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Last time we spoke about the North Borneo Offensive. General Buckner's 10th Army captured strategic locations, including Shuri Castle, marking a turning point. Simultaneously, General Eichelberger's forces liberated Mindanao, overcoming tough Japanese defenses in the mountainous terrain. As they approached Malaybalay, fierce resistance resulted in heavy casualties, but the Americans persisted, inflicting significant losses on their foes. By June 9, the Americans pressed further into the enemy's defensive lines, leading to intense combat. The Marines landed on the Oroku Peninsula, where fierce fighting revealed the tenacity of the Japanese defenders. General Ushijima prepared for a final stand, as American forces began to encircle and dismantle Japanese positions. As the campaign unfolded, Australians under Brigadier Whitehead launched the North Borneo Offensive, landing on Tarakan and swiftly pushing the Japanese into the rugged interior.  This episode is Victory at Okinawa Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Okinawa was more than just a battlefield; it became a symbol of sacrifice, the last heroic stand of a fading empire. By this point in the war, Japan was facing inevitable defeat, yet their resolve remained unbroken. They clung to the samurai spirit, determined to fight to the bitter end out of honor and duty. The stakes were high. Japan needed precious time to fortify its home islands, to stretch the conflict as long as possible. To achieve this, over 100,000 brave souls were sent into the fray, sacrificing their lives to slow the American advance and inflict as many casualties as they could. As we've explored in previous episodes, this fierce determination fueled their resistance. And now, we stand at a pivotal moment, the final days of the Battle of Okinawa, the last major confrontation of the Pacific War. As we last left the battlefield, it was June 16, General Buckner's 10th Army had made significant strides, capturing most of southern Okinawa and finally breaking through the last major enemy defenses at the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. The remnants of General Ushijima's 32nd Army were now locked in a desperate fight to hold onto the Kiyamu Peninsula, slowly being pushed back toward the sea and their ultimate demise. The following day, June 17, the assault continued with renewed determination. General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps pressed on through Kunishi Ridge, while General Hodge's 24th Corps worked to consolidate its hard-won gains in the escarpment. On the west coast, General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division took action as Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines stepped in to relieve the weary 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines at the northern slope of Mezado Ridge. With a fierce spirit, they began to push southward, successfully securing most of the ridge. To the east, General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division forged ahead. Colonel Snedeker's fresh 3rd Battalion took over from the exhausted 1st Battalion and advanced 1,400 yards to seize the high ground just east of Mezado. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines fought hard to capture the remaining positions of Kunishi Ridge, achieving only a gradual extension to the east. Colonel Griebel's 3rd Battalion moved in behind them to reinforce the isolated Marines, bravely fending off a fierce counterattack under the cover of night. Further east, Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment systematically eliminated the last enemy positions in the Yuza-Ozato-Yuza Dake area, while Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment held firm and maintained their lines. In a key maneuver, Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment launched a successful assault, capturing Hill 153 before Colonel Green's 184th Regiment took over during the night. Lastly, Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment secured the reverse slopes of Hill 115, preparing to launch an attack on Mabuni and Hill 89. By nightfall, Hodge's 24th Corps had firmly secured all the commanding heights of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment. Most of Mezado Ridge and Kunishi Ridge were now in American hands, and Colonel Wallace's 8th Marines had landed in the rear to bolster the western push. For the first time, American forces across the line looked down upon nearly eight square miles of enemy-held territory, a staggering view of what lay ahead. Realizing they were forced from their last defensive positions and that their destruction was imminent, the 32nd Army began to unravel, collapsing into chaos. On June 18, Hodge's troops seized the opportunity to strike decisively. The 32nd Regiment advanced down the coast toward Mabuni, facing increasing resistance. The 184th Regiment moved down the reverse slopes of Hill 153, closing in on Medeera, while the 381st Regiment speedily crossed the plateau, tackling scattered enemy fire to seize the high ground just 400 yards north of Medeera. Simultaneously, Dill's 3rd Battalion crashed through a rugged maze of caves and pillboxes, making a daring 600-yard advance to the base of the rocky ridge north of Aragachi. To the west, Griebel's 1st Battalion circled the eastern end of Kunishi Ridge, battling heavy resistance to gain the lower slopes of Hill 79. Further west, Roberts' 2nd Battalion pushed through the 3rd and aimed for Kuwanga Ridge, successfully seizing an 1,800-yard stretch by late afternoon. As they advanced, the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines moved forward to occupy the eastern end of the ridge. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 22nd Marines began to mop up the remnants of resistance on Mezado Ridge. Tragedy struck when Colonel Roberts was tragically killed by a sniper near his observation post during this operation. Lieutenant-Colonel August Larson would succeed him in command. Sadly, Roberts would not be the only American commander to fall that day. In the heart of the Marine line, the 8th Marines were finally called into action in the morning to relieve the weary 7th Marines. After a rigorous artillery bombardment to soften up the enemy defenses, Wallace's 2nd Battalion began its advance south toward the Kuwanga-Makabe Road, successfully capturing the high ground just north of the road by late afternoon. Meanwhile, General Buckner decided to visit Wallace's command post on Mezado Ridge around midday. He observed the 8th Marines' steady progress in the valley, taking stock of their relentless push forward. Tragically, as he was leaving the observation post, disaster struck. Five artillery shells rained down, one striking a coral outcrop near him. The jagged shards of coral filled the air, and Buckner was mortally wounded in the chest. He died within minutes, just days shy of achieving his goal: the complete capture of Okinawa. With Buckner's passing, General Geiger, as the senior troop commander, took over temporary command of the 10th Army for the remainder of the battle. Buckner became the highest-ranking American military officer killed in World War II and would hold that somber distinction throughout the entire 20th century. On June 18, the final written order from General Ushijima of the 32nd Army outlined a daring escape plan. He designated an officer to lead the "Blood and Iron Youth Organization," tasked with conducting guerrilla warfare once organized combat had ceased. Simultaneously, he ordered his remaining troops to make their way to the northern mountains of Okinawa, where a small band of guerrillas was rumored to be operating.  In his message he congratulated them on fulfilling their "assigned mission in a manner which leaves nothing to regret." He urged them to "fight to the last and die for the eternal cause of loyalty to the Emperor." This movement was not to happen in haste. Soldiers were instructed to travel in small groups of two to five over the course of several days. They were urged to don civilian clothes and avoid confrontation whenever possible. In a clever stratagem, most of the army staff officers were directed to leave the command post disguised as native Okinawans, aiming to infiltrate American lines and find safety in northern Okinawa. Some individuals, like Colonel Yahara, were entrusted with the mission of reaching Japan to report to the Imperial General Headquarters. Others were tasked with organizing guerrilla operations, focusing on harassing the rear areas of the 10th Army and Island Command, determined to continue the fight against the American forces in any way they could. Again I have read Yahara's book on the battle of Okinawa and despite being full of apologetic stuff and attempts to make himself look better, its one of the most insightful books on the Japanese perspective. You get a lot of information on how bad it was for the Okinawan civilians in caves, harrowing stuff. I highly recommend it. The American attack pressed on into June 19, though it faced delays due to the influx of civilian and military prisoners. Not all of the 32nd Army survivors were imbued with a will "to die for the eternal cause of loyalty to the Emperor." Loudspeakers mounted on tanks in the 7th Division's front lines and on LCI's that cruised up and down the coast line were successful in convincing over 3,000 civilians to surrender. Far more significant, however, were the 106 Japanese soldiers and 238 Boeitai who voluntarily gave up during the division's advance on 19 June. The relentless attack of American troops, coupled with intensive efforts by psychological warfare teams, brought in increasing numbers of battle-weary Japanese and Okinawans who had decided that the war was lost and their cause was hopeless. It is not inconceivable that every enemy soldier who surrendered meant one less American casualty as the wind-up drive of Tenth Army continued. Despite these challenges, the 32nd Regiment advanced to within just 200 yards of the outskirts of Mabuni. Meanwhile, the 184th and 381st Regiments coordinated their efforts, closing in on Medeera from the south and east. The 382nd Regiment pressed forward, overcoming fierce resistance as they reached the ridges overlooking Aragachi. Tragically, General Easley became the third major high-ranking casualty in just two days. The 5th Marines launched multiple assaults on Hills 79 and 81, but their efforts were met with fierce opposition and ended in failure. Wallace's 3rd Battalion, facing only light resistance, captured Ibaru Ridge, the last high ground before the sea, before pushing onward to the coastal cliffs. On the eastern front, Griebel's 3rd Battalion successfully seized Makabe and then joined forces with the 8th Marines to secure the coastal zone. Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines advanced alongside the 8th Marines throughout most of the day but were unable to reach the coast, halted by a formidable enemy position along the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass. Further south, Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines passed through the 22nd Marines and moved rapidly, also facing light resistance, reaching the base of the Kiyamu-Gusuku hill mass to link up with the 4th Marines before nightfall. As darkness enveloped the battlefield, Shepherd launched an attack on the hill mass. The 4th Marines successfully seized Hill 80, but they could only establish strong positions on the left flank of Hill 72. The 29th Marines encountered minimal opposition as they swept forward toward the southern coast. Meanwhile, the 5th Marines continued their relentless assaults on Hills 79 and 81, managing to capture most of Hill 79 before losing the crest at the last moment. Their tank-infantry assaults against Hill 81, however, once again ended in defeat. Looking east toward Hodge's front on June 21, the 382nd Regiment cleared out the last remnants in Aragachi, while the 381st Regiment seized the northern outskirts of Medeera. In the dark hours of June 20, the last courier contact was made between the Medeera pocket and the Hill 89 pocket. General Amamiya, commander of the 24th Division, issued a desperate order directing all his units "to fight to the last man in their present positions." At the time he gave this ultimatum, he had very few infantrymen left to defend the Medeera position. The relentless advance of the Marines had nearly annihilated the 22nd and 32nd Regiments, while the 96th Division had decimated the 89th Regiment at Yuza Dake and Aragachi. With their ranks severely depleted, the remaining defenders were a ragtag collection of artillerymen, drivers, corpsmen, engineers, Boeitai, and headquarters personnel drawn from nearly every unit of the L-Day island garrison. Those who managed to avoid surrender or sought to evade capture fought with the fierce determination of fanatics, resolutely defending their positions against overwhelming odds. Meanwhile, Colonel Coolidge's 305th Regiment, engaged in a vigorous mopping-up operation behind the lines of the 96th Division, prepared for an assault on Makabe Ridge. The 184th Regiment managed to secure the hills overlooking Udo, and despite facing fierce resistance from hidden enemy forces in coral outcroppings and caves along the coastal cliffs, the 32nd Regiment fought its way to the eastern slope of Hill 89. Throughout June 21, a series of small local attacks and mopping-up actions occupied most units of the 24th Corps, often interrupted to allow large numbers of civilians and soldiers to surrender. In spite of the bitter and costly resistance, the 32nd Regiment successfully secured Mabuni and advanced up to the tableland atop Hill 89. Coolidge's 1st Battalion launched an assault on the hill south of Medeera behind a heavy mortar barrage, successfully capturing its crest. The 5th Marines completed the capture of Hill 79 and undertook a heavy, costly assault that ultimately led to the capture of Hill 81. The 7th and 8th Marines began the crucial task of flushing out remaining Japanese holdouts, while also dealing with the increasing wave of soldiers and civilians choosing to surrender. The 4th Marines executed a successful double envelopment of Hill 72 that secured the strategic Kiyamu-Gusuku ridge, and the 29th Marines met only very light resistance during their sweep of Ara Saki, the southernmost point of the island. This swift progress and the obvious collapse of major enemy opposition prompted General Geiger to declare that the island of Okinawa was secure and that organized enemy resistance had come to an end. That night, in a tragic turn of events, Generals Ushijima and Cho committed Seppuku in the cave housing their command post.  On the night of June 21, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru and Lieutenant General Cho Isamu, the commander and chief of staff of the 32nd Army, fulfilled their final obligation to the Emperor in a deeply traditional manner. In accordance with the warrior code of their homeland, they atoned for their inability to halt the American advance by committing Seppuku. On the evening of their planned departure, Ushijima hosted a banquet in the cave that served as their command post, featuring a large meal prepared by his cook, Tetsuo Nakamutam. The banquet was generously complemented with sake and the remaining stock of captured Black & White Scotch whisky provided by Cho. At 03:00 on June 22, both generals, adorned in their full field uniforms decorated with medals, led a small party of aides and staff officers out onto a narrow ledge at the cave entrance, which overlooked the ocean. American soldiers of the 32nd Regiment were stationed less than 100 feet away, completely unaware of the solemn preparations taking place for the suicide ceremony. First, Ushijima bared his abdomen to the ceremonial knife and thrust inward, followed by Cho, who then fell to the ground. As Ushijima made his final act, a simultaneous slash from the headquarters adjutant's saber struck his bowed neck. The two generals were secretly buried immediately after their deaths, their bodies going undiscovered until June 25, when patrols from the 32nd Regiment found them at the foot of the seaward cliff-face of Hill 89. General Cho had penned his own simple epitaph, stating, “22nd day, 6th month, 20th year of the Showa Era. I depart without regret, fear, shame, or obligations. Army Chief of Staff; Army Lieutenant General Cho, Isamu, age of departure 51 years. At this time and place, I hereby certify the foregoing.” Their deaths were witnessed by Colonel Yahara, who was the most senior officer captured by American forces. Yahara had requested Ushijima's permission to commit suicide as well, but the general had refused, saying, "If you die, there will be no one left who knows the truth about the battle of Okinawa. Bear the temporary shame but endure it. This is an order from your army commander." While many die-hard groups continued to fight until annihilation, an unprecedented number of Japanese soldiers, both officers and enlisted men, began to surrender. On that fateful day, Operation Ten-Go's final breaths were marked by the launch of the two-day tenth Kiksui mass attack, which saw only 45 kamikaze aircraft take to the skies. While this desperate attempt succeeded in sinking LSM-59 and damaging the destroyer escort Halloran, as well as the seaplane tenders Curtiss and Kenneth Whiting, the next day would bring even less impact, with only two landing ships sustaining damage during the final attack of the campaign. As communications from the 32nd Army fell silent, a deeply regretful Admiral Ugaki was forced to conclude the grim reality of their situation. He felt “greatly responsible for the calamity” but recognized that there was seemingly no alternative course that might have led to success. Throughout the defense of Okinawa, approximately 6,000 sorties were flown, including at least 1,900 kamikaze missions. However, the losses were staggering, with over 4,000 aircraft lost during these attacks. In contrast, Allied forces suffered the loss of 763 planes in the Okinawa campaign, with 305 of those being operational losses. Since the operation commenced, naval losses for Iceberg totaled an alarming 4,992 sailors dead, with 36 ships sunk and 374 damaged, accounting for 17% of all American naval losses in the Pacific War. Meanwhile, extensive and coordinated mop-up operations in southern Okinawa were essential before the area could be deemed secure for the planned construction of supply depots, airfields, training areas, and port facilities. In response, Colonel Mason's 1st Marines and Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment established blocking positions in the hills above the Naha-Yonabaru valley to thwart any Japanese attempts to infiltrate north. On June 22, the four assault divisions that had previously shattered the Kiyamu Peninsula defenses received orders to prepare for a sweeping advance to the north. Their mission was clear: destroy any remaining resistance, blow and seal all caves, bury the dead, and salvage any equipment, both friendly and enemy, left on the battlefield. The following day, General Joseph Stilwell arrived to take command of the 10th Army during the mop-up phase of the campaign. Meanwhile, units from the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were engaged on the Komesu and Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridges, while the 7th Division probed Hill 89 and Mabuni. In the Medeera pocket, Coolidge's 3rd Battalion successfully seized Hill 85 on June 22. The 96th Division intensified its focus in the Medeera-Aragachi area, with elements of the 381st Regiment mopping up the last holdouts in the ruins of Medeera by June 23. Two days later, after a thorough search of the area south of the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake Escarpment, the 10th Army finally initiated its drive northward, with both corps taking responsibility for the ground they had captured in the previous month. On the morning of June 26, the reinforced Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed unopposed on Kumejima, marking it as the last and largest of the Okinawa Islands selected for radar and fighter director sites. By the end of June, the mop-up operations in southern Okinawa had resulted in an estimated 8,975 Japanese killed and 3,808 prisoners of war added to the 10th Army's total. Overall, the Americans counted a staggering total of 10,755 prisoners of war and 107,539 Japanese dead, along with an estimated 23,764 believed to be sealed in caves or buried by their comrades. This cumulative casualty figure of 142,058 was "far above a reasonable estimate of military strength on the island," prompting 10th Army intelligence officers to conclude that at least 42,000 civilians had tragically fallen victim to artillery, naval, and air attacks due to their unfortunate proximity to Japanese combat forces and installations. American losses were also substantial, with 7,374 men recorded dead, 31,807 wounded, and 239 missing, in addition to 26,221 non-battle casualties. But now, it's time to leave Okinawa and return to Borneo to continue covering the North Borneo Offensive. As we last observed, by mid-June, General Wootten's 9th Australian Division had successfully executed two major amphibious landings on Brunei Bay. Brigadier Porter's 24th Brigade occupied most of Labuan Island, with the exception of the Pocket, while Brigadier Windeyer's 20th Brigade secured the Brunei area. By June 16, Wootten decided that since the enemy was withdrawing and showing no signs of mounting an attack, he would take control of the high ground stretching from Mempakul and Menumbok to Cape Nosong. This strategic move aimed to prevent the enemy from utilizing the track from Kota Klias to Karukan and to secure beaches for supply points during the planned advance northward. Accordingly, Porter ordered the 2/28th Battalion to reduce the Pocket. The recently landed 2/12th Commando Squadron was tasked with mopping up the outlying areas of the island. Meanwhile, the 2/32nd Battalion began preparing for an amphibious movement to Weston on the mainland east of Labuan, with plans to reconnoiter across country and by river towards Beaufort. The 2/43rd Battalion and the 2/11th Commando Squadron were also set to prepare for an amphibious reconnaissance in the Mempakul area. On June 14, the 2/28th Battalion launched its initial attack against the Pocket, following an artillery barrage. However, they were forced to withdraw in the face of intense machine-gun and mortar fire. In response, the 2/12th Field Regiment took over, bombarding the Pocket for the next six days and nights, hurling a staggering total of 140 tons of shells into it. On June 16, the 2/28th Battalion launched another assault, this time supported by tanks from the north, successfully capturing Lyon Ridge, despite sustaining heavy losses. After several more days of relentless artillery, naval, and air bombardment, the 2/28th launched a final assault on June 21, just as the Japanese attempted to send two raiding parties to infiltrate through the Australian lines and attack Labuan town and its airstrip. Although these raiders managed to catch the confused defenders off guard and inflicted several casualties, they were ultimately dealt with swiftly and without causing significant damage. Meanwhile, with the combined support of tanks and artillery, the 2/28th Battalion attacked the reduced garrison at the Pocket, breaking through Lushington Ridge and Eastman Spur to eliminate the remaining Japanese positions and completely clear the area. By the end of the Battle of Labuan, the Australians had achieved a decisive victory, with 389 Japanese soldiers killed and 11 taken prisoner, while suffering 34 Australian fatalities and 93 wounded. In parallel, following a successful reconnaissance on June 16, the 2/32nd Battalion landed unopposed at Weston on June 17. They quickly secured the area and established a patrol base at Lingkungan. Over the next few days, Australian patrols began probing north towards Bukau, occasionally clashing with Japanese parties. A company from the 2/32nd Battalion also established a patrol base at Gadong up the Padas River, finding no Japanese presence in the surrounding regions. From this position, the Australians were able to patrol along the Padas River in small craft, discovering they could reach Beaufort rapidly using this route, catching the enemy off guard. Meanwhile, on June 19, the 2/43rd Battalion and the 2/11th Independent Company landed unopposed at Mempakul, further solidifying the Australian presence in the area. Two days later, while the commandos worked to clear the Klias Peninsula, the 2/43rd Battalion launched an amphibious expedition up the Klias River. This mission successfully navigated through Singkorap and reached Kota Klias, confirming that Japanese forces were not present in significant strength along the river. As a result, the 2/43rd Battalion set out on June 22 to occupy Kota Klias without encountering any resistance. Given this positive momentum, Brigadier Porter ordered the 2/28th Battalion to take over operations from the 2/32nd Battalion in and around Weston. At the same time, the 2/43rd Battalion was tasked with marching through Kandu to attack Beaufort from the north. Additionally, the 2/32nd Battalion was directed to probe north along the Padas River and along the railway, drawing enemy attention away from the main Australian advance. Looking south, while the 2/17th Battalion remained around Brunei and the 2/15th Battalion probed along the river toward Limbang, Windeyer had ordered the 2/13th Battalion to prepare for an amphibious movement to the Miri-Lutong area. Brunei town had been severely battered by Allied bombers and Japanese demolitions. The troops were critical of the air force's practice of bombing conspicuous buildings even when they were unlikely to contain anything of military importance. In Brunei, for example, the bazaar and the cinema were destroyed, but neither was likely to have contained any Japanese men or material and their destruction and the destruction of similar buildings added to the distress of the civilians. The infantryman on the ground saw the effects of bombing at the receiving end. “The impression was gained, says the report of the 20th Brigade, that, in the oil producing and refining centres-Seria, Kuala Belait, Lutong, Miri much of the destruction served no military purpose. The destruction of the native bazaar and shop area in Kuala Belait, Brunei, Tutong and Miri seemed wanton.“ On June 16, the 2/17th finally moved out and occupied Tutong, successfully crossing the river at its mouth. From there, the battalion began its movement along the coast toward Seria. However, despite the strategic importance of the town's oil wells, there was only one encounter with the enemy at the Bira River on June 20 before the town was occupied the following day, only to find the oil wells ablaze.  At Seria, the oil wells were ablaze. From the broken pipes that topped each well, burning oil gushed forth like fire from immense, hissing Bunsen burners. The pressure was so intense that the oil, as clear as petrol, only ignited several inches away from the pipe. Once ignited, it transformed into a tumbling cloud of flame, accompanied by billowing blue-black smoke. At approximately 1,000 feet, the plumes from more than 30 fires merged into a single canopy of smoke. This horrifying spectacle of waste persisted day and night. The men around Seria fell asleep to the hissing and rumbling of an entire oilfield engulfed in flames and awoke to the same din. The Japanese had set fire to 37 wells, destroyed buildings and bridges, and attempted to incapacitate vehicles, pumps, and other equipment by removing essential components and either discarding them in rivers or burying them. Consequently, the Australian engineers faced the daunting task of extinguishing the fires with only their own equipment, along with abandoned gear they could repair or make functional. They relied on assistance from local natives who had observed the Japanese hiding parts and employed methods of improvisation and selective cannibalization to tackle the crisis. Meanwhile, by June 19, raiding elements of the 2/15th Battalion had successfully secured Limbang. From this location, they began sending patrols up the Limbang River toward Ukong, along the Pandaruan River to Anggun, and east toward Trusan. The following day, after a naval bombardment by three American destroyers, the 2/13th Battalion landed unopposed at Lutong and quickly secured the area. On June 21, the Australians crossed the river and advanced into Miri without facing any resistance, successfully occupying the town and its oilfield by June 23. Turning their attention back north, on June 24, the 2/43rd Battalion began its advance toward Beaufort, swiftly moving through Kandu and reaching a position just north of the Padas River the next day. In response to their progress, Brigadier Porter ordered the 2/32nd Battalion to seize the railway terminus and the spur leading down to the river just south of Beaufort, while the 2/43rd focused on capturing the high ground dominating Beaufort from the north and east. This coordinated attack was launched on June 26. By the end of the day, the leading company of the 2/32nd had reached the Padas River, approximately 2,000 yards west of the railway terminus, while the leading company of the 2/43rd secured the railway north of the Padas, similarly positioned about 2,000 yards from Beaufort. On June 27, the 2/43rd continued their offensive, rapidly capturing the high ground overlooking Beaufort. During the afternoon, one company ascended Mount Lawley and pursued the retreating Japanese, cutting off their escape route at a track junction, while another company moved into the town, taking possession early that night. In the following hours and throughout June 28, the Australians faced a series of heavy counterattacks as they worked to consolidate their positions. Meanwhile, the 2/32nd Battalion successfully captured the railway terminus, encountering only slight opposition, with one company executing a wide flanking maneuver to the Padas just upstream from Beaufort. Under heavy bombardment from artillery and mortars, the bulk of the 368th Independent Battalion began to retreat along the Australian-held track in the early hours of June 29. While many were killed during this withdrawal, most managed to escape. At intervals groups of two or three walked into the company area in the darkness and were killed. Fire was strictly controlled, and one platoon was credited with having killed 21 Japanese with 21 single shots fired at ranges of from five to 15 yards. One Japanese walked on to the track 50 yards from the foremost Australian Bren gun position and demanded the surrender of the Australians who were blocking the Japanese line of retreat. According to one observer his words were: "Surrender pliz, Ossie. You come. No?" He was promptly shot. One company counted 81 Japanese killed with "company weapons only" round the junction and estimated that at least 35 others had been killed; six Australians were slightly wounded.  By morning, the fighting was virtually over, and the mop-up of the disorganized enemy force commenced. The attack on Beaufort cost the 24th Brigade 7 men killed and 38 wounded, while the Australians counted 93 Japanese dead and took two prisoners. Meanwhile, the 2/28th Battalion secured Lumadan village, where it made contact with the 2/32nd. Porter then ordered this battalion to pursue the retreating Japanese eastward, successfully securing the Montenior Besar railway bridge by July 4. The 2/32nd Battalion proceeded to attack toward Papar, encountering little opposition as they captured Membakut on July 5, followed by Kimanis on July 10, and finally Papar on July 12. Turning back south, the 2/17th Battalion occupied Kuala Belait on June 24, where they discovered evidence of a massacre of Indian prisoners of war.  Indian prisoners of war began reaching the lines of the 2/17th Battalion at Seria on June 22. By the end of the month, a total of 41 had arrived, reporting a horrific event: on June 14, the Japanese had slaughtered a portion of a group of more than 100 Indian prisoners at Kuala Belait. The Australians discovered 24 charred bodies at the site, along with evidence indicating that others had also been killed. A report by the 2/17th noted, "The motive for the massacre is not clear, and whether a partial loss of rations, the waving of flags, or simply Japanese brutality was responsible cannot be determined." The surviving Indians were found to be starving, with many suffering from illness. Colonel Broadbent remarked, "The loyalty and fortitude of these Indians has been amazing and is a lesson to us all. Even now, their standard of discipline is high." Two days later, patrols made contact with the 2/13th Battalion at the Baram River. Pushing south along Riam Road, the patrols of the 2/13th clashed with the Japanese at South Knoll, which they captured by the end of the month. Throughout July, the 2/13th continued patrolling down Riam Road against some opposition, eventually pushing the Japanese beyond Bakam by August. At the same time, the 2/17th conducted deep patrols southward from Kuala Belait, particularly along the Baram River toward Bakung, Marudi, and Labi. Overall, Australian losses during the North Borneo Offensive totaled 114 killed and 221 wounded, while they captured 130 prisoners and accounted for at least 1,234 Japanese killed. Following the conclusion of conventional military operations, Wootten's troops began to support the efforts of Australian-sponsored native guerrillas operating in Sarawak under Operation Semut and in British North Borneo as part of Operation Agas.  Between March and July 1945, five Special Operations Australia “SOA” parties were inserted into North Borneo. The Agas 1 and 2 parties established networks of agents and guerrillas in northwestern Borneo, while the Agas 4 and 5 parties, landed on the east coast, achieved little in their missions. The Agas 3 party investigated the Ranau area at the request of the 1st Corps. The results of Operation Agas were mixed; although its parties established control over their respective areas of operation and provided intelligence of variable quality, they were responsible for killing fewer than 100 Japanese soldiers. In parallel, as part of Operation Semut, over 100 Allied personnel, mainly Australians, were inserted by air into Sarawak from March 1945, organized into four parties. These parties were tasked with collecting intelligence and establishing guerrilla forces. The indigenous Dayaks of Sarawak's interior enthusiastically joined these guerrilla groups, essentially allowing SOA personnel to lead small private armies. No. 200 Flight RAAF and the Royal Australian Navy's Snake-class junks played crucial roles in this campaign, facilitating the insertion of SOA personnel and supplies. The guerrilla forces launched attacks to gain control of the interior of Sarawak, while the 9th Division focused on coastal areas, oilfields, plantations, and ports in North Borneo. The guerrillas operated from patrol bases around Balai, Ridan, and Marudi, as well as in the mountains and along key waterways, including the Pandaruan and Limbang Rivers, and along the railway connecting Beaufort and Tenom. Their objective was to disrupt Japanese troop movements and interdict forces as they withdrew from the main combat zone. The RAAF conducted air strikes to support these lightly armed guerrillas, who at times had to evade better-armed Japanese units. These guerrilla forces successfully raided several key towns and facilities, significantly disrupting enemy movements and efforts. It is estimated that over 1,800 Japanese soldiers were killed in North Borneo through guerrilla actions, particularly by the fearsome Dayak people, whose fierce tactics and local knowledge played a crucial role in these operations. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the final throes of the Pacific War, the Battle of Okinawa became a fierce battleground of sacrifice and honor. As American forces, led by General Buckner, advanced, they shattered Japanese defenses, pushing them into a desperate retreat. On June 21, General Ushijima and Lieutenant General Cho, recognizing their imminent defeat, committed seppuku, adhering to the samurai code. The chaotic battle led to staggering casualties, with many Japanese soldiers surrendering, realizing their cause was lost. By June's end, Okinawa was secured, symbolizing not only a victory but also the tragic cost of war, with countless lives lost on both sides.

Andrew Loftesnes is a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps. Specifically, he served with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, which is the same unit that President Donald Trump has, controversially, deployed to Los Angeles to, as Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem put it recently, "liberate this city from the socialist and burdensome leadership" elected by local citizens. The deployment was "not only a direct threat to democracy and in my opinion a significant step towards autocracy, but also a direct betrayal of the young men and women who serve in the Marine Corps and other branches of the US military," Loftesnes said on this episode of Plain Talk. "The escalation 100% is the point," he added when asked if Trump's motive was to inflame an already delecate situation further. "Anyone who calls themselves a conservative politically, I think, should be horrified by this federal overreach," he said. Also on this episode, Attorney General Drew Wrigley explains his legal opinion concluding that Gov. Kelly Armstrong's line-item veto should stand, and that a special session isn't necessary. He points to Article V of the North Dakota constitution which states that the governor need send two things back to the Legislature when issuing a veto: A veto message, and the original bill, with the latter requirement being an anachronism from the pre-digital, pre-copy machine era when there would be only one copy of a given piece of legislation. Wrigley says that the veto message issued by Armstrong was accurate, and that whatever mistakes were made up the marked-up version of the bill Armstrong sent back alongside the message are irrelevant. "This isn't a hieroglyphics contest," he said. Armstrong's office is proceeding following Wrigley's opinion, but the Legislature, and specifically the Legislative Management Committee which Senate Majority Leader David Hogue chairs, has yet to decide whether they'll litigate or call themselves back into session to take further action. In public statements, Hogue was dismissive of Wrigley's opinion, saying his "understanding of the English language" and "respect for the rule of law" prevented him from going along with it. Wrigley says he's since spoken to Hogue, and that they laughed the matter off. "We had a conversation that afternoon," he said. "In fact, I had seen the quote that you just mentioned, and when he called me later in the afternoon, I asked him if he was calling to discuss the English language, at which point he started speaking Spanish. We started off with a pretty good laugh." If you want to participate in Plain Talk, just give us a call or text at 701-587-3141. It's super easy — leave your message, tell us your name and where you're from, and we might feature it on an upcoming episode. To subscribe to Plain Talk, search for the show wherever you get your podcasts or use one of the links below. Apple Podcasts | Spotify | YouTube | Pocket Casts | Episode Archive

Bob Ingram joined the Navy after graduating high school in 1963 to give himself some direction. He was initially assigned to work in electronics, but after getting a bad case of pneumonia, Ingram was so impressed by the dedication of the Navy corpsmen, that he decided to become one. Corpsman training was long and demanding and Marine Corps aid training followed that. After struggling to find a good Marine unit to join, Ingram was off to Vietnam in late 1965 - attached to C Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. They saw a lot of action right from the start.In this edition of Veterans Chronicles, Ingram takes us into corpsman training, being assigned to the wrong company, and the joy of being moved to a great one. He then details his actions in February 1966, as he rendered aid to his Marines and also manned a machine gun to expose the enemy position. Ingram would receive the Silver Star.Just a few weeks later, on March 28, 1966, C Company found itself in another vicious fight, and lost a platoon almost instantly. Ingram provided aid to wounded Marines, gathered weapons and ammo from those who were killed and brought it to those still in the fight, and, again, grabbed a gun to target and drive out the enemy. He did all of this despite being shot several times, including once in the head.Ingram will tell us about his long road to recovery, how he learned of the effort to award him the Medal of Honor, and what the medal means to him and the men he served alongside.

Over the weekend, ICE agents invaded Los Angeles and its suburbs, kidnapping dozens of people on Friday and threatening more near a Home Depot on Saturday. These masked and heavily-armed forces are part of Trump's promised 30-day surge in anti-immigrant attacks in the LA area. But wherever there is repression, there is resistance - and the people of LA are fighting back. The community in LA and the suburbs continues its anti-deportation mobilization as we record this episode.Donald Trump has sent thousands of federalized California National Guard troops to the area against the wishes of Governor Newsom, and under seemingly murky legal authority. US Northern Command announced Monday that at Trump's order it sent 700 Marines with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division from the base at Twentynine Palms, about 2 and a half hours from LA. Trump. The resulting legal and political battle happening at the same time as the pitched street battles and the solidarity and community defense mobilizations that are spreading across the country all but guarantee a larger crisis should Trump not back down.We also react to the breaking news that the government is planning to send 8,000 people to “free up bed space at detention facilities on domestic American soil,” according to Politico.Support the show

//The Wire//2300Z June 9, 2025////ROUTINE////BLUF: LOS ANGELES RIOTS CONTINUE, RIOTS IN OTHER MAJOR CITIES PLANNED. CHINESE RESEARCHER ARRESTED IN MICHIGAN.// -----BEGIN TEARLINE------HomeFront-Michigan: This afternoon the DoJ announced the arrest of another Chinese national conducting research at the University of Michigan. In their press statement, the DoJ stated that Chengxuan Han was a Ph.D. student who had allegedly mailed biological material from China to the United States via the postal system some time ago. Han was arrested at the airport after landing in Detroit yesterday.California: Riots have continued throughout the Los Angeles area as local authorities become overwhelmed. Most of the rioting has been contained within the city center, however overnight roving bands of rioters began movement around the city, expanding unrest to other areas such as the *L.A. Live* area and the Convention Center.This afternoon U.S. NORTHCOM announced the deployment of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division to the Los Angeles area, effective immediately. This deployment incorporates roughly 700x U.S. Marines, who's primary mission will be to provide point security at Key Terrain and critical infrastructure sites around the city. This is intended to supplement the National Guard resources already deployed, and help free up local law enforcement personnel to respond to more dynamic situations as the chaos continues.USA: The LA Riots have sparked additional events in many cities around the nation. There are over 1,000 protests planned in hundreds of cities around the United States, most of which are planned for June 14th. Almost all of these planned protest events are organized by large, well-funded organizations.-----END TEARLINE-----Analyst Comments: The riots in Los Angeles have been made much worse by statements by local authorities. LAPD and LA County Sheriff officials have done everything in their power to distance themselves from the ICE raids that started all of this, and political leadership has worked to prevent police and National Guard soldiers from maintaining order. This has made problems worse for officers on the ground who continue to work with federal resources to keep control of the city; all while their leadership undermines their work to keep the peace.Overnight, reports leaked from within the LAPD that indicate Mayor Karen Bass personally interfered with operations by insisting that she assume command of the response instead of the Incident Commander. In this role, she allegedly intentionally delayed resources and hindered the response to maintain order. Though this will need to be investigated later, right now it seems as though Karen Bass put herself in charge of making decisions over the IC, and then promptly didn't make any decisions, stalling disaster response efforts. Governor Gavin Newsom has likewise made statements condemning the National Guard, and has demanded that they leave the city. Rep. Maxine Waters is on the ground and has been recorded verbally abusing National Guard soldiers on video several times. As such, though the personnel on the ground are doing the best they can, a very tenuous situation remains between local authorities and politicians in California, and the federal authorities seeking to maintain order.Analyst: S2A1Research: https://publish.obsidian.md/s2underground//END REPORT//

Last time we spoke about the Liberation of Mindanao. In the spring of 1945, as the battle for Okinawa intensified, American forces relentlessly confronted entrenched Japanese troops. General Buckner's 10th Army faced fierce resistance amidst harsh weather and dwindling supplies. Despite these challenges, they captured the strategic Shuri Castle, marking a critical turning point as Japanese troops retreated. Simultaneously, the liberation of Mindanao was underway. American troops, under General Eichelberger, rapidly advanced, overcoming fortified Japanese defenses in mountainous terrain. With the 24th Division securing key locations like Digos and Davao, the 31st Division pushed northward against General Morozumi's forces. Despite stubborn resistance, American forces displayed tenacity and courage, leading to significant victories. By May 20, the Americans approached Malaybalay, where remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment held their ground. As Japanese troops attempted to regroup, they faced relentless assaults from the advancing American divisions. Throughout the campaign, the Americans endured heavy casualties, but their determination led to more than 10,000 Japanese losses. This episode is the North Borneo Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we continue our story, by June 9, General Buckner's forces had pushed through to the enemy's main defensive line on the Kiyamu Peninsula. It was there that General Ushijima was preparing to make his final stand. Meanwhile, General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division landed on the Oroku Peninsula, determined to dismantle a stubborn pocket held by Admiral Ota's naval units. On June 10, the pace of the assault quickened dramatically. Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines broke through enemy defenses, capturing the strategic Hills 58 and 55(2). At the same time, Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines secured Hills 28 and 55(1). Although Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines made only limited progress, they effectively identified the last significant pocket of resistance in the high ground west of Oroku village. Looking south, General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division also reignited its offensive. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines successfully advanced into Itoman and Tera, while Colonel Mason's 1st Marines, supported by tanks, cleared the southern slopes of the key ridge between Tera and Yuza, capturing Yuza Hill in the process. To the east, General Bradley's 96th Division launched a renewed attack, bolstered by artillery and tank support. Colonel May's 383rd Regiment advanced approximately 700 yards toward the town of Yuza. Meanwhile, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment pushed into Yunagusuku and Tomui. However, they faced fierce resistance, quickly encountering heavy machine-gun fire originating from the heights of Yaeju Dake, which halted their advance. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its relentless push toward Nakaza, employing the full might of their tanks and artillery. Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment steadily advanced onto the eastern slopes of Hill 95, pressing toward Hanagusuku. At the same time, Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment fought to solidify its precarious position on the southeast end of Yaeju Dake. Back at sea, a kamikaze attack tragically sank the destroyer William D. Porter. That same day, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 unleashed a barrage of bombs and artillery on Minami Daito Island before retreating to Leyte-Samar after 89 consecutive days off the coast of Okinawa. This marked the conclusion of their role in Operation Iceberg. The following day, the sustained pressure from Arnold's offensive began to fracture General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on both flanks.Seas of flame engulfed Hill 95 on 11 June as 1/32 slowly advanced toward the crest of the enemy position behind the jets of armored flame throwers. Flame fuel was pumped and sprayed from hoses over portions of the ridge inaccessible to tanks and then ignited. Infantrymen moved among the still hot and smoking rocks and drove back the surviving defenders. That night the battalion dug in just short of the Hill 95 peak. Although little forward progress was made by 2/32 or the 17th Infantry on 11 June, the enemy position was considerably weakened. Intensive fire from supporting weapons was concentrated against the slopes of Yaeju Dake, and strong patrols cleaned out enemy groups that held positions near the 7th Division front lines. The 32nd Regiment achieved a significant victory by capturing the peak of Hill 95, while the 17th Regiment struggled to make further headway To the west, advances in the 96th Division zone were minimal as Bradley's regiments focused on consolidating their newly-won positions amidst intense enemy fire. Simultaneously, at Yuza Hill, fierce counterattacks were thwarted, and Mason's 2nd Battalion accomplished the critical capture of Hill 69, just west of Ozato, despite heavy machine-gun fire coming from Yuza Dake. Further east, ahead of the 7th Marines, some 800 yards from the southern fringes of the two settlements, lay "the scene of the most frantic, bewildering, and costly close-in battle on the southern tip of Okinawa"Kunishi Ridge. This precipitous coral escarpment constituted the western-most anchor of the last heavily defended line on Okinawa. The ridge contained innumerable caves, emplacements, and tombs on both the forward and reverse slopes. The intervening area between this formidable fortress and the lines of the 7th Marines was a broad valley of grassy fields and rice paddies which offered no protection to advancing infantry. The supporting tanks were restricted to two approaches into the position: a road across the valley which cut through the center of the ridge and another along the coast line. Both of these routes were covered by anti-tank guns. Shortly after noon patrols from the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved out with armored support to probe the Japanese defenses. Intense frontal fire from Kunishi Ridge, enfilade fire from the enemy on Hill 69 opposing the attack of 2/1, and artillery concentrations directed at the tanks forced a withdrawal at 14:47. Because of the complete fire coverage of the open valley enjoyed by the Japanese, both from the heights and slopes of the ridge itself and from the Yuza Dake area, it was apparent that a daylight assault of the position would be a costly affair. Consequently, after Colonel Snedeker had made a personal reconnaissance of the objective from a light liaison plane, it was determined to attack at night. The commanding officers of the assault battalions were oriented on the general plan during the afternoon. The central road and a line of telephone poles was designated as the boundary between battalions upon which the assault units would guide. The scheme of maneuver contemplated a penetration of the ridge where the road passed through it, followed by an expansion of the initial foothold to the right and left flanks to secure the remainder of the objective in the regimental zone of action. Normal artillery would be placed alternately on Kunishi Ridge and Mezado Ridge (500-600 yards southwest of Kunishi) until H-Hour and thereafter on the latter. On June 11, General Shepherd launched a concerted attack. The 22nd Marines successfully secured the Tomigusuki area and Hill 53, while the 29th Marines faced stiff opposition, making only limited gains against the heavily fortified hills west of Oroku. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines worked to strengthen their line, completing the encirclement of Ota's naval forces. Nevertheless, the ramparts of the Oroku fortress were cracking, and Admiral Ota released his last dispatch to General Ushijima: “Enemy tank groups are now attacking our cave headquarters. The Naval Base Force is dying gloriously at this moment… We are grateful for your past kindnesses and pray for the success of the Army.” During the night, artillery units successfully targeted and either killed or dispersed a group of Japanese troops attempting to cross the Kokuba River. Meanwhile, 51 infiltrators were eliminated as they tried to breach the lines held by the 22nd Marines. The following day, the 4th and 29th Marines intensified their efforts to compress the enemy pocket west of Tomigusuki, breaking through to seize Easy Hill while the 22nd Marines consolidated their positions. The capture of this key terrain feature forced the enemy into the alluvial flats along the coast between Oroku and Hill 53. "In the late afternoon enemy troops began displaying flags of surrender. Language officers equipped with loud speaker systems were dispatched to the front line areas to assist in the surrender of those Japs who desired to. The attempt was partially successful, 86 enemy soldiers voluntarily laid down their arms." For several days General Buckner had been sending messages to the Japanese commander by radio broadcast and air drops pointing out the hopelessness of the enemy situation in an attempt to persuade General Ushijima to surrender. During the afternoon of 11 June, Tenth Army representatives were conducted to the 2d Battalion OP overlooking Itoman to await any enemy party that might desire to negotiate. At 1700 all fire was suspended in the 7th Marines' area pending the doubtful appearance of a white flag. About 15 Japanese wearing white headgear appeared in the 1/7 zone in front of Company A at 1740, but dispersed when hailed. Six of the enemy surrendered to Company C at 1802, but the situation returned to normal two minutes later when hostile mortar fire fell on the captors' position. Final orders for the resumption of the attack were issued by Colonel Snedeker about 2000 setting H-Hour at 0330, 12 June. Both 1/7 and 2/7 were to make the assault with one company each, and at 0225 Company C moved out to establish contact with Company F on the line of departure. The attack was launched on schedule at 0330 and at 0500 Companies B and G moved out in support of the assault companies. Concurrently, Company F reached the objective at a point 500 yards north of Mezado village, as Company C came up on its left to extend the line eastward. The enemy was completely surprised and several small groups were wiped out by Company C while they were engaged in preparing breakfast. At the same time, the 1st Battalion extended the line eastward toward Kunishi. However, the Japanese quickly regrouped, pinning down the attackers for the rest of the day, though the Marines managed to reinforce and consolidate their hard-won gains. By midnight the positions there could be considered reasonably secure. But as General del Valle put it, "The situation was one of those tactical oddities of this peculiar warfare. We were on the ridge. The Japs were in it, both on the forward and reverse slopes." Elsewhere, the 1st Marines focused on mopping up Hill 69, dispatching patrols south through Ozato and maintaining their defenses on Yazu Hill. To the east, another pre-dawn attack initiated by the 17th Regiment caught the defenders off guard.  Colonel Pachler had compelling reasons for favoring a night operation. The defenders held a significant advantage in observation, which had posed serious challenges when the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Infantry seized the southeast end of the escarpment. The coral wall of the escarpment was particularly high at this end, and the narrow routes leading to the high ground were easily controlled by Japanese fire. After days of holding positions at the base of the 170-foot cliff, the troops had grown familiar with the terrain and, as their commander, Major Maynard Weaver, noted, they were eager to reach the top and finally see something new. The night attack was primarily planned for the 1st Battalion, but Colonel Pachler decided to coordinate a move to expand the territory held by the 3rd Battalion as well. The final plan involved three assault companies: Company A would occupy a cluster of coral about a hundred yards beyond the edge of the escarpment, near the boundary between the 7th and 96th Divisions. Company B aimed for a similar objective located about 200 yards to the southeast, while Company L was assigned to capture a small hill situated between the 1st Battalion's targets and the positions held by the 3rd Battalion since June 11. Each company was given a separate route: Company A's path led straight up the cliff's face, Company B needed to head south to reach a break in the escarpment before turning right toward its goal, and Company L had an accessible objective near the edge of the escarpment. Movement was set to begin at 0400 on June 12. Since the attack relied on stealth, no artillery preparation was planned. However, two battalions of 105-mm artillery, one battery of 155-mm howitzers, and an 8-inch howitzer battalion were scheduled to deliver heavy harassing fire during the night. Additionally, 21 batteries registered their fire on the afternoon of June 11 and were ready to provide protective artillery support if needed once the objectives were reached. For added firepower, a section of heavy machine guns was assigned to each assault company. Colonel Pachler meticulously planned the attack, ensuring that every soldier involved understood the details of the operation. Reconnaissance patrols had scouted the trails leading to the high ground, and demolition teams had already prepared known cave positions at the cliff's face with satchel charges. Despite thorough preparations, there was a collective apprehension about potential confusion caused by the unknown conditions of darkness. This anxiety was amplified at 2000 on the night of June 11 when the 7th Division G-2 Section intercepted an enemy radio message indicating, "Prepare to support the attack at 2300." Soon after, another intercepted message stated, "If there are any volunteers for the suicide penetration, report them before the contact which is to be made one hour from now." Meanwhile, from dusk until almost 2300, the Japanese unleashed a heavy artillery barrage, leading front-line troops to anticipate a counterattack. That counterattack did come, aimed at the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry, which had reached the summit of Hill 95 earlier that day, as well as against the 96th Division. However, there was no enemy activity observed in the 17th Infantry's sector. As night illumination and harassing fire ceased shortly before 0400, the attack proceeded according to plan. The companies moved out in single file. Remarkably, a heavy fog settled over southern Okinawa, creating the perfect conditions for concealment while allowing the troops to follow their paths without confusion. On the high ground, Company A encountered a few civilians wandering about, while the leading platoon of Company B unexpectedly came across three Japanese soldiers as they reached the shelf of the escarpment. The Americans chose to ignore them and continued silently on their way, with the enemy surprisingly not opening fire. By 0530, just minutes after dawn, Companies A and B were in position without firing a single shot. Company L also successfully reached its objective, and eager to capitalize on the fog and absence of enemy fire, its commander sent a support platoon to a small hill fifty yards beyond. This objective was secured quickly, but not without incident; two enemy soldiers were killed in the process. The platoon leader reported their progress but quickly called for mortar fire as about fifty Japanese troops approached in a column. The Americans opened fire with rifles and BARs, disrupting the formation and resulting in thirty-seven enemy soldiers killed, while the rest managed to escape. The men of the 1st Battalion celebrated the success of the night attack. Shortly after Company A took position, four enemy soldiers stumbled into view and were swiftly eliminated. A few moments later, another four followed suit, meeting the same fate. Company B remained undisturbed until around 0530 when Japanese soldiers attempted to emerge from several caves within the company's area. Although the cave entrances were heavily reinforced with concrete and couldn't be sealed with demolition charges, the Marines guarded the openings and shot at the Japanese as they appeared. Not long after daylight, Company C began clearing the caves at the base of the escarpment, eventually regrouping with the rest of the battalion on the high ground. By 0800, the situation had stabilized, and the 17th Infantry held strong positions on Yaeju Dake. During the night, the Japanese had withdrawn their front-line troops from Yaeju Dake to escape the punishing artillery fire, intending to reoccupy it before the anticipated 0700 attack. Fifteen hours after the 32nd Infantry fought their way to the top of Hill 95, the 17th Infantry had executed a masterful night attack to seize their portion of Yaeju Dake. Throughout the day, the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Infantry relieved Companies I and K, and with Company L attached and supported by medium and flame tanks, continued the offensive. The 1st Battalion maintained its position, firing at enemy soldiers who were slow to realize that their defensive terrain had been lost. Company B alone accounted for sixty-three Japanese soldiers killed throughout the day. Taking advantage of this breakthrough, the 381st Regiment advanced to occupy the slopes of Yaeju Dake, while the 383rd extended the division front and secured Yuza. As the situation unfolded, Japanese troops maintained control over Big Apple Peak, which towered about sixty feet above the surrounding plateau. However, by the evening of June 12, the 7th and 96th Divisions had succeeded in forcing the reconstituted 44th Independent Mixed Brigade from the southeastern end of the enemy's line. General Ushijima acted swiftly, given the limitations imposed by his damaged communication system and the chaos among his front-line units. With his artillery nearly silenced by enemy bombardments and his supplies dwindling faster than his manpower, Ushijima's only hope lay in sending more troops into the relentless shellfire and flames unleashed by American forces sweeping across the frontline. His urgent order read: “The enemy in the 44th IMB sector has finally penetrated our main line of resistance. The plan of the 44th IMB is to annihilate, with its main strength, the enemy penetrating the Yaeju-Dake sector. The Army will undertake to reoccupy and hold its Main Line of Resistance to the death. The 62nd Division will place two selected infantry battalions under the command of the CG, 44th IMB.” Unfortunately, the 64th Brigade, the part of the 62nd Division that had shifted from Shuri to reserve positions near Makabe, didn't receive this order until late on June 13, a full thirty hours after it became critical. This piecemeal commitment of reserve troops proved to be grossly inadequate. By June 13, the 44th Brigade was teetering on the brink of destruction. When reinforcements finally arrived, they found the remnants of the 44th Brigade overwhelmed and absorbed into the reinforcing battalions, with still not enough men to hold the line. In a last-ditch effort, the enemy committed the main strength of the 62nd Division, his final reserve, with a desperate plea for cooperation and orders to "reoccupy and secure the Main Line of Resistance." However, by the time the 62nd Division moved onto the line, they ran headlong into General Hodge's forces, who were advancing southward across the coral-studded plateau. The Americans pressed forward, shielded by the fire of machine guns and tanks, advancing over the bodies of Japanese defenders who had fought fiercely to hold their last stronghold "to the death." On June 13, General Arnold resumed his assault against the rapidly disintegrating 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 32nd Regiment successfully secured the Hill 95-Hanagusuku area, while the 17th Regiment expanded its control over the escarpment's summit. To the west, May's 3rd Battalion and Halloran's 2nd Battalion struggled to capture the top of the escarpment despite repeated attempts. However, they significantly diminished the defenders' strength with a relentless volume of covering fire. At the same time, May's 1st Battalion advanced through Yuza and swept southward to successfully secure Ozato. Meanwhile, General Del Valle prepared to commit the 1st Marines to the fight on Kunishi Ridge, as the isolated 7th Marines continued to be pinned down by heavy Japanese fire, relying on tanks for supplies and evacuation. Further north, the 29th Marines launched an attack southeast to eliminate the enemy pocket, while Shapley's 3rd Battalion moved swiftly toward the beach, progressively chasing the demoralized Japanese forces from the thick brush and marshy terrain along the waterfront. As they reached the sea wall, the assault turned into a rout. Some of the enemy threw down their arms and fled at the Marines' approach. Large numbers surrendered; but some fought back with hand grenades in desperate, individual last ditch stands, while many more used grenades to destroy themselves in despair. The sea wall was reached at noon, and the remainder of the day was spent running to earth small groups hiding in the cane fields and rice paddies. In the late afternoon General Shepherd notified General Geiger that all organized resistance on Oroku had ceased. In the early hours of June 14, Mason's 2nd Battalion advanced toward Kunishi Ridge, tenaciously fighting their way to positions east of the 7th Marines, which remained isolated. Simultaneously, Shepherd's reinforced Reconnaissance Company successfully landed on Senaga Island, completing the occupation of the Oroku Peninsula. Looking south once again, May's 1st Battalion completed the cleanup in Ozato but soon had to withdraw from its vulnerable position, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment pressed forward to the edge of the escarpment west of Yaeju Dake. To the east, despite heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, the 381st Regiment maintained constant pressure on the northern face of Yaeju Dake, finally reaching the top of the escarpment by nightfall. Their success allowed them to link up with the 7th Division, which dealt a crushing blow to the 13th Independent Battalion, advancing approximately 300 yards across the front. After a night of disorganized counterattacks and infiltration attempts, the 7th Division launched an assault toward Hills 115 and 153, advancing about 1,200 yards and reaching the outer slopes of the hill positions. To the west, the 381st Regiment and May's 3rd Battalion successfully secured the escarpment between Yuza and Yaeju Dake, although the remainder of the 383rd struggled to move forward due to heavy fire from Yuza Dake. On Kunishi Ridge, the pressure from the Japanese remained relentless, restricting the 7th Marines to only minor local gains. However, Mason's 2nd Battalion managed to inch its way along the ridge, successfully extending the line by about 200 yards to the east. Behind them, Colonel Griebel's 5th Marines began to relieve the weary 1st Marines, with Griebel's 2nd Battalion finally moving forward during the night to support Mason's isolated 2nd Battalion. On June 16, after an intense bombardment of artillery, mortars, and rockets, the 7th Marines finally broke through. Snedeker's 1st Battalion advanced along the northern slope of Kunishi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion extended the line into the initial high ground of the Mezado hill mass. Concurrently, Griebel's 2nd Battalion advanced, making slow but steady progress until they secured a coral peak on the ridge that commanded their position. To the east, the 62nd Division, attempting to move from its reserve locations southwest of Makabe to support the faltering Japanese lines, faced devastating fire from artillery, ship guns, and aerial bombardments of rockets and napalm. Seizing the opportunity created by the relentless bombardment of enemy rear areas, Bradley launched his battalions through the Yuza Dake perimeter. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment pushed through the 383rd and advanced toward Ozato, aiming to gain control of the high ground southwest of Yuza, while May's 3rd Battalion successfully captured Yuza Dake. Additionally, the 381st Regiment gained approximately 600 yards along its front, reaching the saddle between Yuza Dake and Hill 153. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment pressed onto the forward slopes of Hill 153, and the 32nd Regiment, driving down the coast, took Hill 115, effectively eliminating the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment. Back at sea, despite a significant depletion of Japanese air strength, a kamikaze attack succeeded in sinking the destroyer Twiggs.  But now, it's time to leave Okinawa and turn our attention to Borneo, where we continue covering the Australian offensive. As we last noted, by May 6, Brigadier Whitehead's 26th Australian Brigade had successfully landed on Tarakan, pushing the Japanese garrison into the island's rugged interior. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area (embracing Hills 105 and 102), 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District VI, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops"; and he was directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts. The 4th Company of Tokoi Force (IJA) plus the 1st Company of the 2nd Naval Guard Force were on Hill 105, Margy and Janet; the 1st Company of Tokoi Force, and other troops were on Hill 102. In the north was a composite group. To secure the recently captured airfield from potential counterattacks, raids, or indirect fire, Brigadier Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/48th Battalion to gain the high ground north of the town, reaching up to Snags Track. The 2/4th Commando Squadron was tasked with advancing along Snags Track toward the Sesanip oilfields, while the 2/3rd Pioneers were assigned to sweep the high ground east of the town and move along John's Track to the mouth of the Ama River. Meanwhile, the Dutch company was to clear the unoccupied Cape Batu peninsula, a task that proved surprisingly straightforward. In the Mount Api area, however, the 2/23rd Battalion faced fierce resistance, particularly at Tiger and along Crazy Ridge, resulting in minimal progress until they were relieved by the 2/24th Battalion on May 9. Further to the right, the 2/48th Battalion seized Otway without opposition, and the commandos successfully cleared Snags Track up to Haigh's by May 8, though tanks could not advance any further. The pioneers, on the other hand, encountered heavy resistance along John's Track, which they couldn't overcome until May 9. That day, a long-distance patrol from the 2/24th Battalion also succeeded in driving the Japanese out of the Juata oilfields after a skirmish. On May 10, while the 2/48th and the commandos patrolled aggressively forward, the pioneers began their assault on the heavily defended Helen feature, which would successfully repel repeated Australian attacks for the next five days. Simultaneously, the 2/24th faced strong resistance in the Mount Api area but tenaciously pushed forward to Hill 105 on May 11, capturing Tiger the following night. They conducted patrols that probed about 1,000 yards southeast, cutting Snags Track at several points. On May 12, the 2/48th set out to cut King's Track and clear the heights from Sykes to Butch. The next morning, they successfully attacked and captured the knoll north of Snags Track. Meanwhile, following a highly effective air bombardment, the key Helen feature was found abandoned on May 15. This allowed the pioneers to clear John's Track and reach the coast at the mouth of the Amal River. Concurrently, the commandos secured the Agnes feature, followed by the 2/24th Battalion's capture of Elbow on May 16. The remaining positions on Hill 105 were then subjected to intensive bombing and bombardment, leading to an Australian assault on May 19. They finally captured the feature the following day. In the meantime, the 2/48th Battalion moved to Agnes to attack the Freda feature on May 14.  It was now evident that if the Freda hill was to be taken the attack must have heavier support. Therefore, on 22nd May, 12 Liberators and 12 Lightnings were sent out with bombs and napalm, but the cloud was so low that some of the heavy bombers did not find the objective. Then the artillery and mortars fired, and a two-company attack went in, the infantry moving very close behind the barrage. Gooden's company thrust from the east, and Captain Nicholas's advanced with one platoon pushing east along Snags Track towards Track Junction Knoll and another pressing north. The former platoon (Lieutenant Harvey), moving through very difficult country along a razor-back so narrow that only two men could be deployed on it, edged forward under heavy fire; after losing one killed and 4 wounded and finding the enemy becoming stronger Harvey manoeuvred out of this position. It was then found that a wounded man was not with them, so Harvey and three volunteers thrust back and engaged the enemy fiercely while the wounded man was carried out. During the day Gooden's company on the right had encountered two strongly-held knolls. Derrick's platoon succeeded in cutting the saddle between them and taking one knoll. Derrick's platoon and another launched “a most courageous attack up the steep slopes of Knoll 2 in the fading light. Here, in some of the heaviest and most bitter close-in fighting of the whole campaign these two platoons finally reached the top and secured the Knoll after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.... [Lance-Sergeant] Fennells time and again ... crawled ahead of the attacking troops, even to within five yards of the enemy, and gained vital information. On one occasion, when his section was forced to ground he had charged the Jap positions with his Owen gun blazing and had silenced the enemy post, killing the occupants. In a similar manner, Private W. R. How found the advance of the troops checked by a well-sited pill-box, raced forward with his Owen firing until within grenade range, and then, throwing grenades, moved in for the kill until he fell wounded. He had silenced the post and killed the machine-gunner, thus allowing the advance to continue.” At this stage 28 enemy dead had been counted; one Australian had been killed and 15 wounded.  Unfortunately, the Japanese counterattacked the following day, effectively recapturing the position. Following a devastating combination of air and artillery bombardment, the Australians managed to secure Freda and Track Junction Knoll on May 25. During this time, the 2/23rd Battalion remained in close contact with a resolute enemy at Janet and Margy but struggled to make significant progress. The 2/24th Battalion continued probing northward and captured the Droop feature on May 26. After another failed attack on May 29, a heavy air and artillery bombardment supported the 2/23rd as they finally captured Margy on May 31. Concurrently, the 2/24th successfully attacked and held the Poker Hills. On June 1, the 2/48th Battalion then attacked Hill 102, supported by aircraft and machine-gun fire. Lieutenant O'Rourke's platoon attacked, following an artillery barrage as closely as they could, and bringing with them three flame-throwers. They gained the forward slopes without being fired on and then saw five Japanese moving towards them, evidently to re-enter their positions after the bombing. These were fired on while the flame-throwers were brought into action. One operator sprayed the slope from side to side while another fired straight up it. “The result was devastating (said O'Rourke later). The hill was set completely ablaze to a depth of 50 yards, two of the five Japs were set on fire and the other three killed in their posts. The platoon was able to advance almost immediately through the flames, and with the help of the flame-throwers the feature was com-pletely captured within 15 minutes of the advance commencing. The flame which was fired up a slight rise hit the trees on the crest and also sprayed the reverse slope and had the effect of completely demoralising the enemy.“ While the Australians launched an unsuccessful assault on Wally, the 2/23rd Battalion was engaged in clearing out the remaining Japanese forces from Margy and its surrounding areas. On June 6, the Australians finally secured Wally, and the 2/24th Battalion also managed to capture Roger. In the early hours of June 10, the Japanese launched a counterattack toward Hill 105, but it was easily repelled. At the same time, the defenders began preparing for a withdrawal northeast into the island's interior, planning to split into independent groups to wage guerrilla warfare. Despite the looming withdrawal, Whitehead's battalions commenced attacks on Beech 2, Joyce, and Linda on June 11. However, progress was slow over the next three days, with the only notable achievement being the capture of Sandy on June 13. By nightfall that day, the Japanese finally began their withdrawal, leaving behind only rearguards to hold the crucial Essie Track. This allowed the Australians to capture the abandoned features of Linda, Joyce, Clarice, Hilda Paddy, Melon, and Aunty on June 14. The next day, the Australians took Nelly and Faith, but the Japanese rearguard on Essie Ridge managed to temporarily halt their pursuit. Eventually, however, Essie Ridge was overrun, and by June 16, Fukukaku was cleared. The 2/48th Battalion then pursued the Japanese as they fled eastward from Essie. On June 18, they caught a few but found that a large group had scattered into smaller parties. By June 19, patrols were radiating east, north, and west in pursuit, with Japanese forces standing firm at several points. Ultimately, the fall of Hill 90 on June 20 marked the end of organized resistance on Tarakan. Following this victory, Whitehead initiated a mop-up operation that would continue until the war's end. While the 26th Brigade was fighting to secure Tarakan, General Wootten's 9th Australian Division was preparing to launch the invasion of the Brunei Bay area of north Borneo, codenamed Operation Oboe VI. At the Manila conference in April General Morshead had learnt that OBOE I (Tarakan), OBOE VI (north Borneo) and OBOE II (Balikpapan) were to be carried out in that order. 34 LSTs would be allotted for OBOE VI but had to be released by 23 days after the landing. There were other fairly severe restrictions on the vessels available: the one boat battalion of the American Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment and the one amphibian tractor battalion allotted to OBOE VI had to be used for Balikpapan. Morshead and his staff arrived back at Morotai from Manila on April 21 and next day the Corps issued its staff study of the north Borneo operation, and the 9th Division's staff, which from April 4 to 17 had been planning an operation against Balikpapan, began preparing an outline plan for an attack on Brunei Bay instead. This was presented to Corps and approved on April 26; the final plan, which contained no major changes, was approved on May 16. Meanwhile a variety of problems had arisen at the Corps level and above. On May 1, 2200 troops and 1200 vehicles (including guns) of the 9th Division were still in the Cairns or Atherton areas awaiting shipment, and some of the stores and equipment were not scheduled to arrive at Morotai until May 25, two days after the proposed date of the landing. It also appeared that, on the day of the landing, the 24th Brigade would lack some unit stores and vehicles, and the 20th Brigade would possess only one battalion; there would be no field or anti-aircraft guns, a shortage of signal vehicles and equipment, no equipment for building wharves and bulk oil storage, and neither of the casualty clearing stations allotted would be present. Due to a series of issues at the Corps level and above, the invasion plan had been scaled down to a landing by a brigade on Labuan Island and just a battalion on Muara Island, with the operation further postponed to June 10. The strategy involved landing Brigadier Selwyn Porter's 24th Brigade on Victoria Harbor's Brown Beaches to capture the Labuan airfield and eliminate all hostile forces on the island. Simultaneously, Brigadier William Windeyer's 20th Brigade would put ashore the 2/15th Battalion on Muara Island's White Beach and the 2/17th Battalion on Brunei Bluff's Green Beach. These units were tasked with capturing Brooketon and securing the southern and western sides of Muara Island, setting the stage for an advance on Brunei Town. Upon capturing these objectives, the 9th Division was to occupy and defend the Brunei Bay-Beaufort area and take control of the Miri-Lutong-Seria regions. Once again, Admiral Barbey's Naval Attack Force, primarily comprising Admiral Royal's transports and Admiral Berkey's cruisers, was designated to facilitate the amphibious movement of troops to Brunei Bay. In preparation for the invasion, American and Australian air forces, under General Kenney's command, targeted airfields and other military installations, focusing particularly on destroying bridges on the railway to Jesselton to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to Labuan by rail. On June 4, Barbey's convoy finally departed Morotai, embarking on its 1,100-mile voyage to Brunei Bay. Air attacks intensified on June 5, successfully rendering the Papar River bridge unusable. Four days later, on June 9, the air campaign reached its peak: 54 Liberators and 24 Mitchells launched strikes against targets on Labuan, while 23 Liberators targeted the Brooketon area. In the meantime, minesweepers successfully cleared a channel into the bay, destroying 69 mines between June 7 and 9. Berkey's cruisers sailed ahead and shelled the Brown, White, and Green Beaches in the two days leading up to the landings. The convoy finally arrived at the main channel between Labuan Island and Brunei Bluff just before sunrise on June 10, fully prepared to execute the invasion. Opposing them, General Baba's 37th Army had assembled General Nozaki's depleted 56th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Brunei Bay sector. This included two battalions near Brunei, one at Beaufort, and one garrisoning Labuan. Additionally, the 553rd Independent Battalion was stationed in the Miri area; however, none of these units were equipped to make a stand at the beaches. At 08:15, Barbey's warships commenced a bombardment of the southern beaches as the troops were loading onto the landing vessels. Shortly after 09:05, the first waves began to advance, preceded by craft firing rockets and artillery. As anticipated, there was no opposition on the landing areas. The 2/15th Battalion successfully reached the shore at 09:15, followed by the 2/17th Battalion, which made landfall three minutes later, approximately 1,000 yards east of its intended location. By dusk, the 2/15th had scoured the swampy terrain of Muara Island and reported no Japanese presence. The 2/17th pushed forward a few miles along the road to Brunei, while the 2/13th Battalion landed and moved into reserve behind the 2/17th. Meanwhile, the 2/28th Battalion landed without incident at 09:15 and quickly secured Labuan town, with the 2/43rd Battalion following ashore at 09:20 to initiate the advance toward the airfield.  There was no opposition until 10:45, when the leading troops came under rifle fire just south of Flagstaff Hill. This post was quickly bypassed and taken, but the Australians continued to face strong resistance from the 371st Independent Battalion. Despite this, the defenders could not prevent the 2/43rd from capturing the airfield by nightfall. During the day, Porter also landed the 2/11th Commando Squadron on the unoccupied Hamilton Peninsula, with one troop initiating a move north along Charlie Track. On June 11, while the 2/43rd patrolled north and west, overcoming some opposition, the 2/28th slowly advanced toward the Able and Baker routes, where they encountered the bulk of enemy resistance. Meanwhile, after repelling an enemy patrol overnight, the 2/17th continued its advance to Brunei unopposed, with a company from the 2/15th moving up the Brunei River to land about four miles downstream from the town. The following day, the 2/17th reached and seized the airstrip, finally encountering defenses manned by the 366th Independent Battalion. On Labuan, the 2/43rd moved unopposed to Hamilton Road and successfully linked up with the commandos, leaving behind one company and three tanks to destroy a bypassed stronghold to the northwest. At the same time, the 2/28th probed the strongly held area astride MacArthur Road and to its west, making good progress to compress the resilient enemy into a pocket. On June 13, although the 2/43rd occupied an emergency airstrip at Timbalai, the primary objective remained to continue compressing the enemy into "the Pocket" and mop up the remainder of the island. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Australian troops, under Brigadier Whitehead, landed on Tarakan, swiftly overcoming Japanese strongholds. By May 20, they began the North Borneo Offensive, achieving significant territorial gains amid brutal combat. As Japanese forces faltered, some surrendered, signaling a turning tide. The campaign showcased immense courage and sacrifice, with heavy casualties on both sides, ultimately paving the way for Allied victories in the Pacific theater.

Show SummaryOn today's episode, we welcome back a previous guest Marine Corps Veteran and Veteran Advocate Dean Dauphinais. Dean is an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, and was born and raised on the Spirit Lake Dakota Reservation in North Dakota. Dean and I talk about his work and his role on an advisory committee for PsychArmor to ensure cultural responsivity in content for Native and Tribal Veterans.  Provide FeedbackAs a dedicated member of the audience, we would like to hear from you about the show. Please take a few minutes to share your thoughts about the show in this short feedback survey. By doing so, you will be entered to receive a signed copy of one of our host's three books on military and veteran mental health. About Today's GuestDean Dauphinais served in the United States Marine Corps from 1995 to 1999 with 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division. He is the President and CEO of Native Eco Solutions, a consulting firm that has a goal of connecting tribal communities with opportunities to improve the quality of life of their people by inspiring collaboration in Indian Country and matching Indigenous values with strong business fundamentals in order to improve tribal communities·      Enrolled Member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians·      Bachelor of Education degree - University of North Dakota·      AA Liberal Arts, Cankdeska Cikana Community College·      United States Marine Corps Veteran, Honorable Discharge·      National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), member·      California American Indian Business Chamber of Commerce, member·      Minnesota American Indian Chamber of Commerce, member·      Government Contract Consulting, Project Management, Community Organizing, Veterans Advocacy, Nonprofit Leadership& Management·      Strong network for collaborations in Indian Country, Veterans' Affairs and underserved communities Links Mentioned During the EpisodeDakota 38 FilmPsychArmor Resource of the WeekThis week's resource of the week is the previous two podcast episodes featuring Dean's colleagues on the PsychArmor American Indian and Alaska Native Advisory group, episode 214 with Dr. Chepa Rank and episode 220 with Retired Army Command Sergeant Major Julia Kelly.  You can find the resource here:  https://psycharmor.org/podcast/dr-melita-chepa-rank https://psycharmor.org/podcast/julia-kelly Episode Partner: This week's episode is brought to you by Humana, a leading health and well-being company that has joined forces with PsychArmor to develop campaigns and courses that support veterans and their families in achieving their best health. To learn more about how Humana honors and serves veterans visit healthequity.humana.com/veterans Contact Us and Join Us on Social Media Email PsychArmorPsychArmor on TwitterPsychArmor on FacebookPsychArmor on YouTubePsychArmor on LinkedInPsychArmor on InstagramTheme MusicOur theme music Don't Kill the Messenger was written and performed by Navy Veteran Jerry Maniscalco, in cooperation with Operation Encore, a non profit committed to supporting singer/songwriter and musicians across the military and Veteran communities.Producer and Host Duane France is a retired Army Noncommissioned Officer, combat veteran, and clinical mental health counselor for service members, veterans, and their families.  You can find more about the work that he is doing at www.veteranmentalhealth.com  

This is the VIC 4 VETS, Honored Veteran, during Veterans Month in America. SUBMITTED BY: Listener Michele Lee Scarlet-Ridenour, Rural mail carrier ______________________________________________________________ Corporal Michael Lee Scarlet aka (TWIGGY) served with honor in the U.S. Marine Corp. during the Vietnam War from 9/13/1967 til 9/12/1970. Mr. Scarlet’s duty was as a {Lineman}. On 2/1/1970 he was promoted to the rank of Corporal and was assigned to the S&H Company 3rd Battalion 1st Marine Division. CPL Scarlet earned and was awarded the National Defense Service Medal, the Vietnam Service Medal w/1 Bronze Star, the Vietnam Campaign Medal, the R.V.N. Cross of Gallantry w/Palm, a Combat Action Ribbon, the U.S.M.C. Good Conduct Medal, and a Rifle Marksmanship Badge This was my father and he not only served 1 tour in Vietnam he served 2 so that his younger brother John who was also in service in the Army and was stationed in Germany did not have to fight in combat in Vietnam!! My fathers letters to my grandparents are quite touching as he was just a young 17 year old at the beginning of his time in the Marines. Believe me he was a remarkable man. One that you would want on your side. I will forever be so proud that this beloved man was my dad and he's so very missed, what a true hero. Dad passed in October 2020 due to Agent Orange that had caused Small cell lung cancer which spread to his brain. Semper Fi Daddy Always your girl________________________________________________________________ This is today’s VIC 4 VETS, Honored Veteran, during Veterans Month in America on NewsTalkSTL. With support from our friends at: DG FIREARMS - PATRIOT HEATING AND COOLING - BEST BUY FLOORINGSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This is the VIC 4 VETS, Honored Veteran, during Veterans Month in America. SUBMITTED BY: Listener Michele Lee Scarlet-Ridenour, Rural mail carrier ______________________________________________________________ Corporal Michael Lee Scarlet aka (TWIGGY) served with honor in the U.S. Marine Corp. during the Vietnam War from 9/13/1967 til 9/12/1970. Mr. Scarlet’s duty was as a {Lineman}. On 2/1/1970 he was promoted to the rank of Corporal and was assigned to the S&H Company 3rd Battalion 1st Marine Division. CPL Scarlet earned and was awarded the National Defense Service Medal, the Vietnam Service Medal w/1 Bronze Star, the Vietnam Campaign Medal, the R.V.N. Cross of Gallantry w/Palm, a Combat Action Ribbon, the U.S.M.C. Good Conduct Medal, and a Rifle Marksmanship Badge This was my father and he not only served 1 tour in Vietnam he served 2 so that his younger brother John who was also in service in the Army and was stationed in Germany did not have to fight in combat in Vietnam!! My fathers letters to my grandparents are quite touching as he was just a young 17 year old at the beginning of his time in the Marines. Believe me he was a remarkable man. One that you would want on your side. I will forever be so proud that this beloved man was my dad and he's so very missed, what a true hero. Dad passed in October 2020 due to Agent Orange that had caused Small cell lung cancer which spread to his brain. Semper Fi Daddy Always your girl________________________________________________________________ This is today’s VIC 4 VETS, Honored Veteran, during Veterans Month in America on NewsTalkSTL. With support from our friends at: DG FIREARMS - PATRIOT HEATING AND COOLING - BEST BUY FLOORINGSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Shuri. In the unforgiving terrain of Okinawa during May 1945, American Marines confronted fierce resistance from entrenched Japanese forces. Amidst heavy rain and dwindling supplies, General Buckner's 10th Army battled uphill toward Shuri, a critical stronghold. With communication crumbling and morale wavering, the Americans pressed on, launching daring patrols. The situation reached a turning point when intelligence revealed the Japanese withdrawal plans. Buckner ordered continuous pressure, leading to the capture of significant strategic points like Shuri Castle, which was relentlessly bombarded prior to the Marine assault. On May 29, as the last remnants of Japanese forces fled south, American soldiers swept through Shuri, which lay in utter ruin, a testament to the devastating power of the campaign.  This episode is the Liberation of Mindanao Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last week we covered the fall of Shuri and today we continue the brutal brawl for Okinawa and the liberation of Mindanao. As we last saw, the Japanese retreat from the Shuri line opened the path for General Buckner's 10th Army to move southward, with only General Fujioka's 62nd Division and a few minor rearguards standing in their way. On June 3, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its offensive to the south. Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment successfully secured the area of Itokazu. Meanwhile, Colonel Green's 184th Regiment pushed toward the coast to completely cut off the Chinen Peninsula. Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment was diverted into the rugged hills nearby to clean up any remaining resistance. To the west, despite persistent bad weather and challenging supply conditions, General Bradley's 96th Division also achieved success. Colonel May's 383rd Regiment secured the locations of Kamizato and Tera against relatively light resistance. At the same time, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment advanced to seize the entire Inasomi area. Looking northwest, General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division encountered stronger opposition. The bulk of the 5th Marines managed to push only as far as Tsukasa before being pinned down. In a strategic move, Colonel Griebel's 2nd Battalion executed a wide swing through May's rear area to capture the Gisushi region. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines made steady progress through the Kokuba Valley, facing small enemy blocking forces, in order to extend the line held by the 5th Marines. Meanwhile, at sea, Admiral Ugaki launched his 9th mass Kikisui attack. This operation, featuring just 50 kamikaze aircraft, faced heavy obstacles due to Typhoon Viper but still managed to damage 2 vessels. In another development, after successfully occupying Torishima Island on May 12, Colonel Clarence Wallace's 8th Marines landed on Iheyajima without encountering any opposition. In addition, preparations for the shore-to-shore assault of General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division were completed. Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines were set to land on the Nishikoku beaches before securing the Oroku Peninsula and its airfield. Consequently, during the early hours of June 4, Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company successfully assaulted Ono-Yama Island, while Shapley's assault battalions began the shore-to-shore movement to Nishikoku under the cover of artillery and naval bombardment. Despite some mechanical failures on the LVTs, the Marines successfully landed at 06:00 under sporadic machine-gun fire and then pushed onto the high ground 300 yards inland against minor resistance. After securing the initial foothold, the attack slowed against increasing resistance on the left flank. Because of this, the reserve 3rd Battalion was landed at 08:45 and subsequently advanced to the edge of the airdrome.  During the day development of the enemy's defense had revealed an inordinate number of automatic weapons, ranging in various calibers up to 40mm. Subsequently, it was disclosed that the Japanese had stripped the armament from the air defenses and damaged aircraft in the area and integrated these weapons into the ground fortifications to stiffen materially the resistance on Oroku. Besides meeting with the most extensive mine fields yet encountered during the campaign, on this day the 6th Division had its first contact with an awesome weapon: an 8-inch rocket that exploded with terrific concussion. However, there was little fragmentation and accuracy was poor. While the noise the huge projectiles made, tumbling through the air end over end, sounded "like a locomotive from hell" to the troops, the rockets were mainly a source of annoyance and caused few casualties. Rockets continued to fall in the rear areas during the night, snipers and infiltrators were active, and the entire front came under intermittent heavy mortar fire. This landing allowed Shepherd to bring in Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines by midday, which then secured the Kikibana area of Naha Bay, while the 4th Marines captured one-third of Naha's airfield. To the east, the Americans encountered less resistance than before, as the 62nd Division and other minor rearguards completed their withdrawal from the intermediate lines south of Shuri to a reserve area south of the new Kiyamu Peninsula lines. Recognizing this change, Buckner shifted the corps boundary to the west, assigning General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps the task of isolating the Oroku Peninsula and occupying the Itoman-Kunishi sector, while General Hodge's 24th Corps advanced toward the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake escarpment.  As a result, the 7th Marines were able to move south to seize Takanyuta and isolate Admiral Ota's forces on the Oroku Peninsula. The atrocious weather had converted the already muddy roads to impassable morasses. Transport was hopelessly mired north of the Kokuba Gawa. South of the river the "trails were only negotiable by foot troops, vehicles could not have been used" even if it had been possible to bring them across the inlet. The 5th Marines managed to secure the Hill 107 area without opposition before being relieved by Colonel Mason's 1st Marines. However, the 1st Marines were unable to continue their push south toward Shindawaku Ridge due to a flooded stream. Meanwhile, Mason's 3rd Battalion attempted a wide envelopment through the 96th Division zone but was quickly halted in front of Tera. Food was scarce, but through the wholehearted cooperation of the 96th Division the Marines procured two meals of K rations per man. It was the considered opinion of at least one member of 3/1 that "this day probably was the most miserable spent on Okinawa by men of this battalion." To compound these problems and discomforts, the 3d Battalion also found itself without a supply route or communications with the regiment 11,000 yards to the rear. Further east, the 383rd Regiment advanced rapidly, engaging isolated but strong enemy delaying groups as they secured the outskirts of Iwa. Matching this progress, the 381st Regiment advanced all the way to the hills north of Aragusuku, facing steadily increasing resistance. Additionally, while the 17th Regiment established positions controlling the Minatoga-Meka road, the 184th Regiment advanced against patchy and ineffective resistance until the Minatoga area was secured. The following morning, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched strikes on Okinawa and Kyushu. Unfortunately, poor situational awareness from Admiral Halsey caused the 3rd Fleet to inadvertently enter Typhoon Viper. This storm inflicted varying degrees of damage to four carriers, two escort carriers, three cruisers, one destroyer, and one tanker, while also destroying 76 planes. Additionally, kamikaze attacks succeeded in damaging the battleship Mississippi and heavy cruiser Louisville. Back on Okinawa, Shepherd's attack on the Oroku Peninsula commenced and progressed slowly but steadily against uniformly stubborn resistance. The 4th Marines secured most of the airfield and the Toma high ground, while the 29th Marines fought laboriously to advance toward Mura and Oroku, gaining up to 1,000 yards. To the east, the 7th Marines advanced to positions just north of Hanja, while the 1st Marines bypassed the inundated area in front of them by swinging east and following their 3rd Battalion toward Iwa. In fact, Mason's 3rd Battalion launched another attack aimed at Shindawaku Ridge, advancing over 3,000 yards to the area west of Iwa. Despite muddy conditions and rainy weather, Hodge's infantrymen continued to penetrate the enemy outpost zone, developing the edges of the main Japanese battle position. The outpost line of Kiyamu Peninsula was fully manned on June 4. Japanese Army headquarters estimated that the strength of its now concentrated forces totaled 30000, distributed as follows: 24th Division and attached units, 12000; 62nd Division and attached units, 7000; 44th IMB and attached units, 3000; 5th Artillery Command and attached units, 3000; and units directly under 32nd Army command, 5000. The difference in total strength between the 50000-man estimate late in May and the 30000 left in Kiyamu Peninsula was attributed to "attrition during retirement operations." Only about 20% of the remaining troops were survivors of the original crack infantry-artillery units; the rest were untrained rear echelon personnel or Boeitai. Most senior commanders at battalion level and above were still alive, however, and capable of bolstering the fighting spirit of their motley collection of men. But the 32nd Army had suffered grievous losses in weapons and equipment since L-Day. Hand grenades and explosives were almost entirely expended. 4 out of every 5 machine guns had been destroyed, and the supply of heavy infantry cannon and mortars had been reduced to the vanishing point. Despite the fact that 2 150mm guns, 16 150mm howitzers, and 10 AAA guns had been successfully withdrawn to the Kiyamu battle position, artillery ammunition levels were insufficient for more than 10 days of sustained firing. General Ushijima's 32nd Army was in desperate straits, its destruction merely a question of time, but the tradition, discipline, and indoctrination of Japanese military forces promised only a violent, last-ditch, man-to-man struggle before the battle for Okinawa was ended. By June 6, the 7th Division reached the outskirts of Gushichan, and the 96th Division advanced toward Shindawaku and Tomui. To the west, the 1st Marines finally captured Shindawaku and cleared the bypassed area behind them. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines attacked toward Hill 108, advancing 1,000 yards before encountering stiff resistance and ultimately dug in around Dakiton. Additionally, Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines arrived to contain the Oroku Peninsula in the Hill 103 sector. Although the 29th Marines and Shapley's 1st Battalion made little progress in the Oroku-Mura area due to strong enemy resistance. Meanwhile the terrain confronting the 3rd Battalion there "consisted of a series of small temple-like hills, each of which had been converted into a fortress . . . from which mutually supporting automatic weapons could cover adjacent positions and deny the open ground between the hills." These gun positions were well dug-in and impervious to artillery fire. Because the narrow roads in the area had been made impassable by mines and shell cratering, tank support was not forthcoming, and a day of bitter fighting netted 3/29 a gain of a scant 150 yards. The remainder of the 4th Marines attacked Naha Airfield where counter fire from tanks, artillery, and support craft was immediately laid down. An urgent call for an air strike on the island was answered in less than half an hour, and "as rack after rack of bombs fell on the Nip positions, the troops stood up and cheered." The artillery piece was soon silenced, but 20mm fire was received spasmodically. Nevertheless, 3/4 pressed forward with its open flank covered by continued air strikes on Senaga Shima and completed the capture of Naha airfield before noon, whence they pushed south toward Gushi. At sea, kamikaze attacks crashed into and damaged two destroyer minesweepers, while also causing further damage to escort carrier Natoma Bay and destroyer Anthony on June 7. That day, Shepherd's Marines faced stiff resistance all along the front. The 4th Marines reduced Little Sugar Loaf where stiff resistance and bitter fighting characterized the action in the center and on the left of the 4th Marines' area. However, the attack forged ahead against machine-gun fire coming "from everywhere," while "countless caves were methodically cleaned out and sealed by the old process of direct fire, flame, and demolitions."Meanwhile the 29th Marines entered Oroku, and the 22nd Marines captured Hill 103 and the area south of Tamigusuki.  To the southeast, the 7th Marines overran Hanja and Hill 108, ultimately digging in just north of Zawa and linking up with the 1st Marines, which also advanced up to 1,200 yards as they secured Hill 75 and pushed toward Yuza. Further east, the primary offensive efforts of the 7th and 96th Divisions on June 7 and 8 were focused on probing enemy defenses and advancing assault battalions to more favorable positions for an attack. Additionally, by the afternoon of June 8, the 32nd Regiment successfully relieved the exhausted 184th in the Gushichan area. On that same day, the 1st Marines pressed forward to the high ground overlooking the Mukue River, while the 7th Marines moved through Zawa and began probing enemy positions in Itoman, encountering stiffened resistance. The first LVT's, supported by LVTa's, arrived at the newly-uncovered beaches at noon on 8 June, and shortly thereafter General Hodge sent General del Valle "congratulations for cutting the island in two." Meanwhile, on Oroku, the 29th Marines made little progress as they stalled at a key ridgeline on the left. The 4th Marines committed all three of their battalions to the attack, successfully securing the areas of Hill 39 and Gushi Ridge. The 22nd Marines continued to pivot on their right, seizing Hill 55 and making good progress along the front toward Chiwa and Tomigusuki. On June 9, although the 22nd Marines managed to secure Hill 55 and push to Hill 28, little advancement was achieved to the north. Concurrently, the 4th Marines were able to slowly push to the outskirts of Chiwa and Uibaru, with patrols clearing out Chiwa and Whaling's 3rd Battalion extending the front to the north. The action in the zone of the 4th Marines on 9 June remained unchanged from that of preceding days: “The advance was still slow and tedious against bitter resistance. Every Jap seemed to be armed with a machine gun, and there was still the same light and heavy mortar fire. Casualties continued to mount and the number of Japs killed soared over the maximum of 1500 which were supposed to be defending and there were still plenty left.” In the meantime, to the south, Del Valle sent strong patrols across the Mukue, which began to encounter significant enemy resistance. Consequently, the 7th Marines were unable to push toward Tera and Itoman. Further east, Hodge finally launched a corps attack to the south. The 96th Division focused its efforts on softening the enemy positions on the escarpment in front of them, while the 7th Division carried out the offensive. The 32nd Regiment attempted to attack the eastern end of Hill 95 but was unsuccessful; however, they managed to locate and identify the most troublesome sources of enemy fire for destruction. On a more positive note, the 17th Regiment gained a precarious foothold on the southern end of Yaeju Dake, just north of Nakaza, where they would withstand several Japanese counterattacks throughout the night. The first and greatest obstacle confronting Wallace's attack was the open ground over which both assault companies had to move. Wallace used all available support and the men camouflaged themselves with grass and rice plants, but enemy fire began almost as soon as the leading platoons moved into the open. The infantrymen crawled through the slimy rice paddies on their stomachs. Within an hour Company I was strung from the line of departure to the base of the objective which two squads had reached. About this time the Japanese opened fire with another machine gun, separating the advance squads with a band of fire. This left one squad to continue the attack; the remainder of the company was unable to move, cut off by fire or strung across the rice paddies. Those men in the squad still free to operate lifted and pulled each other to the edge of the cliff and crawled quietly forward through the high grass on top. Pfc. Ignac A. Zeleski, a BAR man, moved so stealthily that he almost touched the heels of one Japanese. Zeleski killed him, and the other men killed eight more Japanese within the first ten minutes. Another squad reached the top of the escarpment about an hour later but was caught in cross and grazing fire from three machine guns, and the entire 8-man squad was killed. Gradually, however, a few more men reached the top, and by evening there were twenty men from Company I holding a small area at the escarpment rim. Company K had a similar experience. Accurate enemy fire killed one man, wounded two others, and halted the company when it was from 200 to 300 yards from its objective. For forty-five minutes the attack dragged on until S/Sgt. Lester L. Johnson and eight men maneuvered forward through enemy fire, gained the high ground, and concentrated their fire on the enemy machine gun that was firing on the remainder of the company. This did not silence the gun but did prevent the gunner from aiming well, and Johnson waved for the rest of the company to follow. By 1330 of 9 June Company K was consolidated on the southeastern tip of the Yaeju-Dake. That evening, three small but determined counterattacks, with sustained grenade fire between each attempt, hit the small force from Company I, which held off the attackers with a light machine gun and automatic rifles. Additionally, Wallace's 1st Battalion successfully landed unopposed on Aguni Island to establish air warning and fighter director installations.  However, it's now time to leave Okinawa and shift our focus to the Philippines to cover the continuation of General Eichelberger's Mindanao Campaign. As we last saw, by May 3, General Sibert's 10th Corps had successfully invaded the island and secured the key Kabacan road junction. General Woodruff's 24th Division occupied Digos and Davao, while General Martin's 31st Division advanced up the Sayre Highway toward Kibawe. Thanks to the arrival of the 162nd Regiment from Zamboanga, the 31st Division was now able to send another regiment, the 155th, to assist in the push north against General Morozumi's 30th Division. In response to the rapid advance of the 31st Division as far as Kibawe, Morozumi was assembling his units at Malaybalay in preparation for a retreat eastward to the Agusan Valley. He dispatched the 3rd Battalion of the 74th Regiment to the south to delay the Americans in the vicinity of Maramag, at least until May 10. Meanwhile, after capturing Davao, Woodruff's goal was to mop up the sector and destroy General Harada's 100th Division in the mountainous interior. The 100th Division located the southern anchor of its defenses at Catigan, 13 miles southwest of Davao, and the northern anchor in hills some twelve miles north of Davao. The Davao River, flowing generally south-southeast into Davao Gulf at Davao, divided the defensive forces into two groupments. The Right Sector Unit, west of the river, was composed of 5 infantry battalions, 3 regular and 2 provisional. The territory east of the river was the responsibility of the Left Sector Unit--2 regular infantry battalions, 2 provisional battalions, and the Air Force's Hosono Unit of ill-armed service personnel. The Right and Left Sector Units had a little artillery attached, for General Harada kept under his direct control most of the artillery as well as many engineer and service units. As a reserve Harada had about a battalion of regular infantry. The central and strongest portion of Harada's defenses rested its right on rising ground overlooking Libby Airdrome, two miles northwest of Talomo on the coast. From this point the central defenses, along which Harada initially deployed three battalions, extended eastward across the Talomo River and some rough hills to the west bank of the Davao River. The focal point of the central defenses was Mintal, four miles up Route 1-D from Talomo. Anticipating ultimate withdrawal into the mountains via Route 1-D, the southeastern section of the so-called Kibawe-Talomo trail, Harada had prepared defenses in depth along the highway and along ancillary roads paralleling it. Much of the region west of the Davao River from Talomo northwest twelve miles to Calinan was covered with overgrown abaca, or hemp, plantations. Resembling banana plants, and growing to a height of about 20 feet, the abaca plants had originally been planted in rows 10 feet apart, with 10 feet between plants. With harvesting slack during the war, the plantations had become thick with shoots, and older plants had grown to a foot or so in diameter. Plants of various sizes were, in April 1945, scarcely a foot apart. Visibility was virtually nil, and the heat at the hemp plantations was like that of an oven. With the 162nd Regiment taking control of Digos and the area stretching from Illana Bay's shores inland to Kabacan, Woodruff was now free to utilize his entire division to engage the enemy forces in the Davao area. At the start of May, the 21st Regiment had already launched an attack to clear Libby Airdrome, Route 1-D between Mintal and Talomo, and Mintal itself. They successfully reached Mintal by May 3, effectively forcing Harada to reinforce his defenses near the Talomo River. Although the airdrome was cleared two days later, subsequent efforts up Route 1-D toward Mintal were repelled by fiercely defending Japanese forces. Due to this resistance, elements of the 34th Regiment attempted to drive north along the high ground on the east bank of the Talomo River to bypass the Japanese defenses on Route 1-D. On May 8, the 21st Regiment finally crossed to the east side at Mintal; however, in the face of Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, they had to withdraw back to the west bank two days later. At the same time, the 19th Regiment was expanding its hold in the Davao area, striking into the high ground controlling the coast road immediately west of the Davao River on May 10. They also cleared scattered Japanese strongpoints on hills just north of Davao and on Samal Island. Two days later, the 21st Regiment again attacked northward along the east bank of the Talomo, successfully clearing out numerous positions from which the Japanese had directed fire on Route 1-D. By May 14, the highway all the way north to Mintal was finally secured. In the meantime, the 124th Regiment started north from Kibawe on May 6. However, the recently arrived Japanese defenders at Maramag managed to delay the occupation of this town until May 12, thus accomplishing their task more than adequately. Despite this success, Eichelberger had shrewdly sensed that Morozumi would attempt to make a last stand in the hills northwest of Davao. Therefore, he decided to land the 108th Regiment behind enemy lines in the Macajalar Bay area to expedite the conquest of Mindanao and open a new supply route to the 31st Division. Accordingly, on May 10, the 108th Regiment landed unopposed along the southeastern shore of Macajalar Bay, making contact almost immediately with guerrilla units operating in the region. This regiment then drove down the Sayre Highway to meet the 31st Division advancing from the south, encountering no significant resistance until May 13, when it faced strong Japanese defenses near Dalirig. With its rear protected by the recently landed 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment, the 108th proceeded to attack the enemy positions with great intensity, finally forcing the Japanese to retreat to the area east of Malaybalay by May 16. Concurrently, on May 13, the 155th Regiment passed through the 124th Regiment to continue the drive northward, meeting little opposition but facing supply problems. By May 20, the Americans finally reached the outskirts of Malaybalay, where fire from remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment halted their advance. Realizing that the regiment could not haul its weapons into the mountains east of Malaybalay, Morozumi had left the unit at Malaybalay to fight a rear-guard action, which was successful in keeping the 155th Infantry out of the town until late on 21 May. On 22 and 23 May the 155th continued up Sayre Highway, encountering elements of Morozumi's Northern Sector Unit that had not learned that American troops had reached Malaybalay and were still withdrawing southward to join the 30th Division's main body. Pressed by troops of the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, which had already landed at Macajalar Bay, the retreating forces gave the 155th Infantry little trouble and, about 1400 on 23 May, the 155th made contact with the 108th Infantry near Impalutao, twelve miles northwest of Malaybalay. Its share in the task of clearing Sayre Highway cost the 31st Division approximately 90 men killed and 250 wounded, while the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, lost roughly 15 men killed and 100 wounded. Together, the two units killed almost 1,000 Japanese during their operations along the highway, and captured nearly 25 more. Nevertheless, the 30th Division had managed to escape east this time to establish new positions near Silae. Back in Davao, on May 15, Woodruff directed the 21st and 34th Regiments to attack abreast to the north and northwest, targeting the Japanese center. Meanwhile, the 19th Regiment advanced north to clear the northeastern shores of Davao Gulf, link up with the guerrilla forces north of the gulf, and ultimately swing westward against the 100th Division's left flank forces. Surprised by the lack of enemy attacks against his flanks, Harada concluded that the American forces intended to neglect his flanks in favor of a frontal assault on his center. As a result, he weakened the defenses of the Left Sector Unit to reinforce the Mintal line, leaving only Admiral Doi's air-naval troops to defend his left flank. On May 17, Woodruff renewed his offensive. The 19th Regiment struck north to establish contact with the guerrilla 107th Division, while the 34th Regiment began clearing the coastal hills between the Talomo and Davao Rivers and attacked northwest toward Tugbok. The 21st Regiment also drove north toward Tugbok in the face of determined opposition. Progress in the following days was slow due to intense artillery, machine-gun, rocket, mortar, and rifle fire. However, by May 27, the 21st Regiment seized the Tugbok area, with the 34th Regiment arriving the next day to relieve them. As Harada's strongest defenses had been breached, he ordered a general withdrawal to a hastily established second line crossing Route 1-D in the vicinity of Ula. Furthermore, the 19th Regiment managed to establish contact with the guerrillas by May 24 as it secured Route 1 north of Davao. On May 29, the 19th Regiment struck westward toward Doi's Mandog defenses, closing in two days later to engage the naval troops in fierce combat. Concurrently, on May 30, the 34th Regiment attacked toward Ula, which fell easily the following day, though progress then slowed in the face of fanatic resistance. Reinforced by the recently arrived 3rd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment on June 4, the 34th began to make headway beyond Ula on the secondary road, gaining one mile by June 6 before swinging east toward Mandog. The next day, having overrun Doi's outer defenses, the 19th Regiment advanced steadily into the main positions near Mandog, which ultimately fell by June 9, just as the 34th was reaching the area. Continuing northward, the 34th was almost three miles north of Ula along both roads and found few signs of organized Japanese resistance by June 11. However, the 19th Regiment would not clear the hills north of Mandog until June 15. In the meantime, the 21st Regiment struck north from Lamogan on May 31 along secondary roads west of Route 1-D, ultimately seizing Wangan on June 16 and forcing Harada's battered forces to commence a full retreat northward in disarray. After the fall of Culanan three days later, Harada finally decided to retreat to a new line near the Bannos River. Yet Woodruff's troops continued to pursue them, rapidly crossing the Tamogan River and inflicting heavy casualties on the retreating enemy until they reached the mountain barrio of Kibangay on June 26, where the pursuit was finally halted. Looking back to the north, with Sayre Highway cleared, the 124th Regiment began probing into the mountains to the east in late May, encountering heavy resistance, rough terrain, bad weather, and supply problems. Nevertheless, by June 5, Morozumi abandoned his plan to hold the Silae area for a month and slowly began moving his best troops eastward toward Waloe in the Agusan River valley, harassed by Filipino guerrillas along the way. In the end, Silae was finally occupied on June 9, with troops of the 108th Regiment pushing further to the Bobonawan River four days later. Additionally, the 155th Regiment arrived on the Pulangi River on June 12, while elements of the 162nd Regiment struck twenty miles into the mountains east from Maramag by June 26. On June 25, the 1st Battalion of the 155th Regiment successfully landed on Butuan Bay and managed to reach Waloe before the Japanese on June 27, dispersing the 3rd Battalion of the 41st Regiment that was holding the area. However, the Japanese retreat was so slow that Morozumi was still assembling his forces about seven miles up the Agusan from Waloe by the end of the war.  Far to the northwest, units of the 31st Division had been probing southeast along the upper section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail ever since early May, and on the 11th of that month a battalion combat team of the 167th Infantry launched the reconnaissance-in-force directed by General Sibert.  Japanese along this section of the trail, about 1,000 men in all, comprised a conglomerate mass of service troops with a small leavening of infantry. Control was vested in General Tomochika, chief of staff of the 35th Army, who had set up a small headquarters groupment near barrio Pinamola, about twenty miles southeast of Kibawe. The Japanese force had a defensive potential far greater than its strength and nature would indicate, for the terrain gave the Japanese every conceivable advantage. Bounded on both sides by dense jungle and thick rain forest, the trail as far as Pinamola ran up and down steep ridges and was scarcely jeep-wide. Rains of late May soon rendered all sections of the trail completely impassable to wheeled vehicles, and supplies had to come in by airdrop, supplemented when possible by hand-carrying parties and laden Carabaos. The mud was so deep that often troops had to pull, push, or even jack the Carabaos out of gooey holes. Delayed by the Japanese, the terrain, and the weather, the 167th Infantry's battalion did not reach the Pulangi River, thirteen miles southeast of Kibawe, until 29 May.  Then, although the Japanese from the trail could no longer offer any threat to the 31st Division, the battalion continued south toward Pinamola, aided considerably by guerrillas. The remnants of the 1st Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the South Sector Unit, 30th Division, which had been driven into the mountains along Highway 3 by the swift American advance in central Mindanao had meanwhile been attached to Tomochika's forces early in June. Troops of the 167th Infantry finally reached Pinamola on 30 June as the remaining Japanese were withdrawing southward another eight miles to the crossing of the Kuluman River. Progress as far as Pinamola had cost the 167th Infantry approximately 60 men killed and 180 wounded, while the Japanese had lost almost 400 killed along the same section of the trail. Elements of the 167th Infantry held along the northwestern section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail until the end of the war, and as of 15 August the regiment was preparing to send troops across the Kuluman River to continue the advance southeastward. On that date nearly 30 miles of Japanese-improved trail, only 19 air miles--still separated the 167th Infantry from guerrilla units operating in the vicinity of Kibangay. Organized remnants of Harada's 100th Division holed up until the end of the war in rugged terrain north of this 30-mile stretch of the trail. Finally, the 24th Reconnaissance Troop successfully landed on the southeastern shore of Sarangani Bay on July 4 to establish contact with the guerrilla 116th Regiment, subsequently clearing the bay's shores against negligible resistance. On July 12, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment landed on the northwest shore, just as two provisional battalions were arriving in the area from different directions. The three forces began to clear the area, successfully locating and destroying the only Japanese unit in the region by July 25. This concluded the campaign in Mindanao, during which the Americans suffered 820 men killed and 2,880 wounded. In turn, almost 10,540 Japanese were killed in eastern Mindanao by June 30, with the pursuing Filipino-American units killing another 2,325 Japanese by the war's end. Roughly 600 Japanese prisoners were captured, over 250 of whom were civilians, before August. After the war, about 22,250 Japanese troops and 11,900 civilians turned themselves in. It is also estimated that an additional 8,235 Japanese lost their lives due to starvation and disease between April and the war's end. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the spring of 1945, the fierce battle for Okinawa escalated as General Buckner's troops captured crucial strongholds, pushing the Japanese forces into retreat. Meanwhile the liberation of Mindanao was kicking up. American forces launched a rapid invasion, confronting Japanese defenders who were heavily fortified in the mountainous regions. Despite the stubborn resistance, American troops relentlessly battled, ultimately culminating in significant victories and paving the way for liberation.

VIC 4 VETS is proudly supported by https://www.dgfirearmsllc.com/ https://www.callpatriothvacstl.com/ https://www.bestbuyflooringstl.com/ Submitted by: Ken Williams, Exec. Producer / Commentator The Vic Porcelli Show CHARLES ANTHONY MCGUIRK – UNCLE CHUCKThis is the VIC 4 VETS, Veteran Of The Day, during Veterans Month in America.Name Charles Anthony McGuirkFrom St Louis, St Louis County, Missouri Birth Date 1 August 1946 Casualty Date 19 July 1966 War Vietnam War Service Branch Marine Corps Rank Private First Class Specialty Rifleman Unit/Group 3rd Marine Division, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, C Company Casualty Type Died through hostile action Location South Vietnam, Quang Nam provincePurple Heart★ Combat Action Ribbon ★ Marksmanship Badge ★ National Defense Service Medal ★ Vietnam Campaign Medal ★ Vietnam Service Medal ★ Marine Corps Presidential Unit Citation ★ Vietnam Gallantry Cross During his service in the Vietnam War, Marine Corps Private First Class McGuirk experienced a traumatic event which ultimately resulted in loss of life on 19 July 1966. Boat sank in the Ca De River 2k from the Nam O Bridge in Quang Nam Province during Operation Hastings sweeps. He left a wife Louise McGuirk This is today’s VIC 4 VETS, Veteran Of The Day, during Veterans Month in America on NewsTalkSTL. Submit a vet so Vic and Ken can honor them June is VIC FOR VETS month. Every day in June, Vic and Ken will honor a veteran…living or dead…during Medal of Honor June. If you have anyone in your family or close circle who served that we can honor, please email their information to KEN at NEWSTALKSTL dot COM NAME & RANK: BRANCH & (optional) Battalion/Platoon: DATE OF SERVICE: ANY MEDALS OR AWARDS (optional): MORE INFO: THIS is the storytelling part…anything that helps us tell their BRIEF story would be great.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

VIC 4 VETS is proudly supported by https://www.dgfirearmsllc.com/ https://www.callpatriothvacstl.com/ https://www.bestbuyflooringstl.com/ Submitted by: Ken Williams, Exec. Producer / Commentator The Vic Porcelli Show CHARLES ANTHONY MCGUIRK – UNCLE CHUCKThis is the VIC 4 VETS, Veteran Of The Day, during Veterans Month in America.Name Charles Anthony McGuirkFrom St Louis, St Louis County, Missouri Birth Date 1 August 1946 Casualty Date 19 July 1966 War Vietnam War Service Branch Marine Corps Rank Private First Class Specialty Rifleman Unit/Group 3rd Marine Division, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, C Company Casualty Type Died through hostile action Location South Vietnam, Quang Nam provincePurple Heart★ Combat Action Ribbon ★ Marksmanship Badge ★ National Defense Service Medal ★ Vietnam Campaign Medal ★ Vietnam Service Medal ★ Marine Corps Presidential Unit Citation ★ Vietnam Gallantry Cross During his service in the Vietnam War, Marine Corps Private First Class McGuirk experienced a traumatic event which ultimately resulted in loss of life on 19 July 1966. Boat sank in the Ca De River 2k from the Nam O Bridge in Quang Nam Province during Operation Hastings sweeps. He left a wife Louise McGuirk This is today’s VIC 4 VETS, Veteran Of The Day, during Veterans Month in America on NewsTalkSTL. Submit a vet so Vic and Ken can honor them June is VIC FOR VETS month. Every day in June, Vic and Ken will honor a veteran…living or dead…during Medal of Honor June. If you have anyone in your family or close circle who served that we can honor, please email their information to KEN at NEWSTALKSTL dot COM NAME & RANK: BRANCH & (optional) Battalion/Platoon: DATE OF SERVICE: ANY MEDALS OR AWARDS (optional): MORE INFO: THIS is the storytelling part…anything that helps us tell their BRIEF story would be great.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this episode, American forces on Saipan face intense Japanese resistance as they push northward toward Marpi Point. On July 6, soldiers from the Army's 27th Infantry Division find themselves trapped in brutal combat near Tanapag and Harakiri Gulch, encountering relentless fire from deeply entrenched enemy positions. As tanks struggle against mines and ambushes, the division's momentum stalls, prompting desperate tactical decisions. Meanwhile, the 4th Marine Division continues advancing steadily eastward, capturing crucial high ground that places further pressure on the Japanese defenders. But as darkness falls, gaps emerge in American lines, leaving troops vulnerable to infiltration. With the Japanese preparing for one last, desperate counterattack, the battle for Saipan reaches a critical turning point. ************* Visit HistoryoftheMarineCorps.com to subscribe to our newsletter, explore episode notes and images, and see our references. Follow us on social media for updates and bonus content: Facebook and Twitter (@marinehistory) and Instagram (@historyofthemarines). Visit AudibleTrial.com/marinehistory for a free audiobook and a 30-day trial.

This week, the Sheriff talks about funding for the Department's Marine Division, his work with the Governor's task force on guns, an update on a murder investigation in Oshtemo and the new KRESA Career Connect Center.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Last time we spoke about the breakthrough on Okinawa. Despite relentless attacks on critical positions like Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, American Marines encountered heavy casualties. Yet, they persisted, inching forward against tenacious resistance. As mid-May approached, the situation for Japanese commanders deteriorated. Encircled and suffering significant losses, they began plotting a retreat to more defensible positions. On the ground, Marines battled through mud and enemy fire, showcasing incredible resolve amidst dire circumstances. Communication crumbled, supplies dwindled, and morale waned, yet the determination of both sides was undeniable. By late May, the tides shifted further in favor of the Allies, marking pivotal breakthroughs despite the challenges. Amidst ruin and chaos, the relentless struggle for control over Okinawa symbolized the brutal nature of war and the unwavering spirit of those fighting on both sides, setting the stage for an eventual Allied victory.  This episode is the Fall of Shuri Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, the battle for Okinawa was reaching a critical juncture. General Buckner's 10th Army had made significant gains, successfully breaking through the fortified Japanese defenses on both flanks. The 6th Marine Division, under General Shepherd, had effectively established control over the Naha area, while General Arnold's 7th Division achieved an impressive penetration at Yonabaru. However, despite these advancements, the remainder of the American forces faced formidable obstacles. They were grappling with relentless rain, fierce enemy resistance, and severe supply shortages, which left them effectively stalled in front of Shuri. In response to the encroaching American forces, General Ushijima had dispatched General Fujioka's 62nd Division to launch a counter-offensive aimed at driving the invaders out of Yonabaru. Meanwhile, Ushijima was preparing his 32nd Army for a strategic withdrawal south to the Kiyamu Peninsula. Fortunately for the Americans, they had caught wind of the defenders' intentions. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, on May 27, General Buckner ordered his troops to apply strong and unrelenting pressure on the enemy. The goal was clear: keep the Japanese forces off balance and prevent an easy transition to new defensive positions. Although the continuing downpour hindered the possibility of a large-scale, coordinated army-wide attack, it did not deter Buckner's strategy. Instead, he initiated a series of strong combat patrols along the front lines, which immediately encountered stiff resistance from Japanese troops that had not yet begun their withdrawal. On the west coast, as patrols from Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines scouted the area, they discovered that the Japanese had largely abandoned Naha. This news spurred the 2nd Battalion into action. They crossed the Asato River, moved through the lines established by Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company, and pressed deeper into the western part of Naha. Simultaneously, Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines made their last desperate push to extend American control into eastern Naha, fighting valiantly against the entrenched enemy. Farther east, Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment once again faced fierce resistance from the hastily committed 62nd Division, which staunchly defended its position. However, not all was lost; patrols from Colonel Green's 184th Regiment managed to reach Inasomi, meeting only scattered resistance. This breakthrough provided a crucial indication that the enemy had no intention of withdrawing into the Chinen Peninsula. As the clocks struck midnight, a significant yet largely unnoticed transition occurred in the waters off Okinawa: Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet relieved Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet. For the troops ashore, this change in command went by without a hint of recognition. The same ships and task groups continued their crucial support for ground operations, now operating under new numerical designations and leadership. However, Halsey faced an immediate challenge as Admiral Ugaki launched an extensive Kikisui attack, a large-scale kamikaze assault involving 110 enemy aircraft. The day of May 27 proved costly, with three destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, two transports, one subchaser, and two auxiliary ships all suffering damage. The following morning brought clear skies, which only heightened the danger for American naval forces. Several kamikaze aircraft succeeded in sinking the destroyer USS Drexler, while also inflicting damage on a transport ship, three freighters, and a landing craft throughout the day. Meanwhile, on land, Colonel Whaling's rehabilitated 29th Marines took over from the battered 4th Marines along the west coast. The 1st Battalion executed a concerted attack alongside the 22nd Marines, advancing successfully by 250 yards through the rubble-strewn city of Naha. In an impressive display of momentum, Roberts' men pushed forward unopposed toward the Kokuba estuary, eventually encountering resistance near Ono-Yama Island. To the east, the improvement in weather allowed Colonel Mason's 1st Marines to launch a coordinated offensive. The 2nd Battalion fought valiantly, climbing to the peak of 110 Meter Hill. The forward elements of Company E gained the hill crest but were forced to withdraw by vicious enemy fire which raked their positions. Lieutenant Colonel Magee felt that his depleted battalion, down to a total strength of 277 men in the rifle companies, might recapture the hill, but "it could not possibly hold it against a strong enemy counterattack." Although new replacements were available to regiments for training or other use, a division order prevented their being sent to front line units during a battle situation that called for the utmost in skill and knowledge of veterans. Throughout most of the morning and all of the afternoon, 2/1 concentrated the fire of its supporting weapons on the reverse slopes of 110 Meter Hill and engaged the Japanese in a fierce and continuous fire fight. Nightfall brought no cessation of enemy resistance, and many infiltrators were killed in the battalion's lines. In contrast, the 3rd Battalion experienced relatively little opposition, allowing some patrols to penetrate into Wana Draw. At the same time, Colonel Griebel's 3rd Battalion effectively moved its front line to the Asato River, while his 1st Battalion achieved a significant milestone by capturing Beehive Hill. However, despite the break in the rain, the conditions on the ground rendered large-scale movements impractical, stalling further advances across the battlefield. Despite Arnold's determined efforts to push west through Fujioka's blocking positions, progress was minimal. Nevertheless, he was able to consolidate his grip on the Ozato hill mass as Green's 2nd Battalion advanced to a position within 1,000 yards of Shinazato, strategically located at the neck of the Chinen Peninsula. The lack of success from the 62nd Division in driving back the breaching American forces reinforced General Ushijima's resolve to evacuate Shuri while the opportunity still existed. In light of this, he ordered the withdrawal to commence the following evening. On May 29, while the 7th Reconnaissance Troop managed to scout a significant portion of the Chinen Peninsula without incident, the 7th and 96th Divisions faced fierce resistance as they attacked toward the road network south of Shuri. The enemy's resolute defense resulted in only minimal gains for the American assault units. General Bruce's 77th Division, after what can be described as "a day almost entirely spent in hand-to-hand combat," found itself unable to penetrate the intense cordon of defensive fire that protected the Japanese positions. In stark contrast, to the west, Griebel's 1st Battalion made a rapid advance, quickly gaining the crest of Shuri Ridge. They launched a bold assault on Shuri Castle. On May 25, as part of the final stages of the Okinawa campaign, the American battleship USS Mississippi bombarded the castle for three days, and by May 27, it was engulfed in flames. That night, the Japanese forces retreated, abandoning Shuri while US troops pursued them southward. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines had started its attack on 29 May with Companies B and C in assault and Company A following in trace of Company C. The Marines quickly gained the crest of Shuri Ridge and Lieutenant Colonel Shelburne requested permission for one of his companies to storm Shuri Castle which commanded his position. Although the castle was in the zone of action of the 77th Infantry Division, General del Valle gave his assent to the request in view of the great danger of enemy action from the strong point. The 1st Marine Division commander felt that "at that time the position of the 77th Division was such that it would have taken several hard day's fighting through enemy resistance" before the castle could be taken. Company A drove east along the muddy ridge line, overwhelming the few Japanese in its path, and by 1015 the castle, core of the Shuri bastion, had been secured. The Marine unit entered Shuri through a gap in the covering forces caused by the withdrawal of the 3d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, in the course of the Japanese retreat from Shuri. This seems to have been the only notable instance of confusion and mistake in the Japanese withdrawal operation as a whole. Everywhere else around Shuri the Japanese still held their covering positions in the front lines. The 77th Division, which had scheduled air strikes and a heavy artillery bombardment on the castle heights for 29 May, received little prior warning of the Marines' assault and "was barely able to avert [its] called strikes in time." Without taking any credit away from Company A of the 5th Marines for its feat of capturing Shuri Castle, its success was clearly the result of the combined effort of all the assault and support troops of Tenth Army which had maintained relentless pressure on the enemy defenses and paved the way for the breakthrough.  Capitalizing on this momentum, General Del Valle swiftly reorganized his forces to bypass Wana Draw and consolidate these crucial gains. Meanwhile, Griebel's 3rd Battalion maneuvered down the division boundary, reaching a position just 2,000 yards from the village of Kokuba, prompting Whaling's 3rd Battalion to push their lines forward by approximately 600 yards. In a coordinated effort, the 29th Marines executed a wheeling assault on 29 May with 1/29 pivoting on 3/29 and attacking south and then east to bring the regiment on line with the 22d Marines. The ultimate objective of the 1st Battalion's attack was the high ground northwest of Shichina. The approach to the objective was over low and open terrain which drew the comment from regiment that it was "about as suitable to fighting as a billiard table." Fire from strong points in tombs and caves on the small hills and ridges to the front kept the advance to a slow pace, and the assault companies, A and C, dug in slightly to the left rear of the positions of the 22d Marines at nightfall. On another front, Roberts' 1st Battalion successfully crossed the Kokuba River and advanced toward Telegraph Hill in east Naha. However, despite their efforts, intense fighting erupted throughout the day without yielding any significant gains. Back at sea, the threat of kamikaze attacks returned with ferocity, yet this time, American defenses held strong, resulting in only a single destroyer and one transport sustaining damage. As night fell, the Japanese began their long-anticipated withdrawal. General Amamiya's 24th Division commenced disengagement, moving southward while leaving a small force, including the 22nd Independent Battalion, to cover their retreat at Shuri. Meanwhile, General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade held their defensive lines outside Naha, and the 62nd Division maintained its positions near Chan and Karadera. By dawn on May 30, the bulk of the 32nd Army had successfully evacuated the Shuri lines, slipping away from the flanking maneuvers of Buckner's 10th Army. Thanks to a continuous curtain of rain, General Ushijima executed a meticulously planned "properly deft withdrawal." His covering forces were strategically positioned to provide him with the necessary time to organize a defensive stance on the Kiyamu Peninsula. However, the Americans, ever vigilant, were quick to capitalize on the enemy's disarray, maintaining relentless pressure on the faltering Japanese front. On the west coast, Roberts' 2nd and 3rd Battalions crossed the canal, seamlessly moving through the 1st Battalion to take up the assault. They pushed forward tenaciously until they captured the entire area encompassing Telegraph Hill and Hill 27. A network of Japanese machine gun positions hidden in the clusters of tombs on the low hills to the Marines' front made progress slow and costly. Enemy machine guns emplaced in burial tombs on Hill 27 in east Naha temporarily checked the infantry. Heavy sniper fire whipped the lines and killed Lieutenant Colonel Woodhouse of 2/22 who was forward controlling his battalion's attack. Major John G. Johnson, the executive officer, took command immediately and continued a steady pressure. During most of the day tanks were unable to reach the position, but in the afternoon three worked their way along the road north of the hill, and their direct fire enabled the marines to seize it. The advance consisted of a series of local assaults and mop-up actions that brought the battalion to secure hill positions overlooking the Kokuba Estuary and the rail line leading to the north by nightfall. Lieutenant Colonel Shisler's 3d Battalion passed through 1/22 during the morning's attack and behind a screen of artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, and rockets drove onto the high ground at the eastern outskirts of Naha. By means of a series of holding attacks and flank assaults, Shisler was able to move his companies into the maze of enemy defenses where close quarter grenade and small-arms exchanges decided the issue. Once the dominating ground was won, the battalion was subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire. At the same time, Whaling's 1st Battalion joined the offensive, encountering fierce resistance as they pressed through 600 yards of enemy territory. To the east, the Marines under Del Valle shifted their focus to vigorous patrolling, as the supply situation gradually improved thanks to dedicated carrying parties and aerial air drops. Despite their efforts, the 306th Regiment's assault on 110 Meter Hill encountered heavy opposition once again. However, Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment finally achieved a breakthrough, seizing the strategic Three Sisters. Dorothy Hill, a fortress directly east of Shuri and a tower of strength in the enemy's inner line for the past two weeks, was attacked by the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, 77th Division. The first platoon to reach the base of the hill was pinned down by heavy fire, the platoon leader and all noncommissioned officers being wounded. Other platoons maneuvered into position and finally one squad reached the crest at the right end. This entering wedge enabled two companies to reach the top, from which they discovered three levels of caves on the reverse slope. They went to work methodically, moving from right to left along the top level, burning and blasting each cave and dugout, the flame-thrower and satchel-charge men covered by riflemen. When work on the top level was finished, the second level of caves and tunnels received similar treatment, and then the third and lowest level. That night fifteen Japanese who had survived the day's fighting crawled out of the blasted caves and were killed by Americans from their foxholes. A great amount of enemy equipment, including ten destroyed 150-mm- guns and twenty-five trucks, was found on the south (reverse) side of Dorothy Hill, testifying to the enemy fire power at this strong point. On 30 May, the 77th Division also took Jane Hill on its left flank and then almost unopposed took Tom Hill, the highest point of ground in the Shuri area, by 1700. This critical victory paved the way for Colonel Smith's forces to advance into the northern outskirts of Shuri through Ishimmi. In a remarkable display of coordination, Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment finally secured the strategic Hen Hill and Oboe Hill areas, while also capturing Hector Hill on their left flank. For nine days elements of the 96th Division had been stalemated at the base of Hen Hill, just northeast of Shuri. On the 30th, Company F and one platoon of Company G, 382d Infantry, resumed the attack on Hen Hill. Pfc. Clarence B. Craft, a rifleman from Company G, was sent out ahead with five companions to test the Japanese positions. As he and his small group started up the slope, they were brought under heavy fire from Japanese just over the crest, and a shower of grenades fell on them. Three of the men were wounded and the other two were stopped. Craft, although a new replacement and in his first action, kept on going, tossing grenades at the crest. From just below the crest he threw two cases of grenades that were passed up to him from the bottom, those of the enemy going over his head or exploding near him. He then leaped to the crest and fired at point-blank range into the Japanese in a trench a few feet below him. Spurred by Craft's example, other men now came to his aid. Reloading, Craft pursued the Japanese down the trench, wiped out a machine gun nest, and satchel-charged the cave into which the remaining Japanese had retreated. Altogether, in the taking of Hen Hill as a result of Craft's action, about seventy Japanese were killed, at least twenty-five of whom were credited to Craft himself. This daring action won him the Congressional Medal of Honor. To the left (east), Company F at the same time engaged in a grenade battle for Hector Hill, using ten cases of grenades in the assault on the crest. It was finally won after a satchel charge was hurled over the top and lit in the enemy trench on the other side, parts of Japanese bodies and pieces of enemy equipment hurtling into the sky in the blast. Hen and Hector Hills had fallen by 1400. Southeast of their position, Colonel May's 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, reached Love Hill and dug in, although scattered fire was still received from a machine gun in a nook of Charlie Hill and there were a few live Japanese on Love itself. In the afternoon the 3d Battalion, 383d Infantry, left its foxholes on Oboe, where it had experienced so great an ordeal, and proceeded down the reverse slope of the hill, finding only a few scattered Japanese. That night the 383d Infantry expressed a heartfelt sentiment when it reported "infinite relief to have Conical Hill behind us." Although there had been suicidal stands in a few places by the last of the holding force, the advances had been rapid. Simultaneously, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment effectively reduced the Conical Hill-Cutaway area and seized Roger Hill, both regiments then advancing toward the vital Naha-Yonabaru road. At the same time, the 32nd Regiment launched a coordinated offensive that allowed them to successfully capture Oak, Ella, and June Hills. This advance brought Finn's troops directly into confrontation with Mabel and Hetty Hills, facing the formidable defenses of Chan. Meanwhile, strong patrols from the 184th Regiment ventured into the Chinen Peninsula's strongholds, encountering only light enemy resistance, a turn of events that buoyed American morale. As night fell, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 24th Division began their long-anticipated evacuation from Shuri. They pulled back behind the second line of blocking positions north of Tsukasan, executing their withdrawal amidst a progressively decreasing barrage of artillery and mortar fire. Consequently, when Buckner's assault troops launched their offensive against the Shuri positions on the morning of May 31, they were met with an eerie silence, the stillness only interrupted by sporadic sniper fire and the distant crack of machine guns.The 77th Division swiftly took 110 Meter Hill and advanced into Shuri with little to no resistance. Concurrently, Mason's units surrounding Shuri Castle moved north unopposed, aiding in the occupation of the battered ruins and the troublesome Wana Draw.  Shuri, the second town of Okinawa, lay in utter ruin. There was no other city, town, or village in the Ryukyus that had been destroyed so completely. Naha too had been laid waste. Certain villages which had been strong points in the enemy's defense, such as Kakazu, Dakeshi, Kochi, Arakachi, and Kunishi, had been fought over and leveled to the ground. But none of these compared with the ancient capital of the Ryukyus. It was estimated that about 200000 rounds of artillery and naval gunfire had struck Shuri. Numerous air strikes had dropped 1000-pound bombs on it. Mortar shells by the thousands had arched their way into the town area. Only two structures, both of concrete, the big normal school at the southwestern corner and the little Methodist church, built in 1937, in the center of Shuri, had enough of their walls standing to form silhouettes on the skyline. The rest was flattened rubble. The narrow paved and dirt streets, churned by high explosives and pitted with shell craters, were impassable to any vehicle. The stone walls of the numerous little terraces were battered down. The rubble and broken red tile of the houses lay in heaps. The frame portion of buildings had been reduced to kindling wood. Tattered bits of Japanese military clothing, gas masks, and tropical helmets-the most frequently seen items-and the dark-colored Okinawan civilian dress lay about in wild confusion. Over all this crater of the moon landscape hung the unforgettable stench of rotting human flesh. To  the west, Griebel's 1st Battalion built upon Mason's gains, but it was the 3rd Battalion that led the main effort, successfully pushing to the hills just north of Shichina.Meanwhile, General Bradley's advancing battalions moved rapidly toward their assigned objectives, spending much of the day mopping up isolated enemy holdouts. This relentless advance effectively pinched off the 77th Division, further consolidating American control in the region. On the extreme left flank, Halloran's 1st Battalion faced enemy forces defending the Tsukasan line, marking the only area where the 96th Division failed to reach the corps boundary. However, the Shuri area had now been completely secured, and contact was made with Del Valle's Marines in the center. On the flanks, though, Buckner's units continued to encounter fierce resistance from the tenacious Japanese defenders. The 32nd Regiment, battling bravely through a series of heavily fortified strongpoints held stubbornly by Fujioka's troops, managed to seize Duck Hill, consolidate its positions on Turkey Hill, and capture the forward face of Mabel. Ultimately, they halted their advance just short of Chan. Meanwhile, on the west coast, Shepherd's Marines pushed forward with support from tanks and artillery, targeting the strategic high ground west of Shichina and Kokuba. However, their advance was stalled by intense enemy fire emanating from Hill 46. During the night, the battered 44th Independent Mixed Brigade executed a withdrawal southeast towards the Kiyamu Peninsula, covered by the 62nd Division, which quickly established a new defensive line along the Kokuba River and around Tsukasan. With the fall of Shuri and the withdrawal of Japanese forces, Buckner's troops had emerged victorious in one of the most difficult and bloody battles of the Pacific War. By the end of May, reports indicated that approximately 62,548 Japanese soldiers had been confirmed killed, with another estimated 9,529 thought to have perished, 64,000 of whom were believed to have fallen in the fierce fighting within the Shuri fortified zone alone. While these casualty figures may be somewhat exaggerated, there is little doubt that Japanese forces, especially their infantry combat units, had suffered severe depletion. In contrast, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps recorded significant losses of its own, with 1,718 killed, 8,852 wounded, and 101 missing during the fighting around Shuri. Additionally, the losses for General Hodge's 24th Corps over two months of combat totaled an alarming 26,044 casualties. On June 1, the American forces faced surprisingly little opposition from the enemy. A frustrated General Buckner, who had hoped to trap the defenders at Shuri, ordered his troops to advance rapidly in pursuit of the retreating Japanese units. With the 77th Division methodically mopping up remnants in the Shuri zone, General Hodge made a strategic decision. He shifted the 7th Division toward the east and ordered the 96th Division to move south to relieve the 32nd Regiment, taking up the western end of the Corps line. This strategic relief enabled Arnold to immediately push south with both the 17th and 184th Regiments in assault, managing to advance approximately 1,100 yards toward Okota and Batan despite increasingly stiff resistance from smaller enemy units. To the northwest, a coordinated attack by the Marine divisions successfully secured all high ground overlooking the primary east-west road in the Kokuba Valley. The 5th Marines anchored their position on the hills east of Shichina, while Shepherd's regiments seized the dominating heights north of Kokuba. Recognizing the strategic importance of the Oroku Peninsula, General Geiger planned a shore-to-shore landing there. To gather intelligence, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the peninsula that evening. Their findings confirmed that the peninsula was not fortified with significant enemy strength. The following day, Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines advanced to relieve the 6th Marine Division on the west coast. The 2nd Battalion continued the momentum by crossing the Kokuba River, moving into the hills on the south bank. Meanwhile, to the east, the 5th Marines also crossed the upper branch of the river and pressed forward to secure the ridgeline that controlled the approaches to Tsukasan. This maneuver effectively placed the entire Naha-Yonabaru road firmly in American hands, further tightening their grip on the battlefield. That evening, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the Oroku Peninsula. Their mission revealed that the peninsula was not heavily defended, opening up opportunities for American forces. Further east, the 383rd Regiment successfully cleared out Chan and seized the high ground just north of Tera and Kamizato. Meanwhile, the 381st Regiment conducted repeated assaults on hill positions that impeded its advance, ultimately managing to penetrate to Karadera. The 7th Division maintained relentless pressure on the retreating garrison of the Chinen Peninsula, advancing its lines by 2,400 yards toward Itokazu and Kerabaru. Now, it's time to shift our focus away from Okinawa and examine the latest operations of General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command. Since the invasion of Okinawa, Admiral Nimitz had requested that the B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers assist his naval forces in countering the deadly kamikaze attacks. In response, LeMay dispatched 53 bombers to target airfields at Kanoya on April 8, although the city of Kagoshima ended up being bombed instead. On April 17, 134 B-29s were sent against Kyushu, successfully neutralizing enemy airfield operations for 18 hours. However, as we've observed, the Japanese continued to launch both scattered and mass kamikaze attacks. To address this ongoing threat, the 21st Bomber Command, bolstered by the arrival of Brigadier General Roger Ramey's 58th Bombardment Wing, dedicated 75% of its combat effort to providing direct tactical support for the Okinawa campaign up to May 11. During this period, they flew a total of 2,104 sorties against 17 airfields in Kyushu and Shikoku. Although they did not fully neutralize these targets, significant damage was inflicted on enemy storage, maintenance, and repair facilities. The bombers also served to keep the Japanese off balance, significantly disrupting their ability to plan and execute large, coordinated attacks. In total, 24 B-29s were destroyed and 233 damaged during these operations, while 134 enemy interceptors were shot down. Between the strikes on Kyushu, General LeMay managed to fit in several medium-strength precision attacks against the Japanese aircraft industry, along with two large-scale night incendiary missions in the Tokyo Bay area. The first of these missions took place on April 13, when 327 B-29s dropped an impressive 2,139 tons of ordnance on the arsenal district of Tokyo, located northwest of the Imperial Palace. The resulting fires consumed 11.4 square miles of this crucial industrial zone, destroying arsenal plants responsible for manufacturing and storing small arms, machine guns, artillery, bombs, gunpowder, and fire-control mechanisms. Just two nights later, on April 15, 303 bombers executed another incendiary attack, dropping 1,930 tons of explosives with equal success. This raid devastated 6 square miles in Tokyo, 3.6 square miles in Kawasaki, and 1.5 square miles in Yokohama, which suffered collateral damage from the fire spills. Cumulatively, these two raids resulted in the destruction of 217,130 buildings in Tokyo and Yokohama and 31,603 in Kawasaki. On April 24, 131 B-29s conducted a highly successful precision strike against the Tachikawa plant of the Hitachi Aircraft Corporation. Although the next planned attack was thwarted by inclement weather, 148 B-29s struck Kure on May 5, delivering devastating damage. After being relieved from support for the Okinawa operation on May 11, LeMay initiated a month of heavy fire raids to complete the campaign that had begun in March, while also addressing top-priority precision targets as opportunities arose. Accordingly, on May 14, 529 B-29s were dispatched to strike northern Nagoya, with 472 successfully dropping 2,515 tons of munitions, resulting in the burning of 3.15 square miles and inflicting significant damage to Mitsubishi's No. 10 engine works. Just two nights later, 522 bombers returned to Nagoya, with 457 of them effectively delivering 3,609 tons over the dock and industrial areas in the southern part of the city, burning 3.82 square miles and causing extensive damage to Mitsubishi's No. 5 aircraft works. These two incendiary attacks finished Nagoya as an objective for area attacks. Good targets remained in the city, and the command was to return six more times for precision attacks before V-J Day. But the industrial fabric of the city had been ruined in the earlier precision attacks and in the fire raids that had burned out twelve square miles of a total built-up urban area of about forty square miles. In all, 113460 buildings had been destroyed, 3866 persons had been killed and 472701 rendered homeless. The displacement of workers aggravated the difficulties caused by physical damage and had an important effect on civilian morale.  After a week of respite, temporarily interrupted by a 318-plane precision attack on the Tachikawa Aircraft Company, 562 B-29s were dispatched to strike Tokyo once more on May 23. Out of these, 520 bombers reached their target, dropping an impressive 3,646 tons of explosives over the district stretching southward from the Imperial Palace along the west side of Tokyo Harbor. Despite encountering strong opposition, this attack resulted in the destruction of 5.3 square miles of area. Two nights later, 502 B-29s returned to Tokyo, targeting the area just north of their previous hit. They faced heavy resistance again, dropping 3,262 tons of incendiaries on the city, which resulted in the destruction of 16.8 square miles, marking the largest area devastated in a single Tokyo raid. In light of the heavy casualties suffered during these last two strikes, General LeMay decided to assign P-51s from Iwo Jima to escort future attacks. As a result, on May 29, 517 B-29s were escorted by 101 P-51 fighters during an assault on Yokohama. These bombers successfully dropped 2,570 tons of munitions, burning out 6.9 square miles while the escorting fighters engaged in fierce battles against about 150 aggressive interceptors. Meanwhile, General Whitehead's 5th Air Force was conducting an extensive program of area bombing against Formosa, experimenting with various types of bombs and tactics in preparation for future attacks on the Japanese mainland. Taihoku, the capital and political and financial center of Taiwan, was subjected to constant aerial bombardment. The largest strike against modern-day Taipei, known as the Taihoku Air Raid, occurred on May 31, when units of the Fifth Air Force consisting of 117 Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy bombers were sent to conduct the largest air raid ever on Taiwan. The bombing began from around ten o'clock in the morning and lasted until one o'clock in the afternoon, during which the attack was non-stop. The Americans met virtually no resistance from the Japanese, mainly due to the attrition the Japanese air forces had suffered in the Aerial Battle of Taiwan-Okinawa, which completely exhausted Japan's fighter units in Taiwan. They successfully dropped approximately 3,800 bombs targeting military units and governmental facilities. The Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan suffered a direct hit, in spite of the building being heavily camouflaged to avoid being targeted. The building suffered extensive damage from fire caused by the bombs and almost collapsed on itself; it was rendered unoccupiable and was not repaired until the Nationalist Chinese takeover. Other facilities hit during the bombing included the residence of the Assistant Governor-General, Taiwan Railway Hotel, Office of Governor-General Library, Army Headquarters, Taihoku Imperial University, Taihoku Station, Bank of Taiwan, Taihoku High Court, Taihoku New Park, and many other facilities. Many civilian installations were damaged, including Taihoku Prefectural Taihoku First Girls' High School, Huashan Catholic Church of Taihoku, and the famous Lungshan Temple of Manka, which was hit in the main building and the left corridor; many precious artifacts and art works in the temple were lost in the ensuing fire. As a result of the extensive bombing campaigns, more than 3,000 civilians lost their lives. Tens of thousands were displaced or left homeless, and countless buildings were destroyed, either directly by the attacks or by the fires they ignited. This devastation left a profound impact on the local population and infrastructure, marking yet another tragic chapter in the toll of the war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the midst of the brutal Battle of Okinawa, American Marines faced relentless resistance as they pushed towards Shuri. Despite heavy casualties and daunting conditions, the tide turned when General Buckner ordered aggressive assaults that outmaneuvered the encircled Japanese forces. After days of relentless combat, they captured the stronghold, leading to the collapse of Japanese defenses. As the dust settled, Shuri lay in ruins, marking a pivotal moment in the Pacific War and showcasing the indomitable spirit of both American and Japanese soldiers.

May 23, 2025 ~ Lt. Gary Wiegand, Marine Division Commander joins Paul W Smith live at HOOK.

Last time we spoke about the second Okinawa Offensive. In the brutal Second Okinawa Counteroffensive, American forces confronted staunch Japanese defenses, with Captain Ryan leading a valiant charge for territory. Despite fierce resistance and heavy casualties, his troops managed to seize crucial ground, enduring intense hand-to-hand combat atop Ryan Ridge. The battle raged on, with American forces fighting through exhaustion and dwindling supplies, while the Japanese, though determined, faced declining morale as they lost ground. The relentless struggle exemplified extraordinary sacrifice on both sides, but it foreshadowed a turning point in the Pacific campaign. As American advances continued, the tide shifted, marking the beginning of the end for Japanese dominance in the region, ultimately paving the way for Allied victory. This episode is the Battle of the Malacca Strait Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  After the failure of their second offensive, the Japanese turned all their energies toward waging a prolonged battle of attrition. Their losses did not impair immediately their defensive capacities; thus the 24th Corps found no weak point in the Shuri defenses resulting from the ill-starred offensive. By throwing fresh troops into the attack of 4 May Ushijima had been able to maintain his strength all along the line. Nor was there any breakdown in his command and staff operation. Front-line units were reorganized without seeming loss of effectiveness; available reinforcements were carefully allotted to existing regiments; local counterattacks were timed for maximum effect. General Ushijima's chief task now was to keep sufficient combat troops at the front to man his Shuri defenses. It was apparent by 7 May that the strength of the remaining regular infantry was not great enough for this task. Consequently, Ushijima converted service units into infantry combat groups. By mixing service troops with the "regulars," he exacted from them their maximum combat effectiveness. "One man in ten will continue with his rear-echelon duties. The remaining nine men will devote themselves to antitank combat training," one order stated. The reorganization of the 32d Regiment, 24th Division, was typical of the resourcefulness of the Japanese. The regimental headquarters received 5 men from the 24th Transport Regiment. The 1st Battalion kept its own surviving members and was allotted all the survivors of the 2d Battalion, 20 men from the 7th Shipping Depot, 90 from the 24th Transport Regiment, and y from the 26th Sea Raiding Squadron. The 2d Battalion was totally reconstituted from the 29th Independent Infantry Battalion and other units. The 3d Battalion was reorganized in a manner similar to that used with the 1st. It was by this process of piecing units together that the 32d Army was able to stay intact long after the original combat units had been virtually destroyed, a capability which at the time American intelligence officers found "baffling." After his offensive failed, the enemy formed a line in which the relative position of the major units was to remain roughly the same until the end of the battle. On the east the 24th Division, reinforced by two independent battalions, held the line as far as Shuri, with its 89th Regiment on the east, its 22d in the center, and its 32d on the west. The remnants of the battered 62d Division were stretched from a point north of Shuri almost to the west coast, holding about one-third of the line. Along the Asa River estuary was a battalion of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The Japanese husbanded their remaining heavy weapons, especially their artillery, as carefully as they meted out their manpower. On 6 May the Japanese 5th Artillery Command directed its units to "revert to the [defensive] situation which held prior to the attack situation of 3 May." Once again the protection of individual pieces was a cardinal feature of enemy operations. Artillery units were ordered to "use ammunition with the utmost economy" and to "wait and fire for effect against vital targets." Along the west coast, preliminary plans were underway for the deployment of General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division to the front lines, while General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division continued its assault on the Dakeshi-Awacha hill complex. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines secured the coastal flank after capturing the north bank of the Asa River. Meanwhile, Colonel Arthur Mason's 1st Marines focused their efforts on the western approaches to the Dakeshi hill defenses, but they were ultimately repulsed by the tenacious Japanese defenders around Hill 60. In the Awacha Pocket, Colonel Griebel's 5th Marines faced fierce opposition, resulting in only modest territorial gains. To the east, after successfully fending off multiple strong enemy counterattacks, General Bruce's 77th Division advanced 800 yards south toward Hill 187, establishing control over the southern slope of the Maeda Escarpment. Finally, operations in General Arnold's 7th Division area were confined to robust patrols aimed at securing the approaches to Conical Hill and eliminating the remaining fragments of the failed Japanese counteroffensive. Convinced that the Japanese had nearly exhausted their fresh reserves, General Buckner began planning a comprehensive assault on the Shuri defenses with his two corps. On May 7, General Geiger was assigned to command the 1st Marine Division within the 24th Corps front and oversee the southern movement of the 6th Marine Division, with General Buckner taking direct tactical control of the two-corps assault. Heavy rains on the morning of 7 May delayed the projected IIIAC advance until tanks were able to negotiate the muddy terrain. In the 1st Marines' zone, the new regimental commander, Colonel Arthur T. Mason, ordered 3/1 to support the attack of the 2d Battalion on Hill 60 with all available weapons (four battalions of artillery, a fire support ship, and 81-mm. and 60-mm. mortars) by firing into the enemy reverse slope defenses. All morning long the regiment's mortars concentrated on the enemy position, and at 1400 when tanks finally reached the front lines the battalion attacked with Company E in assault. Artillery fire covered the foot of the objective while mortars and assault guns blanketed the crest and reverse slopes. The company swept to the top of Hill 60 by 1422 in a vivid demonstration of "the effect of properly massed, supporting fires in front of assault troops." Once the company entered the impact zone, however, and supporting fires were shifted to other targets the enemy defenders emerged from their caves and engaged the Marines in hand grenade duels. The fighting was at such close range that it was impossible to keep enough grenades on the line, and the marines used rifle butts against Japanese who tried to storm their position. Gradually the volume of Japanese fire of all types "grew noticeably stronger and progressively more intense so that it was evident that the enemy was receiving large reinforcements." The troops lost their hold at one point, then fought their way to the top again, yet the continuing Japanese fire from the reverse slope of Nan Hill was the decisive factor. The threat of a strong counterattack measured against the dwindling strength of Company E forced Lieutenant Colonel Magee to adjudge the company's advanced position untenable and to order a withdrawal to the previous night's lines. To the west, the 5th Marines steadily advanced approximately 400 yards in the Awacha Pocket, while the 77th Division gained up to 500 yards of enemy territory despite increasingly fierce resistance. By the end of the day, Colonel Coolidge's 305th Regiment had relieved the weary 307th. On the east coast, Colonel Green's 184th Regiment resumed its southward push, quickly capturing Gaja Ridge and William Hill, but faced greater opposition as they approached the western flanks of Conical Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment continued its assault toward Zebra Hill but could only secure How Hill and make incremental gains on Kochi Ridge, depleting their strength. The following day, as General Bradley's replenished 96th Division prepared to relieve the 7th, the 184th Regiment managed to occupy the forward slope of Easy Hill near Kibara without armored support. Throughout the rest of the 10th Army front, relentless cold rain effectively canceled planned offensive operations, leading the 1st Marines to focus on dismantling enemy positions on Nan Hill. Colonel Schneider's 22nd Marines took over from the 7th Marines along the Asa River just as news of the victory in Europe reached the infantry units, prompting a somewhat indifferent reaction from the rain-soaked soldiers preoccupied with the ongoing fighting in Okinawa. Exactly at 1200 every available artillery piece and naval gun fired three volleys at vital enemy targets to apprise the Japanese of the defeat of their Axis partner. On May 9, Japanese kamikaze pilots launched a series of scattered attacks, damaging the carrier Formidable and two destroyers. In preparation for Buckner's general offensive, the 22nd Marines patrolled their front to identify suitable crossing sites over the Asa River. Meanwhile, with Nan Hill fully cleared, Mason's 2nd Battalion renewed its assault on Hill 60, while the 1st Battalion advanced into the high ground to the east, successfully capturing their objective this time. Reinforced by elements of the 7th Marines, the 5th Marines also launched another attack on the Awacha Pocket but continued to encounter fierce resistance. In response, Griebel was tasked with reducing the Awacha defenses using two battalions, while Snedeker's reinforced 7th Marines pressed the offensive southward. To the east, General Bruce focused his efforts on the 305th Regiment's sector, resulting in the 3rd Battalion securing a foothold on Hill 187. The 17th Regiment, which had fought tenaciously to capture Kochi Ridge and the high ground west of Conical Hill, was relieved by Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment. Concurrently, Colonel May's 383rd Regiment moved into forward assembly areas behind the 184th and on May 10, took over the positions north of Conical Hill. Both fresh regiments of the 96th Division were then able to destroy enemy strongpoints that had impeded the progress of the weary 7th Division and capture key hills that protected the approaches to Conical. On the west coast, after stealthily constructing a footbridge across the Asa during the night, three companies of the 22nd Marines successfully crossed the river. However, two Japanese "human demolition charges" emerged from hiding and rushed the south end of the footbridge, destroying it. Despite the challenges, the attack south toward the town of Asa continued, successfully establishing a bridgehead that stretched 1,400 yards long and 350 yards deep by the end of the day. To the east, the 1st Marines launched an assault on the western end of Dakeshi but were pushed back by intense enfilading fire from the ridge. Similarly, although the 7th Marines initially advanced rapidly against scattered opposition, they were ultimately forced to withdraw under heavy Japanese fire. Behind them, after fending off two fierce night counterattacks, the 5th Marines failed to isolate the Awacha Pocket but made significant strides, penetrating deep into the heart of the Awacha defenses. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment captured additional high ground leading toward the crucial road junction north of Shuri, where the reorganized and reinforced 32nd Regiment had established its primary defenses. The remnants of the 62nd Division were gradually being withdrawn toward Shuri, with General Suzuki's fresh 44th Independent Mixed Brigade taking over the western sector. On May 11, General Buckner initiated his general offensive against Shuri, planning to envelop the town from both the west and east. However, this offensive was preceded by Admiral Ugaki's sixth mass Kikisui strike, during which 150 kamikazes launched successful attacks on American shipping. That morning, the 721st Kokutai's Sub-Lieutenant Yasunori Seizo led six kamikazes out of Kanoya. By 10:02, Admiral Mitscher was informed of possible bogeys infiltrating the returning TF 58 strike to reach the US carriers. Two minutes later came an overhead Corsair's sudden frantic warning: “Alert! Alert! Two planes diving on the Bunker Hill!” Almost immediately, Yasunori's Zero dove out of low overcast toward Bunker Hill and released its payload. The 550lb bomb pierced the flight deck, exited the side of the hull, and exploded above water. Simultaneously, Yasunori's Zero caromed into the center of Bunker Hill's flight deck, its gas tank exploding among 34 manned, armed, and fully fueled US fighters, before careening blazing over the side. One minute later, Yasunori's wingman Ensign Ogawa Kiyoshi roared past Bunker Hill, climbed steeply into a roll, and then dove straight at the carrier. Ogawa released his 550lb bomb, which scored amidships and exploded in the gallery deck, slaughtering much of Mitscher's staff. Simultaneously, Ogawa deliberately slammed his Zero into Bunker Hill's island just 100ft from Mitscher. Mitscher's operations officer, Commander Jimmy Flatley, had just left the gallery deck when Ogawa's bomb struck, searing his back. Mitscher had observed the entire attack in silence, and just then emerged from the bridge to gaze at the blazing flight deck. The Flag Plot was choked with billowing smoke and Mitscher's chief-of-staff, a gasping, wheezing Commodore Arleigh Burke, ordered it evacuated. A third Zero then dove on Bunker Hill, but anti-aircraft fire sent it blazing into the sea close aboard. Aboard Bunker Hill, a cascade of gasoline explosions erupted from burning planes aft, while tracers sprayed haphazardly from detonating machine gun ammunition. Speed fell to 10kts and as the crew began intensive firefighting efforts, a slight list developed. Cruiser Wilkes-Barre and three destroyers came alongside to fight fires and rescue 300 men forced overboard, yet most of Bunker Hill's fighter pilots had been asphyxiated in their ready room. By 11:30, however, damage was largely stabilized. Nevertheless, Bunker Hill had lost 393 men killed and 264 wounded. Although horribly outnumbered, the Americans' Corsair CAP shot down 50 attackers before the Japanese got through at 0800hrs. Over the next 90 minutes the two violently maneuvering destroyers would claim a combined 42 kills before Evans was disabled by four kamikaze hits. Minutes later Hugh W. Hadley was knocked out by her third kamikaze hit. With his ship dead in the water and blazing uncontrollably, Hugh W. Hadley's Commander Mullaney ordered all available colors hoisted: “If this ship is going down, she's going down with all flags flying.” Escorting the destroyers were three LCS(L)s and one LSM(R), who themselves combined to splash 14 Japanese planes before the action mercifully ended. All six ships survived, but the destroyers were towed to Kerama Retto, having suffered a combined 60 killed and 94 wounded. East of Okinawa, a G4M Betty bomber and four Ki-43 Oscars attacked RPS-5 at 0800hrs. One plane crashed destroyer-minelayer Harry F. Bauer (DM-26)'s stern, the kamikaze miraculously “plowing through the rack of depth charges and shoving them into the sea with none of them exploding.” Escorting LCS(L)-88 splashed two Oscars, the second scoring a posthumous 220lb bomb hit on her which killed nine and wounded seven. Back on the west coast, supported by tanks and artillery, the 22nd Marines advanced toward Amike. Their 3rd Battalion established control of the high ground overlooking Naha after an 800-yard advance, while the 1st Battalion gained the coral ridge in front after a series of costly assaults. The 2nd Battalion further extended the line to connect with the 1st Marine Division. Del Valle's advance was spearheaded by Mason's 2nd Battalion, which successfully secured a foothold on the high ground west of Wana despite a heavy artillery bombardment. In constructing the Wana position the Japanese had "taken advantage of every feature of a terrain so difficult it could not have been better designed if the enemy himself had the power to do so." With this natural advantage, the enemy had so organized the area that in order to crack the main line of resistance it was necessary for the 1st Marine Division to wheel towards Shuri and attack directly into the heart of the city's powerful defenses. Any attempt to drive past Shuri and continue the attack to the south would mean unacceptable losses inflicted by artillery, mortar, automatic-weapons, and rifle fire coming from the heights that commanded the division's flank and rear areas. The southernmost branch of the Asa Kawa wandered across the gently rising floor of Wana Draw and through the northern part of Shuri. The low rolling ground bordering the insignificant stream was completely exposed to enemy fire from positions along the reverse slope of Wana Ridge and the military crest of the ridge to the south. At its mouth Wana Draw was approximately 400 yards wide, but it narrowed drastically as it approached the city and the ridge walls closed on the stream bed. Guarding the western end of the draw was Hill 55, rugged terminus of the southern ridge line. The hill bristled with enemy guns whose fields of fire included the whole of the open ground leading to the draw. Defending the Wana position was the 64th Brigade of the 62d Division with remnants of the 15th, 23d, and 273d Independent Infantry Battalions, the 14th Independent Machine Gun Battalion, and the 81st Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion under its command. The 7th Marines advanced approximately 800 yards, establishing a firm hold on Dakeshi Ridge, while the 5th Marines eliminated the last organized resistance in the Awacha Pocket. In the center of the front, Bruce's two regiments needed to coordinate more closely with neighboring divisions than with one another. As a result, the 305th Regiment advanced up to 500 yards against fierce resistance, while Colonel Smith's 306th Regiment struggled to make headway against the formidable defenses of Chocolate Drop Hill and Wart Hill. To the east, after repelling a series of night counterattacks, the 382nd Regiment consolidated its positions on Zebra Hill and continued probing toward the Dick Hills area and the ridges northwest of Kuhazu. The 383rd Regiment quickly secured Easy and Fox Hills, subsequently capturing the summit of Charlie Hill. However, over the next two days, efforts by the 1st Battalion to dislodge the defenders from the top would be thwarted by withering fire from King Hill, while the 2nd Battalion cleared Gaja Ridge and the twin villages of Tobaru and Amaru. On May 12, Dill's 3rd Battalion executed a successful assault, capturing Baker Hill, although the 1st Battalion's attack on Dick Baker was repelled by the defenders. To the west, the 306th Regiment only provided support for the advance of the 305th, which faced difficult terrain in the broken ground west of Route 5, managing to gain about 500 yards. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines solidified their hold on Dakeshi Ridge against sporadic opposition, but the 1st Marines found themselves pinned down while trying to improve their positions west of Wana. The vulnerability of the 6th Marine Division to direct fire from the western slopes of the Shuri massif resulted in significant losses for Schneider's 2nd Battalion as it fought to seize the high ground overlooking Naha, ultimately being repelled from Sugar Loaf Hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion advanced steadily in the center, capturing the high ground north of Asato, while the 3rd Battalion secured commanding positions and conducted patrols through the suburbs of Naha. At sea, scattered kamikaze attacks damaged Admiral Spruance's flagship, the battleship New Mexico, and inflicted further damage on two additional destroyers the following day. In retaliation, Mitscher directed Task Force 58 to strike Kyushu once again. Back on Okinawa, as Schneider's 3rd Battalion reconnoitered the northern suburbs of Naha, the 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack on Sugar Loaf Hill. In light of this resistance and the heavy casualties suffered by the 22nd Marines, Shepherd ordered Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines to reinforce the effort, but they could only position themselves northwest of Makabe. To the east, while the 1st Marines faced heavy losses and were repelled at the mouth of Wana Draw, the 7th Marines finally secured Dakeshi Ridge. In the center, the 305th Regiment continued its determined advance into the extremely rugged terrain north and northeast of Shuri, whereas the 306th Regiment once again failed to capture Chocolate Drop Hill and Wart Hill. Coordinated with this, the 382nd Regiment attacked the Dick Hills, successfully securing Dick Baker and Dick Able against light opposition, but ultimately being pushed back from the latter. Further east, May's 2nd Battalion launched a frontal assault on Conical Hill, successfully reaching the northeast crest of the ridge, where it repelled several heavy Japanese counterattacks. Back at sea, Task Force 58 launched another strike on Kyushu during the early hours of May 14. In response, the Japanese dispatched 28 kamikazes alongside 40 escorts, inflicting heavy damage on Mitscher's new flagship, the carrier Enterprise, in what would become known as the last action of the Gray Ghost.  At 05:25, some 28 Zeros, armed with 1100lb bombs, sortied from Kanoya towards Mitscher's carriers cruising 130nm southeast of Kyushu. 40 fighters escorted them. Around 06:45 Enterprise detected 4 incoming bogies. 3 were shot down over TF 58, but the fourth, flown by Sub-Lieutenant Tomiyasu Shunsuke, continued closing. Using clouds for cover, Tomiyasu approached Enterprise from astern. Already struck by flak, at 06:57 Tomiyasu's blazing Zero suddenly appeared 200ft above Enterprise, which erupted with anti-aircraft fire. Although seeming to have overflown his target, Tomiyasu suddenly snap-rolled his burning Zero onto its back and dove almost vertically into Enterprise's flight deck. Observing from Enterprise's exposed bridge wing, Flatley rushed back inside and shouted to take cover just as Tomiyasu's kamikaze hit. The thunderous explosion blew Enterprise's forward elevator 400ft in the air, rattled the carrier's bridge, and flung shrapnel against her island. As Flatley emerged from cover he observed an unsmiling Mitscher, arms crossed, standing amid the smoking wreckage. “Jimmy,” Mitscher growled, “tell my Task Group commanders that if the Japs keep this up they're going to grow hair on my head yet.” Enterprise remained on station, but her flight deck was out of action. TF 58 splashed 3 more planes before Japanese attacks ended at 08:00. That evening TF 58 retired from Kyushu. The following morning, May 15, Mitscher transferred to carrier Randolph, his third flagship in 5 days. Enterprise would detach for repairs in the United States on May 16, having lost 14 dead and 68 wounded. Her war too was over. Honestly for those of you who might not know, the USS Enterprise is the most decorated ship of all time, an absolutely insane history. She was so impressive, my patreons voted for me to do an exclusive episode on her and it took two full episodes to do. If you are interested in the history of the USS Enterprise, please check out my exclusive podcast. At Okinawa, as positions on Conical Hill were being consolidated, May's 1st Battalion renewed its attack on Charlie Hill, successfully securing a foothold at its northern end, which was later extended down the southern slope. Simultaneously, Company L launched an assault on King Hill, managing to capture the entire crest. To the west, Dill's 1st Battalion attacked and captured Dick Able and Dick Right, although they had to relinquish Dick Right after a vigorous Japanese counterattack. The 3rd Battalion also advanced toward Dick Right, establishing a tenuous hold on the position. Further west, the 306th Regiment committed its last remaining strength, a composite battalion, to advance beyond Wart Hill, but it was quickly cut down by overwhelming flanking fire. Similarly, the battered 305th Regiment made little progress in the rugged terrain. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines advanced to within 100 yards of the ridge crest north of Wana, where they were ultimately pinned down by heavy fire. Concurrently, the depleted 1st Marines launched an assault that captured the western tip of Wana Ridge, aided by tanks and artillery, though a fierce night counterattack forced them to withdraw before being relieved by the fresh 5th Marines. Along the coast, the 22nd Marines successfully pushed toward the north bank of the Asato River, but the main action was poised to occur at Sugar Loaf Hill. Though Schneider's 2nd Battalion successfully seized the forward slopes of the protective hills north of Sugar Loaf, including Queen Hill, they faced intense enemy fire whenever they attempted to maneuver around or over these hills to launch an attack on Sugar Loaf itself. Nevertheless, the Marines pressed on, and by nightfall, a group of about 40 men under Major Henry Courtney managed to storm the hill, throwing grenades ahead of them and subsequently digging in at the summit to withstand a night of heavy mortar fire and constant counterattacks. This attack was further supported by the 29th Marines, which, after overcoming initial hardships, secured the forward slopes of the hill northeast of Sugar Loaf. During the early hours of May 15, the embattled group atop Sugar Loaf gratefully welcomed the arrival of reinforcements, though it was not before Major Courtney heroically fell while leading a grenade assault against the defenders on the reverse slope. Despite the reinforcements, enemy pressure on Sugar Loaf intensified, ultimately forcing the battered Marines off the hill. This triggered a fierce Japanese counterattack across a 900-yard front, compelling Schneider's 2nd Battalion to relinquish the ground immediately north of Sugar Loaf. Fearing a breakthrough, elements of his 1st Battalion seized the hill northwest of Sugar Loaf to help blunt the force of the enemy counterattacks, while the 3rd Battalion relieved the exhausted 2nd across the line. Additionally, the 29th Marines not only played a significant role in repulsing the enemy counterattack but also effectively strengthened its hold on the high ground north of Half Moon Hill.  To the east, while the 7th Marines reorganized and cleared out Dakeshi, the 5th Marines launched their first tank-infantry assault against Wana Draw. At 0630 on 15 May the 5th Marines completed the relief of the 1st, and Colonel Griebel assumed command of the zone of action west of Wana. The 2d Battalion was in assault with the 3d in close support and the 1st in reserve. On the recommendation of the regimental and battalion commanders of both the 1st and 5th Marines, the division decided to subject the high ground on both sides of Wana Draw to a thorough processing by tanks and self-propelled 105mm howitzers before 2/5 attempted to advance across the open ground at the mouth of the draw. With Company F of 2/5 providing fire teams for protection against suicide attackers, nine tanks from Company B, 1st Tank Battalion spent the morning working on the positions at the mouth of the draw. The tanks drew heavy small-arms, mortar, artillery, and AT fire, and accompanying infantry was dispersed to reduce casualties. Because of the open area of operation, the fire teams were still able to cover the tanks at relatively long-ranges. Both sides of the draw were honeycombed with caves and the tanks received intense and accurate fire from every sector at their front. During the morning one 47mm AT gun scored five hits on the attacking armor before NGF silenced it. About noon the tanks withdrew to allow an air strike to be placed in the draw and then return to the attack in reinforced strength. Naval gunfire again silenced a 47mm gun that took the tanks under fire, this time before any damage was done. With the approach of darkness the tanks pulled out of the draw pursued by a fury of enemy fire. The 5th Marines, convinced "that the position would have to be thoroughly pounded before it could be taken," scheduled another day of tank-infantry processing for Wana Draw before making its assault. In the center, the battered 305th Regiment continued its relentless advance through the irregular terrain west of the main Ginowan-Shuri highway. Simultaneously, Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment finally relieved the exhausted 306th and launched simultaneous attacks on Flattop and Chocolate Drop Hill. The 3rd Battalion slowly maneuvered toward the northern base of the Drop and the north slopes of Flattop, while the 2nd Battalion advanced toward Ishimmi Ridge through the open highway valley. Concurrently, the 382nd Regiment supported the assault on Flattop with its own attack against Dick Hill, successfully capturing its crest but failing to cross the skyline. Meanwhile, the 383rd Regiment struggled to make progress against intense enemy fire from the hill complex southwest of Conical's peak, although some elements managed to advance up the northwest spur from King Hill amid thick mortar fire.  Now, it's time to shift our focus from Okinawa to the sea, where we will cover the last destroyer actions of the Second World War. At the beginning of February, with the Southwest Area Fleet staff isolated in the Philippines, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru formed the 10th Area Fleet to defend the shores of Indonesia and Indochina. The 10th Area Fleet was comprised of the remnants of the 2nd Striking Force. This consisted of the two converted battleship/aircraft carriers Ise and Hyuga, forming the carrier squadron, and the two heavy cruisers Ashigara and Haguro, forming the 5th Cruiser Division. Two more heavy cruisers, Takao and Myoko, were at Singapore where both had reached sanctuary after being badly damaged in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Myoko had made one attempt to escape back to Japan in December 1944, but had been torpedoed by the US submarine Bergol on the 13th, and had then returned to Singapore. The cruiser Oyodo joined the fleet from February 5 to 20 and a fourth cruiser, Isuzu, joined on March 25 but lasted barely a fortnight before being sunk, on April 7, in a coordinated attack by the US submarines Charr, Gabilan and Besugo, with peripheral assistance from the British submarine Spark. In February Ise and Hyuga were also recalled and sailed on the 10th from Singapore, bound for Japan, carrying aviation spirit and other war materials. With such valuable cargoes the Japanese took great care to safeguard their passage and, by a combination of good luck and bad weather, both evaded numerous attacks by air and by submarine and reached Moji on the 19th. Haguro and Ashigara, and one old destroyer, Kamikaze, were now the only sizable warships left in the 10th Area Fleet to protect the troop evacuations. At this stage, the Japanese aimed to hold Java, Borneo, and Sumatra for as long as possible while planning their main defensive efforts in Malaya and Indochina. Consequently, they began withdrawing their garrisons from the outlying islands of the Moluccas, Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and the scattered islands of the Panda and Arafura Seas. Anticipating a similar evacuation of Japanese garrisons in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Admiral Arthur Power's East Indies Fleet had dispatched destroyers on a series of anti-shipping sweeps in the Andaman Sea, successfully destroying several relief convoys. On May 10, Fukudome decided to commence the evacuation of the Andaman Islands, dispatching Vice-Admiral Hashimoto Shintaro's heavy cruiser Haguro and destroyer Kamikaze to deliver supplies to the islands and return with troops back to Singapore. Additionally, a secondary convoy consisting of one auxiliary vessel and one subchaser was organized to perform the same mission for the Nicobar Islands. As Allied intelligence uncovered these plans, Vice-Admiral Harold Walker's Force 61, primarily composed of the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Richelieu and four escort carriers, sailed from Trincomalee to intercept the Japanese ships. However, the Japanese were unwilling to risk a battle, and upon receiving an air reconnaissance warning, they returned to Singapore. Nonetheless, Walker decided to remain in the area, awaiting reinforcements in case the enemy regained the confidence to launch another sortie. On May 14, Fukudome finally resolved to carry out the evacuation again, this time first sending forward his secondary convoy to the Nicobars. This force managed to reach the islands unmolested during the day and successfully embarked 450 troops before setting sail for Penang, although they were later spotted by a patrolling Liberator. In response, Walker dispatched the 21st Aircraft Carrier Squadron and the 26th Destroyer Flotilla to conduct an air and sea sweep off Diamond Point aimed at intercepting and destroying the enemy. On the morning of May 15, some Avengers encountered Haguro and Kamikaze as they returned to the Malacca Strait. As Captain Manley Power's destroyers rushed to the area, three Avengers launched by the escort carrier Shah attacked Haguro with bombs in the afternoon, causing minimal damage that only compelled Haguro to alter its course eastward. However, this diversion effectively allowed the destroyer force to intercept Hashimoto's convoy during the night. As the flotilla closed in on the enemy during the early hours of May 16, Hashimoto reacted desperately by fleeing at full speed to the north, thwarting Power's carefully laid ambush. Soon after, however, Haguro turned to port, crossing paths with the destroyer Venus, which was closing in at full speed from the west. Surprisingly, Venus failed to launch its torpedoes, prompting Hashimoto to turn south and back into Power's trap.  Haguro's violent turn away changed the situation dramatically. Saumarez now found the enemy racing down towards her port side at a relative speed of nearly 60 MPH. Kamikaze, following astern of Haguro, passed so close in front of Saumarez from starboard to port that Captain Power had to swing his ship hard to starboard and back to port again to avoid her. Kamikaze passed very close down Saumarez' port side and was taken under fire by both main and close range armament. Opening with star-shell, Saumarez shifted fire to Haguro herself at 0108, the enemy replying with main and secondary armament. The two enemy ships could now be clearly identified from Saumarez' bridge, Haguro at about 5,000 yards and Kamikaze about 2,200 yards range. ‘We had a glimpse of the cruiser by starshell, but now it was dark. She looked pretty big and her direction easy to see by her bow-wave and wash. Inclination vague but obviously broad. I thought she was going very fast. Her side was shining like a wet wall, with the reflection of her own starshell from behind us, I think.' To Lt. Reay Parkinson, also in Saumarez, Haguro ‘seemed to tower above us like a sky-scraper and her guns were depressed to their lowest angle'. Haguro's fire was accurate and splashes from near misses drenched the bridge personnel, binoculars and sound-powered telephones. But, as Captain Power philosophically remarked, ‘if you are only getting wet there is nothing to worry about'. However, Saumarez was unfortunately not merely getting wet. At about 0111, when Captain Power was just considering turning to fire, ‘one boiler got hit. There was a lot of steam and smoke amidships and a sort of queer silence. The ship was obviously slowing down and I thought she was going to stop.' Saumarez' torpedo tubes had been trained to starboard, ready for the bow attack, with torpedoes angled to run 70° left. There was no time to train the tubes to port. Captain Power swung his ship to port ‘like a shotgun' and at 0113, as Saumarez was slowing down but still swinging hard to port, a salvo of eight torpedoes was fired at Haguro's beam, at a range of 2,000 yards. Still under heavy fire, Saumarez continued her turn to port to open the range, telegraphs being put to ‘Full Ahead' to get the utmost speed from whatever engine power remained. A minute after Saumarez' attack, Verulam made an unmolested attack from 2,000 yards on Haguro's port bow, firing eight torpedoes. Saumarez and Verulam were rewarded by three hits, shared between them  ‘very distinct, three gold-coloured splashes like a Prince of Wales' feathers, more than twice as high as her bridge'. Now Haguro was under fire from the destroyers and everywhere she turned there was another destroyer waiting. At 0125 Venus fired six torpedoes and scored one hit. Two minutes later Virago, ordered by Captain (D) to ‘Finish her off', fired a salvo of eight torpedoes and obtained two hits. She reported that the cruiser's upper deck was now awash. Missed torpedoes were racing all over the battle scene; in Venus, at the height of the action, the Engineer Officer and the Chief ERA in the engine-room actually heard the whirring sound of two torpedoes passing very close along the ship's side. Saumarez had retired some five miles to the north-west to collect herself and examine damage. The engine telegraphs were still at ‘Full Ahead', and Saumarez withdrew further than Captain Power had intended. Vigilant had been rather ‘left in the cold' and squeezed out by the other destroyers and was not able to attack until 0151 when she fired eight torpedoes, with one probable hit. Haguro was lying motionless in the water, in her last throes. ‘The rest of the flotilla were snarling round the carcass like a lot of starving wolves round a dying bull. I was too far away to make out what was going on and told them all except Vigilant (who I knew had torpedoes) to come away and join me, with a view to getting formed up and the situation in hand. Of course they did nothing of the sort. I should not have done myself.' Venus was ordered to ‘Close and make a job of it' and at 0202 administered the coup de grace with her two remaining torpedoes. At 0206 Venus signalled that the cruiser had sunk. Haguro had gone, in a position about forty-five miles south-west of Penang. Fifty miles away, Cumberland and Richelieu had had tantalising glimpses of starshell and lights but were too late to take part. Saumarez transmitted Vs for Victory and Captain Power signalled: ‘Pick up survivors. Stay no more than ten minutes.' Kamikaze sustained slight damage from the gunfire but managed to escape, returning the following day to rescue approximately 320 survivors. Nevertheless, over 900 Japanese soldiers lost their lives in the battle, including Vice-Admiral Hashimoto and Rear-Admiral Sugiura Kaju. While the evacuation of the Nicobar Islands was successful, the evacuation of the Andaman Islands proved to be a resounding failure. By the end of the war, with the food situation in the islands becoming critical, the Japanese committed several atrocities against the civilian population. This included the transportation of 300 so-called “useless mouths” to the uninhabited Havelock Island, off South Andaman, where all but eleven of them perished. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. During the intense Battle of the Malacca Strait, Japanese forces attempted a desperate evacuation, facing relentless Allied attacks. Despite fierce resistance, the Allies advanced strategically, leading to significant Japanese losses. Caught in critical confrontations, the Japanese ultimately succumbed, marking a pivotal moment in the Pacific war and shifting the tide toward Allied victory.

Last time we spoke about the Allied invasion of Borneo. The Allies initiated the invasion of Borneo, commanded by General Morshead. The operation, known as Operation Oboe, aimed to reclaim vital oilfields from the demoralized Japanese forces. Despite their fierce resistance, American troops swiftly captured strategic locations on the island. The Japanese, already struggling with low morale and supply shortages, were unable to mount an effective defense. Amid the intense fighting, Air Commodore Cobby's forces conducted air assaults on key targets, weakening Japanese positions. As American troops landed on Tarakan Island on May 1, they faced heavy fire but managed to gain significant territory by nightfall. By early May, despite the loss of ground, Japanese forces continued to resist fiercely. This victory in Borneo marked a turning point in the Pacific campaign, ultimately foreshadowing the decline of Japanese influence in the region and paving the way for further Allied advances. This episode is the Second Okinawa Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we left off, by April 24, General Ushijima's 32nd Army had chosen to abandon the first line of Shuri defenses, with the exception of the extreme right in the Item Pocket area. However, the weary Japanese troops merely withdrew to the next line of prepared positions within the Shuri defense zone, ready to make the American invaders pay for every inch of territory gained. Observing this, General Hodge promptly ordered the 7th, 27th, and 96th Divisions to regroup and enhance their positions through aggressive maneuvers, seizing strategic ground in front of them and pushing back enemy outposts. His forces were also heavily depleted and exhausted, prompting him to plan a final offensive on April 26 before rotating in the relatively fresh 77th Division and the 1st Marine Division for support. Unbeknownst to him, the 62nd Division had suffered significant losses, nearly losing half of its original strength on the left flank. In response, Ushijima decided to move the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade north to reinforce the Shuri defense zone, establishing a fallback position for retreating forces.This shift also meant that the southern areas were defended only by a hastily assembled Shimajiri Security Force of 5,500 men, drawn from rear-area supply units tasked with delaying any American advances from the south until the main infantry units could return.  The question of a second landing in southern Okinawa was considered by 10th Army most seriously before April 22. General Bruce, commander of the 77th Division, knew that his division would be committed in the Okinawa fighting as soon as lejima was secured. At Leyte the amphibious landing of the 77th Division behind the Japanese line at Ormoc had been spectacularly successful. General Bruce and his staff wished to repeat the move on Okinawa and urged it on the 10th Army command even before the division sailed from Leyte. As the Iejima fighting drew to a close, General Bruce pressed his recommendation to land his division on the southeast coast of Okinawa on the beaches just north of Minatoga. He believed that it would be necessary to effect a juncture with American forces then north of Shuri within ten days if the venture was to be successful. His plan was either to drive inland on Iwa, a road and communications center at the southern end of the island, or to push north against Yonabaru. General Buckner rejected the idea. His assistant chief of staff, G-4, stated that he could supply food but not ammunition for such a project at that time. The Minatoga beaches had been thoroughly considered in the planning for the initial landings and had been rejected because of the impossibility of furnishing adequate logistical support for even one division. The reefs were dangerous, the beaches inadequate, and the area exposed to strong enemy attack. Although beach outlets existed, they were commanded both by the escarpment to the west and by the plateau of the Chinen Peninsula. The 10th Army intelligence officer reported that the Japanese still had their reserves stationed in the south. Both the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade were still in the area and could move quickly to oppose any landings. Artillery positions on the heights overlooking the beaches were fully manned. The 77th Division would be landing so far south that it would not have the support of the troops engaged to the north or of 24th Corps artillery. The steep terrain near the beaches favored the defense, and any unit there would be isolated. It might be more like Anzio than Leyte, Buckner suggested. Besides that, the three divisions on the line needed to be relieved, and Buckner's three unused divisions would all be needed there. On April 25, the main focus of action shifted to the Item Pocket, where Captain Bernard Ryan's Company F of the 165th Regiment surged forward following a 20-minute artillery bombardment to seize the summit of Ryan Ridge. Captain Ryan looked out over the rugged expanse of Ryan Ridge, where the Japanese forces entrenched at the top presented a formidable challenge. They controlled the crucial territory between Ryan and Fox Ridges, creating a dangerous stronghold that threatened his position. For Ryan, the solution lay in artillery fire. He understood that since the supporting fire would fall perpendicular to his attack route, the risk of overshooting or undershooting would be minimal, just a lateral deviation of fifteen yards. With this confidence, he ordered a twenty-minute artillery barrage on the slopes of the ridge.As dawn broke on the morning of the 25th, Ryan gathered his men from Company F. He stressed the importance of a swift ground assault to capitalize on the artillery support. However, this was no easy task; his company was tired, undermanned, and severely low on food and ammunition. Despite these challenges, the two assault platoons sprang into action the moment the first shells began to fall. They charged forward, propelled by the roar of mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns that kept enemy forces at bay.But as they sprinted towards the ridge, the enemy struck back fiercely. Enemy fire and natural obstacles thinned their ranks, yet thirty-one determined soldiers reached the summit. They found themselves standing on a jagged ridge, strewn with rocks and scarred vegetation, a treacherous landscape that added to their struggle. Just as the artillery fire began to fade, the Japanese emerged from their hidden positions: “spider holes,” pillboxes, and tunnels. The Americans stood ready, and for the next twenty minutes, a brutal fight erupted. They engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat, reminiscent of earlier battles on Item Pocket ridge tops. The outcome was grim; thirty-five Japanese soldiers fell, and many more fled in panic. However, the Americans also paid a price, five were killed, and two wounded. Now, the real challenge began: consolidating their hard-won position. Captain Ryan knew that previous units had ascended these ridges only to be pushed back by the enemy. By late afternoon, only twenty-four effective soldiers remained atop the ridge, with each man averaging a mere six rounds of rifle ammunition. Medical supplies had run dry, and all the aid men had become casualties. Communication was severed, and Ryan could sense the tightening noose as the Japanese regrouped for an assault. Understanding the gravitas of their situation, Ryan devised a bold plan. He arranged for Company I to maneuver around to his right flank, hoping to replicate the success of the morning. At 4:05 PM, just fifteen minutes after artillery support resumed, Ryan and his company made their ascent once more, enduring five additional casualties along the route. Unfortunately, Company I struggled to reach the top, cut off by heavy enemy fire on the slopes. In a moment of desperation, Ryan and two men ventured out into the dark to seek reinforcement, a risky endeavor that could easily end in disaster. Although Company I was still bogged down, Captain Betts from Company K recognized the urgency of the situation and quickly mobilized his men. By midnight, all of Company K had reached the ridge, bolstering Ryan's weary but determined troops. As these events unfolded at Ryan Ridge, other companies from the 165th were locked in a brutal struggle at Gusukuma, located southwest of the ridge. Fierce fighting erupted as soldiers moved from wall to wall, tree to tree, fighting for every inch in the rubble of Gusukuma. Company A faced an unrelenting barrage, enduring fire from eight machine guns and a 47-mm antitank gun, much of which came from the yet-untamed eastern slope of Ryan Ridge. Amidst this chaos, Private First Class Richard King from Company A became a beacon of valor. In a remarkable display of courage, he climbed a tree to eliminate a Japanese soldier perched above and, from his vantage point, went on to kill ten more enemies before night fell. The day had been marked by sacrifice and bravery, with Captain Ryan and his men fighting heroically for every inch of ground gained on Ryan Ridge. As the sun set, they prepared for the challenges that lay ahead, their resolve unwavering amid the turmoil of war. Meanwhile, other companies of the 165th Regiment engaged fiercely in assaults against Gusukuma, gradually gaining ground at a high cost to both sides. At the same time, the 96th Division consolidated its position in front of Maeda and Kochi, while Colonel Pachler's 1st Battalion advanced 600 yards with minimal resistance to occupy the slope of Horseshoe Ridge. The following day, April 26, the general offensive resumed, with the bulk of the 165th Regiment continuing its costly advance into the heart of the Item Pocket, successfully clearing Gusukuma as Company F pushed along the crest of Ryan Ridge toward the northern end of the Machinato airstrip. To the east, the 105th Regiment advanced to the southern edge of Nakama, while the 106th Regiment extended the front line toward Yafusu. In the center, Colonel Halloran's 2nd Battalion launched an assault on the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repulsed by a brutal barrage of Japanese fire across the front. However, elements of the 383rd Regiment managed to reach the crests of Hills 150 and 152, securing a strategic position to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy below, as tanks and armored flamethrowers moved to the outskirts of Maeda to wreak havoc. At 4 pm in the afternoon General Ushijima issued a terse order: “The enemy with troops following tanks has been advancing into the southern and eastern sectors of Maeda since about 1 pm. The 62d Division will dispatch local units . . . attack the enemy advancing in the Maeda sector and expect to repulse him decisively.” At the same time, adjacent 24th Division units were ordered to cooperate in this effort regardless of division boundary. Two hours later the Japanese commanding general issued another order: "The army will crush the enemy which has broken through near Maeda. The 24th Division will put its main strength northeast of Shuri this evening." Lastly, Pachler's 1st Battalion attempted to advance along the western flank of Kochi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion moved along the eastern flank. Both battalions were immediately repelled by a barrage of enemy fire. The following day, efforts to establish physical contact between the two units proved costly and futile. Meanwhile, Halloran's 1st Battalion, along with elements of the 383rd Regiment, maneuvered through the saddle between Hills 150 and 152, receiving support from tanks and armored flamethrowers. Although tanks and infantry managed to penetrate to the southern edge of Maeda, the advance was halted by intense enemy fire. Atop the escarpment, an all-out effort was made to reduce a heavily fortified underground pillbox that separated Companies F and G; however, this attempt also failed. Concurrently, as the 105th Regiment organized a defensive line at Nakama, Colonel Stebbins' 2nd Battalion engaged in fierce combat around Yafusu in an effort to straighten their front lines. Meanwhile, the disorganized 165th Regiment continued clearing the Item Pocket, which was finally declared secure, although many Japanese troops remained hidden in deep caves and tunnels. Due to this disorganization and the sluggish progress in securing the pocket, General Griner ultimately decided to relieve Colonel Kelley of his command of the 165th. The regiment would then spend the remaining days of the month patrolling the Kuwan Inlet south of Machinato airfield. Griner's overextended and battered division would not undertake any further offensive actions until being relieved at the end of April. At sea, a Japanese suicide boat successfully dropped a depth charge near the destroyer Hutchins, which had to withdraw due to heavy damage. Additionally, Japanese aircraft reemerged during the night, with a kamikaze crashing into and sinking the ammunition ship Canada Victory, while other planes damaged two destroyers and a transport ship. Random factoid by the way, the SS Canada Victory was among the 531 Victory ships constructed during World War II as part of the Emergency Shipbuilding program. Launched by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation on January 12, 1944, she was completed on February 28, 1944. The ship was designated VC2-S-AP3 by the United States Maritime Commission, with hull number 93 (1009). Following her completion, the Maritime Commission transferred her to the civilian operator Alaska SS Company. This was merely a prelude to Admiral Ugaki's fourth mass Kikisui attack, which launched 115 kamikazes on April 28. While interceptor fighters destroyed most of these aircraft, seven managed to slip past the combat air patrol and crashed into destroyers Daly and Twiggs, the destroyer minesweeper Butler, the evacuation transport Pickney, and the hospital ship Comfort. On the ground, Halloran's Company K attempted to weaken resistance at the escarpment by moving through the 27th Division zone to the west and advancing southeast towards the Apartment House barracks, where they were met with heavy losses and forced to retreat. Meanwhile, on the western side of Kochi Ridge, Pachler's 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion and launched an attack into the gap between the ridge and Zebra Hill. They successfully led Company K through Kochi and into the cut, while Company L moved southward along the western slope. However, upon reaching the cut, both companies were met with a barrage of machine-gun fire, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. To the east, the 32nd Regiment faced delays in initiating their attack due to setbacks around Kochi, despite the successful raids by armored flamethrowers into the heart of Kuhazu. The following day, more kamikaze assaults inflicted additional damage on destroyers Hazelwood and Haggard. By the end of April, American pilots reported 1,216 air-to-air kills, while Japanese sources acknowledged losses exceeding 1,000 aircraft, including 820 destroyed in the first four Kikisui attacks. This left Admiral Ugaki with approximately 370 operational aircraft for future operations. It is also important to note that the Japanese pilots inflicted significant casualties, resulting in Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet suffering the loss of 1,853 sailors killed or missing and 2,650 wounded, averaging one and a half ships hit per day. As April expired, a concerned Nimitz personally visited Okinawa, where Buckner reminded Nimitz that as a land battle, 10th Army operations fell under Army command. “Yes,” Nimitz replied, “but ground though it may be, I'm losing a ship and a half a day. So if this line isn't moving within five days, we'll get someone here to move it so we can all get out from under these stupid air attacks.” Nevertheless, by May, 10th Army had thoroughly bogged down into costly, unimaginative frontal assaults against southern Okinawa's heavily fortified Shuri line. Numerous 10th Army generals urged Buckner to “play the amphib card” and land the reserve 2nd Marine Division in southeastern Okinawa, behind Japanese lines. Buckner ultimately refused, claiming insufficient logistics. Nimitz concurred with Buckner, at least publicly, but few others did. Spruance, Turner, and Mitscher were themselves growing increasingly bitter at 10th Army's lack of progress, as well as USAAF lethargy constructing fighter airfields ashore that could finally relieve the battered carriers. Touring the developing Okinawa airstrips, a 5th Fleet staff officer discovered that General “Hap” Arnold had secretly been writing Okinawa's lead USAAF engineer, urging him to divert assigned fighter strip resources into building B-29 bomber airfields instead. An incredulous Spruance went ashore to investigate and discovered the allegation was true. Stunned, Spruance “turned that situation around in about 15 minutes.” On land, following an unsuccessful tank assault toward Onaga, the 32nd Regiment intensified pressure on enemy positions to the southeast to support operations against Kochi Ridge. However, the 17th Regiment's attacks were still stalled. Meanwhile, after fending off two strong counterattacks that resulted in approximately 265 Japanese casualties, the 383rd Regiment advanced to capture the crest of Hill 318 in fierce close combat. This critical victory finally enabled American forces to direct fire onto Shuri itself. On April 29, the 307th Regiment took over the Maeda Escarpment section of the line from the 381st, and the next morning, the 306th Regiment relieved the 383rd on the left flank of the 96th Division. Simultaneously, the 1st Marines relieved the 165th on the west coast, while the 5th Marines took over the line held by the 105th and 106th Regiments on May 1. Despite ongoing efforts, attacks against Kochi Ridge on April 30 once again failed. However, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment successfully established Company C on “Chimney Crag” and Company A on the “Roulette Wheel,” located on the ridge southwest of Kuhazu. During the night, large numbers of Japanese infiltrated behind these companies, disrupting the planned relief of the 32nd by the 184th Regiment. This relief, intended to be completed before dawn on May 1, was delayed until late in the afternoon. Despite this setback, Colonel Green's Company L managed to reach Gaja Ridge, positioned just in front of Conical Hill during the night. Concurrently, Colonel Hamilton's Company A attempted to mount ladders at the eastern end of the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repelled by fierce defenders. On the western front, however, Company B successfully captured the edge of the escarpment using cargo nets by nightfall, although they were ultimately forced to withdraw due to heavy counterattacks later that night. Additionally, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion moved behind the escarpment to Nakama village, launching an attack eastward toward the Apartment House barracks area. Meanwhile, on the west coast, the 1st Marines had been attempting to advance south for two days but were repelled each time, suffering significant casualties. However, they did succeed in clearing an enemy pocket at Miyagusuku. On May 2, the 5th Marines finally joined the offensive but encountered stubborn resistance, while the 1st Marines continued to struggle to cross the draw south of Nakanishi village in their effort to reach the Jichaku ridge mass. To the east, Hamilton's Companies A and B positioned troops on the edge of the Maeda Escarpment but made no significant gains due to the enemy's intense machine-gun fire. The 17th Regiment eventually mopped up Onaga village, with the 1st Battalion taking control of the area, although they failed to capture Kochi during their renewed efforts. On May 3, after a dawn artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion on the east and the 3rd Battalion on the west advanced in a coordinated attack, which included a movement by Company C against How Hill on the eastern flank of Kochi Ridge. However, this entire effort was thwarted as heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire halted all progress. During 3 May the 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, fought a desperate grenade battle to win the top of part of the escarpment. The Japanese showered the top with grenades and knee mortars from the reverse slope and with 81-mm. mortar fire from a distance. Men came back across the narrow top of the escarpment to the north side, swearing and crying, saying they would not go back into the fight. "Yet," observed one platoon leader, "in five minutes' time those men would go back there tossing grenades as fast as they could pull the pins."Finally, while the 1st Marines made only limited gains as they pushed toward the Asa River, the 5th Marines successfully cleared the Awacha Pocket and advanced between 300 and 600 yards in their zone. Unbeknownst to the Americans, their slow, incremental advances and the looming threat of a costly, protracted campaign were far from their only concerns. By the 29th General Cho had argued that in the present state of affairs, the Americans had the upper hand. If the status quo continued, the 32nd Army eventually would be wiped out. At this meeting, only Colonel Yahara spoke for continuing the war of attrition and avoiding an offensive. Yahara pointed out that in modern warfare a superiority of 3 to 1 was usually needed for successful attack. "To take the offensive with inferior forces… is reckless and would lead to certain defeat," he said. Second, the high ground around Minami-Uebaru had already fallen into American hands, giving them a major advantage in defensive terrain. Third, Yahara argued, a hasty offensive would fail, with thousands needlessly lost. Then, 32nd Army's reduced forces would be unable to hold Okinawa for a long period and unable to delay the invasion of Japan. A hasty attack would cause 32nd Army to fail in its duty. And yet, the other young staff members were silent. Cho then declared again that he hoped for an attack to snatch life from the midst of death. At this, Yahara left the room. All the other staff members then agreed to launch an offensive. Cho then tried to manage Yahara by sheer emotional force. At dawn on April 30, before Yahara "had time to splash water on his face," Cho appeared at his quarters. Cho squeezed Yahara's hand and said with genuine enthusiasm that there had been nothing but trouble between them in the past and that they would probably both die together on Okinawa. Cho then asked if Yahara, on this one occasion, would go along with the offensive. As Cho spoke, his tears fell abundantly. Yahara was deeply moved, despite his aloof reputation, and before long he was weeping too. He was overcome by Cho's sudden display of emotion and said, "I consent." Again I have to say, in the “battle of Okinawa” by Yahara, basically his memoirs, in which he notably lies a bunch to cover himself, but I digress, this moment amongst others are really interesting, I highly recommend reading the book. Cho's plan outlined that General Amamiya's 24th Division would lead the main effort on May 4, executing a two-pronged attack on the right half of the line. They intended to sweep past the Tanabaru Escarpment toward Minami-Uebaru hill, ultimately reaching the Futema-Atsuta line. Meanwhile, General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was to shift from its reserve position behind the 62nd Division to a location northeast of Shuri and move northwest toward the coastal town of Oyama, effectively cutting off the 1st Marine Division's retreat. In conjunction with this, General Fujioka's battered 62nd Division would hold its position on the left flank and mount an offensive once the attacking units on its right had breached enemy lines. Additionally, the 23rd and 26th Shipping Engineer Regiments were tasked with conducting counterlandings in the American rear on the east and west coasts, respectively. The Japanese reasoned that success depended on the extent to which they could support their frontline troops with artillery, tanks, supplies, and communications. Their plans specified in detail the role that each of the support units was to play in the projected operations. Artillery units were ordered to regroup in preparation for the attack. Guns and howitzers were pulled out of cave positions and set up farther south in more open emplacements for greater flexibility. They were to open fire thirty minutes before the attack. When the infantry had driven through the American front lines, artillerymen were to move their weapons forward. The 27th Tank Regiment, hitherto uncommitted, was ordered to move from its position near Yonabaru during the night over several routes and support the attack in the Maeda area. To support this comprehensive offensive, Ugaki was alerted to prepare for the fifth mass Kikisui attack directed against the enemy's naval forces. Once the plans were finalized and preparations well underway, Ushijima and Cho celebrated with a pre-victory banquet in their chambers at headquarters. Even as Ushijima's banquet was underway, offensive operations had commenced. Japanese troops infiltrated behind American lines during the night while the shipping engineers prepared for their counterlandings. The 26th and 23d Shipping Engineer Regiments set out up the west and east coasts. On beaches south of Naha and Yonabaru, men of the shipping engineer regiments piled into barges and assault boats. Also, small groups of soldiers with light machine guns infiltrated behind U.S. lines on the night of 3 May to attack Americans as they became visible at dawn. Small units of three or four men, variously designated as "reconnaissance raiding" and "rear harassing" teams, proceeded toward the American lines to attack command posts, heavy weapons, communications, and depots and to send back information by means of smoke signals. The 27th Tank Regiment rumbled up to Ishimmi, several of its tanks being severely damaged by American artillery fire en route. Ugaki's fifth Kikisui attack began on the afternoon of May 3, when at least 19 kamikazes sortied from Formosa, stealthily approaching the American convoys. They successfully sank the destroyer Little and one landing craft, while severely damaging two destroyer-minelayers and another landing craft. Additionally, Japanese aircraft targeted shore installations, focusing their efforts on Yontan airfield. In Nakagusuku Bay, a suicide boat further damaged a cargo ship. At 02:00 on May 4, most of the boats from the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment were spotted approaching the heavily defended area of Kuwan. Armed with antitank guns, heavy machine guns, light arms, and thousands of satchel charges, several hundred men of the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment headed under overcast skies for landing places below Yontan and Kadena airfields. They miscalculated their position and turned, into the shore at a point where it was heavily defended. At 0200 riflemen of the 1st Marine Division on the sea wall near Kuwan caught sight of ten barges and opened up with concentrated fire. Naval flares lighted up the area. One company fired 1,100 rounds from 60-mm. mortars. Several enemy barges burst into flames. One platoon of marines used fifty boxes of ammunition and burned out six machine-gun barrels as it sprayed the Japanese trying to cross the reef. Although many of the engineers managed to reach the shore, some fled back to the Japanese lines, while others were trapped in Kuwan, where they were mopped up by the Marines at their leisure. A smaller group of Japanese forces advanced almost as far as Chatan, ultimately landing at Isa, where they were contained without much difficulty and destroyed the following day. The amphibious assault was even less successful on the east coast of Okinawa, as the 25th Shipping Engineer Regiment attempted to land near Ouki. Most of these troops were killed by fire from ships in Buckner Bay or by the 7th Division Reconnaissance Troop on land. As a result, the Japanese suffered losses of 500 to 800 men and nearly all their landing craft during these amphibious assaults. At 05:00, Ugaki initiated his main mass attack, launching 125 kamikazes and 103 escorting fighters from Kyushu to target Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57, which was currently striking the Miyako and Ishigaki airfields. Taking advantage of the weakened anti-aircraft defenses, the kamikazes managed to score hits on the carriers Formidable and Indomitable, though both vessels ultimately survived. They also targeted American shipping, successfully sinking destroyers Morrison and Luce, along with three landing craft. Additionally, they inflicted further damage on the light cruiser Birmingham, the escort carrier Sangamon, the destroyer Ingraham, and two destroyer-minelayers, resulting in a total of 589 sailors killed.   On land, following a heavy artillery bombardment during the night, the 24th Division commenced its main assault. In the pitch darkness Japanese troops made their way toward the American front lines. At 0500 two red flares ordered them to attack. As the artillery fire became heavy, a guard of Company A, 17th Infantry, on a hill just north of Onaga, dropped back below the crest for cover. He thought that the enemy would not attack through his own artillery, but the enemy did just that. A few Japanese appeared on the crest and set up a light machine gun. Pfc. Tillman H. Black, a BAR man, killed the gunner, and as more of the enemy came over the crest he killed four Japanese who tried to man the machine gun. The enemy advanced over the crest in ragged groups, enabling Black to hold his own. Soon the whole company was in action and drove the enemy off the crest. The Japanese abandoned three light machine guns, four mortars, and much ammunition. At another point a surprise attack nearly succeeded. On high ground 1,000 yards east of Onaga a group of Japanese crept up the hill in front of Company I, 184th, commanded by Capt. James Parker. In the sudden onslaught that followed, two heavy machine gun crews abandoned their positions. One of them left its weapon intact, and the Japanese promptly took it over and swung it around on the company. Parker, watching the attack from the ridge, had anticipated the move. The Japanese managed to fire one burst; then Parker destroyed the usurped weapon with his remaining heavy machine gun. For an hour or two longer the Japanese clung to the forward slopes, firing their rifles amid shrill screams, but they made no further progress. By dawn the general pattern of the Japanese attack on the left (east) of the 14th Corps line was becoming clear. In the 184th's sector the enemy's 89th Regiment, following instructions to "close in on the enemy by taking advantage of cover,"had advanced around the east slopes of Conical Hill, crept across the flats, and assembled in force around the "Y ridges" east of Onaga. They had outflanked three companies of the 184th on Chimney Crag and the Roulette Wheel north of Kuhazu, and had also managed to evade the forward battalions of the 17th around Kochi. Another Japanese element had attacked 7th Division lines on the high ground north of Unaha. At dawn 1st Lt. Richard S. McCracken, commanding Company A, 184th, observed 2,000 Japanese soldiers in the open area east and north of Kuhazu. They were perfect "artillery meat." Unable to get through to his artillery support, McCracken called his battalion commander, Colonel Maybury, and described the lucrative targets. Maybury was equally pleased. McCracken suggested, however, that the Colonel should not be too happy--a group of Japanese at that moment was within 100 yards of Maybury's observation post. There was indeed a party of Japanese busily unlimbering two 75-mm, howitzers just below Maybury. But Company C, 17th Infantry, had spotted this activity, and within a few minutes maneuvered tanks into position and scattered the enemy group. Artillery eliminated the Japanese caught in the open. A mortar duel ensued, sometimes at ranges of 250 yards. The 3d Battalion, 32d, also poured fire on the enemy there. After the impetus of the attack was lost, a Japanese officer stood out on open ground and waved his saber to assemble his men for an attack. American mortarmen waited for a worth-while target to develop, then put mortar fire on it. Four times the officer assembled a group, only to have his men killed or scattered, before he was finally killed. While the 7th Division was repelling the Japanese attack in the eastern sector of the 14th Corps line, the 77th Division was blunting the other enemy "spearhead" in the center. Here the Japanese 32d Regiment, supported by tanks and engineers, attacked behind intense artillery fire. This sector was the critical point of attack, for a break-through here would enable the supporting 44th Independent Mixed Brigade to cut west and isolate the 1st Marine Division. Transportation difficulties beset the 32d Regiment almost from the start. During the night light tanks drove out of Shuri up the Ginowan road (Route 5), but American artillery interdicting the road prevented medium tanks from following. The mediums had to take a long detour, which was in such poor condition that only two of the tanks could enter into the attack. Trucks and artillery also were slowed down. Even foot troops had trouble in moving. One Japanese infantryman recorded that his column was shelled on the way and that everyone except himself and one other was wounded. Another wrote of encountering "terrific bombardment" on the way to Kochi. These difficulties severely handicapped the 32d Regiment in ensuing operations. Supported by nine light tanks, the 3d Battalion led the assault of the 32d Regiment against the 306th Infantry, 77th Division, before dawn on 4 May. The enemy mounted his assault from southeast of Hill 187 and hit the 77th where Route 5 curled around the east end of Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The Japanese drove into the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 306th, near Maeda. Shortly before daylight, when the Japanese infantry had failed to take its initial objectives east of Hill 187, Colonel Murakami, commanding the 27th Tank Regiment, became impatient and recklessly committed his own infantry company, a standard element of a Japanese tank regiment. American artillery fire destroyed one platoon, disrupting the attack, and daylight found the surviving troops in a precarious position across from the American lines. Colonel Murakami ordered the company to withdraw, but artillery fire prevented a retreat during the day. When the Japanese used smoke for concealment, the Americans simply blanketed the obscured area with shell fire. The survivors straggled back to their front lines after nightfall. All the light tanks that had supported the attack were lost. By 07:30, the 306th Regiment had effectively repelled the enemy. The Japanese, broken up into small groups, attempted to withdraw across terrain subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire, but few made it through. By 08:00, the 89th Regiment had also been pushed beyond grenade range along the entire front of the 7th Division. Instead of retreating or pressing the assault, however, Kanayama's troops made the critical mistake of milling about in the exposed flatlands, rendering them easy targets for American heavy weaponry. As a result, the 89th Regiment suffered severe losses from concentrated land, naval, and air bombardment, losing half its strength. Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment in the center fared no better; its advance was delayed by the necessity of laying smoke, and it encountered significant hardships when the smoke unexpectedly cleared. In the center of the line the Japanese 22d Regiment was never able to fulfill its role of following up the "successful" advance of flank units, and the regiment spent the day locked in a violent fire fight with men of 3/306, 3/17, and 1/17 holding the Kochi-Onaga area. The Japanese reported the 22d "was not able attain results worth mentioning." Unbeknownst to the Americans, elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment had penetrated more than 1,000 yards behind American lines near Kochi, identifying a significant weak point before pulling back to the regimental line. Nevertheless, due to the overall failure of the 24th Division, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was not even committed to the attack. On the fronts at Maeda and the west coast, American forces made some gains. Hamilton's 1st Battalion successfully executed a complex demolition assault on the extensive cave-tunnel-pillbox network located about 200 feet west of the eastern end of the escarpment, effectively repulsing several subsequent counterattacks and inflicting approximately 600 casualties on the Japanese. The 5th Marines also advanced up to 400 yards through hotly contested terrain during the day. Although pinned down in the coastal area, Colonel Chappell's 1st Battalion managed to break through a defile east of Jichaku, while the 3rd Battalion secured a ridge approximately 400 yards ahead of its position. Despite the apparent failure of the Japanese attack, Amamiya refused to abandon the offensive, ordering a renewed effort during the night. Kitago's uncommitted 1st Battalion, along with the attached 26th Independent Battalion, was directed to penetrate the enemy lines northwest of Kochi in a night attack, aiming to replicate the breakthrough achieved by elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment. Following another artillery bombardment, the Japanese launched their assault against the 306th Regiment at 02:00 on May 5. However, this attack was quickly disrupted by American artillery. Three hours later, the Japanese struck again, this time supported by tanks. They pressed through artillery and mortar fire to engage the 306th in close combat. Fierce firefights erupted along the regiment's entire line, resulting in the Japanese suffering 248 dead during the fighting. Amid the chaos, a significant portion of Kitago's 1st Battalion successfully infiltrated behind American lines, breaching the defenses at a point between Route 5 and Kochi. While approximately 90 of the infiltrators were quickly killed while assaulting the command post of the 306th Regiment, around 450 Japanese troops crossed the divisional boundary and managed to reoccupy the town of Tanabaru and the Tanabaru Escarpment, effectively cutting off the supply road for the 17th Regiment. In response, Pachler sent Company E to eliminate the infiltrators, but they underestimated the enemy's strength and were repelled with heavy losses. With Company E stalled on the eastern slope of the escarpment, Company F, supported by tanks, attempted a broad flanking maneuver. They successfully pushed through Tanabaru, spending the day destroying the enemy's hastily established defenses. Company E then took over the assault, and by nightfall, they had reached the top of the Tanabaru Escarpment following a mortar preparation. The relentless battle for the Tanabaru Escarpment continued for the next two days, resulting in the Japanese losing 462 killed behind American lines. Only a few men managed to escape the Tanabaru death trap and return to the Shuri lines. Made even more desperate by the failure of Amamiya's grand attack, the ragtag battalions of the 62nd Division fought to the death to defend the vital western approaches to Shuri, ensuring that every yard gained came at a steep price in Marine lives. Each pillbox, cave, and tomb became a stronghold that unleashed a torrent of fire against the attacking Marines from all directions. Despite this fierce resistance, Del Valle's units made significant progress on May 5. The 5th Marines advanced their lines by an average of 300 yards, while the 1st Marines seized the high ground along the Asa River. At the Maeda Escarpment, the reverse slope was slowly captured as caves were blasted and sealed off. By midnight, it became clear to Ushijima that the counteroffensive had failed, with the Japanese suffering approximately 6,227 dead and losing 59 artillery pieces. In turn, the 7th and 77th Divisions, which had absorbed the brunt of the enemy counterattack, sustained 714 losses. Despite these heavy casualties, the 1st Marine Division, which continued its push to the south, incurred corresponding losses of 649 men. This indicated that the Americans experienced greater losses due to the Japanese defensive tactics of attrition. However, the morale of the 32nd Army had been shattered, as the Japanese abandoned all hope for a successful outcome from the operation. Nevertheless, the 24th Division and 5th Artillery Command were ordered to reorganize and shift to a holding action. This strategy aimed to bleed American strength by forcing the 10th Army to maintain its slow, deadly, yard-by-yard advance into the fire of prepared positions. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the fierce Second Okinawa Counteroffensive, weary American troops pressed into determined Japanese defenses. Captain Ryan's valor led to hard-won territory despite heavy casualties. As chaos unfolded, Japanese morale waned, marking a turning point. The relentless battle showcased unparalleled sacrifice, foreshadowing the Allies' gradual victory in the Pacific.  

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindanao. In April 1945, the US launched the invasion of Mindanao under General Eichelberger, focusing on Illana Bay. Initial assaults were swift, and American forces quickly captured vital areas due to the disarray among Japanese troops, who were struggling with low morale and supply shortages. The Japanese were under significant pressure, with commanders ill-prepared to mount a robust defense as American troops advanced toward Davao. Fierce battles unfolded, including attempts to seize key positions, but Japanese forces, that included remnants from earlier campaigns, faced overwhelming and relentless assaults. Despite stiff resistance in some areas, the Americans ultimately made considerable territorial gains, significantly weakening Japanese positions. This successful operation in Mindanao laid crucial groundwork for further advances in the Pacific theater, marking a decisive phase in the war as the tide turned heavily in favor of the Allies. As this chapter closed, it was evident that the end of Japanese resistance in the region was drawing near. This episode is the Allied Invasion of Borneo Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  A long time ago, in a galaxy far away we talked about the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Now it is time to talk about how the Dutch strikes back. . . well not exactly, but I wanted to finish the star wars reference. For an extended period, the Australian forces that had valiantly fought on the island of New Guinea during a crucial phase of the Allied war effort had been assigned to garrison duties in remote areas, conducting minor offensives against a desperate enemy more concerned with obtaining food than engaging in battle. At the same time, General MacArthur deemed it politically unwise for Australians to take a prominent role in reclaiming the Philippines, an American territory, and he also found it politically unfavorable for American troops to participate in restoring Dutch and British authority in the Indies. Recognizing the urgent need to secure the oilfields of British and Dutch Borneo to supply accessible oil for the push toward Japan, Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead's 1st Australian Corps was designated for the operation to retake Borneo, known as Operation Oboe. Should note that after a period of illness, suffering from malaria and a skin condition, the fighting General George Alan Vasey had finally recovered by February 1945. General Blamey, who still had doubts about his physical fitness despite Vasey being given an A by an Army medical board, reluctantly appointed him to command the 6th Division, then in action in the Aitape-Wewak campaign. Vasey then flew north to take up his new command. The aircraft Vasey was travelling in, RAAF Lockheed Hudson A16-118, took off from RAAF Station Archerfield on the afternoon of March 5, 1945. Due to a cyclone that was ravaging the Queensland coast at the time, the aircraft crashed into the sea about 400 metres out from Machans Beach, just north of the mouth of the Barron River, 2 kilometres short of the Cairns Airport. Vasey was killed in the crash along with all those on board. His body was recovered from the crash site and was buried with full military honours in Cairns cemetery along with those of Major-General Rupert Downes and Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Bertram. Vasey's concern for his men outlived him. The men called him 'Bloody George', not after his casualties, but after his favourite adjective, and Vasey's personable style of command attracted immense loyalty from them. "Vasey owns the 7th," wrote a Melbourne journalist, "but every man in the division believes he owns Vasey." Thus now it fell to General Steven to retain command of the 6th Division at that time already engaged in combat at Aitape-Wewak, the initial plan was to land Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th Brigade at Tarakan on April 23 to establish an airstrip for supporting aircraft for subsequent operations, specifically an assault on Balikpapan by the remaining forces of Major-General George Wootten's 9th Division on May 18. Following that, ten days later, a brigade was set to land at Bandjarmasin to secure air support for the planned invasion of Java by the entire corps on June 27. Ultimately, the operations at Bandjarmasin and Java were cancelled; the Tarakan landing was postponed to May 1; the Balikpapan invasion would instead be conducted by Major-General Edward Milford's 7th Division on July 1; and the 9th Division was tasked with the invasion of Brunei Bay on June 10. Consequently, by the end of March, Morshead's headquarters and the entire 9th Division had relocated to Morotai, where they would prepare and rehearse for the impending invasion. In March 1944, General Doihara Kenji organized the 7th Area Army to establish a new defensive line across Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. Yes you heard that right, General Doihara Kenji. For those of you who listen to my Fall and Rise of China podcast, this guy is that infamous intelligence officer who worked on nearly all the significant false flag operations during the second sino-Japanese war. Working as an intelligence officer he played a key role in the orchestration of the Huanggutun Incident, Mukden Incident, kidnapping of Emperor Puyi and Marco Polo Bridge Incident, amongst countless other “incidents”. He was a bonafide mastermind behind numerous false flag operations and the Manchurian drug trade earning the moniker Lawrence of Manchuria.  Now, anticipating an impending enemy invasion, Lieutenant-General Yamawaki Masataka reorganized the Borneo Defence Army into the 37th Army in September, placing it directly under General Terauchi's Southern Army. This force gradually received reinforcements from the 56th and 71st Independent Mixed Brigades, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment, and several smaller units. Despite this, the command was understrength and poorly equipped, as most of the available equipment and experienced troops were reassigned to more critical locations in the Southwest Pacific. By the end of the year, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, the 37th Army had stationed the majority of Major-General Nozaki Seiji's 56th Independent Mixed Brigade at Tawau, Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's understrength 71st Independent Mixed Brigade at Kuching, most of Colonel Iemura Shinichi's 25th Independent Mixed Regiment on Tawi-Tawi Island, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Balikpapan, along with three battalions in Sandakan, two battalions and a naval unit in Tarakan, and one battalion each in Kudat, Beaufort, and Miri. However, in 1945, both Baba and Terauchi recognized that the enemy was likely to first target strategic locations on the east coast before establishing a strong presence in western Borneo to prepare for an invasion of Malaya. Consequently, they decided that the majority of the 37th Army should be concentrated around Brunei Bay, leading to orders for the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade to march overland toward northern Borneo. The 370th Independent Battalion remained in Tawau, while the 369th Independent Battalion was sent to garrison Bandjarmasin. Additionally, half of the 454th Independent Battalion was dispatched to Balikpapan, and the other half to Bandjarmasin. This left only the 455th Independent Battalion and part of the 2nd Guard Unit at Tarakan. Early in April the strength of the Japanese force on Tarakan was estimated at about 4000 of whom 2500 were base troops. On the eve of the attack, however, largely because of information indicating that a battalion had been moved from Tarakan to Balikpapan, it was estimated that only 1500 to 2000 troops remained on the island. Aerial photographs showed five gun positions on the south-eastern tip of the island covering the channel along which ships normally entered Tarakan. Round Lingkas and Tarakan there seemed to be 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 9 medium and 5 light anti-aircraft guns seemed to be round the airfield. The whole of Lingkas beach was protected by parallel rows of posts, rails and pipes driven into the mud and extending into the sea to a distance of 125 yards from high-water mark; and between the beach and the road was an anti-tank ditch about 25 feet wide. A group of oil tanks was near the beach and, as it was possible that the Japanese might try to impede an attacker by flooding the oil over the sea and the swamp near the Pamusian River and setting it alight, the air force had taken pains to destroy these tanks. Field works could be seen; there were concrete pill-boxes built by the Dutch; and it was suspected that, here as elsewhere, tunnels had been dug into the hills.  Units stationed at Sandakan were also ordered to move toward Brunei, leaving the 554th Independent Battalion behind. Furthermore, due to the challenges in supplying Tawi-Tawi, the 25th Independent Mixed Regiment was withdrawn to Borneo in February and instructed to march toward Jesselton, where it was expected to arrive in May. During this time, little was done to enhance the island's defenses, and the overland marches took a significant toll on the soldiers' stamina. Meanwhile, enemy air raids intensified, severely disrupting communications. Between April 11 and 29, Air Commodore Arthur Harry Cobby's Australian 1st Tactical Air Force, along with Major-General Paul Wurtsmith's 13th Air Force, conducted several air assaults on Tarakan and Tawau, targeting oil storage tanks, artillery positions, radar stations, defenses, and various buildings. On April 27, Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1 departed Morotai, carrying Whitehead's 26th Brigade, protected by Admiral Berkey's cruisers and destroyers. Over the next two days, this force executed a naval bombardment on shore targets while a minesweeping unit cleared and marked the approach route within 800 yards of the beach and Sadau Island. Early on April 30, the 2/4th Commando Squadron landed unopposed on Sadau, where they established an artillery battery to support the engineers in clearing obstacles from the invasion beaches. After successfully completing the task with just a few sniper and mortar attacks, the main convoy reached the southwest coast of Tarakan Island an hour before sunrise on May 1. Following a heavy air and naval bombardment prior to landing, Whitehead's assault waves began their approach to the shore, supported by rocket fire from the LCI gunboats. Around 08:00, the 2/23rd and 2/48th Battalions landed on Green Beach and Red Beach, respectively, without facing any opposition. However, once they moved inland, they encountered intense fire from Lingkas Hill and Roach. The 2/23rd Battalion launched an attack and captured both locations while the 2/48th took the Finch and Parks positions as they advanced to secure the Collins Highway ridge. Throughout the day, the remaining units of the 26th Brigade landed despite poor beach conditions and overcrowding, with the 2/24th Battalion held in reserve along Anzac Highway. By nightfall, the brigade managed to hold an area 2,800 yards wide at the base and up to 2,000 yards deep. Early on May 2, the 2/23rd seized Milko with minimal resistance, advancing further north to the Pages feature and Hospital Spur. Simultaneously, the 2/48th quickly secured Lyons and the junction with Burke Highway, while the 2/24th effectively attacked the Wills, Sturt, and Frank positions with support from aircraft and artillery. In the late afternoon, as one company moved up Anzac Highway toward the airfield, Lieutenant-Colonel George Warfe's other companies converged on the Essex feature, which was captured without opposition during the night. The next morning, the 2/24th attacked the airfield from the south and east; although they successfully took the airfield ridge at a high cost, their late assault on the Rippon position to the north was repelled by determined enemy defenders. At the same time, the 2/48th conducted reconnaissance towards the Peter and Sykes features, while the 2/23rd managed to secure the area between Gleneleg Highway and Pamusian. However, their assaults on Hospital Spur and Tarakan Hill were unsuccessful. Fortunately, Burke Ridge was found abandoned on May 4. By then, Whitehead had already instructed the 2/23rd to advance east and join the 2/24th in their attacks on the airfield, with the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/4th Commando Squadron taking over their positions in the west. The commandos then launched an attack on Tarakan Hill. Despite being initially held down by fierce enemy fire, they eventually forced the defenders off the high ground through sustained pressure, tank support, and a sweeping maneuver to the right. Simultaneously, the 2/48th advanced and successfully took control of the Evans feature, while a company from the 2/24th attacked the Peningkibaru stronghold after an intense artillery barrage, managing to secure the position just in time to fend off the Japanese who had retreated during the bombardment. Additionally, Warfe planned another assault on Rippon, but heavy Japanese shelling ultimately compelled him to call it off. On May 5, as the commandos and pioneers continued to diminish the remaining strongholds on Tarakan Hill, the 2/48th successfully cleared the road north to Otway, although they faced greater resistance near Sykes. Rippon was also discovered to be abandoned and was swiftly captured, though the Japanese still controlled the high ground to the north. Finally, on May 6, the 2/48th launched another attack on Sykes and successfully cleared the hill this time. While capturing the airfield and town accomplished Whitehead's primary objective, the Japanese continued to hold the rugged interior of Tarakan, indicating that much fighting lay ahead until the garrison was completely defeated. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area, 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District 6, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops".The enemy was now directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts.  After the unsuccessful general attack on April 19, which yielded minimal gains, Generals Hodge and Buckner were preparing to push the offensive southward, fully aware that breaching the first Shuri defense ring would be a slow and costly endeavor. On the western front, the primary enemy positions on Kakazu Ridge had been entirely circumvented, with General Griner directing his troops to advance and focus on cleanup later. Consequently, on April 20, the majority of the 165th Regiment secured the coastal region before launching a southern attack that encountered immediate and fierce resistance in the rugged terrain north of Gusukuma, particularly around Item Pocket.  The center of the Japanese resistance lay in the I section of Target Area 7777, which came to be called "Item Pocket", in military terminology I is called Item. Actually, the pocket was the hub of the enemy position; from it, like spokes of a giant wheel, extended four low ridges, separated from each other by ravines and rice paddies. Potter's Ridge ran north from the hub, Charlie Ridge to the northeast, Gusukuma Ridge to the southeast, and Ryan Ridge to the southwest. Lying between Gusukuma and Charlie Ridges and sloping to the east was a cone-shaped hill called by Americans "Brewer's Hill." A gulch ran along each side of the hill Anderson's Gulch on the north and Dead Horse Gulch on the south. Both ran in an easterly direction, crossing Route 1 at small bridges just north of Gusukuma. The ground was superbly suited for active defense. Typical Japanese positions were connected by tunnels along the sides and under the crests of the ridges; Ryan Ridge, in particular, was honeycombed with such defenses. From Item Pocket the enemy had excellent command both of the coastal areas to the north and west and of the open land to the east where Route 1 ran north-south. The Japanese had long been aware of the defensive value of this position against either a beach landing on the northwest or an attack from the north. Months before the Americans landed, Japanese troops and Okinawan laborers were boring tunnels and establishing elaborate living quarters and aid stations. The area was held by two companies of the 21st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 64th Brigade, 62nd Division, supported by an antitank company, a machine gun company, and elements of antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar units. At least 600 Japanese occupied the Pocket, reinforced by several hundred Okinawans. Only through persistent effort was the 1st Battalion able to reach a position east of Gusukuma by nightfall, while the 2nd Battalion successfully took control of Potter's Ridge and Fox Ridge but failed in its attempts against Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket itself. The leading platoon was well up on the slope of Ryan when Japanese on top opened up with mortars, machine guns, and artillery, cutting off the rest of Company E. While the company commander, his clothes torn by bullets, and the rest of the company straggled back to Fox Ridge, the leading platoon continued doggedly ahead. Its leader, T/Sgt. Earnest L. Schoeff, managed to reach the top with eight of his men despite almost constant fire. He was ordered by radio to hold until relief came. The men hugged the ground as darkness slowly descended. Then from three directions from fifty to sixty heavily armed Japanese set upon the Americans. In wild hand-to-hand fighting the nine men beat off the attack. Pfc. Paul R. Cook fired four cases of ammunition into the enemy, shooting down at least ten before he was killed. With grenades, rifle butts, and the enemy's own weapons, Schoeff and his men killed another dozen before the Japanese withdrew. With two of his men killed, another missing, and two wounded, Schoeff led the survivors back to his company during the night. To the east, the 106th and 105th Regiments tried to advance south towards the village of Iso and the Pinnacles but were hindered by heavy enemy gunfire. In response, Colonel Winn dispatched his 2nd Battalion to maneuver around the East Pinnacle to reach the village of Natama, where Companies F and G were ultimately repelled by a strong Japanese counterattack. As they retreated in chaos, they faced an ambush from Japanese infiltrators, resulting in significant casualties. Despite these challenges, the 106th Regiment and Winn's 3rd Battalion managed to bypass the West Pinnacle and advance with relative ease, halting 200 yards southwest of Iso. Additionally, Winn's 1st Battalion fought its way to the western edge of Kakazu village and nearly cleared Kakazu Ridge to its eastern point before being ordered back to the escarpment to support the 2nd Battalion and halt any enemy breakthroughs. At the same time, General Bradley ordered the 381st and 382nd Regiments to advance toward Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment. In response, Colonel Dill's 3rd Battalion moved along Tombstone Ridge, clearing out the enemy from caves and tombs, and reached the southern end just in time to join Colonel Halloran's 1st Battalion for a surprise offensive against Nishibaru. They quickly captured the crest but were ultimately driven back by the determined defenders. However, this partial victory prompted Halloran to deploy the 2nd Battalion in the afternoon for another assault to the south. By day's end, the 381st was entrenched along the northern slope of Nishibaru Ridge, though at a significant cost. Further west, Dill's 2nd Battalion also pushed forward despite persistent fire from the Rocky Crags, where attempts by the 184th and 17th Regiments to attack were unsuccessful. They could not catch up with the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, General Arnold targeted Ouki Hill, but his initial assault was quickly halted by enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Two armored flamethrowers successfully advanced 400 yards ahead of the infantry, neutralizing an enemy mortar position on Ouki Hill's west slope. Consequently, the Americans concentrated their mortars and smoke to cover the enemy positions, allowing a composite company to launch a surprise attack that secured the crest of Ouki Hill, although the isolated troops would soon have to fend off a series of fierce counterattacks. The next morning, the 32nd Regiment launched an attack down Skyline Ridge with two companies. However, they were quickly halted by mortar fire at a deep road cut in the middle of the ridge. Despite this setback, the troops persevered, largely due to Sergeant Theodore MacDonnell's efforts, and eventually gained control of the entire forward face of the ridge. When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a gist Chemical Mortar Company observer, was impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a handful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun, but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest he stood up and fired point-blank into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDonnell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion. Lt. Fred Capp, commanding Company E, sent troops to reinforce MacDonnell immediately, and the position was consolidated. Then Company F, on orders given as a result of this sudden development, pressed the attack down Skyline Ridge, and by 18:00 the entire forward face of the ridge was occupied and only a knob at the lower tip was causing trouble.  To the west, while Colonel Pachler's Company B attempted another attack on Rocky Crags, Dill's 3rd Battalion reorganized and encircled to reach Nishibaru Ridge via the 381st Regiment, launching an eastward assault that made good headway until they were met with fierce enemy counterattacks that forced them to halt. Simultaneously, Halloran coordinated an attack on Nishibaru, which was successfully repelled by the defenders. Colonel May's 3rd Battalion was then deployed to fill the gap at the gorge. Overnight, a large number of Japanese troops had moved from the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment to set up mortars and machine guns in the Kakazu Pocket, prompting the 27th Reconnaissance Troop to advance toward Kakazu, where they became pinned down at the village's edge. As a result, Colonel Stebbins' 3rd Battalion was ordered to position itself on Kakazu West. Looking west, the majority of the 105th and 106th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the Pinnacles, but with little success. They did manage to clear the road to the escarpment's summit of mines and obstructions to facilitate tank movements. Finally, Colonel Kelley's 2nd Battalion launched another unsuccessful attack across the mouth of Item Pocket, while Company F attempted to advance along the coast using amphibious tractors but was likewise repelled by intense fire from Ryan Ridge. The 1st Battalion also pushed southwest into Gusukuma, but without armor support, they made minimal progress against the machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket attacking from the right rear. The enemy's defense was very effective on the east. Here the 1st Battalion had a major supply problem on its hands. Two blown bridges along Route 1 east of the Item Pocket were holding up vehicles of support units. During the previous night, fire from the Pocket had driven off an engineer platoon working at the site and killed the platoon leader. Early on the 21st Lieutenant Golden, the Bailey bridge expert, came up with ten truckloads of material. His engineers worked for an hour but had to stop in the face of almost ceaseless fire from the Pocket. Colonel Kelley then ordered scouts to find another stream crossing. A bulldozer cut a bypass around Anderson's Gulch near the railroad, but when, about 10:00, the operator nosed his machine out in the open, he was shot in the ear. General Griner, in Colonel Kelley's observation post at the time, ordered Lt. Col. Walter F. Anderson, commander of the 193rd Tank Battalion, to push the bypass through. Anderson himself climbed into his battalion's sole remaining "tank-dozer" and completed the bypass. A 47-mm. anti-tank gun, hitherto silent, scored a direct hit on Anderson's tank, killing him and a guide. The bypass was now blocked and had to be abandoned. This break-down in supply over Route 1 seriously affected operations east of Gusukuma. Colonel Mahoney's 1st Battalion attacked southwest early on the 21st into Gusukuma, but without tanks or cannon the troops made little ground against machine guns in the village and fire from Item Pocket on the right rear. Mahoney's left company did reach a point 400 yards north of the village of Yafusu, the farthest advance yet registered by 24th Corps since April 19, but here the troops were stopped by a network of enemy positions. Concerned about the significant vertical separation between his battalions, Kelley decided to deploy his 3rd Battalion in an effort to fill the gap and simultaneously penetrate Item Pocket. Consequently, the American forces advanced through Dead Horse Gulch, with Company K fighting nearly to the center of the pocket. However, they were ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy losses and intense counterattacks. On April 22, Kelley opted to hold and enhance his current positions while conducting extensive patrols. Looking to the east, as the 105th Regiment regrouped following a night counterattack from Kakazu, Stebbins' 1st Battalion systematically located and neutralized enemy positions behind them along the escarpment. Brigadier-General William Bradford also took command in the Kakazu area, bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 17th Regiment, and most of the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment, successfully containing the pocket. Further west, the 383rd Regiment replaced the weakened 382nd, while the 2nd Battalion advanced down Nishibaru Ridge to capture the village and higher ground facing Hill 143 to the south. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made minimal progress toward the Gate of the Tanabaru Escarpment. Additionally, Pachler's Company B initiated another attack on the west side of the Rocky Crags, supported by howitzers, tanks, and armored flamethrowers. However, once again, they faced hand grenades and knee mortar shells raining down from above, resulting in heavy casualties and the need to retreat. Finally, the 32nd Regiment maintained control of the forward face of Skyline Ridge but made no attempt to advance, while patrols scoured extensive sections of the southern slope to reach the abandoned eastern face of Hill 178. That night, artillery provided cover to the beleaguered defenders as Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment took over along Skyline Ridge. Following several days of inactivity, 41 kamikaze planes were once again launched on April 22. They successfully sank the minesweeper Swallow and one LCS, while also damaging two destroyers and another minesweeper, resulting in the loss of 25 aircraft. The next day, the 32nd Regiment remained stationed on the north slope of Skyline Ridge, except when conducting patrols or securing caves. This allowed the Japanese defenders to withdraw overnight from their remaining positions around Hill 178. With Company B worn out, the rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th Regiment joined the assault on the Rocky Crags, which fell with little resistance. To the west, medium tanks and armored flamethrowers finally launched a direct attack on Nishibaru Ridge and the Tanabaru Escarpment, successfully destroying most of the enemy positions, although few territorial gains were made. Further west, Winn's 1st Battalion executed a surprise attack on the East Pinnacle, managing to capture the position after fierce hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, the remaining defenders at West Pinnacle initiated a desperate banzai charge towards Iso, where they were ultimately overwhelmed. Kelley then ordered Company I to conduct a probing assault on Ryan Ridge and Item Pocket, while Company C ascended Brewer's Hill but was unable to descend the steep side to join the fight. On April 24, no new attacks were launched due to a confusing mix-up of orders, but preparations were made for an assault the following day. After an artillery barrage, Bradford's task force finally attacked the Kakazu Pocket with four battalions; however, they faced no enemy resistance, as the Japanese had abandoned their positions overnight. To the east, the beleaguered defenders in front of the 96th Division had also retreated, leading to the fall of the Tanabaru Escarpment, its village, Hill 143, and the rest of Nishibaru Ridge without opposition. In a similar manner, the 17th Regiment ascended Hill 178 with only a few scattered artillery rounds landing nearby. The Japanese forces had resisted fiercely for five days, but with the first ring of Shuri defenses breached at multiple points, they chose to withdraw under the cover of heavy mist and light fog the night before. Even so, this advancement was minimal, and it was clear that reaching Shuri would take considerable time given the rate of progress over the first three and a half weeks of the operation. Nonetheless, Buckner believed that any significant landing on the Minatoga beaches or between Machinato airfield and Naha could not be logistically supported and would be vulnerable to strong enemy counterattacks. Therefore, he dismissed proposals to deploy the 77th Division or the 1st Marine Division for these efforts. Instead, it was decided to move the 3rd Marine Corps and the 77th Division from northern Okinawa and Iejima to replace the 24th Corps in the Shuri area. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In April 1945, the Allies launched the invasion of Borneo, led by General Morshead. Swift assaults secured strategic areas against demoralized Japanese troops. Despite fierce resistance, American forces gained ground, crippling Japanese defenses. This victory marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific War, signaling the end of Japanese influence in the region.

At Kwajalein and Roi-Namur, months of rehearsals, better intel, and hard-earned Tarawa lessons came together. The 4th Marine Division, fresh off the boat from Pendleton, made its combat debut alongside Army units already blooded in the Aleutians. They landed under real air cover, backed by real logistics, and fought smart, clearing bunkers with tanks and torches instead of charging into fire. ************* Visit HistoryoftheMarineCorps.com to subscribe to our newsletter, explore episode notes and images, and see our references. Follow us on social media for updates and bonus content: Facebook and Twitter (@marinehistory) and Instagram (@historyofthemarines). This episode is sponsored by Audible. Visit AudibleTrial.com/marinehistory for a free audiobook and a 30-day trial.

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Iwo Jima. In March 1945, as the Pacific War raged, the US Marines began and invasion of Iwo Jima while Allied forces advanced across the Philippines. The Japanese formed the 32nd Army to defend the island, but faced shortages of supplies and equipment. They mobilized Okinawan civilians for support and constructed extensive fortifications. The Americans launched Operation Iceberg, neutralizing enemy air facilities in the Ryukyus, Kyushu, and Formosa. Task Force 58 and other air forces struck Japanese targets, while Spruance's 5th Fleet prepared to land Buckner's 10th Army. Initial landings occurred in the Kerama Islands, followed by the main assault on April 1 on Okinawa's Hagushi beaches. Despite heavy bombardment, Japanese defenses remained concealed. The Americans encountered minimal resistance initially, but the stage was set for a bloody and brutal battle. This episode is Yamato's Last Stand Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, Admirals Turner and Spruance successfully landed over 60,000 troops from General Buckner's 10th Army on the Hagushi beaches of Okinawa with minimal resistance. In response, General Ushijima's main forces remained inactive in their underground positions in the south, having effectively endured the continuous naval and air assaults from the enemy. However, under pressure from higher authorities in Tokyo and Formosa, the 32nd Army began to develop plans for a general counteroffensive aimed at the Yontan and Kadena airfields, utilizing nighttime infiltration and close combat tactics. The primary response, however, was expected to come from the air. As part of Operation Ten-Go, all Army and Navy air forces stationed in the Home Islands were to focus their efforts in the East China Sea to execute a series of coordinated mass air strikes against enemy transport and carrier task forces, collectively referred to as the Kikisui attacks. Japan's wartime terminology exploited the distinctively poetic and euphemistic nature of the Japanese language. The informal term kamikaze actually means “divine wind.” Specifically, kamikaze refers to the typhoons that miraculously wrecked Kublai Khan's Mongol–Koryo invasion fleets in 1274. Like “blitzkrieg”, the unofficial term “kamikaze” was mostly used by Allied journalists. The IJN and IJA officially called suicide attack units tokubetsu kogekitai, meaning “special attack unit.” This was usually shortened to tokkutai, with tokko both noun and adjective meaning “special” i.e. suicide. Kikisui was the codename for the ten mass kamikaze attacks off Okinawa against the Allied fleet. Kikisui means “floating chrysanthemum,” which was the war emblem of legendary 14th-century samurai Masashige Kusinoke, a national exemplar of sacrificial devotion to the Emperor. Ten-Go had been initiated on March 26, following the initial landings on the Kerama Islands; however, by the time of the invasion, Admiral Toyoda's disorganized Combined Fleet was unable to carry out any large-scale kamikaze attacks, as it was still consolidating approximately 3,000 aircraft in Kyushu. Additionally, encouraged by Emperor Hirohito, Toyoda momentarily sanctioned a dramatic, one-way suicide mission involving the superbattleship Yamato and Rear-Admiral Komura Keizo's 2nd Destroyer Squadron, aimed at destroying Spruance's invasion fleet. This surface attack mission, codenamed Ten-Ichi-Go and led by Vice-Admiral Ito Seiichi of the 2nd Fleet, vaguely suggested that if Yamato reached Okinawa, she would ground herself as an artillery platform while her crew disembarked as naval infantry. Nonetheless, the chances of success for this mission were slim; it was primarily intended for the Imperial Japanese Navy to maintain its honor. On April 2, while General Watson's 2nd Marine Division conducted another demonstration off the southeast beaches, American forces prepared to advance eastward. In the south, benefiting from ideal weather and minimal resistance, the 17th Regiment secured the highlands overlooking Nakagusuku Bay and extended its patrols to the bay's shoreline. The 32nd Regiment eliminated a strongpoint south of Koza using tanks and then aligned with the 17th. The 381st Regiment advanced through Shimabuku but faced enemy resistance in and around Momobaru. Meanwhile, the 383rd Regiment captured a hill just south of Momobaru after a fierce battle and also took a ridge northeast of Futema with support from airstrikes, artillery, and tanks. In the north, however, General Geiger's Marines faced challenging terrain and supply issues. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines moved north to secure the unoccupied Zampa Misaki area, where Turner later established a radar station. The 22nd Marines advanced quickly eastward throughout the day against light opposition, successfully securing the Nagahama beaches alongside the 6th Reconnaissance Company. On the other hand, the 4th Marines met with steadily mounting resistance. At 1100 a platoon of 3/4, entering the mouth of a steep ravine was met by a sharp fusillade of small-arms fire, which revealed a series of mutually supporting caves on both sides of the draw. In the fire fight that ensued, 12 wounded men were isolated and not recovered for four hours. "Every means of painlessly destroying the strongpoint was unsuccessfully tried and it was finally taken by a typical 'Banzai' charge, with one platoon entering the mouth of the draw and one platoon coming down one side of the two noses that formed the pocket."  The 1st Marine Division continued its advance with little resistance to the Ishimmi-Kutoku line, also extending southward to Chatan, while the 1st Marines moved past the 5th Marines toward Chibana. With approximately 6,000 yards separating General Del Valle's main frontline units from the 7th Division, General Arnold decided to send Colonel Roy Greene's 184th Regiment to fill this significant gap. At sea, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 launched a strike against Amami Oshima, sinking three vessels and damaging two others, while also witnessing four warships collide and sustain damage. In retaliation, Admiral Ugaki's Kyushu aircraft force conducted sporadic kamikaze attacks, resulting in damage to five transports. The next day, General Hodge's 24th Corps shifted its focus southward. The 17th Regiment secured the rear areas and captured Awase, while the 32nd Regiment advanced approximately 5,000 yards along Nakagusuku Bay to occupy Kuba and establish its lines in front of Hill 165. The 381st Regiment took control of Kishaba and Atanniya but failed in its assaults on Hill 165 and Unjo. Meanwhile, the 383rd Regiment swiftly occupied Isa, Chiyunna, and the Futema high ground. Looking north, Del Valle dispatched the 1st Reconnaissance Company to scout the area along the corps boundary, sweep the Katchin Peninsula, and patrol back up the east coast to the village of Hizaonna. This maneuver enabled the 1st Marines to advance quickly in formation and reach the sea wall overlooking the northern end of Nakagusuku Bay by nightfall. Concurrently, the 5th Marines moved forward and successfully occupied Agina and Tengan; the 7th Marines gained around 2,700 yards of enemy territory and ultimately reached Hizaonna, although Company K became lost and was ambushed. The 4th Marines navigated the challenging terrain and light enemy resistance to secure the significant hill mass behind Yontan airfield, located 3,000 yards short of the east coast. The 22nd Marines advanced and successfully captured Nakadomari, along with a position 400 yards south of that line. Meanwhile, the 6th Reconnaissance Company, supported by armored units, crossed the Ishikawa Isthmus to the village of Ishikawa, where they faced mortar fire. At sea, Mitscher's aircraft carriers targeted Okinawa, sinking two vessels and damaging two others. In response, Ugaki was finally able to launch a preliminary mass Ten-Go air attack, with 119 aircraft causing damage to the escort carrier Wake Island, the destroyers Bennett, Prichett, and Foreman, the minesweeper Hambelton, and two landing craft. Due to significant advancements, Geiger successfully deployed Colonel Victor Bleasdale's 29th Marines to take control of the Yontan airfield and other rear areas. To the south, Del Valle's units moved toward the eastern shore of Okinawa, with the 1st Marines occupying the Katchin Peninsula without facing any resistance, while the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments secured the coastline in their designated zones. Further south, after splitting the island in two, Hodge began advancing toward Naha, targeting the hill mass stretching from Urasoe-Mura to Hill 178 and Ouki. In response, General Bradley positioned Colonel Macey Dill's 382nd Regiment in front of Nodake, while the 184th Regiment moved through the 381st in the Attaniya-Unjo area. For the initial push toward the Uchitomari-Tsuwa line, the 383rd Regiment advanced quickly from Isa to Mashiki, where they were ultimately halted by heavy fire from the south. The 382nd advanced over two miles south from Nodake along the eastern boundary of the division, while Arnold's forward units lagged about two miles behind due to moderate resistance at a high, wooded ridge parallel to the coastline just west of Kuba. Meanwhile, at sea, Ugaki launched only sporadic kamikaze attacks, which resulted in damage to the destroyer Wilson near the Kerama Islands. Additionally, two American vessels collided while Task Force 58 targeted Okinawa, and later that night, a suicide boat attacked and sank an LCI gunboat. In the Attaniya-Unjo area, the 383rd Regiment made a swift advance from Isa to Mashiki as part of the initial push towards the Uchitomari-Tsuwa line. However, the following day marked the onset of fierce resistance on Okinawa, with the 383rd Regiment struggling to make headway against the formidable Japanese defenses on Cactus Ridge. Meanwhile, the 382nd Regiment continued its advance southward against a series of fortified positions, achieving gains of approximately 400 yards to the east and 900 yards to the west. The 184th Regiment moved through Arakachi but was halted by intense and precise fire from a rocky outcrop located about 1,000 yards southwest. The 32nd Regiment finally managed to capture Castle Hill before pushing more than two miles along the coast to a point east of Ukuma. To the north, while the 1st Marine Division shifted to a primarily defensive posture, the 6th Marine Division conducted active reconnaissance toward the Motobu Peninsula, advancing the front to the Atsutabaru-Chima line. Additionally, a patrol from the 1st Marines on the Katchin Peninsula crossed the reef to seize Yabuchi Island swiftly. At sea, there were no kamikaze attacks that day as Ugaki and Toyoda prepared to launch the main phase of Operation Ten-Go, although an Okinawa shore battery managed to hit the battleship Nevada. Unbeknownst to the Japanese, American intelligence had successfully intercepted Combined Fleet codes, allowing them to anticipate the details of the surface Ten-Ichi-Go attack. Consequently, Spruance's warships were prepared for the imminent departure of Ito's “Surface Special Attack Force,” which was executed a few hours later. Additionally, Ushijima was instructed to initiate a strong counterattack the following day to coincide with Ten-Ichi-Go and the first Kikisui attack, but he firmly rejected this order and called for the cancellation of the unnecessarily suicidal surface attack. During the night, as Admiral Blandy's minesweepers completed the perilous task of clearing the vast areas of Chimu and Nakagusuku Bays, the Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed on the northern coast of Tsugen Island to gather intelligence on enemy positions. Upon their arrival in the early hours of April 6, they encountered machine-gun and mortar fire, which ultimately compelled the battalion to retreat to the beach and reembark. Simultaneously, the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments advanced through the 22nd Marine Regiment, with the 29th Marines moving up the west coast in formation and reaching Chuda by noon, while the 4th Marines progressed along the eastern coastal road, successfully advancing seven miles toward Madaira. Further south, the 383rd Regiment continued its assault on the fortified enemy positions at Cactus Ridge, pushing forward relentlessly until they secured the western half by nightfall. The 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, made frontal assaults through intense mortar fire to gain the ridge. "We figured," S/Sgt. Francis M. Rall later wrote, "that the way to get out of that knee mortar fire was to get to where it was coming from. So we stood up in waves, firing everything we had and throwing hand grenades by the dozen, and charged the Jap position." By such tactics the 2d Battalion gained the western half of Cactus.  Over the next two days, the 382nd Regiment advanced slowly east of the Ginowan road, facing fierce resistance from the Tombstone and Nishibaru Ridges. After a 10-minute artillery bombardment, two companies of the 1st Battalion, 184th Regiment climbed nearly to the summit of the Pinnacle but were ultimately pushed back by strong resistance from caves and underground strongholds. Undeterred, Company B continued frontal assaults while Company C maneuvered up the western approaches to surprise the determined defenders. This strategy proved effective, with Company C reaching the top without sustaining any casualties and then methodically eliminating the remaining Japanese troops using white phosphorus grenades and flamethrowers. As the Pinnacle was being captured, the 32nd Regiment advanced across the coastal flatlands with minimal resistance to maintain contact with the 184th Regiment. On this day, Task Force 58 returned to sea, launching strikes on Okinawa and the Daito Islands, while Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57 targeted the Ishigaki and Miyako Islands. Meanwhile, Japanese aerial reconnaissance identified two American carrier groups near Okinawa, prompting Ugaki to initiate his first mass Kikisui attack, sending hundreds of Japanese aircraft to assault Mitscher's carriers. US carriers unleashed a combined 19 USN and four USMC squadrons to blunt the onslaught. Swirling, running dogfights developed around noon and lasted through sunset. April 6 may have started slow, but by evening it had developed into one of the greatest aerial confrontations of all time. American CAPs overwhelmingly massacred the poorly trained Japanese attackers; Mitscher's Task Force 58 fighters claimed 249 Japanese planes for just two lost—a staggering 125-to-1 kill ratio. Yet the kamikaze pilots' grim determination was chillingly apparent. According to VF-82's action report: “Of all the enemy planes encountered, not one returned fire, all remained on course, boring in toward the surface vessels. The only evasive action offered was jinking, and the majority of the aircraft were obsolete models as can be seen by the list [of] destroyed. Primary danger to our pilots was collision or getting in the path of a friendly plane's fire.” Essex's VF-83 (36 Hellcats) and VBF-83 (36 Corsairs) combined for 69 kills, while Belleau Wood's 24 VF-30 Hellcats shot down 47. Belleau Wood's skipper, Captain Red Tomlinson, duly signaled Task Group 58.1's Rear Admiral Joseph J. Jocko Clark: “Does this exceed the bag limit?” Clark responded, “Negative. There is no limit. This is open season. Well done.” The US carrier fighters' 275 kills was thus the war's 4th-highest 1-day total. 13 US pilots achieved ace status (scored their 5th kill) on April 6, with 4 becoming “ace-in-a-day.” 10 pilots claimed 4 kills, while another 17 shot down 3 each. Combined with anti-aircraft fire, the Americans destroyed 355 Japanese planes. However, even significant aerial victories could not prevent the devastating kamikaze assaults, with approximately 182 Japanese aircraft in 22 groups attacking Spruance's 5th Fleet that afternoon. This led to 24 kamikaze planes sinking the destroyers Bush and Colhoun, as well as three transport ships, and inflicting further damage on the light carrier San Jacinto, 12 destroyers, three destroyer minesweepers, and one minesweeper. Friendly anti-aircraft fire also caused damage to battleship North Carolina, light cruiser Pasadena, and destroyer Hutchins. Despite the extensive damage, four new escort carriers arrived off Okinawa that day, bringing the first 222 fighters of Major-General Francis Mulcahy's Tactical Air Force, stationed at Yontan airfield. Meanwhile, the Yamato force set sail at 15:24 towards Okinawa, but within 45 minutes, a B-29 spotted them in transit. Submarine Threadfin then detected Ito's strike force moving through the Bungo Strait at 17:45. As Ito's force rounded Kyushu to the southwest, it was monitored overnight by submarine Hackleback, which sent four additional contact reports and was pursued three times briefly by one of Yamato's escorting destroyers. Concerned about a potential mass Kikisui attack on April 7, Spruance ordered Mitscher's carriers to concentrate on thwarting Japanese air assaults while tasking Admiral Deyo's Task Force 54 with intercepting Ito's strike force. At 06:20, April 7, six Zeros of the 203rd Kokutai arrived over Yamato as CAP. 14 total Zeros would relay in small groups over the Yamato task force, but all would depart as scheduled by 10:00. The Americans already knew the exact CAP schedule of Yamato's fighters, a later US intelligence memo dryly observing, “They left too soon.” At 08:32, an Essex Hellcat reported the Yamato task force southwest of Koshiki Retto at a heading of 300 degrees. The Yamato group was doing 22kts and deployed in a diamond formation, with Yamato in the center and Yahagi astern. Yamato simultaneously reported that she had been sighted. Visibility was highly variable, with patchy overcast. Within minutes, two VPB-21 PBM-3 Mariner flying boats (based at Kerama Retto with seaplane tender Chandeleur) arrived and began shadowing Yamato and radioing situation reports. Meanwhile, Mitscher duly reported the Yamato sighting to Spruance, before dispatching 16 additional fighters at 09:15 to track Yamato. Shortly after Yamato's CAP had departed, at 10:14, the Japanese discovered the two shadowing PBM-3 Mariners, and simultaneously reported a US submarine stalking the task force—this was Hackleback, which had managed to catch back up with the zig-zagging Japanese. Three minutes later, at 10:17, Yamato turned towards the Mariners and opened fire with her awesome 18.1in. Sanshikidan anti-aircraft shells. Yahagi also opened fire, and additionally began jamming the Mariners' transmissions. The Mariners retreated into the clouds unharmed at 10:18, and Yamato and Yahagi ceased fire. To his chief-of-staff, Commodore Arleigh Burke, Mitscher announced: “Inform Admiral Spruance that I propose to strike the Yamato sortie group at 1200hrs unless otherwise directed.” The grizzled aviator desperately wished to sink Yamato, but he likely suspected that Spruance, riding New Mexico, intended his beloved dreadnoughts claim one last moment of glory. “Will you take them or shall I?” Mitscher pressed. Spruance's response: “You take them.” At 10:00, the carriers of Task Groups 58.1 and 58.3 launched the first wave of 282 aircraft, although only 227 managed to locate Ito's strike force as they navigated through challenging, overcast weather. At 11:07, Yamato's radars detected the large formation approaching from 63 nautical miles away, prompting Ito to increase speed to 25 knots. Within eight minutes, the formation closed to 44 nautical miles, leading the Japanese to initiate sharp evasive maneuvers. Bennington's Lieutenant-Commander Hugh Woods' airborne radar detected the Yamato task force some 25nm away from its predicted location, and the US strike altered course. Five minutes later, the Americans made visual contact through a hole in the patchy 3,000ft overcast, a Hornet pilot recalling, “Yamato looked like the Empire State Building plowing through the water.” Yamato cruised in the center, flanked by destroyers Kasumi, Suzutsuki, Hamakaze, and Yukikaze. Light cruiser Yahagi was in the van, followed by destroyers Hatsushimo, Isokaze, and Fuyutsuki. The first American aviators encountered the destroyer Asashimo, which had been experiencing machinery issues for five hours and had fallen 12 nautical miles behind the main task force to the north. San Jacinto's seven Hellcats dove against Asashimo, but the crippled destroyer threw up notably heavy flak. The Hellcats' 1,000lb bombs closely straddled Asashimo, buckling the destroyer's hull plating. The Hellcats then repeatedly strafed the destroyer, causing large fires that quickly silenced Asashimo's guns. San Jacinto's eight Avengers then made a textbook attack run at 300ft, dropping torpedoes from 1,200 to 1,600yds range. Trailing a wide oil slick, the crippled Asashimo attempted to comb the torpedoes, but one struck beneath her bridge and a second hit near her engine room. Successive explosions blew Asashimo partly out of the water and broke her in half. Asashimo sank at 1213hrs, going down with all 330 men. She had lasted three minutes against San Jacinto's attack. Twelve miles ahead, Yamato lookouts spotted the incoming aircraft at 12:32, which then spent the next five minutes circling just outside the range of Japanese anti-aircraft fire to coordinate their strike plan. Around this time, Yamato also raised Togo's iconic Tsushima flag signal: “On this one battle rests the fate of our nation. Let every man do his utmost.”At 12:37, the circling planes launched their coordinated assault on Yamato and her escorts, focusing on the superbattleship's port side in an attempt to capsize her. US fighters repeatedly strafed Yamato with their 5in. rockets and 0.50cal. machine guns, decimating Japanese antiaircraft batteries and slaughtering exposed antiaircraft crews. The intense carnage and chaos that followed suppressed careful targeting and further ravaged Japanese gunners' morale. Yamato was maneuvering hard at her flank speed of 27kts, when at 1240hrs four Bennington Helldivers from VB-82 delivered two 1,000lb bombs near Yamato's mainmast. The first bomb exploded in Yamato's crew quarters. The second detonated near Yamato's aft command station and caused serious damage, destroying one of Yamato's two air search radars, her after secondary gun director, and several 25mm antiaircraft guns. The subsequent fires shortly reached the powder handling area beneath Yamato's after 6.1in. turret and detonated the readyuse propellant. The resulting conflagration virtually exterminated the 6.1in. turret crew, but flash doors prevented the explosion from reaching the rest of the magazine. Nevertheless, the explosion killed the area's entire damage control party, meaning the resulting fire would rage uncontrolled for the rest of the battle. The Americans lost one Helldiver. At 1243hrs, eight Hornet Avengers launched torpedo attacks against Yamato's port side, covered by 14 Bunker Hill Corsairs strafing Yamato with rockets. Antiaircraft fire hit six Avengers, destroying one, but at least three torpedoes hit the water. The first two torpedoes missed, but at 1245hrs the third torpedo slammed into Yamato's port side, opening her hull to 2,235 tons of seawater. Japanese damage control counterflooded with 604 tons of water to correct the list. Attempting to draw US attackers from Yamato, Hara's light cruiser Yahagi had maneuvered away from the Japanese battleship, steaming hard at 35kts. US strafing had already ricocheted machine gun bullets around Yahagi's bridge, killing a lookout. Watching the attack unfold, Hara admitted, “The spectacle was at once thrilling and terrifying.” Meanwhile, Bennington's Lieutenant-Commander Ed De Garmo led three Avengers against Yahagi. At 1246hrs, De Garmo's Avengers delivered Yahagi her first hit and it was a devastating one. A single torpedo struck Yahagi in the engine room, killing the entire engineering crew. Yahagi was left dead in the water nine minutes into the battle. Destroyer Isokaze subsequently sped towards Yahagi to take off Rear Admiral Komura. Meanwhile, around 56 aircraft targeted Yamato's escorting destroyers, leading to multiple torpedo hits that split Hamakaze in two; Isokaze was bombarded with bombs; Fuyutsuki suffered minor damage from two dud rockets; and Suzutsuki was struck by a bomb that severed her bow. The first wave of attacks concluded at 12:50, as Ito sought to reorganize his forces and evaluate Yahagi's status. Shortly after 13:00, a second wave of 50 aircraft appeared, managing to hit Yamato's port bow with a bomb at 13:23 and inflicting several bomb hits near the battleship's bridge. Additionally, two bomb hits and several near misses critically damaged the destroyer Kasumi, leaving her dead in the water and ablaze. At 1333 the third wave of US attackers arrived, comprising 110 new Yorktown, Intrepid, and Langley aircraft from the delayed TG-58.4 strike. The Americans now overwhelmingly focused on the reeling Yamato. Twenty Avengers attacked Yamato's portside. Around 1337, the third wave saw three confirmed torpedo hits on Yamato's portside, plus a fourth probable hit, increasing her portside list to 15–16 degrees. Stationed on Yamato's bridge, Ensign Mitsuru Yoshida recalled, “I could hear the Captain vainly shouting, ‘Hold on men! Hold on men!'”. Aruga had no option but to flood Yamato's starboard machinery spaces, where hundreds of engineers toiled to keep Yamato underway. Water, both from torpedo hits and the flood valves rushed into these compartments and snuffed out the lives of the men at their posts, several hundred in all. Caught between cold sea water and steam and boiling water from the damaged boilers, they simply melted away.” Aruga's drastic measure reduced Yamato's portside list back to five degrees, but exhausted her last starboard counterflooding capacity. Having lost one shaft and gained 3,000 tons more water, Yamato's speed fell to 12kts. At 1342hrs, TG-58.4 Avengers dropped another four torpedoes. Yoshida marveled, “That these pilots repeated their attacks with such accuracy and coolness, was a sheer display of the unfathomable, undreamed-of strength of our foes!” Yamato shot down one Avenger, but two torpedoes plowed into Yamato's portside, making five torpedo hits in five minutes. The Americans had intentionally targeted Yamato's stern to wreck her steering, and the gamble paid off. Yamato's rudders were now disabled, jamming her in a permanent starboard turn. Any chance of reaching Okinawa was gone. Reduced to a speed of 8 knots and unable to maneuver, the stricken Yamato became an easy target. Around 14:02, Mitscher's relentless carrier planes inflicted at least four more bomb hits, disabling most of Yamato's remaining operational anti-aircraft guns as the battleship helplessly circled. As a result, Ito canceled the Ten-Ichi-Go attack and promptly ordered all his warships to rescue survivors and attempt to retreat to Japan. The sinking battleship was then deserted, except for Ito and Captain Aruga Kosaku, who chose to go down with their ship.  Throughout the battle, a stoic Ito had sat silently with arms crossed on Yamato's bridge, unflinching as bullets ricocheted around him, slaughtering his staff. Ensing Yoshida Mitsuru now observed that Ito “struggled to his feet. His chief of staff then arose and saluted. A prolonged silence followed during which they regarded each other solemnly.” Ito then told his staff, “Save yourselves. I shall stay with the ship.” Ito then shook hands deliberately with his officers, retired to his sea cabin one deck below, and locked it behind him. Meanwhile, with Yamato's pumps no longer functioning, alarms began to blare: temperatures in the 18.1-inch magazines were approaching dangerous levels. By 14:20, the capsizing Yamato's main deck was vertical to the ocean. Captain Aruga, eating a biscuit given to him by a rating, tied himself to a binnacle on Yamato's bridge. As Yamato capsized, surviving men clambered across her keel, a crazed, half-naked officer screaming and brandishing his samurai sword at the Americans.  Meanwhile, the Americans continued pummeling the helpless Yahagi, which “quivered and rocked as if made of paper,” recalled Captain Hara. The stricken Yahagi suffered repeated hits. “My proud cruiser,” Hara brooded, “was but a mass of junk, barely afloat.” Around 1400hrs Yahagi took the decisive torpedo hit, triggering a clearly fatal starboard roll. Hara finally ordered, “Abandon ship.” At 1405hrs, one minute after receiving her last bomb, Yahagi capsized and sank, having somehow absorbed at least 12 bombs and seven torpedoes. Captain Hara and Rear Admiral Komura calmly stepped into the water as Yahagi sank from beneath them, only barely surviving the sinking Yahagi's undertow. Now clinging to floating wreckage, the exhausted Hara observed “scores of planes swarming about [Yamato] like gnats.” By 14:20, the capsizing Yamato's main deck was vertical to the ocean, and three minutes later, the sinking dreadnought exploded catastrophically before finally disappearing beneath the East China Sea. Yamato's capsizing motion had likely forced open her 18.1in. powder room doors, allowing fires into the battleship's magazines. An American gunner described the explosion as “the prettiest sight I've ever seen … A red column of fire shot up through the clouds and when it faded Yamato was gone.” The detonation killed most Yamato survivors still struggling in the water and may have destroyed several US aircraft. The Americans' exact score will never be known, but Yamato had certainly absorbed seven bombs and nine to twelve torpedoes out of 150 torpedoes dropped. The US planes departed at 1443, but not before issuing “a few farewell strafing runs across the Yamato survivors.” Destroyers Suzutsuki, Fuyuzuki, Yukikaze, and Hatsushimo rescued 1,620 men, including Hara and Komura, before successfully returning to Japan. Additionally, the disabled destroyers Isokaze and Kasumi were scuttled by Yukikaze and Fuyuzuki, respectively. By the end of the action, the combined losses for Ten-Ichi-Go totaled 4,242 Japanese lives. Meanwhile, Ugaki had launched a second mass kamikaze attack around noon, sending 132 aircraft towards Task Force 58. Although Mitscher's fighters shot down 54 attackers, the kamikazes managed to damage the fast carrier Hancock, the battleship Maryland, the destroyers Bennett and Wesson, and a motor minesweeper. The initial Kikisui operation resulted in the deaths of 485 Americans and left 582 wounded. The significant losses over the two days hindered Ugaki from launching another large-scale Kikisui attack for five days. Meanwhile, back in Okinawa on April 7 and 8, Hodge continued his offensive in the south. In Bradley's sector, the 383rd Regiment persistently executed banzai charges against the remaining enemy strongholds on Cactus Ridge until the entire area was secured by American forces. They then advanced toward Kakazu Ridge, where they faced even stronger resistance. The 382nd Regiment made a slow but steady push forward, ultimately being halted by intense fire across a broad front just north of Kaniku and Tombstone Ridge.  The fighting in the 7th Division's sector on April 7 centered on a low, bare hill 1000 yards west of the town of Minami-Uebaru, called Red Hill because of its color. The enemy had made a fortress of the hill by constructing his usual system of caves and connecting trenches. A frontal assault on Red Hill by troops of the 3rd Battalion failed in the face of machine-gun and mortar fire. In a 2nd attempt, 3 platoons of tanks supported the attack. 10 medium and 5 light tanks advanced through a cut toward Red Hill; 2 tanks were blown up by mines and 1 was satchel-charged as the column moved toward the hill and up the sides. Intense enemy artillery and machine-gun fire drove the infantry back and disabled more tanks. Japanese swarmed in among the armor and tried to destroy the tanks with satchel charges and flaming rags. 2 medium tanks held off the attackers, the defending crews resorting to hand grenades, while the rest of the operative tanks withdrew. The 14th Independent Battalion headquarters proudly described this action as a perfect example of how to separate troops from tanks and thus break up the American infantry-tank team. The enemy dispatch stated: "The above method of isolating the troops from the tanks with surprise fire followed by close combat tactics is an example in the complete destruction of enemy tanks and will be a great factor in deciding the victories of tank warfare." After these 2 reversals the 3rd Battalion made a wide enveloping maneuver to the right. Behind fire from artillery and supporting weapons, the troops drove toward Red Hill from the west and occupied it, suffering only 2 casualties in the move. Once more a Japanese outpost had shown its strength against a frontal attack and its vulnerability to a flanking maneuver. The capture of Red Hill left another sector of enemy territory open for the taking. The troops advanced 100 yards south before digging in. A platoon of tanks conducted a remarkable 4000-yard foray almost to Hill 178 and withdrew safely, despite a bombing attack by two single-engined Japanese planes. The following day, the 184th continued its advance southward under heavy fire, managing to take Triangulation Hill after two fierce assaults. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment captured Tsuwa as it extended the front along the coastline. By the night of April 8, the 24th Corps had sustained 1,510 battle casualties while inflicting 4,489 Japanese fatalities and capturing 13; they had finally reached the formidable perimeter of the Shuri fortified zone. Looking north, on April 7, the Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed on Ike Island, encountering no opposition. Subsequently, Company B was dispatched to secure Takabanare Island, while Company A took control of Heanza and Hamahika Islands. During the night, Company B reembarked, maneuvered around Tsugen Island, and landed on Kutaka Island, where they also found no enemy presence. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment captured Tsuwa as it expanded the front along the coastline. By the evening of April 8, the 24th Corps had incurred 1,510 battle casualties. On the same day, Shepherd advanced north with minimal resistance, as the 29th Marines successfully reached Nago while the 4th Marines moved through Henoko. Ahead of the division, the 6th Reconnaissance Company traveled up the west coast road to the village of Awa and then crossed the base of the Motobu Peninsula to Nakaoshi, encountering and either destroying or scattering several enemy groups along the way. As the reconnaissance zone was extended westward on April 8, clear signs, confirmed by aerial observations and photographs, indicated that the enemy had chosen the rugged mountains of Motobu as their defensive position. As a result, the 22nd Marines were deployed across the island from Nakaoshi to Ora to protect the right flank and rear of the 29th Marines attacking westward, while the 4th Marines assembled near Ora to support either the 29th on Motobu or the 22nd in the north. The 2nd Battalion, 29th Marines probed westward, moving across the base of Motobu and occupying the village of Gagusuku. Additionally, the reserve 1st Battalion at Yofuke successfully secured Yamadadobaru and Narashido, facing heavy enemy machine-gun and rifle fire at the latter location. The following day, the 29th Marines advanced in three columns to locate the enemy's main force at Motobu; all columns encountered resistance, revealing that a significant enemy force confronted the division in the area stretching from Itomi to Toguchi. On April 10, the 2nd Battalion, 29th Marines captured Unten Ko, where the Japanese had established a submarine and torpedo boat base; the 3rd Battalion took Toguchi and sent patrols into the interior, while the 1st Battalion advanced through Itomi and uncovered well-fortified positions on the high ground north of the village. On April 9, the 184th Regiment successfully captured Tomb Hill in the south following an artillery and air bombardment, while the 32nd Regiment took control of several finger ridges to the east that oversaw the approaches to Ouki. The Japanese-held area in front of the 383rd Regiment offered the enemy an ideal combination of defensive features. A deep moat, a hill studded with natural and man-made positions, a cluster of thick-walled buildings behind the hill; these were the basic elements of Kakazu stronghold. The enemy had exploited each one of them. Moreover, Kakazu, unlike such outposts as the Pinnacle, was an integral element of the Shuri fortified zone and a vital rampart that could expect reinforcements and heavy fire support from within the ring of positions that surrounded the 32nd Army headquarters, only 4000 yards to the south. Between the Americans and Kakazu lay a deep gorge, half hidden by trees and brush, which could be crossed only with difficulty. The Kakazu hill mass itself, which was made up of two hills connected by a saddle, stretched northwest-southeast for 2000 yards, sloping on the west toward the coastal flat and ending on the east at Highway 5. Just below Kakazu Ridge on the southeast was the town of Kakazu, a compact group of tile-roofed structures, each surrounded by hedges and stone walls and somewhat in defilade to the adjoining open fields. In and around the Kakazu hills the Japanese had created one of their strongest positions on Okinawa. Mortars dug in on the reverse slope were zeroed-in on the gorge and on vulnerable areas between the gorge and the crest of Kakazu. Several spigot mortars also protected the hill. In an intricate system of coordinated pillboxes, tunnels, and caves Japanese machine-guns were sited to cover all avenues of approach. The enemy was also supported by many artillery pieces within the Shuri fortified zone. The heavy walls and the hedges of the town of Kakazu-and eventually its rubble-afforded the Japanese countless defensive positions. Concurrently, the 383rd Regiment initiated its first coordinated assault on Kakazu Ridge, with Companies A, C, and L swiftly reaching the summit by dawn without detection. However, the surprised defenders quickly launched a fierce counterattack, ultimately forcing Companies A and C to withdraw. Company L, positioned on Kakazu West, continued to fend off enemy counterattacks alone until late afternoon when the exhausted unit had no choice but to retreat. The next day, Brigadier-General Claudius Easley proposed a "powerhouse attack," where the 381st Regiment would assault Kakazu West from positions south of Uchitomari while the 383rd would press on Kakazu Ridge from positions north of the gorge. Following a heavy artillery bombardment, the assault commenced, with the 2nd Battalion of the 381st Regiment rapidly fighting through strong enemy defenses to secure the crest of Kakazu West. However, the 383rd was struggling to make headway, prompting Colonel May to direct his two battalions to execute flanking maneuvers. Although the eastern encirclement was unsuccessful, May's 3rd Battalion managed to cross the gorge at the northern base of Kakazu West to join Colonel Halloran's 2nd Battalion on the crest. Both units then attempted to advance eastward in heavy rain, but relentless Japanese counterattacks forced them back to Kakazu West. Stalemated, Easley eventually ordered Halloran's 1st Battalion to move through May's 3rd Battalion to attack southeast along Kakazu Ridge, but this assault was also repelled by the determined defenders. At the same time, the 382nd Regiment launched its primary assault on Tombstone Ridge, advancing southwest with three battalions in formation but managing to gain only a few hundred yards to the west as fierce defenders thwarted their main offensives against the hills held by the Japanese. Meanwhile, to the east, the 32nd Regiment attempted to advance into the town of Ouki without success, while the 184th Regiment on the heights defended against minor counterattacks, sealed off caves, and solidified their positions. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Okinawa is really heating up, showcasing to the Americans they would be paying dearly for every foot they took off the island. Meanwhile the last stand of the super battleship Yamato would form a legend encompassing the defiant spirit of Japan as well as producing one of the most bizarre science fiction animes of all time.

Last time we spoke about the Visayas Offensive. In March 1945, the Pacific War raged on. On Iwo Jima, the US Marines, after intense fighting and heavy casualties, declared the island secured. Meanwhile, in northern Luzon, General Clarkson's division advanced towards Baguio, facing fierce Japanese resistance, while General Mullins pushed through Balete Pass. The Japanese army, grappling with severe supply shortages, was forced to evacuate Baguio. In the Visayas, General Eichelberger's forces targeted the Sulu Archipelago and Central Visayan Islands, securing key airfields. The 40th Division landed on Panay, capturing Iloilo, and launched an assault on northern Negros. On Cebu, the Americal Division landed near Talisay, encountering mines but minimal resistance, and secured Cebu City. By April, Allied forces had made strategic advances across the Philippines, overcoming Japanese resistance and establishing crucial airfields. This episode is the Invasion of okinawa Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We have come to the grand final battlefield at last, that of Okinawa. Of course battles are raging in all sorts of other theaters like New Guinea, China, Burma, etc. However as you might imagine its becoming impossible given the week by week format to cover all of this in single episodes. So we are going to hardcore focus on Okinawa for awhile, we will circle back to the other theaters to catch up. Seriously it was the only logical way to do this and honestly in retrospect I wish the entire podcast was campaign by campaign instead of week by week. But I am a mere podcaster following the youtube series of this. But if you want to hear a campaign by campaign series, over at Echoes of War me and my cohost Gaurav are beginning to roll them out. The first series will be the entire Malayan Campaign, and I think after that I might try to do the Philippines. Regardless lets jump into the invasion of Okinawa. As previously noted, the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 3 designated Okinawa as the final target for invasion, following the establishment of air and naval bases in Luzon and Iwo Jima. Capturing this crucial island would bring the conflict to Japan's doorstep, disrupt the enemy's air communications through the Ryukyu Islands, and flank their maritime routes to the south. Consequently, from these newly established air and naval bases in the Ryukyus, American forces would be able to launch attacks on Japan's main islands and implement a more rigorous sea and air blockade, isolating them from Japanese territories to the south. This made it imperative for the Japanese Empire to maintain control over Okinawa and the Ryukyus. To this end, the 32nd Army, led by Lieutenant-General Watanabe Masao, was formed there by late March 1944. Initially, it comprised four companies and one artillery regiment stationed at Amami Oshima; five companies and one artillery regiment at Nakagusuku Bay; four companies and one artillery regiment at Iriomote Island; along with various garrison units from the 19th Air District in Okinawa.  Under Operation Tei-Go, the Ryukyus and Formosa were to form a long zone of interprotective air bases. These bases were expected to defeat any American sea or air forces sent into the region. To avoid destruction from the air, each base was to consist of a cluster of airfields, such that if one were damaged others could be used immediately. Military and civilian crews were promptly set to work building the numerous fields. 13 base clusters had to be created, stretching in a line from Tachiarai in the northern Ryukyus to Pingting on Formosa in the south. The only remaining tasks for ground forces were the defense of these facilities and their support anchorages and the unenviable work of building the fields. Much of the energy of 32nd Army would be absorbed building these air facilities. This was more difficult since 32nd Army had only two bulldozers and one earth roller. Japan had produced dozers in small numbers at its Komatsu plant since 1943, but few had reached the front. Since soldiers were thus obliged to use shovels, hoes, straw baskets, and horse-drawn wagons, construction was slow. Moreover, because of enemy submarine raiders, it was impossible for the Japanese to deliver the large quantities of fuel, ammunition, and anti-aircraft guns needed to operate the bases. Even more seriously, the planes themselves were not available. Between April and June, the 32nd Army received reinforcements, including the 44th and 45th Independent Mixed Brigades, the 21st Independent Mixed Regiment, and the 27th Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, among other air garrison units. From these forces, Watanabe chose to send the 45th Brigade to establish bases on Miyako Island and Ishigaki Island, while the 21st Regiment was tasked with setting up a base on Tokunoshima. On June 27, the 1st and 2nd Infantry Corps (approx. 4100 men) boarded the Toyama Maru and began the voyage to Okinawa. The 44th Brigade HQ, Artillery and Engineer Units meanwhile boarded other vessels of the Taka-412 convoy. Two days later, while the convoy was sailing east of Tokunoshima, the submarine Sturgeon successfully sank the Toyama Maru with two torpedoes, therefore inflicting the loss of 3724 men and much heavy equipment. Because of this, the 1st Corps had to be deactivated.  Following the fall of Saipan, the Japanese Empire rapidly deployed significant ground forces to the 32nd Army, including the 9th, 24th, 28th, and 62nd Divisions, as well as the 59th, 60th, and 64th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 27th Tank Regiment. Additionally, the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment was airlifted to bolster the beleaguered 44th Brigade, which was reorganizing its 2nd Corps with local recruits. The 32nd Army Staff wished to use as much of the indigenous population as it could in direct support of the war effort, so on January 1 1945 it ordered total mobilization. All Okinawan males aged 18 to 45 were obliged to enter the Japanese service. 39000 were drafted, of whom 15000 were used as nonuniformed laborers and 24000 as rear-echelon troops called the Home Guard (Boeitai). Many of the Boeitai replaced sea based battalions and rear-area supply units that had been reorganized and equipped for frontline duty. In addition to these, 1500 of the senior boys of the middle schools on Okinawa were organized into Iron and Blood Volunteer Units and assigned to frontline duty. Some of these students had been tried out in the signal service in the autumn of 1944 with good results, so the program was expanded. Since the fall of 1944, 600 senior students of the girls' middle schools also had been given training in the medical service. While most of these troops were sent to strengthen the main defenses at Okinawa, a large portion of the 28th Division was actually assigned to reinforce the garrisons on the Miyako and Yaeyama Islands. The 36th Regiment was dispatched to support the Daito Islands, the entire 45th Brigade was moved to garrison Ishigaki and the rest of the Yaeyamas, the 59th Brigade was tasked with defending Irabu Island, the 60th Brigade was sent to reinforce Miyako Island, and the 64th Brigade was deployed to the Amami Islands. On August 9, Lieutenant-General Ushijima Mitsuru took command of the 32nd Army. His initial strategy was to occupy all of Okinawa with a strong force and eliminate any invading troops at their landing sites. As fierce fighting began at Leyte, intensive training for the troops commenced, including divisional maneuvers at potential American landing points, artillery bombardments of beachheads, and nighttime assaults on bridges. However, on November 13, Tokyo decided to send the elite 9th Division to Formosa to prepare for a movement to the Philippines that ultimately did not occur. The unexpected withdrawal of the 32nd Army's best division disrupted Ushijima's operational plans. Ironically, this situation improved combat efficiency, as it compelled the army to achieve more with fewer resources. Ushijima chose to concentrate most of his forces in the mountainous and easily defensible Shimajiri area, located in the southern part of the island. This strategic location allowed the Japanese to maintain control over Naha port and target the northern airfields with artillery. Similar to the situation in Iwo Jima, this decision marked a departure from the previously favored strategy of a "decisive battle," opting instead for a war of attrition that had proven effective at Peleliu and Iwo Jima. As a result, Ushijima positioned Lieutenant-General Amamiya Tatsumi's reinforced 24th Division at the southern end of the island, Lieutenant-General Hongo Yoshio's reinforced 62nd Division along the central isthmus, Major-General Suzuki Shigeji's reinforced 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on the Hagushi plain, and Colonel Udo Takehiko's Kunigami Detachment, consisting of two battalions from the 2nd Corps, in northern Okinawa. These troop placements were successfully implemented in December; however, concerns arose that the 32nd Army was spread too thin to effectively counter the anticipated enemy invasion. Consequently, on January 15, Ushijima decided to move the 44th Brigade from the Hagushi plain southward to overlap with the 62nd Division's area on the east, significantly shortening the Japanese front. Additionally, one battalion from the Kunigami Detachment was sent to defend Iejima and its crucial airbase, which necessitated the rest of the unit to consolidate its positions and strengthen defenses on Yaedake Mountain in the Motobu Peninsula. Ushijima also had the support of the brigade-sized 5th Artillery Group, led by Lieutenant-General Wada Kosuke; the 21st Field Anti-Aircraft Artillery Corps; the 11th Shipping Group, which included several shipping engineer regiments and sea-raiding battalions; the 19th Air District overseeing various aviation service units; and Rear-Admiral Ota Minoru's Okinawa Naval Base Force, which comprised nearly 9,000 personnel stationed at the Oroku Naval Air Base near Naha. Ushijima had nearly 100,000 troops at his command, with 29,000 assigned to specialized units for anti-aircraft, sea-raiding, and airfield operations. Anticipating the nature of the impending conflict, these well-staffed service units were reorganized for ground combat. The 19th Air District transformed into the 1st Specially Established Regiment, responsible for defending the Yontan and Kadena airfields it had recently constructed and maintained. Most of the service personnel were integrated into the new 1st Specially Established Brigade in the Naha-Yonabaru area, while the sea-raiding base battalions became independent infantry units. Additionally, the remainder of the 11th Shipping Group was restructured into the 2nd Specially Established Brigade on the southwestern part of Okinawa. This reorganization, completed on March 21, bolstered ground combat strength by 14,000 men, leaving only 10,500 of the 67,000 Army personnel in specialized roles. To protect themselves, the Japanese began constructing robust fortifications, tunnels, and cave systems to shield against anticipated enemy bombardments.  Work on the caves was begun with great vigor. "Confidence in victory will be born from strong fortifications" was the soldiers' slogan. The caves meant personal shelter from the fierce bombardments that were sure to come, and they also offered a shimmering hope of victory. The combination was irresistible, and units began to work passionately on their own caves. Enthusiasm was essential because of the great toil it took to create the caves. Just as 32nd Army had only two bulldozers to make airfields, it had no mechanized tunneling equipment at all. Besides lacking cutting equipment, 32nd Army also lacked construction materials. It had no cement, no ironware, and no dynamite. The units had to rely entirely on wooden beams that they obtained themselves to shore up their shafts. This was not necessarily easy because there were no forests in the south of the island where the troops were now stationed. Pine forests were abundant in the mountainous north, however, so each unit was assigned its own lumbering district in the north. Several hundred men from each division were detailed as its lumbering squad. The problem remained, however, of how to move the several million logs that were needed over the 40 or so miles from the forests to the forts. With no railroads and the use of trucks limited by a shortage of gasoline, the solution was for each unit to cut its own logs, then transport them in small native boats called sabenis. The divisions acquired 70 of these, which then plied the waters steadily from north to south. In January 1945, however, the Leyte-based B-24s that began flying over daily for reconnaissance also began strafing the boats. So the waterborne delivery of logs had to be switched from day to night, greatly lowering efficiency. Ushijima aimed to prolong the fight from these positions and decided to destroy the indefensible Yontan and Kadena airfields to prevent their use by the enemy, effectively ending the ineffective air defense strategy initially devised by Tokyo. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were preparing for Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa. Given the expectation that the capture of Iwo Jima and recent air assaults on Japan would concentrate enemy air power around the Empire's core, which would respond aggressively to any attacks on Okinawa, the Americans needed to first neutralize or eliminate enemy air facilities in the Ryukyus, Kyushu, and Formosa to achieve air superiority over their objective. As a result, all available carrier-based and land-based air forces were tasked with this operation, including Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, General Kenney's Far East Air Forces, Admiral Hoover's Central Pacific Forward Area, and General Arnold's 20th Air Force. From the 20th Air Force, General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command was assigned to attack Okinawa before moving on to Kyushu and other vulnerable locations in the home islands. Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Roger Ramey's 20th Bomber Command, supported by General Chennault's 14th Air Force, focused on neutralizing Formosa. Aircraft from the Southwest Pacific Area were also set to conduct searches and continuous strikes against Formosa as soon as conditions on Luzon allowed. Additionally, the British carriers of Vice-Admiral Bernard Rawlings' Task Force 57 were tasked with neutralizing air installations on the Sakishima Group in the ten days leading up to the landings. Once air superiority was achieved, Spruance's 5th Fleet was to land Lieutenant-General Simon Buckner's 10th Army, which included Major-General John Hodge's 24th Corps and Major-General Roy Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps. The 24th Corps comprised the 7th and 96th Divisions, while the 3rd Amphibious Corps included the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions. As the Commanding General of Expeditionary Troops, Buckner also oversaw the 27th and 77th Divisions and the 2nd Marine Division for special operations and reserve purposes. Furthermore, the 81st Division was held in area reserve. In total, Buckner commanded a force of 183,000 troops, with 116,000 designated for the initial landings. The plan called for Major-General Andrew Bruce's 77th Division to first secure amphibious bases in the Kerama Islands on March 26, with one battalion further securing Keisejima five days later to establish a field artillery group there. On April 1, following a demonstration by the 2nd Marine Division in southern Okinawa, the main landings were set to take place. The 24th Corps and the 3rd Amphibious Corps would land simultaneously on the west coast beaches north and south of Hagushi. After landing, both corps were to quickly advance across the island, capturing the airfields in their designated areas before securing all of southern and central Okinawa. Subsequently, Buckner's forces were to invade and secure Iejima and northern Okinawa. Once this was achieved, there were tentative plans to launch an invasion of Kikaijima with the 1st Marine Division and Miyako Island with the 5th Amphibious Corps. For the invasion, Spruance relied on a Covering Force under his command, along with Admiral Turner's Joint Expeditionary Force. This force included Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force, which comprised minesweepers, UDTs, and escort carriers; Rear-Admiral Morton Deyo's Gunfire and Covering Force, consisting of ten battleships and eight heavy cruisers; Rear-Admiral Lawrence Reifsnider's Northern Attack Force, responsible for landing the 3rd Amphibious Corps; and Rear-Admiral John Hall's Southern Attack Force, tasked with landing the 24th Corps. Similar to Iwo Jima, Okinawa had endured multiple air attacks since October 1944 as part of the preliminary operations for the landings on Leyte, Luzon, and Iwo Jima that we previously discussed. These operations also included air strikes aimed at neutralizing Japanese air power on Formosa. Throughout February and March, Mitscher's carriers and LeMay's B-29s brought the conflict back to the Japanese home islands with a series of strikes that caused significant damage and instilled fear in the population. On March 1, Task Force 58 launched the first strike of the month against the Ryukyus, targeting Amami, Minami, Kume, Tokuno, and Okino, as well as Okinawa. This operation resulted in the destruction of 41 planes, the sinking of eleven vessels, damage to five others, and significant harm to island facilities. In between the main assaults on Japan, the superfortresses frequently targeted key sites in the Ryukyus, leading the beleaguered Japanese forces to refer to these missions as the "regular run." Throughout March, aircraft from the Southwest Pacific and the Marianas conducted nearly daily operations over the Ryukyus and surrounding waters, searching for Japanese shipping and contributing to the isolation of Okinawa by sinking cargo ships, luggers, and other vessels, while American submarines intensified the blockade around the Ryukyus. Meanwhile, after completing extensive training and rehearsals, Task Forces 51 and 55 gathered at Leyte, Task Force 53 assembled in the Guadalcanal-Russells area, and the rest of the 5th Fleet convened at Ulithi. On March 12, Reifsneider's convoy, carrying the 3rd Amphibious Corps, was the first to depart, successfully reaching Ulithi nine days later. On March 18, the tractor group transporting the 77th Division began its journey from Leyte to the Kerama Islands. On the same day, Mitscher's carriers targeted 45 airfields in Kyushu, claiming the destruction of 102 Japanese planes, damaging or destroying 275 on the ground, sinking six vessels, and damaging three more. In response, Admiral Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet launched a counterattack against the carriers Enterprise, Intrepid, and Yorktown, inflicting minor damage while losing 33 aircraft. The next morning, after locating the majority of the Combined Fleet at Kure, Mitscher dispatched 436 aircraft to target naval installations and shore facilities in the Inland Sea. At 06:50 three C6N Saiun “Myrt” recon planes discovered Task Force 58, and by 07:00 Captain Genda Minoru's elite, handpicked 343rd Kokutai had scrambled 63 advanced Kawasaki N1K2-J “George” Shiden-Kai fighters from Shikoku to intercept the Americans. Minutes later, Genda's powerful Shiden-Kais “waded into the Hellcats and Corsairs as if the clock had been turned back to 1942.” Soon the 343rd Kokutai was engaged in a wild maelstrom with 80 US fighters, including VF-17 and VBF-17 Hellcats from Hornet and VMF-112 Corsairs from Bennington. For once the Japanese broke about even, losing 24 fighters and one scout plane to the Americans' 14 fighters and 11 bombers. Nevertheless, Genda's expert but outnumbered 343rd Kokutai proved unable to blunt the American onslaught. Despite facing a formidable intercepting force, they managed to inflict damage on 18 Japanese warships, including the battleships Yamato, Ise, Hyuga, and Haruna, as well as six aircraft carriers. Additionally, one incomplete submarine was destroyed, 97 enemy planes were shot down, and 225 were either destroyed or damaged at Japanese airfields. In response, Ugaki launched a kamikaze counterattack that successfully struck the carriers Wasp and Franklin, causing significant damage and forcing Franklin to head to Pearl Harbor immediately. As Task Force 58 slowly withdrew the afternoon of March 20, a damaged Zero crashed destroyer Halsey Powell, killing 12 and wounding 29. Shortly afterwards friendly anti-aircraft fire started fires aboard Enterprise. At 23:00 eight Japanese torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked the carriers, while three overnight snoopers were splashed by anti-aircraft fire. Between March 17 and March 20 Ugaki had committed 193 aircraft to battle and lost 161. On March 21 Ugaki dispatched a 48-plane strike, including 16 G4M “Betty” bombers, carrying the very first Ohka (“Cherry Blossom”) suicide missiles. However the combat air patrol (CAP) of 150 Hellcats and Corsairs repulsed them. Franklin, Wasp, and Enterprise, all damaged, steamed to Ulithi as a reorganized Task Group 58.2. Except for April 8–17, when Task Group-58.2 was briefly reestablished, Task Force 58 strength would remain at three Task Groups throughout Iceberg's duration. Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet was meanwhile effectively incapacitated for several weeks, but Ugaki nevertheless reported five carriers, two battleships, and three cruisers sunk, which IGHQ found scarcely credible. Meanwhile, the Mine Flotilla departed Ulithi on March 19, followed two days later by the rest of Task Force 52 and Task Force 54 to support the Kerama operation. On March 23, to prepare for the imminent minesweeping operations of Iceberg, Task Force 58 conducted extensive bombing raids on all known installations in Okinawa, resulting in significant damage and the sinking of 24 vessels and damage to three others over the following five days. Furthermore, Admiral Lee's battleships traversed the cleared area and opened fire on Okinawa, sinking an additional two vessels. With this naval and air support, Blandy's minesweepers and UDTs successfully cleared the route for Rear-Admiral Ingolf Kiland's Western Islands Attack Group by nightfall on March 25. Their primary opposition in the following two days consisted of a series of kamikaze attacks, which caused damage to the battleship Nevada, light cruiser Biloxi, four destroyers, two destroyer minelayers, one minesweeper, and two transports, while the destroyer Halligan was sunk by mines. The next morning, supported by naval gunfire and carrier aircraft, Bruce initiated his first landings. The 3rd Battalion, 305th Regiment landed on the southern beaches of Aka Island, facing sporadic resistance. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 306th Regiment landed unopposed on Geruma Island, which was quickly secured. The 2nd Battalion, 306th Regiment achieved even faster success at Hokaji Island, while the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment invaded Zamami Island with light resistance. The 2nd Battalion, 307th Regiment encountered minor opposition as it took Yakabi Island. The Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion scouted Keisejima and found no enemy presence. After encountering some resistance, the units on Aka and Zamami pushed back the enemy garrisons, securing two-thirds of Aka by nightfall and successfully repelling a strong counterattack on Zamami that night. Simultaneously, Deyo's warships and Blandy's carriers began bombarding the demonstration beaches, while minesweepers cleared progressively larger areas around Okinawa, although the minesweeper Skylark was sunk by mines. By March 27, the remaining enemy forces on Aka and Zamami were finally eliminated, and a company took Amuro Island without opposition. Additionally, a company from the 307th moved to Kuba Island, which was quickly secured. At the same time, Bruce continued his main landings, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 306th Regiment landing on the west coast of Tokashiki Island, facing minimal opposition. As the two battalions advanced north along narrow trails toward Tokashiki town, the 3rd Battalion landed to secure the southern part of the island. On March 28, they reached the town, clearing the entire island and concluding the Kerama operation.  In Kerama, "Island Chain between Happiness and Good," the Japanese tradition of self-destruction emerged horribly in the last acts of soldiers and civilians trapped in the hills. Camping for the night of March 28 a mile from the north tip of Tokashiki, troops of the 306th heard explosions and screams of pain in the distance. In the morning they found a small valley littered with more than 150 dead and dying Japanese, most of them civilians. Fathers had systematically throttled each member of their families and then disemboweled themselves with knives or hand grenades. Under one blanket lay a father, two small children, a grandfather, and a grandmother, all strangled by cloth ropes. Soldiers and medics did what they could. The natives, who had been told that the invading "barbarians" would kill and rape, watched with amazement as the Americans provided food and medical care; an old man who had killed his daughter wept in bitter remorse. Only a minority of the Japanese, however, were suicides. Most civilians straggled into American positions, worn and dirty. In all, the 77th took 1,195 civilian and 121 military prisoners. This operation resulted in the deaths of 530 Japanese soldiers, 121 captured, and the neutralization of over 350 suicide boats, with American losses totaling 31 killed and 81 wounded. While this initial operation was underway, the tractor groups of the Southern and Northern Attack Forces left their staging areas in Luzon and Ulithi on March 25, followed by the rest of Spruance's fleet two days later. On March 26 and 27, Rawlings' Task Force 57 conducted a series of strikes on the Sakishima Islands, primarily targeting Miyako. Meanwhile, after a 250-plane raid on the Mitsubishi plant in Nagoya on March 24, LeMay sent 165 B-29s from the 73rd and 314th Bombardment Wings to attack the Kyushu airfields on March 27, facing minimal resistance as they caused significant damage to the Tachiarai Army Airfield, the Oita Naval Airfield, and the Omura aircraft plant. Other bombers from the 313th Bombardment Wing laid aerial mines in the Shimonoseki Strait. The Japanese responded with a raid on Spruance's naval units using aircraft and suicide boats on the night of March 28, resulting in one LCM being destroyed and one cargo ship damaged. On March 29, Mitscher launched another strike against Kyushu, but poor weather conditions led to only minor damage, with 12 vessels sunk and one damaged. By this point, the “largest assault sweep operation ever executed” had cleared the Hagushi beach approaches in 75 sweeps, with minesweepers clearing 3,000 square miles of coastal waters. The following morning, as Task Force 58 once again targeted Okinawa, Deyo's ten battleships and eleven cruisers advanced to bombard Okinawa's defenses and demolish coastal seawalls with increased intensity. At the same time, the 314th sent 12 planes to attack the Mitsubishi engine works in Nagoya overnight. The next day, LeMay dispatched 152 B-29s for his second assault on Kyushu, completely destroying the Tachiarai machine works and heavily damaging the Omura airstrip. On March 31, back in Okinawa, the final underwater demolition operation off the Hagushi beaches was underway while the 420th Field Artillery Group was successfully positioned on Keisejima, prompting a strong reaction from Ushijima's artillery. That morning, a Ki-43 fighter crashed into Admiral Spruance's flagship, the Indianapolis, resulting in the deaths of nine crew members and severely damaging a shaft, which ultimately compelled Spruance to transfer his flag to the battleship New Mexico. Meanwhile, the frogmen completed their last demolition operations at Hagushi, and the final preliminary bombardment of Okinawa and the Sakishima Islands was executed successfully. By the end of the month, over 13,000 large-caliber shells had been fired in the shore bombardment, and approximately 3,095 sorties had been conducted against the Ryukyus. However, effective Japanese concealment prevented significant damage to Ushijima's defenses. As night fell, a vast fleet of transports, cargo ships, landing craft, and warships navigated the final miles of their long journey, successfully meeting off the Hagushi beaches in the East China Sea before dawn on April 1. While Turner's forces prepared for the landing, a fire support group consisting of 10 battleships, 9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 177 gunboats began the pre-landing bombardment of the beaches at 05:30, firing a total of 44,825 rounds of shells, 33,000 rockets, and 22,500 mortar shells. In response, the Japanese launched some scattered kamikaze attacks on the convoys, successfully hitting the transport Hinsdale and LST 884. At 07:45, carrier planes from Task Force 58 and Blandy's carriers targeted the beaches and nearby trenches with napalm. Fifteen minutes later, the first wave of amphibious tanks advanced toward the shore at four knots, followed closely by five to seven waves of assault troops in amphibious tractors. Alongside the primary landings, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division staged a feigned landing on the southeast coast of Okinawa, near Minatoga, aiming to distract the enemy's reserves in that region. Meanwhile, on the main front, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats and artillery fire from Keisejima, a nearly continuous line of landing craft advanced toward the beaches at 08:20. Encountering no resistance, the first waves began to land on their designated beaches at 08:30, with additional troops following closely behind. Within an hour, Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps had successfully landed the assault elements of the 6th and 1st Marine Divisions north of the Bishi River, while Hodge's 24th Corps disembarked the 7th and 96th Divisions to the south of the river. The lack of significant opposition, coupled with the rapid disintegration of the untrained 5473 airfield service troops of the 1st Specially Established Regiment under heavy air and artillery bombardment, created a sense of foreboding among the men, prompting them to scout the area cautiously. As before, the enemy's primary response consisted of kamikaze attacks on naval units, resulting in damage to the battleships West Virginia and Tennessee, the British carrier Indefatigable, destroyers Prichett and Vammen, the British destroyer Ulster, the destroyer minelayer Adams, and four other vessels. Returning to Okinawa, after ensuring they were not walking into a trap, the troops began advancing inland while tanks and other support units were brought to the beaches. In the north, Major-General Lemuel Shepherd's 6th Marine Division deployed Colonel Merlin Schneider's 22nd Marines on the isolated Green Beaches and Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines on the Red Beaches near Yontan Airfield. The 4th Marines advanced toward Yontan, encountering only scattered resistance, and quickly secured the objective east of the airfield by 13:00. Meanwhile, Schneider's 3rd Battalion moved through Hanza without opposition, but the 2nd Battalion's progress was hindered as it needed to protect its exposed flank, prompting the 22nd Marines to quickly commit its reserve battalion to maintain their momentum. To the south, Major-General Pedro Del Valle's 1st Marine Division landed Colonel Edward Snedeker's 7th Marines on the Blue Beaches and Colonel John Griebel's 5th Marines on the Yellow Beaches just north of the Bishi River. By 09:45, the 7th Marines on the left had advanced through the village of Sobe, their primary objective, while the 5th Marines were positioned 1,000 yards inland. At this point, it was decided to land the reserve battalions of both regiments, along with Colonel Kenneth Chappell's 1st Marines. With forces arranged in depth and reserves positioned to the right and left, Del Valle's units continued to advance steadily over the rolling terrain as the 11th and 15th Marines artillery units were also being landed. At 13:30, the 4th Marines resumed their advance, facing light resistance on the left but becoming overextended on the right while trying to maintain contact with the 7th Marines. As a result, Shapley landed his reserve battalion to fill this gap, while Shepherd also deployed his reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, to secure the critical northern flank, allowing the 22nd Marines to keep advancing eastward. Meanwhile, further south, Major-General Archibald Arnold's 7th Division disembarked Colonel Frank Pachler's 17th Regiment on the Purple Beaches just south of the Bishi River and Colonel John Finn's 32nd Regiment on the Orange Beaches in front of Kadena Airfield. Both regiments quickly ascended the gentle hills at the landing sites and began advancing eastward. By 10:00, the 27th Regiment had patrols at Kadena Airfield, which was discovered to be empty; by 10:30, the front line was crossing the airstrip. Moments later, it advanced 200 yards beyond, heading towards Cholon. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment secured the southwestern edge of Kadena and continued along the road to Kozo. To the south, Major-General James Bradley's 96th Division landed Colonel Michael Halloran's 381st Regiment on the White Beaches in front of Sunabe and Colonel Edwin May's 383rd Regiment on the Brown Beaches at the extreme southern flank. Both regiments moved eastward with the same ease as the other units that day, making significant progress towards Momobaru in the north and successfully capturing Chatan in the south. Additionally, all divisional artillery of the 24th Corps landed early; Hodge's reserve regiments and battalions were successfully brought ashore, and by nightfall, direct-support battalions were in position. By the end of the day, over 60,000 men had landed, suffering only 28 dead, 27 missing, and 104 wounded, thereby establishing a beachhead 15,000 yards long and up to 5,000 yards deep in some areas. Shepherd's Marines paused for the night along a line stretching from Irammiya to the division boundary south of Makibaru, which the 1st Marine Division extended further south to Kadena. Meanwhile, the 7th Division advanced nearly three miles inland, destroying several pillboxes but losing three tanks to mines. The 96th Division secured positions along the river south of Chatan, on the elevated ground northwest of Futema, in the outskirts of Momobaru, and in the hills to the northwest and southwest of Shido. Although there were gaps in the lines in several areas, they were filled by reserve units or weaponry before nightfall. Thus, the Battle of Okinawa, seen by most as the final climactic battle of the Pacific War has only just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Gandalf the White once said “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” The battle of Okinawa will become the bloodiest campaign America has ever fought. The soul crushing journey has just begun as the Americans end the last stand of the Japanese in the Pacific War.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mandalay. Fierce battles raged over northern Luzon as General Clarkson's forces advanced, capturing key locations while Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas targeted enemy positions. The challenging terrain favored Japanese defenses, creating fierce resistance. Despite this, American troops steadily progressed, securing hills and towns. By mid-March, the 38th Division's relentless push led to significant Japanese losses. The brutal history of POW massacres fueled American resolve, leading to further victories in the region, American forces, led by Major-General Jens Doe were given the task of invading Palawan. Despite facing fortified defenses and rough terrain, the 41st Division advanced under artillery and air support. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces clashed with the Japanese, capturing key positions and repelling assaults. As tensions rose in French Indochina, the Japanese executed a coup, disarming French forces and establishing puppet governments. The conflict intensified, reshaping the region's power dynamics. This episode is the Fall of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are picking up on Iwo Jima. By March 10, General Schmidt's Marine forces had finally breached the determined enemy defenses to reach the northeastern shore of the island. However, there were still some Japanese strongholds to eliminate in the central and southern areas. One of these was Cushman's Pocket, named after the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, and located around a devastated ridge overlooking the sea, which housed the stubborn resistance southwest of Hill 362C. The other stronghold, held by General Senda's remaining troops, was established on March 11 after General Cates initiated his final push southeast toward the sea. Consequently, while Colonel Wensinger's 23rd Marines advanced quickly to the coast, Colonel Lanigan's 25th Marines struggled to make headway, as they were quickly halted by intense rocket, mortar, and small-arms fire from Senda's pocket. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Senda had committed suicide on March 8 following the failure of his banzai counterattack, leaving the disorganized Japanese forces in the pocket without leadership. Meanwhile, General Rockey's 5th Marine Division had advanced all the way to General Kuribayashi's last line of defense in northern Iwo Jima, where the battered defenders were prepared to make their final stand. Following a 50-minute preparation involving air, naval, and artillery support on March 11, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines launched their attack on the left with three battalions in line, while Colonel Wornham's 27th Marines attacked on the right with four battalions. However, fierce resistance soon forced the combat to close quarters, resulting in the Marines advancing only a few yards—up to 50 yards—across the front. To the right, while the 21st Marines advanced northward to connect with the 5th Division, Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines resumed their assaults on Cushman's Pocket. The 1st and 3rd Battalions effectively eliminated all resistance in the eastern sector, completely sealing off the area controlled by the Japanese. On March 12, these battalions launched an attack westward toward Cushman's Pocket, with Colonel Withers' 3rd Battalion serving as a holding force on the opposite flank. However, the Marines faced strong opposition and could only advance slowly against the camouflaged enemy positions. To the north, Rocky's units continued to face intense resistance, with Liversedge making no progress and Wornham achieving only minor advances. An intelligence officer with the 5th Division estimated that a minimum of 1,000 Japanese troops were defending the northern end of the island, and stated ". . . there is no shortage of manpower, weapons, or ammunition in the area the Japanese have left to defend." The entire northern tip of the island seemed to be honeycombed with caves and passageways. When a 500-pound bomb landed in the mouth of a cave near Kitano Pint, a big puff of smoke blew out the side of a cliff over 400 yards away, and another bomb landing in a cave entrance in the same area caused a ring of smoke and dust to come up through the ground for a radius of 200 yards around the point of impact. Meanwhile, to the south, the 25th Marines pressed eastward while Colonel Jordan's 3rd Battalion contained the pocket from the north. Supported by tanks, flamethrowers, bazookas, anti-tank grenades, and 60mm mortars, Lanigan's troops engaged in fierce combat with the heavily fortified Japanese forces in the pocket for four days. During this time, Jordan's 2nd Battalion cleared the beach road, allowing the Shermans to move behind the pocket. On March 13, as Withers' 3rd Battalion returned to the 21st Marines, Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their offensive from the east, making significant gains that reduced Cushman's Pocket to 250 yards. Meanwhile, following a successful water-borne reconnaissance of Kama and Kangoku Rocks the previous afternoon, an armored amphibian company landed on these islets without encountering any resistance. At the same time, Rocky's weary Marines maintained pressure on the ridge above the gorge, achieving only slight gains on the right. Fortunately, by March 14, it seemed that the slow, arduous progress of the past three days had enabled the 27th Marines to push through the last strong enemy positions along the northeastern side of the island. As a result, Liversedge was instructed to hold position while the 26th and 27th Marines advanced north and northwest against lighter resistance, successfully gaining up to 1,000 yards by March 15.After armored dozers hacked paths forward, tanks were able to lend support. The flame tanks were particularly effective during this phase and provided "the one weapon that caused the Japanese to leave their caves and rock crevices and run." Army planes flew the last air support missions of the operation on 14 March when five P-51's dropped fire bombs (gasoline and diesel oil mixture) and strafed in front of 3/27 from 1030 to 1100. From then on, the narrow confines of the area of operations prevented use of those planes that had performed so well in supporting ground troops. Artillery and destroyers continued to furnish limited support, firing a preparation for RCT 26 on 15 March and performing night harassing and illumination missions. Meanwhile, operations against Cushman's Pocket entered their final phase on March 14, when Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions finally breached the last enemy defenses by nightfall and completed the cleanup of the pocket two days later. On March 15, Lanigan redirected the main focus of the attack on Senda's pocket to the south, ordering the two battalions in the center to engage aggressively, resulting in a gain of approximately 200 yards and a deep penetration into the left flank of the Japanese's strongest positions. During the night, enemy forces attempted to infiltrate Marine lines from the south, but each attempt was detected and thwarted. Lanigan launched his final assault on March 16, facing only small, isolated pockets of resistance that were quickly eliminated as his battalions advanced toward the beach road. That day, with organized resistance in the 3rd Division's area of operations coming to an end, the 21st Marines were deployed to relieve the 27th Marines on the right flank to continue the northwest attack. With strong naval and artillery support, Withers' 1st Battalion encountered light resistance in its sector on the right, while the 2nd Battalion faced tougher opposition from scattered enemy positions. Nevertheless, both battalions reached the coastline at Kitano Point by the afternoon and began mopping up. To the left, Colonel Graham's 26th Marines also advanced cautiously northwest, with tanks effectively neutralizing enemy positions as the Marines gained about 400 yards. Despite the presence of 500 determined enemy troops still resisting in the western section of Kitano Point and the draw to the southwest, Iwo Jima was officially declared secured by the end of the day. However, on March 17, the battle for the gorge commenced as the 26th Marines advanced under moderate rifle fire, reaching the northern coast before shifting their focus southwestward to confront the gorge in front of the 28th Marines. The gorge in which the last resisting Japanese were now cornered was rocky and steep-sided, approximately 700 yards long and between 200 and 500 yards wide. Rock outcrops cut this ravine into other minor draws that constituted major obstacles to all types of movement. The entire area was ideally suited to the type of last ditch defense the Japanese had adopted. All routes into the main gorge were swept by heavy and accurate fire from machine guns and rifles concealed in cave positions in the cliffs and outcrops. The plan for attacking this strong point called for the 28th Marines, with attached elements of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and Division Reconnaissance Company, to hold the southern rim along the steep cliffs, while the reinforced 26th Marines worked in from the north and east. For the next nine days exhausted Marines carried out a battle of attrition against the thoroughly entrenched enemy. Advances into the east end of the ravine were measured in yards as each cave had to be sealed off before further progress could be made. Flame-thrower tanks, armored bulldozers, and infantry combined operations to provide the power and teamwork necessary to penetrate the last stronghold. As they gradually pushed down the ravine, resistance concentrated around a large concrete structure built into a knoll near the eastern end. After two days of assaults that silenced the supporting positions, engineers used bulldozers to seal a door on the north side and then demolished the structure with five charges totaling 8,500 pounds of explosives. Nevertheless, the battle of attrition persisted, and it wasn't until the end of March 24 that the pocket was reduced to an area of about 50 by 50 yards at the northwest end of the draw. The following morning, units of the 28th Marines, which had taken full responsibility for the pocket, reached the coastal cliffs to finally eliminate the last remnants of resistance in the gorge. On March 20, the 147th Regiment, set to take over the defense of Iwo Jima, arrived from New Caledonia, and by March 24, it had relieved the 21st Marines to establish night ambushes and patrols. The Japanese defenders fought tenaciously until the very end, choosing death over surrender. However, Kuribayashi had one final assault planned. In the pre-dawn darkness of March 26, the final act of the tragedy was performed. Between 200 and 300 Japanese troops from Death Valley and other scattered positions on the west coast silently crept through the ravines of the 5th Division sector headed for a tented area between Airfield No. 2 and the sea occupied by a mixture of Seabees, Air Force personnel, Shore Parties and AA Gunners. Most of them were sleeping, secure in the knowledge that the battle was virtually over. In a coordinated three-pronged attack against unsuspecting Marines and Air Force ground crews, aiming to create maximum chaos and destruction. Kuribayashi and his men stealthily cut through tents, bayoneted sleeping soldiers, and threw hand grenades, resulting in the deaths of around 44 Airmen and 9 Marines. The noise soon alerted troops from the surrounding area, and Marines from a nearby Pioneer Battalion, african american troops from a Shore Party, and soldiers from the 147th Infantry joined battle in a frenzy of shooting, punching, kicking and stabbing. Once the initial surprise wore off, the defenders retaliated, engaging in a chaotic hand-to-hand combat until the 5th Pioneer Battalion quickly organized a defensive line and halted the attack. Dawn revealed the full extent of the carnage in the ruined encampment: 44 Airman and 9 Marines lay dead with a further 119 wounded; of the attackers 262 were killed and 18 captured. Lt Harry Martin of the 5th Pioneers had hurriedly organized a defense line during the attack and single-handedly killed four enemy machine gunners before dying himself. He was to be Iwo Jima's final Medal of Honor hero, bringing the total to an incredible 27.  The circumstances of General Kuribayashi's death have always been shrouded in mystery. Over the years various sources have suggested that he died in the fighting around Death Valley or that he killed himself in his HQ. According to General Kuribayashi's son, Taro: “It seems that it was after sunset on March 25 to the dawn of the 26th that surviving Imperial Japanese forces were obliged to stand still under the US onslaught and showering shells. Under such circumstances, he had his sword in his left hand and ordered the chief staff officer, Colonel Takaishi, who was beside him, 'Send snipers to shoot'. Sargent Oyama heard the order. Oyama, who was seriously wounded in the last combat, fell unconscious, was hospitalized by the US and after having served as a POW came back and testified the dreadful account of the night to me. My father had believed it shameful to have his body discovered by the enemy even after death, so he had previously asked his two soldiers to come along with him, one in front and the other behind, with a shovel in hand. In case of his death he had wanted them to bury his body there and then. It seems that my father and the soldiers were killed by shells, and he was buried at the foot of a tree in Chidori Village, along the beach near Osaka Mountain. Afterwards General Smith spent a whole day looking for his body to pay respect accordingly and to perform a burial, but in vain.” Following the destruction of this final force, the capture and occupation phase of the Iwo Jima operation was declared complete. Over 34 days of combat, approximately 18,000 Japanese soldiers were killed, and 216 were taken prisoner, while the American side suffered heavy losses: 6,821 killed, 19,217 wounded, and 137 tanks destroyed. On April 4, the 147th Regiment took over full responsibility for the ground defense of Iwo Jima as the Marines were departing the island. Throughout April and May, aggressive patrols and ambushes by infantrymen resulted in an additional 867 prisoners and 1,602 Japanese killed, with the Americans losing 15 killed and 144 wounded. Meanwhile, General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command continued its firebombing campaign against Japan. After the successful Tokyo Great Air Raid and a less effective attack on Nagoya, LeMay decided to send 301 B-29s on the afternoon of March 13 to strike Osaka. Despite having to use radar bombing due to cloud cover, American bombardiers achieved a denser and more uniform bombing pattern than the impressionistic methods employed in Nagoya. This resulted in the destruction of 8.1 square miles in the city's core, including commercial and industrial areas, and caused 13,129 civilian casualties, with the loss of 2 bombers and 13 others damaged. Keeping up the intensity of the firebombing campaign, LeMay dispatched 307 B-29s to attack Kobe on the night of March 16. They faced 314 enemy interceptors, which proved ineffective against the Superfortresses unleashing fire over the port. Consequently, the fire on March 17 spiraled out of control, obliterating the eastern half of the business district and devastating a significant industrial zone to the southeast, including the Kawasaki shipyards. Japanese statistics show that the destruction was appalling. About 500 industrial buildings were destroyed, 162 damaged. The loss of 65,951 houses left 242,468 persons homeless. Police reported 2,669 dead or missing and 11,289 injured. Although the destruction was devastating for the Japanese, LeMay was disheartened to find that only 2.9 square miles of the city had burned. To complete his campaign, LeMay sent 313 bombers back to Nagoya on the night of March 19, utilizing radar techniques to cover a large portion of the city. This resulted in the burning of 3 square miles, including the Nagoya arsenal, freight yards, and Aichi's engine works. With an average of 380 aircraft, the 21st Bomber Command conducted 1,595 sorties over 10 days, dropping a total of 9,365 tons of bombs. The results far exceeded expectations, as the B-29s left a trail of destruction across four major cities, decimating 32 square miles and destroying numerous critical targets. Thus, LeMay's strategy proved successful, leading to incendiary area bombing becoming standard practice in the future. The focus now shifts from the Central Pacific to the South Pacific, where we need to address the ongoing Australian operations in New Britain. Following the capture of Milim and Ea Ea in January, General Ramsay's 5th Division aimed to continue its limited advances to the north. To secure crossings over the Ip River and patrol towards Henry Reid Bay, the entire 6th Brigade began moving to the Kiep-Milim area on January 26, completing this relocation by February 11. Concurrently, the 14th/32nd Battalion had advanced beyond the Ip and was conducting patrols towards Kalai Plantation, where they faced enemy resistance. The 36th Battalion also moved forward to Mavelo Plantation, leading to retaliatory actions against the new Australian outpost at Baia. In response, Ramsay dispatched stronger patrols to the Sai River throughout February, successfully establishing a new defensive line along the Mavelo River by the month's end. Returning to Wide Bay, after a series of aggressive patrols and nighttime ambushes, the 14th/32nd Battalion managed to reach Kamandran Mission by mid-February. The Australians continued to advance, and by the end of the month, the 19th Battalion, which had replaced the 14th/32nd at Gogbulu Creek, secured crossings over the Mevelo River and patrolled east toward the Wulwut River. On March 3, Ramsay ordered the 6th Brigade to cross the Wulwut and capture the Waitavalo Ridge. Two days later, the 19th Battalion initiated the assault but struggled to push more than one company across the river due to fierce enemy resistance. On March 6, following an artillery bombardment, another company successfully crossed and quickly seized Cake Hill. The next day, Lone Tree Hill was taken following another round of artillery bombardment. By March 10, Moose Hill, Young's Hill, and Perry's Knoll had also been captured. In the days that followed, Australian artillery began to suppress enemy mortars as infantry moved toward Kath's Hill. By mid-March, the 14th/32nd Battalion replaced the 19th Battalion, and on March 16, the Australians resumed their offensive, facing fierce resistance but successfully encircling Bacon Hill. The assault continued the next day as the 14th/32nd fought to reach the summit of the hill. On 18th March the mortar fire was intensified from the few remaining enemy positions, and it seemed that the Japanese were firing off their ammunition while they could. The attack was resumed. When Corporal Martin's section was halted on the steep spur by fire from three posts he jumped up shouting, "They can't do that to me", and went on alone, firing posts, killing five, before he himself was hit. The decisive attack was launched through this foothold. By 3 p.m. all the Japanese had been cleared from Bacon Hill; and a patrol from Kath's, under Lieutenant Lamshed,3 penetrated to a knoll 800 yards to the east and found no enemy there. No Japanese now remained in the Waitavalo-Tol area. In the five days from the 16th to the 20th 4 officers and 53 others had been killed or wounded.  In the following days, patrols ventured deep into enemy territory but found few stragglers. On March 21, the 19th Battalion took over again and advanced toward the Bulus and Moondei Rivers. On March 28, Ramsay ordered the 13th Brigade to relieve the 6th Brigade, a transition that was completed by April 12. Following the capture of Waitavalo Ridge, there were four months of infantry patrolling and routine maintenance by other troops, with the 16th Battalion patrolling forward to Jammer Bay in this area. Additionally, looking west, a company from the 36th Battalion successfully landed north of the Sai on March 30 but could not proceed to the Matalaili River due to heavy rains. However, Japanese positions there were heavily bombarded by aircraft and the sloop Swan, prompting the defenders to withdraw to the Toriu River in April. Meanwhile, Brigadier King's 16th Brigade advanced to the Ninahau River by March 12, while Brigadier Moten's 17th Brigade continued its westward push through the Torricelli Mountains, aiming to capture the Japanese base at Maprik. Throughout March, the 2/7th Battalion executed several successful ambushes from their new bases at Ilahop, Balangabadabil, and Bombeta, while Hayforce advanced through Sinahau to the north of Utumugu and eastward to Tatimba. By early March, Moten had cleverly led the enemy to believe that the primary offensive would be launched by the 2/10th Commando Squadron from the north via Ami. As a result, the Japanese bolstered their forces in that area, successfully driving back Australian patrols from Chaulak, Gwanginan, and Wambak. On March 13, the commando outpost at Milak came under attack, with the Japanese gradually encircling the position in the following days but failing to overcome the defenders' steadfast resistance. Fortunately, by March 17, patrols had restored communication lines, and two days later, the enemy pressure finally subsided. During this time, smaller Japanese forces also targeted the commando outposts at Murak and Aupik, but the defenders managed to repel these attacks as well. However, as the 2/10th was completely exhausted, the 2/6th Battalion was dispatched to relieve the commandos in late March amid a new wave of Japanese assaults. Meanwhile, the 2/7th Battalion was engaged in assaults on the fortified enemy positions at Ilaheta, which fell on March 20. The Australians then turned their attention to the Aupik villages, successfully focusing their efforts on the west bank of the Ninab River by the end of March, coinciding with Hayforce's crossing of the Amuk River. In the following three days, the 2/7th Battalion cleared all opposition along the eastern side of the Ninab in preparation for the final push toward Maprik. Consequently, General Miyake's 78th Regiment was ultimately compelled to retreat toward Jamei. Looking further north, King decided to initiate his advance towards But. By mid-March, a company from the 2/2nd Battalion had crossed the Ninahau on March 14 and quickly moved through Bai and Ultan. Although the Australian advance faced a strong enemy position that delayed progress for two days, the 2/2nd ultimately broke through Manib Creek, catching the defenders off guard and swiftly capturing the But airfield on March 17. Following this, the Australians patrolled the foothills and the Old German Road towards the Dagua airfield, encountering minimal resistance. Consequently, on March 21, the 2/2nd advanced rapidly again, successfully taking Dagua while the 2/1st Battalion moved in to secure But. At this stage, Japanese resistance along the coast was light, as General Adachi had focused on the Maprik district, which could produce more food. With the main enemy forces now concentrated in the hills to the south, King directed the 2/2nd to clear the foothills south of Dagua and eliminate the enemy in the Tokoku Pass, while the 2/3rd Battalion launched a flanking attack in the Mabam River-Hamsuk-Yalaminuni area. The 2/2nd then patrolled deep towards Magahen and Wonginara Mission, facing strong resistance at the 1410 Feature. On March 24, they finally captured the feature, while another patrol reached Wonginara without encountering enemy forces. However, in the final days of March, the Australians struggled to advance against the strong resistance of the Japanese defenders on the Wonginara Track, although one patrol successfully probed towards Kauremerak Hill. On April 2, following intense air and artillery bombardments, the 2/2nd Battalion finally managed to break through to Tokoku Pass, which was secured the next day. Meanwhile, another patrol advanced south from Dagua to the Autogi-Walanduum area and then to the coast near Kofi. The 2/3rd Battalion moved south from Feature 1410 towards the Mabam River and Wonginara Mission, successfully eliminating a series of Japanese ridge positions by April 6. The 2/1st Battalion patrolled deep into the hills south and west of But, completely clearing the area by April 1 while also pushing eastward to capture Saburuman. Concurrently, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion advanced to the upper Ninahau, effectively clearing the region up to a north-south line about two miles beyond Muguluwela by the end of March. In early April, the machine-gunners successfully cleared the Marabus area and connected with the 2/1st Battalion. Finally, it was time to shift focus to Bougainville to continue covering the Australian offensives on the island. As previously noted, Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade had secured the Tsimba Ridge area, while Brigadier Field's 7th Brigade was advancing south towards the Puriata River. The swift capture of Mosigetta and the unexpected secondary landing at Toko had already compelled the Japanese to retreat behind the river amid a command crisis. The Japanese policy of resisting the southward advance more strongly even if it entailed heavier casualties failed to impose the hoped-for delay of the Australians. Nevertheless the Japanese leaders considered that the 13th Regiment's "swift damaging hit-and-run tactics" were well executed. However, Mosigetta was at length abandoned and a withdrawal south of the Puriata ordered. The landing at Toko was unexpected and caused an acceleration of this withdrawal. There now occurred a major crisis in the Japanese command. The young reserve officers were highly critical of the conduct of the campaign and blamed the policies of the older professional officers for the constant reverses. This criticism became so outspoken that, in February, a number of the younger officers were relieved of their commands; perhaps partly as an outcome of this crisis, General Hyakutake suffered a paralysis of his left side. General Kanda took command of the 17th Army and Lieutenant-General Akinaga Tsutomu, Chief of Staff of the Army, succeeded him in command of the 6th Division. "This change of command was regarded favourably by the younger officers, but it soon became apparent that Kanda intended to pursue the same policy as Hyakutake. Kanda was a shrewd, hard, fussy little professional soldier of long experience. He was steeped in tradition and a ruthless commander, but even his bitterest critics admitted his capabilities. Akinaga… was a dyed in the wool militarist and a strict disciplinarian. Unused to an active command he was plunged into a situation which was a little out of his depth. One of his staff stated that he spent too much time doing a corporal's job in his forward battalions to be a good divisional commander." In late February, General Bridgeford's forces advanced toward the Puriata, facing only minor rearguard positions. The 25th Battalion captured Barara on February 22 and a five-acre garden two days later, while the 61st Battalion took control of another garden measuring 600 by 400 yards near the river on March 1. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron was sent to secure the Makapeka area, successfully taking Commando Ridge and a ford across the Makapeka River by March 5. With General Savige aiming to reach the Hari River next, Bridgeford promptly ordered the 7th Brigade to move to the Hongorai River line. As a result, Field planned to initiate his main advance on March 11, utilizing the 25th Battalion and the 2/8th Commando Squadron, while the 61st Battalion pushed forward toward Horinu. In response, Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to bolster the 13th at the front, preparing both units for a full-scale counterattack should the Australians cross the Puriata, aiming to delay the enemy long enough to finalize preparations for a decisive battle along the Silibai-Porror Rivers. By March 5, the 25th Battalion had already crossed the river and swiftly captured Slater's Knoll, which soon came under enemy mortar fire. Patrols were sent ahead and found that the 13th Regiment was poised to fiercely contest the Australian advance. Although the northern flank of the 25th Battalion would be effectively contained along the Buin Road on March 11, two Australian companies managed to maneuver through Tokinotu to the south, reaching Hiru Hiru by the end of the day. One of these companies moved along the eastern side of the Buin Road toward Slater's Knoll, but from March 15 to 17, they faced a heavy counterattack that ultimately forced them to withdraw. In response, Field initiated a strong offensive along the Buin Road on March 19, managing to push the Japanese back to some rear positions. Following a significant air and artillery bombardment, the attack resumed on March 22, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance. Meanwhile, the commandos advanced to Nihero, where they began extensive patrols southward towards Unanai, Hari, and the Buin Road. During one of these patrols, they captured detailed orders for a large-scale Japanese offensive planned for early April. As a result, Bridegeford decided to pause his offensive and send the 15th Brigade along with a tank squadron to Toko to reinforce his perimeter. On March 28 and 29, before Akinaga's main assault, the Japanese conducted a series of raids on the Australian lines of communication and rear areas, all of which were successfully repelled by vigilant defenders. On March 30, the 13th Regiment launched several strong attacks against the 25th Battalion, all of which were costly for the attackers and repelled, while the armored squadron advanced toward Tokinotu. Just as the tanks reached the front, the Japanese initiated another wave of fierce attacks against the 25th Battalion on March 31, which were thankfully repelled with the support of the armored units. Consequently, on April 1, two companies advanced again, establishing a perimeter 1,000 yards south of Slater's Knoll. That evening, and for the following three days, Akinaga launched a series of raids to facilitate the arrival of the 23rd Regiment for a renewed assault. In the early hours of April 5, the Japanese began infiltrating the Australian perimeter, launching a vigorous two-pronged assault on Slater's Knoll later that morning. The 23rd Regiment attacked about 1,000 yards to the right of the 13th and north-east of it. The attack failed, Kawano was killed and the regiment withdrew south to the rear of the 13th. The 13th Regiment with 600 men made the main attack from north and east.  Until 6.20 a.m. wave after wave charged forward and was brought low. Some Japanese fell within four yards of the weapon-pits. The artillery sent over accurate defensive fire, registered the previous day. At dawn the surviving Japanese were heard digging in on dead ground. As the light became clearer, the Australians saw that "enemy dead lay, literally, in heaps in front of the wire", and bodies could be seen scattered over an area some 200 yards square. It was gruesome evidence of the efficient siting of weapons and choice of fields of fire in preparation for expected attack. The attackers were ordered to dig in until darkness and make full use of grenades and mortars. However, in the afternoon, tanks and artillery fire drove the Japanese from the positions they had gained, and the Japanese commander accepted defeat. All three battalion commanders in the 13th were killed. After Akinaga had reported his failure Kanda said to his Chief of Staff, Colonel Yoshiyuki Ejima: "It would not have happened if I had been in command. The enemy right flank was wide open. I would have severed his life line and controlled Toko. We could have delayed the enemy for three months."  Concurrently, around 100 Japanese troops attacked the two forward companies along the Buin Road but were similarly repelled with ease. Following the unsuccessful counteroffensive by Akinaga, Slater's Knoll received reinforcements while the remaining Japanese forces were being dealt with, resulting in 620 Japanese fatalities since March 28, compared to 189 Australian casualties. However, Bridgeford could not capitalize on this victory due to the prolonged supply line, which temporarily halted his offensive. As a result, while the 2/8th Commando Squadron moved forward along the Commando Road, the 13th Brigade began to relieve the battered 7th Brigade under Field on April 13. Meanwhile, in the northern sector of the 11th Brigade area, the 26th Battalion launched a significant advance northward on February 21, successfully overrunning the Lalum-Downs' Ridge area by March 8. Two companies then advanced further north to secure the crossing of the Nagam River. On March 13, another company landed near the southern edge of Soraken Plantation and quickly pushed the enemy back behind the Nagam. Australian patrols harassed the Japanese forces at Horseshoe Knoll until March 20, when they finally withdrew. Simultaneously, the 26th Battalion eliminated the remaining enemy positions at the Compton River and secured the Soraken Peninsula, while the Taiof and Saposa Islands were also captured off the coast. The next battalion to take over the forward positions was the 31st/51st Battalion. Perhaps the outstanding patrol leader in the 31st/51st was Lieutenant Reiter, who led out 3 patrols which killed 10 out of the 78 Japanese killed by this battalion's forays. One of these patrols was named by the battalion "the raid on Reiter's Ridge". Reiter and 15 men were given the task of harassing the Japanese occupying a prominent ridge just east of Sisivie and discovering their strength. They departed from Keenan's Ridge at 17:30 on March 27, bivouacked at a former artillery observation post and moved on at 03:00 next morning for a dawn attack. At 06:00 “the patrol moved in, and throwing grenades and firing LMG occupied a small knoll (its report stated). 2 Japanese were killed and 1 pillbox containing LMG destroyed. Patrol raced down narrow neck to a wide clearing in which several huts were sighted. Phosphorus and HE grenades were thrown. In a matter of seconds 4 more Japanese killed (2 in slit trenches, 1 as he ran and another while abluting). 2 were wounded by phosphorus grenades. 3 huts were blazing and 1 (considered to be an ammunition dump) blew up. Enemy opened up with one LMG and 15 rifles and patrol pulled out with 1 man wounded.” Instead of hastening them away Reiter assembled his men nearby in concealment and watched the enemy. At length Japanese began to move about again, and soon they were washing clothes, chopping wood and performing other tasks. There were from 25 to 30 enemy in the post. The Australians watched throughout the morning and at 12:30 opened fire with all their weapons. 2 Japanese were killed and 4 more huts set on fire. The enemy fired back, and at 01:15 Reiter withdrew his men and returned to Keenan's Ridge leaving an ambush on the enemy's track. The ambush party returned later and reported that it had seen no movement.  On the 29th, the day after Reiter's return, a platoon of the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion under Lieutenant Martin set out for Buritsiotorara along the Wakunai River. There they found three huts and a large garden with seven Japanese moving about unarmed. Throwing grenades and firing from the hip the native soldiers attacked and killed all seven. Three more who emerged from a hut were chased and killed. Three of the dead men were found to be lieutenants; three machine-guns were cap-tured. Next day at Aviang, 1,200 yards away, seven more Japanese were seen, of whom three including another lieutenant were killed and the others fled. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima had come to a bitter end. The lessons learnt on Iwo Jima would become guidelines for the Battle of Okinawa in April and would influence allied plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The war planners would later notably take into account that around a third of the troops committed to Iwo Jima, and later again at Okinawa, had been killed or wounded and that they could expect far more in Japan.

Last time we spoke about the Fall of Manila. General LeMay's B-29 bombers wreaked havoc on Japan, targeting key factories at a high cost. On February 19, US Marines landed on Iwo Jima, facing fierce Japanese resistance and heavy casualties. By February 23, after relentless fighting and harsh conditions, they raised the American flag atop Mount Suribachi, marking a hard-won victory. This moment inspired a legacy for the Marine Corps, as battles raged on in the Pacific. Meanwhile troops attacked General Kobayashi's defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, struggling to gain ground. Reinforcements arrived, leading to coordinated assaults, but progress was slow. Meanwhile, General Yamashita reorganized his forces in response to increased guerrilla activity. As American divisions advanced, they faced fierce resistance but gradually secured key positions. Guerrilla leader Volckmann disrupted Japanese supply lines, significantly impacting their operations. Amidst the chaos, a daring rescue mission freed over 2,000 internees, though it provoked brutal reprisals against civilians. This episode is the Great Tokyo Air Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are continuing with the ongoing battle over Iwo Jima. By the end of February, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines had successfully secured Mount Suribachi, while the other regiments from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions advanced toward the O-2 Line, situated beyond Airfield No. 2. This location was where General Kuribayashi maintained his primary defensive positions, which were heavily fortified with caves, tunnels, and traps. On March 1, General Rockey continued his offensive on the left flank as the fresh 28th Marines moved through the weary 27th Marines, led by Colonel Wornham, and launched an assault on Hill 362A and its adjacent positions. The corps' 155mm howitzers and 5th Division artillery commenced firing a preparation at K-minus 45 minutes. One battleship and two cruisers from the gunfire and covering force added their heavy fires from 08:00 to 08:30. Aircraft from the support carrier group delivered strikes throughout the day, but did not participate in preparation for the attack. This proved one of the busiest days for Task Force 54 since D-Day as fire support ships dueled with enemy shore batteries until late afternoon. Shortly after dawn enemy guns in the northern part of the island opened up, and at 07:25 the destroyer Terry took a direct hit by a 6-inch shell, suffering heavy casualties. The battleship Nevada immediately engaged these hostile installations, and after completing their mission in support of the landing force, the cruisers Indianapolis and Pensacola shifted to counter battery fire. At 10:25 the destroyer Colhoun was hit by a major-caliber projectile, and soon after this enemy shells straddled the destroyer Stembel. Counter Battery fire continued throughout the day with the Nevada destroying one casemated gun and starting a fire in another emplacement, while the Pensacola's batteries accounted for a third Japanese gun. Following the robust aerial, naval, and artillery bombardment, Liversedge's forces achieved some initial success, including capturing the hilltop, but were ultimately halted by intense machine-gun fire from Nishi Ridge to the north. However, the 3rd Battalion along the coast managed to advance approximately 350 yards against lighter resistance. In the center, General Erskine also pressed forward beyond Airfield No. 2, with Colonel Withers' 21st Marines advancing north and northeast about 500 yards into the incomplete Airfield No. 3. At the same time, General Cates continued to send his troops into the fray. Colonel Jordan's 24th Marines replaced Colonel Wensinger's exhausted 23rd Marines on the left and fought to dislodge the enemy from Hill 382. They succeeded in advancing about 100 yards along the division's left boundary and 50 yards on the right, establishing a foothold on elevated terrain overlooking Minami village. Further south, Colonel Lanigan committed only his 1st Battalion to eliminate the salient around the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, but this assault was again met with fierce Japanese gunfire. This relief enabled Erskine to initiate a late two-regiment offensive, with the 21st Marines on the left and Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines on the right, although this effort did not achieve any significant progress. The following day, the assault persisted, but the 9th Marines made minimal headway against a strong enemy position on the right, while the 21st Marines advanced toward the base of Hill 362B and the southern edge of Airfield No. 3. Concurrently, Liversedge's 28th Marines successfully cleared Hill 362A and moved toward Nishi Ridge, where they repelled a fierce counterattack by 150 Japanese soldiers. Colonel Graham's 26th Marines were once again deployed to fill the gap between the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions, managing to gain approximately 500 yards to the north. Jordan's 24th Marines finally captured Hill 382 and advanced about 300 yards on the left flank. Meanwhile, Lanigan's 1st Battalion made another unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate and take the high ground north of Turkey Knob. As described by an intelligence officer with the 4th Marine Division “As a result of a close study of the enemy's recent defensive action, aided by observation from OP's and air reconnaissance, the following explanation is suggested of the enemy's defense in this Div's Z of A. The enemy remains below ground in his maze of communicating tunnels throughout our preliminary arty fires. When the fire ceases he pushed OP's out of entrances not demolished by our fires. Then choosing a suitable exit he moves as many men and weapons to the surface as he can, depending on the cover and concealment of that area, often as close as 75 yards from our front. As our troops advance toward this point he delivers all the fire at his disposal, rifle, machine-gun, and mortar. When he has inflicted sufficient casualties to pin down our advance he then withdraws through his underground tunnels most of his forces, possibly leaving a few machine gunners and mortars. Meanwhile our Bn CO has coordinated his direct support weapons and delivers a concentration of rockets, mortars and artillery. Our tanks then push in, supported by infantry. When the hot spot is overrun we find a handful of dead Japs and few if any enemy weapons. While this is happening, the enemy has repeated the process and another sector of our advance is engaged in a vicious fire fight, and the cycle continues.”  Meanwhile the remainder of the 25th Marines managed to advance 300 yards along the coast without facing any opposition. On March 3, the capture of Hill 362A enabled flame-thrower tanks to assist in the advance northward. The 5th Marine Division prepared to press on with its assaults through Nishi Ridge and Hill 362B. The majority of the 28th Marines faced strong resistance as they moved forward over 200 yards. Liversedge's 1st Battalion and Graham's 1st Battalion executed a coordinated attack to take the main enemy positions ahead of them. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 26th Marines surged forward, achieving a gain of over 500 yards, which allowed them to relieve Kenyon's 3rd Battalion and secure the summit of Hill 362B. In the center, the 9th Marines remained in a stalemate, while the 21st Marines launched a vigorous attack to the northeast, successfully capturing the summit of Hill 357 at the eastern edge of the Motoyama Plateau. They then attempted another assault southeast toward Hill 362C, which resulted in a modest gain of about 250 yards. Meanwhile, in the 4th Marine Division's sector, Wensinger's 23rd Marines were deployed in the center, where determined Japanese defenders continued to thwart intense American assaults, despite the partial reduction of the Turkey Knob blockhouse. To the left, the 24th Marines resumed their offensive southeast, advancing up to 350 yards in the center. During the eight days of deadlock and fierce conflict in the Hill 382 and Turkey Knob areas, the weather had been generally favorable. Mild temperatures and fair skies predominated, although early in the morning ground haze combined with smoke to limit observation, and on a few days light showers fell in the afternoon. Night temperatures sometimes went below 60°F, and it was then that tired Marines were grateful for the characteristic subterranean heat of the island that warmed their foxholes. The next day, March 4, dawned gray and sullen, and intermittent showers fell from the overcast skies. Visibility was so limited that all air strikes were canceled and aerial observation seriously curtailed. On the right, Cates' Marines pressed the attack southeast but could only gain 150 yards against the defenders' fierce resistance. To the left, after a failed Japanese infiltration attempt overnight to gather food and water, both the 9th and 21st Marines made no progress with their costly eastward assaults. Finally, supported closely by flame-throwing tanks and combat engineers, Rockey's Marines fought fiercely but achieved only minor advances, prompting Wornham's 27th Marines to be thrown back into the battle to reinforce the two battered assault regiments. March 5 was then dedicated to reorganizing and resupplying the three Marine Divisions in preparation for a renewed effort the next day. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Marines, led by Colonel James Stuart, were sent back to Guam without having landed on Iwo Jima. The three divisions accordingly resumed the offensive on March 6 after a terrific artillery and naval gunfire bombardment. First, on the left, Erskine attacked with his three regiments abreast yet failed to make any significant advance. Then, in the center, the 9th and 21st Marines likewise unsuccessfully attacked towards Hill 362C, though the latter managed to clear the entire Hill 357 area. Lastly, Wensinger's 23rd Marines passed through the 24th on the division left and pressed on forward against heavy opposition, successfully gaining between 150 and 350 yards while Jordan's battalions gained up to 150 yards in their front. Additionally, the 25th Marines mopped up in its area and Cates' Provisional Battalion kept hammering against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. In the knowledge that the battle was swinging irrevocably in favor of the Americans, General Kuribayashi radioed Tokyo: "Our strongpoints might be able to fight delaying actions for several more days. I comfort myself a little seeing my officers and men die without regret after struggling in this inch-by-inch battle against an overwhelming enemy...". The General's predictions were, if anything, on the pessimistic side as his garrison would prolong the battle for another three weeks. Although the fighting was dragging terribly, on this day Brigadier-General Ernest Moore successfully landed on Airfield No. 1 alongside 28 P-51s and 12 P-61s of the 15th Fighter Group to take over control of island air activities. The following day, the Island Commander, Major-General James Chaney, assumed responsibility for base development, air defense, and operation of the airfields. Meanwhile, Schmidt was continuing his coordinated offensive, with the 28th Marines meeting only scattered resistance as it pushed 500 yards north; the 26th Marines overrunning the enemy defenses and gaining about 150 yards before resistance stiffened once again; the 27th Marines attacking on a narrow front but likewise gaining only 150 yards; the 21st Marines achieving tactical surprise to reach Hill 331 and then pushing 250 yards more to Hill 362C, which was ultimately seized as well; the 9th Marines ferociously attacking east but gaining only 200 yards before a rain of fire stopped them; the 23rd Marines recovering from a savage Japanese night counterattack and then pushing around 150 yards against strong resistance; the 24th Marines only progressing over 50 yards as it neutralized a number of enemy defenses; and the 25th Marines and the Provisional Battalion continuing secondary operations against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. On March 8, Rockey pressed on toward the northeast coast, with the 28th Marines advancing against minimal resistance, gaining between 300 and 500 yards along the shoreline. Meanwhile, the 26th Marines faced a complete stalemate against the intricate network of pillboxes and interconnected caves that had once comprised the village of Kita. The 27th Marines managed to advance approximately 150 yards with tank support. In the center, the 21st Marines shifted northeast again, successfully gaining 300 yards through the last organized resistance in the area, while the 9th Marines captured Hill 362C and continued their eastward assault, reaching the edge of the plateau overlooking the beach and initiating a flanking maneuver south of Hill 331. On the right flank, the 23rd and 24th Marines continued their attacks but made little headway against the enemy's formidable defenses. That night, General Senda launched a strong counterattack that caught the Americans off guard. Two of Senda's orderlies would survive and report what occurred during the daring counterattack. Many of his troops believed that Inoue was a superior leader who inspired his men to perform outstanding feats of bravery; others thought he was a maniac. The sight of the Stars and Stripes flying on top of Mount Suribachi had filled him with increasing rage. He is quoted as saying: "We shall destroy their banner, we shall replace it with ours in the name of the great Emperor and the great people of Japan." Inoue was in charge of the Naval Guard Force who manned the shore guns that sank and damaged many of the US warships and landing craft, and was described as a bombastic and temperamental character, a fine swordsman, heavy drinker, and womanizer. His bizarre plan almost beggars belief. The Captain was certain that the airfields would be lightly defended by service troops. He and his men would move southward, destroying B29 bombers as they passed; climb Mount Suribachi and tear down the Stars and Stripes; and replace it with the Rising Sun as an inspiration to all Japanese troops on the island.  However this never came to be. The determined defenders, bolstered by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, repelled the assault, resulting in approximately 800 Japanese casualties. Under relentless pressure in a shrinking area where most critical terrain features had been seized, the disorganized Japanese forces saw a fleeting opportunity to escape destruction, raid American-controlled airfields, and reclaim Mount Suribachi with this counterattack. However, its failure effectively depleted Senda's remaining strength and chances for continued resistance. The following day, Cates resumed the offensive, with the 23rd Marines making minor gains along their front, while Jordan's 3rd Battalion achieved a notable breakthrough of 300 yards. Furthermore, the Provisional Battalion was disbanded, and Lanigan's 2nd Battalion assumed control of the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob region. In the center, Erskine persisted in his advance toward the sea, with patrols from the 9th and 21st Marines successfully reaching the beach as American forces continued to secure the area. Meanwhile, to the left, Rockey faced significant resistance, with his troops soon coming under intense and precise fire from elevated positions extending southeast from Kitano Point. Consequently, the 26th and 27th Marines remained in a stalemate while the 28th Marines moved forward. On March 10, Liversedge's men advanced approximately 40 yards across extremely challenging terrain and against fierce opposition, while Graham's 2nd Battalion gained an additional 75 yards, with the rest of the 26th and 27th Marines still held in place. Over the past 14 days, Rockey's 5th Marine Division advanced 3,000 yards along the west coast, ultimately pushing Kuribayashi's forces into a final pocket at the northern tip of the island.  In a dispatch to Tokyo on March 10, General Kuribayashi summed up the Japanese situation in this manner: “Although the attacks of the enemy against our Northern districts are continuing day and night, our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly… 200 or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" all day. The enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers, and aircraft are very severe, especially the bombing and machine-gun fire against Divisional Headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I cannot express nor write here.” Not until 15 bloody days later did Marines eliminate the last pocket of organized enemy resistance in the northern end of the island. By D+19 all that remained for the enemy force was to fight and die for the Emperor. This advance came at a significant cost, with Rockey suffering 1,098 men killed and 2,974 wounded during this time. In the center, the 21st Marines reported that all organized resistance in their area had been eliminated, while the 9th Marines moved toward the beach, facing harassment from enemy fire from a resisting pocket on their right. Nevertheless, Erskine's 3rd Marine Division successfully secured the airfield areas and only needed to eliminate this last remaining pocket in their zone. However, personnel losses during this 14-day campaign were substantial, with Erskine losing 831 men killed and 2,241 wounded. Finally, Cates took over from the 24th Marines as he initiated his final offensive eastward. Consequently, the 23rd Marines advanced southeast with minimal resistance, covering approximately 700 yards before stopping at a strategic high ground about 500 yards from the beach, while patrols moved toward the coast near Tachiiwa Point. Simultaneously, Lanigan's 1st and 3rd Battalions pushed 600 yards southeast against stronger opposition and successfully occupied the key terrain southwest of Higashi. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion advanced northeast to join them, effectively driving the remaining enemy forces into a small pocket in that area. Over the last 14 days, Cates' 4th Marine Division engaged in relentless assaults, fighting fiercely from Charlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Minami, and the formidable defenses northeast of Hill 382, nearly reaching the coast.  The Japanese conducted an astute defense in this sector. General Kuribayashi had planned well, but much credit for execution of the plan in the 4th Marine Division zone must go to General Senda, who commanded the 2nd Mixed Brigade and exercised tactical control during the battle. Enemy weapons and minefields were well placed to take maximum advantage of terrain features, fire control was excellent when judged by Japanese standards, and camouflage discipline outstanding. Machine-gun positions controlled draws, while mortars were disposed to deliver fire on routes of approach, including the crests, forward, and reverse slopes of ridges. The one obvious mistake made by the Japanese in this long, grueling defense to the death was the night counterattack of March 8. This action cost them many lives and gained no advantage. Even this rather hopeless plunge can be somewhat justified, however, when the situation that existed then is seen from the Japanese point of view. By March 8, the enemy was under heavy, constant pressure in an ever-shrinking area where most of the critical terrain features had been captured. He was quickly becoming dispossessed and disorganized, with few courses of action remaining. Because communications were undoubtedly badly disrupted, it is possible that the Japanese facing the 4th Division did not realize just how hopeless his cause appeared and therefore harbored some hope that the counterattack might not be in vain. The cost was significant, with Cates suffering 848 men killed and 2,836 wounded.  While the battle raged on Iwo Jima, General LeMay was also preparing for a major raid on Tokyo, known as Operation Meetinghouse. After a precision strike by 192 B-29 bombers against Musashi on March 4, which resulted in minimal damage due to heavy cloud cover, a decision was made to move away from the 21st Bomber Command's traditional focus on precision bombing. This eighth fiasco at Musashi marked the end of a well-defined phase of 21st Bomber Command's operations. The effort to knock out the Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, daylight precision bombing of carefully selected targets had failed. Production of aircraft engines, not grossly off scheduled programs when 21st Bomber Command came to the Marianas, fell off sharply during the last two months of 1944 and production of aircraft declined slightly during the same period. In neither case, however, could the shortages be accounted for by destruction wrought by the B-29's; indeed, the output of Franks at Ota had decreased from 300 a month to 100 before the first air strike. Not one of the nine high-priority targets had been destroyed, although Akashi had been effectively crippled and production had been slowed down at Mitsubishi's engine and assembly plants at Nagoya and at Nakajima-Ota. Musashi had suffered only 4% damage after 835 B-29 sorties had been sent against it; Navy planes had done more harm in a single strike. Probably the indirect effects of the B-29 raids were most important: with the fall of Saipan, Japanese industrialists had begun to lose confidence in their supposed immunity from air attack. Although under governmental pressure for increased production, they began, with the first attacks on Nakajima and Mitsubishi, to hunt for underground or forest cover, and the official directive for dispersal issued in mid-January merely served to quicken a process already well under way. This radical change in manufacturing techniques, never as efficiently conducted as the similar movement in Germany had been, explains in part the slowdown in production in late 1944 and early 1945.  In 22 missions comprising 2,148 sorties, the command dropped 5,398 tons of bombs on Japan targeting the Imperial aircraft industry, but only about half of the bombers hit primary targets. Losses were substantial, largely due to fierce enemy interceptors and the lengthy overwater journey from the Marianas to Japan, which lacked any friendly bases for refueling or repairs. As a result of the high costs associated with unescorted daylight missions, the susceptibility of Japanese cities to incendiary attacks, and the minimal impact of precision bombing with high explosives, General Arnold ultimately opted for a comprehensive incendiary campaign. In preparation for the forthcoming assault on Okinawa, LeMay was tasked with initiating a series of intensive incendiary strikes from low altitudes. This lower bombing altitude would enhance accuracy, increase bomb load, and prolong the lifespan of B-29 engines. Although this approach carried risks, LeMay believed that the intense Japanese anti-aircraft fire was not overly threatening, as only two B-29s had been lost due to flak alone. He also decided to conduct these missions at night, which would decrease the likelihood of heavy cloud cover and strong winds, simplify navigation, and enable the bombers to reach the two new emergency airstrips at Iwo Jima by dawn. The first mission was set to commence immediately, with 334 B-29s from the 73rd, 313th, and 314th Bombardment Wings taking off in the late afternoon of March 9, carrying approximately 2,000 tons of bombs. The target was a rectangular area in northeastern Tokyo known as Zone I, measuring about 4 by 3 miles and encompassing most of Asakusa, Honjo, and Fukagawa Wards. After a turbulent journey, the initial pathfinders successfully identified their targets under favorable weather conditions and marked them shortly after midnight with fires However LeMay's decision came late. With the first mission set for the night of March 9, the field orders were not cut until the 8th. Although operational details would vary significantly from normal practice, there was no time to consult Washington as was so frequently done. Arnold was not even informed of the revolutionary plans until the day before the mission. The decision to attack at night ruled out the command's standard technique of lead-crew bombing. Formation flying at night was not feasible, and with flak rather than enemy fighters the chief danger, a tight formation would be a handicap rather than a source of defensive strength. With planes bombing individually from low altitudes, bomb loads could be sharply increased, to an average of about six tons per plane. Lead squadron B-29s carried 180 x 70-pound M47s, napalm-filled bombs calculated to start "appliance fires," that is, fires requiring attention of motorized fire-fighting equipment. Other planes, bombing on these pathfinders, were loaded with 24 x 500-pound clusters of M69s. Intervalometers were set at 100 feet for the pathfinders, 50 feet for the other planes. The latter setting was supposed to give a minimum density of 25 tons (8333 M69s) per square mile. Late reports indicated widespread fires that forced formations to search extensively for targets, with visibility severely hampered by smoke and bomb runs complicated by turbulence from intense heat waves. During the three-hour assault, a total of 279 B-29 bombers targeted Tokyo, successfully dropping 1,665 short tons of bombs on the primary objective. Additionally, 19 Superfortresses, unable to reach Tokyo, attacked alternative or last-resort targets. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise by this tactical shift, resulting in only moderate resistance; intense anti-aircraft fire destroyed 14 B-29s and damaged another 42, while enemy interceptors had no significant effect. The fires were so intense that they nearly extinguished themselves by mid-morning, only halted by wide gaps like rivers. Subsequent photographs revealed that 15.8 square miles had been devastated, including 18% of the industrial sector, 63% of the commercial area, and the core of the densely populated residential district. Tokyo's highly effective firefighting system was also caught off guard, leading to the destruction of 95 fire engines and the deaths of 125 firefighters, while lightweight buildings were completely consumed along with their contents. Little rubble remained; only a few fire-resistant structures, marked by heat damage, stood in the devastated areas. In total, 267,171 buildings were destroyed, 83,793 people lost their lives, 40,918 were injured, and 1,008,005 were left homeless. Moreover, it took 25 days to recover all the bodies from the debris. Radio Tokyo referred to the raid as “slaughter bombing,” with one broadcast stating that “the sea of flames engulfing the residential and commercial districts of Tokyo was reminiscent of the holocaust of Rome, caused by Emperor Nero.” The attack significantly undermined the morale of Japanese civilians, and along with other firebombing raids in March, it led many to believe that the war situation was worse than their government had acknowledged. In response, the Japanese government implemented a mix of repression, including severe penalties for those accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and launched an ineffective propaganda campaign aimed at restoring confidence in the nation's air and civil defense efforts. Meanwhile, LeMay and Arnold viewed the operation as a considerable success. As Tokyo mourned its losses, another 313 B-29s were sent on the afternoon of March 11 to execute a similar strike on Nagoya; however, due to minimal wind to spread the fires from the widely dispersed bombs, the results were less impressive. Nonetheless, only one B-29 was lost during the raid, with another 20 sustaining damage. It became evident, as LeMay had predicted, that the Japanese lacked effective tactics for nighttime interception. Now, attention shifts to Burma to report on the ongoing Chinese-British-Indian offensives. On General Slim's primary front, General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued its vigorous advance toward Mandalay, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division successfully made its way to the Meiktila area in the Japanese rear. In response, Generals Kimura and Katamura sent several reinforcements to this crucial area, but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment, led by Colonel Yoshida, managed to arrive in time to establish some defenses in the town, quickly transforming buildings in Meiktila into bunkers and strongpoints. On February 28, Cowan dispatched the 63rd Brigade to launch an attack from the west and the 48th Brigade to advance from the north along the Mahlaing-Meiktila road, while the 255th Tank Brigade executed a wide flanking maneuver to approach from the east. As a result, the 63rd Brigade secured Kyaukpyugon and set up a roadblock southwest of Meiktila; the 48th Brigade advanced to a bridge over a chaung approximately a mile from the town; and the 255th Brigade fought its way to Kyigon and Khanda, successfully destroying several bunkers near Point 860. On March 1, following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, Cowan's three brigades began to push into Meiktila despite fierce resistance. The 48th Brigade, bolstered by a tank squadron, advanced down the Mandalay-Meiktila road, quickly clearing Kyigon before entering the town, where they reached within 100 yards of the railroad line before the attack was halted in the late afternoon. To the east, the majority of the 255th Tank Brigade captured Point 860 and began clearing the camouflaged bunkers along the ridgeline, while a combined force of tanks and grenadiers advanced to within 200 yards of the railroad station before being recalled. Meanwhile, the 63rd Brigade, supported by a tank squadron, cleared the village of Kanna and continued past it to secure the railroad line and the main Kyaukpadaung-Meiktila road. The following day, the 17th Indian Division tightened the encirclement around Meiktila, inflicting significant casualties on the outnumbered defenders and destroying numerous enemy bunkers. On March 3, the three brigades commenced the task of eliminating the last remaining Japanese forces in and around Meiktila. They faced intense sniper and machine-gun fire from every building. However, due to the tanks' superior firepower, the Japanese strongholds were systematically taken down one by one. By the end of the day, the town was cleared, with an estimated 2,000 Japanese troops killed, including Colonel Yoshida. Additionally, 47 field pieces and anti-tank guns were captured, and the supply dumps surrounding Meiktila were secured. Cowan now needed to organize the town's defenses, anticipating a swift and fierce Japanese counterattack. Immediately after the town's capture, Kimura ordered the 18th Division to work with the weakened 49th Division to reclaim Meiktila, while Katamura reinforced General Naka with the majority of the 119th and 214th Regiments, a strong artillery unit, and the battered 14th Tank Regiment. Following the capture of Meiktila, Cowan's forces spent the next few days clearing the area of any remaining snipers and stragglers. For the town's defense, Cowan assigned each brigade and the divisional infantry to four sectors, each featuring a heavily fortified redoubt. He also tasked the 99th Brigade with defending Kyigon and Meiktila's airfield. To maintain the initiative for the 17th Division, Cowan aggressively deployed strong mobile columns of tanks, mechanized artillery, and infantry to disrupt the Japanese formations as they approached Meiktila. Consequently, while the 18th and 49th Divisions advanced, Ywadan and Nyaungaing were secured on March 5. In the following days, the main roads leading to Mahlaing, Kyaukpadaung, Pyawbwe, Thazi, and Mandalay were cleared, and the enemy units of the 214th Regiment at Thangongyi and Yego were successfully repelled on March 8. General Naka was now prepared to initiate his primary assault on Meiktila, instructing his units to concentrate their efforts north of the town, while the 214th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to move southwest to connect with the 49th Division. In response to these movements, on March 10, Cowan sent a robust tank-infantry force along the Mahlaing road to escort a previously dispatched column back to Meiktila, successfully inflicting significant casualties on the 56th Regiment as the British-Indians secured the Leindaw-Kyanngyagon area. However, the troops faced harassment from artillery fire originating from south of Myindawgan Lake, prompting Cowan to launch another armored sweep on March 14 to eliminate this threat. Although the 55th Regiment managed to capture the hill north of Meiktila after Cowan's tanks and infantry withdrew, the Japanese forces were unable to prevent their return, which resulted in further heavy losses. Concurrently, other tank-infantry units disrupted the advance of the 49th Division, effectively delaying the assembly of Japanese forces to the south and east of Meiktila until March 18. Additionally, a strong raid by the Komatsubara Unit was successfully repelled on March 14. In Stopford's sector, the 19th Division was preparing to launch its final offensive southward toward Mandalay, while the 2nd and 20th Divisions, after fierce fighting to expand their bridgeheads, were advancing east to assault the southern approaches to Mandalay. With close support from artillery and aircraft, General Rees' forces successfully breached the primary defenses of Lieutenant-General Yamamoto Kiyoe's 15th Division, reaching the northern outskirts of Mandalay by March 7. As the assault continued, British-Indian forces were set to enter the city on March 9. However, the determined defenders clung to Mandalay Hill and Fort Dufferin, aiming to extend the conflict and fight to the death. While Mandalay was under siege, the 62nd Brigade stealthily advanced east to Maymyo on March 11, catching the garrison off guard. The next day, Mandalay Hill ultimately fell while Fort Dufferin was being heavily bombarded within the city. By mid-March, the 2nd Division was nearing the capture of Ava, and the 20th Division was steadily advancing east to sever the supply routes from Mandalay to the south. In northern Burma, General Sultan was also pursuing his offensive. After establishing a bridgehead at Myitson, General Festing's 36th British Division faced minimal resistance and successfully took Mongmit on March 9 before continuing southward to Mogok. To the east, the 38th Chinese Division encountered only weak delaying positions as it moved towards Lashio, which was successfully occupied by March 7. At this point, the 56th Division, now independently commanding this area, was gradually retreating towards Hsipaw and Kyaukme. Although General Sun paused his advance until the Generalissimo granted permission to resume the offensive later in the month. Mountbatten feared that if more Chinese troops were withdrawn from Burma it might not be possible to take Rangoon before the monsoon rains began. This was an unpleasant prospect, so Mountbatten went to Chungking on March 8 for two days of conference with the Generalissimo. When the conference of March 9 concluded, the Generalissimo, according to the American minutes, said that he would recapitulate his decision of halting the Chinese advance at Lashio. In so doing, he remarked that the details of withdrawal would be settled later and that no final decisions would be made before General Wedemeyer was able to take part in them. Then he stated that unless there was a simultaneous amphibious attack on Rangoon, operations would stop at Lashio and Mandalay and the Allies would assume the defensive. The Chinese would stop at Lashio, but details of their operations between Lashio and Mandalay would be settled later between the staffs. The misunderstanding became quite apparent in mid-March when General Sultan, under whose command the Chinese were, received conflicting orders. Mountbatten ordered Sultan to move his forces southwestward toward Mandalay, yet the Generalissimo directed that the Chinese divisions stay in the Lashio area. As a compromise and to avoid having the Chinese wait idly around Lashio, Sultan suggested that a smaller task force be directed to proceed south. But the Generalissimo and his American advisers stood firm, lest the shift of troops to China be delayed. This in turn caused the British to believe that if the Chinese were not going to advance they should be withdrawn forthwith and end the burden on the line of communications. The 50th Chinese Division began to push south after securing the Namtu region and by mid-March reached Hsipaw. Meanwhile, in South Burma, the 82nd West African Division had taken Dalet, while the 25th Indian Division engaged in a struggle for control of the Ruywa-Tamandu area. Additionally, the 2nd West African Brigade was advancing inland toward An, posing a significant threat to the Japanese rear areas. Due to the rapid advancement of Slim's offensive, Admiral Mountbatten had to prioritize air supply for the 14th Army. This situation soon compelled General Christison to send the 25th Indian Division back to India, as his logistical support was becoming increasingly strained. Capturing Tamandu and establishing a Forward Maintenance Area there became essential. After successfully clearing Dokekan, the 74th Indian Brigade crossed the Me Chaung on March 4 to circumvent the main enemy defenses. The British-Indians pressed on, launching attacks on Tamandu in the following days, but the determined defenders put up strong resistance. Eventually, General Miyazaki withdrew most of the 111th Regiment and ordered it to attack the 2nd West African Brigade from the rear, which was finally contained by March 17. With the 25th Division scheduled to withdraw to Akyab by the end of the month, the 74th was reassigned to the 82nd West African Division and launched a final assault on Tamandu on March 11, successfully capturing the abandoned objective. The British-Indians then began to advance towards Kolan, reaching the vicinity of the town by mid-March. Simultaneously, the 154th Regiment counterattacked the West Africans at Dalet, successfully halting the enemy's advance beyond the river. Meanwhile, the 4th Indian Brigade landed at Mae near Letpan on March 13 from Ramree Island and established a roadblock to prevent enemy escape. In response, the 121st Regiment sent several companies to conduct a delaying action aimed at slowing the enemy's southward advance. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima intensified as the Marines advanced against fortified Japanese positions, facing heavy resistance and suffering significant casualties while capturing key terrain over several weeks of fierce combat. Meanwhile General LeMay shifted from precision bombing to incendiary raids on Tokyo, resulting in significant destruction and civilian casualties, while Japanese morale plummeted amid military setbacks.  

Last time we spoke about the liberation of Bataan and Corregidor. The Shimbu Group's commander launched a coordinated raid on northern Manila, aiming to weaken enemy defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Allies captured key locations, including Nichols Field. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division overcame strong Japanese defenses at ZigZag Pass, while General Hall's forces secured Bataan. Plans for an airborne assault on Corregidor were set for February 16, leveraging surprise against the outnumbered Japanese garrison. American forces launched the strategic attack on Corregidor, dropping paratroopers from the 503rd Regiment. Despite facing sporadic fire, they secured key positions. The following days saw intense skirmishes as the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment landed and established a foothold. Over eight days, they repelled numerous Japanese counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties. By February 26, organized resistance crumbled, leading to the island's capture. Meanwhile, in Manila, American troops advanced, clearing buildings and securing the city, inching closer to victory in the Philippines. This episode is the Invasion of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A few weeks ago we spoke about Operation Detachment. Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were planning an invasion of Iwo Jima with General Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps. During a thorough campaign of preliminary air and naval bombardment against the Volcano Islands, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, along with other Corps units, were loading at Hawaii between December 25 and January 25. Once training and loading were complete, Admiral Turner's Task Force 51 and Admiral Hill's Task Force 53 left Pearl Harbor on January 27, initially heading toward Saipan. By February 12, Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet had gathered in the Marianas and was prepared to sail for Iwo Jima. Additionally, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 had departed Ulithi to conduct a series of supporting air strikes over and around Tokyo, known as Operation Jamboree. Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi 10 February and shaped a course eastward of the Marianas and Bonins. On the 12th, the air groups rehearsed with the 3rd Marine Division on Tinian. Two days later the task force fueled at sea from one of Admiral Beary's replenishment groups. Everything possible was done to guard against detection. Measures included radio deception, scouting by Pacific Fleet submarines to dispose of any picket vessels there might be en route, scouting by B-29s and Navy Liberators from the Marianas to clear the air. On the 15th a scouting line of five destroyers ranged ahead of the carriers, and antisubmarine air patrol was set up. At 1900 a high-speed run-in began towards launching positions, where the carriers arrived at dawn 16 February. Thanks to these precautions, and to thick weather most of the way, they arrived undetected. General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command, which was being reinforced by the 313th and 314th Bombardment Wings, would also assist Detachment with several strikes against Japan. Following some unremarkable high-altitude daytime missions in late January, 129 B-29s from the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings targeted Kobe on February 3, using a mix of incendiaries and fragmentation bombs. This attack caused significant damage to the urban area and local war production, resulting in the loss of 2 bombers and damage to 35 others. Subsequently, on February 10, a precision strike was launched against Ota's Nakajima aircraft factory, with 84 out of 118 dispatched B-29s successfully bombing the site. However, only 14% of the bombs hit the target, leading to the loss of 12 bombers and damage to 29. Nearly one-third of the factory buildings sustained damage, primarily from the incendiaries combined with high-explosive bombs. Five days later, LeMay dispatched 117 B-29 bombers to target Mitsubishi's engine works in Nagoya. However, an unexpected cold front resulted in only 33 bombers reaching the target area, yielding lackluster results. Meanwhile, after conducting some assault rehearsals, Spruance's amphibious support forces and tractor groups set sail for Iwo Jima on February 14, followed two days later by Turner's main assault convoy. At the same time, the reserve 3rd Marine Division continued loading at Guam, with its 21st Marines departing for Iwo Jima on February 16, followed by the main body of the division the next day. On the morning of February 16, Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force arrived off Iwo Jima and promptly commenced the final preliminary bombardment and minesweeping operations, although inclement weather hindered these efforts. However, the next day, Task Force 52 successfully carried out these missions; beach reconnaissance by UDTs faced heavy mortar fire, resulting in the sinking of one LCI gunboat, damage to eleven others, and casualties of 44 killed and 152 wounded. Despite this, the frogmen encountered no obstacles on the beaches and managed to create accurate maps of the approaches. Meanwhile, by February 16, Mitscher's carriers had quietly moved to a position 60 miles off the coast of Honshu, launching extensive fighter sweeps against airfields in Tokyo Bay and bombing raids on aircraft frame and engine plants in the Tokyo area.  About 100 Japanese fighters attacked Admiral Davison's planes as they crossed the coast and about 40 of them were shot down. American pilots found the Japanese on the whole reluctant to engage; Admiral Mitscher had correctly told his pilots, "He is probably more afraid of you than you are of him". In fact the IJAAF 10th Hiko Shidan immediately ordered an IJAAF night-fighter group and all “second-class” personnel to take cover, while all aircraft not intercepting were ordered to be dispersed, fuel tanks drained, and ammunition unloaded. In contrast, American pilots reported Tokyo antiaircraft fire “the most accurate and intense yet encountered.” By nightfall, Rear-Admiral Matthias Gardner's night-flying carrier group conducted a sweep of night fighters to cover the enemy airfields at dusk. This operation was repeated the following morning, but poor weather ultimately forced the carriers to retreat toward Iwo Jima. Despite this, significant damage was inflicted on aircraft frame and engine facilities, with 10 vessels sunk, including the unfinished escort carrier Yamashio Maru. A total of 531 aircraft were reported destroyed, at the expense of losing 88 planes and damaging two destroyers. On February 18, after the enemy battery camouflage had been obliterated during the previous two days of bombardment. This revealed batteries not previously known to exist, the island's defenses were for the first time properly revealed; and formidable they were indeed. Fortunately for the Americans, the support of UDTs with LCI gunboats had convinced General Kuribayashi that the main landing had started, and to repel it he unmasked batteries that would have caused very heavy casualties on D-day had they not been discovered two days before. This was the only serious mistake made by the Japanese general in his defensive tactics, which won the rueful admiration of his enemies. Blandy opted to focus on the immediate area and flanks of the eastern beaches. Heavy ships moved closer to 2,500 yards to deliver concentrated direct fire on all targets. Consequently, bombardment ships provided continuous direct fire throughout the day, effectively dismantling enemy defenses. However, during the night, the Japanese launched a minor raid that caused significant damage to the destroyer minesweeper Gamble and the destroyer escort Blessman. At 06:00 on February 19, Turner's main force arrived off Iwo Jima and began maneuvering into final positions. Simultaneously, Admiral Rodgers' warships executed the last pre-landing bombardment, coordinated with air strikes from Mitscher's carriers. Between 08:25 and 08:55, as the first wave crossed the line of departure and advanced toward the shore under the protective rocket fire of gunboats, shells fell heavily on Iwo Jima, marking the most intense pre-landing bombardment of World War II. At 08:57, as the leading armored amtracs approached their targets, naval gunfire shifted inland and to the flanks. The LVTs of the first wave touched down on Iwo Jima at 09:02 and began moving forward through the high terraces of soft black volcanic ash, engaging inland targets from the water to support subsequent landings. Three minutes later, the Marines of the 4th and 5th Divisions started landing side by side on the Green, Red, Yellow, and Blue beaches. The assault infantry battalions of the Landing Force received assistance throughout D-Day from all the supporting arms available to the Amphibious Support Force. Carrier pilots of Task Force 58 and the escort carriers of Task Force 52 flew missions all day as airborne observers and spotters maintained constant vigilance over the target. Including pre-H-Hour strikes, 606 support aircraft flew 26 missions on February 19 and dropped 274500 pounds of bombs. These planes also fired 2254 rockets into the island defenses and dropped over a hundred napalm bombs. Air and naval gunfire liaison teams remained in communication with both air and sea supporting units through the hectic hours that followed the beach assault. Naval rifles from 5- to 16-inch caliber pounded enemy positions in response to Marine requests. Gunfire support vessels engaged enemy artillery that covered landing areas from high ground to the north, and concentrated on concealed Japanese mortars that shelled landing areas with deadly effect. The units quickly reorganized and began their advance inland, facing only light resistance, although their progress was hampered by the sandy terrain. General Kuribayashi's forces, however, had been waiting in well-fortified underground positions as planned, emerging only after the bombardment ceased to unleash a barrage of machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire on the advancing troops. As the initial waves of Marines struggled to advance, congestion along the shore became increasingly critical, while the full force of the Japanese defenders was unleashed shortly after 10:00. By 10:30, elements from all eight assault battalions had landed on the island, successfully bringing ashore about 6,000 men and bulldozers that were clearing paths for tank deployment. On the far left flank, Colonel Harry Liversedge's 28th Marines, having landed on Green Beach, initiated a rapid advance across the half-mile isthmus below Mount Suribachi to isolate this crucial position. The attack unfolded in such a way that some units were delayed while others managed to break through and continue westward despite suffering heavy casualties, ultimately crossing the island while the bypassed enemy was being dealt with. By midday, the reserve 3rd Battalion and tanks landed under heavy fire to join the afternoon assault on Suribachi, but intense enemy fire hindered their progress to the assault positions. Consequently, the 2nd Battalion launched an attack on its own, gaining only 150 yards before retreating to regroup with the 3rd Battalion for the night. At the same time, Colonel Thomas Wornham's 27th Marines had landed on the Red Beaches, making swift progress inland despite increasing casualties and bypassing numerous enemy positions. By 11:30, Company A was moving across the southern end of Airfield No. 1, establishing a presence along the western edge while other units continued to advance past the airfield. The 1st Battalion launched an attack on the airfield with tank support but faced strong enemy resistance, resulting in minimal gains. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion pushed westward and reached the cliffs overlooking the western coast. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Battalion landed and began clearing bypassed positions, while the artillery units from the 13th Marines and General Rockey's reserve 26th Marines also arrived in the afternoon as the 27th and 28th Marines solidified their positions. By nightfall, although the 5th Marine Division was still a considerable distance from the O-1 Line, it had established a firm foothold on the island, with Mount Suribachi isolated and portions of the airfield under their control. To the east, General Cates' 4th Marine Division also landed successfully, with Colonel Walter Wensinger's 23rd Marines coming ashore at the Yellow Beaches and Colonel John Lanigan's 25th Marines landing on Blue Beach 1 and the southern part of Blue Beach 2. The two regiments began their advance inland, hindered by intense enemy fire but managing to gain between 400 and 600 yards by midday. As tanks were being deployed, the 3rd Battalion of the 25th Marines moved to the right to clear the remaining area of Beach Blue 2 and encircle the threatening quarry zone. At this stage, as the assault battalions continued their advance, Wensinger and Lanigan deployed their reserve battalions to cover the gaps in their attack lines. With the support of tanks that had finally reached the front, the 23rd Marines advanced towards Airfield No. 1 and successfully captured its outskirts. Meanwhile, the 25th Marines initiated a coordinated assault, with the 3rd Battalion advancing about 200 yards along the beach to secure the problematic quarry, while the other two battalions moved north to seize the high ground to the northwest of the quarry. By the end of the day, Cates had also landed half of the artillery from the 14th Marines, along with his reserve 24th Marines, which began to relieve some of the frontline units from both assault regiments. Although the penetration by the 4th Marine Division was not as extensive as intended, by nightfall, the front lines included the eastern edge of the airfield and extended sufficiently inland from the Blue Beaches to ensure the beachhead could be held successfully. The Marines, forced to advance across open terrain while enduring intense fire from well-concealed positions that were difficult to target, fell significantly short of the O-1 objective. Nonetheless, by the end of the day, six Marine regiments, an equal number of artillery battalions, and two tank battalions had landed and were positioned to defend the narrow beachhead against a potential night counterattack.  Throughout this first day, the situation on the beaches prevented landing of any but the highest priority "hot cargo." This consisted of ammunition, rations, water, and signal equipment brought to the beach in LCVPs and LCMs. Shore party teams, working under extremely adverse conditions without sufficient trucks and other heavy equipment, could do little more than stack the supplies on the beach above the high water mark. LVTs and weasels made trips from the beach dumps inland carrying these supplies to the troops and returned bearing wounded men. The busy amtracs also made nonstop trips from LSTs, ferrying critically needed items direct to Marines on the front lines. Most of the transports and other vessels of the task force retired from the island at nightfall, but some command ships, preloaded LSTs, and hospital LSTs remained behind. Emergency items, especially 81mm mortar ammunition, were brought in during the night, but actually very little unloading was accomplished and many of the wounded spent this night on the beach because they could not be evacuated. Some progress was made cutting exits through the terrace and clearing mines, but enemy fire and the shortage of equipment limited this activity. Despite this, the Japanese did not launch any large-scale assaults, although their mortars and artillery relentlessly bombarded Marine lines along the front throughout the night. Consequently, Allied casualties on this first day totaled 548 killed and 1,755 wounded. On February 20, the goal was for the 28th Marines to take Mount Suribachi while other units advanced north to capture the two airfields. Initially, in the south, after a coordinated air and naval bombardment, Liversedge launched another assault on the volcano but managed to gain only 75 yards by midday. During the forenoon, Marines gained only 50-70 yards. Aircraft and ships pounded Japanese positions and the 3d Battalion, 13th Marines fired mission after mission, but stiff enemy resistance continued, particularly from well-camouflaged pillboxes hidden in the brush to the front of the Marine lines. These emplacements, too close to friendly troops to be engaged by heavy support weapons, could only be silenced by coordinated attacks of assault demolition teams using flamethrowers and explosive charges. Tanks then moved in to provide support, allowing the attack to progress from pillbox to pillbox; however, by the end of the day, the Marines had only advanced 200 difficult yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's other regiments initiated a coordinated offensive to the north following extensive artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. Despite facing heavy resistance, the 23rd Marines successfully overran most of Airfield No. 1 by noon. Wensinger continued to push his units in the afternoon, but progress was limited as tanks were hindered by minefields and rough terrain. Wornham's 27th Marines pressed their attack on the left flank, overcoming enemy mortar and artillery fire to gain about 800 yards along the coast. In contrast, Lanigan's 25th Marines, affected by friendly fire, made only minimal advances against enemy crossfire from concealed positions. At 1600, friendly planes misdirected their fire to the 25th Marine's area, adding terror to the situation. An air strike consisting of .50-caliber machine-gun strafing, rockets, and bombs fell on troops of Company B of the 24th Marines, which was positioned on top of the quarry some 400 yards inland from the eastern shore. This strike was made without a preliminary "dry-run", and despite the fact that yellow front line panels were displayed prior to and during the aerial attack. The 1st Battalion, 24th Marines suffered five killed and six wounded as a result of this misguided effort. Shortly after the planes left the area, this battalion reported that friendly artillery and naval gunfire was being registered on its lines. Due to the slow progress, Schmidt attempted to land his reserve 21st Marines, but high seas and congested beaches ultimately thwarted these efforts. Nevertheless, the remaining 14th Marines were landed, albeit with significant casualties, and elements of the corps artillery began to come ashore. During the night, there were no counterattacks on Mount Suribachi, but the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions had to fend off some small counterattacks on their front lines. On February 21, following a strike involving 40 aircraft, Liversedge's 28th Marines launched another assault on the volcano. The 1st Battalion on the right swiftly advanced along the west beach to the base of Suribachi, while the 3rd Battalion in the center pushed nearly to the foot of the mountain despite facing heavy resistance. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion on the left moved cautiously along the east beach toward the volcano's base, with Company F heading toward Tobiishi Point. At the same time, other regiments continued their offensive towards O-1 after a bombardment from air, artillery, rockets, and naval gunfire. Rockey's units made significant progress, advancing over 1,000 yards, while the 23rd Marines achieved similar gains on the left flank, where slightly sheltered areas allowed for local and limited encirclement, but only advanced 100 yards in the right and center. The 25th Marines maintained steady pressure against the strong enemy defenses, gaining between 50 and 300 yards across the front. Colonel Hartnoll Withers' 21st Marines successfully landed this time; due to heavy casualties in the center, they were assigned to relieve the exhausted 23rd Marines. By nightfall, the Marines had to fend off several local counterattacks and infiltration attempts.  During the night, 50 kamikaze planes targeted Blandy's Task Force 52. They were picked up by the radar of the USS Saratoga, a veteran carrier of the Pacific War, and six fighters were sent to intercept. They shot down two Zeros but the remaining Zeros plowed on through the low lying cloud, two of them trailing smoke, and slammed into the side of the carrier turning the hangers into an inferno. Another solitary attacker smashed into the flight deck leaving a gaping hole 100 yards from the bow. Damage control teams worked wonders and within one hour the fires were under control and the Saratoga was able to recover a few of her planes. Another aircraft, a "Betty" twin engined bomber, tore into the escort carrier USS Bismarck Sea. The decks were full of aircraft and the ensuing explosion caused uncontrollable fires. Abandon ship was sounded and 800 men went over the side. Within a few minutes a huge explosion ripped off the entire stern of the carrier and she rolled 38 over and sank. Three other ships were also damaged: the escort carrier USS Lunga Point was showered with flaming debris as four aircraft were blasted out of the sky; the minesweeper Keokuk was damaged when a "Jill" dive bomber hit her deck; and LST 477 loaded with Sherman tanks received a glancing blow. The Saratoga, with destroyer escort, returned to Pearl Harbor, but by the time the damage was repaired the war was over. The kamikazes had done their work well: 358 men killed, one carrier sunk, and another severely damaged. It was a grim preview of the mayhem they would later cause during the invasion of Okinawa in April. On February 22, amidst a dreary cold rain, Liversedge renewed his assault on Suribachi, where only half of the original garrison remained to oppose the Marine advance. There was no let-up in the weather on Wednesday as Marines of the 28th Regiment, drenched to the skin and bent by the wind, prepared to renew the attack on Suribachi. Fresh supplies of ammunition had been brought to the front during the night, but the Shermans were mired in mud and the Navy declined to supply air support in the appalling weather. It was to be up to the foot soldier with rifle, flamethrower, grenade, and demolition charge to win the day. Colonel Atsuchi still had 800-900 men left and they had no intention of allowing the Americans an easy victory. Major Youamata announced: "We are surrounded by enemy craft of all sizes, shapes and descriptions, enemy shells have smashed at our installations and defenses, their planes bomb and strafe yet we remain strong and defiant. The Americans are beginning to climb the first terraces towards our defenses. Now they shall taste our steel and lead." Throughout the day, the 28th Marines engaged Japanese positions on the lower slopes of the mountain, with the 3rd Battalion making the final push to the base of Suribachi while the other two battalions cleared the coastline to completely encircle the volcano. Simultaneously, Schmidt's northern sweep continued, with the 21st Marines replacing Wensinger's troops, and Colonel Chester Graham's 26th Marines taking over on the 5th Division front. The 26th Marines advanced approximately 400 yards in the center but ultimately had to withdraw as the flanking units could not progress; the 21st Marines began their assault on the formidable defenses of Colonel Ikeda's 145th Regiment in front of Airfield No. 2, managing to advance only about 250 yards on the right; and the 25th Marines were unable to launch an attack on the left due to Withers' lack of significant gains and had to fend off several local Japanese counterattacks. Marine "Howlin' Mad" Smith aboard the USS Auburn was counting the cost. Three days of battle and the Regimental Returns listed 2,517 casualties for the 4th Division and 2,057 for the 5th: 4,574 dead and wounded and the O-1 line had just been reached. Little did he know that as his Marines approached the hills, ravines, canyons, gullies, and cliffs of the north the worst was yet to come. Additionally, as the 4th Division remained stalled, Cates ordered Colonel Walter Jordan's 24th Marines to relieve the weary troops of Lanigan on the right. During the night, most of Task Force 58 departed the area for a second air strike against Tokyo, which significantly limited the availability of aircraft for direct support of ground forces on Iwo Jima. On February 23, the 28th Marines under Liversedge launched their final assault on Suribachi. The 2nd Battalion was tasked with scaling the volcano's heights, while the 1st Battalion advanced south around the mountain's western side. To their surprise, they encountered no enemy fire, and small patrols reached the crater's edge by 09:40. 1st Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, executive officer of Company E, and a 40-man detachment set out to follow the patrols and occupy the highest point of land on Iwo Jima. The number of live Japanese lurking in caves along this north face was unknown, so flankers were sent out to guard against ambush as Schrier's men clawed their way warily upward. Still there was a mysterious lack of enemy activity, and the only Japanese encountered were the harmless dead. Positions along the rim of the crater were reached at about 10:15, and as Marines scrambled over the lip, the tenseness was eased by action. A small defending force challenged the patrol and a short, hot fight developed. Even while this skirmish was in progress, some of the men located a length of Japanese iron pipe, secured a small American flag to one end, and raised the Stars and Stripes at 10:20. It was an inspiring sight for thousands of Americans on Iwo as the flag waved bravely from the summit. Shortly after the mounting of this flag that measured only 54 inches by 28 inches, an unidentified Marine went aboard LST 779, beached near the base of the volcano, to obtain a larger set of colors. As this second and larger (8 feet by 4 feet 8 inches) flag was being carried up the slopes of Suribachi, photographer Joe Rosenthal, who covered the Iwo operation for the Associated Press, noticed it and instantly started in close pursuit. His efforts that morning resulted in the now famous picture of the second flag raising. Also since it's one of my favorite movies, I wanted to add this passage from the book “Flags of our Fathers” by James Bradley The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had decided the previous night that he wanted to go ashore and witness the final stage of the fight for the mountain. Now, under a stern commitment to take orders from General Holland "Howlin' Mad" Smith, the secretary was churning ashore in the company of the blunt, earthy general. Their boat touched the beach just after the flag went up, and the mood among the high command turned jubilant. Gazing upward, at the red, white, and blue speck, Forrestal remarked to Smith: "Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years". Forrestal was so taken with fervor of the moment that he decided he wanted the Second Battalion's flag flying on Mt. Suribachi as a souvenir. The news of this wish did not sit well with 2nd Battalion Commander Chandler Johnson, whose temperament was every bit as fiery as Howlin Mad's. "To hell with that!" the colonel spat when the message reached him. The flag belonged to the battalion, as far as Johnson was concerned. He decided to secure it as soon as possible, and dispatched his assistant operations officer, Lieutenant Ted Tuttle, to the beach to obtain a replacement flag. As an afterthought, Johnson called after Tuttle: "And make it a bigger one." Following this, the 28th Marines conducted mopping-up operations to eliminate remaining enemy positions and seal off caves at the base of Suribachi. All accessible outer and inner slopes were covered as the Marines annihilated enemy snipers and blasted shut the many cave entrances, sealing in an uncounted number of Japanese. Much observation equipment was found, emphasizing the fact that this had been an excellent point of vantage from which hostile observers directed murderous fire against the entire beachhead. Marine artillerymen, ready and eager to seize this advantage, hastened to move flash-ranging equipment into position. By nightfall, approximately 122 Japanese soldiers were killed while attempting to infiltrate American lines. Over the five-day period, the 28th Marines suffered 895 casualties, while nearly 2,000 Japanese were either killed or trapped in over 1,000 caves in the area. Kuribayashi had not anticipated the loss of this strategically significant location so early in the battle, and the survivors who managed to breach American lines faced severe reprimands upon their return to the north. For the remainder of the month, the 28th Marines focused on clearing out stubborn Japanese forces, reorganizing, and reequipping. Meanwhile, fighting in the north persisted as the three assault regiments advanced toward the O-2 Line. The 26th and 21st Marines faced heavy fire and struggled to make progress, while the 24th Marines advanced along their entire front, gaining up to 300 yards in some areas. On this day, the situation on the beach steadily improved as clearance efforts, construction of exits, and unloading continued, facilitating the arrival of essential ammunition and an additional 25 tanks. On February 24, following extensive air, naval, and artillery preparations, the offensive resumed. However, the initial failure of tanks to join the assault due to minefields and heavy anti-tank fire forced the Marines to advance slowly under intense fire from various sources. In the center, the 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines advanced 800 yards, reaching the north side of the east-west runway of Airfield No. 2, while the 2nd Battalion gradually moved northward around the end of the runway by noon. In the afternoon, as tank support began to arrive, Withers' 3rd Battalion captured the hill north of the airstrip after a fierce hand-to-hand battle. Simultaneously, his 2nd Battalion coordinated with the 26th Marines to seize the elevation beyond the airfield. Graham's troops easily secured the ground in front but had to pause their advance when they found themselves about 400 yards ahead of the 21st Marines. On the right flank, the 24th Marines initially made significant progress alongside Withers' men toward the airfield but were ultimately halted by the strong defenses on Charlie-Dog Ridge.  Running along the southeast edge of the east-west runway of Airfield Number 2 was a ridge known only as "Charlie-Dog Ridge." In prolongation of this ridge, on a lower level to the southeast, was a semicircular rise of ground that formed the "Amphitheater." In this area, Japanese engineers had constructed some of the most formidable defenses on the island. From the south, the approach traversed bare flat ground swept by guns on the ridge. To the east, the route led across a weird series of volcanic outcroppings and draws. It was against these positions that the 24th Marines moved out on D-plus-5. Assault squads then had to methodically clear the ridge, moving from one strongpoint to another, using fire and explosives until Charlie-Dog was secured. While the overall gains for the day were notable by Iwo Jima standards, the casualty figures were also high, with the Marines suffering 1,034 killed and 3,741 wounded during the five-day push to the second airfield. Additionally, the remainder of General Erskine's 3rd Marine Division began landing that day to officially take control of the central area. On February 25, a decision was made to hold back the 26th Marines to allow the 3rd Division to align with them. After another intense bombardment, Colonel Howard Kenyon's 9th Marines advanced through the 21st to continue the assault, but the two-battalion attack only managed to gain a meager 100 yards against Ikeda's determined defenders. Kenyon then deployed his reserve 3rd Battalion in the center, but it also failed to break through. To the east, the 23rd and 24th Marines launched simultaneous attacks, but only the 23rd made significant progress, overrunning the eastern end of the strip and establishing a foothold on the high ground to the north. Meanwhile, in the morning, Mitscher's carriers conducted a second strike on Tokyo. The Japanese sighted 600 US carrier aircraft on February 25, but Rear Admiral “Ted” Sherman reported, “The enemy opposition was only halfhearted and Japanese planes which were not shot down seemed glad to withdraw from the scene … as swiftly and unceremoniously as possible. Even here, over their own capital, the enemy were notably inferior to our naval aviators in aggressiveness, tactics, and determination.” TF-58 aircraft hit the Ota and Koizumi aircraft plants, but increasingly snowy, stormy weather meant Mitscher canceled further Tokyo strikes at 1215hrs. Spruance and Mitscher decided to hit Nagoya instead. En route to Nagoya that night destroyers USS Hazelwood and Murray sank three small Japanese craft. Eventually Mitscher realized TF-58 would not reach launching position on time, and at 0530hrs Spruance and Mitscher canceled the Nagoya strikes and headed south to refuel. TF-58 claimed 47 Japanese planes shot down and 111 destroyed on the ground for a total of 158 Japanese planes destroyed on February 25. Two hangars, one radar station, and two trains were destroyed. About 75 percent of the Ota engine plant's buildings were destroyed and an additional 15 percent heavily damaged. The Koizuma plant had also been heavily hit, and five coastal vessels and several smaller craft sunk, with another 14 vessels damaged. Total US losses were nine aircraft to antiaircraft fire and four to operational causes; four pilots were lost.. After TF-58 aircraft had plastered the Nakajima Ota airframe plant with 45 tons of bombs, February 25 photoreconnaissance revealed Ota to be 60 percent destroyed and 30 percent heavily damaged, although half of this was believed due to B-29s. After the photos TF-58 aircraft dropped another 13 tons on the plant. The Nakajima Koizuma plant was attacked on February 25 with 35 to 40 tons of bombs, with hits concentrated in the center of the plant. Reconnaissance showed 20 percent of the Koizuma roof damaged. The Hitachi–Tachikawa aircraft engine plant was attacked by one Task Group strike, with US airmen reporting “excellent results.” Photographs showed many bomb hits, but smoke made precise damage assessments difficult. Slight damage was also inflicted on the Tachikawa airframe plant. TF-58 planes struck the B-29s' nemesis, the Musashino-Tama aircraft engine plant, with 40 tons of bombs in the center of the Tama complex.  On that day, LeMay also dispatched 231 B-29s to attack Tokyo with incendiaries, with 172 successfully dropping 453.7 tons of bombs, incinerating a square mile of the city. This operation served as the "conclusive" test of the incendiary bombs that the 20th Air Force had requested, with valuable lessons to be learned for future use. The next day, the 26th Marines resumed their attack despite the high ground on the left remaining unclaimed, successfully advancing over 300 yards in the right and center. In the center, the 9th Marines continued their assault with the 1st and 2nd Battalions side by side, but they made no notable gains. On the right flank, the 23rd Marines launched another assault towards Hill 382, facing heavy resistance and managing to advance only about 200 yards. Concurrently, Lanigan's 25th Marines moved through the battered 24th Marines, achieving an advance of approximately 100 yards before encountering intense machine-gun fire from the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. On February 27, Wonrham's 27th Marines took over from the exhausted 26th and continued to push northward despite rising casualties, successfully overrunning several strongpoints and gaining about 500 yards across the front. In the center, the 9th Marines finally breached the enemy's main defenses towards Hill 199-O and captured Hill Peter, securing Airfield No. 2. Meanwhile, on the right, the 4th Division pressed on against the heavily fortified Japanese positions at the Meatgrinder, advancing only 150 to 200 yards on each flank while struggling to make headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. In the final attack of the month, the 27th Marines advanced towards Hill 362A, reaching its base but were forced to retreat nearly 100 yards due to Japanese counterattacks and loss of communication. In the center, Withers' 21st Marines moved past the 9th Marines and rapidly advanced north of Airfield No. 2, making significant progress on the right as they swept through Motoyama village and captured the high ground overlooking Airfield No. 3. To the east, Cates continued to send troops into the Meatgrinder, with the 23rd Marines gaining over 200 yards and launching an attack on Hill 382, while the 25th Marines struggled to make any headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, achieving only minor gains along the coast. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus we have begun one of the most brutal battles of WW2, let alone the Pacific War. It was a controversial decision to invade Iwo Jima and the Americans could never have predicted how the Japanese would change their tactics to turn the entire ordeal into one giant meat grinder.

Subscriber-only episodeSend us a textWelcome to the Premium Subscriber edition of the Bill Mauch series. This is the story of Bill Mauch from Sapulpa, OK who served in the 8th Amphibious Tractor Battalion attached to the 1st Marine Division. He fought in WWII on the islands of Peleliu and Okinawa.

Last time we spoke about the Mandalay Offensive. In the midst of intense warfare, General Krueger positioned his troops strategically to bolster the assault at Rosario. As the American forces repelled counterattacks and advanced, they faced fierce Japanese resistance, particularly at Binalonan and Hill 600. Despite heavy casualties, the Americans gradually gained ground, clearing key areas and preparing for further offensives. Meanwhile, Japanese defenses were fortified but weakened by shortages. As battles raged, both sides braced for decisive confrontations in the ongoing struggle for control of Luzon. In a fierce battle across the hills of Luzon, the 103rd Regiment aimed to secure key positions but faced heavy resistance, capturing Hill 800 by nightfall. The 172nd Regiment achieved surprise at Hill 900, while other regiments advanced under relentless fire. Meanwhile, in Burma, the British-Indian forces captured Shwebo, pushing deeper against Japanese defenses. The Mars Task Force disrupted supply lines, leading to a Japanese retreat. Amidst the chaos, both sides suffered heavy losses, marking a pivotal moment in the campaign. This episode is the Return to Bataan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By the end of January, as previously noted on Luzon, the 43rd Division had secured most of the Rosario region and Route 3 from Pozorrubio to the crucial junction with Route 11. The 25th Division had successfully eliminated the Shigemi Detachment at San Manuel, while the 6th Division had cleared the Cabaruan Hills and established outposts between Balungao and Guimba. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps had advanced to Clark Field, where it was engaged in a fierce battle with the Kembu Group. By January 27, the 40th Division had breached General Tsukada's northern defensive line, and the 37th Division had fortified Mabalacat, Angeles, and Runway No. 1 in preparation for the final push toward Manila. On that same day, General Krueger received significant reinforcements, with the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 32nd Division, and the 112th Cavalry Regiment at Lingayen Gulf. He planned to gather the cavalry division at Guimba to launch a coordinated advance toward the capital along the eastern side of the Central Plains via Route 5. After returning the reserve 35th Regiment to General Mullins, Krueger intended to deploy the 32nd Division, minus the 126th Regiment in Army Reserve, to the San Manuel-Asingan area. This would allow the 25th and 6th Divisions to narrow their fronts and continue south and southeast toward the Licab-Lupao line with reduced risk of exposing the 1st Corps' flank. Additionally, this strategy would enable the 37th Division to resume its advance toward Manila. However, General Griswold wanted to push Tsukada's forces further into the Zambales Mountains first, directing General Beightler to assault the enemy's southern defensive line centered around Fort Stotsenburg, while only the 148th Regiment and the 37th Reconnaissance Troop moved south along Route 3 to San Fernando. On January 28, the attack commenced as planned, with the 129th Regiment advancing westward through Runway No. 2, but it was quickly halted by the formidable forward defenses of the Eguchi Detachment. Meanwhile, with the assistance of Filipino guerrillas, reconnaissance units from the 37th Division successfully secured the San Fernando bridges intact. To the north of the Bamban River, the 160th Regiment faced unexpectedly light resistance as it moved along its ridge line to capture open-crested Hill 620, although it would later encounter stronger opposition when it reached the main defenses of the Takaya Detachment. At the same time, General Patrick began gathering the 1st and 20th Regiments at Guimba and Victoria, while the 6th Reconnaissance Troop advanced toward Cabanatuan, where they identified a significant Japanese concentration. Further north, the 35th Regiment advanced unopposed to barrio Gonzales, while the 27th Regiment moved overland and successfully dislodged a Japanese outpost from barrio Pemienta. Meanwhile, MacArthur was planning a secondary landing on the Zambales coast of Luzon, assigning Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps, which included the 38th Division and the 34th Regiment, to land at San Antonio and quickly advance across the base of Bataan to prevent any significant Japanese retreat into the peninsula. He also aimed to divert the Kembu Group's attention to relieve some pressure on the 14th Corps. However, General Yamashita had no intention of retreating to Bataan and had only dispatched Colonel Nagayoshi Sanenobu's 39th Regiment to defend the peninsula and the Kembu Group's right flank. On January 26, Hall's 11th Corps had departed Leyte Island aboard vessels from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, heading directly to Luzon for the San Antonio landing, codenamed Operation Mike 7. The convoy reached its destination on the morning of January 29. After receiving reports from Filipino guerrillas indicating that there were no Japanese forces in the landing area, Struble decided to cancel the planned pre-assault bombardment. Instead, he ordered Hall's four regiments to land simultaneously across a nearly six-mile stretch of coastline from San Antonio. Upon landing, the 151st Regiment secured San Felipe and San Antonio, while the 149th Regiment quickly moved inland to capture the San Marcelino Airstrip. However, they discovered that guerrillas led by Captain Ramon Magsaysay had already taken control of the airstrip three days prior. Before nightfall, the 34th Regiment and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop advanced south along Route 7 to the northern shore of Subic Bay. To the east, the 160th Regiment made significant progress, advancing nearly two miles southwest and breaching a stronghold at the center of the Takaya Detachment. The 129th Regiment also managed to penetrate enemy defenses into Fort Stotsenburg but was halted at barrio Tacondo by six tanks from the Yanagimoto Detachment. Despite this setback, the inability of the Japanese counterattacks to reclaim lost territory compelled Tsukada to order the Eguchi and Yanagimoto Detachments to retreat to their main line of resistance. Meanwhile, further north, units from the 1st and 20th Regiments successfully captured Licab and Talavera, cutting off the road between Cabanatuan and Muñoz. The 27th Regiment engaged a small tank-artillery force from the 2nd Tank Division that had become trapped along the highway between Gonzales and Pemienta.  With the rapid advances of the 6th and 25th Divisions, the 2nd Tank Division main strength in the Tayug-Triangle Hill area was in danger of being cut off from its sole remaining escape route into the northern bastion via San Jose and Highway 5. To meet the new situation, General Iwanaka was directed to pull back all remaining division strength from the Tayug-Umingan and Triangle Hill sectors with the exception of small outpost forces to be left at Gonzales and Umingan to delay an enemy advance from the northwest. The division was instead to concentrate the bulk of its forces in a triangular-shaped area bounded by Lupao, Muñoz and Rizal. These new dispositions had barely been effected when enemy elements swept around the outpost force at Gonzales and cut its withdrawal route to Umingan, forcing the detachment to withdraw through the hills after destroying most of its tanks and all of its mechanized artillery. From 20:00 on the 29th until 04:30 the next morning the force tried unsuccessfully to break through the Pemienta perimeter, against a sharp enemy. By the time the action had ended the 27th Regiment had killed 125 Japanese and had destroyed 8 tanks, 8 artillery prime movers, 4 tractors, 8 105-mm howitzers and 5 trucks, while only losing about 15 men killed and 45 wounded. Only four tanks succeeded in breaking through the enemy encirclement and escaped along the highway to Umingan. The next day, the 27th Regiment began positioning itself to attack Umingan from the north and northwest, while the 35th Regiment started preparations for a holding attack from the west and southwest. In an effort to avert the mass execution of prisoners of war at Cabanatuan, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mucci led a contingent of approximately 233 men, composed of Filipino guerrillas, soldiers from the Alamo Scouts, and Mucci's 6th Ranger Battalion. They traversed 30 miles cross-country between January 28 and 30 to liberate 522 weakened prisoners during the night. Most of the prisoners had vacated the camp by 2010 hours. Rangers and guerrillas had to carry most, piggy-backing them or making hasty litters from rifles and shirts. It was 2 miles to the Pampanga River, where carts waited to take them to Platero to be treated, fed, and organized. Many were still in shock and had not yet fully understood that they were free. At 2040 hours, Capt Prince was at the Pampanga River supervising the loading of stumbling prisoners into 25 carts as Rangers and prisoners trickled in. The rest of the Scouts established an ambush at the crossing site. At 2045 hours, one hour after the raid was launched, Prince fired the third red flare and departed for Balangkare. The loaded carabao carts were ordered on their way to Balangkare at 2145 hours.  Meanwhile Major Robert Lapham's guerrilla forces provided cover for their escape, successfully returning them to Allied lines on January 31. During this operation, around 270 Japanese soldiers were killed at the camp, with an additional 900 casualties along the Cabu River. Over 270 Japanese lay dead or dying in the smoldering camp; most of the wounded dying by dawn as no aid was forthcoming. Japanese bodies were literally stacked at the Cabu bridge and scores more littered the riverside woods. The 359th Battalion had ceased to exist. In the morning, battalion commander Capt Oyanu was still alive, but most of his officers were dead. Only 255 men of 1,200 survived and most were wounded.   In contrast, the Americans suffered only 2 fatalities and 7 wounded, along with 12 wounded Filipinos and 2 dead prisoners. Fortunately, the anticipated retaliation against the Filipino population did not occur, as the Japanese retreated from the area within a day of the raid, while the 20th Regiment secured the road junction barrio of Baloc and began advancing toward Muñoz. On January 30, Griswold continued his vigorous offensive against Clark Field; the 129th Regiment cleared the hills near Dolores and took control of the abandoned Fort Stotsenburg area, while the 160th Regiment made only 500 yards of progress against the determined Takaya Detachment. The 108th Regiment finally captured Hill 5 and Thrall Hill. Further south, patrols from the 37th Division reached within a mile of Calumpit and the Pampanga River, and on Bataan, the 34th Regiment took Olongapo after a fierce skirmish, while the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment captured Grande Island at the entrance to Subic Bay. At the same time, MacArthur was strategizing another secondary landing on Luzon, this time utilizing General Swing's 11th Airborne Division to assault Nasugbu, located 45 miles southwest of Manila. With this operation, MacArthur aimed to initiate a southern advance toward Manila while simultaneously hindering Japanese forces in southern Luzon from moving north to challenge Krueger's main offensive. General Eichelberger intended to deploy the 187th and 188th Glider Regiments and advance them approximately twenty miles along Route 17 to Tagaytay Ridge. There, the 511th Parachute Regiment would conduct an airdrop to secure the ridge for the ground troops and capture adjacent sections of Route 17 before the Japanese could regroup to defend the highway. In opposition, General Yokoyama had assigned only the Fuji Force to defend the area south of Manila. This force, centered around Colonel Fujishige Masatoshi's reinforced 17th Regiment, had only deployed the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment in the Tagaytay Ridge region, with a small outpost at Nasugbu and its main defenses positioned on Mounts Cariliao and Batulao. At this stage, Yokoyama was nearing completion of the organization of the diverse Shimbu Group forces east of Manila into a cohesive combat task force. To the north, near Ipo, he had stationed the Kawashima Force, which was composed of the 82nd Brigade and the 31st Regiment. To the south, the main contingent of the former Manila Defense Force had been relocated from the Philippine capital and renamed the Kobayashi Force, guarding the Wawa-Montalban area. However, the departure of General Tsuda's 105th Division to the northern stronghold had created a significant gap in the Shimbu Group's defenses. Although Yokoyama intended to address this vulnerability with the Noguchi Detachment, Major-General Noguchi Susumu's troops were still in the midst of a lengthy march from the Bicol Peninsula by the end of January. As a temporary solution, the Okita Detachment, a composite force consisting of five battalions centered around the 186th Independent Battalion, and the Kuromiya Detachment, a three-battalion unit based on the 181st Independent Battalion, were deployed in the Bosoboso-Antipolo region. Meanwhile, the Kogure Detachment, organized around the 1st Surface Raiding Base Force, was stationed at Lamon Bay. Manila was entrusted to Rear-Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji's Manila Naval Defense Force, which included approximately 13,700 naval personnel from the 31st Special Base Force responsible for defending the islands of Manila Bay and the capital, along with some Army reinforcements. On January 27, Swing's 11th Airborne Division departed from Leyte Island aboard ships from Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2, heading directly to Nasugbu Bay to carry out Operation Mike 6. Following an uneventful journey and a brief preliminary bombardment on January 31, the 188th Glider Regiment successfully landed with minimal resistance and quickly advanced inland toward the Palico River, aiming for the section of Route 17 that leads to Tagaytay Ridge. Pleased with the initial landing, Swing subsequently deployed the 187th Glider Regiment and the division artillery, which began to relieve the rear elements of the 188th by midday. At the same time, the majority of the 188th secured the Palico bridge and crossed the river to reach Route 17. Further north, under pressure from MacArthur and Krueger, the 148th Regiment successfully crossed the Pampanga River and captured Calumpit, just as Beightler was dispatching the 145th Regiment along Route 3 to assist in the advance toward Manila. At Clark Field, the 108th Regiment was patrolling forward, while the 160th Regiment faced challenges in breaking through enemy defenses. Meanwhile, the 129th Regiment launched an attack on the main positions of the Eguchi Detachment at Top of the World hill, successfully securing its steep, grassy southern and southeastern slopes. On Bataan, General Jones sent the 152nd Regiment to travel through Olongapo and advance east along Route 7, while the 149th Regiment moved east toward Dinalupihan via a challenging trail located about 1,200 yards north of the highway. By the end of January, the 32nd Division had successfully taken control of the recently vacated Tayug area. The 6th and 25th Divisions reorganized in preparation for their final push towards San Jose, and the 1st Cavalry Division gathered at Guimba. The World War II brigade structure of Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge's dismounted 1st Cavalry Division differed greatly from that of the triangular infantry division of the period. Instead of three infantry regiments the 1st Cavalry Division had four cavalry regiments--the 5th and 12th in the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 7th and 8th in the 2d Cavalry Brigade. Each regiment had two cavalry squadrons, each smaller than an infantry battalion, as opposed to the three battalions of an infantry regiment. Each cavalry regiment contained a weapons troop armed with 81-mm. mortars, .30-caliber and .50-caliber machine guns, and bazookas, but there was no heavy weapons troop within each squadron. The cavalry regiments lacked the antitank and cannon companies of an infantry regiment. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery was composed of one 75-mm. howitzer battalion, three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, and, for obvious reasons, an attached 155-mm. howitzer battalion. Reinforcing combat and service attachments brought the division's strength up to nearly 15,000 men, somewhat less than the strength of the reinforced 37th Division at the same time. On paper, each of the four cavalry regiments numbered 1,750 men--in contrast to the 3,000-odd of an infantry regiment--but none of the 1st Cavalry Division's regiments was up to strength. The division had received few replacements since entering combat on Leyte in October, and it had come to Luzon after very little rest from its arduous campaign through Leyte's mountains. The 1st Cavalry division was ready to advance towards Cabanatuan as General Mudge dispatched two reinforced motorized squadrons. On February 1, the Flying Columns, led by General Chase, crossed the Pampanga River and began their southern march with minimal resistance. As a result, Cabanatuan and Gapan were quickly captured, although some opposition was encountered south of the Peñaranda River. Meanwhile, the 188th Glider Regiment continued its advance towards Tagaytay Ridge, facing heavy enemy fire from Mount Cariliao but still managing to secure the important Mount Aiming. The 148th Regiment swiftly moved down Route 3 and captured Malolos with little resistance. However, the 152nd Regiment faced increasingly strong resistance at ZigZag Pass. While more rugged terrain than the ZigZag Pass area is to be found on Luzon, few pieces of ground combine to the same degree both roughness and dense jungle. Route 7 twists violently through the pass, following a line of least terrain resistance that wild pigs must originally have established. The jungle flora in the region is so thick that one can step 5 yards off the highway and not be able to see the road. The Japanese had honeycombed every hill and knoll at the ZigZag with foxholes linked by tunnels or trenches; at particularly advantageous points they had constructed strongpoints centered on log and dirt pillboxes. All the defenses were well camouflaged, for rich jungle foliage covered most positions, indicating that many had been prepared with great care and had been constructed well before Colonel Nagayoshi's 39th Regiment had reached the area in December. Colonel Nagayoshi had plenty of food and ammunition for a prolonged stand, and he also possessed numerous mortars and machine-guns. His artillery, however, was inadequate for the task at hand and he lacked certain types of medical supplies, especially malaria preventatives and cures. He had so scattered his mortars and artillery in order to protect them against American artillery and air strikes that his troops would often have difficulty massing their fires. Finally, his defensive line was scarcely 2000 yards wide northwest to southeast, thus rendering his whole position susceptible to vigorous outflanking maneuvers. On the other hand, he had good troops, well-prepared positions, and excellent defensive terrain. The 129th Regiment secured the summit of Top of the World hill, effectively ensuring Clark Field's protection from all but long-range artillery fire. The 20th Regiment launched its initial attack on Muñoz, which was thwarted by Colonel Ida Kumpei's tanks fortified as pillboxes. Additionally, the 27th Regiment attempted to advance towards Umingan but was unable to break through, while elements of the 35th Regiment bypassed this area and occupied barrio San Roque. February 2 mirrored the previous day in the San Jose sector, as the 20th and 27th Regiments continued their battle against the determined Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, Mullins dispatched the 35th Regiment in a two-pronged maneuver towards Umingan, successfully clearing most of the town by noon. In an effort to recover lost time, Mullins then directed the 35th toward Lupao in the afternoon, but its leading battalion was ultimately halted by intense Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. With their forward units stalled at Muñoz and Lupao, Patrick and Mullins resorted to flanking tactics. Accordingly, Patrick sent the 1st Regiment along the Talavera River to attack San Jose from the southeast, while the 63rd Regiment attempted to bypass Muñoz to the east and rejoin Route 5 north of the town. In turn, Mullins ordered the 161st Regiment to move cross-country to positions on Route 99 south of Lupao, then advance to Route 8 between San Isidro and San Jose while the 35th surrounded and cleared Lupao. However, on this day, the 105th Division successfully evacuated San Jose along with its stockpiled ammunition, regrouping north at Puncan and rendering the entire San Jose offensive ineffective. Simultaneously, Chase's Flying Columns passed through Gapan and entered Sabang, fording the Angat River to launch two simultaneous advances to the south and east. The 148th Regiment secured Plaridel after a brief but fierce skirmish, while the 152nd Regiment faced setbacks in the ZigZag Pass due to nighttime Japanese counterattacks and artillery fire. The 149th Regiment became disoriented and had to return to Olongapo, and the 188th Glider Regiment managed to break through to barrio Aga amidst heavy resistance, while the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment moved forward to begin the assault toward Tagaytay. On February 3, Swing's glider infantry launched an assault on the western end of Tagaytay, while paratroopers from the 511th Parachute Regiment began to drop along the ridge in a rather scattered manner. The first echelon of the 511th, about 915 in all, had come to Tagaytay Ridge aboard 48 C-47 aircraft of the 317th Troop Carrier Group. The planes had flown north from Mindoro to approach Tagaytay Ridge from the northeast in order to avoid fire from Japanese anti-aircraft weapons west of the drop zone. The first 18 planes, carrying about 345 troops, dropped over the assigned area. At this juncture, planes from succeeding flights were nearly 6 miles and 3 minutes behind the lead aircraft. About 08:20 one of these later planes dumped out a couple of bundles of supplies. Taking this as a signal that they were over the proper drop zone, 'troopers of the succeeding 30 planes began jumping. Aircraft pilots, realizing they had not yet reached the proper point, attempted to halt the jumping, but the 511th's jump-masters continued sending the paratroopers out. Most of them landed almost 5 miles east-northeast of the assigned drop zone. A second group of 51 C-47s began approaching the drop area about 12:10. Some 80 men from the first 5 aircraft of this group landed in the proper place. The rest started out of their planes when they saw on the ground the collapsed chutes of the first misplaced jump. In the end, only 425 men landed on the assigned drop zone; the others, about 1325 in all, made scattered landings 4.5 to 6 miles to the east and northeast. The 11th Airborne Division, blaming the 317th Troop Carrier Group for the premature dropping, reported that the "true reason was the refusal of the Air Force to cooperate in a combined training program for Airborne and Air Force troops." In any event, it appears that some lack of jump discipline within the 511th contributed to the scattered, premature jumping. Fortunately for them, they encountered minimal resistance as they secured the unoccupied ridge. To the north, the 148th Regiment continued its advance southward, facing delays at several tidal streams that were unbridged and unfordable, but managed to reach a point two miles south of Marilao by day's end. At the same time, the 5th Cavalry's Flying Column destroyed a Japanese outpost at Angat and moved through the guerrilla-held Norzagaray before crossing the Santa Maria River to join the 8th Cavalry's Flying Column, which had already progressed to Talipapa and was nearing the outskirts of Manila. Meanwhile, the 27th Regiment successfully eliminated the remaining enemy pockets at Umingan; the 3rd Battalion of the 35th Regiment, advancing over elevated terrain northeast of Lupao, established a position on Route 8 approximately 1500 yards southeast of Lupao, while the rest of the regiment continued to launch unsuccessful frontal assaults on the town. The 20th Regiment managed to overrun a few Japanese strongholds at Muñoz but was unable to break through. On 3 February the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, moved in on the northwest, but could not reach Route 99 in its sector. The 3d Battalion pushed across that road at the southwest corner of Muñoz, but gained only half a block into the main section of the town. The 1st Battalion, on the south side of Muñoz, made negligible progress. By dusk, the 20th Infantry had overrun a few Japanese strongpoints, but in order to hold its gains had had to destroy completely and physically occupy every position it had reached so far. Muñoz, General Patrick had begun to realize, was going to be a costly, hard, and time-consuming nut to crack. The 20th Infantry had not yet closed with the main Japanese defenses, but had spent most of the last three days pinned down by Japanese artillery, tank, and machine gun fire. Only by hugging the ground and taking advantage of the little cover even shattered tree stumps afforded had the regiment kept its casualties down to 15 men killed and 90 wounded. Meanwhile the 63rd Regiment successfully bypassed Muñoz and advanced up Route 5 toward Caanawan; and the 1st Regiment similarly advanced along the San Jose-Rizal road, assembling at two points 1000 yards south and 1500 yards east of San Jose. Now, however, it is time to leave Luzon and head toward the Central Pacific. Following the successful capture of the Marianas and the establishment of B-29 Superfortress air bases on these islands, the Allies were finally able to conclude Operation Matterhorn and cease using bases in China and India for conducting raids on the Japanese mainland and other targets in East Asia. Between June 5, 1944, and January 17, 1945, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command executed a total of 29 combat missions, inflicting significant damage on key military installations in southern Japan, Manchuria, Formosa, and Indochina, with a total loss of 73 B-29s. Meanwhile, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command, reinforced by the 313th Bombardment Wing, struggled to achieve similar outcomes in both daylight precision bombing and area incendiary bombing, with the first three missions of January yielding the same disappointing results as those in December and November.  On January 3rd, Norstad's incendiary test mission was run on 3 January, when ninety-seven B-29's got off for Nagoya. Each plane carried a mixed load of bombs -14 x 350-pound M18 IB clusters fuzed to open at 8,000 feet and one 420-pound fragmentation cluster fuzed to open 1,000 feet below releasing altitude. What with aborts and planes straying from course, only fifty-seven bombed the urban area designated as primary target, most of them releasing visually though cloud cover was rated as 6/10. Some fires were started but there was no holocaust. Smoke rising to 20,000 feet combined with cloud to make observation of results impossible for the attackers. As a test, then, the mission was inconclusive. To the citizens of Nagoya, who were better informed than intelligence officers of 21st Bomber Command, the damage seemed slight. On January 9th, having satisfied Norstad's requirement, the command returned to its program of precision bombing against aircraft factories. Performance for the most part was of a piece with what had gone before. On 9 January 1945 seventy-two B-29's were sent against Musashino near Tokyo. High winds broke up the formations so that only eighteen planes were able to bomb the target; twenty-four bombs, widely scattered in the plant area, destroyed one warehouse and damaged two others-a slight return for the effort expended and the six B-29's lost. On January 14th, at the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works at Nagoya on the 14th, precision bombing was again less than precise. Seventy-three B-29's were airborne and forty bombed, getting four GP's-one ton-into the No. 5 Works area and damaging three buildings. Frustrated by this, Hansell increasingly blamed his crews for the unsatisfactory outcomes. Remarkably, he would only achieve his first fully successful B-29 attack on his final mission of the war. The target for the January 19 strike was virgin, a plant of the Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company located 2 miles northwest of Akashi, a village on the Inland Sea some 12 miles west of Kobe. The Akashi works housed Kawasaki's general headquarters and one of the company's two large production units, which built the twin-engine fighters Nick and Randy and engines for Tony, Oscar and Frank fighters. Smaller than Nakajima and Mitsubishi, Kawasaki in 1944 delivered 17% of Japan's combat airframes and 12% of its combat engines. Against Akashi, Hansell sent 77 B-29s, plus 3 others in a diversionary strike. With good weather, 62 bulled it through to the Kawasaki factory, dumped 155 tons of GPs, and then returned with no losses. Interpreting strike photos, intelligence officers estimated that 38% of the roofed area showed major damage. This was an understatement. Every important building in both the engine and airframe branches had been hit and production was cut by 90%. Indeed, the Kawasaki Company liquidated the combined plant and dispersed the machine tools, which had suffered only slightly, to other sites. The Akashi shops were given temporary repairs at the cost of 226 tons of critical materials and over 9000000 yen, but the installation was used thereafter only for limited assembly jobs. It is a pity that the full results of this mission could not have been known to Hansell. His first completely successful B-29 attack, Akashi seemed to epitomize the doctrines of precision bombardment he had championed-and it was his last strike of the war. Unaware of this success, Hansell was replaced the following day as head of the 21st Bomber Command by the determined LeMay, who immediately suggested a shift to firebombing Japan's major cities at low altitude during nighttime, marking a stark departure from Hansell's previous strategies. However, the only obstacle in the flight path was Iwo Jima, which could alert the Japanese to an impending raid and still had operational airfields capable of launching intercepting fighters. These airfields had also been used for sporadic air assaults on the Marianas, although few attacks were actually carried out in January. Capturing Iwo Jima would resolve these issues, and Admiral Nimitz aimed to establish emergency landing facilities for B-29s based in Saipan, as well as a base for their fighter escorts targeting Japan. Consequently, he decided to proceed with the invasion, codenamed Operation Detachment. After this operation, Nimitz planned to invade Okinawa to secure and develop a robust air and naval base for the assault on the Japanese home islands, which we will discuss further later. For the Iwo Jima operation, Admiral Spruance was once again given overall command of the "big blue fleet," which was re-designated as the 5th Fleet. Under his command, Vice-Admiral Richmond Turner led Task Force 51, the Joint Expeditionary Force, responsible for landing Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's Expeditionary Troops. Turner was supported by Rear-Admiral William Blandy's Task Force 52, the Amphibious Support Force, which included ten escort carriers; Rear-Admiral Harry Hill's Task Force 53, comprising all transports and landing craft; Rear-Admiral Bertram Rodgers' Task Force 54, which had six battleships and five cruisers for shore bombardment; and Vice-Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58, the Fast Carrier Force. For the amphibious invasion, Major-General Harry Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps would deploy the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, planning to land the 4th and 5th Divisions side by side with two regiments each along the two-mile stretch of beach between Mount Suribachi and the East Boat Basin on the island's southeast coast. Smith and Schmidt also decided to limit corps artillery to two battalions of 155mm howitzers, organized as the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, due to the limited space available for emplacements on the island. After landing, Major-General Clifton Cates' 4th Marine Division would take control of the Motoyama Plateau and its airfields, while also capturing the O-1 Line on the corps' right flank. Meanwhile, Major-General Keller Rockey's 5th Marine Division would secure the Mount Suribachi region before advancing northeast to capture the O-1 Line on the corps' left flank. They would then push forward across the island until Iwo Jima was fully secured. At the same time, Major-General Graves Erskine's 3rd Marine Division would remain in reserve, with only its 21st Marine Regiment deployed as the corps reserve. To aid in this effort, the 7th Air Force, under Generals Harmon and Hale, had been consistently targeting Iwo Jima's facilities since August 1944. Following intense attacks in December, which included bombardments by Rear-Admiral Allan Smith's 5th Cruiser Division against Iwo Jima, Haha Jima, and Chichi Jima were again struck on January 5, but the next bombardment wouldn't occur until January 25.  A fighter sweep by 28 P-38s opened the attack at 0945; 62 B-29s bombed at 1100 and 102 B-24s at noon; Crudiv 5 (Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith), comprising heavy cruisers Chester, Pensecola and Salt Lake City with six destroyers, arrived off Iwo at 1330 and opened bombardment at 1347. "Hoke" Smith approached the island from the west, rounded Mount Suribachi and then reversed track in a half-circle. Unfortunately the sky was so heavily overcast as to force the planes to bomb by radar and to hamper ships' spotting. Surface visibility was good enough to enable the island to be well covered by a naval bombardment, which lasted for 70 minutes and expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch and 5334 rounds of 5-inch shell. The bombers dropped 814 tons of bombs. Photographs, taken three days later, showed that both airfields on Iwo were wholly or in part operational, but no more enemy air raids hit the Marianas until Christmas Day. The job of keeping Iwo airfields neutralized was now turned over to B-24s of VII A.A.F. Between 8 December 1944 and 15 February 1945 they flew at least one strike daily over the island. The day before Christmas, Rear Admiral Smith's heavy cruisers, together with five destroyers, delivered a second bombardment, coordinated with a B-24 strike. This strike was slightly more eventful than the initial one in December, but even less effective. The bombardment, which expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch, provoked return fire from a 6-inch coast defense battery (designated "Kitty" on the target maps) in the northeast part of the island, but "Kitty's" claws managed to strike no closer than 200 yards. As proof of the slight damage inflicted by this bombardment, the Japanese were able to pay a vicious return visit to Saipan on Christmas Eve, a raid of 25 planes which destroyed one B-29 and damaged three more beyond repair. Crudiv 5 returned 27 December for a repeat performance, lighter than the others; and a fourth bombardment was set up for 5 January 1945. While fighter planes and B-24s hit Iwo Jima the same cruisers and six destroyers bombarded Chichi Jima, 145 northward, and the slightly nearer Haha Jima. Their hope was to catch a convoy bringing Japanese supplies to these islands, whence they were forwarded to Iwo by small craft at night. Destroyer Fanning, steaming ahead of the group as radar picket, encountered at 0206 a surface target, later identified as LSV-102, which she sank. At 0700 Admiral Smith's group opened a one hour and 49 minutes' bombardment of Chichi Jima. During it, destroyer David W. Taylor suffered an underwater explosion, probably from a mine, which flooded her forward magazine. The Haha Jima bombardment by Salt Lake City and two destroyers lasted for an hour. Crudiv 5 then pounded Iwo Jima for another hour and three quarters. The reply was negligible, and a few aircraft which made passes at the cruisers were easily driven off. Starting on the last day of January and continuing for two weeks, 7th Air Force aircraft bombed the island day and night, occasionally joined by LeMay's Superfortresses. For ten weeks, Iwo Jima faced near-daily bombardments from land-based aircraft, with nearly 6,800 tons of bombs dropped. Additionally, there were five naval bombardments that fired 203 rounds of 16-inch shells, 6,472 rounds of 8-inch shells, and 15,251 rounds of 5-inch shells. Under normal circumstances, such a heavy and sustained bombardment would have been more than enough to devastate an island of that size. However, the Japanese managed to restore the airfields on Iwo Jima just hours after each attack and continued to strengthen their defenses on the island. Following the fall of Saipan, the Japanese appointed Lieutenant-General Kuribayashi Tadamichi to oversee the defenses of the Bonin Islands, renaming the Ogasawara District Group as the 109th Division. Kuribayashi stationed Major-General Tachibana Yoshio's 1st Mixed Brigade and most of Colonel Iida Yusuke's 17th Independent Mixed Regiment on Chichi Jima, along with several other units across the islands. He accurately predicted that Iwo Jima would be the target for an Allied landing and took measures to make it virtually indestructible. To this end, he coordinated with Major-General Senda Sadasue's 2nd Mixed Brigade, Colonel Ikeda Masuo's 145th Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Nishi Takeishi's severely weakened 26th Tank Regiment, which had sustained heavy losses from American submarines at sea. Additionally, Major Fujiwara Tamachi's 3rd Battalion of the 17th Independent Mixed Regiment and a robust artillery unit led by Colonel Kaido Chosaku were included in the defense. Rear-Admiral Ichimaru Toshinosuke also provided a significant naval garrison on the island, centered around the 27th Air Flotilla, bringing Kuribayashi's total forces to approximately 21,060 men, far exceeding the American estimate of 13,000. Aware that the beaches would be vulnerable to enemy naval and air assaults, Kuribayashi opted to strengthen the Mount Suribachi and Motoyama Plateau areas. The Mount Suribachi area was made a semi-independent defense sector, its heavily fortified positions bristling with weapons of all types, ranging from casemated coast-defense guns and artillery to automatic weapons emplaced in mutually supporting pillboxes. The narrow isthmus connecting Suribachi to the rest of the island was lightly held by infantry, but heavily defended by enfilade fire from artillery, rockets, and mortars emplaced on both the high ground in the south (Suribachi area) and the northern portion of the island. The main defense line was a belt of mutually supporting positions organized in depth, running generally northwest-southeast across the island. It stretched from the cliffs north of the western beaches south to include Airfield Number 2; then, turning eastward through Minami, terminated at the rugged coast north of the eastern beaches. Pillboxes, blockhouses, bunkers, and dug-in tanks strengthened the defenses in the naturally formidable terrain everywhere throughout this belt. The second defense line generally bisected the remaining area in the northern portion of the island. It began several hundred yards below Kitano Point on the northwest coast, cut through Airfield Number 3 and the Motoyama area in the center, and terminated between Tachiiwa Point and the East Boat Basin on the eastern coast. Man-made emplacements were not as numerous in this second line, but natural caves and other covered positions afforded by the fantastically rugged terrain were skillfully organized for the defense. The beaches would be lightly defended but would receive fire support from the elevated positions. A substantial reserve force, including tanks, was also prepared to counterattack and push the Americans back into the sea if they managed to establish a foothold. In a shift from traditional Japanese defensive strategies, Kuribayashi moved away from full-scale counterattacks and suicidal banzai charges, instead instructing his troops to hold their mutually supportive positions to the last and to carry out small unit counterattacks at cutoff points. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allied forces continued their advance through Luzon, battling Japanese defenses, liberating prisoners, and securing key locations, paving the way for a final push toward Manila. Meanwhile, on Iwo Jima, General Kuribayashi was preparing for a final stand, hoping beyond hope to make the Americans pay so dearly they might end the war.

Between all the mud, rain, maggots and bullets, we discuss Okinawa. The 1st Marine Division fight a determined Japanese force on Okinawa who prefer death to surrender and are indifferent to the lives of Okinawan civilians. We are NOT experts, veterans or master tacticians of World War II but we do love a bloody good...

Sledge and the 1st Marine Division land at Okinawa. Cynical and exhausted, Sledge and "Snafu" Shelton show no compassion for the Japanese troops and struggle to lead new replacement Marines fresh out of boot camp. The Marines are horrified to discover Okinawan civilians, including women and children, are being forced to act as human shields. As the battle concludes, the Marines hear of a "new bomb" that "vaporized an entire [Japanese] city in the blink of an eye".See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Tired of selling war bonds, Basilone requests a combat assignment and is transferred to the 5th Marine Division where he trains Marines for combat as a gunnery sergeant. He meets and marries Lena Riggi. Basilone lands at Iwo Jima, but is killed in action on the first day. Join Sean and James as they discuss this gut-wrenching episode.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The ultimate podcast for military veterans, police officers, firefighters, and first responders preparing for life after service. As a military veteran or first responder, you need to be planning and implementing strategies to prepare for your transition into civilian life. In this episode of the Transition Drill Podcast, Johann Figueroa shares his transformative journey from his childhood struggles to his time in the Navy, where he confronted internal demons while serving as a Corpsman. Johann opens up about his battles with self-sabotage during his time in the military and his transition and how he ultimately found healing and purpose through faith, mentorship, and the pursuit of a new mission. He talks about his time in Afghanistan assigned to 1st Marine Division and candid reflections on his struggles with post-military life, Johann provides hope and actionable insights for veterans and first responders navigating their own transitions. Today, Johann is channeling his experiences to inspire others as a life coach, proving resilience and purpose are within reach for anyone willing to confront their past and embrace their potential. SPONSORS: Trident Coffee Get 15% off your purchase Link: https://tridentcoffee.com Promo Code: TDP15 Human Performance TRT Get 10% off your purchase Web: https://hptrt.com/ Promo Code: TDP CONNECT WITH THE PODCAST: IG: https://www.instagram.com/paulpantani/ WEB: https://www.transitiondrillpodcast.com QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS: paul@transitiondrillpodcast.com CONNECT WITH JOHANN: LINKEDIN: https://www.linkedin.com/in/johannfigueroa/ IG: https://www.instagram.com/_johannfigueroa/

    What drives someone to shift their life's course towards military medicine, forging a path of service and sacrifice? US Navy Independent Duty Corpsman Mike Shoener shares his compelling journey from aspiring Fire Controlman to revered Navy Corpsman. Inspired by a legacy of service and a pivotal meeting with a fellow corpsman, Mike's story is one of transformation and dedication. Through his experiences, listeners gain insight into the powerful influence of family and mentors in shaping career choices that have far-reaching impacts.    This episode offers a deep dive into the rigorous training and responsibilities that define a Navy Corpsman's career. We explore the demanding yet rewarding path from classroom theory to real-world application in high-stakes environments like Afghanistan. Mike recounts his experiences in instructing future corpsmen, emphasizing the critical role of diverse subject matter experts in nurturing autonomy, mastery, and purpose in military medicine. His narrative on becoming the Senior Sailor of the Year amidst the challenges of COVID-19 underscores the importance of teamwork and support within the Navy's tight-knit community.     Listeners are guided through Mike's multifaceted career as a Surface Force Independent Duty Corpsman, transitioning into advisory roles within Naval Special Warfare. His involvement in initiatives like the Doc Kent Corpsman competition and the Corman Performance Assessment Program highlights efforts to enhance military medical training and preparedness. Through captivating anecdotes and expert insights, this episode celebrates the warrior culture within the Navy and underscores the ongoing commitment to honing expertise in military medicine.   Chapters (00:05) - Legacy of Service in Military Medicine (07:25) - Building Mastery in Military Medicine (13:48) - Navy Sailor of the Year Journey (17:36) - Duties and Responsibilities of Navy IDCs (26:09) - Training and Integration in Special Operations (31:40) - Doc Kent Corpsman Competition and Training (41:14) - Enhancing Corpsman Training (50:55) - Emphasizing Skill and Warrior Culture Highlights (05:22) Legacy of Service and Navy Training (68 Seconds) (08:55) Keys to Core School Training (46 Seconds) (12:07) Teaching Mastery in the Military (95 Seconds) (19:32) Naval Corpsman's Specialized Duties (80 Seconds) (26:58) Overcoming Challenges in Special Operations (72 Seconds) (33:45) Importance of Training in War Care (41 Seconds) (37:26) Medevac Training for Tactical Personnel (66 Seconds) (42:10) Performance Assessment for Marine Corps Corpsmen (113 Seconds) (47:11) Data-Driven Fitness Testing in Military (75 Seconds) (52:25) Striving for Excellence in Military Culture (65 Seconds)   Take Home Messages: Legacy and Mentorship in Military Careers: The episode underscores the significant influence of family legacy and mentorship in shaping one's career path, especially in military service. Listening to family stories and having impactful encounters can inspire and guide individuals toward unexpected yet fulfilling careers in military medicine. Rigorous Training and Real-World Application: The journey to becoming a Navy Corpsman involves intense training that transitions quickly from classroom theory to real-world practice in high-pressure environments like Afghanistan. The importance of diverse subject matter experts in the training process is highlighted, ensuring a comprehensive education for future corpsmen. Adapting and Thriving in Challenging Times: The episode explores the journey of achieving recognition within the Navy during challenging periods, such as the COVID pandemic. It emphasizes the importance of teamwork, support, and adaptability in navigating complex processes and advancing in one's career. Expanding Roles and Responsibilities: The discussion delves into the multifaceted responsibilities of Independent Duty Corpsmen (IDCs), who serve as force multipliers in both operational and primary care settings. The episode highlights the critical role of IDCs in providing medical support across various Navy units and environments, including special operations. Continuous Improvement and Skill Proficiency: The episode highlights initiatives like the Doc Kent Corpsman competition and the Corpsman Performance Assessment Program (CPAP), which aim to enhance the skills and preparedness of military medical teams. The importance of maintaining proficiency and readiness in military medicine is emphasized, ensuring that corpsmen are well-prepared for future challenges.   Episode Keywords: US Navy, Independent Duty Corpsman, Military Medicine, Family Legacy, Service, Enlist, Fire Controlman, Hospital Corpsman, Military Career, Mentorship, Training, Real-World Application, Afghanistan, Instructing, Autonomy, Mastery, Purpose, Senior Sailor of the Year, COVID, Surface Force, Special Operations, Trident Exercises, MARSOC, Comprehensive Training, Doc Kent Corpsman Competition, Advisory Roles, Direct Action, Combat Operations, 2nd Marine Division, Corpsman, Corman Performance Assessment Program, Physical Fitness, Battlefield Medicine, General Medical Knowledge, Tactical Knowledge, Military Culture, Warrior Culture, Skill Proficiency, Realistic Training, WarDocs Hashtags: #MilitaryMedicine #NavyCorpsman #Mentorship #FamilyLegacy #WarriorCulture #NavySailorOfTheYear #MilitaryTraining #SpecialOperations #CorpsmanLife #MilitaryHealthcare   Honoring the Legacy and Preserving the History of Military Medicine The WarDocs Mission is to honor the legacy, preserve the oral history, and showcase career opportunities, unique expeditionary experiences, and achievements of Military Medicine. We foster patriotism and pride in Who we are, What we do, and, most importantly, How we serve Our Patients, the DoD, and Our Nation.   Find out more and join Team WarDocs at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/ Check our list of previous guest episodes at https://www.wardocspodcast.com/our-guests Subscribe and Like our Videos on our YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast Listen to the “What We Are For” Episode 47. https://bit.ly/3r87Afm WarDocs- The Military Medicine Podcast is a Non-Profit, Tax-exempt-501(c)(3) Veteran Run Organization run by volunteers. All donations are tax-deductible and go to honoring and preserving the history, experiences, successes, and lessons learned in Military Medicine. A tax receipt will be sent to you. WARDOCS documents the experiences, contributions, and innovations of all military medicine Services, ranks, and Corps who are affectionately called "Docs" as a sign of respect, trust, and confidence on and off the battlefield,demonstrating dedication to the medical care of fellow comrades in arms.     Follow Us on Social Media Twitter: @wardocspodcast Facebook: WarDocs Podcast Instagram: @wardocspodcast LinkedIn: WarDocs-The Military Medicine Podcast YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@wardocspodcast

This week's educational episode showcases the incredible work of Semper Fi and America's Fund, an organization that has been providing vital support to service members, veterans, and their families for over 20 years. At the heart of this organization is Sondria Saylor, the Executive Vice President, whose personal connection to the military community runs deep.Sondria's connection to the military began in 1984 when she became an active-duty spouse. In 2003, she saw the challenges faced by wounded service members returning from Iraq and knew action was needed. Along with other military spouses, Sondria met medevacs at the hospital, providing essentials and comfort to these brave individuals. This grassroots effort grew into the Semper Fi and America's Fund, which has provided over $500 million in support and programs to 33,000 service members across all branches of the U.S. armed forces.Sondria's dedication to the mission of Semper Fi and America's Fund is truly inspiring. Through comprehensive case management and lifetime support, she and her team ensure that service members, caregivers, and their families receive the care and resources needed to navigate recovery and reintegration. Semper Fi and America's Fund serves as a beacon of hope and community for those who have sacrificed for our country, offering caregiver retreats, sports programs, and holiday celebrations.About Sondria:Sondria is the Executive Vice President of Semper Fi & America's Fund, where she oversees Case Management for the Western Region, Communications Operations, and the Apprenticeship, Jinx McCain Horsemanship, and Veteran to Veteran (V2V) Programs.Before her current role, Sondria was Vice President of Case Management in the Western Region from 2014 to 2021, Senior Director of Case Management from 2005 to 2014, and Director of Donor Operations from 2004 to 2005.Sondria's connection to the military began in 1984 when she became an active-duty spouse. From its early years in the 1980s until 2004, she was involved in the evolution of Marine Corps Family Readiness, serving as Key Volunteer Advisor to the 1st Marine Division.As Key Volunteer Advisor in 2003, she worked alongside Karen Guenther to support returning wounded at the Naval Hospital at Camp Pendleton, which led to the creation of Semper Fi & America's Fund.Sondria's contributions to Family Readiness earned her induction into the US Field Artillery Honorable Order of Molly Pitcher in 1993. In 2007, her work with Semper Fi & America's Fund was recognized by Cookie Magazine with the 1st Annual Smart Cookie Award, honoring women making a difference.Raised and educated in Fairfax, VA, Sondria has extensive experience in small business ownership and management. She has been married to her husband Ben, a retired Marine Colonel, for 38 years, and they have two adult sons.Support the showConfessions of a Reluctant Caregiver Sisterhood of Care, LLC Website: www.confessionsofareluctantcaregiver.com Like us on Facebook! Tweet with us on Twitter! Follow us on Instagram! Watch us on Youtube! Pin us on Pinterest! Link us on LinkedIn!Tune in on Whole Care Network

Last time we spoke about the battle of Ormoc Bay. Amid the fierce Battle of Leyte in November 1944, American and Japanese forces clashed across rugged terrains and stormy weather. A typhoon swept the island, halting supply lines, while Colonel Verbeck's forces launched a determined assault on Breakneck Ridge, advancing against Colonel Miyauchi's well-defended lines. Meanwhile, Japanese reinforcements suffered devastating losses from American air raids. Through relentless attacks and strategic maneuvers, the Americans gained ground, signalling the turning point toward Japanese retreat and Allied victory on Leyte. Meanwhile a Japanese convoy led by Rear-Admiral Sato suffered devastating losses to Allied submarines and air attacks while attempting to transport troops. Concurrently, Australian and American forces launched aggressive operations in New Guinea, and American B-29 Superfortresses, despite some challenges, intensified the bombing campaign against Japan. This episode is the Fall of Peleliu Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In our previous update, General Gill's 32nd Division had arrived to relieve the exhausted 24th Division and take charge of the main offensive down the Ormoc Valley. During this lull in the battle, General Kataoka took advantage of the pause to reposition his 1st Division and ordered Colonel Miyauchi's 57th Regiment to counterattack toward Breakneck Ridge. The counterattack had limited success, ultimately leaving the 57th Regiment significantly weakened. On November 16, Colonel John Hettinger's 128th Regiment moved in to relieve the 21st Regiment at Breakneck Ridge but was unable to capture Corkscrew Ridge following a fierce battle. Simultaneously, General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry was deployed to secure and patrol the Mount Minoro area, while Colonel Clifford's reinforced 1st Battalion advanced to Kilay Ridge behind Japanese lines, where it faced artillery fire and unsuccessfully attempted to link up with Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion roadblock on Highway 2. To the south, the 32nd Regiment moved toward Baybay to launch a second push toward Ormoc, initiating an advance north to the Damulaan-Caridad area on November 14. Meanwhile, General Yamagata's 26th Division, including Colonel Saito Jiro's 13th Independent Regiment, advanced in the same direction with plans to assault Burauen, setting up a confrontation with the American forces on Shoestring Ridge. By November 17, Hettinger's 1st Battalion had entrenched on the slopes of Corkscrew Ridge while the 3rd Battalion progressed roughly 1,000 yards down the highway, securing a ridge about 500 yards north of Limon. At the same time, Clifford's patrols finally made contact with Chapman's 2nd Battalion, but they struggled to establish a communication line due to the strong enemy presence between them. The following day, Clifford positioned machine guns for a firefight against the enemy on a ridge to the southeast. Throughout the night and into November 19, Japanese machine-gun fire targeted the perimeter, successfully disabling one gun and surrounding Clifford's southernmost outpost, eventually forcing the Americans to withdraw. Meanwhile, Hettinger's 1st Battalion launched another assault on Corkscrew Ridge on November 18, though it achieved only minor gains. Additionally, Colonel Kora Keijiro's 49th Regiment infiltrated the enemy's left flank, initiating a two-pronged advance toward Colasian and Capoocan, but this had limited impact on Gill's offensive. As a result, Hettinger's 1st Battalion continued its siege of Corkscrew Ridge until November 20, while the 3rd Battalion held positions on a ridge overlooking Limon. On November 20 and 21, Japanese forces also gained ground against Clifford's defenses on Kilay Ridge. At the same time, the 32nd Regiment had established a defensive stance on Shoestring Ridge, while the 13th Independent Regiment fortified the opposite ridge with trenches, machine-gun pits, and other installations, sending a reinforced battalion eastward toward Burauen. On November 22, the 11th Airborne Division arrived to relieve the 7th Division, which subsequently redeployed to the west coast. Gill resumed his offensive, sending Hettinger's 2nd and 3rd Battalions south while the 1st Battalion contained Corkscrew Ridge. The Americans fought their way to Limon, establishing defensive positions along a tributary of the Leyte River south of the town after repelling a fierce Japanese counterattack. Meanwhile, Japanese assaults intensified on Kilay Ridge, pushing back Clifford's troops, though they held firm. Fortunately, the Japanese did not press further on November 23, as Kataoka needed to reorganize his forces following the fall of Limon. To support the division's left flank along the Limon-Ormoc highway, he dispatched the 49th Regiment and his reserve battalion, coinciding with the arrival of the 1st Regiment to reinforce the heavily weakened 57th Regiment. However, the withdrawal of the 49th created a significant gap between the 1st and 102nd Divisions, which the 126th Regiment quickly exploited, advancing through the Hill 1525 area to strike at the enemy's rear. The 128th Regiment also took this time to realign and consolidate its positions, focusing the next three days on extensive patrols and placing harassing fire along an east-west ridge overlooking the highway about 1,000 yards south of Limon. Additionally, on November 24, the 112th Cavalry began advancing southwest from Mount Minoro toward the highway with a similar objective. With the occupation of Limon, the Battle of Breakneck Ridge concluded, costing the 24th and 32nd Divisions a total of 1,498 casualties, while the Japanese suffered an estimated 5,252 fatalities and had eight captured. The American victory was largely aided by the establishment of a roadblock south of Limon by Chapman's 2nd Battalion and the defense of Kilay Ridge in the Japanese rear by Clifford's battalion.  From November 12 to 23 the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment had defended the roadblock under extremely difficult conditions. The operations report of the 24th Division graphically summarizes the deeds for which the battalion received a presidential citation: “These bearded, mud caked soldiers came out of the mountains exhausted and hungry. Their feet were heavy, cheeks hollow, bodies emaciated, and eyes glazed. They had seen thirty-one comrades mortally wounded, watched fifty-five others lie suffering in muddy foxholes without adequate medical attention. Yet their morale had not changed. It was high when they went in and high when they came out. They were proud that they had rendered invaluable aid to the main forces fighting in Ormoc corridor, by disrupting the Japanese supply lines and preventing strong reinforcements from passing up the Ormoc road. They were proud that they had outfought the Emperor's toughest troops, troops that had been battle trained in Manchuria. They were certain they had killed at least 606 of the enemy and felt that their fire had accounted for many more. And they were proud that this had all been accomplished despite conditions of extreme hardship. 241 of the battalion's officers and enlisted men were hospitalized for skin disorders, foot ulcers, battle fatigue, and sheer exhaustion.” These units, facing constant fire and heavily outnumbered, prevented General Suzuki from reinforcing Limon. Abandoning a potential counteroffensive here, Suzuki redirected his primary efforts to the Burauen front for his Wa offensive. Despite Yamagata's preparations for combat, the effectiveness of the 26th Division depended heavily on acquiring more heavy weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Thus, a convoy with three transports and a submarine chaser departed Manila on November 23, carrying the essential supplies to Ormoc. As night fell over Shoestring Ridge, Saito finally launched his main offensive against the stretched defenses of the 32nd Regiment. Artillery, mortars, and machine guns provided cover for two companies advancing forward to capture sections of the ridge. The next morning, the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment reorganized its defensive positions, enabling the Americans to push back a Japanese force that had penetrated south of the Palanas River and east of Hill 918. Meanwhile, General Tominaga initiated a large-scale air offensive to support Operation TA's latest convoy, deploying sixty planes from the 2nd Air Division to strike the Leyte airfields, while thirty Navy aircraft targeted enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. Over the next four days, daily air attacks were conducted in the Leyte area, and the 7th Air Division carried out coordinated strikes against enemy bases on Morotai. However, on November 24, the convoy's transports were sunk by an air attack off Masbate Island, just as another convoy consisting of three transports and one destroyer was dispatched to Ormoc. This convoy was similarly destroyed the next day off Marinduque Island by carrier aircraft, resulting in a complete operational failure. Back in Leyte, on the night of November 24, Saito's troops launched another ferocious assault on enemy positions, beginning with the heaviest artillery barrage the 32nd Regiment had yet encountered. The Americans quickly responded with their own supporting weapons, effectively repelling repeated Japanese attacks. Only Company K was pushed back, but American artillery, mortars, and machine guns prevented the Japanese from exploiting this breakthrough. After failing to penetrate the front lines, Saito's troops desperately attempted to neutralize the artillery supporting the 32nd Regiment before ultimately retreating, allowing the defenders to regroup. By nightfall, the Japanese employed the same tactics as in their previous assault but were ultimately pushed back after a fierce grenade battle and some close-quarters fighting. At the same time, Kataoka's newly deployed reserve battalion launched an attack on Kilay Ridge during the night. However, the weary defenders were able to fend off the assault, resulting in casualties for both sides. After reinforcing Shoestring Ridge, the 32nd Regiment faced another attack on the night of November 26.  At 2100 Colonel Saito renewed the assault against the American position, following the pattern set by the previous night actions. The Japanese first laid down mortar and machine gun fire, and then heavy-weapons fire of the 13th Infantry Regiment hit the right platoons of Company G, shifting to the east in about fifteen minutes. Immediately afterward, about a battalion of Japanese infantry attacked Company G, while twelve machine guns started to fire from a ridge 1,200 yards to the east. The Japanese moved into the fire of their own heavy weapons. The 32d Infantry, using all of its artillery batteries, mortars, machine guns, and rifles, started throwing lead against the enemy force as fast as its men could load and fire. The Japanese, employing an estimated fifty machine guns, continued to come on. "All hell broke loose" as the enemy shot off flares to guide their own artillery fire. The sharp declivity in front of the American lines did not allow for a close concentration of friendly artillery fire. Just as it appeared that the lines were to be overrun, some more enemy flares went up, and the Japanese withdrew, covered by heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Colonel Finn, taking advantage of this fortunate circumstance, hastily rearranged riflemen to fill gaps caused by casualties and replenished his ammunition supplies. The mortars of the regiment continued to fire into the draw. After a short lull Colonel Saito renewed the attack. There was no preparatory artillery fire, but the mortars and machine guns introduced the assault. The attack did not seem as determined as the previous one, though the number of troops was apparently about the same. The 32d Infantry again called down all types of fire upon the enemy. Elements of the 13th Infantry Regiment continued to advance, although "the carnage was terriffic," and attempted to pass through the American lines. A strong enemy group moved into a bamboo grove on a nose in front of the center platoon of G Company. From this position the enemy launched an attack which the company resisted with grenades and bayonets. As Colonel Finn later reported: "The battle continued to flare up and die down as the valiant soldiers fought like devils to hold our lines." The 81-mm. mortars from the mortar platoon of H Company fired 650 rounds in five minutes, and fire from the 60-mm. mortars was "practically automatic." After an hour's intense fighting, the enemy force withdrew. Unbeknownst to the Americans, however, the left and center platoons of Company G fell back in confusion during the fight, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate the American lines in the bamboo thicket previously occupied by the center platoon. The Japanese had not attacked the left flank of Company G. These troops heard the battle raging to the right and the sounds of the Japanese forming below them. A non-commissioned officer in charge of a listening post sent a man to get permission for his 3-man group to withdraw. After receiving permission he shouted the order from a distance of 50 yards. As the men from the listening post started back, they were joined by the left platoon and two squads from the center platoon. Within 45 minutes the two platoons, less one squad, plus the section of heavy machine guns, were moving south on the highway. "There was no thought in their minds that the withdrawal was not authorized." After proceeding down the road 250 yards they met the executive officer of Company H who ordered them back. It was too late, the damage was done. Though the left platoon was able to regain its position without trouble, the two squads from the center platoon found the enemy well dug-in in the bamboo thicket where the squads had been. It was later learned that there were about 200 hostile troops with 20 machine guns in the thicket. The Japanese were within the American lines and in a position from which they could fire on A Battery and the flanks of Companies E, L, I, and K. Although the surprised defenders managed to contain the infiltrators—who seemingly did not recognize the Americans' precarious situation, as they made no attempt to capitalize on it—the situation remained unstable until the 1st Battalion, 184th Regiment arrived on November 27 and regained the lost ground. At this point, all the assault elements of General Arnold's 7th Division had crossed to the eastern shore of the Camotes Sea, and reinforcements were en route. On November 28, the 184th Regiment relieved the exhausted defenders on Shoestring Ridge and successfully repelled a small Japanese attack that night. Meanwhile, Yamashita decided to shift most of his division toward Burauen to initiate Suzuki's planned offensive, leaving only a small detachment to prevent the Americans from reaching Albuera and cutting off the base of his attack. By the end of November, the 184th had successfully taken control of Shoestring Ridge and the Bloody Bamboo Thicket, although it was unable to advance further north due to the enemy's strong resistance. At the same time, Tominaga made an unsuccessful attempt to drop off a raiding unit over Burauen on November 26, marking the first use of a tactic that would be repeated in the coming weeks. On November 27, Admiral Okawachi launched another convoy carrying heavy equipment for the 26th Division, which successfully reached Ormoc Bay overnight. However, it was intercepted by PT boats the following day, resulting in the loss of one frigate and one subchaser during the encounter. The convoy faced further attacks from aircraft on November 29, which sank one transport before the remaining ships departed for Manila. On their return journey, the last two vessels were ultimately destroyed by air strikes. Back in Leyte, on November 29, Clifford's exhausted troops managed to fend off one final heavy assault before being relieved by Hettinger's 2nd Battalion. By the end of the month, the Americans had solidified their positions on Kilay and Shoestring Ridges and were prepared to advance their two offensives against Ormoc. However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to Peleliu, where Colonel Nakagawa's remaining 700 men continued to hold out against American assaults with their dwindling strength. At the beginning of November, Colonel Watson's 323rd Regiment had taken over the task of neutralizing the Umurbrogol Pocket, with Colonel Dark's 3rd Battalion on Walt Ridge and Mortimer Valley being the last unit remaining from the 321st Regiment. After a brief pause in combat at the end of October, operations became more active again on November 2. Watson's 2nd Battalion successfully attacked the Five Sisters from the southwest, while elements of the 1st Battalion advanced north along the ridges west of Death Valley, pursuing the remaining Japanese forces from South Pocket. Meanwhile, part of the 3rd Battalion moved slowly south through the ridges and rugged terrain at the northern end of China Wall. However, before Watson could continue his offensive, heavy rains began on November 4, escalating into a typhoon that persisted for four days. By November 12, no significant progress had been made by any unit, with slow patrols and sandbagging ongoing. The 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and elements of the 321st Regiment focused on securing additional offshore islets north of Peleliu. Attacks in the Umurbrogol resumed on November 13, with Watson's 1st Battalion advancing eastward from the ridges west of Death Valley, and his 2nd Battalion pushing north into the gorge and Wildcat Bowl, though little ground was gained in the following days. Despite this slow advancement, a key center of resistance was identified in the rough terrain west of central Death Valley. On November 16, oil was sent forward through a hose from fuel tanks set up in covered positions 300 yards distant and poured into a large cave which seemed to be the center of the new-found defenses. Ignited by white phosphorus hand grenades lobbed into the cave, the flaming oil produced such promising results in driving Japanese into the open or killing them, that the same method of conquest continued to be used by the 1st Battalion and in other parts of the pocket. Over the next five days, tanks and LVT-flamethrowers targeted enemy caves at the bases of China Wall and Five Brothers, effectively destroying or sealing all accessible enemy positions and leaving Nakagawa with only 150 men still capable of fighting. By November 21, infantry patrols could operate largely unimpeded throughout Wildcat Bowl and the southern section of Death Valley. The next day, the 323rd launched an assault on the China Wall, where the majority of Nakagawa's weary troops were entrenched, effectively compressing the enemy into a space measuring 125 yards wide by 285 yards long. Meanwhile, on November 23, Five Brothers Ridge was finally cleared. The following day, a second assault on the China Wall gained additional ground, leaving only 57 enemy troops alive. To enable tanks and LVT-flamethrowers to access the central hollow of China Wall, engineers began constructing a ramp up the east wall at the northern end of Wildcat Bowl. As the ramp ascended, Nakagawa realized his situation was hopeless.  On November 24th, Nakagawa burnt the regimental colors and performed harakiri.  He was posthumously promoted to lieutenant general for his valor displayed on Peleliu. His final message to General Inoue read  “Our sword is broken, and we have run out of spears.” The 57 remaining soldiers were divided into 17 small teams, instructed to hide during the day and raid American positions at night. With the enemy largely absent, American forces cautiously advanced into the area. On November 26, tanks and LVT-flamethrowers moved up the completed ramp to bombard caves and other defenses in the hollow center of China Wall. The next morning, as units from the north and south finally linked up, Watson declared that hostilities had come to an end. What General Rupertus had anticipated would last only four days had, in fact, extended to nearly two and a half months. The 323rd suffered significant losses during that battle, with approximately 118 soldiers killed and 420 wounded. The overall casualties for the Battle of Peleliu reached over 1,573 American deaths and 6,531 injuries. In contrast, the Japanese forces experienced a total of 10,695 men killed and 301 taken prisoner. Although the fighting was officially declared over and Peleliu secured, isolated groups and individual Japanese troops remained hidden in pockets and caves, primarily in the northern part of the island and the Umurbrogol mountains. For several months afterward, the units of the 81st Division assigned to garrison the island continued to root out stragglers and seal off caves. Many of these soldiers would survive in the mountains and swamps until the war's conclusion and beyond. In fact a Japanese lieutenant with 26 men of the 2nd Infantry soldiers and eight 45th Guard Force sailors held out in the caves in Peleliu until April 22nd of 1947 and surrendered after a Japanese admiral convinced them the war was over. The effort to reduce the Japanese pocket around Umurbrogol Mountain is often regarded as the most challenging battle faced by the U.S. military throughout the entire war. The 1st Marine Division suffered heavy losses and remained inactive until the invasion of Okinawa began on April 1, 1945. During their month on Peleliu, the 1st Marine Division incurred over 6,500 casualties, representing more than one-third of the division's strength. The 81st Infantry Division also experienced significant losses, with approximately 3,300 casualties during their time on the island. Postwar analyses indicated that U.S. forces required more than 1,500 rounds of ammunition to kill each Japanese defender. They expended a staggering 13.32 million rounds of .30-caliber ammunition, 1.52 million rounds of .45-caliber, 693,657 rounds of .50-caliber bullets, 118,262 hand grenades, and 150,000 mortar rounds.The battle sparked considerable controversy in the United States, as many believed that the high number of American casualties was unjustified for an island with minimal strategic importance. The Japanese defenders were incapable of hindering potential U.S. operations in the Philippines, and the airfield captured on Peleliu did not significantly influence subsequent military actions. Instead, the Ulithi Atoll in the Caroline Islands was utilized as a staging ground for the Okinawa invasion. The casualty rate from this battle surpassed that of any other amphibious operation in the Pacific War. Moreover, coverage of the battle was limited, as only six reporters were motivated to report from the shore, influenced by General Rupertus's prediction of a quick victory within three days. The battle also received less attention due to General MacArthur's return to the Philippines and the Allies' advance toward Germany in Europe. The battles for Angaur and Peleliu illustrated the typical patterns of Japanese island defense, yet few adjustments were made for the subsequent battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Naval bombardment before the amphibious assault at Iwo Jima proved to be only marginally more effective than at Peleliu, while the preliminary shelling for Okinawa saw significant improvements. Underwater demolition teams, known as frogmen, conducted operations at Iwo Jima that confused the enemy by targeting both coasts, but this tactic later alerted Japanese defenders to the precise assault beaches during the Okinawa invasion. American ground forces gained valuable experience at Peleliu in assaulting heavily fortified positions similar to those they would encounter again at Okinawa. Admiral William Halsey Jr. recommended canceling the planned occupation of Yap Island in the Caroline Islands. He also suggested that the landings at Peleliu and Angaur be abandoned in favor of deploying their Marines and soldiers to Leyte Island; however, this recommendation was ultimately overruled by Admiral Nimitz. Turning our attention to China, we need to discuss the conclusion of the pivotal Operation Ichi-Go, as the 11th and 23rd Armies pressed on with their offensives against Guilin and Liuzhou. Back in August, following battles in Hunan and Guangdong, the 11th and 23rd Armies of the IJA initiated offensives toward Guilin and Liuzhou, respectively. The NRA troops defending the region were primarily remnants from the Battle of Hengyang, resulting in only 20,000 soldiers being present in Guilin on November 1 when the Japanese commenced their assault on the city. The Chinese government recognized that it could not hold Guilin but chose to prolong the battle for political reasons, sending food and supplies to those besieged. Most civilians had fled Guilin weeks earlier, leaving the city heavily scorched by fire. Defenses were reinforced with pillboxes, barbed wire, and Guangxi troops commanded by Muslim General Bai Chongxi. General Joseph Stilwell, who had a good relationship with Bai, made considerable efforts to supply American munitions to Bai's forces. Trenches were also dug throughout the hilly terrain. By early November, General Yokoyama's forces had effectively surrounded Guilin, with the 3rd and 13th Divisions ready to advance toward Liuzhou, while General Tanaka's units were also preparing to move north following the fall of Wuxuan. Consequently, most of Yokoyama's troops continued to tighten their grip on Guilin, where the determined defenders inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese as they facilitated the withdrawal of American personnel. Additionally, the 13th Division advanced through Yongfu on November 6, the 3rd Division captured Luzhaizhen on November 8, and the 104th Division began its movement toward the area west of Liuzhou. On November 9, just as the 11th Army initiated its main assault on Guilin, General Okamura assigned the 3rd and 13th Divisions to the 23rd Army to enhance coordination for the attack on Liuzhou. Fortunately for them, the Chinese forces offered minimal resistance, leading to the city and its airfield falling the next day. Simultaneously, with the support of the 5th Air Army, Yokoyama successfully captured Guilin, achieving the primary goal of Operation Togo II.  To eliminate the retreating enemy forces, the 23rd Army continued its advance westward. On November 15, the 104th Division took Xincheng, while the 3rd Division captured Yizhou and the 13th Division moved towards Hechi, effectively cutting off the Chinese retreat and destroying the remaining enemy troops. The 3rd Division then advanced north, capturing Huanjian on November 27, while the 13th Division continued west, successfully taking Nandan on November 28 and Dushan on December 2. In response, Tanaka dispatched the 22nd Division and the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade to capture Nanning, which fell by November 28. By early December, elements of the 22nd Division joined forces with the Indochinese garrison near Shangsi, marking the conclusion of Operation Ichi-Go. After ten days of fierce fighting, the Japanese forces captured Guilin and entered Liuzhou on the same day. Sporadic fighting persisted as Chinese forces retreated rapidly. By November 24, the Japanese had taken control of 75 counties in Guangxi, encompassing about two-thirds of the region. Reports indicate that they killed 215,000 civilians in reprisals and during crossfire, injuring over 431,000. After the fall of Guilin and Liuzhou, the majority of NRA troops lost their morale and retreated without ever confronting the enemy, leading to significant losses in both equipment and personnel. This event became one of the most devastating defeats of the entire Second Sino-Japanese War. Nevertheless, despite having destroyed the airbases in this area, the USAAF could still launch attacks on the Japanese mainland from their other bases. While the Japanese achieved some objectives of Operation Ichigo, it ultimately expanded the territory they needed to defend and significantly weakened their lines, creating a favorable scenario for future counterattacks by Chinese forces. After destroying enemy air bases and annihilating the main enemy forces in the Guilin-Liuzhen area, the 6th Area Army assigned the 22nd Division and the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade to the 11th Army to secure strategic locations in the region, while the 23rd Army returned to Guangzhou and the Leizhou Peninsula. By the operation's end, Japanese losses were estimated at around 100,000 killed, 200,000 wounded, and significant material losses, including 1,938 small river vessels and 367 aircraft. In contrast, Chinese losses totaled approximately 310,000 killed, 410,000 wounded, and 80,000 captured, along with substantial war material losses, including 312 Allied aircraft, resulting in the deaths of 100 Americans. Additionally, the entire Japanese offensive resulted in the deaths of approximately 500,000 civilians. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fight on Leyte gruels on as the fight for Peleliu finally came to an end. The controversial battle of Peleliu would have major ramifications for American planners going forward. In China, absolute horror was continuing to be inflicted upon the Chinese people, leaving to the massacre of hundreds of thousands in a war that just never seemed like it would end.

In this episode, Sean and James discuss Part 5 of The Pacific, in which Eugene Sledge goes into combat for the first time. Sledge is briefly reunited with Phillips on Pavuvu before Phillips departs to return home to Mobile. Sledge meets Merriell "Snafu" Shelton, R.V. Burgin, Bill Leyden, Gunny Haney, and his company commander Andy Haldane, all of whom will be his companions in the fighting come.  Later, the 1st Marine Division lands at Peleliu, where they encounter stiff resistance from the Japanese defenders.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Lt. Col. Matthew Perry is an active-duty Marine with over 16 years of experience in the infantry and reconnaissance community. He has served in all four Marine Divisions and deployed throughout the Pacific and in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.As an infantry officer, he served in the 7th Marines as a rifle platoon and 81mm Mortar Platoon Commander, with the 2nd Marine Division as an infantry Battalion Executive Officer and as the operations officer at the 2nd Marine Regiment.As a Reconnaissance officer, he served as a Force Platoon Commander and Force Company Commander with 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion and as the Operations Officer at 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion.His civilian education includes an undergraduate degree from Louisiana State University and a graduate degree from Syracuse University. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps Infantry Officer and Basic Reconnaissance courses and Army Ranger School.Instagram: www.instagram.com/redstick6/Timestamps:00:00:21 Introduction to Matthew Perry00:01:22 Matthew Perry's Career & Educational Background00:05:12 Writing & Social Media00:07:47 Reading List & Recommended Resources for Leadership00:09:38 Vietnam00:11:30 Practical Leadership Experience - Becoming a Better Leader00:15:11 Important Mistakes & Valuable Lessons00:23:16 Performance & Potential00:27:10 Incentivizing Your Team00:32:52 Basic Reconnaissance Course (BRC) & Recon Qualification00:38:06 Haircuts, Sideburns, and Shaving00:43:28 How to Scale Your Leadership 00:50:40 The Role of Health and Physical Fitness in Leadership01:00:45 Wrap Up

Previously limited by a heart murmur, Eugene Sledge enlists in the Marines and trains for combat, while Leckie and the 1st Marine Division are put into action at Cape Gloucester. The relentless rain and jungle environment takes its toll on the Marines. Leckie is treated for nocturnal enuresis caused by combat stress and is hospitalized for a number of weeks. The Marines (including both Sledge and Leckie) arrive on Pavuvu, which serves as a temporary base for the 1st Marine Division. Meanwhile, Basilone continues to promote war bonds in the U. S. but becomes increasingly disenchanted and longs to return to combat.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Lt. Col. Tom Williams USMC (Ret.) - Doorsteps of Hell: The Arizona & Tropical Jungles 1969 -1970; The Heart of a Marine Series, Book 1. This is episode 721 of Teaching Learning Leading K12, an audio podcast. On 20 December 1944, Tom Williams was born Tom Collins in Savannah, GA. Abandonment by his biological father at the age of six months old, profoundly impacted Tom's early life causing his mother to farm him out to relatives while she worked to make a living for them both.  At the age of six years old, Tom's mother met and married U.S. Air Force Major Carl F. Williams Jr. This fortuitous marriage would bring about a radical change in Tom's life. As a military dependent, he immediately found himself traveling the world, living in foreign lands, learning about Ancient Roman history and archaeology, assimilating a basic conversance in the French, Arabic, and Japanese Languages, as well as being immersed in their respective cultures. After Tom's dad retired, his family moved to the Williams' ancestral homestead established in 1832, in Dooly County Georgia. Yet again, living, working, and learning to manage the family farm would have another major influence on Tom's future interests, especially regarding his love for the agrarian way of life.  From 1964-68 Tom attended North Georgia College (NGC) acquiring a BA degree in history and a minor in psychology and political science. He then attended the Marine Corps' Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Quantico, Va., where he set the Marine Corps' record of 52 seconds for the Obstacle Courses and was the Platoon Honor Man. He then completed The Basic School (TBS) for all newly commissioned Marine Corps 2nd lieutenants, also at Quantico, graduating in the top 10% of his class. Before leaving Quantico, Tom then attended and graduated from High Intensity Language Training (HILT) for Vietnamese.  As an infantry officer, Tom deployed as a 2nd lieutenant to Vietnam in 1969-70 where he commanded an infantry platoon in Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, followed by commanding a reconnaissance platoon as a 1st lieutenant in Alpha Company, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division.  Subsequent to this combat tour, Tom commanded the Shore Party Platoon at the 1st Marine Brigade, followed by commanding the 81mm Mortar Platoon in 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, Hawaii. Twenty-five months later, on two days' notice, Tom was redeployed back to Vietnam, as a captain, where he served as a school trained aerial observer.  During this second combat deployment, Tom was imbedded with a Vietnamese O-1 Bird Dog squadron flying 183 combat missions from Hue Phu Bai Airfield, during the 1972 Easter Offensive. During his twenty-nine-year career, Tom participated in six amphibious deployments: four Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). In 1976 as a school trained Communications Officer, he participated in the Non-Combat Evacuation Operation (NEO) of Beirut, Lebanon. In 1980-83, under secret orders, he was assigned as the regimental operations officer for developing the one-of-a-kind Mechanized Combined-Arms Task Force (MCATF), at Twenty-nine Palms, CA. In 1983-86, he was the Infantry Weapons Officer at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) Washington, DC, responsible for replacing or improving all Marine Corps infantry weapons. From 1986-90, he was the Amphibious Operations Officer for Commander Sixth Fleet's NATO staff, Commander Striking Forces South (CSFS) in Naples, Italy, responsible for coordinating all NATO amphibious training exercises throughout the Mediterranean Sea. That was followed by his participation in the First Gulf War, 1990-91, as a G3 operations officer with I MEF HQ.  His last major active-duty assignment was as the G3 for the first Marine Component HQ to the European Command (EUCOM), in Stuttgart, Germany, 1993-96.  After retiring in 1997, he spent eleven years as a contract mentor and trainer, six years in Saudi Arabia (1998-06) and five years in Afghanistan (2006-12).  Currently, he lives an agrarian life on a 75-acre cattle property, Camelot, located on the Lamington Rain Forest Plateau in southeastern Queensland, Australia. He raises beef cattle, sells free-range eggs, and is a beekeeper, a gardener, and is developing his home into a Bed & Breakfast, while also writing a series of books, Heart of a Marine, in which he shares his Marine Corps experiences and his life's lessons learned. Our focus will be Col. Williams book series Heart of a Marine - Book 1 - Doorsteps of Hell: The Arizona & Tropical Jungles 1969-1970 Incredible book. Amazing conversation. So much to learn. Before you go... You could help support this podcast by Buying Me A Coffee. Not really buying me something to drink but clicking on the link on my home page at https://stevenmiletto.com for Buy Me a Coffee or by going to this link Buy Me a Coffee. This would allow you to donate to help the show address the costs associated with producing the podcast from upgrading gear to the fees associated with producing the show. That would be cool. Thanks for thinking about it.  Hey, I've got another favor...could you share the podcast with one of your friends, colleagues, and family members? Hmmm? What do you think? Thank you! You are AWESOME! Connect & Learn More: www.heartofamarineseries.com https://www.facebook.com/heartofamarineseries https://www.instagram.com/heartofamarineseries/ info@heartofamarineseries.com Length - 01:10:27

Tony Trzeciak is a Philadelphia native, husband and father of four. He served in the United States Marine Corps from 2008 to 2012. Assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, Kilo Company, Tony completed a combat tour in Afghanistan and a humanitarian mission in Haiti with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. Sadly due to injuries and medical malpractice Tony was paralyzed, which led to many life-saving surgeries, depression, suicide ideation and drug abuse. Tony has triumphed over those daunting challenges and is using his life experiences to help other veterans and military members in need of help and support. Today, he channels his passion for finance into his roles as an angel investor, entrepreneur, and work on AI projects in finance and sports with chata.ai. As the personification of resilience, personal empowerment and personal well-being, Tony joins Dr. Chris Meek on Next Steps Forward to discuss how he managed to navigate through the worst times and come out on the other side stronger, how his experiences with paralysis changed and reinforced his sense of purpose, his transition from a military mindset to a business mindset and how he evaluates risk as an entrepreneur.

The 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal is relieved and arrives in Melbourne, Australia. Battle weary, many Marines go AWOL, engaging in drunken escapades. Leckie falls in love with an Australian girl of Greek descent, who invites him to stay at her parents' home. Not wanting to go through the pain of losing him, Stella breaks up with Leckie and tells him not to return. As a result, Leckie becomes belligerently drunk; when his friend Lew Juergens asks Leckie to relieve him on guard duty so he can urinate, an officer catches him, culminating in Leckie pulling a sidearm and both he and Juergens are punished and demoted. Basilone receives the Medal of Honor for his actions on Guadalcanal and is sent home to sell war bonds.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This week Seth and Bill and good buddy Jon Parshall get into the US Marine Corps side of the campaign ashore for Okinawa. The team begins their coverage, fittingly, at the beginning of the month of May 1945 and talk about the situation as it stands ashore at the beginning of the month before getting into the early fighting against the Awacha Pocket by the 1st Marine Division and then getting deep into the weeds on the final Japanese offensive of World War II against the Americans. The disasterous offensive costs the Japanese lives by the bushel--and for nothing. Then the team gets into the incredibly brutal fight for Half Moon Hill, the Horseshoe and Sugar Loaf Hill by the 6th Marine division before talking about the oft-forgotten 1st Marine Division's struggles at Wana Ridge and Wana Draw. Medal of Honor recipients Louis Hauge, James Day and Henry Courtney highlight the exceptional bravery of the Marine Corps' trials ashore at Okinawa. #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum #essex #halsey #taskforce38 #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum #hollywood #movie #movies #books #mastersoftheair #8thairforce #mightyeighth #100thbombgroup #bloodyhundredth #b17 #boeing #airforce wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum #hollywood #movie #movies #books #oldbreed #1stMarineDivision #thepacific #Peleliu #army #marines #marinecorps #worldwar2 #worldwar #worldwarii #leytegulf #battleofleytegulf #rodserling #twilightzone #liberation #blacksheep #power #prisoner #prisonerofwar #typhoon #hurricane #weather #iwojima#bullhalsey #ace #p47 #p38 #fighter #fighterpilot #b29 #strategicstudying #tokyo #boeing #incendiary #usa #franklin #okinawa

Last time we spoke about the conquest of Angaur and the Japanese Triumph in China. By October 18th, the remaining Japanese on Angaur were compressed into a small area, and by the 21st, resistance had ceased. The Americans suffered 264 killed and 1,355 wounded, while approximately 1,300 Japanese were killed. Over in China, Hara's forces suffered heavy losses during a delaying action at Momauk, with troops joining Bhamo's defense by November 16. The 113th Regiment maneuvered to encircle Bhamo from the south, while the 114th Regiment approached from the north, creating a loose encirclement. The 22nd Division's movement prompted concerns of severing key rail lines, leading Japanese forces to reposition defensively. Despite intense fighting, including a strong Chinese offensive on November 19, the Japanese withdrew from key positions, allowing Chinese forces to capture Mangshi and secure a strategic airfield for resupply, significantly impacting the campaign's dynamics. This episode is the Formosa Air Battle Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last saw on Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division, bolstered by Colonel Dark's 321st Regiment, successfully secured the island after approximately two weeks of intense fighting. However, Colonel Nakagawa's isolated and outnumbered garrison continued to resist in the Umurbrogol Pocket. As left by nature, the Umurbrogol Pocket was much like the Ibdi Pocket on Biak Island, but larger and rougher. Like Ibdi, the Umurbrogol originally had a thick cover of tropical trees and dense jungle undergrowth which, as the result of continued air, naval, and artillery bombardment (including extensive employment of aerial napalm strikes), was gradually knocked down or burned away. Again, as on Biak, the Japanese had improved upon nature. There were many artificial or semi-artificial caves which had been constructed to protect approaches to the inner sections of the pocket, and the Japanese had improved almost every natural cave. Where no caves were available or could be constructed, the defenders employed rock faults and crevices for defensive positions. Digging new entrances to existing caves or even cutting new levels within some caves, the Japanese were well prepared to execute a long and bloody holding action along the many ridges. These ridges, with the exception of the Five Sisters group at the southern side of the pocket, were generally parallel and oriented north-northeast to south-southwest. Steep-sided and fissured, many of them had razor-back summits upon which no cover could be found. The ridges were separated by deep draws, gullies, and wider valleys, the floors of which were strewn with coral boulders or coral outcroppings similar to stalagmites. Steep as they were, the sides of some ridges also were covered with such chunks and outcroppings. In late September, the exhausted infantrymen, who were tasked with containing the pocket while the Marines cleared northern Peleliu, made several heavy assaults. They only managed to reach the X-ray phase line, marking what was believed to be the northern edge of the core Japanese defenses, before being relieved by the 7th Marines. With Colonel Hanneken's 1st and 3rd Battalions now holding the X-ray line, Rupertus planned a strong attack southward while other Marine units maintained their positions on the western and southern sides of the pocket. On the morning of September 30, the attack was launched. However, fierce Japanese resistance, heavy rain, fog, and sickness hindered the 7th Marines' progress southward by October 2. On the following day, Hanneken's 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks, secured a foothold along the eastern side and top of Walt Ridge, while the 3rd Battalion finally captured the eastern slope of Boyd Ridge. By October 4, however, the 7th Marines had suffered such heavy losses and were so depleted that Rupertus was left with no choice but to relieve them as well. As a result, Colonel Harris's 5th Marines were once again thrust into action. On October 7, following an hour-long artillery and mortar barrage, the 3rd Battalion, along with six tanks, advanced into Mortimer Valley. However, Nakagawa's determined defenders continued to resist fiercely, successfully repelling two powerful tank-infantry assaults, causing heavy American casualties. Our old friend Eugene Sledge with K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, wrote about fighting in this area, it is as follows  “Johnny led us on up through a jumble of rocks on Hill 140. Company K's line was emplaced along a rock rim, and we set up the mortars in a shallow depression about twenty yards behind it. The riflemen and machine gunners in front of us were in among rocks along the rim of Hill 140 facing east toward Walt Ridge and the northern end of the infamous Horseshoe. We had previously attacked that valley from its southern end. From the rim of Hill 140 the rock contours dropped away in a sheer cliff to a canyon below. No one could raise his head above the rim rock without immediately drawing heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. The fighting around the pocket was as deadly as ever, but of a different type from the early days of the campaign. The Japanese fired few artillery or mortar barrages, just a few rounds at a time when assured of inflicting maximum casualties. That they usually did, and then secured the guns to escape detection. Sometimes there was an eerie quiet. We knew they were everywhere in the caves and pillboxes. But there was no firing in our area, only the sound of firing elsewhere. The silence added an element of unreality to the valleys. If we moved past a certain point, the Japanese opened up suddenly with rifle, machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It was like a sudden storm breaking. More often than not we had to pull back, and not a man in the company had seen a live enemy anywhere. They couldn't hope to drive us off by then or to be reinforced themselves. From that point onward, they killed solely for the sake of killing, without hope and without higher purpose. We were fighting in Peleliu's ridges and valleys, in terrain the likes of which most Americans could not even visualize, against an enemy unlike anything most Americans could imagine”. In response to this setback, Rupertus halted further offensive operations and ordered his forces to maintain pressure on the Japanese stronghold through sustained artillery fire and aerial bombardments. Over the next two days, this relentless bombardment cleared so much foliage and undergrowth that visibility across the ridges improved significantly. This allowed the attacks to resume on October 9, and although no ground was gained initially, Harris's 2nd Battalion succeeded in securing Wattie, Baldy, and 120 Ridges on October 10. They then pushed south to capture the tactically vital Hill 140. From this position, a Marine howitzer provided critical support to the 5th and 7th Marines as they cleared an area approximately 700 yards long and up to 200 yards east beyond the previous containment lines along West Road. However, on October 14, Dark's 321st Regiment began moving up to relieve the Marines, as General Geiger had decided to end Marine participation in the Battle of Peleliu.  Just before they were relieved, Eugene Sledge wrote a passage about moving through positions in October, finding numerous dead, stinking in the hot sun. One corpse he found made a significant impact on him, here is the passage. “As we moved past the defilade, my buddy groaned, “Jesus!” I took a quick glance into the depression and recoiled in revulsion and pity at what I saw. The bodies were badly decomposed and nearly blackened by exposure. This was to be expected of the dead in the tropics, but these Marines had been mutilated hideously by the enemy. One man had been decapitated. His head lay on his chest; his hands had been severed from his wrists and also lay on his chest near his chin. In disbelief I stared at the face as I realized that the Japanese had cut off the dead Marine's penis and stuffed it into his mouth. The corpse next to him had been treated similarly. The third had been butchered, chopped up like a carcass torn by some predatory animal. My emotions solidified into rage and a hatred for the Japanese beyond anything I ever had experienced. From that moment on I never felt the least pity or compassion for them no matter what the circumstances. My comrades would field-strip their packs and pockets for souvenirs and take gold teeth, but I never saw a Marine commit the kind of barbaric mutilation the Japanese committed if they had access to our dead. When we got back to the gun pit, my buddy said, “Sledgehammer, did you see what the Nips did to them bodies? Did you see what them poor guys had in their mouths?” I nodded as he continued, “Christ, I hate them slant-eyed bastards!” “Me too. They're mean as hell,” was all I could say.” About mid-October, a number of command changes occurred in the Palaus area. On the 12th, for instance, the 1st Marine Division was relieved of all responsibilities other than continuing the fight in the Umurbrogol Pocket. The 321st Infantry took over the defenses along the eastern arm, while the Island Garrison Force assumed responsibility for the area south of the pocket. On the morning of October 12, the command post of the 3rd Amphibious Corps moved ashore and General Geiger, the corps commander, declared that the assault and occupation phase of operations on Peleliu was ended. The exact meaning of this announcement is not clear, especially in relation to Admiral Fort's somewhat similar declaration of September 30, stating that Angaur, Peleliu, Ngesebus, and Kongauru had been captured and occupied. However, General Geiger's announcement seems to have been made in preparation for the 1st Marine Division's imminent departure from the Palaus. The statement also bears relation to the passing of control of operations in the Palaus from the 3rd Fleet and Admiral Halsey (as then represented by Admiral Fort's Western Attack Force headquarters) to the Headquarters, Forward Area Central Pacific (Task Force 57), under Admiral Hoover. On the 13th General Geiger issued orders alerting the 321st Regimental Combat Team to relieve the 1st Marine Division elements still at the Umurbrogol Pocket. The next day, control over all operations in the Palaus passed from Admiral Fort to Admiral Hoover's command. With the relief of the Marines at the Umurbrogol, the remainder of the battered 1st Marine Division then began preparations for leaving the Palaus. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 323rd Regiment, fresh from operations at Ulithi Atoll, started preparations to relieve Marine units in the southwest corner of the pocket, with the rest of the regiment to follow. Consequently, the Marines prepared to depart from the Palaus, with Dark taking over responsibility for the reduction of Umurbrogol. Since September 29, the Marines had endured an additional 1,000 casualties, bringing their total to 1,252 killed and 5,274 wounded. In return, they estimated having killed between 850 and 1,000 Japanese soldiers, leaving roughly 1,000 defenders in the shrinking pocket as the 321st moved back in. After a failed local attempt to capture the northernmost peak of the Five Brothers Ridge on October 16, Dark launched a general attack the next day, which resulted in a modest gain of about 125 yards and the neutralization of some caves to the east. On the morning of October 18, the attack resumed, with Dark's 2nd Battalion successfully capturing three peaks of the Five Brothers, thanks to support from mortars, tanks, and LVT-mounted flamethrowers. However, undeterred by this overwhelming firepower, the Japanese immediately counterattacked and reclaimed the three peaks by nightfall. On the southwest side of the pocket, Nakagawa had also sent infiltrators through tunnels and connecting caves to raid the enemy lines, forcing Geiger to redirect elements of the 7th Marines and 323rd Regiment to address this new southern pocket. After much effort, most of the infiltrators were finally pushed north on October 23, though mopping up in the Southern Pocket wasn't completed until November 3. Meanwhile, on October 19, following a deadly napalm strike, Dark's 1st Battalion advanced up to 50 yards along the ridges west of Hill 140 with the help of howitzers and much-needed sandbags. The battalion's men, lying prone on the ground, inched their sandbags forward with rifle butts or sticks, laboriously expanding their hold and almost realizing the infantrymen's dream of portable foxholes. The next day, General Mueller formally assumed command of the Peleliu campaign. Following some reconnaissance and a napalm strike, the 321st resumed its assault on October 21, making significant progress by advancing over 100 yards and capturing the northernmost peak of the Five Brothers. On the subsequent day, Dark launched a coordinated attack with his 2nd Battalion securing the first three Brothers, the reinforced 1st Battalion struggling to breach Death Valley, and the 3rd Battalion sweeping through Mortimer Valley with tank support. After this achievement, while Colonel Watson was bringing the remaining 323rd Regiment to the Umurbrogol area, the only major progress was the capture of the fourth Brother on October 23. Two days later, the 323rd began relieving the weary 321st Regiment. By this time, Dark had lost 146 men killed and 469 wounded on Peleliu. As Watson took over, Nakagawa's forces had been reduced to about 700 effective troops, including those lightly wounded. The pocket's dimensions had also been compressed to an average north-south length of about 600 yards. Fortunately for the defenders, heavy rains, fog, and poor visibility significantly hampered Watson's operations in the Umurbrogol Pocket from October 26 to November 1. This period was used mainly for mortar barrages, napalm strikes, defense enhancements, and extending sandbag fortifications. Despite this pause, Nakagawa launched near-nightly counterattacks over the six days, primarily targeting the Five Brothers, which mostly resulted in further casualties for the defenders. To understand the eventual reduction of the Umurbrogol Pocket, we will need to shift our focus to the plans and preparations for General MacArthur's grand return to the Philippines. Previously, General MacArthur, along with Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, decided to abandon the preliminary operations for Mindanao and Yap in favor of a direct assault on Leyte. To be much more frank General MacArthur was having a turf war with Admiral Nimitz. After the Marianas campaign, the endgame of Nimitz island hoping across the Pacific forced the Joint Chiefs of staff to make a choice, to invade the Philippines, or leave it to wither on the vine and instead invade formosa. Admiral King, the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Leahy and General Hap Arnold all favored the Formosa option. For quite awhile Nimitz got everyone onboard with this plan as Formosa was a logical choice being only 900 kms away from Japan and its seizure would cut off southeast asia from the home islands. With Formosa the Americans could even begin an invasion of southern CHina to aid their allies there and toss plenty of B-29s at the home islands from a much closer location. But then there was the force of nature that was Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur argued Formosa would be “a massive operation, extremely costly in men and shipping, logistically precarious and time consuming.” And he was willing to take his case straight to Washington. In July of 1944 he along with Nimitz went to Honolulu to meet with FDR. MacArthur bitterly protested the meeting, as he knew full well FDR was trying to get re-elected for a fourth term “humiliation of forcing me to leave my command to fly to Honolulu for a political picture taking junket.” So not to be outdone by FDR, MacArthur showboated, by landing early with. He went to a local shop in a limousine he borrowed, and had his staff place a 4 star general insignia upon. He wore khaki trousers a brown leather air force jacket and the cap of a Filipino Field Marshall, going out into public waving at crowds gathering to see the president. When he moved into a cabin to meet with FDR he refused to change into cooler attire stating to FDR , “you haven't been up there where I came from, and it's cold up there in the sky.” MacArthur then pretended Nimitz was not in the room and dominated the strategic discussions and attempted at every possible moment to impose his will on the rather ailing and sickly president, whose physical decline had become more apparent. During a private meeting between the two MacArthur said this to FDR “Mr. President, the country has forgiven you for what took place on Bataan. You hope to be re-elected president of the United States, but the nation will never forgive you if you approve a plan which leaves 17 million Christian American subjects to wither in the Philippines under the conqueror's heel until the peace treaty frees them. You might do it for reasons of strategy or tactics, but politically, it would ruin you” Rather ironic given it was his responsibility to defend those he was now blackmailing FDR to save. But the truth of the matter was, MacArthur had stolen the American press and American peoples hearts, his grand statement to return to the Philippines was a huge issue. There of course was the other issue, MacArthur could run on the Republican ticket against FDR. Some would allege FDR was bullied into an invasion of the Philippines because of this. To twist FDR's arm, MacArthur assured him the losses in retaking Luzon would be minimal “Mr. President, my losses would not be heavy, any more than they have been in the past … your good commanders do not turn in heavy losses.” Despite it being a slight against Nimitz, MacArthur's arguments did twist his wrist. That evening FDR spoke to his doctor Ross McIntire stating this “Give me an aspirin before I go to bed. In fact, give me another aspirin to take in the morning. In all my life nobody ever talked to me the way MacArthur did.” When leaving back on his plane, MacArthur turned to his aide and boasted, “We've sold it.” and when he returned to his South West Pacific Area Command HQ in Brisbane, MacArthur informed his staff, “the President has accepted my recommendations and approved the Philippines plan.” MacArthur was a bit too optimistic, although FDR agreed to invade the Philippines he did not do so without recommendations of his joint chiefs of staff. The Navy was to bear the brunt of furnishing air support in the early stages of the campaign. By arrangement with Admiral Nimitz, the Carrier Task Force from Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet was to strike northern Luzon and Okinawa or Formosa, or both, from A Day minus 10 to A minus 7. From A minus 4 through A Day, strikes were to be made on Luzon, the Cebu-Negros area, and the Leyte area in support of the landings. As soon as the Palau air base facilities would permit, shore-based air forces from the Central Pacific were to operate in the Bicol area. The Allied Naval Forces was to furnish carrier aircraft as protection for convoys and naval task forces and, supplemented by aircraft of the 3rd Fleet and the Allied Air Forces, to provide direct air support for the landings. In addition, it was to furnish protective air support and cover by carrier aircraft prior to A Day for the preliminary landings in Leyte Gulf and for the mine sweeping. On September 24, General Kenney issued his order for the Leyte operation and assigned missions to the Allied Air Forces. He designated General Whitehead's 5th Air Force as the Air Assault Force. It was to support the operation by intensified air activities against enemy installations, destroy hostile air and surface forces in the Celebes Sea and assigned areas in the Philippine Archipelago, and provide air defense for existing bases and forces in transit to Leyte within range of its capabilities. It was also to be prepared to establish, on order, land-based air forces on Leyte. The 13th Air Force was to support the missions of the 5th Air Force, while the Royal Australian Air Force Command was to destroy Japanese installations and sources of raw materials in the Netherlands Indies. Additionally, Halsey's 3rd Fleet was to be on standby to support the Leyte operation, with the objective of "destroying enemy naval and air forces in or threatening the Philippine Area." Submarines from both the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas would provide support through offensive reconnaissance of likely Japanese routes, maintaining observation and lifeguard services, and offering weather reports and strategic patrols. On the ground, General Krueger's 6th Army would lead the Leyte assault, taking over the operation after the disbandment of Alamo Force on September 25. With this force moving to the Philippines, General Eichelberger's 8th Army was assigned garrison duties in New Guinea, New Britain, the Admiralties, and Morotai. For King II, Krueger's forces included General Sibert's 10th Corps, consisting of the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, totaling 53,000 men, and General Hodge's 24th Corps, comprising the 7th and 96th Divisions, totaling 51,500 men. The corps originally designated for the canceled Yap operation was reassigned to the 6th Army, replacing the 14th Corps, which was meant to carry out the initial Leyte landings after securing Mindanao. However, the 14th Corps was still in the process of being relieved at Bougainville. To further support the operation, Krueger kept the 32nd and 77th Divisions in reserve, totaling approximately 28,500 troops. Krueger's plan involved an advance team landing Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mucci's 6th Ranger Battalion on the islands guarding the approaches to Leyte Gulf on October 17. As the Rangers took control of these small islands, Admiral Oldendorf's Fire Support Group would initiate a comprehensive bombardment campaign in preparation for the landings. Minesweepers and underwater demolition teams would also begin clearing natural and man-made obstacles from the gulf. On October 20, Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 was to transport and land the 10th Corps, while Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 was tasked with landing the 24th Corps. The reinforced 21st Regiment was scheduled to land at 09:30 near Panaon Strait, at the southeastern tip of Leyte, to secure control of the entrance to Sogod Bay. Further north, the 10th Corps was to land two divisions abreast in the Marasbaras and Palo areas at 10:00, while the 24th Corps would simultaneously land two divisions abreast in the Dulag area, about 15 miles to the south. Major-General Verne Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division was to capture Tacloban and its airfield and secure control of San Juanico Strait, while Major-General Frederick Irving's 24th Division seized Palo and advanced northwest through the Leyte Valley. The two divisions would then converge on Carigara at the northern end of the valley. Hodge's strategy involved Major-General James Bradley's 96th Division landing between Dulag and San Roque to secure a segment of Highway 1 within its operational zone, as well as Catmon Hill and the Dagami-Tanauan area. Since Bradley's task was relatively easier, the 381st Regiment was designated as Krueger's floating reserve. At the same time, Major-General Archibald Arnold's 7th Division was tasked with coming ashore in the Dulag area. One part of this division was to move south to capture the Highway 1 bridge and the Daguitan River crossings at Dao, while the main force advanced along the Dulag-Burauen road to take Burauen and then push on to Dagami. From there, Arnold's troops were expected to be ready to seize Abuyog and Baybay, eliminating enemy forces on the west coast and in southern Leyte. With the successful completion of these objectives, Krueger aimed to break the backbone of Japanese resistance. Consequently, with Leyte Valley and its airfields and base sites secured by the 6th Army, the 10th Corps would then advance south through the Ormoc Valley towards Ormoc, while the 24th Corps would move north from Baybay along the Ormoc Bay coast to link up with Sibert. Meanwhile, General Yamashita relied on General Suzuki's 35th Army, which consisted of four divisions and two independent mixed brigades dispersed across the central and southern Philippines. Specifically, Leyte was defended by Lieutenant-General Makino Shiro's 16th Division, experienced veterans of the initial Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Aside from minor forces left on Luzon and Samar, Makino commanded the full combat strength of the 16th Division, supplemented by 4th Air Division ground units, 35th Army service units in the area, and elements of the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Ormoc and Tacloban. Anticipating that enemy landings would most likely occur in the Dulag-Tarragona-Abuyog sector, Makino strategically positioned the majority of his troops in fortified coastal positions between Abuyog in the south and Palo in the north, with the densest concentration around Dulag. By October, the 16th Division had completed three lines of trenches along the shoreline, but these defenses were weak and inadequately placed. The field positions were old-type long connecting trenches prepared in three echelons. These were difficult to defend and easily discovered from the air since camouflage was lacking. The only effective positions were the cave emplacements for artillery, which had been constructed on Catmon Hill. About 60% of the defenses constructed were completed by the time of the invasion. In the event of an enemy invasion, Suzuki kept the 30th Division and three battalions of the 102nd Division as a mobile reserve, ready to be deployed to destroy the enemy wherever they landed. This strategy was known as the Suzu Plan: if the enemy landed at Davao, the mobile reserve would reinforce the 100th Division; if they landed on Leyte, the main force of the 30th Division and three battalions of the 102nd Division were to land at Ormoc to support Makino's defenders. Meanwhile, back in September, Mitscher's fast carriers had conducted several strikes against the Philippines, leading to the near destruction of Japanese air forces and shipping in the region. To prevent air reinforcements to the Philippines, Halsey ordered Admiral Sherman's carrier-based aircraft to launch strikes against enemy aircraft staging areas in the Ryukyus, particularly Okinawa, on October 10. These strikes successfully destroyed an estimated 111 planes and sank or damaged 34 ships. Simultaneously, a cruiser force under Rear Admiral Allan Smith shelled Minami Torishima. The following day, the carriers under Admirals McCain and Davison carried out a feint attack on northern Luzon, sinking two more ships off Aparri. As the attack on the Ryukyus began, Admiral Toyoda was at Shinchiku in northern Formosa, returning to Tokyo after a command inspection in the Philippines intended to boost morale. Upon learning of the strikes, Toyoda believed that the American carriers in the northern Philippine Sea were vulnerable to his powerful land-based air forces. Over 1,800 aircraft were allocated for Sho in total, but they were widely dispersed across the four operation regions. About one third of them were not battle-ready due to casualties and a lack of parts or trained pilots. When the fighting began, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru (commander of the 2nd Air Fleet based in the Kyūshū-Okinawa-Formosa district) had approximately 700 planes ready in Formosa and Kyushu. 100 or so aircraft in the Seto Inland Sea was later added to his command. Over the next four days, an additional 690 or so planes flew in from bases in Japan and China. Toyoda saw this as a prime opportunity to deal a crippling blow to the enemy fleet and disrupt the Allied invasion timeline. Consequently, he decided to risk all available naval air power in a determined effort to destroy Mitscher's carrier forces, taking personal command of the battle operations in Formosa on October 10. As anticipated, Halsey planned to launch strong carrier-based strikes against Formosa on October 12 and 13. Mitscher's four task groups were assigned targets in southern, northern, and central Formosa, as well as the Takao area. Additionally, General LeMay's first two B-29 strikes of October were scheduled to support the attack, targeting the Okayama aircraft repair and assembly facility in Takao with 170 sorties. Originally set for October 11 and 14, these strikes were postponed to October 14 and 16 due to unfavorable weather forecasts. After a rapid overnight approach on October 11, Mitscher's carriers reached their positions off Formosa the next morning. All four task groups completed launch of predawn fighter sweeps by around 06:00 hours. Because the Japanese were on alert, Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters from all four groups were intercepted by enemy aircraft and moderate to intense anti-aircraft fire was universally reported. Air-to-air engagements were fiercest over northern and central Formosa, where aircraft from Rear Admiral Gerald F. Bogan's TG 38.2 and Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman's TG 38.3 operated. Sherman's USS Lexington and USS Essex claimed almost 50 enemy aircraft shot down between them. Bogan's task group contained three Essex-class carriers – USS Intrepid, USS Bunker Hill and USS Hancock. Intrepid and Bunker Hill claimed over 50 Japanese aircraft destroyed, making the combined claims for the two groups around 100. Many of Japan's more experienced pilots were killed during the first wave of American air raid. American carrier air groups had suffered minimal personnel losses with nine U.S. aircraft shot down with three pilots subsequently recovered by nearby ships or submarines. These lopsided results were in part due to a lack of experience among Japanese pilots. IJAAS fighters stationed to the north of the Philippines were still in training. The bulk of enemy fighter aircraft reported by U.S. aviators were Japanese Army types, primarily the Nakajima Ki-44 (Allied reporting name "Tojo"), Kawasaki Ki-61 ("Tony") and Nakajima Ki-43 ("Oscar") models. Even though there were some experienced Japanese naval aviators operating at this time, IJNAS Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter units reconstituted after the Battle of the Philippine Sea were still learning to work together and did not execute the kind of section or division flying that yielded tactical advantage. By the third strike, the Hellcats had established air dominance over Formosa, with Admirals Bogan and Sherman each claiming over 50 Japanese aircraft destroyed at the cost of nine American planes shot down. This enabled the Americans to carry out four strikes during the day preceded by a fighter sweep. The Hellcats quickly gained air control over Formosa against the 230 Japanese fighters on the island. By the third strike of the day, the Americans faced no air opposition. A total of 1400 sorties were carried out on this day, sinking or damaging 24 vessels off the Pescadores and Takao.  This led Toyoda to order the activation of the air component of Operation Sho-Go at 10:30 on October 12. Although over 1,900 dispersed aircraft were assigned to Sho-Go, most did not arrive in the forward area for several days. Consequently, Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru's 2nd Air Fleet began preparing up to 800 planes in southern Kyushu for an attack, supported by Admiral Ozawa's newly-reconstituted flying groups from the 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions. Though the day's remaining carrier strikes by Hellcat fighters, Curtiss SB2C Helldiver dive bombers, and Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers did significant damage to military installations on Formosa, they failed to completely neutralize Japanese air power based on the island. Lead aircraft on 14 October had made photos revealing Navy damage which included four buildings destroyed and nine damaged out of eighty at the assembly plant, and five hangars destroyed at the air base. Many surviving structures would be destroyed by B-29 raids during the later days of the battle, however.  The only Japanese attack that day involved about 45 torpedo bombers, which mistakenly reported two carriers as damaged. Meanwhile, the T Attack Force, a special unit for operations in adverse weather, conducted a strike within a sudden typhoon from 19:00 to 20:20 before landing on Formosan bases. Their efforts were largely ineffective as American ships used smoke screens and evasive maneuvers to avoid damage. Eight Japanese aircraft were shot down by ships' guns during the night, and three Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers were claimed by night fighters from the USS Independence. USS Pritchett suffered damage from friendly fire, but no damage from enemy aircraft was incurred. On October 13, Mitscher's forces resumed strikes against Formosa and the Pescadores with up to 600 aircraft, encountering less opposition but achieving only minor damage due to poor weather. Despite this, Halsey reported the destruction of 520 Japanese aircraft, the sinking of 37 ships, and 74 probable sinkings over the two days. At dusk, the carriers came under attack from 32 planes of the T Attack Force. Despite Belleau Wood's combat air patrol shooting down 16 enemy aircraft, six G4M bombers managed to evade the interceptors and launched a series of determined attacks on Davison's carriers, releasing four torpedoes before all six were eventually downed by shipboard anti-aircraft guns. Fortunately, the torpedoes missed their targets. One torpedo ran just ahead of the USS Franklin, and another ran too deep and passed beneath the carrier. One of the Bettys attempted to crash into Franklin on its way down but glanced off the flight deck and slid over the starboard edge of the ship into the water. However, McCain's carriers faced more challenges as eight B6N2 bombers, evading radar by flying low, attacked the group. While six of the bombers were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, one successfully torpedoed the cruiser Canberra, killing 23 crew members and causing severe damage. The torpedo struck the cruiser in a vulnerable spot—under the main armor belt between both firerooms. The ship lost all power, laying just 90NM off Formosa. As a result, Halsey organized a unit to tow Canberra to safety, necessitating an additional day of protection for the damaged cruiser. On October 14, Mitscher launched early morning fighter sweeps to suppress enemy air power over Luzon and Formosa, while the newly-formed unit escorted Canberra. Japanese reports claimed two carriers were sunk and one was burning, leading Toyoda to believe the enemy retreating east had been severely damaged. Consequently, Fukudome ordered his full strength of 450 planes to launch from southern Kyushu, and Vice-Admiral Shima Kiyoshide's 2nd Striking Force was deployed to sweep the waters east of Formosa. However, before the Japanese could counterattack, 130 B-29s from Chengdu attacked Formosa in the afternoon, with 104 bombers successfully dropping about 650 tons of bombs on Okayama and 13 hitting secondary targets. A dozen planes made emergency landings at friendly fields in China, one crashed near Changteh whence its crew walked out, and one was listed as missing. This was a cheap price to pay for very severe damage done to Okayama installation. At 15:25, Fukudome's initial wave of 124 planes attacked Bogan's carriers. A formation of 25 Yokosuka D4Y "Judy" dive bombers, using cloud cover to evade detection, was intercepted by the group's combat air patrol. Only a few Japanese planes made it past the American fighters. The surviving bombers were able to put two bombs in the vicinity of the Hancock, and one hit the forward port side gun tube without detonating on impact. No serious damage was inflicted by this attack. At around 17:00 a large formation of enemies showed up on radar headed towards TG 38.3. As before, a great many of these were shot down by combat air patrol. The surviving enemy planes flew down to the water level to evade further radar detection. These planes – torpedo bombers and fighters – successfully ambushed the formation just minutes later. Evasive maneuvers, squall weather, and poor fighter cover on the part of the Japanese helped TG 38.3 escape without suffering any significant damage. The only bright spot for the Japanese was another twilight attack by the T Force by 52 aircraft against TG 38.1. Four Jills broke through to attack light cruiser Houston. Three were shot down, but the last succeeded in placing a torpedo in another vulnerable spot that flooded the engineering spaces and caused all power to be lost. As a result, Halsey was left needing to tow two cruisers to safety. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By hook or by crook, General MacArthur bullied FDR into allowing an invasion of the Philippines. To soften up the new targets, strikes were unleashed against Luzon, Formosa and Okinawa. Despite a strong Japanese defense, American air superiority was achieved through aggressive carrier strikes, leading to the destruction of numerous Japanese aircraft and ships.