Podcasts about Musashi

Dans cet épisode, Lionel Froidure est interviewé par Gabriel Ben Soussan pour la célèbre maison Budo Éditions, référence incontournable du livre d'arts martiaux en France. Ensemble, ils explorent la place des livres dans la pratique, la transmission martiale, l'enseignement et la pédagogie moderne.

Welcome to Your Movie Rocks, an Alternate Ending podcast hosted by Mandy Albert. For every episode, Mandy will watch a movie assigned by her guest host, followed by a lively discussion. There's only one rule: no matter what the movie does to her, Mandy is only allowed to love it. In Episode 5, Mandy is joined by AE regular Andrew Milne for a lively discussion of a movie that does not even occupy the same fold of spacetime as her wheelhouse: Shimomura Yuji's Crazy Samurai Musashi (2020), a psychology experiment in the form of a movie.  But was it an enjoyable psychology experiment?  Tune in to hear Mandy and Andrew develop a Grand Theory of Crazy Samurai Musashi in real time, learn about one of the strangest movie gimmicks of the decade so far, and find out why Andrew was so eager to revisit a movie that made him angry the first time around.   You can snag a copy of Andrew's novel White Scar Across the Firmament here!

El podcast d’aquesta setmana el fem des de la 3era diada del còmic en català de Mataró, organitzada per plataforma per la llengua. La Jayce torna als podcasts presencials amb l’actualitat de la setmana, on ens anunciarà una nova editorial que publicarà mangas en català, amb títols ja confirmats. Tot seguit farem una tertúlia sobre com es plasma la gastronomia japonesa al manga i a l’anime, amb l’Oriol Estrada i en Musashi (restaurant Ohana Manos Japonesas) com a convidats. A la Doraxarxa no hi serà Xavi Omella sino Oriol Clavell, amb qui comentarem les millors respostes a la pregunta “quin plat de gastronomia japonesa que heu vist en un manga us agrada més”. I finalment al Tenkaichi Musical torna en Jerry Brown, versionant per primera vegada i en català el nou opening de Fire Force.

▼映像はこちら https://youtu.be/4WjCaWil32E ■お知らせ 片野秀樹さん（医学博士／日本リカバリー協会代表理事）の直筆サイン入著書を抽選で5名の皆様にプレゼント！ 応募フォームはこちらです。 https://forms.gle/QSURfzFj8AwRbq7o8 ＊ぜひ、すぽきゃすTVの番組登録のうえ、ご応募ください！たくさんのご応募お待ちしています。 ■今回は、ベストセラー書籍『休養学』の著者の片野秀樹先生をお迎えして、攻めの休養について伺います（全4回の4回目） ■健康にまつわるモノ・コト紹介 「栄養補助食品（MUSASHI）」 https://musashijapan.com/ 【ゲスト紹介】 ◉片野秀樹（かたの・ひでき） 日本リカバリー協会代表理事、博士(医学) 博士(医学)、一般社団法人日本リカバリー協会代表理事。株式会社ベネクス執行役員。 東海大学大学院医学研究科、東海大学健康科学部研究員、東海大学医学部研究員、日本体育大学体育学部研究員、特定国立研究開発法人理化学研究所客員研究員を経て、現在は一般財団法人博慈会老人病研究所客員研究員、一般社団法人日本未病総合研究所未病公認講師(休養学)も務める。日本リカバリー協会では、休養に関する社会の不理解解消やリテラシー向上を目指して啓発活動に取り組んでいる。編著書に『休養学基礎:疲労を防ぐ!健康指導に活かす』(共編著、メディカ出版)。 『休養学』（片野秀樹／東洋経済新報社） https://amzn.to/4jkqsAl ＊本番組でお届けしている医療、健康などの情報については、専門家への取材や出演者本人の体験、見聞をもとにしておりますが、特定の企業、製品等を、具体的に推奨するものではありません。特に医療品や医療機関の選択に当たってはご自身でご判断いただくか、かかりつけ医にご相談されることをお勧めいたします。 【番組への感想はこちら】 https://forms.gle/QJQvRqLD8fM8RJfn9 【目次】 00:00 OP 00:38 健康にまつわるモノ・コト紹介「栄養補助食品（MUSASHI）」 05:12 一流選手の休み方 08:51 体力の正体とは 14:33 スポーツは休養？ 16:53 本に書けなかった話 21:10 今後の活動構想 22:00 視聴者へのメッセージ 23:00 ED 【出演者】 ◉石崎勇太 1981年生まれ。中央大学法学部法律学科卒。 幼少期からテニスを始め、高校時代にはインターハイ、全日本ジュニアに出場。 大学時代には体育会硬式テニス部主将として1部リーグで活躍。全日本選手権、インカレ出場。 卒業後大手建設会社、広告代理店を経て、現在はGODAIグループが運営するGODAI白楽支店 支配人。 『すぽきゃすTV』の前身番組『すぽきゃす』の企画・立ち上げ、インタビュアーとしてGODAIのコーチ・スタッフや各界で活躍しているスポーツ・健康の専門家にインタビュー。 時にはスポーツアスリートのマネジメントやメンタルサポートを行い、テニススクールのコーチとして熱心な指導はお客様に高く評価されている。 プライベートでは二児のパパ。育児に奔走中！ https://godai.gr.jp/ ◉早川洋平 新聞記者等を経て2008年キクタス株式会社設立。羽生結弦、コシノジュンコ、髙田賢三など世界で活躍する著名人、経営者、スポーツ選手等ジャンルを超えて対談。13年からは海外取材を本格化するいっぽうで、戦争体験者の肉声を世界へ発信するプロジェクト『戦争の記憶』にも取り組む。 公共機関・企業・作家などのパーソナルメディアのプロデュースも手がけ、キクタス配信全番組のダウンロード数は毎月約200万回。累計は3億回を超える。『We are Netflix Podcast@Tokyo』『横浜美術館「ラジオ美術館」』『石田衣良「大人の放課後ラジオ」などプロデュース多数。 https://yoheihayakawa.substack.com/ 【関連キーワード】 #休養学 #攻めの休養 124_SpocasTV_Podcast.mp3

This fifth episode looks at the second half of Champion Carnival, the great matches that were on its final show, THAT amazing MUSASHI vs Seiki Yoshioka title match, and the many ways in which we love to fangirl about wrestling.

Ray and a Pro Goblin tackle JSA, who is now a full fledged Faction! Lists: Standard Shikami-Hatamoto-ShizokuhE0DanNhASCBLAIBAQAJAIMFAQIAAIceAQIAAICnAQIAAIPkAQEAAIchAQIAAIccAQMAAIcjAQIAAIckAQIAAICQAQsAAgEABgCHHwEGAACD5wEHAACAngECAACAogEBAACHKQEBAAAyAQEA "Well rounded" list that I talked about. My version in Adepticon cut the Shizoku and made upgrades on the "chaff" to fit in a Keisotsu hacker, Uran GML and a Garon, because I was expecting a need to deter the opponent and defend my Capture and Protect Beacon at the front of my DZ, and also to use the Kurayami as a means to both activate consoles and Spotlight entrenched HVTs for UnmaskingKarakuri HarishE0DanNhASCBLAIBAQAJAICaAQUAAICaAQQAAICkAQEAAIccAQMAAICnAQIAAIcnAQEAAIcmAQEAAIckAQIAAIcjAQIAAgEABwCHHwEFAACD5wEHAACAogEBAACHKQEBAACAngEDAACAoQEBAAAyAQEASpecifically good in to TLB, MAF, vCA/Onyx, IA and other factions where you're expecting MSV / GML Alpha Strikes from your opponent. Karakuri are really tough to chew through. Deployable cover engi can be downgraded to fit a Spitfire Hatamoto, but i like the Xvisor Rangebands and Shock Ammo on him more than the PS6We do not talk about the OniwabanhE0DanNhASCBLAIBAQAJAIMFAQIAAIPkAQEAAIcnAQEAAIccAQMAAIb%2FAQIAAICeAQIAAICVAYISAACAkAEBAACHIwECAAIBAAYAgJ0BAwAAg%2BcBBwAAgKIBAQAAhykBAQAAhx4BAgAAgN8BAQA%3Dthis is purpose built for Decap+Firefight tournament packs-Lt is super safe. Shizoku, Sohei, Musashi, Shikami and even the Oni can all do the Veteran/Elite troop cards. We only have Shikami, Teishin and Tokusetsu Engi for specialists so the opp really has to work for kill more specops. There is a lack of FO/spotlight, MSV, and Doctor/Paramedic, but we still cover 15/20 cards. You can hit 19/20 by swapping the Keisotsu for Senku FO (+3 cards) and Musashi for a RuiShi (+1 card).TAG listhE0DanNhASCBLAIBAQAKAIb8AQEAAICTAQQAAICeAQMAAIChAQEAAICiAQEAAIPkAQEAAIckAQIAAIcnAQEAAIcnAQEAAIcjAQIAAgEABgCHHwEGAACD5wEHAACG%2FgECAACAogEBAACHKQEBAAAyAQEA

Wrestle Universe takes center stage in this episode of The Eastern Lariat as STRIGGA & Dylan go though all eight promotions that are on the most comprehensive streaming service for japanese pro wrestling. There's a digest on the current situation and upcoming cards for these promotions as well as viewing recommendations from DDT and NOAH over Sendai Girls to Michinoku Pro. From there, the focus shifts onto the finals of the 2025 Champion Carnival that saw Rei Saito come out on top of a tournament that overall left a lot to be desired, while the Junior Title match delivered on every level. With Kikuta in the Champion Carnival and Dragon Dia in the BOSJ, STRIGGA & Dylan also discuss the news about BIGBOSS Shmizu before finally looking at the Best of the Super Junior so far.

“The greatest polluting element in the earth's environment is the proliferation of electromagnetic fields. I consider that to be a far greater threat on a global scale than warming, or the increase of chemical elements in the environment.” Welcome back to another episode of Made You Think! In this episode, we're diving into The Body Electric by Robert O. Becker, a fascinating read on how electricity flows through the body and the ways it might influence healing, health, and even consciousness. Becker, a pioneer in bioelectricity, lays out connections between injury recovery, electromagnetic fields, and the body's natural currents. We cover a wide range of topics including: The link between magnetic storms and spikes in psychiatric admissions How the body's healing process relies on electric signals Diet, metabolism, and avoiding the “swamp” Modern concerns about EMF exposure from wifi, Bluetooth, and power lines The crossover between bioelectricity and mitochondrial theory And much more. Please enjoy, and make sure to follow Nat, Neil, and Adil on Twitter and share your thoughts on the episode. Links from the Episode: Mentioned in the Show: Anabology (19:53) Experimental Fat Loss (23:41) Randle Cycle (26:26) Faraday Labz (35:56) Husk (52:34) Gauntlet AI (55:12) Books Mentioned: The Body Electric Elegant Complexity (1:55) Infinite Jest (1:37) (Book Episode 1) (Book Episode 2) (Nat's Book Notes) The Count of Monte Cristo (2:30) One Hundred Years of Solitude (3:31) East of Eden (3:48) (Book Episode) (Nat's Book Notes) Healing Back Pain (12:54) Musashi (52:09) The Metamorphisis of Prime Intellect (57:32) People Mentioned: Ray Peat (15:26) Noah Ryan (22:30) Show Topics: (0:00) We're back! Nat, Neil, and Adil catch up and share some recent long reads that delivered a good payoff. (4:11) Today's discussion is on The Body Electric by Robert O. Becker, a deep dive into the body's electrical systems and what they mean for healing, health, and human potential. (8:59) Psychiatric admissions spike after magnetic storms... why is that? And how injuries can disrupt your body's electrical current, slowing down the healing process. (15:05) We explore the overlap between Becker's ideas and theories on mitochondrial efficiency, including connections to Ray Peat's metabolic philosophies. (20:57) Energy flow, metabolism, and how different diets affect the body's ability to generate and use energy. (25:25) Why you should avoid the “swamp”. With all the conflicting diet advice out there, how do we know what to eat? (28:50) Mitochondria and the electrical nature of cells. While Becker doesn't directly mention mitochondria, modern science connects the dots. (33:05) Neil shares his findings from using an EMF meter around the house. We talk about everyday EMF exposure and what to avoid. (37:49) What does Deep Research have to say about some of the claims in the book? (43:37) Living near high-voltage power lines, earbuds, and lifestyle changes we've made (or not made) since reading the book.  (48:55) Bluetooth vs. wifi: Is one worse than the other in terms of EMF exposure? (52:07) Nat, Neil, and Adil wrap up the episode with chats about what book is next on the podcast. Thanks for listening to this episode! If you enjoyed this episode, let us know by leaving a review on iTunes and tell a friend. As always, let us know if you have any book recommendations! You can say hi to us on Twitter @TheRealNeilS, @adilmajid, @nateliason and share your thoughts on this episode. You can now support Made You Think using the Value-for-Value feature of Podcasting 2.0. This means you can directly tip the co-hosts in BTC with minimal transaction fees. To get started, simply download a podcast app (like Fountain or Breez) that supports Value-for-Value and send some BTC to your in-app wallet. You can then use that to support shows who have opted-in, including Made You Think! We'll be going with this direct support model moving forward, rather than ads. Thanks for listening. See you next time!

8 Principles of the Book of Five Rings | Miyamoto Musashi: Book of WaterMiyamoto Musashi, the greatest swordsman in Japan's history, wrote his teachings of strategy in The Book of Five Rings back in 1645. This text is divided into five books—Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, and Void—each teaching essential lessons on mastery. The Book of Earth teaches clarity and understanding. The Book of Fire reveals conflict and action. The Book of Wind warns against rigidity and narrowness. The Book of Void speaks to intuition and perception. Lastly is The Book of Water. Water is formless, adapting to whatever contains it. It teaches how to flow; adjusting your stance, your spirit, and your technique to meet any challenge. To fight like water is to move effortlessly between offense and defense, to be calm yet decisive; concealing your intentions while reading those of your opponent. Miyamoto Musashi says: The battlefield exists wherever you are.These are the 9 principles Musashi's Book of Water. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Le chemin vers le UN, de Musashi et Otsu.Interpretation entre les lignes de l'oeuvre VAGABOND, Musashi Miyamoto de TAKEHIKO INOUEDE L'EVEIL AU RÉVEIL

Send us a textIn 2015, Fairfax criminal lawyer Jonathan Katz finished court early enough to rush over to the Mindful Leadership conference in Arlington, eager to meet such great teachers as Roshi Joan Halifax, Jim Dethmer and Rhonda Magee. Sold out, said a front desk person. A woman overheard my asking what I could do about that, and she sold me her extra ticket. This conference was so good that it would have been worth flying coast-to-coast for such an experience. Learning applications of mindfulness to my life and work are very important. Among the best teachers for that at this conference was author of Awake at Work (and more) Michael Carroll -- currently with Global Coaching Alliance, and a student of such advanced teachers as Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche -- who immediately captured me with leading a grounding sit followed soon after with the story of a tollbooth angel who would greet people even at the most trafficked, sweaty and stressful times of day, hand them an M&M candy, and wish them a nice day. Michael bridges any gap between mindfulness and Buddhist teachings and applying them to the real world, including the rough and tumble of the workplace, and, in this episode, the courthouse. I should have known long ago already about highly accomplished samurai and Five Rings  author Miyamoto Musashi, but did not, other than hearing about Five Rings. In this podcast interview with Jon Katz, Michael masterfully relates the lessons of Musashi's masterful defeat of Sasaki Kojiro to its applications to our own lives. Michael is a life tourguide who helps reveal plenty, including lessons and truisms that are right in front of our eyes, but that we have yet to see more clearly. Check out -- and read -- his books and more here. This podcast with Fairfax, Virginia criminal / DUI lawyer Jon Katz is playable on all devices at podcast.BeatTheProsecution.com. For more information, visit https://KatzJustice.com or contact us at info@KatzJustice.com, 703-383-1100 (calling), or 571-406-7268 (text). If you like what you hear on our Beat the Prosecution podcast, please take a moment to post a review at our Apple podcasts page (with stars only, or else also with a comment) at https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/beat-the-prosecution/id1721413675

Become a Patreon Member / Instagram Subscriber / YouTube Membership for $5 a month and Daniel will answer your questions on SUPER GREAT TIME TOKYO.⁠patreon.com/DanielYWilson⁠YouTube Video Podcast https://youtu.be/ubhwGDP45TUThis week Daniel walks around Musashi Koyama, Tokyo answering questions and teaching what itty bitty tittie$ is called in Japanese. EVERY THURSDAY 9:00PM JAPAN TIME

This month, Darrin runs into a game that he really WANTS to like in Brave Fencer Musashi, plus an update on how lost he's gotten in the world of Avowed. Also, Chad takes a crack at explaining how a really troublesome Dungeons and Dragons monster works. Sponsored by Gamefly. New customers can get a 30-day free trial by clicking on the GameFly link at the top of GeekCavePodcast.com. Like the show? Please leave a rating wherever you found us! Download and listen today on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, iHeart, Amazon, Stitcher, Goodpods, and more of your favorite podcast services! 

A comprehensive collection of quotes and wisdom from Miyamoto Musashi, a renowned Japanese swordsman who lived from 1584 to 1645. Known for engaging in over 60 duels—the most ever recorded—Musashi left behind a lasting legacy in martial arts and strategy.His most famous works include The Book of Five Rings, a guide on combat, strategy, and philosophy, and Dokkōdō (or The Path of Aloneness), which he wrote a week before his death in 1645. Dokkōdō outlines 21 core principles for self-discipline and personal growth, while his broader teachings include 101 guiding principles that reflect his deep understanding of life, war, and mastery.Welcome to the Motiversity Quotes channel. Subscribe for new videos every week featuring the greatest thinkers and warriors of all time. https://www.youtube.com/@MotiversityQuotes"Preoccupied with a single leaf, you won't see the tree.Preoccupied with a single tree, you'll miss the entire forest.Don't be preoccupied with a single spot. See everything in its entirety. Effortlessly. That is what it means to truly see." – Miyamoto MusashiSpeakerJarrett Raymond Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Where did Musashi come from - Simon had that's slightly interesting today!

The Eastern Lariat returns right before the final stage of the 2025 New Japan Cup with a look back at the tournaments' early rounds, an assessment of the overall tournament quality and where the roads might lead for some of the main players such as David Finlay and Shota Umino and for some up and coming talent like Drilla Moloney and Callum Newman. Besides the New Japan Cup, STRIGGA & Dylan also cover DRAGONGATE's Rey de Parejas tournament trying to figure out how the tournamen could lead to a new challenger for YAMATO. The third big chunk of the show is All Japan Pro Wrestling and their March series including the World Tag Team Title match between the Saitos and Business Tag and a great Junior Title match. The shhow concludes with a brief look at this past weekend's Cinderella Tournament final.

Unlock the secrets of honor, strength, and wisdom through Miyamoto Musashi's 21 Principles for Life, a timeless guide to resilience and personal growth. We explore how his teachings transcend materialism and emotional dependence, drawing parallels with modern warriors like Jocko Willink. By embracing extreme ownership, discipline, and self-reliance, we uncover strategies for decisive action and acceptance of reality. Drawing from Stoic philosophy and Navy SEAL principles, we highlight the power of detachment, integrity, and responsibility. Through the samurai ethos and military discipline, we emphasize the importance of a guiding philosophy that defines true strength and the warrior's way of life.Dokkōdō, “The Way of Walking Alone.”1. Accept everything just the way it is.2. Do not seek pleasure for its own sake.3. Do not, under any circumstances, depend on a partial feeling.4. Think lightly of yourself and deeply of the world.5. Be detached from desire your whole life long.6. Do not regret what you have done.7. Never be jealous.8. Never let yourself be saddened by a separation.9. Resentment and complaint are appropriate neither for oneself or others.10. Do not let yourself be guided by the feeling of lust or love.11. In all things have no preferences.12. Be indifferent to where you live.13. Do not pursue the taste of good food.14. Do not hold on to possessions you no longer need.15. Do not act following customary beliefs.16. Do not collect weapons or practice with weapons beyond what is useful.17. Do not fear death.18. Do not seek to possess either goods or fiefs for your old age.19. Respect Buddha and the gods without counting on their help.20. You may abandon your own body but you must preserve your honor.21. Never stray from the Way.--------- EPISODE CHAPTERS ---------(0:00:01) - Musashi's 21 Principles Explained(0:07:13) - Warrior Mindset and Disciplined Living(0:16:29) - Warrior Principles for Disciplined Living(0:34:11) - The Warrior's CodeSend us a text

Last time we spoke about the Fall of Manila. General LeMay's B-29 bombers wreaked havoc on Japan, targeting key factories at a high cost. On February 19, US Marines landed on Iwo Jima, facing fierce Japanese resistance and heavy casualties. By February 23, after relentless fighting and harsh conditions, they raised the American flag atop Mount Suribachi, marking a hard-won victory. This moment inspired a legacy for the Marine Corps, as battles raged on in the Pacific. Meanwhile troops attacked General Kobayashi's defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, struggling to gain ground. Reinforcements arrived, leading to coordinated assaults, but progress was slow. Meanwhile, General Yamashita reorganized his forces in response to increased guerrilla activity. As American divisions advanced, they faced fierce resistance but gradually secured key positions. Guerrilla leader Volckmann disrupted Japanese supply lines, significantly impacting their operations. Amidst the chaos, a daring rescue mission freed over 2,000 internees, though it provoked brutal reprisals against civilians. This episode is the Great Tokyo Air Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are continuing with the ongoing battle over Iwo Jima. By the end of February, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines had successfully secured Mount Suribachi, while the other regiments from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions advanced toward the O-2 Line, situated beyond Airfield No. 2. This location was where General Kuribayashi maintained his primary defensive positions, which were heavily fortified with caves, tunnels, and traps. On March 1, General Rockey continued his offensive on the left flank as the fresh 28th Marines moved through the weary 27th Marines, led by Colonel Wornham, and launched an assault on Hill 362A and its adjacent positions. The corps' 155mm howitzers and 5th Division artillery commenced firing a preparation at K-minus 45 minutes. One battleship and two cruisers from the gunfire and covering force added their heavy fires from 08:00 to 08:30. Aircraft from the support carrier group delivered strikes throughout the day, but did not participate in preparation for the attack. This proved one of the busiest days for Task Force 54 since D-Day as fire support ships dueled with enemy shore batteries until late afternoon. Shortly after dawn enemy guns in the northern part of the island opened up, and at 07:25 the destroyer Terry took a direct hit by a 6-inch shell, suffering heavy casualties. The battleship Nevada immediately engaged these hostile installations, and after completing their mission in support of the landing force, the cruisers Indianapolis and Pensacola shifted to counter battery fire. At 10:25 the destroyer Colhoun was hit by a major-caliber projectile, and soon after this enemy shells straddled the destroyer Stembel. Counter Battery fire continued throughout the day with the Nevada destroying one casemated gun and starting a fire in another emplacement, while the Pensacola's batteries accounted for a third Japanese gun. Following the robust aerial, naval, and artillery bombardment, Liversedge's forces achieved some initial success, including capturing the hilltop, but were ultimately halted by intense machine-gun fire from Nishi Ridge to the north. However, the 3rd Battalion along the coast managed to advance approximately 350 yards against lighter resistance. In the center, General Erskine also pressed forward beyond Airfield No. 2, with Colonel Withers' 21st Marines advancing north and northeast about 500 yards into the incomplete Airfield No. 3. At the same time, General Cates continued to send his troops into the fray. Colonel Jordan's 24th Marines replaced Colonel Wensinger's exhausted 23rd Marines on the left and fought to dislodge the enemy from Hill 382. They succeeded in advancing about 100 yards along the division's left boundary and 50 yards on the right, establishing a foothold on elevated terrain overlooking Minami village. Further south, Colonel Lanigan committed only his 1st Battalion to eliminate the salient around the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, but this assault was again met with fierce Japanese gunfire. This relief enabled Erskine to initiate a late two-regiment offensive, with the 21st Marines on the left and Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines on the right, although this effort did not achieve any significant progress. The following day, the assault persisted, but the 9th Marines made minimal headway against a strong enemy position on the right, while the 21st Marines advanced toward the base of Hill 362B and the southern edge of Airfield No. 3. Concurrently, Liversedge's 28th Marines successfully cleared Hill 362A and moved toward Nishi Ridge, where they repelled a fierce counterattack by 150 Japanese soldiers. Colonel Graham's 26th Marines were once again deployed to fill the gap between the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions, managing to gain approximately 500 yards to the north. Jordan's 24th Marines finally captured Hill 382 and advanced about 300 yards on the left flank. Meanwhile, Lanigan's 1st Battalion made another unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate and take the high ground north of Turkey Knob. As described by an intelligence officer with the 4th Marine Division “As a result of a close study of the enemy's recent defensive action, aided by observation from OP's and air reconnaissance, the following explanation is suggested of the enemy's defense in this Div's Z of A. The enemy remains below ground in his maze of communicating tunnels throughout our preliminary arty fires. When the fire ceases he pushed OP's out of entrances not demolished by our fires. Then choosing a suitable exit he moves as many men and weapons to the surface as he can, depending on the cover and concealment of that area, often as close as 75 yards from our front. As our troops advance toward this point he delivers all the fire at his disposal, rifle, machine-gun, and mortar. When he has inflicted sufficient casualties to pin down our advance he then withdraws through his underground tunnels most of his forces, possibly leaving a few machine gunners and mortars. Meanwhile our Bn CO has coordinated his direct support weapons and delivers a concentration of rockets, mortars and artillery. Our tanks then push in, supported by infantry. When the hot spot is overrun we find a handful of dead Japs and few if any enemy weapons. While this is happening, the enemy has repeated the process and another sector of our advance is engaged in a vicious fire fight, and the cycle continues.”  Meanwhile the remainder of the 25th Marines managed to advance 300 yards along the coast without facing any opposition. On March 3, the capture of Hill 362A enabled flame-thrower tanks to assist in the advance northward. The 5th Marine Division prepared to press on with its assaults through Nishi Ridge and Hill 362B. The majority of the 28th Marines faced strong resistance as they moved forward over 200 yards. Liversedge's 1st Battalion and Graham's 1st Battalion executed a coordinated attack to take the main enemy positions ahead of them. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 26th Marines surged forward, achieving a gain of over 500 yards, which allowed them to relieve Kenyon's 3rd Battalion and secure the summit of Hill 362B. In the center, the 9th Marines remained in a stalemate, while the 21st Marines launched a vigorous attack to the northeast, successfully capturing the summit of Hill 357 at the eastern edge of the Motoyama Plateau. They then attempted another assault southeast toward Hill 362C, which resulted in a modest gain of about 250 yards. Meanwhile, in the 4th Marine Division's sector, Wensinger's 23rd Marines were deployed in the center, where determined Japanese defenders continued to thwart intense American assaults, despite the partial reduction of the Turkey Knob blockhouse. To the left, the 24th Marines resumed their offensive southeast, advancing up to 350 yards in the center. During the eight days of deadlock and fierce conflict in the Hill 382 and Turkey Knob areas, the weather had been generally favorable. Mild temperatures and fair skies predominated, although early in the morning ground haze combined with smoke to limit observation, and on a few days light showers fell in the afternoon. Night temperatures sometimes went below 60°F, and it was then that tired Marines were grateful for the characteristic subterranean heat of the island that warmed their foxholes. The next day, March 4, dawned gray and sullen, and intermittent showers fell from the overcast skies. Visibility was so limited that all air strikes were canceled and aerial observation seriously curtailed. On the right, Cates' Marines pressed the attack southeast but could only gain 150 yards against the defenders' fierce resistance. To the left, after a failed Japanese infiltration attempt overnight to gather food and water, both the 9th and 21st Marines made no progress with their costly eastward assaults. Finally, supported closely by flame-throwing tanks and combat engineers, Rockey's Marines fought fiercely but achieved only minor advances, prompting Wornham's 27th Marines to be thrown back into the battle to reinforce the two battered assault regiments. March 5 was then dedicated to reorganizing and resupplying the three Marine Divisions in preparation for a renewed effort the next day. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Marines, led by Colonel James Stuart, were sent back to Guam without having landed on Iwo Jima. The three divisions accordingly resumed the offensive on March 6 after a terrific artillery and naval gunfire bombardment. First, on the left, Erskine attacked with his three regiments abreast yet failed to make any significant advance. Then, in the center, the 9th and 21st Marines likewise unsuccessfully attacked towards Hill 362C, though the latter managed to clear the entire Hill 357 area. Lastly, Wensinger's 23rd Marines passed through the 24th on the division left and pressed on forward against heavy opposition, successfully gaining between 150 and 350 yards while Jordan's battalions gained up to 150 yards in their front. Additionally, the 25th Marines mopped up in its area and Cates' Provisional Battalion kept hammering against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. In the knowledge that the battle was swinging irrevocably in favor of the Americans, General Kuribayashi radioed Tokyo: "Our strongpoints might be able to fight delaying actions for several more days. I comfort myself a little seeing my officers and men die without regret after struggling in this inch-by-inch battle against an overwhelming enemy...". The General's predictions were, if anything, on the pessimistic side as his garrison would prolong the battle for another three weeks. Although the fighting was dragging terribly, on this day Brigadier-General Ernest Moore successfully landed on Airfield No. 1 alongside 28 P-51s and 12 P-61s of the 15th Fighter Group to take over control of island air activities. The following day, the Island Commander, Major-General James Chaney, assumed responsibility for base development, air defense, and operation of the airfields. Meanwhile, Schmidt was continuing his coordinated offensive, with the 28th Marines meeting only scattered resistance as it pushed 500 yards north; the 26th Marines overrunning the enemy defenses and gaining about 150 yards before resistance stiffened once again; the 27th Marines attacking on a narrow front but likewise gaining only 150 yards; the 21st Marines achieving tactical surprise to reach Hill 331 and then pushing 250 yards more to Hill 362C, which was ultimately seized as well; the 9th Marines ferociously attacking east but gaining only 200 yards before a rain of fire stopped them; the 23rd Marines recovering from a savage Japanese night counterattack and then pushing around 150 yards against strong resistance; the 24th Marines only progressing over 50 yards as it neutralized a number of enemy defenses; and the 25th Marines and the Provisional Battalion continuing secondary operations against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. On March 8, Rockey pressed on toward the northeast coast, with the 28th Marines advancing against minimal resistance, gaining between 300 and 500 yards along the shoreline. Meanwhile, the 26th Marines faced a complete stalemate against the intricate network of pillboxes and interconnected caves that had once comprised the village of Kita. The 27th Marines managed to advance approximately 150 yards with tank support. In the center, the 21st Marines shifted northeast again, successfully gaining 300 yards through the last organized resistance in the area, while the 9th Marines captured Hill 362C and continued their eastward assault, reaching the edge of the plateau overlooking the beach and initiating a flanking maneuver south of Hill 331. On the right flank, the 23rd and 24th Marines continued their attacks but made little headway against the enemy's formidable defenses. That night, General Senda launched a strong counterattack that caught the Americans off guard. Two of Senda's orderlies would survive and report what occurred during the daring counterattack. Many of his troops believed that Inoue was a superior leader who inspired his men to perform outstanding feats of bravery; others thought he was a maniac. The sight of the Stars and Stripes flying on top of Mount Suribachi had filled him with increasing rage. He is quoted as saying: "We shall destroy their banner, we shall replace it with ours in the name of the great Emperor and the great people of Japan." Inoue was in charge of the Naval Guard Force who manned the shore guns that sank and damaged many of the US warships and landing craft, and was described as a bombastic and temperamental character, a fine swordsman, heavy drinker, and womanizer. His bizarre plan almost beggars belief. The Captain was certain that the airfields would be lightly defended by service troops. He and his men would move southward, destroying B29 bombers as they passed; climb Mount Suribachi and tear down the Stars and Stripes; and replace it with the Rising Sun as an inspiration to all Japanese troops on the island.  However this never came to be. The determined defenders, bolstered by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, repelled the assault, resulting in approximately 800 Japanese casualties. Under relentless pressure in a shrinking area where most critical terrain features had been seized, the disorganized Japanese forces saw a fleeting opportunity to escape destruction, raid American-controlled airfields, and reclaim Mount Suribachi with this counterattack. However, its failure effectively depleted Senda's remaining strength and chances for continued resistance. The following day, Cates resumed the offensive, with the 23rd Marines making minor gains along their front, while Jordan's 3rd Battalion achieved a notable breakthrough of 300 yards. Furthermore, the Provisional Battalion was disbanded, and Lanigan's 2nd Battalion assumed control of the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob region. In the center, Erskine persisted in his advance toward the sea, with patrols from the 9th and 21st Marines successfully reaching the beach as American forces continued to secure the area. Meanwhile, to the left, Rockey faced significant resistance, with his troops soon coming under intense and precise fire from elevated positions extending southeast from Kitano Point. Consequently, the 26th and 27th Marines remained in a stalemate while the 28th Marines moved forward. On March 10, Liversedge's men advanced approximately 40 yards across extremely challenging terrain and against fierce opposition, while Graham's 2nd Battalion gained an additional 75 yards, with the rest of the 26th and 27th Marines still held in place. Over the past 14 days, Rockey's 5th Marine Division advanced 3,000 yards along the west coast, ultimately pushing Kuribayashi's forces into a final pocket at the northern tip of the island.  In a dispatch to Tokyo on March 10, General Kuribayashi summed up the Japanese situation in this manner: “Although the attacks of the enemy against our Northern districts are continuing day and night, our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly… 200 or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" all day. The enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers, and aircraft are very severe, especially the bombing and machine-gun fire against Divisional Headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I cannot express nor write here.” Not until 15 bloody days later did Marines eliminate the last pocket of organized enemy resistance in the northern end of the island. By D+19 all that remained for the enemy force was to fight and die for the Emperor. This advance came at a significant cost, with Rockey suffering 1,098 men killed and 2,974 wounded during this time. In the center, the 21st Marines reported that all organized resistance in their area had been eliminated, while the 9th Marines moved toward the beach, facing harassment from enemy fire from a resisting pocket on their right. Nevertheless, Erskine's 3rd Marine Division successfully secured the airfield areas and only needed to eliminate this last remaining pocket in their zone. However, personnel losses during this 14-day campaign were substantial, with Erskine losing 831 men killed and 2,241 wounded. Finally, Cates took over from the 24th Marines as he initiated his final offensive eastward. Consequently, the 23rd Marines advanced southeast with minimal resistance, covering approximately 700 yards before stopping at a strategic high ground about 500 yards from the beach, while patrols moved toward the coast near Tachiiwa Point. Simultaneously, Lanigan's 1st and 3rd Battalions pushed 600 yards southeast against stronger opposition and successfully occupied the key terrain southwest of Higashi. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion advanced northeast to join them, effectively driving the remaining enemy forces into a small pocket in that area. Over the last 14 days, Cates' 4th Marine Division engaged in relentless assaults, fighting fiercely from Charlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Minami, and the formidable defenses northeast of Hill 382, nearly reaching the coast.  The Japanese conducted an astute defense in this sector. General Kuribayashi had planned well, but much credit for execution of the plan in the 4th Marine Division zone must go to General Senda, who commanded the 2nd Mixed Brigade and exercised tactical control during the battle. Enemy weapons and minefields were well placed to take maximum advantage of terrain features, fire control was excellent when judged by Japanese standards, and camouflage discipline outstanding. Machine-gun positions controlled draws, while mortars were disposed to deliver fire on routes of approach, including the crests, forward, and reverse slopes of ridges. The one obvious mistake made by the Japanese in this long, grueling defense to the death was the night counterattack of March 8. This action cost them many lives and gained no advantage. Even this rather hopeless plunge can be somewhat justified, however, when the situation that existed then is seen from the Japanese point of view. By March 8, the enemy was under heavy, constant pressure in an ever-shrinking area where most of the critical terrain features had been captured. He was quickly becoming dispossessed and disorganized, with few courses of action remaining. Because communications were undoubtedly badly disrupted, it is possible that the Japanese facing the 4th Division did not realize just how hopeless his cause appeared and therefore harbored some hope that the counterattack might not be in vain. The cost was significant, with Cates suffering 848 men killed and 2,836 wounded.  While the battle raged on Iwo Jima, General LeMay was also preparing for a major raid on Tokyo, known as Operation Meetinghouse. After a precision strike by 192 B-29 bombers against Musashi on March 4, which resulted in minimal damage due to heavy cloud cover, a decision was made to move away from the 21st Bomber Command's traditional focus on precision bombing. This eighth fiasco at Musashi marked the end of a well-defined phase of 21st Bomber Command's operations. The effort to knock out the Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, daylight precision bombing of carefully selected targets had failed. Production of aircraft engines, not grossly off scheduled programs when 21st Bomber Command came to the Marianas, fell off sharply during the last two months of 1944 and production of aircraft declined slightly during the same period. In neither case, however, could the shortages be accounted for by destruction wrought by the B-29's; indeed, the output of Franks at Ota had decreased from 300 a month to 100 before the first air strike. Not one of the nine high-priority targets had been destroyed, although Akashi had been effectively crippled and production had been slowed down at Mitsubishi's engine and assembly plants at Nagoya and at Nakajima-Ota. Musashi had suffered only 4% damage after 835 B-29 sorties had been sent against it; Navy planes had done more harm in a single strike. Probably the indirect effects of the B-29 raids were most important: with the fall of Saipan, Japanese industrialists had begun to lose confidence in their supposed immunity from air attack. Although under governmental pressure for increased production, they began, with the first attacks on Nakajima and Mitsubishi, to hunt for underground or forest cover, and the official directive for dispersal issued in mid-January merely served to quicken a process already well under way. This radical change in manufacturing techniques, never as efficiently conducted as the similar movement in Germany had been, explains in part the slowdown in production in late 1944 and early 1945.  In 22 missions comprising 2,148 sorties, the command dropped 5,398 tons of bombs on Japan targeting the Imperial aircraft industry, but only about half of the bombers hit primary targets. Losses were substantial, largely due to fierce enemy interceptors and the lengthy overwater journey from the Marianas to Japan, which lacked any friendly bases for refueling or repairs. As a result of the high costs associated with unescorted daylight missions, the susceptibility of Japanese cities to incendiary attacks, and the minimal impact of precision bombing with high explosives, General Arnold ultimately opted for a comprehensive incendiary campaign. In preparation for the forthcoming assault on Okinawa, LeMay was tasked with initiating a series of intensive incendiary strikes from low altitudes. This lower bombing altitude would enhance accuracy, increase bomb load, and prolong the lifespan of B-29 engines. Although this approach carried risks, LeMay believed that the intense Japanese anti-aircraft fire was not overly threatening, as only two B-29s had been lost due to flak alone. He also decided to conduct these missions at night, which would decrease the likelihood of heavy cloud cover and strong winds, simplify navigation, and enable the bombers to reach the two new emergency airstrips at Iwo Jima by dawn. The first mission was set to commence immediately, with 334 B-29s from the 73rd, 313th, and 314th Bombardment Wings taking off in the late afternoon of March 9, carrying approximately 2,000 tons of bombs. The target was a rectangular area in northeastern Tokyo known as Zone I, measuring about 4 by 3 miles and encompassing most of Asakusa, Honjo, and Fukagawa Wards. After a turbulent journey, the initial pathfinders successfully identified their targets under favorable weather conditions and marked them shortly after midnight with fires However LeMay's decision came late. With the first mission set for the night of March 9, the field orders were not cut until the 8th. Although operational details would vary significantly from normal practice, there was no time to consult Washington as was so frequently done. Arnold was not even informed of the revolutionary plans until the day before the mission. The decision to attack at night ruled out the command's standard technique of lead-crew bombing. Formation flying at night was not feasible, and with flak rather than enemy fighters the chief danger, a tight formation would be a handicap rather than a source of defensive strength. With planes bombing individually from low altitudes, bomb loads could be sharply increased, to an average of about six tons per plane. Lead squadron B-29s carried 180 x 70-pound M47s, napalm-filled bombs calculated to start "appliance fires," that is, fires requiring attention of motorized fire-fighting equipment. Other planes, bombing on these pathfinders, were loaded with 24 x 500-pound clusters of M69s. Intervalometers were set at 100 feet for the pathfinders, 50 feet for the other planes. The latter setting was supposed to give a minimum density of 25 tons (8333 M69s) per square mile. Late reports indicated widespread fires that forced formations to search extensively for targets, with visibility severely hampered by smoke and bomb runs complicated by turbulence from intense heat waves. During the three-hour assault, a total of 279 B-29 bombers targeted Tokyo, successfully dropping 1,665 short tons of bombs on the primary objective. Additionally, 19 Superfortresses, unable to reach Tokyo, attacked alternative or last-resort targets. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise by this tactical shift, resulting in only moderate resistance; intense anti-aircraft fire destroyed 14 B-29s and damaged another 42, while enemy interceptors had no significant effect. The fires were so intense that they nearly extinguished themselves by mid-morning, only halted by wide gaps like rivers. Subsequent photographs revealed that 15.8 square miles had been devastated, including 18% of the industrial sector, 63% of the commercial area, and the core of the densely populated residential district. Tokyo's highly effective firefighting system was also caught off guard, leading to the destruction of 95 fire engines and the deaths of 125 firefighters, while lightweight buildings were completely consumed along with their contents. Little rubble remained; only a few fire-resistant structures, marked by heat damage, stood in the devastated areas. In total, 267,171 buildings were destroyed, 83,793 people lost their lives, 40,918 were injured, and 1,008,005 were left homeless. Moreover, it took 25 days to recover all the bodies from the debris. Radio Tokyo referred to the raid as “slaughter bombing,” with one broadcast stating that “the sea of flames engulfing the residential and commercial districts of Tokyo was reminiscent of the holocaust of Rome, caused by Emperor Nero.” The attack significantly undermined the morale of Japanese civilians, and along with other firebombing raids in March, it led many to believe that the war situation was worse than their government had acknowledged. In response, the Japanese government implemented a mix of repression, including severe penalties for those accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and launched an ineffective propaganda campaign aimed at restoring confidence in the nation's air and civil defense efforts. Meanwhile, LeMay and Arnold viewed the operation as a considerable success. As Tokyo mourned its losses, another 313 B-29s were sent on the afternoon of March 11 to execute a similar strike on Nagoya; however, due to minimal wind to spread the fires from the widely dispersed bombs, the results were less impressive. Nonetheless, only one B-29 was lost during the raid, with another 20 sustaining damage. It became evident, as LeMay had predicted, that the Japanese lacked effective tactics for nighttime interception. Now, attention shifts to Burma to report on the ongoing Chinese-British-Indian offensives. On General Slim's primary front, General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued its vigorous advance toward Mandalay, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division successfully made its way to the Meiktila area in the Japanese rear. In response, Generals Kimura and Katamura sent several reinforcements to this crucial area, but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment, led by Colonel Yoshida, managed to arrive in time to establish some defenses in the town, quickly transforming buildings in Meiktila into bunkers and strongpoints. On February 28, Cowan dispatched the 63rd Brigade to launch an attack from the west and the 48th Brigade to advance from the north along the Mahlaing-Meiktila road, while the 255th Tank Brigade executed a wide flanking maneuver to approach from the east. As a result, the 63rd Brigade secured Kyaukpyugon and set up a roadblock southwest of Meiktila; the 48th Brigade advanced to a bridge over a chaung approximately a mile from the town; and the 255th Brigade fought its way to Kyigon and Khanda, successfully destroying several bunkers near Point 860. On March 1, following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, Cowan's three brigades began to push into Meiktila despite fierce resistance. The 48th Brigade, bolstered by a tank squadron, advanced down the Mandalay-Meiktila road, quickly clearing Kyigon before entering the town, where they reached within 100 yards of the railroad line before the attack was halted in the late afternoon. To the east, the majority of the 255th Tank Brigade captured Point 860 and began clearing the camouflaged bunkers along the ridgeline, while a combined force of tanks and grenadiers advanced to within 200 yards of the railroad station before being recalled. Meanwhile, the 63rd Brigade, supported by a tank squadron, cleared the village of Kanna and continued past it to secure the railroad line and the main Kyaukpadaung-Meiktila road. The following day, the 17th Indian Division tightened the encirclement around Meiktila, inflicting significant casualties on the outnumbered defenders and destroying numerous enemy bunkers. On March 3, the three brigades commenced the task of eliminating the last remaining Japanese forces in and around Meiktila. They faced intense sniper and machine-gun fire from every building. However, due to the tanks' superior firepower, the Japanese strongholds were systematically taken down one by one. By the end of the day, the town was cleared, with an estimated 2,000 Japanese troops killed, including Colonel Yoshida. Additionally, 47 field pieces and anti-tank guns were captured, and the supply dumps surrounding Meiktila were secured. Cowan now needed to organize the town's defenses, anticipating a swift and fierce Japanese counterattack. Immediately after the town's capture, Kimura ordered the 18th Division to work with the weakened 49th Division to reclaim Meiktila, while Katamura reinforced General Naka with the majority of the 119th and 214th Regiments, a strong artillery unit, and the battered 14th Tank Regiment. Following the capture of Meiktila, Cowan's forces spent the next few days clearing the area of any remaining snipers and stragglers. For the town's defense, Cowan assigned each brigade and the divisional infantry to four sectors, each featuring a heavily fortified redoubt. He also tasked the 99th Brigade with defending Kyigon and Meiktila's airfield. To maintain the initiative for the 17th Division, Cowan aggressively deployed strong mobile columns of tanks, mechanized artillery, and infantry to disrupt the Japanese formations as they approached Meiktila. Consequently, while the 18th and 49th Divisions advanced, Ywadan and Nyaungaing were secured on March 5. In the following days, the main roads leading to Mahlaing, Kyaukpadaung, Pyawbwe, Thazi, and Mandalay were cleared, and the enemy units of the 214th Regiment at Thangongyi and Yego were successfully repelled on March 8. General Naka was now prepared to initiate his primary assault on Meiktila, instructing his units to concentrate their efforts north of the town, while the 214th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to move southwest to connect with the 49th Division. In response to these movements, on March 10, Cowan sent a robust tank-infantry force along the Mahlaing road to escort a previously dispatched column back to Meiktila, successfully inflicting significant casualties on the 56th Regiment as the British-Indians secured the Leindaw-Kyanngyagon area. However, the troops faced harassment from artillery fire originating from south of Myindawgan Lake, prompting Cowan to launch another armored sweep on March 14 to eliminate this threat. Although the 55th Regiment managed to capture the hill north of Meiktila after Cowan's tanks and infantry withdrew, the Japanese forces were unable to prevent their return, which resulted in further heavy losses. Concurrently, other tank-infantry units disrupted the advance of the 49th Division, effectively delaying the assembly of Japanese forces to the south and east of Meiktila until March 18. Additionally, a strong raid by the Komatsubara Unit was successfully repelled on March 14. In Stopford's sector, the 19th Division was preparing to launch its final offensive southward toward Mandalay, while the 2nd and 20th Divisions, after fierce fighting to expand their bridgeheads, were advancing east to assault the southern approaches to Mandalay. With close support from artillery and aircraft, General Rees' forces successfully breached the primary defenses of Lieutenant-General Yamamoto Kiyoe's 15th Division, reaching the northern outskirts of Mandalay by March 7. As the assault continued, British-Indian forces were set to enter the city on March 9. However, the determined defenders clung to Mandalay Hill and Fort Dufferin, aiming to extend the conflict and fight to the death. While Mandalay was under siege, the 62nd Brigade stealthily advanced east to Maymyo on March 11, catching the garrison off guard. The next day, Mandalay Hill ultimately fell while Fort Dufferin was being heavily bombarded within the city. By mid-March, the 2nd Division was nearing the capture of Ava, and the 20th Division was steadily advancing east to sever the supply routes from Mandalay to the south. In northern Burma, General Sultan was also pursuing his offensive. After establishing a bridgehead at Myitson, General Festing's 36th British Division faced minimal resistance and successfully took Mongmit on March 9 before continuing southward to Mogok. To the east, the 38th Chinese Division encountered only weak delaying positions as it moved towards Lashio, which was successfully occupied by March 7. At this point, the 56th Division, now independently commanding this area, was gradually retreating towards Hsipaw and Kyaukme. Although General Sun paused his advance until the Generalissimo granted permission to resume the offensive later in the month. Mountbatten feared that if more Chinese troops were withdrawn from Burma it might not be possible to take Rangoon before the monsoon rains began. This was an unpleasant prospect, so Mountbatten went to Chungking on March 8 for two days of conference with the Generalissimo. When the conference of March 9 concluded, the Generalissimo, according to the American minutes, said that he would recapitulate his decision of halting the Chinese advance at Lashio. In so doing, he remarked that the details of withdrawal would be settled later and that no final decisions would be made before General Wedemeyer was able to take part in them. Then he stated that unless there was a simultaneous amphibious attack on Rangoon, operations would stop at Lashio and Mandalay and the Allies would assume the defensive. The Chinese would stop at Lashio, but details of their operations between Lashio and Mandalay would be settled later between the staffs. The misunderstanding became quite apparent in mid-March when General Sultan, under whose command the Chinese were, received conflicting orders. Mountbatten ordered Sultan to move his forces southwestward toward Mandalay, yet the Generalissimo directed that the Chinese divisions stay in the Lashio area. As a compromise and to avoid having the Chinese wait idly around Lashio, Sultan suggested that a smaller task force be directed to proceed south. But the Generalissimo and his American advisers stood firm, lest the shift of troops to China be delayed. This in turn caused the British to believe that if the Chinese were not going to advance they should be withdrawn forthwith and end the burden on the line of communications. The 50th Chinese Division began to push south after securing the Namtu region and by mid-March reached Hsipaw. Meanwhile, in South Burma, the 82nd West African Division had taken Dalet, while the 25th Indian Division engaged in a struggle for control of the Ruywa-Tamandu area. Additionally, the 2nd West African Brigade was advancing inland toward An, posing a significant threat to the Japanese rear areas. Due to the rapid advancement of Slim's offensive, Admiral Mountbatten had to prioritize air supply for the 14th Army. This situation soon compelled General Christison to send the 25th Indian Division back to India, as his logistical support was becoming increasingly strained. Capturing Tamandu and establishing a Forward Maintenance Area there became essential. After successfully clearing Dokekan, the 74th Indian Brigade crossed the Me Chaung on March 4 to circumvent the main enemy defenses. The British-Indians pressed on, launching attacks on Tamandu in the following days, but the determined defenders put up strong resistance. Eventually, General Miyazaki withdrew most of the 111th Regiment and ordered it to attack the 2nd West African Brigade from the rear, which was finally contained by March 17. With the 25th Division scheduled to withdraw to Akyab by the end of the month, the 74th was reassigned to the 82nd West African Division and launched a final assault on Tamandu on March 11, successfully capturing the abandoned objective. The British-Indians then began to advance towards Kolan, reaching the vicinity of the town by mid-March. Simultaneously, the 154th Regiment counterattacked the West Africans at Dalet, successfully halting the enemy's advance beyond the river. Meanwhile, the 4th Indian Brigade landed at Mae near Letpan on March 13 from Ramree Island and established a roadblock to prevent enemy escape. In response, the 121st Regiment sent several companies to conduct a delaying action aimed at slowing the enemy's southward advance. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima intensified as the Marines advanced against fortified Japanese positions, facing heavy resistance and suffering significant casualties while capturing key terrain over several weeks of fierce combat. Meanwhile General LeMay shifted from precision bombing to incendiary raids on Tokyo, resulting in significant destruction and civilian casualties, while Japanese morale plummeted amid military setbacks.  

Batman Forever | The Schumacher Cut | Audio Drama Ben Wan of Superhero Stuff You Should Know and NeuverseCreative team up to give you the “Schumacher Cut” of Batman Forever as an immersive audio drama!Gotham is under siege as the Riddler and Two-Face unleashchaos, testing Batman like never before. While the Riddler's mind-bending device threatens the city's future, Two-Face sets a deadly trap to destroy theDark Knight. Haunted by a mysterious red leather book tied to his parents'murder, Bruce Wayne struggles to reconcile his dual identity. With the sharp-witted Dr. Chase Meridien challenging his psyche and young Dick Grayson seeking vengeance, Batman must face his darkest fears and unite with unlikelyallies.VOICE CAST:Ben Wan – Batman/Bruce WayneAustin Garner – Edward Nygma/RiddlerTommy Rickard - Two-FaceLauren Sanders – Dr. Chase MeridienAlexander Pond - AlfredTim Maxwell – Dick Grayson/RobinLoren King – GordonAJ Carter – Dr. AimsJett Weston – Fred StickleyAngela Hoeffler – CatwomanJacob L. Skrapka – Penguin, The JokerNarrated by Simon Mitchell CREDITS: Adapted by Ben Wan Based on the original Batman Forever screenplay written by Lee & Janet Scott Batchler with Additions by Akiva GoldsmanDirected, mixed, and edited by Tim Maxwell  Batman created by Bob Kane, with Bill Finger Based oncharacters appearing in comics published by DC Comics  Produced by NEUVERSE CREATIVE A big thanks to Ben Wan from @SuperHousePodcast for writing and voicing Batman/Bruce Wayne in this episode. If you liked the writing of this adaptation, check out BenWan's original comics Alter Ego, and Musashi and Son on Amazon. Also, check out more from Ben Wan at benwanwriter.com.

Tim Burton's Batman 3 Gotham descends into chaos as the Riddler and Two-Face launch a relentless assault, pushing Batman to his limits. With the Riddler's mind-twisting invention threatening the city's future and Two-Face laying a deadly trap, the Dark Knight faces his most perilous challenge yet. Haunted by a mysterious red leather book linked to his parents' murder, Bruce Wayne grapples with his dual identity. As the insightful Dr. Chase Meridien probes his psyche and young Dick Grayson seeks vengeance, Batman must confront his deepest fears and forge unexpected alliances. Set in the visionary world of Tim Burton, and based on the original Batman Forever script, Batman 3 is a gripping tale of justice, power, and redemption. CHAPTERS Prologue 00:00:33Intro 00:01:551: You're A Killer, Too 00:02:362: Birth of The Riddler 00:16:293: Kindred Spirits 00:24:344: Rise of the Riddler 00:36:115: Birth of Robin 00:42:206: Happy Halloween 00:56:187: Not My Fault 01:02:118: Both Bruce Wayne and Batman 01:14:14Credits 01:26:19 VOICE CAST: Ben Wan – Batman/Bruce Wayne Nick Gonzalez – Edward Nygma/Riddler Derric Willingham – Two-Face Lauren Sanders – Dr. Chase Meridien Christopher Anderson – Dick Grayson/Robin Loren King – Gordon AJ Carter – Dr. Aims Jett Weston – Fred Stickley Angela Hoeffler – Catwoman Jacob L. Skrapka – Penguin, The Joker Adapted by: Ben Wan Based on the original Batman Forever screenplay by Lee & Janet Scott Batchler, with additions by Akiva Goldsman Directed, Mixed, and Edited by: Tim Maxwell Music for this production features unreleased tracks from Danny Elfman's Batman and Batman Returns soundtracks, along with music from Jonathan Cox, Mike Verta, Luke Nemitz, Nick Gonzalez, Donny Pearson, and Kevin MacLeod. Batman was created by Bob Kane with Bill Finger and is based on characters appearing in DC Comics. Special thanks to Ben Wan from @SuperHousePodcast for writing and voicing Batman/Bruce Wayne. Enjoyed this adaptation? Explore Ben Wan's original comics, Alter Ego and Musashi and Son, available on Amazon:Ben Wan's Amazon Author Page For more from Ben Wan, visit benwanwriter.com. Produced by NEUVERSE CREATIVE

This show we do a throwback to our 100th episode where we talk with our two most important mentors ------ Our 100th show!  We couldn't think of a better way to celebrate this milestone than by having our two most important mentors on the show:  Mike Brown of the former Praesidium Group and Craig Douglas of Shivworks. Topics:   Meeting Mike in the mid 90s, how he became such an important coach and mentor to Eric and Aaron; how he pushed Eric join the TPI forums and to take ECQC.  The Twins becoming a host to Craig for multiple classes through the years and how that relationship led to training with others in the Shivworks collective.   TPI and its influence on the current multidisciplinary realm and how forums have transitioned to video and social media.  Is this good/bad?  Who are folks in this multidisciplinary realm whom both Craig and Mike recommend and what makes great instructors.  Lastly, we talk a little gear, P365s, red dots, and some other fun topics to close out the show.  Previous appearances of Mike and Craig Mike Brown Ep. 5 https://directory.libsyn.com/episode/index/show/evosec/id/10923969 Ep 45 https://directory.libsyn.com/episode/index/show/evosec/id/18674765 Craig's Ep 13 https://directory.libsyn.com/episode/index/show/evosec/id/12326351 Ep 49 https://directory.libsyn.com/episode/index/show/evosec/id/19725887 Please subscribe and share our podcast with friends and family.  Visit our website for bios, future events and info at www.evosec.org  Like, follow and share us on Facebook and Instagram @evosecusa WE ARE PUMPED TO HAVE A NEW AFFILIATE LINK FOR ORIGIN AND JOCKO FUEL!!!  Help support this show by purchasing any of your JiuJitsu gear, Jocko Supplements, books clothing and more... link below. Origin/Jocko Fuel – Bringing back American manufacturing, producing the best Jiu-Jitsu Gis on the market, Jeans, rash guards, and world class supplements to help you on the path.  Use EvoSec10 at checkout for 10% off, this helps us greatly.  EVOSEC Originusa.com AFFILIATE LINK Tenicor – www.tenicor.com they are educators, and innovators in the holster market.  They are firearms instructors themselves, pressure testing their gear in multiple force on force events every year.  We support those who do the work.   Patronizing our sponsors helps us greatly so thank you in advance.   Evolution Security is Eric Davis, Aaron Davis and Brian Schilt; specializing in self-protection education, defensive pistol and carbine, consulting, and weapons based grappling.  Their mission is to help those serious about protecting themselves and their loved ones, become more capable though filtered information, recommended study, and highlighting their mentors who are the best in the field.   In addition, Eric and Aaron (twins) are musicians keeping with Musashi's adage that martial artist should focus on art outside of the martial (bumper music recorded by the brothers). 

Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops.  By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region.  In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang.  In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command.  The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya.  The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured.  For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464.  On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.

“In that instant they felt an overwhelming sense of pride and accomplishment. Though they had failed dismally even to come close to the expedition's original objective, they knew now that somehow they had done much, much more than ever they set out to do.” Welcome back to another episode of Made You Think! If you love exploration books as much as we do, you'll definitely enjoy this episode. Today, we're talking about Endurance: Shackleton's Incredible Voyage by Alfred Lansing. Join us as we explore Shackleton's legendary expedition, where a crew of 28 men faced nearly two years of extreme conditions after their ship became trapped in ice. We cover a wide range of topics including: How Shackleton's leadership prevented descent into madness Physical vs. mental challenges in extreme survival situations Were previous generations tougher than we are today? Antarctic exploration's parallels to modern space missions The life-or-death decisions in the final rescue attempt And much more. Please enjoy, and make sure to follow Nat, Neil, and Adil on Twitter and share your thoughts on the episode. Links from the Episode: Mentioned in the Show: Equip (1:35) TrueMed (1:39) Gusto (3:15) CrowdHealth (4:16) Ross Sea Party (9:31) SpaceX 'Chopsticks' (14:20) Kerbal Space Program (15:57) Oppenheimer (22:55) Apollo 13 (40:06) The Martian (40:35) Endurance Documentary (43:50) Free Solo (44:34) JD Vance on Joe Rogan (1:14:04) Justin Mares - The Next (1:20:19) Anthony Gustin - The Feed (1:20:43) News article on Epic (1:21:43) Books Mentioned: Colony One Mars (19:21) The Fourth Turning (28:08) (Book Episode)  Dune (33:57) Musashi (34:11) East of Eden (34:12) (Book Episode) (Nat's Book Notes) Lord of the Rings (35:29) The River of Doubt (48:10) (Book Episode) Hatchet (1:02:36) The Lost Men (1:04:17) Where Is My Flying Car? (1:08:07) (Book Episode) Energy and Civilization (1:10:00) (Book Episode) (Nat's Book Notes) How the World Really Works (1:10:03) (Book Episode) The Prize (1:10:44) Oil 101 (1:11:31) The Brothers K (1:12:00) Power to Save the World (1:12:19) How to Drive a Nuclear Reactor (1:12:29) Crypto Confidential (1:29:43) People Mentioned: Ernest Shackleton Alfred Lansing (10:47) Amundsen and Scott (12:19) Alfred Cheetham (19:58) Jimmy Chin (44:20)  Elizabeth Chai Vasarhelyi (44:24) Show Topics: (0:00) After an unintended hiatus, we're back! We begin the episode with a tangent on our favorite blender, health insurance plans, and protein powder. (5:44) We begin our discussion of Endurance by Alfred Lansing. Nat shares a unique perspective, having read the book during his own trip to Antarctica. (09:15) The timeline of Shackleton's expedition spanned from August 1914 to September 1916, marking nearly two years of survival against impossible odds. Later on, Shackleton would help rescue another stranded crew in January 1917. (11:16) Endurance draws from the crew's journal entries, a common practice during the age of exploration when survival wasn't guaranteed. We discuss how these historical records parallel potential Mars missions in the future. (13:46) We explore current Mars exploration initiatives across the globe. China aims for a sample return mission by 2030, SpaceX targets 2028 for their missions, and India continues to advance their rover program. (18:01) The core of Shackleton's story unfolds: an attempted Antarctic crossing, leading to a two-year fight for survival. Despite the world presuming them dead, every crew member survived, with many later serving in World War I, highlighting their extraordinary resilience. (22:11) "Men wanted for hazardous journey. Low wages, bitter cold, long hours of complete darkness. Safe return doubtful. Honour and recognition in event of success." Shackleton's legendary recruitment advertisement exemplified his unique approach to crew selection. Nat, Neil, and Adil also discuss whether the people of previous generations were tougher than we are today.  (30:30) Shifting the conversation to growing up in the pre-Internet era. We reminisce about outdoor adventures, early video games, and how different forms of entertainment shaped our imaginations compared to today. (35:54) The physical hardships endured by the crew were severe, with frostbite being a constant threat. Shackleton's leadership proved crucial, maintaining strict schedules and discipline to prevent the crew from succumbing to despair during their long wait trapped in ice. (39:26) We draw parallels between Shackleton's earlier failures and the Apollo 13 mission.  (42:41) The type of ship they chose for the journey actually had a huge impact on the outcome. Its specific shape made it vulnerable to being trapped within the large blocks of ice. (46:31) National parks and the preservation of nature. There are very few places left in the country where there is no light pollution at all. (49:43) After a year on the ship and another camping on ice, they modified their lifeboats for a perilous journey to Elephant Island. Shackleton's team then faced the task of scaling mountains without proper gear and navigating treacherous waters. (55:12) Nat, Neil, and Adil debate whether the physical or mental challenges were the most difficult to overcome in this expedition. Would you rather have been on the boat with Shackleton, or waiting for the boat to return for rescue?  (1:01:32) The book itself has an interesting publishing history. Though it achieved only modest sales during Lansing's lifetime, it found massive success about a decade after his death. (1:07:49) We reflect on a few other books we've read on energy. If you have any recommendations, send them our way!  (1:13:07) A discussion about current political leadership's understanding of technology and its implications for policy decisions. (1:20:55) The 'Make American Healthy Again' efforts, healthcare system incentives, and potential future programs in the U.S. What is to come under the new administration? (1:24:59) It wouldn't be an episode of MYT without a little crypto and meme coin talk! (1:34:58) That concludes this episode! If you're interested in reading Endurance, you can grab a copy of the book here. Next up on the podcast, we will be reading Musashi by Eiji Yoshikawa. Make sure to stay tuned to our website to see what's next and leave us a book rec! If you enjoyed this episode, let us know by leaving a review on iTunes and tell a friend. As always, let us know if you have any book recommendations! You can say hi to us on Twitter @TheRealNeilS, @adilmajid, @nateliason and share your thoughts on this episode. You can now support Made You Think using the Value-for-Value feature of Podcasting 2.0. This means you can directly tip the co-hosts in BTC with minimal transaction fees. To get started, simply download a podcast app (like Fountain or Breez) that supports Value-for-Value and send some BTC to your in-app wallet. You can then use that to support shows who have opted-in, including Made You Think! We'll be going with this direct support model moving forward, rather than ads. Thanks for listening. See you next time!

Episode 265 - The Musashi Experience with Nic Gregoriades

Musashi, a renowned ronin from Japan who lived between 1584 and 1645, is widely regarded as one of history's greatest swordsmen. Boasting an unmatched dueling record of 61 victories with no defeats, his legendary skill with the sword remains unparalleled. Beyond his martial prowess, Musashi was also a writer and philosopher. His enduring work, 'The Book of Five Rings', continues to be published and studied worldwide even today.Musashi's nine principles of strategy, outlined in the Book of Earth, offer practical guidance for mastering both combat and life. They emphasize discipline, balance, and an unyielding focus on understanding the fundamentals of any endeavor. These principles encourage simplicity, awareness, and perseverance as key components for achieving success.MusicUniversal Music For CreatorsSoundstripeEpidemic Sound Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Jocko Willink is a retired Navy SEAL, CEO of Echelon Front, bestselling author, and the host of the wildly popular Jocko Podcast. His insights on discipline, ownership, and mindset have transformed lives in boardrooms, on battlefields, and beyond. From leading combat missions in Iraq to helping businesses and individuals thrive under pressure, Jocko's approach to life is as relentless as it is empowering.In this episode of The Resilient Life, Ryan sits down with her long-time friend to answer some of the most-requested questions. From advice to transitioning service members, to improving mental health, and what's on Jocko's Thanksgiving table, don't miss this up close and personal conversation.CONNECT with The Resilient Life Podcast:Instagram SUBSCRIBE Get the latest video podcast on YouTubeGet the latest audio podcastCONNECT Ryan Manion on Social Media:Facebook - Twitter - Instagram - LinkedIn  LEARN about Travis Manion FoundationMEET Jocko WillinkInstagram

Apologies for the ****show that has been this week's episode. I'll talk about it at the top of next week's show. -Gregr We're taking Branden's wife to the Basho! Not an inside joke, we swear. Ceej is paying for all those Four Loko's. Gerg is a post Japan mess and he we forgot to talk about Musashi island... nerdtalkplus.com to join in! Please leave us a comment where you listen, specifically if you listen on Spotify, leave a comment on the episode itself!

Last time we spoke about the advance to Ormoc Valley. As October 1944 unfolded in the Leyte campaign, American forces steadily pushed Japanese troops inland. Despite fierce resistance, they captured key positions, like Dagami, Catmon Hill, and multiple airstrips. While the Japanese reinforced areas like Ormoc, American regiments advanced through challenging conditions, relying on artillery amid minimal air support due to weather and resource constraints. By month's end, American forces had inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese, securing vital beachheads and pushing closer to full control of Leyte. After suffering losses at Leyte Gulf, the 7th Fleet withdrew, leaving Kenney's P-38s to defend Tacloban airfields amid Japanese air raids. As kamikaze attacks grew, USS Franklin sustained heavy casualties, while the Americans pressed forward, capturing Carigara on Leyte. Meanwhile, Australian forces began reclaiming New Britain, pushing Japanese forces back through guerilla warfare. Facing tough jungle conditions, Australian and native troops gradually secured strategic positions by December, reinforcing the Allied grip in the Pacific. This episode is the Battle of Ormoc Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we have seen over the past few weeks, the Battle of Leyte Gulf saw Generals MacArthur's forces land and successfully defeat the 16th Division of Leyte Island as well as seized Carigara and Pinamopoan over the northern coast. The 24th Division also engaged the enemy's reinforcements, centred around the elite 1st Division during the battle for the northern entrance into the Ormoc Valley. Meanwhile Admiral Okawachi and General Yamashita aimed to bring more reinforcements to Leyte which would lead to another air-naval battle. The previous week, Colonel Verbeck's 21st Regiment was engaged in a mission to capture Breakneck Ridge, fiercely defended by Colonel Miyauchi's 57th Regiment. Simultaneously, General Kataoka mobilized his remaining two regiments to initiate a broad, four-pronged assault on the Pinamopoan perimeter. However, the rugged terrain slowed their movement toward assembly areas. On the morning of November 8 a typhoon, moving in from the west, swept over the entire island of Leyte. Jan Valtin, a member of the 24th Division, graphically describes it: "From the angry immensity of the heavens floods raced in almost horizontal sheets. Palms bent low under the storm, their fronds flattened like streamers of wet silk. Trees crashed to earth. In the expanse of… [cogon] grass the howling of the wind was like a thousand-fold plaint of the unburied dead. The trickle of supplies was at a standstill. On Carigara Bay the obscured headlands moaned under the onslaught of the… seas. Planes were grounded and ships became haunted things looking for refuge. Massed artillery… barrages to the summit of Breakneck Ridge sounded dim and hollow in the tempest. Trails were obliterated by the rain. The sky was black." In the midst of the storm, the 21st's infantry attacked. As the typhoon swept across the island, Verbeck's forces launched a three-pronged assault on Breakneck Ridge and Hill 1525, facing staunch resistance from Miyauchi's defenders but making considerable progress toward Hill 1525. Notably, plans for General Suzuki's offensive were found on a deceased Japanese officer, enabling General Krueger to redeploy his forces effectively. On 10 November General Mudge sent elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to patrol the area of the mountains of central Leyte extensively. From 5 November through 2 December, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division extensively patrolled the central mountain area and had many encounters with small forces of the enemy. At all times the supply situation was precarious. The 12th Cavalry established high in the foothills, at the entrance to the passes through the mountains, a supply base that was also a native camp, a hospital, and a rest camp. About 300 Filipino carriers were kept here under the protection of the guerrillas. The carriers had been hired for six days at a time and were not allowed to leave without a pass from their Filipino leader. This precaution was necessary, since the ration-carrying assignment was extremely arduous. The cavalrymen would frequently skirmish with the 41st Regiment and the 169th and 171st Independent Battalions during this period. Brigadier-General Julian Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, expected by November 14, was tasked with relieving General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division in the Carigara-Barugo area to enable a southwest advance from the central mountains and ease pressure on General Irving's 24th Division.  General Bradley's 96th Division was directed to capture the high ground between Jaro and Dagami, with the 382nd Regiment remaining at Dagami to inflict significant losses on the 16th Division while securing Bloody Ridge. By November 4, the 382nd Regiment had made some progress into Bloody Ridge. The night of 4-5 November was not quiet. The Japanese delivered harassing fire on the 1st Battalion, and at 2205 elements of the 16th Division launched a heavy assault against the perimeter of the 2d Battalion. An artillery concentration immediately stopped the attack, and the Japanese fled, leaving 254 dead and wounded behind them. The following morning, after the artillery had fired a preparation in front of the 1st and 2d Battalions, the two battalions renewed the attack at 0900 and two companies from the 3d Battalion protected the regimental left (south) flank. The battalions advanced about 1,000 yards before they encountered any strong resistance. The defenses of the 16th Division consisted of a great many concrete emplacements, concealed spider holes, and connecting trenches. By nightfall, at 1700, the two battalions, assisted by the tanks from Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, successfully reduced the enemy to their front and captured the ridge. Each battalion formed its own perimeter and made plans to renew the attack on 6 November. At 0830 the 1st Battalion, with light tanks in support, moved out in the attack westward against a strong enemy force that was well entrenched in foxholes and pillboxes. Each of these defensive positions had to be reduced before the advance could continue. At 1300 the 2d Battalion moved to the high ground on the right flank of the 1st. The 1st Battalion encountered a strong concrete enemy pillbox which was believed to be a command post, since there were no firing apertures. As grenades had no effect it became necessary finally to neutralize the pillbox by pouring gasoline down the ventilation pipes and setting it afire. Two officers and nineteen enlisted men of the enemy were killed in the pillbox. The Japanese continued to fight tenaciously. There was no withdrawal, but by the end of the day only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained. The Japanese 16th Division was taking a bad beating. Its supply of provisions had run out. All the battalion commanders, most of the company commanders, and half the artillery battalion and battery commanders had been killed. On the night of 6 November the 16th Division contracted its battle lines and on the following day took up a new position in the Dagami area. The new position ranged from a hill about four and a half miles northwest of Dagami to a point about three and three-fourths miles northwest of Burauen. On 7 November all three battalions of the 382d Infantry engaged the enemy and maintained constant pressure against his positions. The 1st and 3d Battalions advanced west, while the 2d Battalion drove north and west. The 3d Battalion encountered -the more determined resistance. Advancing, preceded by tanks, it met heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire. A large enemy force assaulted the troops at close quarters and tried to destroy the tanks, but when the 382d Infantry introduced flamethrowers and supporting machine guns, the attackers fell back in disorder. The regiment overran the Japanese defensive positions and killed an estimated 474 of the enemy. Company E of the 2d Battalion had remained in the Patok area, engaged in patrolling and wiping out isolated pockets of enemy resistance. On 8 November strong patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions probed west into the hills. They encountered the left flank of the enemy supporting position at a point about 2,600 yards west of Patok. A very heavy rainfall on the night of 8-9 November made an assault against the position impossible on 9 November. After all-night artillery fire, the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 0900 on 10 November. They met no resistance, but progress was slow because of the swamps. By 1225 the two battalions, supported by a platoon of light tanks, occupied the ridge formerly held by elements of the 16th Division. The 1st Battalion had advanced 2,500 yards. The 382d Infantry had destroyed all organized enemy resistance in its sector and removed the threat to Dagami.  Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division stationed at the Burauen-Abuyog area began sending patrols from Baybay toward Ormoc to prepare for a larger advance, while the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment moved to Baybay, successfully ambushing the Japanese unit advancing to Abuyog. Concurrently, Okawachi sent his fourth convoy from Manila, consisting of three transports, four frigates, and six destroyers under Admiral Kimura. This convoy carried the bulk of General Yamagata's 26th Division and approximately 3,500 tons of supplies, followed by another echelon of three transports with the remainder of the 1st Division. The echelon reached Ormoc the next day, unloaded successfully, and departed without issue. However, the main convoy encountered air attacks as it approached Ormoc Bay, beginning its debarkation by nightfall. On 10 November the 38th Bomb Group, based on Morotai, sent 32 B-25 Mitchells escorted by 37 P-47 Thunderbolts to attack TA-4 near Ponson Island. Reaching the convoy just before noon, the B-25s attacked at minimum altitude in pairs, sinking the two largest transports, Takatsu Maru and Kashii Maru, disabling a third, and sinking two of the patrol craft escorts at a cost of seven bombers, for which the group was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation. Although Yamagata's troops were finally ashore by November 10, most of the supplies couldn't be unloaded due to ongoing enemy air attacks. Shortly after leaving Ormoc, American planes intercepted the convoy, destroying two transports and one frigate, while further damaging another frigate and a destroyer. Meanwhile, Okawachi dispatched a third convoy, consisting of five transports, a submarine chaser, and five destroyers under Rear Admiral Hayakawa Mikio, transporting special troops and heavy equipment of the 26th Division. When one transport ran aground on Luzon's Bondoc Peninsula, Kimura sent two frigates and three destroyers to transfer its cargo to Ormoc. As a result, Hayakawa's convoy arrived at Ormoc Bay on November 11 and began unloading. However, ULTRA intercepts had detected the enemy convoy departing Manila, prompting Admiral Halsey to redeploy Task Force 38 under Admiral McCain. While under repair at Manila on 29 October, Nachi and Kumano were attacked by aircraft from USN Task Force 38. Nachi was hit by a single bomb to her aircraft deck, and this, as well as strafing attacks, killed 53 crewmen and further delayed repairs. On 5 November, again in Manila Bay, Nachi was attacked by three waves of U.S. planes from the aircraft carriers USS Lexington and Ticonderoga. She escaped the first wave undamaged, but was hit by five bombs and two or three torpedoes in the second wave while attempting to get underway. During the third wave, Nachi was hit by five torpedoes in her port side, which severed her bow and stern, and by an additional 20 bombs and 16 rockets. Nachi's flag commander, Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, was ashore for a conference at the time of the attack, but arrived at dockside in time to see his flagship blown apart. The central portion of the vessel sank in 102 feet (31 m) of water about 12 nautical miles (22 km) northeast of Corregidor. McCain launched an attack on Kimura's convoy. Just as unloading began, 347 planes struck, sinking all four transports and four destroyers, including the flagship Shimakaze, on which Hayakawa lost his life. This costly reinforcement operation thus ended in partial failure, with most equipment lost and over 1,500 casualties. Nevertheless, elements of the 1st Division moved immediately toward the Limon area, while Yamagata's units, though short on weaponry, were ordered to assemble at Dolores to prepare for joining the Imahori Detachment at Daro. At the same time, noticing the rapid advance of the enemy into the Carigara area, Yamashita concluded that Suzuki's proposed offensive toward Tacloban was destined for failure. He ordered the main force of the 35th Army to join the 16th Division in the advantageous mountainous positions of the Burauen-Dagami area to regain control of the recently captured airstrips, thereby limiting operations in the Carigara area to a holding action. Concurrently, as this adjustment to the tactical plan was made, Yamashita communicated his growing belief that the overall situation offered little hope for victory on Leyte and unsuccessfully tried to persuade General Terauchi to shift the decisive battle to Luzon. As a result of Terauchi's decision, the 68th Brigade was still to be sent to Leyte; the 23rd Division was scheduled to go to Manila in mid-November before returning to Leyte; and the 10th and 19th Divisions were planned for movement to the island by the end of the year. With the plans finalized for continuing the decisive battle on Leyte, Terauchi's headquarters departed Manila for Saigon on November 17. Back on Leyte, on November 9, the weary, mud-stained troops of the 21st Regiment launched another attack, with the 3rd Battalion assaulting the center of Breakneck Ridge and the 2nd Battalion targeting OP Hill, though they made only minor gains. Additionally, Verbeck's 1st Battalion attacked Limon but was repelled by heavy enemy fire, and fresh Japanese troops subsequently counterattacked the Hill 1525 position, forcing the Americans to retreat. Finally, Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached the western slopes of Hill 1525 in the afternoon, but it was too late for them to take part in the battle. On November 10, Verbeck continued his assault, successfully capturing OP Hill and making significant headway in the area. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion began advancing westward to establish a roadblock on Highway 2, approximately 2000 yards south of Limon. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Clifford's 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment landed on the western shore of Carigara Bay and initiated a wide envelopment around the western flank of the 57th Regiment to secure the high ground known as Kilay Ridge. Additionally, Mudge's cavalrymen pressed forward toward Mount Minoro. On this day, Yamashita's adjustments to the tactical plan finally reached Suzuki's headquarters. As a result, Suzuki abandoned his initial strategy and directed Yamagata to move his troops quickly to Albuera to prepare for an offensive eastward, dubbed Operation Wa. To replace the 26th Division in upcoming operations on the Jaro front, Suzuki decided to deploy the 30th Division, which had not yet departed Mindanao, instructing them to land at Ipil and prepare to support the Imahori Detachment, already skirmishing with Bradley's patrols. On November 11, following a heavy artillery barrage, Verbeck resumed his assault, although the 2nd Battalion quickly found itself pinned down, while the 1st Battalion successfully secured a ridge 300 yards southwest of OP Hill. The next morning, the 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced against the crest of Breakneck Ridge, successfully capturing the objective before being halted by Japanese artillery fire. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached Highway 2, and Clifford's 1st Battalion, supported by elements of the guerrilla 96th Regiment, arrived in the Cabiranan area. By November 13, Verbeck's 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced 600 and 400 yards, respectively, without encountering opposition. Breakneck Ridge was secured, although the Japanese maintained control over several nearby spurs, particularly Corkscrew Ridge. Nonetheless, the 21st Regiment reported approximately 1,779 Japanese soldiers killed, suffering 630 casualties in the process. Additionally, Clifford's 1st Battalion successfully reached Kilay Ridge undetected and quickly established defensive positions. At 0855 on 13 November a column of Filipino men, women, and children entered the perimeter and brought approximately thirty-five boxes of rations from Consuegra. The battalion left the area at 0930 and reached the ridge without opposition. Trenches and prepared gun positions without a man in them honeycombed the ridge from one end to the other. It was evident that elements of the 1st Division had intended to occupy the area in the latter stages of the battle for Limon. On 14 November Colonel Clifford ordered his battalion to entrench itself along the ridge in positions that would afford the best tactical advantage. The battalion established strong points and observation posts on the knolls, placed blocks on the trails leading through the area, and sent out reconnaissance patrols to locate enemy positions. Colonel Clifford made arrangements to utilize the Filipinos as carriers. These men were to use a trail on the north end of the ridge and bring supplies to the battalion from a supply dump at Consuegra. The first human pack train arrived in the area at 1010 with twenty-eight cases of rations and a supply of batteries for the radios. At 1125 enemy artillery shelled the southern end of the ridge and twenty minutes later shifted its fire to the Limon area. The battalion did not succeed in establishing physical contact with the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, which was operating east of the road, but it was able to make radio contact. Throughout the day, patrols of the battalion were active in searching out enemy positions. Meanwhile the 112th Cavalry was landed at Carigara and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division to strengthen the assault on the central Leyte mountains. Meanwhile, the reserve 32nd Division, led by Major-General William Gill, was also dispatched to the island to relieve the fatigued 24th Division. This newly arrived division was assigned the mission of capturing Limon and advancing down the Ormoc Valley toward Ormoc. On the Japanese side, after receiving the rest of his division, Kataoka chose to move the 1st Regiment to the left flank to assist the 57th, which had also been bolstered by two fresh battalions. This combined force aimed to launch an attack along the main road toward Pinamopoan while the 49th Regiment and the 171st Independent Battalion sought to envelop the enemy's left flank toward Colasian. By mid-November, the headquarters of the 102nd Division and most of the 364th Independent Battalion had also arrived in Ormoc, with Lieutenant-General Fukei Shinpei taking command of the 41st Regiment and his other battalions on the island as they advanced toward Mount Pina. Furthermore, despite significant losses to enemy aircraft, five air regiments had reinforced the 4th Air Army, enabling General Tominaga to make the 4th Air Division fully operational, a unit that had previously focused solely on base activities and anti-submarine patrols. The replenishment of naval air strength was progressing well, with replacement aircraft for the 1st Combined Base Air Force outnumbering losses by 26% in November. On November 15, the Combined Fleet opted to cease training carrier air groups and instead focus on expanding the base air forces. The 3rd Air Fleet, stationed in the homeland, was tasked with training replacement units for deployment to the Philippines. Due to the successful reinforcement of Japanese air forces in the Philippines and General Kenney's ongoing inability to provide close air support, Halsey once again directed Task Force 38 to attack enemy airbases on Luzon. On November 13 and 14, McCain's carriers conducted several strikes against Japanese airfields in Luzon, resulting in a significant decrease in enemy air operations over Leyte. On 13 November 1944, on the threat of American carrier strikes on Luzon, Kiso was ordered to return to Brunei that evening carrying Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima. Before she could leave for Brunei, she was attacked on 13 November while underway in Manila Bay by more than 350 carrier planes of Task Force 38's carrier task groups 38.1's Hornet, Monterey and Cowpens, TG 38.3's Essex, Ticonderoga and Langley and TG 38.4's Enterprise and San Jacinto. Three bombs hit Kiso to starboard - one in the bow, one near her boiler rooms and one near her aft gun mounts. Kiso sank in shallow water 13 kilometres (7.0 nmi; 8.1 mi) west of Cavite. Captain Ryonosuke Imamura and 103 of her crew survived, but 175 crewmen went down with the ship. Akebono, while alongside destroyer Akishimo at Cavite pier near Manila, was attacked in a USAAF air raid. A direct bomb hit set both ships ablaze, and the following day a large explosion on Akishimo blew a hole in Akebono, which sank upright in shallow water, with 48 crewmen killed and 43 wounded. After returning to Manila, Hatsuharu was caught in an air raid in Manila Bay. A series of near misses buckled plates and set fires, causing the ship to sink in shallow water. The attack killed 12 crewmen and injured 60 more, but 218 survived. Several other vessels were also sunk. Meanwhile, on November 14, the Hi-81 convoy, comprising the escort carriers Shinyo and Akitsu Maru, destroyer Kashi, seaplane tender Kiyokawa Maru, submarine chaser No. 156, seven escort ships, five oilers, and three transports, left Imari Bay under Rear-Admiral Sato Tsutomu. The convoy carried most of Lieutenant-General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division and headed into the Yellow Sea, wary of enemy submarines. After stopping for the night in Ukishima Channel near the Gotō Islands, Sato's convoy resumed its journey on November 15 but was soon ambushed by two submarine wolfpacks. Commander Charles Loughlin's submarines were the first to strike, successfully hitting the Akitsu Maru with two torpedoes, which later sank, resulting in the loss of 2,046 lives, including most of the 64th Regiment. After the attack, Sato withdrew to Strange Island, located off the coast of Korea, to take refuge for the day. On the morning of November 17, the convoy resumed its journey but was soon detected by a B-29 Superfortress as it made its way toward the Shushan Islands. By late afternoon, Commander Gordon Underwood's submarines launched an assault on the Japanese ships, successfully striking the transport vessel Mayasan Maru, which sank quickly, resulting in the loss of 3,437 men, including most of the 72nd Regiment. Almost twelve hours later 200 kilometers off Saishu Island, Spadefish surfaced and attacked the Shinyo with six torpedoes. Four struck the carrier on the starboard at 11:03 pm, and it caught fire. At least 1,130 Japanese sailors went down with their ship; only about seventy survived, including Ishii. Kashi immediately dropped several depth charges where the Spadefish was thought to be. An oil slick and other debris eventually made the Japanese believe they had sunk Spadefish so the Kashi broke off the engagement, but Spadefish had escaped apparently without serious damage. Only minor cracks were reported to have appeared on the submarine after the alleged "sinking" by Kashi. Underwood's final strike was against the submarine chaser No. 156, which sustained three torpedo hits and sank rapidly. Following some rescue efforts, Sato continued his advance on November 21, eventually arriving in Kaohsiung five days later. Half of the convoy then proceeded to San Fernando, where the remaining members of the 23rd Division disembarked on December 2.  Yet thats it for today for the Philippines as we now need to shift over to Morotai.With Japanese reinforcements pushed back into the interior of the secured island, General Persons directed the 31st Division to capture several islands off New Guinea that served as observation points for Japanese outposts monitoring Allied movements. On November 15, the 2nd Battalion of the 167th Regiment landed on Pegun Island, followed by a successful attack on Bras Island the next day. By November 18, with the Mapia Islands secured, Company F of the 124th Regiment was sent to occupy the unguarded Asia Islands on November 19. In the Aitape region, Major-General Jack Stevens' 6th Australian Division was assigned to relieve American forces, similar to the Australian efforts on New Britain and Bougainville, in order to free up troops for the Philippines Campaign. By late October, a base had been successfully set up, allowing the 19th Brigade to arrive by mid-November, with the 17th Brigade scheduled for early December, and the 16th by year-end. Under General Blamey's orders, the new Australian garrisons were to adopt a more active approach than the American units had, so Stevens planned not only to secure the airfield and radar installations in the Aitape-Tadji area, but also to carry out extensive patrols in support of intelligence and guerrilla operations aimed at weakening the enemy in Wewak.  One of General Stevens' tasks was to give maximum help to AIB. and Angau units in the area in their tasks of gaining Intelligence, establishing patrol bases and protecting the native population. These AIB. and Angau units had been active in the Sepik-Aitape triangle since the time of the landing of American forces at Aitape in April 1944, and the 6th Division came into an area where, from the outset, practically all the deep patrolling had been done by groups of Australians. In the Aitape area, prior to the arrival of the Division (said the report of the 6th Division), Angau long-range patrols operated without troop support and, for their own protection, inaugurated a type of guerilla warfare. Selected village natives called "sentries" were taught to use grenades and Japanese rifles. The sentries, besides furnishing Intelligence, accounted for large numbers of enemy. This system was continued. As each area was freed the sentries were rewarded and returned to their villages. By early November, the 2/10th Commando Squadron had established a patrol base at Babiang, conducting numerous patrols throughout the month. Intelligence gathered suggested the Japanese forces were weakened, poorly nourished, and mainly focused on sourcing food. In response, Stevens planned two significant December operations: to sever the enemy's communication line along the Malin-Walum-Womisis-Amam axis and to neutralize enemy positions east of the Danmap River. By November 25, the seasoned 2/7th Commando Squadron had arrived at Babiang, and by month-end, the 19th Brigade took over the area. The commandos then advanced southward, setting up a base at Tong on December 4 and establishing an outpost at Kumbum three days later. Now to finish this week's episode let's explore the B-29 Superfortress operations during this time. After the Formosa Air Battle and the Omura raid on October 25, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command conducted four missions in November. Three of these supported Southeast Asia operations as part of “PAC-AID,” while the fourth targeted the Omura Aircraft Factory, a key focus for the command. On November 3, 44 B-29s from India effectively bombed the Malegon Railway Yards at Rangoon. Two days later, 53 bombers hit Singapore's King George VI Graving Dock, the largest of several dry docks at Singapore and one of the world's best. The first of 53 Superforts attacking was over target at 0644, and the bombardier, Lt. Frank McKinney, put a I,ooo-pound bomb into the target within 50 feet of the aiming point, the caisson gate; Lt. Bolish McIntyre, 2 planes back, laid another alongside. This was the sort of pickle-barrel bombing the Air Corps had talked about before the war. Strike photos showed a rush of water into the dock, presumptive evidence that the gate had been strained, and subsequent reconnaissance photos indicated that the dock was out of use (A-2's estimate of three months of unserviceability was to prove quite accurate). There were other hits on the dock, on a 465-foot freighter in it, and on adjacent shops. For “baksheesh,” as the boys had learned to say in India, seven B-29's bombed the secondary target, Pangkalanbrandan refinery in Sumatra, and reported direct hits on the cracking plant. The Japanese, evidently relying on the inaccessibility of Singapore, put up a feeble defense, but the long trip took a toll of two planes and twelve crewmen, including Col. Ted L. Faulkner, commander of the 468th Group. On November 11, 96 B-29s launched from China to strike Omura under difficult weather; only 29 reached the aircraft factory unsuccessfully, while 24 more bombed Nanking with limited results. The month's final mission on November 27 saw 55 B-29s severely damage the Bang Soe marshaling yards in Bangkok. Meanwhile, in the Marianas, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command prepared for strikes on the Japanese Home Islands. In order to properly plan missions to Japan, up-to-date reconnaissance photos of the proposed targets were needed. Other than information which was used during the Doolittle Raid in 1942, there was scant information about the locations of Japanese industry, especially the aircraft industry. On November 1, two days after arriving on Saipan, a 3rd Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron F-13A Superfortress (photo reconnaissance-configured B-29) took off bound for Tokyo. The aircraft flew over Tokyo at 32000 feet for 35 minutes taking picture after picture. A few fighters made it up to the camera plane's altitude but did not attack. These photos, along with other intelligence, gave the 21st Bomber Command the locations of the Japanese aircraft manufacturing plants and enabled mission planners to plan missions for the combat crews to attack. In honor of his mission, the aircraft was named "Tokyo Rose". In response, about ten G4Ms launched from Iwo Jima attacked Isley Field on Saipan the next day, scoring five bomb hits but losing three bombers. Hansell responded with a practice strike on Iwo Jima on November 5, though results were again limited. On November 7, the Japanese launched a follow-up attack, but it again resulted in minimal damage and cost them three bombers. A retaliatory strike by 17 B-29s the next day also fell short: one squadron had to jettison its bombs into the ocean, while another dropped its load through a gap in the undercast. Between Japanese attacks, American aircrew inexperience, delays in constructing airfields in the Marianas, and the slow movement of B-29s to Saipan, the 21st Bomber Command was behind schedule in its planned offensive against Japan. By November 15, only half of the 73rd Bombardment Wing's authorized 180 B-29s had arrived, but by November 22, around 118 bombers were finally in place. At this point, General Arnold ordered Hansell to begin Operation San Antonio I, marking the first strike against Tokyo. The chosen target was Nakajima's Musashi Aircraft Engine Plant, which supplied 27% of Japan's combat aircraft engines. On November 24, 111 B-29s took off for Japan, collectively carrying 277.5 tons of bombs. However, 17 bombers aborted mid-flight, and six others couldn't bomb due to mechanical issues. For the first time, the B-29s encountered the Jet stream, which was a high-speed wind coming out of the west at speeds as high as 200 mph at precisely the altitudes at which the bombers were operating. This caused the bomber formations to be disrupted and made accurate bombing impossible. As a result, only 24 B-29s bombed the Musashi plant, while 64 hit nearby dock and urban areas instead. The Japanese fighter response was less intense than expected, with the Americans claiming to have downed seven fighters, likely destroyed 18 more, and damaged nine, losing just one bomber in return. Another B-29 was lost on the return trip after running out of fuel and ditching. Despite disappointing bombing results in the mission—only 48 bombs struck the factory area, causing damage to just 1% of the building area and 2.4% of the machinery, with 57 killed and 75 injured—the raid exposed the weaknesses in Japan's air defense and showed the six million residents of Tokyo that they were vulnerable to attack. Given the limited impact of the November 24 mission, Hansell decided to launch a second major strike, dubbed San Antonio II, targeting Musashi once more. However, in the early hours of November 27, two G4M bombers from Iwo Jima carried out a low-altitude raid on Isley Field, escaping after destroying one B-29 and damaging eleven others.  Later that day, twelve bomb-equipped Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters from the IJN's 252 Kōkūtai (252 Air Group) accompanied by two Nakajima C6N "Myrt" reconnaissance aircraft for navigation purposes departed Iwo Jima for Saipan. The attackers flew just above sea level to avoid US radar, and one of the A6Ms was forced to divert to Pagan after its propeller struck a wave; this aircraft was shot down by a USAAF Thunderbolt while attempting to land. The remaining eleven A6Ms arrived over Saipan at noon, shortly after XXI Bomber Command's second raid on Tokyo had departed. These aircraft strafed Isley Field destroying three or four B-29s and damaging up to two others. One of the Japanese pilots landed his fighter on Isley Field and fired on airfield personnel with his pistol until he was killed by rifle fire; this incident was witnessed by Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell, the commander of XXI Bomber Command. None of the ten other A6Ms survived; four were shot down by USAAF fighters and six by anti-aircraft guns. The U.S. gunners also downed a USAAF Thunderbolt in circumstances which an official assessment later described as "inexcusable". Of the 81 bombers launched, 19 aborted, and those that reached Tokyo found the target covered by clouds, forcing them to drop bombs by radar over Tokyo's docks, urban areas, and the cities of Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Numazu, and Osaka. Ultimately, for the loss of one Superfortress, the damage caused by this second strike was minimal. However, the strong Japanese response led Hansell to relocate some B-29s from Isley to safer Guam, strengthen Saipan's defenses and radar, and plan coordinated air-sea operations to neutralize Iwo Jima's staging fields. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans pressed through Leyte's treacherous terrain and fierce resistance, aiming to secure strategic positions. Typhoons, enemy reinforcements, and brutal battles tested them harshly, but they advanced steadily. Despite heavy losses and airstrikes from both sides, American forces captured Breakneck Ridge and pushed onward, inching closer to victory.

21 Principles of the Dokkodo: Miyamoto Musashi's Way of Walking AloneMusashi was a Ronin in Japan from 1584 to 1645. He is probably the most famous swordsman from history with an undefeated 61-0 dueling record. Not only was Musashi an excellent swordsman, he was also a writer and philosopher. His book, The Book of Five Rings, is still printed and read to this day.Musashi's philosophy is one of self reliance, inner calm, acceptance, and discipline. His work is read all over the world to help people develop mental strength and the qualities needed for a resilient and happy life. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Chris and Bryan discuss the Musashi principle of "never grab your sword other than the way you would grab it to cleave a man in half".

Send us a textImagine you're in a high-stakes situation, facing off with an opponent. You know the next move matters. Instead of reacting, you take a breath and analyze—not just what they're doing, but their motivations, their weaknesses, their fears. This isn't just a physical battle anymore; it's mental warfare. Musashi believed that true mastery lies not only in strength but in understanding the mind of the other. When you can see through your opponent's intentions and recognize their emotions—even the ones they're hiding—that's when you have the upper hand.” Discover Strength and Discipline at South Texas Judo ! Are you looking to enhance your physical fitness, build self-confidence, and learn the art of self-defense? South Texas Judo offers comprehensive Judo training for all ages and Skill levels.Support the show

After a long hiatus, Nic returns to share his recent journey and unveil his latest project - The Musashi Experience. Together with his friend Max Whittle, he explores the transformative power that breathwork and Japanese culture have had on their lives. The discussion delves into how breath serves as a barometer for one's overall wellbeing and ways to harness this awareness for personal growth. Max shares insights from his two decades of living in Japan, complemented by Nic's experiences during his visits to the country.   https://musashiexperience.com

Last time we spoke about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. General MacArthur's forces landed on Leyte, prompting a response from Admiral Toyoda. Kurita's 1st Striking Force was sent to attack Leyte Gulf, while Shima's force faced confusion and delays. Japanese naval forces were hit hard by American submarines, with significant losses including the sinking of the Atago and Maya. Despite efforts, Japanese counterattacks faltered. On October 24, American forces secured key positions, and MacArthur announced the re-establishment of the Philippine government amidst ongoing naval battles and air attacks. During the fierce Battle of Leyte Gulf, Musashi endured multiple torpedo and bomb hits from American aircraft but continued to fight as it took on severe flooding. Despite efforts from Kurita's fleet, Musashi was eventually abandoned and sank, marking the largest ship ever sunk by air attack. Nishimura's force faced relentless torpedo strikes and a decisive night battle, with the battleship Fuso and cruiser Mogami being heavily damaged or sunk. Ultimately, Nishimura's forces retreated, and the Americans achieved a significant victory. This episode is the Last Carrier Battle  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Where we last left off during the Battle of Leyte Fulg, the 10th and 24th Corps had established successful beachheads at Palo-Tacloban and Dulag. In response, Admiral Toyoda launched Operation Sho-Go, mobilizing the full strength of the Imperial Japanese Navy to eliminate enemy warships and transports at sea. However, after losing three heavy cruisers to submarines, Admiral Kurita's 1st Striking Force faced severe damage from Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 38, culminating in the sinking of the battleship Musashi by the end of October 24. Shortly after the Sibuyan Sea engagement, Admiral Nishimura's Force C was annihilated by Admiral Kinkaid's 7th Fleet at the Surigao Strait. Despite these setbacks, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force was approaching the area. Meanwhile, the Americans had identified Admiral Ozawa's decoy force by the end of the day. In response, the aggressive Admiral Halsey chose to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded and pursue the depleted Japanese carrier force to the north, aiming to finish off the IJN. Unknown to him, Kurita, with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and several destroyers, was advancing towards San Bernardino Strait to attack Kinkaid's transports and escort carriers from the rear. This set the stage for one of the final and largest naval battles of the Pacific War. To the north, as the Battle of Surigao Strait was in progress, radar-equipped aircraft from the Independence detected Admiral Matsuda's battleship carriers and later Ozawa's carriers in the early hours of October 25. However, due to a transmission error, the location of the Japanese forces was reported inaccurately. After the rendezvous of three of Halsey's four carrier task groups just before midnight on October 24, TF 38 headed north with every expectation of achieving a great victory. At 0100hrs on October 25, five radar-equipped aircraft flew off Independence to search out to a distance of 350NM. Contact was gained at 0205hrs on Force A and at 0235hrs on the Main Body. Because of a transmission error, the position of the Japanese forces was given incorrectly. The wrong position was plotted out some 120NM nearer to TF 38 than it actually was. In fact, TF 38 and Ozawa were actually about 210NM apart.  Despite this, Mitscher's carrier was readying for morning strikes while Admiral Lee's Task Force 34 was being reorganized. Meanwhile, Kurita's 1st Striking Force surprisingly navigated through San Bernardino Strait during the night without encountering resistance, proceeding towards Leyte Gulf and a confrontation with Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague's escort carriers near Samar. However, the movement of Shima's force was not coordinated with Nishimura's. Shima designed his advance so he could attack separately from Nishimura's force. The gap between the forces was originally five hours, but Shima reduced this to two hours by the time his force began entering the strait. As he entered Surigao Strait on the night of October 24/25, Nishimura issued reports during the early part of his transit, which Shima received, but when he met serious resistance, the reports stopped. Shima was therefore unaware of the virtual annihilation of Nishimura's force. The only information available was gunfire flashes in the distance and snippets of radio traffic from Nishimura's ships under attack. Oldendorf was aware that a second force was moving to support Nishimura. The first firm indication of this was a contact report from the PT boats on Shima's force at 0038hrs. Oldendorf knew he was dealing with two widely spaced Japanese forces. Just as Nishimura was forced to deal with incessant PT boat attacks, now it was Shima's turn. These turned out to be more than a mere nuisance. Shima's introduction to combat came at about 0315hrs when PT-134 mounted an ineffective attack. One PT boat managed to hit the cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo at 03:25, causing a significant explosion and slowing her to 10 knots, forcing her to exit Shima's formation. As Shima advanced, he observed several ships ablaze and saw the destroyer Shigure retreat before detecting a radar contact 13,000 yards away. Without Shima's approval, his chief of staff ordered the two cruisers to maneuver for a torpedo strike against the distant and indistinct radar contacts. At 0422hrs Nachi and Ashigara each fired eight Type 93 torpedoes at the radar contacts. In fact, these were Oldendorf's flagship Louisville followed by Portland. Despite the element of surprise, the Japanese torpedo attack completely failed. Immediately after firing its torpedo broadside, Nachi faced disaster. The burning Mogami had loomed out of the darkness minutes before. Nachi's skipper failed to grasp that Mogami was underway, not stationary, and he failed to take proper measures to avoid the damaged cruiser. As Nachi was unable to pass forward of Mogami, the two ships side-swiped each other forward at 04:23. Frantic last-second maneuvers lessened the impact of the collision, but the result was still dramatic. Nachi took the worst of it, suffering a large gash in her bow at the waterline on her port side. Damage to the bow reduced her speed to 18 knots. Shima's four destroyers then continued north but failed to locate any targets. Fearing inevitable destruction, Shima decided to retreat south at 04:35. Although Oldendorf had dispatched his cruisers and destroyers to pursue the fleeing Japanese, his forces did not aggressively pursue, allowing Shima to escape. In the end, Oldendorf's pursuing cruisers only managed to catch the damaged Mogami and Asagumo, which they unsuccessfully attacked at 05:29. Despite sustaining additional hits, the Mogami continued to fight, escorted southwest by the destroyer Akebomo. The Asagumo, however, came under attack again at 07:02 and sank 19 minutes later. As Asagumo slipped under the waves, all that was left of Nishimura's force were hundreds of survivors in the water. Rescue efforts by at least four American destroyers resulted in only a handful being picked up. When one of Oldendorf's destroyer skippers asked at 07:35 what to do with the hundreds of men still in the water, Oldendorf simply replied, “Let them sink.” Japanese survivors who reached shore were, in many cases, killed by local inhabitants. While it seemed the Mogami might escape, Sprague's Taffy 1 group carriers launched their first strikes before 06:00. Four Avengers attacked the cruiser at 07:41 but failed to score any hits. Around 08:40, 21 aircraft also targeted Shima's force, but only inflicted minor strafing damage on the destroyer Shiranuhi. Before Sprague could continue his air attacks, new developments were occurring off Samar as Kurita's warships approached Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague's Taffy 3 group. At 06:44, a lookout from the Yamato made visual contact, though he mistakenly identified the escorting destroyers as heavy cruisers and battleships.  Kurita's initial orders increased the confusion generated by the first contact at 06:44. He ordered “General Attack” at 07:03, meaning that each ship or division proceeded on its own against the Americans. This tactic abandoned any pretense of coordination between the various elements of the 1st Striking Force. Battleships Yamato and Nagato remained together, but Kongo and Haruna operated individually. For most of the engagement, the six heavy cruisers operated in three groups of two. The two destroyer flotillas, each led by a light cruiser, were kept to the rear by Kurita. He held his destroyers back to maintain their fuel reserves by not having them maneuver at high speeds, instead sending his heavy cruisers ahead to pursue at full speed. This precluded them from screening the heavy ships and kept them out of position to make a torpedo attack. The General Attack decision was a critical error. It resulted in a loss of control by Kurita and a melee for the next two hours. His rationale for ordering an immediate, but uncoordinated, attack was to close the range as quickly as possible and knock out the carriers' flight decks. Throughout the battle, Kurita maneuvered to keep the weather gauge; by so doing, he could prevent the carriers from turning into the wind to conduct flight operations. Meanwhile, an Avenger from Kadashan Bay sighted Kurita's force at 06:47 following radar contacts. Despite his surprise, Sprague immediately ordered Taffy 3 to head east, increased speed to 17.5 knots, directed every ship to lay smoke, and launched all available aircraft at 06:55. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Sprague began sending clear text messages at 07:01 to report his predicament and request assistance. Sprague's main objective was to delay the Japanese forces until reinforcements could arrive. To achieve this, he decided to use smoke screens and continuous air assaults, supported by Taffy 2's aircraft, to hinder Kurita's ships. As Kurita's cruisers advanced north, Sprague opted to maneuver southwest, moving closer to Leyte Gulf and the potential assistance from the 7th Fleet. Starting at 06:59, Kurita's battleships began firing from long range, with their salvos becoming more frequent and accurate. To mitigate this pressure, Sprague directed his forces into a rain squall from 07:06 to 07:15. Once clear of the squall, he changed course southward towards the approaching help from Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, as Kurita's ships continued east before turning south, the range of Sprague's carriers was extended, and the rain and smoke impaired the accuracy of the Japanese gunners. Sprague also ordered his three destroyers to launch a torpedo counterattack to shield the escort carriers as they emerged from the squall. The Johnston, charging through enemy fire, engaged the cruiser Kumano with gunfire to close the distance for a torpedo attack. At 10,000 yards, the Johnston fired all ten of its torpedoes, scoring a critical hit that slowed the cruiser and forced it to retreat. It was inevitable that Evans would pay a price for approaching so close to a collection of enemy cruisers and battleships. This came at 0730hrs in the form of three large shells (possibly fired from Yamato) and a number of smaller shells that struck Johnston. The armor-piercing shells failed to explode, but damage was extensive. The aft machinery room was destroyed, which reduced speed to 17 knots. Most of the 5in./38 guns were knocked out, but after repairs were made during a providential 10-minute respite as a squall passed over, three were brought back online. The battleship evaded the torpedoes at 07:33 and retaliated with devastating gunfire against the Hoel. By 07:30, all operational aircraft were airborne, prompting Sprague to order the initial attacks on the heavy cruisers approaching his port quarter. Unrelenting American air attacks were the main reason for the Japanese defeat. Taffy aircrews were not highly trained for maritime attack, and torpedoes or armor-piercing bombs were in short supply. Most Avengers were launched with bombs instead of more effective torpedoes for two reasons. Torpedoes took more time and preparation to load, and the deck crews on Taffy 3 did not have the luxury of time. Also, once loaded with a heavy torpedo, the Avengers could only be launched if the escort carrier steamed into the wind. Moving downwind, like Taffy 3 was forced to do for most of the action, did not get enough wind across the flight deck. The first attacks by Taffy 3 aircraft were conducted in groups of two or three with aircraft not properly armed for attacking ships. Because Taffy 3 could not steam into the wind while being pursued by Kurita's force, recovering aircraft during the battle was impossible. When they ran out of ordnance or fuel, they had to land on Taffy 2 or fly 100NM to the newly opened airfield at Tacloban. Even when lightly armed or unevenly unarmed, the aircraft made unceasing strafing runs in the case of the Wildcats or dummy bombing runs in the case of the Avengers. These attacks were poorly coordinated, but the Japanese, on the receiving end of incessant attacks, saw it differently. After the battle, Kurita and others commented that the attacks were well coordinated, skillful, and aggressive. At 07:35, ten Avengers struck the cruiser Suzuya just as Vice-Admiral Shiraishi Kazutaka was boarding, scoring a near miss that reduced her speed to 20 knots and took her out of the battle. The damaged Hoel then attempted a second torpedo attack on the heavy cruiser Haguro at 07:50 but failed to hit the target. However, this attack forced the Superbattleship Yamato to open fire at 0659hrs. Her third salvo straddled White Plains, with one of the shells striking the carrier and causing some underwater damage. Around 0800hrs, to evade torpedoes fired from Hoel aimed at Haguro, Yamato turned due north. This evasive maneuver forced her to the north for almost ten minutes until the torpedo tracks disappeared, placing her at the rear of Kurita's formation and effectively removing her from the battle for a period. Nagato opened fire at 0701hrs at a carrier assessed to be 36,000 yards away. After the three salvos, the battleship stopped firing having hit nothing. At 07:54, the Heermann launched seven torpedoes at Haguro, but they missed. Destroyer escorts Samuel B. Roberts, Raymond, and Dennis also joined in the attack but also failed to score hits, though they managed to escape unharmed. The Heermann subsequently launched a second torpedo attack on the Haruna at 08:00, but once again, none of the torpedoes hit their mark. Despite using smoke and evading shell splashes, the Heermann avoided damage. The first ship to succumb to the barrage of Japanese shellfire was the crippled Hoel. After her run against Haguro, and only able to make 17 knots, she was trapped between Kongo on one side and four heavy cruisers on the other. Using every possible method to evade the storm of shells directed against his ship, Kintberger survived for well over an hour after the first hit was recorded. Hoel took as many as 23 hits, but the actual number will never be known since most passed through the ship without exploding. The final engine was knocked out at 0830hrs, bringing the ship to a halt. As the crew abandoned ship under continued fire, the Hoel finally rolled over at 08:55. Meanwhile, the Japanese cruisers continued to close in on the escort carriers. Under fire from the battleships, Sprague's initial course was to the eastsoutheast at full speed—17.5 knots. As the Japanese heavy cruisers began to pressure his formation's port quarter, Sprague was forced to alter course to the southwest. Kalinin Bay was at the rear of the formation. She took a battleship shell at 0750hrs (probably from Haruna) that went through the hangar deck and out of her unarmored hull. As many as 14 other hits followed, all probably from 8in. shells. Kalinin Bay retaliated against the cruisers at 18,000 yards with her aft 5in./38 gun. The smoke generated from all six carriers and from the destroyers and destroyer escorts on their starboard quarter succeeded in hiding the carriers from direct Japanese observation for much of the battle. The Japanese shot slowly and methodically with four-gun salvos, allowing the escort carriers to chase salvos. The smoke and evasive maneuvering kept damage to a minimum, but of the six escort carriers, four were eventually hit. Fanshaw Bay took six 8in. hits, all forward, that killed three and wounded 20. White Plains took a probable 6in. hit and suffered light damage. Kitkun Bay was not hit but suffered several personnel casualties from near misses. St. Lo suffered no damage during the battle. The Gambier Bay bore the brunt of enemy fire, with an initial shell igniting a fire at 08:10. Ten minutes later, a devastating hit reduced her speed to 11 knots and forced the carrier to lag behind the rest of the formation. At 08:22, Yamato reentered the fray, intensifying the assault on the carrier. Heermann closed on the carrier at 0841hrs to find her burning and listing 20°. Continued Japanese fire resulted in more hits, with most of the armor-piercing shells passing through the ship. Hit by as many as 26 shells from Yamato, Haruna, and several cruisers, Gambier Bay went dead in the water at 0845hrs; five minutes later, the captain gave the order to abandon ship. Gambier Bay capsized at 0907hrs, one of only two carriers sunk by gunfire during the entire war. Meanwhile, at 08:26, Sprague ordered the destroyer escorts on the starboard side of the formation to position themselves between the carriers and the Japanese heavy cruisers on their port side. As John C. Butler and Dennis engaged the enemy cruisers, the latter sustained minor damage from two hits. Samuel B. Roberts also was struck at 0850hrs. At 0900hrs, the destroyer escort was hit by two or three 14in. shells from Kongo. The large shells tore a huge hole in the side of the ship and knocked out all power. A total of six shells hit the ship. This prompted an order to abandon ship at 0910hrs for the crew of 178. Half (89 of them) did not survive. Samuel B. Roberts sank at 1005hrs. During this time, Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi instructed his destroyers to launch a torpedo attack at 08:45, targeting Kalinin Bay. Fortunately, Johnston detected the new threat and made a daring suicide charge through the smoke. Evans engaged Yahagi with gunfire at 7,000 yards, and several hits were gained. Then Evans engaged the next destroyer in column, again claiming several hits. Kimura ordered his torpedoes fired from about 10,500 yards—not an ideal range for even the formidable Type 93. Yahagi launched seven torpedoes at 0905hrs, followed by three destroyers beginning at 0915hrs, Urakaze fired four, Isokaze eight, and Yukikaze four. Evans may have been responsible for Kimura's premature torpedo attack, but now his ship was about to pay the ultimate price. The Japanese destroyers and Yahagi took Johnston under fire, joined by as many as three heavy cruisers. The hits began to pile up. By 0920hrs, Evans was reduced to conning the ship by yelling orders through an open hatch on the fantail to men below turning the rudder manually. At 0945hrs, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. The Japanese destroyers closed in and continued to pound the wreck. After an epic fight, Johnston rolled over and sank at 1010hrs. Most of the crew of 327 got into the water, but 186, including Evans, were lost. Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral Felix Stump's Taffy 2 group began their strikes against Kurita's fleet, with 15 Avengers and 20 Wildcats successfully hitting the Haguro with a bomb at 08:25. Five minutes later, six Avengers and 20 Wildcats from Taffy 3 joined forces with 16 Avengers and 8 Wildcats from Taffy 2 to launch a major assault on the enemy cruisers. At 08:50, the Chokai was attacked, and by 09:05, it had sustained severe damage from a bomb hit. The destroyer Fujinami arrived to assist at 10:18, but by then, the cruiser was immobilized. The destroyer evacuated the crew and sank the Chokai with torpedoes. At 08:54, four Avengers targeted the Chikuma, landing a critical torpedo hit that caused significant flooding. With American aircraft focusing on the Japanese warships, Kurita decided to withdraw at 09:11, planning to regroup and return to Leyte Gulf. Another attack against Suzuya was mounted at 1050hrs by as many as 30 aircraft. This time, a near miss amidships turned deadly. Shrapnel from the bomb ignited the torpedoes in the starboard forward mount, igniting a fire that caused other torpedoes to explode at 1100hrs. The explosion caused extensive damage to the secondary battery and the machinery, which left the ship unmaneuverable. For a second time in the morning, Vice Admiral Shiraishi had to transfer, this time to Tone. The fires reached the remaining torpedoes, with a large explosion resulting at 1200hrs. In turn, this caused the magazine of the secondary battery to explode, and soon the entire ship was an inferno. Surviving crewmen were taken off by destroyer Okinami after the order to abandon ship was given at 1300hrs, and at 1320hrs Suzuya sank. Twohundred forty-seven men were lost. The Tone suffered a bomb hit at 12:40, and three minutes later, Noshiro experienced minor damage from near misses. The destroyer Nowaki was tasked with rescuing Chikuma's crew and then scuttling the crippled cruiser, which was completed by 11:00. Due to these air attacks and fearing total destruction if the battle continued, Kurita signaled Toyoda at 12:36 to abandon the attack on Leyte Gulf and began his retreat north. During this withdrawal, Kurita's force faced attacks from 37 Avengers and 19 Wildcats at 12:45, resulting in only minor damage to Nagato and Tone. Subsequent strikes by Stump's carriers were also ineffective, but Sprague's carriers' total of 441 sorties that day was a notable accomplishment. At 13:15, 100 aircraft from Admiral McCain's carrier, which had been recalled on October 24 and were now arriving in the area, launched one of the longest carrier strikes of the war. Despite their efforts, they were unable to inflict additional damage. A follow-up strike at 15:00 with 52 planes also failed, allowing Kurita to escape. Tremendously outgunned, the commander of Taffy 3, Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, began to plead for help minutes into the battle. As Kurita pressed his advantage, these pleas became more urgent. In response, Oldendorf recalled his advance guard at 0723hrs. Kinkaid ordered Oldendorf to bring his entire force north at 0847hrs to assist the escort carriers. He formed a task force of the battleships California, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania, because they had the most armor-piercing shells remaining. They were escorted by three heavy cruisers and 20 destroyers with 165 torpedoes. The next strike consisting of ten Avengers, each with two 500lb bombs instead of torpedoes, escorted by five Wildcats, all from Ommaney Bay, went after Mogami. The Avenger pilots claimed five hits on the cruiser; in fact, only two bombs struck the ship. By the time the attack concluded at 0910hrs, Mogami was dead in the water after the failure of her last turbine. New fires raged beyond control and the danger of the forward 8in. magazine exploding (the others had been flooded) put the entire crew in danger. After evacuating the remaining crew, the Akebono scuttled Mogami at 13:07, resulting in the loss of 191 men. Additionally, in the morning, Taffy 1 faced Admiral Onishi's first kamikaze attack. The first ship to be attacked was Santee. At 0740hrs, a kamikaze commenced its dive, gained complete surprise, and encountered no antiaircraft fire before hitting the ship forward on the flight deck. Fires from the resulting explosion were quickly put out, but not before 43 men had been killed or wounded. Within five minutes of the fires being extinguished, submarine I-56 slammed a torpedo into the ship. The converted tanker shook it off with no casualties and no loss of capability. The final aircraft also selected Petrof Bay but ended up going after Suwannee after it was damaged by antiaircraft fire. It struck the carrier on the flight deck forward of the aft aircraft elevator. The Zero's 551lb bomb exploded, creating a hole on the hangar deck. The fires were put out within minutes, and within two hours flight operations had resumed. The suicide pilots approached the remaining five escort carriers at low level before popping up to altitude a few miles from their target. At this point they were detected on radar, but no interception by defending Wildcats was possible. At 1049hrs, Kitkun Bay was attacked by a single Zero. The pilot failed to hit the carrier's bridge, but his aircraft hit the port-side catwalk before crashing into the sea. The ship incurred damage when the Zero's bomb exploded close alongside. Two more suicide aircraft were dispatched by antiaircraft fire. The last two Zeros selected White Plains for their attentions. One came in from astern but missed the ship after crashing into the water close aboard the port side. The other was deterred by antiaircraft fire and headed toward St. Lo. The last kamikaze was the most skillful. At 1053hrs, the Zero came in over the stern of St. Lo and dropped his bomb before performing a shallow dive into the flight deck amidships. The aircraft slid off the bow, leaving a trail of fire on the flight deck from its fuel. The fire was no problem to deal with, but the bomb penetrated the flight deck and exploded in the hangar deck, where six aircraft were being fueled and armed. The resulting explosion forced the ship to be abandoned, and 32 minutes after being struck, the ship sank with 114 crewmen after the fires reached its magazines. St. Lo was the first ship sunk by kamikaze attack. At 1110hrs, another four kamikazes appeared and selected Kalinin Bay for attack. Two were shot down by antiaircraft fire. The other pair both scored glancing hits. One Zero was hit by antiaircraft fire, remained in control, and then hit the flight deck at a shallow angle and slid overboard. The second hit the ship with a glancing blow aft. Looking north, despite losing contact with Ozawa's force overnight, Mitscher decided to launch an initial strike of 130 aircraft, led by Commander McCampbell, by 06:00. At the same time, he dispatched search aircraft, which reestablished contact with Ozawa's now reunited Main Body at 07:10. The American strike was then directed toward the enemy, and McCampbell's planes successfully located Ozawa's carriers at 08:10, beginning their assault. Despite encountering 13 Zeros on combat air patrol, the Helldivers struck first at 08:30, targeting the enemy carriers. They were followed by strafing Hellcats and torpedo-armed Avengers. The hour-long attack resulted in significant damage: Zuikaku was hit by three bombs and one torpedo, leading to fires, flooding, and a severe list; Zuiho sustained a single bomb hit causing fires on the hangar deck; Chitose was heavily damaged by three near misses that ruptured its unarmored hull, causing flooding and a severe list, and it sank at 09:37 with 904 casualties; the light cruiser Tama was torpedoed and had to make its way to Okinawa for repairs; the cruiser Oyodo suffered light damage from a bomb hit; and the destroyer Akizuki was hit amidships, caught fire, and broke apart before sinking following a major explosion. As this attack unfolded, Mitscher launched a second wave of 36 aircraft, which arrived at the target area around 09:45. Under McCampbell's coordination, these planes focused on the carrier Chiyoda, which was hit by one bomb and several damaging near misses that caused flooding and a list, ultimately bringing the carrier to a halt. Simultaneously, he deployed search aircraft, which reestablished contact with Ozawa's now reunited Main Body at 07:10. With the American strike directed towards this position, McCampbell's planes successfully located the enemy at 08:10 and began their assault on Ozawa's carriers. The Japanese were aware of the impending arrival of the initial strike, since radar aboard Zuikaku had detected the American aircraft at 08:04 about 110NM to the southwest. Four Zeros were already on CAP; these were joined by the last nine fighters on Zuikaku. Such a meager CAP meant that survival of Ozawa's ships depended on their ability to throw up accurate anti-aircraft fire and maneuver adeptly under dive-bombing and torpedo attack. According to American pilots, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was heavy and began with a display of multi-colored explosions at 15NM out as Ise and Hyuga fired sanshiki-dan incendiary shells from their 14in. main battery. The small Japanese CAP raced toward the approaching American formation, but the escorting Hellcats prevented them from reaching the Helldivers or Avengers. Essex Hellcats claimed nine Zeros, but one Hellcat was shot down and its pilot left in the water to witness the unfolding attack; he was rescued after the battle. The Helldivers launched the initial attack on the enemy carriers at 08:30, followed by strafing runs from Hellcats and then torpedo attacks from Avengers. Zuikaku came under attack from dive-bombers and torpedo bombers from Intrepid, and two light carriers. Five minutes into the attack, Zuikaku was hit by three bombs amidships, which created a fire on the lower and upper hangar decks. Just minutes later, a torpedo launched by an Avenger from either Intrepid or San Jacinto struck the ship on her port side. One of the engine rooms was flooded, and one of the shafts was damaged and had to be shut down. The ensuing flooding caused a severe list, but this was quickly corrected to a manageable 6°. The veteran carrier had an experienced and capable damage-control team. By 0850hrs, the fires were extinguished, and 23 knots were restored using the starboard shafts. However, steering was uneven, and the ship's transmitters were out of commission. Since she was no longer suitable as a flagship, plans were made to transfer Ozawa and his staff to cruiser Oyodo. Before this could happen, the second strike showed up.  Zuiho was caught out of formation launching aircraft when the first attack began. Enterprise's strike group targeted the veteran light carrier known to her crew as a lucky ship, since she had survived three earlier carrier battles. Reports from Enterprise air crew stated that the carrier was left dead in the water and on fire. In exchange, one Enterprise Avenger was seriously damaged by antiaircraft fire and was rolled over the side of the carrier when it landed back onboard. Another Enterprise Hellcat was lost to Zero attack. Intrepid Helldivers also selected Zuiho for attack and claimed hits. In fact, Zuiho suffered three near misses followed by a direct bomb hit at 0835hrs. The explosion caused fires on the hangar deck, but these were out by 0855hrs. After the dive-bombers did their work, torpedo bombers from Essex and Lexington attacked Zuiho, but no hits were gained. Light carrier Chitose was crippled early and was the first of Ozawa's carriers to sink. At 0835hrs, she was attacked by dive-bombers from Essex and Lexington. Helldivers from Essex reported dropping 12 bombs and claimed 8 hits, leaving the carrier burning and listing. In fact, Chitose suffered three near misses along her port side. This was enough to rupture the carrier's unarmored hull. The resulting flooding knocked out two boiler rooms and caused a severe 27° list. Damage-control efforts reduced the list and kept power, but steering was only accomplished by using the engines. At 0915hrs, progressive flooding knocked out the starboard engine room and speed fell below 14 knots. Ten minutes later, flooding caused all power to be lost and the list increased to a dangerous 30°. Hyuga was directed to tow the carrier, but her condition was beyond salvage. Chitose sank at 0937hrs with the loss of 904 officers and men; another 601 were saved. Light cruiser Tama was attacked by torpedo bombers from Belleau Wood and San Jacinto. One torpedo hit the ship in her boiler room. After emergency repairs, the cruiser was ordered to proceed independently to Okinawa at her best speed of 14 knots.  Oyodo was also subjected to attack and was slightly damaged. At 0848hrs, she was struck by a bomb and two rockets and recorded near misses from bombs. The cruiser's speed was unimpaired. Large destroyer Akizuki also came under attack from aircraft in the first strike. At 0842hrs the ship was struck amidships and set afire. The ship lost power and fell out of formation. Within minutes, a large explosion was noted amidships and at 0856hrs Akizuki broke in two and quickly sank. The cause was either a torpedo or a bomb hit that detonated torpedoes in the amidships torpedo mount. The commanding officer and 150 officers and men were pulled out of the water before more air attacks forced destroyer Maki to abandon rescue operations. Meanwhile, as this attack unfolded, Mitscher launched a second strike of 36 aircraft, which reached the target area around 09:45. Coordinated by McCampbell, these planes focused on the carrier Chiyoda, which was hit by one bomb and several near misses, resulting in flooding and a severe list, ultimately bringing the carrier to a halt. The climax of Halsey's battle of annihilation against the Main Body should have been an engagement by Task Force 34 with six of the world's most powerful battleships. But this was never to be. The plight of the escort carriers off Samar brought a flurry of urgent pleas to Halsey for assistance. These began at 07:07 with a plain text message from Kinkaid. In response, Halsey ordered Task Group 38.1 to steam west from Ulithi to support Kinkaid, but otherwise remained focused on crushing Ozawa with the rest of Task Force 38. This changed when Nimitz weighed in at 10:00 with an inquiry on the location of Admiral Lee's battleships, which finally prompted Halsey to order Task Force 34, supported by Task Group 38.2, south at 10:15. At this point, Task Force 34 was some 42NM away from Ozawa's remnants. This order was executed at 11:15 when the battleships turned south, yet the change of orders came too late. Even at their best speed, the battle line could not arrive off San Bernardino Strait until about 01:00 on October 26. At 13:45, Task Force 34 also slowed from 20 to 12 knots to fuel destroyers, something that took until 16:22.  By noon, as Ozawa transferred to the Oyodo, Mitscher launched his third strike. Launched between 1145hrs and1200hrs, the third strike was the largest and most effective of the day. It was active over the target area from about 1310hrs to 1400hrs with some 200 aircraft, 75 percent of which had taken part in the initial strike in the morning. The strike coordinator was Commander T. Hugh Winters from Lexington. By this point, the Main Body's formation was in a shambles. Two carriers were located to the north with a battleship and what was reported as two cruisers. Another carrier was located some 20NM to the south on fire and listing. A second battleship, a cruiser, and a destroyer were nearby the crippled carrier. Winters ordered TG 38.3's 98 aircraft from Essex, Lexington, and Langley, to go after the two operational carriers. Aircraft from Lexington focused on Zuikaku. By 1100hrs, Ozawa had departed his flagship and transferred to Oyodo. The nine surviving Zeros on CAP were forced to ditch around 1030hrs, so for the rest of the day the Americans faced no air opposition. Zuikaku worked up to 24 knots shortly after the third strike was spotted at 1308hrs. The attack by Helldivers and Avengers was well coordinated, with the Avengers coming in from both bows in an anvil attack. In less than ten minutes, Zuikaku was subjected to six torpedo hits—two on the starboard side and four on the port side. The first was a hit at 1315hrs that failed to detonate. The last of the six hit at 1323hrs. Within minutes of the last torpedo hit, the mighty carrier was listing to port by 14° and was dead in the water after all power was lost. In addition to the torpedoes, four bombs hit the ship, which resulted in renewed fires on the hangar decks. At 1327, with the list increasing to 21°, the crew was ordered up to the flight deck. The captain gave a final address and then the ensign was lowered. Finally, after this touch of the dramatic, the crew was ordered to abandon ship at 1358hrs. The ship rolled over at 1414hrs and took the captain, 48 other officers, and 794 enlisted men with her. Essex's strike focused on Zuiho. When aircraft from TG 38.4 arrived, including Enterprise's second strike of six Hellcats, ten Helldivers, and five Avengers, most were also directed at Zuiho at 1310hrs followed by more at 1330hrs. At 1317hrs, the carrier was hit by one torpedo on her starboard quarter. According to Japanese accounts, one small bomb hit the aft elevator, followed by seven very close near misses, and then 60 more near misses. Bomb fragments caused flooding in the starboard engine room and created a 13° list.  Mitscher's fourth strike, launched around 13:15 and reaching the target area by 14:45, involved 40 aircraft but only achieved ten near misses on the Zuiho and four near misses on the battleship Ise. Despite this, the Zuiho ultimately sank at 15:26, with 215 men lost. At 16:10, Mitscher launched his fifth strike, while a strong surface force under Rear-Admiral Laurance DuBose closed in on Chiyoda to finish her off. DuBose's force first encountered Chiyoda dead in the water with light cruiser Isuzu nearby preparing to rescue survivors. Isuzu quickly fled, leaving the heavy cruisers to open fire at Chiyoda at 1624hrs from some 20,000 yards. The carrier responded with her 5in. dual-purpose guns, but against a stationary target the American cruiser scored quickly and often and after 15 minutes the carrier was a mass of flames. A towering column of black smoke marked Chiyoda's final moments. At 1655hrs, the carrier rolled over—there were no survivors from her crew of 970 men.  Between 17:10 and 17:40, the fifth strike, consisting of 85 aircraft, targeted the Ise. However, due to pilot fatigue, only one bomb hit the battleship, with 34 near misses causing minor flooding. The sister ship, Hyuga, which was positioned south of the Main Body, experienced seven near misses but no direct hits. Mitscher then launched a final strike of 36 aircraft at 17:10, which reached the target area about an hour later but failed to cause further damage. Overall, Task Force 38 executed 527 sorties against Ozawa's force that day, marking the most intense effort by fast carriers against naval targets up to that point. Despite the lack of significant air opposition and heavy but largely ineffective anti-aircraft fire, the results were underwhelming. The limited damage can be attributed to heavy anti-aircraft fire, effective ship maneuvering, and pilot fatigue from previous attacks on the Sibuyan Sea. The Battle off Cape Engaño was not over yet. As DuBose's mop-up force continued north, they encountered three destroyers rescuing survivors from Zuikaku and Zuiho. At 18:52, DuBose's light cruisers engaged the Hatsuzuki, which tried to resist but was ultimately destroyed by the intense gunfire, sinking at 20:59. DuBose ceased his pursuit at 21:30. This decision was timely, as Hatsuzuki's distress calls led Ozawa to advance south with three battleships and one destroyer at 20:41. Finding no targets, Ozawa turned back at 23:30, bringing the battle to an end. On his retreat, two wolf packs were lying in wait. Although Ise avoided significant damage from a powerful torpedo attack at 18:44,  the Tama, already damaged, wasn't as fortunate. The cruiser was proceeding independently to Okinawa at 14 knots after taking a torpedo in the first air attack. Jallao's skipper fired three torpedoes from her bow tubes, but they all missed. He quickly lined up another shot with the four stern tubes. Three of the four hit, and two exploded. The damage was catastrophic, causing Tama to break in two and quickly sink. There were no survivors from the crew of some 450 men. Meanwhile, Halsey had dispatched the fastest ships from his battle line at 16:22 in a last-ditch effort to intercept Kurita's force before it could navigate the San Bernardino Strait. However, they arrived too late, as aircraft from Independence detected Kurita's force moving through the strait at 21:40. The only ship that did not make it was the destroyer Nowaki, which, overloaded with survivors from Chikuma, was attacked by the American forces at 00:54 on October 26 and was swiftly sunk by 01:32. During this time, General Krueger's offensive persisted with General Sibert's 10th Corps and General Hodge's 24th Corps making steady progress inland. To the north, cavalry units secured San Juanico Strait, while Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion captured Hill C and Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion took Hill B despite heavy resistance. Additionally, Chapman's 1st Battalion secured Hill 85, and the majority of the 3rd Battalion advanced towards Castilla, 8000 yards southwest of Palo. Further south, a patrol from the 383rd Regiment reached the Binahaan River and linked up with Chapman's Company K; the 382nd Regiment pushed beyond Aslom and Kanmonhag; Colonel May's Company K attempted, but failed, to capture Tabontabon; the 17th and 184th Regiments consolidated their newly captured positions on Burauen while sending patrols towards Dagami; and the 32nd Regiment made some headway toward the Buri airstrip but was still unable to capture it. By October 26, Shima's two heavy cruisers and two destroyers had successfully evaded several PT boat attacks and made their escape. However, the damaged cruiser Abukuma, under the protection of destroyer Ushio, was struck by 43 B-24 heavy bombers in the Sulu Sea. Usually high-altitude attacks on ships were totally ineffective, so the bombers came in at an altitude of about 6,500ft. In the first attack, Abukuma took a direct hit in the area of her bridge at 1006hrs and another aft. The second group of bombers scored a damaging near miss forward, and then a direct hit aft that knocked out one of the shafts and the steering equipment. The resulting fires spread to the engine rooms and the torpedo mounts located aft. When the fires reached the torpedoes, four exploded at 1037hrs. A third attack at 1044hrs brought only near misses. Abukuma was mortally damaged but remained afloat long enough for 284 of the crew to leave the ship. The veteran cruiser, part of the force that attacked Pearl Harbor, sank at 1242hrs with the loss of 220 men (added to the loss of 37 from the torpedo hit from the PT boat). As they came in at a lower altitude, Abukuma and Ushio were able to account for three bombers in this action.  On the same day, kamikaze attacks resumed against Taffy 1. Three Zeros penetrated the CAP and attacked Suwannee, which had completed repairs from the prior day's suicide attack. One Zero hit the flight deck and smashed into a group of ten aircraft parked on the bow. The aircraft were quickly engulfed in flames that spread down into the hangar bay, where another ten fueled aircraft were preparing to be brought up to the flight deck. The resulting fires on the hangar deck were put out, followed two hours later by the fire on the flight deck. The crew paid a high price for saving their ship— 85 dead, 58 missing, and 102 wounded. Other kamikazes selected Sangamon and Petrof Bay for attack; both carriers reported being near-missed. The initial success of the kamikaze attacks, including one carrier sunk and five damaged, gave the Japanese hope that they had found a way to halt the American naval advance. This marked the beginning of the Kamikaze era in the Pacific War. As Kurita's force moved through the Sibuyan Sea, Admirals McCain and Bogan launched a strike at 06:00 with 257 aircraft. Despite this effort, the exhausted pilots managed only three bomb hits on Kumano, causing moderate damage. Aircraft from Wasp and Cowpens also found Kurita's main force. Noshiro was able to evade six torpedoes aimed at her, but at 0852hrs one struck with devastating effect. The ship lost all power and within minutes developed a 26° list to port. The next attack was conducted by aircraft from Hornet. A second torpedo hit the lightly protected cruiser at 1039hrs, and at 1113hrs she sank bow first. By this point, Kurita's destroyers were down to their last few tons of fuel, forcing them to reduce speed. Destroyers had to shift fuel among themselves to reach a tanker positioned at Coron Bay. Hayashimo was forced to temporarily anchor off Semirara Island south of Mindoro. She was attacked by Avengers from 1045hrs to 1050hrs, and had her bow blown off by a torpedo. As a result, she was grounded and sank in shallow water off Semirara Island. Kurita's remaining ships managed to reach Coron Bay or Brunei, except for the destroyers Fujinami and Shiranui, which were sunk by air attacks on October 27, resulting in the loss of their crews, including those from Chokai aboard Fujinami. By the end of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the IJN had been effectively decimated. Despite suffering a severe defeat, Admiral Mikawa assessed that he still had enough resources to carry out Operation TA, which involved transporting reinforcements to Ormoc. On October 24, the cruiser Kinu and the destroyer Uranami escorted five transports through intense strafing fire to Cagayan. After boarding the 41st Regiment, Admiral Sakonju's convoy set sail the next morning and successfully landed the reinforcements at Ormoc early on October 26. Although they faced occasional enemy air attacks, they did not incur significant troop losses. Sakonju then sent three transports to Manila, but these were targeted by aircraft from Sprague's carriers. The attacks resulted in two bomb hits on Uranami and three on Kinu, leading to the sinking of both ships in the Visayan Sea. Another transport proceeded to Bohol, embarked the 169th Independent Battalion, and landed them at Ormoc on October 27. Although the Leyte beachheads were secured against sea-based attacks, the Americans could not control all surrounding waters, allowing Generals Yamashita and Suzuki to continue reinforcing the island. This marks the conclusion of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In exchange for the loss of one light carrier, two escort carriers, two destroyers, one destroyer escort, one submarine, one PT boat, 255 aircraft, and about 2,000 men, the Americans had destroyed approximately 300 enemy planes and sunk 28 warships, including the carrier Zuikaku (the last survivor of the Pearl Harbor attack), three light carriers, three battleships, ten cruisers, and eleven destroyers, with a total of 12,000 Japanese casualties. Despite losing all his carriers, Ozawa fulfilled his expected role and managed to survive the battle with two battleships and two cruisers. After the war, he noted that the final three strikes were not damaging, and his chief of staff remarked that he was unimpressed with the American pilots' quality. In contrast, Halsey faced severe criticism for his controversial decision to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded while moving his entire force north. If he had employed more strategic thinking and embraced decentralized decision-making, Mitscher's carriers could have engaged and defeated both Ozawa and Kurita. Nishimura also performed his duties effectively; despite losing his life and almost his entire force, he diverted the 7th Fleet's surface forces, leaving Kinkaid's transports and escort carriers vulnerable to Kurita's attack. The Shima force contributed nothing to the mission but survived largely intact. Kurita demonstrated bravery throughout the battle but was occasionally indecisive. Although he was not responsible for the losses at the Sibuyan Sea and was unlucky with his lookouts misidentifying cruisers and battleships among Sprague's escort carriers, he faced American tactics that he perceived as skillful. Sprague's desperate maneuvers to avoid annihilation were seen by the Japanese as tactical excellence. Kurita acknowledged the effective performance of American destroyers, which broke up his formation with torpedo attacks and utilized smoke screens effectively. Both Kurita and his chief of staff found the American air attacks to be relentless, aggressive, skillful, and well-coordinated, considering them the most proficient attacks encountered by the 1st Striking Force throughout the battle. In the end, Toyoda's Sho-Go plan was fundamentally flawed and destined for failure. Although it contained some clever elements that exploited weaknesses in the US Navy's command structure, it was ultimately incapable of success and served only as a means of the IJN's destruction. Even if Kurita had advanced into Leyte Gulf, it would have provided no significant military advantage for the Japanese and would likely have led to the complete destruction of Kurita's forces. The failure of Sho-Go left the Japanese without a fleet and with no realistic hope of defeating the Americans. However, the emergence of Kamikaze attacks allowed Japan to continue the war for a while longer. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Imperial Japanese Navy was virtually annihilated during the battle of Leyte Gulf. Few of her mighty warships remained and now she would cling to desperate measures to try and force the Americans to sue for an early peace to retain pieces of her empire. How long could Japan drag this war on?

Last time we spoke about the Return to the Philippines. Admiral Halsey, in preparation for the Leyte invasion, devised a strategic ploy to lure the Japanese forces by feigning vulnerability. Despite significant air engagements and the heavy damage to two cruisers, Halsey's forces maintained control. Meanwhile, a massive convoy approached Leyte, and the Japanese launched a desperate counterattack. The battle severely depleted Japan's air strength, leading to the birth of the Kamikaze Corps. As Davison's carrier aircraft attacked, Japanese forces struggled due to bad weather and underestimated the Americans. General Terauchi activated Sho-Go 1, targeting Leyte, despite disagreements with General Yamashita. Pre-landing operations saw U.S. Rangers secure islands, while heavy bombardments prepared Leyte for invasion. MacArthur's forces landed amidst fierce resistance, capturing key positions. Though logistics were disorganized, U.S. troops gained ground, marking the beginning of a decisive battle in the Philippines, with the Japanese struggling to counter. This episode is the Battle of Leyte Gulf Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously mentioned, General MacArthur's forces successfully landed on Leyte, with General Sibert's 10th Corps landing in the Palo-Tacloban sector and General Hodge's 24th Corps at Dulag. In response, Admiral Toyoda activated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Admiral Kurita's 1st Striking Force to move to Brunei Bay and destroy enemy warships and transports in Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force prepared to support counter-landings led by Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi's Southwest Area Fleet. The planning for Admiral Shima's small force was emblematic of the shambolic state of the IJN organization for the battle. His force was originally assigned to Ozawa as part of the Main Body. Then it was detached to go down to Formosa to mop-up Halsey's Third Fleet in the aftermath of the Battle off Formosa. Then it was assigned to the Southwest Area Fleet based in Manila to spearhead an envisioned counter-landing on Leyte. The commander of the Southwest Area Fleet, Admiral Mikawa, determined that the Shima force was not required to accomplish the counter-landing mission. On October 19 Toyoda rejected this and instructed Mikawa to use the Shima force as part of the counter-landing force. In spite of this and after confirming that the counter-landing operation did not require Shima's force, Mikawa sent orders to Shima on the afternoon of the 19th that he was not required to stand by to support the counter-landing. Early in the afternoon on October 21, the Combined Fleet again ordered Shima to take part in the transport mission and ordered his force to Manila. At this point, two forces were assigned to the counter-landing operation with a total of five cruisers and eight destroyers. This was a very questionable use of the Combined Fleet's limited resources.  Kurita's 16th Cruiser Division was detached to reinforce the effort, and Admiral Ozawa's depleted Main Body was tasked with luring the enemy north, allowing Kurita to break through to the landing zone. Vice Adm. Ozawa's Task Force Main Body sortied from the Bungo Channel, at the southern entrance to the Inland Sea, on the afternoon of October 20, immediately after receiving the Combined Fleet battle order. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3d Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships (Ise, Hyuga), three light cruisers(Oyodo, Tama, Isuzu) and eight destroyers (31st Destroyer Squadron). At around 06:00 on 21 October, Japanese aircraft attempted to bomb the Allied ships in Leyte Bay. An Aichi D3A dive-bomber dove for Shropshire, but broke away after heavy anti-aircraft fire was directed at it. The Aichi, damaged by Bofors fire, turned and flew at low level up the port side of the nearby Australia, before striking the cruiser's foremast with its wingroot. Although the bulk of the aircraft fell overboard, the bridge and forward superstructure were showered with debris and burning fuel. Seven officers (including Captain Dechaineux) and twenty-three sailors were killed by the collision, while another nine officers (including Commodore Collins), fifty-two sailors, and an AIF gunner were wounded. Observers aboard Australia and nearby Allied ships differed in their opinions of the collision; some thought that it was an accident, while the majority considered it to be a deliberate ramming aimed at the bridge. Following the attack, commander Harley C. Wright assumed temporary control of the ship. Since Kurita lacked air cover, Tominaga's forces were regrouping in the Philippines to bolster Japanese air strength for Operation Sho-Go, while Admiral Fukudome's 2nd Air Fleet was assembling in the Manila area. At the same time, with communication lost with General Makino's 16th Division.Because of the typhoon of October 17-18, signal communications were impossible. Roads were washed out and impassable. Bridges were down; and for about a week from the time the storm first hit the island, elements of the 16th Division were scattered and out of contact with one another. While trying to assemble its forces for operations, the Japanese were then hit by enemy bombardment, which further severely disrupted General Makino's radio-telegraphic communications. Additionally, the evacuation of Tacloban by the division rear echelon, which began early on October 20, necessitated the abandonment of permanent wireless installations and resulted in complete severance for 48 hours of all contact between the 16th Division and higher headquarters at Cebu and Manila. During this critical period, 14th Area Army and 35th Army were completely without knowledge of developments on Leyte. General Suzuki initiated the Suzu Plan, preparing the 41st Regiment and two battalions of the 102nd Division to move toward Ormoc. General Terauchi, having decided that the decisive battle would be fought at Leyte, directed General Yamashita to place the provisional Tempei Battalion and the 20th Antitank Battalion under Suzuki's command and ordered Lieutenant-General Yamagata Tsuyuo's 26th Division to prepare for early deployment to Leyte. Additionally, reinforcements from the 1st Division and the 68th Brigade, soon to arrive in the Philippines, were assigned to the 35th Army. The Japanese anticipated that the enemy would not move inland until the beachheads at Tacloban and Dulag were connected, so they aimed to gather reinforcements in the Carigara area before launching a major counteroffensive to crush the invading forces. In the meantime, Makino's 16th Division was tasked with holding off the enemy advance in eastern Leyte long enough to allow reinforcements to assemble. Reacting swiftly to the enemy landings, Makino sent the reserve 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment, and the 7th Independent Tank Company to strengthen the defenses at Palo and Dulag, respectively. General Krueger, however, intended to move quickly through Leyte Valley, aiming to secure key roads and airfields before the Japanese could regroup and mount a solid defense. The 1st Striking Force departed Lingga at 01:00 on October 18 and headed to Brunei Bay on the north coast of Borneo. At Brunei, Kurita's ships refuelled, and Kurita took the opportunity to confer with his officers. The details of Sho-1 reached Kurita's force during the day on October 18. This made for a dramatic conference and reflected the unease many felt about the plan. Many officers at the conference were appalled that the fleet was being risked attacking empty transports and doubted that they would ever get close to Leyte Gulf. Kurita probably had his own doubts about the plan, but after many of those present expressed their doubts, Kurita reminded them of the “glorious opportunity” they had been given. “Would it not be a shame to have the fleet remain intact while the nation perishes?” posed Kurita, and followed with the plea: “What man can say that there is no chance for our fleet to turn the tide of war in a decisive battle?” Whatever their doubts, the crews and ships of the 1st Striking Force departed Brunei at 08:00 on October 22 and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage. Kurita's 3rd Section—consisting of the old battleships Fuso and Yamashiro, heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers—stayed behind. These ships departed at 15:00 and headed to the Balabac Strait and then into the Sulu Sea. If all went according to plan, they would storm Leyte Gulf through the Surigao Strait and meet Kurita's ships inside the gulf on the morning of October 25. To the north, General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division continued advancing northwest along San Juanico Strait, with the 7th Cavalry liberating Tacloban with minimal resistance. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments faced tougher opposition in the southwestern foothills, where Colonel Royce Drake was killed by enemy machine-gun fire, but they managed to secure Utap and Caibaan despite the swampy terrain. To the south, Colonel Aubrey Newman's 34th Regiment repelled a strong enemy counterattack, resulting in 600 Japanese casualties, before launching an assault on Hill 332. Although only the northern knoll was captured by nightfall, the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment consolidated its position on Hill 522, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced towards Palo, with the 2nd successfully entering the town. Further south, Japanese artillery positioned on Catmon Hill targeted the beachhead area while General Bradley's 96th Division advanced. Colonel May's 1st Battalion attacked the Japanese positions at Labiranan Head, the remaining forces of the 383rd Regiment moved west to a point north of Tigbao, and Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment made slow progress towards Tigbao. At the same time, General Arnold's 7th Division, after repelling two minor tank attacks, began advancing west toward the Burauen airstrips, with the 32nd and 184th Regiments moving side by side. The 184th faced minimal opposition as it captured the Dulag airstrip and continued moving forward about 1000 yards beyond the beachhead, whereas the 32nd had to overcome several bunkers and pillboxes to reach its objective. The next day, both regiments continued their westward advance, with the 184th stopping after 2800 yards due to increased enemy resistance, waiting for the 32nd to close the gap. To the north, May's 1st Battalion secured Labiranan Hill and San Roque, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment advanced to Anibung to surround Catmon Hill, and the 382nd Regiment pushed through Tigbao and Canmangui. In response to these developments, Makino decided to reorganize his southern forces to better defend Catmon Hill and Burauen, with the 20th Regiment largely disengaging and retreating towards Hindang. Simultaneously, the 34th Regiment captured Hill 332, while Lieutenant-Colonel George Chapman's 19th Regiment defended Palo from strong enemy counterattacks. The 3rd Battalion managed to reach the town, allowing the 2nd Battalion to launch an attack towards Hill B, though it was unable to capture its crest. Further north, while the 7th Cavalry secured the hills around Tacloban, Brigadier-General William Chase's 1st Cavalry Brigade continued to face challenges advancing up the western foothills. In the morning, Kurita set sail from Brunei and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage, leaving Vice-Admiral Nishimura Shoji's Force C behind to advance through the Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf. Taking the direct route along the west coast of Palawan, the 1st Striking Force was detected by submarines Darter and Dace in the early hours of October 23. After reporting the enemy task force to Admirals Halsey and Kinkaid, the submarines executed a coordinated attack at 06:10. The first torpedoes struck Atago just as Kurita was having morning tea with his chief of staff. In total, four torpedoes hit the cruiser, dooming her instantly. Nineteen officers and 341 sailors went down with the ship. Kurita and his staff were thrown into the water and had to swim for their lives. The second salvo from Darter hit cruiser Takao, steaming behind Atago. Two torpedoes hit the cruiser, killing 32 crewmen and wounding another 30. Takao was not only out of the battle, but her heavy damage put her out of the war. After eventually reaching Singapore, she was deemed unrepairable.On Dace, Claggett observed Darter's devastating attack. Claggett identified a Kongo-class battleship for attack and began his approach. Six torpedoes were fired from a range of 1,800 yards toward the target, which was actually heavy cruiser Maya. The cruiser took four hits on her port side and sank in a mere eight minutes, taking with her 16 officers and 320 men. Kurita narrowly escaped the sinking of the Atago, later transferring to the battleship Yamato after sending two destroyers to escort the damaged Takao back to Brunei. The submarines then endured ineffective counterattacks from Japanese destroyers, although Darter ran aground on a reef while pursuing Takao. This successful submarine attack not only diminished Kurita's force by three powerful cruisers but also provided the Americans with the location of the 1st Striking Force. In response, Admiral Oldendorf's fire support group established a battle line across the mouth of Surigao Strait, and Halsey ordered his dispersed carrier groups to prepare for battle, recalling Task Group 38.4 immediately. Additionally, Vice-Admiral Sakonju Naomasa's 16th Cruiser Division, en route to Mindanao with the 41st Regiment for Ormoc, was tracked by submarine Bream near Manila Bay early on October 23. This led to a torpedo attack that critically damaged the heavy cruiser Aoba, forcing her to return to Japan, where she would never be operational again. Despite these challenges, the first reinforcement successfully arrived in Ormoc on the same day after an uneventful voyage. At the same time, the IJA and IJN air forces were rapidly assembling their resources in the Philippines in preparation for a coordinated air offensive set to begin on October 24, a day before the scheduled fleet attack. To the north, Ozawa's substantial but ineffective decoy force was positioned due east of Okinawa, moving south into the Philippine Sea, while Shima's 2nd Striking Force neared the Coron Islands. Back in Leyte, Krueger's offensive was advancing as well. In the north, the 8th Cavalry had moved through the 7th and successfully captured a bridge over the Diit River. On October 22, elements of the 5th Cavalry were sent to Tacloban to act as a guard of honor for General MacArthur. The guard of honor, consisting of 1st Lt. John Gregory and thirty enlisted men of the 5th Cavalry, arrived at Tacloban later on October 23. President Osmeña of the Philippine Commonwealth was also present, having come ashore for the occasion. A simple but impressive ceremony was held in front of the municipal building of Tacloban, though the interior of the edifice was a shambles of broken furniture and scattered papers. A guard of honor of "dirty and tired but efficient-looking soldiers" was drawn up in front of the government building. General MacArthur broadcasted an address announcing the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with President Osmeña as its head. Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland then read the official proclamation. President Osmeña spoke appreciatively of American support and of the determination of the Filipinos to expel the enemy. "To the Color" was sounded on the bugle, and the national flags of the United States and the Philippines were simultaneously hoisted on the sides of the building. Colonel Kangleon of the guerrilla forces was then decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross. Few Filipinos except representatives of the local government were present for the ceremony. Apparently the inhabitants had not heard of it, or did not know that they were permitted to attend. Information quickly spread, however, that the civil government had assumed control, and as General MacArthur and his party left town the civil population cheered them. The 1st Cavalry Brigade continued its slow advance through challenging terrain before being reassigned to support the overstretched 24th Division in its rear. Newman's 1st Battalion made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Hill Nan, and the 19th Regiment similarly failed to take Hill B. On the night of October 23 Col. Suzuki Tatsunosuke, the commanding officer of the 33rd Regiment, led a raiding detachment, armed with rifles, sabres, grenades, and mines, into Palo from the southwest. Using Filipino civilians in front of them, the men of the detachment tricked the guards at the outpost into believing that they were guerrillas. The Japanese were thus able to capture two machine guns and a 37-mm. gun. They penetrated to the town square and charged, throwing explosives into houses, trucks, and a tank, and broke into an evacuation hospital where they killed some wounded. They then moved toward the bridge and mounted the captured machine guns on it, firing until their ammunition was exhausted and then abandoning the guns. The American guards on the other side of the bridge, however, were able to fire upon the bridge and its approaches so effectively that they killed fifty Japanese, according to a count made the next morning. The raid was completely broken up, and sixty Japanese, including Colonel Suzuki, were killed. The American casualties were fourteen killed and twenty wounded. To the south, the 383rd Regiment secured the Guinarona River, while the 382nd conducted patrols. Even farther south, Arnold deployed the 17th Regiment, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment and the 767th Tank Battalion, to push through his advance elements and continue the assault westward, with the other two regiments trailing 1000 yards behind. This "flying wedge" maneuver proved highly effective, with the infantry securing San Pablo airfield and the tanks advancing to the western edge of Burauen. They disrupted the disorganized enemy forces and killed Colonel Hokota Keijiro, commander of the 20th Regiment. Meanwhile, at sea, Kurita's intact warships advanced into Mindoro Strait by nightfall, while Nishimura's force was crossing the Sulu Sea. To the north, Ozawa's decoy force was deliberately broadcasting messages to draw enemy attention. Shima was also directed to penetrate Surigao Strait to support Nishimura's assault, as Mikawa had determined that the 2nd Striking Force was not needed for the counter-landing mission. On Leyte, the troops continued their engagement on October 24, unaware of the impending major naval battle. In the northern region, to secure San Juanico Strait and prevent Japanese reinforcements from Samar, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed successfully at Babatngon; Troop C of the 8th Cavalry did the same at La Paz; and the rest of the 1st Squadron advanced to Guintiguian. By nightfall, these cavalry units had to repel a strong counterattack from the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, which was stationed in Samar. To the south, Newman's 1st Battalion secured Hills Nan and Mike; his 2nd Battalion fought its way to a small hill southeast of Hill C; Chapman's 2nd Battalion continued its unsuccessful assault on Hill B; and his Company K captured San Joaquin south of Palo. Further south, the 382nd Regiment pushed through Hindang, causing the 20th Regiment units to retreat, and also secured Anibung, while the 383rd Regiment began patrolling its area. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment, supported by the 184th, advanced along the road to Burauen, fought through the town, and began preparing for a push north to Dagami. Additionally, the 32nd Regiment attacked toward the Buri airstrip but was eventually forced to withdraw. At dawn on October 24, the crucial air phase of the Sho-Go plan began, with 200 aircraft of the 1st and 2nd Air Fleets taking off from Clark Field to patrol the waters east of Luzon. At 08:20, Admiral Sherman's carriers were finally spotted, prompting the launch of three waves of Japanese aircraft for an attack. The first attack in the morning was intercepted by seven Hellcats from Essex led by Commander David McCampbell, the air group commander. The quality of the Japanese air crews was very low. McCampbell methodically proceeded to shoot down nine Japanese aircraft, for which he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, and his wingman claimed six more. After the record action, he managed to return and land in extremis on Langley because the Essex's deck was too busy to accommodate him although he had run short of fuel. Altogether, aviators from Essex were credited with 24 downed enemy aircraft, and fighters from Lexington 13. Despite the Hellcats' rough handling of the incoming Japanese strike, fleet air defense was never airtight. At 0938hrs, one Judy divebomber used clouds for cover and then made a skillful attack against light carrier Princeton. The aircraft's 551lb bomb hit in the middle of the flight deck some 75ft forward of the aft elevator. It penetrated several decks to the ship's bakery, where it exploded. The resulting blast reached into the hangar deck where it engulfed six fully armed and fully fueled Avengers. These aircraft caught fire and soon exploded with a blast so powerful both ship's elevators were thrown into the air. Water pressure was knocked out, which allowed the flames to spread quickly. All non-essential personnel were ordered off the ship at 1010hrs, followed by all but the fire-fighting personnel ten minutes later. In response, the cruiser Birmingham came to Princeton's aid but sustained severe damage from a major explosion and had to retreat to Ulithi, leading to Princeton being scuttled later in the afternoon. The subsequent two waves of Japanese aircraft were successfully intercepted, resulting in the loss of 67 Japanese planes by the end of the day. Meanwhile, Tominaga launched full-scale attacks on enemy invasion shipping in Leyte Gulf with minimal results. The failure to neutralize Halsey's carriers and Ozawa's undetected diversion mission allowed Admiral Mitscher to conduct a series of strikes against Kurita's force. That morning, American reconnaissance aircraft detected Kurita's 1st Striking Force south of Mindoro, prompting Admiral Bogan to dispatch 45 aircraft under Commander William Ellis to attack the battleships Yamato and Musashi as they neared the Sibuyan Sea. At approximately 10:30, aircraft from the Intrepid and Cabot began their attack. The lead group of Japanese ships included the huge Yamato and Musashi. Of these two, Musashi was nearest, so Commander Ellis selected her as the main target. He split the 12 Helldivers into two six-aircraft divisions to attack both battleships with their 1000lb bombs. The two nearest large ships were the subject of the Avengers' attack. Two were ordered to go after heavy cruiser Myoko and the other six were directed against Musashi. These were divided into two three-plane sections in order to execute an anvil attack. The four Avengers from Cabot were allocated against Yamato in the center of the formation. American pilots all remarked on the ferocity of the antiaircraft fire from the multi-colored 5in. bursts to the streams of tracers from the 25mm guns. The Japanese also used Type 3 incendiary shells from 18.1in. and 16in. main battery guns. Despite the spectacular appearances of this barrage, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was generally ineffective. The giant Type 3 shells proved totally ineffective, and Japanese records indicate that the battleships fired a relatively low number of 6in. and 5in. shells during each attack, indicating that the fire-control systems were taking too long to generate a targeting solution. These and the ubiquitous 25mm guns damaged many aircraft, but of the over 250 aircraft that attacked during the day, only 18 were shot down. Though the numbers confirm the ineffectiveness of IJN anti-aircraft fire, the American aviators displayed great courage pressing home their attacks through what was described as an impenetrable wall of flak. Musashi was hit with one torpedo, leading to flooding and listing, and another torpedo struck the cruiser Myoko, which had to return to Singapore. For most of the day, Musashi was the center of attention. Due to a fault in the design of her side belt, slow flooding entered the adjacent boiler room. The effect of some 3,000 tons of water was a 5.5° list, which was quickly reduced to a single degree by pumps in the affected boiler room and counterflooding on the opposite. Facing Musashi's intact antiaircraft batteries, one Avenger was shot down before it launched its torpedo and a second went down after deploying its weapon. The two Avengers that attacked Myoko were even more successful. At 1029hrs, one torpedo hit the heavy cruiser on her starboard side aft. Her propulsion system was damaged, and her top speed reduced to 15 knots. The cruiser fell astern of the formation. Kurita was forced to send her back to Singapore for repairs without destroyer escort. Since Myoko was the flagship of Sentai 5, at 1100hrs the commander transferred to cruiser Haguro. Myoko limped back to Singapore but was out of the war. Four of Kurita's heavy cruisers were out of the battle before they had a chance to engage an enemy ship. Cabot's small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Yamato, but the battleship dodged all torpedoes directed at her. Concurrently, Nishimura's fleet was located by an enhanced search operation from Admiral Davison's carriers. At 09:18, 16 Hellcats and 12 Avengers from the Enterprise attacked the Yamashiro and Fuso battleships, hitting the latter with two bombs, though the damage was minimal. Operating to the west of Nishimura was Shima's Second Striking Force and also in the area was Shima's detached Destroyer Division 21 with three ships, which was hurrying to rejoin Shima's main force after having completed a transport mission to Manila. Franklin's air group was assigned the northern sector of the Sulu Sea. It spotted the three ships of Shima's Destroyer Division 21 off Panay. Attacking high-speed destroyers was a challenge for any airman, but at 0813hrs Wakaba was hit by a bomb and several near misses. The damage proved fatal—45 minutes later, Wakaba sank with the loss of 30 men. Franklin launched a follow-up strike of 12 Hellcats and 11 bombers that reached the two remaining destroyers just before noon. Only one bomb hit was scored against Hatsushimo, which did little damage. The Japanese commander decided to head back to Manila with the survivors of Wakaba. Inexplicably, he failed to notify Shima of his decision. Destroyer Division 21 was out of the battle.  After this initial strike, Bogan sent a second wave of 42 aircraft, which targeted Musashi between 12:07 and 12:15. Again, Helldivers opened the attack. The 12 bombers scored at least two direct hits and five near misses. One 1,000lb hit forward and passed through Musashi's bow without exploding. The second hit just to the port side of the stack and penetrated two decks before exploding. The resulting damage forced the abandonment of the port-side inboard engine room, which reduced the ship to three shafts. A fire near one of the boiler rooms was quickly extinguished. Adding to the chaos, Musashi's steam siren was damaged, and it continued to sound off and on for the remainder of the action. Once again Intrepid's Avengers deployed to conduct an anvil attack. Of the nine aircraft, eight got their torpedoes in the water and headed toward the huge battleship. As was the case for the entire series of attacks, it is impossible to precisely trace the number of hits suffered by Musashi; American and Japanese records do not even coincide on the overall number of attacks during the day. It is probable that the second wave of Avengers put three torpedoes into Musashi's port side. One hit near the stack on the junction of the outboard port engine room and the port hydraulic machinery space; it caused slow flooding but little else. Another hit forward of the armored citadel and caused massive flooding into several large spaces. The last confirmed hit occurred abaft Turret No. 2. Despite these three additional hits, Musashi remained on an even keel, but was noticeably down by the bow. In exchange, Musashi antiaircraft gunners forced one Avenger to ditch some 15 miles away and shot down two Helldivers. During this attack, Japanese records indicate nine Type 3 shells were fired. American pilots were impressed that they were engaged at 25,000–30,000 yards, but no aircraft were damaged. This damage reduced Musashi's speed to 22 knots, prompting Kurita to slow his formation. Despite taking four torpedoes, Musashi's skilled damage-control teams managed to keep it afloat throughout the day. At 10:50, Sherman launched 58 aircraft from the Essex and Lexington, focusing on Musashi again at 13:30. With her speed reduced and unable to fully maneuver, she was a much easier target. Despite the heavy fire directed against them, the Helldivers performed their mission of preparing the way for the torpedo bombers. At least four 1,000lb bombs hit Musashi. Three hits caused minimal damage as they impacted near the forward 18in. turret and exploded in the unoccupied crew accommodation spaces below. Damage from the final hit that exploded on contact when it hit the starboard side of the stack was not serious, but the explosion devastated many nearby 25mm triple mounts and caused heavy casualties among the gun crews. While the Helldivers added to the topside carnage, damage from the Avengers was much more serious. Three more torpedo hits were confirmed in the third attack, bringing the total to seven. Two struck forward of the armored citadel on either side of the bow. The design flaw of having comparatively little compartmentation in the unarmored forward section of the ship led to massive flooding. In addition, the explosions forced the hull plating outward creating what looked like a huge plow throwing water up as the ship moved forward. Another torpedo struck the starboard side close to the previous starboard side hit. This increased flooding and forced the abandonment of the starboard hydraulic machinery room. A possible fourth hit was reported by some witnesses near the forward 6.1in. triple turret on the starboard side. This assault resulted in at least four bomb hits and three torpedo hits, causing severe flooding. Despite this, Musashi continued to fight, but with its speed reduced to 12 knots, Kurita ordered it to move west with destroyers Shimakaze and Kiyoshimo. Additionally, the cruiser Tone was struck by two bombs during this attack, sustaining only light damage. At 14:26, 12 Helldivers and 8 Hellcats from the Essex launched an assault on the Yamato and Nagato, delivering three bomb hits to the Yamato and two to the Nagato, though the damage was not severe. The fifth air attack of the day was the most intense, with 65 aircraft from the Enterprise and Franklin taking off at 13:15 to strike the heavily damaged Musashi at 15:10. The results against the near-defenseless battleship were devastating. Of the 18 Helldivers that dove on Musashi, 11 claimed hits. On this occasion, the aviators' claims were not inflated. Japanese sources agreed that within minutes, Musashi was pounded by ten 1,000lb bombs. This barrage can be detailed with some degree of certainty. One bomb hit forward of Turret No. 1 and added to the damage there from earlier bombs. Another bomb hit the roof of the same turret and failed to penetrate its thick roof armor. Another hit to the starboard side of the turret and penetrated two decks before exploding against the main armored deck. Two bombs hit together between the forward 6.1in. turret and the superstructure, exploded on contact, and did minimal damage. Another two hit just to port in the same general area, penetrated two decks, and exploded on the main armored deck without penetrating. The eighth bomb hit the port side of the massive superstructure and exploded on contact, causing devastation to nearby 25mm mounts and their crews. Another projectile hit the top of the superstructure and destroyed the main battery fire-control director and its rangefinder. The resulting explosion caused significant personnel casualties on the bridge and operations room totaling 78 killed and wounded. Among the wounded was the ship's captain. The final hit landed abaft the superstructure but caused only minor damage. Musashi was equally helpless against the Avengers. The eight Enterprise Avengers conducted an anvil attack, and all claimed hits. At this point in the action, the accounts of Musashi's surviving crewmembers are not reliable. It is certain that four more torpedoes hit the ship. The first was on the port side in the area of the magazine for Turret No. 1. Another hit on the port side was recorded abeam the superstructure, flooding one boiler room. The third hit to port was placed just aft of the stack. It was in the same area of an earlier hit, and it immediately flooded the outboard engine room. The only confirmed hit on the starboard side occurred in the area of Turret No. 2. On top of the four confirmed hits, some Japanese accounts mention as many as six more. Two of these struck amidships on the port side but did not explode. All attacking aircraft returned safely, confirming the ineffectiveness of Musashi's defenses at this point. At 15:21, Helldivers targeted the Haruna, but only managed five near misses. The increasing intensity of the air attacks throughout the day indicated that Japanese land-based air forces had failed to neutralize Halsey's carriers. Consequently, at 15:30, Kurita ordered his fleet to change course westward, away from the San Bernardino Strait, hoping that this maneuver would reduce the pressure from air attacks and allow Japanese air forces to achieve better results. Meanwhile, Bogan launched his third strike of the day at 15:50, with 31 aircraft under Ellis targeting the Musashi one final time. However, due to fatigue, the attack was ineffective. After this last air strike, Kurita decided to head back towards the San Bernardino Strait and instructed the sinking Musashi to beach itself on Sibuyan Island at 17:15. Before this could be executed, the battleship sank at 19:36, resulting in the loss of 1,023 lives. Thus, the Musashi became the largest ship ever sunk by air attack in what was the largest air-sea battle in history up to that point. Despite losing 18 aircraft, the Americans succeeded in sinking the Musashi, torpedoing the Myoko, and damaging three other battleships to varying extents. Nevertheless, the 1st Striking Force emerged in better condition than anticipated, with the Musashi absorbing much of the torpedo and bomb damage and allowing the other ships to weather the attack. Kurita planned to navigate San Bernardino Strait during the night, proceed down the east coast of Samar, and reach Leyte Gulf around 11:00. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher's search planes had located Ozawa's carriers at 16:40. By afternoon, Ozawa had launched most of his aircraft in an attack on Sherman, but the final assault by the once formidable IJN carrier force achieved only limited success, with 28 planes lost before retreating to the Philippines. Remaining undetected, Ozawa then dispatched two battleship carriers and four destroyers under Rear-Admiral Matsuda Chiaki southward, drawing American attention to his position.  In the aftermath of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Americans did not know that the IJN had no prospects of replacing its lost aviators. Because the majority of the carriers themselves survived the battle, and the Americans knew other carriers were being added to the force, the IJN's carrier force was still a threat. The intelligence Halsey received on the IJN's carrier force indicated that it was fully capable. In every other major battle of the war, the IJN carrier fleet was the main threat. The Pacific War had become a carrier war and surface forces had been firmly supplanted as the primary striking force. The Americans had no way of knowing that the Japanese had turned this thinking on its head in their planning for Leyte Gulf. Nimitz wanted to destroy the Combined Fleet and thus gain an increased measure of operational freedom for future operations. He was disappointed that this did not occur at Philippine Sea and thus had inserted the instruction to Halsey that the destruction of the Japanese fleet would be his primary objective if the opportunity was presented. Achieving this not only would eliminate the main threat to the invasion, but it would cripple the IJN's ability to interfere with future operations. As the assessment from the aviators was that Kurita's force no longer posed a threat, at 19:50 Halsey ordered his entire force north to crush what he assessed as the primary threat: Ozawa's carrier force. He decided to do so with the entirety of his force. By doing so, he decided to ignore the threat posed by the Kurita force, which was headed toward San Bernardino Strait. He kept his whole force together, because that was how TF 38 fought and because, as he stated after the war, he did not want to divide his force in the face of the enemy. A decisive victory was most likely if the carriers of TF 38 worked with the battleships of TF 34. This was USN doctrine and Halsey fully supported it.  At 20:22, Task Force 38 set course north, with the three carrier groups in the area meeting just before midnight. Earlier, at 20:05, a night reconnaissance aircraft from Independence had reported that Kurita's formidable surface force was heading back toward the San Bernardino Strait. This news raised concerns among several of Halsey's subordinates, including Bogan and Lee, but they were dismissed by the resolute Halsey. As a result, the 3rd Fleet's full strength continued northward toward Ozawa's decoy force, leaving the San Bernardino Strait completely unprotected. This left Kurita's battleships unopposed between themselves and the American landing vessels, except for Kinkaid's vulnerable escort carriers off Samar's coast. Meanwhile, the detection of Nishimura's force on October 24 gave Kinkaid enough time to prepare for a battle at Surigao Strait. Oldendorf set up his battle line under Rear-Admiral George Weyler near Hingatungan Point in the northern part of the strait, providing maximum sea space while still constraining Japanese movement. Eight cruisers in two groups were positioned south of this line, with 24 destroyers stationed to screen the battleships and cruisers and positioned on both flanks to launch torpedo attacks against the approaching Japanese. Additionally, 39 PT boats were deployed in the southern approaches to the strait and into the Mindanao Sea to provide early warning and execute torpedo attacks when possible. The main issue was that the battleships were primarily equipped with high-explosive shells and would only engage once the Japanese forces were about 20,000 yards away. Moreover, Kinkaid had intercepted an order from Halsey to assemble a powerful task force of fast battleships. Misinterpreting the order's unclear wording, Kinkaid mistakenly believed Task Force 34 was coming to defend San Bernardino Strait, allowing his forces to concentrate on Surigao Strait instead. Despite Kurita's delays, Nishimura pressed on to breach the strait, advancing with the heavy cruiser Mogami and three destroyers. Little is known about Nishimura's precise thinking as he approached the strait. He was planning on arriving off Tacloban at 0430hrs on October 25 in accordance with Toyoda's master plan that had Kurita's force arriving off Leyte a short time later. This schedule fell apart after Kurita's advance was thrown off schedule on the afternoon of October 24 when he temporarily turned around in the face of intensive air attack in the Sibuyan Sea. At 2013hrs Nishimura sent a message to Toyoda and Kurita that he planned to arrive off Dulag at 0400hrs the next morning, a half hour later than planned. This was only a minor change; much more important was the receipt at 2200hrs of Kurita's message that he would not be in the gulf until 1100hrs. This meant that Nishimura's force was on its own when it executed its attack into the gulf. However, Nishimura did not change his plan after learning of Kurita's revised intentions. He was determined to force the strait in darkness and in so doing draw forces away from Kurita's main attack. The battle began at 2236hrs when PT-131 gained radar contact on Nishimura's main force. The three boats of the section headed toward the contact to make a torpedo attack. Two of the boats were slightly damaged, but one was able to close within torpedo range. News of the contact did not reach Oldendorf until 0026hrs on October 25. Another section sighted the advance group built around Mogami at 2350hrs and two of the boats fired a torpedo at the cruiser. Neither hit its target. Demonstrating the confusion in any night battle, at about 0100hrs Mogami was hit by a 6in. shell from Fuso. Though a dud, it killed three men. About an hour later, PT134 closed to within 3,000 yards of Fuso and fired three torpedoes. Again, all missed. This running series of encounters continued up until 0213hrs. Of the 39 boats, 30 contacted the Japanese and launched 34 torpedoes. None of Nishimura's ships was hit. While Nishimura's force was successfully fighting its way up the strait in good order, he kept Kurita and Shima informed of his progress. At 0040hrs, the two parts of Nishimura's force reunited. First blood went to the Japanese, since ten PTs were hit, and one (PT-493) sank, with a total of three dead and 20 wounded. Though unable to exact any attrition on the Japanese, the PTs had provided an invaluable service informing Oldendorf of Nishimura's location and strength. Based on an earlier report from one of Mogami's scout aircraft on the location and numbers of USN ships in Leyte Gulf, Nishimura appeared to believe that the battle would occur inside Leyte Gulf and not in Surigao Strait. If he really believed that Oldendorf would not use favorable geography to his advantage, he was sorely mistaken. Having survived the PT boat attacks with no damage, Nishimura now faced a much more deadly threat. This came in the form of five Fletcher-class destroyers under the command of the aggressive Captain Coward. Two other destroyers from Coward's Destroyer Squadron 54 were left on picket duty and did not take part in the torpedo attack. The five destroyers assigned to the attack were arrayed to conduct an anvil attack (with torpedoes coming in from both bows of the enemy target), with McDermut and Monssen from the west and Remey, McGowan, and Melvin from the east. Approaching at 30 knots, Coward's ships would launch torpedoes guided by radar, and refrain from using their 5in. guns so as not to give their positions away. Once the torpedoes were on their way, the destroyers would break off and head north along the coast to clear the area and reduce the possibility of a friendly fire incident. What ensued was one of the most successful attacks of the entire war. Shortly after 03:00, Coward's three eastern destroyers launched 27 torpedoes from a range of 8200 to 9300 yards at the advancing Japanese ships. They scored two critical hits on the Fuso at 03:08, causing flooding and fires. The battleship, unaware of the severity of the damage, veered off course and headed south, ultimately sinking at about 03:45 with 1620 lives lost. The Americans claimed that the torpedoes had split the Fuso in two. Meanwhile, Coward's two western destroyers fired a full salvo of 20 torpedoes at 03:10. In response, Nishimura changed course, exposing his screen to danger. By 03:19, three torpedoes from McDermut struck the Yamagumo, which exploded and sank within two minutes; another torpedo hit the Michishio amidships, causing it to sink 15 minutes later after coming to a halt; and a final torpedo hit the Asagumo, damaging its bow and reducing its speed, forcing it to withdraw from the battle. McDermut's ten torpedoes were the most effective salvo of the war from any American destroyer. Monssen's torpedo attack resulted in a single hit on the battleship Yamashiro, causing some flooding and reducing her firepower by a third. Following Coward's devastating torpedo strike, six more destroyers, divided into two groups of three, approached Nishimura's force from the west along the coast of Leyte. The first group commenced their attack at 03:23, launching 14 torpedoes from a range of 6500 to 6800 yards, but only one torpedo struck the Yamashiro, temporarily slowing her to 5 knots. The second group of destroyers fired 15 torpedoes at 03:29, but none of their torpedoes hit their targets, and the gunfire from both sides proved ineffective. After this failed assault, nine destroyers in three sections of three approached Nishimura's weakened column from both flanks. The first two sections, attacking from either side, fired a half-salvo of five torpedoes from each destroyer, but none hit. Before the final section could launch its attack, a fierce gunnery battle was underway.  The gunnery battle began at 0351hrs when the first American cruiser opened up. Two minutes later, West Virginia commenced fire from 22,800 yards. All ships fired at the largest radar return of the three Japanese ships, which was Yamashiro. The American barrage grew as each battleship gained a fire control solution. The three ships with the most modern fire control systems did most of the work. California joined in at 0355hrs from 20,400 yards followed by Tennessee one minute later. The three battleships with the less capable Mk 3 fire control radar struggled to gain a firing solution. Maryland opened fire at 0359hrs by ranging her Mk 3 radar on the shell splashes from the other battleships. Mississippi took until 0412hrs when she fired a full salvo at Yamashiro from 19,790 yards. Pennsylvania never gained a good solution for her 14in. main battery and failed to fire a single salvo. Unbeknownst to Nishimura, the Americans had executed a "T" maneuver, leaving his ships able to fire only their forward guns while the enemy could unleash full broadsides. Concentrating their fire on the Yamashiro, Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships landed several hits during the 18-minute engagement. By 03:56, the Yamashiro was seen burning amidships, aft, and in the bridge area. Despite this, the battleship fought back fiercely, targeting the cruisers Phoenix, Columbia, Shropshire, and Denver, though no hits were achieved. The Mogami endured severe damage during this engagement, with the cruiser Portland focusing its fire on her and inflicting heavy harm. In the early phase of the battle, she took several 5in. hits from American destroyers. In the first minutes of the withering barrage from Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships, Mogami sustained more damage, including a hit on one of her 8in. turrets. After firing four Type 93 torpedoes at 0401hrs against the gun flashes from enemy ships to the north, she came under fire from heavy cruiser Portland. Two 8in. shells hit Mogami's bridge at 0402hrs, killing her commanding officer, and other shells disabled two engine rooms. The new commanding officer decided to break off the action and head south at slow speed. While headed south, she encountered the Second Diversion Attack Force.  As American gunfire pummeled Yamashiro's superstructure, the last destroyer group approached head-on, closing to within 6200 yards before launching 13 torpedoes. Before the torpedoes could reach their targets, the destroyers came under friendly fire and further assault from Yamashiro's guns, resulting in the Albert W. Grant taking 18 hits before being withdrawn. Observing the friendly fire, Oldendorf ordered a ceasefire at 04:09, allowing Nishimura to begin a retreat south. However, by 04:11, the Yamashiro had been hit by three torpedoes from the final destroyer salvo, causing a severe list and bringing the battleship to a halt. Yamashiro's valiant yet ultimately futile resistance ended at 04:19 when she capsized to port, taking Nishimura and 1625 others with her. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The largest naval battle in human history had only just begun. As many historians argue, given the fateful decision of Halsey to try and knock out the IJN combined fleet, the transports had been left completely open to an attack. Absolute carnage could unfold on an unprecedented scale…perhaps enough to cause America to rethink continuing the war?

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This episode features Joey, aka "9mm Musashi", a stalwart in the law enforcement training world and, predictably, a pretty serious watch enthusiast. We discuss everything from emotional intelligence in law enforcement, the importance of service to the community, and one hell of a good story about a watch gifted to his dad. I also make a lame attempt to draw parallels between Musashi's teachings and the world of watch collecting. Spoiler alert: it's a bit cringe (but funny). Thanks for listening!

Today we were joined in studio by Musashi rep, All Black, Kiwi and NZ Warrior, Roger Tuivasa-Sheck to chat the Musashi Shield and a look back at the time Mulls gave Roger a buzz. 

The book of 5 rings | THE LIBRARY

In this thought-provoking episode of Find Your Daily Calm, join Joseph Indolos, an 18-year veteran in business consultancy, as he reads a calming version of life lessons from Sun Tzu's 'The Art of War' and Musashi's 'Book of Five Rings.' Joseph's unique blend of ancient wisdom and modern business insights promises to guide and inspire. Tune in to explore a fresh perspective on timeless teachings. #FindYourDailyCalm #JosephIndolos #SunTzu #Musashi #LifeLessons #BusinessWisdomSupport this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/find-your-daily-calm/exclusive-contentAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

We are finally starting to get into the Taika era and the Taika reforms, which would really start the transformation of Yamato into the bureaucratic state of the Nara period.  This episode, we look back at how the Yamato state had been changing up to this point, some of the possible influences and precursors, and then dive into some of the first edicts, largely dealing with sending out governors to the provinces.  These governors, or "kokushi", were originally temporary positions, limited in what they could do.  More info over at https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-108  Rough Transcript   Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  My name is Joshua and this is Episode 108: The Great Change ……………….. The Kuni no Miyatsuko, hereditary leader of his lands, likely heard the news before they arrived.  Apparently Yamato was sending out an official—a kokushi—who was going to be doing some sort of survey.  Whatever.  Just another person from Yamato's court—what did it matter?  His family had been in charge of the local lands for as long as anyone remembered, and while they might give nominal fealty to the Oho-kimi in Yamato, along with the occasional bit of taxes, paid in rice, what consequence was it to him?  Some might say he was a big fish in a small pond, but it was his pond.  Always had been, and always would be.  Wouldn't it? ……………….. And we are back with our regular chronological podcast, and we are finally going to pick back up on the fall out from the events of 645, the Isshi Incident, when Prince Naka no Oe orchestrated the murder of Soga no Iruka, and later his father, Soga no Emishi, in full view of the court, including his mother, Takara, aka Kougyoku Tennou.  That incident would be the start of Naka no Oe's own rise to power and the reshaping of Yamato from the its longstanding clan based system of government to a new national government of laws and punishments, known generally as the Ritsuryo system.  This episode we'll dive into this new system and the so-called “Taika reforms” that brought it about, the changes it ushered in, and the ripples this sent throughout the entire archipelago.     The term “Taika” itself means “Great Change”, and it isn't clear to me if it was picked because they expected to be making big changes or after the fact, but in the minds of most Japanese historians it is quite accurate. The entire system actually took about a century or so to really come together—we often think of the Ritsuryo system as it was in its final version.  This period, though, is where things kicked off, so we'll be setting the stage and talking about some of the edicts during this period that eventually became the written code of the Ritsuryo system.  This was started by Naka no Oe who, spoiler alert, would eventually reign as sovereign and be known as Tenchi Tennou.  The system he helps put into place would continue to be used and refined even after his death and even after the end of the period covered by the Nihon Shoki. So after some background, we'll get to some of the very first edicts this episode, and then spend more time on them again, in the future. The RitsuryoThe Ritsuryo system was based largely on continental models, with Confucian ideals and the legal code of the Tang dynasty having particular influence.  And as we discuss these changes, which were huge, I'll start with some clarifications and caveats.  This was a system of government based largely on continental models, with Confucian ideals and the legal code of the Tang dynasty having particular influence.  That   One of the first things to emphasize is that said, itthis wasn't exactly an immediate revolution and reformation.  Based on the entries in the Nihon Shoki, some of the work had already  been started long before Naka no Oe came on the scene, largely attributed to the influence of Prince Umayado, aka Shotoku Taishi, and things like the 17 article constitution and rank system, which we discussed back in episode 95.  And even after its initial implementation, there would come various tweaks to the system.  Although there are numerous edicts made in the initial years of what is known as the Taika era, leading this change to often be given the nickname of the “Taika reforms”, the earliest formal administrative codes would come much later, firming up in the 8th century. Another thing to keep in mind as we realize, as we start looking at these changes is that the Yamato courtit didn't necessarily discard the old system, either.  Changes like this take time, and something even if it is implemented for a year or two , it might not stick.  This is one of the reasons that it is important that two of the apparent architects of the new system for these changes were there present through much of its implementation, actively guiding and shaping the process direction that the changes would take.  These two individuals at wereas Prince Naka no Oe and Nakatomi no Kamako, later known in this reign as Kamatari, which is the name I'm going to use from here on out as it is the much more well known in case anyone decides to look up information later. Finally, I would also note that many of these changes were being applied at the level of the elites of society, how they organized power and how they approached governance – but  we should also spare a thought for how this affected the majority of people.  After all, it was the majority of people who were working the fields, cutting the wood, or fishing the seas.  The elites were often otherwise engaged, and whichthat isn't to say that they did nothing.  Often they were coordinating and bringing things together, but that was a smaller part of the overall population.  In these reforms we get to see some rare glimpses into how all of thisit may have affected people beyond just the court elites. To set this up, let's start with a look at what brought us here, and how things changed over time and how they had governed things up until now—or at least as best as we can make out from our various sources.  From there we can take a look at some of the earliest edicts related to the changes evolution in the government, focusing how they focused on consolidating the power and support at the center of the Yamato court and starteding to make more concrete Yamato's control across the rest of the archipelago. We've covered much of the development of complex society in Yamato this in previous episodes:  How Yayoi society came with or at least introduced a form of stratification evident in graves, grave goods, as well as other patterns of lifeways.  Local elites rose up to oversee communities, and eventually extended their influence, creating the various “kuni”, or countries—regional collections of communities that came together under a leadership structure and some shared cultural values.   Some of the earliest stories give us the Hiko-Hime leadership structure, often with a male and female head of state, though sometimes shown as elder and younger co-rulers.  This is backed up by some evidence in the kofun era, as we see large, single-purpose tomb mounds built for what we can only assume are the elite.  Their construction would have required control of a large labor force, indicating a certain amount of their power, and their shape and various burial goods have further suggested, at least to scholars like Kishimoto, that there may have been a division of rulership, at least early on. We've talked about the spread of Yamato style round keyhole shaped kofun through the archipelago and how the popularity of that kofun shape demonstrated Yamato's influence but  in the shape of their kofun, but that didn't necessarily accompany a change in  change the actual dynamics of local government, other than demonstrating Yamato's increased influence.  The next thing we see in the record, I would argue, is the change to a familial based system, or the Bemin-sei.  This is what we've talked about periodically in terms of both the uji, familial groups or clans, and the “be” familial or occupational groups, but here I'll give an overview of the whole practice and what its development means in the sense of changing approaches to organizing and governing a complex society. The Bemin system was a means of further dividing and categorizing people in society, .  It is  rooted in continental concepts of a familial group.  Prior to the 5th century, there isn't a clear indication of familial clans in Yamato, though that doesn't mean people didn't know where they were from.  They still remembered who their ancestors were, and that was important, often tracing back to mythical and legendary individuals who are recorded as gods, or kami.  I suspect, however, that in the smaller communities of the Yayoi period, where you were from was as a good an indicator of your relationships as anything else.  Farming is a pretty sedentary lifestyle, and if you know all of your neighbors there isn't as much need to divide each other up into specific familial groups.  It was more important that I'm from this village or region than I'm from this particular family. And so the oldest stories in the Nihon Shoki and the Kojiki only refer to individuals by their names or by locatives.  Occasionally we will be told that so-and-so was an ancestor of this or that uji, or clan, but it is telling that they don't use the clan name with that person. Surnames do become important, however, in the Bemin system.  But they are only really important for those in the upper tiers of society.  Amongst the farmers and other commoners—the heimin—you often won't find specific surnames, or people will use pure locatives or something similar to refer to a person.  Surnames were for people a little further up the social food chain. From what we can tell, the uji structure likely started with the “-Be” families, trying to set up groups of individuals who were in charge of certain economic activities beyond just farming the land.  The Imbe, the Mononobe, the Abe, the Kuratsukuribe, and the Kusakabe are all examples of family names ending in “-Be”.  Some, like Kuratsukuribe, Inukaibe, and Umakaibe are all fairly straightforward:  These are groups that were set up around particular industries.  Kuratsukuri literally means “saddle-making”, so the Kuratsukuri-be are the saddlemakers.  Inukai and Umakai refer to the ones who kept or raised the dogs and horses. Setting up a familial or clan unit around a certain profession was one way of organizing society so that you had the things that you needed.  Such jobs were often inherited, anyway, passing from father to son, mother to daughter, etc.  So it makes some sense.  And the clan, or uji, structure meant that there was a person or persons at the head of the familial unit who could be responsible for coordinating efforts across different, sometimes dispersed, groups of people. The thing is, there is no indication that the people in these professions were necessarily related to each other prior to this organization, and in many ways the idea that they were a family with a common ancestor was a created fiction.  There may have been some relationship—for instance, weaver groups were often centered on immigrant groups that came over from the continent with knowledge of specific techniques, so there was likely some pre-existing relationship, but they weren't necessarily what we would consider family, related by blood, to one another. Over time these groups became actual clans—children were born into them and remained, unless they specifically were split off into a different uji for some reason.  Some of them dropped the “-Be” part of their name—in some instances it seems this may have created a distinction between the line at the head of the clan vice the other members, but that distinction isn't entirely clear.  Furthermore, members of these clans were not, ultimately, restricted to the hereditary jobs for which the clan had been created.  There are also clans that appear to be more about location, possibly local rulers or magnates.  For example, there are the Munakata and the Miwa, referring to local chiefs or lords of the Munakata and Miwa areas, both important ritual areas. The clans formed another function as well, as each clan had a kabane, which was an early form of social rank.  Some of these ranks appear to have come from titles or positions.  So, for instance, you have the Omi, the Muraji, the Kimi, and the Atahe.  Early on, Muraji appears to be the more prestigious title, with the Ohomuraji being the head of a Muraji level house that was also a key member of the government.  Omi, meaning minister, eventually came to be seen as more prestigious, however.  Meanwhile, both were more presitiousprestigious than the term “Kimi”, although that may have originated as a term for the rulers of the local countries, which makes sense if you consider that the Yamato sovereign was the Oho-kimi, or the Great Kimi, much as the Oho-omi was in charge of an Omi group and the Ohomuraji was in charge of a Muraji level house.  There are also Omi and Muraji households for whom there is no Oho-omi or Oho-muraji ever mentioned, but only members of the Omi and Muraji ranked families were considered for positions at the top of the court hierarchy.  This All of this clan and rank system began to change in the 6th century during the reign of Toyomike Kashikiya Hime, aka Suiko Tenno, with the introduction of the 17 article constitution and new rank system.  While both of these developments are of debatable veracity, since the chroniclers likely made this change seem much more structured than it actually was in practice, —there is probably at least something to the idea that the Yamato court y werewas adopting more continental ideas regarding state governance.  The rank system, in particular, was a step towards recognizing individuals above simply their inherited social position.  While kabane rank was applied to an entire uji, the new rank was applied to individuals alone, meaning that an individual could be recognized without necessarily rewarding every other person holding their same surname.  At the same time, more and more books were coming in from the continent.  Some of these were focused on the new Buddhist religion, but there were also other works, based on a variety of subjects and introducing the Yamato court to some of the philosophical ideas of what government should be.  And then there were various envoys sent to the Sui and Tang courts in the early 7th century, where they would have seen how things were working there. Nonetheless, to be clear, we don't know it is unclear just how far Yamato control extended across the archipelago.  We know that in the 5th century there were individuals who considered themselves part of the Yamato court structure from the Kantou to Kyuushuu.  In the Nihon Shoki, we also see the establishment of Miyake up and down the archipelago, from as far out as Kamitsukenu, aka Kozuke, to the western edge of Kyushu, in the early 6th century.  These were areas of rice-land which owed their output to the Yamato court or a particular endeavor.  They would have had officials there tied to the court to oversee the miyake, providing a local court presence, but how much this translated into direct Yamato control is hard to say. Then there is the Dazai , the Yamato outpost in Kyushu,  set up in the area of Tsukushi, modern Fukuoka Prefecture, largely following the Iwai Rebellion, and which we .  We talked about this some in the Gishiwajinden Tour episode about Ito and Na, extending a more directand how the Yamato government extended a more direct, and explicitly military, presence in Kyushu. Still, the individual lands of places like Hi, Toyo, Kibi, Owari, or Musashi were all governed by the Kuni no Miyatsuko, the Yamato court's term for the various chieftains or rulers of the different lands. And that gets us roughly to the situation where we are now, in 645.  Prince Naka no Oe hadand been talking with his good friend Nakatomi no Kamatari about how things should be, ever since the day that Kamatari had helped him out at a kemari game—something akin to group hackey-sack with a volleyball.  As we've discussed in past episodes, a lot of this sense of “how things should be” related to nipping the power of Soga no Iruka and Soga no Emishi in the bud, cutting off what they no doubt saw as a thread to imperial power and the ”right way of doing things”.  But Tthe two had also been taking lessons from the Priest Minabuchi, and, like students everywhere, they thought they had figured this whole government thing out as well.  They'd been reading the classics and would have had access to the reports from various envoys and ambassadors to the Tang court.  The last one had left in 630 and returned in 632.  They would no doubt have seen the workings of the Tang dynasty law code of 624 and the subsequent update in 627.  Naka no Oe and Kamatari may have even heard news of the update in 637. Thise law code, implemented by Tang Taizong, relied on Confucian and Legalist theory.  It wasn't the first law code in East Asia, or even the Yellow River basin , but it is one of the most significant and influential, and the earliest for which we have the actual code itself—though the extant version is from 653, about eight years after the events of 645., butHowever, as we'll see, all of this was well withing the timeframe which the Ritsuryo system was used and updated, itself. So, Naka no Oe and Kamatari have a shiny new document in their hands, promising an organized system of government very different from the status quo in Yamato to date.  However, the Tang law code did have a problem:  It was undeniably centered in the imperial culture of the Yellow River and Yangzi River basins.  These areas had long had the concept of empire, and even in the chaotic period of the Sixteen Kingdoms and the Northern and Southern dynasties, the concept of an empire that ruled “All Under Heaven”, or “Tianxia” was something that people generally accepted.  The Wa polities of the Japanese archipelago, even as they were now consuming media from the continent, still operated under their own cultural imaginaries of how the world was ordered and how government operated.  And so the code couldn't just be adopted wholesale:  It would have to be adapted to the needs and demands of the Wa polity. I should note that this was unlikely the reforms that took place in Yamato were sole effort of Naka no Oe and Kamatari, and much of what is written suggests that this wasn't done simply through autocratic fiat, but included some key politicking.  This started even before the Isshi Incident.  Kamatari already had close ties with Prince Karu before he met with Naka no Oe.  Kamatari and Naka no Oe had also brought Soga no Kurayamada no Ishikawa no Maro into their confidence, a member of the Soga family.  The Fujiwara family history, the Toushi Kaden, compiled by Fujiwara Nakamaro in the 8th century, describes Maro—referenced as Soga no Yamada—as a man of particular and upright character.  He also appears to have had a beef with his cousin , Soga no Iruka, and was ambitious. I'm not sure just how much Naka no Oe and Kamatari were sharing their plans about reforming the State at this point, or if they were simply concentrating efforts on bringing down—that is to say murdering—Soga no Iruka. The Toushi Kaden mentions that others were also brought around to at least the idea that something had to be done about Soga no Iruka, though nobody was quite willing to speak out for fear of Soga no Iruka and his father, Emishi, and what they could do to someone's reputation—or worse.  After all, Soga no Iruka had only   recently killed the Prince Yamashiro no Oe, reportedly as part of a plot to ensure Prince Furubito would be next elevated to the throne.  On the other hand, not much information seems to be given about the reforms until they are enacted. And so after the Isshi Incident, we see our murderous firebrands taking the reins of power.  As we noted back in episode 106, Prince Karu was encouraged to take the throne, while Prince Furubito no Ohoye retired from the world and took orders at a temple in Yoshino.  Naka no Oe had been offered the throne, we are told, but turned it down, as the optics on it would not have been great.  Not only because he was clearly responsible for the death of Soga no Iruka and his father, and thus his mother's abdication.  However, he could still be made Crown Prince, and keep right on going with his ambitions to change up the way things were done in the Yamato government. Although Naka no Oe and Kamatari get most of the credit, the work required the cooperation—or at least consent—of the newly made sovereign, Prince Karu, also known as Ame Yorozu Toyohi, later styled as Koutoku Tennou.  After all, it would be his edicts that would lay out the new system, and his name that would be attached to it.   One good example is a change that came immediately: Meanwhile, in place of Soga no Iruka as Oho-omi, Karu selected two individuals to take his place, dividing up the position of Oho-omi into ministers of the Left and Right.  The first was Abe no Omi no Uchimaro, as Minister of the Left, and then Soga no Kurayamada no Omi no Ishikawa no Maro, Naka no Oe's recently made father-in-law, was made the Minister of the Right.  These positions, later known as the Sadaijin and Udaijin, would continue to be two of the most powerful civil positions in the Ritsuryo and later Japanese governments.  The Minister of the Left, the Sadaijin, was often considered the senior of the two. By the way, “Daijin” is just a sinified reading applied to the characters used for “Oho-omi”, or great minister.  This means that the Minister of the Left, the Sadaijin, could just as easily be called the Oho-omi of the Left, or something similar.  This actually causes a bit of confusion, especially in translation, but just realize that this is effectively just a rebranding, and not entirely a new name.  What was new was this idea that they were broken into the Left and the Right a distinction that would mean a lot more once more of the bureaucratic offices and functionaries were properly defined. Who were these two new ministers? Abe no Uchimaro has popped up a few times in the narrative.  He was an experienced courtier.  The Abe family had been moving within the halls of power for some time, and had even stood up to the Soga family when Soga no Umako had tried to acquire their lands in Katsuraki, making an ancestral claim.  Uchimaro had also been involved in the discussions regarding Princes Tamura and Yamashiro no Oe after the death of Kashikya Hime, hosting one of the dinners during which the delicate issue of succession was discussed.  He was clearly a politician of the first order.  Of course, Soga no Kurayamada had clearly earned his position through his connections with the conspirators. , bBut what about Nakatomi no Kamatari?  Well, he wasn't exactly left out in the cold.  Nakatomi no Kamatari was made the Naijin, the Minister, or “Omi”, of the Middle or the Minister of the Interior, implying that he had some authority over the royal household itself.  This feels like a created position, possibly to allow him the freedom to help with the primary work of transforming the Yamato government. Although Naka no Oe and Kamatari get most of the credit, the work required the cooperation—or at least consent—of the newly made sovereign, Prince Karu, also known as Ame Yorozu Toyohi, later styled as Koutoku Tennou.  After all, it would be his edicts that would lay out the new system, and his name that would be attached to it. One of the first things that is recorded in the Nihon Shoki was the declaration of a nengo, or era name.  Up to this point, years in Yamato were remembered by the reign of the sovereign—typically based on their palace.  So you would see things like the second year of the reign of the sovereign of Shiki palace, or something like that.  In addition, at least since about the 6th century, if not earlier, years would eventually be given the appropriate sexagesimal year name, combing one of the ten stems and twelve branches.  For example, 2024, when this episode is coming out, is the year of the Wood Dragon, or Kinoe-tatsu.  This is still used for various Japanese traditionspractice still continues today in Japan for various reasons. The Nengo was something newly introduced to Japan, however: .  Aan era name would be chosen by the sovereign, often based on important changes that either had occurred or even as a wish for something new.  So you would we see a new nengo with the ascension of a new sovereign, but it couldan also come because of an auspicious omen or because of a terrible disaster and hope for something new.  The current nengo, which started with the reign of Emperor Naruhito a few years back, is “Reiwa”. This very first nengo, we are told, was “Taika”, meaning, as I said up front, “Great Change”.  It certainly was apropos to the work at hand.  So let's go through the Chronicles and see some of the “great changes” occurring at the Yamato court now that the intention had been made clear.  We already talked about the change from an single Oho-omi to ministers of the Left and Right, but there were many other Some of the first things were to set up various newly created officials and positions.  An example is , such as two doctors, or Hakase – doctors in the sense of learned experts, not medical doctors, although medicine was certainly revered.  One of these new Hakase was the Priest Min, presumably the same one who had brought back astronomical knowledge from the Sui dynasty, possibly the same as the one known as Sho'an.  The other was Takamuko no Fubito no Kuromaro, who had gone to the Sui Dynasty with Min and others and come back with knowledge of how things worked on the continent.  The Takamuko family had immigrant roots as descendants of the Ayabito, and Kuromaro was well traveled, returning from the Sui court by way of Silla.  These two were well positioned to help with the work at hand. Now that the rudiments of a cabinet were in place, Oone of the first problems set before things after setting up their cabinet, as it were, was to askthe their new Ministers of the Right and Left, as well as the various officials, the Daibu and the Tomo no Miyatsuko, was how tohey should  get people to acquiesce to forced, or corvee labor—the idea that for certain government projects villages could be called upon to provide manual labor in the form of a healthy adult—typically male—to help as needed.  This was a thorny problem, and evidently it was thought best to get expertise beyond the purely human.  The following day, tThe Udaijin, Soga no Ishikawa no Maro, suggested that the kami of Heaven and Earth should be worshipped and then affairs of government should be considered.  And so Yamato no Aya no Hirafu was sent to Wohari and Imbe no Obito no Komaro was sent to Mino, both to make offerings to the kami there for their assistance, it would seem, in setting up a good government. This is significant, in part, as it shows the continued importance of local traditions focused on appeasing the kami, rather than the Buddhist rituals that they could have likely turned to, instead. FinallyThree weeks later, on the 5th day of the 8th month—about three weeks later— camecomes the first truly major edict of the Taika era, which and it wasis to appoint new governors, or kokushi, of the eastern provinces.  Note that they specifically mention the Eastern Provinces, presumably meaning those east of Yamato, since they only sent out eight of them.  They also did not send them to usurp control, necessarily, from the Kuni no Miyatsuko of those areas.  The Kuni no Miyatsuko were still nominally in charge, it would seem, but the court was getting ready to make some major changes to the relationship. These governors were expected to go out and take a census of the people—both those free and those in bondage to others.  They were also to take account of all of the land currently under cultivation, likely to figure out how to tax it appropriately.  As for things other than arable land, such as gardens, ponds, rivers, oceans, lakes, mountains, etc., the edict commands the governors to consult with the people—presumably the people of the province—to get a better idea of what should be done. And this doesn't sound so bad.  It is basically just a tally of what is already there.  That said, anyone who has worked in a modern office probably knows about the dread that comes over a workplace when people show up from the Head Office with clipboards in hand.  However, apparently many of the people had not yet heard of a “clipboard” and likely didn't realize that this was only a precursor to greater and more centralized bureaucratic control. Now in addition to taking a zero-baseline review of provincial resources, there was also a list of what these new governors y were to avoid – clear boundaries around the power they were to wield.  For one thing, they were not to hear criminal cases.  They weren't there to be an extension of the Yamato court in such matters or to usurp the duties of the Kuni no Miyatsuko, one supposes.  Furthermore, when they were traveling to the capital, they were only to bring themselves and district officials, but not a huge retinue.  Whether they realized it or not, these kokushi were early bureaucrats in a burgeoning bureaucratic state, and they weren't supposed to be going out there to become minor kings in their own right; their power came from and was limited by the royal edict.  They also did not send them to usurp control, necessarily, from the Kuni no Miyatsuko of those areas.  The Kuni no Miyatsuko were still nominally in charge, it would seem, but the court was getting ready to make some major changes to the relationship. When traveling on official business, the governors could use appropriate government resources, such as the horses and food that they were entitled to.  Remember that post stations were set up, previously, to help better facilitate official travel and communication.  In a later edict it would be clarified that officials would be given a bronze token with bell-like figures on it.  The shape of the token would indicate what kinds of resources the individual was entitled to.  This applied to governors and their assistants.  Those who follow the rules could be rewarded with rank and more, while those who disobeyed would be reduced in rank, and any stipend that came with it.  Furthermore, any government official who was found taking a bribe would be liable to pay twice the amount, as well as being open to criminal punishment. The Chief Governor was allowed nine attendants, while the assistant was allowed seven, and a secretary—for which think more of the head of a branch office or department under the governor—could have five.  Any more, and the governor and followers could be punished for it. While in the provinces, the governors were expected to look into any claims of potentially false inheritance.  This included anyone using a false name or title to claim rights that were not theirs.  Governors were to first investigate what was going on before submitting their findings up to the court. Governors were also to erect arsenals on waste pieces of ground—ground that could not be cultivated for some reason.  In those arsenals they were to gather the various weapons and armor of the provinces and districts, presumably so that soldiers could be called up quickly and everyone could just get their equipment from one place, but it also looks like an attempt to take control of the means of violence.  Whether or not that was their direct intention I cannot say.  There was a provision for those on the frontier, with the Emishi, to allow the owners to keep their weapons, probably because the situation was potentially volatile, and it could turn at any moment. And so that was the first major piece of legislation:  Sending out governors to what are translated as “provinces”—though we are still using the term “kuni”, which equally refers to a state or country—ostensibly for the purposes of assessing the land, its value, the number of people, etc, but also to .  They are centralizeing military assets.   and they are given status as true court representatives.  I do notice that it was explicitly stated that these governors were for the eastern lands, .  presumably meaning those east of Yamato, since they only sent out eight of them These are areas that historically appear to have relied more on Yamato or else been something of a frontier area for the ethnic Wa people.  They may have been more open to Yamato's demands on their sovereignty. There were two more pieces to thise edict that didon't directly apply to the governors.  First off was the institution of a bell and a box to be set up at the court.  The box was basically a place to receive complaints about how things were going in the realm.  They are careful to note that complaints should be vetted by the Tomo no Miyatsuko, one of the hereditary government officials, or at least to the head of one's uji, if possible.  If they couldn't come to a decision, though, the complaints would be collected at dawn and then the government would look into them.  If anyone thought that there was a problem with how a complaint was being handled—for example, if they thought there was malfeasance involved or even just neglect, with officials not addressing it in a timely fashion, then the plaintiffs could go to the court and ring the bell, officially noting their dissatisfaction with the process. This idea of a bell and complaints seems to be a wide-ranging practice throughout Asia.  During the reign of the Legendary Yao, people were encouraged to nail their complaints to a tree.  Other edicts suggest that bells and drums were hung in royal palaces to allow common people to voice their grievances.  We have examples of the practice showing up in the Sukhothai kingdom of Thailand, during the 13th century reign of King Ramkhamhaeng, and then a 16th century example in what is now Myanmar, aka Burma.  While they differ in specifics, they are all related to the concept of royal justice even for the lowest of the people.  Granted, if you are a farmer in Owari province, I don't know how easy it was going to be to make your way over to the royal palace and ring that bell, but at least there was the idea that people could submit complaints. This was apparently used relatively soon after, as recounted in the second month of the following year, about six months later.  Apparently some person had placed a complaint in the box stating that people who had come to the capital on government business were being put to work and ill-used.  Basically it sounds like they were being rounded up for corvee labor even though they weren't local residents, they were just passing through.  In response, the sovereign, Karu, put a stop to forced labor at various places—presumably where the offending action was taking place, so I guess the complaint system it was working. The last part of this first set of edicts, kicking off the change was about inheritance.  Not all people in Yamato were free, and the law saw a difference between the status of free and unfree persons—that is to say enslaved persons.  And so they made laws that only the child of two free persons would be considered free.  If either parent was in bondage, then the child was also considered in bondage to their parent's house.  If two enslaved persons of different houses had a child, then they would stay with the mother.  Temple serfs, though technically bound to service of the temple, were made a special case, and their children were to be treated as if the temple serf was a free person. Slavery is something that doesn't always get talked about regarding ancient Yamato, and the Chronicles themselves don't tend to mention enslaved peoplethem often, but more because they belonged to a class of society that was largely outside of the scope of the narrative.  In cases where they are discussed, such as in these edicts, the Chronicles are unapologetic of the practice.  These may have been people who were captured in raids, or their descendants, or people who had been enslaved as punishment for some offence, although it isn't quite clear just what would count.  We know that Himiko sent enslaved persons as part of the tribute to the Wei Court, as she was trying to curry favor, and mention of them certainly shows up now and again. It is unclear how many people were enslaved up to this point, but some estimates suggest that it may have been five to ten percent of the population.  As I've mentioned before, this practice continued up until the Sengoku Period, and was only abolished by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in an attempt to stop the Portuguese from buying enslaved Japanese people and transporting them away from Japan.  That didn't meant that other forms of bondage, often economic in nature, didn't happen, however. So that was the content of the first edict—one of many.  The court sent out newly appointed “governors” to the provinces, but these governors were, so far, limited in their scope.  There is even some evidence that these may have been initially seen as temporary positions, and there was mention of “kokushi” in the previous reign.  Still, this was part of a clearly concentrated effort to assume central authority over the archipelago.  There were even officials appointed over the six districts of Yamato province, the core of the Yamato state, who were likewise expected to prepare registers of the population and the cultivated land. Even the idea that the sovereign had the right to make these appointments was something a bit radical, and indicated a change in way that the court, at least, would view the sovereign.  It likewise placed the sovereign in a position to dispense justice, through the vehicle of the court, and it began to define the citizens of the realm as well. That said, this all could have been argued for by using the Sui and Tang as examples of what government should look like and what a true nation should look like. It is also possible that this didn't all happen of a sudden in the 8th month, as the Chronicles describe it.  This is suggested at based on a separate account, mentioned in the Nihon Shoki, that the gathering of weapons, for instance—one of the things that the governors were charged with—actually took place between the 6th and 9th month, so some of this likely started before the date listed for the edict, and that may just have been one part of the whole.  The Chroniclers often do this, finding one particular date and throwing in everything rather than giving things piecemeal—depending on the event.  In addition, on the 19th day of the 9th month, officials were sent out to all of the provinces—not just the eastern provinces—to take a proper census.  At this same time, the sovereign, Karu, issued another edict, which seems related to their work as well as that of the governors, or kokushi, sent to the east.  In it he noted that the powerful families—the Omi, the Muraji, the Tomo no Miyatsuko, and the Kuni no Miyatsuko—would compel their own vassals to work at their pleasure.  They would also appropriate for themselves various pieces of land, so that people could only work it for them.  Not everyone was doing this, though.  Some unnamed persons were accused of hording thousands of acres of rice-land, while others had no more land than you could stick a needle into.  Furthermore, these powerful families were collecting taxes for themselves, first, and then handing a portion over to the government.  They likely compelled their vassals to work on their own tombs, and such.  And so, the sovereign, Karu, forbade anyone from becoming a landlord and forcing people to pay rent.  Presumably he was also dealing with some of the other aspects, though that may have proved more difficult.  After all, from what we've seen, everything that Karu is complaining about—things that no doubt were considered antithetical to good government based on pure Confucian values—were the norm for the elite at the time.  Heck, the Kuni no Miyatsuko had no doubt thought of the land and the people on it as their own, not Yamato's.  However, things were shifting, and once again we see Yamato exerting royal prerogative over the land and people, something that they would do more and more as the system of laws and punishments eventually came together. Now the big question is how did this all pan out?  Well, it took some time, but we get a report on the second day of the third month of the following year, 646, and to be honest, it doesn't sound like things were going too well.  Of the high officials sent out as kokushi to govern the eastern provinces, six listened and did what they were told, but two did not, and then there were numerous other issues.  A more detailed list was given on the 19th of the month, including a clearer idea of punishments. The decree was given to the “Choushuushi”, apparently other government officials sent to check on how things were going, though it was clearly about various officials. The decree starts by reminding officials that they were not to use their position to appropriate public or private property.  Anyone of Assistant governor rank or higher would be punished by being degraded in rank, and presumably their stipend.  Those officials of clerk, or secretary, on down would face flogging.  If anyone was found converting public property (or someone else's) to their own use, they would be fined double the value of the property, just as with bribes.  So the Yamato government was They were really trying to tamp down on people trying to make a profit from their position. Here are a few of the specific things that the Choushuushi reported back: -             Hozumi no Omi no Kuhi taxed individual families for his own use and though he gave some of it back make, it wasn't all.  His two assistants were at fault for not correcting him. -             Kose no Tokune no Omi did something similar, taking away horses from the farmers for his own use.  His assistants not only did not correct him, but actually helped him.  They also took horses from the Kuni no Miyatsuko of the province.  One of the officials tried to remonstrate with him, but he finally gave in to the corruption. -             Ki no Marikida no Omi sent men to Asakura no Kimi and Inoue no Kimi to look at their horses for his own use.  He also had Asakura no Kimi make him swords and provide bow-cloth.  He also took the payments in lieu of weapons offered by the Kuni no Miyatsuko but didn't properly report it.  As a somewhat strange addition to these charges, he apparently was guilty of allowing himself to be robbed of a sword in his own province as well as in Yamato, presumably one that was actually government property.  Apparently being held up at sword point wasn't considered sufficient justification for letting it go.  This was facilitated by his assistants and their subordinates. -             Adzumi no Muraji apparently made the Kuni no Miyatsuko send government property to someone when they were ill, and he took horses belonging to the Yube clan.  His assistant gathered items at his house that were paid in lieu of hay, and he took the horses of the Kuni no Miyatsuko and exchanged them for others.  At least two other brothers were found guilty as well. -             Ohochi no Muraji broke the decree of not personally judging the complaints of the people in the districts under his charge.  He took it on himself to judge the case of the men of Udo and the matter of the enslaved persons of Nakatomi no Toko, who was also considered guilty. -             Kishida no Omi, as with Ki no Marikida, also allowed his sword to be stolen, showing a want of circumspection. -             In one of the strangest put-downs in this list, Womidori no Omi and Tanba no Omi weren't guilty of anything, but were just considered incompetent.  So make of that what you will. -             Imbe no Konomi and Nakatomi no Muraji no Mutsuki also committed offenses, we are told, but the nature is unclear. -             Hada no Omi and Taguchi no Omi, on the other hand, were free and clear.  Apparently they hadn't committed any offenses. -             Finally, Heguri no Omi was guilty of neglecting to investigate the complaints of the men of Mikuni. A big to-do was made about the punishments to be meted out to all of these individuals, as well as to the Kuni no Miyatsuko who may have enabled them.  However, instead of prosecuting them, Karu declared a general amnesty.  This was like a mass pardon of offenses—a do-over if you would.  Not that anything would be forgotten.  On the other hand, six individuals who did as they were told were all commended for their service.  He also took the lent-rice for the maintenance of the late Kibishima, the dowager queen who had passed away in 643, and distributed her official-rice lands amongst the ministers down to the Tomo no Miyatsuko.  He also gave rice-land and hill tracts, which weren't suitable for farming, over to various temples which had previously been omitted from the official registers for some reason. Over all, this seems to be a rather powerful message:  We're not They weren't fooling around with these changes, and people better get on board or get out of the way.  Whereas previously things in the provinces may have operated under a sort of Vegas Rules, that was no longer going to be tolerated.  On the other hand, Karuhe demonstrated mercy, likely realizing that too harsh an approach would bring the wrath of the other powerful nobles.  Nonetheless, he elaborated what each person had done and effectively put them and anyone else harboring thoughts that they could just ignore these edicts on notice.  These reforms weren't going away. So we've talked about where we were and we can see the powers at the Yamato court starting to make changes.  For now, this is probably going to be a good place to take a break for this episode, but there are a lot more of these reforms to get to, not to mention the rest of the intra-palace politicking at the court, as well as the changing situation on the continent and in diplomatic channels.  We are going to keep looking at these changes as we move forward through the period of Great Change, known as the Taika era. Until then, thank you for listening and for all of your support. If you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website, SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.

Paul and Gerard talk about some assorted matches, DDT Peter Pan, NOAH Limit Break and a great Yuma Anzai vs. Ryuki Honda match for the Triple Crown. They also preview some upcoming All Japan shows including the Royal Road Tournament participants.Our Sponsors:* Support our sponsor Arena Club and get 10% off your first purchase at http://www.arenaclub.com/vownetAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Ito-koku and Na-koku were the next two countries on the path of the Wei envoys noted in the Gishiwajinden.  They likely refer to the areas known today as Itoshima and Fukuoka, so what do we know about these places in the Yayoi period, and how is it that by the 3rd century Yamato seemed to have taken the foremost position on the archipelago and not one of these other countries, where wet paddy rice agriculture and other continental technologies first arrived in the archipelago. For more see our podcast blog post at: https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/itoandna Rough Transcript Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  My name is Joshua, and this is Gishiwajinden Part Five: Ito-koku and Na-koku This episode we are finishing up our Gishiwajinden Tour, focusing on our journey to Ito-koku and Na-koku, or modern day Itoshima and Fukuoka. We'll talk about what we know from the records of these two areas in the Yayoi and early Kofun periods, and then look at some of the later history, with the development of the Dazaifu, the build up of Hakata and Fukuoka, and more.  A key thread through all of this will be our discussion about why it was Yamato, and not these early states, who eventually became paramount.  If this is where things like wet paddy rice agriculture started, and they had such close ties to the continent, including sending a mission to the Han dynasty, why did the political center shift over to Yamato, instead?  It is certainly something to wonder about, and without anything written down by the elites of Na and Ito we can only really guess based on what we see in the histories and the archaeological record. We ended our tour in Na for a reason: while the Gishiwajinden—the Japanese section of the Wei Chronicles—describes the trip from the continent all the way to Yamatai, the locations beyond Na are largely conjecture.  Did ancient travelers continue from Na along the Japan Sea coast up to Izumo and then travel down somewhere between Izumo and Tsuruga to the Nara Basin?  Or did they travel the Inland Sea Route, with its calmer waters but greater susceptibility to pirates that could hide amongst the various islands and coves?  Or was Yamatai on the island of Kyushu, and perhaps the name just happens to sound similar to the Yamato of Nara?  Unfortunately, the Wei Chronicles have more than a few problems with accuracy, including problems with directions, meaning that at most we have some confidence in the locations out to “Na”, but beyond that it gets more complicated.  And even “Na” has some questions, but we'll get to that later. Unlike the other points on our journey, we didn't stay overnight at “Ito-koku”, , and we only briefly stayed at Na—modern Fukuoka, but I'll still try to give an account of what was going on in both places, and drawing on some past visits to the area to fill in the gaps for you.   Both the Na and Ito sites are believed to be in the modern Fukuoka prefecture, in Itoshima and Fukuoka cities.  Fukuoka prefecture itself actually spans all the way up to the Shimonoseki straits and includes the old territory of Tsukushi—Chikuzen and Chikugo—as well as the westernmost part of Buzen, the “closer” part of the old land of “Toyo” on the Seto Inland Sea side of Kyushu.  When it comes to locating the country of Ito-koku, we have lots of clues from current place names.  The modern Itoshima peninsula, which, in old records, was known as the country of Ito, and was later divided into the districts of Ito and Shima.  Shima district, at the end of the peninsula, may have once been an island—or nearly so.  It is thought that there was a waterway between the two areas, stretching from Funakoshi bay in the south to Imazu Bay, in the north, in Fukuoka proper.  Over time this area was filled in with deposits from the local rivers, making it perfect for the Yayoi style wet rice paddy agriculture that was the hallmark of the growth in that period.  And indeed there are certainly plenty of Yayoi and Kofun era ruins in the area, especially in eastern reaches of the modern city of Itoshima, which reside in the valley that backs up to Mt. Raizan.  There you can find the Ito-koku History Museum, which tells much of the story of Ito. The Weizhi, or the Wei Chronicles, note that Ito-koku had roughly a thousand households, with various officials under their own Queen, making it one of the few Wa countries that the Chroniclers specifically noted as being a “kingdom”, though still under the nominal hegemony of the queen of Yamatai or Yamateg.  If you continue eastward along the coast from Itoshima, you next hit Nishi-ku, the Western Ward, of modern Fukuoka city, which now continues to sprawl around Hakata Bay.  Nishi-ku itself used to also be known as “Ito”, though spelled slightly differently, and you can still find Ito Shrine in the area. So was this part of Ito-koku also? It's very possible.   Na-koku, or the country of Na, was probably on the eastern edge of modern Fukuoka, perhaps around the area known as Hakata down to modern Kasuga.  Much like in Karatsu, this area features some of the earliest rice fields ever found in Japan – in this case, in the Itazuke neighborhood, just south of Fukuoka airport.  The land here is mostly flat, alluvial plains, formed by the rivers that empty out into Hakata Bay, another great area for early rice agriculture. Locating the country of Na is interesting for several reasons.  For one, unlike all of the other Wei Chronicles sites we've mentioned, there is no clear surviving placename that obviously matches up between “Na” and the local area.  It is a short enough name that it may simply be difficult to distinguish which “Na” is meant, though there is a “Naka” district in Kasuga that may show some promise.  There certainly is evidence for a sizeable settlement, but that's much more tenuous than the placenames for other areas, which remained largely in use in some form up to the modern day, it would seem. The name “Na” shows up in more than just the Weizhi, and it is also mentiond in the Houhan-shu, or the Record of the Later Han, a work compiled later than the Weizhi, but using older records from the Late Han dynasty period.  There it is asserted that the country of Na was one of the 99 some-odd countries of Wa, and they sent an embassy to the Later Han court, where they received a gold seal made out to the “King of Na of Wa”.  We talked about this in Episode 10: The Islands of the Immortals: That seal, made of gold, was seemingly found in the Edo period—1784, to be precise.  A farmer claimed to have found it on Shika island, in Hakata Bay, which is quite prominent, and connected to the mainland with a periodically-submerged causeway.  The description of the find—in a box made up of stones, with a large stone on top that required at least two men to move it—seems like it could have been an old burial of some kind.  The island certainly makes sense as an elite burial site, overlooking Hakata Bay, which was likely an important feature of the lifeways of the community.  While there have been questions about the authenticity of the seal, if it is a forgery, it is quite well done.  It looks similar to other Han era seals, and we don't really have a way to date the gold it is made of.  Without the actual context we can't be quite sure. This certainly seems like pretty strong evidence of the country of Na in this area, somewhere – probably not on the island itself, then close by.So unless something else comes along, I think we can say that this is at least the vicinity of the old country of Na.  Okay, so now that we've talked in general about where these two places were, let's go back and look at them in more detail. The Ito-koku site is just up the coast from where we stayed for Matsuro-koku, in Karatsu, which all makes sense from the position of the Chronicles in that it says the early envoys traveled overland from one place to the other.  Of course it also says they traveled southeast, which is not correct as the route is actually northeast.  However, they had traveled southeast from the Korean peninsula to Tsushima and then Iki and Matsuro, so that direction was well established, and this is an easy enough error that could have been made by the actual envoys or by later scribes, as it would be a one character difference. For Ito-koku, as with Matsuro-koku, we have no large, reconstructed sites similar to Harunotsuji on Iki or Yoshinogari, further inland in Saga prefecture, where we have an entire, large, so-called “kingly” settlement.  There is evidence of settlements, though, both near the major burial sites as well as around the peninsula.  And as for those burial sites, well, Ito has a few, and they aren't merely important because of their size.  Size is often an indication of the amount of labor that a leader must have been able to mobilize, and so it can be used to get a general sense of the power that a given leader or system was able to wield, as they could presumably turn that labor to other users as well. However, it is also important to look at other factors, like burial goods. What kind of elite material was the community giving up and placing with the deceased? That is the case with the first site we'll discuss, the Hirabaru burial mound.  At first glance it isn't much—a relatively unassuming square mound, about 12 by 14 meters, and less than 2 meters in height.  It was discovered in 1965 by a farmer who started digging a trench to plant an orchard and started pulling up broken pieces of a bronze mirror, one of the first clues that this was someone important.  They later found various post holes around the site, suggesting that it was more than just an earthen mound, and as they excavated the site they found pottery, beads, mirrors, and more. Let's start with those post-holes.  It looks like there was at least one large pillar set up due east of the burial.  We don't know how tall it was, but it was likely of some height given the size of the pillar hole—I've seen some estimates that it could have been up to 70 meters tall.  A tall pole would have provided visibility, and it may also be significant that it was east, in the direction of the rising sun.  We know that the ancient Wa had a particular connection with the sun, and this may be further evidence of that.  There are other holes that may be a gate, and possible a storehouse nearby, presumably for various ritual items, etc.  Suddenly, even without knowing exactly what was there, we start to see a picture of a large, manmade complex that seems to be centered on this burial and whomever is there. On top of that, there was a mirror in the tomb that was larger than any other ever found in Japan at that time—certainly the largest round mirror of that period.  It is not one of the triangular rimmed mirrors that Yamato is known for, but may have been part of another large cache brought over from the mainland.  About 40 mirrors in total, many of them very large, were found buried in the tomb, some of which appear to have been broken for some reason.  Furthermore, the large mirrors appear to fit within the dimensions given the Great Mirror—the Yata no kagami—housed at the sacred Ise Shrine.  There is a document in 804, the “Koutai Jingu Gishiki Chou”, detailing the rituals of Ise shrine, which describes the sacred mirror sitting in a box with an inner diameter of 1 shaku, 6 sun, and 3 bu, or approximately 49.4 centimeters, at least using modern conversions.  The same measurements are given in the 10th century Engi Shiki.  So we can assume that the mirror in Ise, which nobody is allowed to actually see, let alone measure, is smaller than that, but not by much, as the box would have been made to fit the mirror, specifically.  It isn't like you can just grab a box from Mirror Depot.  The mirrors found at Hirabaru Mound measure 46.5 centimeters, and have a floral pattern with an eight petaled flower on the back.  Could this mirror be from the same mold or the same cache, at least, as the sacred mirror at Ise?  At the very least, they would seem to be of comparable value.   In addition, there were many beads, jars, etc.  Noticeably absent from the burial were swords and weapons.  Based on this, some have argued that this was the burial of a queen of Ito-koku.  There is evidence that this may be the case, but I don't think the presence of weapons, or the lack thereof, is necessarily a good indicator. After all, we see in the old stories that women were also found wielding swords and leading troops into battle. So it's dangerous to make assumptions about gender based on this aspect alone. I wonder if the Hirabaru tomb assemblage might have more to do with something else we see in Yamato and which was likely applicable elsewhere in the archipelago: a system of co-rulership, where one role might have to do more with administrative and/or ritual practice, regardless of gender. This burial assemblage or mirrors and other non-weapons might reflect this kind of position. The Weizhi often mentions “secondary” or “assistant” positions, which may have truly been subordinate to a primary ruler, or could have just been misunderstood by the Wei envoys, who saw everything through their particular cultural stratification.  In a similar fashion, early European explorers would often name people “king”—from the daimyo of Sengoku era Japan to Wahunsenacawh, known popularly as “Powhatan” for the name of his people, on what would become known as North America.  That isn't to say that these weren't powerful individuals, but the term “king” comes with a lot of Eurocentric assumptions and ideas about power, stratification, etc.  Is there any reason to believe that the Wei envoys and later chroniclers were necessarily better at describing other cultures? And of course we don't have any physical remains of the actual individual buried there, either. However, there is a good reason to suggest that this may have been a female ruler, and that *is* because of something in the Weizhi, which specifically says that the people of Ito lived under the rule of a female king, aka a queen, using a description not unlike what is used for Queen Himiko.  In fact, Ito gets some special treatment in the record, even though it isn't the largest of the countries.  Let's look at those numbers first: Tsushima is said to have 1,000 households, while Iki is more like 3,000.  Matsuro is then counted at 4,000 families, but Ito is only said to have 1,000, similar to Tsushima.  Just over the mountains and along the Bay, the country of Na is then counted at a whopping 20,000 households, so 20 times as many.  These numbers are probably not entirely accurate, but do give an impression of scale, at least. But what distinguishes Ito-koku in this is that we are told that it had a special place for envoys from the Korean peninsula to rest when they came.  It makes you wonder about this little place called Ito. Hirabaru is not the only kingly tomb in the area.  Walk about 20 to 30 minutes further into the valley, and you might just find a couple of other burials—in particular Mikumo-Minami Shouji, discovered in 1822, and Iwara-Yarimizo, which includes artifacts discovered in the 1780s in the area between Mikumo and Iwara as they were digging a trench.  Based on evidence and descriptions, we know that they pulled out more bronze mirrors and other elite goods indicative of the late Yayoi paramounts. In these areas they have also found a number of post holes suggesting other buildings—enough to perhaps have a relatively large settlement. As noted earlier, we do not have a reconstructed village like in Harunotsuji or Yoshinogari, given that these are private fields, so the shape of the ancient landscape isn't as immediately impressive to people looking at the area, today.  The apparent dwellings are largely found in the triangle created between two rivers, which would have been the water source for local rice paddies.  The tombs and burials are found mostly on the outskirts, with the exception of the kingly burial of Mikumo-Minami Shouji.  This is also interesting when you consider that the later Hirabaru mound was situated some distance away, raising a bunch of questions that we frankly do not have answers for. The area of these ruins is not small.  It covers roughly 40.5 hectares, one of the largest Yayoi settlements so far discovered.  Of course, traces of other large settlements—like something in the Fukuoka area or back in Yamato—may have been destroyed by later construction, particularly in heavily developed areas.  This is interesting, though, when you consider that the Weizhi only claimed some 1,000 households. There are also other graves, such as various dolmens, across Ito and Shima, similar to those found on the peninsula, and plenty of other burials across both ancient districts.  And as the Yayoi culture shifted, influence of Yamato can be seen.  While Ito-koku clearly had their own burial practices, which were similar to, but not exactly like, those in the rest of the archipelago, we can see them start to adopt the keyhole style tomb mounds popular in Yamato. During the kofun period, the area of Itoshima built at least 60 identified keyhole shaped tombs, with a remarkable number of them from the early kofun period.  Among these is Ikisan-Choushizuka Kofun, a large, round keyhole tomb mound with a vertical stone pit burial, estimated to have been built in the latter half of the 4th century.  At 103 meters in length, it is the largest round keyhole tomb on the Genkai coast—that is to say the northwest coast of Kyushu. All of these very Yamato-style tombs would appear to indicate a particular connection between Ito and  Yamato—though what, exactly, that looked like is still up for debate.  According to the various early Chronicles, of course, this would be explained because, from an early period, Yamato is said to have expanded their state to Kyushu and then even on to the Korean peninsula.  In particular, the Chronicles talk about “Tsukushi”, which is both used as shorthand for the entirety of Kyushu, while also indicating the area largely encompassing modern Fukuoka prefecture.  On the other hand, this may have been a sign of Ito demonstrating its own independence and its own prestige by emulating Yamato and showing that they, too, could build these large keyhole tombs.  After all, the round keyhole shape is generally thought to have been reserved, in Yamato, for members of the royal family, and Ito-koku may have been using it similarly for their own royal leaders.  It may even be something in between—Ito-koku may have recognized Yamato's influence and leadership, but more in the breach than in actuality.  Afterall, until the standup of things like the various Miyake and the Dazai, we aren't aware of a direct outpost of the Yamato government on Kyushu.  The Miyake, you may recall, were the ”royal granaries”, which were basically administrative regions overseeing rice land that was directly controlled by Yamato, while the Dazai was the Yamato government outpost in Kyushu for handling continental affairs.  On top of a lack of local control in the early Kofun, the Weizhi appears to suggest that the Yamato paramount, Himiko, was the “Queen of the Wa” only through the consensus of other polities, but clearly there were other countries in the archipelago that did not subscribe to her blog, as it were, as they were in open conflict with Yamato.  This all leads into something we've talked about in the main podcast at various times, but it still bears discussing:  How did Yamato, over in the Nara Basin, become the center of political life in the Japanese archipelago, and why not somewhere in Kyushu, like ancient Na or Ito?  While we don't entirely know, it is worth examining what we do and some of the factors that may have been in play.  After all, Kyushu was the closest point of the main Japanese islands to the mainland, and we see that the Yayoi culture gets its start there.  From there, Yayoi culture spread to the east, and if we were to apply similar assumptions as we do on the spread of the keyhole shaped kofun, we would assume that the culture-givers in the west would have held some level of prestige as groups came to them to learn about this new technology, so why wasn't the capital somewhere in Kyushu?  We likewise see other such things—Yayoi pottery styles, fired in kilns, rather than open fired pottery; or even bronze items brought over from the continent.  In almost every instance, we see it first in Kyushu, and then it diffuses eastward up to the edge of Tohoku.  This pattern seems to hold early on, and it makes sense, as most of this was coming over from the continent. Let's not forget, though, that the Yayoi period wasn't simply a century: by our most conservative estimates it was approximately 600 years—for reference, that would be roughly equivalent to the period from the Mongol invasions up to the end of the Edo period, and twice as long as the period from Mimaki Iribiko to the Naka-no-Oe in 645, assuming that Mimaki Iribiko was ruling in the 3rd century.  So think about all that has happened in that time period, mostly focused on a single polity, and then double it.  More recent data suggests that the Yayoi period may have been more like an 1100 to 1300 year range, from the earliest start of rice cultivation.  That's a long time, and enough time for things in the archipelago to settle and for new patterns of influence to form.  And while Kyushu may have been the first region to acquire the new rice growing technology, it was other areas around the archipelago that would begin to truly capitalize on it. We are told that by the time the Wei envoys arrived that the state of Yamato, which we have no reason not to believe was in the Nara Basin, with a focus on the area of modern Sakurai, had approximately 70,000 households.  That is huge.  It was larger than Na, Ito, and Matsuro, combined, and only rivaled in the Weizhi by Touma-koku, which likely referred to either the area of Izumo, on the Japan Sea coast, or to the area of Kibi, along the Seto Inland Sea, both of which we know were also large polities with significant impact in the chronicles.  And here there is something to consider about the Yayoi style agriculture—the land determined the ultimate yield.  Areas with more hills and mountains are not as suited to wet rice paddy agriculture.  Meanwhile, a flat basin, like that in Yamato, which also has numerous rivers and streams draining from the surrounding mountains into the basin and then out again, provided the possibility for a tremendous population, though no doubt it took time to build. During that time, we definitely see evidence of the power and influence of places like Na and Ito.  Na sent an embassy to the Han court—an incredible journey, and an indication of not only their interest in the Han court and continental trade, but also their ability to gather the resources necessary for such a journey, which likely required some amount of assistance from other, nearby polities.  Na must have had some sway back then, we would assume. Meanwhile, the burial at Ito shows that they were also quite wealthy, with clear ties to the continent given their access to large bronze mirrors.  In the absence of other data, the number and size of bronze mirrors, or similar bronze items, likely only useful for ritual purposes, indicates wealth and status, and they had some of the largest mirrors as well as the largest collection found for that period.  Even into the stories in the Nihon Shoki and the Kojiki we see how mirrors, swords, and jewels all are used a symbols of kingship.  Elite status was apparently tied to material items, specifically to elite trade goods.  Assuming Yamato was able to grow its population as much as is indicated in the Weizhi, then by the 3rd century, they likely had the resources to really impress other groups.  Besides things like mirrors, we can probably assume that acquisition of other goods was likewise important.  Both Ito and Yamato show evidence of pottery shards from across the archipelago, indicating extensive trade networks.  But without any other differentiating factors, it is likely that Yamato, by the 3rd century, at least, was a real powerhouse.  They had a greater production capacity than the other states listed in the Weizhi, going just off of the recorded human capital. And this may answer a question that has been nagging me for some time, and perhaps others:  Why did other states acquiesce to Yamato rule?  And the answer I keep coming back to is that it was probably a combination of wealth, power, prestige, ritual, and time. For one thing, wealth: Yamato had it.  That meant they could also give it.  So, if Yamato was your friend, you got the goods, and you had access to what you need.  You supported them, they could help you with what you needed.  These transactional alliances are not at all uncommon, and something I think most of us can understand. There is also power—specifically military power.  With so many people, Yamato would likely have been a formidable threat should they decide that violence was the answer.  That said, while we read of military campaigns, and no doubt they did go out and fight and raid with the best of them, it's expensive to do so.  Especially exerting control over areas too far out would have been problematic, especially before writing AND horses.  That would be costly, and a drain on Yamato's coffers.  So while I do suspect that various military expeditions took place, it seems unlikely that Yamato merely bested everyone in combat.  Military success only takes you so far without constant maintenance. And so here is where I think prestige and ritual come into play.  We've talked about how Yamato did not exactly “rule” the archipelago—their direct influence was likely confined to the Kinki region for the longest period of time.  And yet we see that they influenced people out on the fringes of the Wa cultural sphere: when they started building large, keyhole shaped kofun for their leaders, and burying elites only one to a giant mound, the other areas of Japan appear to have joined in.  Perhaps Yamato was not the first to build a kofun for a single person, but they certainly were known for the particular shape that was then copied by so many others.  But why? We don't know for certain, but remember that in Yamato—and likely the rest of the Wa cultural sphere—a large part of governance was focused on ritual.  The natural and what we would consider the supernatural—the visible and invisible—worked hand in hand.  To have a good harvest, it required that workers plant, water, harvest, etc. in the right seasons and in the right way.  Likewise, it was considered equally important to have someone to intercede with the kami—to ensure that the rains come at the right time, but not too much, and a host of other natural disasters that could affect the crop. And if you want to evaluate how well ritual works, well, look at them.   Are you going to trust the rituals of someone whose crops always fail and who barely has a single bronze mirror?  Or are you going to trust the rituals of someone with a thriving population, multiple mirrors, and more?  Today, we might refer to this as something like the prosperity gospel, where wealth, good health, and fortune are all seen as stemming from how well one practices their faith, and who's to say that back in the day it wasn't the same?  Humans are going to human, after all. So it makes sense that one would give some deference to a powerhouse like Yamato and even invite their ritualists to come and help teach you how it is done.  After all, the local elites were still the ones calling the shots.  Nothing had really changed. And here is where time comes in.  Because over time what started as an alliance of convenience became entrenched in tradition.  Yamato's status as primus inter pares, or first among equals, became simply one of primus.  It became part of the unspoken social contract.  Yamato couldn't push too hard on this relationship, at least not all at once, but over time they could and did demand more and more from other states. I suspect, from the way the Weizhi reads, that Yamato was in the early stages of this state development.  The Weizhi makes Queen Himiko feel like something of a consensus candidate—after much bickering, and outright fighting, she was generally accepted as the nominal paramount.  There is mention of a male ruler, previously, but we don't know if they were a ruler in Yamato, or somewhere else, nor if it was a local elite or an earlier paramount.  But not everyone in the archipelago was on board—Yamato did have rivals, somewhere to the south (or north?); the directions in the Weizhi are definitely problematic, and it may refer to someone like the Kuma or Kumaso people in southern Kyushu or else people that would become known as the Emishi further to the east of Yamato. This lasted as long as Yamato was able to continue to demonstrate why they were at the top of this structure.  Theoretically, anyone else could climb up there as well, and there are certainly a few other powerful states that we can identify, some by their mention and some by their almost lack of mention.  Izumo and Kibi come to mind almost immediately. The Weizhi makes it clear that Himiko's rule was not absolute, and part of her reaching out to the Wei in the first place may have been the first attempt at something new—external validation by the continent.  A large part of international diplomacy is as much about making people believe you have the power to do something as actually having that power.  Getting recognition from someone like the Wei court would further legitimize Yamato's place at the top of the heap, making things easier for them in the long run. Unfortunately, it seems like things did not go so smoothly, and after Himiko's death, someone else came to power, but was quickly deposed before a younger queen took over—the 13 year old Toyo.  Of course, the Wei and then the Jin had their own problems, so we don't get too many details after that, and from there we lose the thread on what was happening from a contemporary perspective.  Instead, we have to rely on the stories in the Nihon Shoki and Kojiki, which are several hundred years after the fact, and clearly designed as a legitimizing narrative, but still present us something of a picture.  We don't see many stories of local elites being overthrown, though there do seem to be a fair number of military campaigns.  Nonetheless, even if they were propped up by Yamato, local elites likely had a lot of autonomy, at least early on, even as they were coopted into the larger Yamato umbrella.  Yamato itself also saw ups and downs as it tried to figure out how to create a stable succession plan from one ruler to the next.  At some point they set up a court, where individuals from across the archipelago came and served, and they created alliances with Baekje, on the peninsula, as well as with another polity which we know of as Nimna.  Through them, Yamato continued to engage with the continent when the dynastic struggles there allowed for it.  The alliance with Baekje likely provided even more legitimacy for Yamato's position in the archipelago, as well as access to continental goods. Meanwhile the court system Yamato set up provided a means for Yamato to, itself, become a legitimizing factor. Hierarchical differences in society were already visible in the Yayoi period, so we can generally assume that the idea of social rank was not a new concept for Yamato or the other Wa polities.  This is eventually codified into the kabane system, but it is probably likely that many of the kabane came about, originally, as titles of rank used within the various polities.  Yamato's ability to claim to give—or even take away—that kabane title, would have been a new lever of power for Yamato.  Theoretically, other polities could just ignore them and keep going on with their daily lives, but if they had already bought into the social structure and worldview that Yamato was promoting, then they likely would have acquiesced, at least in part, to Yamato's control. Little by little, Yamato's influence grew, particularly on those closer to the center.  Those closer, and more affected, started to listen to Yamato's rules about kofun size and shape, while those further on the fringes started to adopt Yamato's traditions for themselves, while perhaps maintaining greater independence. An early outlier is the Dazai.  It is unclear whether this was forcibly imposed on the old region of Na and nearby Ito, or if it was more diplomatically established.  In the end, though, Yamato established an outpost in the region early on, almost before they started their practice of setting up “miyake”, the various royal granaries that appear to have also become local Yamato government offices in the various lands.  The Dazai was more than just a conduit to accept taxes in the form of rice from various locals—it was also in charge of missions to the continent.  Whether they were coming or going, military or diplomatic, the Dazai was expected to remain prepared.  The early iterations were likely in slightly different locations, and perhaps not as large, but still in roughly the area near modern Fukuoka and Dazai.  This was a perfect place not only from which to prepare to launch or receive missions from the continent, but also to defend the nearby Shimonoseki straits, which was an important entryway into the Seto Inland Sea, the most direct route to Naniwa and the Yamato court. The first iterations of direct Yamato control in Tsukushi—modern Fukuoka—claim to have been focused largely on being a last point to supply troops heading over to fight on the peninsula, not unlike the role of Nagoya castle on the Higashi-Matsuura peninsula in the 16th century.  Over time, though, it grew into much more.  The Weizhi, for its part mentions something in the land of Ito, where there were rooms set up for envoys from the continent, but the Dazai was this on steroids. Occasionally we see evidence of pushback against Yamato's expansion of powers.  Early on, some states tried to fool the envoys into thinking that they were Yamato, perhaps attempting to garner the trade goods for themselves and to take Yamato's place as the interlocutor between the Wa polities and the continent.  We also see outright rebellions—from Iwai in Kyushu, in the 6th century, but also from various Emishi leaders as well.  The Iwai rebellion may have been part of the impetus for setting up the Dazai as a way to remotely govern Tsukushi—or at least help keep people in line.  For the most part, though, as time goes by, it would seem that Yamato's authority over other polities just became tradition, and each new thing that Yamato introduced appears to have been accepted by the various other polities, over time.  This is likely a much more intricate process than even I'm describing here, but I'm not sure that it was necessarily a conscious one; as the concept of Yamato as the “paramount” state grew, others ceded it more and more power, which only fed Yamato's self-image as the paramount state.  As the elites came under the Yamato court and rank system, they were more closely tied to it, and so Yamato's increased power was, in a way, passed on to them as well.  At least to those who bought in. By the 5th century, we know that there were families sending people to the court from as far away as Hi no Kuni in Kyushu—near modern Kumamoto—and Musashi no Kuni in the east—including modern Saitama.  All of that said, while they may have subordinated themselves to Yamato in some ways, the various polities still maintained some independent actions and traditions.  For example, whatever their connection to Yamato, the tombs at Itoshima also demonstrate a close connection to the peninsula.  The horizontal entry chamber style of tomb—something we saw a lot in Iki, and which seems to have been introduced from the continent—started to become popular in the latter half of the 4th century, at least in the west of the archipelago. This is well before we see anything like it in Yamato or elsewhere, though it was eventually used across the archipelago.  Itoshima appears to have been an early adopter of this tomb style, picking it up even before the rest of the archipelago caught on, making them the OG horizontal chambers, at least in Japan. Ultimately, the image we have of Ito-koku is of an apparently small but relatively influential state with some influence on the cross-strait trade, with close ties to Yamato. The history of the region seems a bit murky past the Kofun period.  There are earthworks of an old mountain castle on Mt. Raizan that could be from the Asuka period, and in the 8th century the government built Ito castle on the slopes of Mt. Takaso, possibly to provide some protection to the Dazaifu, which was the Yamato outpost in Kyushu, and eventually became the main administrative center for the island.  It seems, then, that whatever power the country of Ito may have once had, it was subsumed by the Dazai, which was built a little inland, east of the old Na territory.  Furthermore, as ships grew more seaworthy over time, they could make the longer voyages straight to Iki or Tsushima from Hakata.  For the most part, the area of the Itoshima peninsula seems to have been merely a set of districts in the larger Tsukushi and then the Chikuzen provinces.  The area of Na, meanwhile, which is said to have had 20,000 households in the 3rd century—much larger than nearby Ito—was completely eclipsed by the Dazaifu after the Iwai rebellion.  After the fall of Baekje, the Dazaifu took on even greater administrative duties, and eventually took over all diplomatic engagement with the continent.  They even set up a facility for hosting diplomatic envoys from the continent.  This would come to be known as the Kourokan, and they actually found the ruins of it near the site where Maizuru castle was eventually built in what is now Chuo-ku, or the central ward, of Fukuoka city. From the Heian period onwards, the Harada family eventually came to have some power in the area, largely subordinate to others, but they built another castle on Mt. Takaso, using some of the old Ito Castle earthworks, and participated in the defense of the nation during the Mongol invasions. The Harada family rose briefly towards the end of the Sengoku Period, pushing out the Otomo as Hideyoshi's campaign swept into Kyushu.  They weren't quite fast enough to join Hideyoshi's side, though, and became subordinate to Kato Kiyomasa and eventually met their end during the Invasions of Korea. The Ito district at some point after that became part of the So clan's holdings, falling under Tsushima's purview, along with a scattering of districts elsewhere, all likely more about the revenue produced than local governance.  In the Edo period, there were some efforts to reclaim land in Imazu bay, further solidifying links with the Itoshima peninsula and the mainland, but that also fits in with the largely agricultural lifestyle of the people in the region.  It seems to have remained largely a rural backwater up into modern times, when the Ito and Shima districts were combined into an administrative district known as “Itoshima city”. Meanwhile, the Dazaifu continued to dominate the region of modern Fukuoka.  Early on, worried about a Silla-Tang alliance, the Yamato state built massive forts and earthworks were built around the Dazaifu to protect the region from invasion.  As the Tang dynasty gave way to the Song and Yuan dynasties, however, and the Heian court itself became more insular, the Dazaifu's role faded, somewhat.  The buildings were burned down in the 10th century, during the failed revolt of Fujiwara no Sumitomo.  The government never rebuilt, and instead the center of regional government shifted to Hakata, closer to the bay. Appointed officials to the Dazai were known as the Daini and the Shoni.  Mutou Sukeyori was appointed as Dazai Shoni, the vice minister of the Dazaifu, in the late 12th century.  Though he had supported the Taira in the Genpei wars, he was pardoned and made the guardian of Northern Kyushu, to help keep the region in check for the newly established Kamakura Bakufu.  He would effectively turn that into a hereditary position, and his family became known as the “Shoni”, with their position eventually coming to be their family name.  They would provide commendable service against the Mongol invasion, and eventually became the Shugo Daimyo over much of western Kyushu and the associated islands, though not without pushback from others in the region. Over time, the power of the Shoni waned and various other daimyo began to rise up.  The chaos of the Sengoku period saw the entire area change hands, back and forth, until Hideyoshi's invasion of Kyushu.  Hideyoshi divided up control of Kyushu, and Chikuzen, including the areas of Hakata and modern Itoshima, was given to Kobayakawa Takakage.  Hideyoshi also began to redevelop the port of Hakata.  After the battle of Sekigahara, Kobayakawa Hideaki, Takakage's adopted son and nephew to the late Hideyoshi, was transferred to the fief of Okayama, and the area of modern Fukuoka city was given to Kuroda Nagamasa, creating the Fukuoka Han, also known as the Kuroda Han. Nagamasa would go on to build Maizuru Castle on the other side of the Naka river from the port of Hakata, creating two towns with separate administration, each of which fell under the ultimate authority of the Kuroda.  Hakata, on the east side of the river, was a city of merchants while Fukuoka was the castle town, and largely the domain of samurai serving the Kuroda.  The Kuroda would remain in control of the Fukuoka domain through the Edo period, and only lost control at the very start of the Meiji, as the domain system in general was dissolved. Over that time, Hakata remained an important port city, and the samurai of Fukuoka were known for maintaining their martial traditions. In the Meiji era, samurai from the Kuroda Han joined with other Kyushu samurai, rising up during Saigo Takamori's rebellion.  Later, it would be former samurai and others from Fukuoka who would form the Gen'yosha, an early right wing, nationalist organization that would greatly influence the Japanese government heading into the latter part of the 19th and early 20th century. But that is getting well into more modern territory, and there is so much else we could discuss regarding the history of this area, and with any luck we will get to it all in time.  For now, this concludes our Gishiwajinden Tour—we traveled from Kara, to Tsushima and Iki, and then on to Matsuro, Ito, and Na.  From here the envoys traveled on to Fumi, Toma, and then Yamato.  Fumi and Toma are still elusive locations, with various theories and interpretations as to where they were.   For us, this was the end of our journey. Next episode we will be back with the Chronicles and getting into the Taika era, the era of Great Change.  There we will really see Yamato starting to flex its administrative muscles as it brings the various polities of the archipelago together into a single state, which will eventually become known as the country of Nihon, aka Japan. Until then, thank you for listening.  If you like what we are doing, tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website, SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to us at our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.

Essa semana falamos do ambicioso 1000xResist, os jogos que encontramos no Festival Jogatório, o fechamento do estúdio Piranha Bytes, o futuro dos jogos Like a Dragon, as expectativas não correspondidas com Megaton Musashi W e mais! 00:08:46: Festival Jogatório 2024 00:34:32: Fim da Piranha Bytes 00:42:46: Exoprimal não terá mais novos conteúdos 00:48:20: Série de Horizon Zero Dawn foi cancelada 00:53:10: Adaptação de Like a Dragon para série de TV 00:56:10: Novo Like a Dragon vai surpreender 01:00:20: 1000xResist 01:27:37: Perguntas dos ouvintes 01:52:59: Finalmentes: Megaton Musashi W: Wired Contribua | Twitter | YouTube | Twitch | Contato

Last time we spoke about the Invasion of Saipan, Tinian and Guam. The Japanese mistakenly believed that the Americans were preparing for a decisive battle near New Guinea, not realizing the real target was Saipan. The US assembled a large fleet for Operation Forager, aiming to capture Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, advancing the US strategy to establish strategic airfields to hit  Tokyo. Japanese defenses were ill-prepared, with shortages of ammunition and inadequate inland defenses. The Americans hit Saipan with extensive air and naval bombardments, neutralizing Japanese positions, and faced stiff resistance during landings but ultimately secured a beachhead. The 23rd Marines of Colonel Louis Jones, advanced through Charan Kanoa and secured Mount Fina Susu despite significant losses. Heavy artillery pinned them down at the O-1 Line, leading Jones to reposition his forces. Casualties mounted on both sides as American forces fought to secure the beachhead and push inland. This episode is the the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Before his death Admiral Yamamoto instilled a sort of mind virus into the Imperial Japanese Navy. To be honest, the virus was a pre war doctrine, laying around ever since perhaps the First-Sino Japanese War of 1894-1895, but Yamamoto certainly focused attention more so upon it. The infamous decisive naval battle. The event that could turn the tide of the war, to bolster Japan's poker hand for peace negotiations. If Japan could simply knock out a enormous sum if not the entire strength the American Pacific fleet, something extremely unrealistic by this point of the war, but if they could, would America not reconsider settling this all up at the peace table? It had been the strategy of not just the IJN but for the Japanese military as a whole. Japan would never be able to win a war of attrition with the US, but they could make them pay so dearly, perhaps the Americans would just sue for peace. This idea consumed Yamamoto, leading to the disaster at the Battle of Midway. After the Guadalcanal Campaign, Japan lost the initiative, they retreated behind an inner perimeter. Henceforth the IJN scoured over the actions of the American navy, looking for any opportunity to unleash their full might down upon a significant American naval force. So many times the American navy eluded them, but here, with the invasion of Saipan, the IJN felt the decisive naval battle had finally come.  Admiral Turner and General Smith's American forces had just successfully invaded Saipan, establishing a beachhead with some challenges by June 17. This incited a strong Japanese response, as Admiral Toyoda initiated Operation A-Go, the IJN's strategy for a decisive battle that could potentially win them the war. Following Admiral Koga's Plan Z, Toyoda's A-Go involved Admiral Kakuta's land-based aircraft providing early warning and reconnaissance, aiming to neutralize one third of the enemy carriers before Admiral Ozawa's carriers completed the destruction of the enemy fleet with large-scale daytime air attacks, operating beyond the enemy's aircraft range. Additionally, Toyoda planned a nighttime surface engagement where enemy screening forces would be targeted by massed torpedo attacks. On June 16, at 9:00, the First Mobile Fleet departed the Guimaras and headed to the northeast. At 5:30pm, the Japanese fleet entered the Philippine Sea through the San Bernardino Strait. Admiral Ugaki's battleships Yamato and Musashi were not with the main body, but were proceeding independently through the Philippine Sea with two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and five destroyers to join with Ozawa. Once into the Philippine Sea, Ozawa headed southeasterly. At about 5:00 on the 16th, Yamato and Musashi joined with the First Mobile Fleet. The Japanese began to refuel which was not completed until 10:00 on the 17th.  In response, Admiral Spruance directed Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, strengthened by Admiral Lee's battleships and Turner's cruisers and destroyers, to remain positioned west of the Marianas, prepared to counter any IJN attack. On June 16, Mitscher continued strikes against Guam and Tinian. Several Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air, but their airfields remained usable. The following day saw an increase in Japanese air activity. A small strike flown from Truk, five torpedo bombers and one J1N1-S night fighter attacked a transport group east of Saipan at 5:50pm. Three Japanese aircraft were claimed as destroyed, but a torpedo hit the small landing craft LCI-468 that later sank. On June 18th, the Japanese mounted a larger raid, this time from Yap Island. This operation featured 31 Zeros, 17 Judys and two P1Y twin-engined bombers. Combat Air Patrol did not intercept this group before it attacked shipping off the landing beach at Saipan that resulted in damage to an LST. The attack group then encountered the American escort carrier groups and attacked them at dusk. Two escort carriers were nearmissed and Fanshaw Bay was hit by a bomb which penetrated to the hangar deck. The carrier was forced to retire for repairs. As usual, Japanese aviators over-claimed, stating that three or four carriers from Task Force 58 had been hit.Furthermore, Admirals Lockwood and Christie's submarines were tasked with reconnaissance of IJN fleet movements, launching attacks when possible, and rescuing downed aircrews. Since Ozawa's fleet maintained radio silence and operated beyond the reach of American search planes, the only way to track his movements was through submarines, leaving the Americans mostly uninformed until the battle began. Unknown to Ozawa and Toyoda, Mitscher's carrier aircraft had already disabled Kakuta's land-based air power in the area, which significantly weakened a major part of A-Go. Additionally, the Americans, who had acquired Plan Z on April 3, were prepared for the critical carrier battle, although they were hesitant to engage in nighttime combat. Meanwhile, on June 18, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions began their attacks at 10:00 a.m. The 4th Marine Division attacked toward the east coast with three regiments abreast: 25th Marines on the right, 24th Marines in the center, and 23rd Marines on the left. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, remained attached to the 23rd Regiment. Good progress was made by the 24th and 25th Marines, although the former sustained an attack at 10:15 by two Japanese tanks which surged to within 350 yards of the front lines. The situation for a while was alarming: American tanks had departed for rear areas to refuel and rearm so that only bazookas were immediately available for anti-tank defense. Though the 24th Marines' Weapons Company was immediately alerted, it arrived too late to participate in the fight. The enemy tanks were finally chased by bazookas and artillery, but not before they had sprayed the area, causing 15 casualties with machine-gun and small cannon fire. A portion of the O-3 line was reached by the 24th and 25th Marines during the day, placing the latter along the coast of Magicienne Bay. This healthy gain severed the island's southern portion, including Nafutan Point, from the remainder of the island. To maintain the momentum of the attack and avoid the long delay of a mopping-up process, the 24th Marines by-passed the southern extremity of a heavily defended cliff line running north and south through its zone of action. However, since the direction of attack for the division would soon Swing north through the by-passed area, it was necessary to secure the cliff line. This mission was assigned to the division reserve, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines. This, the unit's first experience with cleaning cave positions, proved a sIow, unpleasant and dangerous task. Rather than a coordinated move, the task took the form of a series of small, separated actions, each employing groups of four or five men. At 7:30, the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, relieved Haas' 1st Battalion on the division's left wing and commenced the move on O-2, which would serve as the line of departure. As will be seen, however, events of the day prevented the regiment from reaching this line. Organizational readjustments within the 23rd Marines included the attachment of the 3rd Battalion's rifle companies and 81mm mortar platoon to Dillon's 2nd Battalion and formation of a composite battalion from the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion Headquarters. The latter unit would support the attack of the other two battalions from positions on Mt. Fina Susu. Machine-gun fire stopped the 23rd Marines' left elements after an advance of 200 to 250 yards. Most of this fire came from a clump of trees to their front, but a definite location of enemy weapons was impossible. Frequent barrages of Japanese mortar fire hampered efforts to spot the enemy, and the attack faltered. At this juncture, Cosgrove's composite battalion was committed on the left of the 3rd Battalion. 24th Marines, in an attempt to retain the impetus, and the attack again moved forward. But the advance was slow. By 5:15, the 23rd Marines had moved to a line about 400 yards short of O-2. Prior to darkness, 23rd Marines' patrols were dispatched to the east. On the right, these patrols reached O-2, but on the left machinegun fire denied movement as far as O-2. Colonel Jones, the 23rd Marines' commander, requested permission from General Schmidt to withdraw to more favorable ground for the night. General Schmidt approved, and the 23rd pulled back to a position about 400 yards east of Lake Susupe, breaking contact with the 2nd Division. The 23rd Marines emerged from the swamps, the 24th Marines reached the base of Hill 500, and the 25th Marines progressed to Magicienne Bay, effectively dividing the island. General Smith's soldiers also captured the Aslito Airfield, with the 165th and 105th Regiments securing Cape Obiam and the area south of the field. This isolated numerous Japanese forces in the north at Nafutan Point. Concurrently, General Saito was shifting his remaining troops to the Garapan-Mount Tapotchau area, facing relentless artillery, naval, and air attacks that left the Japanese in a dire situation.  The chief of staff of the 31st Army, General Igeta, drafted a message on the morning of June 18th to the commanding general at Yap Island and the chief of staff in Tokyo. In it he summarized the situation as he saw it and, in the process, revealed how very little he knew of what was taking place. Not that the general was caught in the bog of apathy, nor was he too frightened or lazy to find out what was going on; it was simply impossible for him to penetrate the shroud of obscurity resulting from ruptured communications in the vast area over which the action was taking place. As such, he erroneously reported that the 43rd Division HQ “underwent an enemy attack this morning and the division CO died along with his staff officers.” In another dispatch later in the day, Igeta corrected his error in regard to the division commander's death, reporting that General Saito was “all right, but that his staff officers were wounded.” He also added that “the secret documents in custody of the 31st Army Headquarters… were completely burned at 1830 of 18 June…” Recognizing the desperate circumstances, Prime Minister Tojo sent a fatalistic message to the garrison, despite reinforcements en route. “Have received your honorable Imperial words. By becoming the bulwark of the Pacific with 10000 deaths; we hope to acquire Imperial favor.” Reports indicated that Ozawa's mobile fleet was approaching the Marianas and expected to arrive on June 19. When Spruance finally received the spotting report from Cavalla, this prompted a decision that turned out to be the most important of the battle. Assuming that the report from Cavalla was Ozawa's main force, and assuming it would continue at a speed of 19 knots to the east, Spruance's staff calculated that the Japanese would still be about 500nm from TF 58 at 5:30 on the 18th. This placed the Japanese well out of range of American searches or strikes. The only way to alter this situation was to steam TF 58 to the southwest toward the contact and plan to locate and engage the Japanese during the afternoon of the 18th. Mitscher advised the aggressive option of steaming to the southwest to close the range on Ozawa's force. He wanted to launch afternoon strikes to locate and possibly attack Ozawa and even advocated a nighttime surface engagement. While this offered the possibility of opening the battle on terms set by the Americans, there were several problems with it in Spruance's calculating mind. The first was that TF 58 was not yet concentrated; TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were not due to link up with the other two task groups operating west of Saipan until 1200 on the 18th. If he allowed Mitscher to take off to the west, it would only be with two task groups. Since the Japanese possessed longer-range strike aircraft, this offered Ozawa the chance to attack TF 58 and defeat it piecemeal. As for the prospects of a night engagement, both Spruance and Lee declined that possibility.  In response, Spruance adopted a cautious approach, instructing Mitscher to gather his carrier groups and redirect them toward Saipan. In a last effort to change Spruance's mind, Mitscher sent him a message at about 11:30pm and proposed a course change to the west at 1:30am in order to position TF 58 to launch a strike against the Japanese carrier force at 5:00am. At 12:38am on the 19th, Spruance sent a message rejecting the proposal. The die was finally cast for a defensive battle on June 19.Spruance's priority was to safeguard the invasion force rather than eliminate the Japanese fleet. At 6:00am on the 18th, Japanese search floatplanes from the First Mobile Fleet spotted six carriers from TF 58. In the afternoon, seven aircraft from Carrier Division 1 flying out to 420nm spotted TF 58 after its 1200 rendezvous. The first report was issued at 3:14pm and included detection of an American task group with two carriers. A second aircraft sighted a task group with an “unknown number of carriers” at 4:00 and later issued another report at 1710 which identified two task groups, each with two carriers. These were within strike range, but Ozawa elected not to launch an immediate strike since his pilots were so inexperienced in night flying. Nonetheless, Rear-Admiral Obayashi Sueo of the 3rd Carrier Division boldly ordered the launch of 67 aircraft from the carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda, hoping to surprise the Americans. However, when he learned of Ozawa's decision, Obayashi reluctantly called off his strike. Ozawa had correctly assessed that the enemy would hold its position near Saipan, allowing him to maintain his own position without fearing an American attack. With this understanding, he changed course southwest to maintain the distance, while Admiral Kurita's Vanguard Force moved east, and Forces A and B shifted south. At 03:00 on June 19, all three forces turned northeast and increased their speed to 20 knots. Ozawa executed his plan flawlessly, positioning himself to launch significant attacks against the unsuspecting Americans the next morning. His only misstep was breaking radio silence at 20:20 to coordinate the decisive operation with Kakuta, who consistently misrepresented the true condition of his air forces while giving overly optimistic reports of successes by his aviators. As a result, an American station intercepted the transmission and geo-located it accurately. Once the mobile fleet reached strike positions, the Japanese began launching search aircraft, sending 16 floatplanes at 04:45 and another 14 planes about 30 minutes later. Although they lost seven scouts, the Japanese were able to spot the northern elements of Task Force 58 and the picket destroyers deployed ahead by 7:00. Starting at 05:30, Mitscher's combat air patrol engaged Japanese aircraft from Guam, which were unsuccessful in bombing destroyers. At 6:30am, American radar detected Japanese air activity over Guam and four Hellcats were sent to investigate. At 7:20am, these arrived and found themselves in the middle of many Japanese aircraft taking off. More Hellcats rushed in and, beginning at 8:07am for the next hour, there was constant combat over and near Guam. Up to 33 American fighters were involved, and they claimed 30 fighters and five bombers. The Americans claimed to have destroyed 30 aircraft, successfully hindering Kakuta's support for Ozawa's decisive battle. However, with the return of Japanese floatplanes, Ozawa was preparing to launch his first strike, deploying 69 aircraft: 16 Zero fighters, 45 Zeros with bombs and eight Jills with torpedoes at 08:30 under Obayashi's command. Fortunately for the Americans, radar warnings enabled Mitscher to dispatch every available Hellcat for interception. At 10:23am, launching of every available Hellcat from TF 58 began as the force headed east into the wind. The American carriers cleared their decks and all airborne bombers on search and patrol missions were instructed to clear the area. This allowed the fighters to return as necessary to rearm and refuel. The goal was to keep as many fighters in the air as possible to intercept incoming threats. The Hellcats had reached their interception altitudes of between 17,000 and 23,000ft when at 10:35am they spotted the incoming Japanese aircraft identified as two groups of strike aircraft with escorting Zeros on each flank. The first American fighters on the scene were Hellcats from Essex. Lieutenant Commander C. Brewer of Fighter Squadron 15 VF-15 led them.  The escorting Japanese fighters did not protect the bombers and the bombers scattered making them easy to pick off. Brewer claimed four aircraft, and his wingman claimed another four. In all, VF-15 pilots claimed 20 Japanese aircraft. Joining the Hellcats from Essex were others from Hornet and Bunker Hill as well as from five light carriers for a total of 50 Hellcats. Altogether, some 25 out of the 69 Japanese aircraft in this raid were accounted for by this initial interception. In return, three Hellcats were lost in combat and a Bunker Hill Hellcat was lost when it ditched on its way back to its carrier. The remaining Japanese aircraft continued their approach but were intercepted by Bunker Hill's Hellcats, which claimed another 16. Only around 28 Japanese planes remained and made minor attacks on Admiral Lee's group. Two targeted battleship South Dakota, with one scoring a direct bomb hit at 10:49, though causing minimal damage. Another narrowly missed heavy cruiser Minneapolis, while another almost missed cruiser Wichita. The Japanese reported  losing 42 aircraft:  eight fighters, 32 fighter-bombers, and two torpedo bombers. Most had been destroyed by Hellcats, with anti-aircraft gunnery from TG 58.7 accounting for the rest. Meanwhile, Ozawa launched his main strike at 08:56, composed of the 1st Division's best-trained pilots from three fleet carriers. This was a large strike designated Raid II from the three fleet carriers of Carrier Division 1 with the best-trained aviators in the First Mobile Fleet. The raid consisted of 128 aircraft – 48 Zero fighters, 53 Judy dive-bombers and 27 Jills with torpedoes. Launching began at 08:56 but was disrupted when at 09:09 Taiho came under attack by American submarine Albacore. The submarine fired six torpedoes at the fast-moving carrier. A last-second glitch in the boat's fire-control computer made it necessary to fire the six torpedoes by eye. One of Taiho's aircraft saw the torpedoes headed for the ship and dove into one in an effort to save the ship. In spite of this, one of the torpedoes hit the carrier abreast the forward elevator and created a hole which resulted in flooding. The ship's forward elevator, which was raised for the launch, was knocked out of alignment and fell several feet. Within 30 minutes, the elevator space was planked over by damage-control personnel and the launch continued. In addition to the aircraft lost from Taiho, eight other aircraft developed engine trouble and were forced to return. More trouble soon followed. When the attack group flew over the Vanguard Force deployed about 100nm in front of the main carrier force, it was engaged by the Japanese ships. This fire was effective enough to shoot down two more aircraft and damage another eight that were forced to return.  This attack and some friendly fire reduced the Japanese force to just 109 aircraft for the largest strike of the day, which was detected by radar. In a swirling action that began at 11:39am, the Hellcats again tore through the Japanese formation. McCampbell claimed three Judys and his wingman two. Other Hellcats joined the fray resulting in about 70 Japanese aircraft being shot down. VF-16 from Lexington claimed 22 Japanese aircraft without a loss; 12 Bunker Hill Hellcats were unable to gain a solid intercept but still claimed five kills, and Hellcats from light carriers Bataan, Monterey and Cabot claimed ten, seven and five, respectively. VF-1 from Yorktown also scored heavily. This still left a number of Japanese aircraft headed for TF 58. Twenty were reported in three groups at 11:45. Most of these made the mistake of attacking the picket destroyers deployed in advance of TG 58.7 or Lee's battleship force itself. Destroyer Stockham reported being under attack for 20 minutes, but again the ship suffered no damage. Around noon, TG 58.7 came under attack. Two torpedo bombers attacked South Dakota with no success, and two more selected Indiana in the center of TG 58.7's formation as their target. One crashed into the waterline of the heavily armored ship but caused little damage. Another Jill went after Iowa, but again missed. Alabama was undamaged by two bombs aimed at her. Potentially more serious was a group of six Judy dive-bombers that escaped the Hellcats and proceeded south until running across TG 58.2. Of this group, four selected carrier Wasp for attack. None scored a hit, but one of the bombs detonated overhead which rained down shrapnel that killed one and wounded 12 crewmen. The other two selected TG 58.2's other fleet carrier, Bunker Hill, for attack at 12:03. They scored two near misses that caused minor fires and other damage, in addition to killing three and wounding 73. Both carriers continued in action. Four of the aircraft were shot down by antiaircraft fire, with the other two landing on Rota and Guam. Finally, six B6N bombers attacked Admiral Reeves' carriers, but their attacks began at 11:57 and were also ineffective, failing to hit any targets. One missed Enterprise, and another three attacked light carrier Princeton, but all three were destroyed by antiaircraft fire.Thus, Ozawa's second strike resulted in a significant loss for the Japanese, with 97 of the 128 aircraft not returning to their carriers. His losses totaled 32 fighters, 42 dive-bombers and 23 Jills. At 5:30, the third group of Japanese scout aircraft took off. This comprised 11 Judys from Shokaku and two Jakes from heavy cruiser Mogami. The aircraft flew 560nm to the east. Two contacts were radioed back to Ozawa. The first, at 9:45, was reported at a position well to the south of TF 58's actual position. The problem resulted from an uncorrected compass deviation on the search aircraft. This contact was designated “15 Ri” by the Japanese. The second contact, designated “3 Ri”, was reported at 10:00. It was of a task force of three carriers and escorts to the north of TF 58's actual position, but may have been of TG 58.4.This third Japanese strike designated Raid III by the Americans was mounted by Carrier Division 2. This effort, from Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho, comprised 47 aircraft including 15 fighters, 25 Zeros with bombs, and seven Jills with torpedoes. The remaining 20 aircraft saw what they believed to be two battleships but chose to keep searching for carriers. After a failed search, the group eventually attacked the battleships they initially spotted at 12:55 but were intercepted by Hellcats and lost seven aircraft. Nonetheless, the group pressed on and attacked Rear-Admiral William Harrill's carriers at 13:20. The effort was ineffective with one aircraft dropping a bomb 600 yards from Essex. Ozawa's third strike had accomplished nothing, but at least 40 of its 47 aircraft survived to return to their carriers. At 11:00, Ozawa launched his final attack of the day, consisting of 82 aircraft from the carriers Junyo, Hiyo, Ryuho, and Zuikaku of Carrier Division 1. It comprised 30 Zero fighters, ten Zeros with bombs, 27 Vals and nine Judys and six Jills. The planes set off for the new, incorrect southern target and found nothing, causing them to divide into three groups. The largest group of 49 planes headed toward Guam, where the Americans had been periodically discarding their ordnance to neutralize Kakuta's airfields.  As Ozawa sent his series of strikes against TF 58, Spruance directed Mitscher to keep a number of Hellcats active over Guam to disrupt any Japanese attempt to mount attacks from there. This reflected Spruance's fear that the Japanese would use Guam as a base for “shuttle bombing” using aircraft from the 1st Mobile Fleet. Before the first Japanese carrier raid, Hellcats encountered airborne Japanese aircraft over Guam. This action continued throughout the day and periodically intensified when TF 58 dive-bombers and Avengers, ordered to the east to steer clear of the air battle, dumped their ordnance on Guam. Before noon, 15 Yorktown and 17 Hornet Helldivers bombed Orote Field on Guam. Another attack was mounted at 13:30 by Dauntlesses from Lexington and Enterprise, nine Avengers from Enterprise and ten Hellcats for escort. The armor-piercing bombs carried by the dive-bombers did little damage, but the Avengers succeeded in cratering the runway. Other attacks continued throughout the afternoon including Hellcats from Bunker Hill strafing Japanese aircraft on the ground and 11 Helldivers from Essex just before 14:00. The price to keep Guam suppressed during the day was steep – six Hellcats and one Helldiver – but the Base Air Force did not support Ozawa's main attack. Back over at the carrier action, Ozawa's first group approaching Guam were picked up by TF 58 radar at 1449hrs. Before long, 27 Hellcats were on the scene. Among these were 12 from light carrier Cowpens, seven from Essex again led by McCampbell, and eight from Hornet. The Hellcats did great execution, shooting down 30 of the 49 Japanese trying to land on Guam. The remaining 19 planes landed but were damaged on the ground and could no longer fly.Another 15 aircraft headed for Rota but changed course to attack Montgomery's group when they sighted it en route. Six aircraft approached Wasp unmolested until 2:23 when they were engaged by antiaircraft fire just as they were dropping their bombs. Adept maneuvering by Wasp thwarted the aircraft, identified as Judys. Another group of divebombers appeared and split up; two went after Bunker Hill, and one after Wasp. All missed, and of the nine attackers, only one escaped. The final 18 aircraft of Raid IV, including the eight from Zuikaku and ten Zeros with bombs, were returning to their carriers when they encountered two American scout groups consisting of Hellcats and Avengers some 200nm west of Guam.This encounter cost the Japanese six aircraft, but they did gain a measure of revenge when at 3:30 the same group of returning Japanese aircraft encountered and shot down two Bunker Hill aircraft on a search mission. Despite these efforts, none of the American ships were hit during this fourth attack, while Ozawa suffered a significant loss of 73 aircraft. The situation worsened when the submarine Cavalla spotted Shokaku recovering aircraft at 11:52 and launched six torpedoes. Three torpedoes hit the carrier's starboard side at 12:22, sparking fires in the hangar and causing the ship to list. Soon, the ship came to a halt and was left behind when Carrier Division 1 moved north. At 1310, the fires on the hangar set off a bomb that set off fumes from the cracked forward fuel tank. Large explosions ensued and it was obvious the carrier was doomed. Shokaku sank at 15:01, resulting in the deaths of 1,272 crew members. The light cruiser Yahagi and destroyers Urakaze, Wakatsuki, and Hatsuzuki rescued Captain Matsubara and 570 men. Additionally, a torpedo hit Taiho, cracking the forward aviation fuel tank and turning the IJN's newest and most heavily protected carrier into a floating bomb. At 3:32pm, a massive explosion hit Taiho, lifting her flight deck and causing damage to her hull that led to the ship sinking. Despite Ozawa's initial desire to stay with the carrier, he and his team were eventually evacuated by a destroyer. However, 660 members of Taiho's crew perished as the ship sank. The transfer to the Haguro, added to the confusion for Ozawa was the fact that he and his staff were jammed into inadequate facilities aboard heavy cruiser Haguro after they were forced to depart from Taiho. Communications were grossly inadequate; Ozawa admitted later that he should have turned over command to Kurita until he could have moved to a ship with adequate command and control facilities. After the final strike aircraft returned, the Japanese turned northwest at 18:08, preparing to refuel the following day before continuing their attack. In their four strikes, the Japanese had launched 373 aircraft; of these 243 were lost. Added to these losses were another 50 from Guam, nine when Shokaku went down, and another 13 from Taiho to bring the total to 315. Some 296 Hellcats had been engaged during the day in combat, and only 14 were lost in combat with another six recorded as operational losses. The lack of sufficient training and experience among Japanese aircrews was evident, as seasoned American pilots compared the battle to “an old-time turkey shoot down home.” As a result of the significant losses inflicted on Japanese aircraft by American forces, the aerial portion of the Battle of the Philippine Sea was known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. In the war upon the land, after an uneventful night, the 2nd Marine Division conducted patrols as Generals Schmidt and Smith focused on securing the rest of southern Saipan. Although the 4th Marine Division's assault was postponed due to their need to disperse a sizable Japanese group near Tsutsuran village, the 27th Division pressed forward in the morning with the 165th Regiment swiftly reaching Magicienne Bay. In contrast, the 105th advanced more slowly through challenging terrain, resulting in a gap between the two regiments and requiring the 165th to extend its lines to maintain contact. Further north, Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines succeeded in advancing close to Hill 500 after intense artillery bombardment, but were compelled to withdraw about 400 yards to protect their vulnerable flank. At this stage, Brigadier-General Arthur Harper's Corps artillery had arrived on the island, offering essential reinforcement to the division's artillery units. By the end of the day, Schmidt's division realigned its regiments and shifted north. The most vicious action of the night occurred in the sector occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines. Starting at about 3:50am and lasting until daylight, an enemy force of approximately 75 attacked the Marines with grenades and bayonets. In the close-in fighting that ensued, 11 Marines were wounded, but, in the process, the enemy attack was broken. By daylight, many of the attackers were sprawled forward of the Marines' foxholes, the rest had taken to their heels. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher, having retrieved all his aircraft, set a westerly course and increased speed to 23 knots in an attempt to catch up with the enemy. However, on June 20, his usual morning search found no results. The Japanese also maintained radio silence during the day, with no new intelligence obtained by American submarines or PBM flying boats based in Saipan. In the afternoon, a successful search finally established contact, prompting Mitscher to prepare for a bold night strike against an enemy fleet beyond the maximum strike range. Meanwhile, the plan to refuel the 1st Mobile Fleet on June 20 fell through amid confusion, prompting Ozawa to abandon the attempt after noon. He transferred to the Zuikaku and restored communications, discovering the extent of his aircraft losses. Ozawa's hope that he could continue strikes was buoyed by reports from Kakuta that some of Ozawa's aircraft had landed on Guam and the prospects that additional land-based aircraft reinforcements would flow into the area. The only concession he made was to move his next attack until the 21st. However, at 16:45, Ozawa's reconnaissance revealed he had been spotted, so he decided to retreat northwest at 24 knots. Thirty minutes later, when his scout aircraft located Task Force 58, Ozawa opted to initiate a night attack with seven B5Ns and three radar-equipped B6Ns. Meanwhile, Mitscher launched a full deckload from 11 carriers, including 85 Hellcats, 77 dive-bombers, and 54 Avengers. The First Mobile Fleet was not well positioned to meet the attack. The Van Force with most of the heavy escorts and the best antiaircraft capabilities was not the closest formation to the incoming American strike. Each of Ozawa's three groups was headed northwesterly with the Van Force to the south, Carrier Division 2 in the center and Zuikaku to the north. Astern of the carrier groups were the two supply groups composed of six oilers with their escorts, making this the closest group to the Americans. After an uneventful flight, the American aircraft found the 1st Mobile Fleet at 18:40, at the edge of their fuel range after nearly 300 miles. Lacking time for a coordinated attack, the American aircraft easily bypassed the 40 fighters and 28 bombers sent to intercept them and individually targeted the enemy carriers. The veteran carrier Zuikaku was defended by 17 fighters and put up a good fight with heavy antiaircraft fire and adept maneuvering. She avoided the four torpedoes aimed at her from the Hornet Avengers and took only a single direct hit by a 500- pound bomb aft of the island. After departing, the Americans reported the big carrier with heavy fires onboard. However, the damage was not as great as it appeared. The single bomb hit penetrated to the upper hanger deck where a fire started among the remaining aircraft. These were not fueled, so after a few tense moments and an order to abandon ship that was quickly rescinded, the fire was extinguished. Six near misses were recorded, but overall damage was light. Zuikaku, the last surviving carrier from the Pearl Harbor attack force, lived to fight again. Aircraft from Bunker Hill, Monterey, and Cabot attacked the Chiyoda group, which evaded five torpedoes and sustained one bomb hit, surviving to fight another day. The Japanese were organized into three groups, each centered on a light carrier with several escorting battleships or heavy cruisers. The Zuiho and Chitose groups were not attacked, but the Chiyoda group was. The light carrier was the target of over 20 Helldivers and Avengers with bombs, but only a single bomb hit Chiyoda on the flight deck resulting in 20 dead, 30 wounded and two aircraft destroyed. The Avengers from Monterey probably scored the single hit, which caused a fire that was quickly extinguished. Chiyoda successfully dodged five torpedoes from Bunker Hill Avengers and lived to fight another day. Escorting battleship Haruna was hit by a 500-pound bomb that penetrated her stern and flooded the steering compartment. The ship's speed was reduced, and 15 crewmen were killed and 19 wounded. Cruiser Maya endured a near miss that caused flooding. The strike group from Lexington, with support from the Avengers from Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood, and the bomb-carrying Hellcats from Hornet and Yorktown, attacked Admiral Jojima's carriers. They inflicted minor damage on Junyo and Ryuho. Most of Lexington's Dauntless dive-bombers selected Junyo for attention. At 7:04, one or two bombs hit the carrier's island, and several near misses created minor flooding. Casualties included 53 dead, but overall damage was light. Light carrier Ryuho was attacked by the five Avengers from Enterprise with bombs at 7;10; eight hits were claimed, but only slight damage was caused by near misses. The carrier also survived attacks from Enterprise Dauntlesses, Avengers from Yorktown five with torpedoes and probably Hellcats from Hornet. Hiyo suffered the most successful attack of the evening. The carrier left the formation to launch two Jills to lay a smoke screen and was caught behind the main body when the American strike arrived. In the opening attack by Dauntlesses from Lexington, one bomb hit the foremast and exploded above the bridge resulting in heavy casualties to bridge personnel. The Japanese reported that another bomb hit the flight deck. However, the group of four Belleau Wood Avengers with torpedoes caused fatal damage. Three conducted an anvil attack, and one torpedo hit the carrier's starboard engine room. This was followed by a dive-bomb attack from six Enterprise Dauntlesses. The single torpedo hit, the only one scored by Avengers during the entire attack, proved fatal to the largely unprotected carrier. Within minutes, the damage created a list. The ship proceeded for a time on its port engine, but then went dead in the water. Just before sunset, at 1917, there was a large explosion amidships that caused a loss of power. The Japanese were convinced that this was the result of a submarine-launched torpedo, but there were no submarines in the area. A fuel-fed conflagration ensued, causing multiple explosions. The fire was beyond being contained, and the order to abandon ship was given. Hiyo sank at 20:32, claiming 247 crew members. The final American counterattack came from Wasp's aircraft, targeting Ozawa's Supply Group to disrupt the withdrawal of the 1st Mobile Fleet by damaging the oilers. Three oilers were damaged, and two were later scuttled. In this series of uncoordinated attacks, the Americans lost 20 aircraft and destroyed 80 Japanese planes; although the results were underwhelming, with only one carrier sunk, they fared better than Ozawa's combined strikes the previous day. At 20:45, American aircraft began returning to their carriers. The distance from the targets to TF 58 was between 240 and 300 miles, so fuel exhaustion was a real danger for many pilots. On a dark night, the returning aircraft began to return to their carriers at 8:45. Mitscher decided to ignore the potential Japanese air and submarine threats and ordered his ships to use extra illumination beyond the normal landing lights on each carrier deck to guide his appreciative aviators home. Any pretense of order was quickly lost and soon aircraft were ordered to land on any deck in sight. Almost half of the returning aircraft landed on the wrong carrier. This hectic scene took over two hours to play out. When the final accounting was complete, aircraft losses were expectedly heavy. The Americans would end up losing a total of 100 pilots and 109 crew members. Meanwhile, Admiral Toyoda ordered Ozawa to disengage from the decisive battle and retreat northwest, with the Japanese fleet successfully evading Mitscher's slow pursuit and reaching Okinawa on the afternoon of June 22. Once more, the Japanese sought a decisive battle but were decisively defeated. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. In contrast, the Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious. In terms of scale the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot dwarfed the four carrier battles that preceded it. At the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands, the largest carrier engagement involved 7 carriers at Midway; by comparison there were 24 carriers at the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. It was, by a factor of almost 350 percent, the biggest carrier battle in history. Though Mitscher's Combat Air Patrol was not flawless, the combination of inadequate Japanese aircrew training and American radar-directed fighter interception rendered a significant Japanese strike ineffective. Ozawa conducted an intelligent battle, accurately assessing American intentions to launch carrier air strikes that would have been catastrophic to a carrier task force by 1942 standards. Nevertheless, his tools failed him. Despite Ozawa's skilled fleet handling, he lacked the airpower to inflict serious damage on Task Force 58. Admiral Spruance has faced criticism for his cautious approach, which exposed his carriers to attack without a strong chance of striking back at the enemy. Only the significant difference in skill between American and Japanese aviators and some good luck prevented this strategy from failing.  Now back over on Saipin, General Watson continued to focus mainly on patrolling, while the 8th Marines worked to secure Hill 500. Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion encountered minimal resistance, enabling them to quickly advance to the O-4 Line. Around 09:00, the 25th Marines moved towards Hill 500, subjecting the Japanese to a severe, thundering beating administered by the 4.5-inch rockets. As the Marines charged up the hill through the thinning smoke, artillery shells walked ahead in sturdy escort. Shortly before noon the hill was seized, and mopping up of the cave network began. Compartments at different levels and angles made it possible for the Japanese occupants to retreat from one cave-room to another, and the cleaning out process was a slow one. The price for Hill 500 was not light. Chambers' battalion suffered 49 casualties, nine of whom were killed. Counted Japanese dead numbered 44. Upon examination, it was found that Hill 500 had been well organized for defense but that the positions were not strongly manned. As darkness approached, the Marines dug in to defend their newly won possession. Meanwhile, the 24th Marines also reached the O-4 Line near Tsutsuran, but the 27th Division struggled to push the Japanese forces onto the challenging terrain at Nafutan Point. Additionally, the 106th Regiment arrived on June 20, and Aslito Airfield became operational, putting the security of the Japanese home islands in jeopardy. The following day involved reorganizing, resupplying, mopping-up, and patrolling to prepare for the next day's attack into central Saipan. General Smith's infantry continued their offensive south toward Nafutan Point, making incremental progress through each cave and ravine.  At 12:15, while engaged in the Nafutan Point attack, the 27th Division received a change of mission and disposition. NTLF Operation Order 9 dictated less one battalion and one light tank platoon, to assemble northwest of Aslito Airfield in NTLF reserve. Control of the division artillery would pass to the 23rd Corps Artillery. The designated infantry battalion was ordered to “operate in the Garrison Area and mop up remaining enemy detachments, maintain anti-sniper patrols within the Garrison Area and along the coast line to protect installations within its zone of action with particular attention to Aslito Airfield.” At 5:00, after consideration of the NTLForder, Ralph Smith telephoned Holland Smith and urged that a complete regiment be used to clean up Nafutan Point, rather than one battalion. He said that he planned to use the 105th Infantry for the job and that he believed they could finish in a couple of days. Holland Smith agreed to this but specified that one battalion of the 105th must be retained in reserve for possible use elsewhere. For this task, the 2nd Battalion would be selected. This modification was later confirmed in a mailbrief from NTLF which arrived at the 27th Division command post at 8;30, 22 June. Ralph Smith then issued an order to his division, the 105th will hold the present front line facing Nafutan Point, with two battalions on the line and one battalion in regimental reserve. It would relieve elements of 165th now on the front line by . Reorganization of the present front line to be effected not later than 11:00, 22 June and offensive operations against the enemy continued. Reserve battalion will maintain anti-sniper patrols in the vicinity of Aslito Airfield.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of the Philippines  was the last hurrah of the once proud IJN carrier fleet that had humbled the American two and a half years earlier. Admiral Spruance's strategic patience led to a decisive American victory. Japan's carrier threat, which had driven its early wartime expansion, was annihilated in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.

“If the war was to be over by Christmas, as many believed, or at the latest by Easter 1915, tens of thousands of soldiers might be killed or wounded before the guns fell silent. Every army believed that it could crush its opponents within a few months.” Welcome back to another episode of Made You Think! Join us as we dive into The First World War by Martin Gilbert. We'll explore the intricate details of WW1, from the seemingly pointless triggers to the significant aftermath that reshaped the world. We'll also touch on intriguing historical anecdotes, like Germany's return in WW2, and the far-reaching consequences of redrawing borders. History lovers, buckle up for this one! We cover a wide range of topics including: Technological advancements from cavalry to tanks and planes How WW1 redrew the map and ended empires The concept of 'war guilt' and its impact America's pivotal role and the intercepted telegram The seemingly unnecessary triggers of the first World War And much more. Please enjoy, and make sure to follow Nat, Neil, and Adil on Twitter and share your thoughts on the episode. Links from the Episode: Mentioned in the Show: The Great War on Youtube (2:32) Schlieffen Plan (10:57) French Foreign legion (16:48) Empires before WW1 (34:42) Zimmerman Telegram (41:21) Marshall Plan (1:13:34) They Shall Not Grow Old (1:26:26) Books Mentioned: The First World War The Second World War (3:13) Shadow Divers (43:46) The Power of Geography (1:24:57) Blueprint for Armageddon (1:38:21) The Brothers K (1:39:40) Musashi (1:39:47) People Mentioned: Martin Gilbert Ho Chi Minh (3:59) David Lloyd George (24:47) John J. Pershing (41:03) Dan Carlin (1:37:32) Ernest Shackleton (1:38:47) Show Topics: (0:00) Today, we're covering The First World War by Martin Gilbert. While the book offers a detailed play-by-play of WW1, it wasn't the most enjoyable read. However, we gained significant insights into the war. (4:53) The war's triggers and conflicts felt somewhat pointless. Despite this, WW1 felt more significant than WW2 as it redrew maps and ended four empires. Unlike WW2's clear-cut good vs. evil narrative, WW1 began with cavalry and ended with advanced technology like planes, tanks, gas, and submarines. (8:02) Numerous underlying tensions grew and eventually exploded in unpredictable ways. One of the triggers was Germany's insecurity about its geographical position. We delve into the circumstances that led to the start of the war. (11:10) A major theme was the widespread belief that the war would end quickly, without long-term consequences. We discuss what wars were like before WW1, typically regional with smaller armies and less impact on civilian populations. (13:57) What was the aftermath of the war like? You might belong to a different town or region, but it may not have affected your daily life much. (18:00) Nat, Neil, and Adil talk about the multiple empires that collapsed during this time.  (20:10) War guilt was a new concept, unlike previous wars where the winning side simply negotiated their gains. The sheer number of deaths and the devastation of this war was shocking.  (25:35) How did the Ottoman Empire get involved and what was their involvement in the war? (27:05) The Germans came back much stronger in WWII, despite being devastated in WWI. They put up a bigger fight just 20 years later. It leads us to wonder, from where did they find the resources? (31:38) How the war marked a complete era shift. Would communism have had as much impact in the 20th century without WWI? Would the Soviet Union have emerged? (34:42) We take a look at a map of empires before WW1 and how the territories looked before then, which leads into our first tangent of this episode! (37:52) Though Mexico wasn't involved in the war, Germany sent them a telegram promising several U.S. states in exchange for support. The British intercepted this message and informed the U.S. (40:34) America's entry into the war truly tipped the scales and accelerated the conflict. They joined gradually, but their involvement turned the tide. We discuss the telegram that prompted America's entry into WWI. (43:58) We were surprised by the advanced use of submarines in WWI. It's fascinating to consider how much the world has changed, especially thinking about the Ottoman Empire, which lasted over 600 years. (47:49) WWI was the first time oil played a significant role, and the Ottoman Empire had some of the largest oil reserves. Had they survived, they could have controlled one of the 20th century's most crucial resources. From the four dissolved empires, 40 new countries emerged. (50:12) While book wasn't the most entertaining and it felt repetitive, its importance lies in how it made people rethink the norms and rules of engagement. If a major war broke out next year, for example, there would likely be a similar period of figuring out new ground rules. (57:15) The Russian Revolution. Two generations of European leaders were responsible for the deaths of tens of millions of people. With two major world wars only 20 years apart, the loss of life was staggering. (1:02:11) In the last 6 months of the war, everyone believed they were losing. The Germans were preparing to surrender, and the British doubted they would make it. After the war, the US never ratified the Treaty of Versailles and chose not to get involved in the aftermath. (1:06:31) The redrawing of borders after the war marked the end of colonialism, profoundly impacting various parts of the world. Much of the end of colonialism stemmed from the end of WW1 and the dissolution of empires. The poorly executed division of territories led to cascading conflicts in the aftermath. (1:11:25) The Hapsburg empire isn't extensively covered in the book, yet it was a very old empire, with its dynasty dating back to the 11th century. The exact beginnings are unclear since it follows a family rather than a defined state, making the timeline a bit blurry. (1:13:34) We talk about the Marshall Plan. Would the Marshall Plan be effective in a kingdom-era setup? Plus, we talk about the idea of 'collective insanity' and how it can be seen as a form of self-governance, where a group loses its rationality as opposed to just an individual. (1:20:25) There were many overarching themes of the book and the war as a whole: From the end of the old European system to the transition from kingdoms to states. (1:24:01) Geographical positioning and how that plays a huge impact where you sit on the map. Much of the war is a downstream of geography. Some European countries were at a disadvantage based off of where they are on the map.  (1:30:25) How lives changed drastically because of the war. One day you're working your normal job and the next you're on the front lines of the war. (1:35:59) Neil and Adil give their final thoughts on the book, Gilbert's writing style, and what they took away from reading the book.  (1:38:47) That wraps up this episode! Stay tuned for our next episode where we'll be reading Endurance by Alfred Lansing. Make sure to pick up a copy of the book and head on over to our website to see what's next. If you enjoyed this episode, let us know by leaving a review on iTunes and tell a friend. As always, let us know if you have any book recommendations! You can say hi to us on Twitter @TheRealNeilS, @adilmajid, @nateliason and share your thoughts on this episode. You can now support Made You Think using the Value-for-Value feature of Podcasting 2.0. This means you can directly tip the co-hosts in BTC with minimal transaction fees. To get started, simply download a podcast app (like Fountain or Breez) that supports Value-for-Value and send some BTC to your in-app wallet. You can then use that to support shows who have opted-in, including Made You Think! We'll be going with this direct support model moving forward, rather than ads. Thanks for listening. See you next time!

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mogaung. General Vinegar Joe's strategy against Myitkyina had turned into a brutal struggle. Stillwells forces were besieging the town while the Chindits battled for Mogaung, diverting Japanese reinforcements in the process. Despite heavy losses, the Chindits captured Naungkyaiktaw with the help of flamethrowers. Gradually Mogaung fell, but the credit was wrongly attributed to the Chinese while it should have gone to the Chindits. Mytikyina withstood endless attacks and at Biak the Americans repelled numerous Japanese assaults. The 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment tossed over to help, but this further complicated supply issues on the plateau. Progress was deeply hampered by water shortages, difficult jungle terrain and supply roads needing repairs. Lastly the battle for Lone Tree Hill saw absolute mayhem and horror, something the Americans and Japanese would never forget. This episode is the Invasion of Saipan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The use of US fleet and escort carriers during the landings on Hollandia and Aitape had convinced Admiral Toyoda's staff that the American naval force could be drawn into decisive naval battle off of New Guinea. On June 1st, however, a reconnaissance flight had discovered a major build up of enemy vessels at Majuro, suggesting that a new invasion was just days away. The Imperial General Staff reeled with shock in response to this, not knowing whether the Allied objective was Biak, Palau or Saipan. Aboard Toyoda's flagship Oyodo in Tokyo Bay, the naval staff debated, and the debate degenerated into argument. The truth was that no one had a “feel” for the American strategy except one lone staff intelligence officer, Commander Nakajima Chikataka. He said it had to be Saipan. But his fellow staff members scoffed at this. Even the Americans did not have such power that they could mount an operation the size of the three-pronged New Guinea strike as just a feint, they argued. They  further argued that an enemy airfield at Biak would allow the Allies to bomb the Philippines and Palau with their long-range B-24 Liberators. And the American carriers were in evidence off New Guinea, unlike at Majuro. Thinking that Nakajima must be seeing things, Toyoda thus decided that Biak had to be the place. The Japanese unleashed Operation KON, diverting an enormous sum of their naval and air resources to bolster Biak in response to the perceived allied advance.   However, in actuality, Admiral Spruance was gathering the largest Pacific force yet seen at Pearl Harbor, comprising approximately 535 ships, ranging from battleships to tugs, carrying a total of 127,500 personnel of Lt-General Holland Smith's 5th Amphibious Corps.  They were going to hit Saipan, Tinian and Guam. Designated “Operation Forager” it was to be the end game of Admiral Nimitz Central thurst into the Pacific. Taking these would see strategic airfields only 1400 miles away from Tokyo in the hands of the allies. From there the US Army Air Force could begin their long wished bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. For the Japanese, Saipan in particular was considered a “home island”. Japan had seized Saipan during WW1 from the German Colonial Empire and she heavily invested in “Japanizing” the island. The Japanese government had encouraged southern Japanese and Okinawans to colonize Saipan, introducing Japanese language and culture to the indigenous peoples there. It was more than just another Imperial asset, in many ways Saipan had become a home island. Part of the new operation would include Admiral Mitscher commanding the Fast Carrier Task Force 58 stationed at the Marshalls, along with Vice-Admiral Charles Lockwood overseeing 19 submarines and Rear-Admiral Ralph Christie leading 9 submarines operating across the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Operation Forager entailed Admiral Turner's Task Force capturing Saipan and Tinian sequentially with the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, followed by the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attacking Guam. The 27th Division was reserved for Saipan and the 77th Division for Guam. The outcome on Saipan would determine subsequent operations, with the Southern Landing Forces also held in reserve for the Northern Landing Forces until June 25. Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's strategy for the Saipan invasion involved landing four assault regiments simultaneously on four beaches in the Charan Kanoa area. Following three days of continuous air and naval bombardments, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division's 6th and 8th Marine Regiments were to land north of Afetna Point on the Red and Green Beaches, while Major-General Harry Schmidt's 4th Marine Division's 23rd and 25th Marine Regiments would land south of Afetna Point on the Blue and Yellow Beaches. Thomas Watson was then going to seize the Charan Kanoa Airstrip, afterwards he would sing northeast towards Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau while Schmidt secured Charan Kanoa village, the Aslito Airfield and the islands southern end before moving north to take part in clearing the remainder of Saipan. Alongside this, Smith planned to dispatch the reserve 2nd and 24th Marine Regiments of Lt Colonel Walter Stuart and Lt Colonel Guy Tannyhill over to Scarlet and Black Beaches in the north to divert enemy attention. Two innovations would be tried for Forager. The 4th Marine Division had recently and optimistically accepted the proposal to employ amphibian tanks inland. This was a large part due to the unit's experiences on low and level Roi-Namur, during the Kwajalein assault. The 2nd Marine Division on the other hand, having fought on rugged Guadalcanal and experienced the limitations of LVTs during the Tarawa assault, were more pessimistic. General Watson convinced General Smith that he would only allow the amphibian tanks to advance inland far enough to clear the immediate beach area and that only the first troop-carrying LVT wave would follow them to discharge their troops beyond the beach. All subsequent waves would discharge troops on the beach and not proceed beyond the Tractor Control Line. The reason for this pessimism was that the Marines expected the terrain to be rougher than some predicted. They feared control would be lost over troops embarked in LVTs, concentrated groups of men would be exposed to fire, and that more amtracs would be lost to enemy fire inland. They were needed to return to the Transfer Control Line on the reef's lip where support troops boated aboard LCVPs would be picked up and run to shore in the amtracs. Furthermore, LVTs are not designed for cross-country movement. They have comparatively narrow tracks and low ground clearance, making it easy for them to "belly-out" on rough ground, rocks, and stumps. Amphibian tanks are poor substitutes for medium tanks for the same reasons, and in addition they have very thin armor and a high profile. The Marine divisions commenced training for Saipan in March, conducting a significant rehearsal between May 14 and 20 off Maui. With all arrangements in place, Admiral Turner's invasion fleet was poised to depart Hawaii by late May. The slower LSTs were scheduled to set sail for Eniwetok on May 25, followed by the troop transports departing Hawaii five days later. Turner's vessels were slated to gather at Eniwetok on June 6, coinciding with the departure of Admiral Mitscher's carriers from Majuro for the Marianas. Between June 8 and 10, Turner then embarked from Eniwetok in echelons, experiencing a relatively uneventful voyage towards Saipan. Meanwhile, the Japanese expedited the deployment of 31st Army units to the Central Pacific, successfully positioning most of their line units at designated locations by the end of May. Additionally, certain disparate units of the 31st Army underwent reorganization into seven independent mixed brigades and five independent mixed regiments to enhance chain of command and troop cohesion.   This, however, did not allow adequate time to prepare inland defenses in multiple lines, especially in the case of the Marianas. The larger elevated islands within the Marianas offered strategic advantages for establishing multi-layered defenses, creating strongholds on key terrain features, and positioning reserves centrally for potential counterattacks. However, the Japanese were unable to fully exploit these opportunities due to various factors. Insufficient troop deployments occurred until less than two months prior to the US assault, leaving limited time for comprehensive inland defense preparations. Many coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns were discovered still packed and alongside incomplete positions, due to a shortage of construction materials for fortified installations. Consequently, the high ground at the island's center remained unprepared for defense, and several beach defenses were unfinished. There was an overestimation of the natural ruggedness of the terrain to impede American advances. Despite this, some coastal defense guns were strategically placed within earlier reinforced concrete structures. While Saipan and Tinian lacked significant artificial underwater or beach obstacles, mines were sporadically utilized on their shores. The Japanese also suffered from a lack of anti-aircraft ammunition to counter the enemy air superiority. Over on Saipan, Lieutenant-General Saito Yoshitsugu commanded a significant military presence including the 43rd Division, the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 9th Tank Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and various support units totaling 25,500 personnel. Despite its apparent strength, a convoy carrying reinforcements for the 43rd Division was ambushed by two American submarines between June 4 and 6, resulting in the loss of five transports and nearly decimating the 118th Regiment. Saito, overseeing Saipan as commander of the Northern Marianas Army Group, was joined by Admiral Nagumo's Central Pacific Area Fleet headquarters, bolstering defense with an additional 6,200 naval personnel. Additionally, General Obata, stationed at Saipan's army headquarters, delegated authority to his chief of staff, Major-General Igeta Keiji, as he inspected defenses in Palau during the American landings. Saito organized Saipan's defense into five sectors, anticipating landings on the island's west and northwest coasts, Tanapag Harbor, and the north shore of Magicienne Bay. The Japanese strategy relied on tank-infantry counterattacks launched at night from designated positions to repel enemy landings. However, American bombardment of Saipan commenced before Saito's forces could fully fortify their positions. Large numbers of heavy weapons, ranging from 200mm mortars to 5-inch coastal defense guns and literally dozens of searchlights and antiaircraft guns still remained in naval depots or loaded on railroad cars or still packed in cosmoline near partially excavated gun positions. The high ground in the island's center had received little attention in the defensive preparations; and, indeed, beach defenses themselves were in many cases far from complete. In so far as training in defensive warfare is concerned, Japanese forces displayed a marked deficiency; there was little evidence of organization of the ground, the principal airfield (Aslito) was virtually undefended against ground troops, and their counterattack plans were poorly conceived. On the afternoon of June 11, Mitscher's Task Force 58, began a relentless three and a half day heavy bombardment against Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. This onslaught, featuring a 225-plane fighter sweep, caught the Japanese off guard in the Marianas and resulted in the destruction of 150 enemy aircraft, securing air superiority for the rest of the campaign. On June 12th and 13th, 216 carrier bombers hit Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, while Admiral Hoover's B-24s started pounding the southern Marianas airfields. You might be raising your eyebrows, the B-24's belonged to Task Force 57, under Vice-Admiral John Hoover, which was currently formed by the 5th Air Force over on Cape Gloucester and New Guinea; the 7th Air Force and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands; and the 13th Air Force on the Admiralty Islands. Concurrently, two Japanese convoys were intercepted, leading to the sinking of 16 enemy vessels. The first of these, was a formation of 20 ships, fleeing on a northerly course 125 miles west of Pagan Island. They were attacked on the afternoon of the 12th by planes of Rear Admiral William K. Harrill's Task Group 58.4. Further  south, 135 miles west of Guam, the other convoy of six ships became the target for a special attack mission sent by Rear Admiral Joseph J. Clark, commanding Task Group 58.1. Between the two attacks 12 cargo ships, three submarine chasers, and one patrol-torpedo boat were sunk. Additionally, on June 13th, Mitscher's fast battleships shelled Saipan, though with limited success. The following day, Turner's fire support ships joined Task Force 58 in bombarding Saipan's beaches and installations, effectively neutralizing most of the Japanese coastal defenses and anti-aircraft positions. Despite some damage inflicted on the destroyer Braine and battleship California, Saito's defenses were not completely destroyed, indicating that the preliminary bombardment was not entirely effective. Meanwhile, underwater demolition teams surveyed the landing beaches, clearing them of mines and obstacles and creating gaps in the reefs for the amphibious approach. Smith's reserves staged a demonstration off Tanapag to divert Japanese attention, while carrier groups were dispatched to prevent enemy aircraft staging through the Bonins, successfully attacking Iwo Jima, Chichi-jima, and Haha-jima. To deter the Japanese from utilizing the Bonins in the north as a staging area for aircraft, two task groups led by Clark's 58.1 and Harrill's 58.4 set sail from Saipan on June 14th for an offensive. This marked the furthest advance into Empire waters by a carrier striking force at that time. Task Groups 58.1 and 58.4 refueled on June 14th and were then dispatched that night toward Chichi and Iwo Jima. Airstrikes on Japanese airfields in those locations commenced the following afternoon despite challenging weather conditions. Despite facing strong resistance from the Japanese, American fighter sweeps and bombing runs resulted in the destruction of 28 out of 37 Zeros engaged, with an additional seven destroyed on the ground, while only two American aircraft were lost. Adverse weather hampered morning strikes on the 16th, but the afternoon sortie of 54 American aircraft encountered Japanese planes on the runway, claiming 63 destroyed, though this wasn't confirmed by Japanese sources. Only two American aircraft were lost due to anti-aircraft fire and operational issues. Despite airborne opposition and unfavorable flying conditions, the mission achieved its objectives, significantly diminishing the Bonins' effectiveness as an aircraft staging area. After the afternoon raid, the two task groups headed south as per Mitscher's orders to position themselves off Saipan by the 18th. This operation proved successful, as around 100 Japanese aircraft that could have intervened in the impending battle were eliminated. On the morning of June 15, while the landing craft were lowered and began the complex assembly process, the Americans carried the last air and naval preparations on Saipan. At 8:12am, Turner finally gave the landing signal and the amtracs began to approach their assigned beaches under the cover of the LCI gunboats' rockets. Enemy fire was light until the LVTs reached the coral reef's lip, at which time artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire increased drastically. Some control craft had drifted slightly to the north and coupled with a stronger than expected current some 2nd Marine Division units landed north of their intended beaches. The UDTs had not experienced this as the sea conditions and tides were different when they went to work the day before. Once over the reef lip some 400yds from shore, the swell made stationkeeping even more problematic. The swell increased through the day, making unloading and transfer difficult as well as capsizing landing craft and LVTs. The 2nd Marine Division had 31 of its 68 amphibian tanks hit or mechanically disabled before reaching the Tractor Control Line ashore. Nonetheless, in 20 minutes, some 8000 assault troops were ashore despite the strong Japanese artillery fire, albeit suffering heavy casualties. On the Red Beaches, Colonel James Riseley's 2nd and 3rd Battalions encountered stiff resistance from Hill 500 but still managed to secure a shallow beachhead, subsequently repelling a savage counterattack as the reserve 1st Battalion was landing. To the south, as Colonel Clarence Wallace's 2nd and 3rd Battalions had both come ashore on Green Beach 1, the 2nd would be sent south to seize Afetna Point while the 3rd advanced inland. Afetna Point was important for another reason than just denying the Japanese excellent positions for enfilading the American landing craft. Possession of the point would make Beach Green 3 available for landing of the tanks of both divisions. Because of an open channel off Green 3, LCM's carrying tanks could proceed directly to the beach without crossing the troublesome reef that fenced all other beaches. Once through the channel the craft could either move straight into Green 3 or fan out to the north or south and put the tanks ashore, wherever it was desired. The same channel could also be used for logistical purposes after tanks were ashore. As a result, the 2nd met strong resistance, progressing slowly and costly against a determined foe while the 1st Battalion was being landed; yet the 3rd managed to push inland against weaker resistance, finally halting about 900 yards from the O-1 Line. In the afternoon, the reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines was also landed and employed to fill the gap between Wallace's battalions. It's also important to note that the 4th Company, 9th Tank Regiment conducted piecemeal counterattacks on either side of Charan Kanoa with 14 tanks, losing all but three. Meanwhile, along the Blue Beaches, the 23rd Marines led by Colonel Louis Jones made headway through Charan Kanoa, facing occasional gunfire, and successfully advanced to the O-1 Line. Despite encountering challenging terrain and harassment from Japanese riflemen, their amtracs managed to secure Mount Fina Susu, albeit with significant losses. Upon reaching the O-1 Line, heavy artillery fire pinned down the Americans. Because of the concentrated mortar and artillery fire which had struck his troops throughout the day, the commander of the 23rd Marines, Colonel Jones estimated that the light forces on the O-1 line would be incapable of holding there for the night without being virtually annihilated. In addition, the regimental commander felt that “pulling back would allow our artillery and air to bring fire on the Jap batteries a short distance inland, better contact could be obtained on the right, and the exposed left flank could be better protected.” Dillon's 2nd Battalion and Cosgrove's 3rd Battalion were therefore ordered to establish a defense line generally 800 yards west of O-1 for the night. This involved a withdrawal under cover of darkness of the meager forces on O-1.Concerned about the exposed left flank between the 2nd and 4th Divisions, Colonel Jones directed the reserve 1st Battalion to fill the dangerous gap. Further south, Colonel Merton Batchelder's 1st Battalion faced fierce resistance from Agingan Point, repelling enemy counterattacks with the aid of air and naval support. Reinforcement from 3rd Battalion units allowed partial clearance of Japanese positions. The 2nd Battalion to the left encountered enemy concentrations but benefited from the heroic actions of the LVTAs, enabling them to advance inland.  About half the assault Marines of this battalion were carried to a railroad embankment prior to debarkation from LVTs. Until it reached there, the battalion was subjected to frontal small-arms fire from Japanese behind the embankment. There the small arms fire ceased, but mortar and artillery fire continued. From the direction of Nafutan Point came shells which burst overhead, apparently from antiaircraft guns depressed to fire at ground targets. And, as if troubles to the front and flanks were not enough, two enemy mortars began firing on the Marines from positions 500 yards to the rear. Before a request for assistance could be made, friendly planes spotted the mortars, attacked, and silenced them. Much credit for the 2nd Battalion's success in pushing inland goes to the LVT(A)s of the Army's 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, which, according to the Marine battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, took “more than their share of punishment diverted enemy attention from the amphibious tractors carrying troops ... I shall always re- member the excellent support given to my battalion by the Army LVT(A)'s”. Meanwhile, Marine tanks and artillery, under Turner's command, were successfully brought ashore, although some tanks and howitzers from the 4th Division were lost to fire and reef obstacles. By late afternoon, the bulk of the reserve 2nd and 24th Marines were landed, with the latter sustaining 400 casualties from accidents and artillery fire.  Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandergrift,  therefore, deployed his battalion and moved it on foot to an assembly area some 700 yards inland from Yellow 1, near a fork in the rail- road tracks. The men had no more than taken entrenching tools in hand when a barrage of well-directed Japanese artillery fire engulfed them. After the day's casualties were totalled, it was discovered that the unit had suffered heavily, though it had yet to enter the front line fighting: 25 killed, 72 wounded, 39 missing, mostly those lost on board the overturned LVTs. Other battalions had suffered more heavily, but the real significance of these figures lies in the fact that the 3rd Battalion did not arrive on the beach until 5:27pm. However, by nightfall, only the 25th Marines had reached the O-1 Line, constituting less than one-third of the planned beachhead, with casualties exceeding 2000 during the landings. After half an hour of the Saipan Invasion, Admiral Toyoda announced Operation A-Go proclaiming "The fate of the Empire rests upon this single battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost." The same Nelsonia words used by Admiral Togo at the legendary battle of Tsushima in 1905. He had created that statement taking Nelson's signal "England expects that every man will do his duty" at the Battle of Trafalgar. Toyoda planned to destroy the American fleet. Admiral Ugaki's battleships were to rendezvous with Admiral Ozawa's carriers in the Philippine Sea to attack the American fleet around Saipan. At 6:35pm on June 15th, the submarine Flying Fish reported that a force of Japanese battleships and at least three carriers had passed through the San Bernardino Strait. The submarines were under orders to report sightings before attempting to attack, so Flying Fish waited until nightfall, then surfaced to radio in its report. The sighting report from the submarine was monitored by the Japanese who knew they had been located. About one hour later, submarine Seahorse also sighted a Japanese force 200nm east-southeast of Surigao Strait. The exact composition of this force was unclear, but was thought to be Yamato and Musashi plus escorts. The submarine was not able to send a signal of its sighting until 4:00am on June 16th. Additionally, throughout the 15th, a growing body of signals intelligence indicated that a major IJN fleet action was underway.   Receiving this intelligence on the enemy's intentions, Admiral Spruance made the decision to halt the Guam landings, instructed for unloading at Saipan to continue until June 17th only, and tasked Turner with preparing for an imminent decisive battle. However, that's a podcast for next week. General Saito was on the verge of initiating his counterattack. Throughout the night, there were various probes and minor counterattacks that were swiftly repelled. Nonetheless, the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines faced a major assault at 3am when a Japanese bugler 75 sounded a loud, clear call on the tense night air, and with a waving of flags, loud screams, and a brandishing of swords, the attack was launched. Added to the din were the shouts of the 6th Marines for “flares.” Illumination shells, fired by the three destroyers, Halsey Powell, Coghlan and Monssen of Task Unit 52.17.3 began to burst over the area, clearly revealing the Japanese attackers. Men of Companies F and I opened with accurate, devastating lire. California joined with a tornado of salvos in front of the Marine lines. The Japanese, stripped by the illumination of the advantage afforded by their superior knowledge of the terrain (so helpful in night lighting), dropped before the Marines' fusillade. As Japanese fell, others replaced them in the determined onslaught.  At one point in the fighting, it was feared that the enemy had effected a penetration of Company I, along the coastal road. To contain this Japanese prong, Colonel Riseley shifted one company of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, company L, into the area. The light of morning, however, revealed that no penetration had been made and that Company B had, in effect, formed a secondary line. By 5:45, the Japanese pressure reached a peak; two Marine 37mm guns near the beach were knocked out and their crews forced back. Although the main positions held, a false report reached the 6th Marines' command post to the effect that Company F's lines along the beach had been forced back about 50 yards. This erroneous report, probably fostered by the withdrawal of the two 37mm crews and the infiltration of small enemy groups to the regimental command post, had no basis in fact. Fortunately, five medium tanks arrived in the nick of time to halt the Japanese advance and thwart their assault. With the dawn of June 16th, the battlefield revealed approximately 700 enemy casualties strewn across the terrain. Meanwhile, as the 6th Marines consolidated their position and the remaining 2nd Marines landed, Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion resumed its offensive against Afetna Point, successfully eliminating enemy resistance and bridging the gap between Marine divisions. Further south, General Schmidt led his three regiments towards Fina Susu Ridge in a coordinated advance. Despite the 23rd Marines encountering formidable enemy opposition in the mountains and marshes, the 25th Marines managed to clear Agingan Point and extend beyond the beachhead, while Colonel Franklin Hart's 24th Marines in the center made significant progress towards the O-1 line despite facing fierce resistance. Meanwhile,  Spruance opted to withdraw the unnecessary transports in anticipation of the impending naval confrontation. General Smith made the decision to deploy the reserve 27th Division for landing. Consequently, Major-General Ralph Smith's units, excluding the 106th Regiment, commenced landing operations in the afternoon. However, during the night, Saito initiated his second significant counterattack. The Japanese 136th Infantry (two battalions) and 9th Tank Regiments were to counterattack the center of the 2nd Marine Division sector at 17.00hrs. Yokosuka 1st SNLF was to attack the north flank from the Garapan area and “cooperate with the tanks to annihilate the enemy's front line and advance towards Oreai (Charan Kanoa) Airfield.” Vice Admiral Nagumo, Commander Central Pacific Fleet and 5th Base Force, was ordered to command the attack personally. The units were still disorganized from the previous night's action and the attack was not launched until 03.30hrs. The objective of the Japanese attack was modest enough: the Saipan radio station, a short 400 yards behind the 6th Marines' lines. This objective, in itself, represented a revision in Saito's pre-D-Day policy to “destroy the enemy, during the night, at the water's edge." Seizure of the radio station area would still leave 500—600 yards distance to the water. This resulted in an estimated 44 tanks and 500 infantry attacking the positions of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The attack began at about 3:30, and the brunt struck Lieutenant Colonel Jones' 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,  and to a lesser extent the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The tanks advanced in groups of four or five with Japanese soldiers clinging to them. Poor and ineffective tactics reflected the inadequacy of Saito's order; some tanks cruised about in an aimless fashion, some bogged down in the swampy ground, some made an effort to break through the lines, still others stopped to let off their pugnacious passengers. The Japanese suffered heavy losses, including approximately 24 tanks and 300 men, while inflicting only 97 casualties. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. Concurrently, General Obata had instructed the commanders of Guam, Truk, and Tinian to send reinforcements to Saipan via barge, although only two companies managed to land on Rota by June 22nd. On June 17th, the American offensive resumed, yielding significant progress, partly due to artillery support. General Watson expanded the beachhead area nearly twofold, with the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines advancing northward to within 1000 yards of Garapan. Meanwhile, Colonel Riseley's remaining units secured the base of Mount Tipo Pale along the O-2 Line, and Colonel Wallace's Marines maneuvered around Lake Susupe to reach the O-1 Line.  To the south, the 25th Marines led by Colonel Batchelder advanced in a column formation, making headway towards Aslito Airfield by approximately 1500 yards. They managed to secure advantageous high ground along the O-2 Line on the northwest perimeter of the airfield. Simultaneously, Colonel Gerard Kelley's 165th Regiment also moved towards Aslito, making gains of around 1200 yards despite encountering light resistance. By 2:00pm, the 2nd Battalion had moved to the southwest edge of Aslito Airfield, while the 1st Battalion had become involved in a fight for a dominating ridge line extending from the airfield's southwest corner to the vicinity of Cape Obiam. Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion led by Major James H. Mahoney inched slowly up the steep and open slope, so that, by 5:00pm, a toehold had been gained at the crest. At this point, however, the Japanese launched a counterattack and drove the soldiers back off the hill. Reorganizing and reforming the lines at the base of the ridge, the battalion dug in for the night. Amid heavy artillery bombardment, the 24th Marines reached and secured the O-2 Line, consolidating their position on the ridge. In contrast, progress for the 23rd Marines to the south of Lake Susupe's swamps was minimal as they faced entrenched enemy forces. With the expansion of the beachhead, additional Corps units landed, including General Smith's command post, advance parties of the Corps artillery, and Colonel Leonard Bishop's 105th Regiment. During the night, Saito launched another counterattack, deploying the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment to stage a counterlanding on the Marine beachhead. However, the intervention of LCI gunboats and Marine artillery thwarted the attempt, driving the enemy back to Tanapag Harbor. Shifting focus to the Battle of Biak, General Fuller's forces had previously seized Mokmer but now found themselves encircled by Colonel Kuzume's formidable positions in the East and West Caves. Despite progress in repairing the airdrome, intense Japanese fire prevented its use until the enemy cave strongholds were neutralized. In contrast, the Japanese had attempted twice to reinforce Biak but failed both times. However, Operation KON drew the Allied forces away from the island, allowing barges to discreetly bring reinforcements from the southwest to Biak without naval protection. As a result, most of the 2nd Battalion, 221st Regiment was successfully transported to the island by June 12, and General Numata was evacuated during this period. Following this success, the 2nd Battalion, 219th Regiment was loaded onto barges in Sorong and transported to Biak via Noemfoor Island, arriving successfully by June 16. Meanwhile, as Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment secured its positions on June 8, Fuller decided to send the rest of Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment to the recently secured Parai Jetty. With the Ibdi Pocket contained, Haney made significant progress toward Mokmer. The next day, Haney continued his advance, successfully connecting with his 2nd Battalion despite heavy mortar fire. Newman faced multiple night counterattacks and was unable to expand his beachhead. On June 10th the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, sent two companies to the point on the low ridge where Company B had been halted the previous afternoon. Despite artillery support, the two units could make little progress and were themselves pinned down about 10:30. Japanese rifle and mortar fire was silenced by the 1st Battalion's 60-mm. mortars, but the Japanese continued to pour machine gun fire from a number of bunkers and pillboxes which proved impervious to bazooka and 75-mm. tank fire. The units withdrew while more artillery fire was placed along the low ridge. On the east flank, enemy fire from the East Caves had died down, and the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, was able to move on eastward. On that same day, as Admiral Toyoda ordered a third attempt for Operation KON, Admiral Ugaki's battleships were directed to support Admiral Sakonju's convoy, assembling at Batjan Island on June 11th. The start of the Marianas bombardment on that day forced Toyoda to suspend the operation and prepare for A-Go, ordering the battleships to rejoin Admiral Ozawa's command and sending the 23rd Air Flotilla to Palau to reinforce Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet. With two regiments now stationed at Mokmer, Fuller decided to resume his offensive by advancing westward towards Borokoe and northward towards the low ridge. The 163rd Regiment was assigned to hold the Ibdi Pocket and the East Caves. On June 11, the assault battalions began moving to the starting point in front of Menoebaboe. Haney's forces faced strong resistance and only reached the starting point by afternoon. The Americans then crossed the starting line, encountering minimal resistance along the coast but significant opposition on the low ridge. As a result, three battalions reached the 1st Phase Line, while Haney's 3rd Battalion couldn't move beyond the starting line. This forced Newman to pause his advance temporarily until Haney cleared enemy positions on the ridge. On June 12, Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced on the low ridge. The 3rd Battalion fought doggedly forward during the afternoon, discovering an ever increasing number of Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, and hasty automatic weapons and rifle emplacements of all kinds, manned by 1st Battalion and 5th Company, 222nd Regiment. Dusk found the unit still some 100 yards short of the line of departure and about 1,300 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, taking no part in the action during the day, moved forward to Mokmer Drome from Parai. Due to heavy Japanese resistance, their progress was slow. The next day, the Americans continued their attacks against enemy positions, but they couldn't close the gap between Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Fuller concluded that his troops were fatigued and that the Japanese had likely received reinforcements, so he requested an additional infantry regiment. General Krueger planned to send the 34th Regiment from Hollandia, scheduled to arrive on June 18. In response to recent setbacks, General Doe ordered the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments to support the 3rd Battalion on June 14. These battalions positioned themselves on the terrace above the low ridge, facing the main Japanese strongpoint directly. In response to the enemy's aggressive action, Colonel Kuzume initiated a tank-infantry counterattack with his remaining forces to push back the enemy battalions, inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting the American advance. Despite this, the Americans managed to regroup and establish a continuous line, while the Japanese sustained significant losses and were unable to execute any further major counterattacks for the rest of the battle. Generals Krueger and MacArthur were unhappy with the progress of operations in Biak, which led them to relieve Fuller of his duties as task force commander. Whether General Fuller's relief as commander of the HURRICANE Task Force was entirely justifiable is a question which cannot be answered categorically. At the time of his relief, the task force had seized Mokmer Drome. Patrols sent westward to Borokoe and Sorido Dromes had found no enemy at those two fields, and General Fuller knew they could be occupied with ease. But he had not sent more troops beyond Mokmer Drome because he believed it more important to secure an overland line of communications to that field and to clear the low ridge so that repair work could continue and at least one strip could be put in service. By June 14th it was only a question of time before the West Caves area and the low ridge would be secured. Indeed, General Eichelberger, who took 3.5 days to acquaint himself with the situation at Biak, drew up new attack plans according to which the 162nd and 186th Infantry Regiments were to be employed in the same area and in much the same manner as General Fuller had been using them. General Eichelberger realized, as had General Fuller, that Borokoe and Sorido Dromes would be no safer than Mokmer Drome as long as the Japanese held the low ridge and West Caves positions. But, in the last analysis, the mission of the HURRICANE Task Force, quick seizure and rehabilitation of the Biak fields, had not been accomplished by mid-June. General Eichelberger then took command of Operation Hurricane on June 15. Although the initial plan was to keep Fuller in charge of the 41st Division, he felt unjustly treated and requested to be relieved of this role as well. Consequently, Doe was promoted to command the 41st Division in Fuller's place. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Saipan was seeing tremendous casualties for both the Japanese and Americans. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. This island was not going to be a cake walk by any measure, it would be paid for in blood.  

Inspired by Miyamoto Musashi's "The Book of Five Rings," this meditation focuses on grounding and stabilizing your Root Chakra. Just as Musashi emphasized the importance of a solid foundation, this practice will help you connect with the Earth element, fostering a sense of stability, security, and strength. Through guided visualization and deep breathing, you will anchor yourself firmly in the present moment, drawing upon the steadfastness of a samurai. Embrace this meditation to cultivate a strong foundation, enabling you to face life's challenges with resilience and confidence. Welcome to our 7-day meditation series inspired by "The Book of Five Rings" by the legendary samurai, Miyamoto Musashi. In this series, we will delve into the profound teachings of the five elements—Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, and Void—each representing a unique aspect of strategy and life. Through daily meditations and reflections, you will learn to harness these elements to cultivate inner strength, adaptability, passion, freedom, and infinite potential. Join us on this transformative journey to gain clarity, balance, and mastery in both your personal and professional life. This is episode 5 of this week's 7-day meditation series, "The Circle of 5 Rings: A Strategy to Win at Life " 379-385. THIS WEEK'S CHALLENGE: Win Differently Quest Practice going with the flow by engaging in a new activity or solving a problem in a different way than usual. Notice how being flexible and adaptable impacts your experience. Journal about a situation where adapting like water helped you navigate more effectively. A DIFFERENT MEDITATION TECHNIQUE EVERY DAY FOCUSED ON A WEEKLY THEME: Get ready for an exciting journey with a new meditation technique every day, perfectly tailored to the week's theme! Infuse these powerful practices into the most stressful moments of your day to master difficult emotions. These dynamic techniques will help you tame the "monkey mind," keeping your thoughts from interrupting your meditation and bringing peace and focus to your life. FREE TOOLS: For free meditation tools to help you meditate please head over to my website at www.SipandOm.com, and there you'll find free resources to help you on your Meditation Journey. Enjoy access to more than 3,000 guided meditations without ads on the Sip and Om app. Try it for 7 days of free access to the full app! Listen on iTunes for 1-Week Free! https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/sip-and-om/id1216664612?platform=iphone&preserveScrollPosition=true#platform/iphone   1-week Free Access to the Android app! https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.sipandom.sipandom   ***All meditations are Mary Meckley's original copyrighted content unless otherwise stated, and may not be shared without her written permission.   RESOURCES Music composed by Christopher Lloyd Clark licensed by RoyaltyFreeMusic.com, and also by musician Greg Keller.   I'D LOVE TO HEAR FROM YOU I'd love your feedback! Please let me know how you're enjoying the meditations by leaving me a review on iTunes.   **All of the information shared on this podcast is for your enjoyment only. Please don't consider the meditation techniques, herbal tea information, or other information shared by Mary Meckley or any of her guests as a replacement for any medical or psychological treatment. That being said, please enjoy any peace, energy, or clarity you may experience as you meditate.

Marc starts things off this week with some Fast and Furious talk, in addition to other movie talk, and a hint of what the next Attack the Backlog game will be, before getting to what they've been playing with Horizon Chase 2, Bread & Fred, Hive Jump 2: Survivors, Cozy Caravan, Musashi vs Cthulhu, Doctor Cat, Cat Pipes, and Doug's Nightmare. Anyway and as always, thank you for watching or listening, I hope you enjoy this here episode, and I hope you have a wonderful wonderful rest of your day. (And if you haven't already, or are a listener and not a watcher, please like, subscribe, hit the bell, and all that jazz; it may not seem like much, but it goes a long way in helping support the show and site in general. I would appreciate it greatly.)

Be guided with meditation to master your biggest fears by mastering your emotions. Welcome to the "Master Your Moods" 7-day meditation series. In this transformative journey, we will explore techniques and insights aimed at empowering you to take control of your emotional landscape. Backed by scientific research and ancient wisdom, each day will offer guided meditations and reflections to help you cultivate emotional resilience and inner balance. This is part 7  of a 7-part meditation series titled Master Your Moods, episodes 3043-3049. THIS WEEK'S CHALLENGE: Go on a Mushin (No Mind) Quest: Take part in Mushin and battle your moods like a samurai. Musashi Miyamoto is considered to be one of Japan's fiercest and most celebrated samurais. He was known to advocate for the concept of mushin, or "no-mind," in combat. It involves acting without conscious thought, free from hesitation, fear, or distraction. By training himself to enter into a state of mushin during duels and battles, Musashi could maintain emotional equilibrium and react instinctively to his opponents' movements. A DIFFERENT MEDITATION TECHNIQUE EVERY DAY FOCUSED ON A WEEKLY THEME: You are guided with a different meditation technique every day that is customized for the week's theme. Weave the techniques into the most stressful times of your day to manage difficult emotions. The meditation techniques help to calm the "monkey mind," when your thoughts continuously interrupt your meditation. FREE TOOLS: For free meditation tools to help you start meditating please head over to my website at www.SipandOm.com, and there you'll find a multitude of free resources to help you on your Meditation Journey. Enjoy access to more than 3,000 guided meditations without ads on the Sip and Om app. Try it for 7 days of free access to the full app! Listen on iTunes for 1-Week Free! https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/sip-and-om/id1216664612?platform=iphone&preserveScrollPosition=true#platform/iphone   1-week Free Access to the Android app! https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.sipandom.sipandom   ***All meditations are Mary Meckley's original copyrighted content unless otherwise stated, and may not be shared without her written permission.   RESOURCES Music composed by Christopher Lloyd Clark licensed by RoyaltyFreeMusic.com, and also by musician Greg Keller.   I'D LOVE TO HEAR FROM YOU I'd love your feedback! Please let me know how you're enjoying the meditations by leaving me a review on iTunes.   **All of the information shared on this podcast is for your enjoyment only. Please don't consider the meditation techniques, herbal tea information, or other information shared by Mary Meckley or any of her guests as a replacement for any kind of medical or psychological treatment. That being said, please enjoy any peace, energy, or clarity you may experience as you meditate!

Be guided with meditation techniques to master your most difficult emotions. Welcome to the "Master Your Moods" 7-day meditation series. In this transformative journey, we will explore techniques and insights aimed at empowering you to take control of your emotional landscape. Backed by scientific research and ancient wisdom, each day will offer guided meditations and reflections to help you cultivate emotional resilience and inner balance. This is part 6 of a 7-part meditation series titled Master Your Moods, episodes 3043-3049. THIS WEEK'S CHALLENGE: Go on a Mushin (No Mind) Quest: Take part in Mushin and battle your moods like a samurai. Musashi Miyamoto is considered to be one of Japan's fiercest and most celebrated samurais. He was known to advocate for the concept of mushin, or "no-mind," in combat. It involves acting without conscious thought, free from hesitation, fear, or distraction. By training himself to enter into a state of mushin during duels and battles, Musashi could maintain emotional equilibrium and react instinctively to his opponents' movements. A DIFFERENT MEDITATION TECHNIQUE EVERY DAY FOCUSED ON A WEEKLY THEME: You are guided with a different meditation technique every day that is customized for the week's theme. Weave the techniques into the most stressful times of your day to manage difficult emotions. The meditation techniques help to calm the "monkey mind," when your thoughts continuously interrupt your meditation. FREE TOOLS: For free meditation tools to help you start meditating please head over to my website at www.SipandOm.com, and there you'll find a multitude of free resources to help you on your Meditation Journey. Enjoy access to more than 3,000 guided meditations without ads on the Sip and Om app. Try it for 7 days of free access to the full app! Listen on iTunes for 1-Week Free! https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/sip-and-om/id1216664612?platform=iphone&preserveScrollPosition=true#platform/iphone   1-week Free Access to the Android app! https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.sipandom.sipandom   ***All meditations are Mary Meckley's original copyrighted content unless otherwise stated, and may not be shared without her written permission.   RESOURCES Music composed by Christopher Lloyd Clark licensed by RoyaltyFreeMusic.com, and also by musician Greg Keller.   I'D LOVE TO HEAR FROM YOU I'd love your feedback! Please let me know how you're enjoying the meditations by leaving me a review on iTunes.   **All of the information shared on this podcast is for your enjoyment only. Please don't consider the meditation techniques, herbal tea information, or other information shared by Mary Meckley or any of her guests as a replacement for any kind of medical or psychological treatment. That being said, please enjoy any peace, energy, or clarity you may experience as you meditate!