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Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

Coming up in the news: A man faces murder and wounding charges after a deadly incident last week — we'll tell you who's been remanded and when he's back in court. Police appeal for information after a man is charged over an incident caught on camera in Windsor Park, and a man avoids immediate prison time after admitting sexual communication with a 14‑year‑old — the Grand Court's ruling is next. And, the Regiment deploys on its first operational overseas mission. All that and more in our 6 PM News!

Get an understanding behind what the 1767 Townshend Acts aimed to accomplish including those specific items which were greatly affected. Learn who had been serving as Commander In Chief of British Forces in North America since 1763. Go behind the scenes and discover what unraveled on October 1,1768. Discover who replaces Massachusetts Royal Governor Francis Bernard come July 31,1769. Learn if Governor Bernard's replacement is no stranger to mob violence. Explore what had been pursued by more than 60 Merchants come August 1768, one year prior to Governor Bernard stepping down from his post. Get introduced to Ebenezer Richardson & Theophilus Lillie including where both men stood regarding the 1768 Boston Non Importation Agreement. Learn what unfolded on February 22, 1770 involving Richardson, Lillie, and hard core radicals. Agree if it's fair to say that what occurred on February 22, 1770 played a contributing factor behind the evening of March 5,1770. Receive an in depth analysis behind what occurred on March 5,1770 involving Boston's Townspeople and British Troops from 29th Regiment of Foot. Learn how Dr. Benjamin Church was involved following the aftermath of what happened on March 5. Determine if Dr. Church had served on a committee which issued request seeking troop withdrawal from town of Boston. Figure out which Forefather chose to defend the accused British Soldiers from 29th Regiment of Foot including his personal reasons for having done so. Discover whether the jury found all 8 soldiers accused of murder to have been guilty for those charges brought against them including their lead commanding officer. Learn who Parliament was trying to save from total financial ruin a few years after the infamous Boston Massacre Incident. Discover what unraveled on December 16,1773 including the fallout that followed three months later. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this episode, we had an inspiring conversation with Ed and Rick of Obsidian Spear Group. They shared their journey of starting a new company focused on law enforcement training after retirement, discussing what that experience has been like, how they're giving back, and the valuable lessons they've learned along the way—lessons that have made them better professionals and people. “ That's Just Texas Talkin”ED Founder - Obsidian Spear GroupEd  dedicated over 21 years in U.S. Army special operations. He served in the 75th Ranger Regiment as a Recce Team Leader, Platoon Sergeant, and Small Unit Tactics Instructor, shaping the next generation of elite warriors. In 2014, Ed was assigned to the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), where he operated globally as an Assaulter, Breacher, Sniper, and Senior Tactical Advisor. With multiple deployments around the world and deep combat experience, he now leads Obsidian Spear Group—bringing hard-earned lessons to those who face danger head-on "I started Obsidian Spear Group in 2024 to continue a calling that began in the Regiment—mentoring warriors. Some of my most rewarding moments in the military came from training new Rangers, helping them become more lethal, more decisive, and more resilient in chaos. I saw that same need in the law enforcement and civilian world. OSG was born to pass on not just what I learned from success, but also the hard lessons from failure—to equip today's protectors with the mindset, skill, and heart to thrive in the fight."If you would like to train with TTPOA, here is the training link: https://ttpoa.org/advanced-trainingIf you would like to be a vendor at our Conference, here is the link: https://ttpoa.org/conferences/2026-ttpoa-conference/vendorsTTPOA Partnerships:Jorge Pastore Foundation Law Enforcement training is essential for preparing officers to effectively and safely perform their duties. Everyone benefits from training, and by providing greater access to meaningful tactical training, we improve the lives of officers and the safety of our community. JPF was founded to honor the sacrifice of Officer Jorge Pastore and his passion for training.  We are proud to provide foundation-sponsored classes at no or low cost to law enforcement officers in various areas, including firearms training, defensive tactics & wellness.  In addition, we provide funding to officers seeking training outside of the central Texas area when approved by their department or association. https://www.jpastorefoundation.com/The American Warrior AssociationThe American Warrior Association (AWA) is a faith-driven, research-based nonprofit dedicated to healing moral injury among service members, veterans, first responders, and their families. We provide faith-based healing, practical support, and comprehensive wellness programs to foster lasting resilience and spiritual strength.https://www.awa-usa.org/programs/explore-awa-programs

 Keith Bohannon on Wheeler's Cavalry in the Atlanta Campaign For more info: WWW.ChicagoCWRT.ORG Keith Bohannon will examine General Joe Wheeler's background and the operations of his command from May-September 1864. During much of this time, Wheeler's command guarded the flanks of the army and protected vital railroads from Union cavalry raids. Often his cavalry, dismounted, fought in the lines against Sherman's infantry. Wheeler's decisive defeat of Union cavalry forces during the McCook-Stoneman Raid is arguably the high point of his career. Dr. Keith Bohannon is Professor of History at the University of West Georgia, where he teaches courses on the Civil War and Reconstruction, the Old South, and Georgia history. He is the co-editor, with Randall Allen, of Campaigning with Old Stonewall in Virginia: The Letters of Ujanirtus Allen, Company F, 21st Regiment, Georgia Volunteer Infantry (LSU Press, 1998), author of The Giles Artillery (Virginia Regimental Series) and is the author of numerous essays, book reviews, and scholarly journal articles. He has appeared on C-Span numerous times. Prior to his appointment to the faculty at West Georgia, Dr. Bohannon worked as a historian, interpreter, and living historian with the National Park Service at multiple Civil War sites. 

By mid-March 1879, Cetshwayo kaMpande made another attempt to open talks with Chelmsford, sending his indunas to negotiate for peace — but the British had no appetite for compromise. On the 22nd March two emissaries arrived at Middle Drift, a central crossing between Natal and Zululand, but Chelmsford had already laid out rules that any Zulu representatives should communicate directly with him. Captain Frank Cherry who was He commanding officer of the 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent (NNC), was stationed at Middle Drift. His job was primarily defensive—guarding that specific crossing point against a potential Zulu counter-invasion of Natal. Alongside him, F.B. Fynney - the Border Agent for the Lower Tugela. Fynney was a crucial figure because he was one of the few British officials who was fluent in Zulu and understood the nuances of Zulu diplomacy. The two messengers used their Christian names, Johannes and Klaas. They brought a message from King Cetshwayo that essentially said: "What have I done? I want peace. Let the fighting stop.” They were frigidly received and sent back with a reminder about the terms of the ultimatum before war began. The British were also fully aware that Cetshwayo had called a general muster of his army at oNdini, and believed the two messengers were actually spies. A day later, on the 23rd March, two other messengers arrived in Eshowe but Lieutenant Colonel Pearson ordered them to be clapped into irons — they were spies he said and could not be accorded the traditional sanctity they enjoyed at royal emissaries. Not to be denied, Cetshwayo, who by now had been joined by his main army and he was pondering where to send them. Unfortunately for Colonel Evelyn Wood, the Zulu King decided they should attack his column. After the largely inconsequential but shocking massacre at the Ntombe River we covered last episode, Colonel Wood was in a bit of a bind. He'd lost over 70 men on the 12th March. Still, he had something positive to report to Lord Chelmsford, Cetshwayo's eldest brother prince Hamu had decided to switch sides and support the British. Many of the men of his amaButho had fought the British at Isandlwana, and Wood promptly recruited these very same men into his column as irregular troops, despite the fact that their spears had been so recently washed by imperial British blood. It is hard to explain how the military works to most people, but battles are not carried out with the hot headedness of hate. So when a soldier wants to swap sides, usually they are debriefed, given a quick training update, checked to ensure they're not lunatics, and then given their new uniforms and weapons and signed on. They are very useful when it comes to intelligence gathering. Chelmsford was over the moon about Hamu's move, and believed what he called the “important event” would ‘spread doubt and distrust in Zululand'. Partly to alleviate the pressure on Pearson in Eshowe, and partly because he hoped to capitalise on Hamu's arrival, Chelmsford gave Wood carte blanche to make an attack on the Zulu. “If you are in a position to make any forward movement about the 27th March, so that the news may reach the neighbourhood of Eshowe about the 29th, I think it might have a good effect…” A relief column was on it's way from Natal and would soon cross the lower Thukela on its way to Eshowe. Perhaps some kind of victory to the north where Wood was operating would draw Zulu amabutho away. Wood was nothing if not a quick operator. A few days after receiving the order, on the 28th March, he launched a two-pronged attack on the abaQulusi stronghold of Hlobane Mountain. It was risky, not only did he have no idea of how many Zulu warriors faced him, he also had no idea about what lay in store on the summit.

By mid-March 1879, Cetshwayo kaMpande made another attempt to open talks with Chelmsford, sending his indunas to negotiate for peace — but the British had no appetite for compromise. On the 22nd March two emissaries arrived at Middle Drift, a central crossing between Natal and Zululand, but Chelmsford had already laid out rules that any Zulu representatives should communicate directly with him. Captain Frank Cherry who was He commanding officer of the 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent (NNC), was stationed at Middle Drift. His job was primarily defensive—guarding that specific crossing point against a potential Zulu counter-invasion of Natal. Alongside him, F.B. Fynney - the Border Agent for the Lower Tugela. Fynney was a crucial figure because he was one of the few British officials who was fluent in Zulu and understood the nuances of Zulu diplomacy. The two messengers used their Christian names, Johannes and Klaas. They brought a message from King Cetshwayo that essentially said: "What have I done? I want peace. Let the fighting stop.” They were frigidly received and sent back with a reminder about the terms of the ultimatum before war began. The British were also fully aware that Cetshwayo had called a general muster of his army at oNdini, and believed the two messengers were actually spies. A day later, on the 23rd March, two other messengers arrived in Eshowe but Lieutenant Colonel Pearson ordered them to be clapped into irons — they were spies he said and could not be accorded the traditional sanctity they enjoyed at royal emissaries. Not to be denied, Cetshwayo, who by now had been joined by his main army and he was pondering where to send them. Unfortunately for Colonel Evelyn Wood, the Zulu King decided they should attack his column. After the largely inconsequential but shocking massacre at the Ntombe River we covered last episode, Colonel Wood was in a bit of a bind. He'd lost over 70 men on the 12th March. Still, he had something positive to report to Lord Chelmsford, Cetshwayo's eldest brother prince Hamu had decided to switch sides and support the British. Many of the men of his amaButho had fought the British at Isandlwana, and Wood promptly recruited these very same men into his column as irregular troops, despite the fact that their spears had been so recently washed by imperial British blood. It is hard to explain how the military works to most people, but battles are not carried out with the hot headedness of hate. So when a soldier wants to swap sides, usually they are debriefed, given a quick training update, checked to ensure they're not lunatics, and then given their new uniforms and weapons and signed on. They are very useful when it comes to intelligence gathering. Chelmsford was over the moon about Hamu's move, and believed what he called the “important event” would ‘spread doubt and distrust in Zululand'. Partly to alleviate the pressure on Pearson in Eshowe, and partly because he hoped to capitalise on Hamu's arrival, Chelmsford gave Wood carte blanche to make an attack on the Zulu. “If you are in a position to make any forward movement about the 27th March, so that the news may reach the neighbourhood of Eshowe about the 29th, I think it might have a good effect…” A relief column was on it's way from Natal and would soon cross the lower Thukela on its way to Eshowe. Perhaps some kind of victory to the north where Wood was operating would draw Zulu amabutho away. Wood was nothing if not a quick operator. A few days after receiving the order, on the 28th March, he launched a two-pronged attack on the abaQulusi stronghold of Hlobane Mountain. It was risky, not only did he have no idea of how many Zulu warriors faced him, he also had no idea about what lay in store on the summit.

Sintonía: "The Persuaders Theme" - John Barry 1.- "Firefly" - Homelife 2.- "Hero Theme" - The Infesticons 3.- "Bucket Bottom" - Prince Alla 4.- "Get A Move On" - Mr. Scruff 5.- "T Plays It Cool" - Marvin Gaye 6.- "Regiment" - Brian Eno & David Byrne 7.- "It´s Not Too Beautiful" - The Beta Band 8.- "Rodney Yates" - David Holmes 9.- "Nature Boy" - Fila Brazillia 10.- "Nuclear Symphony" - Unforscene 11.- "Les Nuits" - Nightmares On Wax 12.- "Prelude & Fugue in C Minor" - The Swingle SingersTodas las músicas extraídas de la sesión (1xCD) "AnotherLateNight" (Azuli Records, 2001) de los 2 DJS y productores británicos Fila BrazilliaTodas las músicas seleccionadas y mezcladas por Fila BrazilliaEscuchar audio

Episode 101 and I'm joined by Ryan. Ryan enlisted in 2009, marched out of Kapooka in 2010 and posted to 3RAR. He completed Basic Parachute Course, Assault Pioneer Course, deployed to Afghanistan with MTF-5, later qualified as a Combat Engineer before transferring to become an ADF Firefighter with 6 Aviation Regiment.Medically discharged in 2017 with physical and mental injuries, Ryan did what many struggle to do — he rebuilt. He faced his demons, sorted his injuries, and turned pain into purpose.Since leaving the Army he's run operations for Veteran Mentors, opened his own strength & conditioning facility (REVL Training), and now serves as Co-Founder & Director of The Youth Regiment, backed by Campsie RSL — launching this April to give young Aussies discipline, direction and accountability.HOME | The Youth RegimentShoutout to Now That's Dramas Podcast for letting us use their studio!Now Thats Dramas Podcast – Now That's Dramas PodcastFind us on Instagram and Facebook. @5withadiggerpodcastThis podcast proudly sponsored by @Gravelempireholdings @Cuzkell_pty_ltd @Eliteboxingclubadl @MinorityInfluencesClothingUse "5WITHADIGGER" at checkout for 15% off on Savvy Touch Products.Merch available at www.crewapparelprint.com.auLike. Subscribe. Tell your mates.YOU'RE NEVER ALONE! Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Last time we spoke about The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow. Following the brutal 1938 capture of Wuhan, Japanese forces aimed to solidify their hold by launching an offensive against Chinese troops in the 5th War Zone, a rugged natural fortress in northern Hubei and southern Henan. Under General Yasuji Okamura, the 11th Army deployed three divisions and cavalry in a pincer assault starting May 1, 1939, targeting Suixian and Zaoyang to crush Nationalist resistance and secure flanks. Chinese commander Li Zongren, leveraging terrain like the Dabie and Tongbai Mountains, orchestrated defenses with over 200,000 troops, including Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group. By May 23, they recaptured Suixian and Zaoyang, forcing a Japanese withdrawal with heavy losses, over 13,000 Japanese casualties versus 25,000 Chinese, restoring pre-battle lines. Shifting south, Japan targeted Shantou in Guangdong to sever supply lines from Hong Kong. In a massive June 21 amphibious assault, the 21st Army overwhelmed thin Chinese defenses, capturing the port and Chao'an despite guerrilla resistance led by Zhang Fakui. Though losses mounted, Japan tightened its blockade, straining China's war effort amid ongoing attrition.   #188 From Changkufeng to Nomonhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Well hello again, and yes you all have probably guessed we are taking another detour. Do not worry I hope to shorten this one a bit more so than what became a sort of mini series on the battle of Changkufeng or Battle of Lake Khasan. What we are about to jump into is known in the west as the battle of khalkin Gol, by the Japanese the Nomohan incident. But first I need to sort of set the table up so to say. So back on August 10th, 1938 the Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement established a joint border commission tasked with redemarcating the disputed boundary between the Soviet Union and Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. However, this commission never achieved a mutually agreeable definition of the border in the contested area. In reality, the outcome was decided well before the group's inaugural meeting. Mere hours after the cease-fire took effect on the afternoon of August 11, General Grigory Shtern convened with a regimental commander from Japan's 19th Division to coordinate the disengagement of forces. With the conflict deemed "honorably" concluded, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters mandated the swift withdrawal of all Japanese troops to the west bank of the Tumen River. By the night of August 13, as the final Japanese soldier crossed the river, it effectively became the de facto border. Soviet forces promptly reoccupied Changkufeng Hill and the adjacent heights—a move that would carry unexpected and profound repercussions. Authoritative Japanese military analyses suggest that if negotiations in Moscow had dragged on for just one more day, the 19th Division would likely have been dislodged from Changkufeng and its surrounding elevations. Undoubtedly, General Shtern's infantry breathed a sigh of relief as the bloodshed ceased. Yet, one can't help but question why Moscow opted for a cease-fire at a juncture when Soviet troops were on the cusp of total battlefield triumph. Perhaps Kremlin leaders deemed it wiser to settle for a substantial gain, roughly three-quarters of their objectives, rather than risk everything. After all, Japan had mobilized threatening forces in eastern Manchuria, and the Imperial Army had a history of impulsive, unpredictable aggression. Moreover, amid the escalating crisis over Czechoslovakia, Moscow may have been wary of provoking a broader Asian conflict. Another theory posits that Soviet high command was misinformed about the ground situation. Reports of capturing a small segment of Changkufeng's crest might have been misinterpreted as control over the entire ridge, or an imminent full takeover before midnight on August 10. The unexpected phone call from Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to the Japanese embassy that night—proposing a one-kilometer Japanese retreat in exchange for a cease-fire along existing lines—hints at communication breakdowns between Shtern's headquarters and the Kremlin. Ironically, such lapses may have preserved Japanese military honor, allowing the 19th Division's evacuation through diplomacy rather than defeat. Both sides endured severe losses. Initial Japanese press reports claimed 158 killed and 740 wounded. However, the 19th Division's medical logs reveal a grimmer toll: 526 dead and 914 injured, totaling 1,440 casualties. The true figure may have climbed higher, possibly to 1,500–2,000. Following the armistice, the Soviet news agency TASS reported 236 Red Army fatalities and 611 wounded. Given Shtern's uphill assaults across open terrain against entrenched positions, these numbers seem understated. Attackers in such scenarios typically suffered two to three times the defenders' losses, suggesting Soviet casualties ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. This aligns with a Soviet Military Council investigation on August 31, 1938, which documented 408 killed and 2,807 wounded. Japanese estimates placed Soviet losses even higher, at 4,500–7,000. Not all victims perished in combat. Marshal Vasily Blyukher, a decorated Soviet commander, former warlord of the Far East, and Central Committee candidate, was summoned to Moscow in August 1938. Relieved of duty in September and arrested with his family in October, he faced charges of inadequate preparation against Japanese aggression and harboring "enemies of the people" within his ranks. On November 9, 1938, Blyukher died during interrogation a euphemism for torture-induced death.Other innocents suffered as well. In the wake of the fighting, Soviet authorities deported hundreds of thousands of Korean rice farmers from the Ussuri region to Kazakhstan, aiming to eradicate Korean settlements that Japanese spies had allegedly exploited. The Changkufeng clash indirectly hampered Japan's Wuhan offensive, a massive push to subdue China. The influx of troops and supplies for this campaign was briefly disrupted by the border flare-up. Notably, Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group, slated for Wuhan, was retained due to the Soviet threat. Chiang Kai-shek's drastic measure, breaching the Yellow River dikes to flood Japanese advance routes—further delayed the assault. By October 25, 1938, when Japanese forces captured Hankow, Chiang had relocated his capital to distant Chungking. Paradoxically, Wuhan's fall cut rail links from Canton inland, heightening Chiang's reliance on Soviet aid routed overland and by air from Central Asia. Japan secured a tactical win but missed the decisive blow; Chinese resistance persisted, pinning down a million Japanese troops in occupation duties. What was the true significance of Changkufeng? For General Koiso Suetaka and the 19th Division, it evoked a mix of bitterness and pride. Those eager for combat got their share, though not on their terms. To veterans mourning fallen comrades on those desolate slopes, it might have felt like senseless tragedy. Yet, they fought valiantly under dire conditions, holding firm until a retreat that blended humiliation with imperial praise, a bittersweet inheritance. For the Red Army, it marked a crucial trial of resolve amid Stalin's purges. While Shtern's forces didn't shine brilliantly, they acquitted themselves well in adversity. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow observed that any purge-related inefficiencies had been surmounted, praising the Red Army's valor, reliability, and equipment. His counterpart in China, Colonel Joseph Stilwell, put it bluntly: the Soviets "appeared to advantage," urging skeptics to rethink notions of a weakened Red Army. Yet, by World War II's eve, many British, French, German, and Japanese leaders still dismissed it as a "paper tiger." Soviet leaders appeared content, promoting Shtern to command the Transbaikal Military District and colonel general by 1940, while honoring "Heroes of Lake Khasan" with medals. In a fiery November 7, 1938, speech, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov warned that future incursions would prompt strikes deep into enemy territory. Tokyo's views diverged sharply. Many in the military and government saw it as a stain on Imperial Army prestige, especially Kwantung Army, humiliated on Manchukuo soil it swore to protect. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji Inada, however, framed it as a successful reconnaissance, confirming Soviet border defense without broader aggression, allowing the Wuhan push to proceed safely. Critics, including Major General Gun Hashimoto and historians, questioned this. They argued IGHQ lacked contingency plans for a massive Soviet response, especially with Wuhan preparations underway since June. One expert warned Japan had "played with fire," risking Manchuria and Korea if escalation occurred. Yet, Japanese commanders gleaned few lessons, downplaying Soviet materiel superiority and maintaining disdain for Red Army prowess. The 19th Division's stand against outnumbered odds reinforced this hubris, as did tolerance for local insubordination—attitudes that would prove costly. The Kremlin, conversely, learned Japan remained unpredictable despite its China quagmire. But for Emperor Hirohito's intervention, the conflict might have ballooned. Amid purges and the Czech crisis, Stalin likely viewed it as a reminder of eastern vulnerabilities, especially with Munich advancing German threats westward. Both sides toyed with peril. Moderation won in Tokyo, but Kwantung Army seethed. On August 11, Premier Fumimaro Konoye noted the need for caution. Kwantung, however, pushed for and secured control of the disputed salient from Chosen Army by October 8, 1938. Even winter's chill couldn't quench their vengeful fire, setting the stage for future confrontations. A quick look at the regional map reveals how Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic each jut into the other's territory like protruding salients. These bulges could be seen as aggressive thrusts into enemy land, yet they also risked encirclement and absorption by the opposing empire. A northward push from western Manchuria through Mongolia could sever the MPR and Soviet Far East from the USSR's heartland. Conversely, a pincer movement from Mongolia and the Soviet Maritime Province might envelop and isolate Manchukuo. This dynamic highlights the frontier's strategic volatility in the 1930s. One particularly tense sector was the broad Mongolian salient extending about 150 miles eastward into west-central Manchukuo. There, in mid-1939, Soviet-Japanese tensions erupted into major combat. Known to the Japanese as the Nomonhan Incident and to the Soviets and Mongolians as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, this clash dwarfed the earlier Changkufeng affair in scale, duration, and impact. Spanning four months and claiming 30,000 to 50,000 casualties, it amounted to a small undeclared war, the modern era's first limited conflict between great powers. The Mongolian salient features vast, semiarid plains of sandy grassland, gently rolling terrain dotted with sparse scrub pines and low shrubs. The climate is unforgivingly continental: May brings hot days and freezing nights, while July and August see daytime highs exceeding 38°C (100°F in American units), with cool evenings. Swarms of mosquitoes and massive horseflies necessitate netting in summer. Rainfall is scarce, but dense morning fogs are common in August. Come September, temperatures plummet, with heavy snows by October and midwinter lows dipping to –34°C. This blend of North African aridity and North Dakotan winters supports only sparse populations, mainly two related but distinct Mongol tribes. The Buriat (or Barga) Mongols migrated into the Nomonhan area from the northwest in the late 17th to early 18th centuries, likely fleeing Russian expansion after the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Organized by Manchu emperors between 1732 and 1735, they settled east of the river they called Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian for "river"), in lands that would later become Manchukuo. The Khalkha Mongols, named for the word meaning "barrier" or "shield," traditionally guarded the Mongol Empire's northern frontiers. Their territories lay west of the Buriats, in what would become the MPR. For centuries, these tribes herded livestock across sands, river crossings, and desert paths, largely oblivious to any formal borders. For hundreds of years, the line dividing the Mongolian salient from western Manchuria was a hazy administrative divide within the Qing Empire. In the 20th century, Russia's detachment of Outer Mongolia and Japan's seizure of Manchuria transformed this vague boundary into a frontline between rival powers. The Nomonhan Incident ignited over this contested border. Near the salient's northeastern edge, the river, called Khalkhin Gol by Mongols and Soviets, and Halha by Manchurians and Japanese, flows northwest into Lake Buir Nor. The core dispute: Was the river, as Japan asserted, the historic boundary between Manchukuo and the MPR? Soviet and MPR officials insisted the line ran parallel to and 10–12 miles east of the river, claiming the intervening strip. Japan cited no fewer than 18 maps, from Chinese and Japanese sources, to support the river as the border, a logical choice in such barren terrain, where it served as the sole natural divider. Yet, Soviets and Mongolians countered with evidence like a 1919 Chinese postal atlas and maps from Japanese and Manchukuoan agencies (1919–1934). Unbeknownst to combatants, in July 1939, China's military attaché in Moscow shared a 1934 General Staff map with his American counterpart, showing the border east of the river. Postwar Japanese studies of 18th-century Chinese records confirm that in 1734, the Qing emperor set a boundary between Buriat and Khalkha Mongols east of the river, passing through the hamlet of Nomonhan—as the Soviets claimed. However, Kwantung Army Headquarters dismissed this as non-binding, viewing it as an internal Qing affair without Russian involvement. Two former Kwantung Army officers offer a pragmatic explanation: From 1931 to 1935, when Soviet forces in the Far East were weak, Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities imposed the river as the de facto border, with MPR acquiescence. By the mid- to late 1930s, as Soviet strength grew, Japan refused to yield, while Mongolians and Soviets rejected the river line, sparking clashes. In 1935, Kwantung Army revised its maps to align with the river claim. From late that year, the Lake Buir Nor–Halha sector saw frequent skirmishes between Manchukuoan and MPR patrols. Until mid-1938, frontier defense in northwestern Manchukuo fell to the 8th Border Garrison Unit , based near Hailar. This 7,000-man force, spread thin, lacked mobility, training, and, in Kwantung Army's eyes, combat readiness. That summer, the newly formed 23rd Division, under Kwantung Army, took station at Hailar, absorbing the 8th BGU under its command, led by Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara. At 52, Komatsubara was a premier Russian specialist in the Imperial Army, with stints as military attaché in the USSR and head of Kwantung's Special Services Agency in Harbin. Standing 5'7" with a sturdy build, glasses, and a small mustache, he was detail-oriented, keeping meticulous diaries, writing lengthy letters, and composing poetry, though he lacked combat experience. Before departing Tokyo in July 1938, Komatsubara received briefings from Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations Section chief. Amid planning for Changkufeng, Inada urged calm on the Manchukuo-MPR border given China's ongoing campaigns. Guidelines: Ignore minor incidents, prioritize intelligence on Soviet forces east of Lake Baikal, and study operations against the Soviet Far East's western sector. Familiar with the region from his Harbin days, Komatsubara adopted a low-key approach. Neither impulsive nor aggressive, he kept the green 23rd Division near Hailar, delegating patrols to the 8th BGU. An autumn incident underscores his restraint. On November 1, 1938, an 8th BGU patrol was ambushed by MPR forces. Per Japanese accounts, the three-man team, led by a lieutenant, strayed too close to the border and was attacked 50 meters inside Manchukuo. The lieutenant escaped, but his men died. Komatsubara sent an infantry company to secure the site but forbade retaliation. He pursued body recovery diplomatically, protested to MPR and Soviet officials, and disciplined his officers: garrison leaders got five days' confinement for poor troop training, the lieutenant thirty days. Despite this caution, pressures at AGS and KwAHQ were mounting, poised to thrust the 23rd Division into fierce battle. Modern militaries routinely develop contingency plans against potential adversaries, and the mere existence of such strategies doesn't inherently signal aggressive intentions. That said, shifts in Japan's operational planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may have inadvertently fueled the Nomonhan Incident. From 1934 to 1938, Japanese war scenarios emphasized a massive surprise assault in the Ussuri River region, paired with defensive holding actions in northwestern Manchuria. However, between mid-1938 and early 1939, a clandestine joint task force from the Army General Staff  and Kwantung Army's Operations Departments crafted a bold new blueprint. This revised strategy proposed containing Soviet forces in the east and north while unleashing a full-scale offensive from Hailar, advancing west-northwest toward Chita and ultimately Lake Baikal. The goal: sever the Transbaikal Soviet Far East from the USSR's core. Dubbed Plan Eight-B, it gained Kwantung Army's endorsement in March 1939. Key architects—Colonels Takushiro Hattori and Masao Terada, along with Major Takeharu Shimanuki—were reassigned from AGS to Kwantung Army Headquarters to oversee implementation. The plan anticipated a five-year buildup before execution, with Hattori assuming the role of chief operations staff officer.  A map review exposes a glaring vulnerability in Plan Eight-B: the Japanese advance would leave its southern flank exposed to Soviet counterstrikes from the Mongolian salient. By spring 1939, KwAHQ likely began perceiving this protrusion as a strategic liability. Notably, at the outbreak of Nomonhan hostilities, no detailed operational contingencies for the area had been formalized. Concurrently, Japan initiated plans for a vital railroad linking Harlun Arshan to Hailar. While its direct tie to Plan Eight-B remains unclear, the route skirted perilously close to the Halha River, potentially heightening KwAHQ's focus on the disputed Mongolian salient. In early 1939, the 23rd Division intensified reconnaissance patrols near the river. Around this time, General Grigory Shtern, freshly appointed commander of Soviet Far Eastern forces, issued a public warning that Japan was gearing up for an assault on the Mongolian People's Republic. As Plan Eight-B took shape and railroad proposals advanced, KwAHQ issued a strikingly confrontational set of guidelines for frontier troops. These directives are often cited as a catalyst for the Nomonhan clash, forging a chain linking the 1937 Amur River incident, the 1938 Changkufeng debacle, and the 1939 conflict.Resentment had festered at KwAHQ over perceived AGS meddling during the Amur affair, which curtailed their command autonomy. This frustration intensified at Changkufeng, where General Kamezo Suetaka's 19th Division endured heavy losses, only for the contested Manchukuoan territory to be effectively ceded. Kwantung Army lobbied successfully to wrest oversight of the Changkufeng salient from Chosen Army. In November 1938, Major Masanobu Tsuji of KwAHQ's Operations Section was sent to survey the site. The audacious officer was dismayed: Soviet forces dominated the land from the disputed ridge to the Tumen River. Tsuji undertook several winter reconnaissance missions. His final outing in March 1939 involved leading 40 men to Changkufeng's base. With rifles slung non-threateningly, they ascended to within 200 yards of Soviet lines, formed a line, and urinated in unison, eliciting amused reactions from the enemy. They then picnicked with obentos and sake, sang army tunes, and left gifts of canned meat, chocolates, and whiskey. This theatrical stunt concealed Tsuji's real aim: covert photography proving Soviet fortifications encroached on Manchukuoan soil. Tsuji was a singular figure. Born of modest means, he embodied a modern samurai ethos, channeling a sharp intellect into a frail, often ailing body through feats of extraordinary daring. A creative tactician, he thrived in intelligence ops, political scheming, aerial scouting, planning, and frontline command—excelling across a tumultuous career. Yet, flaws marred his brilliance: narrow bigotry, virulent racism, and capacity for cruelty. Ever the ambitious outsider, Tsuji wielded outsized influence via gekokujo—Japan's tradition of subordinates steering policy from below. In 1939, he was a major, but his pivotal role at Nomonhan stemmed from this dynamic. Back in Hsinking after his Changkufeng escapade, Tsuji drafted a response plan: negotiate border "rectification" with the Soviets; if talks failed, launch an attack to expel intruders. Kwantung Army adopted it. Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Otozaburo Yano flew to Tokyo with Tsuji's photos, seeking AGS approval. There, he was rebuffed—Changkufeng was deemed settled, and minor violations should be overlooked amid Tokyo's aversion to Soviet conflict. Yano's plea that leniency would invite aggression was countered by notes on Europe's tensions restraining Moscow. Yano's return sparked outrage at KwAHQ, seen as AGS thwarting their imperial duty to safeguard Manchukuo. Fury peaked in the Operations Section, setting the stage for Tsuji's drafting of stringent new frontier guidelines: "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes." The core tenet: "If Soviet troops transgress the Manchukuoan frontiers, Kwantung Army will nip their ambitions in the bud by completely destroying them." Specific directives for local commanders included: "If the enemy crosses the frontiers … annihilate him without delay, employing strength carefully built up beforehand. To accomplish our mission, it is permissible to enter Soviet territory, or to trap or lure Soviet troops into Manchukuoan territory and allow them to remain there for some time… . Where boundary lines are not clearly defined, area defense commanders will, upon their own initiative, establish boundaries and indicate them to the forward elements… . In the event of an armed clash, fight until victory is won, regardless of relative strengths or of the location of the boundaries. If the enemy violates the borders, friendly units must challenge him courageously and endeavor to triumph in their zone of action without concerning themselves about the consequences, which will be the responsibility of higher headquarters." Major Tsuji Masanobu later justified the new guidelines by pointing to the "contradictory orders" that had hamstrung frontier commanders under the old rules. They were tasked with upholding Manchukuo's territorial integrity yet forbidden from actions that might spark conflict. This, Tsuji argued, bred hesitation, as officers feared repercussions for decisive responses to incursions. The updated directives aimed to alleviate this "anxiety," empowering local leaders to act boldly without personal liability. In truth, Tsuji's "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes" were more incendiary than conciliatory. They introduced provocative measures: authorizing commanders to unilaterally define unclear boundaries, enforce them with immediate force "shoot first, ask questions later", permit pursuits into enemy territory, and even encourage luring adversaries across the line. Such tactics flouted both government policy and official army doctrine, prioritizing escalation over restraint. The proposals sparked intense debate within Kwantung Army's Operations Section. Section chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and Colonel Masao Terada outranked Tsuji, as did Major Takeharu Shimanuki, all recent transfers from the Army General Staff. Tsuji, however, boasted longer tenure at Kwantung Army Headquarters since April 1936 and in Operations since November 1937, making him the de facto veteran. Hattori and Terada hesitated to challenge the assertive major, whose reputation for intellect, persuasion, and deep knowledge of Manchuria commanded respect. In a 1960 interview, Shimanuki recalled Tsuji's dominance in discussions, where his proactive ideas often swayed the group. Unified, the section forwarded Tsuji's plan to Kwantung Army Command. Commander Lieutenant General Kenkichi Ueda consulted Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai and Vice Chief General Otozaburo Yano, seasoned leaders who should have spotted the guidelines' volatility. Yet, lingering grudges from AGS "interference" in past incidents like the Amur River and Changkufeng clouded their judgment. Ueda, Isogai, and Tsuji shared history from the 1932 Shanghai Incident: Tsuji, then a captain, led a company in the 7th Regiment under Colonel Isogai, with Yano as staff officer and Ueda commanding the 9th Division. Tsuji was wounded there, forging bonds of camaraderie. This "clique," which grew to include Hattori, Terada, and Shimanuki, amplified Tsuji's influence. Despite Isogai's initial reservations as the group's moderate voice, the guidelines won approval. Ueda issued them as Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488 on April 25, 1939, during a division commanders' conference at KwAHQ. A routine copy reached AGS in Tokyo, but no formal reply came. Preoccupied with the China War and alliance talks with Germany, AGS may have overlooked border matters. Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations head, later noted basic acceptance of Order 1488, with an informal expectation—relayed to Hattori and Terada—of prior consultation on violations. KwAHQ dismissed this as another Tokyo intrusion on their autonomy. Some Japanese analysts contend a stern AGS rejection might have prevented Nomonhan's catastrophe, though quelling Kwantung's defiance could have required mass staff reassignments, a disruptive step AGS avoided. Tsuji countered that permitting forceful action at Changkufeng would have deterred Nomonhan altogether, underscoring the interconnectedness of these clashes while implicitly critiquing the 1939 battle's location. Undeniably, Order 1488's issuance on April 25 paved the way for conflict three weeks later. Japanese records confirm that Khalkha Mongols and MPR patrols routinely crossed the Halha River—viewed by them as internal territory, 10 miles from the true border. Such crossings passed uneventfully in March and April 1939. Post-Order 1488, however, 23rd Division commander General Michitaro Komatsubara responded aggressively, setting the stage for escalation. The Nomonhan Incident ignited with a border clash on May 11–12, 1939, that rapidly spiraled into a major conflict. Over a dozen "authoritative" accounts exist, varying in viewpoint, focus, and specifics. After cross-referencing these sources, a coherent timeline emerges. On the night of May 10–11, a 20-man Mongolian People's Republic border patrol crossed eastward over the Halha River (known as Khalkhin Gol to Mongols and Soviets). About 10 miles east, atop a 150-foot sandy hill, lay the tiny hamlet of Nomonhan, a cluster of crude huts housing a few Mongol families. Just south flowed the Holsten River, merging westward into the broader Halha. By morning on May 11, Manchukuoan forces spotted the MPR patrol north of the Holsten and west of Nomonhan. In the MPR/Soviet perspective, Nomonhan Hill marked the Mongolia-Manchuria border. To Manchukuoans and Japanese, it sat 10 miles inside Manchukuo, well east of the Halha. A 40-man Manchukuoan cavalry unit repelled the Mongolians back across the river, inflicting initial casualties on both sides—the Manchukuoans drawing first blood. The MPR patrol leader exaggerated the attackers as 200 strong. The next day, May 12, a 60-man MPR force under Major P. Chogdan evicted the Manchukuoans from the disputed zone, reestablishing positions between the Halha and Nomonhan. The Manchukuoans, in turn, reported facing 700 enemies. Sporadic skirmishes and maneuvering persisted through the week. On May 13, two days post-clash, the local Manchukuoan commander alerted General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division headquarters in Hailar. Simultaneously, Major Chogdan reported to Soviet military command in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital. What began as a Mongolian-Manchukuoan spat was poised to draw in Soviet and Japanese patrons. Attributing the May 10–11 violation hinges on border interpretations: both sides claimed the Halha-Nomonhan strip. Yet, most accounts concur that Manchukuoan forces initiated the fighting. Post-May 13 notifications to Moscow and Tokyo clarify the record thereafter. Midday on May 13, Komatsubara was leading a staff conference on the newly issued Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488—Major Tsuji Masanobu's aggressive border guidelines. Ironically, the first Nomonhan combat report arrived mid-discussion. Officers present recall Komatsubara deciding instantly to "destroy the invading Outer Mongolian forces" per Order 1488. That afternoon, he informed Kwantung Army Headquarters of the incident and his intent to eradicate the intruders, requesting air support and trucks. General Kenkichi Ueda, Kwantung commander, approved Komatsubara's "positive attitude," dispatching six scout planes, 40 fighters, 10 light bombers, two anti-aircraft batteries, and two motorized transport companies. Ueda added a caveat: exercise "extreme caution" to prevent escalation—a paradoxical blend of destruction and restraint, reflective of KwAHQ's fervent mood. Ueda relayed the details to Tokyo's Army General Staff, which responded that Kwantung should handle it "appropriately." Despite Kwantung's impulsive reputation, Tokyo deferred, perhaps trusting the northern strategic imbalance, eight Japanese divisions versus 30 Soviet ones from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, would enforce prudence. This faith proved misguided. On May 14, Major Tsuji flew from KwAHQ for aerial reconnaissance over Nomonhan, spotting 20 horses but no troops. Upon landing, a fresh bullet hole in his plane confirmed lingering MPR presence east of the Halha. Tsuji briefed 23rd Division staff and reported to Ueda that the incident seemed minor. Aligning with Order 1488's spirit, Komatsubara deployed a force under Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma: an armored car company, two infantry companies, and a cavalry troop. Arriving at Nomonhan on May 15, Azuma learned most MPR forces had retreated westward across the Halha the prior night, with only token elements remaining, and those withdrawing. Undeterred, he pursued. The advance met scant resistance, as foes had crossed the river. However, Japanese light bombers struck a small MPR concentration on the west bank, Outpost Number 7, killing two and wounding 15 per MPR reports; Japanese claimed 30–40 kills. All agree: the raid targeted undisputed MPR territory. Hearing of May 15's events, Komatsubara deemed the Mongolians sufficiently rebuked and recalled Azuma to Hailar on May 16. KwAHQ concurred, closing the matter. Soviet leaders, however, saw it differently. Mid-May prompted Soviet support for the MPR under their 1936 Mutual Defense Pact. The Red Army's 57th Corps, stationed in Mongolia, faced initial disarray: Commander Nikolai Feklenko was hunting, Chief of Staff A. M. Kushchev in Ulan Ude with his ill wife. Moscow learned of clashes via international press from Japanese sources, sparking Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov's furious inquiry. Feklenko and Kushchev rushed back to Ulaanbaatar, dispatching a mixed force—a battalion from the 149th Infantry Regiment (36th Division), plus light armor and artillery from the 11th Tank Brigade—to Tamsag Bulak, 80 miles west of the Halha. Led by Major A. E. Bykov, it bolstered the MPR's 6th Cavalry Division. Bykov and Cavalry Commander Colonel Shoaaiibuu inspected the site on May 15, post-Azum's departure. The cavalry arrived two days later, backed by Bykov (ordered to remain west of the river and avoid combat if possible). Some MPR troops recrossed, occupying the disputed zone. Clashes with Manchukuoan cavalry resumed and intensified. Notified of renewed hostilities, Komatsubara viewed it as defiance, a personal affront. Emboldened by Order 1488, he aimed not just to repel but to encircle and annihilate. The incident was on the verge of major expansion. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ghosts of the Changufeng incident have come back to haunt both the USSR and Japan. Those like Tsuji Masanobu instigated yet another border clash that would erupt into a full blown battle that would set a precedent for both nations until the very end of WW2. 

Podcast Episode

Colonel Rowland's number five column had been sent to guard the roads and garrison the Boer towns in the north eastern Transvaal — part to police the Zulu across the border, but also to overawe the more volatile Boers who wanted to take advantage of the war in Zululand by rebelling against British rule. The German village of Luneberg was vulnerable, within striking distance of Mbilini, who was Cetshwayo's loose canon along the Phongola River, and Manyanyoba who hailed from the Ntombe Valley. Although Manyonyoba had seemed prepared to open negotiations with the British, he was overborne by his chief induna who wanted to intensify the raiding. Once convinced he should support king Cetshwayo's call for war, Manyonyoba led a powerful force to join Mbilini and Qulusi induna Tola kaDilikana who had made his way east from Hlobane. Their target was the 1500 or so Christianised black workers, the amakholwa of the Ntombe Valley. They killed 41 amakholwa, burned their homes down and drove off hundreds of cattle. In retaliation, British troops were sent to garrison Luneberg and four companies of the 80th Regiment were dispatched there under Major Charles Tucker. Redverse Buller joined them from Khambula further west, leading a force of 54 mounted men and 517 black auxiliaries against Manyonyoba's caves. 34 Zulu were killed, five imizi were burned down and 375 head of cattle, 254 goats and 8 sheep captured for the loss of two black auxiliaries - but Manyonyoba remained at large, his main force unaffected. Late in February a convoy of 18 wagons loaded with ammunition, flour and mealies left Lydenburg to resupply the garrison. At first things went well, but when they arrived at the border with Transvaal, their route was less secure — particularly as they approached the Ntombe River because Mbilini was operating close by. Tucker sent a company of the 80th to escort the wagon train from Derby — but heavy rainfall swelled the rivers and softened the ground. By March 8th the convoy was still 16 kilometres out from Luneberg. Fearing an attack, Tucker sent a message to the company commander to get into Luneberg that night ‘at any cost' — but the officer took the message literally and abandoned his wagons. The British were riding their luck, and that lady was about to run out. The Zulu were monitoring all this movement and Mbilini realised his relatively large amabutho was powerful enough to smash this small company of British soldiers. Cetshwayo knew that important rule - keep your friends close but your enemies closer — at the outbreak of war he had ordered Hamu to oNdini where he could be kept under close scrutiny. But Hamu communicated with his chief izinduna Ngwegwana and Nymubana back in his district who exchanged secret messages with Colonel Wood in turn.

Colonel Rowland's number five column had been sent to guard the roads and garrison the Boer towns in the north eastern Transvaal — part to police the Zulu across the border, but also to overawe the more volatile Boers who wanted to take advantage of the war in Zululand by rebelling against British rule. The German village of Luneberg was vulnerable, within striking distance of Mbilini, who was Cetshwayo's loose canon along the Phongola River, and Manyanyoba who hailed from the Ntombe Valley. Although Manyonyoba had seemed prepared to open negotiations with the British, he was overborne by his chief induna who wanted to intensify the raiding. Once convinced he should support king Cetshwayo's call for war, Manyonyoba led a powerful force to join Mbilini and Qulusi induna Tola kaDilikana who had made his way east from Hlobane. Their target was the 1500 or so Christianised black workers, the amakholwa of the Ntombe Valley. They killed 41 amakholwa, burned their homes down and drove off hundreds of cattle. In retaliation, British troops were sent to garrison Luneberg and four companies of the 80th Regiment were dispatched there under Major Charles Tucker. Redverse Buller joined them from Khambula further west, leading a force of 54 mounted men and 517 black auxiliaries against Manyonyoba's caves. 34 Zulu were killed, five imizi were burned down and 375 head of cattle, 254 goats and 8 sheep captured for the loss of two black auxiliaries - but Manyonyoba remained at large, his main force unaffected. Late in February a convoy of 18 wagons loaded with ammunition, flour and mealies left Lydenburg to resupply the garrison. At first things went well, but when they arrived at the border with Transvaal, their route was less secure — particularly as they approached the Ntombe River because Mbilini was operating close by. Tucker sent a company of the 80th to escort the wagon train from Derby — but heavy rainfall swelled the rivers and softened the ground. By March 8th the convoy was still 16 kilometres out from Luneberg. Fearing an attack, Tucker sent a message to the company commander to get into Luneberg that night ‘at any cost' — but the officer took the message literally and abandoned his wagons. The British were riding their luck, and that lady was about to run out. The Zulu were monitoring all this movement and Mbilini realised his relatively large amabutho was powerful enough to smash this small company of British soldiers. Cetshwayo knew that important rule - keep your friends close but your enemies closer — at the outbreak of war he had ordered Hamu to oNdini where he could be kept under close scrutiny. But Hamu communicated with his chief izinduna Ngwegwana and Nymubana back in his district who exchanged secret messages with Colonel Wood in turn.

Let us know what you think! Text us!Christi Myers joins Deny Caballero to discuss ketamine therapy, trauma healing, and the role of mindfulness and integration in modern mental health care. This episode explores safety, access, and the future of psychedelic medicine.Key Topics:Ketamine therapyTrauma and mental healthMindfulness and breathworkPsychedelic medicineHealing and integration

Let us know what you think! Text us!Former Army Ranger Marty Skovlund Jr. breaks down his transition from elite military service to storytelling and writing. This episode explores vulnerability, growth, mental health, and why process matters more than outcomes when redefining purpose after service.Key Topics:Military transitionWriting and storytellingMental health and self-careGrowth beyond the uniformCommunity and brotherhood

Let us know what you think! Text us!Former Green Beret Travis joins Deny Caballero to discuss life after combat, resilience, and recovery. From TBI and mental health challenges to stem cell therapy and veteran advocacy, this episode highlights the work being done through Project Recon to change veteran healthcare outcomes.Key Topics CoveredGreen Beret life and combat experienceTransitioning from military to civilian lifeTraumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and recoveryStem cell therapy for veteransMental health and resilienceProject Recon and veteran advocacyEntrepreneurship after serviceKey Takeaway Veterans can thrive after service with education, resilience, and the right support systems. Chapters:00:00 From Military to Academia: A Journey of Growth01:56 The Early Days: Becoming a Green Beret07:52 Combat Experiences: The Highs and Lows14:44 Facing Adversity: Lessons from Injury20:14 Building a Future: Entrepreneurship and Recovery28:51 Stem Cells and Project Recon: A New Mission30:04 Healing Through Stem Cells32:28 Project Recon: A Mission for Veterans33:54 Understanding TBI and Treatment Procedures36:57 Navigating the Challenges of Stem Cell Therapy39:20 Advocacy for Veterans' Health49:14 Personal Health and Mental Well-being56:26 Resources and Closing ThoughtsSponsored by: Dr. Mark Gordon & Millennium Health Centers  Get the book Peptides for Health Vol.1 Medical Edition today.  Use code PTH25 for 25% off through March 15  Use code Phase2P for 10% off Millennium products  Available only at MillenniumHealthStore.com PRECISION WELLNESS GROUP  Use code: Security Halt Podcast 25Website: https://www.precisionwellnessgroup.com/  Security Halt Mediahttps://www.securityhaltmedia.com/ Instagram: @securityhaltX: @SecurityHaltTik Tok: @security.halt.podLinkedIn: Deny Caballero Connect with Travis and Project R3con Today!Website: https://projectr3con.org/Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/projectr3con/Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/travisgreenberet/ Syracuse University D'Aniello Institute for Veterans & Military Families Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for Veterans (EBV)https://ivmf.syracuse.edu/programs/entrepreneurship/start-up/ebv/ Looking for custom handmade items, military memorabilia, or laser engraving? Contact Eric Gilgenast.Instagram:https://www.instagram.com/haus_gilgenast_woodworks_main/Website: https://www.hausgilgenastwoodworks.com/ SOF Heritage Designs Custom belt Buckles. Of the Regiment for the Regiment SOF-HD.Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/sofhdesigns/Support the showProduced by Security Halt Media

Fronts linked to Storm Leonardo are set to bring a significant change in our weather, with heavy rain and strengthening winds on the way. Niamh Murray from the Met Office will be here to explain what's coming.The business community is being invited to hear directly from Government at a Town Hall meeting, as Gibraltar prepares for the next phase of the EU-UK Treaty. Broadcast journalist Shelina Assomul will break down what businesses can expect.We're talking about how the University of Gibraltar has secured major backing for projects including coral restoration.And The Royal Gibraltar Regiment has marked a series of promotions and long service awards recognising leadership, professionalism and dedication within its ranks. Commanding Officer of the Regiment Lieutenant John Pitto spoke to us alongside Sergeant Matthew Hall and Sergeant Alec Spooner. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Nick Brokhausen is a highly decorated U.S. Army Special Forces veteran who served in the secretive Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) from 1970 to 1971, conducting high-risk reconnaissance missions deep behind enemy lines in Vietnam and Laos. On his second tour in Vietnam, he joined Recon Team Habu in Command and Control North (CCN), participating in some of the most dangerous operations of the war. With a 15-year career in the Regiment, Brokhausen undertook classified missions across the globe. He is the author of "We Few: U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam" (2018) and "Whispers in the Tall Grass: Back Behind Enemy Lines with MACV-SOG" (2019), offering firsthand accounts of SOG's covert operations and the camaraderie among elite warriors. He advocates for preserving the history of special operations and honoring the sacrifices of Vietnam veterans. Shawn Ryan Show Sponsors: Get 30% off your first subscription order at ARMRA by going to https://ARMRA.com/srs or entering code SRS at checkout. Go to https://shopbeam.com/SRS and use code SRS to get up to 50% off Beam Dream Nighttime Cocoa—grab it for just $32.50 and improve your sleep today. Join thousands of parents who trust Fabric to help protect their family—apply today in just minutes at https://meetfabric.com/SHAWN Try ZipRecruiter for free at https://ziprecruiter.com/SRS. Nick Brokhausen Links: Amazon Author Page - https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B07CKVZHTP Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanchang. After securing Hainan and targeting Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway corridors, Japan's 11th Army, backed by armor, air power, and riverine operations, sought a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to sever eastern Chinese logistics and coerce Chongqing. China, reorganizing under Chiang Kai-shek, concentrated over 200,000 troops across 52 divisions in the Ninth and Third War Zones, with Xue Yue commanding the 9th War Zone in defense of Wuhan-Nanchang corridors. The fighting began with German-style, combined-arms river operations along the Xiushui and Gan rivers, including feints, river crossings, and heavy artillery, sometimes using poison gas. From March 20–23, Japanese forces established a beachhead and advanced into Fengxin, Shengmi, and later Nanchang, despite stiff Chinese resistance and bridges being destroyed. Chiang's strategic shift toward attrition pushed for broader offensives to disrupt railways and rear areas, though Chinese plans for a counteroffensive repeatedly stalled due to logistics and coordination issues. By early May, Japanese forces encircled and captured Nanchang, albeit at heavy cost, with Chinese casualties surpassing 43,000 dead and Japanese losses over 2,200 dead.    #187 The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Having seized Wuhan in a brutal offensive the previous year, the Japanese sought not just to hold their ground but to solidify their grip on this vital hub. Wuhan, a bustling metropolis at the confluence of the Yangtze and Han Rivers, had become a linchpin in their strategy, a base from which they could project power across central China. Yet, the city was far from secure, Chinese troops in northern Hubei and southern Henan, perched above the mighty Yangtze, posed an unrelenting threat. To relieve the mounting pressure on their newfound stronghold, the Japanese high command orchestrated a bold offensive against the towns of Suixian and Zaoyang. They aimed to annihilate the main force of the Chinese 5th War Zone, a move that would crush the Nationalist resistance in the region and secure their flanks. This theater of war, freshly designated as the 5th War Zone after the grueling Battle of Wuhan, encompassed a vast expanse west of Shashi in the upper Yangtze basin. It stretched across northern Hubei, southern Henan, and the rugged Dabie Mountains in eastern Anhui, forming a strategic bulwark that guarded the eastern approaches to Sichuan, the very heartland of the Nationalist government's central institutions. Historian Rana Mitter in Forgotten Ally described this zone as "a gateway of immense importance, a natural fortress that could either serve as a launchpad for offensives against Japanese-held territories or a defensive redoubt protecting the rear areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi". The terrain itself was a defender's dream and an attacker's nightmare: to the east rose the imposing Dabie Mountains, their peaks cloaked in mist and folklore; the Tongbai Mountains sliced across the north like a jagged spine; the Jing Mountains guarded the west; the Yangtze River snaked southward, its waters a formidable barrier; the Dahong Mountains dominated the center, offering hidden valleys for ambushes; and the Han River (also known as the Xiang River) carved a north-south path through it all. Two critical transport arteries—the Hanyi Road linking Hankou to Yichang in Hubei, and the Xianghua Road connecting Xiangyang to Huayuan near Hankou—crisscrossed this landscape, integrating the war zone into a web of mobility. From here, Chinese forces could menace the vital Pinghan Railway, that iron lifeline running from Beiping (modern Beijing) to Hankou, while also threatening the Wuhan region itself. In retreat, it provided a sanctuary to shield the Nationalist heartlands. As military strategist Sun Tzu might have appreciated, this area had long been a magnet for generals, its contours shaping the fates of empires since ancient times. Despite the 5th War Zone's intricate troop deployments, marked by units of varying combat prowess and a glaring shortage of heavy weapons, the Chinese forces made masterful use of the terrain to harass their invaders. Drawing from accounts in Li Zongren's memoirs, he noted how these defenders, often outgunned but never outmaneuvered, turned hills into fortresses and rivers into moats. In early April 1939, as spring rains turned paths to mud, Chinese troops ramped up their disruptions along the southern stretches of the Pinghan Railway, striking from both eastern and western flanks with guerrilla precision. What truly rattled the Japanese garrison in Wuhan was the arrival of reinforcements: six full divisions redeployed to Zaoyang, bolstering the Chinese capacity to launch flanking assaults that could unravel Japanese supply lines. Alarmed by this buildup, the Japanese 11th Army, ensconced in the Wuhan area under the command of General Yasuji Okamura, a figure whose tactical acumen would later earn him notoriety in the Pacific War, devised a daring plan. They intended to plunge deep into the 5th War Zone, smashing the core of the Chinese forces and rendering them impotent, thereby neutralizing the northwestern threat to Wuhan once and for all. From April onward, the Japanese mobilized with meticulous preparation, amassing troops equipped with formidable artillery, rumbling tanks, and squadrons of aircraft that darkened the skies. Historians estimate they committed roughly three and a half divisions to this endeavor, as detailed in Edward J. Drea's In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Employing a classic pincer movement, a two-flank encirclement coupled with a central breakthrough, they aimed for a swift, decisive strike to obliterate the main Chinese force in the narrow Suixian-Zaoyang corridor, squeezed between the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains. The offensive erupted in full fury on May 1, 1939, as Japanese columns surged forward like a tidal wave, their engines roaring and banners fluttering in the dust-choked air. General Li Zongren, the commander of the 5th War Zone, a man whose leadership had already shone in earlier campaigns like the defense of Tai'erzhuang in 1938, issued urgent orders to cease offensive actions against the Japanese and pivot to a defensive stance. Based on intelligence about the enemy's dispositions, Li orchestrated a comprehensive campaign structure, assigning precise defensive roles and battle plans to each unit. This was no haphazard scramble; it was a symphony of strategy, as Li himself recounted in his memoirs, emphasizing the need to exploit the terrain's natural advantages. While various Chinese war zones executed the "April Offensive" from late April to mid-May, actively harrying and containing Japanese forces, the 5th War Zone focused its energies on the southern segment of the Pinghan Railway, assaulting it from both sides in a bid to disrupt logistics. The main force of the 31st Army Group, under the command of Tang Enbo, a general known for his aggressive tactics and later criticized for corruption, shifted from elsewhere in Hubei to Zaoyang, fortifying the zone and posing a dire threat to the Japanese flanks and rear areas. To counter this peril and safeguard transportation along the Wuhan-Pinghan Railway, the Japanese, led by the formidable Okamura, unleashed their assault from the line stretching through Xinyang, Yingshan, and Zhongxiang. Mobilizing the 3rd, 13th, and 16th Divisions alongside the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, they charged toward the Suixian-Zaoyang region in western Hubei, intent on eradicating the Chinese main force and alleviating the siege-like pressure on Wuhan. In a masterful reorganization, Li Zongren divided his forces into two army groups, the left and right, plus a dedicated river defense army. His strategy was a blend of attrition and opportunism: harnessing the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains, clinging to key towns like lifelines, and grinding down the Japanese through prolonged warfare while biding time for a counterstroke. This approach echoed the Fabian tactics of ancient Rome, wearing the enemy thin before delivering the coup de grâce. The storm broke at dawn on May 1, when the main contingents of the Japanese 16th and 13th Divisions, bolstered by the 4th Cavalry Brigade from their bases in Zhongxiang and Jingshan, hurled themselves against the Chinese 37th and 180th Divisions of the Right Army Group. Supported by droning aircraft that strafed from above and tanks that churned the earth below, the Japanese advanced with mechanical precision. By May 4, they had shattered the defensive lines flanking Changshoudian, then surged along the east bank of the Xiang River toward Zaoyang in a massive offensive. Fierce combat raged through May 5, as described in Japanese war diaries compiled in Senshi Sōsho (the official Japanese war history series), where soldiers recounted the relentless Chinese resistance amid the smoke and clamor. The Japanese finally breached the defenses, turning their fury on the 122nd Division of the 41st Army. In a heroic stand, the 180th Division clung to Changshoudian, providing cover for the main force's retreat along the east-west Huangqi'an line. The 37th Division fell back to the Yaojiahe line, while elements of the 38th Division repositioned into Liushuigou. On May 6, the Japanese seized Changshoudian, punched through Huangqi'an, and drove northward, unleashing a devastating assault on the 122nd Division's positions near Wenjiamiao. Undeterred, Chinese defenders executed daring flanking maneuvers in the Fenglehe, Yaojiahe, Liushuihe, Shuanghe, and Zhangjiaji areas, turning the landscape into a labyrinth of ambushes. May 7 saw the Japanese pressing on, capturing Zhangjiaji and Shuanghe. By May 8, they assaulted Maozifan and Xinji, where ferocious battles erupted, soldiers clashing in hand-to-hand combat amid the ruins. By May 10, the Japanese had overrun Huyang Town and Xinye, advancing toward Tanghe and the northeastern fringes of Zaoyang. Yet, the Tanghe River front witnessed partial Chinese recoveries: remnants of the Right Army Group, alongside troops from east of the Xianghe, reclaimed Xinye. The 122nd and 180th Divisions withdrew north of Tanghe and Fancheng, while the 37th, 38th, and 132nd Divisions steadfastly held the east bank of the Xianghe River. Concurrently, the main force of the Japanese 3rd Division launched from Yingshan against the 84th and 13th Armies of the 11th Group Army in the Suixian sector. After a whirlwind of combat, the Chinese 84th Army retreated to the Taerwan position. On May 2, the 3rd Division targeted the Gaocheng position of the 13th Army within the 31st Group Army; the ensuing clashes in Taerwan and Gaocheng were a maelstrom of fire, with the Taerwan position exchanging hands multiple times like a deadly game of tug-of-war. By May 4, in a grim escalation, Japanese forces deployed poison gas, a violation of international norms that drew condemnation and is documented in Allied reports from the era, inflicting horrific casualties and compelling the Chinese to relinquish Gaocheng, which fell into enemy hands. On May 5, backed by aerial bombardments, tank charges, and artillery barrages, the Japanese renewed their onslaught along the Gaocheng River and the Lishan-Jiangjiahe line. By May 6, the beleaguered Chinese were forced back to the Tianhekou and Gaocheng line. Suixian succumbed on May 7. On May 8, the Japanese shattered the second line of the 84th Army, capturing Zaoyang and advancing on the Jiangtoudian position of the 85th Army. To evade encirclement, the defenders mounted a valiant resistance before withdrawing from Jiangtoudian; the 84th Army relocated to the Tanghe and Baihe areas, while the 39th Army embedded itself in the Dahongshan for guerrilla operations—a tactic that would bleed the Japanese through hit-and-run warfare, as noted in guerrilla warfare studies by Mao Zedong himself. By May 10, the bulk of the 31st Army Group maneuvered toward Tanghe, reaching north of Biyang by May 15. From Xinyang, Japanese forces struck at Tongbai on May 8; by May 10, elements from Zaoyang advanced to Zhangdian Town and Shangtun Town. In response, the 68th Army of the 1st War Zone dispatched the 143rd Division to defend Queshan and Minggang, and the 119th Division to hold Tongbai. After staunchly blocking the Japanese, they withdrew on May 11 to positions northwest and southwest of Tongbai, shielding the retreat of 5th War Zone units. The Japanese 4th Cavalry Brigade drove toward Tanghe, seizing Tanghe County on May 12. But the tide was turning. In a brilliant reversal, the Fifth War Zone commanded the 31st Army Group, in concert with the 2nd Army Group from the 1st War Zone, to advance from southwestern Henan. Their mission: encircle the bulk of Japanese forces on the Xiangdong Plain and deliver a crushing blow. The main force of the 33rd Army Group targeted Zaoyang, while other units pinned down Japanese rear guards in Zhongxiang. The Chinese counteroffensive erupted with swift successes, Tanghe County was recaptured on May 14, and Tongbai liberated on May 16, shattering the Japanese encirclement scheme. On May 19, after four grueling days of combat, Chinese forces mauled the retreating Japanese, reclaiming Zaoyang and leaving the fields strewn with enemy dead. The 39th Army of the Left Army Group dispersed into the mountains for guerrilla warfare, a shadowy campaign of sabotage and surprise. Forces of the Right Army Group east of the river, along with river defense units, conducted relentless raids on Japanese rears and supply lines over multiple days, sowing chaos before withdrawing to the west bank of the Xiang River on May 21. On May 22, they pressed toward Suixian, recapturing it on May 23. The Japanese, battered and depleted, retreated to their original garrisons in Zhongxiang and Yingshan, restoring the pre-war lines as the battle drew to a close. Throughout this clash, the Chinese held a marked superiority in manpower and coordination, though their deployments lacked full flexibility, briefly placing them on the defensive. After protracted, blood-soaked fighting, they restored the original equilibrium. Despite grievous losses, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese encirclement and exacted a heavy toll, reports from the time, corroborated by Japanese records in Senshi Sōsho, indicate over 13,000 Japanese killed or wounded, with more than 5,000 corpses abandoned on the battlefield. This fulfilled the strategic goal of containing and eroding Japanese strength. Chinese casualties surpassed 25,000, a testament to the ferocity of the struggle. The 5th War Zone seized the initiative in advances and retreats, deftly shifting to outer lines and maintaining positional advantages. As Japanese forces withdrew, Chinese pursuers harried and obstructed them, yielding substantial victories. The Battle of Suizao spanned less than three weeks. The Japanese main force pierced defenses on the east bank of the Han River, advancing to encircle one flank as planned. However, the other two formations met fierce opposition near Suixian and northward, stalling their progress. Adapting to the battlefield's ebb and flow, the Fifth War Zone transformed its tactics: the main force escaped encirclement, maneuvered to outer lines for offensives, and exploited terrain to hammer the Japanese. The pivotal order to flip from defense to offense doomed the encirclement; with the counterattack triumphant, the Japanese declined to hold and retreated. The Chinese pursued with unyielding vigor. By May 24, they had reclaimed Zaoyang, Tongbai, and other locales. Save for Suixian County, the Japanese had fallen back to pre-war positions, reinstating the regional status quo. Thus, the battle concluded, a chapter of resilience etched into the chronicles of China's defiance. In the sweltering heat of southern China, where the humid air clung to every breath like a persistent fog, the Japanese General Staff basked in what they called a triumphant offensive and defensive campaign in Guangdong. But victory, as history so often teaches, is a double-edged sword. By early 1939, the strain was palpable. Their secret supply line snaking from the British colony of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland was under constant disruption, raids by shadowy guerrilla bands, opportunistic smugglers, and the sheer unpredictability of wartime logistics turning what should have been a lifeline into a leaky sieve. Blockading the entire coastline? A pipe dream, given the vast, jagged shores of Guangdong, dotted with hidden coves and fishing villages that had evaded imperial edicts for centuries. Yet, the General Staff's priorities were unyielding, laser-focused on strangling the Nationalist capital of Chongqing through a relentless blockade. This meant the 21st Army, that workhorse of the Japanese invasion force, had to stay in the fight—no rest for the weary. Drawing from historical records like the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) compiled by Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, we know that after the 21st Army reported severing what they dubbed the "secret transport line" at Xinhui, a gritty, hard-fought skirmish that left the local landscape scarred with craters and abandoned supply crates, the General Staff circled back to the idea of a full coastal blockade. It was a classic case of military opportunism: staff officers, poring over maps in dimly lit war rooms in Tokyo, suddenly "discovered" Shantou as a major port. Not just any port, mind you, but a bustling hub tied to the heartstrings of Guangdong's overseas Chinese communities. Shantou and nearby Chao'an weren't mere dots on a map; they were the ancestral hometowns of countless Chaoshan people who had ventured abroad to Southeast Asia, sending back remittances that flowed like lifeblood into the region. Historical economic studies, such as those in The Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China by Stephen Fitzgerald, highlight how these funds from the Chaoshan diaspora, often funneled through family networks in places like Singapore and Thailand, were substantial, indirectly fueling China's war effort by sustaining local economies and even purchasing arms on the black market. The Chao-Shao Highway, that dusty artery running near Shantou, was pinpointed as a critical vein connecting Hong Kong's ports to the mainland's interior. So, in early June 1939, the die was cast: Army Order No. 310 thundered from headquarters, commanding the 21st Army to seize Shantou. The Chief of the General Staff himself provided the strategic blueprint, a personal touch that underscored the operation's gravity. The Army Department christened the Chaoshan push "Operation Hua," a nod perhaps to the flowery illusions of easy conquest, while instructing the Navy Department to tag along for the ride. In naval parlance, it became "Operation J," a cryptic label that masked the sheer scale unfolding. Under the Headquarters' watchful eye, what started as a modest blockade morphed into a massive amphibious assault, conjured seemingly out of thin air like a magician's trick, but one with deadly props. The 5th Fleet's orders mobilized an impressive lineup: the 9th Squadron for heavy hitting, the 5th Mine Boat Squadron to clear watery hazards, the 12th and 21st Sweeper Squadrons sweeping for mines like diligent janitors of the sea, the 45th Destroyer Squadron adding destroyer muscle, and air power from the 3rd Combined Air Group (boasting 24 land-based attack aircraft and 9 reconnaissance planes that could spot a fishing boat from miles away). Then there was the Chiyoda Air Group with its 9 reconnaissance aircraft, the Guangdong Air Group contributing a quirky airship and one more recon plane, the 9th Special Landing Squadron from Sasebo trained for beach assaults, and a flotilla of special ships for logistics. On the ground, the 21st Army threw in the 132nd Brigade from the 104th Division, beefed up with the 76th Infantry Battalion, two mountain artillery battalions for lobbing shells over rugged terrain, two engineer battalions to bridge rivers and clear paths, a light armored vehicle platoon rumbling with mechanized menace, and a river-crossing supplies company to keep the troops fed and armed. All under the command of Brigade Commander Juro Goto, a stern officer whose tactical acumen was forged in earlier Manchurian campaigns. The convoy's size demanded rehearsals; the 132nd Brigade trained for boat transfers at Magong in the Penghu Islands, practicing the precarious dance of loading men and gear onto rocking vessels under simulated fire. Secrecy shrouded the whole affair, many officers and soldiers, boarding ships in the dead of night, whispered among themselves that they were finally heading home to Japan, a cruel ruse to maintain operational security. For extra punch, the 21st Army tacked on the 31st Air Squadron for air support, their planes droning like angry hornets ready to sting. This overkill didn't sit well with everyone. Lieutenant General Ando Rikichi, the pragmatic commander overseeing Japanese forces in the region, must have fumed in his Guangzhou headquarters. His intelligence staff, drawing from intercepted radio chatter and local spies as noted in postwar analyses like The Japanese Army in World War II by Gordon L. Rottman, reported that the Chongqing forces in Chaozhou were laughably thin: just the 9th Independent Brigade, a couple of security regiments, and ragtag "self-defense groups" of armed civilians. Why unleash such a sledgehammer on a fly? The mobilization's magnitude even forced a reshuffling of defenses around Guangzhou, pulling resources from the 12th Army's front lines and overburdening the already stretched 18th Division. It was bureaucratic overreach at its finest, a testament to the Imperial Staff's penchant for grand gestures over tactical efficiency. Meanwhile, on the Nationalist side, the winds of war carried whispers of impending doom. The National Revolutionary Army's war histories, such as those compiled in the Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Shi (History of China's War of Resistance Against Japan), note that Chiang Kai-shek's Military Commission had snagged intelligence as early as February 1939 about Japan's plans for a large-scale invasion of Shantou. The efficiency of the Military Command's Second Bureau and the Military Intelligence Bureau was nothing short of astonishing, networks of agents, double agents, and radio intercepts piercing the veil of Japanese secrecy. Even as the convoy slipped out of Penghu, a detailed report outlining operational orders landed on Commander Zhang Fakui's desk, the ink still fresh. Zhang, a battle-hardened strategist whose career spanned the Northern Expedition and beyond , had four months to prepare for what would be dubbed the decisive battle of Chaoshan. Yet, in a move that baffled some contemporaries, he chose not to fortify and defend it tooth and nail. After the Fourth War Zone submitted its opinions, likely heated debates in smoke-filled command posts, Chiang Kai-shek greenlit the plan. By March, the Military Commission issued its strategic policy: when the enemy hit Chaoshan, a sliver of regular troops would team up with civilian armed forces for mobile and guerrilla warfare, grinding down the invaders like sandpaper on steel. The orders specified guerrilla zones in Chaozhou, Jiaxing, and Huizhou, unifying local militias under a banner of "extensive guerrilla warfare" to coordinate with regular army maneuvers, gradually eroding the Japanese thrust. In essence, the 4th War Zone wasn't tasked with holding Chao'an and Shantou at all costs; instead, they'd strike hard during the landing, then let guerrillas harry the occupiers post-capture. It was a doctrine of attrition in a "confined battlefield," honing skills through maneuver and ambush. Remarkably, the fall of these cities was preordained by the Military Commission three months before the Japanese even issued their orders, a strategic feint that echoed ancient Sun Tzu tactics of yielding ground to preserve strength. To execute this, the 4th War Zone birthed the Chao-Jia-Hui Guerrilla Command after meticulous preparation, with General Zou Hong, head of Guangdong's Security Bureau and a no-nonsense administrator known for his anti-smuggling campaigns, taking the helm. In just three months, Zhang Fakui scraped together the Independent 9th Brigade, the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Guangdong Provincial Security Regiments, and the Security Training Regiment. Even with the 9th Army Group lurking nearby, he handed the reins of the Chao-Shan operation to the 12th Army Group's planners. Their March guidelines sketched three lines of resistance from the coast to the mountains, a staged withdrawal that allowed frontline defenders to melt away like ghosts. This blueprint mirrored Chiang Kai-shek's post-Wuhan reassessment, where the loss of that key city in 1938 prompted a shift to protracted warfare. A Xinhua News Agency columnist later summed it up scathingly: "The Chongqing government, having lost its will to resist, colludes with the Japanese and seeks to eliminate the Communists, adopting a policy of passive resistance." This narrative, propagated by Communist sources, dogged Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army for decades, painting them as defeatists even as they bled the Japanese dry through attrition. February 1939 saw Commander Zhang kicking off a reorganization of the 12th Army Group, transforming it from a patchwork force into something resembling a modern army. He could have hunkered down, assigning troops to a desperate defense of Chaoshan, but that would have handed the initiative to the overcautious Japanese General Staff, whose activism often bordered on paranoia. Zhang, with the wisdom of a seasoned general who had navigated the treacherous politics of pre-war China, weighed the scales carefully. His vision? Forge the 12th Army Group into a nimble field army, not squander tens of thousands on a secondary port. Japan's naval and air dominance—evident in the devastation of Shanghai in 1937, meant Guangdong's forces could be pulverized in Shantou just as easily. Losing Chaozhou and Shantou? Acceptable, if it preserved core strength for the long haul. Post-Xinhui, Zhang doubled down on resistance, channeling efforts into live-fire exercises for the 12th Army, turning green recruits into battle-ready soldiers amid the Guangdong hills. The war's trajectory after 1939 would vindicate him: his forces became pivotal in later counteroffensives, proving that a living army trumped dead cities. Opting out of a static defense, Zhang pivoted to guerrilla warfare to bleed the Japanese while clutching strategic initiative. He ordered local governments to whip up coastal guerrilla forces from Chao'an to Huizhou—melding militias, national guards, police, and private armed groups into official folds. These weren't elite shock troops, but in wartime's chaos, they controlled locales effectively, disrupting supply lines and gathering intel. For surprises, he unleashed two mobile units: the 9th Independent Brigade and the 20th Independent Brigade. Formed fresh after the War of Resistance erupted, these brigades shone for their efficiency within the cumbersome Guangdong Army structure. Division-level units were too bulky for spotty communications, so Yu Hanmou's command birthed these independent outfits, staffed with crack officers. The 9th, packing direct-fire artillery for punch, and the 20th, dubbed semi-mechanized for its truck-borne speed, prowled the Chaoshan–Huizhou coast from 1939. Zhang retained their three-regiment setup, naming Hua Zhenzhong and Zhang Shou as commanders, granting them autonomy to command in the field like roving wolves. As the 9th Independent Brigade shifted to Shantou, its 627th Regiment was still reorganizing in Heyuan, a logistical hiccup amid the scramble. Hua Zhenzhong, a commander noted for his tactical flexibility in regional annals, deployed the 625th Regiment and 5th Security Regiment along the coast, with the 626th as reserve in Chao'an. Though the Fourth War Zone had written off Chaoshan, Zhang yearned to showcase Guangdong grit before the pullback. Dawn broke on June 21, 1939, at 4:30 a.m., with Japanese reconnaissance planes slicing through the fog over Shantou, Anbu, and Nanbeigang, ghostly silhouettes against the gray sky. By 5:30, the mist lifted, revealing a nightmare armada: over 40 destroyers and 70–80 landing craft churning toward the coast on multiple vectors, their hulls cutting the waves like knives. The 626th Regiment's 3rd Battalion at Donghushan met the first wave with a hail of fire from six light machine guns, repelling the initial boats in a frenzy of splashes and shouts. But the brigade's long-range guns couldn't stem the tide; Hua focused on key chokepoints, aiming to bloody the invaders rather than obliterate them. By morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 625th Regiment charged into Shantou City, joined by the local police corps digging in amid urban sprawl. Combat raged at Xinjin Port and the airport's fringes, where Nationalist troops traded shots with advancing Japanese under the absent shadow of a Chinese navy. Japanese naval guns, massed offshore, pounded the outskirts like thunder gods in fury. By 2:00 a.m. on the 22nd, Shantou crumpled as defenders' ammo ran dry, the city falling in a haze of smoke and echoes. Before the loss, Hua had positioned the 1st Battalion of the 5th Security Regiment at Anbu, guarding the road to Chao'an. Local lore, preserved in oral histories collected by the Chaozhou Historical Society, recalls Battalion Commander Du Ruo leading from the front, rifle in hand, but Japanese barrages, bolstered by superior firepower—forced a retreat. Post-capture, Tokyo's forces paused to consolidate, unleashing massacres on fleeing civilians in the outskirts. A flotilla of civilian boats, intercepted at sea, became a grim training ground for bayonet drills, a barbarity echoed in survivor testimonies compiled in The Rape of Nanking and Beyond extensions to Guangdong atrocities. With Shantou gone, Hua pivoted to flank defense, orchestrating night raids on Japanese positions around Anbu and Meixi. On June 24th, Major Du Ruo spearheaded an assault into Anbu but fell gravely wounded amid the chaos. Later, the 2nd Battalion of the 626th overran spots near Meixi. A Japanese sea-flanking maneuver targeted Anbu, but Nationalists held at Liulong, sparking nocturnal clashes, grenade volleys, bayonet charges, and hand-to-hand brawls that drained both sides like a slow bleed. June 26th saw the 132nd Brigade lumber toward Chao'an. Hua weighed options: all-out assault or guerrilla fade? He chose to dig in on the outskirts, reserving two companies of the 625th and a special ops battalion in the city. The 27th brought a day-long Japanese onslaught, culminating in Chao'an's fall after fierce rear-guard actions by the 9th Independent Brigade. Evacuations preceded the collapse, with Japanese propaganda banners fluttering falsely, claiming Nationalists had abandoned defense. Yet Hua's call preserved his brigade for future fights; the Japanese claimed an empty prize. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese operations had yet again plugged up supply leaks into Nationalist China. The fall of Suixian, Zaoyang and Shantou were heavy losses for the Chinese war effort. However the Chinese were also able to exact heavy casualties on the invaders and thwarted their encirclement attempts. China was still in the fight for her life.

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Episode Notes Full descrptions from the Library of Congress “The Tramp and the Dog” (1896)                                                          "The Tramp and the Dog," a silent film from Chicago's Selig Polyscope Company, is considered director William Selig's most popular early work. Filmed in Rogers Park, it is recognized as the first commercial film made in Chicago. Previously a lost film, it was rediscovered in 2021 at the National Library of Norway. The film depicts a tramp who attempts to steal a pie from a backyard windowsill, only to be met by a broom-wielding housewife and her dog, who foils the crime. The film is one of the first known as “pants humor,” where a character loses (or almost loses) his pants during an altercation. This scene inspired future comedy gags showing drifters and tramps losing their pants to dogs chasing them. “The Oath of the Sword” (1914)                                                                        A three-reel silent drama, "The Oath of the Sword" depicts the tragic story of two young lovers separated by an ocean. Masao follows his ambitions, studying abroad at the University of California, Berkeley, while Hisa remains in Japan, caring for her ill father. This earliest known Asian American film production featured Japanese actors playing Japanese characters and was produced by the Los Angeles-based Japanese American Film Company. Made at a time when Hollywood studios were not yet the dominant storytellers of the American film industry, "The Oath of the Sword" highlights the significance of early independent film productions created by and for Asian American communities. James Card, the founding curator at the George Eastman Museum, acquired “The Oath of the Sword” in 1963. The museum made a black and white photochemical preservation in 1980. In 2023, a new preservation reproducing the original tinting was done in collaboration with the Japanese American National Museum, and the film has since become widely admired. “The Maid of McMillan” (1916)Known to be the first student film on record, this whimsical, silent romance film was shot on campus in 1916 by students in the Thyrsus Dramatic Club at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. Club members Donald Stewart (Class of 1917) and George D. Bartlett (Class of 1920) wrote the screenplay. The original nitrate print of “The Maid of McMillan” was rediscovered in 1982, and two 16mm prints were made; the original nitrate was likely destroyed at this time. In 2021, with funding from the National Film Preservation Foundation, one of those 16mm prints was scanned at 4k and reprinted onto 35mm helping to secure the film's survival and legacy. “The Lady” (1925)When “The Lady” debuted in theaters in 1925, the silent film era had hit its stride, and this movie represents a powerhouse of artists at their peak. Director Frank Borzage was a well-established expert in drawing out intense expressions of deep emotion and longing in his actors. He did just that with the film's lead actress, Norma Talmadge, also at the height of her career, both in front of and behind the camera. Talmadge produced “The Lady” through her production company and commissioned one of the most prolific screenwriters, Frances Marion, to deliver a heartfelt story of a woman seeking to find the son she had to give up, to protect him from his evil grandfather. “The Lady” was restored by the Library of Congress in 2022. “Sparrows” (1926)As a silent actress, producer and key founder in the creation of the American film industry, Mary Pickford's performance in “Sparrows” represents her ability to master the genre she helped nourish: sentimental melodramas full of adventure and thrills, with dashes of comedy and heartfelt endings. Pickford plays Molly, the eldest orphan held within the swampy squalor of the Deep South, who moves heaven and earth to save the other orphan children from a Dickensian world of forced labor. The film takes some departures from the visual styles found in Pickford's other films, invoking an unusual tone of despair while deploying camera angles and lighting akin to German Expressionist cinema. “Sparrows” was preserved by the Library of Congress in collaboration with the Mary Pickford Company in 2020. “Ten Nights in a Barroom” (1926)                                                                     Featuring an all-Black cast, “Ten Nights in a Barroom” was produced in 1926 by the Colored Players Film Corporation of Philadelphia and is the earliest of only two surviving films made by the company. This silent film is based on the stage melodrama adapted from the 1854 novel “Ten Nights in a Bar-Room and What I Saw There” by Timothy Shay Arthur. Released in 2015 by Kino Lorber as part of the five-disc set “Pioneers of African-American Cinema,” the compilation was produced by the Library of Congress, in association with the British Film Institute, George Eastman Museum, Museum of Modern Art, National Archives, Smithsonian's National Museum of African American History and Culture, Southern Methodist University and the UCLA Film & Television Archive. Preserved by George Eastman Museum. “White Christmas” (1954)                                                           While the chart-topping song "White Christmas" was first performed by Bing Crosby for the 1942 film "Holiday Inn," its composer, Irving Berlin, was later inspired to center the song in the 1954 musical "White Christmas." Crosby, along with Danny Kaye, Rosemary Clooney, Vera-Ellen Rohe and director Michael Curtiz, embedded "White Christmas" in American popular culture as a best-selling single and the top-grossing film of 1954, as well as regular holiday viewing throughout the decades. The story of two World War II veterans-turned-entertainers and a singing sister act preparing a show for a retired general, the film and its grand musical numbers were captured in VistaVision, a widescreen process developed by Paramount Pictures and first used for "White Christmas." “High Society” (1956)                                                                  Often referred to as the last great musical of the Golden Age of Hollywood, “High Society” features an all-star cast including Bing Crosby, Grace Kelly, Frank Sinatra and Louis Armstrong (and his band), along with a memorable score of Cole Porter classics. Set in Newport, Rhode Island, the film showcases the Newport Jazz Festival (established in 1954) and features a remarkable version of Cole Porter's “Now You Has Jazz.” It includes the first big-screen duet by Frank Sinatra and Bing Crosby, singing “Well, Did You Evah?” This was Grace Kelly's last movie before she retired from acting and married the Prince of Monaco; she wore her Cartier engagement ring while filming. “Brooklyn Bridge” (1981)                                               With “Brooklyn Bridge,” Ken Burns introduced himself to the American public, telling the story of the New York landmark's construction. As with later subjects like the Civil War, jazz and baseball, Burns connects the building of the Brooklyn Bridge to American identity, values and aspirations. Released theatrically and nominated for an Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature, “Brooklyn Bridge” marked the beginning of Burns' influential career in public media*.* More than just a filmmaker, Burns has become a trusted public historian. His storytelling presents facts, but maybe more importantly, invites reflection on what America is, where it's been, and where it's going. His influence is felt not only in classrooms and through public broadcasting, but across generations who see history as something alive and relevant. “Say Amen, Somebody” (1982)George Nierenberg's documentary is a celebration of the historical significance and spiritual power of gospel music. With inspirational music, joyful songs and brilliant singers, the movie focuses on the men and women who pioneered gospel music and strengthened its connections to African American community and religious life. Prior to production, Nierenberg, who is white, spent over a year in African American churches and communities, gaining the trust of the performers. Restored by the Smithsonian's National Museum of African American History and Culture in 2020, the film features archival footage, photographs, stirring performances and reflections from the father of gospel Thomas A. Dorsey and its matron Mother Willie Mae Ford Smith. Nierenberg shows the struggles and sacrifices it takes to make a living in gospel, including criticism endured by women who sought to pursue careers as professional gospel singers while raising their families. “The Thing” (1982)Moody, stark, often funny and always chilling, this science fiction horror classic follows Antarctic scientists who uncover a long-dormant, malevolent extraterrestrial presence. “The Thing” revolutionized horror special effects and offers a brutally honest portrait of the results of paranoia and exhaustion when the unknown becomes inescapable. “The Thing” deftly adapts John W. Campbell's 1938 novella “Who Goes There?” and influenced “Stranger Things” and “Reservoir Dogs.” It remains a tense, thrilling and profoundly unsettling work of cinema. “The Big Chill” (1983)Lawrence Kasdan's best picture-nominated “The Big Chill” offers an intimate portrait of friends reunited after the suicide of one of their own and features actors who defined cinema in the 1980s – Glenn Close, William Hurt, Jo Beth Williams, Kevin Kline, Jeff Goldblum and Meg Tilly. This powerful ensemble portrays American stereotypes of the time – the yuppie, the drug dealer, the TV star – and deftly humanizes them. Through humor, tenderness, honesty and an amazing soundtrack, it shows formerly idealistic Americans making and dealing with the constant compromises of adulthood, while buoying one another with uncompromising love and friendship. “The Karate Kid” (1984)An intimate story about family and friendship, “The Karate Kid” also succeeds as a hero's journey, a sports movie and a teen movie – a feel-good movie, but not without grit. The film offers clearly defined villains, romance and seemingly unachievable goals, but also an elegant character-driven drama that is relatable and touching. A father who has lost his son meets the displaced son of a single mother and teaches him about finding balance and avoiding the pitfalls of violence and revenge. Race and class issues are presented honestly and are dealt with reasonably. Our hero practices a lot, gets frustrated, gets hurt, but still succeeds. It's as American as they come, and it's a classic. “Glory” (1989)“Glory,” described by Leonard Maltin as “one of the finest historical dramas ever made,” portrays a historical account of the 54th Regiment, a unit of African American soldiers who fought for the North in the Civil War. Authorized by the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, the regiment consisted of an all-Black troop commanded by white officers. Matthew Broderick plays the young colonel who trains the troop, and Denzel Washington (in an Academy Award-winning performance) is among an impressive cast that includes Morgan Freeman, Cary Elwes and Andre Braugher. American Civil War historian James M. McPherson said the film "accomplishes a remarkable feat in sensitizing a lot of today's Black students to the role that their ancestors played in the Civil War in winning their own freedom.” “Philadelphia” (1993)                                                                  “Philadelphia” stars Tom Hanks in one of the first mainstream studio movies to confront the HIV/AIDS crisis. In the film, law partner Andrew Beckett (Hanks) is fired from his firm when they discover that he is gay and has AIDS. He hires personal attorney Joe Miller (Denzel Washington) to help him with litigation against his former employer. Director Jonathan Demme is quoted as saying, “The film is not necessarily just about AIDS, but rather everyone in this country is entitled to justice.” The film won two Oscars: one for Hanks and the other for Bruce Springsteen's original song, “The Streets of Philadelphia.” Through the song's mainstream radio and MTV airplay, it brought the film and its conversation around the HIV/AIDS pandemic to a wider audience. “Before Sunrise” (1995)                                                              Richard Linklater has explored a wide range of narrative storytelling styles while consistently capturing ordinary, everyday American life. However, his innovative use of time as a defining and recurring cinematic tool has become one of his most significant accomplishments. As the first film in his “Before” trilogy – three films, each shot nine years apart – “Before Sunrise” unfolds as one of cinema's most sustained explorations of love and the passage of time, highlighting the human experience through chance encounters and conversation. With his critically acclaimed 12-year production of the film “Boyhood” (2014) and a new 20-year planned production underway, his unique use of the medium of film to demonstrate time passing demonstrates an unprecedented investment in actors and narrative storytelling. “Clueless” (1995)                                                             A satire, comedy and loose Jane Austen literary adaptation dressed in teen movie designer clothing, “Clueless,” directed by Amy Heckerling, rewards both the casual and hyper-analytical viewer. It's impossible to miss its peak-1990s colorful, high-energy, soundtrack-focused on-screen dynamism, and repeated viewings reveal its unpretentiously presented and extraordinarily layered and biting social commentary about class, privilege and power structures. Heckerling and the incredible cast never talk down to the audience, creating main characters that viewers root for, despite the obvious digs at the ultrarich. The film centers on Cher (Alicia Silverstone) as a well-intentioned, fashion-obsessed high school student who is convinced she has life figured out. In the age of MTV, the film's popularity launched Paul Rudd's career and Silverstone's iconic-1990s status. The soundtrack, curated by Karyn Rachtman, helped solidify the film as a time capsule of clothing, music, dialogue and teenage life. “The Truman Show” (1998)Before social media and reality television, there was “The Truman Show.” Jim Carrey breaks from his usual comedic roles to star in this dramatic film about a man who, unbeknownst to him, is living his life on a soundstage filmed for a popular reality show. Adopted at birth by the television studio, Truman Burbank (Carrey) grew up in the (fictitious) town of Seahaven Island with his family and friends playing roles (paid actors). Cameras are all over the soundstage and follow his activities 24/7. Almost 30 years since its release, the film continues to be a study in sociology, philosophy and psychology, and has inspired university classes on media influence, the human condition and reality television. “Frida” (2002)Salma Hayek produced and starred in this biopic of Frida Kahlo, adapted from the book “Frida: A Biography of Frida Kahlo” by Hayden Herrera. The film explores Kahlo's rise as an artist in Mexico City and the impact disability and chronic pain from an accident as a young adult had on her life and work. The film centers around her tumultuous and passionate relationships, most significantly with her husband, painter Diego Rivera (Alfred Molina). Directed by Julie Taymor, the film was nominated for six Academy Awards, including Best Actress. It won awards for Best Makeup and Best Original Score for Elliot Goldenthal, who also won a Golden Globe in the same category. “The Hours” (2002)Director Stephen Daldry's “The Hours” weaves the novel “Mrs. Dalloway” into three women's stories of loneliness, depression and suicide. Virginia Woolf, played by Nicole Kidman (who won an Oscar and a Golden Globe for her performance), is working on the novel while struggling with what is now known as bipolar disorder. Laura, played by Julianne Moore (nominated for Best Actress in a Supporting Role), is unfulfilled in her life as a 1950s housewife and mother. Clarissa (played by Meryl Streep) is – like Mrs. Dalloway – planning a party, but for her close friend who is dying of AIDS. The film is based on Michael Cunningham's Pulitzer Prize-winning novel. It earned nine Academy Award nominations, including Best Picture, and won a Golden Globe for Best Picture. “The Incredibles” (2004)                                                 With an all-star cast and memorable soundtrack, this Academy Award-winning Pixar hit uses thrilling action sequences to tell the story of a family trying to live normal lives while hiding their superpowers. For the first time, Pixar hired an outside director, Brad Bird, who drew inspiration from spy films and comic books from the 1960s. The animation team developed a new design element to capture realistic human anatomy, hair, skin and clothing, which Pixar struggled with in early films like “Toy Story.” The film spawned merchandise, video games, Lego sets and more. The sequel, “Incredibles 2,” was also a huge hit, and together, both films generated almost $2 billion at the box office. “The Wrecking Crew” (2008)                                                     “The Wrecking Crew” is a documentary that showcases a group of Los Angeles studio musicians who played on many hit songs and albums of the 1960s and early 1970s, including “California Dreamin',” “The Beat Goes On,” “You've Lost That Lovin' Feeling” and “These Boots Are Made for Walkin'.” Through interviews, music, footage and his own narration, director Denny Tedesco reveals how the Wrecking Crew members – including his father, guitarist Tommy Tedesco – were the unsung heroes of some of America's most famous songs. Production for the film began in 1996, and the film was completed in 2008. Due to the high cost of song licenses, the official release was delayed until 2015, when a successful Kickstarter campaign raised over $300,000 to pay for the music rights. “Inception” (2010)                                                                         Writer and director Christopher Nolan once again challenges audiences with multiple interconnected narrative layers while delivering thrilling action sequences and stunning visual effects. “Inception” asks the question, “Can you alter a person's thoughts by manipulating their dreams?” Taking almost 10 years to write, the film was praised for its aesthetic significance and Nolan's ability to create scenes using cameras rather than computer-generated imagery. A metaphysical heist film with an emotional core driven by grief and guilt, “Inception” offers a meditation on how dreams influence identity, and it resonates deeply in an age of digital simulation, blurred realities and uncertainty. The film earned $830 million at the box office and won four Academy Awards. “The Loving Story” (2011)Nancy Buirski's acclaimed documentary gives an in-depth and deeply personal look at the true story of Richard Loving (a white man) and Mildred Loving (a Black and Native American woman), who were forbidden by law to marry in the state of Virginia in the 1960s. Their Supreme Court case, Loving vs. Virginia, was one of the most significant in history, and paved the way for future multiracial couples to marry. The movie captures the immense challenges the Lovings faced to keep their family and marriage together, through a combination of 16mm footage, personal photographs, accounts from their lawyers and family members, and audio from the Supreme Court oral arguments. “The Grand Budapest Hotel” (2014)“The Grand Budapest Hotel” stands as one of Wes Anderson's most successful films and demonstrates his own brand of unique craftsmanship, resulting in a visually striking and emotionally resonant story. As one of the most stylistically distinctive American filmmakers of the last half-century, Anderson uses historically accurate color and architecture to paint scenes to elicit nostalgia and longing from audiences, while at the same time weaving in political and social upheaval into the film. The film is an example of Anderson as a unique artist who uses whimsy, melancholy, innovative storytelling and a great deal of historical research, which is on display in this visually rich gem of a movie. Find out more at https://registry-a-podcast.pinecast.co

Let us know what you think! Text us!In this episode of Security Halt!, Deny Caballero sits down with Jay Fain for a candid conversation that begins with humor and ends with clarity. Together, they explore Freemasonry—what it is, what it isn't, and why it continues to matter, especially for veterans seeking brotherhood after service.This episode covers: • Freemasonry myths vs reality • Community and connection for veterans • Brotherhood beyond ideology • Letting go of defensiveness • The value of open dialogue

Let us know what you think! Text us!Deny Caballero introduces the 100 Days to Optimize Challenge—a structured, veteran-led approach to improving mental health, physical performance, and spiritual alignment. This episode explains the framework, rules, and accountability measures behind the challenge and why holistic wellness is critical to addressing veteran suicide and long-term resilience.Key Topics: • Mind, body, spirit optimization • Veteran mental health & suicide prevention • Accountability and ownership • Goal setting and discipline • Community-driven growth

Let us know what you think! Text us!In this episode, Deny Caballero welcomes Rick Franco, co-founder of Four Branches Bourbon, to discuss veteran entrepreneurship, responsible alcohol culture, and building a business rooted in service and honor.Rick shares how Four Branches was created by veterans from different military branches to honor sacrifice while changing the narrative around alcohol and mental health. This episode explores entrepreneurship after service, navigating the bourbon industry, and finding harmony between work, family, and purpose.Key Topics Covered:Veteran-owned business and entrepreneurshipResponsible drinking and mental health awarenessHonoring military sacrifice through businessNavigating the bourbon industryFinding harmony in life and leadershipFollow Security Halt! Podcast for more conversations on leadership, service, and purpose.Chapters:00:00 – Veteran-Owned Bourbon With a Mission 01:15 – The Story Behind Four Branches Bourbon 05:30 – Military Service, CIA Experience, and Leadership 10:27 – Honoring Sacrifice Through Business 15:55 – Changing Alcohol Culture and Responsibility 18:48 – Mental Health and Responsible Drinking 22:54 – Navigating the Bourbon Industry 28:03 – Crafting a Veteran-Built Brand 33:27 – Entrepreneurship After Military Service 39:47 – Lessons Learned From Business Failures 48:14 – Family, Business, and Life Harmony 52:55 – Defining Success Beyond Profit 55:10 – The Future of Four Branches Bourbon Sponsored by: Dr. Mark Gordon & Millennium Health Centers  Get the book Peptides for Health Vol.1 Medical Edition today.  Use code PTH25 for 25% off through March 15  Use code Phase2P for 10% off Millennium products  Available only at MillenniumHealthStore.com PRECISION WELLNESS GROUP  Use code: Security Halt Podcast 25Website: https://www.precisionwellnessgroup.com/  Security Halt Mediahttps://www.securityhaltmedia.com/ Instagram: @securityhaltX: @SecurityHaltTik Tok: @security.halt.podLinkedIn: Deny Caballero Connect with Rick Today!LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/alfredo-franco/Website: https://www.fourbranches.com/?srsltid=AfmBOooy2ANhz1vnVgx8z5ZsFUFarnguDV4ACE2_CqtMJJRRYkZKjarK Looking for custom handmade items, military memorabilia, or laser engraving? Contact Eric Gilgenast.Instagram:https://www.instagram.com/haus_gilgenast_woodworks_main/Website: https://www.hausgilgenastwoodworks.com/SOF Heritage Designs Custom belt Buckles. Of the Regiment for the Regiment SOF-HD.Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/sofhdesigns/Support the showProduced by Security Halt Media

Last time we spoke about the Japanese invasion of Hainan. In early 1939, the Sino-Japanese War shifted from pitched battles to a grueling struggle over lifelines and logistics. Japan pursued a southward strategy (Nanshin-ron), aiming to choke Chinese resistance by isolating key railways and airbases. It seized Hainan in February to secure southern airfields and threaten Indochina routes, then targeted Nanchang to cut the vital Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, crippling Free China's eastern supply lines. The Japanese used a blended-arms approach: concentrated armor, air support, and amphibious and river operations, focusing on rapid, strategic breakthroughs rather than large-scale frontal assaults. China, though battered, relied on a reconstituted defense around Wuhan and Nanchang, with the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue delaying Japanese advances and preserving critical corridors south of the Yangtze. The campaign highlighted the war's broader human and political dimensions: massive casualties, forced labor, and internal political fragility within the Kuomintang, even as both sides sought to outlast the other.   #186 The Battle of Nanchang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. For the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1939 marked a transition from broad occupation tactics to a focused, politically driven military strategy aimed at breaking Nationalist cohesion and isolating key nodes. After the January 11, 1938 Imperial Conference, Tokyo framed the China Conflict as a contest of endurance and political attrition: hold occupied territories as strategic assets, push a narrow operational corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, and treat the broader east-of-line spaces as pacified. The aim was to deny resources to Chiang Kai-shek's regime while awaiting a more opportune political rupture, instead of pursuing indiscriminate conquest. By October 1938, the tactical center of gravity shifted toward Wuhan and the Yangtze corridor. General Headquarters acknowledged the need to adapt to a protracted war: emphasize political strategy alongside combat operations, bolster a new regime in areas under pressure, and gradually erode Chongqing's moral and material resolve. This shift produced a dual track: reinforce a centralized, secure core while permitting peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing.   In early 1939, Japan sought to consolidate gains through layered defenses and strategic war zones, aiming to blunt Chinese mobilization and disrupt critical logistics. The Ninth War Zone, commanded by Xue Yue, formed a defensive umbrella over Nanchang's northern approaches and the surrounding rail-and-river arteries. China's leadership, notably Chiang Kai-shek, pressed for preemption to seize the initiative: an ambitious plan from Xue Yue to strike by March 24, 1939, to prevent a river-crossing Japanese advance and to pin forces before they could entrench. Japan responded with Operation Ren, targeting the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway to sever lines of communication and isolate Nanchang. Okamura Yasuji reorganized heavy weapons into concentrated tank groups, supported by air power, while late-February 1939 movements staged feints and riverine maneuvers to complicate Chinese concentration around Nanchang. The objective was a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to blind the southern airbase network, disrupt the critical rail spine, and push Chinese forces deeper inland, thereby tightening a blockade around southern China. Together, these shifts framed Nanchang not as an isolated objective but as the climactic hinge in a broader strategy of coercive pressure, air-ground mobility, and rail control. The city's fall would represent the culmination of a protracted contest to deny the Nationalist regime its logistical arteries and air superiority, paving the way for further Japanese consolidation and pressure along the Yangtze corridor. In the wake of the Japanese capture of Wuhan in late 1938, the city swiftly transformed into a pivotal stronghold for the Imperial Japanese Army. It became the new base for the 11th Army, occupying the former territories of the National Revolutionary Army's 5th and 9th War Zones. This shift not only consolidated Japanese control over central China but also positioned their forces to launch further offensives, exploiting the region's logistical and geographical advantages. As a key railway hub and the western terminus of the Zhejiang-Hunan Railway, Nanchang served as a vital supply artery connecting the Third and Ninth War Zones of the Nationalist forces. Its airfields further amplified its importance, posing a direct threat to Japanese shipping routes along the Yangtze River. Capturing Nanchang would sever Chinese supply lines, isolate key military districts, and pave the way for deeper incursions into southern China. Faced with this looming threat, the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek moved quickly to reorganize its defenses in the 9th War Zone. General Chen Cheng retained his nominal position as commander in chief, but the actual operational reins were handed to General Xue Yue, a seasoned tactician known for his defensive prowess. This restructuring aimed to streamline command and bolster resistance, yet it was hampered by persistent logistical challenges that rendered many changes ineffective on the ground. As tensions escalated in early 1939, Chinese forces began amassing near Nanchang in preparation for the inevitable clash. Over 200,000 troops from 52 divisions were mobilized, drawing from units across the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Area. This region alone housed more than 29 divisions organized into four army groups: the 1st, 19th, 30th, and 32nd. On paper, this formidable assembly included over 16,000 officers and 240,000 enlisted men, representing a significant concentration of Nationalist power.   Leading this defensive effort was General Chen Cheng as the overarching commander in chief, with General Xue Yue stepping in as the acting commander to oversee day-to-day operations. Within this structure, the 19th Army Group stood out under the command of General Luo Zhuoying, supported by Lieutenant General Luo Weixong as his chief of staff. Luo Zhuoying, in particular, emerged as a central figure, assuming overall command for much of the ensuing Battle of Nanchang. His leadership would be tested against the relentless advance of the Japanese Eleventh Army, setting the stage for one of the bloodiest engagements of the war. In July 1938, during their offensive against Wuhan, Japanese forces attempted to advance toward Nanchang but were halted by Chinese defenders along the Xiushui River. The Chinese had established strong, fortified positions that effectively barred the Japanese path. The impasse endured for the rest of the year, with both armies locked in a standoff on opposite sides of the river. By March of 1939, the 11th Army led by General Okamura Yasuji, part of the Central China Expeditionary Army of General Hata Shunroku comprised 3 divisions, the 6th, 101st and 106th, roughly 120,000 men supported by 130 tanks and tankettes, 200 pieces of artillery, 30 warships with 50 motor boats, a battalion of SNLF and several air squadrons.  On March 12,  the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army issued orders to its directly subordinate 116th Division. This division was commanded to dispatch two key detachments: the Ishihara Detachment and the Murai Detachment, the latter composed meticulously of five battalions drawn from the 119th Brigade. Their mission was to conduct a thorough search along the eastern shore of Poyang Lake, supported by naval vessels that patrolled the waters with menacing precision. The purpose was multifaceted: to safeguard the integrity of land and water transportation routes and to protect the left flank of the main Japanese force as it prepared for larger operations. By March 15, these detachments had advanced without encountering any resistance from the Chinese army, allowing them to conclude their search operation successfully. Following this, they deployed the necessary troops at key points along the route, establishing garrisons that would serve as footholds for future advances. This reconnaissance was no mere stroll; it was a calculated probe into enemy territory, drawing lessons from prior engagements like the grueling Battle of Xuzhou in 1938, where intelligence gathering had proven crucial to Japanese successes. The Japanese soldiers boots sank into the marshy banks of Poyang Lake, China's largest freshwater body, covering over 3,500 square kilometers and teeming with reeds that could hide ambushes. The lack of opposition allowed the Japanese to fortify their positions, setting the stage for the preemptive strikes that would follow. The tempo of battle quickened on March 17, 1939, as the Japanese army launched its preemptive attack, a move designed to seize the initiative and disrupt Chinese preparations. The very next day, on March 18, the Murai Detachment departed from Xingzi aboard warships, navigating the treacherous waters to land near Wucheng, approximately 30 kilometers northeast of Yongxiu. Their objective was to assault the Chinese defenders in this area, but they encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 32nd Army and other supporting units, turning the landing into a brutal contest of wills. Concurrently, the main forces of the Japanese 101st and 106th Divisions, bolstered by their artillery and tank units, advanced methodically toward the north bank of the Xiushui River. They occupied their respective attack starting points with precision, after which the artillery units began conducting test firings and further reconnaissance to gauge the strength of Chinese defenses. This phase echoed the Japanese tactics employed in the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, where combined arms operations had overwhelmed urban defenses. A Chinese defender's recollection "We watched the enemy approach like a dark cloud, our rifles ready, knowing that the river would soon run red with the blood of brothers." The climax of preparation erupted at exactly 16:30 on March 20, when the Japanese 11th Army issued orders to the commander of the 6th Artillery Brigade. This commander was directed to orchestrate all available artillery to bombard the positions held by the Chinese 49th and 79th Armies on the south bank of the Xiushui River. What ensued was a pre-general offensive artillery barrage that endured for more than three grueling hours, incorporating a large number of poison gas shells, a heinous weapon that flouted international conventions like the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Many defenders' positions were utterly destroyed in this onslaught, and several officers and soldiers, including the valiant Wang Lingyun, commander of the 76th Division, were poisoned by the toxic fumes, suffering agonizing effects that highlighted the barbarity of chemical warfare. At precisely 19:30 that evening, the 106th Division commenced its forced crossing of the Xiushui River at Qiujin. Later, on the night of the 20th, the 101st Division also initiated its crossing north of Tujiabu. The Xiushui River, measuring about 30 meters in width, had swollen by approximately 3 meters due to continual heavy rains, rendering the crossing exceedingly difficult for the Japanese troops who battled against the raging currents. Nevertheless, the flooding had an unintended benefit for the invaders: many defender positions were inundated, and most water obstacles were washed away by the deluge. Leveraging this, the two Japanese divisions broke through the defenders' front lines and executed continuous night attacks, establishing a beachhead that extended 2 kilometers deep by dawn on the 21st. This foothold provided essential cover for Japanese engineers to construct pontoon bridges amid the chaos. At around 8 a.m., the Japanese tank group crossed these pontoon bridges and launched an attack on the Dongshan garrison from the front of the 106th Division, then proceeded to circle around toward Nanchang along the west side of Nanxun Road. Historian Rana Mitter aptly describes such river crossings as "desperate gambles where nature itself became a combatant," underscoring how environmental factors often tipped the scales in Sino-Japanese confrontations.Chiang Kai-shek, monitoring these developments from his command center, would have felt the weight of impending crisis.   By 21:30 on March 22, the Japanese vanguard tank group had advanced to Fengxin and successfully occupied the Liaohe Bridge outside the South Gate. The sudden and ferocious tank attack caught the defending troops off guard, preventing them from withdrawing the 38 artillery pieces that had been deployed on the city's outskirts before they were forced into a hasty retreat. On March 23, the Japanese army fully occupied Fengxin. Simultaneously, a portion of the 101st Division launched a frontal assault along Nanxun Road. Under the protective cover of artillery, they crossed the Xiushui River and encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 32nd Army at Tujiabu, resulting in a prolonged stalemate where neither side could gain a decisive advantage. Following the Japanese launch of their general offensive, the Guilin Headquarters of the National Government Military Commission, under Director Bai Chongxi, urgently ordered all units of the Ninth War Zone to hold their positions firmly on March 21. On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Gu Zhutong, commander-in-chief of the Third War Zone, with specific instructions to immediately transfer the 102nd Division to Nanchang to reinforce the city's defenses, placing it under the command of Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group. He also ordered the 16th and 79th Divisions to proceed to Dongxiang and Jinxian, southeast of Nanchang, to guard the southern bank of Poyang Lake and provide support for operations in Nanchang. Simultaneously, he commanded the 19th Army Group to deploy approximately two divisions of its strongest forces to strike key enemy points in the rear, including Mahuiling, Ruichang, Jiujiang, and De'an, with the aim of sabotaging railways and highways, cutting off enemy rear-area transportation, and preventing reinforcements from reaching the front. However, due to poor communication, slow troop movements, and inadequate coordination among units, these ambitious plans were not implemented, and the battlefield situation had already undergone significant changes by the time adjustments could be made. On the 23rd, Chiang Kai-shek came to realize that the Japanese army was resolutely determined to capture Nanchang, and thus he conceived the strategic idea of inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy before potentially abandoning the city. He specifically telegraphed Xue Yue, commander-in-chief of the Ninth War Zone; Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group; and Xiong Shihui, chairman of Jiangxi Province, with the following directive: "The key to this battle is not the gain or loss of Nanchang, but inflicting the greatest blow on the enemy. Even if Nanchang falls, all our armies should disregard everything and advance toward the designated targets, and decide on future operational plans in accordance with this policy." This telegram, preserved in wartime archives, exemplifies Chiang's shift toward a war of attrition, a tactic that would define much of China's resistance. On March 25, Chiang Kai-shek again telegraphed Bai Chongxi, Xue Yue, Luo Zhuoying, and Gu Zhutong, providing detailed instructions: "1. The main force of Luo's group should maintain focus on the Hunan-Jiangxi Highway, attack the enemy's right flank, and press them toward the Gan River. It is crucial to avoid having the main force operate with its back to the Gan River. (That is, the main force of the 19th Army Group should be moved to a mobile position west of the Gan River to avoid being forced to the Gan River and facing a decisive battle in an unfavorable situation.) 2. A necessary portion should be used to defend the Nanchang front. If necessary, resistance can be carried out gradually between the Fu and Gan Rivers to cover southern Jiangxi." On the very same day, the Japanese army defeated the 102nd Division, which had been reinforced from the Third War Zone, in engagements west of Nanchang. By March 26, the Japanese army had advanced to the vicinity of Shengmi Street on the left bank of the Gan River. They crossed the river that day, executing a maneuver to outflank Nanchang from the south and simultaneously cut off the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway, a critical supply line. The main force of the 101st Division also advanced to Shengmi Street via Wanbu and Huangxi on March 26, crossed the Gan River that evening, and launched a direct attack on Nanchang. Its 101st Brigade, moving along the Nanchang-Xuncheng Railway via Lehua and Jiaoqiao, reached the north bank of the Gan River northwest of Nanchang on the 26th. Upon discovering these Japanese advances, the 19th Army urgently ordered the 32nd Army to withdraw from Tujiabu on the Nanchang-Xuncheng Railway back to Nanchang to join the 102nd Division in defending the city. However, before the 32nd Army had fully withdrawn, the Japanese tank group and the 101st Brigade had already advanced to the Gan River bridges to the west and north of Nanchang, respectively. Although the defending forces managed to destroy the bridges to halt their progress west and north of the Gan River, the Japanese 101st Division had already penetrated into Nanchang from the south. The defenders found themselves outnumbered and with weak firepower compared to the invaders. After engaging in intense street fighting, they suffered heavy casualties and were ultimately ordered to retreat to Jinxian. On March 27, the Japanese 101st Division occupied Nanchang, marking a significant, albeit temporary, victory in their campaign. Eyewitness account "The city fell amid the thunder of guns and the wails of the wounded, a testament to the fragility of urban defenses against mechanized onslaught." Following the capture, on March 28, the Japanese 11th Army was ordered to ensure that the main force of the 101st Division would return to Nanchang and that the 106th Division would retake Fengxin, all in preparation for subsequent operations in Gao'an or areas west of Fengxin. By April 2, the Japanese army had occupied Gao'an City, further consolidating their hold on the region. Meanwhile the fighting extended to Wuning. Wuning is located on the north bank of the Xiushui River, approximately 80 kilometers west of the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway. This position holds immense strategic importance, backed by the formidable Mufu Mountains, and serves as a key point on the left flank of the Ninth War Zone's defense line in northern Jiangxi. The forces deployed here included the 72nd and 78th Armies of the 30th Army Group, along with the 8th and 73rd Armies of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army, all positioned along both banks of the Xiushui River under the unified command of Wang Lingji, commander-in-chief of the 30th Army Group. To bolster the defense of Nanchang, the Nationalist Government's Military Commission devised a plan to send a powerful force eastward from Wuning toward Qiujin and De'an, with the intent of harassing the rear and flanks of the enemy advancing south along the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway and disrupting their transportation networks. After carefully assessing the Chinese deployments and strategic intentions, the Japanese 11th Army also regarded Wuning as a crucial flank in its overall Nanchang campaign. Consequently, they dispatched their 6th Division to Wuning to contain and block the Chinese army, thereby ensuring the safety of its main force's right flank and facilitating the capture of Nanchang. On March 20, while the Japanese army was heavily engaged on the Nanxun Railway front, its 6th Division launched an attack westward along the north bank of the Xiushui River from Ruoxi (situated between Qiujin and Wuning). However, they encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 73rd and 8th Armies, which resulted in slow and painstaking progress for the attackers. On the afternoon of the 21st, a portion of the 6th Division, under the protective cover of aircraft and artillery, crossed the Xiushui River east of Ruoxi, and the main force directed its assault toward Wuning, while its 36th Brigade targeted Yangzhou Street. The 30th Army Group, tasked with defending Wuning, mounted a tenacious resistance by leveraging the advantageous mountainous terrain, making the Japanese advance extremely difficult. After four days of fierce and unrelenting fighting, the Japanese were still unable to break through the defenders' positions. On the morning of March 23, under continued air and artillery cover, the Japanese army persisted in its fierce attack, repeatedly dropping incendiary and chemical bombs on Chinese positions. The defending forces suffered heavy losses as a result and were compelled to withdraw from Wucheng Town on the 24th, moving farther back to regroup. After occupying Wucheng, the Murai Detachment continued its operations to clear the Gan River and Xiushui River of obstacles and to remove mines that had been laid by the Chinese forces. By the 28th, they had advanced to the vicinity of Xinning Town, which is about 4 kilometers east of Wuning. Its 36th Brigade engaged in fierce fighting with the defending 19th Division at Yangzhou Street on the 24th and successfully captured Jing'an on the 27th; however, due to the conclusion of the Nanchang battle and the fact that its main force was blocked east of Wuning, it quickly returned and redirected its attack toward Wuning. Because the 73rd and 8th Armies had suffered heavy casualties from days of intense fighting, the 30th Army Group ordered the 72nd Army to assume the defense of northeast Wuning. The Japanese 6th Division concentrated its forces for a fierce and coordinated assault, and by the 29th, the defending forces had retreated to the south bank of the Xiushui River, allowing the Japanese army to occupy Wuning. After further intense fighting, by April 5, the Japanese 36th Brigade had advanced to the south bank of the Xiushui River.During this entire period, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly telegraphed Bai Chongxi and Xue Yue, issuing orders for the 30th Army Group in Wuning and the 31st Army Group in Chongyang and Tongshan (commanded by Tang Enbo) to launch a counteroffensive regardless of the evolving situation in Nanchang. The objective was to flank and attack the enemy's rear, advancing toward Mahuiling, De'an, Yongxiu, and Ruichang on the Nanchang-Xunyi road, to cut off enemy transportation lines and block reinforcements. However, this plan was not implemented due to various logistical and coordination challenges.   After the Japanese army captured Nanchang, it maintained a tense standoff with the Third and Ninth War Zones of China along the southeast bank of Poyang Lake to the east, Xiangtang to the south, and Gao'an, Fengxin, and Wuning to the west. The Military Commission of the National Government made a calculated judgment that although the Japanese had occupied Nanchang, they had suffered heavy losses and had not yet had the opportunity to replenish their forces. The defending forces within the city were deemed insufficient, prompting the Commission to decide on launching a counteroffensive while the Japanese army was still in the process of consolidating its position. At the same time, it ordered each war zone to initiate the "April Offensive" (also known as the "Spring Offensive") with the goals of harassing and containing the Japanese army and preventing it from continuing to advance westward toward Changsha. The Military Commission specifically ordered the Ninth War Zone and the Third War Zone to plan and execute a counteroffensive against Nanchang. The forces designated for this operation were planned to include the 1st, 19th, and 30th Army Groups of the Ninth War Zone and the 32nd Army Group of the Third War Zone, totaling about 10 divisions, all under the unified command of Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group. On April 17, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed his detailed "Plan to Conquer Nanchang" to Bai Chongxi, the director of the Guilin Headquarters, and sought his opinion on the matter. The operational strategy outlined was: "First, use the main force to attack the enemy along the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway, effectively cutting off enemy communications, and then use a portion of the force to directly capture Nanchang. The attack is scheduled to begin on April 24th." The main content of its troop deployment was as follows: The 1st Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Gao Yin-huai), the 19th Army Group, and the 74th Army (Commander Yu Ji-shi) were ordered to advance through Fengxin and Dacheng toward the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway between Xiushui and Nanchang, thoroughly disrupting transportation, cutting off enemy reinforcements, and cooperating in the capture of Nanchang; the 49th Army of the 19th Army Group (Commander Liu Duo-quan) was ordered to advance gradually as the general reserve; the 32nd Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Shangguan Yun-xiang) was ordered to attack Nanchang from the east of the Gan River with three divisions, and to organize a regiment to seize Nanchang by surprise; the 30th Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Wang Ling-ji) was ordered to attack Wuning. On April 18, Bai Chongxi replied to Chiang Kai-shek, offering his own suggestions on troop deployment with slight modifications. He emphasized the critical need for a surprise attack and for disrupting and harassing the enemy's transportation and rear areas, as well as cutting off the enemy's communication lines. He also believed that the attack should be brought forward and carried out as soon as possible, at the latest around the 22nd. On April 21, the forces of the Ninth War Zone began their operations in earnest. The 1st Army Group, comprising the 184th Division of the 60th Army and the New 10th Division of the 58th Army, attacked Fengxin, while the New 11th Division of the 58th Army monitored the Japanese forces in Jing'an; the main force of the 74th Army attacked Gao'an, and parts of the 74th Army and the 49th Army crossed the Jinjiang River to the north, attacking Dacheng and Shengmijie. Fierce fighting continued until the 26th, when the Japanese retreated to the areas of Fengxin, Qiuling, and Wanshougong. The 19th Army Group captured strongholds such as Dacheng, Gao'an, and Shengmijie. However, progress thereafter became difficult, and the offensive stalled. Neither army group was able to advance to the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway as originally planned. On April 23, the 32nd Army Group of the Third War Zone, consisting of the 16th and 79th Divisions of the 29th Army, the 5th Reserve Division, and part of the 10th Reserve Division, crossed the Fu River and launched an attack on Nanchang. Fierce fighting persisted until the 26th, when they captured Shichajie (south of Nanchang) and advanced toward the city. On the 27th, the Japanese concentrated the main force of the 101st Division to launch a counterattack. Supported by heavy artillery and air power, they engaged in fierce fighting with the Chinese army in the southeastern and southern areas, repeatedly contesting villages and strongholds. Due to the heavy casualties sustained, Duan Langru, commander of the 79th Division, changed the offensive deployment on the night of April 28 and reported this alteration to the army and army group commanders. The commander-in-chief of the 32nd Army Group, citing unauthorized changes to the plan, reported to the Third War Zone for approval and requested the dismissal of Duan Langru. Eager to capture Nanchang and driven by strategic impatience, Chiang Kai-shek, upon hearing the report, issued a stern order on May 1: Duan Langru was to be executed in front of the army for delaying military operations, He Ping, commander of the 16th Division, was ordered to atone for his crimes by achieving success in battle, and Shangguan Yunxiang was sent to the front to supervise the battle personally, with a strict deadline of May 5 for capturing Nanchang. On May 2, the 102nd Division recaptured Xiangtang and then Shichajie. The 16th Division once captured Shatanbu, but it was subsequently taken back by Japanese reinforcements. Shangguan Yunxiang then committed the 26th Division into the battle. On May 4, they launched another concerted attack. By dusk on the 5th, the 5th Reserve Division had reached the outer perimeter of the city and destroyed the barbed wire defenses, but Japanese firepower was intensely concentrated, causing the division to suffer heavy casualties and rendering it unable to continue the assault. The 152nd Regiment of the 26th Division broke into Xinlong Airport at dawn on the 5th and destroyed three Japanese aircraft. The 155th Regiment broke into the railway station at 9:00 a.m. on the 5th, but was blocked by fierce Japanese firepower and a determined counterattack. On May 5, after Chiang Kai-shek had issued the order to capture Nanchang by May 5, Xue Yue, acting commander of the Ninth War Zone, held the belief that with troops not having been replenished after the defense of Nanchang and with weaponry far inferior to that of the enemy, it was impossible to capture Nanchang within the subjective timeframe set. However, he did not directly dissent to Chiang Kai-shek, and on May 3, he telegraphed Chen Cheng to express his views in detail. He wrote: "Attacks on Nanchang and Fengxin have continued for 11 days since April 23. Because our army's equipment cannot keep pace with the enemy's, and the enemy's heavy weapons, mechanized units, and aircraft can support their ground forces everywhere, it is quite difficult to destroy the enemy's strong positions. Now I have received the Chairman's telegram: our army's operational strategy is to wear down the enemy without being worn down by the enemy, to avoid the enemy's strength and attack their weaknesses, and to achieve a protracted war of resistance. Therefore, this attack on Nanchang is aimed at wearing down the enemy. Under the principle of avoiding the enemy's strength and attacking their weakness, we should lie in ambush in advance and launch a surprise attack from all sides, hoping to recapture Nanchang with the fastest and most agile means. However, the battle has already dragged on; a direct assault is impossible, and striking their weakness is also unattainable. Although the enemy's strength is waning, it is practically impossible to capture Nanchang before May 5. Besides strictly ordering all units to overcome all difficulties and continue the fierce attack at all costs, I intend to politely explain the above situation to Chiang Kai-shek during a telephone conversation." Chen Cheng forwarded Xue Yue's telegram in full to Chiang Kai-shek on May 5. At the time, Bai Chongxi, director of the Guilin Headquarters, also considered the order to capture Nanchang within a limited time to be unrealistic, and on May 5 he telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin, subtly offering a different suggestion. He stated, "Our army's attack on the enemy must be unexpected to be effective. Now, the enemy in Nanchang is prepared, and our army has launched a ten-day attack and has exerted all its efforts. To consider morale and our highest strategic principles, it is proposed that one-third of our forces continue the siege of Nanchang, while the other two-thirds are reorganized. Outside, we should continue to publicize our aggressive strategy…" The aim of both telegrams was to "turn the enemy's own spear against his shield," hoping Chiang Kai-shek would alter his order to capture Nanchang within a specified time, citing the operational guidance as inconsistent with the broader strategic policy. Upon receiving the telegrams, Chiang Kai-shek also learned of the sacrifice of Commander Chen Anbao and the heavy casualties among the attacking troops. On May 6, the main force of the Japanese 106th Division, supported by aircraft and tanks, launched a pincer attack on the 29th Army in the suburbs of Nanchang and Liantang. By 5 PM, the 29th Army was encircled. Liu Yuqing, commander of the 26th Division, was wounded in the fighting, and army commander Chen Anbao and Xie Beiting, commander of the 156th Regiment, were killed in action. Based on the actual battlefield situation, Xu Zhixun, chief of staff of the 29th Army, and Liu Yuqing, realizing that capturing Nanchang was impossible, decided to break out toward Zhongzhouwei and Shichajie to avoid total annihilation and potential execution by Chiang Kai-shek for failure. A regiment of the 5th Reserve Division, disguised as civilians, had infiltrated the city but was forced to withdraw due to the lack of follow-up support. Finally, on May 9, Chiang Kai-shek issued an order to halt the attack on Nanchang. The Japanese army, having suffered heavy losses themselves, was also unable to mount an effective counterattack, and thus the Battle of Nanchang came to an end, leaving behind a legacy of valor and tragedy. In the Battle of Nanchang, China suffered more than 52,000 casualties, including over 43,000 deaths, while Japan sustained more than 24,000 casualties and over 2,200 deaths. Although the National Army eventually lost Nanchang, the engagement thwarted Japan's plan to crush the main Chinese force. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.   The Nanchang battle was a decisive Japanese victory, yet the Chinese did manage to halt the Japanese western advance and showcased their perseverance amid a growing strategic stalemate. Supplies were still leaking into Nationalist China, the Japanese would have to continuously find and plug them. The war for China was nowhere near over.

In this episode, we tell the story of the Rani of the Jhansi Regiment, the first all-female combat unit in modern Indian history, formed in Singapore during World War II and led by Dr Lakshmi Sahgal, known as Captain Lakshmi.Most of its members were teenage Tamil girls from plantation communities in Malaya and Burma, many with little formal education, who left estate life to train as soldiers in the Indian National Army. We trace how they were recruited, trained, deployed to the Burma front, and forced into retreat as the war turned against Japan and the INA.Although the regiment never fought a major battle, its legacy reshaped ideas about women's roles in anti-colonial struggle and military service. Drawing on historical research and oral histories, this episode explores how nationalism, class, gender, and war collided in Southeast Asia, and how ordinary young women briefly became part of a global conflict and a revolutionary movement.Hosted by Agas Ramirez.Full script and bonus episodes available on Patreon.All links available here.Audio ClipsWildFilmsIndia - Laxmi Sehgal of the INA on The Forgotten Army ExpeditionDoordarshan National - Speech of Netaji Subhas Chandra BoseInterkast - शुभ सुख चैन की/Subh Sukh Chain Ki - With Auspicious Happiness | Anthem of Free IndiaYouTube Free Audio ClipsTheme Music - Goddess of War - Unicorn HeadsJourney Home - Chris Haugen

   This episode features SFC Jacob Allen, an elite medic from the 75th Ranger Regiment currently transitioning into the Inter-service Physician Assistant Program (IPAP). With a background that includes six combat deployments, Allen offers a rare firsthand account of what it means to deliver medical care at the "tip of the spear." He describes the unique pressures of being the primary medical provider for a platoon of Rangers, where the responsibility is immense, and the environment is often austere. A major theme of the conversation is the 75th Ranger Regiment's culture of excellence, built on mastering basic medical skills and a relentless commitment to training both medics and non-medical infantrymen.    SFC Allen shares his expert insights on the evolution of military medical training and strongly advocates for realistic simulation. He explains why human roleplayers and "the feel of skin" are irreplaceable when preparing for high-stakes procedures like cricothyrotomies. Beyond the clinical technicalities, Allen delves into the leadership challenges he faced while managing medical readiness for multiple companies, emphasizing that the most difficult part of the job is often managing personalities and expectations. His transition from a senior non-commissioned officer to an officer candidate in IPAP is fueled by a lifelong passion for medicine and a desire to build longitudinal relationships with patients, a hallmark of the Battalion PA role.      The episode also serves as a practical guide for enlisted service members interested in IPAP. Allen breaks down the application process, from prerequisites and SAT scores to the importance of strong letters of recommendation. He concludes with profound leadership advice for junior officers, urging them to humble themselves and lean on the vast experience of their senior NCOs. SFC Jacob Allen's story is a testament to the "for the boys" philosophy—a commitment to putting the welfare and development of soldiers above all else. This conversation is essential listening for anyone interested in special operations, advanced medical education, or the intersection of clinical excellence and military leadership. Chapters (00:00-01:28) Introduction to SFC Jacob Allen (01:28-09:16) Life as a Medic in the 75th Ranger Regiment (09:16-17:15) Realistic Training and Medical Simulation (17:15-26:47) Leadership Challenges and the Move to IPAP (26:47-38:45) Navigating the IPAP Application and Curriculum (38:45-51:00) Future Aspirations and Advice for Leaders Chapter Summaries (00:00-01:28) Introduction to SFC Jacob Allen: Dr. Soderdahl introduces SFC Jacob Allen, a student in the Inter-service Physician Assistant Program with an extensive background in the 75th Ranger Regiment. SFC Allen shares his unique path of enlisting with a college degree and his motivation to join the "family business" of military service. (01:28-09:16) Life as a Medic in the 75th Ranger Regiment: SFC Allen describes the immense responsibility of being a SOF medic, where one often operates on a "medical island" as the primary provider for a platoon. He emphasizes the Regiment's culture of training non-medics to high standards and notes that the unit's core is the professional development of young soldiers. (09:16-17:15) Realistic Training and Medical Simulation: This section explores SFC Allen's philosophy on medical training, which prioritizes extreme realism and the use of human role-players over high-tech mannequins. He discusses innovative "cheats" for simulation, such as using earbuds to communicate with role-players to better simulate patient feedback and clinical symptoms. (17:15-26:47) Leadership Challenges and the Move to IPAP: SFC Allen reflects on the difficulties of managing personalities across multiple companies and the realization that senior NCO roles eventually move away from direct clinical care. He explains his decision to join IPAP to stay close to medicine and his desire to emulate the influential Battalion PAs he served under. (26:47-38:45) Navigating the IPAP Application and Curriculum: SFC Allen provides a detailed breakdown of the IPAP selection process, including academic prerequisites, the PA-CAT, and the weight of NCOERs in the holistic review. He also describes the transition from the program's intensive didactic phase to his current emergency department clinical rotations. (38:45-51:00) Future Aspirations and Advice for Leaders: In the final chapter, SFC Allen discusses the expectation for PAs to return to conventional units before reassessing for SOF roles to learn the administrative side of the job. He offers final words of wisdom for junior officers, encouraging them to prioritize their troops' welfare and to value the mentorship of senior NCOs. Take Home Messages Master the Fundamentals First: Excellence in high-stakes environments is built upon the mastery of basic medical tasks and trauma care. Training should never "out-kick its coverage," as the ability to perform the basics perfectly under pressure is what saves lives on the battlefield. Prioritize Realistic Simulation: There is no substitute for human roleplayers and the tactile feedback of real skin and anatomy when training for medical procedures. Effective training should be as close to reality as possible, including the emotional intensity and physical complications of treating a real person. Leadership is About Managing People: Whether in a clinical setting or a combat unit, the greatest challenge of leadership is managing diverse personalities and expectations. Success requires a leader to adapt their communication style to the individual needs of their subordinates and commanders. NCO Experience is Invaluable to Officers: Junior officers must recognize that senior NCOs possess a level of operational experience that cannot be replicated in a classroom. Developing a humble, learner's mindset and leaning on NCO mentorship is essential for any officer to lead an effective medical team. Put the Soldiers First: True leadership is defined by the philosophy of being "for the boys," meaning the mission and the welfare of the troops always take priority over personal career advancement. A leader's legacy is found in the professional development and care they provide to the young soldiers under their charge.   Episode Keywords military medicine podcast, 75th Ranger Regiment, Army medic, combat medic, special operations medicine, SOCM, physician assistant, Army IPAP, military leadership, Ranger medic training, healthcare careers, military education, veteran stories, battlefield medicine, emergency medicine, military officer, enlisted to officer, 68W, medic training, Army Ranger stories, pre-hospital care, trauma medicine, medical simulation, IPAP application, Ranger Regiment medicine, medical student, clinical rotations Hashtags #rangers, #militarymedicine, #medic, #specialoperations, #physicianassistant, #veteran, #SOF, #leadership   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission is to honor the legacy, preserve the oral history, and showcase career opportunities, unique expeditionary experiences, and achievements of Military Medicine. We foster patriotism and pride in Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoD, and Our Nation.   Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm   WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield,demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast      

WASHINGTON'S NAVY AND THE LIFEGUARD Colleague Patrick O'Donnell. Upon arriving in Cambridge in July 1775, George Washington formed a close bond with the Marblehead Regiment, relying on them for security and expertise. Facing a desperate shortage of gunpowder, Washington utilized the Marbleheaders to create an impromptu navy; Captain John Manley successfully captured a British ordinance ship, delivering vital supplies. Washington also established the "Lifeguard" (Commander-in-Chief's Guard) to protect himself and his papers, appointing Marbleheader Caleb Gibbs as commander. The segment describes Beverly as a crucial, difficult-to-navigate port that protected these new cruisers from the Royal Navy. NUMBER 41870

Let us know what you think! Text us!What happens when a warrior's greatest battle begins after the war ends?In Episode 396 of the Security Halt! Podcast, Host Deny Caballero sits down with Seth Ryan, a former U.S. Army Ranger and veteran advocate, for a powerful and unfiltered conversation on faith, trauma, and transformation.Seth shares the raw truth of what it means to wear the uniform, lose yourself in the chaos of war, and rebuild life through faith and purpose. This is not just a story about combat—it's about the fight to heal, to forgive, and to find meaning when everything else fades.Together, Deny and Seth dive deep into the reality of invisible wounds, the cost of service, and the strength it takes to rediscover who you are beyond the battlefield.

Gespräche in Washington über US-Annexion von Grönland, Regime im Iran geht weiter mit aller Härte gegen Massenproteste vor, USA setzt Visa-Verfahren von 75 Ländern aus, Rechtsextreme Gesten und sexualisierte Gewalt: Verteidigungsausschuss tagt zu Vorwürfen gegen Fallschirmjäger-Regiment, Justizministerin Hubig will besseren Schutz vor KI-generierten sexualisierte Bilder, Warnstreiks im Öffentlichen Dienst der Länder, Viele Tote und Verletzte nach Zugunglück in Thailand, Klimakrise spitzt sich zu - laut EU-Klimadienst Copernicus ist 2025 drittwärmstes Jahr seit Aufzeichnungsbeginn, Das Wetter

Gespräche in Washington über US-Annexion von Grönland, Regime im Iran geht weiter mit aller Härte gegen Massenproteste vor, USA setzt Visa-Verfahren von 75 Ländern aus, Rechtsextreme Gesten und sexualisierte Gewalt: Verteidigungsausschuss tagt zu Vorwürfen gegen Fallschirmjäger-Regiment, Justizministerin Hubig will besseren Schutz vor KI-generierten sexualisierte Bilder, Warnstreiks im Öffentlichen Dienst der Länder, Viele Tote und Verletzte nach Zugunglück in Thailand, Klimakrise spitzt sich zu - laut EU-Klimadienst Copernicus ist 2025 drittwärmstes Jahr seit Aufzeichnungsbeginn, Das Wetter

The Calendar is circled presented by Fabulous Flooring a Division of Discount Flooring Centre Quick Question (presented by Waterworks Pools & Spas) was part 2 from Andrew14 on Twitter - Wildcats related acquisition do you feel stands out the most, en route to a potential repeat?? News & Notes from around the League (Presented by Speedy Auto Service Moncton) - Coaching Change, Potential Expansion & the QMJHL Team of the Week & Boucher's Team of the Week. Weekly Rewind (presented by Alphas Appliance Solutions) The Wildcats go 2-0 on the week and both games were dominating wins, 1st Q shutout for Weiner in a 7-0 win over Gat and then they rose above the dirty Regiment beating them 9-2. Eric Murray Reality Stick Tap of the Week Rosemary Lynns Massage & Spa Wildcast Wildcat of the Week ENJOY!! Follow Wildcast Podcast across all social media platforms: Facebook: / wildcastpodcast Instagram: / wildcastpodcast Twitter/X: / monctonwildcast TikTok: / wildcastpodcast Our Podcast is brought to you by our wonderful sponsors: Discount Flooring Services: www.discountflooringcentre.ca Waterworks Pools & Spas: www.waterworkspools.com Alpha's Appliance Solutions: www.appliancesolutions.ca Eric Murray - Greater Moncton Realtor Facebook : www.facebook.com/ericmurrayrealtor Rosemary Lynn's Massage & Spa Facebook Page: / www.facebook.com/RLmassage1/ Speedy Auto Service Moncton: www.speedy.com/en-ca/shop/moncton/ 

Let us know what you think! Text us! SPONSORED BY: PURE LIBERTY LABS, PRECISION WELLNESS GROUP, and THE SPECIAL FORCES FOUNDATIONWhat happens when a Green Beret's toughest battle begins after war? In Episode 395 of the Security Halt! Podcast, Host Deny Caballero sits down with Matthew Butler — former Green Beret, author, and advocate — to discuss how psychedelic medicine and self-awareness helped him face PTSD, addiction, and trauma that nearly took his life.This episode explores the hidden wounds of war, the growing science behind plant medicine for mental health, and the courage it takes to truly heal. 

On this week's podcast, I speak with former Australian Special Forces Special Air Services Regiment Commanding Officer Colonel ret Paul Burns DSC & Bar. Paul served as both a soldier and an officer in the Australian Defence Force for 25 years, with operational tours to Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq. During his service, he commanded 1 SAS Squadron in the Western Desert during the invasion of Iraq and was tasked with a mission of vital strategic importance, for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) and Australia's first Unit Citation for Gallantry. From 2009, he commanded the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), Australia's most elite Special Forces unit, tasked with solving the Australian government's most urgent, politically sensitive and dangerous situations within Australia and overseas. In 2010, he commanded all of Australia's Special Forces in Afghanistan and executed an operational plan that resulted in the liberation of over 30,000 Afghan civilians from Taliban control, and the removal of numerous very senior Taliban leaders, for which he received a Bar to the DSC. His rotation was awarded a Battle Honour for the Shah Wali Kot Offensive, the first and only since the Vietnam War. Paul is an honour graduate of the United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) and holds two Master's degrees. In 2012, Paul discharged from the Army after 25 years of service. Paul is currently the owner of several companies that provide immersive live fire shooting capabilities, immersive training solutions and strategic security services for Australian and international customers. He is also the founder of Heroes and Horses Australia, a 41-day program for combat veterans that "un-programs the programmed" post military service. Paul is married with two adult children. Presenter: Adam Blum Guest :Paul Burns DSC & Bar Editor: Kyle Watkins

Guest: Ronald White. Chamberlain's early war experience included the massacre at Fredericksburg and a smallpox outbreak that sidelined his regiment. Under the tutelage of the disciplinarian Adelbert Ames, Chamberlain learned command strategies. The narrative culminates at the Battle of Gettysburg, where the 20th Maine was ordered to hold the extreme left flank at Little Round Top "at all cost." Facing overwhelming Confederate forces and running out of ammunition, Chamberlain ordered a desperate, unconventional bayonet charge to sweep down the hill. In the chaos, he saved his own life by physically disarming a Confederate officer pointing a pistol at his head.1863 GETTYSBURG

This week, we continue our comprehensive coverage of the Frost and Fire V Festival in Ventura, California in October 2025. We resume the narrative on Day 2 with a trio of bands: Intranced, Blind Illusion and Early Moods. For each act, you will hear snippets of their studio output, live audio from the festival, and the impressions and reactions of the Night Demon guys. Listen in to hear about all the highs, the lows, the euphoria, and the snafus.LINKSIntranced "Switchblade" - SwitchbladeBlind Illusion "Straight as the Crowbar Flies" -Blind Illusion - Straight as the Crowbar Flies - Official Video 2021Early Moods -  Music | Early Moods Listen at nightdemon.net/podcast or anywhere you listen to podcasts! Follow us on Instagram Like us on Facebook

Last time we spoke about the second Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights. Night operations opened the action: scouts moved in darkness, wires were cut, and Hill 52 fell before dawn, followed by Shachaofeng as dawn pressed the front. The Russians responded with a heavy counterattack, tanks, aircraft, and sustained artillery, yet the Japanese adapted quickly, shifting guns and reinforcing sectors to hold the crest. By 3–5 August, Japanese and Soviet forces fought in a fragmented front across multiple sectors: Hill 52, Changkufeng, Shachaofeng, the lake. Japanese commanders coordinated between infantry, engineers, and mountain artillery, while seeking long-range support from Kwantung Army. Soviet artillery sought to disrupt lines of communication and press from the Crestline with massed tanks and air strikes. Despite intense bombardments and repeated tank assaults, Japanese regimental guns, antitank teams, and close-quarters defense bore the brunt of the defense, inflicting heavy Soviet losses. Yet in the end the Japanese had yet again repelled the enemy from the heights.   #183 The end was near for Changkufeng Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. While the front-line fighting raged on 6 August, Tokyo moved to supply the 19th Division with the coveted long-range artillery and antiaircraft support. In the evening, the Korea Army officially learned from the AGS that, by Imperial order, the Kwantung Army would add the strength already informally approved: four 7.5-centimeter field guns, two 15-centimeter cannons, two 10-centimeter railway guns, and two 7.5-centimeter antiaircraft guns. The North China Area Army would also provide mobile antiaircraft units. The Korea Army estimated that the field and heavy artillery reinforcements would reach the town of Tumen on 7–8 August. The new guns were expected to ease the division's pressure in due course. The fighting continued on the 7th. The 75th Infantry observed that, despite the Russians' vigorous attacks aimed at capturing Hill 52 and Changkufeng on 6 August, they failed at both objectives and were repelled with heavy losses. Because of the Soviets' ignominious defeat at Changkufeng, they seemed determined to seize Hill 52 on 7 August. Most of the shallow and isolated Japanese positions at Hill 52 had been shattered by bombardments. Some men retrieved Japanese corpses still piled atop one another; the wounded were to proceed to the rear by themselves. Many had not eaten since the morning of 6 August, yet morale remained high. It was decided to knock out the Soviets' advancing tanks under the cover of darkness, employing infantry and engineers. At 03:00, these elements moved against the armor 150 meters behind the Russian wire, killed some advancing infantry, and destroyed two tanks. The infantry platoon leader, Warrant Officer Kanaoka, jumped aboard a tank, pried open the turret, and fought with his blade as blood dripped from the blade. The eastern sky brightened as he stood there smiling and holding his bloodied sword; at that moment, Private First Class Kimura exploded a grenade inside the tank, which promptly blew up. The assault force returned safely at dawn. At dawn, from heavy-weapon positions 200–300 meters in front, the Soviets opened fire, exploiting gaps between the smashed armor. Since 04:00, sixty Russian tanks had been moving south on the far side of Khasan. By daybreak, more than ten machines could be seen in the dip northeast of Hill 52, with several dozen other tanks newly active along Hill 29 Crestline as infantry deployed in gullies. At 05:30, Russian artillery began firing from all directions. In addition to shelling from Gaho, Hill 29, and Maanshan, the Soviets directed flank fire against Hill 52, using two rapid-fire guns 700 meters northeast and three mountain guns on the slope of Changkufeng. As the works at Hill 52 were progressively pulverized, K. Sato dispatched reinforcements from the 76th Regiment there. Near 11:00, the Russian barrage intensified and became more accurate; positions were destroyed one by one, and casualties rose. A new apex of fury occurred between 13:30 and 14:30, when a pall of smoke blanketed the region, producing a ghastly impression. Russian planes bombed and strafed Hill 52 from 11:00; a raid by twelve bombers against the western slope at 13:30 was particularly fierce, though many bombs fell harmlessly into the Tumen. The Russian lines were built up gradually, and all types of Soviet weapons were employed. From 14:30, about 100 Russians approached, led by four tanks, and penetrated the defense positions. Close-quarter counterattacks were launched by elements of three Japanese infantry companies, a machine-gun platoon, and an engineer platoon. One officer recalled "It was tough and costly fighting. Men were overrun by tanks, some losing limbs." Nine engineers linked up with the infantry, placing explosives under tank turrets and blowing up two machines. During the crisis, with tanks and infantry overrunning his lines. From the right wing, in the Eleventh Company sector, the Japanese fought fiercely against Soviet heavy weapons and infantry who had advanced to point-blank range. Master Sergeant Suzuki, acting company commander, on his own initiative ordered the main force to counterattack. Through coordinated action, the Japanese knocked out four tanks that had penetrated their positions. Two enemy battalions that had "come close bravely" were nearly wiped out. Total Soviet strength committed in this sector amounted to three battalions and forty tanks. Japanese losses on the Hill 52 front were heavy indeed: seventy-four had been killed and eighty-five wounded, one hundred fifty-nine out of three hundred twenty-eight men in action. The remnants of one infantry company were commanded by a superior private; sergeants led two other infantry and two machine-gun companies. Seven of thirteen heavy weapons were inoperable.  Meanwhile 9th Company elements defended Noguchi Hill, 800 meters southeast of Changkufeng. By 05:00 on 7 August, Soviet troops facing the hill numbered 200 infantry, five tanks, and two rapid-fire guns. From positions set up the previous night along the lake, the Russians opened fire at dawn while 50 soldiers moved to attack with the tanks in support. Captain Noguchi's men poured fire on the enemy and inflicted heavy losses. But the Russians, who possessed superior supporting fire, fought their way forward until, after 40 minutes, they got within 70 meters. The Soviet tanks disappeared into a dead angle near the lakeshore. When the fog lifted at 06:00, the Russians on the southeast slope of Changkufeng fired down at Noguchi Hill with four heavy machine guns. Seven tanks, advancing anew from the gully northeast of Hill 52, came as close as 80 to 200 meters, deployed to encircle, and opened fire. By now, eight Japanese had been killed and five wounded; most of the light machine guns and grenade dischargers had been crippled and all three heavy weapons were out of action. The Russians attacked again at 08:00, hurling grenades and shouting. A dozen tanks operated in support of two infantry companies. The Japanese responded with grenades; yellow and black smoke masked the heights, and the scene was extremely impressive. Desperate hand-to-hand combat raged along the sector for a half-hour until the Soviets fell back after suffering enormous losses.  At 10:40, the Russians assaulted with infantry from the southeast front and from the Changkufeng direction, aided by tanks from the zone between. Captain Noguchi sortied with his remnant, charged the Russians, and drove them off. In this fighting, however, he was shot in the chest and most of his subordinates were killed or wounded. Somehow the captain stayed on his feet. He and six survivors threw grenades at the Russians, who were now behind the Japanese, and then he led a last charge back to the highest positions. Once the enemy had been evicted, Captain Noguchi collapsed. Only three or four soldiers were in fighting condition. The captain begged them to report to Sato, but, refusing to abandon him, the men managed to help him down to the rear. It was 11:30. Captain Noguchi's unit, which had fought bravely since the first combat on 6 August, had been destroyed. Of 78 officers and men, 40 lay killed and another 31 wounded. The hill had been lost. Meanwhile, Soviet bombardment of the Hill 52 district had been heavy, and phone contact with the regiment was severed. Suddenly, the indomitable Captain Noguchi appeared at headquarters, and the regiment finally learned that the foe had penetrated the defenses. The bleeding captain pleaded for a counterattack and kept trying to return to the fight; K. Sato had to restrain him by ordering him to leave for the rear. It was true that the position Captain Noguchi had occupied was the key point connecting Hill 52 and Changkufeng. But Sato reasoned that if they held solidly to the latter hills, their defenses would never be in danger, and it would be easy to retake Noguchi Hill at any time by concentrating fire from all the high ground and by employing artillery, once strength could be spared. Around sunset, however, Sato received an order from the brigade, and a report came from Changkufeng that "our troops' brave fighting has tied us over the crisis." Reassured, Sato proceeded to Hill 52, cheered on Kojima and the soldiers, and examined the condition of the wounded and the heaped-up corpses.  The 75th Infantry estimated that there had been 900 Russian casualties in the right sector and that more than ten tanks and three heavy machine guns had been put out of action. The regiment itself had lost four officers killed and had four wounded. In the entire right sector which included 1,332 men in action, 140 had been killed and 180 wounded. Seven soldiers of the 75th Infantry were also listed as missing in action but presumed dead. Total casualties including the missing, as a percentage of those listed as engaged, amounted to 25 percent for the right sector unit. On the 7th, the unit had lost 19 machine guns and 11 grenade dischargers. As of 18:00 on 7 August, Japanese intelligence estimated that the Russians had committed a grand total of 25 infantry battalions, up six from 6 August, 80 artillery pieces, up 10, and 200 tanks . Situation maps showed one Soviet infantry battalion east of Changkufeng, another north of Hill 52, armor and infantry in unknown strength east of that hill, and artillery positions from northeast to southeast of Khasan. On the 7th, spotters also observed seven large steamers entering Posyet and Khansi, as well as one 10,000-ton vessel at Yangomudy. At least 200 or 300 enemy soldiers in the Karanchin sector were working to strengthen positions. Units moving south from Novokievsk included 350 trucks, 60 tanks, and 400 troops. Heading north from the region of the battlefield were 100 trucks and 150 horsemen. Meanwhile, on the front in eastern Manchuria, elements of the Kwantung Army's 8th Division had forcibly ousted a small party of Soviet border trespassers. The "punch" had gone out of the Russians in the Hill 52 sector after their thorough defeat on 6 and 7 August, but they continued to build up firepower, deploying heavy weapons and artillery observation posts. The bombardments grew more accurate; even regiment and brigade headquarters lost their last dead angles. By daylight on the 8th, two Soviet infantry battalions plus tanks were deployed on the Hill 52 front. Their main forces were distributed along a line 800 meters from the Japanese, and snipers and machine gunners held positions 200 to 300 meters away. "Each time they detected movement, they sniped at us and interfered with our observation." From 09:00, the Japanese sustained scattered artillery fire. At 13:30 there was a bombing raid by 15 planes, but no casualties were incurred. Soviet guns pounded Hill 52 around 18:30, and the Japanese suffered four or five casualties, but morale was generally high, and they sought to strengthen and repair their positions throughout the night. On the Changkufeng front, which had drawn rather serious attention, Russian heavy guns opened slow fire after 05:00 from east of Khasan and from Maanshan. Through the night of 7–8 August, Soviet infantry had assembled near the lake crossing. Russian troop strength increased beyond one-and-a-half battalions. The defenders ran out of grenades and had to resort to rocks, but by 10:00 the Soviet assault waves began to weaken after five hours of fierce resistance. Supporting the Japanese lines had been barrages by grenade launchers, flank fire by a heavy-machine-gun platoon at Chiangchunfeng, and supported by the mountain artillery. Around 10:30, the attackers fled to Khasan. The battlefield quieted, but enemy snipers dug foxholes 300 meters away and kept up persistent fire, and infantry mounted repeated attacks in varying strength.    Since morning, the mountain gun and the two battalion guns at Fangchuanting had engaged infantry and machine guns that appeared on the middle of the Changkufeng crest as well as in the Hill 52 area. The timely fire from these guns caused severe losses, especially to Russian observation posts. But Lieutenant Maeoka, who commanded the mountain platoon from Changkufeng, was wounded badly at 10:30. The mountain battalion also fired at targets in the Changkufeng sector from the Korean side of the Tumen. At 13:20, the Russians pressed new attacks against Changkufeng from three sides, using a total of two companies and three tanks. Although they got close and attacked persistently, they were driven off each time; these afternoon efforts were not very vigorous. Fighters strafed at low altitude and more than ten bombers attacked near 15:00, igniting fires in the village of Fangchuanting. The raids by planes and guns caused frequent cuts in signal lines again. At 06:50 on the 8th, Soviet forces in the left sector resumed their efforts until they were pinned down at 100 meters and had to dig in. Excepting spotter posts, everyone must enter shelters from warning till all-clear. Meanwhile, T. Sato estimated that although enemy attacks were aimed mainly against Changkufeng, there existed some danger that hostile forces would cross the Tumen near Yangkuanping and launch a sudden attack against our left rear, as actions in that area had become pronounced. He accordingly issued an order at 17:00: all of us, superiors as well as subordinates, must overcome exhaustion, make nighttime guardings rigorous, and leave the foe not the slightest opening between friendly battalions or from the shores of the Tumen River.  Suetaka estimated in the morning of the 8th that the Russians were trying to generate propaganda advantageous to them at home and abroad by staking their honor and seizing Changkufeng quickly. From the standpoint of overall political tactics, it was imperative to thwart their intentions. The enemy relied consistently on elements that remained on the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng and served as a base; they must be deprived of that attack base. If his assault plans were to be successful, the 37th Brigade would require reinforcement. The first battalion-size elements of Cho's infantry were arriving. As an initial step, Hanyu's battalion should cross the Tumen and join the brigade, while the main body of the regiment, due that afternoon, should be ready to enter the lines. The division chief of staff issued an order in the name of Suetaka, stipulating that the division would secure its positions while adhering to the great policy of nonexpansion. At 22:30 Morimoto speculated that the Russians were hoping for the good fortune of retaking Changkufeng. Strict guard measures were enjoined. Eventually, before midnight, Suetaka met Cho at Seikaku station. To implement Suetaka's request that the Russian foothold southeast of Changkufeng be wiped out soon, Morimoto decided in the morning to employ the new battalion from Cho's regiment. But since Hanyu's unit was delayed by enemy fire, Morimoto had to turn to the reserve 76th Regiment. At 16:00 Okido was told to prepare an attack, using one infantry battalion and an engineer squad. The mission was to take advantage of darkness to expel the foe remaining on Changkufeng, secure the heights in concert with the elements on the hill, and smash any serious attack at night. At 17:00 Okido issued his detailed order. Enemy elements were located near the cliff close to the northern top of Changkufeng. Apparently hostile bases existed in scattered fashion on the southern slopes as well, as well as a rather large base on the middle of Akahage "Red Bald" Hill, formerly held by Captain Noguchi's company. The regiment was to drive those forces north of Hill 52. The 3rd Battalion commander, Major Hashimoto Seishiro, was to direct both companies' assaults, and, once the foe had been ousted, secure the locations until dawn, after which he would return to the reserve unit.  On the 8th, at 19:30, Hashimoto proceeded with his battalion staff to the foot of Changkufeng and conferred with Major Sato and Captain Shimomura, the majors commanding the units with which he was to cooperate. The assault units moved out from Chiangchunfeng, but their timing was thrown off by a half-hour of artillery checking fire from northeast of the lake. At 20:50, Captain Iwai's 10th Company, supported by a machine-gun platoon, attacked the rock corner on the east side of Changkufeng. After cutting down Soviet sentries, the Japanese rushed in; 40–50 Russian soldiers retreated toward Akahage. On that hill there had been only 20–30 Soviet troops to begin with, but their strength had been built up to two companies plus tanks and infantry guns. The Russians laid down violent small-arms fire, causing 17 Japanese casualties in a short period, after which 30–40 enemy soldiers sought to counterattack. The Japanese drove back this effort, readied their own offensive, and continued to launch close assaults against the heavy-machine-gun nest at the rock corner. Simultaneously, Captain Shidara's 7th Company jumped off with five attached demolition engineers. The 1st Platoon broke through the entanglements and cut down lookouts while the 2nd Platoon proceeded to mop up footholds on the north side—about ten Russian soldiers who dotted the slope at four locations. In the process, the company ran into the positions Iwai had been attacking. Terrain and enemy fire dictated a detour south of the ridgeline. Shidara's men moved up behind Iwai on the right, joining Hashimoto's command. The battalion commander consolidated his lines and directed reconnaissance preparatory to an attack against Akahage. Hours passed; Okido, at the command post, decided it might be wiser to wait till daybreak and call for artillery support. Hashimoto then issued his own instructions from the eastern salient, cautioning his men to dig in well. Near 04:00 the redeployments were completed, but construction did not progress due to the rocky terrain; soldiers were barely able to scoop knee-high firing trenches by daybreak. Total Russian losses on the 8th were estimated to exceed 1,500. More than 100 tanks were claimed publicly, and it was "confirmed" that since the 1st, six planes had been shot down, two of which had fallen behind Japanese lines. In Tokyo, the war ministry and the Gaimusho denied categorically that the Russians had retaken Changkufeng. Soviet troops had attempted to rush positions 600 feet from the crest at 1400 hours; after two and a half hours of furious hand-to-hand fighting, they were beaten off with presumably heavy casualties on both sides. Soviet tanks were reported moving north from Posyet Bay, though it remained unclear whether this indicated withdrawal or strategic movement. Right sector casualties were relatively light on 8 August: eight killed and 41 wounded, the 75th Infantry suffering five and 38 of these respectively. Officer casualties were proportionately high: two wounded in the 75th Regiment, one in the 76th Regiment, and a fourth in the mountain artillery. Personnel rosters of the 75th Regiment, as of 30 July and 8 August, showed a reduction from 1,403 to 826, down 41 percent. The cumulative effect of Japanese losses and the scale of Soviet commitment troubled the Korea Army. Suetaka reported Japanese casualties as: through 2 August, 45 killed, 120 wounded; from 3-5 August, 25 killed, 60 wounded; since 6 August, killed unknown, 200 wounded. Remarkably, the same casualty totals were released publicly by the war ministry on the night of the 8th. Throughout 9 August at 15:20 the Japanese were hit by a very intense barrage from Hill 29. The mountain gun was damaged by shellfire and had to be moved to the foot of Fangchuanting. Tanaka had ordered his artillery to conduct long-range artillery neutralization and communications-cutoff fire, and short-range neutralization as well as checking fire. The accuracy of our artillery elements had improved, and the power of our guns had been enhanced greatly. On the left, from 05:30, T. Sato dispatched an antitank platoon, under cover of mist, to finish off immobilized Soviet tanks whose main armament was still operational and which had done some severe firing the day before. As the day wore on, spirits rose, for the men heard the roar of friendly 15-cm cannon laying down mighty neutralization fire against enemy artillery. Near 14:15, Russian troops were detected creeping forward in the woods 400 meters away on the right. Supporting mountain artillery wiped out this threat in short order. Suetaka decided to move his division headquarters to Seikaku and his combat command post to the Matsu'otsuho message center. Anxiety about the Wuchiatzu sector to the north had diminished greatly; in addition, the entire strength of the division had already been brought to the front. Lastly, dealings with the Seoul and Tokyo levels had by now become rather secondary in importance. Suetaka could discern the steady, disturbing exhaustion of his front-line troops. On the other hand, newly arrived Cho was raring to go. After receiving authorization from Suetaka, Cho allowed Nakajima's battalion to cross the river at Matsu'otsuho but kept Osuga's battalion on the Korean bank as division reserve. Since Tanaka had surmised that the Russians' intention was to direct their main offensive effort against the Japanese right wing, it seemed best to transfer the mountain guns to strengthen the right sector positions. The brigade order of 17:30 endorsed Tanaka's shift of defensive emphasis, particularly with regard to the artillery and the new elements from Cho's regiment. Morimoto added that the core of the Soviet assault force southeast of Changkufeng amounted to two infantry battalions. T. Sato accordingly ordered Obo's battalion to integrate its heavy firepower and deliver swift fire in timely fashion. Soon afterward, Obo discerned a massed battalion of Russian infantry, who had been hauled up by trucks, on the northeastern skirt of Changkufeng. He unleashed every available weapon, organic and attached, at 19:30. The Soviets seemed taken completely by surprise; they showed extreme bewilderment and dispersed in an instant. The right sector unit estimated that on 9 August it had caused 450 casualties, stopped five tanks, and knocked out one light artillery piece and seven heavy machine guns. Japanese casualties in the right sector had amounted to 28 killed and 43 wounded. Ammunition expenditures were considerably higher than on the 8th.  During the night of 9–10 August, the 74th Infantry reinforcements crossed the Tumen steadily. In the early hours, Okido concluded that Soviet attack designs had been frustrated for the time being. The Hill 52 front was relatively calm. Soviet automatic weapons and riflemen were still deployed 200 to 300 meters from Japanese positions, where they sniped selectively. Russian artillery was quiet, apparently as the result of the movement of the main Japanese artillery force to the right wing and the arrival of long-range guns. The 75th Regiment command post at Fangchuanting was the focal point of Japanese artillery activity. Firing began at 07:10, when four battalion guns engaged and smashed two Soviet mountain pieces.  As for Soviet ground assaults, one company attacked at Changkufeng as early as 05:20 under cover of fog but was driven off after 40 minutes. The Russians struck again from three directions in formidable strength between 09:00 and 10:00. Morimoto, growing concerned about the danger of irruptions through gaps between Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, sent elements of Nakajima's battalion to Chiangchunfeng. Since the right wing of the Russians atop Changkufeng was spilling onto the western slopes, at 10:30 Nakajima had his heavy machine guns and battalion guns lay down strong fire from the peak of Chiangchunfeng. Meanwhile, heavy weapons from the left sector were also contributing to the repulse of the morning assaults. A battalion of Soviet infantry attacked Changkufeng all afternoon. Fierce gunfire by the 75th Regiment at 14:00 routed troops massing on the slopes facing the red flag. Considerable losses were inflicted on 75 Russians sighted northeast of Hill 52. An enemy company on the Khasan shore and another two east of Akahage Hill were attempting to occupy positions from which to strike Fangchuanting with the support of two rapid-fire guns. By 17:00 the Russians had been repulsed by the energetic fire of Japanese small arms, battalion guns, and artillery. Soviet forces dispersed toward the lakeshore and Hill 52, leaving many corpses behind. The last important firing by Japanese battalion guns at Fangchuanting on the 10th was a mission against the eastern slopes of Changkufeng at 18:00. Thereafter, the battle zone grew still.  In the left sector, T. Sato concluded that, to secure Changkufeng, it would be best to reinforce flank fire instead of concentrating on the direct attack or defense of the Changkufeng district. He therefore made arrangements with Okido to borrow one machine-gun platoon and assign it to Obo. As of 05:30, enemy troops were still holding a line 300 meters from the positions of Obo's right battalion and 800 to 1,000 meters ahead of Takenouchi's left battalion. Shortly afterward, good news was received at the left sector command post: the last battalion of the 73rd Regiment was to have left Nanam at 16:00 on 9 August and would arrive in the near future. On the right wing of the left sector, the Russians facing Kadokura's company began to operate energetically from 09:00, advancing in two lines, 150 meters apart, with a total strength of one company: two platoons up, one platoon back. They were supported by forces on the high ground north of Khasan and on Akahage. Kadokura waited for the enemy to close to 200 meters before ordering his men to open fire; particularly effective was the flanking fire by the machine-gun company and by elements of Okuda's company. Many heavy artillery shells were hitting the Japanese lines now, but defensive fire pinned down the attacking infantry for a while, 100 meters from the breastworks. Then 30 or 40 Soviet soldiers, covered by firepower, worked forward as close as 30 meters, hurling grenades and giving every indication of mounting a charge. The Japanese responded with grenades. At the same time, the left-flank squad of Kadokura's company was being annihilated. Thus encouraged, Russian assault troops plunged close, whereupon Kadokura assembled his available men, a dozen or so, from the command teams and runners—and grappled with the foe at point-blank range. An ammunition man joined in the melee and broke up the Soviet assault by expert use of hand grenades. The second echelon gradually fell back around 10:30, in the face of heavy fire laid down by the machine guns and Okuda's company. The Russians appeared to be adjusting their deployment but made no further efforts to close. At Changkufeng, meanwhile, two or three enemy companies were approaching the crest. Left sector raiding fire caused the Russians to flee. Japanese casualties in the old right sector had been nine killed and 22 wounded on 10 August. It was estimated that Soviet casualties amounted to 600 killed or wounded, with five heavy machine guns knocked out. By this time, the Soviets had committed their maximum infantry and artillery strength: 27 battalions and 100 guns, the same as on 9 August but up 17 battalions and 60 units since 3 August. Higher headquarters reported no tanks at the front, though 75th Infantry situation maps indicated some Soviet armor still faced Hill 52 sector. Although Japanese officers insisted that Changkufeng Hill remained in Japanese possession, they acknowledged increased casualties due to the accuracy of Soviet shelling. Losses were not as severe as might have been expected because the enemy did not time their charges with their bombardments; Japanese troops lay in trenches and met the attackers with grenades. Every combat unit of the 19th Division had been committed. Nevertheless, the maimed and the fresh battalions had amounted to a combined maximum strength of only 12 infantry battalions and 37 artillery pieces, primarily 75-mm mountain guns, without armor or aircraft. These forces had to cope with 27 enemy infantry battalions and 100 artillery pieces, including many long-range guns, as well as sizable tank and aerial units. Every echelon, regiment, division, and army, had voiced the need for troop replacements and reinforcements.  By evening of 10 August, the situation had deteriorated to the point that the division chief of staff sent Seoul a very long and painful message that ended with: "There is danger of radical change in combat situation in few days if matters go on. It is estimated that this division has only one or two days left in which it can retain definite freedom of action,initiative to advance or retreat. Even if overall situation should develop to our advantage in next three or four days, we ought to be patient from broader standpoint, and be satisfied with our achievement, that Japanese Army has manifested its strength against enemy till now. While we do retain freedom of action, it would be appropriate to solve incident now through speedy diplomatic negotiations. Such measures are entirely up to Korea Army and high command but, so far as division is concerned, there is no other way except of course to make desperate efforts to maintain occupation line for sake of mission. Please take these matters into sympathetic consideration and conduct appropriate measures urgently". I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Night raids and artillery opened the fight, with Hill 52 and Changkufeng changing hands amid intense Soviet tank and air assaults. Japanese forces, aided by engineers, infantry, and mountain guns, mounted tenacious defense, repelling repeated Soviet breakthroughs though suffering heavy casualties. By August 10, Japanese divisions faced mounting exhaustion and warnings of potential strategic shifts, while both sides suffered substantial casualties and material losses.

Let us know what you think! Text us!  SPONSORED BY: PURE LIBERTY LABS, PRECISION WELLNESS GROUP, and THE SPECIAL FORCES FOUNDATION In this episode of Security Halt!, Deny Caballero sits down with Lukas Simianer to unpack the realities of veteran entrepreneurship, leadership, and mental health. They explore why veterans possess a unique advantage in building purpose-driven businesses, how accountability and self-care shape effective leadership, and why community support is essential during transition. The conversation also dives into the role of AI in veteran services, scaling businesses responsibly, and naming personal challenges as the first step toward growth and long-term success. 

Let us know what you think! Text us!SPONSORED BY: PURE LIBERTY LABS, PRECISION WELLNESS GROUP, and THE SPECIAL FORCES FOUNDATION In this episode of Security Halt!, Deny Caballero is joined by Corey Russell and Peyton Smith, co-founders of ROE Labs, to discuss the realities of military transition, mental health, and brain health after service. The conversation explores how cumulative exposure, overpressure, and TBI affect veterans—and why research-backed supplements, education, and community support are critical during transition. Corey and Peyton share how their shared experiences led them to build a purpose-driven company focused on protecting the brain and empowering veterans to pursue new opportunities after the uniform comes off. 

Last time we spoke about the Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights. On the Manchurian frontier, a Japanese plan hatched in the hush before dawn: strike at Hill 52, seize the summit, and bargain only if fate demanded. Colonel Sato chose Nakano's 75th Regiment, delivering five fearless captains to lead the charge, with Nakajima rising like a bright spark among them. Under a cloak of night, scouts threaded the cold air, and at 2:15 a.m. wires fell away, revealing a path through darkness. By dawn, a pale light brushed the crest; Hill 52 yielded, then Shachaofeng did, as dawn's demands pressed forward. The Russians responded with a thunder of tanks, planes, and relentless artillery. Yet the Japanese braced, shifting guns, moving reinforcements, and pressing a discipline born of training and resolve. The battlefield fractured into sectors, Hill 52, Shachaofeng, the lake, each demanding courage and cunning. Night winds carried the buzz of flares, the hiss of shells, and the stubborn clang of rifles meeting armor. The Russians tried to reweave their strength, but Japanese firepower and tenacious assaults kept the line from bending. By nightfall, a quiet resolve settled over the hills; the cost was steep, but the crest remained in Japanese hands.   #182 The Second Russian Counteroffensive over the heights Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The Japanese retained their hard won positions despite fierce Russian counterattacks. For the Japanese command structure at the front, 3 August was of prime importance. Suetaka concluded that he could not merely direct the fighting around Changkufeng nor abandon Kyonghun, given his need to manage relations with Korea Army Headquarters and central authorities, as well as the special characteristics of these battles and his grave concerns about the Wuchiatzu front to the north. By 5 p.m., the newly arrived 37th Brigade commander, Morimoto Nobuki, was assigned control of all sectors from Hill 52 and Changkufeng to Shachaofeng, establishing his command post at the former site of the 75th Regiment at Chiangchunfeng. The Japanese estimated losses from the Soviet counterattacks on 2–3 August as follows: Hill 52-Changkufeng, at least 300 Soviet casualties and four tanks; Shachaofeng, about 300 casualties and several tanks, plus several heavy machine guns knocked out. By 17:00 on 3 August, Russian strength committed to the front and immediate rear was assessed at ten infantry battalions, 40 artillery pieces, and 80 tanks. Japanese casualties on the 2nd and 3rd totaled 16 killed and 25 wounded. Suetaka judged the Soviet bombardments on 3 August powerful, but their infantry assaults were not particularly bold, likely due to their heavy losses on the 2nd. Even though morale was not high, there were signs of reinforcements from elite units, including armor and large artillery formations. Suetaka concluded the Russians would again attempt to retake the Shachaofeng sector and positions around Changkufeng. During the night of 3–4 August, the 75th Infantry, still on alert against resumed enemy counterattacks, intensified security and worked energetically to strengthen defenses. K. Sato remained at Chiangchunfeng to complete the turnover to the 37th Brigade and to brief Morimoto. The regiment established its new command post for the right sector at the foot of Fangchuanting. Throughout the night, Soviet vehicles with blinking lights were observed moving south along the high ground east of Khasan, and a new buildup of mechanized forces and artillery appeared in the area. At 05:30, 36 tanks were seen advancing to Hill 29, followed by the apparent withdrawal of 50–60 Russian horsemen into the same area. At 07:00 on 04 August, Soviet artillery began a bombardment. Although there was a lull around noon, by 14:00 intensity peaked, described as "like millions of lightning bolts striking at once." After another quiet spell, enemy guns renewed their tempo at 19:30, targeting Hill 52 and Changkufeng. The Russians' artillery was not precisely zeroed in; "many of the shells plopped into the Tumen, which delighted us considerably." Beginning on the 4th, Soviet artillery sought to cut lines of communication by bombarding the river crossing site, disrupting daytime supply. Japanese artillery records add: "Until today, this battalion had been fired on only by field artillery; now 122-mm. howitzers went into action against us. We sustained no losses, since the points of impact were 100 meters off. Apparently, the Russians conducted firing for effect from the outset, using data provided by the field artillery in advance." Around midnight, Ichimoto, the old commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion, arrived at the 75th Regiment Headquarters to resume command. He was "itching to fight." K. Sato described the casualties in detail, but "he didn't look beaten at all." "To the contrary, the colonel was strong and in excellent spirits. Yet while he wasn't pessimistic, one could not call him optimistic." At the battalion site, about 100 men were in operational condition out of an original 400. Some soldiers were hauling ammunition, rations, and position materiel; others were cremating the dead, since corpses would rot in the August heat. Japanese casualties on 4 August were light: the 75th Infantry lost five killed and three wounded; among attached engineers, the platoon leader and two men were wounded. Ammunition expenditure was very low. The Japanese press noted that although the Russians had been reported retreating behind the lake to the northeast, investigation showed a redeployment forward from south of Changkufeng. An American observer in Tokyo stated that "the best information obtainable is that the Russians now occupy the lower slopes of Changkufeng, while the Japanese still occupy the heights." From this period dates a series of pleas from the 19th Division for the dispatch of long-range artillery from the Kwantung Army. Suetaka believed that the addition of long-range artillery was necessary and feasible. As Kitano predicted, Suetaka submitted his recommendation at 05:00 on 5 August for the attention of the Korea Army commander and the AGS deputy. As dawn approached on 5 August, the Korea Army received Suetaka's request. A message was dispatched to the vice minister of war and the AGS deputy, and an inquiry was sent to Hsinking. The note detailed Soviet artillery on the Changkufeng front, eight to ten batteries of field and mountain guns, including 10-cm cannons and two or three 15-cm howitzers, and described how these long-range pieces kept up a slow fire beyond Japanese firing range. Overnight, Soviet traffic pressed along the high ground east of Khasan, and by 06:30 the horizon brimmed with new threat: 48 tanks concentrated near Hill 29, with fresh artillery deployed once the Russians realized their own guns were receiving scant challenge from the Japanese. Movement across the lake suggested continued armor in play; at dawn, 10 to 15 tanks lingered on the Crestline, while closer still, six Russian tanks prowled near the southern edge of Khasan. By 03:00, Changkufeng came under bombardment again. K. Sato urged the mountain artillery to answer dawn with counterfire against the high ground east of Khasan and against Hill 29. Between 05:00 and 05:40, the artillery struck armor concentrations, knocked out two tanks, and forced the rest toward the east of Hill 29. Observation posts were neutralized, and cavalry was driven north. At the same hour, the Soviet barrage against the Japanese rear intensified, targeting lines of communication across the Tumen. The Sozan link failed by day, and telephone lines to the artillery battalion were severed, though signalmen managed to restore communications. The river crossings, Fangchuanting, Hill 52, and Shachaofeng bore the brunt of the shelling, with 15-cm blasts jolting the frontline. "From today enemy shellfire was coned and grew increasingly accurate, until every area along our front was deprived of its dead angles and our casualties mounted." The Hill 52 zone endured a slow siege, but tank fire from the eastern heights remained severe. Noguchi's company, positioned south of Changkufeng, found itself trapped in crossfire from positions across the lake. Suetaka, his front-line subordinates, and their worries about artillery superiority pressed onward. He did what he could with the resources at hand, and, in the morning, shifted a two-15-cm howitzer battery from Kyonghun to the sector opposite Changkufeng, a modest increment in reach but a needed one. At 10:00, Suetaka ordered replenishment of frontline strength. He calculated the enemy's power and their own limits: the Russians had deployed three or four infantry battalions, around 120–130 tanks, 50–60 armored cars, about 1,000 mounted troops, and three or four artillery battalions. Yet he found a glimmer in their morale; "the morale of our own units has risen, as we have been dealing grievous blows to the foe on occasion and have been steadily breaking hostile intentions." By 5 August, he noted, fifty enemy tanks had already fallen. Morimoto watched the ominous lull that threatened another attritional test and warned that the situation demanded constant vigilance. "Even if the front seems quiet, we must tighten security, reinforce positions, and not give the foe even the slightest advantage to exploit." The 5th saw only four Japanese soldiers wounded, three from the 75th and one from the mountain artillery, while ammunition usage remained low. Anti-aircraft guns west of Sozan drove off two aircraft that appeared over Changkufeng at 11:45, triggering a counterbarrage from the northeast of Khasan. A few Soviet planes skimmed over Hill 52 and Changkufeng in the afternoon, but their flights felt more like reconnaissance than threat. Across the line, the Russians continued to probe the east side. Northeast of Khasan, waves of infantry and trucks, dozens at a time, slipped south, while roughly 20 tanks began their own southern march. The Russians worked to erect new positions along the Khansi heights. In the meantime, conversations in Moscow pressed toward a decision, with intelligence predicting that a breakthrough would come by noon on the 5th. Around midnight on 5 August, Morimoto observed that the Russians' forward elements seemed to have been pulled back and the front lay quiet. He ordered vigilant guard duties, stressing that crossing the border, trespassing, and fomenting trouble were prohibited by all units and even by scouts. Meanwhile, the Japanese had been preparing for night attacks and consolidating positions. Throughout the foggy night, mechanized units moved on the Crestline east of Khasan. At daybreak, a platoon leader north of Changkufeng reported tanks heading toward Hill 29, estimating the total force at about 70 tanks and 50 troop-laden trucks. Japanese observers at Hill 52 detected new artillery positions on both sides of Hill 29 and 40 tanks on the Crestline south of the hill. By 07:00, the high ground was covered by no fewer than 100 tanks, with 8 or 9 infantry battalions deployed ahead and behind. As early as 03:00, K. Sato had urged his artillery liaison officer to ensure friendly guns fired at daybreak against the Hill 29 sector to thwart the enemy's intentions in advance. When morning fog lifted a bit at 06:00, Kamimori's mountain artillery battalion "hit the tanks very well," and front-line officers spotted shell impacts, though visibility improved only until 10:00, when mist again hampered observation. By 07:00, Soviet guns began firing from near Hill 29, triggering a duel in which the Japanese outranged them. Around 09:00, as the fog lifted from the higher crest of Changkufeng, Japanese gunners added their fire against the 40 Russian tanks near Hill 29. From Fangchuanting, the lone Japanese mountain piece also engaged armor and troop-laden trucks around Hill 29. As time wore on, the Soviet artillery showed its power, and Hill 52 became a beehive of shelling. From 11:00 onward the defenders began to suffer more and more casualties, with works shattered in succession. Flank fire from Gaho and heavy guns from Maanshan took a toll. The 100 tanks deployed on the Crestline north and south of Hill 29 delivered furious low-trajectory fire, gradually turning the front walls of our firing trenches into something resembling a saw. Russian shellfire pounded defenses at Hill 52, Noguchi Hill, and Changkufeng. Between 02:00 and 05:00 the Russian shells had been dispersed; now they concentrated their bombardment. They even struck the rear headquarters of the 37th Brigade and the 75th Regiment. The crossings at Sozan and Matsu'otsuho took heavy hits, and Sato worried that friendly batteries would become exposed to counter-battery fire if they opened up too soon. A peak of intensity arrived near 13:30 as the Soviet ground assault began. Now 30 Soviet aircraft bombed Changkufeng, Fangchuanting, and Hill 52, and Russian tanks moved toward Hill 52, with infantry 300–400 meters behind. To blunt the assault, Hirahara ordered ammunition caches and instructed troops not to open fire prematurely. The Soviet infantry and tanks pressed to a line about 900 meters from the Japanese, paused briefly, then continued. By 14:00, the advance resumed, led by three battalions and 50 tanks. Lieutenant Saito, commanding the 3rd Battalion's antitank battery, waited until tanks were 800 meters away and then opened fire with his three pieces. In a furious exchange between 13:50 and 14:30, as armor closed to 300 meters, the Japanese stopped 14 tanks and seriously damaged others in the rear. One antitank squad leader, a corporal, would later receive a posthumous citation for destroying more than ten tanks. Several tanks fled into a dip near Khasan; some Soviet troops were reportedly crushed by their own tanks in the melee. Supporting Saito's fire were Hisatsune's regimental guns and the captured antitank gun at Changkufeng, which the Japanese used to engage armor along the lake's slopes. Noguchi's unit fired battalion guns against the tanks while the attached mountain pieces bombarded the Russians despite intense counterbattery fire. At Hill 52, liaison lieutenant Fuji'uchi observed the shelling and coordinated infantry–artillery actions with a platoon leader, never flinching even after being buried in trenches three times by shell blasts; he was killed near 14:00. Captain Shiozawa, the mountain battery commander, took charge of directing fire and also was also slain. The Russians' assault pushed forward; 16 tanks followed behind the vanguard, moving along the Crestline behind Hill 52, and joined the tanks in firing but did not advance further. To the rear, a large force moved along the lake north of Hill 52 until checked by fire from Noguchi's positions. A dozen Russian tanks converged southwest of Khasan at 16:00. Master Sergeant Kobayashi, acting platoon leader of the engineers, proposed a close-quarter demolition attack since Japanese antitank strength was limited. After approval from Hirahara, at around 16:30 he and 13 men crept forward 300 meters undetected. Twenty meters from the tanks, Kobayashi urged his men: "One man, one tank! Unto death for us all!" The assault wrecked six to eight (or possibly ten) of the 12 enemy tanks and killed many crew members inside and outside the vehicles, but Kobayashi and seven of his men were killed; only one soldier, Kabasawa, survived to perform a posthumous rescue of a fallen comrade. Of the 60 Russian tanks and at least four battalions that rushed to Hill 52, only one tank charged into the hill positions. At 17:30, this machine reached within 150 meters of the 11th Company lines but was destroyed by armor-piercing heavy machine-gun fire. Back at the 75th Regiment command post, K. Sato received reports from the line units, but hostile fire cut communications with Hill 52 in the afternoon. His antitank guns were increasingly inoperable, and casualties mounted. He reinforced Hill 52 first with heavy machine guns and then with an infantry company. North of Hill 52, Noguchi had been in position with an infantry platoon, a machine-gun platoon, and the battalion gun battery. By 09:30, enemy bombardment forced him to pull back temporarily to the lower Scattered Pines area to avoid needless casualties. At Akahage or "Red Bald" Hill, Noguchi left only lookouts. Around 16:00, about two enemy companies were observed moving toward Changkufeng. Noguchi redirected fire to meet the threat. The Japanese, pinned by infantry and four tanks approaching within 150 meters, endured infantry guns and other tanks in a protracted exchange. Shelling continued until sundown. Casualties mounted; the machine-gun platoon leader, Master Sergeant Harayama, fell with 20 of his men. "It was a hard battle, but we retained our positions, and the enemy advance toward Changkufeng was checked." After sunset there were occasional fire exchanges; tanks remained visible burning. Soviet troops attempting to breach barriers faced hand-grenade assaults. A great deal of noise signaled casualties being evacuated and tanks salvaged behind enemy lines, but no fresh assaults followed. The effective barrage by the 2nd Mountain Artillery Battalion helped deter further attempts.  Around 13:30 the advance began. Soviet ground troops laid down a barrage of field, heavy, and mountain gunfire against Hill 52, Noguchi Hill, and Fangchuanting until sunset. Casualties were heaviest between 15:00 and 17:00. Soviet cutoff fire against the Tumen crossings continued even after the sun went down. Japanese close-support artillery attracted instantaneous counterbattery fire. Enemy planes also seemed to be bombing in quest of the artillery sites. On the sector defended by T. Sato, throughout the night of 5-6 August, Russian movements had been frequent on the Kozando-Paksikori road and east of Khasan, trucks and tanks making round trips. The roar of engines and rumbling of vehicles were especially pronounced on the lake heights. Headlights shone brightly, causing Japanese lookouts to speculate that the Russians were putting on a demonstration to suggest that their main offensive effort was being aimed against Hill 52. Nevertheless, the left sector unit was ready for an enemy dawn assault, which did materialize around 06:00. One or two Soviet battalions struck forward, encountered a torrent of fire at 300 meters, and fled, leaving 30 bodies behind. Near 09:00 the left sector experienced a fierce series of bombardments; all of the men except lookouts took cover in trenches. The Soviet guns thundered unrelentingly, apparently in preparation for an offensive. At 14:30 several dozen bombers struck. Simultaneously, a wave of 60 tanks moved forward, followed by three battalions of infantry. Major Obo, battalion commander on the right wing, had his heavy machine guns, battalion guns, and line companies engage the foot soldiers, while antitank and regimental guns concentrated against armor. The tanks fanned out and approached within 700 meters, stopping to fire on occasion in "mobile pillbox" fashion. Despite unrelenting enemy tank and artillery shelling, the Japanese regimental guns, and the rapid-fire pieces in particular, shifted position and laid down raiding fire. In conjunction with heavy weapons belonging to Takenouchi's battalion, Obo's men succeeded in stopping 20 tanks. The rest of the armored group continued to push forward. The Russian infantry had pressed on another 200 meters behind the tanks, but eventually they lost momentum 400 meters from the Japanese positions. Having managed to separate the tanks from the infantry, the Japanese units staged close-in assaults in concert with heavy weapons and smashed ten more tanks. Thirty machines had been immobilized by now after a furious struggle lasting five hours. Although Lieutenant Ikue was killed by machine-gun fire, his mountain artillery platoon, emplaced at Shachaofeng, rendered yeoman service, stopping 20 tanks. The forward elements of Soviet infantry, still firing from 400 meters behind the tanks, had apparently abandoned the attack. Second-line forces seemed to have pulled far back, northeast of the lake.   Several dozen Soviet bombers struck Takenouchi's left-wing battalion around 14:30 and lost one plane to machine-gun fire. At the same time, 50 Soviet tanks closed to 800 meters. Engaging this armored formation were battalion guns, heavy field artillery, and mountain artillery attached to the sector unit, as well as heavy weapons firing from the neighboring battalion. In succession the tanks were knocked out, perhaps 20 in all. Under cover of artillery and bombing, a battalion of Soviet infantry, who had been advancing behind the tanks, got as close as 30 or 40 meters before being checked by guns firing from the Nanpozan area and by the vigorous resistance of the defenders. The enemy withdrew 600 meters and began to dig in. T. Sato noted at 19:00 that, although the Russians on the right and left sectors seemed to have sustained considerable losses, they apparently were "planning something at point-blank range in front of our positions." The 73rd Infantry would therefore cope with a twilight or night attack by the one battalion and several tanks immediately facing it. On 06:08, immediately after large-scale air attacks involving four-engine bombers between noon and 14:00, enemy barrages began. Enemy artillery positions, 6,000–7,000 meters away, were not engaged by the Japanese since their gunners were trained only at 1,000 meters. Longer ranges were ineffective, would betray the guns, and would waste ammunition. Near 16:00 50 tanks appeared at 3,000 meters, and infantry could also be seen, wearing high boots and marching around the lake. Although the Russians may have closed to 200 or 300 meters, Tominaga received no impression that their foot soldiers were particularly aggressive. Soviet armored tactics were poor: some tanks were moving, some stopped, but they did their firing from rises, which made them easy targets. Perhaps it was because of the terrain, undulating and swampy. Without armor-piercing rounds, the Japanese guns could not penetrate the heaviest armor, so they aimed at the treads or at the belly when the tank was on a rise. Tominaga's weapons were aided by rapid-fire pieces and machine guns and by the 15-cm howitzers from across the river. Of the ten targets which came within effective range, Tominaga's battery claimed five light tanks. Major Takenouchi remembered a tank-led Soviet attack that day on Takenouchi's sector. The enemy infantry deployed in good order four kilometers from the defenses. As the formations drew closer, the Japanese counted more than 40 tanks and 3,000 ground troops. The commander knew he had a serious problem, for there were only 20 antitank shells for the rapid-fire guns. When the Russians got within 4,000 meters, the Japanese opened fire with all available heavy weapons. The attackers hit the ground and continued to advance in creeping formation, although the terrain consisted of paddy fields. All the Japanese could see were Russians, wearing reddish-purple trousers and carrying rifles, deployed every 200 meters behind the front lines and apparently exhorting the soldiers. These must have been the "enforcers." The Japanese let the tanks close to 800 meters before opening fire with their precious antitank ammunition. Both the lead and the last tanks were knocked out, but there were by now only four or five shells left, and the firing had to be stopped. Fortunately for the Japanese, the tanks never again advanced, perhaps because of the wet terrain. The Soviet infantry, however, pressed forward tenaciously all day and wormed their way close to the front edge of the barbed wire under cover of artillery and machine guns. Throughout the day, pleas for reinforcement were made frequently by the two Japanese line companies, but the battalion had no reserves, only the few soldiers in the command team. Requests were met with the reply to "hold on for a while; help is coming." Luckily, there was no close-quarter fighting by the time night fell, but the Russians did lay down concerted machine-gun fire after dark. When dawn broke without a Soviet assault, Major Takenouchi surmised that the barrage of machine-gun fire laid down by Russian infantry the evening before must have been intended to cover disengagement from the lines or to check a Japanese attack. Now, in daylight, Russian assault troops which had closed to the entanglements the day before had pulled back to a distance of 400 or 500 meters and could be seen constructing positions. At 19:10 Morimoto warned that while the Soviet offensive had bogged down, "all units are to be wary of attacks after twilight and are to crush them in good time." Ito, in charge at Changkufeng, was consequently alert, although regimental headquarters did not particularly share his concern. Ito had only two infantry squads from the 6th Company and Hisatsune's regimental gun battery, 121 men in all. A little after 20:00, Ito received a report from lookouts that enemy troops were advancing onto the southern skirt. At 20:30 two Soviet companies attacked the advanced lines, hurling grenades. One Japanese squad was almost wiped out; "they died heroic deaths, leaping into a hostile force which outnumbered them 20:1." Immediately, the Russians surged toward the main Japanese positions farther up the hill, while other strong elements sought to encircle the crest on the left. Accompanying the Soviet troops were "wardens." From north, east, and south the Japanese defenses were being overrun, and the regimental guns were in jeopardy. Wounded men fell back and down the hill, one by one. Lieutenant Hisatsune personally sought to repulse the Russians. Taking his command team, a dozen men under a master sergeant, and the two regimental gun squads which possessed only captured rifles, he led a desperate charge at 21:10. With fixed bayonets, the Japanese rushed forward, yelling loudly and hurling rocks, since there were not enough grenades. The Russians retreated in confusion, pursued by the Japanese. Hisatsune cut down several Russians, was wounded badly by grenades, but plunged into the enemy one last time before meeting a "matchlessly heroic death" at 21:40. Almost all of the noncoms and soldiers fell with him. Suddenly, at 21:20, Ito's antitank squad leader staggered to the 75th Regiment command post at Fangchuanting, his face mangled. "Changkufeng is in danger! Avenge us!" Nishimura and the reinforcements had to run 1,200 meters to reach the hill. Major Ichimoto also worked desperately to retrieve men from logistical chores; somehow he assembled 45. Grabbing every grenade available at the command post, Ichimoto ran with his men to the relief of Changkufeng. Next, Regimental Aide Suko sent 10 soldiers, the last being headquarters clerks and runners. When 16 men from the 2nd Company turned up, having delivered their supplies, Suko rushed them out, also. At regimental headquarters there now remained only a dozen soldiers and one heavy machine gun. By then, the Russians had climbed up and across Changkufeng peak and were pushing halfway down the Japanese slope of the hill. Enemy machine guns fired fiercely, but it was mainly grenades that felled Murakoshi's unit; although few were killed, half of the lead platoon was wounded. Murakoshi, struck by a grenade fragment, tied a cloth around his knee and kept on running. Clinging to Changkufeng, Ito now had little more than 50 men left—only seven of his own soldiers, the rest gunners. The latter had lost their pieces, however, and had never been armed with rifles in the first place. The survivors had to use stones, picks, and shovels to grapple with the foe in the trenches.  A little before 22:00, the 17-man contingent under Nishimura arrived. Ten minutes later, Ichimoto rushed up with his 45 men, bunched closely. The survivors, inferior to the reinforcements in numbers, were heartened immensely. Soon afterward, at 22:30, the regimental warrant officer, Nishizawa, caught up with another dozen soldiers, and Murakoshi brought 16 more at 23:00. Wild fighting ensued, furious grenade exchanges, the crisscrossing of fire, and shouts and flashes. Ichimoto remembered that by the time he arrived, the last remnants of Ito's company were fighting hand-to-hand in the trenches on the north side in utter darkness. Thirty meters from the peak, he and Nishimura scouted the situation. Then, having combined the 120 reinforcements into one line, Ichimoto drew his sword and led the charge. In the constant flashes, shapes could be discerned rather well. The Russian machine guns were firing "crazily," all tracers, probably to warn away their own troops. But the firing was very high, sometimes ten meters over the heads of the Japanese, perhaps because of the darkness, the 40-degree slope near the crest, and the angle of the guns. Much of the fire was considerably lower, but the Japanese had only to observe the roots of the tracer fire and stay down, ducking behind boulders. The Soviets had been committing new troops steadily, and a considerable amount of heavy weapons had been emplaced. Near midnight the Russians were driven south, down the cliff, but most of the Japanese had been killed or wounded, and ammunition was exhausted. The mere dozen unscathed survivors were pushed back, but Master Sergeant Isobe and his platoon from Inokuma's company reached the crest in the nick of time at 02:00. With this reinforcement, Ichimoto led a new charge and again drove the enemy below the cliff.  At 22:50 P.M., Inokuma set out with only 49 men, crossed the border, and headed for the enemy's rear. First to be encountered, probably at 01:00, were several dozen Soviet soldiers, armed with machine guns, who were surprised and almost destroyed, abandoning more than 20 corpses. Inokuma veered north along Khasan, cutting down Russian phone lines on the way. The Japanese detected no evidence of enemy retreat. Instead, voices and the sound of oars on the lake could be heard from the eastern foot of Changkufeng, perhaps they came from Soviet reinforcements. Inokuma decided that the best course would be to plunge ahead and take the Russians by surprise. On his own initiative, he began his new operation, although by now he had lost permanent touch with the assault teams. At 02:00, Inokuma's unit broke silently through the "imperfect" lines of barbed wire and charged through another enemy force of company size which was equipped with machine guns. Next, Inokuma directed an attack against a concentration just behind the company location, a unit estimated to number two battalions massing west of the Khasan crossing. The Russians were "stunned" by the assault. According to Akaishizawa, the enemy were killing their own men by wild firing. A portion fled north, leaving over 30 bodies behind. At the same time, the foe called down fire from all areas, causing very heavy Japanese casualties. Inokuma charged, managed to scatter the foe, and seized the cliff. By now he had only a half-dozen men left. His own sword had been shattered and his pistol ammunition exhausted; he picked up a Russian rifle and bayoneted several enemy soldiers. Now the Soviet troops, who had fallen back once, were approaching again from the right rear. Inokuma charged once more, shouting. The Russians retreated to the foot of the heights on the northeast. Daybreak was near. Already hit several times, Inokuma sought to resume the attack, this time from the rear of hostile forces desperately engaging Ichimoto's elements on Changkufeng crest. Akaishizawa said his last orders were, "Ito is just ahead. Charge on!" Although he had only a few soldiers left, Inokuma was trying to move forward when a bullet or a grenade fragment struck him in the head, and he died at 03:00. Sergeant Okumura, although wounded seriously, had remained with Inokuma to the last and defended the positions that had been reached. He saw to it that Inokuma's corpse was recovered first and next struggled to evacuate the wounded. Only then did he withdraw. Around 07:00, Okumura got back to Fangchuanting with one unscathed and two badly wounded soldiers. A day later, the seriously injured but indestructible M. Saito appeared at the regiment command post, somehow dragging a rifle and light machine gun with his one good arm, for "we were always trained to respect our weapons." It was estimated that, during the fighting throughout 6 August, the Russians lost 1,500 killed and wounded as well as 40 tanks knocked out in K. Sato's right sector alone. Japanese casualties were heavy on the 6th. The 75th Infantry lost three officers; 44 enlisted men were killed and 85 wounded. In the engineer platoon seven were killed and five wounded out of 19 men. The 54 killed and 90 wounded in the right sector amounted to 17 percent of the 843 men available. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japanese leadership under Colonel Sato assigned Nakano's 75th Regiment for a dawn assault, seizing Hill 52 and Shachaofeng despite fierce Soviet counterattacks,tanks, aircraft, and heavy artillery. Across the front, sustained bombardment, shifting fire, and nocturnal maneuvers characterize the period. Yet the crest endured, losses mounting but resolve unbroken, until the sun dipped and the hillside remained stubbornly Japanese

Last time we spoke about the Japanese Victory over Changkufeng. Japan's generals hatched a plan: strike at night, seize the peak, then bargain if need be. Colonel Sato, steady as a compass, chose Nakano's brave 75th Regiment, selecting five fearless captains and a rising star, Nakajima, to lead the charge. Ahead, scouts and engineers threaded a fragile path through darkness, while distant Soviet tanks rumbled like distant thunder. At 2:15 a.m., wire breached and soldiers slipped over the slope. The crest resisted with brutal tenacity, grenades flashed, machine guns spit fire, and leaders fell. Yet by 5:15 a.m. dawn painted the hill in pale light, and Japanese hands grasped the summit. The dawn assault on nearby Hill 52 and the Shachaofeng corridor followed, with Takeshita's and Matsunobe's units threading through fog, fire, and shifting trenches. Narukawa's howitzers answered the dawn with measured fury, silencing the Soviets' early artillery as Japanese infantry pressed forward. By daybreak, the Russians were driven back, their lines frayed and retreating toward Khasan. The price was steep: dozens of officers dead or injured, and a crescent of smoke and memory left etched on every face.    #181 The Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After admitting the loss of Changkufeng and Shachaofeng by dawn on 31 July, the Russian government issued a communique the next day asserting that Soviet troops had "hurled back a Japanese division… after a two-day battle" involving tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Some hours after the Japanese penetration, Soviet regulars rushed to the scene and drove out the invaders. Japanese losses amounted to 400 men; Soviet losses were 13 killed and 55 wounded. On Soviet soil, the Japanese abandoned five cannons, 14 machine guns, and 157 rifles, while the Russians admitted losing one tank and one gun. A Soviet reconnaissance pilot may have fallen into Japanese hands after bailing out. "Both before and during the Japanese attack… Soviet troops did not once cross the Manchukuoan frontier,which deprived them of the possibility of surrounding or outflanking the invaders." By 1 August, Russian ground forces were deployed and the Soviet Air Force took action. Soviet aircraft appeared at 24:30 to reconnoiter. Soon after, more than ten planes flew in formation, launching strikes against forward units. Eight sorties, light bombers and fighters, roughly 120–150 aircraft in flights of two or three dozen, bombed and strafed. Raids were conducted by as many as 30 planes, though no Soviet losses were reported. The Russians also hit targets on the Korean side of the Tumen. The 75th Regiment judged that the Soviet Air Force sought only to intimidate. Russian planes dropped several dozen bombs on the Kyonghun bridge, but the span was not struck; damage was limited to the railway, producing an impression of severity that was misleading. The lack of air cover troubled the troops most. Japanese casualties on 1 August were modest: three men wounded in the 75th Infantry, and one wounded and a horse killed in the 76th. However the three Japanese battalions expended over 15,000 machine-gun and 7,000 rifle rounds that day. The appearance of Soviet air power at Changkufeng drew anxious international attention. Shanghai reports electrified observers, who anticipated that major Russo-Japanese hostilities would transform the China campaign overnight. Some observers were openly dismayed, foreseeing a prolongation of the mainland war with potential benefits to Soviet interests. Japanese Army spokesmen sought to downplay the situation. Officers in Hsinking told correspondents that the raids, while serious, represented only a face-saving measure. The Red Army was reportedly attempting to compensate for losses at Changkufeng and other disputed positions, but aside from the bombings, the frontier remained quiet. If the Russians were serious, observers noted, they would have bombed the vital Unggi railway bridge, which remained untouched; raids focused on minor bridges, with limited damage. In Tokyo, foreign observers believed the appearance of about 50 Soviet heavy bombers over North Korea signaled an extension of the incidents and that the Japanese government was taking urgent measures. Military leaders decided not to escalate but prepared for emergencies. The Korea Army Headquarters denied Soviet bombing of Harbin in Manchuria or Najin and Chongjin in Korea. Regarding retaliation, an American correspondent reported that the Japanese military had no intention of bombing Russian territory. Although Soviet use of aircraft introduced a new dimension of danger, the main efforts remained ground-based on both sides. After Japanese troops cleared Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, the Russians appeared to be redeploying to contract their defensive frontage; no troops or works remained west of Khasan. Four or five Russian infantry companies and ten artillery pieces stood between the lake and Paksikori, while the main forces, with numerous gun sites, were concentrated west of Novokievsk. On the Kwantung Army front in southeast Manchuria, no changes were observed. "The Russians were apparently shocked by their defeat at Changkufeng and must suddenly have resorted to negative, conservative measures." Korea Army Headquarters assessed the situation as of the evening of 31 July: "The enemy must fear a Japanese advance into the Novokievsk plain and therefore is concentrating his main forces in that district. Our interests require that we anticipate any emergency, so we must prepare the necessary strength in the Kyonghun region and reinforce positions at Wuchiatzu."  At 20:45 on the 31st, the 19th Division received a detailed message from the Hunchun garrison commander describing his northward deployments. Suetaka was heartened; he "earnestly desired to bring about the end of the incident as a result of the fighting of 30–31 July but was equally resolved to defend the border firmly, based on Japanese interpretation of the Hunchun pact, in case the Soviet side did not perform intensive self-reflection." First, Suetaka issued instructions from Kyonghun at 8:15 on the 31st via K. Sato: "It is our intention that Changkufeng and the high ground northwest of Shachaofeng be secured, as well as the high ground south of Shachaofeng if possible. Enemy attacks are to be met at our positions, but you are not to pursue far." Second, Colonel Tanaka was instructed not to fire as long as Russian artillery did not bombard friendly forces. "Except for preparing against counterassaults, your actions will be cautious. In particular, harassing fire against inhabited places and residents is prohibited." Suetaka was finally armed with formal authority, received at 22:05 on 1 August. He did not delay in implementing it. At 23:00 he ordered the immediate rail movement of strong reinforcements: the alerted infantry brigade headquarters, as well as four infantry battalions and the remaining mountain artillery battalion. Thus, Suetaka could deploy forward not only the forces he had requested but also a brigade-level organization to assume control of the now sizeable combat elements massed at the front for "maneuvers." Earlier that afternoon he had already moved his division's message center forward to the Matsu'otsuho heights at the Tumen, and he regularly posted at least one staff officer there so that the center could function as the division's combat headquarters. An additional matter of explosive potential was built into the divisional order: provision of Japanese Air Force cover for rail movements forward, although use of aircraft had been prohibited by all higher headquarters; Nakamura intended only ground cover. At the front, Japanese units spent most of their time consolidating their hard-won positions. By 3 on 1 August, a column of Soviet forces with vehicles was observed moving from the east side of Khasan. Late in the day, the division received an extremely important telegram from the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of the Kwantung Army: "According to a special espionage report from our OSS in Khabarovsk city, Red Army authorities there have decided to retake the high ground along Changkufeng." From other intelligence, the Kwantung Army concluded that the Russians were rebuilding in the Novokievsk region. Frequent movements observed immediately to the rear of the Soviet battle zone caused K. Sato to grow apprehensive about a dawn counterattack on the 1st, and he reinforced Changkufeng with the 6th Company. The second of August was marked by continuation of Soviet air attacks and the anticipated Russian counteroffensive. According to Japanese intelligence, Marshal Blyukher had arrived in Khabarovsk, and Lieutenant General Sokolov was in Voroshilov. An offensive buildup, estimated at about 3,000 men plus tanks and guns, was reported in the Kozando area by evening on the 1st. Hirahara, commanding the battalion at Changkufeng, grew concerned about Hill 52. With day's end approaching, he reinforced the defenses further and ordered the battalion medical officer to establish a dressing station at Fangchuanting. Around 15:00 Soviet artillery began firing at forward areas, especially gun positions; the bombardments were described as severe. Japanese artillery sought to conserve ammunition, firing only at worthwhile, short-range targets. Main Russian ground actions focused on the far-right (Hill 52) and far-left (Shachaofeng) sectors, not Changkufeng. In line with Hirahara's orders, two infantry companies and four heavy machine guns were moved by 8:00 from Changkufeng to the heights 800 meters southeast. Soviet heavy artillery pounded the zone between Fangchuanting and Hill 52; observing the enemy became difficult. Russian planes engaged at 9:00 fighters, then bombers, to soften defenses and gun positions. Meanwhile, the Soviets deployed firepower southeast of Khasan, while two infantry battalions and more than ten tanks advanced through the pines on the western slopes. Japanese regimental guns and two machine-gun platoons at Hill 52 attacked the enemy heavy machine guns and neutralized them. By 10:00 the Russians had advanced with heavy weapons to the high ground 800 meters from Hill 52. From Changkufeng, the battalion guns engaged heavy weapons. Hirahara moved with the engineers and battalion guns to the heights to which he had transferred reinforcements earlier, took command, and prepared an assault. Initially, Soviet troops advanced in formation, but after cresting a dip, they dispersed and moved onto the high ground opposite Hill 52. Heavily armed, they drew within 700 meters, with artillery and heavy machine guns providing coverage. By 10:00 Sato requested Shiozawa's mountain guns across the Tumen to unleash a barrage against Hill 52's front. For about half an hour, the battery fired. By 10:30, the Soviet advance grew listless. Believing the moment ripe, Hirahara deployed his men to charge the foe's right wing, ordering rapid movement with caution against eastern flank fire. On the heights north of Hill 52, Inagaki watched the struggle; with the telephone out and the situation urgent, he brought up firepower on his own initiative. Taking the main body of the 1st Machine Gun Company, along with the battalion guns, he moved out at noon, making contact with the 10th Company on Hill 52 around 14:00, where the Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians, losing momentum, were checked by Japanese heavy weapons and by mountain guns from Hill 82. Hirahara's main battalion advanced onto the high ground north of Hill 52 around noon. By 15:00, two enemy companies began to fall back, climbing the western slopes of Hill 29 as the main forces retreated piecemeal to a dip. By 16:00, Suetaka observed that his units were continuing to secure their positions and were "gradually breaking the hostile intention." Despite heat and rain, front-line troops showed fatigue but remained vigilant. Between 11:00 and 16;00, Sato inspected the lines and directed defensive positions, particularly at Hill 52. After a poor initial performance, the Russians awaited reinforcements before attempting another assault on Hill 52. They moved up a mechanized corps, and by 15:00 50 tanks massed east of Maanshan. Around 17:00, the Russians began moving south along the high ground across Khasan. Another two Soviet battalions advanced along the Tumen hills, led by armor. Hirahara anticipated an assault at twilight, especially after 18:00, when nine bombers struck Hill 52. Earlier, Takeshita had received reports from the antitank commander, Lieutenant Saito, that at 17:00 several enemy tanks and three infantry battalions were advancing from Hill 29. Convinced of an imminent Soviet strike, Takeshita ordered the defense to conceal its efforts and to annihilate the foe with point-blank fire and hand-to-hand fighting. He sought to instill confidence that hostile infantry could not reach the positions. Before 19:00, the enemy battalions came within effective range, and Japan opened with all available firepower. Rapid-fire antitank guns set the lead tank alight; the remaining tanks were stopped. Support came from Hisatsune's regimental guns and two antitank gun squads atop Changkufeng. The Russian advance was checked. By nightfall, Soviet elements had displaced heavy weapons about 400 meters from Japanese positions. As early as 16:00, Suetaka ordered a mountain artillery squad to cross the river. Sato told Takeshita at 7:30 that there would be a night attack against Hill 52. Takeshita was to annihilate the foe after allowing them to close to 40–50 meters. The Russians did mount a night assault and pressed close between 8 and 9 p.m. with three battalions led by four tanks. The main force targeted Takeshita; all ten Russian heavy machine guns engaged that side. Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians pressed within 30 meters, shouted "Hurrah! Hurrah!" and hurled grenades before advancing a further 15 meters. The Japanese repelled the first waves with grenades and emplaced weapons, leaving light machine guns and grenade dischargers forward. Soviet illuminating shells were fired to enable closer approaches within 100 meters. Japanese grenade-discharger fire blasted the forces massed in the dead space before the works. While the Hill 52 night attack collapsed, other Russian units, smaller in strength and with one tank leading, moved against the hill on the left that the Japanese had not yet occupied that morning. The Russians advanced along the Khasan slope north of Hill 52, came within point-blank range, and shouted but did not charge. By 22:00, the Japanese, supported by machine guns, had checked the foe. Thereupon, the 6th Company, now under a platoon leader, Narusawa, launched a counterattack along the lake. "The enemy was bewildered and became dislocated. Buddies were heard shouting to one another, and some could be seen hauling away their dead." The Soviet troops held back 300–400 meters and began to dig in. Sato decided artillery should sweep the zone in front of Hill 52. At 21:30, he requested support, but the mountain guns could not open fire. Still, by 23:00, not a shadow of an enemy soldier remained on the Hill 52 front, where the Japanese spent the night on alert. In the northern sector, eight Russian tanks crossed the Japanese-claimed border at 5:25 on 2 August and moved south to a position northwest of Shachaofeng. Around 7 Russian artillery opened fire to "prepare" the Japanese while a dozen heavy bombers attacked. An hour later, the ground offensive began in earnest, with one and a half to two infantry battalions, a dozen machine guns, and several tanks. Supporting Takenouchi's left wing were several batteries of mountain artillery and two heavy batteries. Well-planned counterfire stopped the offensive. There was little change north of Shachaofeng and in the southeast, where Kanda's company held its positions against attack. On Takenouchi's front, Akaishizawa notes 120-degree daytime heat and nighttime chill. Men endured damp clothes and mosquitoes. To keep warm at night, soldiers moved about; during the day they sought shade and camouflage with twigs and weeds. No defense existed against cold night rain. Nocturnal vigilance required napping by day when possible, but the intense sun drained strength. For three days, Imagawa's company had only wild berries and dirty river water to eat. At 6:00 on 2 August, Colonel Tanaka exhorted his artillery to "exalt maximum annihilation power at close range, engage confirmed targets, and display firepower that is sniperlike—precise, concentrated, and as swift as a hurricane." Tanaka devised interdiction sectors for day and night attacks. At 10:30, the artillery laid down severe fire and eventually caused the enemy assault to wither. Around 24:40, Rokutanda's battalion detected a Russian battalion of towed artillery moving into positions at the skirt of Maanshan. When the first shells hit near the vanguard, a commander on horseback fled; the rest dispersed, abandoning at least eight artillery wagons and ten vehicles. Suetaka, observing from the Kucheng BGU, picked up the phone and commended the 3rd Battalion. Japanese casualties on 2 August were relatively light: ten men killed and 15 wounded. Among the killed, the 75th Infantry lost seven, the 76th Infantry two, and the engineers one. Among the wounded, the 75th suffered nine and the 76th six. Infantry ammunition was expended at an even higher rate than on 30–31 July. In Hirahara's battalion area, small arms, machine guns, ammunition, helmets, knapsacks, and gas masks were captured. A considerable portion of the seized materiel was employed in subsequent combat, as in the case of an antitank gun and ammunition captured on 31 July. Soviet casualties to date were estimated at 200–250, including 70 abandoned corpses. Twelve enemy tanks had been captured, and five more knocked out on 1–2 August; several dozen heavy bombers and about 5,000 Soviet ground troops were involved in the concerted offensives.  Nevertheless, reports of an imminent Soviet night attack against Hill 52 on 2–3 August alarmed Suetaka as much as his subordinates. Shortly after 20:00 accompanied by his intelligence officer, Suetaka set out for the hill, resolved to direct operations himself. Somewhat earlier, the division had sent Korea Army Headquarters a message, received by 18:30, reflecting Suetaka's current outlook: 30 to 40 Soviet planes had been bombing all sectors since morning, but losses were negligible and morale was high. The division had brought up additional elements in accord with army orders, and was continuing to strive for nonenlargement, but was "prepared firmly to reject the enemy's large-scale attacks." Impressed by the severity of the artillery and small-arms fire, Suetaka deemed it imperative "quickly to mete out a decisive counterassault and thus hasten the solution of the incident." But Japanese lines were thinly held and counterattacks required fresh strength. This state of affairs caused Suetaka to consider immediate commitment of the reinforcements moving to the front, although the Korea Army had insisted on prior permission before additional troops might cross the Tumen. Suetaka's customary and unsurprising solution was again to rely on his initiative and authorize commitment of every reinforcement unit. Nearest was T. Sato's 73rd Regiment, which had been ordered the night before to move up from Nanam. Under the cover of two Japanese fighters, these troops had alighted from the train the next morning at Seikaku, where they awaited orders eagerly.   K. Sato was receiving reports about the enemy buildup. At 20:10 orders were given to the 73rd Regiment to proceed at once to the Matsu'otsuho crossing and be prepared to support the 75th. Involved were T. Sato's two battalions, half of the total infantry reinforcements. Suetaka had something else in mind: his trump, Okido's 76th Infantry. At 23:40 he ordered this regiment, coming up behind the 73rd, to proceed to Huichungyuan on the Manchurian side of the Tumen, via Kyonghun, intercept the enemy, and be ready to go over to the offensive. On the basis of the information that the division planned to employ Okido's regiment for an enveloping attack, K. Sato quickly worked out details. He would conceal the presence of the reinforcements expected momentarily from the 73rd Regiment and would move Senda's BGU and Shimomura's battalion to Huichungyuan to cover the advance of the 76th Regiment and come under the latter's control. Japanese forces faced the danger of Soviet actions against Changkufeng from the Shachaofeng front after midnight on 2 August. Takenouchi had been ready to strike when he learned that the enemy had launched an attack at 01:00 against one of his own companies, Matsunobe's southwest of Shachaofeng. Therefore, Takenouchi's main unit went to drive off the attackers, returning to its positions at 02:30. The Russians tried again, starting from 04:00 on 03 August. Strong elements came as close as 300 meters; near 05:00 Soviet artillery and heavy weapons fire had grown hot, and nine enemy fighters made ineffective strafing passes. By 06:30 the Russians seemed thwarted completely. Hill 52 was pummeled during the three battles on 2 August. Taking advantage of night, the Russians had been regrouping; east of the hill, heavy machine guns were set up on the ridgeline 500 meters away. From 05:00 on 03 August, the Russians opened up with heavy weapons. Led by three tanks, 50 or 60 infantrymen then attacked from the direction of Hill 29 and reached a line 700–800 meters from the Japanese defenses. Here the Russian soldiers peppered away, but one of their tanks was set ablaze by gunfire and the other two were damaged and fled into a dip. Kamimori's mountain artillery reinforcements reached Nanpozan by 07:15 on 03 August. Tanaka issued an order directing the battalion to check the zone east of Hill 52 as well as to engage artillery across Khasan. A site for the supply unit was to be selected beyond enemy artillery range; on the day before, Russian shells had hit the supply unit of the 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion, killing two men and 20 horses. The exposed force was ordered to take cover behind Crestline 1,000 meters to the rear. After 09:00 on 03 August, the artillery went into action and Japanese morale was enhanced. Near 09:00, Soviet bombardment grew pronounced, accompanied by bomber strikes. The Japanese front-line infantry responded with intensive fire, supported by mountain pieces and the regimental guns atop Changkufeng. Enemy forces stayed behind their heavy weapons and moved no further, while their casualties mounted. At 11:00 the Russians began to fall back, leaving only machine guns and snipers. One reason the Soviets had been frustrated since early morning was that K. Sato had seen the urgency of closing the gap midway between Changkufeng and Hill 52 (a site called Scattered Pines) and had shifted the 2nd Company from Changkufeng. Between 06:00 and 07:40, the company fired on Soviet troops which had advanced north of Hill 52, and inflicted considerable casualties. A corporal commanding a grenade launcher was cited posthumously for leading an assault which caused the destruction of three heavy machine guns. In the afternoon, the Japanese sustained two shellings and a bomber raid. Otherwise, the battlefield was quiet, since Russian troops had pulled back toward Hill 29 by 15:00 under cover of heavy weapons and artillery. At Hill 52, however, defense posed a problem, for each barrage smashed positions and trenches. During intervals between bombardments and air strikes, the men struggled to repair and reinforce the facilities. Changkufeng was again not attacked by ground troops during the day but was hit by planes and artillery. Trifling support was rendered by the mountain gun which had been moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen. Japanese infantry reinforcements were on the way. By 23:00 on 02 August, T. Sato had left Shikai. His 73rd Regiment pushed forward along roads so sodden that the units had to dismantle the heavy weapons for hauling. The rate of advance was little more than one kilometer per hour, but finally, at 05:20 on 03 August, he reached Chiangchunfeng with the bulk of two battalions. The esprit of the other front-line troops "soared." K. Sato, who was commanding all forces across the Tumen pending Morimoto's setting up of headquarters for the 37th Brigade, had T. Sato take over the line to the left of Changkufeng, employing Takenouchi's old unit and the 73rd Regiment to cover Shachaofeng. T. Sato set out with his battalions at 06:00 amid heavy rain. By 07:30, under severe fire, he was in position to command the new left sector. According to division orders to Morimoto, this zone was to include the heights south and northwest of Shachaofeng, but, in the case of the former, it was "permissible to pull back and occupy high ground west of the heights south of Shachaofeng." T. Sato contemplated using his regiment to encircle the foe on the north side of the lake, while Okido's 76th Infantry formed the other prong. Most of the day afterward, Soviet artillery was active; the Japanese responded with barrages of their own. Eventually, from 15:30, the entire enemy front-line force in this sector began falling back under violent covering fire. Morimoto's initial operations order, received at 18:00, advised T. Sato officially that he was coming under command of the 37th Brigade. The night of 03–04 August passed with the units uneasy, striving to conduct security and reconnaissance while working on the battered defenses. Total Japanese casualties on 3 August were light again: six men killed and ten wounded, four of the dead and seven of the wounded being suffered by the 75th Infantry, the rest by Takenouchi's battalion. Ammunition was expended at a lower rate than on the preceding day. The Japanese War Ministry reported no significant change since nightfall on 03 August. Thereafter, the battlefield seemed to return to quiescence; Japanese morale was high. In the press abroad, Changkufeng attracted overriding attention. The world was no longer talking of "border affrays." Three-column headlines on page 1 of the New York Times announced: "Soviet Hurls Six Divisions and 30 Tanks into Battle with Japanese on Border, 2 Claims Conflict, Tokyo Reports Victory in Manchukuo and Foes' Big Losses, Moscow Asserts It Won." The startling claim that six Soviet divisions were in action seemed to have been supplied for external consumption by Hsinking as well as Seoul. According to Nakamura Bin, the Russians employed 4,000 to 5,000 men supported by 230 tanks. Although Japanese casualties were moderate, Soviet artillery bombardment had stripped the hills of their lush summer grass. According to the uninformed foreign press, "the meager information showed both sides were heavily armed with the most modern equipment. The Russians were using small, fast tanks and the Japanese apparently were forewarned of this type of weapon and were well supplied with batteries of armor-piercing antitank guns." On 03 August the Russians lost 200 men, 15 tanks, and 25 light artillery pieces. One feature of the fighting was Japanese use of "thousands of flares" to expose fog-shrouded enemy ranks during a Soviet night attack. During the "first phase counteroffensive" by the Russians on 2–3 August, the 75th Regiment judged that the enemy's choice of opportunities for attacking was "senseless"; once they started, they continued until an annihilating blow was dealt. "We did not observe truly severe attacking capacity, such as lightning breakthroughs." With respect to tactical methods, the Japanese noted that Soviet offensive deployment was characterized by depth, which facilitated piecemeal destruction. When Russian advance elements suffered losses, replacements were moved up gradually. Soviet artillery fired without linkage to the front-line troops, nor was there liaison between the ground attacks staged in the Shachaofeng and Hill 52 sectors. Since enemy troops fought entirely on their own, they could be driven off in one swoop. Additionally, although 20–30 Russian tanks appeared during the counterattacks, their cooperation with the infantry was clumsy, and the armor was stopped. Soviet use of artillery in mobile warfare was "poorness personified." "Our troops never felt the least concern about hostile artillery forces, which were quite numerous. Even privates scoffed at the incapability of Russian artillery." It seemed that "those enemies who had lost their fighting spirit had the habit of fleeing far." During the combat between 31 July and 03 August, the defeated Russians appeared to fear pursuit and dashed all the way back to Kozando, "although we did not advance even a step beyond the boundary." On 4 August Suetaka prepared a secret evaluation: the enemy attacks by day and night on 2 August were conducted by front-line corps built around the 40th Rifle Division. "In view of the failure of those assaults, the foe is bound to carry out a more purposeful offensive effort, using newly arrived corps reinforcements." Russian actions on 02 August had been the most serious and persistent offensive efforts undertaken since the outset of the incident, but they were about the last by the front-line corps whose immediate jurisdiction lay in the region of the incident. Consequently, the enemy's loss of morale as a result of their defeat on 30–31 July, combined with their lack of unity in attack power, caused the attacks to end in failure. "We must be prepared for the fact that enemy forces will now mount a unified and deliberate offensive, avoiding rash attacks in view of their previous reversal, since large new corps are coming up." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the shadowed night, Japan's Sato chose Nakano's 75th to seize a peak, sending five captains and a rising Nakajima into darkness. At 2:15 a.m., they breached wires and climbed the slope; dawn lit a hard-won crest, then Hill 52 and Shachaofeng yielded to resolve and fire. The day wore on with brutal artillery, fluttering bombers, and relentless clashes. By August's edge, casualties mounted on both sides, yet Japanese regiments held fast, repelling night assaults with grit. 

The morning of January 22, 1879, dawned with a deceptive, stillness across Zululand masking the fact that over 45,000 men were in motion across a 200 kilometer front, each group operating in a vacuum of information that would, by sunset, shatter the British Victorian ego. At the coast, Colonel Charles Pearson's Column No. 1 represented the textbook invasion. His force was a heavy, industrial machine led by the 3rd Foot regiment, the Buffs, along with the 99th Regiment, and the Naval Brigade dragging their heavy Gatling guns and artillery. By 5:00 AM, the 5000 strong column was already a dusty serpent stretching more than 8 kilometers back toward the Tugela River. Pearson's scouts were a mix of the Natal Native Contingent and European volunteers who pushed through the tall grass toward the Nyezane River. They were being observed on Wombane mountain by the uDududu, iMbube, and isigQu regiments - 6,000 warriors under the command of Godide kaNdlela. Wombande mountain lay on the wagon trail between Gingingdlovu on the coastal flats, and Eshowe where Pearson was hoping to setup a main base at the abandoned Norwegian mission station before pushing on to ONdini and Cetshwayo's HQ. The Zulu plan was traditional, await in complete stillness on the high-ground then sweep in for a surprise ambush. Pearson's advance guard crossed the Nyezane River and crossed over at 7.30am. Thick bush grew all around, the cavalry was reconnoitering and saw nothing. Vedettes, or mounted guards, were placed to keep an eye out for the Zulu army. Pearson's main party reached the knoll selected for the first stop at around 8am, and the men began to outspan their oxen for a late breakfast. As the laager was being formed up, a party of the Natal Native Contingent who scouted ahead attracted fire from Zulu snipers. The latest Zulu tactic which would also be repeated at Isandlwana, Rorke's Drift, and as Evelyn Wood would report later from Hlobane mountain - a combination of heavy fire from high ground in support of a surging attack by warriors on foot. The road was a now completely commanded by Godide, along with the all important high ground and as his snipers fired non-stop, the Zulu horns swept towards the exposed British column. Naval officer Midshipman Lewis Coker had the honor of commanding the first Gatling gun to be used in combat by British troops. Pearson recognized the value of this machine gun and he ordered Coker to take up a position opposite the advancing Zulu. Coker fired off 300 rounds, and the Zulu attack shuddered and halted — then the sound of the rockets fiendishly shrieking led to a general withdrawal. Hart continued advancing on the retreating Zulu when one of the older warriors, his oiled head ring glistening in the morning sun, stopped and turned, fell to one knee in a classic rifleman's position, took careful aim and fired — but missed. Then he bolted away. Hart noted the conventional approach this older warrior had taken. He'd been trained in the finer arts of fire and movement. 200 kilometers to the north of Pearson near the modern town of Vryheid, Colonel Evelyn Wood who led the left column of the British triple column invasion, was preparing for his morning assault atop the Zungwini Mountain. Wood was by far the most experienced and therefore pragmatic of the British commanders. He had the good fortune of commanding "Flying Column," the vast majority of his men were mounted. The force was centered on the 13th and 90th Light Infantry and the formidable Frontier Light Horse under Redvers Buller. It was in the centre of the three pronged British attack where the day of skop, skiet and donner would change history. This was at the foot of the Sphinx-like crag of Isandlwana where Chelmsford's Second Column hunkered down.

Let us know what you think! Text us! SPONSORED BY: PURE LIBERTY LABS, PRECISION WELLNESS GROUP, and THE SPECIAL FORCES FOUNDATION In this episode of Security Halt!, Deny Caballero talks with Mike Edwards about his journey from elite infantry and reconnaissance roles to leadership and spiritual growth. They discuss the operational challenges of Afghanistan, the importance of cultural understanding, and the transition from combat-focused missions to mentorship. Mike also shares how faith, prayer, and community helped him navigate identity shifts after service. This conversation highlights the deep connection between military excellence, personal purpose, and spiritual grounding. 

Last time we spoke about the battle over Changfukeng Hill. In the frost-bit dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, two empires faced a cliff of fate: Soviet and Japanese, each convinced that Changkufeng belonged to them. Diplomats urged restraint, yet Tokyo's generals brewed a daring plan, strike at night, seize the crest, then bargain. Sato and Suetaka debated risk and restraint, weighing "dokudan senko" against disciplined action as rain hissed on the ground. Night fell like velvet. Nakano, a quiet, meticulous regimental leader, gathered the 75th Regiment's veterans, choosing five fearless captains and a rising star, Nakajima, to carry the charge. Scouts and engineers moved ahead, weaving a fragile path across the Tumen: wire-cutters in the dark, signals humming softly, and the thunder of distant Soviet tanks rolling along the shore. At 02:15, after breaches breached and silent men slid through wire, the Japanese surged up the slopes with bayonets glinting, swords ready, and nerves as taut as steel. The crest lunged with savage resistance: grenades flashed, machine guns roared, and leaders fell. By 05:15, dawn broke, and the hill, Course of blood and courage, stood in Japanese hands.   #180 A premature Japanese Victory over Changkufeng Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. On 31 July 1938, dawn seemed to indicate Changkufeng Hill was in Japanese hands. From his command post, Colonel Sato Kotoku, his regimental staff, and most of Hirahara's 3rd Battalion had been anxiously watching the progress of the 1st Battalion's operations since 12:30 on 31 July. Around 03:00, the Japanese infantry commanders issued "heroic orders to charge," audible above the withering fire. Sato expected the crest to fall in little more than an hour; when no signal shell burst over the hill, he grew apprehensive, praying for success with his heart breaking. A mile away on Hill 52, the troops could discern no voices, only gunfire and the spectacular glow of flares and tracers. As one soldier recalled "It was like fireflies," another soldier added "it was like a carnival". To Sasai, on the heights at Kucheng, it was, as he put it, "c'était un grand spectacle." By the way I think its one of the only times I've read a Japanese soldier using French, what he said translates to "it was a large spectacle", I am from Quebec so I speak baguette. The mist moved up Changkufeng Hill, and Japanese troops followed it, fighting for hours. Fearing Nakano's battalion might have been wiped out, Sato's staff prayed for fog. Sato later admitted, "By dawn we were failing to take our objectives."   At the base of Chiangchunfeng, Sato held the 6th Company in reserve, ready to attack Changkufeng from the left. He would have preferred not to commit it, given the danger of an accidental fire-fight with friendly forces. Nevertheless, as combat intensified, Sato decided to push the company into support of the 1st Battalion. After orders at 03:15, Ito moved toward the northwest side of Changkufeng. The Russians laid down heavy fire, especially from a well-placed machine-gun position on the far left. Ito's company, suffering heavy and needlessly casualties, had to hold near the middle of the slope. A runner was sent to the regimental command post requesting artillery support after dawn. By 04:30, Sato could discern the Changkufeng crest, where fierce close-quarters fighting raged between Japanese and Russians on the south edge, while the enemy continually sent reinforcements, troops followed by tanks, up the northern slope. Ito's company was visible on the western slope, bravely bearing a Japanese flag. 10-15 minutes later, grenade-discharger fire began to blast the Soviet positions. At 04:40, Ito, redeploying at dawn, observed elements of the 1st Company near the hill's summit. Contact was established with Inagaki's men. The Russians began to show signs of disarray under the grenade dischargers and the heavy weapons deployed by the reserve battalion at Chiangchunfeng. Thereupon Ito's company charged as well, capturing the northwest corner of Changkufeng roughly concurrently with the main body of the 1st Battalion under Sakata. Ito was wounded and evacuated; two sergeants were later cited in dispatches. Meanwhile, the 10th Company, led by Takeshita of the 3rd Battalion, was to conduct a separate night assault against fire points around Hill 24, about 1,000 meters north of Changkufeng. The aim was to disrupt Russian withdrawal along the slopes to the rear and to hinder reinforcements. At midnight, the company left the skirts of Chiangchunfeng in fog and darkness. Moving stealthily over the undulating terrain, they faced knee-deep bogs and tall vegetation. After evading sentries, they penetrated behind the enemy. By 02:00, five teams totaling 16 men under Sergeant Uchibori were ready to strike Hill 24. Takeshita led the charge from the right and overran the defenders by 02:20. The Russians, numbering 20 to 30 riflemen with one machine gun, fled toward Khasan, leaving four soldiers behind whom the Japanese bayoneted. Takeshita's company continued to consolidate Hill 24, awaiting counterattacks, which soon followed. At 04:00, eight tanks, with headlights on, launched an attack from the Shachaofeng sector, supported by an infantry company . Takeshita reinforced Uchibori's unit with assault teams; the Russian infantry were routed, and five tanks were knocked out. At dawn, about 100 Soviet troops were observed retreating from the direction of Changkufeng, surprised and mowed down by heavy and light machine guns at ranges of about 300 meters. At 06:30, the Soviets attacked again with an infantry battalion and a machine-gun company from north of Khasan. The Japanese allowed them to close, then concentrated the firepower of both infantry platoons plus heavy machine guns. After a 30-minute firefight with heavy casualties on the Soviet side, the Russians fell back. Again, at 07:10, the Soviets struck from the north of Khasan, this time with one company and five tanks. Russian infantry, supported by three tanks, pushed in front of the Japanese positions, but machine-gun and small-arms fire forced them to retreat eastward, the tanks being stopped 50 meters from the lines. Meanwhile, two Japanese enlisted men on patrol near the lake encountered armor; they attacked and, after taking casualties, returned with captured ammunition and equipment. One rapid-fire piece had been providing covering fire behind Takeshita's unit and opened fire on three tanks attacking north of Changkufeng, helping to stop them. As daybreak arrived, Takeshita's company cleared the battlefield, retrieved casualties, and reinforced the defenses. Then an order from the regiment transferred the main body to Changkufeng. Leaving one platoon at Hill 24, Takeshita came directly under Hirahara's command. Takeshita was later officially cited by the regiment. If Hill 52 fell, Changkufeng would be lost. The Russians understood the importance of this constricted sector as well. Their armor could swing south of Khasan, while the terrain to the north was boggier and could be made impassable by the field-artillery battery emplaced on the Korean side of the Tumen. To check hostile reinforcements into this vital region, Sato had dispatched an infantry element to Hill 52 early. Northward, he had 1st Lieutenant Hisatsune emplacement the two 75-millimeter mountain pieces belonging to his infantry gun battery, together with two of 2nd Lieutenant Saito's three 20-millimeter anti-tank guns and the two 37-millimeter infantry rapid-fire guns belonging to 2nd Lieutenant Kutsukake's battalion gun battery. At 23:00 on 30 July, in accord with Nakano's orders, Hisatsune moved these six guns to the ridgeline between Changkufeng and Hill 52. Apart from the guns to the left, defense of Hill 52 was entrusted to the experienced Master Sergeant Murakoshi Kimio, 2nd Platoon leader in Nakajima's company. After the Shachaofeng affair, Murakoshi was ordered to occupy the hill. Moving along the shore on 30 July, his unit encountered neither friendly nor hostile troops. The regimental records note that "some enemy unit came into the dip east of Hill 52 since morning on the 30th, and both sides were watching each other." Murakoshi deployed his three rifle squads, totaling 34 men. After Nakano's battalion jumped off on 31 July, the platoon observed not only the "fireworks display" but also Soviet motorized units with lights aglow, moving on high ground east of Khasan. Later, tanks could be heard clanking toward Hill 52. Around 04:00, Murakoshi organized anti-tank teams and sent them into action. Most accounts emphasize the anti-tank efforts, rather than the fire of Murakoshi's machine gunners. Three privates, carrying anti-tank mines, undertook daring assaults once the terrain obliged the Russian tanks to slow. They laid their mines, but the soil proved too soft, and the attempt failed. In the most publicized episode, Private First Class Matsuo, nicknamed a "human bullet," was badly wounded by machine-gun fire from a tank and knocked from the vehicle, but he managed to reboard with a satchel charge and, it is said, stop the tank at the cost of his life. The platoon leader and his remaining 20 men, having withdrawn 200 meters below their positions, poured torrents of fire at the infantry accompanying the tanks. Flames from the antitank mine assaults provided blazing targets. In concert with Hisatsune's six infantry guns emplaced on the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng, Murakoshi knocked out the remaining two tanks. When the tanks were immobilized, the Soviet troops did not press forward; exposed to Japanese fire, their losses mounted. By daybreak, the Russians had pulled back. Official records describe one Soviet company with four heavy machine guns, led by mounted officers. After hours of intense combat, Colonel Sato and his staff observed that all operations were succeeding by dawn. It was fortunate that Japanese units had posed a threat from the east; only then did the Russians begin to retreat. "But what an incomparably heroic first combat it had been… the scene at Changkufeng was sublime and inspiring. Private feelings were forgotten, and all bowed their heads in respect for the gallant fighting by matchless subordinates." As soon as Sato confirmed that Changkufeng had been occupied, he sent an aide to assess casualties. "When the colonel learned about the death of his capable and dependable officers," a lieutenant recalled, "he… murmured, 'Is that so?' and closed his eyes. The dew glistened on his lids." Meanwhile, in addition to the battle of annihilation at Changkufeng, Major Takenouchi of Okido's regiment was to conduct the dawn assault in the Shachaofeng area. His 1st Battalion and attached elements numbered 379 men; Kanda's company of the Kucheng Border Guard Unit added another 49. An engineer platoon was attached. At 18:00 on 30 July, Takenouchi issued his orders. According to that evening's regimental maps, north of Khasan were two battalions of Soviet infantry and 20 tanks. South of Shachaofeng, the Russians had entanglements and machine-gun nests, with additional emplacements to the rear, west of the lake, and armor moving south toward Changkufeng. Northwest of Shachaofeng lay the main body of Takenouchi's battalion. Signal lines connected his headquarters with Sato's command post. The only Soviet patrol activity noted, as of evening, was in the direction of Matsunobe. Around 02:00, machine guns chattered south of Changkufeng, signaling an increasing intensity of Sato's night assault. On Takenouchi's front, the Russians went on alert, firing illuminating shells and opening fire from the north side of Changkufeng. At 02:30, Matsunobe's unit finished breakfast and moved to the jump-off site. The terrain was difficult and there was considerable enemy tracer fire, but, thanks to effective reconnaissance, the force reached its destination without loss by 04:00. Matsunobe eliminated an outpost unit using rear-area scouts who struck from the rear and gave the enemy little opportunity to respond. Then the Japanese prepared for the main attack as they awaited daybreak. At 04:00, the supporting mountain artillery platoon took position between Matsunobe and Takenouchi. Throughout this period, the sounds of fighting grew more violent toward Changkufeng; machine guns were especially active. At 05:00, three enemy tanks could be seen moving up the northern slope of Changkufeng, but soon after news arrived that friendly forces had seized the crest. With sunrise imminent, the Japanese guns assumed their role. The longest-range support Takenouchi could expect was Narukawa's two 15-centimeter howitzers, emplaced across the Tumen north of Sozan. This battery took position at 04:20, after which the commander went to join Sato just behind the front. Several thousand meters of telephone line had been strung across the river, linking observation post and battery. Narukawa watched the fierce struggle at Changkufeng and prepared to support the dawn assault, while honoring the desperate effort of Ito's company for covering fire. Firing began at 05:10, though range data were not adequate. After little more than ten rounds, the enemy heavy machine guns on the Shachaofeng front subsided. A veteran artilleryman proudly remarked, "These were the first howitzer shells ever fired against the Soviet Army." At 05:20, Takenouchi's own heavy weapons added effective counterfire. Matsunobe and his company had crept to a line 150 meters in front of the Russian positions, taking advantage of dead angles and covered by light machine guns. Three Soviet tanks, however, had pressed forward against the main body. Two Private First Class soldiers, members of a close-quarters team, waited until the lead tank reversed course, then dashed in from the rear and blew it up. Two other soldiers attacked the third tank with mines but could not destroy it because of the tall grass. In a dramatic action that always thrilled Japanese audiences, a Private First Class jumped aboard with a portable mine, while a superior private jammed explosives into the tank's rear and allegedly blew off both treads, though the tank continued firing. While Matsunobe's company laid a smoke screen and prepared to charge, the Soviet tank was knocked out by rapid-fire guns. Master Sergeant Sudo's platoon seized the opportunity to race forward 15 meters and overrun two firing points at 05:40. When the Russians counterattacked with 60 infantrymen and three new tanks, Matsunobe ordered the grenade-discharger squad to fire while he had Sudo pull back to the foot of the hill. Close-quarter teams knocked out the tanks in succession. By this time the Russians had been shaken badly, allowing Matsunobe's main force to surge into two more positions. Five or six remaining Soviet soldiers were wiped out by a combination of Japanese pursuit fire and Soviet gunfire emanating from east of Khasan. After 06:00, the Japanese held the high ground at Shachaofeng. Kanda's unit had achieved a similar result, swinging around Matsunobe and skirting the left of the Soviet positions. Russian artillery opened from the east, but the Japanese used the terrain to advantage and suffered no casualties. Around this time, enemy forces in the Changkufeng area began to retreat, a portion by motor vehicle. Takenouchi had Matsunobe secure the site and, at 06:13, directed the main battalion to advance toward the north side of Khasan. A stubborn four-hour battle then ensued as Soviet forces delayed their retreat and the covering unit occupied the northern edge of the lake. Takenouchi estimated the enemy's strength at two infantry companies, a company of 12 heavy machine guns, and one heavy battery. Several Russian counterattacks were mounted against Matsunobe, while Takenouchi reinforced Kanda. The battalion attacked with great intensity and by 10:30 had managed to encircle the right flank of the enemy defenses at the northwest edge of Khasan. The Russians began to fall back, though one company of infantry resisted vigorously. At 10:50, the Soviet rear-guard company opened fire with machine guns while several tanks delivered heavy machine-gun and cannon fire. Soviet artillery, firing rapidly, also joined the resistance to Takenouchi's advance. Firepower pinned down the Japanese in this sector from late morning until nightfall.    For reasons of necessity as well as doctrine, the night assault on Changkufeng Hill received no artillery support. The dawn assault to clear Shachaofeng, however, required all available firepower, even if limited. Firing diagrams reflect no howitzer fire directed north of Changkufeng; this is understandable since Narukawa had only two pieces to handle numerous targets. A Soviet tank element was driven off, west of the lake, by 03:00 from the skirt of Chiangchunfeng by 3rd Battalion heavy weapons. Sasai, at the Kucheng command post, contends that Japanese artillery scored a significant success: school-tactics were followed, and the battery stood ready in case the night assault by the infantry failed. By dawn, Russian remnants clung to the crest, though the infantry had "peeled the skin" from their defenses. "In the morning, one of our howitzer shells hit near Changkufeng, whereupon the last of the enemy fled." Survivors of the night assault recalled no direct artillery support by Japanese artillery, though firing charts suggest some; Soviet sources dispute this. Regimental records note: "After firing against positions southwest of Shachaofeng, the Narukawa battery fired to cut off the enemy's retreat path from Shachaofeng and to neutralize the foe's superior artillery. Results were great." In the morning, Sato returned to Chiangchunfeng, observed the difficult anti-artillery combat by the Narukawa battery, and commended their performance. He watched howitzer fire disrupt Soviet artillery positions opposite Shachaofeng and estimated enemy strength at a battalion. Sato saw Russian horse-drawn artillery blasted from its sites and pulled back north of Khasan. Narukawa's first targets were positions and tanks south of Shachaofeng. Northeast of the lake, one battery of Russians headed north after dawn. In Narukawa's firing pattern, north of the lake, a Soviet motorized unit of more than ten vehicles withdrew in the afternoon. A new Russian artillery formation moving north of Khasan that afternoon received the heaviest fire from the howitzers. On that day Narukawa's two active pieces fired a total of 74 rounds. The only other Japanese artillery support for the infantry consisted of the half-battery of 75-millimeter mountain guns already forward. The platoon under 2nd Lieutenant Ikue moved west of Shachaofeng, starting from behind Kanda at 04:00, and bombarded Soviet positions to the northeast. Firing a lighter projectile than Narukawa's pieces, Ikue's men fired 162 shells and 37 shrapnel rounds at the Russians. Colonel Tanaka, the artillery regiment commander, reached the front during the night as battle's fury peaked from Changkufeng. Tanaka's mission was to take over Narukawa's battery and support infantry combat from dawn. Upon establishing his headquarters, Tanaka sent a liaison officer to the 75th Regiment. The 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion completed unloading at Shikai Station in the night, and at 03:40, it entered emplacements on the north side of Nanpozan. Tanaka ordered Rokutanda to repel any enemy attacks that might be staged from Changkufeng and north of Yangkuanping. The battalion made good use of prior surveys and proved helpful in thwarting offensive attempts from the vicinity of Shachaofeng after daybreak. Rokutanda also coordinated with Narukawa to cut off the Soviet retreat route after enemy motorized and infantry forces began to fall back from Shachaofeng.   At Changkufeng, once the last Russians had been routed, two hours of quiet settled over both sides. The Japanese busied themselves with cleaning up the field, retrieving casualties, and bearing the dead to the rear. The few Japanese historians who have worked with 75th Regiment records have argued with a dramatic passage describing dawn: "From 05:15, after the top had been secured by us, the fog began to drift in. At about 05:30 rain started to drench the whole area; therefore, enemy artillery had to stop firing. God's will." Sakata counters that no Russian artillery shelled the peak after his men had cleared it. Sato agrees; only in the afternoon did at least 20 Soviet guns, emplaced north of the lake, open fire at Changkufeng. At first, Russian shells fell harmlessly into a pond nearby; Sato recalls fish splashing out. Thereafter, Soviet gunners gradually corrected their aim, but the Japanese took cover behind rocks and sustained no casualties. Soviet shellfire may have begun at dawn but appeared to be directed mainly toward Shachaofeng, where Soviet defenders were not evicted until an hour after Changkufeng fell. Tanaka, however, argues that when he arrived at the front at 05:00, Russian artillery was firing on objectives west of the Tumen, and several shells struck his men and guns. Japanese firing charts show that Soviet guns initially bombarded Takenouchi's sector at Shachaofeng from two positions north and northeast of Khasan. After these Russian positions were forced to evacuate, the new Soviet gun unit that arrived in the afternoon engaged not only Changkufeng but also the area of the Japanese regimental headquarters. A Japanese military history suggests that Chiangchunfeng, the site of the observation post for the heavy field-artillery battery, was hit early in the morning, just after Takenouchi's ground assault against Shachaofeng had begun. The only other Russian artillery fire noted is the early-morning bombardment of the region of Hill 52. This shelling emanated from a point southeast of the lake but appeared directed primarily against Hisatsune's guns, which pulled back to Changkufeng at 06:00. Takeshita's company, which had jumped off at 02:00 and struck to the rear of Changkufeng toward the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, sustained severe enemy artillery fire after dawn. The main body secured the positions it had captured, while one platoon occupied Hill 24. On Takenouchi's front, intense enemy artillery fire continued after the Shachaofeng district was cleared, but the battalion maintained its position throughout the day. At 20:00, Takenouchi pulled back to the heights northwest of Shachaofeng. Elements of Matsunobe's unit on the right flank clung to advanced positions southeast of Shachaofeng. Regarding the theological allusion to merciful rain at dawn, no interviewee recalled a torrential downpour at Changkufeng. One soldier remembered descending from the crest at 08:30, taking breakfast, and returning for battlefield cleanup an hour later, at which time it began to drizzle. The 75th Regiment's weather record for Sunday, 31 July, simply states, "Cloudy; sunrise 05:08."   At 06:40, Colonel Sato ordered Hirahara's 3rd Battalion to relieve Nakano's mauled 1st Battalion and Ito's company atop Changkufeng. The 1st Battalion was to become the regimental reserve force, assemble at Chiangchunfeng, and collect its dead and wounded. Shortly after 08:00, Hirahara arrived at the crest of Changkufeng. Sakata was still upright, blood-streaked. "It's all right now," Hirahara told him. "You can go down." Sakata limped away with the remnants of the 1st Battalion. At the command post he met Sato, who praised him, promised to replace his damaged sword with one of his own, and told him to head for the hospital. When he protested, Sato bellowed, more in pride than anger, "To the hospital with you!" Sakata went, leaving Kuriyama as acting company commander. That morning, Sato climbed Changkufeng and gave Hirahara instructions. He commended the heavy field artillery battery commander, Narukawa, for his effective support of Takenouchi's dawn attack at Shachaofeng. Before returning to his command post, Sato carefully supervised the collection of Japanese dead. He looked into the face of each man and bade him farewell, a regiment officer recalls. "His sincerity and sorrow inspired reverence in all of us." In the afternoon, Sato sent Oshima back to Haigan to report the victory to forces in the rear, to visit the families of the fallen, and to "exert a beneficial influence on the native inhabitants lest they become confused and upset by the recent fighting." After the Russians had been ousted from Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, information became available to Japanese headquarters concerning the extent of the victory and the price. The 75th Regiment put Soviet casualties at 300 men in each area and claimed a total of 17 tanks knocked out during the operations—seven at Changkufeng, three at Hill 52, seven at Shachaofeng. Assault infantrymen noted that few Soviet bodies were found in the crestline positions, other than those cut down by cold steel; many Russians were presumably wounded by grenades. Colonel Sato asserts that 30 Soviet corpses were picked up in the Changkufeng area after the night attack. Most Japanese survivors judge that Soviet casualties were at least double those incurred by their own forces. The Japanese used much of the materiel they had captured. The price had been grim in the assault units: 45 killed, 133 wounded. In both Colonel Nakano's and Colonel Takenouchi's battalions, about 25 percent of the officers and almost 10 percent of the men were killed or wounded. The main assault waves, chiefly the 1st and 2nd infantry companies and 1st Machine-Gun Company of Colonel Nakano's unit, suffered as many as one-half or two-thirds casualties, down to platoons and squads. Before the night attack, Colonel Nakano's battalion had a total of 401 men. The strength of Shimomura's battalion had diminished by only 17: Hirahara's by 10. Nakano's unit lost over 80 percent of all Japanese killed and wounded in the Changkufeng–Hill 52 sector.  Japanese accounts were lavish in their praise of Colonel Sato's conception and execution of the night-dawn assaults. "Everybody had conducted several inspections of the front, yet only two or three individuals were acquainted with the precise sector where we carried out our assault." The costly lack of comprehensive intelligence necessitated reduction of firing points in succession and made the assault on the peak, the true key, possible only at the end. "This was a rather difficult method. It would have been better to have thrown one small unit against one firing point invariably and to have used the main force to break through the depth of the foe swiftly." On the larger benefits of the night operation, Akaishizawa wrote, "We prevented the main hostile forces, numbering several thousand troops concentrated east of Khasan about 600 or 700 meters behind Changkufeng, from laying a finger on us." Sato regards the night attack as a success: "The Soviets would have taken over the entire region unless checked." But with respect to Suetaka's words of praise for Sato himself, one candid division staff officer does not share what he calls "extravagant laudation." "The night-attack plan had been devised long in advance. I do not see anything particularly brilliant about it. Only in terms of results could one call the assault well done." Sakata concurs but stresses that training paid off: "All the men in my company followed their leaders to the crest and thus displayed their teamwork and unity," despite the unexpectedly severe casualties. The Soviets seemed particularly apprehensive about the possibility of Japanese armored operations. Antitank weapons were deployed on the eastern slopes of Changkufeng, ready to fire against the axis of Hill 52, which theoretically was good tank country. Illuminating shells and flares were employed profusely in concert with heavy machine guns firing blue tracers from the time Japanese troops entered the zone of wire defenses. Tanks supplemented the fire network, as did artillery zeroed in east of Khasan. But it was the grenades, in "heaps and mounds," that troubled the attackers most: "This tactic must be one of the most important aspects of Soviet infantry training, together with snipers. Our night assault unit did not sustain too many casualties until the crest but, since we could not run up into the positions, the foe was able to hurl many milk-bottle-size grenades. Our forces must be given more training with hand grenades".  The first phone call to Seoul did not come until Changkufeng had been assaulted and cleared. Around 05:00 the division learned that victory had been achieved at Changkufeng; the first reports mentioned no Japanese casualties. "Thank God!" was the reaction. Suetaka and the major toasted Sato's victory with sake. "At 06:00, one company of the Sato unit occupied Shachaofeng and expelled the Soviet forces across the border." Not long afterward, the division, like the 75th Regiment, began to learn the extent of the casualties. Although personal sorrow displaced initial elation, there was grim satisfaction that the insolent Russians had been ousted and the dignity of the Imperial Army maintained. It was hoped and expected that the Korea Army would share this view. Seoul had learned of the Japanese assaults only after the fact and in a rather cursory fashion. Nakamura ordered the front-line units to secure the heights and to localize the affair by limiting the strength used in that area and by ensuring cautious action.  Nakamura's orders to not expand upon the victory were criticized heavily. However Tsuchiya recalled "The decision was taken too easily. Perhaps some had covert opposition, but no one spoke up. I think there was some misunderstanding of individual positions. Yet the crisis should have been analyzed carefully. It is too bad that there was no direct supervision by the Chief of Staff." For Tsuchiya, the Korea Army would have been in trouble if the incident had dragged on because of Soviet buildup and Japanese casualties and low mobilization. Although Nakamura likely wished the 19th Division to abandon unnecessary actions regardless of victory or defeat, he did not seem to care; he showed no intention of inspecting the local scene. Yet Tsuchiya felt such a keen sense of responsibility that he was prepared to commit suicide if matters went wrong. Inada argued that Nakamura did not visit the front to avoid expanding the troubles and disturbing the troops. Analyzing the Korea Army's nebulous control, Imaoka notes that Nakamura had only recently arrived in Korea and had little time before fighting began, but something seemed lacking in the army's exercise of command. Thus, Nakamura never met Suetaka until after the incident had been resolved, although the governor-general came from Seoul to visit Suetaka at the battlefront and to express appreciation in person. "It was quite proper to adhere to the policy of nonenlargement, but the Korea Army should have furnished more positive operational guidance in such a case when a subordinate division was in serious trouble." There were important lessons to be learned here, Tsuchiya recalled  "The 19th Division attacked the Russians twice in 36 hours without army orders or approval. How is it that the division commander, a lieutenant general and certainly not an reckless man, could have been allowed so much margin to act independently?" Some suggest that Suetaka tended to violate the spirit of the law, especially in force majeure. Others think that Suetaka was loyal, deliberate, and law-abiding, a worrier who could be expected to follow orders. Why risk one's career—one's life, given that self-censure loomed—when headquarters' decision was available? Military discipline and national interest dictated prior consultation and compliance. Or did Suetaka, like other notable generals, think gambles were justified by the goddess of Victory? I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A daring Japanese night assault, led by Colonel Sato and his bold captains, threaded through fog, wire, and enemy fire. As dawn broke, the crest fell into Japanese hands, after brutal stand-ins on Hill 52 and Shachaofeng. Glinting grenades, roaring tanks, and disciplined infantry forged the victory, at a heavy price: dozens of officers and many men lost.   

The "Long Tail" Logistical Supply and Heroic Resupply Missions — James Holland — Holland explains the critical "Long Tail" logistical support infrastructure that sustained the regiment's operational capability despite mounting casualties during rapid mechanized advance into Belgium. Holland describes the eccentric personality of Baron Lord Leigh, a regimental officer whose unconventional behavior masked genuine leadership capability. Holland recounts a desperate night combat operation at Gheel wherein soldier George Stanton heroically executed resupply missions to a trapped squadron surrounded by German Jagdpanther tank destroyers, demonstrating exceptional courage and logistical improvisation under extraordinary threat conditions.

Relentless Drive into Germany: Personal Loss Amid Victory — James Holland — Holland details the regiment's relentless mechanized push into Germany, from the destructive Operation Veritable through the dramatic Rhine Rivercrossing, chronicling the escalating tempo of combat operations. Holland illustrates the war's profound personal costs through the tragedy of Stuart Hills, who experienced overwhelming grief over the death of his closest friend Dennis Elmore merely weeks before German capitulation, embodying the devastating human consequences of protracted warfare. Holland juxtaposes moments of lingering humanity and compassion against the mechanized brutality of tank warfare, documenting how soldiers maintained moral and emotional resilience despite systematic exposure to death and destruction.

Ceasefire and Post-War Legacy — James Holland — Holland describes the final ceasefire order received at a German farmyard, evoking the profound mixture of "immense relief and overwhelming grief" experienced by surviving regiment members who had endured years of combat and witnessed countless comrades' deaths. Hollandtraces the post-war lives of veterans including Arthur Reddish and John Semken, documenting their transition from combat to civilian life and the lasting psychological impact of sustained warfare. Holland concludes by noting that the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry continues to exist in contemporary Britain as an integral component of the Royal Yeomanry, maintaining institutional continuity and commemorating the regiment's extraordinary combat history and sacrifice during World War II.

This is the 2nd part of the story of Miles, a British National Service conscript during his military service in the late 1950s. I'd like to give special thanks for the Norfolk Tank Museum for highlighting Miles' story and one of his relatives for putting me in contact with him. Throughout the episode, our Miles shares captivating anecdotes and the thrill of being part of a light armoured reconnaissance regiment. He vividly recounts the challenges of operating various armoured vehicles, including the Saladin and Saracen, and the responsibilities that came with being on the front lines of military operations. One of the most intriguing aspects of his service was the border patrols, where he and his comrades would venture into the woods, often encountering their East German counterparts. The tension of those moments, coupled with the knowledge that they were living in a semi-war footing, adds a layer of gravity to his experiences. ⁠Help me preserve Cold War history. ⁠⁠ You'll become part of our community, get ad-free episodes, and get a sought-after CWC coaster as a thank you and you'll bask in the warm glow of knowing you are helping to preserve Cold War history. Just go to ⁠⁠⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/⁠⁠⁠ If a monthly contribution is not your cup of tea, We also welcome one-off donations via the same link. Episode Extras ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/episode434/ Find the ideal gift for the Cold War enthusiast in your life! Just go to ⁠https://coldwarconversations.com/store/⁠ CONTINUE  THE COLD WAR CONVERSATION Follow us on BlueSky ⁠https://bsky.app/profile/coldwarpod.bsky.social⁠ Follow us on Threads ⁠https://www.threads.net/@coldwarconversations⁠ Follow us on Twitter/X ⁠https://twitter.com/ColdWarPod⁠ Facebook ⁠https://www.facebook.com/groups/coldwarpod/⁠ Instagram ⁠https://www.instagram.com/coldwarconversations/⁠ Youtube ⁠https://youtube.com/@ColdWarConversations Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle of lake Khasan. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, two empires, Soviet and Japanese, stared at Changkufeng, each certain the ridge would decide their fate. Diplomats urged restraint, but Tokyo's generals plotted a bold gamble: seize the hill with a surprise strike and bargain afterward. In the Japanese camp, a flurry of trains, orders, and plans moved in the night. Officers like Sato and Suetaka debated danger and responsibility, balancing "dokudan senko", independent action with disciplined restraint. As rain hammered the earth, they contemplated a night assault: cross the Tumen, occupy Hill 52, and strike Changkufeng with coordinated dawn and night attacks. Engineers, artillery, and infantry rehearsed their movements in near-poetic precision, while the 19th Engineers stitched crossings and bridges into a fragile path forward. Across the river, Soviet scouts and border guards held their nerve, counting enemy shadows and watching for a break in the line. The clash at Shachaofeng became a lightning rod: a small force crossed into Manchurian soil in the restless dark, provoking a broader crisis just as diplomacy teetered.   #179 From Darkness to Crest: The Changkufeng Battle Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As remarked in the 19th division's war journal "With sunset on the 30th, the numbers of enemy soldiers increased steadily. Many motor vehicles, and even tanks, appear to have moved up. The whole front has become tense. Hostile patrols came across the border frequently, even in front of Chiangchunfeng. Tank-supported infantry units were apparently performing offensive deployment on the high ground south of Shachaofeng." Situation maps from the evening indicated Soviet patrol activity approaching the staging area of Nakano's unit near the Tumen, moving toward Noguchi's company to the left of Chiangchunfeng, and advancing toward Matsunobe's unit southwest of Shachaofeng. Russian vessels were depicted ferrying across Khasan, directly behind Changkufeng, while tanks moved south from Shachaofeng along the western shores of the lake. The 19th division's war journal states "Then it was ascertained that these attack forces had gone into action. All of our own units quietly commenced counteraction from late that night, as scheduled, after having systematically completed preparations since nightfall." Meanwhile, to the north, the Hunchun garrison reinforced the border with a battalion and tightened security. All evidence supported the view that Suetaka "in concept" and Sato"(in tactics" played the main part in the night-attack planning and decisions. Sato was the only infantry regimental commander at the front on 30 July. One division staff officer went so far as to say that Suetaka alone exerted the major influence, that Sato merely worked out details, including the type of attack and the timing. Intertwined with the decision to attack Changkufeng was the choice of an infantry regiment. The 76th Regiment was responsible for the defense of the sector through its Border Garrison Unit; but the latter had no more than two companies to guard a 40-mile border extending almost to Hunchun, and Okido's regimental headquarters was 75 miles to the rear at Nanam. T. Sato's 73rd Regiment was also at Nanam, while Cho's 74th Regiment was stationed another 175 miles southwest at Hamhung. Thus, the regiment nearest to Changkufeng was K. Sato's 75th, 50 miles away at Hoeryong. Although Suetaka had had time to shuffle units if he desired, Sasai suggested that troop movements from Nanam could not be concealed; from Hoeryong they might be termed maneuvers. Suetaka undoubtedly had favorites in terms of units as well as chiefs. K. Sato had served longest as regimental commander, since October 1937; Okido's date of rank preceded K. Sato's, but Okido had not taken command until 1938. He and Cho were able enough, but they were unknown quantities; T. Sato and Cho were brand-new colonels.  Thus, K. Sato was best known to Suetaka and was familiar with the terrain. While he did not regard his regiment as the equal of units in the Kwantung Army or in the homeland, K. Sato's training program was progressing well and his men were rugged natives of Nagano and Tochigi prefectures. From the combat soldier's standpoint, the Changkufeng Incident was waged between picked regulars on both sides. The matter of quantitative regimental strength could have played no part in Suetaka's choice. The 74th, 75th, and 76th regiments each possessed 1,500 men; the 73rd, 1,200. Even in ordinary times, every unit conducted night-attack training, attended by Suetaka, but there was nothing special in July, even after the general inspected the 75th Regiment on the 11th. It had been said that the most efficient battalions were selected for the action. Although, of course, Sato claimed that all of his battalions were good, from the outset he bore the 1st Battalion in mind for the night attack and had it reconnoiter the Changkufeng area. Some discerned no special reasons; it was probably a matter of numerical sequence, 1st-2nd-3rd Battalions. Others called the choice a happy coincidence because of the 1st Battalion's 'splendid unity' and the aggressive training conducted by Major Ichimoto, who had reluctantly departed recently for regimental headquarters. Coming from the 75th Regiment headquarters to take over the 1st Battalion was the 40-year-old aide Major Nakano. By all accounts, he was quiet, serious, and hard-working, a man of noble character, gentle and sincere. More the administrative than commander type, Nakano lacked experience in commanding battalions and never had sufficient time to get to know his new unit (or they, him) before the night assault. He could hardly be expected to have stressed anything particular in training. Since there was no battalion-level training, the most valid unit of comparison in the regiment was the company, the smallest infantry component trained and equipped to conduct combat missions independently. Sato valued combat experience among subordinates; Nakano's 1st Battalion was considered a veteran force by virtue of its old-timer company commanders. All but one had come up through the ranks; the exception, young Lieutenant Nakajima, the darling of Sato, was a military academy graduate. For assault actions synchronized with those of the 1st Battalion, Sato selected Ito, the one line captain commanding the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion, and Takeshita, 10th Company commander, one of the two line captains of the 3rd Battalion. In short, Sato had designated five veteran captains and a promising lieutenant to conduct the night-attack operations of 30-31 July, the first Japanese experience of battle against the modern Red Army. During the last two weeks of July, numerous spurious farmers had gambled along the lower reaches of the Tumen, reconnoitered the terrain, and prepared for a crossing and assault. Scouts had operated on both the Manchurian and Korean sides of the river. Major Nakano had conducted frequent personal reconnaissance and had dispatched platoon and patrol leaders, all heavy-weapons observation teams, and even the battalion doctor to Sozan Hill, to Chiangchunfeng, and close to enemy positions. In Korean garb and often leading oxen, the scouts had threaded their way through the Changkufeng sector, sometimes holing up for the night to observe Soviet movements, soil and topography, and levels of illumination. From this data, Nakano had prepared reference materials necessary for an assault. Hirahara, then located at Kucheng BGU Headquarters, had established three observation posts on high ground to the rear. After Chiangchunfeng had been occupied, Hirahara had set up security positions and routes there. Regarding Changkufeng, he had sought to ensure that even the lowest private studied the layout. Formation commanders such as Takeshita had volunteered frequently. Sato had also utilized engineers. Since the order to leave his station on 17 July, Lieutenant Colonel Kobayashi had had his regiment engage in scouting routes, bridges, and potential fords. Sato's 1st Company commander had prepared a sketch during 3% hours of reconnaissance across from Hill 52 during the afternoon of 18 July. Captain Yamada's intelligence had contributed to the tactical decisions and to knowledge of Russian strength and preparations. The most important information had been his evaluation of attack approaches, suggesting an offensive from the western side, preferably against the right flank or frontally. This concept had been the one applied by the regiment in its night assault two weeks later; Yamada had died on the green slopes he had scanned. Cloudy Saturday, 30 July, had drawn to a close. The moment had been at hand for the 75th Regiment to storm the Russians atop Changkufeng. Setting out from Fangchuanting at 22:30, Nakano's battalion, about 350 strong, had assembled at a fork one kilometer southwest of Changkufeng. The roads had been knee-deep in mud due to intermittent rain and downpours on 29–30 July. Now the rain had subsided, but clouds had blotted out the sky after the waning moon had set at 22:30. Led by Sakata's 1st Platoon leader, the men had marched silently toward the southern foot of Changkufeng; the murk had deepened and the soldiers could see no more than ten meters ahead. It had taken Sakata's men less than an hour to push forward the last 1,000 meters to the jump-off point, where they had waited another two hours before X-hour arrived. Scouts had advanced toward the first row of wire, 200–300 meters away. Platoon Leader Amagasa had infiltrated the positions alone and had reconnoitered the southeastern side of the heights. Sakata had heard from the patrols about the entanglements and their distance and makeup. While awaiting paths to be cut by engineer teams, the infantry had moved up as far as possible, 150 meters from the enemy, by 23:30. Although records described Changkufeng as quite steep, it had not been hard to climb until the main Russian positions were reached, even though there were cliffs. But as the craggy peak had been neared, the enemy defenses, which had taken advantage of rocks and dips, could not have been rushed in a bound. It had been 500 meters to the crest from the gently sloping base. The incline near the top had been steep at about 40 degrees and studded with boulders. Farther down were more soil and gravel. Grass had carpeted the foot. Japanese Army radio communications had been in their infancy; wire as well as runners had served as the main means of linking regimental headquarters with the front-line infantry, crossing-point engineers, and supporting guns across the Tumen in Korea. From Chiangchunfeng to the 1st Battalion, lines had been installed from the morning of 29 July. Combat communications had been operated by the small regimental signal unit, 27 officers and men. In general, signal traffic had been smooth and reception was good. Engineer support had been rendered by one platoon, primarily to assist with wire-cutting operations. Nakano had ordered his 1st Company to complete clearing the wire by 02:00. At 23:30 the cutters had begun their work on the right with three teams under 1st Lieutenant Inagaki. Since the proposed breach had been far from the enemy positions and there were no outposts nearby, Inagaki had pressed the work of forced clearing. The first entanglements had been breached fairly quickly, then the second. At about midnight, a dim light had etched the darkness, signaling success. There had been two gaps on the right. On the left side, Sakata's company had hoped to pierce the barbed wire in secrecy rather than by forced clearing. Only one broad belt of entanglements, actually the first and third lines, had been reconnoitered along the south and southeastern slopes. Sakata had assigned one team of infantry, with a covering squad led by Master Sergeant Amagasa, to the engineer unit under 2nd Lieutenant Nagayama. Covert clearing of a pair of gaps had begun. The Russian stakes had been a meter apart and the teams cut at the center of each section, making breaches wide enough for a soldier to wriggle through. To the rear, the infantry had crouched expectantly, while from the direction of Khasan the rumble of Soviet armor could be heard. At 00:10, when the first line of wire had been penetrated and the cutters were moving forward, the silence had been broken by the furious barking of Russian sentry dogs, and pale blue flares had burst over the slopes. As recalled by an engineer "It had been as bright as day. If only fog would cover us or it would start to rain!" At the unanticipated second line, the advancing clearing elements had drawn gunfire and grenades. But the Russians had been taken by surprise, Sakata said, and their machine guns had been firing high. Two engineers had been wounded; the security patrol on the left flank may have drawn the fire. Sakata had crawled up to Lieutenant Nagayama's cutting teams. One party had been hiding behind a rock, with a man sticking out his hand, grasping for the stake and feeling for electrified wire. Another soldier lay nearby, ready to snip the wire. The enemy had seemed to have discerned the Japanese, for the lieutenant could hear low voices. Although the cutters had been told to continue clearing in secrecy, they had by now encountered a line of low barbed wire and the work had not progressed as expected. Forced clearing had begun, which meant that the men had to stand or kneel, ignoring hostile fire and devoting primary consideration to speed. The infantrymen, unable to delay, had crawled through the wire as soon as the cutters tore a gap. Ten meters behind the small breaches, as well as in front of the Soviet positions, the Japanese had been troubled by fine low strands. They had resembled piano-wire traps, a foot or so off the ground. The wires had been invisible in the grass at night. As one soldier recalled "You couldn't disengage easily. When you tried to get out, you'd be sniped at. The wires themselves could cut a bit, too." Sakata had kept up with the clearing teams and urged them on. On his own initiative, Amagasa had his men break the first and third lines of wire by 01:50. Meanwhile, at 01:20, Nakano had phoned Sato, reporting that his forces had broken through the lines with little resistance, and had recommended that the attack be launched earlier than 2:00. Perhaps the premature alerting of the Russians had entered into Nakano's considerations. Sato had explained matters carefully, that is, rejected the suggestion, saying Changkufeng must not be taken too early, lest the enemy at Shachaofeng be alerted. The entire battalion, redeployed, had been massed for the charge up the slope. In an interval of good visibility, the troops could see as far as 40 meters ahead. A little before 02:00, Nakano had sent runners to deliver the order to advance. When the final obstructions had been cut, Nagayama had flashed a light. Then a white flag had moved in the darkness and the infantry had moved forward. Sakata's company, heading directly for Changkufeng crest, had less ground to traverse than Yamada's, and the point through which they penetrated the wire had been at the fork, where there appeared to have been only two lines to cut. The soldiers had crawled on their knees and one hand and had taken cover as soon as they got through. It had been 02:15 when the battalion traversed the barbed wire and began the offensive. The Japanese Army manual had stated that unaimed fire was seldom effective at night and that it had been imperative to avoid confusion resulting from wild shooting. At Changkufeng, the use of firearms had been forbidden by regimental order. Until the troops had penetrated the wire, bayonets had not been fixed because of the danger to friendly forces. Once through the entanglements, the men had attached bayonets, but, although their rifles had been loaded, they still had not been allowed to fire. The men had been traveling light. Instead of the 65 pounds the individual rifleman might ordinarily carry, knapsack, weapons and ammunition, tools, supplies, and clothing, each helmeted soldier had only 60 cartridges, none on his back, a haversack containing two grenades, a canteen, and a gas mask. To prevent noise, the regulations had prescribed wrapping metal parts of bayonets, canteens, sabers, mess kits, shovels, picks, and hobnails with cloth or straw. The wooden and metal parts of the shovel had been separated, the canteen filled, ammunition pouches stuffed with paper, and the bayonet sheath wrapped with cloth. Instead of boots, the men had worn web-toed, rubbersoled ground socks to muffle sound. Although their footgear had been bound with straw ropes, the soldiers occasionally had slipped in the wet grass. Considerations of security had forbidden relief of tension by talking, coughing, or smoking. Company commanders and platoon leaders had carried small white flags for hand signaling. In Sakata's company, the platoons had been distinguished by white patches of cloth hung over the gas masks on the men's backs, triangular pieces for the 1st Platoon, square for the second. Squad leaders had worn white headbands under their helmets. The company commanders had strapped on a white cross-belt; the platoon leaders, a single band. Officer casualties had proven particularly severe because the identification belts had been too conspicuous; even when the officers had lay flat, Soviet illuminating shells had made their bodies visible. On the left, the 2nd Company, 70–80 strong, had moved up with platoons abreast and scouts ahead. About 10 meters had separated the individual platoons advancing in four files; in the center were Sakata and his command team. The same setup had been used for Yamada's company and his two infantry platoons on the right. To the center and rear of the lead companies were battalion headquarters, a platoon of Nakajima's 3rd Company, and the Kitahara Machine-Gun Company, 20 meters from Nakano. The machine-gun company had differed from the infantry companies in that it had three platoons of two squads each. The machine-gun platoons had gone through the center breach in the entanglements with the battalion commander. Thereafter, they had bunched up, shoulder to shoulder and with the machine guns close to each other. Kitahara had led, two platoons forward, one back. The night had been so dark that the individual soldiers had hardly been able to tell who had been leading and who had been on the flanks. The 2nd Company had consolidated after getting through the last entanglements and had walked straight for Changkufeng crest. From positions above the Japanese, Soviet machine guns covering the wire had blazed away at a range of 50 meters. Tracers had ripped the night, but the Russians' aim had seemed high. Soviet illuminating shells, by revealing the location of dead angles among the rocks, had facilitated the Japanese approach. Fifty meters past the barbed wire, Sakata had run into the second Soviet position. From behind a big rock, four or five soldiers had been throwing masher grenades. Sakata and his command team had dashed to the rear and cut down the Russians. The captain had sabered one soldier who had been about to throw a grenade. Then Master Sergeant Onuki and the others had rushed up and overran the Russian defenses. The Japanese had not yet fired or sustained casualties. There had been no machine guns in the first position Sakata had jumped into; the trenches had been two feet deep and masked by rocks. To the right, a tent could be seen. Blind enemy firing had reached a crescendo around 02:30. The Russians had resisted with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, hand grenades, rifle grenades, flares, rapid-fire guns, and a tank cannon. "The hill had shaken, but our assault unit had advanced, disregarding the heavy resistance and relying only on the bayonet." The battalion commander, Major Nakano, had been the first officer to be hit. Moving to the left of Sakata's right-hand platoon, he had rushed up, brandishing his sword, amid ear-splitting fire and day-like flashes. He had felled an enemy soldier and then another who had been about to get him from behind. But a grenade had exploded and he had dropped, with his right arm hanging grotesquely and many fragments embedded in his chest and left arm. After regaining consciousness, Nakano had yelled at soldiers rushing to help him: "You fools! Charge on! Never mind me." Staggering to his feet, he had leaned on his sword with his left hand and pushed up the slope after the assault waves, while "everybody had been dashing around like mad." Sakata had encountered progressive defenses and more severe fire. The main body of the company had lost contact with other elements after getting through the entanglements. Sakata had thought that he had already occupied an edge of Changkufeng, but about 30 meters ahead stood a sharp-faced boulder, two or three meters high, from which enormous numbers of grenades had been lobbed. The Japanese, still walking, had come across another Soviet position, manned by four or five grenadiers. Sword in hand, Sakata had led Sergeant Onuki and his command team in a rush : "The enemy was about to take off as we jumped them. One Russian jabbed the muzzle of his rifle into my stomach at the moment I had my sword raised overhead. He pulled the trigger but the rifle did not go off. I cut him down before he could get me. The others ran away, but behind them they left grenades with pins pulled. Many of my men fell here and I was hit in the thighs".  Onuki had felled two or three Russians behind Sakata, then disposed of an enemy who had been aiming at Sakata from the side. It had been around 03:00. On the right, the 1st Company had made relatively faster progress along the western slopes after having breached two widely separated belts of barbed wire. Once through the second wire, the troops had found a third line, 150 meters behind, and enemy machine guns had opened fire. Thereupon, a left-platoon private first class had taken a "do or die" forced clearing team, rushed 15 meters ahead of the infantry, and tore a path for the unit. At 03:00, Yamada had taken his men in a dash far up the right foot of the hill, overran the unexpected position, and captured two rapid-fire guns. The company's casualties had been mounting. Yamada had been hit in the chest but had continued to cheer his troops on. At 03:30, he had led a rush against the main objective, tents up the hill, behind the antitank guns. Yamada had cut down several bewildered soldiers in the tents, but had been shot again in the chest, gasping "Tenno Heika Banzai!" "Long Live the Emperor!", and had fallen dead. His citation had noted that he had "disrupted the enemy's rear after capturing the forwardmost positions and thus furnished the key to the ultimate rout of the whole enemy line." Sergeant Shioda, though wounded badly, and several of the men had picked up their commander's body and moved over to join Lieutenant Inagaki. On the left, Kadowaki had charged into the tents with his platoon and had played his part in interfering with the Russian rear. After this rush, the unit had been pinned down by fire from machine-gun emplacements, and Kadowaki had been wounded seriously. His platoon had veered left while watching for an opportunity to charge. Eventual contact had been made with Sakata's company.   The assault on the right flank had been failing. With the death of Yamada, command of the company had been assumed temporarily by Inagaki. He and his right-flank platoon had managed to smash their way through the entanglements; Inagaki had sought to rush forward, sword in hand. Furious firing by Soviet machine guns, coupled with hand grenades, had checked the charge. Losses had mounted. Still another effort had bogged down in the face of enemy reinforcements, supported not only by covered but by tank-mounted machine guns. Russian tanks and trucks had appeared to be operating behind Changkufeng. Sergeant Shioda had been trying to keep the attack moving. Again and again, he had pushed toward the Soviet position with five of his surviving men, to no avail. The left-flank platoon had sought to evade the fierce fire by taking advantage of rock cover and hurling grenades. Finally, a private first class had lobbed in a grenade, rushed the machine gun, and silenced the weapon. By now, precious time and lives had been lost. Either instinctively or by order, the 1st Company had been shifting to the left, away from the core of the enemy fire-net. Inagaki had decided to veer left in a wide arc to outflank Changkufeng from the same side where the 2nd Company and most of the battalion were at-tacking. There would be no further attempts to plunge between the lake and the heights or to head for the crest from the rear. Military maps had indicated tersely that remnants of the 1st Company had displaced to the 2nd Company area at 04:00, sometime after the last charge on the right by Yamada. On the left front, in the sector facing the main defenses on Changkufeng crest, Sakata had fallen after being hit by a grenade. A machine gunner had improvised a sling. "I had lost a lot of blood," Sakata had said, "and there were no medics. Onuki, my command team chief who had been acting platoon leader, had been killed around here. I had ordered Warrant Officer Kuriyama to take the company and push on until I could catch up." As Sakata lay on the ground, he had seen the battalion commander and the Nakajima company move past him in the darkness. Nakano had said not a word; Sakata had not known the major had been maimed. "I still hadn't felt intense pain," Sakata had recalled. "I had rested after the first bad feelings. In about 15 minutes I had felt well enough to move up the hill and resume command of my company." With both Nakano and Sakata wounded, individual officers or noncoms had kept the assault moving. The 1st Platoon leader, Kuriyama, had been securing the first position after overrunning it but had become worried about the main force. On his own initiative, he had brought his men up the hill to join the rest of the company, while the battalion aide, 2nd Lieutenant Nishimura, had made arrangements to deploy the heavy machine guns and reserve infantry in support. Before 4 A.M., these troops under Kitahara and Nakajima had caught up with the remnants of the 2nd Company, which had pressed beyond the third position to points near the Soviet Crestline.   By the time Sakata had regained his feet and moved toward the peak, somewhere between 03:30 and 04:00, the Japanese had been pinned down. Most of the losses had been incurred at this point. "Iron fragments, rock, sand, blood, and flesh had been flying around," Akaishizawa had written. Grenades had caused the preponderance of wounds after the men had penetrated the barbed wire. Deaths had been inflicted mainly by the Soviet "hurricane" of small arms and machine-gun fire and by ricochets ripping from man to man. Six Russian heavy weapons had kept up a relentless fire from three emplacements, and milk-bottle-shaped grenades had continued to thud down on the Japanese. The grenades had hindered the advance greatly. Mainly at the crest, but at every firing position as well, the Russians had used rifle grenades, primarily to eliminate dead angles in front of positions. There had been low piano wire between firing points, and yellow explosive had been planted amidst rock outcroppings and in front of the emplacements. "The Russians had relied exclusively on fire power; there had been no instance of a brave enemy charge employing cold steel." Only 20 meters from the entrenchments atop Changkufeng, Kitahara had been striving to regain the initiative and to hearten the scattered, reeling troops. One Japanese Army motto had concerned the mental attitude of commanders: "When surprised by the enemy, pause for a smoke." Kitahara had stood behind a rock, without a helmet, puffing calmly on a cigarette—a sight which had cheered the men. Sakata could not forget the scene. "It really happened," he had said, respectfully. As soon as Sakata had reached the forward lines, he had joined Kitahara (the senior officer and de facto battalion commander till then) and three enlisted men. All had been pinned behind the large boulder, the only possible cover, which had jutted in front of the Soviet crestline positions. Fire and flame had drenched the slopes, grenades from the peak, machine guns from the flank. The eastern skies had been brightening and faces could be discerned. Troubled by the stalemate yet not feeling failure, Sakata had said nothing about his own wounds but had told Kitahara he would lead his 2nd Company in a last charge up the left side of Changkufeng if only the machine gun company could do something about the enemy fire, especially some Soviet tanks which had been shooting from the right. "The enemy must have learned by now," the regimental records had observed, "that our forces were scanty, for the Soviets exposed the upper portions of their bodies over the breastworks, sniped incessantly, and lobbed illuminating shells at us." Agreeing with Sakata that the "blind" Japanese would have to take some kind of countermeasure to allow his two available heavy machine guns to go into concerted action, Kitahara had ordered illuminating rounds fired by the grenade dischargers. He had clambered atop the boulder and squatted there amidst the furious crossfire to spot for his guns, still only 20 meters from the Russian lines. Perhaps it had been the golden spark of Kitahara's cigarette, perhaps it had been the luminescence of his cross-bands, but hardly a moment later, at 04:03 am, a sniper's bullet had caught the captain between the eyes and he had toppled to his death. Nakajima had wanted to support Sakata's stricken company as well. The lieutenant had seen the advantage of outflanking the emplacements from the far left of Changkufeng where the fire of two Soviet heavy machine guns had been particularly devastating. Nakajima had swung his reserve unit around the crest to the southwest side, pressed forward through deadly grenade attacks, and had managed to reach a point ten meters from the Russian positions. Perched on the cliff's edge, he had prepared to continue: "Nakajima, who had been calming his men and looking for a chance to advance, leaped up and shouted, "Right now! Charge!" Sword in hand, he led his forces to the front on the left and edged up against the crest emplacements. But the enemy did not recoil; grenades and machine gun fusillades burst from above on all sides. Men fell, one after another. [During this final phase, a platoon leader and most of the key noncoms were killed.] A runner standing near Nakajima was hit in the head by a grenade and collapsed. Nakajima picked up the soldier's rifle, took cover behind a boulder, and tried to draw a bead on a Russian sniper whom he could see dimly 20 meters away through the lifting mist. But a bullet hit him in the left temple and he pitched forward, weakly calling, "Long Live the Emperor!" A PFC held the lieutenant up and pleaded with him to hang on, but the company commander's breath grew fainter and his end was at hand. The time was 4:10 am". Nakajima's orderly said of the event "Lieutenant Nakajima charged against the highest key point on Changkufeng, leading the reserve unit, and ensured the seizure of the hill. The lieutenant was wearing the boots which I had always kept polished but which he had never worn till this day." Akaishizawa added that Nakajima had purified himself in the waters of the Tumen before entering combat, in traditional fashion. Lieutenant Yanagihara had penned a tribute to his young fellow officer, the resolute samurai "Lt. Nakajima must have been expecting a day like today. He was wearing brand-new white underclothes and had wrapped his body with white cloth and the thousand-stitch stomach band which his mother had made for him. .. . Was not the lieutenant's end the same as we find in an old tanka verse? "Should you ask what is the Yamato spirit, the soul of Japan: It is wild cherry blossoms glowing in the rising sun."  On this main attack front, Soviet heavy machine guns and tanks had continued to deliver withering fire against the Japanese remnants, while Russian snipers and grenadiers had taken an increasing toll. Shortly after 04:00, enemy reinforcements had appeared at the northeast edge. Of the company commanders, only Sakata had still been alive; the other three officers had died between 03:30 and 04:30. A machine gunner who had been pinned down near the crest had commented: "It must have been worse than Hill 203" (of bloody Russo-Japanese War fame). Between a half and two-thirds of each company had been dead or wounded by then. Sakata had still been thinking of ways to rush the main positions. After Kitahara had been shot down, he had moved around to investigate. A colleague had added: "The agony of the captain's wounds had been increasing. He rested several times to appease the pain while watching intently for some chance to charge once more." Now, Sakata had been wounded again by grenade fragments tearing into the right side of his face. "It hadn't been serious," Sakata had insisted. As he had limped about, he could see his platoon leader, Kuriyama, sniping at a Russian grenadier.   Much would depend on the effectiveness of supporting firepower. With the death of Kitahara, control of the machine-gun company had been assumed by Master Sergeant Harayama. There had been almost no time to coordinate matters before Kitahara had fallen, but Harayama as well as Sakata had known that the infantry could not break loose until the Soviet heavy weapons had been suppressed. Working with another sergeant, Harayama had ordered his gunners to displace forward and rush the positions 20 meters away. The one heavy machine gun set up for action had been the first to fire for the Japanese side at Changkufeng, after its crew had manhandled it the last few meters to the first Soviet trench below the crest. The trench had been empty. Thereupon, the gunner had opened up against tents which could be seen 20 meters to the rear. Other friendly machine guns had begun to chatter. Kuriyama had dashed up and secured the southeast edge of the heights. Enemy resistance had begun to slacken. What appeared to be two small Soviet tanks, actually a tank and a tractor had been laying down fire near the tents in an apparent effort to cover a pullback. The two vehicles had advanced toward the Japanese and sought to neutralize the heavy machine guns. A squad leader had engaged the tractor, set it afire, and shot down the crewmen when they had tried to flee. Next, the tank had been stopped. The Japanese lead gun had consumed all of its armor-piercing (AP) ammunition—three clips, or 90 rounds—in 10 or 15 seconds. No more AP ammunition had been available; one box had been with the last of the six squads struggling up the heights. "More AP!" had yelled the 1st Squad leader, signaling with his hand—which had at that moment been hit by a Russian slug. A tank machine-gun bullet had also torn through the thumb and into the shoulder of the squad's machine gunner, whereupon the 21-year-old loader had taken over the piece. Similar replacements had occurred under fire in all squads, sometimes more than once in the same unit. "It had been a fantastic scene," Sakata had commented. "Just like grasshoppers! But they had finally neutralized the heavy weapons." The knocked-out Russian vehicles had begun to blaze while the eastern skies had lightened. New enemy tanks (some said many, others merely three) had lumbered up the slopes, but the Japanese heavy machine guns had continued to fire on them, and the tanks had stopped. If the machine guns had gone into action minutes later, the Russian armor might have continued to the top, from which they could have ripped up the surviving Japanese infantrymen: "So we gunners fired and fired. I could see my tracers bouncing off the armor, for there was still no AP. We also shot at machine guns and infantry. Since we carried little ammo for the night attack, my gun ran out, but by then the enemy had been ousted. We had originally expected that we might have to fire in support of the infantry after they took the crest. We lost none of our own heavy machine guns that night, overran four Maxims and captured mountains of hand grenades. By dawn, however, our machine gun company had lost more than half of its personnel—about 40 men".  The light-machine-gun squad leader had been wounded in the hand by a grenade near the site where Sakata had been hit. Nevertheless, the superior private had clambered up the slope with his men. After 04:00, when he and his squad had been pinned down with the infantry below the crest, he had heard Japanese heavy machine guns firing toward the foe on the right: "Our units were in confusion, bunched up under terrific fire in a small area. Getting orders was impossible, so I had my light machine gun open up in the same direction at which the heavies were firing. We could identify no targets but tried to neutralize the enemy located somewhere on the crest. Although Soviet flares were going off, we never could glimpse the enemy clearly. But we heard the Russians yelling "Hurrah!" That ought to have been the signal for a charge; here it meant a retreat".  But, of the ten men in this Japanese machine-gun squad, only four had been in action when dawn had come. The turning point had arrived when the machine-guns belonging to Sakata, and the reserves of the late Nakajima, had torn into the Russian emplacements, tanks, and tents behind. Others had said the key had been the fire of grenade dischargers belonging to the same units. A high-angle weapon, the grenade discharger, had been light, effective, and ideal for getting at dead space. In terms of ammunition, it had been especially useful, for it could fire hand grenades available to the foot soldier. Undoubtedly, the combined action of the grenade dischargers and machine guns (heavy and light) had paved the way for a last charge by the infantry. The four light machine guns of the 2nd and 4th companies had played their part by pouring flank fire against the Russians, who had clung to the position although Kuriyama's platoon had made an initial penetration. At about 04:30, Japanese assault forces could be seen dimly, in the light of dawn, exchanging fire with the Russians only a few meters away on the southern edge of Changkufeng Hill. At the same time, on the northern slopes, enemy reinforcements numbering 50 men with trucks and tanks had been scaling the hill. Around 04:45, Japanese grenades began to burst over the heads of the last enemy atop Changkufeng; the Russians had wavered. After the heavy weapons had finally begun to soften up the Soviet positions, Sakata had judged that there were not many Russians left. He had jumped into the first trench, ahead of his only surviving platoon leader, Kuriyama, and several soldiers. Two or three Russians had been disposed of; the rest had fled. By then the 2nd Company had been chopped down to a platoon; about 40 men still lived. There had been no cheer of banzai, as journalists had written; it would have drawn fire to stand up and raise one's arms. But Sakata had remained proud of the assertion by Sato that, from Chiangchunfeng, he had observed the last rush and knew the "real story," that "Sakata was the first to charge the peak." The regimental eulogist had written that Sakata's earnestness "cut through iron, penetrated mountains, and conquered bodily pain." As for Inagaki, about 15 or 20 minutes after the badly wounded Sakata had managed to reach the point where Kitahara and Nakajima had been pinned down near the Crestline, the lieutenant had arrived with the remnants of Yamada's company, probably by 04:20. The records would have us believe that Sakata had been able to coordinate the next actions with Inagaki despite the storm of fire: "The acting battalion commander [Sakata] resumed the charge with a brand-new deployment—his 2nd Company on the right wing and the 1st Company on the left." Actually, all Sakata could think of had been to charge; it had been too confused a time to issue anything like normal orders as acting battalion commander: "About all I remember asking Inagaki was: "What are you doing over here? What happened to your company commander?" I think he told me that Yamada had been killed and resistance on the right flank had been severe. Undoubtedly, he acted on his own initiative in redeploying. Nor was there any particular liaison between my company and Inagaki's force." To the left of Sakata's survivors were the vestiges of Nakajima's platoon, and further to the left, the outflanking troops brought up by Inagaki. These forces gradually edged up to the rear of the foe, in almost mass formation, on the western slope just below the top. "The enemy soldiers who had been climbing up the northern incline suddenly began to retreat, and Inagaki led a charge, fighting dauntlessly hand-to-hand." As a result of the more or less concerted Japanese assaults, "the desperately resisting enemy was finally crushed and Changkufeng peak was retaken completely by 05:15," three hours after the night attackers had jumped off. Akaishizawa had said that the troops "pushed across the peak through a river of blood and a mountain of corpses. Who could withstand our demons?" Sato's regimental attack order had called for the firing of a green star shell to signal success. At 05:15, according to the records, "the signal flared high above Changkufeng, showering green light upon the hill; the deeply stirring Japanese national flag floated on the top." Sakata thought that this must have been 10 or 20 minutes after the hill was taken, but he remembered no flare. "After the last charge I had no time to watch the sky!" The flare had probably been fired from a grenade launcher by the battalion aide or a headquarters soldier. After the final close-quarter fighting, Sakata had pressed forward while the survivors came up. The captain had deployed his men against possible counterattack. Later he had heard that Soviet tanks had lumbered up to reinforce the peak or to counterattack but that, when they observed the Japanese in possession of the crest, they had turned back. Only after his men had secured the peak had Sakata talked to Inagaki about sharing defensive responsibility. The records described Sakata's deployments at 05:20, but there had been painfully few men to match the tidy after-action maps. Did Sakata and his men push across the peak? "Not downhill a bit," he had answered. "We advanced only to the highest spot, the second, or right-hand peak, where we could command a view of the hostile slope." He had merely reconnoitered to deploy his troops. The senior surviving Japanese officer atop Changkufeng heights had been Sakata. What had happened to Major Nakano, who had been wounded shortly after jump-off? Although his right arm had been shattered, he had dragged himself to his feet, once he had regained consciousness, and kept climbing to catch up. His men had pleaded with him to look after his terrible wounds, but he had insisted on advancing, leaning on his sword and relying on spiritual strength. "Left! Move left!" he had been heard to shout, for the faltering Japanese had apparently been of the opinion that they were at the enemy's rear. Instead, they had pressed against the Russians' western wing, directly in front of the enemy works, from which murderous fire had been directed, especially from machine-gun nests ripping at their flanks. With sword brandished in his uninjured hand, high above his head, Nakano had stood at the corner of the positions. The explosion of an enemy grenade had illuminated him "like the god of fire," and he had been seen to crumple. He had died a little before 0500, to the left of where young Nakajima had fallen at 0430. His citation had said: "The battalion commander captured Changkufeng, thanks to his proper combat guidance and deployments. He provided the incentive to victory in the Changkufeng Incident." A eulogist had called Nakano a "human-bullet demon-unit commander": "All who observed this scene were amazed, for it was beyond mortal strength. One could see how high blazed the flame of his faith in certain victory and what a powerful sense of responsibility he had as unit commander. Major Nakano was a model soldier." When Nakano had pitched forward, badly wounded PFC Imamura had tried to protect the commander's corpse. Imamura had killed a soldier who appeared from behind a boulder, had lunged at another two or three, but had toppled off the cliff. Two other Japanese privates—a battalion runner and PFC Iwata—had been lying nearby, hurt seriously; but when they saw Imamura fall to his death, leaving the major's body undefended, they had dragged themselves to the corpse, four meters from the foe. Iwata, crippled and mute, had hugged Nakano's corpse until other soldiers managed to retrieve it. While death had come to Nakano, Sakata had been fighting with no knowledge of what was going on to his left. Pinned behind a boulder, he had had no way of checking on the battalion commander. Only after Sakata had charged onto the crest and asked for the major had he been told by somebody that Nakano had been killed. He had not even been sure where the commander had fallen. Such had been the time of blood and fury when battalion chief, company commanders, and platoon leaders had fought and died like common soldiers, pressing on with saber or pistol or sniping rifle under relentless cross-fire. Pretty patterns of textbook control had meant nothing. Life—and victory—depended on training, initiative, raw courage, and the will to win. The result of this combination of wills could not be ascertained, on 31 July 1938, until dawn brightened the bleeding earth on Changkufeng Hill. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Tokyo gambled on a night strike to seize Changkufeng, while diplomacy urged restraint. Amid mud, smoke, and moonless skies, Nakano led the 1st Battalion, supported by Nakajima, Sakata, Yamada, and others. One by one, officers fell, wounds multiplying, but resolve held. By 05:15, shattered units regrouped atop the peak, the flag rising as dawn bled into a costly, hard-won victory.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin.  As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air.    #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff."  The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th);  (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th);  (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th).  Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix.  After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have".  Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident".  The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail."  The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng.   Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered.  At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled".  Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted."  The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war.