spared. As the days progressed, horrifying accounts of violence began to emerge. A barber, the sole survivor among eight people in his shop when the Japanese arrived, was admitted to a hospital with a stab wound that had nearly severed his head from his body, damaging all muscles at the back of his neck down to his spinal canal. A woman suffered a brutal throat wound, while another pregnant woman was bayoneted in the abdomen, resulting in the death of her unborn child. A man witnessed his wife being stabbed through the heart and then saw his child hurled from a window to the street several floors below. These are but a few stories of individual atrocities committed. Alongside this there were mass executions, predominantly targeting young able-bodied men, in an effort to weaken Nanjing and deprive it of any potential resistance in the future. American professor, Lewis Smythe recalled “The disarmed soldier problem was our most serious one for the first three days, but it was soon resolved, as the Japanese shot all of them.” On the evening of December 15, the Japanese rounded up 1,300 former soldiers from the Safety Zone, binding them in groups of about 100 and marching them away in silence. A group of foreigners, permitted to leave Nanjing on a Japanese gunboat, accidentally became witnesses to the ensuing slaughter. While waiting for their vessel, they took a brief walk along the riverbank and stumbled upon a scene of mass execution, observing the Japanese shooting the men one by one in the back of the neck. “We observed about 100 such executions until the Japanese officer in charge noticed us and ordered us to leave immediately”. Not all killings were premeditated; many occurred impulsively. A common example was when Japanese soldiers led lines of Chinese POWs to holding points, tightly bound together with ropes. Every few yards, a Japanese soldier would stand guard with a fixed bayonet aimed at the prisoners as they trudged forward. Suddenly, one of the prisoners slipped, causing a domino effect as he fell, dragging down the men in front of and behind him. The entire group soon found themselves collapsed on the ground, struggling to stand. The Japanese guards lost their patience, jabbing their bayonets into the writhing bodies until none remained alive. In one of the largest massacres, Japanese troops from the Yamada Detachment, including the 65th Infantry Regiment, systematically executed between 17,000 and 20,000 Chinese prisoners from December 15 to 17. These prisoners were taken to the banks of the Yangtze River near Mufushan, where they were machine-gunned to death. The bodies were then disposed of by either burning or flushing them downstream. Recent research by Ono Kenji has revealed that these mass killings were premeditated and carried out systematically, in accordance with orders issued directly by Prince Asaka. A soldier from the IJA's 13th Division described killing wounded survivors of the Mufushan massacre in his diary “I figured that I'd never get another chance like this, so I stabbed thirty of the damned Chinks. Climbing atop the mountain of corpses, I felt like a real devil-slayer, stabbing again and again, with all my might. 'Ugh, ugh,' the Chinks groaned. There were old folks as well as kids, but we killed them lock, stock, and barrel. I also borrowed a buddy's sword and tried to decapitate some. I've never experienced anything so unusual”. Frequently, the Japanese just left their victims wherever they fell. Corpses began to accumulate in the streets, exposed to the elements and onlookers. Cars constantly were forced to run over corpses. Corpses were scavenged by stray dogs, which, in turn, were consumed by starving people. The water became toxic; workers in the Safety Zone discovered ponds clogged with human remains. In other instances, the Japanese gathered their machine-gunned or bayoneted victims into large heaps, doused them in kerosene, and set them ablaze. Archibald Steele wrote for the Chicago Daily News on December 17th “I saw a grisly scene at the north gate, where what was once a group of 200 men had become a smoldering mass of flesh and bones, so severely burned around the neck and head that it was difficult to believe he was still human.” During the chaos in the beginning, whereupon the Japanese had not yet fully conquered the city, its defenders scrambled desperately to escape before it was too late. Individually or in small groups, they sought vulnerabilities in the enemy lines, acutely aware that their survival hinged on their success. Months of conflict had trained them to expect no mercy if captured; previous experiences had instilled in them the belief that a swift death at the hands of the Japanese would be a fortunate outcome. On December 12, amid intense artillery fire and aerial bombardment, General Tang Sheng-chi issued the order for his troops to retreat. However, conflicting directives and a breakdown in discipline transformed the ensuing events into a disaster. While some Chinese units successfully crossed the river, a far greater number were ensnared in the widespread chaos that engulfed the city. In their desperation to evade capture, some Chinese soldiers resorted to stripping civilians of their clothing to disguise themselves, while many others were shot by their own supervisory units as they attempted to flee.Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of individual escape stories emerged from this period. In some rare instances, entire units, even up to divisional strength, successfully infiltrated Japanese lines to reach safety. For others, such as the 156th Division, there were detailed plans outlining escape routes from Nanjing. Several soldiers and officers adhered to this three-day trek, skillfully evading Japanese patrols until they reached Ningguo, located south of the capital. Nonetheless, these cases were exceptions. The vast majority of soldiers from China's defeated army faced significant risk and were more likely to be captured than to escape. Some of Chiang Kai-shek's most elite units suffered near total annihilation. Only about a thousand soldiers from the 88th Division managed to cross the Yangtze safely, as did another thousand from the Training Division, while a mere 300 from the 87th Division survived. Even for units like the 156th Division, the escape plans were only effective for those who learned of them. These plans were hurriedly disseminated through the ranks as defeat loomed, leaving mere chance to determine who received the information. Many stayed trapped in Nanjing, which had become a fatal snare. One day, Japanese soldiers visited schools within Nanjing's Safety Zone, aware that these locations sheltered many refugees. They called for all former soldiers to step forward, promising safety in exchange for labor. Many believed that the long days of hiding were finally coming to an end and complied with the request. However, they were led to an abandoned house, where they were stripped naked and bound together in groups of five. Outside, a large bonfire had been ignited. They were then bayoneted and, while still alive, thrown onto the flames. Only a few managed to escape and share the horrifying tale. The Japanese were of course well aware that numerous soldiers were hiding in Nanjing, disguised as locals, evidenced by the piles of military uniforms and equipment accumulating in the streets. Consequently, they initiated a systematic search for soldiers within hours of taking control. The Safety Zone was not spared, as the Japanese Army suspected that Chinese soldiers had sought refuge there. On December 16, they raided Ginling College, despite a policy prohibiting the admission of men, except for elderly residents in a designated dining room. The soldiers brought axes to force open doors that were not immediately complied with and positioned six machine guns on the campus, prepared to fire at anyone attempting to escape. Ultimately, they found nothing. In cases where they did encounter young men of military age, the soldiers lined them up, scrutinizing for distinct telltale features such as close-cropped hair, helmet marks, or shoulder blisters from carrying a rifle. Many men, who had never served in the military but bore callouses from hard manual labor, were captured based on the assumption that such marks indicated military experience. As noted by Goerge Fitch the head of Nanjing's YMCA “Rickshaw coolies, carpenters, and other laborers are frequently taken”. The Japanese employed additional, more cunning tactics to root out soldiers. During an inspection of a camp within the Safety Zone, they struggled to get the approximately 6,000 men and women to surrender. Before leaving, they resorted to one last trick. “Attention!” a voice commanded in flawless Chinese. Many young men, conditioned by months or years of military training, instinctively responded. Even though most realized their mistake almost immediately, it was too late; the Japanese herded them away. Given the scale of the slaughter, efforts were soon organized to facilitate the killing and disposal of as many individuals as possible in the shortest time. Rows of prisoners were mowed down by machine-gun fire, while those injured were finished off with single bullets or bayonets. Much of the mass murder occurred near the Yangtze River, where victims could be disposed of easily by being pushed into the water, hoping the current would carry them away.As the weeks progressed and the Japanese grew increasingly concerned about the possibility of former soldiers still at large, the dragnet tightened. Beginning in late December, Japanese authorities implemented a registration system for all residents of Nanjing. At Ginling College, this process lasted about a week and resulted in scenes of almost indescribable chaos, as the Japanese also decided to register residents from the surrounding areas on campus. First, the men were registered, followed by the women. Often, women attended the registration to help save their husbands and sons, who would otherwise have been taken as suspected former soldiers. Despite these efforts, a total of 28 men were ultimately seized during the registration process at Ginling College. Each individual who registered received a document from the authorities. However, it soon became clear that this paper provided little protection against the caprices of the Japanese military. That winter in Nanjing, everyone was a potential victim. While systematic mass killings primarily targeted young men of military age, every category of people faced death in the days and weeks following the Japanese conquest of Nanjing. Reports indicated that fifty police officers from the Safety Zone were executed for permitting Chinese soldiers to enter the area. The city's firefighters were taken away to meet an uncertain fate, and six street sweepers were killed inside their dwelling. Like an uncontrollable epidemic, the victors' bloodlust seemed to escalate continuously, seeking out new victims. When the Japanese ordered the Safety Zone committee to supply workers for the electricity plant in Xiaguan to restore its operations, they provided 54 individuals. Within days, 43 of them were dead. Although young men were especially targeted, the Japanese made no distinctions based on age or sex. American missionary John G. Magee documented numerous instances of indiscriminate killings, including the chilling account of two families nearly exterminated. Stabbings, shootings, and rapes marked the slaughter of three generations of innocents, including toddlers aged four and two; the older child was bayoneted, while the younger was struck in the head with a sword. The only survivors were a badly injured eight-year-old girl and her four-year-old sister, who spent the following fortnight beside their mother's decaying body. The violence was often accompanied by various forms of humiliation, as if to utterly break the spirit of the conquered people. One woman lost her parents and three children. When she purchased a coffin for her father, a Japanese soldier tore the lid off and discarded the old man's body in the street. Another soldier, in a drunken stupor, raped a Chinese woman and then vomited on her. In yet another incident, a soldier encountered a family of six huddled over a pot of thin rice soup; he stepped over them and urinated into their pot before continuing on his way, laughing heartlessly. The atrocities committed at Nanjing were not akin to something like the Holocaust. Within places like Auschwitz killings became industrialized and often took on an impersonal, unemotional character. The murders in Nanjing had an almost intimate quality, with each individual perpetrator bearing the blood of their victims on their hands, sometimes literally. In this sense, the Nanjing atrocities resemble the early Holocaust killings executed by German Einsatzgruppen in Eastern Europe, prior to the implementation of gas chambers. How many died during the Nanjing Massacre? Eyewitnesses at the time recognized that the Japanese behavior had few immediate precedents. Missionary John Magee compared the situation to the Turkish genocide of the Armenians during World War I, which was still fresh in memory. Despite this, no consensus emerged regarding the exact number of fatalities, a state of affairs that would persist for nearly eight decades. In his first comprehensive account of the atrocities following the conquest of the capital, New York Times correspondent Tillman Durdin reported that 33,000 Chinese soldiers lost their lives in Nanjing, including 20,000 who were executed. Foreign correspondent Frank Oliver claimed in a 1939 publication that 24,000 men, women, and children were put to death during the first month of the city's occupation. As time progressed, much larger figures began to circulate. After returning to Germany in 1938, John Rabe held a lecture where he cited European estimates that between 50,000 and 60,000 people had died. In February 1942, Chiang Kai-shek stated that 200,000 were slaughtered within one week. The Nanjing tribunal established by Chiang's government to try Japanese war criminals in 1946 and 1947 reported that more than 300,000 lives had been lost following the city's fall. The highest estimate recorded comes from a Chinese military expert, who put the death toll at 430,000. Currently, the figure most commonly accepted in official Chinese media is 300,000, a number also cited by various authors sympathetic to China's contemporary regime. The debate over the Nanjing death toll has been a complex and extensive discussion, likely to remain unresolved to everyone's satisfaction. As missionary and Nanjing University teacher Miner Searle Bates remarked when he testified before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in July 1946, “The scope of this killing was so extensive that no one can provide a complete picture of it.” On December 16, American missionary Minnie Vautrin witnessed a truck passing by Ginling College, loaded with eight to ten girls. When they saw the Western woman, they cried out, "Jiu ming! Jiu ming!" which means “Help! Help!” Vautrin felt powerless, fully aware of the fate that awaited them. As early as Tuesday of that week, she had documented rumors of girls being raped. The following night, women were taken in large numbers from their homes. Another missionary, John Magee wrote to his wife “The most horrible thing now is the raping of the women, which has been going on in the most shameless way I have ever known”. A tentative list compiled by Lewis Smythe detailed instances of rape occurring soon after the Japanese Army entered Nanjing: four girls at noon on December 14; four more women that evening; three female refugees on December 15; and a young wife around the same time. The accounts revealed chilling individual horrors. A 15-year-old girl was taken to a barracks housing 200 to 300 Japanese soldiers and locked in a room, where she was raped multiple times daily. Victims ranged from as young as 11 to over 80. American correspondent Edgar Snow recalled “Discards were often bayoneted by drunken soldiers,. Frequently, mothers had to witness their babies being beheaded, only to then be raped themselves.” Y.M.C.A. head George Fitch reported the case of a woman whose five-month-old infant was deliberately smothered by a soldier to silence its cries while he raped her. Such acts were a gruesome form of humiliation, designed to demonstrate that the vanquished were powerless to protect their own families. Japanese soldier Takokoro Kozo recalled “Women suffered most. No matter how young or old, they all could not escape the fate of being raped. We sent out coal trucks to the city streets and villages to seize a lot of women. And then each of them was allocated to fifteen to twenty soldiers for sexual intercourse and abuse. After raping we would also kill them”. Women were frequently killed immediately after being raped, often through horrific mutilations, such as being penetrated with bayonets, long bamboo sticks, or other objects. For instance, one six-months-pregnant woman was stabbed sixteen times in the face and body, with one stab penetrating her abdomen and killing her unborn child. In another case, a young woman had a beer bottle forcibly inserted into her vagina after being raped, and was subsequently shot.  On December 19, 1937, the Reverend James M. McCallum wrote in his diary “I know not where to end. Never I have heard or read such brutality. Rape! Rape! Rape! We estimate at least 1,000 cases a night and many by day. In case of resistance or anything that seems like disapproval, there is a bayonet stab or a bullet... People are hysterical... Women are being carried off every morning, afternoon and evening. The whole Japanese army seems to be free to go and come as it pleases, and to do whatever it pleases”.  Rabe wrote in his diary dated December 17 “wo Japanese soldiers have climbed over the garden wall and are about to break into our house. When I appear they give the excuse that they saw two Chinese soldiers climb over the wall. When I show them my party badge, they return the same way. In one of the houses in the narrow street behind my garden wall, a woman was raped, and then wounded in the neck with a bayonet. I managed to get an ambulance so we can take her to Kulou Hospital... Last night up to 1,000 women and girls are said to have been raped, about 100 girls at Ginling College...alone. You hear nothing but rape. If husbands or brothers intervene, they're shot. What you hear and see on all sides is the brutality and bestiality of the Japanese soldiers”. In a documentary film about the Nanjing Massacre, In the Name of the Emperor, a former Japanese soldier named Shiro Azuma spoke candidly about the process of rape and murder in Nanjing. “At first we used some kinky words like Pikankan. Pi means "hip", kankan means "look". Pikankan means, "Let's see a woman open up her legs." Chinese women didn't wear under-pants. Instead, they wore trousers tied with a string. There was no belt. As we pulled the string, the buttocks were exposed. We "pikankan". We looked. After a while we would say something like, "It's my day to take a bath," and we took turns raping them. It would be all right if we only raped them. I shouldn't say all right. But we always stabbed and killed them. Because dead bodies don't talk”. Without anyone to defend them, the women of Nanjing resorted to desperate measures for their safety. The young and attractive cut their hair and smeared soot on their faces to diminish their allure. Others donned boys' clothes or the garments of elderly women. However, the Japanese were well aware of these tactics and were not easily deceived. As American correspondent Snow described, it was an orgy of unprecedented debauchery, involving not only the lower ranks of the Japanese military but also officers who turned their quarters into harems, bedding a new captive each night. Open-air sexual assaults were common. During the first ten days of occupation, groups of Japanese soldiers entered the Ginling campus ten to twenty times daily, brandishing fixed bayonets stained with fresh blood. So overwhelmed, Vautrin decided to prioritize saving lives over salvaging possessions, spending those early days frantically moving across campus to prevent marauding soldiers from taking away women. A particularly tense situation unfolded on the evening of December 17, when Vautrin and other staff members at Ginling College were called to the front of the campus to confront a group of Japanese soldiers. Earlier, Vautrin had received documentation from another officer affirming that the area was a legitimate refugee camp. The soldiers torn up the document in front of her. For hours, with armed Japanese soldiers encircling them, Vautrin and her colleagues were left standing or kneeling, uncertain of what awaited them. Gradually, it became clear that they had been lured to the front gate so that other soldiers could enter through a side entrance and abduct twelve women. As Vautrin recalled “Never shall I forget the scene. The dried leaves rattling, the moaning of the wind, the cries of women being led away.” The staff remained at the entrance until 11:00 pm, fearing that hiding soldiers might fire on them if they moved. This was the only time that Vautrin was unable to prevent rape, a failure that would haunt her for the rest of her life. Some Japanese soldiers, seeking young girls, ordered a middle-aged Chinese woman to assist them in finding targets. When she either could not or would not comply, they shot a rifle across her abdomen, narrowly missing and taking away “three handbreadths of flesh.” When the Japanese Army entered Nanjing, little damage had been inflicted on the buildings, as noted by U.S. missionary James McCallum at the end of December. On the first day of their occupation, Japanese soldiers immediately dispersed into Nanjing in small groups, breaking shop windows and looting the goods within. They carried away their spoils in crates and stolen rickshaws. Initially, the looting was partly a makeshift response to the poor logistics of the Japanese Army. Combat soldiers had arrived well ahead of their supply lines and faced severe food shortages until the roads reopened and the Yangtze River became navigable.  Every building in Nanjing was looted and turned upside down. Everything not nailed down was stolen: doors and window frames were removed, safes opened with rifle shots or grenades. Japanese soldiers often pillaged property while the owners were present, threatening them with bayonets. Abandoned cars littered the streets, typically overturned and stripped of useful items, including batteries. Like Russian soldiers in Berlin seven and a half years later, the rank-and-file soldiers displayed a particular interest in watches. As the scale of plunder grew, transportation became scarce. By the end of December, looting was being conducted using trucks. When vehicles were unavailable, Japanese soldiers resorted to wheelbarrows and even children's prams. Mules, donkeys, and people were also commandeered. Just as during their advance from Shanghai to Nanjing, the Chinese were forced to assist in looting their own homes. A common sight was a Japanese soldier leading a group of Chinese down the street, laden with stolen goods. While Chinese soldiers had also engaged in some looting during their evacuation of Nanjing, it was nothing compared to the scale of the Japanese victors' plunder. The Chinese forces had deliberately avoided breaking into foreign buildings, a distinction that the Japanese disregarded. The American, British, and German embassies, along with the ambassadors' residences, were ransacked, stripped of everything from bedding and money to watches, rugs, and artwork. The American School was looted, and its wall breached to remove the piano. As the Japanese stripped the city, they also began to burn it. While the winter sky could have been sparkling, it was instead filled with smoke from thousands of fires across the city. Some fires resulted from carelessness, such as when soldiers cooked meat from a stolen cow over a bonfire, accidentally igniting an ancient building. Others were acts of mindless vandalism. The Nanking Music Shop saw all its instruments and sheets piled in the street and set ablaze. The extent of the massacre can, to some degree, be linked to a breakdown in discipline among Japanese soldiers. Released from weeks or months of hardship on the battlefield, many soldiers experienced an intoxicating sense of freedom, resembling misbehaving boys. The deterioration of order among Japanese soldiers astonished those familiar with the stories of the stringent discipline within Japan's armed forces. Observers commented on soldiers laughing at proclamations from their own officers or tearing up orders and tossing them to the ground. Some foreign witnesses speculated that this lack of discipline was exacerbated by the absence of visible individual numbers on soldiers, making it challenging to identify wrongdoers. The issue also stemmed from the quality of the Japanese officer corps and their ability to manage a large army of young men, many of whom were experiencing freedom from societal constraints for the first time. Not all officers rose to the occasion; Vautrin witnessed an officer almost fail to prevent a soldier from raping a girl. Even worse, some officers transitioned from passive bystanders, guilty by inaction, to active participants in prolonged rape sessions. While a few attempted to instill discipline among their troops, their efforts often fell short. A Japanese colonel, for instance, slapped a soldier attempting to rape a Chinese woman. Another general was seen striking a private who had bayoneted a Chinese man and threatened two Germans, raising questions about how much of this discipline was merely performative for the benefit of foreign observers. Ultimately, disciplinary measures had little impact. As Rabe noted in his diary dated December 18th “The soldiers have almost no regard for their officers”. The absence of effective higher leadership during this critical period likely exacerbated the problem. General Matsui had been suffering from malaria since November 3, which left him largely incapacitated from December 5 to 15. A subordinate later testified that he had been informed of "incidents of stealing, killing, assault, and rape and had become quite enraged.” Although Matsui may have been displeased by the unruly behavior of his soldiers, it is conceivable that his inaction led to even greater levels of atrocity than might have occurred otherwise. He insisted on holding a victory parade on December 17, immediately after recovering from his illness, which likely triggered a security frenzy among Japanese officers concerned about the safety of Prince Asaka, uncle to Emperor Hirohito. This reaction likely prompted a surge in searches for, and executions of, suspected former Chinese soldiers. The Japanese high command in Tokyo was also aware of the unraveling discipline. On January 4, 1938, Army Headquarters sent Matsui an unusually direct message ordering him to restore control among his troops: Our old friend Ishiwara Kanji bitterly criticized the situation and placed the blame on Matsui “We earnestly request enhancement of military discipline and public morals. The morale of the Japanese had never been at a lower level.” A detachment of military police eventually arrived in Nanjing, leading to some improvements, though their presence was mixed. Some officers stationed outside the Safety Zone ignored atrocities occurring before them and, in some cases, participated directly. At Ginling College, the experience with military police was decidedly uneven. The first group of about 25 men tasked with guarding the college ended up committing rape themselves.  Despite frequent visits from Japanese soldiers in search of loot and victims to assault, the Safety Zone was perceived as successful. Many believed that both the zone and the work of its managing committee were responsible for saving countless lives. W. Plumer Mills, vice chairman of the committee, noted that the zone “did give some protection during the fighting…but the chief usefulness of the Zone has been the measure of protection it has afforded to the people since the occupation.” Shortly after the Japanese conquest, the population of the Safety Zone swelled to a quarter million people. Around 70,000 of these were organized into 25 pre-arranged camps, while the majority sought accommodation wherever possible. Makeshift “mat-shed villages” sprang up in vacant areas throughout the zone. Nanjing quickly became informally divided into two distinct cities. Outside the Safety Zone, the atmosphere was ghostly, with a population dwindling to around 10,000, while within the zone, bustling activity thrived. Shanghai Road, which ran through the center of the zone and had once been a wide boulevard, transformed into a hub of barter and trade, resembling a festive market during Chinese New Year, overflowing with makeshift stalls, tea shops, and restaurants, making it nearly impossible to traverse by vehicle. The Japanese held a degree of respect for Westerners, although this sentiment was not universal and did not always offer protection. Many foreigners tried to safeguard their homes by displaying their national flags outside, but they often found that Japanese soldiers would break in regardless. To protect Ginling College, American flags were displayed at eight locations around the compound, and a large 30-foot American flag was spread out in the center. However, this proved to be “of absolutely no use” in preventing Japanese soldiers from entering the area. Despite this, there was some limited outright hostility towards Americans. Stronger negative sentiments were directed towards the Russians and the British, who were viewed as representatives of nations with competing interests against the Japanese Empire. The Japanese displayed particular reverence for one nationality, the Germans. Rabe would shout “Deutsch” or “Hitler” to command respect from unruly Japanese soldiers or show them his swastika armband, indicating his allegiance to the Nazi Party. Germany was seen as a rising power and rapidly becoming one of Japan's closest allies, a fellow outcast in global politics. However, as time passed, the limits of this respect became evident; individual soldiers began searching for women within the German embassy compound, and eventually, nearly all German buildings were broken into. Despite all the challenges, there was no doubting that foreigners offered a form of protection unavailable elsewhere. Within days of the Japanese conquest, women and children began appearing in large numbers outside Rabe's home, kneeling and knocking their heads on the ground as they begged to be let into his already overcrowded garden.  At 1:00 pm on January 1, the Chinese were proclaimed rulers of their own city, or at least this is what Japanese propaganda sought to convey. On the first day of the new year, a puppet government was established in a ceremony held just north of the Safety Zone. A new five-bar flag, the one associated with the early Chinese republic was raised, signaling a patriotic spirit in a gesture that felt unconvincing. As the new leaders took office, vowing to resurrect their city, buildings burned all around them. The ceremony marked the culmination of two weeks of preparatory work. As early as December 15, General Matsui met with a local Chinese leader, referred to in the Japanese commander's diary only as Chen, who had been selected to assist in forming this new puppet government. Chen had been present in the northern port city of Tianjin two years earlier when Matsui helped establish the Chinese chapter of the Greater Asia Association. He subscribed to Matsui's concepts of “Asia for Asians,” but cautioned that Chinese fears of the Japanese would complicate the governance of the conquered territories.   The new government aligned with the Japanese army to implement a system of indoctrination centered on conservatism, primarily targeting the youth, who were perceived as most likely to resist. The indoctrination included messages like, “You must follow the old custom in marriage, letting your parents make arrangements for you. You must not go to theaters or study English, etc. China and Japan must become one, and then the nation will be strong.” Few were deceived by these attempts to win hearts and minds. The government-sanctioned newspaper, the Xinshengbao, or New Life Journal, was immediately dismissed as a crude vehicle for propaganda. Additionally, the government made minimal progress in more urgent tasks, such as restoring peacetime conditions and revitalizing Nanjing's economy, a challenge made formidable by Japanese brutality. Given the fate of the first group of volunteers at the electricity plant after the conquest, no one could be found to fill the needed 40 to 45 worker slots. The same was true for firefighters. The predictable outcomes followed. Water and limited power were restored to parts of the city by January 2, but within two days, the city was plunged back into darkness. By January 13, the waterworks were still non-operational, and the power supply remained intermittent while fires continued to blaze well into January. The government was not taken seriously, struggling even with the Japanese. It quickly built a reputation for being venal and corrupt. One of its names was the Nanjing Autonomous Government, which a clever member of the foreign community humorously rebranded as the “Automatic Government,” reflecting its actual role as a puppet regime devoid of autonomy.  While Nanjing endured its own nightmarish reality, the city's inhabitants had little understanding of the events transpiring beyond its walls. The first radio news that reached foreign residents came on January 7, reporting Japanese air raids on Wuhan. There were also unconfirmed rumors suggesting that Hangzhou was experiencing similar horrors to those in Nanjing, but details were scarce. It was perhaps expected that reports from afar would be limited in wartime, yet information about situations closer to Nanjing was similarly scarce, and the horrific truth gradually dawned on the city's populace. A Westerner who managed to escape east from Nanjing in early January reported that all villages within a 20-mile radius had been burned to the ground. Outside the city, Japanese soldiers were randomly shooting civilians, including children. A German who drove an hour from Nanjing encountered no living souls. After the conquest, Chinese who managed to leave Nanjing reported that every pond between the city and Juyong was filled with the decaying corpses of people and animals. Many of the atrocities committed during this time appeared to stem from boredom and a search for cheap thrills. American missionary Magee witnessed a young farmer who had sustained severe burns on his upper body. After the soldiers demanded money from him and he failed to comply, they doused him in kerosene and set him ablaze. Similarly, a young boy suffered horrific burns after he failed to lead a group of soldiers to his “mama.” People in the rural areas surrounding Nanjing faced danger from numerous directions. Not only were they potential targets for marauding Japanese soldiers, but they were also at risk from bands of Chinese outlaws, who preyed on the large influx of refugees on the roads and the few souls who remained at home despite the fierce conflict raging nearby. Magee encountered a 49-year-old woman whose home was invaded by bandits looking for money. “When she and her husband said they had none they battered her head and breast with a stool and burned her feet until she revealed their savings of between four and five dollars.” In the absence of a formal government, informal authority was often wielded by secret societies. For instance, the “Big Sword Society” reportedly offered protection not only against Japanese soldiers and local bandits but also against small groups of Chinese troops seeking to escape back to their lines and resorting to theft for survival. What a blast from the past eh?   Rumors began to circulate in early January 1938 that the Chinese Army was preparing to retake Nanjing and that Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers had already been spotted inside the city walls. Many of the small makeshift Japanese flags that had appeared outside private homes in mid-December suddenly vanished, and some Chinese residents who had been wearing Japanese armbands hastily removed them. There was even talk of launching an attack on the Japanese embassy. Word spread that the Japanese were becoming frightened and were searching for Chinese clothing to disguise themselves as civilians in the event of a retreat. In reality, none of this was true. The Chinese Army was still reorganizing after the costly campaign that had forced it from Shanghai to Nanjing and then further into the interior. However, this did not imply that the Japanese had achieved complete control over the city. After six weeks of terror, Nanjing began to reassert itself. Japanese soldiers faced fatalities and injuries in skirmishes with members of secret organizations like the “Yellow Spears” and the “Big Sword Society.”  After the New Year, the population within the Safety Zone began to dwindle. A week into 1938, the number of refugees at Ginling College, which had peaked at more than 10,000, fell to around 5,000. Less than a month after the conquest, many former residents started returning to their homes during the day and then coming back to the college at night. Still, the city was far from safe, and even for those whose homes were located within the Safety Zone, Vautrin believed it was unwise to stray too far from her refugee camp. One month after Japanese forces had surged through its gates, Nanjing was a thoroughly devastated city, with fires still being set every day and night. By mid-January, estimates suggested that more than half the city had been burned down, with the main shopping district completely gone, as well as the entertainment area surrounding the Confucius Temple. Nevertheless, slowly but surely, the shell-shocked city began to pull itself together and started the long process of renewal. Vautrin considered opening an industrial school offering four-month courses for women to help compensate for the loss of labor resulting from the indiscriminate killing of men. Chinese New Year fell on January 31, 1938. Celebrated throughout Asia, it was also recognized by the Japanese. It was a “dismal, muddy” day, and as many feared, soldiers who appeared “too happy” from excessive drinking attempted to enter the Safety Zone in search of women but were stopped. The sound of thousands of firecrackers filled the air, fulfilling the age-old purpose of scaring away evil spirits. Refugees in Rabe's compound presented him with a large red silk banner adorned with a gold Chinese inscription. His Chinese friends translated the message for him “You are the living Buddha For a hundred thousand people”. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In December 1937, the battle for Nanjing left its residents in terror as the Japanese army advanced. Following the invasion, a horrific massacre began, with thousands targeted in brutal killings, torture, and humiliation. Civilians and soldiers alike were indiscriminately slain, and the Japanese military showed no mercy. To this day the Nanjing Massacre stands as a testament to the unbelievable evil man holds within him.

香淳皇后宮内庁は１９日付で、昭和天皇の后、香淳皇后の生涯を記録した「香淳皇后実録」が完成し、天皇、皇后両陛下に献上したと発表した。 Japan's Imperial Household Agency said Friday that it has completed full official records of Empress Kojun, the wife of former Emperor Hirohito, posthumously called Emperor Showa.

Japan's Imperial Household Agency said Friday that it has completed full official records of Empress Kojun, the wife of former Emperor Hirohito, posthumously called Emperor Showa.

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions. Why did Japan, or better said, why did Emperor Hirohito decide to finally surrender? It seems obvious on the face of it, but there is actually a lot more to it than bombs or Soviet invasions. I guess you can call this episode a teaser or a shameless plug for going over to my Youtube Membership or Patreon. There's honestly a lot of interesting subjects such as ‘why was the japanese army so brutal”, “Hirohito's war time responsibility”, “the 4 part Kanji Ishiwara series”. Thus if you liked this one please show some love and check out my other stuff on my Youtube Membership or over at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.   Stating all of that lets just jump right into it.   We first need to start off briefly looking at Emperor Hirohito.    Upon taking the throne, Emperor Hirohito in 1926 Hirohito inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. From the beginning, despite what many of you older audience members may have been told, Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. Hirohito chose when to act and when not to. When the Kwantung Army assassinated Zhang Zuolin, he indulged their insubordination. This emboldened them to invade Manchuria in 1931, whereupon Hirohito was furious and demanded they be reigned in. Attempts were made, but they were heavily undermined by radicals. Hirohito could have put his foot down, but he chose not to. On September 22nd, at 4:20pm Hirohito said to the IJA Chief of General staff, Kanaya Hanzo “although this time it couldn't be helped, the army had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito again acquiesced to the military, despite wanting them to stop or at least localize the conflict. The military had disregarded his wishes, they should have been severely punished. Why did Hirohito not take a firmer stance?    Again for older audience members you may have heard, “hirohito was a hostage at the whim of his own military”. This narrative made it seem he was some sort of hostage emperor, but this is not the case at all. In fact Hirohito was instrumental in many military decisions from 1931-1945. The reason this, I will call it “myth” , went on was because after Japan's surrender, the US basically rewrote the Japanese constitution and covered up the Emperor's involvement in all the nasty stuff, to maintain control over Japan. Yeah it sounds a bit conspiracy esque, but I assure you it was indeed the case. This narrative held firm all the way until Hirohito's death, when finally meeting notes and personal accounts from those close to him came out, illuminating a lot. Though to this day, many records are still red -tapped.   The reason Hirohito did not stamp his foot down has to do with the Kokutai.    The Kokutai   So before I carry on, I have to explain what exactly is the Kokutai.    The Kokutai, loosely translated as "national essence," refers to the qualities that distinguish the Japanese identity. However, this concept is remarkably vague and poorly defined; even Japanese historians acknowledge this ambiguity. In contrast to Kokutai is seitai, or "form of government." While the Kokutai embodies the eternal and immutable aspects of Japanese polity—rooted in history, traditions, and customs centered around the Emperor—Japan's seitai has evolved significantly throughout its extensive history. For instance, shoguns governed for over 700 years until 1868, when the Meiji Restoration reinstated direct imperial rule.   Nevertheless, Emperor Meiji's direct authority came to an end with the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, which established a constitutional monarchy, introducing significant complexities into the governance system.   Article 4 of the constitution declares: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the Imperial Diet.” Under this framework, the Emperor alone possessed the power to appoint or dismiss ministers of state, declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties, direct national administration, and command the army and navy.   A glaring flaw in this arrangement is the inherent ambiguity of the Meiji Constitution. While it established a democratic parliament, it simultaneously afforded the Emperor absolute authority to usurp it. The document failed to clearly define the relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and its language was intentionally vague. Most critically, the military—the army and navy—were not directly accountable to the civilian government.    So with the kokutai, the Emperor is a divine figure who embodies the state's sovereignty. It was not necessarily the Emperor's job to surrender on behalf of the official government of Japan, but he most certainly could do so, given the Japanese people still remained faithful to the kokutai.    Now Hirohito did not live an ordinary life. According to the imperial custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. One thing that was absolutely indoctrinated into him was to defend the kokutai. It became his top mission as a monarch, it was the only mission in many ways. At the very core of how he saw the world and how he acted, it was always to protect the kokutai.    So when the Japanese military began these insubordinate acts, Hirohito's primary concern was to the kokutai, ie: anything that threatened his imperial authority and the imperial institution itself. Although the military usurped his authority, the operations had been successful. Hirohito was not at all opposed to seeing his empire expand. He understood the value of manchuria, he was fully onboard with the military plans to eventually seize control over it, but these radicals were accelerating things to quickly for everyone's liking. He turned a blind eye, dished light punishments and carried on. However the local conflict escalated. It traveled to Shanghai by 1932 and here Hirohito took action. He understood Shanghai was full of western powers. Nations like Britain and America could place economic sanctions on Japan if things were allowed to get out of hand here. So he ordered General Yoshinori Shirakawa to bring the Shanghai expedition to a close.    During this period, two factions emerged within the Japanese military: the Kodoha, or “Imperial Way,” and the Toseiha, or “Control” faction. The Kodoha was founded by General Sadao Araki and his protégé, Jinzaburo Masaki. Their primary objective was a Shōwa Restoration aimed at purging Japan of corrupt politicians and businessmen, especially those associated with the zaibatsu. Composed mainly of young army officers, the Kodoha espoused a romanticized and radical interpretation of Bushido, idealizing pre-industrial Japan, which Araki believed had been tainted by Western influences. To achieve their goals, they resorted to assassinations and planned a coup d'état.   In response, the Toseiha faction was formed, initially led by Lt. General Tetsuzan Nagata and later by Hideki Tojo. Like the Kodoha, the Toseiha sought a Shōwa Restoration but adopted a more moderate and conservative approach. They recognized the importance of preserving traditional values while integrating Western ideals, advocating for a balanced perspective. The Toseiha promoted pragmatic military strategies to navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Although they acknowledged the existence of corrupt politicians and zaibatsu, they preferred to work within the existing political system, anticipating that future total wars would necessitate a strengthened industrial and military capacity. Their ranks primarily included promising graduates from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Academy, Army Staff College, and select naval members. The most significant distinction between the two factions was that the Toseiha explicitly rejected the use of a coup d'état in pursuit of their goals.   Between 1932-1936 radical officers, mostly of the Kodoha faction assassinated politicians and military leaders trying to usher in a showa restoration. You might be led to believe this was in the interest of Hirohito, you would be mistaken. Hirohito did not want a military dictatorship at the whim of the cult of the emperor. Ironic to say, given how WW2 turns out mind you. This really would have been a hostage situation. Hirohito wanted to maintain the exact ambiguous situation that was Showa Era Japan pre 1945. He saw this as the most ideal structure to defend the kokutai, because blame could not be placed solely upon his shoulders. He always maintained a get out of jail free card one could say.    The February 26 incident of 1936, was the climax of the Kodoha faction. They performed a mutiny trying to usher in a SHowa restoration. They assumed when their messenger came to the emperor he would join them and take direct rule. Instead Hirohito was furious. His first thought was the mutineers were trying to enlist his brother Chichibu to overthrow him. He dragged his brother who was a fraternizer amongst the kodoha members mind you, into a meeting, demanding he never associate with them again nor attempt to challenge him. Then Hirohito furious demanded the mutineers be dealt with. At one point he even threatened to lead the imperial guards to put them down. The coup failed, the kodoha faction was destroyed. Ironically the toseiha faction were the ones to do it and thus they became the defacto ruling clique.    The military, especially the kwantung army did not stop with their insubordination.    On July 8th of 1937 the Kwangtung army performed the Marco Polo Bridge incident, ushering in the second sino-japanese war. This was one of many false flag operations they had pulled off over the years. Upon being told about this Hirohito's first response was whether the USSR would invade Manchukuo over the matter. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied. Hirohito furious demanded to know what contingency plans existed and his advisors told him before he gave his red seal of approval to invade northern china.   Henceforth he micromanaged a lot of the military decisions going forward and he oversaw the forming and dissolving of numerous cabinets and positions when things went his way or did not in the military and political scene.  Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Nanking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer.   By 1939 the US began threatening sanctions for what Japan was doing in China. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”.   Fast forward a bit, with war raging in Europe Hirohito, on June 19th of 1940 Hirohito asked if chief of staff Prince Kan'in and Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” This question highlighted Hirohito's belief at that time that Germany was close to achieving victory, which led him to gradually consider deploying troops to French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies since neither of those parent nations was in a position to protect their territories and vital resources. Regarding the war in China, the Japanese aimed to stop the flow of materials entering China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicating that Britain would not agree to block the shipment of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military recognized that an invasion of Hong Kong might be necessary, which would mean declaring war on Britain. When this was communicated to him, Hirohito responded, “If that occurs, I'm sure America will enforce an embargo, don't you think?” In response, Kido, the lord of the privy seal, reassured him by stating, “The nation must be fully prepared to resist, proceeding with caution and avoiding being drawn into events instigated by foreign interests.”   Hirohito went through countless meetings, but eventually signed order number 458 authorizing the invasion of French Indochina, knowing full well the consequences. The US,UK and Netherlands began embargoes of oil, rubber and iron. In the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.   On October 13th Hirohito told his closest advisor Koichi Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.”   The reason I am bringing up all this stuff is to solidify, Hirohito had agency, he was micromanaging and forming decisions. After the war broke out with the west, Hirohito did have the ability to stamp his foot down. Of course there could have been wild repercussions, his military could have usurped him with Chichibu, it was definitely possible. But you need to keep this mind set, as far as why Hirohito acts or doesn't, its always to protect the Kokutai. Thus one of the levers for peace, solely rested on Hirohito's perception if the kokutai could be retained or not.    From the outset of the Pacific War, Hirohito believed Germany was going to defeat the USSR. In line with his military leaders, they all believed Japan had to seize everything they could in the asia-pacific and thwart off the US until a negotiated peace could be met. Hirohito committed himself to overseeing the war, determined to achieve victory at any cost. He was a very cautious leader, he meticulously analyzed each campaign, anticipating potential setbacks and crafting worst-case scenario predictions. He maintained a skeptical view of the reports from his senior officials and was often harshly critical of high commanders.   While he did not frequently visit the front lines like other commanders in chief, Hirohito wielded significant influence over theater operations, shaping both planning and execution whenever he deemed necessary. Similar to his approach during the war in China, he issued the highest military orders from the Imperial Headquarters, conducted audited conferences, and made decisions communicated under his name. He regularly welcomed generals and admirals to the imperial palace for detailed briefings on the battlefront and visited various military bases, battleships, and army and naval headquarters. His inspections encompassed military schools and other significant military institutions, adding to his comprehensive involvement in the war effort.   Now the war went extremely well for Japan until the battle of Midway. This was as major setback, but Japan retained the initiative. Then the Guadalcanal campaign saw Japan lose the initiative to the Americans. Upon receiving the initial report of the Ichiki detachment's destruction, Hirohito remarked, “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” Despite the numerous reports detailing the devastating effects of tropical diseases and starvation on his troops, he persistently demanded greater efforts from them. Hirohito exerted continuous pressure on his naval and land commanders to retake the island. On September 15th, November 5th, and November 11th, he requested additional Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops and aircraft to be allocated to the cause.   General Sugiyama expressed concerns about dispatching more IJA pilots due to their inexperience in transoceanic combat, preferring to reinforce the North China Army for an attack on Chongqing instead. Hirohito pressed the issue again, but Sugiyama responded that the IJA had diverted its air resources to New Guinea and Rabaul. Undeterred by the objections from senior commanders, Hirohito persisted in his demands. By late November, it became evident that Guadalcanal was a lost cause.   At an Imperial Headquarters conference on December 31st, 1942, the chiefs of staff proposed canceling the attempts to recapture Guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned this decision but stated, “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” He insisted on this point, leading to the selection of new strategic targets in the Solomons, north of New Georgia, and in the Stanley Range on New Guinea. Hirohito even threatened to withhold authorization for withdrawing troops from Guadalcanal until a new plan was established. He later opposed the withdrawal from Munda Airfield, as it contradicted the newly defined defensive line.   As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern Solomons began to crumble, Hirohito continued to insist that the navy engage in decisive battles to regain the initiative, allowing for the transport of supplies to the many soldiers trapped on various islands. When he learned of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd, he asked, “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for a while.” The phrase “Do this for me” would come to be his signature rallying cry.   After Guadal canal, it was loss after loss for Japan. By February of 1944, Hirohito forced Sugiyama to resign so Hideki Tojo could take his position as chief of the general staff, note Tojo was prime minister and army minister at this point. Hirohito worked alongside Tojo to plan some last ditch efforts to change the war situation. The most significant one was Operation Ichi-Go. As much damage as they did to China with that, Chiang Kai-Shek's government survived. Hirohito watched as island by island fell to the Americans. When the Americans were poised to take Saipan he warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” Saipan fell, so Hirohito stopped supporting Tojo and allowed his rivals to take down his cabinet by june 18th of 1944.    Hirohito remained resolute in his determination to wrest victory from the Allies. On October 18th, the Imperial Headquarters ordered a decisive naval engagement, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After the war, Hirohito publicly stated, "Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I consented to the showdown battle at Leyte, believing that if we launched an attack and America hesitated, we might find an opportunity to negotiate." Leyte Gulf didnt work. The military began the kamikaze program. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    The Surrender time   Now we come to the time period where Japan seriously began looking for ways to surrender. In Europe Germany was heading to its defeat and Japan knew this. As for Japan, their army in Burma had been annihilated. Their forces in China were faring better after Operation Ichi-go, having opened up a land corridor along the main railway from Beiping to Wuhan and from throughout Guangdong but still stuck in a deadlock stalemate, facing a guerrilla war that was costing them 64% of their military expenditures. They deeply feared once the Soviets finished up with Germany, they would undoubtedly turn east against Manchuria. With the Soviets attacking from the north, the US would attack from the south, perhaps landing in Shanghai and the home islands. The Kamikaze tactics were proving formidable, but not nearly enough. By 1945, 43% of the IJA were now stationed in Japan, Korea and Formosa, bracing for the final stand. Former prime minister Reijiro Wakatsuki came out of retirement in may of 1945, having heard Germany collapsed, to urge Hirohito and the Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki to open negotiations with the US as soon as possible. However he also said “the enemy must first be made to see the disadvantages of continuing the war”. To this Hirohito's chief counselor Makino Nobuaki said that “the ultimate priority is to develop an advantageous war situation.” Advisor admiral Kesiuke Okada said Japan should wait for “a moment favorable for us,” then make peace. Advisors Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota advised the emperor to fight on until the end.   Now I want to bring in a key player to the surrender decision, that of Prince Konoe. Konoe was very close to Hirohito and understood the emperors mentality, especially how he viewed things in relation to the kokutai.    The senior statesman Prince Konoe had been consulting with Hirohito for over 18 months at this point trying to convey the message that if the war continued it would threaten the kokutai. Many months prior, he confided in the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, that the army was suffering from “a cancer” in the form of the Toseiha faction. However, he noted that “Kido and others” did not share his perspective, while “his Majesty is relatively unconcerned with ideological issues.” For the past four years, he continued, the emperor had been advised and still believed that “the true extremists are the Kodoha faction.” In reality, the greater threat to the kokutai arose from the Toseiha faction. Konoe further asserted that if the war escalated, they would attempt to alter the kokutai.   Konoe speculated that whether the threat originated from communists within the nation, primarily referring to left-wing radicals in the Toseiha faction, or from the “Anglo-American enemy,” both would seek to preserve the emperor while pushing towards the country's communization.In his written report to the emperor on February 14, which Kido listened to attentively, Konoe elaborated on his conspiracy theory. He asserted that the Soviet Union regarded Japan as its primary threat in East Asia. The Soviets had allied with the Chinese Communists, the largest and most formidable Communist party in Asia, and were collaborating with the United States and Britain to drive Japan out of China. He warned that they would enter the war when the opportunity arose.   Defeat, he cautioned the emperor, was inevitable if the conflict persisted. However, he emphasized that a far greater fear was the potential destruction of the kokutai. The ongoing war was eroding the domestic status quo, unleashing forces that threatened Japan and its imperial institution from within as much as from external adversaries. The real danger lay in the emperor's and Kido's trust in the generals of the Toseiha faction, who were unintentionally facilitating the communization of Japan. Konoe implored for a swift peace settlement before a Communist revolution emerged, making the preservation of the kokutai impossible. Hirohito agreed with Konoe but stated “ To end the war would be “very difficult unless we make one more military gain.” Konoe allegedly replied, “Is that possible? It must happen soon. If we have to wait much longer, . . . [a mere battle victory] will mean nothing.” Hirohito replied “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.”   On February 15th of 1945, Hirohito's intelligence warned the Soviet Union would likely abrogate its Neutrality Pact with Japan. Even Tojo conceded there was a 50/50 chance the USSR would invade Manchuria. In March, the US began B-29 incendiary bombing raids over Tokyo, turning 40% of the capital into ash. On March 18th, Hirohito with some aides drove around the capital to witness the devastation. The civilians looked exhausted and bewildered to Hirohito. Factory production was collapsing, absenteeism was rising, instances of lese majeste were running rampant. For the next 5 months imperial family members and senior statesmen all began speaking to Hirohito about the “crises of the kokutai”. The threat Konoe had warned about for months was becoming the main talking point. It seemed like the Japanese people within the countryside and urban areas remained steadfast in the resolve to obey their leaders, work and sacrifice for their nation, but for how long would they feel so?    It was only after the battle for Okinawa was lost and 60 Japanese cities had been leveled by American incendiary bombs that Hirohito openly indicated he wanted to negotiate a surrender.   Kido's diary reveals the first clear indication that the emperor might be urged to consider an early peace on June 8, 1945, when Kido drafted his “Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation.” This marked a pivotal moment. It followed the unintentional bombing of the Imperial Palace, the complete loss of hope for saving Okinawa, and coincided with the day the Supreme War Leadership Council adopted the “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War.” With the fighting in Europe concluded, Japan found itself entirely isolated. Kido's plan, although vague, proposed seeking the Soviet Union's assistance as an intermediary to help Japan gain leverage in negotiations with its adversaries. By drafting this plan, Kido signaled the end of his long alliance with the military hard-liners. Hirohito's acceptance of it indicated his readiness for an early peace.   Hirohito was moved to an underground bunker in the mountains of Matsushiro in Nagano prefecture where upon those around him noted he fell into a deep depression. On June 22nd  Hirohito informed the Supreme War Leadership Council he wanted them to open diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. In early July Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik broke off inconclusive talks with Hirota. Hirohito stepped in immediately and ordered a new special envoy be sent to Moscow. However Hirohito nor the Suzuki government had concrete plans on how to mediate a surrender through the Soviets. The only things they did prioritize was a guarantee of the emperors political position and retainment of the imperial system, ie the kokutai. This was taken into consideration rather than ending the war as quickly as possible to save the lives of millions.    From April 8, 1945, until Japan's capitulation, the Suzuki government's chief war policy was “Ketsugo,” an advanced iteration of the “Shosango” (Victory Number 3) plan for defending the homeland. The hallmark of this strategy was a heavy reliance on suicide tactics, including deploying a massive number of kamikaze “special attack” planes, human torpedoes launched from submarines, dynamite-stuffed “crash boats” powered by truck engines, human rocket bombs carried by aircraft, and suicide assaults by specially trained ground units.   While preparations for Operation Ketsu progressed, the Imperial Diet convened on June 9 to pass a Wartime Emergency Measures Law, along with five additional measures aimed at mobilizing the entire nation for this final battle. On the same day, the emperor, who had yet to initiate efforts to end the war, issued another imperial rescript in conjunction with the Diet's convocation, instructing the nation to “smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations” and “achieve the goals of the war.” Concurrently, the controlled press launched a daily die-for-the-emperor campaign to foster gratitude for the imperial benevolence and, from around mid-July onward, initiated a campaign to “protect the kokutai.”   The Americans countered with their own propaganda aimed at breaking Japan's will to fight. B-29 bombers dropped millions of leaflets written in Japanese, announcing the next scheduled targets for bombing raids and urging surrender, while using the emperor to challenge the militarists. Leaflets bearing the chrysanthemum crest criticized the “military cliques” for “forcing the entire nation to commit suicide” and called on “everyone” to “exercise their constitutional right to make direct appeals [for peace] to the Emperor.” They asserted that “even the powerful military cliques cannot stop the mighty march for peace of the Emperor and the people.” One notable batch of seven million leaflets conveyed the terms of the “joint declaration” issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China. “Today we come not to bomb you,” they stated. “We are dropping this leaflet to inform you of the response from the United States government to your government's request for conditions of surrender.... Whether the war stops immediately depends on your government. You will understand how to end the war if you read these two official notifications.”   Amid pressures from imperial edicts to continue preparations for a final battle and focus solely on victory, the Japanese people were also subjected to an intense American psychological warfare campaign in addition to aerial bombardment. During late July and August, prefectural governors, police chiefs, and officers of the “special higher police” submitted reports to the Home Ministry detailing the rapidly deteriorating national morale.    Now on the other side, Roosevelt made it known back in January of 1943 at the Casablanca conference, the allies would only accept unconditional surrender. By 1945, the allies understood the predicament this left Japan with. On May 8th of 1945, Truman added “Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people” trying to indicate a non vindictive spirit. However the Kokutai question always remained ambiguous. State Department Joseph Grew, the former ambassador to Japan, began arguing to Truman they needed to make public a clear definition of the terms to persuade Japan to surrender. As he argued to Truman: Emperor Hirohito was seen as the key figure in Japan's surrender, likened to a "queen bee in a hive... surrounded by the attentions of the hive." Throughout the war, he was characterized in various ways—as a “puppet” of the militarists, a constitutional monarch, and a pacifist. Grew had immense faith in the influence exerted by what he referred to as the “moderates” surrounding the Japanese throne.    However many of Grew's colleagues argued the future existence of the monarchy was intolerable as it was akin to fascism. Many wanted to punish the emperor. Truman was in a tug of war. The Potsdam declaration issued on July 26th of 1945 came in the form of a ultimatum aiming to quicken japans surrender. Truman clarified the terms for the unconditional surrender at the end of its terms: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Zero mention of the emperor. Grew had argued to add “this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.” But it was deleted from the article. The status of the emperor was not guaranteed, the kokutai was thus up in the air.    The next day, the Suzuki cabinet rejected the terms. The Japanese leadership and Hirohito were still banking and awaiting Soviet replies to their terms.    Lets talk about the Soviet talks now   Back on July 12th ambassador Naotake Satō sent this message to the Soviets: “His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland”.  However the Soviets had made commitments to their allies, promising in fact to invade Japan to aid them.    As for the Soviets their primary objective was to ensure unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean. The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastline, particularly Vladivostok, could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. Securing these territories to guarantee free access to the Soya Strait was their main goal. Secondary objectives included acquiring leases for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Southern Manchuria Railway, as well as gaining control over Dairen and Port Arthur.   To achieve these aims, Stalin and Molotov prolonged negotiations with the Japanese, creating a false sense of hope for a Soviet-mediated peace. Simultaneously, in their discussions with the United States and Britain, the Soviets insisted on strict adherence to the Cairo Declaration, which had been reaffirmed at the Yalta Conference. This declaration stipulated that the Allies would not accept a separate or conditional peace with Japan; thus, the Japanese would need to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. The Soviets aimed to prolong the war by opposing any efforts to dilute this requirement. This approach would provide the Soviets with the necessary time to complete the transfer of their troops from the Western Front to the Far East and to conquer Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and potentially Hokkaidō, starting with an assault on Rumoi. AUGUST 1945   Thus we come to at last the critical point, August of 1945.    The Americans prepared for the deployment of atomic bombs and for an invasion of southern Kyushu, known as Operation Olympic, scheduled to commence on November 1. At 8:15 A.M. on August 6, a single B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay dropped little boy, devastating much of the undefended city of Hiroshima, instantly killing an estimated 100,000 to 140,000 people and leading to the deaths of possibly another 100,000 over the next five years. At the epicenter of the explosion, “a light appeared 3,000 times brighter than the sun,” creating a fireball that emitted thermal radiation capable of “instantly scorching humans, trees, and houses.” As the air heated and rushed upward, cold air surged in to ignite a firestorm. Hours later, a whirlwind escalated the flames to their peak until more than eight square miles were virtually reduced to cinders. Subsequently, black, muddy rain filled with radioactive fallout began to fall. Two days later, using Japan's rejection of the Potsdam Declaration as a pretext, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Then on August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, resulting in the immediate deaths of approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people and injuring more than 60,000.   Meanwhile, in Tokyo, during the critical period between the Potsdam Declaration and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito remained silent about accepting the Potsdam terms. However, on July 25 and 31, he explicitly conveyed to Kido that the imperial regalia must be defended at all costs. The three sacred objects—a mirror, a curved jewel, and a sword—symbolized the legitimacy of his rule through the northern court and were integral to his identity as the divine sovereign. Hirohito's focus was on protecting these symbols of office, as he insisted on having them brought to the palace. This fixation on maintaining his symbols occurred during a pivotal moment when the pressing issue was whether to accept immediate capitulation. Reflecting on this, he was unprepared to seize the opportunity to end the war himself.   Prime Minister Suzuki, following his initial rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum, also saw no need for further action. His Cabinet Advisory Council, which included the president of Asano Cement, the founder of the Nissan consortium, the vice president of the Bank of Japan, and other representatives from the nation's leading business interests that had profited significantly from the war, convened on the morning of August 3. They recommended accepting the Potsdam terms, arguing that the United States would permit Japan to retain its non-military industries and continue participating in world trade.    Here are some reactions to the two bombs and invasion of Manchuria.    Yonai Mitsumasa said to admiral Takagi Sokichi, on August 12, that “I think the term is perhaps inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods [tenyu, also “heaven-sent blessings”]. This way we don't have to say that we quit the war because of domestic circumstances. I've long been advocating control of our crisis, but neither from fear of an enemy attack nor because of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. The main reason is my anxiety over the domestic situation. So, it is rather fortunate that we can now control matters without revealing the domestic situation”.    Konoe's characterized the Soviet involvement in the war as “a godsend for controlling the army,”. Kido viewed of both the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the conflict as “useful” elements for ensuring a smooth transition. A nascent power struggle was unfolding, rendering the potential death toll—whether one hundred thousand or two hundred thousand—immaterial to those involved, as long as their desired outcome was achieved: an end to the war that would leave the monarchy intact and capable of managing the discontent that defeat would inevitably provoke. Throughout the final acts of this wartime drama, the Japanese “moderates” found it easier to capitulate to external pressures than to take decisive action on their own to conclude the war.   Another illuminating looks at Japan's elite's perspective on surrender terms was the document titled “Essentials of Peace Negotiations” (wahei kosho no yoryo). Drafted by Konoe and his adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Sakai Koji, after Konoe had reluctantly accepted a mission to Moscow, this document, stipulated the preservation of the emperor system, along with most of the imperial prerogatives, as the absolute minimum condition for peace. It defined the “original” or “essential homeland” as including the southern half of the Kurile Islands but showed a willingness to concede all overseas territories to the enemy, including Okinawa and the American-occupied Bonin Islands, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. The “Essentials” also accepted complete disarmament for an unspecified period, thereby compromising on the issues of demobilizing and disarming the armed forces. More significantly, an “explanation” attached to the “Essentials” emphasized that “the main aim is to secure the imperial line and maintain the political role of the emperor.”    Why Japan surrendered   We come to it atleast after a long podcast. Why did Japan ultimately surrender?   The twin psychological shocks of the first atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, combined with Kido's and the emperor's concern over escalating public criticism of the throne and its occupant, fueled an almost paranoid fear that, sooner or later, the populace would react violently against their leaders if the war persisted much longer. These factors ultimately led Hirohito to accept, in principle, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.   At the first meeting of the six member constituents of the Supreme War Leadership Council, held from 10:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. on August 9, Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chiefs of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, representing the army, and Yonai, representing the navy, along with Tōgō, from the Foreign Ministry, were expected to discuss the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Instead, the conversation revolved around whether to attempt a conditional surrender—specifically, should they insist on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, or four?   After Suzuki addressed the assembly regarding the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet attack, Yonai, as recounted by Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, was the first to speak, framing the issue in terms of four conditions. “Let's start to talk, Do we accept the Potsdam Declaration with no conditions? If not, and we wish to insist on attaching hopes and conditions, we may do so this way. First, preservation of the kokutai; then for the rest, the main items in the Potsdam Declaration: treatment of war criminals, method of disarmament, and the matter of sending in an army of occupation.” Thus, the participants identified what they perceived to be the ambiguous points within the Potsdam Declaration and used them as the foundation for their discussions.   The army insisted on four conditions: First, the preservation of the kokutai, which they considered distinct from the Potsdam Declaration itself. The other conditions proposed were, second, that the Imperial Headquarters assume responsibility for disarmament and demobilization; third, a prohibition on occupation; and fourth, the delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government. The army equated the kokutai with the emperor's right of supreme command. Their self-serving desire for autonomous war crimes trials was based on the belief that the Allies would use such trials to politically indict the military. Consequently, army leaders aimed to preempt the activities of any international tribunal by conducting their own trials—similar to the approach taken by the uninvaded and unrepentant Germans after World War I.   Supporting the military's views during cabinet meetings that day were three civilian members of the Suzuki cabinet: Justice Minister Matsuzaka Hiromasa, Home Minister Yasui Toji, and Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko. At the imperial conference that night, which extended into the early hours of the tenth, Foreign Minister Tōgō's interpretation of the “preservation of the kokutai” referred solely to the safeguarding of the Imperial House or dynasty, rather than the continuation of Hirohito's reign.   Hiranuma, another advocate for the single condition, interpreted the kokutai as the “emperor's sovereign right to rule the state [not] deriving from national law. Even if the entire nation is sacrificed to the war, we must preserve both the kokutai and the security of the imperial house.” This discrepancy illustrated that there was no completely unified understanding of what the kokutai entailed; the debate over one condition versus four represented conflicting visions for the future of the Japanese state and masked the competition for political power that was already unfolding.   It remains doubtful whether the emperor and Kido initially sided with Tōgō against the four conditions proposed by the senior military leaders. A more likely inference is that both men retained sympathies for the hardliners, both military and civilian, who preferred to continue the futile war rather than surrender immediately and unconditionally. This may explain why, on August 9, Konoe had Hosokawa Morisada approach Navy General Headquarters to urge the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, to pressure Hirohito (through Kido) to accept the Potsdam terms. Later that afternoon, Konoe enlisted the help of diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru to persuade Kido to reconsider his stance on the four conditions. Ultimately, at the urging of Takamatsu and Shigemitsu, Kido did shift to support Tōgō's position.   At the end of the war, as at its beginning and throughout every stage of its progression, Emperor Hirohito played a highly active role in supporting the actions carried out in his name. From the very beginning of the Asia-Pacific war, the emperor played a significant role in the unfolding events around him. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, he consistently advocated for a decisive victory. Afterward, he acknowledged the necessity of pursuing an early peace, although he did not favor an immediate cessation of hostilities. Instead, he wavered, steering Japan toward ongoing warfare rather than direct negotiations with the Allies. When the final crisis fully unfolded, the only option left was unconditional surrender. Even then, he continued to procrastinate until the atomic bomb was dropped and the Soviets launched their attack. The wartime emperor ideology that once sustained morale made it exceedingly difficult for Japan's leaders to accept the act of surrender. Aware of their objective defeat, yet indifferent to the suffering the war inflicted on their own people—as well as on the populations of Asia, the Pacific, and the West whose lives they had disrupted—the emperor and his military leaders sought a means to lose without appearing to lose. They aimed to mitigate domestic criticism following surrender while preserving their power structure.   Blinded by their fixation on the fate of the imperial house and committed to an overly optimistic diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, Japan's leaders missed several opportunities to end their lost war. Would Japan's leaders have surrendered more promptly if the Truman administration had “clarified” the status of the emperor before the cataclysmic double shocks of the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war? Probably not. However, it is likely they would have surrendered to prevent the kokutai from being destroyed from within. The evidence suggests that the first atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war led Hirohito, Kido, and other members of the court to believe that continuing the war would inevitably result in that destruction. They recognized that the populace was war-weary and despondent, with rising hostility toward the military and the government, accompanied by increasing criticism of the emperor himself. More specifically, Kido and Hirohito were privy to Home Ministry reports, which contained information from governors and police chiefs nationwide. These reports indicated that citizens were beginning to label the emperor as an incompetent leader responsible for the deteriorating war situation.   This is the third variable, never spoken about. Many first look at the atomic bombs. Bigger brain people turn to the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria. But hardly anyone reads about how the collapse of Japan's social fabric, scared the shit out of the Emperor and his closest advisors. You can't have a kokutai, without a populace that worshiped you.    When the emperor expressed in February, “What worries me is whether the nation [could] endure” long enough to achieve victory, he was not merely voicing concern for the suffering of his subjects; rather, he feared that such suffering could lead to social upheaval—in short, revolution. At that time, he referred to the ordinary, war-related hardships of food shortages, air raids, devastated cities, destruction of homes, and the omnipresent grief from the loss of loved ones. The atomic bomb escalated death, pain, and suffering to unimaginably higher levels, intensifying the threat from within. After the bombings of Japan and two atomic bombs, Hirohito was in a dark way, given a golden get out of jail free card. Hirohito could now save his suffering people from further anguish by surrendering, allowing him to deflect responsibility for leading them into misery while adopting an air of benevolence and care. Indeed, Hirohito did care—though not primarily for the Japanese people, but rather for the survival of his own imperial house and throne.   After the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito delayed for a full two days before instructing Kido, shortly before 10 A.M. on August 9, to “quickly control the situation” because “the Soviet [Union]” had declared war. Kido immediately communicated with Prime Minister Suzuki, who began arrangements for an Imperial Conference scheduled for later that night. Following the seidan of August 10, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu took charge of drafting the “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” based on Hirohito's directives. Assisted by two scholars of the Chinese classics, Kawada Mizuho and Yasuoka Masahiro, Sakomizu worked tirelessly for over three days before submitting a version of the rescript to the Suzuki cabinet. After six hours of contentious discussion on the night of August 14, the cabinet modified and approved the document. Hirohito promptly signed it, and Shimomura and Kido persuaded him to record a suitably opaque final version for broadcast to the nation.   On the night of August 14, the Suzuki government notified the United States and other Allied nations that it had accepted both the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes letter of August 11. Accelerating the emperor's actions during this climactic moment of the unconditional surrender drama was the American psychological warfare campaign. When a leaflet dropped from B-29 bombers came into Kido's possession on the night of August 13 or the morning of the fourteenth, he conferred with the emperor and explained the gravity of the situation. The latest enemy leaflets were informing the Japanese people of the government's notification of surrender under one condition, along with the full text of Byrnes's response. If this continued, it would undermine the imperial government's reliance on secrecy to obscure the true nature of the lost war and the reasons for the prolonged surrender delay.   Given Kido's and the emperor's concerns about rising signs of defeatism, including criticism of the throne, immediate action was necessary to prevent the populace from acting on their own initiative. Thus, the second seidan was convened. At noon on August 15, the Japanese people gathered around their radio receivers and heard, for the first time, the high-pitched voice of their emperor telling them:    “After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration. To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable”.   Clearly Hirohito sought to justify his decision to surrender by citing the dropping of the atomic bombs. He wanted to become the saviour of the Japanese people. Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai.  Interestingly, the surrender declaration to the civilian population was not the same one sent to the military. On August 17th Hirohito issued a second “rescript to soldiers and sailors” throughout the asia-pacific.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The lesser-known August 17 rescript to the army and navy specified Soviet participation as the sole reason for surrender, while maintaining the kokutai as the primary aim. Dissembling until the end—and even beyond—it was noted that the emperor presented two different justifications for his delayed surrender. Both statements were likely true.   Months later Hirohito's said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.”    There exists this sort of childish argument today whether it was the atomic bombs or the Soviet Invasion that caused Japan to surrender. However, this overlooks as I think I've explained in 9000 words jeez, the influence of the kokutai. Defending the kokutai was Hirohito's number one priority. The Soviets threatened it. Communism threatened it. What Japan perceived to be “democracy” threatened it. American victory threatened it. And the destruction of Japan's social fabric threatened it. I love this one piece of history, that I have only come across in one book, that being the main one I am using here.   On August 12th, Hirohito came to the imperial family to tell them he had made the decision to surrender. His uncle Prince Yasuhiko Asaka asked him whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito replied “of course”.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials were based on the London Agreement, signed on August 8, 1945, which was an accord between the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union to establish an International Military Tribunal to prosecute the major war criminals of the European Axis. It provided a legal framework that codified crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, laying the foundation for the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. Beginning on November 20, 1945, 22 Nazi officials were brought to trial in the city of Nuremberg in Germany. And on May 3, 1946, 28 Japanese Military and Civil Leaders were brought to trial in Tokyo.  

Let us know what you think of the latest episode of Distinct Nostalgia by clicking here and sending us a messageAs we await the arrival of Part 2 of The President and the Emperor, acclaimed actor Samuel Barnett who plays 'father of the bomb' Robert Oppenheimer chats about taking on historical figures as characters - and what it means to play the famous nuclear scientist.  Sam also reflects on the meticulousness of the script by Guy Smith and what he hopes listens around the world draw from this epic seven part drama.Samuel Barnett is In Conversation with Ashley ByrneA Made in Manchester ProductionLISTEN TO PART ONE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE EMPEROR JUST BY SCROLLING THROUGH THIS FEED. YOU CAN ALSO HEAR INTERVIEWS WITH CLIFTON TRUMAN DANIEL WHO PLAYS HIS GRANDPA PRESIDENT TRUMAN - AND SADAO UEDA WHO PLAYS EMPEROR HIROHITOThe President and The Emperor  brings to life the story behind one of the most consequential decisions in modern history, the dropping of the atomic bomb eighty years ago.Told in seven parts and produced by indie company Made in Manchester, the series draws on newly declassified US and Japanese documents, along with first-hand testimony, to present a dual-perspective account of the final days of the Second World War.At the heart of the drama are two isolated but powerful figures, President Harry S. Truman and Emperor Hirohito. They navigate moral and political dilemmas as the world teeters on the brink of nuclear devastation.In a unique casting move, Truman is portrayed by his real-life grandson, Clifton Truman Daniel, adding an intimate connection to a role few could approach with such personal insight.He stars alongside acclaimed Japanese actor Sadao Ueda, who plays Hirohito with quiet intensity and emotional nuance.“This drama is not about who was right or wrong in the war,” Ueda says. “It presents historical facts dramatically from two different points of view. I hope the listener will reflect on what global conflict might mean if it ever happened again.”Samuel Barnett plays Robert OppenheimerThe President and the Emperor is written by Guy Smith, directed by Jonathan Kydd and produced by Ashley Byrne. The Executive Producer is Kurt Brookes.Guy Smith says: ''I wanted to find out what really took place behind the scenes in Washington and Tokyo in the weeks leading up to the most momentous - and controversial - decision in the history of modern warfare; the order to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.And, just as importantly, I wanted to find out if that world changing event could have been avoided.  Was it inevitable?  Or could the conflict have been ended without the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?The more I dug into the archives and examined first hand accounts of those who were there at the White House and Imperial Palace, I discovered an extraordinary story full of intrigue, drama and turmoil.Now, as the world once again moves closer to the threat of nuclear conflict than at any time since the Cold War, I hope The President and the Emperor provides listeners with a timely warning on the dangers of escalating tensions and failing to explore all possible opportunities to stop man's inhumanity to man.'With thanks to:The National Security Archive, Washington DChttps://nsarchive.gwu.eduThe Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MOhttps://www.trumanlibrary.govSupport the show

Last time we spoke about the surrender of Japan. Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender on August 15, prompting mixed public reactions: grief, shock, and sympathy for the Emperor, tempered by fear of hardship and occupation. The government's response included resignations and suicide as new leadership was brought in under Prime Minister Higashikuni, with Mamoru Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister and Kawabe Torashiro heading a delegation to Manila. General MacArthur directed the occupation plan, “Blacklist,” prioritizing rapid, phased entry into key Japanese areas and Korea, while demobilizing enemy forces. The surrender ceremony occurred aboard the Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, with Wainwright, Percival, Nimitz, and UN representatives in attendance. Civilians and soldiers across Asia began surrendering, and postwar rehabilitation, Indochina and Vietnam's independence movements, and Southeast Asian transitions rapidly unfolded as Allied forces established control. This episode is the Aftermath of the Pacific War Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Pacific War has ended. Peace has been restored by the Allies and most of the places conquered by the Japanese Empire have been liberated. In this post-war period, new challenges would be faced for those who won the war; and from the ashes of an empire, a defeated nation was also seeking to rebuild. As the Japanese demobilized their armed forces, many young boys were set to return to their homeland, even if they had previously thought that they wouldn't survive the ordeal. And yet, there were some cases of isolated men that would continue to fight for decades even, unaware that the war had already ended.  As we last saw, after the Japanese surrender, General MacArthur's forces began the occupation of the Japanese home islands, while their overseas empire was being dismantled by the Allies. To handle civil administration, MacArthur established the Military Government Section, commanded by Brigadier-General William Crist, staffed by hundreds of US experts trained in civil governance who were reassigned from Okinawa and the Philippines. As the occupation began, Americans dispatched tactical units and Military Government Teams to each prefecture to ensure that policies were faithfully carried out. By mid-September, General Eichelberger's 8th Army had taken over the Tokyo Bay region and began deploying to occupy Hokkaido and the northern half of Honshu. Then General Krueger's 6th Army arrived in late September, taking southern Honshu and Shikoku, with its base in Kyoto. In December, 6th Army was relieved of its occupation duties; in January 1946, it was deactivated, leaving the 8th Army as the main garrison force. By late 1945, about 430,000 American soldiers were garrisoned across Japan. President Truman approved inviting Allied involvement on American terms, with occupation armies integrated into a US command structure. Yet with the Chinese civil war and Russia's reluctance to place its forces under MacArthur's control, only Australia, Britain, India, and New Zealand sent brigades, more than 40,000 troops in southwestern Japan. Japanese troops were gradually disarmed by order of their own commanders, so the stigma of surrender would be less keenly felt by the individual soldier. In the homeland, about 1.5 million men were discharged and returned home by the end of August. Demobilization overseas, however, proceeded, not quickly, but as a long, difficult process of repatriation. In compliance with General Order No. 1, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters disbanded on September 13 and was superseded by the Japanese War Department to manage demobilization. By November 1, the homeland had demobilized 2,228,761 personnel, roughly 97% of the Homeland Army. Yet some 6,413,215 men remained to be repatriated from overseas. On December 1, the Japanese War Ministry dissolved, and the First Demobilization Ministry took its place. The Second Demobilization Ministry was established to handle IJN demobilization, with 1,299,868 sailors, 81% of the Navy, demobilized by December 17. Japanese warships and merchant ships had their weapons rendered inoperative, and suicide craft were destroyed. Forty percent of naval vessels were allocated to evacuations in the Philippines, and 60% to evacuations of other Pacific islands. This effort eventually repatriated about 823,984 men to Japan by February 15, 1946. As repatriation accelerated, by October 15 only 1,909,401 men remained to be repatriated, most of them in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Higashikuni Cabinet and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru managed to persuade MacArthur not to impose direct military rule or martial law over all of Japan. Instead, the occupation would be indirect, guided by the Japanese government under the Emperor's direction. An early decision to feed occupation forces from American supplies, and to allow the Japanese to use their own limited food stores, helped ease a core fear: that Imperial forces would impose forced deliveries on the people they conquered. On September 17, MacArthur transferred his headquarters from Yokohama to Tokyo, setting up primary offices on the sixth floor of the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, an imposing edifice overlooking the moat and the Imperial palace grounds in Hibiya, a symbolic heart of the nation.  While the average soldier did not fit the rapacious image of wartime Japanese propagandists, occupation personnel often behaved like neo-colonial overlords. The conquerors claimed privileges unimaginable to most Japanese. Entire trains and train compartments, fitted with dining cars, were set aside for the exclusive use of occupation forces. These silenced, half-empty trains sped past crowded platforms, provoking ire as Japanese passengers were forced to enter and exit packed cars through punched-out windows, or perch on carriage roofs, couplings, and running boards, often with tragic consequences. The luxury express coaches became irresistible targets for anonymous stone-throwers. During the war, retrenchment measures had closed restaurants, cabarets, beer halls, geisha houses, and theatres in Tokyo and other large cities. Now, a vast leisure industry sprang up to cater to the needs of the foreign occupants. Reopened restaurants and theatres, along with train stations, buses, and streetcars, were sometimes kept off limits to Allied personnel, partly for security, partly to avoid burdening Japanese resources, but a costly service infrastructure was built to the occupiers' specifications. Facilities reserved for occupation troops bore large signs reading “Japanese Keep Out” or “For Allied Personnel Only.” In downtown Tokyo, important public buildings requisitioned for occupation use had separate entrances for Americans and Japanese. The effect? A subtle but clear colour bar between the predominantly white conquerors and the conquered “Asiatic” Japanese. Although MacArthur was ready to work through the Japanese government, he lacked the organizational infrastructure to administer a nation of 74 million. Consequently, on October 2, MacArthur dissolved the Military Government Section and inaugurated General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, a separate headquarters focused on civil affairs and operating in tandem with the Army high command. SCAP immediately assumed responsibility for administering the Japanese home islands. It commandeered every large building not burned down to house thousands of civilians and requisitioned vast tracts of prime real estate to quarter several hundred thousand troops in the Tokyo–Yokohama area alone. Amidst the rise of American privilege, entire buildings were refurbished as officers' clubs, replete with slot machines and gambling parlours installed at occupation expense. The Stars and Stripes were hoisted over Tokyo, while the display of the Rising Sun was banned; and the downtown area, known as “Little America,” was transformed into a US enclave. The enclave mentality of this cocooned existence was reinforced by the arrival within the first six months of roughly 700 American families. At the peak of the occupation, about 14,800 families employed some 25,000 Japanese servants to ease the “rigours” of overseas duty. Even enlisted men in the sparse quonset-hut towns around the city lived like kings compared with ordinary Japanese. Japanese workers cleaned barracks, did kitchen chores, and handled other base duties. The lowest private earned a 25% hardship bonus until these special allotments were discontinued in 1949. Most military families quickly adjusted to a pampered lifestyle that went beyond maids and “boys,” including cooks, laundresses, babysitters, gardeners, and masseuses. Perks included spacious quarters with swimming pools, central heating, hot running water, and modern plumbing. Two observers compared GHQ to the British Raj at its height. George F. Kennan, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, warned during his 1948 mission to Japan that Americans had monopolized “everything that smacks of comfort or elegance or luxury,” criticizing what he called the “American brand of philistinism” and the “monumental imperviousness” of MacArthur's staff to the Japanese suffering. This conqueror's mentality also showed in the bullying attitudes many top occupation officials displayed toward the Japanese with whom they dealt. Major Faubion Bowers, MacArthur's military secretary, later said, “I and nearly all the occupation people I knew were extremely conceited and extremely arrogant and used our power every inch of the way.” Initially, there were spasms of defiance against the occupation forces, such as anonymous stone-throwing, while armed robbery and minor assaults against occupation personnel were rife in the weeks and months after capitulation. Yet active resistance was neither widespread nor organized. The Americans successfully completed their initial deployment without violence, an astonishing feat given a heavily armed and vastly superior enemy operating on home terrain. The average citizen regarded the occupation as akin to force majeure, the unfortunate but inevitable aftermath of a natural calamity. Japan lay prostrate. Industrial output had fallen to about 10% of pre-war levels, and as late as 1946, more than 13 million remained unemployed. Nearly 40% of Japan's urban areas had been turned to rubble, and some 9 million people were homeless. The war-displaced, many of them orphans, slept in doorways and hallways, in bombed-out ruins, dugouts and packing crates, under bridges or on pavements, and crowded the hallways of train and subway stations. As winter 1945 descended, with food, fuel, and clothing scarce, people froze to death. Bonfires lit the streets to ward off the chill. "The only warm hands I have shaken thus far in Japan belonged to Americans," Mark Gayn noted in December 1945. "The Japanese do not have much of a chance to thaw out, and their hands are cold and red." Unable to afford shoes, many wore straw sandals; those with geta felt themselves privileged. The sight of a man wearing a woman's high-buttoned shoes in winter epitomized the daily struggle to stay dry and warm. Shantytowns built of scrap wood, rusted metal, and scavenged odds and ends sprang up everywhere, resembling vast junk yards. The poorest searched smouldering refuse heaps for castoffs that might be bartered for a scrap to eat or wear. Black markets (yami'ichi) run by Japanese, Koreans, and For-mosans mushroomed to replace collapsed distribution channels and cash in on inflated prices. Tokyo became "a world of scarcity in which every nail, every rag, and even a tangerine peel [had a] market value." Psychologically numbed, disoriented, and disillusioned with their leaders, demobilized veterans and civilians alike struggled to get their bearings, shed militaristic ideologies, and begin to embrace new values. In the vacuum of defeat, the Japanese people appeared ready to reject the past and grasp at the straw held out by the former enemy. Relations between occupier and occupied were not smooth, however. American troops comported themselves like conquerors, especially in the early weeks and months of occupation. Much of the violence was directed against women, with the first attacks beginning within hours after the landing of advance units. When US paratroopers landed in Sapporo, an orgy of looting, sexual violence, and drunken brawling ensued. Newspaper accounts reported 931 serious offences by GIs in the Yokohama area during the first week of occupation, including 487 armed robberies, 411 thefts of currency or goods, 9 rapes, 5 break-ins, 3 cases of assault and battery, and 16 other acts of lawlessness. In the first 10 days of occupation, there were 1,336 reported rapes by US soldiers in Kanagawa Prefecture alone. Americans were not the only perpetrators. A former prostitute recalled that when Australian troops arrived in Kure in early 1946, they “dragged young women into their jeeps, took them to the mountain, and then raped them. I heard them screaming for help nearly every night.” Such behaviour was commonplace, but news of criminal activity by occupation forces was quickly suppressed. On September 10, 1945, SCAP issued press and pre-censorship codes outlawing the publication of reports and statistics "inimical to the objectives of the occupation." In the sole instance of self-help General Eichelberger records in his memoirs, when locals formed a vigilante group and retaliated against off-duty GIs, 8th Army ordered armored vehicles into the streets and arrested the ringleaders, who received lengthy prison terms. Misbehavior ranged from black-market activity, petty theft, reckless driving, and disorderly conduct to vandalism, arson, murder, and rape. Soldiers and sailors often broke the law with impunity, and incidents of robbery, rape, and even murder were widely reported. Gang rapes and other sex atrocities were not infrequent; victims, shunned as outcasts, sometimes turned to prostitution in desperation, while others took their own lives to avoid bringing shame to their families. Military courts arrested relatively few soldiers for these offenses and convicted even fewer; Japanese attempts at self-defense were punished severely, and restitution for victims was rare. Fearing the worst, Japanese authorities had already prepared countermeasures against the supposed rapacity of foreign soldiers. Imperial troops in East Asia and the Pacific had behaved brutally toward women, so the government established “sexual comfort-stations” manned by geisha, bar hostesses, and prostitutes to “satisfy the lust of the Occupation forces,” as the Higashikuni Cabinet put it. A budget of 100 million yen was set aside for these Recreation and Amusement Associations, financed initially with public funds but run as private enterprises under police supervision. Through these, the government hoped to protect the daughters of the well-born and middle class by turning to lower-class women to satisfy the soldiers' sexual appetites. By the end of 1945, brothel operators had rounded up an estimated 20,000 young women and herded them into RAA establishments nationwide. Eventually, as many as 70,000 are said to have ended up in the state-run sex industry. Thankfully, as military discipline took hold and fresh troops replaced the Allied veterans responsible for the early crime wave, violence subsided and the occupier's patronising behavior and the ugly misdeeds of a lawless few were gradually overlooked. However, fraternisation was frowned upon by both sides, and segregation was practiced in principle, with the Japanese excluded from areas reserved for Allied personnel until September 1949, when MacArthur lifted virtually all restrictions on friendly association, stating that he was “establishing the same relations between occupation personnel and the Japanese population as exists between troops stationed in the United States and the American people.” In principle, the Occupation's administrative structure was highly complex. The Far Eastern Commission, based in Washington, included representatives from all 13 countries that had fought against Japan and was established in 1946 to formulate basic principles. The Allied Council for Japan was created in the same year to assist in developing and implementing surrender terms and in administering the country. It consisted of representatives from the USA, the USSR, Nationalist China, and the British Commonwealth. Although both bodies were active at first, they were largely ineffectual due to unwieldy decision-making, disagreements between the national delegations (especially the USA and USSR), and the obstructionism of General Douglas MacArthur. In practice, SCAP, the executive authority of the occupation, effectively ruled Japan from 1945 to 1952. And since it took orders only from the US government, the Occupation became primarily an American affair. The US occupation program, effectively carried out by SCAP, was revolutionary and rested on a two-pronged approach. To ensure Japan would never again become a menace to the United States or to world peace, SCAP pursued disarmament and demilitarization, with continuing control over Japan's capacity to make war. This involved destroying military supplies and installations, demobilizing more than five million Japanese soldiers, and thoroughly discrediting the military establishment. Accordingly, SCAP ordered the purge of tens of thousands of designated persons from public service positions, including accused war criminals, military officers, leaders of ultranationalist societies, leaders in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, business leaders tied to overseas expansion, governors of former Japanese colonies, and national leaders who had steered Japan into war. In addition, MacArthur's International Military Tribunal for the Far East established a military court in Tokyo. It had jurisdiction over those charged with Class A crimes, top leaders who had planned and directed the war. Also considered were Class B charges, covering conventional war crimes, and Class C charges, covering crimes against humanity. Yet the military court in Tokyo wouldn't be the only one. More than 5,700 lower-ranking personnel were charged with conventional war crimes in separate trials convened by Australia, China, France, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Of the 5,700 Japanese individuals indicted for Class B war crimes, 984 were sentenced to death; 475 received life sentences; 2,944 were given more limited prison terms; 1,018 were acquitted; and 279 were never brought to trial or not sentenced. Among these, many, like General Ando Rikichi and Lieutenant-General Nomi Toshio, chose to commit suicide before facing prosecution. Notable cases include Lieutenant-General Tani Hisao, who was sentenced to death by the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal for his role in the Nanjing Massacre; Lieutenant-General Sakai Takashi, who was executed in Nanjing for the murder of British and Chinese civilians during the occupation of Hong Kong. General Okamura Yasuji was convicted of war crimes by the Tribunal, yet he was immediately protected by the personal order of Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek, who kept him as a military adviser for the Kuomintang. In the Manila trials, General Yamashita Tomoyuki was sentenced to death as he was in overall command during the Sook Ching massacre, the Rape of Manila, and other atrocities. Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu was likewise executed in Manila for atrocities committed by troops under his command during the Bataan Death March. General Imamura Hitoshi was sentenced to ten years in prison, but he considered the punishment too light and even had a replica of the prison built in his garden, remaining there until his death in 1968. Lieutenant-General Kanda Masatane received a 14-year sentence for war crimes on Bougainville, though he served only four years. Lieutenant-General Adachi Hatazo was sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes in New Guinea and subsequently committed suicide on September 10, 1947. Lieutenant-General Teshima Fusataro received three years of forced labour for using a hospital ship to transport troops. Lieutenant-General Baba Masao was sentenced to death for ordering the Sandakan Death Marches, during which over 2,200 Australian and British prisoners of war perished. Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake was sentenced to death by a Dutch military tribunal for unspecified war crimes. Rear-Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu was executed in Guam for ordering the Wake Island massacre, in which 98 American civilians were murdered. Lieutenant-General Inoue Sadae was condemned to death in Guam for permitting subordinates to execute three downed American airmen captured in Palau, though his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1951 and he was released in 1953. Lieutenant-General Tachibana Yoshio was sentenced to death in Guam for his role in the Chichijima Incident, in which eight American airmen were cannibalized. By mid-1945, due to the Allied naval blockade, the 25,000 Japanese troops on Chichijima had run low on supplies. However, although the daily rice ration had been reduced from 400 grams per person per day to 240 grams, the troops were not at risk of starvation. In February and March 1945, in what would later be called the Chichijima incident, Tachibana Yoshio's senior staff turned to cannibalism. Nine American airmen had escaped from their planes after being shot down during bombing raids on Chichijima, eight of whom were captured. The ninth, the only one to evade capture, was future US President George H. W. Bush, then a 20-year-old pilot. Over several months, the prisoners were executed, and reportedly by the order of Major Matoba Sueyo, their bodies were butchered by the division's medical orderlies, with the livers and other organs consumed by the senior staff, including Matoba's superior Tachibana. In the Yokohama War Crimes Trials, Lieutenant-Generals Inada Masazumi and Yokoyama Isamu were convicted for their complicity in vivisection and other human medical experiments performed at Kyushu Imperial University on downed Allied airmen. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, which began in May 1946 and lasted two and a half years, resulted in the execution by hanging of Generals Doihara Kenji and Itagaki Seishiro, and former Prime Ministers Hirota Koki and Tojo Hideki, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, specifically for the escalation of the Pacific War and for permitting the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war. Also sentenced to death were Lieutenant-General Muto Akira for his role in the Nanjing and Manila massacres; General Kimura Heitaro for planning the war strategy in China and Southeast Asia and for laxity in preventing atrocities against prisoners of war in Burma; and General Matsui Iwane for his involvement in the Rape of Nanjing. The seven defendants who were sentenced to death were executed at Sugamo Prison in Ikebukuro on December 23, 1948. Sixteen others were sentenced to life imprisonment, including the last Field Marshal Hata Shunroku, Generals Araki Sadao, Minami Hiro, and Umezu Shojiro, Admiral Shimada Shigetaro, former Prime Ministers Hiranuma Kiichiro and Koiso Kuniaki, Marquis Kido Koichi, and Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro, a major instigator of the second Sino-Japanese War. Additionally, former Foreign Ministers Togo Shigenori and Shigemitsu Mamoru received seven- and twenty-year sentences, respectively. The Soviet Union and Chinese Communist forces also held trials of Japanese war criminals, including the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials, which tried and found guilty some members of Japan's bacteriological and chemical warfare unit known as Unit 731. However, those who surrendered to the Americans were never brought to trial, as MacArthur granted immunity to Lieutenant-General Ishii Shiro and all members of the bacteriological research units in exchange for germ-w warfare data derived from human experimentation. If you would like to learn more about what I like to call Japan's Operation Paper clip, whereupon the US grabbed many scientists from Unit 731, check out my exclusive podcast. The SCAP-turn to democratization began with the drafting of a new constitution in 1947, addressing Japan's enduring feudal social structure. In the charter, sovereignty was vested in the people, and the emperor was designated a “symbol of the state and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people in whom resides sovereign power.” Because the emperor now possessed fewer powers than European constitutional monarchs, some have gone so far as to say that Japan became “a republic in fact if not in name.” Yet the retention of the emperor was, in fact, a compromise that suited both those who wanted to preserve the essence of the nation for stability and those who demanded that the emperor system, though not necessarily the emperor, should be expunged. In line with the democratic spirit of the new constitution, the peerage was abolished and the two-chamber Diet, to which the cabinet was now responsible, became the highest organ of state. The judiciary was made independent and local autonomy was granted in vital areas of jurisdiction such as education and the police. Moreover, the constitution stipulated that “the people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights,” that they “shall be respected as individuals,” and that “their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall … be the supreme consideration in legislation.” Its 29 articles guaranteed basic human rights: equality, freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin, freedom of thought and freedom of religion. Finally, in its most controversial section, Article 9, the “peace clause,” Japan “renounce[d] war as a sovereign right of the nation” and vowed not to maintain any military forces and “other war potential.” To instill a thoroughly democratic ethos, reforms touched every facet of society. The dissolution of the zaibatsu decentralised economic power; the 1945 Labour Union Law and the 1946 Labour Relations Act guaranteed workers the right to collective action; the 1947 Labour Standards Law established basic working standards for men and women; and the revised Civil Code of 1948 abolished the patriarchal household and enshrined sexual equality. Reflecting core American principles, SCAP introduced a 6-3-3 schooling system, six years of compulsory elementary education, three years of junior high, and an optional three years of senior high, along with the aim of secular, locally controlled education. More crucially, ideological reform followed: censorship of feudal material in media, revision of textbooks, and prohibition of ideas glorifying war, dying for the emperor, or venerating war heroes. With women enfranchised and young people shaped to counter militarism and ultranationalism, rural Japan was transformed to undermine lingering class divisions. The land reform program provided for the purchase of all land held by absentee landlords, allowed resident landlords and owner-farmers to retain a set amount of land, and required that the remaining land be sold to the government so it could be offered to existing tenants. In 1948, amid the intensifying tensions of the Cold War that would soon culminate in the Korean War, the occupation's focus shifted from demilitarization and democratization toward economic rehabilitation and, ultimately, the remilitarization of Japan, an shift now known as the “Reverse Course.” The country was thus rebuilt as the Pacific region's primary bulwark against the spread of Communism. An Economic Stabilisation Programme was introduced, including a five-year plan to coordinate production and target capital through the Reconstruction Finance Bank. In 1949, the anti-inflationary Dodge Plan was adopted, advocating balanced budgets, fixing the exchange rate at 360 yen to the dollar, and ending broad government intervention. Additionally, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was formed and supported the formation of conglomerates centered around banks, which encouraged the reemergence of a somewhat weakened set of zaibatsu, including Mitsui and Mitsubishi. By the end of the Occupation era, Japan was on the verge of surpassing its 1934–1936 levels of economic growth. Equally important was Japan's rearmament in alignment with American foreign policy: a National Police Reserve of about 75,000 was created with the outbreak of the Korean War; by 1952 it had expanded to 110,000 and was renamed the Self-Defense Force after the inclusion of an air force. However, the Reverse Course also facilitated the reestablishment of conservative politics and the rollback of gains made by women and the reforms of local autonomy and education. As the Occupation progressed, the Americans permitted greater Japanese initiative, and power gradually shifted from the reformers to the moderates. By 1949, the purge of the right came under review, and many who had been condemned began returning to influence, if not to the Diet, then to behind-the-scenes power. At the same time, Japanese authorities, with MacArthur's support, began purging left-wing activists. In June 1950, for example, the central office of the Japan Communist Party and the editorial board of The Red Flag were purged. The gains made by women also seemed to be reversed. Women were elected to 8% of available seats in the first lower-house election in 1946, but to only 2% in 1952, a trend not reversed until the so-called Madonna Boom of the 1980s. Although the number of women voting continued to rise, female politicisation remained more superficial than might be imagined. Women's employment also appeared little affected by labour legislation: though women formed nearly 40% of the labor force in 1952, they earned only 45% as much as men. Indeed, women's attitudes toward labor were influenced less by the new ethos of fulfilling individual potential than by traditional views of family and workplace responsibilities. In the areas of local autonomy and education, substantial modifications were made to the reforms. Because local authorities lacked sufficient power to tax, they were unable to realise their extensive powers, and, as a result, key responsibilities were transferred back to national jurisdiction. In 1951, for example, 90% of villages and towns placed their police forces under the control of the newly formed National Police Agency. Central control over education was also gradually reasserted; in 1951, the Yoshida government attempted to reintroduce ethics classes, proposed tighter central oversight of textbooks, and recommended abolishing local school board elections. By the end of the decade, all these changes had been implemented. The Soviet occupation of the Kurile Islands and the Habomai Islets was completed with Russian troops fully deployed by September 5. Immediately after the onset of the occupation, amid a climate of insecurity and fear marked by reports of sporadic rape and physical assault and widespread looting by occupying troops, an estimated 4,000 islanders fled to Hokkaido rather than face an uncertain repatriation. As Soviet forces moved in, they seized or destroyed telephone and telegraph installations and halted ship movements into and out of the islands, leaving residents without adequate food and other winter provisions. Yet, unlike Manchuria, where Japanese civilians faced widespread sexual violence and pillage, systematic violence against the civilian population on the Kuriles appears to have been exceptional. A series of military government proclamations assured islanders of safety so long as they did not resist Soviet rule and carried on normally; however, these orders also prohibited activities not explicitly authorized by the Red Army, which imposed many hardships on civilians. Residents endured harsh conditions under Soviet rule until late 1948, when Japanese repatriation out of the Kurils was completed. The Kuriles posed a special diplomatic problem, as the occupation of the southernmost islands—the Northern Territories—ignited a long-standing dispute between Tokyo and Moscow that continues to impede the normalisation of relations today. Although the Kuriles were promised to the Soviet Union in the Yalta agreement, Japan and the United States argued that this did not apply to the Northern Territories, since they were not part of the Kurile Islands. A substantial dispute regarding the status of the Kurile Islands arose between the United States and the Soviet Union during the preparation of the Treaty of San Francisco, which was intended as a permanent peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers of World War II. The treaty was ultimately signed by 49 nations in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and came into force on April 28, 1952. It ended Japan's role as an imperial power, allocated compensation to Allied nations and former prisoners of war who had suffered Japanese war crimes, ended the Allied post-war occupation of Japan, and returned full sovereignty to Japan. Effectively, the document officially renounced Japan's treaty rights derived from the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and its rights to Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands, the Spratly Islands, Antarctica, and South Sakhalin. Japan's South Seas Mandate, namely the Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, and Caroline Islands, had already been formally revoked by the United Nations on July 18, 1947, making the United States responsible for administration of those islands under a UN trusteeship agreement that established the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In turn, the Bonin, Volcano, and Ryukyu Islands were progressively restored to Japan between 1953 and 1972, along with the Senkaku Islands, which were disputed by both Communist and Nationalist China. In addition, alongside the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan and the United States signed a Security Treaty that established a long-lasting military alliance between them. Although Japan renounced its rights to the Kuriles, the U.S. State Department later clarified that “the Habomai Islands and Shikotan ... are properly part of Hokkaido and that Japan is entitled to sovereignty over them,” hence why the Soviets refused to sign the treaty. Britain and the United States agreed that territorial rights would not be granted to nations that did not sign the Treaty of San Francisco, and as a result the Kurile Islands were not formally recognized as Soviet territory. A separate peace treaty, the Treaty of Taipei (formally the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty), was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952 between Japan and the Kuomintang, and on June 9 of that year the Treaty of Peace Between Japan and India followed. Finally, Japan and the Soviet Union ended their formal state of war with the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, though this did not settle the Kurile Islands dispute. Even after these formal steps, Japan as a nation was not in a formal state of war, and many Japanese continued to believe the war was ongoing; those who held out after the surrender came to be known as Japanese holdouts.  Captain Oba Sakae and his medical company participated in the Saipan campaign beginning on July 7, 1944, and took part in what would become the largest banzai charge of the Pacific War. After 15 hours of intense hand-to-hand combat, almost 4,300 Japanese soldiers were dead, and Oba and his men were presumed among them. In reality, however, he survived the battle and gradually assumed command of over a hundred additional soldiers. Only five men from his original unit survived the battle, two of whom died in the following months. Oba then led over 200 Japanese civilians deeper into the jungles to evade capture, organizing them into mountain caves and hidden jungle villages. When the soldiers were not assisting the civilians with survival tasks, Oba and his men continued their battle against the garrison of US Marines. He used the 1,552‑ft Mount Tapochau as their primary base, which offered an unobstructed 360-degree view of the island. From their base camp on the western slope of the mountain, Oba and his men occasionally conducted guerrilla-style raids on American positions. Due to the speed and stealth of these operations, and the Marines' frustrated attempts to find him, the Saipan Marines eventually referred to Oba as “The Fox.” Oba and his men held out on the island for 512 days, or about 16 months. On November 27, 1945, former Major-General Amo Umahachi was able to draw out some of the Japanese in hiding by singing the anthem of the Japanese infantry branch. Amo was then able to present documents from the defunct IGHQ to Oba ordering him and his 46 remaining men to surrender themselves to the Americans. On December 1, the Japanese soldiers gathered on Tapochau and sang a song of departure to the spirits of the war dead; Oba led his people out of the jungle and they presented themselves to the Marines of the 18th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company. With great formality and commensurate dignity, Oba surrendered his sword to Lieutenant Colonel Howard G. Kirgis, and his men surrendered their arms and colors. On January 2, 1946, 20 Japanese soldiers hiding in a tunnel at Corregidor Island surrendered after learning the war had ended from a newspaper found while collecting water. In that same month, 120 Japanese were routed after a battle in the mountains 150 miles south of Manila. In April, during a seven-week campaign to clear Lubang Island, 41 more Japanese emerged from the jungle, unaware that the war had ended; however, a group of four Japanese continued to resist. In early 1947, Lieutenant Yamaguchi Ei and his band of 33 soldiers renewed fighting with the small Marine garrison on Peleliu, prompting reinforcements under Rear-Admiral Charles Pownall to be brought to the island to hunt down the guerrilla group. Along with them came former Rear-Admiral Sumikawa Michio, who ultimately convinced Yamaguchi to surrender in April after almost three years of guerrilla warfare. Also in April, seven Japanese emerged from Palawan Island and fifteen armed stragglers emerged from Luzon. In January 1948, 200 troops surrendered on Mindanao; and on May 12, the Associated Press reported that two unnamed Japanese soldiers had surrendered to civilian policemen in Guam the day before. On January 6, 1949, two former IJN soldiers, machine gunners Matsudo Rikio and Yamakage Kufuku, were discovered on Iwo Jima and surrendered peacefully. In March 1950, Private Akatsu Yūichi surrendered in the village of Looc, leaving only three Japanese still resisting on Lubang. By 1951 a group of Japanese on Anatahan Island refused to believe that the war was over and resisted every attempt by the Navy to remove them. This group was first discovered in February 1945, when several Chamorros from Saipan were sent to the island to recover the bodies of a Saipan-based B-29. The Chamorros reported that there were about thirty Japanese survivors from three ships sunk in June 1944, one of which was an Okinawan woman. Personal aggravations developed from the close confines of a small group on a small island and from tuba drinking; among the holdouts, 6 of 11 deaths were the result of violence, and one man displayed 13 knife wounds. The presence of only one woman, Higa Kazuko, caused considerable difficulty as she would transfer her affections among at least four men after each of them mysteriously disappeared, purportedly “swallowed by the waves while fishing.” According to the more sensational versions of the Anatahan tale, 11 of the 30 navy sailors stranded on the island died due to violent struggles over her affections. In July 1950, Higa went to the beach when an American vessel appeared offshore and finally asked to be removed from the island. She was taken to Saipan aboard the Miss Susie and, upon arrival, told authorities that the men on the island did not believe the war was over. As the Japanese government showed interest in the situation on Anatahan, the families of the holdouts were contacted in Japan and urged by the Navy to write letters stating that the war was over and that the holdouts should surrender. The letters were dropped by air on June 26 and ultimately convinced the holdouts to give themselves up. Thus, six years after the end of World War II, “Operation Removal” commenced from Saipan under the command of Lt. Commander James B. Johnson, USNR, aboard the Navy Tug USS Cocopa. Johnson and an interpreter went ashore by rubber boat and formally accepted the surrender on the morning of June 30, 1951. The Anatahan femme fatale story later inspired the 1953 Japanese film Anatahan and the 1998 novel Cage on the Sea. In 1953, Murata Susumu, the last holdout on Tinian, was finally captured. The next year, on May 7, Corporal Sumada Shoichi was killed in a clash with Filipino soldiers, leaving only two Japanese still resisting on Lubang. In November 1955, Seaman Kinoshita Noboru was captured in the Luzon jungle but soon after committed suicide rather than “return to Japan in defeat.” That same year, four Japanese airmen surrendered at Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea; and in 1956, nine soldiers were located and sent home from Morotai, while four men surrendered on Mindoro. In May 1960, Sergeant Ito Masashi became one of the last Japanese to surrender at Guam after the capture of his comrade Private Minagawa Bunzo, but the final surrender at Guam would come later with Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi. Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi survived in the jungles of Guam by living for years in an elaborately dug hole, subsisting on snails and lizards, a fate that, while undignified, showcased his ingenuity and resilience and earned him a warm welcome on his return to Japan. His capture was not heroic in the traditional sense: he was found half-starving by a group of villagers while foraging for shrimp in a stream, and the broader context included his awareness as early as 1952 that the war had ended. He explained that the wartime bushido code, emphasizing self-sacrifice or suicide rather than self-preservation, had left him fearing that repatriation would label him a deserter and likely lead to execution. Emerging from the jungle, Yokoi also became a vocal critic of Japan's wartime leadership, including Emperor Hirohito, which fits a view of him as a product of, and a prisoner within, his own education, military training, and the censorship and propaganda of the era. When asked by a young nephew how he survived so long on an island just a short distance from a major American airbase, he replied simply, “I was really good at hide and seek.”  That same year, Private Kozuka Kinshichi was killed in a shootout with Philippine police in October, leaving Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo still resisting on Lubang. Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo had been on Lubang since 1944, a few months before the Americans retook the Philippines. The last instructions he had received from his immediate superior ordered him to retreat to the interior of the island and harass the Allied occupying forces until the IJA eventually returned. Despite efforts by the Philippine Army, letters and newspapers left for him, radio broadcasts, and even a plea from Onoda's brother, he did not believe the war was over. On February 20, 1974, Onoda encountered a young Japanese university dropout named Suzuki Norio, who was traveling the world and had told friends that he planned to “look for Lieutenant Onoda, a panda, and the abominable snowman, in that order.” The two became friends, but Onoda stated that he was waiting for orders from one of his commanders. On March 9, 1974, Onoda went to an agreed-upon place and found a note left by Suzuki. Suzuki had brought along Onoda's former commander, Major Taniguchi, who delivered the oral orders for Onoda to surrender. Intelligence Officer 2nd Lt. Onoda Hiroo thus emerged from Lubang's jungle with his .25 caliber rifle, 500 rounds of ammunition, and several hand grenades. He surrendered 29 years after Japan's formal surrender, and 15 years after being declared legally dead in Japan. When he accepted that the war was over, he wept openly. He received a hero's welcome upon his return to Japan in 1974. The Japanese government offered him a large sum of money in back pay, which he refused. When money was pressed on him by well-wishers, he donated it to Yasukuni Shrine. Onoda was reportedly unhappy with the attention and what he saw as the withering of traditional Japanese values. He wrote No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War, a best-selling autobiography published in 1974. Yet the last Japanese to surrender would be Private Nakamura Teruo, an Amis aborigine from Formosa and a member of the Takasago Volunteers. Private Nakamura Teruo spent the tail end of World War II with a dwindling band on Morotai, repeatedly dispersing and reassembling in the jungle as they hunted for food. The group suffered continuous losses to starvation and disease, and survivors described Nakamura as highly self-sufficient. He left to live alone somewhere in the Morotai highlands between 1946 and 1947, rejoined the main group in 1950, and then disappeared again a few years later. Nakamura hinted in print that he fled into the jungle because he feared the other holdouts might murder him. He survives for decades beyond the war, eventually being found by 11 Indonesian soldiers. The emergence of an indigenous Taiwanese soldier among the search party embarrassed Japan as it sought to move past its imperial past. Many Japanese felt Nakamura deserved compensation for decades of loyalty, only to learn that his back pay for three decades of service amounted to 68,000 yen.   Nakamura's experience of peace was complex. When a journalist asked how he felt about “wasting” three decades of his life on Morotai, he replied that the years had not been wasted; he had been serving his country. Yet the country he returned to was Taiwan, and upon disembarking in Taipei in early January 1975, he learned that his wife had a son he had never met and that she had remarried a decade after his official death. Nakamura eventually lived with a daughter, and his story concluded with a bittersweet note when his wife reconsidered and reconciled with him. Several Japanese soldiers joined local Communist and insurgent groups after the war to avoid surrender. Notably, in 1956 and 1958, two soldiers returned to Japan after service in China's People's Liberation Army. Two others who defected with a larger group to the Malayan Communist Party around 1945 laid down their arms in 1989 and repatriated the next year, becoming among the last to return home. That is all for today, but fear not I will provide a few more goodies over the next few weeks. I will be releasing some of my exclusive podcast episodes from my youtube membership and patreon that are about pacific war subjects. Like I promised the first one will be on why Emperor Hirohito surrendered. Until then if you need your fix you know where to find me: eastern front week by week, fall and rise of china, echoes of war or on my Youtube membership of patreon at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.

武蔵野陵を参拝された秋篠宮家の長男悠仁さま、９日午前、東京都八王子市秋篠宮家の長男悠仁さまは９日、成年式を終えたことの報告のため、東京都八王子市の武蔵陵墓地を訪れ、昭和天皇の武蔵野陵などを参拝された。 Japan's Prince Hisahito visited the mausoleum of Emperor Hirohito, posthumously known as Emperor Showa, in a western Tokyo suburb on Tuesday to report the completion of his coming-of-age ceremony.

Japan's Prince Hisahito visited the mausoleum of Emperor Hirohito, posthumously known as Emperor Showa, in a western Tokyo suburb on Tuesday to report the completion of his coming-of-age ceremony.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Lake Tai. In November 1937, as Japanese forces advanced, Nanjing's fate hung in the balance. Commander Tang Shengzhi led the desperate defense amidst disarray among Chinese generals, many advocating retreat. Despite political strife, civilians rallied, fortifying the city, knowing its fall could destroy Chiang Kai-Shek's government. On November 19, Japanese Commander Yanagawa seized the moment, directing his troops towards Nanjing, igniting panic in Tokyo.  As fierce battles erupted around Lake Tai, the Chinese forces, though outmatched in technology, employed guerilla tactics and stubborn resistance. Chinese artillery delivered devastating blows, and bold counterattacks kept Japanese momentum in check. However, as the month closed, the tide turned, logistical challenges and internal chaos hampered communication. The stage was set for one of the darkest chapters of modern Chinese history, where the battle for Nanjing would symbolize the struggle against oppression.   #165 Nanjing Surrounded Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. On December 1st, Jiangyin fell. That same day Japanese Army General Staff Deputy Chief Tada Hayao arrived to the Shanghai region to conduct an inspection of the front lines and personally deliver Tokyo's orders authorizing an assault upon Nanjing. The directive was exceptionally brief: “The Central China Area Army is to attack Nanjing in coordination with the Navy.”  Later that same day, at 7:00 pm more detailed instructions were issued by the Central China Area Army. The 10th Army was set to begin its decisive assault on Nanjing on December 3, advancing along two primary routes toward the capital. The left flank was to advance through Wuhu, while the right flank would move via the city of Lishui. The Shanghai Expeditionary Force, having endured more strain than the 10th Army due to its longer tenure at the front, was scheduled to launch its attack two days later, concentrating its forces around Danyang and Jurong. On December 2nd, Matsui received a promotion, given overall command of the Central China Area Army. The responsibility for the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was entrusted to a recent appointee in the Shanghai theater, Prince Asaka Yasuhiko, a member of the Imperial family. As Matsui noted in his diary that day "It's a great honor”. He promptly issued orders to ensure the prince's comfort and safety by all available means. At the age of 55, Prince Asaka, Emperor Hirohito's uncle, boasted a successful military background, including a tenure at the Japanese embassy in Paris. However, this experience had left its mark on him in two significant ways: he walked with a limp due to a car accident in France and spoke French fluently. Despite his talents and efforts, he did not earn the highest regard from Hirohito. He had not demonstrated the loyalty expected of him during the February 26th Coup attempt in 1936 and had since been met with a cold shoulder from the emperor Command in China presented a crucial opportunity for him to restore his standing in the eyes of Hirohito. Meanwhile over in the capital a war for air supremacy raged. More and more soviet pilots were arriving alongside their Polikarpov I-16 fighters. Exhausted from the long distance travel to Nanjing, the Soviet pilots were given no respite and tossed into the fray, performing 5 sorties in their first day. The Soviets were kept very busy as the Japanese increasingly unleashed raids against the airfields in the Nanjing region. The raids became so intense, the Chinese had to relocate their aircraft to bases hundreds of miles behind the front. While the Polikarpov I-16's were severely hampering the Japanese, suddenly a new adversary emerged. The Mitsubishi A5M fighter, still a prototype was rushed into service to help escort the bombers. This was the predecessor to the legendary A6M Zero fighter. Like I mentioned previously I wrote the Kings and Generals episode on the A6M Zero Fighter's history and over at my patreon I have a hour long podcast on it. Needless to say the A5M changed everything in the theater, taking away the advantage the Soviet fighters had wielded for a brief window of time.  At 9:00 am on December 2, a small customs cruiser waving a swastika flag docked at the Nanjing waterfront after making an overnight journey down the Yangtze River from Wuhan. German Ambassador Oskar Trautmann quickly disembarked, accompanied by embassy councilor Heinz Lautenschlager and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xu Mo. Trautmann's mission was so secretive that although he had dined with a secretary from the Italian embassy, an Axis partner just hours before departing from Wuhan, he made no mention of his impending trip.  Despite the secrecy surrounding his visit, news of Trautmann's arrival in Nanjing spread rapidly within the German community. Businessman John Rabe, noted in his diary that day “I assume his return has something to do with Germany's attempt to act as a mediator”. Just before Trautmann's arrival, Chiang Kai-shek had a meeting with his closest advisers, primarily military generals. Vice Foreign Minister Xu briefed those present on the peace conditions proposed by the Japanese nearly a month prior. Many in attendance were hearing these terms for the first time and were startled to discover that Japan did not require reductions in Chinese armaments. Bai Chongxi was the first to speak “If these are the only terms, then why should there be war?” Given that the Japanese proposal seemed to allow for the continuity of the Kuomintang led Chinese nation, the generals present, including Tang Shengzhi, agreed to use it as a basis for negotiations. Later, at 5:00 pm Chiang met with Trautmann. The German diplomat said “I believe it is necessary for China to declare its willingness to discuss the Japanese terms in a conciliatory spirit.” Chiang replied, “I intend to do so, but I also expect the same from Japan.” Chiang then explained that they needed to be addressed for peace talks with Japan to proceed, explicitly stating that he would not accept Japanese control over northern China and that he was unwilling to sacrifice his recent friendship with the Soviet Union to achieve peace with Japan. Having secured Chiang's agreement to initiate talks with Japan, Trautmann promptly returned to the German embassy to report to his superiors in Berlin. He then headed back to the docks, boarding the same vessel that had brought him to Nanjing, traveling back up the dark Yangtze River. One particular concern weighed heavily on Trautmann's mind: a request from Chiang to maintain absolute secrecy regarding the upcoming Sino-Japanese negotiations. Trautmann believed that Germany should support this request. He was convinced that if news leaked about Chiang's willingness to engage with the despised Japanese, it could spell the end of his government in China, allowing the Soviets to take charge. At this time, both the Germans and Japanese feared fragmenting China further. Both wanted the Kuomintang to remain in charge and maintain the status quo as they benefitted from it greatly. Staff officer Kawabe Torashiro after a recent tour of the front lines had this to say, “To dismantle the Chiang regime would leave it in a dire situation, giving it the desperate tenacity of a cornered rat in its struggle against Japan. Whether we destroy it or not, we would ultimately contribute to a fragmented China for many years, one that would be a significant drain on the Empire's resources well into the future.” Meanwhile, the city of Changzhou fell on December 2nd, without any resistance. Private Azuma Shiro landed at Changzhou and was ordered alongside his 20th regiment to prepare an assault upon Danyang,  a walled city located about 25 miles northwest of Changzhou. The road between the two locations was nearly straight, running parallel to the railway connecting Shanghai and Nanjing, allowing the 20th Regiment to make swift progress. Upon arriving at Danyang, Azuma's platoon cautiously approached a bamboo grove concealing a Chinese position. Suddenly, a ZB vz 26 machine gun opened fire. Taking cover, the Japanese soldiers entered a nearby cemetery, where the small grave mounds offered some protection. The platoon's knee mortars responded, firing shells that silenced the machine gun. Seizing the opportunity, they launched their assault, swords raised and bayonets fixed, shouting at the top of their lungs. As they closed the distance to the bamboo grove, the machine gun sliced them down. When they finally reached the trench, they discovered it was already abandoned; the occupants had fled mere moments before. Danyang also fell on December 2, clearing one of the significant obstacles in the 16th Division's path to Jurong. Meanwhile to the south, the 9th Division was advancing from Tianwangsi towards Chunhua village, just miles from the capital, while elements of the 3rd Division were also making significant headway. At the northern end of the front, the Amaya Detachment was approaching the Yangtze port city of Zhenjiang, preparing to cross the river and sweep west along the opposite bank. As Matsui noted in his diary that day “The enemy's entire defensive line has been breached, and their morale has declined sharply. I believe there won't be much fight left in them moving forward”. Although the Shanghai Expeditionary Force had yet to launch its final assault on the capital, the soldiers were managing to advance at an impressive pace. Matsui noted in his diary on December 4th “I plan for an orderly occupation of Nanjing. Before entering the city, we must offer Chiang Kai-shek or the garrison commander the opportunity to surrender. While occupying Nanjing, I hope we can avoid unnecessary damage to the city and harm to the population.” Over in Nanjing, Henri Johan Diederick de Fremery, a Dutch officer serving as an advisor to the Chinese army, had assessed the city's fortifications prior to the war and found them lacking. He noted that coastal batteries had been installed to the north and northeast of the city, including outdated muzzle-loaders. In his report he stated  “They might serve against warship attacks, but who would think of attacking this city with warships?” Although some artillery pieces were positioned along the city wall, they were insufficient in number. Some locations were poorly constructed due to material shortages. For instance, a portion of the wall between Sun Yat-sen Gate and the Gate of Enlightenment had been reinforced with makeshift structures, concrete on the outside and a fragile network of bamboo within. It was a façade that would collapse upon the impact of the first Japanese shell. Natural obstacles like Purple Mountain to the east and the Yuhuatai hills to the south existed, but little was done to incorporate these features into the defensive network. The river, which served as a natural moat, became shallower on the eastern side, allowing for relatively easy crossing. As further noted by de Fremery “Nanking cannot be justifiably termed a heavily defended city”. Meanwhile the Chinese Army was engaged in a frantic effort to prepare for the anticipated Japanese onslaught. Engineers readied to demolish strategic bridges, and in many cases, entire villages were set ablaze, blackening the horizon with thick smoke. Heart-wrenching scenes unfolded as farmers were evicted from homes that had been in their families for generations.  By the end of the first week of winter, distant bombings echoed through the air, with explosions powerful enough to rattle windows within the city. The front lines were alarmingly close, leading to a steady influx of injured Chinese soldiers into Nanjing on foot. A pervasive sense of foreboding enveloped the city. Amidst the gloom, there lingered a belief that despite impending challenges, life would somehow continue. On the morning of December 3, a ship departed from Nanjing, loaded with treasures that represented three millennia of Chinese history. Thousands of crates filled with irreplaceable bronzes, porcelain, paintings, and other art objects were sent upriver. These invaluable items had been moved from Beijing four years earlier and stored in vaults in Nanjing. It was evident that the situation could deteriorate rapidly, leaving little time to respond. On December 5, all US citizens in Nanjing were urged to pack their essential belongings and be prepared to leave the city on short notice. The following day, a final order was issued: all American passport holders were directed to make their way to the Yangtze docks and board a river gunboat awaiting them, the USS Panay. As the Japanese Army advanced westward toward Nanjing, it left behind a horrifying trail of arson, rape, and murder. Helpless civilians who fell into the hands of the victorious soldiers endured brutal treatment that often defied comprehension. Now similar to other episodes I have done on my own channel or Pacific War Week by Week, this is a disclaimer, I am about to talk about some gut wrenching horrifying stuff. We are reaching Nanjing, and yes the infamous massacre is going to be told to the fullest. So warning, its about to get graphic. At the hamlet of Nanqiantou 38 residents were met with atrocities that would become more and more common. The Japanese Army set fire to the twelve homes that comprised the hamlet, forcing the captives to witness the destruction. When some of the residents attempted to escape and salvage their belongings, the soldiers trapped them inside, locking the doors and sealing their fate as the roofs collapsed in flames. Among the victims, two women, one of whom was pregnant, were subjected to repeated rapes. In a particularly gruesome act, the soldiers “cut open the belly of the pregnant woman and gouged out the fetus.” Amid the chaos, a 2 year old boy cried out, and a soldier seized him from his mother's arms, throwing him into the flames. The frantic mother was bayoneted and discarded into a nearby creek. The remaining captives met a similar fate, dragged to the water's edge, stabbed, and pushed into the stream. The 170 miles between Shanghai and Nanjing transformed into a nightmarish wasteland of death and destruction. For miles, the only living beings visible were the deceased. The reputation of the Japanese soldiers preceded them, leading many Chinese civilians to prefer a swift death at their own hands rather than the prospect of a slow demise at the hands of the Japanese. While passing through the town of Pinghu on their way to Nanjing, First Lieutenant Nishizawa Benkichi and his men from the 114th Division spotted two Chinese girls across a river. They appeared to be strolling hand in hand, possibly sisters. As they stepped onto a bridge, the girls began to walk towards the Japanese soldiers but suddenly stopped. Still clasping hands, they jumped into the river, disappearing into the swift current. Military efficiency was accompanied by a staggering brutality, where victories against armed opponents were often followed by the massacre of unarmed women and children. This pattern parallels the incomprehensible behavior of German soldiers on the Eastern Front, though there are significant differences. The Germans viewed themselves as a superior race compared to their Slavic adversaries, labeling them as "untermensch." In contrast, the Japanese could not deny their connections to the Chinese. Japan's historical role as a major influence on Chinese civilization was undeniable, as reflected in aspects as basic as the shared writing system. To many Japanese, their nation's relationship with China resembled that of two brothers, one younger and righteous, the other older and misguided, in need of redemption. Matsui Iwane embodied this perspective. Alongside his military duties, he held a deep interest in fostering cooperation among the peoples of Asia, who he believed remained under the yoke of Western imperialism. Since his youth, Matsui had been captivated by China, and while other ambitious officers sought postings in Western capitals like Paris or London, he applied to serve in China, remaining there for nearly a decade as part of Japan's diplomatic representation. By the 1930s, Matsui's commitment to this pan-Asian vision had gained a political dimension, leading him to become a prominent founder of the Greater Asia Association in 1933. This of course was created mostly through the work of Kanji Ishiwara. What was once a exclusive on my patreon can be found over at Echoes of War or my youtube channel, its a four part series on the life of Ishiwara and it goes into the history of how he tried to forge pan asianism, but ultimately failed against his adversaries like Hideki Tojo. Its fascinating stuff, please if you are interested check it out on youtube and comment where you came from.  This organization, though dominated by Japan, has been described as "probably the single most influential organization propagating Pan-Asianism during the 15 year war. During a visit to China in late 1935, Matsui helped establish the Chinese Greater Asia Association in the northern port city of Tianjin. For individuals like Matsui, Japan's actions on the Asian mainland were akin to liberating its peoples. They viewed the establishment of the Japanese-controlled puppet state, Manchukuo, in northeast China in 1932, as a bold experiment in nation-building, hoping the rest of China would benefit similarly. As Matsui wrote in 1933 “Next, we must also extend to the 400 million people of China the same help and deep sympathy that we provided to Manchuria, relieving them of their miserable condition of political, economic, and intellectual subjugation by various countries of the world.” The violence perpetrated by the Japanese Army stemmed from numerous variables. One was a grotesque belief they were actually liberators to what they deemed, ungrateful Chinese. The Japanese believed their presence in China was partly for the benefit of the Chinese people and felt a messianic obligation to save them. This led to frustration akin to that of a father confronting a disobedient son, compelling them to punish what they perceived as disobedience. While the rank-and-file soldiers might not have reflected deeply on these issues, such philosophies filtered down from their leaders. Of course there is a lot more to it, and sorry again for shamelessly plugging it, but on my patreon I specifically did an episode titled “why the Japanese army was so brutal” where I went through everything involved. It ran from cultural issues, to the brutal system of abuse in the military, to racism, radicalization of male youth in Japan, its a very complicated matter. Because again, most of the atrocities were committed by 20-30 year old grunts who had families back home. This was not like the traditional “I was following orders” type of situation, these were atrocities committed by the lowest ranks upwards.  The safety zone, created by Rabe and a handful of other foreigners, began to take shape in the first week of December. It was officially announced, and four committees were established to manage food, housing, finances, and sanitation. Once the plans for the zone were publicized in local newspapers, scared Chinese civilians flocked to it by the hundreds. From its inception, the zone faced numerous problems. Thousands of bags of rice and flour intended for the future residents of the zone were left unguarded and quickly looted, leading many to assume they had been stolen by military personnel. More troubling were the issues that arose when Chinese military units began digging trenches and setting up field telephones within the safety zone, putting it at heightened risk of a Japanese attack. Chinese officers assured organizers that they would vacate the area, but the delay led to growing frustration among those overseeing the zone. Until all Chinese soldiers withdrew, the organizers could not erect flags to formally designate the area as demilitarized. Although the Japanese refused to officially recognize the safety zone, they pledged to respect it.    Following the outbreak of the battle for Shanghai, the Chinese Red Cross stepped in where military medicine had faltered, establishing first-aid teams and emergency hospitals while ensuring that wounded soldiers were accommodated in existing medical facilities. In October, they opened a 3,000-bed hospital on the campus of the National Central University, staffed by 300 doctors, nurses, and 400 orderlies. By the end of October, the hospital had admitted 1,200 patients and performed over 50 operations daily, primarily amputations. However, as the Japanese forces advanced toward Nanjing, doctors and nurses were evacuated westward along the Yangtze River. The entire Red Cross hospital was dismantled, and at the American Mission Hospital, the staff, which had initially numbered nearly 200 doctors, nurses, and trained personnel, dwindled to just 11 by the onset of winter.  With medical facilities on the brink of collapse, a group of foreigners took the initiative to improve conditions, achieving small victories along the way.  Back at the front, the 10th Army continued their march to Nanjing. On the right flank, the 114th Division had marched through Liyang within hours, covering 40 miles over the next two days to reach Lishui on December 4. Behind them, the 6th Division was still lagging somewhat, struggling to catch up after making a large detour east of Lake Tai. The Kunisaki Detachment was tasked with reaching the Yangtze at Taiping, crossing the river, and heading for Pukou, directly opposite Nanjing, to cut off any retreating Chinese forces. To the left of the 6th and 114th Divisions, the 18th Division received orders on December 2 to march northwest from the Guangde area toward Nanjing. However, when intelligence reports indicated that large numbers of Chinese troops were withdrawing south toward Ningguo, trying to escape encirclement, thus the 18th Division had its mission altered. On December 4, they were instructed to change course and press straight west, aiming to trap as many Chinese soldiers as possible. The residents of Nanjing were jolted awake by the roar of airplanes shortly before 6:00 am on December 7. It was the sound of Chiang Kai-shek and Song Meiling departing the capital. Three days before his departure, Japanese forces had advanced dangerously close, and their shelling had intensified to the point that he was forced to move from his residence on Purple Mountain to a villa belonging to a famous scholar who had since passed away, located within the city walls. While organizing his departure, Chiang kept the morale of the troops and civilians trapped in Nanjing at the forefront of his mind. In his diary, Chiang noted, “Staying in Nanjing until the last moment has not only enabled us to complete military preparations, but it has also boosted the morale of soldiers and civilians alike. The evacuation of necessary material has been carried out without disorder. I cannot imagine what might have happened if I had left ten days earlier.” On one of his last nights in Nanjing, Chiang gathered all officers of major general rank and above at Tang Shengzhi's headquarters in the Railroad Ministry. With the First Lady by his side, he delivered an inspiring pep talk ahead of the impending battle, emphasizing that although the Chinese had faced temporary setbacks, they had managed to strike back at the Japanese forces, thwarting their plans for a swift victory. Additionally, he noted that China had garnered the sympathy and support of the international community. “You're being watched by the entire nation, indeed by the whole world. We cannot abandon Nanjing!” He then formally handed overall responsibility for the defense of the capital to Tang Shengzhi, urging the officers to obey him as they would obey Chiang himself. He insisted that this would not be merely a symbolic fight; a sustained defense of Nanjing could tie down Japanese forces, giving the bulk of the Chinese Army the opportunity to regroup and strengthen. He promised that three divisions, fully equipped and at peak strength, would soon arrive from the southwestern province of Yunnan. He pledged to personally lead them back to Nanjing to break the siege.  Meanwhile on the front of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, the 16th Division had broken through Chinese lines at the crucial town of Jurong, located 30 miles east of the Nanjing city wall, and was now advancing toward the village of Tangshui. To the south, the 9th Division had reached Chunhua, another strategic town straddling the approaches to the capital. Meanwhile, to the north, soldiers from the 13th Division were crossing the Yangtze River at Zhenjiang to establish a foothold on the other side. Progress was similarly swift in the 10th Army's sector. The 114th Division had advanced all the way to Molingguan, a town less than 20 miles south of Nanjing. The 6th Division, having rushed to the front since the order to capture China's capital had been issued in early December, was expected to arrive later that day. To the south of these two divisions, the 18th Division was set to capture the city of Ningguo while continuing its push toward the Yangtze, effectively completing the encirclement of Nanjing. By December 5th, Matsui and his staff completed its transfer from Shanghai to Suzhou, they issued a general directive for the attack on Nanjing. This order outlined two possible scenarios. In the best-case outcome, the Chinese defenders would surrender and open the city gates. In that event, each Japanese division would send in one battalion to complete the pacification of the city and eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance from soldiers unwilling to capitulate. In the worst-case scenario, if the Chinese commanders disregarded Japanese offers to surrender and prepared for a prolonged defense of their capital, Japan would unleash the full force of its artillery on the city. Each division would then send in one regiment to breach the city gates and engage in a fierce battle, fighting street by street and house by house. It quickly became evident to the Japanese, the Chinese had no intention to simply hand over their capital. New York times correspondent, F Tillman Durdin witnessed action between the recently arrived 154th and 156th divisions from southern China who were quickly encircled atop a cone-shaped peak. “The Japanese set a ring of fire around the peak. The flames, consuming trees and grass, gradually crept closer and closer to the summit, forcing the Chinese upward until, huddled together, they were mercilessly machine-gunned to death.” As the Japanese troops closed in on Nanjing, the level of destruction left in the wake of the Chinese defenders became increasingly apparent. Near the capital, hardly a bridge remained intact as efforts intensified to hinder the invaders. The rush to reach Nanjing heightened rivalries within the Japanese Army. In early December, soldiers from the 16th Infantry Division traversed hilly terrain at what they believed was a vigorous pace. Suddenly, to their left, they spotted a parallel column of Japanese soldiers, quickly identifying them as members of the 9th Infantry Division's 35th Regiment. The company commander shouted “Don't let the 35th beat us to Nanjing! Get moving!”  Cities, towns, villages, and hamlets lay in the path of Japan's multifaceted advance on Nanjing. Some areas fell without much resistance, while others were fiercely defended by Chinese soldiers determined to hold their ground until the end. Chunhua, a town located roughly 15 miles southeast of Nanjing, was among the latter. The town was defended by troops from the Chinese 51st Infantry Division, who had participated in some of the toughest battles around Shanghai during the autumn months. The 51st Division found its withdrawal to Nanjing cut off by fast-moving Japanese columns. Only with the assistance of local civilians were various units able to sneak back to the capital, filtering through enemy lines. Upon arrival, the division's soldiers had hoped for a chance to cross the Yangtze for much-needed rest. Instead, Chiang Kai-shek ordered them to immediately reinforce the defenses at Chunhua. As the troops arrived in Chunhua village in early December, they were dismayed to find the pillboxes in disrepair. Some bunkers had been buried too deep to function effectively as defensive structures, while others had excessively large embrasures that offered little to no protection from enemy fire. Most frustratingly, keys to the bunkers were often missing, making entry problematic. The division worked tirelessly to improve their positions using whatever materials could be requisitioned from the area, but time was too short to bring the defenses up to the standard the commanders desired. Nonetheless, they achieved significant upgrades: three lines of defenses in front of Chunhua, centered around several pillboxes; two rows of barbed wire; and an antitank ditch to complicate any advance. Hidden machine gun nests also provided surprises for the Japanese infantry. On December 4, the Japanese vanguard, a column of about 500 soldiers from the 9th Division, was spotted, and over the next two days, the solitary company at Shuhu endured intense assaults. The Chinese dispatched an armored platoon as temporary reinforcements, marking one of the rare instances when Chinese tanks confronted Japanese infantry directly. The Chinese lost three armored vehicles, while the Japanese reported around 40 casualties among their infantry. By the afternoon of December 6, the surviving Chinese soldiers at Shuhu, numbering fewer than 30, abandoned their positions and fought their way back to Chunhua, leaving their fallen comrades behind. Advancing units of Japan's 9th Division closely followed, initially avoiding contact with the Chinese defenses to conduct reconnaissance. Based on their observations, the Japanese concluded that although the Chinese defenses appeared well-prepared, they were thinly manned. Costly fighting resulted in the Japanese gaining control over only the first of the three Chinese defense lines. Determined to capture the next two lines, they once again depended heavily on their artillery.  In several sectors along the front, soldiers of the 9th Japanese Division found themselves caught in the deadly crossfire of Chinese machine guns, creating a virtual kill zone from which there was no escape. For the Chinese defenders, the conditions were equally horrific. As recalled by the commander of the Chinese 51st division, Wang Yaowu “The shelling was incessant. Body parts were flying through the air. Some men lost legs, others arms. Brains were splattered everywhere”. The division's 301st Regiment, which bore the brunt of the battle, suffered approximately 1,500 casualties among its officers and soldiers. On the second day of the battle for Chunhua, December 7, their left flank made some gains, penetrating the area behind the village. The breakthrough, however, came in the afternoon of December 8 when an entire regiment that had been lagging behind the rest of the 9th Division arrived just in time to join the fight. This bolstered the morale of the Japanese troops and provided momentum to their attack. By the end of that day, Chunhua was firmly under Japanese control. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As the Japanese forces advanced, Nanjing's fate teetered on the brink. Commander Tang Shengzhi led a beleaguered defense amidst chaos, while civilians fortified the city, aware of its significance. On December 1, General Matsui officially ordered an assault on Nanjing. As Japanese troops closed in, brutality loomed on the horizon, heralding one of China's darkest chapters in its fight against oppression.

Last time we spoke about the Soviet Victory in Asia. After atomic bombings and Japan's surrender, the Soviets launched a rapid Manchurian invasion, driving toward Harbin, Mukden, Changchun, and Beijing. Shenyang was taken, seeing the capture of the last Emperor of China, Pu Yi. The Soviets continued their advances into Korea with port captures at Gensan and Pyongyang, and occupation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, ahead of anticipated American intervention. Stalin pushed for speed to avoid US naval landings, coordinating with Chinese forces and leveraging the Sino-Soviet pact while balancing relations with Chiang Kai-shek. As fronts closed, tens of thousands of Japanese POWs were taken, while harsh wartime reprisals, looting, and mass sexual violence against Japanese, Korean, and Chinese civilians were reported.  This episode is the Surrender of Japan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  With the Manchurian Campaign over and Japan's surrender confirmed, we've reached the end of the Pacific War and the ushering of a new era. This journey took us 3 years, 8 months, and 27 days and it's been a rollercoaster. We've gone over numerous stories of heroism and horror, victory and defeat, trying to peel back a part of WW2 that often gets overshadowed by the war in Europe. Certainly the China War is almost completely ignored by the west, but fortunately for you all, as I end this series we have just entered the China war over at the Fall and Rise of China Podcast. Unlike this series where, to be blunt, I am hamstrung by the week by week format, over there I can tackle the subject as I see fit, full of personal accounts. I implore you if you want to revisit some of that action in China, jump over to the other podcast, I will be continuing it until the end of the Chinese civil war. One could say it will soon be a bit of a sequel to this one. Of course if you love this format and want more, you can check out the brand new Eastern Front week by week podcast, which really does match the horror of the Pacific war. Lastly if you just love hearing my dumb voice, come check out my podcast which also is in video format on the Pacific War Channel on Youtube, the Echoes of War podcast. Me and my co-host Gaurav tackle history from Ancient to Modern, often with guests and we blend the dialogue with maps, photos and clips. But stating all of that, lets get into it, the surrender of Japan. As we last saw, while the Soviet invasion of Manchuria raged, Emperor Hirohito announced the unconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire on August 15. Public reaction varied, yet most were stunned and bewildered, unable to grasp that Japan had surrendered for the first time in its history. Many wept openly as they listened to the Emperor's solemn message; others directed swift anger at the nation's leaders and the fighting services for failing to avert defeat; and some blamed themselves for falling short in their war effort. Above all, there was a deep sympathy for the Emperor, who had been forced to make such a tragic and painful decision.  In the wake of the Emperor's broadcast, war factories across the country dismissed their workers and shut their doors. Newspapers that had been ordered to pause their usual morning editions appeared in the afternoon, each carrying the Imperial Rescript, an unabridged translation of the Potsdam Declaration, and the notes exchanged with the Allied Powers. In Tokyo, crowds of weeping citizens gathered all afternoon in the vast plaza before the Imperial Palace and at the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines to bow in reverence and prayer. The shock and grief of the moment, coupled with the dark uncertainty about the future, prevented any widespread sense of relief that the fighting had ended. Bombings and bloodshed were over, but defeat seemed likely to bring only continued hardship and privation. Starvation already gripped the land, and the nation faced the looming breakdown of public discipline and order, acts of violence and oppression by occupying forces, and a heavy burden of reparations. Yet despite the grim outlook, the Emperor's assurance that he would remain to guide the people through the difficult days ahead offered a measure of solace and courage. His appeal for strict compliance with the Imperial will left a lasting impression, and the refrain “Reverent Obedience to the Rescript” became the rallying cry as the nation prepared to endure the consequences of capitulation. Immediately after the Emperor's broadcast, Prime Minister Suzuki's cabinet tendered its collective resignation, yet Hirohito commanded them to remain in office until a new cabinet could be formed. Accordingly, Suzuki delivered another broadcast that evening, urging the nation to unite in absolute loyalty to the throne in this grave national crisis, and stressing that the Emperor's decision to end the war had been taken out of compassion for his subjects and in careful consideration of the circumstances. Thus, the shocked and grief-stricken population understood that this decision represented the Emperor's actual will rather than a ratified act of the Government, assuring that the nation as a whole would obediently accept the Imperial command. Consequently, most Japanese simply went on with their lives as best they could; yet some military officers, such as General Anami, chose suicide over surrender. Another key figure who committed seppuku between August 15 and 16 was Vice-Admiral Onishi Takijiro, the father of the kamikaze. Onishi's suicide note apologized to the roughly 4,000 pilots he had sent to their deaths and urged all surviving young civilians to work toward rebuilding Japan and fostering peace among nations. Additionally, despite being called “the hero of the August 15 incident” for his peacekeeping role in the attempted coup d'état, General Tanaka felt responsible for the damage done to Tokyo and shot himself on August 24. Following the final Imperial conference on 14 August, the Army's “Big Three”, War Minister Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, and Inspectorate-General of Military Training General Kenji Doihara, met at the War Ministry together with Field Marshals Hata and Sugiyama, the senior operational commanders of the homeland's Army forces. These five men affixed their seals to a joint resolution pledging that the Army would “conduct itself in accordance with the Imperial decision to the last.” The resolution was endorsed immediately afterward by General Masakazu Kawabe, the overall commander of the Army air forces in the homeland. In accordance with this decision, General Anami and General Umezu separately convened meetings of their senior subordinates during the afternoon of the 14th, informing them of the outcome of the final Imperial conference and directing strict obedience to the Emperor's command. Shortly thereafter, special instructions to the same effect were radioed to all top operational commanders jointly in the names of the War Minister and Chief of Army General Staff. The Army and Navy authorities acted promptly, and their decisive stance proved, for the most part, highly effective. In the Army, where the threat of upheaval was most acute, the final, unequivocal decision of its top leaders to heed the Emperor's will delivered a crippling blow to the smoldering coup plot by the young officers to block the surrender. The conspirators had based their plans on unified action by the Army as a whole; with that unified stance effectively ruled out, most of the principal plotters reluctantly abandoned the coup d'état scheme on the afternoon of 14 August. At the same time, the weakened Imperial Japanese Navy took steps to ensure disciplined compliance with the surrender decision. Only Admiral Ugaki chose to challenge this with his final actions. After listening to Japan's defeat, Admiral Ugaki Kayō's diary recorded that he had not yet received an official cease-fire order, and that, since he alone was to blame for the failure of Japanese aviators to stop the American advance, he would fly one last mission himself to embody the true spirit of bushido. His subordinates protested, and even after Ugaki had climbed into the back seat of a Yokosuka D4Y4 of the 701st Kokutai dive bomber piloted by Lieutenant Tatsuo Nakatsuru, Warrant Officer Akiyoshi Endo, whose place in the kamikaze roster Ugaki had usurped, also climbed into the same space that the admiral had already occupied. Thus, the aircraft containing Ugaki took off with three men piloted by Nakatsuru, with Endo providing reconnaissance, and Ugaki himself, rather than the two crew members that filled the other ten aircraft. Before boarding his aircraft, Ugaki posed for pictures and removed his rank insignia from his dark green uniform, taking only a ceremonial short sword given to him by Admiral Yamamoto. Elements of this last flight most likely followed the Ryukyu flyway southwest to the many small islands north of Okinawa, where U.S. forces were still on alert at the potential end of hostilities. Endo served as radioman during the mission, sending Ugaki's final messages, the last of which at 19:24 reported that the plane had begun its dive onto an American vessel. However, U.S. Navy records do not indicate any successful kamikaze attack on that day, and it is likely that all aircraft on the mission with the exception of three that returned due to engine problems crashed into the ocean, struck down by American anti-aircraft fire. Although there are no precise accounts of an intercept made by Navy or Marine fighters or Pacific Fleet surface units against enemy aircraft in this vicinity at the time of surrender. it is likely the aircraft crashed into the ocean or was shot down by American anti-aircraft fire. In any event, the crew of LST-926 reported finding the still-smoldering remains of a cockpit with three bodies on the beach of Iheyajima Island, with Ugaki's remains allegedly among them. Meanwhile, we have already covered the Truman–Stalin agreement that Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel would surrender to the Soviets while those to the south would surrender to the Americans, along with the subsequent Soviet occupation of Manchuria, North Korea, South Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. Yet even before the first atomic bomb was dropped, and well before the Potsdam Conference, General MacArthur and his staff were planning a peaceful occupation of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. The first edition of this plan, designated “Blacklist,” appeared on July 16 and called for a progressive, orderly occupation in strength of an estimated fourteen major areas in Japan and three to six areas in Korea, so that the Allies could exercise unhampered control over the various phases of administration. These operations would employ 22 divisions and 3 regiments, together with air and naval elements, and would utilize all United States forces immediately available in the Pacific. The plan also provided for the maximum use of existing Japanese political and administrative organizations, since these agencies already exerted effective control over the population and could be employed to good advantage by the Allies. The final edition of “Blacklist,” issued on August 8, was divided into three main phases of occupation. The first phase included the Kanto Plain, the Kobe–Osaka–Kyoto areas, the Nagasaki–Sasebo area in Kyushu, the Keijo district in Korea, and the Aomori–Ominato area of northern Honshu. The second phase covered the Shimonoseki–Fukuoka and Nagoya areas, Sapporo in Hokkaido, and Fusan in Korea. The third phase comprised the Hiroshima–Kure area, Kochi in Shikoku, the Okayama, Tsuruga, and Niigata areas, Sendai in northern Honshu, Otomari in Karafuto, and the Gunzan–Zenshu area in Korea. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially favored Admiral Nimitz's “Campus” Plan, which envisioned entry into Japan by Army forces only after an emergency occupation of Tokyo Bay by advanced naval units and the seizure of key positions ashore near each anchorage, MacArthur argued that naval forces were not designed to perform the preliminary occupation of a hostile country whose ground divisions remained intact, and he contended that occupying large land areas was fundamentally an Army mission. He ultimately convinced them that occupation by a weak Allied force might provoke resistance from dissident Japanese elements among the bomb-shattered population and could therefore lead to grave repercussions. The formal directive for the occupation of Japan, Korea, and the China coast was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 11. The immediate objectives were to secure the early entry of occupying forces into major strategic areas, to control critical ports, port facilities, and airfields, and to demobilize and disarm enemy troops. First priority went to the prompt occupation of Japan, second to the consolidation of Keijo in Korea, and third to operations on the China coast and in Formosa. MacArthur was to assume responsibility for the forces entering Japan and Korea; General Wedemeyer was assigned operational control of the forces landing on the China coast and was instructed to coordinate his plans with the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek; and Japanese forces in Southeast Asia were earmarked for surrender to Admiral Mountbatten. With the agreement of the Soviet, Chinese, and British governments, President Truman designated MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on August 15, thereby granting him final authority for the execution of the terms of surrender and occupation. In this capacity, MacArthur promptly notified the Emperor and the Japanese Government that he was authorized to arrange for the cessation of hostilities at the earliest practicable date and directed that the Japanese forces terminate hostilities immediately and that he be notified at once of the effective date and hour of such termination. He further directed that Japan send to Manila on August 17 “a competent representative empowered to receive in the name of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Imperial Government, and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender.” General MacArthur's stipulations to the Japanese Government included specific instructions regarding the journey of the Japanese representatives to Manila. The emissaries were to leave Sata Misaki, at the southern tip of Kyushu, on the morning of August 17. They were to travel in a Douglas DC-3-type transport plane, painted white and marked with green crosses on the wings and fuselage, and to fly under Allied escort to an airdrome on Lejima in the Ryukyus. From there, the Japanese would be transported to Manila in a United States plane. The code designation chosen for communication between the Japanese plane and US forces was the symbolic word “Bataan.” Implementation challenges arose almost immediately due to disagreements within Imperial General Headquarters and the Foreign Office over the exact nature of the mission. Some officials interpreted the instructions as requiring the delegates to carry full powers to receive and agree to the actual terms of surrender, effectively making them top representatives of the Government and High Command. Others understood the mission to be strictly preparatory, aimed only at working out technical surrender arrangements and procedures. Late in the afternoon of August 16, a message was sent to MacArthur's headquarters seeking clarification and more time to organize the mission. MacArthur replied that signing the surrender terms would not be among the tasks of the Japanese representatives dispatched to Manila, assured the Japanese that their proposed measures were satisfactory, and pledged that every precaution would be taken to ensure the safety of the Emperor's representatives on their mission. Although preparations were made with all possible speed, on August 16 the Japanese notified that this delegation would be somewhat delayed due to the scarcity of time allowed for its formation. At the same time, MacArthur was notified that Hirohito had issued an order commanding the entire armed forces of his nation to halt their fighting immediately. The wide dispersion and the disrupted communications of the Japanese forces, however, made the rapid and complete implementation of such an order exceedingly difficult, so it was expected that the Imperial order would take approximately two to twelve days to reach forces throughout the Pacific and Asiatic areas. On August 17, the Emperor personally backed up these orders with a special Rescript to the armed services, carefully worded to assuage military aversion to surrender. Suzuki was also replaced on this date, with the former commander of the General Defense Army, General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, becoming the new Prime Minister with the initial tasks to hastily form a new cabinet capable of effecting the difficult transition to peace swiftly and without incident. The Government and Imperial General Headquarters moved quickly to hasten the preparations, but the appointment of the mission's head was held up pending the installation of the Higashikuni Cabinet. The premier-designate pressed for a rapid formation of the government, and on the afternoon of the 17th the official ceremony of installation took place in the Emperor's presence. Until General Shimomura could be summoned to Tokyo from the North China Area Army, Prince Higashikuni himself assumed the portfolio of War Minister concurrently with the premiership, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai remaining in the critical post of Navy Minister, and Prince Ayamaro Konoe, by Marquis Kido's recommendation, entered the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio to act as Higashikuni's closest advisor. The Foreign Minister role went to Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had previously served in the Koiso Cabinet. With the new government installed, Prince Higashikuni broadcast to the nation on the evening of 17 August, declaring that his policies as Premier would conform to the Emperor's wishes as expressed in the Imperial mandate to form a Cabinet. These policies were to control the armed forces, maintain public order, and surmount the national crisis, with scrupulous respect for the Constitution and the Imperial Rescript terminating the war. The cabinet's installation removed one delay, and in the afternoon of the same day a message from General MacArthur's headquarters clarified the mission's nature and purpose. Based on this clarification, it was promptly decided that Lieutenant General Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, should head a delegation of sixteen members, mainly representing the Army and Navy General Staffs. Kawabe was formally appointed by the Emperor on 18 August. By late afternoon that same day, the data required by the Allied Supreme Commander had largely been assembled, and a message was dispatched to Manila informing General MacArthur's headquarters that the mission was prepared to depart the following morning. The itinerary received prompt approval from the Supreme Commander. Indeed, the decision to appoint a member of the Imperial Family who had a respectable career in the armed forces was aimed both at appeasing the population and at reassuring the military. MacArthur appointed General Eichelberger's 8th Army to initiate the occupation unassisted through September 22, at which point General Krueger's 6th Army would join the effort. General Hodge's 24th Corps was assigned to execute Operation Blacklist Forty, the occupation of the Korean Peninsula south of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur's tentative schedule for the occupation outlined an initial advance party of 150 communications experts and engineers under Colonel Charles Tench, which would land at Atsugi Airfield on August 23. Naval forces under Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet were to enter Tokyo Bay on August 24, followed by MacArthur's arrival at Atsugi the next day and the start of the main landings of airborne troops and naval and marine forces. The formal surrender instrument was to be signed aboard an American battleship in Tokyo Bay on August 28, with initial troop landings in southern Kyushu planned for August 29–30. By September 4, Hodge's 24th Corps was to land at Inchon and begin the occupation of South Korea. In the meantime, per MacArthur's directions, a sixteen-man Japanese delegation headed by Lieutenant-General Kawabe Torashiro, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, left Sata Misaki on the morning of August 19; after landing at Iejima, the delegation transferred to an American transport and arrived at Nichols Field at about 18:00. That night, the representatives held their first conference with MacArthur's staff, led by Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland. During the two days of conference, American linguists scanned, translated, and photostated the various reports, maps, and charts the Japanese had brought with them. Negotiations also resulted in permission for the Japanese to supervise the disarmament and demobilization of their own armed forces under Allied supervision, and provided for three extra days of preparation before the first occupying unit landed on the Japanese home islands on August 26. At the close of the conference, Kawabe was handed the documents containing the “Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” which concerned the arrival of the first echelons of Allied forces, the formal surrender ceremony, and the reception of the occupation forces. Also given were a draft Imperial Proclamation by which the Emperor would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and command his subjects to cease hostilities, a copy of General Order No. 1 by which Imperial General Headquarters would direct all military and naval commanders to lay down their arms and surrender their units to designated Allied commanders, and the Instrument of Surrender itself, which would later be signed on board an American battleship in Tokyo Bay. After the Manila Conference ended, the Japanese delegation began its return to Japan at 13:00 on August 20; but due to mechanical problems and a forced landing near Hamamatsu, they did not reach Tokyo until August 21. With the scheduled arrival of the advanced party of the Allied occupation forces only five days away, the Japanese immediately began disarming combat units in the initial-occupation areas and evacuating them from those areas. The basic orders stated that Allied forces would begin occupying the homeland on 26 August and reaffirmed the intention ofImperial General Headquarters "to insure absolute obedience to the Imperial Rescript of 14 August, to prevent the occurrence of trouble with the occupying forces, and thus to demonstrate Japan's sincerity to the world." The Japanese government announced that all phases of the occupation by Allied troops would be peaceful and urged the public not to panic or resort to violence against the occupying forces. While they sought to reassure the population, they faced die-hard anti-surrender elements within the IJN, with ominous signs of trouble both from Kyushu, where many sea and air special-attack units were poised to meet an invasion, and from Atsugi, the main entry point for Allied airborne troops into the Tokyo Bay area. At Kanoya, Ugaki's successor, Vice-Admiral Kusaka Ryonosuke, hastened the separation of units from their weapons and the evacuation of naval personnel. At Atsugi, an even more threatening situation developed in the Navy's 302nd Air Group. Immediately after the announcement of the surrender, extremist elements in the group led by Captain Kozono Yasuna flew over Atsugi and the surrounding area, scattering leaflets urging the continuation of the war on the ground and claiming that the surrender edict was not the Emperor's true will but the machination of "traitors around the Throne." The extremists, numbering 83 junior officers and noncommissioned officers, did not commit hostile acts but refused to obey orders from their superior commanders. On August 19, Prince Takamatsu, the Emperor's brother and a navy captain, telephoned Atsugi and personally appealed to Captain Kozono and his followers to obey the Imperial decision. This intervention did not end the incident; on August 21 the extremists seized a number of aircraft and flew them to Army airfields in Saitama Prefecture in hopes of gaining support from Army air units. They failed in this attempt, and it was not until August 25 that all members of the group had surrendered. As a result of the Atsugi incident, on August 22 the Emperor dispatched Captain Prince Takamatsu Nabuhito and Vice-Admiral Prince Kuni Asaakira to various naval commands on Honshu and Kyushu to reiterate the necessity of strict obedience to the surrender decision. Both princes immediately left Tokyo to carry out this mission, but the situation improved over the next two days, and they were recalled before completing their tours. By this point, a typhoon struck the Kanto region on the night of August 22, causing heavy damage and interrupting communications and transport vital for evacuating troops from the occupation zone. This led to further delays in Japanese preparations for the arrival of occupation forces, and the Americans ultimately agreed to a two-day postponement of the preliminary landings. On August 27 at 10:30, elements of the 3rd Fleet entered Sagami Bay as the first step in the delayed occupation schedule. At 09:00 on August 28, Tench's advanced party landed at Atsugi to complete technical arrangements for the arrival of the main forces. Two days later, the main body of the airborne occupation forces began streaming into Atsugi, while naval and marine forces simultaneously landed at Yokosuka on the south shore of Tokyo Bay. There were no signs of resistance, and the initial occupation proceeded successfully.  Shortly after 1400, a famous C-54  the name “Bataan” in large letters on its nose circled the field and glided in for a landing. General MacArthur stepped from the aircraft, accompanied by General Sutherland and his staff officers. The operation proceeded smoothly. MacArthur paused momentarily to inspect the airfield, then climbed into a waiting automobile for the drive to Yokohama. Thousands of Japanese troops were posted along the fifteen miles of road from Atsugi to Yokohama to guard the route of the Allied motor cavalcade as it proceeded to the temporary SCAP Headquarters in Japan's great seaport city. The Supreme Commander established his headquarters provisionally in the Yokohama Customs House. The headquarters of the American Eighth Army and the Far East Air Force were also established in Yokohama, and representatives of the United States Pacific Fleet were attached to the Supreme Commander's headquarters. The intensive preparation and excitement surrounding the first landings on the Japanese mainland did not interfere with the mission of affording relief and rescue to Allied personnel who were internees or prisoners in Japan. Despite bad weather delaying the occupation operation, units of the Far East Air Forces and planes from the Third Fleet continued their surveillance missions. On 25 August they began dropping relief supplies, food, medicine, and clothing, to Allied soldiers and civilians in prisoner-of-war and internment camps across the main islands. While the advance echelon of the occupation forces was still on Okinawa, “mercy teams” were organized to accompany the first elements of the Eighth Army Headquarters. Immediately after the initial landings, these teams established contact with the Swiss and Swedish Legations, the International Red Cross, the United States Navy, and the Japanese Liaison Office, and rushed to expedite the release and evacuation, where necessary, of thousands of Allied internees.  On September 1, the Reconnaissance Troop of the 11th Airborne Division conducted a subsidiary airlift operation, flying from Atsugi to occupy Kisarazu Airfield; and on the morning of September 2, the 1st Cavalry Division began landing at Yokohama to secure most of the strategic areas along the shores of Tokyo Bay, with Tokyo itself remaining unoccupied. Concurrently, the surrender ceremony took place aboard Halsey's flagship, the battleship Missouri, crowded with representatives of the United Nations that had participated in the Pacific War.  General MacArthur presided over the epoch-making ceremony, and with the following words he inaugurated the proceedings which would ring down the curtain of war in the Pacific “We are gathered here, representatives of the major warring powers, to conclude a solemn agreement whereby peace may be restored. The issues, involving divergent ideals and ideologies, have been determined on the battlefields of the world and hence are not for our discussion or debate. Nor is it for us here to meet, representing as we do a majority of the people of the earth, in a spirit of distrust, malice or hatred. But rather it is for us, both victors and vanquished, to rise to that higher dignity which alone befits the sacred purposes we are about to serve, committing all our peoples unreservedly to faithful compliance with the understandings they are here formally to assume. It is my earnest hope, and indeed the hope of all mankind, that from this solemn occasion a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past — a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfillment of his most cherished wish for freedom, tolerance and justice. The terms and conditions upon which surrender of the Japanese Imperial Forces is here to be given and accepted are contained in the instrument of surrender now before you…”.  The Supreme Commander then invited the two Japanese plenipotentiaries to sign the duplicate surrender documents : Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, on behalf of the Emperor and the Japanese Government, and General Umezu, for the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters. He then called forward two famous former prisoners of the Japanese to stand behind him while he himself affixed his signature to the formal acceptance of the surrender : Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, hero of Bataan and Corregidor and Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur E. Percival, who had been forced to yield the British stronghold at Singapore. General MacArthur was followed in turn by Admiral Nimitz, who signed on behalf of the United States. Alongside the recently liberated Generals Wainwright and Percival, who had been captured during the Japanese conquest of the Philippines and Singapore respectively, MacArthur then signed the surrender documents, followed by Admiral Nimitz and representatives of the other United Nations present. The Instrument of Surrender was completely signed within twenty minutes. Shortly afterwards, MacArthur broadcast the announcement of peace to the world, famously saying, “Today the guns are silent.” Immediately following the signing of the surrender articles, the Imperial Proclamation of capitulation was issued, commanding overseas forces to cease hostilities and lay down their arms; however, it would take many days, and in some cases weeks, for the official word of surrender to be carried along Japan's badly disrupted communications channels. Various devices were employed by American commanders to transmit news of final defeat to dispersed and isolated enemy troops, such as plane-strewn leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, strategically placed signboards, and prisoner-of-war volunteers. Already, the bypassed Japanese garrison at Mille Atoll had surrendered on August 22; yet the first large-scale surrender of Japanese forces came on August 27, when Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio surrendered Morotai and Halmahera to the 93rd Division. On August 30, a British Pacific Fleet force under Rear-Admiral Cecil Harcourt entered Victoria Harbour to begin the liberation of Hong Kong; and the following day, Rear-Admiral Matsubara Masata surrendered Minami-Torishima. In the Marianas, the Japanese commanders on Rota and Pagan Islands relinquished their commands almost simultaneously with the Tokyo Bay ceremony of September 2. Later that day, the same was done by Lieutenant-General Inoue Sadae in the Palaus and by Lieutenant-General Mugikura Shunzaburo and Vice-Admiral Hara Chuichi at Truk in the Carolines. Additionally, as part of Operation Jurist, a British detachment under Vice-Admiral Harold Walker received the surrender of the Japanese garrison on Penang Island. In the Philippines, local commanders in the central Bukidnon Province, Infanta, the Bataan Peninsula, and the Cagayan Valley had already surrendered by September 2. On September 3, General Yamashita and Vice-Admiral Okawachi Denshichi met with General Wainwright, General Percival, and Lieutenant-General Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of Army Forces of the Western Pacific, to sign the formal surrender of the Japanese forces in the Philippines. With Yamashita's capitulation, subordinate commanders throughout the islands began surrendering in increasing numbers, though some stragglers remained unaware of the capitulation. Concurrently, while Yamashita was yielding his Philippine forces, Lieutenant-General Tachibana Yoshio's 109th Division surrendered in the Bonins on September 3. On September 4, Rear-Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu and Colonel Chikamori Shigeharu surrendered their garrison on Wake Island, as did the garrison on Aguigan Island in the Marianas. Also on September 4, an advanced party of the 24th Corps landed at Kimpo Airfield near Keijo to prepare the groundwork for the occupation of South Korea; and under Operation Tiderace, Mountbatten's large British and French naval force arrived off Singapore and accepted the surrender of Japanese forces there. On September 5, Rear-Admiral Masuda Nisuke surrendered his garrison on Jaluit Atoll in the Marshalls, as did the garrison of Yap Island. The overall surrender of Japanese forces in the Solomons and Bismarcks and in the Wewak area of New Guinea was finally signed on September 6 by General Imamura Hitoshi and Vice-Admiral Kusaka Jinichi aboard the aircraft carrier Glory off Rabaul, the former center of Japanese power in the South Pacific. Furthermore, Lieutenant-General Nomi Toshio, representing remaining Japanese naval and army forces in the Ryukyus, officially capitulated on September 7 at the headquarters of General Stilwell's 10th Army on Okinawa. The following day, Tokyo was finally occupied by the Americans, and looking south, General Kanda and Vice-Admiral Baron Samejima Tomoshige agreed to travel to General Savige's headquarters at Torokina to sign the surrender of Bougainville. On September 8, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Samarinda surrendered to General Milford's 7th Australian Division, as did the Japanese garrison on Kosrae Island in the Carolines. On September 9, a wave of surrenders continued: the official capitulation of all Japanese forces in the China Theater occurred at the Central Military Academy in Nanking, with General Okamura surrendering to General He Yingqin, the commander-in-chief of the Republic of China National Revolutionary Army; subsequently, on October 10, 47 divisions from the former Imperial Japanese Army officially surrendered to Chinese military officials and allied representatives at the Forbidden City in Beijing. The broader context of rehabilitation and reconstruction after the protracted war was daunting, with the Nationalists weakened and Chiang Kai-shek's policies contributing to Mao Zedong's strengthened position, shaping the early dynamics of the resumption of the Chinese Civil War. Meanwhile, on September 9, Hodge landed the 7th Division at Inchon to begin the occupation of South Korea. In the throne room of the Governor's Palace at Keijo, soon to be renamed Seoul, the surrender instrument was signed by General Abe Nobuyuki, the Governor-General of Korea; Lieutenant-General Kozuki Yoshio, commander of the 17th Area Army and of the Korean Army; and Vice-Admiral Yamaguchi Gisaburo, commander of the Japanese Naval Forces in Korea. The sequence continued with the 25th Indian Division landing in Selangor and Negeri Sembilan on Malaya to capture Port Dickson, while Lieutenant-General Teshima Fusataro's 2nd Army officially surrendered to General Blamey at Morotai, enabling Australian occupation of much of the eastern Dutch East Indies. On September 10, the Japanese garrisons on the Wotje and Maloelap Atolls in the Marshalls surrendered, and Lieutenant-General Baba Masao surrendered all Japanese forces in North Borneo to General Wootten's 9th Australian Division. After Imamura's surrender, Major-General Kenneth Eather's 11th Australian Division landed at Rabaul to begin occupation, and the garrison on Muschu and Kairiru Islands also capitulated. On September 11, General Adachi finally surrendered his 18th Army in the Wewak area, concluding the bloody New Guinea Campaign, while Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's 71st Independent Mixed Brigade surrendered at Kuching and Lieutenant-General Watanabe Masao's 52nd Independent Mixed Brigade surrendered on Ponape Island in the Carolines. Additionally, the 20th Indian Division, with French troops, arrived at Saigon as part of Operation Masterdom and accepted the surrender of Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu, who had already met with Viet Minh envoys and agreed to turn power over to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.  When the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on 15 August 1945, the Viet Minh immediately launched the insurrection they had prepared for a long time. Across the countryside, “People's Revolutionary Committees” took over administrative positions, often acting on their own initiative, and in the cities the Japanese stood by as the Vietnamese took control. By the morning of August 19, the Viet Minh had seized Hanoi, rapidly expanding their control over northern Vietnam in the following days. The Nguyen dynasty, with its puppet government led by Tran Trong Kim, collapsed when Emperor Bao Dai abdicated on August 25. By late August, the Viet Minh controlled most of Vietnam. On 2 September, in Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As the Viet Minh began extending control across the country, the new government's attention turned to the arrival of Allied troops and the French attempt to reassert colonial authority, signaling the onset of a new and contentious phase in Vietnam's struggle.  French Indochina had been left in chaos by the Japanese occupation. On 11 September British and Indian troops of the 20th Indian Division under Major General Douglas Gracey arrived at Saigon as part of Operation Masterdom. After the Japanese surrender, all French prisoners had been gathered on the outskirts of Saigon and Hanoi, and the sentries disappeared on 18 September; six months of captivity cost an additional 1,500 lives. By 22 September 1945, all prisoners were liberated by Gracey's men, armed, and dispatched in combat units toward Saigon to conquer it from the Viet Minh, later joined by the French Far East Expeditionary Corps, established to fight the Japanese arriving a few weeks later. Around the same time, General Lu Han's 200,000 Chinese National Revolutionary Army troops of the 1st Front Army occupied Indochina north of the 16th parallel, with 90,000 arriving by October; the 62nd Army came on 26 September to Nam Dinh and Haiphong, Lang Son and Cao Bang were occupied by the Guangxi 62nd Army Corps, and the Red River region and Lai Cai were occupied by a column from Yunnan. Lu Han occupied the French governor-general's palace after ejecting the French staff under Sainteny. Consequently, while General Lu Han's Chinese troops occupied northern Indochina and allowed the Vietnamese Provisional Government to remain in control there, the British and French forces would have to contest control of Saigon. On September 12, a surrender instrument was signed at the Singapore Municipal Building for all Southern Army forces in Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and the eastern islands; General Terauchi, then in a hospital in Saigon after a stroke, learned of Burma's fall and had his deputy commander and leader of the 7th Area Army, Lieutenant-General Itagaki Seishiro, surrender on his behalf to Mountbatten, after which a British military administration was formed to govern the island until March 1946. The Japanese Burma Area Army surrendered the same day as Mountbatten's ceremony in Singapore, and Indian forces in Malaya reached Kuala Lumpur to liberate the Malay capital, though the British were slow to reestablish control over all of Malaya, with eastern Pahang remaining beyond reach for three more weeks. On September 13, the Japanese garrisons on Nauru and Ocean Islands surrendered to Brigadier John Stevenson, and three days later Major-General Okada Umekichi and Vice-Admiral Fujita Ruitaro formally signed the instrument of surrender at Hong Kong. In the meantime, following the Allied call for surrender, Japan had decided to grant Indonesian independence to complicate Dutch reoccupation: Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta signed Indonesia's Proclamation of Independence on August 17 and were appointed president and vice-president the next day, with Indonesian youths spreading news across Java via Japanese news and telegraph facilities and Bandung's news broadcast by radio. The Dutch, as the former colonial power, viewed the republicans as collaborators with the Japanese and sought to restore their colonial rule due to lingering political and economic interests in the former Dutch East Indies, a stance that helped trigger a four-year war for Indonesian independence. Fighting also erupted in Sumatra and the Celebes, though the 26th Indian Division managed to land at Padang on October 10. On October 21, Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake and Vice-Admiral Hirose Sueto surrendered all Japanese forces on Sumatra, yet British control over the country would dwindle in the ensuing civil conflict. Meanwhile, Formosa (Taiwan) was placed under the control of the Kuomintang-led Republic of China by General Order No. 1 and the Instrument of Surrender; Chiang Kai-shek appointed General Chen Yi as Chief Executive of Taiwan Province and commander of the Taiwan Garrison Command on September 1. After several days of preparation, an advance party moved into Taihoku on October 5, with additional personnel arriving from Shanghai and Chongqing between October 5 and 24, and on October 25 General Ando Rikichi signed the surrender document at Taipei City Hall. But that's the end for this week, and for the Pacific War.  Boy oh boy, its been a long journey hasn't it? Now before letting you orphans go into the wild, I will remind you, while this podcast has come to an end, I still write and narrate Kings and Generals Eastern Front week by week and the Fall and Rise of China Podcasts. Atop all that I have my own video-podcast Echoes of War, that can be found on Youtube or all podcast platforms. I really hope to continue entertaining you guys, so if you venture over to the other podcasts, comment you came from here! I also have some parting gifts to you all, I have decided to release a few Pacific War related exclusive episodes from my Youtuber Membership / patreon at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel. At the time I am writing this, over there I have roughly 32 episodes, one is uploaded every month alongside countless other goodies. Thank you all for being part of this long lasting journey. Kings and Generals literally grabbed me out of the blue when I was but a small silly person doing youtube videos using an old camera, I have barely gotten any better at it. I loved making this series, and I look forward to continuing other series going forward! You know where to find me, if you have any requests going forward the best way to reach me is just comment on my Youtube channel or email me, the email address can be found on my youtube channel. This has been Craig of the Pacific War Channel and narrator of the Pacific war week by week podcast, over and out!

Let us know what you think of the latest episode of Distinct Nostalgia by clicking here and sending us a messageAhead of the launch tomorrow (Sunday August 31st) of the epic new landmark drama about the decision to drop the first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Sadao Ueda chats to Ashley Byrne about playing Emperor Hirohito. Sadao grew up in Japan and here he talks about what he was taught about the devastating events at school in the 1970s. He also reflects on taking on a part he's really wanted to play all his acting career. Sadao Ueda is in conversation with Ashley Byrne.A Made in Manchester Production   Coming soon ....The President and The Emperor  brings to life the story behind one of the most consequential decisions in modern history, the dropping of the atomic bomb eighty years ago.Told in seven parts and produced by indie company Made in Manchester, the series draws on newly declassified US and Japanese documents, along with first-hand testimony, to present a dual-perspective account of the final days of the Second World War.At the heart of the drama are two isolated but powerful figures, President Harry S. Truman and Emperor Hirohito. They navigate moral and political dilemmas as the world teeters on the brink of nuclear devastation.In a unique casting move, Truman is portrayed by his real-life grandson, Clifton Truman Daniel, adding an intimate connection to a role few could approach with such personal insight.He stars alongside acclaimed Japanese actor Sadao Ueda, who plays Hirohito with quiet intensity and emotional nuance.“This drama is not about who was right or wrong in the war,” Ueda says. “It presents historical facts dramatically from two different points of view. I hope the listener will reflect on what global conflict might mean if it ever happened again.”Samuel Barnett plays Robert OppenheimerThe President and the Emperor is written by Guy Smith, directed by Jonathan Kydd and produced by Ashley Byrne. The Executive Producer is Kurt Brookes.Guy Smith says: ''I wanted to find out what really took place behind the scenes in Washington and Tokyo in the weeks leading up to the most momentous - and controversial - decision in the history of modern warfare; the order to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.And, just as importantly, I wanted to find out if that world changing event could have been avoided.  Was it inevitable?  Or could the conflict have been ended without the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?The more I dug into the archives and examined first hand accounts of those who were there at the White House and Imperial Palace, I discovered an extraordinary story full of intrigue, drama and turmoil.Now, as the world once again moves closer to the threat of nuclear conflict than at any time since the Cold War, I hope The President and the Emperor provides listeners with a timely warning on the dangers of escalating tensions and failing to explore all possible opportunities to stop man's inhumanity to man.'With thanks to:The National Security Archive, Washington DChttps://nsarchive.gwu.eduThe Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MOhttps://www.trumanlibrary.govSupport the show

Last time we spoke about the Battle for South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. In August 1945, as Japan teetered on the edge of destruction following the atomic bombings, a desperate situation unfolded. The Soviet Union launched a sudden invasion of Manchuria, catching Japanese forces off guard. On August 14, Japan's decision to surrender was made, announced to the world the following day. However, the Kwantung Army resisted fiercely, engaging in frantic evacuations. In South Sakhalin, Japanese defenders clashed with advancing Soviet troops, facing overwhelming odds. By August 18, chaos reigned on the Japanese side, with forces surrendering and civilians in panic. As the Soviets pushed forward, the situation became increasingly dire for Japan. Despite valiant resistance, the imminent defeat became clear. In a moment of critical decision, Emperor Hirohito accepted the surrender terms, officially sealing Japan's fate and marking the end of the Pacific War. However the Soviets had not yet stopped their onslaught.  This episode is the Soviet Victory in Asia Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are drawing near to the real conclusion of this series! Japan has officially surrendered, however the Soviets are not done just yet. East asia is a delicious piece of cake, laid wide open and Stalin intends to take every piece he can grab before the curtain falls. Now as we last left off it was August 18, and General Yamada's Kwantung Army had surrendered to the Soviet forces led by Marshal Vasilevsky, who were advancing rapidly through Manchuria. Yet, some Japanese units, like those at Kalgan, continued to resist occupation until the month's end. On August 19, following Yamada's announcement that all military operations had ceased, a Soviet delegation arrived at Hsinking.  A daring operation took place, where a 225-strong detachment from the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, part of the 5th Guards Tank Corps, was airlifted to the city's main airfield. This mission, along with others, was carried out under orders from Marshal Vasilevsky on August 18, following the commander's initial offer of surrender from the Kwantung Army. Vasilevsky's directive was urgent: “The Japanese resistance is broken, and the challenging road conditions hinder the swift advance of our main forces. We need to deploy specially formed, fast-moving, and well-equipped units to capture Changchun, Mukden, Jilin, and Harbin immediately. These units should remain flexible for future missions, regardless of their distance from the main forces.”The push to accelerate operations came directly from Stalin himself. In Kulichkin's biography of Marshal Vasilevsky, he recounts a pivotal phone call on August 15. Stalin was informed that the Japanese had “lost command and control” and were unable to mount a strong defense, with their forces divided into several fragmented groups. Vasilevsky confidently stated, “Even a miracle cannot save the Japanese from total defeat,” stressing the need to maintain the momentum of the offensive. Stalin's response was straightforward: “Good. We need to increase the pace. What proposals do you have?” Vasilevsky revealed plans to use airborne assault forces against larger cities like Harbin, Changchun, Jilin, and Mukden, alongside advanced mobile units across all combined arms armies. These units, consisting of tanks and assault guns, were fully equipped with desantniki, ready to engage firmly in the ongoing operations. The landing at Shenyang revealed a remarkable twist of fate. Waiting at the airfield for evacuation to Japan was none other than the recently abdicated Emperor Puyi of Manchukuo. On August 15, 1945, Puyi tuned in to the radio and listened to Emperor Hirohito's address announcing Japan's surrender. In this historic speech, the Showa Emperor referred to the Americans' use of a "most unusual and cruel bomb," which had just devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For Puyi, this was the first revelation of the atomic bombings, information that the Japanese had conveniently withheld from him until that moment. The aircraft carrying Major Chelyshev's force, escorted by fighter planes, landed at 1:15 PM without any opposition and captured him. This small unit's survival hinged on remaining unchallenged, and they successfully secured the airfield. They also freed several Allied personnel held at the nearby Hoten prisoner-of-war camp. As soon as the landing was secured, additional reinforcements were airlifted in later that day, led by General Kravchenko, the commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army. He formally accepted the city's surrender, and the Soviets then transported Puyi to the Siberian town of Chita.  Meanwhile, Vasilevsky's ground offensive pressed on, mostly unopposed, though some resistance persisted. In the Transbaikal Front, Marshal Malinovsky's General Pliyev led his cavalry-mechanized units against the Japanese forces at Kalgan. Other units reached Jehol and accepted the surrender of the 108th Division. General Danilov's 17th Army secured the Shanhaiguan coast, while General Managarov's 53rd Army pushed towards Kailu. The main force of General Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army regrouped at Tungliao and Kaitung, preparing to advance south toward Mukden. General Lyudnikov's 39th Army steadily approached Changchun, confronting the bypassed 107th Division, and General Luchinsky's 36th Army occupied Tsitsihar, accepting the surrender of the 136th Independent Mixed Brigade. At the same time, on General Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front, General Teryokhin's 2nd Red Banner Army continued its siege of the Aihun fortified region. Meanwhile, a forward detachment moved slowly south through the Lesser Khinghan Mountains. General Mamonov's 15th Army began capturing and processing prisoners from the many retreating Japanese units after a successful amphibious assault secured Sansing. The Amur Flotilla supported the army's push towards Harbin, while General Pashkov's 5th Rifle Corps finally reached Poli, which had already been occupied by other Soviet units. In Marshal Meretskov's 1st Far Eastern Front, forward detachments of General Zakhvatayev's 35th Army began arriving at Linkou, focusing on the surrender of Japanese units in the area. Rear elements effectively eliminated the last traces of enemy resistance in the Hutou fortified area.  After a challenging struggle through the wetlands and the capture of Mishan on August 12, advanced detachments of the 35th Army's main force, the 66th and 363rd Rifle Divisions, continued their advance against minimal opposition. The situation was starkly different to their rear, where the 1056th Rifle Regiment of the 264th Rifle Division, supported by the heavily reinforced 109th Fortified Region, worked to dismantle the now-isolated Hutou fortified area. Despite the dire circumstances, the garrison refused to surrender. Thus, the focus shifted to systematically eliminating their defenses, which became a painstaking task. The attackers deployed an artillery destruction group, secured air supremacy, and utilized well-trained assault formations. Their techniques included pouring kerosene or gasoline into ventilation shafts of underground structures, sometimes in alarming quantities. For instance, two tonnes of gasoline were recorded being poured into a single installation before ignition was applied. Despite the brutal and methodical obliteration of their positions, the defenders continued to ignore orders to surrender. Notably, on August 18, a Japanese prisoner was sent under a flag of truce to inform those still holding out that the war was officially over; tragically, he was hacked to death by a sword-wielding officer. Ultimately, this stubbornness led to catastrophic consequences: about 3,000 defenders were killed, blasted and burned, before a small number finally capitulated. Additionally, advanced detachments of General Beloborodov's 1st Red Banner Army reached Shangzhi before continuing towards Harbin, and forward elements of General Krylov's 5th Army pushed on toward Jilin. General Chistyakov's 25th Army commenced disarming General Murakami's 3rd Army, while the 10th Mechanized Corps advanced rapidly westward, crossing the Laoilin Mountain passes to arrive at Tunhua by nightfall. Over in North Korea, the 335th Rifle Division successfully landed in Chongjin, as General Kabanov's Southern Defense Region prepared for an assault on Gensan. In South Sakhalin, despite the surrender of the 125th Regiment and ongoing negotiations with General Mineki's 88th Division, Soviet forces opted to proceed with the planned landing at Maoka. Consequently, Admiral Andreyev's Northern Pacific Flotilla departed from Sovetskaya Gavan in the morning, carrying the bulk of the 113th Rifle Brigade along with a battalion of marines for the long and challenging voyage to Maoka. On Shumshu Island, as General Gnechko's forces were landing their artillery to renew their assault, Japanese officers unexpectedly approached the Soviets under flags of truce, carrying a letter from General Tsutsumi proposing negotiations for surrender. Representatives from both sides began discussions, and by 6 PM, the 91st Division formally surrendered the garrisons of Shumshu, Paramushir, and Onekotan. On August 20, Gnechko dispatched a small detachment on six vessels to seize control of the airfield at Kataoka. However, as they crossed the Second Kuril Strait, batteries on both sides of the narrow waterway opened heavy fire on the Soviet ships, forcing them to withdraw. This breach of the surrender agreement sparked a renewed offensive at 1 PM, coordinated with air strikes. The bases at Kataoka and Kashiwabar were bombed by 61 aircraft, which dropped over 200 bombs, enabling ground troops to push forward up to six kilometers. It was not until General Tsutsumi intervened that the Soviets were assured the Japanese would indeed lay down their arms. Meanwhile, Andreyev's convoy arrived at Maoka harbor on the morning of August 20, successfully landing the first wave of marines amid heavy fog. They quickly spread out and secured the area while the second and third waves of infantry followed behind. By noon, the port area was secured, and the marines began advancing eastward into the city, supported by infantry on their flanks. Taken by surprise, the Japanese defenders were ultimately compelled to retreat, with the 113th Rifle Brigade pursuing them through the mountains to the villages of Futamata and Osaka. In Manchuria, between August 20 and 21, Vasilevsky's units continued their advance to occupy the region's main centers. Stalin urged for greater speed, fearing that any delay might prompt President Truman to order General MacArthur's air-naval assault forces to land there. Notably, Pliyev's first column successfully captured Kalgan, while his second column moved south toward Beijing, securing Gubeikou at the border. Located in one of the passes through the Great Wall, marking the border between Manchukuo and China, the town was garrisoned by Japanese units. These forces surrendered upon the approach of the Soviet troops, who then quickly advanced toward Beijing, about 100 kilometers away. Although not the former capital itself, this area was under the control of Chinese Communist forces known as the 8th Route Army, who aligned with the Soviets. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek was acutely aware that any Japanese capitulation to the Communists in northern China would allow the latter to occupy vital territories, making their removal difficult. Consequently, he commanded the 8th Route Army not to accept any Japanese surrenders, insisting they only surrender to Nationalist forces, with dire punishments threatened for defiance. Adding to the complexity, the Soviet Union and China had signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, discussed at Yalta, just six days earlier on August 14. This treaty promised mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The Soviets had also committed to providing “moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources” exclusively to the National Government as the legitimate central authority of China. Thus, a significant political and military predicament loomed. However, the Soviets quickly extricated themselves from this situation when Malinovsky issued an order forbidding Pliyev's forces from crossing the border. As Pliyev recounted, his formations were poised just halfway between Chengde and Beijing, needing “only one 'leap' to the Chinese capital.” He noted, “I had to suspend the offensive and move north beyond the Great Wall.” Units from the 6th Guards Tank Army occupied both Changchun and Mukden, initiating a rail movement towards Port Arthur and Dairen. For those curious, at Pingfan and Changchun, General Shiro Ishii and the remaining personnel from Units 731 and 100 were captured by Soviet forces. In a tragic turn of events, all test subjects were murdered and cremated, while the Japanese attempted to destroy evidence of their facilities but were unable to do so in time. Following their capture, the Soviets launched an extensive campaign to uncover the secrets behind Units 731 and 100, leading to the Khabarovsk Trial. If you want to learn more about what I would call “japans operation paperclip”, the secret dealings between Unit 731 and the Allies after the war, I did make an episode about it over on my patreon. Its pretty gruesome stuff so big disclaimer there.' The Soviets arrived to Dairen on 24 August, although these places had surrendered to air-landed forces two days earlier. This was, no doubt, much to the relief of Stalin, as these were amongst the main locations where he most feared American intervention. Indeed, on the day of the landing he had told Vasilevsky to ‘keep in mind' the fact that any delay could mean ‘Truman will order General MacArthur to land his naval assault forces'. The long-resisting 135th Independent Mixed Brigade finally surrendered at Aihun, while advanced units of the 2nd Red Banner Army secured Nencheng and Peian before pushing towards Tsitsihar and Harbin. Forward detachments from the 15th and 1st Red Banner Armies also reached the already-occupied Harbin. Furthermore, advanced units of the 5th and 25th Armies arrived in Jilin to reinforce the air-landed detachment there. Additionally, units from the 88th Rifle Corps and the 10th Mechanized Corps began their southward movement into Korea, heading toward the 38th Parallel. In North Korea, Kabanov dispatched a marine battalion and other units, totaling around 2,000 men, to occupy the fortified port of Gensan on August 20. The following morning, the landing force arrived and disembarked without opposition. However, the Japanese garrison refused to surrender until orders from higher command were received. Meanwhile, Japanese troops began to peacefully surround the harbor area, while Soviet sailors and marines, in a similarly calm manner, took up their defensive positions. As Kabanov noted, “An incomprehensible situation arose, neither peace nor war. The enemy has numerical superiority, but he neither fights nor wants to capitulate.” Unsurprisingly, he added, “the night passed in suspense.” The surreal situation was resolved when Rear Admiral Hori Yugoro and Colonel Tado boarded the frigate EK-3 to meet with Captain Studenichnikov on the morning of August 22. During their discussions, they attempted to negotiate terms, but the Soviet captain issued a bold threat of an immediate large-scale air strike and the initiation of hostilities at the port unless they surrendered unconditionally. While the latter was likely an empty threat, the Japanese officers signed the surrender agreement nonetheless. The process of surrendering the garrison began that evening and continued until August 26. In total, the Soviets captured more than 7,000 officers and men, along with all their military equipment. Looking toward the northern Kuriles, Japanese forces on Shumshu finally began to lay down their weapons on the afternoon of August 22, as Gnechko's units spread out to secure the island. In Manchuria, airborne detachments were also landed at Dairen and Port Arthur to secure these key administrative centers before the Americans could take control. Vanguard units of the 6th Guards Tank Army arrived to reinforce them two days later. Meanwhile, in South Sakhalin, heavy fighting persisted at Futamata despite Mineki's ceasefire agreement on August 22. Soviet air strikes supported the ground forces when weather conditions allowed, and the Japanese finally surrendered by the nightfall of August 23. At the same time, Andreyev dispatched three marine battalions on a small convoy to capture Otomari. However, a fierce storm forced the flotilla to seek refuge in the port of Honto on the morning of August 24. Once the storm subsided that evening, the force left a company of marines to garrison the port and resumed their voyage to Otomari, arriving there on the morning of August 25, just as elements of the 113th Rifle Brigade reached the eastern outskirts of the city. By noon, the 88th Division surrendered, and the city was secured. Shortly after, the 214th Tank Brigade arrived at Toyohara to secure South Sakhalin's administrative center. Thus, the South Sakhalin operation concluded with nearly 18,320 Japanese soldiers taken prisoner. Yet, this wouldn't mark the end of operations for General Cheremisov's 16th Army. Stalin pushed for the 87th and 135th Rifle Brigades, along with three marine battalions, to assemble at Otomari and execute amphibious landings on the southern Kurile Islands, specifically, Etorofu, Shikotan, and Kunashiri, and the islets of the Habomai group. The failure to include the Kuril Islands in the areas designated for surrender to Soviet forces in Truman's General Order No. 1, originally issued on August 15, exacerbated Stalin's inherent suspicions regarding American intentions. Consequently, Vasilevsky was instructed to organize landings on the Kurils, ensuring that, similar to Port Arthur, Soviet occupation would manifest physically through boots on the ground. Despite Truman's subsequent correction of the omission, mistrust endured, as did the directive to occupy the islands. However, where Stalin hesitated was concerning Hokkaido. Truman's somewhat abrupt rejection of Stalin's demand for a portion of Hokkaido undoubtedly irritated the Soviet dictator, yet he chose not to take further action. Scholarly debates have arisen around the rationale behind Stalin's ‘retreat.' When viewed within the framework of his stated geostrategic goal of securing the Soviet Union's sea lines of communication in the Pacific, it becomes understandable. Churchill once likened the Soviet Union's challenges in this regard to those of a “giant with his nostrils pinched.” A look at the map reveals that control of the Kurils would significantly alleviate this pressure in the Far East, making their acquisition crucial. Similarly, occupying southern Sakhalin would allow the Soviet Union to control the northern side of the La Pérouse Strait, which connects the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk. The strait's opposite shore is formed by the northern coast of Hokkaido, and possessing this area would undeniably enhance the security of communications and is therefore highly desirable. However, any unilateral action in this regard would incur a significant and public breach with the Americans, the consequences of which could not be easily predicted. Given that Stalin's claim to the Kurils was firmly based on the agreement reached at Yalta, an agreement which Truman honored, his choice to avoid completely rupturing relations with the U.S. was motivated by strategic self-interest. Consequently, Andreyev's flotilla, carrying these units, departed Otomari on August 27, reaching the west coast of Etorofu at 3:15 AM on August 28. The landing, conducted using small boats, went unopposed and was met by the surrender of General Ogawa's 89th Division. The occupation of the other islands was also peaceful, with the Soviets securing Kunashiri by September 2, and Shikotan and the Habomai islets by September 5. The remaining northern Kurile Islands surrendered without incident as elements of Gnechko's Kamchatka forces arrived at Paramushir on August 24, Onekotan and Shiashkotan on August 25, Matsuwa by August 26, Shimushiru on August 27, and Uruppu by August 29. In total, 63,840 prisoners were taken throughout the Kuriles. On August 24, air-landed detachments arrived at the cities of Pyongyang and Kange to secure the last administrative centers in North Korea. Two days later, units of the 25th Army reached Gensan. With this move, albeit with some geographical liberties, Chistyakov asserted that "the troops of the 25th Army, on the orders of Marshal Meretskov, reached the 38th Parallel.” In the days that followed, units of General Kushibuchi's 34th Army gradually began to surrender and disarm. Finally, in Manchuria, most of Yamada's units had surrendered and were being disarmed. However, one unit continued to resist until the end of the month. The bypassed and encircled 107th Division was engaged in fierce fighting for survival against the 94th Rifle Corps. Due to a lack of communication with Kwantung Army Headquarters, they did not receive any ceasefire orders. As a result, a staff officer from General Iida's 30th Army was dispatched by plane to locate the division and deliver the ceasefire orders. The 107th Division was found near Chalai, and the plane made a forced landing between the Japanese troops and the opposing Soviet forces. The staff officer successfully delivered the orders terminating hostilities in that sector on August 30, which the Japanese troops promptly complied with. By September 1, units of the 53rd Army occupied Kailu, Chaoyang, Fuhsin, and Gushanbeitseifu, while forward detachments secured the Chinchou area on the Liaotung Peninsula. This marked the conclusion of the Manchurian campaign, with the Soviets claiming to have captured between 594,000 and 609,000 prisoners of war across Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and North Korea. The captured Japanese military personnel were subjected to forced labor in Siberian internment camps, as well as camps in Sakhalin, Manchuria, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia. A significant number were assigned to the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline. Unfortunately, the treatment of prisoners of war was deemed inhumane and mishandled. Many suffered from malnutrition, overwork, cave-ins, floods, unsanitary working conditions leading to epidemics, harsh winter weather, violent guards, and brutal suppression of even mild resistance. Disturbingly, some Japanese prisoners were even lynched by their fellow captives. Estimates suggest that between 60,000 and 347,000 Japanese died in captivity. Although 18,616 prisoners were released in 1946, the process of repatriating prisoners of war extended into the 1950s. Those who remained after 1950 were detained for various convictions. However, their release began in 1953 under different amnesties. Following Josef Stalin's death and the subsequent Khrushchev Thaw, the Soviet attitude toward the remaining Japanese prisoners shifted significantly. Accompanied by Soviet officials, they were taken on tours of cities and allowed to purchase gifts for their families. Before repatriation, a banquet in Khabarovsk, hosted by Nikolai Gagen, included high-ranking prisoners such as Jun Ushiroku as attendees. The last major group of 1,025 Japanese POWs was released on December 23, 1956. After that, some Japanese POWs were released in small groups, with some only returning in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, some prisoners who had been held for decades, many of whom had married and started families during their captivity, chose not to return permanently to Japan. The Soviets committed numerous war crimes during their invasion and occupation of Manchuria and other Japanese territories. During the invasion, Soviet soldiers killed and raped Japanese civilians and looted civilian property. Following the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 9, 1945, a large number of Japanese citizens residing in the region sought to repatriate to Japan. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers supervised this mass movement and, in October 1945, delegated responsibility to Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare. The Kwantung Army, which was meant to protect the Japanese settlers in Manchuria, quickly retreated and abandoned them. With most able-bodied men drafted into the army, the majority of those left behind were women, children, and the elderly, rendering them highly vulnerable to attacks from Soviet soldiers and local Chinese seeking revenge.In Soviet-occupied Manchuria and North Korea, the repatriation of Japanese civilians was characterized by violent expulsions, accompanied by widespread looting, mass killings, and rampant sexual violence perpetrated by both Soviet soldiers and local populations seeking retribution. Many Japanese civilians succumbed to starvation, disease, mass killings, and mass suicides. Approximately 223,000 Japanese civilians residing in the Soviet-occupied zones died, most within a year and a half after August 9, 1945. Regarding the extensive rape of Japanese women and girls by Soviet soldiers, a former Japanese soldier, Wakatsuki Yoshio, detailed these grim experiences in his memoir, The Records of Postwar Repatriation “What word can possibly describe the violence committed by the Soviet soldiers on Japanese women? I can only think of the word “hideous”. The victim could be a girl of twelve or thirteen years old or an old lady of almost seventy years old. These soldiers did not choose the sites where they raped them, in public, in broad daylight, even on snow-covered roads”. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria in 1945 left many Japanese women stranded after their male family members were either conscripted or killed. These women, including young girls, endured severe hardships, facing gang rapes by Soviet soldiers and local Chinese militia groups. In a desperate effort to survive, many were forced to marry Chinese men, either out of necessity or in exchange for assistance in repatriating their remaining family members. Disturbingly, some victims were as young as thirteen. Some women were held in groups and subjected to repeated sexual violence over extended periods. In certain instances, to ensure the safety of the group, members of the Japanese community offered women to their perpetrators. There were also reports of women voluntarily submitting themselves to protect their families, younger peers, or others in their communities. After Japan's defeat in 1945, leaders of the Kurokawa Settler Group in Manchuria offered approximately 15 young women, aged 17 to 21, to Soviet soldiers in exchange for protection. This tragic practice continued from September to November 1945, with some of the women later being offered to Chinese soldiers as well. With no protection from Japanese soldiers, Japanese women often had to devise unique strategies to avoid rape. Memoirs from female repatriates detail various escape tactics. Some women hid in attics every night, narrowly avoiding capture or even gunfire. Others managed to trap intruders in rooms before fleeing or bribed Soviet soldiers with valuables, such as wristwatches, to secure their escape. Notably, some women, particularly former geisha and bar workers, voluntarily went with Soviet soldiers to protect others. These women were referred to as tokkōtai (kamikaze) for their self-sacrifice. Additionally, it wasn't just Japanese women who suffered; Korean and Chinese women were also victims of sexual violence at the hands of various perpetrators in Manchuria. British and American reports indicate that Soviet Red Army troops looted and terrorized the local population in Shenyang, a city in Manchuria. A foreign witness described how Soviet troops, formerly stationed in Berlin, were permitted by the Soviet military to enter Shenyang for "three days of rape and pillage." In Harbin, Soviet forces ignored protests from leaders of the Chinese Communist Party regarding the widespread mass rape and looting committed by their troops. In the immediate aftermath of the war in 1945, in areas of Manchuria occupied by the National Revolutionary Army, 176 Koreans were killed, 1,866 were injured, 3,468 were detained, and 320 were raped by armed Chinese mobs. The attacks against Korean residents in Manchuria were believed to stem from a perception of Korean collaboration with Japanese colonial rule. One of the most infamous instances was the Gegenmiao massacre. On August 10 and 11, Xing'an was bombed, nearly destroying its urban functions. It is estimated that 3,000 of the 4,000 civilians. Anticipating the Soviet invasion, Xing'an had prepared an evacuation plan divided into three groups based on residential area and workplace. The Kwantung Army, however, failed to inform the General Office officials about their retreat. As a result, residents in the eastern area, many of whom were self-employed or office workers, had difficulty obtaining information and securing transportation, while those in the western area had military personnel who were first to learn of the situation. Some of the civilians with a handful of armed men had proceeded on foot towards Gegenmiao Township, about 35 kilometers southeast of Xing'an Street, to wait for a train at Gegenmiao Station and then evacuate to Baichengzi. They aimed to receive protection from the Kwantung Army in Baichengzi. Around 11:40 AM on August 14 in the vicinity of Gegenmyo Hill, where a Lamaist temple was located, they encountered an infantry unit consisting of 14 Soviet medium tanks and 20 trucks. The column reportedly stretched for two kilometers, with about a hundred survivors among them. Soviet troops launched an attack from the hilltop, deploying tanks with machine-gun fire. The tanks attacked multiple times, and when they ceased, Soviet soldiers disembarked and ruthlessly shot and bayoneted survivors. Many who escaped death from gunfire were still severely injured or witnessed family members being killed. Some were left holding their loved ones or chose to commit suicide. It is estimated that only about a hundred survivors were later confirmed, including nearly 200 schoolchildren from the Xing'an Street Zaiman National School. Kwantung Army units, which were supposed to escort the civilians and counterattack, had already retreated southward. Even after the Soviet soldiers left, sporadic gunfire continued, presumably due to suicides. Local residents began to plunder the bodies, stripping them of clothes and valuables. Others drowned in the river while attempting to escape. Reports tell of one woman who had her child killed by Soviet soldiers, only to later face an attack from Chinese militia, who stripped her of her clothes and mutilated her. Surviving mothers and children were also attacked, and those separated were often taken by the Chinese. At the time, it was common for Japanese boys to be sold for 300 yen and girls for 500 yen. Some survivors gathered together and began committing mass suicide, killing those who wished to end their lives. Others expressed intentions to form a death squad with rifles for revenge but ultimately did not resist.   After the war ended on August 15, attacks on displaced persons continued. A 12-year-old girl who joined a group of about ten women after the incident reported that they were attacked and robbed, taking over a week to reach Zhenxi Station, 10 kilometers from Gegenmiao Station. The women sought shelter in an abandoned house near the station but were discovered by Soviet soldiers that night who assaulted them until midnight. Afterward, the soldiers piled dry grass into the house, setting it ablaze in an attempt to burn the women alive. The girl and her sister managed to escape through a window, but many others could not flee in time due to the fire's rapid spread. The girl was forced to live as a residual orphan afterward. Fortunately, some Chinese, Mongolians, and Koreans provided food for the survivors, with some Chinese showing kindness towards the children. Those orphaned children, whose parents had been killed, became known as residual orphans, with about 30 in this unfortunate situation. Many women were forced to become residual women as well. Tragically, around 200 students from a local school, including the headmaster and his wife, were killed during this chaos. Some historians believe the attack stemmed from Soviet soldiers mistaking the refugees for armed Japanese troops because men within the group were carrying firearms for protection. In general, displaced persons at this time often carried small weapons like rifles, and some groups were even armed with light machine guns. In the pioneer groups, women sometimes participated in fighting against bandits, and in the Sado pioneer group incident, children above the fifth grade were forced into combat, regardless of gender. There may also have been prior skirmishes with other Japanese civilian groups before the war's end, further complicating the situation as the Soviet Army, which included female soldiers, may have regarded these mixed civilian and armed groups as a threat. According to Soviet military combat records, on August 14, the Soviet 17th Guards Rifle Division, 19th Guards Rifle Division, 91st Guards Rifle Division, and 61st Tank Division were stationed northwest of Gezhne Temple, but there was no combat activity in the area. On August 15, this unit advanced toward Bai Chengzi and occupied Bai Chengzi Station, which was then taken over by tanks from the 61st Tank Division. Despite extensive documentation, nothing about this incident was revealed until 2014 during the process of perestroika. Reports from British and American sources indicate that the 700,000 Soviet troops occupying Manchuria also terrorized and looted the local population in Mukden. They were not deterred by Soviet authorities and engaged in what was described as "three days of rape and pillage," with similar atrocities occurring in Harbin and across the country. Amid the mass repatriation of Japanese civilians living in the region, Japanese women in Manchuria faced repeated sexual violence at the hands of Russian soldiers every day. In North Korea, it was similarly reported that Soviet soldiers raped both Japanese and Korean women. Additionally, Soviet soldiers looted the property of Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans residing in Manchuria and North Korea. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amid chaotic surrenders, Emperor Hirohito accepted defeat, but Soviet advances continued relentlessly. As they pushed deeper, the Soviets captured key cities, including Harbin, while Japan's soldiers and civilians struggled for survival against the onslaught. War crimes committed by Soviet troops added to the tragedy, with rampant violence against Japanese civilians. Amidst political tensions, the Soviets secured territory, culminating in the surrender of remaining Japanese forces. The grim conclusion of this campaign marked a profound shift in the power dynamics of East Asia and paved the way for post-war ramifications.

FAN MAIL--We would love YOUR feedback--Send us a Text MessageThe darkest moments of history often involve impossible choices between terrible options. Such was the case in August 1945, when President Harry Truman authorized the use of atomic weapons to end World War II. In this compelling episode, we examine Richard B. Frank's definitive account "Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire" to understand why those bombs, despite their horrific toll, likely saved millions of lives.What makes this historical moment so powerful is the stark mathematics behind the decision. By summer 1945, Japan's strategic situation was hopeless, yet their commitment to fight remained absolute. American intelligence revealed 4 million Japanese troops still under arms, with 900,000 defenders fortifying Kyushu exactly where Americans planned to land. Their "Operation Ketsu-Go" included 540 midget submarines, 3,000 suicide boats, 4,000 underwater frogmen, and waves of kamikazes – all designed to inflict such devastating American casualties that the U.S. would accept a negotiated peace rather than unconditional surrender.The alternatives to atomic weapons were grim. Conventional bombing had already killed 300,000 Japanese civilians and destroyed 66 cities without prompting surrender. A naval blockade would cause millions to starve slowly. The planned invasion, Operation Downfall, projected 500,000 to 4 million American casualties and 5-10 million Japanese deaths. Even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which together killed approximately 214,000 people, Japan's War Council remained deadlocked until Emperor Hirohito personally intervened.This episode challenges us to consider how we judge difficult historical decisions without knowing all the facts. As Frank concludes: "American goals were simply not victory but peace... Had American leaders in 1945 been assured that Japan and the United States would pass two generations in tranquility... they would have believed their hard choices had been vindicated, and so should we." Join us as we explore this pivotal moment that reminds us why understanding history's hardest choices matters for our world today.Key Points from the Episode:• After David's father's accident and recovery, the podcast is returning to its previous format• The "patriotic orthodoxy" that emerged after WWII holds that atomic bombs not only caused Japanese surrender but prevented horrific invasion casualties• Critics argue Japan was already defeated and seeking surrender, or that alternatives like a demonstration bombing would have sufficed• American intelligence revealed 4 million Japanese troops under arms, with 900,000 defenders on Kyushu and 12,000 aircraft converted for kamikaze attacks• Japan's "Operation Ketsu-Go" strategy focused on inflicting maximum American casualties to force a negotiated peace• Conventional bombing had already killed 300,000 Japanese civilians and destroyed 66 cities without prompting surrender• Atomic bombs killed approximately 214,000 people by December 1945 – a tragedy, but far fewer than the 5-10 million Japanese casualties projected from invasion• The Japanese Supreme War Council remained deadlocked even after both bombs, requiring Emperor Hirohito's personal intervention• History shows Truman faced only bad options, and chose the one that would end the war with the fewest deathsOther resources: Want to leave a review? Click here, and if we earned a five-star review from you **high five and knuckle bumps**, we appreciate it greatly, thank you so much!

Last time we spoke about the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki amidst relentless Allied aerial campaigns, chaos engulfed Japan. Prime Minister Suzuki's cabinet debated surrendering to avoid annihilation while fearing for the imperial family's future. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union launched an unexpected invasion of Manchuria, rapidly advancing and catching Japanese forces off guard. As negotiations unfolded, a group of military conspirators, led by Major Hatanaka, attempted a coup to halt the surrender, believing they could rally support. They seized the Imperial Palace but failed to find the Emperor's recorded surrender speech amid the chaos. In a decisive moment, Emperor Hirohito accepted the Potsdam Declaration, stipulating the emperor's continuation, thus sealing Japan's fate. That same day, the world learned of Japan's capitulation, marking the end of the Pacific War. The once powerful nation now lay in ruins, yet the Emperor's decision bore the weight of a nation saved from further destruction, embodying a fragile hope for the future amidst the horrors of war. This episode is the Battle for South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we previously discussed, the Japanese Empire made the difficult decision to surrender on August 14, amid the turmoil of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and South Sakhalin. The following day, this decision was announced to the world. However, in Manchuria, General Yamada's Kwantung Army chose to continue fighting until they received a clear ceasefire order. At this moment, several developments unfolded. General Hongo's 44th Army was on a forced retreat toward the Hsinking-Mukden line under General Ushiroku's command, leaving their 107th Division trapped behind Soviet lines. Meanwhile, General Iida's 30th Army was redeploying to Hsinking, which was starting to be evacuated, while General Uemura's 4th Army had orders to withdraw to Meihokou, taking over positions left by the 30th Army.  The advance of enemy armored columns in the west was severely hindering the evacuation of Japanese nationals. On the 10th, the Kwantung Army requested the Manchukuoan Government to facilitate the evacuation of Japanese residents in Hainking and its surroundings. They directed the Continental Railway Command to prepare ten trains for this purpose, with the first train scheduled to depart from Hsinking that same day. However, the Manchukuoan Government found it nearly impossible to carry out the withdrawal swiftly. They managed to transport only the families of officers and civilians linked to the army, and these families had to flee with just a few hours' notice, taking almost nothing but the clothes on their backs. By the 12th, Hsinking was in a state of chaos. The advance of enemy armored units, coupled with the retreat of the main force of the 44th Army, led to the evacuation of the capital by the Kwantung Army General Headquarters. This turmoil coincided with the arrival of the first refugee trains, carrying Japanese evacuees from the western border areas, causing widespread panic among local residents. Many hurried to the already overcrowded train station, desperate to escape the unfolding crisis. In the face of enemy pressure, the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 119th Division continued to resist assaults at Hailar and Pokotu, respectively. The 123rd Division and the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade were heavily engaged in the fortified regions of Sunwu and Aihun, and the 136th Independent Mixed Brigade was directed to reinforce Tsitsihar, while the 134th Division retreated to Fangcheng. General Shimizu's 5th Army prepared for a last stand at Mutanchiang, while the isolated 124th Division made plans to withdraw. The 132nd Independent Mixed Brigade had already retreated to Tachienchang, and the 128th Division was getting ready to confront the enemy advance at Lotzokou, with General Murakami's 3rd Army holding strong in the Tumen fortified region. Meanwhile, the Nanam Divisional District Unit successfully repelled an amphibious invasion in Chongjin, and the 88th Division's 125th Regiment staunchly defended Furuton on South Sakhalin. In a desperate bid to avoid further disaster, Yamada finally instructed Ushiroku to adhere to their original plan and prepare for a withdrawal to the Hunjen area, even if it meant leaving Japanese citizens and their cities vulnerable to the approaching Soviets. Ushiroku hesitantly agreed to the order but never got the chance to act on it. On August 15, Marshal Vasilevsky's offensive advanced much like the previous days, facing an enemy that continued to resist fiercely. To counter this, orders came to intensify the assault to gain control of key operational and strategic points as quickly as possible. In Marshal Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front, General Pliyev's cavalry-mechanized units encountered heavy opposition from the Inner Mongolian 3rd, 5th, and 7th Cavalry Divisions at Kanbao. Meanwhile, General Danilov's 17th Army pressed toward Chihfeng but was hindered by water shortages, intense heat, and challenging sandy terrain. General Managarov's 53rd Army began its advance toward Kailu, while General Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army continued its march along two fronts. The 7th Guards Mechanized Corps moved east toward Changchun, while both the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps advanced southeast toward Mukden. Notably, General Lyudnikov's 39th Army finally captured Tepossi and Wangyemiao.  Heavy Japanese resistance persisted in the sector of the 36th Army, notably in the Hailar Fortified Region and along the road and rail line through the Grand Khingan Mountains leading to Pokotu. The Japanese 119th Infantry Division put up a determined defense of Pokotu, successfully delaying the Soviet forces of the 2nd Rifle Corps from August 15 to 17, despite heavy rainfall. Meanwhile, in the rear of the 36th Army, the fighting in Hailar remained intense. The 86th Rifle Corps employed heavy artillery to systematically dismantle enemy strongholds in the hills to the northwest and southwest of the city. Position after position fell to relentless artillery bombardments, combined with sapper and infantry assaults. Ultimately, the Soviets extinguished the last vestiges of Japanese resistance in Hailar on August 18 when the remaining garrison of 3,827 men surrendered. Concurrently, in Marshal Meretskov's 1st Far Eastern Front, forward detachments of General Zakhvatayev's 35th Army secured Poli. General Beloborodov's 1st Red Banner Army broke through the frontline of the 135th Division and initiated an assault on the last Japanese positions just outside Yehho. Meanwhile, General Krylov's 5th Army, having successfully breached the Ssutaoling heights the previous evening, launched attacks against the 126th Division's positions at Aiho but was ultimately repelled by the defenders. In light of these developments, Generals Kita and Shimizu decided to order a withdrawal toward Hengtaohotzu, which they executed successfully after sunset, leaving behind some units to cover the retreat. Further south, General Chistyakov's 25th Army split into two columns at Heitosai. The 17th Rifle Corps and the 72nd Mechanized Brigade advanced west toward the Taipingling Pass, while the 39th Rifle Corps, along with the 72nd and 257th Tank Brigades, headed southwest toward Wangching. The 17th Rifle Corps effectively breached the main defenses of the Japanese 128th Division, forcing it to retreat to second-line positions southwest of Taipingling. On the morning of August 15, enemy air activity against Army Headquarters intensified significantly. Meanwhile, the Army Commander and several staff officers set out via Pataohotzu to inspect the defenses in the Hoeryong area, where the 101st Regiment was retreating from the Chonghak sector. At noon, while at the headquarters of the 127th Division in Pataohotzu, General Murakami and his accompanying staff listened to the Emperor's broadcast announcing the termination of the war. Opinions among the officers were divided regarding the veracity of this broadcast. After a brief discussion, they decided to continue military operations as per existing instructions until they received a formal cessation order. Later that night, a formal order arrived from First Area Army Headquarters, directing that all active resistance be halted, though self-defense measures were still to be implemented if necessary. Around the same time, a report came in from the 1st Mobile Brigade indicating that their positions in the Wangching area, about 25 miles northeast of Army Headquarters at Yenchi, were under attack by a sizable Soviet tank force. In response, a counterattack force was hastily assembled, consisting of two infantry battalions from the 127th Division. They were directed to advance to Wangching along the Yenchi-Chiulungping road to confront the enemy tanks. These battalions likely included the 3rd Battalion of the 280th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 281st Regiment. Additionally, the 88th Rifle Corps took control of Hunchun and crossed the Inanho River, where they encountered well-entrenched Japanese forces from the 112th Division. To further pressure the enemy, the 258th Rifle Division crossed the Tumen River at Hunyong to attack the Japanese right flank. In General Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front, General Mamonov's 15th Army continued its two-pronged advance toward Chiamussu, while General Pashkov's 5th Rifle Corps pushed forward to Poli. Meanwhile, General Teryokhin's 2nd Red Banner Army assigned some elements to maintain the siege of Sunwu and Aihun while forward detachments bypassed these fortified regions, moving south toward Nencheng and Peian. In South Sakhalin, General Cheremisov's 16th Army faced fierce resistance from Japanese forces at Furuton. Admiral Andreyev's Northern Pacific Flotilla prepared for an amphibious landing at Toro, while the Pacific Fleet, under Admiral Yumashev, successfully landed Major-General Vasily Trushin's 13th Naval Infantry Brigade at Chongjin in the early hours of August 15. This effort aimed to relieve the besieged Soviet naval units and gradually push back against the defending Japanese forces. On August 16, the entire Soviet force, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sergey Kabanov, secured Chongjin city and its port after overcoming strong resistance, just as the 393rd Rifle Division was arriving in the area. Simultaneously, Andreyev's fleet departed from Sovetskaya Gavan and approached Toro in the early hours of the day. At 05:17, 141 marines from the initial reconnaissance detachment successfully landed ashore quietly, and by 06:00, they had taken the port with virtually no opposition. The reconnaissance group then advanced about three kilometers east, where they encountered heavy resistance; meanwhile, the rest of the marine battalion landed successfully by 10:00. After securing Shakhtyorsk at midday, the Soviet marines began their push south toward Esutoru, their main objective, while a supporting infantry battalion landed behind them. To the north, the 56th Rifle Corps managed to break through and capture Furuton, though it failed to seize the strategically significant Happo Mountain. In Manchuria, the 88th Rifle Corps continued its attacks on the 112th and 79th Divisions but was unsuccessful. The 39th Rifle Corps column advanced toward Tumen and Yenchi, while the 17th Rifle Corps column effectively expelled Japanese forces from the Taipingling area to secure the pass. By evening, units from the 1st Red Banner Army cleared Mutanchiang, and the 5th Army units moved south of the city to continue their southwest advance toward Ningan. The 15th Army executed a coordinated amphibious assault, successfully capturing Chiamussu. The 39th Army advanced along the railroad from Wangyemiao to Changchun, with its main force ultimately securing Taonan by the end of the day, while other units reduced the Halung-Arshaan fortified region. Finally, forward detachments of the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps secured Tungliao and Kaitung, respectively. On August 17, Prince Takeda Tsuneyoshi, on behalf of the Emperor, arrived at Hsinking to deliver the official ceasefire order. However, this did not cancel ongoing operational missions, as the order stipulated that the cessation of hostilities did not apply to unavoidable acts of self-defense during enemy attacks made before the completion of armistice negotiations. Tokyo's orders demonstrated that Yamada was authorized to conduct on-the-spot negotiations for an armistice with the Soviets. Consequently, the Manchurian Campaign continued amidst the negotiations. Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian units successfully defeated the Inner Mongolians at Kanbao; the 17th Army overcame light opposition from the 108th Division to occupy Chihfeng; the 39th Army concentrated its forces at Taonan while the 94th Rifle Corps mopped up rear areas; and the 36th Army defeated the 119th Division to capture Pokotu. Simultaneously, the 2nd Red Banner Army directed heavy artillery and air strikes to reduce the Aihun and Sunwu Fortified Regions, while the 15th Army initiated a push south along the Sungari River toward Sansing. The 363rd Rifle Division passed through Chihsi, with the 66th Rifle Division focusing on Poli. Units from the 1st Red Banner Army advanced northwest toward Harbin, and the 72nd Rifle Corps marched southward along the east bank of the Mutan River, attempting unsuccessfully to cross the river north of Ningan. The 17th Rifle Corps pursued the 128th Division, and forward elements of the 10th Mechanized Corps moved sixty kilometers from the Taipingling Pass to secure the critical rail and road junction at Tahsingkou. Additionally, the reinforced 72nd Tank Brigade intercepted the counterattacking force of the 127th Division at Nianyantsun. The 39th Rifle Corps broke through the northern defenses of the 79th Division to seize the outskirts of Tumen, while the 88th Rifle Corps successfully pushed aside enemy defenders at Mayusan to occupy Onsang. At South Sakhalin, as the marine force surrounded Esutoru, the 22nd Independent Machinegun Company was deployed to support the marine assault, which quickly penetrated the urban area and secured the city by midday. Meanwhile, fighting continued around Mount Happo, where the 214th Tank Brigade was dispatched south toward the ultimate objective of Toyohara. However, given the distance involved, it was decided to conduct a second amphibious assault on the port of Maoka. On August 18, Yamada finally issued the ceasefire orders to the 1st, 3rd, and 17th Area Armies, as well as to the 4th Army and the 2nd Air Army. His chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Hata Hikosaburo, met with Marshal Vasilevsky in Harbin to discuss procedures for disarmament, the protection of Japanese nationals in Manchuria, and related matters. Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army Headquarters made extensive efforts to relay as much information as possible about the termination of hostilities and disarmament to its subordinate commands using all available communication methods. However, these efforts were hindered by the wide dispersal of forces, many of which initially refused to surrender. General Higuchi's 5th Area Army received the ceasefire orders on August 17. Although he quickly notified his units—particularly those in Sakhalin and the Kuriles, war continued in these islands for a short period as he sought to prevent a potential invasion of Hokkaido. In Sakhalin, Major Yoshio Suzuki, the Chief of Staff of the 88th Division, received Higuchi's combat order on the afternoon of August 16, preparations for ceasefire were already underway, such as the disbandment of mobilized units, the discharge of some troops, and the disposal of the regimental flag. The division had no tanks or aircraft, and certainly no anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons that could withstand Soviet forces. In light of this, Suzuki quickly ordered the re-arming of units and the occupation of positions, in accordance with the desire of Mineki and Higuchi to prevent the fall of South Sakhalin and a possible invasion of Hokkaido. Civilians, at this point, were already voicing complaints, wondering if the military was still going to continue fighting. After the surrender of the 125th Infantry Regiment, the Japanese command in the Northern District was effectively assumed by the staff of the 88th Division stationed at Kamishikika. During the fighting on the central military road, by the morning of August 17, evacuation of the civilian population from Kamishikika had been completed, and the town was burned to the ground by Japanese forces' scorched earth tactics, along with an air raid by 20 Soviet aircraft. Kamishikika was abandoned on August 20, marking the start of a full retreat. The construction of a defensive line involving the destruction of the Uro Bridge and the Chidori River Bridge was considered but ultimately abandoned due to the presence of evacuees. Meanwhile, in the Kuriles, a new operation was unfolding. According to Vasilevsky's orders, once operations against Manchuria and South Sakhalin were sufficiently advanced, a small force from the Kamchatka Defense Region, supported by naval units from the Petropavlovsk Naval Base, was to conduct amphibious assaults on the Kuril Islands in preparation for a future landing at the port of Rumoi on Hokkaido's west coast On August 15, President Truman and Soviet Premier Stalin agreed that Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel would surrender to the Soviets, while those to the south would surrender to the Americans. Stalin's agreement surprised the US, as there was little chance of American forces landing on the Korean peninsula at that time. In what many scholars interpret as an attempt to achieve reciprocal generosity from Truman, Stalin proposed amending the order to include the northern half of Hokkaido and all of the Kuril Islands in the region of surrender to Soviet forces. This northern portion, he stated, should be demarcated by a line drawn ‘from the town of Kushiro on the eastern coast . . . to the town of Rumoe (Rumoi) on the western coast . . .', with both towns included in the occupation area However, Truman only acquiesced concerning the Kuriles, honoring the pact reached at Yalta, while specifying that all the islands of mainland Japan were to surrender to General MacArthur. Nonetheless, concerned by the exclusion of the Kuriles from the original agreement, Stalin instructed Vasilevsky to organize landings to occupy the islands. This mission was assigned to Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front and Yumashev's Pacific Fleet, which, in turn, designated Major-General Aleksei Gnechko's Kamchatka Defense Region and Captain Dmitri Ponomarev's Petropavlovsk Naval Base to execute the first landings on Shumshu and Paramushir, followed by a subsequent amphibious assault on Onekotan. These inexperienced commanders had limited time to plan for their operations, assemble the necessary commercial vessels for transportation, and hurriedly gather the army units dispersed across Kamchatka. Ultimately, the primary unit chosen for the landings was Major-General Porfiry Dyakov's 101st Rifle Division, supplemented by a battalion of marines. Meanwhile, Ponomarev managed to gather an invasion flotilla of 64 vessels. Although the Soviets had air superiority, it was unreliable due to the peculiar climatic conditions. “There were very peculiar climatic conditions in the Far East and Sakhalin; almost every airfield had its own special microclimate. In the coastal zone, frequent outbursts of moist sea air, forming a curtain of thick fog, caused a lot of trouble.”. The limited firepower of Ponomarev's flotilla forced the Soviets to land on the northeast corner of Shumshu, which could be targeted by the coastal guns at Cape Lopatka. Additionally, Gnechko planned a diversionary landing on the southeast side of the island. Opposing the Soviets, Higuchi had Lieutenant-General Tsutsumi Fusaki's 91st Division garrisoning the northern islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, the 41st Independent Mixed Regiment on Matsuwa Island, the 129th Independent Mixed Brigade on Uruppu Island, and Lieutenant-General Ogawa Gonosuke's 89th Division stationed on the southern islands of Etorofu, Shikotan, and Kunashiri.  Shumshu is the northernmost island in the Kuril chain, separated from Cape Lopatka, the southernmost tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula, by the 11-kilometer-wide First Kuril Strait. Covering an area of approximately 388 square kilometers and roughly oval in shape , Shumshu's proximity to Soviet territory, similar to its larger neighbor to the south, Paramushir, ensured that it was strongly defended. The garrison on Shumshu comprised about 8,500 troops, whereas the larger island boasted a garrison of approximately 14,500. The strait between the two islands narrows to about 2.5 kilometers at its smallest point, thus allowing these garrisons to provide mutual support. As Slavinsky notes: “Shumshu and Paramushir, with their naval bases located opposite each other on both sides of the Second Kuril Strait, were, in essence, a single key position.” The capture of Shumshu was crucial to the success of subsequent island operations. While there were several airfields on these islands, they housed very few aircraft, which had been withdrawn earlier to the Japanese main islands in preparation for the anticipated “final battle” with the Americans. However, Shumshu was defended by a tank force from the 11th Tank Regiment, commanded by Colonel Sueo Ikeda. This force consisted of thirty-nine medium tanks, including nineteen Type-97 Chi-Ha tanks and twenty Type-97 ShinHoTo Chi-Ha (improved Type-97) tanks, alongside twenty-five Type-95 Ha-Go light tanks. Both Shumshu and Paramushir were equipped with permanent defensive works along the coast and inland. On Shumshu, these defenses included 34 bunkers and 24 pillboxes within several powerful strongpoints, featuring around 100 guns of varying calibers, some reaching up to 100mm. Approximately 300 prepared firing points were established for both heavy and light machine guns. Most of Shumshu's coast is bordered by cliffs, leading to a concentration of the strongest defenses in areas deemed vulnerable to amphibious assault. Notably, a battery was installed in the wreck of the Soviet tanker Mariupol, which had become stranded on the beach between Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari in 1943. Although the island is relatively flat, it possesses several hills with sides that are nearly bare of trees, and these heights also housed additional strongpoints. Shumshu features 120 kilometers of roads, which facilitated terrestrial communication between various points. Additionally, the garrison constructed numerous dummy installations to mislead reconnaissance efforts. Nevertheless, Ponomarev's flotilla departed from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky at approximately 05:00 on August 17, moving slowly and stealthily toward their objective in foggy conditions. This weather ultimately forced Gnechko to cancel the planned diversionary landing. In any event, the first landing craft approached the beach at 04:22 hours on 18 August still hidden in the murk, but were forced to halt some 100–150m from shore in water up to 2m deep; they had been overloaded which prevented them getting closer in. The troops of the advanced detachment (two companies of marines, a maritime border guard company, and a submachine gun company) had then to wade, heavily burdened, to dry land. This went on undisturbed until personnel on one of the landing craft opened fire; this, spreading to the other ships, alerted the defenders, who replied with ‘promiscuous' machine-gun fire. Nevertheless, by 05:00 hours, and having suffered only ‘insignificant' losses, the advanced detachment was ashore and its main force, under Major Pyotr Shutov, was moving off the beach into the interior of the island. Two groups of marines moved left and right to deal with enemy positions on the capes flanking the landing ground. They managed to destroy several firing points, but were too few to overcome the stronger resistance nests protecting the gun positions. A series of hills inland formed the initial objective of the advance. Behind them, Dyatlov's first wave faced heavy bombardment from Japanese artillery, suffering significant casualties as the troops struggled to scramble ashore by 09:00. The second wave experienced a similar fate but managed to disembark by 13:00, joining the first wave in advancing on the high ground to the southwest. This second wave successfully repelled a series of Japanese tank counterattacks, resulting in the loss of Colonel Sueo. Despite being pushed back somewhat, the Soviets held their position while their aircraft targeted the naval bases on the island's southern side, aiming to hinder reinforcements from Paramushir. By nightfall, Gnechko's forces had secured a beachhead approximately 4 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers deep, while assault groups successfully destroyed Japanese artillery positions on Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari. Meanwhile, Kabanov's new Southern Defense Region command was ordered to quickly land naval units at Odaejin and Gensan to prevent the Japanese from evacuating their forces from Korea to the Home Islands. Consequently, a small naval force from the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade departed from Chongjin, successfully landing unopposed at Odaejin at 08:00 on August 18. Elsewhere in eastern Manchuria, the 25th Army consolidated its hold on northeastern Korea, dispatching the 10th Mechanized Corps west toward Tunhua and Kirin and northwest toward Tungchingcheng amidst the surrender of Murakami's 3rd Army. The 72nd Rifle Corps successfully crossed the Mutan River north of Ningan, while units from the 1st Red Banner Army and the 5th Army were deployed to receive and process surrendering Japanese units of Shimizu's 5th Army. To the north, the 2nd Red Banner Army maintained pressure on the Aihun and Sunwu Fortified Regions, leading to the surrender of the 123rd Division, although the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade continued to resist at Aihun. Be that as it may, the Japanese artillery positioned at Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari wreaked havoc on the second echelon, which was comprised of the 373rd Rifle Regiment. During this engagement, a patrol boat and four landing craft were lost, while eight others sustained serious damage. Once again, Soviet troops were forced to improvise ways to reach dry land; however, this time, the echelon's commander, Colonel P.A. Artyushen, along with his headquarters, managed to land via a torpedo boat. It took until 13:00 hours to fully disembark the second echelon, by which point its forward units had linked up with those forces advancing on the high ground to the southwest. By then, Artyushen had assumed command of all the forces ashore. While the number of troops was considerable, they still lacked heavy weapons, with only four 45mm anti-tank guns having been landed. Unsurprisingly, the Japanese counterattacked as soon as possible, with the advanced forward units under Shutov bearing the brunt of the assault. In a reversal of the combat situations previously encountered throughout the war with Japan, Soviet infantry now found themselves facing several tank attacks from the Japanese. One of these assaults was personally led by Colonel Sueo Ikeda, the commander of the 11th Tank Regiment, who was reported to be waving a samurai sword and Japanese flag from the turret, according to some accounts. Fortunately for the Soviets, these Japanese tanks were relatively weak compared to the T-34. While they posed a threat to unsupported infantry, they proved vulnerable to Degtyarev PTRD-41 anti-tank rifles and RPG-43 anti-tank grenades. The tank-led attacks were ultimately repelled, with Colonel Sueo perishing in the fighting. Despite being pushed back somewhat, the Soviets managed to withstand the onslaught. For his heroism during this challenging combat situation, in which he was wounded three times, Shutov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, along with the Order of Lenin and the Golden Star medal. Despite being somewhat pushed back, the Soviets held their ground while their aircraft targeted the naval bases on the southern side of the island to hinder reinforcements from Paramushir. The weather cleared sufficiently in the late morning, allowing Soviet air strikes to commence that afternoon. These strikes involved groups of eight to sixteen aircraft and were primarily directed at the Kataoka and Kashiwabar naval bases, successfully preventing the transfer of Japanese reinforcements from Paramushir. However, the sky remained cloudy enough to hinder any close battlefield support. As Zakharov et al. described it, the situation on the ground “remained tense.” The thinning fog later allowed seven Japanese aircraft to appear at 10:30 hours, attempting to strike at the shipping gathered off the landing beach. Their first strike targeted the Kirov, but it was unsuccessful, and the attackers were driven off by anti-aircraft fire. A second attempt at 12:00 hours focused on the minesweeper T-525, which also failed, resulting in two of the attacking aircraft being shot down by gunfire.  By nightfall on 18 August, it was evident that the Soviet landing had succeeded to the point where the forces would not be driven back into the sea. The invasion force had established a beachhead approximately 4 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers deep, and they were capable of defending this position against any immediate Japanese counterattacks, despite most of their artillery still being stuck offshore. Gnechko, stationed at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, ordered that enough artillery be transported ashore overnight to resume the offensive, with the goal of occupying the island by the end of 19 August. He also dispatched several self-propelled barges and kungas (shallow-draft boats used for fishing or transport) to assist with the unloading, although these vessels could not arrive until the following morning. To eliminate further artillery attacks on shipping, assault groups were formed to attack and destroy the Japanese strongpoints on Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari during the hours of darkness. Shortly after midnight on 17 August, a second order regarding the cessation of hostilities was received from the First Area Army, directing that all fighting be stopped. At daybreak, General Murakami dispatched his intelligence chief, Lt. Col. Fujimoto, to Chiulungping to inform the Soviet tank battalion commander of the end of hostilities. Simultaneously, he ordered all divisions under his command to cease all combat operations. At approximately 16:00 hours, the Soviet tank battalion commander arrived at the Army Officers Club in Yenchi, where he conferred with Major General Hanjiro Iketani, the Army Chief of Staff. The following day, General Iketani traveled to Wangching to conduct armistice negotiations. The 72nd Rifle Corps finally crossed the Mutan River north of Ningan, while units from the 1st Red Banner Army and the 5th Army were deployed to receive and process the surrendering Japanese units of Shimizu's 5th Army. Since the Army began its withdrawal, communications with Area Army Headquarters in Tunhua had been completely disrupted. On the morning of the 17th, a member of the Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company's Harbin office sent a message via railway telephone concerning disarmament, stating that he had been asked by the First Area Army Headquarters to relay the information. The Army Commander and his staff, however, suspected it might be another ruse from the enemy's fifth column. They agreed to exercise caution in addressing the matter and decided to send Staff Officer Maeda to Area Army Headquarters in Tunhua by railway gasoline engine car to verify the truth. Colonel Maeda proceeded to the railway station, and while preparing to depart, he received a railway telephone call from Staff Officer Tsumori at Area Army Headquarters regarding the cease-fire order. Subsequently, around 14:00 hours, the Army convened a meeting with representatives from each unit to announce the cease-fire orders. That evening, Soviet forces began entering Hengtaohotzu and immediately started disarming Japanese forces.  Looking west, the bulk of the 36th Army advanced southward and seized the railroad station at Chalantun amid the surrender of the 119th Division. The 86th Rifle Corps, after several days of intense artillery bombardment, finally extinguished the last remnants of Japanese resistance at Hailar, forcing the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade to surrender. Meanwhile, the 39th Army forces prepared for transport to Changchun and then on to the Liaotung Peninsula. The 17th Army moved toward the coast, capturing Pingchuan and Linguan before reaching the coastline at Shanhaiguan, directly across from the Liaotung Peninsula. Additionally, Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian forces approached the outskirts of Kalgan, where they encountered a small contingent of the China Expeditionary Army. Indeed, with the surrender of the Kwantung Army, the war was coming to an end. However, several independent units, including the one mentioned, would continue to resist into the last days of August, thereby prolonging the Pacific War by another week. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In August 1945, amidst Japan's turmoil, the Soviet Union surprisingly invaded Manchuria. As chaos ensued, Japanese forces in South Sakhalin faced robust Soviet resistance. Ultimately, Japan's surrender shattered its imperial power, marking a historic end to the Pacific War, leaving a nation in ruins yet igniting a fragile hope for the future beyond the horrors of conflict.

WAR ENDINGS NEITHER SWIFT NOR MERCIFUL:  5/8  Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II by  Evan Thomas  (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Road-Surrender-Three-Countdown-World/dp/0399589252 At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war “at once.” Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet? So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb—and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender. Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender. To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.

WAR ENDINGS NEITHER SWIFT NOR MERCIFUL:  1/8  Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II by  Evan Thomas  (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Road-Surrender-Three-Countdown-World/dp/0399589252 1918 GERMANY IN UKRSINE At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war “at once.” Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet? So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb—and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender. Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender. To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.

WAR ENDINGS NEITHER SWIFT NOR MERCIFUL:  2/8  Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II by  Evan Thomas  (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Road-Surrender-Three-Countdown-World/dp/0399589252 1940 At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war “at once.” Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet? So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb—and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender. Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender. To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.

WAR ENDINGS NEITHER SWIFT NOR MERCIFUL:  3/8  Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II by  Evan Thomas  (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Road-Surrender-Three-Countdown-World/dp/0399589252 1942 UKRAINE At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war “at once.” Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet? So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb—and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender. Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender. To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.

WAR ENDINGS NEITHER SWIFT NOR MERCIFUL:  4/8  Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II by  Evan Thomas  (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Road-Surrender-Three-Countdown-World/dp/0399589252 1941 KYIV At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war “at once.” Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet? So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb—and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender. Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender. To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.

WAR ENDINGS NEITHER SWIFT NOR MERCIFUL:  6/8  Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II by  Evan Thomas  (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Road-Surrender-Three-Countdown-World/dp/0399589252 At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war “at once.” Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet? So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb—and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender. Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender. To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.

WAR ENDINGS NEITHER SWIFT NOR MERCIFUL:  7/8  Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II by  Evan Thomas  (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Road-Surrender-Three-Countdown-World/dp/0399589252 At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war “at once.” Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet? So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb—and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender. Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender. To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.

WAR ENDINGS NEITHER SWIFT NOR MERCIFUL:  8/8  Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II by  Evan Thomas  (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Road-Surrender-Three-Countdown-World/dp/0399589252 2945 TOKYO At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war “at once.” Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet? So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb—and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender. Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender. To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.

This episode looks at the courtroom drama that helped to shape Asia after World War II with Princeton University's Gary Bass. Far more than a simple account of justice served, the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal represents a fascinating intersection of international law, power politics, and competing visions of history that continues to reverberate through East Asian relations today.The tribunal tried 28 Japanese leaders for crimes that began long before Pearl Harbor. Imperial Japan's expansionist wars stretched back decades, leaving a trail of atrocities including the Nanjing Massacre where approximately 200,000 civilians were killed. Yet political calculations ensured Emperor Hirohito remained untouched, creating an enduring contradiction where his closest advisor received a life sentence while the monarch himself watched from his palace.Three defendants embody the trial's moral complexities: defiant Prime Minister Tojo Hideki who used his testimony to justify the war; the Emperor's advisor Kido Koichi who claimed to restrain militarists yet enabled their actions; and perhaps most poignantly, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori who actively opposed the war, confronted military leadership, and later pushed for surrender—only to die in prison after conviction.What truly distinguishes this tribunal from Nuremberg is its contested legacy. While Germany embraced denazification, some Japanese war criminals later returned triumphantly to politics—including Kishi Nobusuke who became Prime Minister in 1957. His grandson, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, continued questioning the tribunal's legitimacy decades later. Meanwhile, at the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, war criminals are venerated alongside fallen soldiers, revealing Japan's unresolved relationship with its imperial past.How do nations reconcile with dark chapters in their past? Can justice truly be served when political considerations shape legal proceedings? You can send a message to the show/feedback by clicking here. The system doesn't let me reply so if you need one please include your email.

Let us know what you think of the latest episode of Distinct Nostalgia by clicking here and sending us a messageFirst Look Trailer 2 for The President and the Emperor starring Clifton Truman Daniel as President Harry S Truman, Sadao Ueda as Emperor Hirohito and Samuel Barnett as Phillip Oppenheimer.Episode 1 coming soon.....The President and the Emperor Cast - Episode One Clifton Truman Daniel - President Harry S Truman Sadao Ueda - Emperor Hirohito Christopher Strauli - Secretary of War Henry StimsonMark Takeshi Ota - Lord Koichi Kido Mike Grady - General Leslie Groves Leo Ashizawa - Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo Samuel Barnett - Dr J Robert Oppenheimer Takatsuna Mukai - Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki Jonathan Kydd - Dr Robert Stearns Samuel Barnett - English Radio announcerTakatsuna Mukai - Studio EngineerJonathan Kydd - American Radio Announcer.The narrator is Lorelei King The music is by Andy StreetThe historian is Guy Waltersand historical observers were Kazuhiko andShigehiko Togo.The President and the Emperor is written byGuy Smith.The director is Jonathan Kydd.Produced by Ashley ByrneExecutive Producer is Kurt BrookesA Made in Manchester production.Support the show

Kate Adie presents stories from Afghanistan, China, Japan and Tajikistan.In Afghanistan's Ghor Province, Mahjooba Nowrouzi reports from a small maternity hospital where two female doctors serve thousands of patients. With limited resources and financial support, the odds are stacked against them - and against the women they tend to and treat.Last year, BBC Radio 4's Crossing Continents aired the award-winning documentary ‘Our Whole Life is a Secret', which charted the daily life of a young Afghan woman. In this dispatch, she provides an update on her life today, four years after the Taliban returned to power.In Beijing, pro-democracy campaigners regularly face surveillance and restrictions on their movement. Among them is human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang, who was arrested in 2015 and imprisoned for 'subverting state power'. Danny Vincent heard about his life since his release.It's 80 years since Japan's Emperor Hirohito surrendered to allied forces in World War II after the US dropped two atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing an end to the six-year-long conflict. Ellie House encountered a group of schoolchildren in Hiroshima's peace park - and learned more about how the war is remembered there.In the Tajikistan the endangered striped hyena is fighting for survival. Tajik conservationists have been working hard to save this elusive and much misunderstood animal. Antonia Bolingbroke-Kent met them on a trek into the mountains.Series Producer: Serena Tarling Production Coordinators: Katie Morrison & Sophie Hill Editor: Richard Fenton-Smith

Let us know what you think of the latest episode of Distinct Nostalgia by clicking here and sending us a messageA First Look Teaser for The President and the Emperor starring Clifton Truman Daniel as President Harry S Truman, Sadao Ueda as Emperor Hirohito and Samuel Barnett as Phillip Oppenheimer.Episode 1 coming soon.....The President and the Emperor Cast - Episode One Clifton Truman Daniel - President Harry S Truman Sadao Ueda - Emperor Hirohito Christopher Strauli - Secretary of War Henry StimsonMark Takeshi Ota - Lord Koichi Kido Mike Grady - General Leslie Groves Leo Ashizawa - Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo Samuel Barnett - Dr J Robert Oppenheimer Takatsuna Mukai - Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki Jonathan Kydd - Dr Robert Stearns Samuel Barnett - English Radio announcerTakatsuna Mukai - Studio EngineerJonathan Kydd - American Radio Announcer.The narrator is Lorelei King The music is by Andy StreetThe historian is Guy Waltersand historical observers were Kazuhiko andShigehiko Togo.The President and the Emperor is written byGuy Smith.The director is Jonathan Kydd.Produced by Ashley ByrneExecutive Producer is Kurt BrookesA Made in Manchester production.Support the show

Why was the second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki? How did Japanese mutineers in government try to keep the war going? When did the Emperor Hirohito admit defeat? Join James Holland and Al Murray for Part 3 as they explore the monumental decisions that led to the world's first atomic bomb being dropped at the end of WW2. Start your free trial at patreon.com/wehaveways and unlock exclusive content and more. Enjoy livestreams, early access to podcast episodes, ad-free listening, bonus episodes, and a weekly newsletter packed with book deals and behind-the-scenes insights. Members also get priority access and discounts to live events. A Goalhanger Production Produced by James Regan Exec Producer: Tony Pastor Social: @WeHaveWaysPod Email: wehavewayspodcast@gmail.com Join our ‘Independent Company' with an introductory offer to watch exclusive livestreams, get presale ticket events, and our weekly newsletter - packed with book and model discounts. Membership Club: patreon.com/wehaveways Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

On the morning of August 15th, 1945, Emperor Hirohito's voice crackled over Japanese airwaves to announce the unthinkable - the surrender of Japan. Today we delve into the complex story behind that surrender, examining Japan's fierce military code, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.We're joined by Dr. Evan Mawdsley, historian of the Second World War, to unpack the final days of the Pacific War and explore what might have happened if Japan had not surrendered.Produced by James Hickmann and edited by Tim Arstall.Join Dan and the team for a special LIVE recording of Dan Snow's History Hit on Friday, 12th September 2025! To celebrate 10 years of the podcast, Dan is putting on a special show of signature storytelling, never-before-heard anecdotes from his often stranger-than-fiction career, as well as answering the burning questions you've always wanted to ask!Get tickets here, before they sell out: https://www.kingsplace.co.uk/whats-on/words/dan-snows-history-hit/.We'd love to hear your feedback - you can take part in our podcast survey here: https://insights.historyhit.com/history-hit-podcast-always-on.You can also email the podcast directly at ds.hh@historyhit.com.

Last time we spoke about the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. In the summer of 1945, Japan faced its most devastating siege, characterized by an aerial campaign called "Starvation" that crippled its industrial capabilities. As resources dwindled and chaos reigned, the Allies intensified their firebombing efforts, targeting major cities. By July, Japan was on the brink of collapse, culminating in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, where over 140,000 lives were altered or lost in a blinding flash. As the nation reeled from the destruction, the Japanese leadership was torn between surrender and continuing the fight. They faced not just the threat of American bombs, but also a Soviet invasion looming on the horizon. Days after Hiroshima, the atomic bomb "Fat Man" was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, resulting in catastrophic casualties and extensive industrial losses. This attack further devastated an already weakened Japan, leaving the Emperor and his government grappling with the dire consequences. This episode is the Invasion of Manchuria Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    August 9 stands as a catastrophic day in Japanese history. On this day, the nation faced the devastating impact of a second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, along with the relentless Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Admiral Ivan Yumashev's Pacific Fleet moved to disrupt Japan's maritime communications in the Sea of Japan and provide support for offensive operations. At the same time, Soviet air forces targeted cities across Northeast Asia, striking both Manchuria and North Korea, as well as Japanese convoys in the Sea of Japan. General Twinning led a diversionary B-29 raid on Amagasaki, followed by a significant attack involving 108 aircraft on the rail yards at Marifu. In addition, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet launched more strikes against airfields in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, where U.S. intelligence suspected a large Japanese air fleet and commando force was preparing for a desperate mission to Okinawa. Japanese paratroopers were gearing up for a new mission, codenamed Ken-go, but this time their target wasn't Okinawa. Similar to the earlier May 24 Raid on Yontan Airfield, Lieutenant General Sugawara Michio's Giretsu Kuteitai, also known as the “Heroic Paratroopers,” set their sights on the B-29 complex in the Mariana Islands for nighttime suicide raids. This operation marked the second planned assault on bases within the Mariana Islands, specifically aimed at destroying B-29 bombers. The plan involved deploying 60 transport aircraft to deliver 900 commandos during the nights of August 19 to 23. Around 300 personnel from Lieutenant Commander Daiji Yamaoka's 1st Kure Special Naval Landing Force initiated preparations at the end of June. Originally established for submarine-delivered raids on U.S.-held islands, these forces were now adapted to be flown in 30 Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' twin-engine bombers, which had the necessary range for an unrefueled, one-way trip to the Marianas. The raid was initially scheduled for July 24. However, ten days earlier, U.S. carrier-based warplanes had attacked Misawa naval air base on Honshu Island, damaging or destroying many of the operation's bombers. Consequently, the raid was postponed to August 19, with the addition of 30 transport planes and 300 paratroopers from the army's 1st Raiding Regiment. Ultimately, however, on August 15, Japan surrendered, and Operation Ken-go was cancelled. Meanwhile, Admiral Shafroth's Bombardment Group unleashed heavy damage on the Kamaishi steel mill. The day after, to assist the Soviets, Halsey ordered additional airstrikes on northern Japanese airfields, causing extensive destruction. However, these were not isolated incidents; they were part of a sustained air-sea siege that had been intensifying for several months. The Allied blockade of Japan had severely impacted food imports, and industrial activity had nearly ground to a halt due to the ongoing blockade and bombings. By this point, six of Japan's ten largest cities had been completely destroyed, and over sixty smaller cities had been reduced to ashes from relentless incendiary raids. This scenario was a powerful manifestation of War Plan Orange in action. More critically, with the reality of Hiroshima's destruction echoing loudly, the Japanese government now grappled with the impending threat of complete annihilation, a grim reality they had never faced before in this war. Though they had recognized their defeat with the loss of Saipan and the initial Yawata raid, the stubborn resolve of the Japanese leadership had pushed them to prolong the conflict for an agonizing 14 months, clinging to the hope of a different outcome. Many now believed that peace was the only path to survival for the Japanese nation. As the crisis intensified, Prime Minister Suzuki and his cabinet engaged in heated discussions. He sought to persuade War Minister General Anami Korechika and Chief of the Army General Staff General Umezu Yoshijiro to accept the Potsdam Declaration on August 9. However, Suzuki and the militants could only agree that if there were any surrender, then it should ensure that the "national polity" or imperial family would continue in any postwar settlement. Anami and Umezu pushed for further, more favourable conditions. First, Japan would demobilize and disarm any IJA or IJN forces overseas. Second, Japanese courts would prosecute any war criminals. Third, after surrender the Allies would not occupy Japan. Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, agreed with Anami and Umezu. To break this deadlock, it became necessary to involve the Emperor directly. Around 2:00 AM on August 10, the cabinet convened with Emperor Hirohito, who ultimately agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration and ordered an end to all military efforts, initiating the surrender process. Faced with no viable alternatives, all present reached a unanimous agreement. That morning, the Japanese government, through Swedish and Swiss intermediaries, sent an offer to accept the Potsdam Declaration, stipulating one condition: there would be no change to Japan's government structure, with Hirohito retaining his title as Emperor and sovereign ruler. Months afte the war Hirohito said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.” Simultaneously, a new military campaign was underway, and several units of General Yamada's Kwantung Army were unexpectedly caught off-guard in Manchuria. In response, he implemented emergency measures and ordered commands to proceed with their plans for delaying operations. Upon learning of the Soviet declaration of war and the subsequent invasion led by Marshal Vasilevsky's Far East Command, Tokyo decided to place General Kozuki's 17th Area Army under the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, they instructed General Okamura Yasuji's China Expeditionary Army to transfer one army headquarters, along with six divisions and six brigades, to support this effort. As directed by Tokyo, the primary objective of the Kwantung Army was to defend Japanese territory in Korea. However, by the end of the first day of conflict, several border observation units had been completely destroyed while attempting to defend their positions. In the east, Lieutenant General Shimizu Noritsune's 5th Army, supported by the reinforced 128th Division, was confronting the main assault by Marshal Meretskov's 1st Far Eastern Front. To the south, Lieutenant General Murakami Keisaku's 3rd Army was engaged in defending against multiple penetrations along the border. In the northern sector, the 134th Division at Chiamussu was withdrawing towards Fangcheng, as planned, while flames engulfed Japanese houses in the city. General Uemura's 4th Army was preparing to face what they expected to be the main assault from General Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front. Meanwhile, the 119th Division had already departed Hailar for Wunoerh, leaving only the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade behind. To the west, Lieutenant General Hongo Yoshio's 44th Army was confronting the formidable armored spearhead of Marshal Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front. Southwest of their position, the 108th Division was redeploying to the Chinhsien area. On August 10, the offensive led by Vasilevsky continued, as Colonel General Ivan Managarov's 53rd Army began crossing the border behind the now distant 6th Guards Tank Army. Recognizing that the 44th Army was not prepared to engage the overwhelming enemy armor in guerrilla warfare across the expansive terrain of western Manchuria, General Ushiroku made the independent decision to order Hongo to retreat to the Dairen-Hsinking line. This was where Lieutenant General Iida Shojiro's 30th Army was already establishing defensive positions. This decision contradicted Yamada's main strategy, which called for delaying the enemy advance at the borders.  Faced with what they deemed an illegal order, the Kwantung Army Headquarters convened an urgent staff conference. During this meeting, several opinions emerged: a sudden shift from established plans would likely create confusion; any attempt to counterattack after a withdrawal would likely fail if the enemy advanced quickly; and abandoning forward airfields prematurely would enable the enemy to advance unimpeded. To most participants, General Ushiroku's decision seemed to deliver a potentially fatal blow to the overall operational direction of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. However, since the 44th Army had already begun its withdrawal as ordered by General Ushiroku, Kwantung Army Headquarters was left with a fait accompli. Thus, they felt compelled to uphold the decision of the Third Area Army Commander, which was subsequently approved by General Yamada. Meanwhile, General Pliyev's cavalry-mechanized units advanced rapidly toward Kalgan and Dolonnor, reaching the foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains. General Danilov's 17th Army also continued to encounter weak resistance, covering an additional 40 kilometers. General Lyudnikov's 39th Army bypassed the encircled 107th Division in the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions. Here, the 5th Guards Rifle Corps moved toward Solun and Tepossi, while the 113th Rifle Corps advanced southeast toward Wangyemiao. The 94th Rifle Corps had to divert southward to support the 124th Rifle Division. In the east, General Luchinsky's 36th Army launched ongoing attacks against Hailar, with the 2nd Rifle Corps bypassing it to the east. Meanwhile, General Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army reorganized its right-wing column and began crossing the Grand Khingan Mountains during the night, with both columns entering the central Manchurian plain by August 11. To the east, Meretskov continued his offensive. The 17th, 65th, and 72nd Rifle Corps of General Krylov's 5th Army advanced swiftly west and south, ultimately securing Machiacho, Laotsaiying, Suiyang, and Suifenho. This maneuver widened the zone of penetration to 75 kilometers and forced the 126th and 135th Divisions to withdraw their main forces to Yehho. In support, General Beloborodov's 1st Red Banner Army to the north broke through into open terrain, pushing rapidly westward to occupy parts of the cities of Pamientung and Lishuchen, along with their vital bridges across the Muleng River. Further south, General Chistyakov's 25th Army captured Tungning and successfully reduced its fortified region. Units in that area also secured Tumentzu, Hunchun, and Wuchiatzu. Lastly, General Zakhvatayev's 35th Army continued its operations far to the north. The 264th Rifle Division and the 109th Fortified Region seized Hutou and initiated a movement west along the railroad toward Hulin, while the 363rd and 66th Rifle Divisions pressed on with their advance northwestward. In northern Manchuria, General Purkayev continued his main assault, with General Mamonov's 15th Army reconnoitering key enemy strongholds south of the Amur River. After successfully crossing the river, the 34th Rifle Division and the 203rd Tank Brigade occupied Lopei and advanced through Fenghsiang to bypass the Hsingshanchen Fortified Region, leaving a force behind to reduce it. Meanwhile, the 361st Rifle Division captured Tungchiang, and the 388th Rifle Division secured Chienchingkou, preparing for an advance toward Fuchin. In support of these operations, General Pashkov's 5th Rifle Corps cleared Japanese forces from the Jaoho Fortified Region, while General Teryokhin's 2nd Red Banner Army was preparing to launch its offensive the following morning. On August 11, forward units landed at Heiho, Aihun, and Holomoching under the cover of artillery fire, quickly establishing a beachhead as additional forces crossed the Amur. However, due to a lack of crossing equipment, it took five days to transport all units across the river. Consequently, Teryokhin had to commit his forces piecemeal against the 123rd Division and the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade. This was not the only new offensive operation initiated by Purkayev on this day. A new target had emerged: South Sakhalin, known as Karafuto to the Japanese. As per Vasilevsky's plans, Major-General Leonty Cheremisov's 16th Army was deployed on North Sakhalin and along the mainland coast of the Tatar Strait, stretching from Sovetskaya Gavan to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. If the invasion of Manchuria continued to progress favorably, this force was set to attack the Japanese-controlled portion of the island alongside the Northern Pacific Flotilla, commanded by Vice-Admiral Vladimir Andreyev, which was prepared to conduct amphibious operations against Esutoru and Maoka on the island's west coast. Opposing the Soviet forces, General Higuchi of the 5th Area Army positioned Lieutenant General Mineki Toichiro's 88th Division in the southern part of South Sakhalin, with only the 125th Regiment stationed to the north. Sakhalin shared many characteristics with several of the Manchukuoan border areas, presenting challenging terrain for mechanized warfare. The only viable invasion route south from the border at the 50th Parallel followed the Poronay River, located more or less in the center of the island. This river flows southward, flanked to the east and west by forested mountain ranges, as well as countless swamps and bogs. Both sides recognized the strategic importance of this potential invasion route and constructed extensive fortification networks. The Japanese fortifications were collectively known as the Koton, or Haramitog, fortified region. These defenses were built in three interlinked layers, with their western flanks anchored in the mountain range and eastern flanks in the wooded, swampy river valley. The permanent defenses spanned approximately 12 kilometers in frontage and extended up to 30 kilometers in depth, containing over 350 bunkers, pillboxes, artillery positions, and similar fortifications. These were protected by an elaborate network of infantry trenches, anti-tank ditches, minefields, and barbed wire. The heavy forest and brush made it challenging to locate these defenses. While enough vegetation had been cleared to allow for effective defensive fire, sufficient cover remained to obscure them from an attacking force. Consequently, the 16th Army would confront these formidable defenses without the advantage of surprise. At daybreak on August 9, reports emerged that the Soviet Army had unexpectedly invaded Manchuria from multiple directions. By 8:00 AM, telegraph lines were cut near Handa, a village located at the center of the Russo-Japanese border in Sakhalin. An excellent military road connected Handa to Kamishikuks, a region known as the Central Military Road area. At the same time, reports indicated that enemy forces were attacking the observation posts in this area. On August 10,  observation posts were forced to withdraw as the Soviet Army gradually advanced toward our main position in the Happo Mountains, situated about 10 kilometers south of the border. That evening, it was reported that the 125th Infantry had engaged in a skirmish, during which the Isunisawa Platoon, fighting near the Handa River bridge for over five hours, was wiped out. On that same day, the commander of the Fifth Area Army declared that not only had the Army engaged Soviet forces, but civilians in the area, including office workers and laborers, had also joined the battle in a desperate attempt to halt the advancing Soviet Army. By August 13, the National Volunteer Combat Teams were summoned. The recruitment of these volunteer combat teams from the general populace was unique to the Sakhalin campaign, aimed at creating the appearance of military readiness to deter the Soviet advance. Additionally, the 125th Regiment executed demolitions while retreating to establish stronger defensive positions on the western flank of Happo Mountain, northwest of Furuton. Given the unexpectedly favorable developments in Manchuria, the invasion of South Sakhalin was authorized on August 10. General Yumashev further directed Vice-Admiral Andreyev's naval forces to commence attacks on both South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Major General Georgii Dziuba's air forces joined the effort, conducting reconnaissance flights over key Japanese ports that revealed Toro and Esutoru were almost entirely unprotected. In the early hours of August 11, the 56th Rifle Corps crossed the border and began its main advance along the central military road but encountered resistance at Handa, where around 100 defenders held them up for an entire day. Back in northern Manchuria, the 5th Rifle Corps embarked on a challenging march southwest toward Paoching, while Mamonov launched a bombing raid followed by an attack on Fuchin, which ultimately fell after a coordinated tank-infantry assault. Concurrently, the 4th Army headquarters and the bulk of the 149th Division received orders to retreat from Tsitsihar to Harbin. To the south, the 112th Fortified Region and the 6th Field Fortified Region crossed the Muleng River south of Mishan during the night. In the following days, they collaborated with units from the 35th Army to secure the Mishan Fortified Region. More importantly, the 26th and 59th Rifle Corps successfully secured Pamientung and Lishuchen, initiating a pursuit of withdrawing Japanese forces to the west and southwest. On August 11, the 5th Army advance continued, with reinforced forward detachments of the 65th and 72nd Rifle Corps reaching the Muleng River and preparing for an advance on Mutanchiang. At this juncture, Meretskov reassessed the situation and determined that his best opportunity for successful exploitation in the front zone lay within the 25th Army area. Consequently, he attached the 17th and 88th Rifle Corps to this command and placed the 10th Mechanized Corps in army reserve. This allowed the 17th and 39th Rifle Corps to commence a coordinated advance toward Wangching, Tumen, Tunhua, and Kirin. Looking west, Pliyev's units continued to encounter minimal resistance. The 17th Army was finally nearing the western foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains. The lead brigade of the 5th Guards Tank Corps reached Lupei, while the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps completed its crossing of the Grand Khingan Mountains. The 39th Army maintained its holding operations against the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions, coupled with main advances toward Solun and Wangyemiao. The 2nd Rifle Corps and the 205th Tank Brigade advanced along the railroad to Yakoshih. The 94th Rifle Division, supported by air and artillery, launched an assault and captured the southwestern portion of Hailar city before being reinforced by the entire 86th Rifle Corps. Meanwhile, the Soviet operational group on the right flank of the 36th Army broke through Japanese resistance at Manchouli, moving eastward along the rail line to join the Soviet forces besieging Hailar. As the Soviet armored units in the west made an unexpectedly swift advance, they were anticipated to reach Hsinking by August 15. On this same day, Yamada decided to relocate his headquarters to Tunghua. Additionally, during the night, a small naval force successfully conducted an assault landing at Yuki in North Korea, securing the port unopposed on August 12. Simultaneously, the 393rd Rifle Division pushed south into North Korea, quickly reaching Yuki before continuing toward Rashin. There, another small naval force landed on August 12, facing minimal resistance except for artillery fire. Meanwhile, the 25th Army advanced up to 40 kilometers in its main march southwest, prompting the commitment of the 10th Mechanized Corps to exploit further toward Wangching and beyond. The 5th Army had to eliminate a strong enemy position east of Taimakou before it could resume its advance to Mutanchiang. The 1st Red Banner Army pressed forward relentlessly, with the 26th Rifle Corps successfully bypassing Tzuhsingtun to advance on Hsientung, cutting the Linkou-Mutanchiang railroad line. The 363rd Rifle Division occupied Mishan while the 264th Rifle Division secured Hulin. The 171st Tank Brigade began a challenging advance southwest toward Chiamussu as the 15th Army reduced the Fuchin fortified region. Forward detachments of the 2nd Red Banner Army engaged Japanese advanced positions south of Holomoching and north of Aihun. After reducing Handa, the 56th Rifle Corps commenced an advance toward Furuton, although it faced delays from small enemy forces. Furthermore, in western Manchuria, Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian formations and the 17th Army continued their advance through Inner Mongolia largely unopposed for the next two days. Throughout 12 and 13 August on the Trans-Baikal Front's right flank, the Soviet-Mongolian formations of General Pliyev swept across the Inner Mongolian deserts towards Dolonnor and Kalgan at a rate of ninety to one hundred kilometers a day, rudely shunting aside local cavalry forces. Pliyev's principal concern was providing his forces in the vast desert wastes sufficient food, fuel, fodder, and water. The 6th Guards Tank Army had to temporarily halt its advance as the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps reached Tuchuan. This pause was necessary due to severe fuel shortages, requiring an increase in fuel supplies before the offensive could resume. This situation allowed Ushiroku to withdraw the 63rd and 117th Divisions before they could be engaged. However, the 107th Division was less fortunate, as it was attacked by the 5th Guards Rifle Corps on the road to Solun. On the northern flank, the 36th Army continued its siege of the Hailar fortifications while the 2nd Rifle Corps seized Yakoshih and advanced up to Wunoerh. That day, Japan also received the initial Allied response to its surrender offer, penned by Secretary of State James Byrnes and approved by the British, Chinese, and Soviet governments. A critic of the Japanese imperial system, Byrnes insisted on an unconditional surrender but remained ambiguous regarding the future of the imperial family's position. The response included a statement that Japan's future form of government should be “established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” Thus, even though the Soviet and Chinese governments aimed for the abolition of the imperial system, the Japanese could choose to retain their emperor, and likely would. Meanwhile, Secretary Stimson urged President Truman to accept the peace offer immediately, believing that, without an organized surrender supported by the emperor, U.S. forces would face “a score of bloody Iwo Jimas and Okinawas” across China and Southeast Asia. He cautioned that without the immediate capitulation of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, rogue military commanders might continue to resist. Retaining Hirohito would also aid Allied efforts to achieve a swift and orderly reconstruction while maintaining a compliant populace. The Japanese cabinet deliberated over the Allied response, with Anami and Suzuki, among other key military figures, arguing for its rejection unless an explicit guarantee for the imperial system was provided. Ultimately, however, Foreign Minister Togo and Marquess Kido Koichi succeeded in persuading Suzuki to support the acceptance of Byrnes' reply. Meanwhile, President Truman issued instructions prohibiting any further atomic weapons from being dropped on Japan without his approval, and he later ordered a complete halt to all bombings. Despite this, Halsey's 3rd Fleet remained in the area, preparing to launch additional strikes. Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 37 unfortunately had to retire at this point, though a token force was integrated into Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 to ensure British support until the end.  The Olympic timetable had called for Third Fleet to retire to Eniwetok and Manus in mid-August, but late on the night of August 10 Missouri intercepted a cryptic radio transmission: “Through the Swiss government, Japan has stated that she is willing to accept Allied surrender ultimatum at Potsdam, provided they can keep their Emperor.” Halsey had long predicted an early Japanese collapse, and had accordingly kept his logistic pipeline full. The following morning, August 11, flagships Missouri and King George V refueled simultaneously alongside oiler USS Sabine. Halsey recalled, “I went across to the ‘Cagey Five' as we called her, on an aerial trolley, just to drink a toast with Vice Admiral Rawlings.” Although Japan teetered near collapse, TF-37 lacked its own fast oilers and would have to retire immediately. With Nimitz's permission Halsey offered to sustain a token British force with Third Fleet so that the Royal Navy would be in “at the death.” Rawlings enthusiastically accepted. After replenishment, King George V, Indefatigable, Gambia, Newfoundland, and ten destroyers were re-designated TG-38.5 and absorbed into McCain's TF-38. The rest of TF-37, under Vian, reluctantly retired for Manus. In a truly desultory attack the following day, August 12, a single Japanese plane penetrated Buckner Bay, Okinawa undetected and torpedoed TF-95's just-arrived battleship Pennsylvania. Twenty Americans were killed, while Oldendorf and nine others were wounded. Back off Honshu, Halsey canceled August 12 strikes due to a typhoon. Late that night Third Fleet intercepted a confusing and ambiguous radio bulletin announcing that Japan had, with qualifications, accepted Allied terms. After a heated staff conference Halsey decided that, without firmer information, the following day's strikes were still on. Nevertheless, the prolonged negotiations were causing the Third Fleet considerable logistical problems; Halsey recalled, “Our galleys were reduced to serving dehydrated carrot salad. If the war was over, we could provision on the spot; if it was not, we would have to retire, reprovision, and return.” That night, a group of officers led by Major Hatanaka Kenji and Colonel Arao Okikatsu approached Anami, seeking his backing for a coup d'état to prevent Japan's surrender. Anami refused, leaving Hatanaka's conspirators to attempt the coup on their own. At the recommendation of American psychological operations experts, B-29 bombers spent August 13 dropping leaflets over Japan detailing the Japanese offer of surrender and the Allied response. In stark contrast, that same day, McCain's newly Anglo-American TF-38 launched 1,167 sorties against Tokyo, expending 372 tons of bombs and 2,175 rockets. Only seven planes and one pilot were lost, none to combat. Airborne opposition was virtually nil, as Lieutenant-General Kanetoshi Kondo, commander of Tokyo's defending 10th Hiko Shidan, “failed to urge his men to press the attack to the utmost, because it seemed absurd to incur additional losses with the war obviously lost and its termination due in a matter of days.”  Simultaneously, Suzuki's cabinet debated their reply to the Allied response late into the night but remained deadlocked. Back in Manchuria, on August 13, the 6th Guards Tank Army resumed its offensive by pushing reconnaissance units toward Tungliao and Taonan. The 39th Army continued its assault on Japanese units at Halung-Arshaan, while the 5th Guards Rifle Corps attacked and captured Solun. To the north, as the battle for Hailar raged on, the 2nd Rifle Corps engaged the determined 119th Division for control of the Grand Khingan passes west of Pokotu, achieving little progress over the next two days. Looking east, the 2nd Red Banner Army gathered sufficient forces to resume its offensive, successfully penetrating the defenses of the 123rd Division at Shenwutan and Chiko. They destroyed small Japanese outposts at Huma and Santaoka, further pushing the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade toward the main fortified region at Aihun. Additionally, the 15th Army reduced the fortified positions at Fuchin, while the 171st Tank Brigade continued its advance toward Chiamussu. To the south, the 66th Rifle Division finally occupied Tungan, cutting the highway and railroad to Hutou. Meanwhile, the 59th Rifle Corps reached and secured Linkou before turning south toward Mutanchiang. Advance elements of the 26th Rifle Corps attacked and occupied the railroad station at Hualin, though they could not secure crossing sites over the Mutan River due to the fierce resistance of a single battalion. During the night, heavy Japanese counterattacks forced Soviet forces back to a hill northeast of Hualin. More importantly, while the 45th Rifle Corps continued to reduce remaining Japanese strongpoints in the Volynsk, Suifenho, and Lumintai centers of resistance, the bulk of the 5th Army advanced 30 kilometers along the road and rail line, successfully approaching the outer fortifications of Mutanchiang by nightfall. Even farther south, the 25th Army pushed southwestward, with its three formations sharing a single road along the military rail line through the mountainous, heavily wooded area from Laoheishan to Heitosai. In South Sakhalin, the 56th Rifle Corps launched a siege attack against Furuton. However, the fierce resistance of the 125th Regiment successfully repelled Soviet assaults for the next three days. On the same day, in preparation for an amphibious invasion of Toro, two naval patrol craft reconnoitered Esutoru. Additionally, Meretskov approved the Seishin Operation in North Korea, leading to another small naval force landing successfully at Chongjin that afternoon. Soon after, they faced a strong Japanese counterattack, which drove the landing force out of the port and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. The following morning, a naval infantry battalion was landed to retake Chongjin, but Japanese reinforcements from the Nanam Divisional District Unit arrived to contest the port. As the Russians were pushed back again, Yumashev decided to embark the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade for a third assault scheduled for August 15. To the north, the 393rd Rifle Division advanced south along the coast, reaching Kwangjuryong by August 14. Concurrently, after breaking through the 128th Division's main defenses at Lotzukou, the 25th Army reached Heitosai and prepared to launch its main attack against Murakami's 3rd Army. The 5th Army struck the right flank of Shimizu's 5th Army at Ssutaoling and in the hills southeast of Mutanchiang, while the 1st Red Banner Army attacked the northern and eastern flanks of the city and the railroad station at Yehho on the eastern bank of the Mutan River. The 35th Army began a rapid advance toward Poli and Linkou, encountering negligible opposition. Meanwhile, the 5th Rifle Corps reached Paoching, drove off its garrison, and continued marching toward Poli. In addition, the 15th Army finally reduced the Hsingshanchen Fortified Region, opening a more direct advance route toward Chiamussu. Meanwhile, the 2nd Red Banner Army succeeded in breaking through the outer Japanese defenses to besiege the Sunwu Fortified Region and surround the Aihun Fortified Region. To the west, the 36th Army continued to encounter strong resistance at Hailar and Wunoerh. The 5th Guards Rifle Corps initiated a southeastward pursuit along the railroad toward Wangyemiao, eventually catching elements of the 107th Division at Tepossi, while also engaging Japanese units retreating from the Wuchakou area. The forward detachment of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps occupied Taonan after a march hindered by wet weather and Japanese kamikaze attacks. The 17th Army captured Taopanshin, and Pliyev's left column overcame a small Manchurian cavalry force, entering Dolonnor at the east end of the pass across the southern Grand Khingan Mountains. Back in the Pacific, the Allies grew restless as they awaited a Japanese response, ultimately interpreting the silence as a non-acceptance of the imposed peace terms. Consequently, Truman ordered a resumption of attacks against Japan at maximum intensity. More than 400 B-29 bombers launched daylight attacks, while over 300 conducted night raids, culminating in what would become the largest and longest bombing raid of the Pacific War. Furthermore, Truman began planning to drop a third atomic bomb on Tokyo. However, before he could proceed, Emperor Hirohito met with the most senior Army and Navy officers in the early hours of August 14, convincing them to cooperate in ending the war. The cabinet immediately convened and unanimously ratified the Emperor's wishes for an unconditional surrender. They also decided to destroy vast amounts of material related to war crimes and the war responsibilities of the nation's highest leaders. Shortly after concluding the conference, a group of senior army officers, including Anami, gathered in a nearby room and signed an agreement to execute the Emperor's order of surrender. This decision would significantly impede any attempts to incite a coup in Tokyo. During this meeting, General Kawabe Torashirō, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, proposed that the senior officers present should each sign an agreement to carry out the Emperor's order of surrender, "The Army will act in accordance with the Imperial Decision to the last." An agreement was ultimately signed by each of the most important officers present, including Minister of War Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, commander of the 1st General Army Field Marshal Sugiyama Hajime, commander of the 2nd General Army Field Marshal Hata Shunroku and Inspector-General of Military Training Doihara Kenji. When Umezu voiced concern about air units causing trouble, Vice Minister of War Wakamatsu Tadaichi took the agreement next door to the Air General Army headquarters, where its commander Kawabe Masakazu, the brother of Torashirō also signed. The document would serve to seriously impede any attempt to incite a coup in Tokyo. Simultaneously, the Foreign Ministry transmitted orders to its embassies in Switzerland and Sweden to accept the Allied terms of surrender, which were received in Washington at 02:49 on August 14. Anticipating difficulties with senior commanders on distant war fronts, three princes of the Imperial Family, who held military commissions, were dispatched to deliver the news personally. By 19:00, the text of the Imperial Rescript on surrender was finalized, transcribed by the official court calligrapher, and presented to the cabinet for their signatures. Around 23:00, the Emperor, with assistance from an NHK recording crew, made a gramophone record of himself reading the rescript. At long last, Japan had admitted defeat.  However at around 21:30 on 14 August, the conspirators led by Hatanaka set their plan into motion. The Second Regiment of the First Imperial Guards had entered the palace grounds, doubling the strength of the battalion already stationed there, presumably to provide extra protection against Hatanaka's rebellion. But Hatanaka, along with Lt. Col. Shiizaki Jirō, convinced the commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, Colonel Haga Toyojirō, of their cause, by telling him (falsely) that Generals Anami and Umezu, and the commanders of the Eastern District Army and Imperial Guards Divisions were all in on the plan. Hatanaka also went to the office of Tanaka Shizuichi, commander of the Eastern region of the army, to try to persuade him to join the coup. Tanaka refused, and ordered Hatanaka to go home. Hatanaka ignored the order. Originally, Hatanaka hoped that simply occupying the palace and showing the beginnings of a rebellion would inspire the rest of the Army to rise up against the move to surrender. This notion guided him through much of the last days and hours and gave him the blind optimism to move ahead with the plan, despite having little support from his superiors. Having set all the pieces into position, Hatanaka and his co-conspirators decided that the Guard would take over the palace at 02:00. The hours until then were spent in continued attempts to convince their superiors in the Army to join the coup. Hatanaka, Shiizaki, Ida, and Captain Shigetarō Uehara (of the Air Force Academy) went to the office of Lt. Gen. Takeshi Mori to ask him to join the coup. Mori was in a meeting with his brother-in-law Michinori Shiraishi. The cooperation of Mori, who was the commander of the 1st Imperial Guards Division, was vital. When Mori refused to side with Hatanaka, Hatanaka killed him, fearing Mori would order the Guards to stop the rebellion. Uehara killed Shiraishi. These were the only two murders of the night. Hatanaka then used General Mori's official stamp to authorize Imperial Guards Division Strategic Order No. 584, a false set of orders created by his co-conspirators, which would greatly increase the strength of the forces occupying the Imperial Palace and Imperial Household Ministry, and "protecting" the Emperor. The rebels, led by Hatanaka, spent the next several hours fruitlessly searching for the recordings of the surrender speech, failing to locate them amid a blackout caused by American bombings. Around the same time, another group of Hatanaka's rebels, led by Captain Takeo Sasaki, targeted Prime Minister Suzuki's office with the intent to kill him. When they found it empty, they opened fire with machine guns, devastating the office, and then set the building ablaze before departing for Suzuki's home. Fortunately, Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief secretary to Suzuki's Cabinet, had warned Suzuki, enabling him to escape just minutes before the assassins arrived. After setting fire to Suzuki's residence, the rebels then proceeded to the estate of Kiichirō Hiranuma, aiming to assassinate him as well. Hiranuma managed to escape through a side gate, but the rebels torched his house too. In the aftermath, Suzuki spent the remainder of August under police protection, sleeping in a different bed each night to avoid detection. Around 03:00, Hatanaka was informed that the Eastern District Army was on its way to the palace to confront him and urged him to surrender. As Hatanaka saw his plan collapse around him, he pleaded with Tatsuhiko Takashima, the Chief of Staff of the Eastern District Army, for airtime on NHK radio to explain his intentions to the Japanese people. His request was denied. Meanwhile, Colonel Haga, commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, learned that the Army did not support Hatanaka's rebellion and ordered him to vacate the palace grounds. Just before 05:00, while his rebels continued their search, Major Hatanaka went to the NHK studios, desperately trying to secure airtime to convey his actions. However, slightly over an hour later, after receiving a phone call from the Eastern District Army, Hatanaka finally conceded defeat. He gathered his officers and left the NHK studio, feeling the weight of his failed coup. At dawn, General Tanaka learned that the palace had been invaded, so he went there to confront the rebellious officers. He berated them for acting against the spirit of the Japanese army and ultimately convinced them to return to their barracks. By 08:00 on August 15, the rebellion was entirely dismantled. Although they had held the palace grounds for much of the night, they ultimately failed to find the recordings. After his failed coup, Hatanaka took his own life before witnessing Japan's surrender. While TF-38 refueled on August 14, Halsey signaled McCain, stating, “I intend to strike the same general target area on the fifteenth.” McCain informed TF-38, “Our orders to strike indicate the enemy may have dropped an unacceptable joker into the surrender terms. This war could last many months longer. We cannot afford to relax. Now is the time to pour it on.” In fact, the Western Allies had sunk their last Japanese ships of the war that day, when submarines USS Torsk (SS-423) and USS Spikefish (SS-404) torpedoed I-373 and two small escort ships in the East China Sea, resulting in the death of 112 Japanese sailors. The following morning, August 15, the Third Fleet launched its first strike of 103 aircraft at 04:15 hours. At 06:14, just as the first strike was returning and the second strike was five minutes from the target, Halsey was ordered by Nimitz, “Air attack will be suspended. Acknowledge.” Shortly afterward, an officer burst in, waving a transcript—President Truman's official peace announcement. Halsey erupted with exuberance, “pounding the shoulders of everyone within reach.” He recalled, “My first thought at the great news was, ‘Victory!' My second was, ‘God be thanked, I'll never have to order another man out to die.'” However, within minutes, four retiring Hancock Hellcats were attacked by seven Japanese fighters, resulting in the Hellcats shooting down four without loss. Over Tokorazawa airfield, northwest of Tokyo, 20 IJAAF Ki-84 “Franks” ambushed six VF-88 Hellcats from Yorktown. The Hellcats managed to shoot down nine Franks but lost four of their own, along with their pilots. Rawlings' dawn strikes were intercepted by about 12 Zeros. Escorting Seafires shot down eight Zeros but lost one, while an Avenger downed a ninth Zero. Tragically, seven TF-38 flyers never returned. During the morning, Halsey launched his last strike of the war, but was soon ordered by Admiral Nimitz to suspend all air attacks. At 12:00, the Emperor's recorded speech to the nation, reading the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War, was finally broadcast. The war was over… or was it really? I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Prime Minister Suzuki and his cabinet debated surrender, the Emperor Hirohito finally accepted the Potsdam Declaration, conditionally ensuring the imperial family's continuity. However, conspirators attempted a coup to prevent the surrender, ultimately failing. By August 15, Japan officially surrendered, marking the end of the Pacific War.

Let us know what you think of the latest episode of Distinct Nostalgia by clicking here and sending us a messageAhead of the launch of the epic new landmark drama about the decision to drop the first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Clifton Truman Daniel chats to Ashley Byrne about playing his grandfather in The President and the Emperor. Clifton talks candidly about his relationship with his grandpa and how he learned about his family history when he was growing up. He also reflects on the impact the decision his grandfather made has had on the world and on the work he's done to foster peace the region.Clifton Truman Daniel is in conversation with Ashley Byrne.A Made in Manchester Production   Coming soon ....The President and The Emperor  brings to life the story behind one of the most consequential decisions in modern history, the dropping of the atomic bomb eighty years ago.Told in seven parts and produced by indie company Made in Manchester, the series draws on newly declassified US and Japanese documents, along with first-hand testimony, to present a dual-perspective account of the final days of the Second World War.At the heart of the drama are two isolated but powerful figures, President Harry S. Truman and Emperor Hirohito. They navigate moral and political dilemmas as the world teeters on the brink of nuclear devastation.In a unique casting move, Truman is portrayed by his real-life grandson, Clifton Truman Daniel, adding an intimate connection to a role few could approach with such personal insight.He stars alongside acclaimed Japanese actor Sadao Ueda, who plays Hirohito with quiet intensity and emotional nuance.“This drama is not about who was right or wrong in the war,” Ueda says. “It presents historical facts dramatically from two different points of view. I hope the listener will reflect on what global conflict might mean if it ever happened again.”Samuel Barnett plays Robert OppenheimerThe President and the Emperor is written by Guy Smith, directed by Jonathan Kydd and produced by Ashley Byrne. The Executive Producer is Kurt Brookes.Guy Smith says: ''I wanted to find out what really took place behind the scenes in Washington and Tokyo in the weeks leading up to the most momentous - and controversial - decision in the history of modern warfare; the order to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.And, just as importantly, I wanted to find out if that world changing event could have been avoided.  Was it inevitable?  Or could the conflict have been ended without the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?The more I dug into the archives and examined first hand accounts of those who were there at the White House and Imperial Palace, I discovered an extraordinary story full of intrigue, drama and turmoil.Now, as the world once again moves closer to the threat of nuclear conflict than at any time since the Cold War, I hope The President and the Emperor provides listeners with a timely warning on the dangers of escalating tensions and failing to explore all possible opportunities to stop man's inhumanity to man.'With thanks to:The National Security Archive, Washington DChttps://nsarchive.gwu.eduThe Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MOhttps://www.trumanlibrary.govSupport the show

Last time we spoke about the Siege of Japan. In the summer of 1945, Japan faced its most devastating siege. A pivotal component was the aerial mining campaign entitled "Starvation," masterminded by General Curtis LeMay. B-29 Superfortress bombers were deployed to lay mines in critical waterways, cutting off resources and crippling Japan's industrial capabilities. This silent assault inflicted chaos on Japan's shipping lanes, sinking over 670 vessels and significantly disrupting supply lines. Amid this turmoil, the Allies intensified their firebombing campaigns, targeting urban centers like Tokyo, Osaka, and Kobe, leading to extensive devastation and loss of life. By August, Japan's civilian and military morale crumbled under the weight of destruction. The climax of this siege came with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, which unleashed unparalleled destruction. As Japan's leadership struggled for options, the nation was effectively brought to its knees. The relentless siege had achieved its goal, Japan was irrevocably broken, marking a profound moment in history. This episode is the Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Hello there, again like in the previous episode, this one is just going to state what happened, I am not going to delve into the why's just yet. I am currently writing an entire special episode on why exactly Japan surrendered, focused on the actions of Emperor Hirohito, who I will argue prolonged the 15 year war to protect the Kokutai. So a bit of a spoiler there I guess.  The worst has come to pass for the Japanese Empire. An atomic bomb has fallen, devastating an entire city. In a blinding flash, over 140,000 lives were lost or forever altered. But this was merely the beginning. The Americans were poised to unleash destruction from the skies, a scale of devastation never before witnessed on this planet. The choices were grim: surrender or complete annihilation.The Japanese faced not only this overwhelming threat but also another peril. The Soviet Union prepared to invade Manchuria and other crucial territories within its reach. As we last left off, the Americans had been conducting a prolonged and devastating air and naval siege of the Japanese Home Islands in preparation for the invasion of Kyushu. This campaign culminated in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, reducing the once-great city to ruins and leaving a staggering casualty toll that would forever haunt the Japanese people. Survivor accounts recount the haunting experience of wandering through the destruction, disoriented and unsure of where to go. They spoke of hearing the desperate cries of those trapped beneath crushed buildings or suffering from horrific burns. As small fires ignited by the blast began to spread, they coalesced into a firestorm that surged through the rubble, claiming the lives of many still trapped inside. Frightened residents jumped into the rivers of Hiroshima, only to drown in their desperate attempts to escape the flames. Over 90% of the doctors and 93% of the nurses in Hiroshima perished or were injured, and most hospitals were either destroyed or heavily damaged. By early afternoon, police and volunteers worked tirelessly to establish evacuation centers at hospitals, schools, and tram stations. Yet, tragically, many would die before receiving aid, leaving behind grim rings of corpses around these facilities. Some survivors who initially appeared unharmed would succumb within hours or days to what would later be identified as radiation sickness. Most members of General Hata's 2nd General Army headquarters were undergoing physical training on the grounds of Hiroshima Castle, barely 900 yards from the hypocenter. As a result, 3,243 troops lost their lives on the parade ground. Miraculously, Hata himself survived the explosion with only minor injuries, but many of his staff were not so fortunate, including Lieutenant-Colonel Yi U, a prince of the Korean imperial family, who was killed or fatally wounded. In total, the 2nd General Army, 59th Army, 5th Division, and other combat units in the city lost an estimated 20,000 troops. Survivors regrouped at the Ujina Air Base on the outskirts of Hiroshima, where they organized relief efforts and maintained public order once martial law was declared. With Mayor Awaya Senkichi killed at the mayoral residence, Hata assumed control of the city's administration and coordinated relief efforts. The initial reaction of the Japanese government to the devastation in Hiroshima was mixed. The Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy military leadership received only fragmentary reports about the tragedy, as communications with Hiroshima had been severed. Meanwhile, American and British radio broadcasts promptly informed ordinary Japanese civilians and their government about the atomic bomb attack on August 7. The following day, Tokyo issued a press release confirming the bombing of Hiroshima, but it notably did not state that the United States had dropped an atomic weapon. After technical teams visited the site of the bombing, they concluded that the enemy B-29s had indeed used a nuclear device. At this juncture, the diplomatic situation within Japan was chaotic. Many members of the Japanese cabinet believed that surrender was the only viable option, while others, particularly military figures like Hata, were determined to continue the fight. Looking back, between July 17 and August 2, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Harry Truman convened in Potsdam to negotiate terms for the end of World War II. The Potsdam Conference is perhaps best known for President Truman's conversation with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin on July 24, during which Truman informed Stalin that the United States had successfully detonated the first atomic bomb on July 16. Prior to leaving for the conference, a top-level civilian Interim Committee, led by Secretary of War Henry Stimson, suggested that Truman inform Stalin about America's new nuclear capability. This was intended to prevent the Soviets from learning about the bomb through leaked information, and Truman agreed to share this news. Historians have often interpreted Truman's somewhat firm stance during negotiations as a reflection of the U.S. negotiating team's belief that their nuclear capability would enhance their bargaining power. However, Stalin was already well-informed about the American nuclear program, courtesy of the Soviet intelligence network. This understanding enabled him to hold firm in his positions, complicating the negotiations. In the end, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, despite their differences, remained allied throughout the war. However, they would never meet again collectively to discuss cooperation in postwar reconstruction. One of the critical topics discussed was how to handle Japan. During the conference, Truman sought and received Stalin's final assurance of entering the war on August 9, in accordance with the agreements made among the Allies during the Yalta Conference in February 1945. On April 5, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed Tokyo of the Soviet Union's unilateral abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. He assured Japan that the treaty would remain in effect until April 1946, even though the Soviets were already planning an offensive in the Far East. A Soviet invasion would prove beneficial for the Americans, as it could prevent the movement of hostile troops from Manchuria, Korea, and North China to the Home Islands of Japan before an invasion of Kyushu was launched. On July 26, the United States, Great Britain, and China released a declaration demanding Japan's immediate surrender. The declaration called for the dismemberment of Japan's remaining empire, the demobilization of all military forces, trials for war criminals, and the elimination of Japan's capacity for future belligerence. While the declaration did not alter the requirement for unconditional surrender, critically it left ambiguous how the Japanese people might shape their future government, as it did not specify a direct end to or continuation of the imperial dynasty. The crux of that matter was the preservation of the Kokutai. The Kokutai was the national essence of Japan. It was all aspects of Japanese polity, derived from history, tradition and customs all focused around the cult of the Emperor. The government run by politicians was secondary, at any given time the kokutai was the belief the Emperor could come in and directly rule. If you are confused, dont worry, I am too haha. Its confusing. The Meiji constitution was extremely ambiguous. It dictated a form of constitutional monarchy with the kokutai sovereign emperor and the “seitai” that being the actual government. Basically on paper the government runs things, but the feeling of the Japanese people was that the wishes of the emperor should be followed. Thus the kokutai was like an extra-judicial structure built into the constitution without real legal framework, its a nightmare I know. Let me make an example, most of you are American I imagine. Your congress and senate actually run the country, wink wink lets forget about lobbyists from raytheon. The president does not have executive powers to override any and all things, but what if all American voters simply felt he did. So the president goes above his jurisdiction, and the American people violently attack Congress and the Senate if they don't abide by the president's wishes. That's kind of how it works for a lack of better words. Again in the specials I will roll out soon, it will make more sense after I blabber about it in roughly 7000 words. Now, in response, Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro expressed to the Japanese press on July 29 his belief that the Potsdam Declaration was nothing new and held no "significant value." This statement was interpreted by Truman and his administration as a rejection of the declaration. In reality, since the Yalta Conference, Japan had repeatedly approached the Soviet Union in an attempt to extend the Neutrality Pact and to enlist the Russians in negotiating peace with the Allies, offering attractive territorial concessions in return.  The Japanese, therefore, chose not to officially respond to the Potsdam Declaration as they awaited a reply from the Soviet Union. However, this response never materialized. The Soviet Union was preparing for an invasion of Manchuria, fully aware that Japan had become a weakened nation after suffering several defeats in the Pacific. In contrast, the once-inadequate Russian military had transformed into one of the strongest forces of the time. They had successfully absorbed powerful German offensives in 1941, 1942, and 1943, and rebounded with their own offensives in 1944 and 1945, ultimately crushing the military might of Nazi Germany. Motivated by Allied requests for support and the desire to solidify the Soviet Union's post-war position in the Far East, Soviet leaders began planning in March for a final campaign to reclaim Manchuria, northern Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands from Japan. However, most Soviet troops were stationed more than 10,000 kilometers away in Europe. As a result, forces and equipment designated for deployment to Manchuria had to be transported along a fragile and limited-capacity network over a five-month period from April to August. Initially, they stockpiled equipment in the Far East to re-equip units already present in that region. Then, a massive regrouping of forces to the east commenced in May, with units still arriving even as the campaign opened in August. This shift, involving nearly one million men, effectively doubled the strength of Soviet forces in the Far East from forty to more than eighty divisions. Opposing Valisevsky's Far East Command was General Yamada Otozo's Kwantung Army, along with its Manchukuoan and Inner Mongolian auxiliaries. Once the most prestigious and powerful unit of the Imperial Japanese Army, the Kwantung Army had significantly eroded in strength and quality over the past few years due to the diversion of its main assets to other theaters. Consequently, many experienced units were siphoned off and replaced by formations made up of draft levies, reservists, and smaller, cannibalized units. By August, the Kwantung Army consisted of General Kita Seiichi's 1st Area Army in eastern Manchuria, which included the 3rd and 5th Armies, alongside two divisions under direct area army control. General Ushiroku Jun commanded the 3rd Area Army in central and western Manchuria, encompassing the 30th and 44th Armies, plus two divisions, three independent mixed brigades, and one independent tank brigade under his direct command. In northern Manchuria, Lieutenant-General Uemura Mikio led the 4th Army, which was composed of three divisions and four independent mixed brigades. Additionally, the army of Manchukuo contributed eight infantry and seven cavalry divisions, along with fourteen brigades of infantry and cavalry. Mengjiang added six cavalry formations and other garrison forces from Inner Mongolia. Furthermore, Lieutenant-General Kozuki Yoshio's 17th Area Army was stationed in central and southern Korea, totaling seven divisions and three independent mixed brigades. In northern Korea, Lieutenant-General Kushibuchi Senichi's 34th Army consisted of two divisions and one independent mixed brigade. Recognizing that his forces lacked adequate training and equipment, Yamada's plans called for a delay at the borders, followed by a defense consisting of successive positions culminating in a final stand at a stronghold constructed in the Tunghua area. This strategy would see roughly one-third of the Japanese forces deployed in the border region, while the remaining two-thirds would be concentrated in operational depth to create a series of defensive lines. By July 25, Soviet force deployments to the Far East were virtually complete. The Soviets meticulously tailored all military units, from the front level down to army, corps, division, brigade, and battalion, to effectively achieve specific missions. This tailoring took into account not only the strength and dispositions of enemy forces but also the terrain where the unit would operate and the desired speed of the operation. Each unit was equipped with the necessary artillery, anti-tank, tank, air defense, and engineer support. For instance, the 1st Far Eastern Front received heavy artillery attachments to provide the firepower needed to breach heavily fortified Japanese positions. In contrast, the Transbaikal Front was given heavy vehicular and motorized rifle support, enabling it to conduct rapid, balanced combined arms operations across the broad expanses of western Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Within each front, armies assigned to assault strong enemy fortified zones had significantly more artillery assets compared to those operating on open axes of advance. Units deployed in difficult terrain were afforded extensive engineer support to facilitate their operations. At the lowest tactical levels, specially tailored forward detachments from rifle divisions and tank and mechanized corps, alongside assault groups from rifle regiments and battalions, ensured the firepower and mobility necessary to execute high-speed operations. However, the final decision to attack would not be made until August 7, when Vasilevsky committed the Transbaikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts to a simultaneous assault scheduled for August 9. It is believed that the detonation of the atomic bomb the previous day prompted this hasty decision, resulting in the short two-day period between the decision and the planned attack. Vasilevsky's strategy called for a double envelopment conducted by Soviet forces along three axes to secure Manchuria and destroy a significant portion of the Kwantung Army. The Transbaikal Front was tasked with attacking eastward into western Manchuria, while the 1st Far Eastern Front would move westward into eastern Manchuria. Both offensives were to converge in the Mukden, Changchun, Harbin, and Kirin areas of south-central Manchuria. Meanwhile, the 2nd Far Eastern Front would conduct a supporting attack into northern Manchuria, driving southward toward Harbin and Tsitsihar. Moreover, the timing of on-order operations against southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles would depend on the progress of these main attacks. For the western pincer, Malinovsky's plan involved the 17th and 39th Armies and the 6th Guards Tank Army, followed by the 53rd Army, launching the primary assault. Their objective was to bypass the Halung-Arshaan Fortified Region to the south and advance toward Changchun. The success of the Transbaikal Front operation hinged on speed, surprise, and the deployment of mobile forces across virtually every sector, aiming to preempt effective Japanese defenses. To achieve this swiftness and surprise, tank formations were positioned in the first echelon of units at all command levels. The operation required tank-heavy forward detachments at each command level, with the 6th Guards Tank Army designated to spearhead the front's efforts. A tank division would lead the advance of the 39th Army, supported by tank brigades assigned to the first-echelon corps and divisions. Planned rates of advance were ambitious: 23 kilometers per day for combined arms units and an impressive 70 kilometers for tank units. However, the operation involved significant risks. If Japanese units responded quickly to the Soviet attack, or if even nominal forces occupied strategic positions in the Grand Khingan mountain passes, the Soviet advance could be severely hampered. Additionally, the success of the operation relied heavily on logistical units' capability to supply these fast-moving formations deep into Manchuria. Despite these challenges, the Soviets confidently accepted the risks involved. Their mission was to crush the enemy in the border regions, cross the Grand Khingan Mountains, and occupy positions in the central Manchurian plain from Lupei to Solun by the tenth to fifteenth day of the operation.In support, the Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanized Group was to attack across the Inner Mongolian desert and southern Grand Khingan Mountains toward Kalgan and Dolonnor. Simultaneously, the 36th Army was set to advance from Duroy and Staro-Tsurukaytuy across the Argun River to secure Hailar. In the next phase, for the second pincer, Meretskov's plan involved the 1st Red Banner Army, the 5th Army, and the 10th Mechanized Corps launching the main attack from the Grodekova area, located northwest of Vladivostok. Their objective was to advance toward Mutanchiang to exploit and secure the Kirin, Changchun, and Harbin regions, while coordinating with Soviet forces from the Transbaikal Front. Additionally, the 35th Army was tasked with attacking from the Lesozavodsk-Iman area, north of Lake Khanka, to capture Mishan, Linkou, and Poli. Meanwhile, the 25th Army would launch an offensive from northwest of Ussurysk to secure the Tungning, Wangching, and Yenchi areas. Once the 1st Far Eastern and Transbaikal Fronts converged in the Changchun area, they would advance together to eliminate the final Japanese resistance on the Liaotung Peninsula and secure the strategic naval base at Port Arthur. Furthermore, Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front was to advance on a broad front across the Amur and Ussuri rivers, extending from Blagoveshchensk to south of Khabarovsk. This movement aimed to exert maximum pressure on Japanese forces in northern Manchuria. The 15th Army would spearhead the main attack across the Amur River in the Leninskoye area, advancing southward into the regions around the Sungari and Ruhe rivers. In support, the 2nd Red Banner Army was designated to attack across the Amur River from the Blagoveshchensk area to Sunwu and then advance southward to Tsitsihar. The 5th Rifle Corps would also be involved, attacking from Bikin to secure Paoching and Poli. This multifront operational plan aimed for the complete destruction of Kwantung Army units in Manchuria with maximum speed, effectively cutting off Japanese troops from reinforcements coming from northern China or Korea. These relentless mobile attacks, deployed across the broadest of fronts, were designed to prevent the Japanese from reallocating forces, leading to their ultimate collapse and piecemeal defeat. As planned, the Japanese were caught completely by surprise when they received the Soviet declaration of war just an hour before midnight on August 8. At the same time, they were facing a critical decision in response to the recent bombing of Hiroshima. After learning about the success of Colonel Tibbets' mission, President Truman released a pre-approved statement that detailed the atomic bomb's destructive capabilities and warned that if Japan did not accept the Potsdam Declaration, "they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth." Although Truman had only the plutonium Fat Man device remaining for use, he had been informed that a third bomb might be ready sometime in August. Among American military leaders, including Admiral Nimitz and Generals Spaatz, LeMay, and Twining, there was a belief that this third nuclear weapon should be dropped on Tokyo if Japan did not surrender. Conversely, some Japanese senior officials, like Admiral Toyoda, speculated that even if the Allies had used an atomic bomb, they likely would not have many more at their disposal. They argued that the Japanese people should be prepared to defend their home islands to the death if favorable terms of surrender could not be secured. However, on August 8, Prime Minister Suzuki instructed Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, who advocated for negotiating with the United States, to inform Emperor Hirohito about the devastation caused by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. Hirohito responded by authorizing foreign minister Togo to notify the world on August 10th that Japan would accept the allied terms of surrender with one condition “that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.”  In the meantime, to increase pressure on the Japanese, Twinning launched additional conventional B-29 raids. A total of 412 B-29s targeted the Nakajima aircraft plant in Musashino during a daylight attack on August 8. However, the United States also needed to demonstrate to the Japanese government and people that Little Boy was not just an isolated experimental device. As a result, a decision was made to drop the Fat Man plutonium bomb on either the primary target of Kokura or the secondary target of Nagasaki, with this mission scheduled for August 9. For this operation, Tibbets selected Major Charles Sweeney to pilot the B-29 named Bockscar and deliver the device. The leading B-29 would decide the ultimate target based on weather reports from two reconnaissance B-29s, followed by two additional aircraft assigned to scientific and photographic missions. To prepare for takeoff, the bomb was armed by installing three plugs. At 03:49 on August 9, Sweeney departed from Tinian, heading toward Yakushima Island to rendezvous with his escorts. The mission began with complications that only escalated. A typhoon near Iwo Jima forced mission planners to relocate the planned rendezvous between Bockscar and her escorts to Yakushima, an island south of Kyushu. Sweeney took off at 03:49 on August 9 and headed north, but strong headwinds hindered her progress toward Yakushima. A further issue arose when a photographic specialist assigned to the support aircraft Full House was barred from flying due to forgetting his parachute. Consequently, Major Hopkins on Full House had to break radio silence to seek instructions on operating the camera. However, a more critical situation was uncovered when Commander Ashworth and his assistant discovered that an indicator was showing that Fat Man's electronic fusing circuits had closed, indicating that arming was complete. A faulty switch, with incorrectly installed wiring, posed the risk of a premature explosion. As the mission continued over Yakushima, Sweeney successfully met up with Captain Bock, piloting the scientific support B-29, but failed to rendezvous with Major Hopkins. This meant that Bockscar would only have The Great Artiste to accompany it for the final leg of its mission. According to Ashworth's log, they arrived at the rendezvous point at 09:00 and saw Bock at 09:20, while Full House waited south of the arranged position. Sweeney had initially agreed to circle Yakushima for only 15 minutes; however, he ended up waiting approximately 50 minutes for Hopkins to arrive, wasting precious fuel in the process. Due to the weather conditions, Hopkins had lost visual contact with the other B-29s and had to break radio silence again to locate Bockscar, but Sweeney did not respond. Despite reports indicating 30% cloud cover over Kokura, Sweeney chose to proceed there, believing the haze over the city would clear. Bockscar arrived at the initial start point for the bomb run over Kokura at 10:44, but unfortunately, heavy cloud cover had settled over the city, preventing a successful bomb delivery. After three unsuccessful bomb runs, which consumed an additional 45 minutes of fuel, a flight engineer discovered that a fuel pump had malfunctioned, trapping 600 gallons of fuel in the auxiliary bomb bay fuel tanks. Despite fuel concerns, Sweeney chose to proceed with the mission, heading south and then east toward Nagasaki, which he reached at 11:50. Unfortunately, the weather there was as poor as it had been at Kokura, prompting Sweeney to make the controversial decision to drop Fat Man using radar guidance. Due to the fuel shortage, he only conducted a single bomb run. Just before initiating the radar approach, a hole in the clouds opened, revealing the aim point: the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works located on the Urakami River. Fat Man was dropped at 11:58 and detonated approximately 1,650 feet above the target after a 50-second descent. Initial reports indicated that the explosion occurred about 500 yards north of the Mitsubishi plant and roughly 0.8 miles south of another Mitsubishi facility. While Fat Man had a more powerful detonation, the damage and casualties were not as extensive as those caused by the lower-yield Little Boy. The topography of Nagasaki, surrounded by hills, confined the explosion to the bowl-shaped center of the city, in stark contrast to Hiroshima's relatively flat landscape. Of the 7,500 Japanese employees at the Mitsubishi plant, 6,200 were killed, with an additional 17,000 to 22,000 employees at other war plants and factories also perishing. Unlike Hiroshima, where the military death toll was high, only about 150 Japanese soldiers were killed instantly, alongside at least 8 prisoners of war. Overall, it is estimated that around 45,000 civilians lost their lives due to the explosion, with between 50,000 and 60,000 sustaining injuries. The radius of total destruction extended about one mile, with fires spreading across the northern portion of the city to two miles south of the impact point. Thankfully, no firestorm developed as it had in Hiroshima. Bomb damage to physical structures in Nagasaki was erratic. Some areas, such as the Nagasaki Arsenal and the Mitsubishi plant, experienced significant destruction, while nearby locations appeared almost untouched. Despite this, Sweeney's mission resulted in an estimated 68.3% loss of pre-existing industrial production, excluding the harbor facilities, without disrupting the critical north-south National Railway track. While Fat Man's debut was historic, its destructive capability was comparable to other B-29 incendiary night raids. After circling Fat Man's expanding mushroom cloud, Sweeney headed toward Okinawa at 12:05, with only 300 gallons of fuel remaining. Fortunately, Bockscar's crew managed to return to Yontan Field with just seven gallons of fuel left, successfully making their way back to Tinian later that same day.  Simultaneously, Vasilevsky's Far East Command began its offensive just ten minutes after midnight on August 9. Reconnaissance units, forward detachments, and advanced guard units of the Transbaikal Front crossed the border into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Initially, attacking units faced resistance primarily in the 36th Army zone, where their attack routes passed through fortified Japanese border installations. However, most assault units advanced with little opposition. By 04:30, main force units had begun to follow closely behind the assault troops. Colonel-General Issa Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanized Group advanced in two march columns, 200 kilometers apart. By nightfall, they had penetrated 55 miles into the arid expanses of Inner Mongolia, moving southward toward Dolonnor and Kalgan while sweeping aside small detachments of Inner Mongolian cavalry. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Aleksei Danilov's 17th Army entered Inner Mongolia virtually unopposed in two columns, advancing approximately 70 kilometers by nightfall. To the left, Colonel-General Andrey Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army led the main attack into Inner Mongolia in two columns, encountering limited opposition and rapidly advancing about 150 kilometers until reaching the foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains, west and north of Khorokhon Pass, by nightfall. Simultaneously, Colonel-General Ivan Lyudnikov's 39th Army advanced along two divergent axes. The 5th Guards and 113th Rifle Corps gained 60 kilometers as they bypassed the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions to the south. Meanwhile, the 94th Rifle Corps struck northeast towards the rear of the Hailar Fortified Region, swiftly overcoming light resistance. The 124th Rifle Division was also deployed between both axes to probe toward the Halung-Arshaan Fortified Region. Lieutenant-General Alexander Luchinsky's 36th Army advanced on two fronts, with the 2nd and 86th Rifle Corps successfully crossing the rain-swollen Argun River between Staro-Tsurukhaytuy and Duroy and securing key bridges north of Hailar. Additionally, an operational group of two rifle divisions attacked across the border, establishing a foothold in the small fortified post at Manchouli. During the night, Luchinsky sent the 205th Tank Brigade to assault Hailar from the northeast, while the 152nd Rifle Regiment maneuvered to attack from the southeast. This offensive succeeded only in capturing the railroad station in the northern part of Hailar, as the southern and eastern sections of the city fell the following day. However, the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade continued to delay the Soviet advance, while the 119th Division moved eastward to fortify positions in the Grand Khingan Mountains, stretching from Yakoshih to Pokotu. Despite these setbacks, the 36th Army had advanced 60 kilometers into Manchuria and had partially secured Hailar. Meanwhile, to the east, drenched by inundating thunderstorms, the 1st Far Eastern Front advanced under the worst weather conditions during the dark of night. This totally surprised the Japanese defenders and led to the rapid reduction of many unsuspecting border posts. Colonel-General Nikolay Krylov's 5th Army spearheaded the main attack, with the 17th, 65th, and 72nd Rifle Corps quickly breaking through the Volynsk center of resistance. They achieved a penetration of 16 to 22 kilometers toward Laotsaiying and Machiacho. Meanwhile, the 105th Fortified Region and assault engineer units attacked the Suifenho center of resistance, successfully seizing critical railroad tunnels on the main rail line into Manchuria. In support, Colonel-General Afanasy Beloborodov's 1st Red Banner Army to the north launched an assault with the 26th and 59th Rifle Corps over a 16-kilometer sector through heavily wooded, wet terrain. As they advanced, they constructed roads through the forest. By nightfall, forward divisional elements had advanced five to six kilometers deep into Manchuria, crossing the Shitouho River and half of the forested region. At the same time, the 6th Field Fortified Region and the 112th Fortified Region stormed several Japanese border positions and slowly advanced north towards Mishan. This assault supported Lieutenant-General Nikanor Zakhvatayev's 35th Army, which deployed the 66th and 363rd Rifle Divisions to cross the Sungacha River and attack towards Mishan. The 264th Rifle Division and the 109th Fortified Region assaulted across the Ussuri River against Hutou. After securing a crossing over the Sungacha, the 66th Division penetrated deep into the swamps, managing to advance 12 kilometers into Tachiao. Meanwhile, the 363rd Division successfully broke through an enemy strongpoint at Maly Huankang, ultimately reaching the southwest edge of Tachiao. In turn, the 264th Division crossed the Ussuri River and outflanked Hutou to the south, capturing the railroad depot and cutting the highway to Hulin. Lastly, Colonel-General Ivan Chistyakov's 25th Army launched an attack along two principal axes. The 39th Rifle Corps and the 259th Tank Brigade targeted Tungning, while border guard units, along with the 108th and 113th Fortified Regions, crossed the Hunchun and Tumen rivers to engage Japanese defenses in Korea and at Hunchun. Shielded by rain, the Russians swiftly captured or subdued the Japanese forward defenses along the front. By nightfall, the 39th Rifle Corps had advanced ten to twelve kilometers into the Japanese rear along the Pad Sennaya River. Lead elements, reinforced by the 72nd Tank Brigade, began their assault on the town of Tungning and the vital railroad line to Tumen. To the north, the 2nd Far Eastern Front deployed its forces across three separate sectors. Lieutenant-General Stepan Mamonov's 15th Army was tasked with the main attack across the Amur River in the center of the front sector. Lieutenant-General Makar Teryokhin's 2nd Red Banner Army was assigned to conduct a supporting attack against the Aihun and Sunwu Fortified Regions, while Major-General Ivan Pashkov's 5th Rifle Corps aimed to seize the fortified region at Jaoho. Supported by the Amur Naval Flotilla, reconnaissance and advanced detachments of the 15th Army launched assaults without artillery preparation and rapidly secured major islands in the Amur River. Mamonov's rifle divisions then sent reconnaissance units across to the south bank of the river, which was likewise secured against light opposition. Throughout the remainder of the day, reconnaissance units and advanced battalions of the 15th Army consolidated their positions on the islands and the south bank, while main forces concentrated on conducting a challenging river crossing, hampered by heavy rains, high water, and mud. At the same time, assault units and reconnaissance detachments of the 5th Rifle Corps crossed the Ussuri River, successfully securing a beachhead north of Jaoho while the remainder of the corps was transported across the river. From August 9 to 11, the forces of the 2nd Red Banner Army limited their activities to reconnaissance, focusing on seizing islands in the Amur River and harassing Japanese installations. This operation occurred at a critical moment for the Japanese, who were still reeling from the impacts of two atomic bombings. The Soviet Union had successfully initiated its invasion of Manchuria, setting the stage for a campaign that, although brief, was just beginning. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Two atomic bombs have been dropped and the Soviet Union has invaded Manchuria. For months the Japanese had been working tirelessly to obtain better peace terms through the Soviets, hoping above all else to preserve the Kokutai. It was all for nothing. The Americans offered terms, leaving the Kokutai ambiguous. What would Japan, or better said, the Emperor do?

Last time we spoke about a major Chinese counter offensive at Shanghai. "Black Saturday," saw over a thousand civilians killed. In response, Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek launched Operation Iron Fist on August 17, aiming to exploit weaknesses in Japanese defenses but failing due to disarray and entrenched opposition. Amid mounting pressure, Chinese commanders redirected their strategy toward Yangshupu, seeking to breach Japanese lines along the Huangpu River. The 36th Infantry Division, newly trained by German advisers, launched a surprise assault on August 19, but inexperienced troops faced relentless Japanese fire, struggling to hold their positions. As casualties mounted, the Japanese executed strategic landings at Chuanshakou and Wusong, capturing key points with minimal resistance. The battle at Baoshan became emblematic of their resistance, where a handful of defenders vowed to fight to the last man, encapsulating the desperation and bravery of those battling under the shadow of impending defeat.    #159 The Battle of Shanghai Part 4: The Battle for Luodian Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the early days of September, a profound sense of resignation descended upon the senior Chinese commanders as the Japanese troops captured stronghold after stronghold along the riverbank, first Shizilin, then Wusong, and finally Baoshan. Despite the resignation among their leaders, the rank and file remained resolute in their determination to defend every inch of Chinese soil. The fighting along Wusong Creek, extending west from Wusong, became particularly brutal. “There were huge numbers of deaths on both sides, and the water of the creek turned red,” wrote Chinese official Wang Jieshi in his diary. “The saying about ‘rivers of blood' became a grim reality.” Meanwhile the Japanese were landing more reinforcements, such as the Tida detachment on September 6. The next day Tokyo HQ authorized the dispatch of the 9th, 13th and 101st divisions and the Shigeto Detachment to Shanghai. That same day over 10 Japanese infantry battalions were ordered to advance from Northeast China to Shanghai. The situation was dire for the Chinese. Not only were their frontline units struggling in battle, but they were also sustaining exceptionally high casualties. By early September, Yao Ziqing's 98th Infantry Division had suffered 4,960 casualties, including a regimental commander killed and another wounded. Throughout the battle for Shanghai, various units within the division received reinforcements up to four times. Upon arrival, these reinforcements were quickly armed and sent directly to the front lines. As recalled by Fang Jing “Some were injured almost immediately after arriving. When they reached the hospital, they had no idea which unit they belonged to.” The string of defeats and setbacks significantly affected morale within the Chinese Army, particularly among senior officers. While the lower ranks generally showed a willingness to continue the fight, high-ranking officials exhibited waning resolve. “All my soldiers have been sacrificed. There's nobody left,” Xia Chuzhong, commander of the 79th Division, lamented in a phone call to Luo Zhuoying, head of the 18th Army, part of the 15th Army Group. In response, Luo Zhuoying urged, “Aren't you still standing? Hold your ground and fight.” Having lost Baoshan the next defensive position was the small town of Luodian, the transportation center connecting Baoshan, downtown Shanghai, Jiading, Songjiang and several other towns via highways. The successful defense of Luodian was crucial for the security of Suzhou and Shanghai. On August 29, German adviser Alexander von Falkenhausen warned Chiang Kai-shek that the town needed to be held at all costs, describing it as "the most crucial strategic point.”. Chiang Kai-shek was determined to hold on to Luodian. He personally summoned senior commanders to the 3rd War Zone headquarters in Suzhou, emphasizing that the town must be retaken at all costs. In response, the commanders deployed entire divisions to the battle for Luodian. During one of several Chinese assaults, Qiu Weida, a regimental commander in the 51st Infantry Division, led a night attack on the southern part of Luodian. Moving quietly through the darkness, the Chinese force, about two companies strong, approached a Japanese camp, most of whose soldiers were asleep. The Chinese launched a swift attack, giving the Japanese no chance to react. They shot and bayoneted soldiers while they were still lying down, successfully taking over the camp and preparing for a counterattack. When the Japanese responded, the Chinese staged a fighting retreat, deliberately luring the enemy into an open area where well-armed soldiers lay in ambush. As the Japanese advanced, Qiu Weida signaled with a flare, a pre-arranged signal to open fire. Infantry weapons of various calibers joined in the assault. As dawn broke, Qiu raised his binoculars to survey the scene, which was a disturbing sight, covered with a tangled mass of dead and dying bodies. The Japanese commanders launched what they hoped would be the decisive blow to break out from the Baoshan perimeter. Elements of the 3rd Division were tasked with moving down the road toward Liuhang and occupying Yanghang. Meanwhile, the 11th Division's Amaya Detachment, which had arrived in Wusong on September 2, was to seize Yuepu, a village on the other strategic road leading west from Baoshan that blocked access to Luodian and the opportunity to link up with other units of the 11th Division fighting in the area. This operation aimed to create the necessary space for a full assault on Shanghai, and the Japanese dedicated every available resource to the effort. The artillery barrage began before dawn on September 1, with Japanese guns of all calibers participating. For more than two weeks, the Japanese had been able to disembark supplies at landing sites along the Yangtze and Huangpu Rivers. After daybreak, air raids intensified unusually, with the Japanese seemingly deploying all available aircraft in this narrow part of the front. Eventually, the Japanese infantry prepared to launch their attack. While this was simply the latest in a series of Japanese assaults, the sheer tenacity displayed indicated to the Chinese that this time was different. However, after an entire day of fighting, little territorial gain was made. The defenders fought with a determination bordering on fanaticism, despite a total lack of air and artillery support, effectively utilizing the obstacles created by canals that cut through the heavily cultivated area. By sunset, the Japanese had advanced no further than the eastern edge of Yuepu, although the village had been completely destroyed by artillery fire. Yanghang remained firmly in Chinese hands. In the countryside between the two western roads leading from Baoshan, Japanese units had only managed to occupy territory where their artillery and aircraft had utterly obliterated the defenders. To an outsider, it might seem that the Chinese could breathe a sigh of relief. However, from the perspective of Chinese commanders, the situation was vastly different. Their primary concern was the Japanese superiority in artillery. The contested area north of Shanghai consisted mainly of low-lying rice and cotton fields with relatively few trees, offering insufficient camouflage for all but the smallest units. This allowed Japanese naval gunners on the elevated waters of the Yangtze and Huangpu to sometimes directly observe Chinese troops. Even when there was no direct line of sight from the ships in the rivers, they were aided by the directions of observers patrolling in aircraft or hovering in balloons over the horizon. The Chinese had long realized that exposing their units to continuous attack from naval guns played directly into the Japanese hands. They understood that they needed to move away from the riverbank and the lethal fire of the IJN Although the decision to withdraw would have been made sooner or later, it was hastened by the relentless Japanese pressure on the two roads from Baoshan, as their loss would create a breach between Zhang Zhizhong's 9th Army Group in the Shanghai area and Chen Cheng's 15th Army Group to the left. General Gu Zhutong, a member of Chiang Kai-shek's inner circle who had recently been appointed deputy commander of the 3rd War Zone, witnessed how some of the best divisions were being decimated in the defense of Yuepu and Yanghang. Meanwhile, Zhang Zhizhong was pushing for the withdrawal of troops in Yangshupu, which risked becoming a dangerously exposed salient if a breach occurred. The order for the two Chinese army groups to withdraw came late on September 11. Under the cover of darkness, the bulk of the divisions pulled back to positions reinforced by reserves in the preceding days. As thousands of soldiers moved several miles to the rear, the Japanese remained unaware that anything unusual was occurring, and the entire movement took place without enemy harassment. Only skeleton crews remained in the original Chinese positions. By the morning of September 12, the new frontline stretched from the North Railway Station to the eastern edge of Jiangwan, bent west of Yanghang and Luodian, and extended north to the banks of the Yangtze. Unbeknownst to them, the Japanese had become masters of heavily contested areas from Yangshupu in the south to Yuepu in the north. The Chinese military leadership attempted to explain to the public that it had no choice but to withdraw and had never seriously expected to be able to push the Japanese back into the Yangtze, given the hundreds of naval guns at their disposal. A military spokesman said “The objective of the Chinese command was to delay and harass the landing. It was never hoped that we would permanently repel the landing.” The Chinese expressed confidence in their new positions, even comparing them to the Maginot Line along the French border with Germany, which of course would become rather ironic. The Japanese now controlled the entire left bank of the Huangpu River from Yangshupu to the mouth of the Yangtze. They had access to several good roads, some interconnected, which could serve as supply lines for future attacks. Additionally, they could exploit a large number of modern Chinese wharfs and docks, setting the stage for a steady flow of reinforcements.  On the 12th, Matsui received word from the Amaya Detachment that it had finally captured Yuepu. After driving the Chinese out of the village, the detachment established a defensive perimeter in a semicircle 500 yards around the western edge. Nearly simultaneously, the Ueno Detachment, a unit attached to the 3rd Division, reported that it had occupied Yanghang and pursued the enemy to a position about two miles west of the village. In both cases, it appeared that the enemy had abandoned their positions under the cover of night. Yet despite the victories Matsui desperately needed more men. In the three weeks leading up to September 11, the Japanese had managed to land 40,000 soldiers and establish a bridgehead measuring roughly 25 miles in length and over five miles in depth. Together with the troops already present in Shanghai, Japan had about 50,000 soldiers in the area. While this was a significant force, it was still insufficient to ensure the conquest of Shanghai, especially given the rapid attrition faced. As of September 9, the 3rd Division had reported losses of 589 killed and 1,539 injured, while the 11th Division recorded 616 dead and 1,336 wounded. But Tokyo was very reluctant to dispatch troops to Shanghai. From the viewpoint of the IJA leadership, Shanghai and Central China were a sideshow to the north china theater, which they alongside the Kwantung Army argued was more essential, given the proximity of the USSR. This belief was strongly reinforced when the Sino-Soviet agreement was signed in late August. Shanghai also heavily favored the Chinese terrain wise, it was basically like the battle of Thermopylae, instead of a mountain pass it was an extremely concentrated urban area. Then there was one of the main advocates opposing the China War altogether, Kanji Ishiwara. The entire time he was screaming and lecturing non-expansion and advised diplomacy and to even form an alliance with China against the USSR. Concentrating on China and ignoring the Soviet menace was, in his eyes, like “chasing the dogs away from the front door while forgetting the wolves approaching the back door.” However, Ishiwara's reluctance to send more troops to Shanghai was overruled. On September 4, a meeting of officers in Tokyo concluded that the battle in the Shanghai area should be completed by late October or early November, and to that end, sufficient troops should be deployed. Three days later, Emperor Hirohito approved reinforcements for the Shanghai front, including the dispatch of three additional infantry divisions from the home islands, along with units from the garrison forces in Taiwan. Ishiwara was so upset by this decision that he submitted his resignation, although he was later appointed to a position in the army in northeastern China. There was little doubt among Japanese leaders that the deployment of these reinforcements marked a significant escalation in the war. The situation was unlike anything Japan had ever experienced before. Army Minister Sugiyama Hajime remarked in a statement to his commanders, “This war has become total war.” A junior Japanese officer inspecting the Shanghai front reported upon his return to Tokyo “The enemy resistance is undeniably strong. Whether they are bombed out or surrounded, they do not retreat.” Luodian had remained under Japanese control since late August, but the surrounding countryside largely remained Chinese territory. Despite increasing pressure after the Chinese withdrawal to the south on September 12, the Japanese advanced only slowly and hesitantly. Taken aback by the sudden gains at Yuepu and Yanghang, and revealing their typical tardiness in responding to unforeseen events, it took them several days to even dispatch patrols for probing attacks against the new Chinese defenses. This delay provided Chinese commanders with extra time to reinforce their positions near Luodian, particularly on both sides of the road from Yuepu, which they correctly assumed would be the primary route for the Japanese attackers. Chinese preparations were just one reason Japan's mid-September assault was only moderately successful. Like the Chinese, the Japanese had yet to develop much skill in coordinating infantry and armor operations. The road connecting Yuepu and Luodian was of relatively good quality, enabling the Japanese to deploy about 25 tanks as the spearhead of their thrust. These armored vehicles quickly eliminated the Chinese positions closest to the road and advanced rapidly toward Luodian. However, the accompanying infantry from the Amaya Detachment was unable to keep pace. The Japanese only held a few yards of terrain on either side of the road. Beyond that narrow strip, the area was swarming with Chinese soldiers, making the advancing Japanese infantry easy targets. The Japanese infantry became bogged down, and it was only after dark, when the Chinese defenders north of the road chose to withdraw westward, that the Japanese had a chance to reach Luodian. The debacle on the road to Luodian was not solely a result of flawed training within the Japanese ranks. The area around Shanghai, a patchwork of small farm plots divided by creeks and canals, was ill-suited for tank warfare. This terrain had previously been a key argument against large-scale deployments by the Japanese Army. Nevertheless, once the decision was made in Tokyo to send enough troops to win the battle for the city, the generals had to strategize ways to overcome these terrain challenges. One proposed solution was to deploy amphibious tanks. However, the tactics employed called for using the tanks in a supportive role rather than leading the attacks across waterways. If a creek needed to be crossed, Japanese commanders would first order a small infantry unit to wade or swim to the opposite bank and prepare it for the tanks to land under the cover of darkness. While it was still dark, the tanks would cross and provide support to the infantry by daybreak. This cumbersome procedure often felt like putting the cart before the horse, but the Japanese executed it precisely as prescribed, time and again. This predictability allowed their Chinese opponents to acclimate to Japanese tactics to such an extent that they could usually anticipate what the Japanese would do next. While flawed tactics prevented either side from breaking the stalemate at the Luodian front, both continued to pour in reinforcements. The Shigeto Detachment arrived from Taiwan and was attached to the 11th Division on September 14, the same day the Amaya Detachment made its way up the road from Yuepu to return to the division's direct command. By mid-September, the division had grown into a sizeable fighting force. However, the enemy it faced around Luodian was also growing stronger by the day, posing a significant threat to the division's right flank if it were to rush south toward Dachang to link up with the 3rd Division. Therefore, on September 18, the Shanghai commanders ordered the division to focus initially on eliminating the Chinese troops amassed around Luodian. By this time, heavy rain had already fallen in the Shanghai region for three days, gradually slowing the fighting. The Japanese disliked the rain, as it turned the roads into muddy rivers, making transportation difficult, if not impossible, while also grounding most of their aircraft. In contrast, the Chinese welcomed the lull, as it provided them with an opportunity to improve their positions. The challenge of breaking through the Chinese defenses was only becoming more difficult as time passed. The Chinese Army's performance during the initial stage of the fighting in Shanghai altered the world's perception of the nation's military capabilities. China, which had lost every war over the past century, invariably to nations much smaller than itself, had suddenly taken a stand. At Shanghai, the Chinese Army experienced more intense fighting than anyone could have anticipated, suffering losses that had taken years to build up. However, it had gained prestige and respect, even among its Japanese adversaries. Even the withdrawal on September 12 was met with sympathy and admiration in capitals around the world. Every journalist in Shanghai during the fall of 1937 had a story to tell about the remarkable Chinese soldier. American journalist Carroll Alcott spent many hours in dugouts in Zhabei. “While Japanese shells pelted down over their heads, the Chinese soldiers sat unfazed in their self-made caves, cooking rice, vegetables, and occasionally a small bit of pork over a charcoal brazier. They dispelled the inevitable boredom with games of checkers and mahjong and wrote letters home to their families. In the Chinese trenches, there was a sense of safety and a primitive kind of comfort”. Chiang Kai-shek had decided as early as September 15 that changes were needed at the top of the command in the 3rd War Zone. What this meant became clear six days later when Chiang sent two separate cables to the zone's senior officers. In the first cable, he announced that he would take over command of the 3rd War Zone from Feng Yuxiang, and dispatched him to the 6th War Zone further north. This was a sideways move rather than a direct demotion, but it undeniably removed Feng Yuxiang from the most crucial theater at the time. Despite this, the decision seemed logical to most senior officers in Suzhou. Feng Yuxiang had never effectively managed the 3rd War Zone during his time in command. None of his direct subordinates truly considered him to be in charge; instead, they continued to view Chiang as their actual commander. In the second cable of the day, Chiang Kai-shek went a step further by relieving Zhang Zhizhong of his duties as commander of the 9th Army Group. He replaced him with General Zhu Shaoliang, a staunch ally and, if possible, an even more vehement opponent of communism than himself. For Zhang Zhizhong, the decision was no major surprise, as he had faced Chiang Kai-shek's constant reproaches since the early days of the battle. Although Chiang initially selected Zhang due to his close connections with the divisional commanders he led, he grew increasingly disenchanted with Zhang's style of command characterized by “much talk and little action” and expressed his irritation both publicly and privately. There may have been an additional reason for this. Disagreements among the top echelons of the 3rd War Zone threatened to bring about paralysis. Zhang Zhizhong had not gotten along well with Chen Cheng, the commander of the neighboring 11th Army Group. Zhang had told anyone who would listen, “Chen Cheng isn't capable enough,”to which Chen retorted, “Zhang Zhizhong loves to show off.”  The strain that Shanghai was under also had an economic aspect. Although it had been a bumper year for both rice and cotton,  the two most popular crops in the area and many farmers were unable to harvest due to the continued heavy fighting around the city. Labor disputes simmered and occasionally erupted into open conflict. On September 14, a group of workers hired on short-term contracts by the Fou Foong Flour Mill in the western part of the International Settlement locked themselves inside and refused to leave until their demand for ten months' salary was met. Police and members of the Reserve Unit, a special anti-riot outfit, attacked the premises with tear gas and managed to disperse the protesters. Subsequently, ambulances transported 25 injured individuals to various hospitals from the mill. As if the city was not already suffering enough hardship, a cholera epidemic broke out, taking a particularly heavy toll on the poorest inhabitants. As of September 13, the outbreak had lasted for a month, with 119 confirmed cases and nine deaths. Less than a fortnight later, it had infected 646 people and resulted in 97 deaths. By early October, when the outbreak peaked, it had claimed a total of 355 lives. These statistics marked only the tip of the iceberg, as they accounted only for patients at hospitals in the International Settlement, excluding the likely much larger numbers in the Chinese part of the city. In a way, these individuals were collateral damage. A doctor who worked with the patients stated with a high degree of certainty that the disease had likely been brought to Shanghai by troops from the south. There existed a large villa overlooking Luodian they Japanese termed “the white house”. The Chinese forces had held the white house for four weeks, demonstrating fierce resistance. Encamped outside, the Japanese Army's 44th Regiment, known as the Kochi Regiment, was gradually being worn down, as their repeated attempts to storm the stronghold had failed. During their time at Luodian, the regiment had made numerous unsuccessful attempts to seize the villa. Limited artillery support hampered their efforts; logistical challenges meant each artillery piece received only one-fifth of its normal daily ammunition supply. On September 19, engineers began digging a tunnel from the trenches toward the White House. Four days later, they had excavated exactly 35 yards, effectively halving the distance the infantry would need to cross exposed ground before reaching the villa's defenses. A new attack was launched on the 23rd, beginning with an artillery bombardment, followed by air raids. Next, tanks advanced toward the walls, with small clusters of soldiers trailing behind. This attack included a surprise element for the Chinese defenders: as the offensive unfolded, a tunnel's entrance erupted open, allowing soldiers to emerge in single file close to the wall too quickly for the Chinese machine gunners to adjust their aim. The soldiers rushed forward, bearing heavy satchels of explosives. Pressing against the wall, they ignited the fuses and sought cover as loud explosions rang out. When the dust settled, the Japanese surged through the new openings in the walls, spreading out within the compound. After a fierce battle lasting two and a half hours, the building was captured by the Japanese troops. Despite losing the "White House," Lin Yindong, the commander of the 1st Battalion, was awarded an A-2 grade for the "Medal of the Armed Forces." He was also promoted to lieutenant colonel and appointed as the regimental attaché of the 66th Regiment for successfully defending the "White House" against a numerically superior enemy for nearly a month. The capture of the White House was part of a significant offensive launched by the 11th Division in the Luodian area. Initially scheduled for September 20, the operation faced delays of several days due to prolonged preparations, a common issue in the challenging countryside surrounding Shanghai. The division chose to attack south of the town with a narrow front to concentrate enough forces to deliver a powerful, unified strike against Chinese positions. The Japanese employed massed armor in their assault, deploying aircraft to neutralize any anti-tank weapons that emerged. These tactics proved effective, as the Chinese were pushed back in multiple sections of the front. To marshal sufficient troops for the attack, the division assigned the Shigeto Detachment to cover its right flank north and west of Luodian. However, the newly arrived detachment, full of morale, exceeded its mandate by launching a vigorous counterattack against the Chinese in its sector. Unfortunately, their efforts yielded little significant progress, and they suffered heavy casualties. As Matsui would report "The detachment has already had 200 casualties. They can't keep attacking blindly like this."  Further south, the 3rd Japanese Division also mounted attacks against Chinese forces, primarily around Liuhang. The fighting revealed Japan's material superiority, which was so pronounced that the Chinese refrained from deploying heavy artillery, even when available. Anti-aircraft guns were strategically positioned near artillery batteries, but the Chinese were reluctant to use them for fear of revealing their locations. Consequently, the Chinese Army found itself with virtually no air defense. Overall, local Chinese reserves struggled to repel the Japanese advances, leading to a shift from the see-saw battles that had characterized the front since early September. The Japanese gradually maintained their positions even after nightfall.  Despite their numerical superiority, defending Luodian proved nearly impossible for the Chinese forces. The Japanese's overwhelming firepower forced the Chinese into a defensive posture, preventing them from launching counterattacks until the enemy was almost upon them. Consequently, the decision was made to hold the entire town at all costs, a tactic that significantly increased the attrition rate within Chinese ranks. General Chen Cheng's army group experienced a casualty rate exceeding fifty percent, resulting in more than 15,000 losses. Additionally, units from Xue Yue's 19th Army Group participated in the combat southwest of Luodian and suffered severe casualties. The 59th and 90th divisions of the 4th Corps endured seventy to eighty percent losses within just five days. The training brigade of the 66th Corps reported 3,003 casualties after several days of fighting. Faced with these circumstances, Chinese commanders decided to execute another major retreat along the entire front north of Shanghai. They took advantage of a lull in Japanese assaults on September 25 to withdraw approximately one mile to a new defensive line. As before, this retreat was conducted with great discipline, and it took the Japanese two more days to fully comprehend that the Chinese forces had disappeared from their positions.  In the wake of these Japanese successes, significant changes began to unfold. The three divisions that the Japanese high command had dispatched to the Shanghai area in early September gradually arrived. First to land was the 101st Division, which started disembarking on September 22 and was ordered to position itself on the left flank of the 3rd Division. The 9th Division arrived in the same area on September 27, followed by the 13th Division on October 1. With these reinforcements, Japan now had five divisions stationed in Shanghai, compared to more than 25 divisions fielded by the Chinese. While China's numerical superiority was undeniable, the disparity was not as stark as it appeared. A typical Japanese division consisted of 15,000 men. Combined with the marines and infantry defending Hongkou, Japan had approximately 90,000 soldiers at its disposal in and around the city. In contrast, Chinese divisions often had as few as 5,000 men, making it unlikely that China deployed more than 200,000 soldiers in Shanghai at that time. Furthermore, the Japanese compensated for their numerical disadvantage with significant superiority in materials, aircraft, and naval artillery, which could still reach key areas within the Chinese front. Overall, the addition of the three new divisions significantly bolstered the Japanese forces, prompting Matsui and his staff to begin preparations for what they hoped would be the decisive strike against the Chinese defenders. Their plan was straightforward: they intended to execute a powerful thrust across Wusong Creek and advance toward Suzhou Creek. The goal was to encircle and annihilate the main Chinese force in a maneuver they had envisioned since their arrival in China. After all, encirclement was the cornerstone of Japanese military doctrine. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In August 1937, the Battle of Luodian raged as Chinese forces faced relentless Japanese attacks. After initial successes, the Chinese struggled under heavy casualties and dwindling morale. They fought fiercely to retain the critical town of Luodian, a vital transportation hub. Despite courageous defensive efforts, including a surprise night assault, the Japanese overwhelmed the Chinese with superior numbers and artillery. Encounters turned devastating, with both sides suffering severe losses. By late September, as the Japanese received reinforcements, the situation forced the Chinese to retreat, marking the beginning of a dire struggle for Shanghai's control.

Last time we spoke about Operation Nekka, the Invasion of Rehe Province. In 1932, the Kwantung Army eyed Rehe province as vital for Manchukuo's success. General Tang Yulin, ruling Rehe, initially favored Japanese interests due to economic ties, particularly in opium. Tensions escalated after a Japanese civilian was abducted, prompting military actions that led to skirmishes in Shanhaiguan. Amidst growing conflict, Zhang Xueliang mobilized forces against Tang, who eventually conceded. As Japan prepared for invasion, both sides strategized, with Chiang Kai-Shek reluctant to engage directly, fearing Japanese influence over his rivals. Operation Nekka commenced, showcasing the Kwantung Army's efficiency as they swiftly routed Chinese forces in Rehe. By March 4th, key passes were captured, but fierce resistance emerged. General Nishi faced counterattacks, leading to strategic retreats. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-Shek struggled with internal conflicts while managing the Japanese threat. As the Kwantung Army pushed beyond the Great Wall, logistical issues arose, prompting political maneuvers to secure local warlord alliances. However, plans faltered when Zhang Qingyao, a potential ally, was assassinated.   #147 The Battle for the Great Wall of China Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Thus in the previous episode, Operation Nekka had been unleashed. The Kwangtung Army tossed 2 divisions into Rehe province with the intent of forcing its annexation into Manchukuo. They were under strict orders to not extend operations past the Great Wall of China. However they believed it was necessary to seize the main gateways along the Great Wall of China to establish their new borders, and in order to do so this absolutely required going past them. Yet military operations were not the only means to secure their goals. The Japanese forces faced significant logistical challenges, including a shortage of troops, having advanced into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most resolute general in the Kwantung Army doubted that their military strength could prevail against the vast numbers of Chinese troops in the plains of Hubei. As a result, they needed to supplement their military efforts with political strategies targeting regional warlords. The tactic of bribing local elites had proven highly effective during the pacification of Manchuria, and there was no reason to think it wouldn't work in North China as well. All of these actions were carried out without any oversight from Tokyo headquarters.   On February 13, 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, who was then the head of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any formal announcement of his promotion. He took up a position in Tientsin specifically to initiate political maneuvers in eastern Hubei, leading to the establishment of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially, this agency sought to engage various competing warlords in North China, including Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, and Sun Chuanfang, but eventually focused on Zhang Qingyao. Zhang had previously been a protégé of Duan Qirui, serving as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 before shifting his allegiance to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao again battled Zhang Zuolin, who was then in control of the National Pacification Army. After the Northern Expedition concluded, he allied with Yan Xishan's forces in Shanxi. So yeah it would seem he was not a man of principles nor loyalties of any kind. The Tientsin Special Service Agency initially aimed to approach Zhang Qingyao in hopes that he could orchestrate a coup d'état against Chiang Kai-Shek. They also hoped to persuade other figures such as Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying, and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If successful, this could lead to a swift takeover of North China as they were advancing towards Peiping after taking the Great Wall. However, on May 7, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely derailing their plans. With Zhang Qingyao dead, the agency concentrated their efforts instead to instigate riots in the Peiping-Tientsin region. They also began encouraging and propping up new political organizations that sought to form an independent northern regime. One scheme they were performing was to form a committee composed of Northern Warlords headed by Lu Zengyu, a banker who had studied in Japan. The idea was to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition to carve out north china. The agency received a significant amount of funds to make ends meet. Itagaki alone would spend over 50,000 yen to try and bring about an anti-Chiang regime in the north. Some sources indicated over 3 billion yen being allocated to the IJA to be dished out to various Chinese warlords and elites in the form of bribes.  Meanwhile operations in the district east of the Luan River saw attacks formed against the Xumenzhai and Lengkou gateways. On April 1st, the Kwantung Army issued Order 491, seeing the Iwata detachment of the IJA 6th Division storm through the Xumenzhai gate and succeed in securing a supply route behind the great wall to help with the assaults against the other gateways in the region. By April 10th, the IJA 6th Division was making steady progress against the Lengkou gate. The next day they stormed through and captured Qienqangying, pursuing the retreating Chinese to the banks of the Luan River. Meanwhile the IJA 8th Division were facing a much more difficult situation. On the 12th, they captured Xifengkou, but their assault against Quehlingkou was going nowhere. After repeated assaults, the Chinese finally retreated, allowing the Japanese to focus on Taitouying. Thus from the 10th to the 23rd the gateways in northeastern Hubei were all falling into Japanese hands. The Kawahara Brigade was well on its way towards Nantienmen. The Operations within the Great Wall area had been fully authorized by Generals Nishi and Sakamoto. However there still existed limits upon the operations. For example, Operations order 495 issued by General Muto given on the 11th stated "Without specific orders, pursuit by the main force of ground troops is to be limited to the line connecting Hotung, Chiench'angying, and T'ait'ouying; but air units are to be limited to the Luan River."  Meanwhile the Special Service Agency in Tientsin had reported that Zhang Qingyao would stage a coup on the 21st and this prompted Song Queyuans troops to prevent the Central Army forces from fleeing towards Peiping. The Agency requested that the Kwantung Army not return to the Great Wall and instead perform a feint attack towards Peiping and Tientsin to scare the Chinese. As the plot was reaching its climax, on the 18th the Kwantung Army chief of staff, General Koiso Kuniaki issued a order for the 8th Division to strike in full force against the Gubeikou area. The Kwantung Army's plan was to bomb Miyun while launching their feint attack in combination with an all out effort to break Gubeikou. However on the night of the 18th, all of these plans changed dramatically. Suddenly General Muto issued Operations Order 498, hastily ordering all forces to withdraw to the Great Wall. Emperor Hirohito had decided to put his foot down. In Tokyo the emperor asked the vice chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Mazaki Jinzaburö, "Has the Kwantung Army withdrawn from the Luan River line?" The vice chief retired from the imperial presence with a sense of guilt and wrote a confidential letter to the commander of the Kwantung Army. It was personally carried by Infantry Captain Katö [Michio] of the General Staff, who on April 19 arrived at the capital [of Manchukuo] bearing an imperial rescript. The vice chief also cabled to the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army a highly confidential dispatch, the main point of which stated, "Withdraw your troops immediately, or an imperial command will be issued." Thereupon the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army directed staff officer Endò Saburò to draft the withdrawal order. Thus as a result, the Kwantung Army began a withdrawal on the 21st, the same day the Peiping coup was to be unleashed. Those around Emperor Hirohito at this time have gone on the record to state it seemed to them, the emperor had hesitated heavily on issuing the withdrawal order. His motivations for giving the order are simply, the Kwantung Army had gone against his decrees, it was an identical situation to what had happened at Mukden in 1931. The Kwantung Army had no choice but to submit to what essentially was him “asking them to stop”. With that, operations east of the Luan River were over, for now. The order was certainly a critical blow to the Agency in Tientsin. How did they react? They doubled down on the coup effort. Likewise Koiso did not stop the 8th Division operation at Gubeikou. Instead the 8th Division was given orders "to maintain a menacing attitude toward hostile forces in North China." In accordance, the 3800 man Kawahara Brigade on direct orders from General Nishi, launched an attack against two Central Army Divisions numbered nearly 30,000 men stationed at Nantienmen. After a brutal week of battle the Kawahara Brigade seized the town. Meanwhile a battalion of 280 men led by Colonel Shimmura Eijiro attacked a central army force around 4000 strong at Xinglong. They suffered a 38% rate of casualties by the night of the 27th. The Battalion was nearly annihilated when suddenly the Chinese withdrew enabling the Japanese to slip by. Meanwhile the Piping coup did not materialize as planned on the 21st. Instead a secondary coup was initiated by Zhang Zuoxiang on the 26, but this misfired greatly. Reports began to emerge that troops led by Zhang Tingxu, Sun Tienying, Feng Zhanhai and Xu Yusan were willing to rebel in response to the failed coup attempts, but this proved completely false. A report issued on the 30th stated troops under Fang Chenwu were rebelling against Chiang Kai-Shek. However in reality Fang Chenwu only advanced his force north on May 10th and it was to join the anti-Japanese forces.  From mid April to mid May, the United States, Britain, France and Germany finally entered the fray in North China. It was an extremely chaotic situation for everyone. The Japanese military in Tokyo had no control nor idea what the Kwantung Army was doing, so when they tried to explain their actions to the international community, they continuously were walking over rakes. All the talk from Tokyo seemed incomprehensible to the other great powers. The Chinese were clamouring the entire time for a ceasefire agreement, but lacked the means to force the Japanese to do so. Japan had left the League of Nations, thus was extremely isolated and insecure in regards to foreign relations. Thus if a nation like Britain or the US had actually put their foot down, the Japanese more than likely would have backed off. Another element to this debacle was the stance of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who had made it adamantly clear they had zero intention of fighting off the British or Americans because of their unruly siblings within the Army. However, both Britain and America were too preoccupied with internal strife, mostly the result of the Great Depression, to devote considerable effort to the crisis in China. The League of Nations remained completely useless during the North China incident, similarly to how they were useless with the Manchurian incident. The Lytton Commission had performed an on the spot inquiry, and it did play a role in establishing a ceasefire by the time of the Shanghai incident, but did nothing to really help China. China had begun appealing to the League when Shanhaiguan was attacked and this prompted the nations of the league to rapidly agree to the Lytton Commission report's recommendations. In turn this led Matsuoka Yosuke to walk out on the league. With Japan out of the League, Wellington Koo proposed harsh sanctions upon Japan in response to their invasion of Rehe province. Yet they did nothing. China would continuously make pleas, but it was to no avail.  Rather than rely upon the League, the Chinese began secret talks with Japanese officials aiming first for a ceasefire. Tang Erho, Lee Shuzheng and Wang Komin attempted talks, but failed. Then Chen Yi the political vice minister of military affairs, secretly spoke with Nemoto Hiroshi, an army attache at the Shanghai legation on April 27th. They established negotiations with Nemoto speaking on behalf of the Kwantung Army and Chen Yi on behalf of Ho Yingqin. The Chinese were clearly more eager than the Japanese for a ceasefire, but the Japanese no longer had a rationale to continue their operation. Regardless the Japanese took the victors stance and demanded the Chinese withdraw from the battlefield as a prerequisite to further Japanese advances. In the first meeting, Nemoto told Chen that the Kwantung Army had already withdrawn from the area east of the Luan River to give Ho Yingqin an opportunity to consider a ceasefire. He described the action as a friendly gesture and suggested the Chinese reciprocate it by withdrawing their troops. Chen countered this by claiming Ho Yingqin had shown his own sincerity at the battle of Nantienmen by ordering his troops to withdraw to a second line of defense, hoping this would allow the Japanese to pull away from Nantienmen. However by May 1st, the Japanese claimed they had captured and secured Nantienmen, so Nemoto informed Chen the Chinese forces north of the Great Wall should withdraw to a line connecting Miyun, Pinkou, Yutien and the Luan River. On May 2nd, the Chinese sent a reply to this, completely ignoring the line idea and instead referred to the recent battle at Xinglong and explained the local commander there was eager for a victory and refused to withdraw despite being asked twice to do so. The Chinese also notified Nemoto that a Political affairs council headed by Huang Fu was being established at Peiping, and it should be through that body that further negotiations were held. The Japanese welcomed this development. Just as it seemed the Shanghai talks were paving a way to a ceasefire, the leadership of the Kwantung Army abandoned their political maneuvers in favor of a settlement. On April 30th the Tientsin Special Service Agency insisted to their Japanese colleagues, the Chinese were just buying time and not sincere in their actions. That same day the Army General Staff and Foreign Ministry suddenly refused to initiate a ceasefire on the grounds the Chinese had agreed to an armistice only to save face. Lt Colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, the army attache at Peiping urged the 8th Division to rapidly strike southwards as far as Miyun to annihilate He Yingqin's planned counteroffensive. Such an action would immediately threaten the Peiping-Tientsin region. To push the envelope, the Japanese could toss a new Division into the mix and force further negotiations when the Chinese withdrew south of Miyun. Clearly the Japanese had their eyes set on Miyun now. As such General Nishi was secretly told to capture it without any direction from Tokyo HQ, nor from most of the Kwantung Army leadership. The Operations department of the Kwantung Army also independently elected to move troops east of the Luan River again. They argued "the enemy again advances east of the Luan River and persists in its defiant attitude. Therefore we must again deal them a crushing blow." The IJA 6th Division had been evacuated to the Great Wall back on April 23rd and along the way were closely pursued by Chinese forces. General Sakamoto sent a plan to the Kwantung Army headquarters "to again drive the enemy west of the Luan River,". A lot of chaos was reigning within the Japanese military because they were in echo chambers and not relaying information to another. When the Kwantung Army Operations department suddenly proposed a new advance east of the Luan River, on May 2nd a heated exchange took place between them and the Kwantung Army Intelligence Section: “INTELLIGENCE SECTION: The defiant attitude of the enemy is a matter of degree. While it is indisputable that some of their forces continue defiant, their main force is still stationed west of the Luan River. Therefore, a defiant attitude on the part of the enemy is not sufficient reason to deal them a crushing blow. The Kwantung Army withdrew from the Luan River line only ten days ago. As we understand it, the purpose was to comply with the imperial wish. If the army begins operations on a flimsy pretext at this time, inviting intervention by the central leadership, how can the honor of the commander in chief be maintained? What we should now attack are rather the enemy forces facing the 8th Division. For this, we should employ additional strength. By dealing a severe blow to the Chinese Central Army forces in this area, we can threaten Peiping and the operation should be all the more effective.  OPERATIONS SECTION: Due to the limitations of our supply capacity, we cannot use more than a certain level of forces against the enemy facing the 8th Division. Since the enemy east of the Luan River maintains a defiant attitude, they must be punished regardless of their strength.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: Since the seizure of Nant'ienmen the 8th Division lacks the capability of pursuing the enemy. This is an unavoidable consequence of the small strength of its force from the outset of the operation. Isn't the First [Operations] Section uncertain that the enemy can be defeated even by the main force of the 8th Division, and doesn't it intend ultimately to deploy the 6th Division southward in concert with action by the 8th Division? If this is the case, it is understandable, and this section is not necessarily against it.   OPERATIONS SECTION: That is not what this section is considering.  INTELLIGENCE SECTION: In that case, there is no clear justification for launching the operation. The objective of the operation must be plainly spelled out to all concerned, from His Majesty at the top down to the lowest private. There must not be the slightest doubt about it.” After this conversation the Intelligence department debated amongst themselves before relaying another response at midnight, ultimately not approving it. The next day the Operations department sent a telegram to the negotiations team in Peiping: “1) Under present conditions, the Kwantung Army has no intention of accepting a cease-fire proposal for the time being, particularly because there are signs suggesting intervention by third countries in the matter.  2) Previously the Kwantung Army suggested the Miyun-Yiit'ienLuan River line as the retreat line for the Chinese army; but this did not mean it was to be their front line after a cease-fire. It rather indicated a line to which the Chinese army should immediately and voluntarily retreat as evidence of their sincerity. In other words, a cease-fire cannot be negotiated until they retreat to this line and abandon their provocative attitude, and until this is confirmed by the Kwantung Army. Their mere retreat to the indicated line, in today's circumstances, is not sufficient reason for us to respond to the cease-fire proposal. According to Peking telegram 483 [not identified], it appears that the intentions of our army have been somewhat misunderstood. Even if the Chinese retreat to the indicated line and display the sincerity of their intentions, we may possibly demand a retreat line farther south. We believe negotiations in this region should be handled by the central leadership in Tokyo rather than by the Kwantung Army. Act on this understanding.”   So after this message, the Intelligence department accused the Operations department of trying to find any excuse to renew the advance and sent a wire to Nemoto on April 29th "If the Chinese suddenly perceive their mistake, . . . we will not make war for the fun of it." However the Intelligence department was suddenly overruled by Colonel Kita who cabled the negotiators that the Operations department now had full approval from Kwantung Army vice chief of staff Okamura Yasuji. When General Muto received this notice he questioned "This draft order, states that the enemy has moved into the region east of the Luan River and is showing a provocative attitude. I did not receive such a report from the Second [Intelligence] Section before my departure from Hsinching. Does this mean there has been a subsequent change in the situation?" After being informed more so, Muto simply stated he wished to wait until the chief of staff could speak to him. Obviously Muto was getting wet feet and did not want to perform any actions not in accordance with Tokyo HQ, as Emperor Hirohito had put his foot down.  On May 3rd, General Koiso and Operations Department staff officer Endo Saburo spoke with Muto, indicating they had approval of Tokyo HQ general staff and even the Emperor. So Muto relented for a second advance and issued Order 503 on May 3rd to the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions. Now the Army General Staff were dragged into the Kwantung Army's debacle fully. So they drew up an emergency draft plan for measures in North China. To this aim:  “Through continuing pressure by the military might of the Kwantung Army, applied in concert with various political measures in North China, the Chinese forces in North China are to be compelled to make a substantia] surrender or to dissolve, thereby resulting in the withdrawal of the Chinese army along the China-Manchukuo border and in the establishment of peace in this area”.  Added to this the General Staff suggested a large counteroffensive be driven along the Great Wall and a formal truce agreement should be concluded once three conditions had been met: “(a) that Chinese forces had retreated voluntarily south and west of a line connecting Hsuanhua, Shunyi, Sanho, Yüt'ien, Luanchou, and Lot'ing; (b) that anti-Japanese activities had been controlled; and (c) that the preceding had been verified by the Japanese army”. Under immense pressure from the renewed Japanese advance, the Chinese government on May 3rd, had pushed for a new body to tackle the North China situation. That was the Peiping Political Affairs Council. It was composed of 22 members, headed by Huang Fu. Huang Fu was notably a pro-Japanese official, having been a graduate of the Tokyo Land Survey department training institute and had served early as a minister of foreign affairs. Since China had zero faith anymore in the League of Nations and believed if they failed to resolve the North China issue, this all might see a new civil war break out between Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei. Thus everyone felt the time for active resistance was over and they must place all their effort into negotiations. Chiang Kai-Shek placed a great amount of authority upon Huang Fu and trusted the man. Huang Fu began his new task by speaking with all the political and financial leaders from both sides of the conflict to see how a real ceasefire could be met through dealmaking.  Meanwhile on May 6th the IJA 6th Division unleashed a new offensive south of the Great Wall and were followed by the 8th Division on the 11th. General Muto at this time made public statements blaming the Chinese for the renewed hostilities, making it seem the Japanese had intended to stay within the Great Wall area. The 6th Division swept across the sector east of the Luan River and by the 11th the Chinese defensive line collapsed. On the 12th the 6th Division crossed the Luan River, pursuing Yu Xuechengs 51st Army. In turn this threatened He Yingqin's main force who were facing the 8th Division. In the previous battles, Yu Xuechengs men had performed quite poorly and now even under direct command of He Yingqin were proving themselves helpless against the 6th division. Additionally Itagaki's agency over in Tientsin were using radio facilities to dispatch false directives from Chinese high command, ordering the forces to retreat from the front battle line. Two to three Chinese divisions were neutralized by these fake radio messages and in turn the Chinese became very demoralized at their lines. The 8th division had driven into the Gubeikou area on the 11th and it took them only a day to dislodge the Chinese from their line near Xuxiachen. By the 13th Xuxiachen had fallen completely. On the 11th and 12th, Japanese aircraft began flying over Peiping, as a demonstration of the terror they could deliver to the city at any moment. These developments altogether were pushing the Chinese civilians to demand of their politicians and generals that they appease the Japanese. Huang Fu proposed to Nemoto on the 12th that all Chinese troops could be withdrawn from Miyun to a line extending from Shunyi to Yutien and Tangshan. This was an enormous concession and nearly mirrored the line the Japanese had demanded.  The Japanese however, rejected the concession. To make matters worse for the Chinese, He Yingqin had been notified of the large concession proposal in advance and expected the Japanese to take it. Thus he had refrained from operating in strength at Miyun and did not significantly defend the path towards Peiping. It was the belief of the Japanese commanders, if they performed a full-scale attack towards Peiping now, He Yingqin would have no choice but to withdraw towards Shunyi. With this in mind the Japanese made a proposal on the 14th:  “1) According to the reports of the Peiping military attaché, the 8th Division should be prepared to advance in a single sweep to the southern limit of Miyun, if it is deemed necessary. Preparations for this attack should be expedited.  2) In conjunction with the above, front-line aircraft should take actions implying that a major Japanese offensive is about to begin.  3) In Tokyo, it should be announced publicly, in liaison with the Foreign Ministry, that the security of Jehol province cannot be guaranteed as long as the Chinese army remains in Miyun. Furthermore, every so often Japanese aircraft should make demonstration flights over the Shunyi-T'ungchou area.” Confronted with this, the Chinese were pretty screwed. The Chinese negotiations team were frantically searching for any way to force a ceasefire. Then the secretary of the Shanghai legation, Suma Yakichiro showed up to Peiping, which the Chinese viewed as a golden opportunity. The Chinese complained to him that the Kwantung Army had resumed their offensive and that a political agency in Tientsin were trying to enact coups. Suma bluntly told them the Japanese actions were backed fully by Tokyo and despite the Chinese belief that this was false or that Japan was facing a major financial deficit, this was all untrue.  While the dialogue continued to go nowhere, the 6th division had pursued the Chinese forces to the vicinity of Fengjun. Muto believed this had gone to far so he issued orders on May 13th limiting operations to the area north of a line connecting Miyun, Pingkou, Fegjun and Yungping. Now the 6th and 8th divisions were to assemble around Xuxiachen and Zunhua. Two days later he issued this statement to the public "If the Chinese army immediately abandons its hitherto provocative attitude and withdraws some distance from the border, our army will quickly return to the line of the Great Wall and pursue its regular task of maintaining security in Manchukuo." Likewise Muto ordered the Tientsin group to inform the Chinese that the Kwantung Army would return to the Great Wall if the Chinese forces retreated to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line. Nemoto forwarded all of this to Chen Yi. On May 15th He Yingqin ordered the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to a line between Malanyu, Linnantsang and Pamencheng.  With what seemed a imminent ceasefire at hand, the Kwantung Army HQ ordered the 6th and 8th divisions to take up positions strategically favorable for the negotiations to finally begin in ernest. On the 17th a draft ceasefire plan was drawn up. It envisioned the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the Shunyi-Yutien-Tangshan line and in return the Japanese would pull back to the Great Wall area. Huang Fu was on his way back to Peiping from Shanghai for probably the 10th time in two weeks, when the Japanese captured Fengjun and Zhunhua, routing the Chinese across the Qi Canal to the right bank of the Pai River. The 6th Division then advanced towards Yutien and Xumenchen as the 8th division stood around Xuxiachn. When the Chinese began retreating from Miyun on May 18th, the 8th division suddenly converged upon Miyun. Muto was of course delighted by their new advantageous position and even briefly began talking to his colleagues about the prospect of just marching upon Peiping. Instead he decided to sweep through Miyun, Pingku and the Qi Canal, going even further west than he had stated he would back on the 13th.  With these new orders in hand, the 6th Division quickly captured Qixien on the 19th and further pursued retreating Chinese forces to Sanho. The 8th Division entered Miyun and two days later began advancing to Huaijou. By the 23rd Huaijou had fallen as the 6th Division reached the Qi Canal. These advances threatened the Peiping-Tientsin region. Both Japanese divisions halted on the 25th as the ceasefire was issued. With that last strike Muto felt he had significantly increased their poker hand going forward. Meanwhile Itagaki's team at Tientsin were still trying to bring about a coup. In tandem with the 8th Divisions attack on Miyun, the agency tried to engineer a revolt by the militia troops led by Song Queyuan, Fang Chenwu, Sun Tienying, amongst others. The idea was for these forces to occupy Peiping while wrecking havoc upon the Chinese central army within th region. The agency had attempting recruiting Wu Peifu, but the old jade marshal was unwilling, so they turned to this former protege, the chairman of Hubei, Yu Xuecheng. However he also declined. Yu Xuecheng was also approached by Hu Hanmin, looking to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek campaign in cooperation with Han Fuqu and Feng Yuxiang. To this Yu Xuecheng declined as well. Itagaki kept searching for disgruntled warlords, and then turned to Li Qiashan and Xu Yusan. Xu Yusan was a former ally to Feng Yuxiang with a history of anti-Chiang Kai-Shek actions. If they got the backing of his personal army, roughly 10,000 men strong at Tangshan they could do some real damage. On May 16th Xu Yusan declared independence and took up the Manchukuo 5 color flag in direct opposition to the Kuomintang. He began issuing the slogan “Hubi for the people of Hubei” as his army marched west along the Peiping-Shanhaiguan railway. His force reached the vicinity of Tangu whereupon they had increased to 30,000 and rumors emerged they would occupy Tientsin. This began a mass panic. . . for literally a day. His army collapsed into nothing more than a rabble as now had the stomach to actually fight their fellow countrymen.  Despite this grand failure, the Tientsin group continued with other plots. At 8 pm on May 19th, a Peiping bound train from Tangu, carrying Chinese soldiers was bombed around Tientsin station. The Japanese love bombing trains as we all know. This resulted in small incidents involving Japanese and Chinese officials, giving precedent for 600 Japanese troops led by Lt General Nakamura Kotaro to reinforce Tientsin on May 23rd. There were a few other incidents were supposedly Chinese agents were tossing grenades at Japanese officials. One of these officials was Major Mori Takeshi of the Japanese Army General Staff who was working in Tientsin. However the grenade thrown at him was a dud, and before the Japanese could seize it, some local Chinese grabbed it, finding a stamp on it bearing “Tokyo Artillery Arsenal”, oops.  These numerous incidents influenced the Chinese who feared Japan was trying to force an invasion into North China. To these rumors, He Yingqin insisted they mount a proper defense of Peiping, but many were arguing they had to further retreat. Meanwhile the Tientsin agency was told to stop performing incidents and instead secure northern warlords to their future cause. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for the Great Wall of China was coming to a bitter end for the Chinese forces. The Japanese were using every deceptive measure to edge further and further into China proper. It seemed clear to the Chinese, nothing would stop Japanese encroachment upon their nation, while the rest of the world simply watched on doing nothing. 

Last time we spoke about Manchukuo. In the early 1930s, Ishiwara Kanji sought to dominate Manchuria to secure resources and counter American influence. He envisioned Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian league promoting racial cooperation, despite it being a puppet state under Japan. With Puyi as a figurehead, Ishiwara aimed for autonomy, but his plans faced resistance from the Kwantung Army, which prioritized control. As conflicts arose, Ishiwara's vision of unity clashed with military interests, leading to his eventual isolation and reassignment, marking a tumultuous chapter in Manchukuo's history. In November 1931, Doihara orchestrated the "Tianjin Incident," facilitating the removal of Puyi from his home to establish the puppet state of "Manchukuo." By March 1932, Puyi was declared its ruler, but his authority was merely symbolic, overshadowed by Japanese control. Despite international condemnation, Japan solidified its grip on Manchuria, exploiting its resources and suppressing local resistance. By the late 1930s, Manchukuo became a colonial entity, suffering under harsh economic policies while Puyi's regime served as a facade for Japanese imperial ambitions.   #146 Operation Nekka: the Invasion of Rehe Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. From the very beginning of their consolidation of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army regarded the province of Rehe, today's Jehol province, to be an integral part of it. According to some of the Kwantung Army leadership, all of Rehe would be necessary to consummate Manchukuo. In April of 1932, the IJA 8th Division based at Hirosaki in Aomori prefecture was transferred to Manchukuo under secret orders to prepare for an invasion of Rehe. Now Rehe province covers 160,00 square kilometers and back then held some 2.3 million people. Since 1926 it was ruled by General Tang Yulin. His direct command was over the NRA 36th division, consisting of 13,000 regular troops with a provincial militia of 8500 men. As was the Warlord practice of the time, Tang Yulin exploited his population. Now until July of 1932, Tang Yulin's attitude towards the emerging state of Manchukuo directly to his east was certainly favorable. That is because Tang Yulin favored the Japanese. During the debacle that was the invasion of Manchuria, Tang Yulin had done everything possible to prevent Zhang Xueliang from moving into Rehe whenever he was trying to consolidate forces there. Now Tang Yulin had no greater aspirations, its not like he loved Japan, or believed the Japanese were better leaders for his nation. What he was motivated by was a very practical concern, economics, more precisely the opium trade. Rehe number one source of income was opium, and they number one purchaser of it, was Manchuria. Thus as one can imagine, when Manchukuo was being formed, and the opium door closed on him, well he took heavy financial losses.  On July 17th of 1932, an incident broke out between the towns of Chaoyangxu and Nanling. A Japanese civilian employed by the Kwantung Army, Ishimoto Gonshiro was abducted by a Rehe militia group while taking the train from Jinzhou to Chaoyang. General Nishi Yoshikazu, the commander of the IJA 8th Division stationed at Jizhou, dispatched a small unit to rescue Ishimoto. In doing so they occupied Chaoyangxi, where they also protested the Rehe provincial government. This did not see Ishimoto handed over to them, so General Nishi bombarded Chaoyangxu and then had his forces advance upon Nanling. Even doing so, no Ishimoto to be found. So Nishi withdrew back to Jinzhou. The following year during what would become the invasion of Rehe, Ishimoto's body would be found at Chaoyangxu. Zhang Xueliang utilized this small incident to advance into Rehe. Claiming he was acting upon orders from Nanjing, he moved his Northeastern Army to the border of Rehe, due south of the Great Wall. Zhang Xueliang then threatened Tang Yulin and bribed his subordinates to defect over to him. Consequently, by late July, Tang Yulin tossed the towel and for the first time sanctioned passage of a volunteer army through Rehe. Come August Zhang Xueliang organized a volunteer force 40,000 strong, obviously all from his Northeastern army to advance from Gubeikou into Rehe, where he sought to confront the Kwantung Army if they advanced. Zhang Xueliang was heavily in contact with Chiang Kai-Shek during this period. Zhang Xueliang was making multiple proclamations about retaking Manchuria, and Chiang Kai-Shek was supporting him in that endeavor as best as he could. Meanwhile Tang Yulin was sort of stuck in the middle.  Between October 1932 to January 1933, Shanhaiguan, the strategic gateway and midpoint between Mukden and Beijing became the focal area of 3 major skirmishes.  The Boxer Protocol of 1901 dictated that some of the 8 nation alliance members, notably, France, Italy and Japan were allowed to maintain small contingents at Shanhaiguan. In 1932, the Japanese garrison there was 261, France had 61 men and Italy 69. After the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan had increased its garrison to have some more border guards in the town of Shanhaiguan itself. Of course the Chinese also had local troops, that was the 9th Independent Brigade commanded by Ho Chukuo, a force roughly of 9000 men. The first skirmish at Shanhaiguan broke out on October 1st, between Ho Chukuo's men and an armored train of troops from the IJA 8th Division. Another exact same event occurred on December 8th, both occasions were settled locally and peacefully with the Chinese offering an apology and indemnity payment. Then a third clash broke out on January 1st, but this one got out of hand.  The mastermind behind the third incident was Major Ochiai Jinkuro, the leader of the Japanese garrison at Shanhaiguan. Upon his orders, at 9pm, 3 Japanese soldiers tossed two hand grenades each into the backyard of the Japanese military police detachment and the railway track running in front of the Japanese garrison. This was of course immediately blamed upon the Chinese and at 11:30 pm Ochiai presented the local Chinese with 2 demands. The first was to evacuate the Chinese force and the second to allow the Japanese to occupy their south gate at Shanhaiguan for the time being. Now the Japanese had legitimate pretext for these demands based off the Boxer Protocol. It allowed them the right to ensure the security of the railway and telegraph lines and to defend their citizens and property within two miles of the railway zone. Since Ho Chukuo's troops allegedly disturbed the peace in said zone, the Japanese were in their right to ask them to depart.  According to Japanese sources, the Chinese refused at first then consented at 4:50 am on January 2nd. This effectively saw them surrender the south gate. However at 9:30 am the chief of staff for the Chinese Brigade requested that the takeover of said gate be postponed until the scheduled arrival of Ho Chukuo, coming over from Beiping. Ochiai turned down this request, whereupon the Chinese agreed that the south gate would be included within the area overseen by the Japanese. Yet at 10:50 am Japanese troops went to take over guarding the south gate whence Chinese guards tossed grenades at them. Yes, it is most certainly the Japanese who tossed those grenades. The Chinese account of this event is somewhat different. It asserts the Japanese attacked the gate while the issue of surrender was still being negotiated. By January 11th, China sent a formal appeal to Britain, France, the US and other signatories of the Boxer Protocol charging the Japanese for perverting the treaty to seize the south gate of Shanhaiguan. Meanwhile General Ho Chukuo called Ochiai from Qinhuangdao to tell him he would arrive by 8am on January 3rd to negotiate. But by 10am he failed to show up, as the Chinese and Japanese fired upon another. Ochiai thereupon resolved to take the south gate by force. By that point the IJA 8th Division had strengthened its position in front of Shanhaiguan. Two companies had become 10 and one air force company was made ready to strike. Additionally the commander of the 2nd China Fleet, Tsuda Shizue dispatched Hirado and the 16th Destroyer Squadron to Shanhaiguan and Qinhuangdao “to defend Japanese residents and assist the troops in case of hostilities”. At dawn on January 3rd, the Japanese launched a combined land, sea and air assault and by 2pm had taken Shanhaiguan. Ho Chukuo's forces were pushed to the Shih River where they were reinforced during the night and hastily constructed fortifications against the incoming Japanese. Henceforth a propaganda war emerged over Rehe. Japan charged that Zhang Xueliang was mobilizing large forces to advance into Rehe, while China claimed the same of the Japanese. The Chinese protested the Japanese seizure of Shanhaiguan, but none of the western powers would intervene. However the League of Nations constant condemnation of Japan ever since the Mukden incident provoked the Japanese on march 27th to simply walk out on the league. The ordeal also prompted Prince Saioji Kimmochi to dispatch Major General Umezu Yoshijiro, the chief of General affairs of the army general staff and Consul Tanaka Sotaro of the foreign ministry to go over and restrain the unruly troops at various positions in the Beiping-Tientsin region. Saionji's main concern was elevated by Army Minister Araki Sadao, who on March 6th stated to Harada Kumao “that if Japan were to land about 3 divisions at Qingdao and they strike into the Peiping-Tientsin region via Tsinan, Zhang Xueliang will probably flee even before they reach Tsinan. If we do anything at all, I'd like to act boldly and go that far”. Despite claims by various sources, mostly Chinese, the Shanhaiguan incident as it became known was not actually preplanned by the Kwantung Army, it really was an arbitrary act on the part of the garrison commander. How everything went down at Shanhaiguan provided vital intel on the Northeastern Army, and what to expect in Rehe. In December of 1932, the IJA 6th Division was dispatched to Manchuria and assigned security detail in southern Jilin province. They were given further secret orders to participate in what was going to be an operation in Rehe once they arrived to Manchuria. When the Shanhaiguan incident broke out, the Rehe operation was expedited rapidly. Therefore the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions west of the Liao River were immediately tossed into the operation. Given the foreign and domestic conditions, the Rehe operation was extremely dangerous. Tokyo HQ yet again sought to reign in the men, so they sent General Umezu to Manchuria to talk to the Kwantung leadership. The Kwantung leadership was adamant the operation be unleashed before the spring that, provided the operation did not extend beyond the Great Wall. To this Tokyo HQ yet again relented.  On January 27th of 1933, General Muto Nobuyoshi, then commander of the Kwantung Army, issued the following general order for the Rehe operation designated, Operation Nekka “The situation in Jehol has become increasingly serious day by day and has now developed into a state of affairs necessitating intervention. To strengthen the foundations of Manchukuo, the time is close at hand, as far as military operations by the Kwantung Army are concerned, to put the finishing touch on our sublime task. First, the affairs of Jehol province are unquestionably an internal problem of Manchukuo. They neither embrace nor are accompanied by any international implications. Because subjugation of the province is designed to strike a fatal blow to anti-Manchukuo, anti-Japan elements, these elements purposely confuse the distinction between Jehol and North China. They move troops into the province and, glossing over these matters, raise a loud outcry, propagandizing that Japan harbors designs of territorial aggression. In this manner they have endeavored to draw the restraining attention of the world, and every move of the Kwantung Army in Jehol—even the slightest raising of a hand or the stretching of a leg—is now the object of worldwide surveillance” At this stage the Kwantung Army treated the Rehe Operation as an internal matter of Manchukuo and did not openly talk about extending it beyond the Great Wall into Hubei. But their gunna. On January 26th, General Muto issued Order 466, kinda funny how its almost order 66, but I digress. This order directed the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions to prepare to invade Rehe. On February 9th, Muto drafted the “Rehe Subjugation Plan” to some staff officers. It stated “without specific orders, operations are not to be carid out in Hubei”. It also stipulated they should “foster and promote a climate leading to the downfall of Zhang Xueliang in North China, which is the strategic base for the disturbance of Manchukuo”. On February 27th, Muto issued Order 473 which repeated to the men again not to move into Hubei. On the 29th, Muto issued another  order “The subjugation of Jehol is purely and simply an internal problem of Manchukuo. In the light of our national policy, it must not develop into a provocation for war with China. This is why Kwantung Army Operations Order 473 stipulated that, unless specific orders are issued, operations are not to be conducted beyond the Great Wall in Hopei province. I fully expect you to issue strict orders to the various units under your command that, although our forces may act freely in Jehol, which is a part of Manchukuo, they are not, without an imperial command, allowed to take any action in Hopei province, which is separated from Jehol by the Great Wall. They should be admonished that, even in the light of local circumstances, they must never be blinded by tactical considerations and miss the main point of our national policy. (In particular, the garrison at Shanhaikuan should be doubly careful and not act beyond its authorized limits.) I have learned that His Imperial Majesty, the supreme commander, is gravely concerned about the foregoing and again issue these instructions in awe of His Majesty's concern”. Thus one can read between the lines here. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down and demanded no forces go past the great wall and to this the Kwantung Army obeyed. For Operation Nekka, the IJA 6th and 8th Division would have their own theaters of operation along a line running from Paotzu, the eastern most town in Rehe to Chaoyang. The northern zone was the IJA 6th divisions theater, the southern one was the 8th's. Geneal Sakamoto Masemon led the 6th Division and ordered his forces on February 23rd to advance north along the rail line between Tahushan and Tungliao, then on towards Tienshan, Xiawa and Chaoyang. Afterwards they would carry out operations in the Chifeng-Linxu-Tolun region.  General Nishi ordered his 8th Division, excluding one unit to advance along the border around Peipiao, towards Suichung on the 27th, then into the Lingyuan region. The other unit would secure as fast as possible the important gateways along the Great Wall of China: Qilingkou, Lenkou, Xufengkou, Lowenyukou and Manlankuan to protect their divisions flank. Afterwards they would seie Chengde and Gubeikou. However he also gave explicit orders "Without specific orders, operations must not be extended beyond the Great Wall into Hopei province,". So yeah, while they had direct orders to not advance beyond the Great Wall. . . they were going to basically capture all of the key passes of the Great Wall. Kind of playing with fire.  On the other side, on January 23rd, Zhang Xueliang was meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek and our old friend Duan Qirui to discuss how to prepare for what seemed to be an impending invasion of Rehe. Chiang Kai-Shek politely said to Duan Qirui "I sincerely hope that you will come south and give me your guidance at this time of national crisis,". The real reason he sent this request was because he did not want the Japanese to enlist their former lacky against him. At the meeting, according to a Japanese intelligence report, Zhang Xueliang insisted that Chiang Kai-Shek personally come north and assume direct command of the Northern troops. Chiang Kai-Shek refused on the grounds he had to deal with the communists in Jiangxi and sent in his place Yang Que, the current president of the Army Staff College and a graduate of the Japanese Army War College. Yang would arrive to Peiping with his staff on January 30th, where he devised a plan for joint operations with Zhang Xueliang. They anticipated the Kwantung Army would cross the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan, so their basic strategy was to concentrate a large force in its region, especially east of the Luan River. That forces mission would be to defend at all costs the front line at Qinhuangdao. The Japanese intelligence indicated the Chinese had roughly 50,000 men, including 7700 men of the 25th Division ld by Kuan Lincheng and 12800 men of the 2nd Division led by Yang Que who were sent to Miyun and Gubeikou. There were also reports that ancient art objects and documents from Peiping were being transported to Nanjing, beginning on January 10th. To the Chinese public this was shocking news as one could imagine. Operation Nekka was unleashed and showcased the rapid efficiency of the Kwantung Army. By March 2nd, the IJA 6th Division routed the 41st Army of General Sun Tienying; the IJA 14th Mixed Brigade of the IJA 8th Division captured the Lengkou pass on March 4th; while the Kawahara detachment captured Chengde near the border with Hubei. General Nishi then assembld his main force at Lingyuan as the 14th Mixed Brigade withdrew to Chapeng. On March 4th, Muto issued Order 480, directing the troops "to make preparations for operations in North China, firmly seizing the major passes along the Great Wall, mopping up resistance by remnant troops and bandits, and restoring peace and order in Jehol province." One unit of the IJA 8th Division was given the task of seizing the Gubeikou Pass and advanced to such on the 7th. Within the vicinity of Changshanyu, around 40 kilometers southwest of Chengde, they encountered 5000 advancing Chinese forces. Here one of the first of many fierce battles along the Great Wall came to be. Until roughly March 20th, the Kwantung Army was met with fierce counterattacks, coming from the main gateways of the Great Wall. Initially the fighting went tremendously wall for the Japanese, yet by March 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade had taken Tungqiaku, Tiehmenkuan and Xifengkou. Two days later the IJA 8th Division began an assault upon Gubeikou. Nishi then sent the Hayakawa Brigade to seize Lowenyukou. Then on the 10th, after receiving reports the main passes were secured, General Muto took his HQ from Jinzhu to Changchun, believing everything was already won and done. However he would be very wrong, they had misjudged the Chinese strength.  On the 13th, Muti and Nishi received a report, that on the night of the 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou had come under heavy attack by a Chinese force led by General Song Qeyuang. Reinforcements were rapidly sent over, but they were unable to relieve the trapped brigade. On the 14th, Muto ordered Genera Sakamoto to lead the Mukai unit from the 6th Brigade to help out. With this the Chinese forces were driven off and then the Japanese began assaults upon Lengkou, Lowenyukou and Quehlingkou. On the 16th, the IJA 8th Division took Quehling, but the next day received a vicious counterattack by the NRA 116th Division. At Lowenyukou the Hayakawa Brigade was counterattacked by Song Cheyuan. The Hayakawa Brigade was still able to secure on portion of the Great Wall, it was constantly under attack and unable to progress further.  On the 22nd, Nishi was forced to order his Brigade to pull back to Chengde. Over at Lengkou, the Mukai unit managed to capture the town as the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou was attacked by the NRA 139th Division. Unable to repel the counterattacks, Nishi ordered his forces back 13 kilometers on the 24th. The battles at Quehlingkou and Lowenyukou were very intense. On March 18th, Muto realized the casualties were severe and taking the gateways was not showing progress. He therefore decided to divert the 6th Divisions attention to Lengkou in a flanking maneuver aimed at severing the Chinese supply lines to the gateways and as a result this would extend operations south of the Great Wall into the region east of the Luan River. Thus there we have it, they were going past the Great Wall against Emperor Hirohito's orders.  Operation Nekka, similar to Operation Jinzhou was deemed essential to establish and protect Manchukuo. However while the battles along the Great Wall were deemed necessary to create the borders for Manchukuo, their extension past that boundary literally brought them into the heart of North China. Unlike in Manchuria, the Chinese forces in North China held excellent morale, they were very willing to fight. On top of that, they had better logistics and were fighting on top of the Great Wall, which offered significant advantages. Thus from a tactical standpoint, the Japanese had to seize the gateways and flush out the Chinese from the areas. The Chinese remained defiant. Atop the walls the Chinese defenders would shout at the Japanese waving anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese flags.  Outside the ongoing battle, Chiang Kai-Shek had his own, perhaps in his mind, more important battle, the one with the communists. The encirclement campaigns had all gone to shit thus far. Added to this was the invasion of Manchuria and Shanghai. As Chiang Kai-Shek would later put it "tantamount to subjecting the Government to a pincer attack both from within and without." Basically Chiang Kai-Shek could choose to focus on the Japanese or communists. He figured going into a full war against Japan would be the end of himself and his government. Thus he worked to reach an agreement with the Japanese in May of 1932 which had ended the Shanghai incident. After doing so he released a slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression". Upon doing so he unleashed his full attention upon the communists. As we have seen, Chiang Kai-Sheks last encirclement campaign proved successful. But as he was in the middle of it, Operation Nekka was unleashed. It looked extremely bad for Chiang Kai-Shek, for the KMT and for China in general. On March 20th, as a gesture to indicate to the masses Chiang Kai-Shek was doing his job, he dispatched 5 divisions, roughly 50,000 men from the Central Army north. Chiang Kai-Shek personally traveled north from Hankou to Beiping, but no further than that. Back on the 10th he had received the resignation of Zhang Xueliang, who had publicly been calling for a massive war against Japan so that Manchuria could be recovered. Chiang Kai-Shek had to replace him with General He Yingqin.  Another major development at this time, was our old and dear friend who never causes any trouble, Wang Jingwei returned from I believe his 20th time in exile. He came to resume his post as president of the Executive Yuan. Yet again Wang Jingwei was trying to reconcile with Chiang Kai-Shek. In reality and as many of you might guess, the only reason Chiang Kai-Shek never had this guy shot was because Wang Jingei had the firm backing of the left, thus in order to really grab the majority of the political class he had to play nice with him. For Wang Jingwei's part, much like starscream in transformers, yes I am using this as an analogy, hes just trying to overthrow megatron every chance he gets, but always fails like a dumb idiot. There was also the dichotomy between the two men. Wang Jingwei was seen as a civilian leader while Chiang Kai-Shek was seen as a military leader. So together they seemed like a perfect team, despite the fact they loathed each other. So Wang Jingwei became the civil administrator while Chiang Kai-Shek focused on the military. In regards to Japan, Wang Jingwei was following a conciliatory policy of "resistance on the one hand and negotiation on the other,” based on Chiang Kai-Sheks slogan "first internal pacification, then resist external aggression."  Following a fight with Zhang Xueliang in August of 1932 over the issue of defending Manchuria against the Kwantung Army, Wang Jingwei had resigned, trying to strongarm Chiang Kai-Shek to get rid of the young marshal. Thus like what had happened countless times before, Wang Jingwei said he was out on sick leave, and departed for Europe for supposed treatment. When he returned 6 months later, Operation Nekka had begun, although the Japanese troops had not yet then reached the Great Wall. Wang Jingwei immediately became acting foreign minister in place of Lu Wenkuan, a supporter of Zhang Xueliang, who was notably anti-japanese. Wang Jingwei kicked Lu Wenkuan over to Xinjiang to deal with some conflicts breaking out there, fun times for him as we know.  Meanwhile He Yingqin had been placed as the head of the Peiping branch military council, entrusted with control over all military matters in North China. He Yingqin went to work reorganizing the forces in north china in mid March, forming them into an effective battle order to face the Japanese. By bringing together the local, very disorganized forces into a unified command, He Yingqin hoped they would be capable alone to block the Japanese advance, leaving the central army out of the conflict. This was because Chiang Kai-Shek did not want to risk losing his central army, considered the most elite one in all of china. But Chiang Kai-Shek did come around to the idea of at least testing some units against the Kwantung forces. Above all Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to have his cake and eat it to. He wanted he population of China to think he was actively resisting, while in reality he was biding time. Central army units deployed around Gubeikou, the main gateway leading to the Peiping-Tientsin region. When the Kwantung army leaders were planning operation Nekka, they had believed it would not be necessary to go beyond the Great Wall, but once the fighting around the walls and gateways kicked off, they knew immediately they could not hope to take the wall areas without getting behind the enemy. Particularly they needed to get past the area east of the Luan River. Some 20 Chinese divisions had assembled in the Peiping-Tientsin region and were tossing endless counter attacks along the line of the Great Wall. In the Lengkou region a force of 7000 Central Chinese Army units had penetrated deep into Rehe and smashed the Mukai detachment of the IJA 8th Division. These counterattacks reaffirmed the Kwantung Army leadership it was necessary to go beyond the Great Wall. It should also be noted the Kwantung Army's operations in North China were not just military. The Japanese were plagued with logistical problems. There was a shortage of troops because they had driven into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most determined Kwantung general did not believe their military prowess could overcome the plains of Hubei packed with an immeasurable amount of Chinese troops. Therefore they had to augment this military operation with political schemes aimed at the regional warlords. During the pacification of Manchuria, the tactic of bribing local elites had worked wonders and there was zero reason to believe it would not work in North China. All of this was done without any supervision from Tokyo HQ. On February 13th of 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, at the time chief of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any official announcement of this promotion. He took a post in Tientsin, specifically to begin political maneuvers in eastern Hubei. This saw the birth of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially this agency was attempting to lure all the competing warlords in North China, such as, Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, but then began targeting Zhang Qingyao. Zhang Qingyao had once been the protege of Duan Qirui, acting as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 whereupon his allegiance had shifted over to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao had fought again against Zhang Zuolin, then controlling the National Pacification Army. When the Northern expedition was over, he joined Yan Xishans forces in Shanxi. Thus one could easily see he was not a man of many principals, nor any specific loyalties. The Tientsin Special Service Agency first proposed to reach out to Zhang Qingyao in the hopes he could organize a coup d'etat against Chiang Kai-Shek. It was further hoped he could get Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If they managed this, North China would fall in a single stroke. It was hoped this would be achieved as they were taking the Great Wall and were enroute towards Peiping. However on May 7th, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely ruining the plan. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Nekka had been unleashed with a large bang. 20,000 Japanese troops stormed Rehe province under strict orders not to go past the Great Wall of China. So they immediately began planning how to go past the Great Wall of China. Yet what they did not expect was the determination of the Chinese defenders, who were not going to allow them an easy time.

Last time we spoke about the January 28th Incident. In January of 1932, tensions escalated in Shanghai as anti-Japanese sentiments surged after Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Orchestrated by Yoshiko Kawashima, a Japanese spy, a provocation led to violence, sparking outrage among Japanese expatriates. Japan demanded apologies and compensation from China, threatening military action if their demands were unmet. As the Japanese military amassed forces in Shanghai, the Chinese 19th Route Army prepared to resist, igniting the conflict known as the January 28th Incident, marking the beginning of a fierce struggle for control. Amidst chaos, the Nanjing government struggled to respond to Japan's escalating aggression in Shanghai. Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized avoiding war, urging a diplomatic approach to protect Shanghai's economy. Despite pressure, the 19th Route Army was ordered to withdraw, but tensions flared when Japan attacked the Chinese garrison. The 19th Route Army fiercely resisted, leading to intense battles. As Japan sent reinforcements, Chiang faced mounting protests and criticism for his passive stance, questioning whether he could maintain his strategy against the encroaching enemy.   #144 The First Battle of Shanghai 1932 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we covered the January 28th Incident. At 11:30 pm on January 28, Japan ordered 2,300 Japanese Marines to advance westward along every branch road on the west side of North Sichuan Road, without waiting for a response. This road, which crosses into the northern area of the International Settlement and has frequently been designated as a Japanese defense zone, includes Target Road (now known as Wujin Road in Hongkou District, Shanghai), Qiujiang Road, and Yokohama Road. Their objective was to seize the Songhu Railway defense line at Tiantong'an Station. They faced strong resistance from the 19th Route Army, further escalating the conflict. In the early hours of the 29th, Japanese aircraft launched from the Notoro seaplane carrier, which was moored on the Huangpu River, attacked the Chinese district of Zhabei. Both the Commercial Press located at No. 584 Baoshan Road and the Oriental Library, the largest private library in China with over 300,000 books, were completely destroyed. That same day the 19th Route Army sent a telegram to the entire nation concerning the situation: Do forgive me it's a rough translation “Urgent. Dear Sir and Madam, the Japanese have occupied our three northeastern provinces, changing the color of our territory and making our nation perish. Recently, they have killed and set fire in Shanghai, and vagrants are everywhere, doing the most despicable and violent things in the world. Gunboats are coming one after another, and the Marines are all landed. At 12:00 a.m. on the 28th, they openly invaded our defense line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and challenged us. Guang Nai and others are soldiers, and they only know that it is their duty to defend themselves and defend their land. They cannot give up even an inch of land or an inch of grass. They resist to save the country and protect the race. Even if they sacrifice only one person and one bullet, they will never retreat and lose the personality of the soldiers of the Republic of China. This thing and this ambition are exposed to the sun and the sun and are known to the world. The spirits of our ancestors in heaven are truly relying on it”. On the morning of January 29, Chiang Kai-shek met with He Yingqin and Zhu Peide to discuss countermeasures. Simultaneously Zhu Peide convened a meeting with He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, Li Jishen, Deng Shizeng, Lin Wei, and others to address issues such as defense deployment, the security of Nanjing and the Yangtze River, and resistance against Japan. Chiang Kai-Shek established the principles going forward for negotiations with Japan, emphasizing the need to prepare for talks while actively resisting. He stated that negotiations must have a clear final line of defense and a maximum limit that would not compromise administrative and territorial integrity, undermine the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, or jeopardize national sovereignty. If these limits were exceeded and unacceptable concessions were made, a decisive battle would be fought, even at the cost of defeat and death.  The defense and military strategy for Beijing and Shanghai included the 19th Route Army defending Shanghai with full strength, while the front guard army consisting of the 87th and 88th divisions would protect Nanjing. He Yingqin would remain in Nanjing, overseeing all party, government, and military personnel left behind. Chiang, along with the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Government, and Chen Mingshu, all expressed their commitment to resisting Japanese aggression. Chiang also sent a telegram to He Chengjun, director of the Hubei Province Pacification Office, and Xu Tingyao, commander of the Fourth Division, stating "Last night, the Japanese invaders attacked our 19th Route Defense Line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and the battle is ongoing. Our army is determined to fight to the death. Their naval forces in Han and Xun will likely engage in military operations. We urge you to remain vigilant and defend yourselves, never yielding to them. The Fourth Division should concentrate on strict defense in Wuhan and avoid dispersal. If military funds become scarce, local governments will need to raise them independently." The National Government Military Committee appointed Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Xueliang as members responsible for mobilizing the army and commanding the Shanghai War. Chiang Kai-Shek officially resumed power after resigning to prevent a surrender and committed to a prolonged resistance. On January 30, the Chinese Nationalist Government announced the relocation of the capital to Luoyang. Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram urging resistance against the Japanese and dispatched the elite Fifth Army to reinforce Shanghai. That night, Dai Ji, the commander of the Songhu Garrison, took charge of military operations in Shanghai, overseeing the 19th Route Army. The commander-in-chief was Jiang Guangnai, with Cai Tingkai as the army commander and division commanders Qu Shounian, Mao Weishou, and Shen Guanghan. Chiang Kai-Shek then issued a telegram to his troops across the nation and again I apologize for the rough translation. "Since the Northeast Incident began, the Central Government has been enduring humiliation and maintaining peace in order to avoid war and protect the lifeline of the country. It hopes to use justice and fairness to awaken the Japanese pirates. Unexpectedly, the more we tolerate, the more arrogant they become. When the Shanghai Incident occurred, we accepted their demands with great pain, but the Japanese pirates still brazenly pressed on, repeatedly attacking our Shanghai Defense Force, bombing civilian houses, throwing bombs on the streets, and our compatriots were ravaged. The country is about to perish. Anyone with blood in his veins would rather endure it. Since the 19th Route Army has risen up to defend itself bravely, our entire army In this time of national destruction and extinction, when the revolutionary soldiers are facing imminent danger, they should fight for the dignity of the country, strive for the survival of the nation, fulfill their responsibilities for the revolution, and be determined to die rather than live in disgrace, so as to deal with the brutal Japan that destroys peace and despises faith and integrity... Chiang Kai-shek and his comrades have shared hardships for a long time. Although I am now in the opposition, I am willing to swear to live and die with the soldiers and fulfill my bounden duty. I am here to inform you in advance with my blood and sincerity, and ask you to be determined and work hard, share the same hatred with the enemy, do not be arrogant, maintain the spirit of sacrifice, stay ready to fight, and save the country from danger." From that day on, the various ministries, commissions and committees of the National Government began to move to Luoyang, but the Military Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained in Nanjing . At the same time, the frontline troops were ordered to be jointly commanded by the Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin and the Chief of the General Staff Zhu Peide.  Typically Chinese sources breakdown what is known as the First Battle of Shanghai into three phases. In the previous episode we looked through the event up until the point of the first phase. After the initial fighting, both the 19th route army and Japanese agreed to a ceasefire so they could strengthen their positions and at least allow some form of diplomacy to occur. This went into effect on the 29th. As we mentioned, immediately afterwards the Japanese rapidly began reinforcing their position in Shanghai. They first sent the Sasebo 26th Squadron on the 30th, bearing 474 troops of the Sasebo 3rd Special Marine Corps alongside supplies. The next day the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho came over with 30 aircraft from the 1st air fleet. Then the cruisers Naka, Yura and Abukuma alongside 4 torpedo boats came bearing another 2000 marines. On February 1st the Terukoku Maru brought over the Yokosuka 1st Special Marine corps, roughly 525 men who landed at Huishan Wharf. With all that said and done, roughly 7000 Japanese troops had been brought over. On February 1st, the IJN warships began bombarding Nanjing from the Yangtze River, prompting Yu Jishi to frantically demand Chiang Kai-Shek transfer more troops to Shanghai. That night the Japanese light cruiser Tenryu, the protected cruisers Hirado and Taima, and the seven ships of the Navy's 23rd Destroyer Squadron fired upon Nanjing using four 140mm guns, 12 152mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns, 12 120mm single-mounted guns, and 20 76mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns. The rich and officials fled the city for refuge, but the Japanese army did not land any men to follow up the attack. Simultaneously 40,000 Shanghai workers from over 20 Japanese owned cotton mills began an anti-Japanese strike, being heavily backed by Communists. The workers began aiding the 19th route army to blockade the Japanese in the factories and streets and sabotage what they could.  On February 2nd, the Japanese army attacked Wusong several times, but was repelled each time. On the 3rd the Japanese expanded their attacks against Zhabei, Baziqiao and other locations, but the Chinese defenders successfully repelled these assaults as well. On the 4th, the Japanese launched their first major offensive, which extended the conflict to Jiangwan and Wusong. Following a day of intense fighting, the Wusong fort was destroyed by enemy bombardment; however, the Japanese army was unable to land due to the determined resistance of the Chinese defenders. The anti-aircraft artillery company from the 88th Division, reassigned to the 4th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, managed to shoot down a Japanese aircraft. After the failure of the general offensive, Yukiichi Shiozawa was dismissed and sent back to Japan. Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, the newly appointed commander of the Third Fleet, succeeded Shiozawa. After Nomura assumed his role, the Japanese army began to bolster its forces. Japan had initially planned to deploy troops when tensions escalated in Shanghai, but the navy had opposed this move. However, as the situation deteriorated, the navy was compelled to seek assistance from the army. On February 2, the Japanese cabinet officially decided to send troops. In response to the urgent circumstances in Shanghai, they resolved to dispatch the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade, led by Brigade Commander Major General Shimomoto Kuma, along with the 9th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Ueda Kenkichi. The Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade and the Second Independent Tank Squadron were prioritized for transport. Concurrently, the Japanese Navy also sent the Yokosuka 2nd Special Marine Corps to Shanghai. The 24th Mixed Brigade landed in Wusong on the afternoon of February 7. By this time, the combined forces of the Japanese navy, army, and air force had exceeded 10,000 personnel. At dawn on February 8, the Japanese Army's 24th Mixed Brigade launched an attack on Zhanghuabang, Yunzaobang, and Wusong Town along three routes, but they were repelled by our forces. Meanwhile on February 4, the National Government Military Commission sent out a telegram that divided the country into four defense zones. The first zone, which includes the area north of the Yellow River, was assigned to Zhang Xueliang as the commander-in-chief. The second zone, covering the area south of the Yellow River, was placed under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. The third zone, encompassing the area south of the Yangtze River as well as Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, was led by He Yingqin. The fourth zone, which includes Guangdong and Guangxi, was commanded by Chen Jitang. The telegram also stated that, aside from maintaining troops for local stability, all commanders were to concentrate their forces within their respective defense zones to confront the aggressive Japanese. Additionally, a directive was issued for the provinces of Sichuan, Hunan, Guizhou, Hubei, Shaanxi, and Henan to send troops to serve as a general reserve. On February 5, upon learning that the Japanese army had been redeployed from mainland China to Shanghai, Chairman of the Military Commission Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram from Luoyang to He Yingqin. He instructed that if the Japanese forces landed, the Chinese Air Force would engage in combat. Additionally, Chiang sent a message of condolence to Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Dai Ji of the 19th Route Army, stating "Brothers, you have been fighting valiantly for a week. Each time I reflect on the tremendous sacrifices made by the soldiers and their dedication, I feel a deep sadness... If necessary, Zhong (Zheng) can come to lead in person. When the Air Force enters the fray, the Army must establish various signals in advance to communicate with it and ensure coordinated efforts..." On the same day, the 88th Division arrived in Suzhou. On February 6, Chiang ordered the 261st Brigade of the 87th Division to move from Nanjing to reinforce Kunshan. The troops reached Kunshan on February 7. On February 8, Chiang directed He Yingqin to transfer an artillery battalion to support the 19th Route Army. Then, on February 9, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the First Division, led by Commander Hu Zongnan, and the Seventh Division, commanded by Wang Jun, to prepare for reinforcement of the 19th Route Army in Shanghai. February 8th marks the second phase of the battle. On the 10th, to ensure that the 88th Division of the Central Army complied with the orders from the 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Army, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Yu Jishi insisting that "your troops must strictly follow the commands of Commander-in-Chief Chiang and coordinate their movements with allied forces." The Japanese Marine Corps, under Yukio Shiozawa, initiated a three-pronged encirclement attack from Hongkou. The National Army mounted a determined defense and ultimately repelled the Japanese forces, pursuing and destroying them, which significantly lowered their morale. On February 11, Chen Cheng, commander of the Central Army's 18th Army, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek from Ji'an, Jiangxi, reporting that the troops had not been paid for nearly two months and were lacking food. At that time, the National Government was planning to redeploy the National Army that had been engaged in suppressing the Communists in Jiangxi to Zhejiang and Shanghai and to relocate the capital to Luoyang.  On February 12, following a battle at Caojiaqiao, the Japanese army's strategy to consolidate their forces was entirely disrupted. The next morning, February 13, the Japanese 24th Mixed Brigade crossed the Caojiaqiao Bridge in Zhuozaobang and engaged with the Nationalist army. Seizing the moment, the 19th Route Army Headquarters aimed to annihilate the Japanese forces. The Nationalist army surrounded the Japanese troops near the Yong'an Cotton Mill. Additionally, 60 members of a suicide squad launched a suicide attack, resulting in the complete destruction of 1,600 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese army faced significant losses, thwarting their attempt to swiftly capture Wusong. On February 14, Chiang ordered the 88th and 87th Divisions, which were already stationed in Nanxiang and Kunshan near Shanghai, to be reorganized into the Fifth Army. He appointed Zhang Zhizhong, a volunteer eager to fight against the Japanese, as the commander of the Fifth Army. This new army was placed under the unified command of the 19th Route Army and took over the defense line stretching from the northern end of Jiangwan through Miaoxing to the western end of Wusong. It served as the left-wing army, while the 19th Route Army acted as the right-wing, tasked with defending Jiangwan, the area south of Dachang, and the urban region of Shanghai. To replenish the 19th Route Army's losses, Chiang repeatedly ordered reinforcements from various locations. For instance, on February 15, Shangguan Yunxiang dispatched 500 active soldiers from Bengbu to the 19th Route Army; on February 17, Liang Guanying sent 500 unarmed soldiers from Qingjiangpu; and on February 19, Liu Zhi contributed 1,000 active unarmed soldiers from Henan. On February 16, Chiang Kai-shek communicated with Finance Minister Song Ziwen via telegram, stating, "Since the Japanese refuse to withdraw their troops from Shanghai, we must resist until the end. ... Food supplies in Jiangxi and Henan will dwindle, and assistance will be completely halted. Please arrange to deposit 10 million yuan in central banknotes in Nanchang and 20 million yuan in Zhengzhou. This will allow the government to continue functioning, the army to be sustained, and perhaps we can navigate this crisis and avert collapse. This is my final request. I hope you can find a way to assist." To prevent any friction between the Fifth Army and the Nineteenth Route Army over competing for military accolades, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Zhang Zhizhong and Yu Jishi on February 18. "The fight against Japan is a matter of national survival and is not a matter of honor for an individual or a certain unit. Our frontline officers and men should fully understand this. Therefore, the honor of the 19th Route Army is the honor of our entire National Revolutionary Army. There is absolutely no distinction between honor and disgrace. The Fifth Army's joining the front line is feared by the enemy and will also be slandered by the reactionaries (those who oppose the Nanjing Central Government). If we can continue to fight in the name of the 19th Route Army, it will be enough to demonstrate the strength of our National Revolutionary Army. We will share life and death, let alone honor and disgrace. I hope that this will be conveyed to the officers and men of the Fifth Army. They must unite and fight with our 19th Route Army and make no sacrifices to complete the revolutionary mission." Over on the other side, following reports of significant losses suffered by the Japanese army in Wusong, Tokyo received an imperial decree from Emperor Hirohito demanding the Shanghai incident get settled quick. In response, Chief of Staff Zairen urgently ordered the 9th Army Division, commanded by Ueda Kenkichi, to swiftly reinforce Shanghai. By the afternoon of February 13, the main contingent of the 9th Division had arrived at Shanghai Port, and by February 16, all personnel had disembarked in Wusong. Consequently, Lieutenant General Ueda took over command from Nomura. At this point, the Japanese invading forces comprised over 30,000 troops from naval, land, and air units, along with 60 to 70 field artillery pieces, more than 60 aircraft, and dozens of ships concentrated at the Wusong mouth. Ueda issued a statement late on the night of the 13th, asserting, "If anyone obstructs our division from fulfilling its mission, we will take decisive action without hesitation." On the 18th, he sent an ultimatum to Cai Tingkai, demanding, "Your army must immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from the following areas by 5:00 p.m. on February 20: on the west bank of the Huangpu River, retreat from areas connecting the western end of the concession, Caojiadu Town, Zhoujiaqiao Town, and Pushong Town to the north; on the east bank, withdraw from areas connecting Lannidu and Zhangjialou Town to the north, and retreat to a zone 20 kilometers away from the border of each concession Additionally, all military installations in the specified areas must be dismantled and no new ones established. If these demands are not met, the Japanese army will have no choice but to act freely against your forces, and your army will bear all resulting consequences." In response to Ueda's ultimatum, Tsai and Chiang ordered their front-line troops to fire heavily at Japanese positions as a warning. On the morning of February 20, Ueda commanded a full-scale attack across the front, employing tactics to break through the center while flanking from both sides. The 9th Division led the assault on the junction of Jiangwan and Miaohang, aiming to encircle Wusong from the north with the Kurume Brigade and Zhabei with the Marine Corps from the south. The Japanese began with artillery bombardments, followed by infantry and tank assaults on the Zhanghuabang and Yangshupu lines, both of which were successfully repelled by Chinese defenders. Over a thousand Japanese soldiers and several tanks in Zhabei were killed or wounded due to landmines. On February 21, Ueda personally directed thousands of infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery, to attack the Chinese defensive positions. Both sides incurred heavy casualties, and the battle continued until dawn on the 23rd. The Japanese forces attempted to encircle Jiangwan Town from Jiangwan Station, but the Chinese defenders fought valiantly, launching multiple charges and capturing Japanese Major Kong Sheng along with hundreds of soldiers. Ultimately, the Japanese army was unable to withstand the resistance and began to retreat. After the Japanese 9th Division arrived in Shanghai, it prepared to initiate a second major assault on the defenders of the city. The strategy involved a comprehensive attack stretching from Zhabei to Wusong to contain the Chinese army's strength, with primary forces concentrated on Jiangwan and Miaohang. The goal was to seize these two strategic points, achieve a breakthrough in the center, sever the link between the 5th Army and the 19th Route Army, and then defeat them individually. At dawn on February 20, the Japanese dispatched over ten aircraft for reconnaissance and bombing missions over the Miaohang area. Naval artillery and heavy army cannons heavily shelled the Miaohang positions. Simultaneously, Japanese artillery bombarded the Yunzaobang area in an effort to force a crossing and facilitate the Miaohang offensive.   By 9 am, part of the Japanese forces advanced towards the Xiaochang Temple and the Maijiazhai position, immediately conducting a fire search on our troops' positions. At noon, 3,000 Japanese soldiers launched an attack against our forces. The officers and soldiers of the 527th Regiment, defending the Maijiazhai and Zhuyuandun positions, mounted a counterattack, marking the beginning of the Battle of Miaohang. After three hours of intense fighting, the Japanese suffered significant casualties and were unable to continue, retreating to their original positions. Following this, over 2,000 Japanese troops attacked the Xiaochang Temple and Jinjiatang positions. The officers and soldiers of the 523rd Regiment, taking cover in the trenches, launched counterattacks and successfully repelled the Japanese forces. As dusk fell, the Japanese infantry halted their assaults, but naval and land artillery continued to bombard our positions in an attempt to weaken our defenses and personnel for a renewed attack the following day. On February 21, Japanese artillery relentlessly shelled the positions of the 88th Division of the Fifth Army in Miaohang. Following this, thousands of Japanese infantry launched an assault on the Yanjiazhai and Miaohang Town front. As the Japanese forces advanced, the officers and soldiers of the 523rd and 524th Regiments bravely counterattacked and successfully repelled them. However, a significant number of enemy troops coordinated a comprehensive assault on the Maijiazhai, Zhuyuandun, Xiaochangmiao, and Yanjiazhai lines south of Miaohang. Our 523rd, 524th, and 527th Regiments engaged in intense combat with the enemy, particularly at the Zhuyuandun front near Maijiazhai and Xu Xu, where the fighting was especially fierce. After a day of conflict, the enemy was temporarily pushed back. On February 22, the Japanese 9th Division launched a full-scale attack on the Miaohang position held by the 88th Division of the Fifth Army. Throughout the day, aircraft bombed the Chinese defenders, and thousands of artillery shells were fired at them. However, under the direct command of Zhang Zhizhong, the enemy faced a devastating defeat due to the coordinated three-pronged assault by the Sun Yuanliang Brigade, the Song Xilian Brigade, and the 61st Division of the 19th Route Army. The Miaohang position was ultimately saved from peril, inflicting heavy casualties on the elite forces of the Japanese 9th Division and the Kurume Mixed Brigade. This victory became known as the "Miaohang Victory." In the days that followed, the enemy continued their bombardment and attacks but were consistently repelled by the defenders. The Japanese army suffered significant losses, shifting from an all-out offensive to a more focused approach before ultimately halting their attacks. By the 25th, Ueda's overall offensive strategy had also failed. On February 24, the Japanese army decided to escalate the conflict once more, transferring the 11th and 14th divisions from Japan to join the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, which included troops already engaged in the war. At that time, the flagship of the Japanese Navy's Third Fleet, the Izumo, sustained damage from a bombing raid carried out by the suicide squad of the 19th Route Army, which sent shockwaves through Japan. Additionally, the large troop presence made a quick resolution to the war impossible. Consequently, on the 23rd, the Japanese cabinet decided to promptly reinforce the army. The General Staff then established the Shanghai Expeditionary Army Command, appointing General Shirakawa Yoshinori, the former Minister of War in the Tanaka Cabinet, to replace Ueda. They dispatched the 11th Division (led by Lieutenant General Atsutarou Atsuto), the 14th Division (led by Lieutenant General Naoaki Matsuki), and over 100 aircraft to China to initiate a larger-scale offensive in Shanghai. After several reinforcements, the Japanese forces in Shanghai, under Shirakawa's command, grew to over 90,000 troops, supported by 80 warships and 300 aircraft, significantly enhancing their combat effectiveness. In contrast, the total strength of the Chinese defenders was less than 50,000, with inadequate equipment. After a month of intense fighting, the Chinese forces had suffered heavy losses, leaving their river defenses in the Taicang Liuhe area vulnerable. Learning from the failures of the previous three commanders' frontal assaults, Shirakawa opted to land at Liuhe and flank the Songhu defenders. He directed the 9th Division and other units to launch a direct attack on Songhu and Shanghai while using the 3rd Fleet to escort the 11th Division into the Yangtze River estuary. They executed surprise landings at Liuhekou, Yanglinkou, and Qiyakou, quickly outflanking the defenders. On March 1, the Japanese forces initiated attacks in Naobei, Jiangwan, and Miaohang, employing heavy artillery, field guns, and aircraft for continuous bombardment. The infantry capitalized on this to engage in close-quarters combat, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Meanwhile, Shirakawa secretly instructed the 11th Division to exploit the weakness of the Chinese troops in Liuhe, forcibly landing at Qiyakou, Yanglinkou, and Liubinkou, ultimately capturing Liuhe. The fall of Liuhe posed a significant threat to the flank and rear of the Chinese army, compelling the entire force to retreat to the second line of defense (the Jiading-Huangdu line) by the evening of March 1.  After 34 days of intense fighting, they were forced to retreat to their second line of defense. At this point, the war had entered its final phase, resulting in a stalemate between the two sides. On the 2nd, the Japanese army seized Shanghai, and by March 3, they occupied Zhenru and Nanxiang, subsequently announcing a ceasefire. Now while we have been focused on the Japanese and Chinese perspectives in this, the international community was also heavily involved in the background. After the outbreak of hostilities, the British and American consuls in Shanghai offered to mediate. However despite a ceasefire being implemented the hostilities continued. So on February 2nd, Britain, America, France, Italy and Germany sent a notice to China and Japan "proposing to stop the conflict; (1) both sides immediately stop all violent acts according to the following conditions; (2) there will be no mobilization or preparation for any hostile acts between the two countries; (3) the Chinese and Japanese combatants in Shanghai will withdraw from the contact points; (4) a neutral zone will be established to separate the combatants of both sides to protect the public concession. The area will be garrisoned by neutral military and police, and various methods will be formulated by the consular corps; (5) once the two countries accept the treaty, they will not make any demands or reservations in advance, but will quickly negotiate with the assistance of neutral observers or participants in accordance with the spirit of the Kellogg-War Pact and the December 9th League of Nations resolution to resolve all outstanding issues..." Nanjing generally accepted the terms, but Japan instead proposed non-military zones be established 20 miles around the major ports of Shanghai, Hankou, Tianjin, Qingdao and Guangzhou as a sort of counter proposal. Meanwhile at the League of Nations, Yan Huiqing was drawing attention to the Shanghai incident, obviously linking it to the Manchuria incident and advocated for Article 10 of the League of Nations Charter, which was in regards to respecting territorial integrity and political independence of league nations. The League of Nations agreed and organized a committee to investigate the Shanghai incident. On February 4th Chiang Kai-Shek would write in his diary "As long as we do not lose our national sovereignty and territory, and the Japanese invaders do not put forward unacceptable conditions, we can take advantage of the opportunity of British and American intervention to negotiate with them; we cannot take a tough stance when other countries intervene, which will lead to adverse effects." By late February US Secretary of State Henry Stimson warned Japan for the second time, that the Nine Power Treaty and other treaties had to be maintained. Then on the 23rd he sent a letter reiterating the nine-power treaty and Kellogg War Pact to the League of Nations in regards to the Shanghai situation. On the 29th, a four-point plan for mediating the Shanghai incident was adopted at the League of Nations. The objective was to swiftly establish a local ceasefire agreement with the assistance of civil and military officials from various countries present in Shanghai. Following this, a round-table meeting was to be convened with representatives from nations with vested interests in Shanghai to discuss security measures for the International Settlement, the French Concession, and the local residents, as well as to address other issues. Subsequently, representatives from Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and other nations unanimously supported the plan, with Chinese representative Yan Huiqing and Japanese representative Sato Naotake also indicating their general agreement in principle. However, on March 2, the situation escalated when the Japanese army compelled the Chinese forces to retreat to their second line of defense. The Japanese side adopted a more aggressive stance, presenting four stringent conditions and insisting that the Chinese army withdraw first before halting their attacks. The Japanese forces were only willing to withdraw to the Shanghai and Wusong areas and refused to do so under the supervision of neutral countries, which the Chinese government firmly rejected. On March 3, the Japanese army launched another offensive. On that same day, U.S. Secretary of State Stimson summoned Japanese Ambassador to the United States Idebuchi, condemning Japan for accepting the League of Nations resolution on February 29 while simultaneously escalating military operations. On March 3rd a ceasefire came into effect as a formal meeting was held at the British consulate. The Chinese delegation was led by Guo Taiqi, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, along with military representatives Dai Ji, Huang Qiang, and seven others. The Japanese delegation included Shigemitsu Mamoru, Minister to China, and military representatives Ueda, Tashiro, and nine others. Officials from Britain, the United States, France, and other nations also participated in the meeting. During the negotiations, numerous contentious issues arose, particularly regarding the timing and location of the Japanese army's withdrawal. It would take until May 5th for a armistice agreement to be signed. The agreement designated Shanghai as a demilitarized zone, prohibiting China from stationing troops in the areas around Shanghai, Suzhou, and Kunshan, while permitting a limited number of Japanese units to remain in the city. China was permitted to maintain only a small police force within Shanghai. According to Chinese war reports, a total of 10,254 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the Battle of Shanghai on January 28. According to Japanese data, a total of 3,091 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded in the invasion of Shanghai: 620 Japanese soldiers were killed and 1,622 were wounded in the army; 149 Japanese soldiers were killed and 700 were wounded in the navy. Another Chinese report, stated the 19th Route Army and the Fifth Army suffered a total of 14,104 casualties 4,274 killed and 9,830 wounded. Among them, the 19th Route Army suffered 8,792 casualties, while the Fifth Army suffered 5,312 casualties. Shanghai residents faced bombardments from Japanese aircraft and artillery, resulting in over 6,080 fatalities, more than 2,000 injuries, 10,400 missing persons, and property losses totaling 1.6 billion yuan. At the onset of the war, the Japanese military intentionally targeted cultural institutions in Shanghai, such as the Commercial Press and the Oriental Library, leading to the total destruction of the Commercial Press, the oldest and largest publishing house in China. The Oriental Library, which housed millions of volumes, including over 100,000 rare ancient texts from the Song and Yuan dynasties and the Sikuquanshu compiled during the Qianlong era of the Qing Dynasty, was first devastated by artillery fire and then looted by Japanese forces. Reports from that time indicated that the Japanese army used trucks to transport the remaining books for seven consecutive days. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus what became known as the first battle of Shanghai had come to a not so swift end. Was its resolvement a victory for the League of Nations? Or was it just another indicator that the League of Nations was nothing but promises and pieces of paper? One man took notice of the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents, and he would soon bring Europe into a global war.