Podcasts about british indian

You must check out this fascinating and illuminating conversation with Rohini Walker, British-Indian writer and devoted practitioner of soul-body liberation. Rohini moved to the desert of Joshua Tree, California with her husband from London, England in 2013 and began a creative journey of writing, mentoring, and consulting. Rohini co-founded the arts and cultural print periodical Luna Arcana, with Martin Mancha (Ted's cousin) Ted was inspired to have Rohini as a guest because of her article titled “Committing to Digestion in the Information Age.” In this article from her newsletter Letters from Luna, Rohini discusses the over-consumption of information that has become addictive and normalized. Like going from one all-you-can-eat buffet to another without allowing anything to digest, this incessant consumption of news and social media keeps us distracted, anxious, and uncomfortable in our bodies with “hot heads and cold bellies.” Drawing from Ayurveda, Traditional Chinese Medicine and other indigenous wisdom traditions, Rohini shares how she works with her clients to have greater connection with one's body as well as to the natural world, allowing us to cultivate “Cool heads and warm bellies”.  This episode is guaranteed to give you some things to think about. TedinYourHead.com

Written and Narrated by Shweta Misra.First Published here https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/readersblog/creating-shared-values-for-sustainable-society/believe-it-indians-won-world-war2-29220/Consider this –Number of Soldiers in Indian Army currently- 14 lakh. approx.A number of Indian Soldiers who participated in the Second World War-A Staggering 25 lakh.Aggregating much more than1.5 times the strength of the existing Indian troops, they made the largest volunteer army of any country in the world! This information hits one like a revelation since it was never a part of history lessons in our schools and even today it is not being brought to the fore either through academics or through any other channels.More scandalous is the realization that the second world war was actually won by  Indians for the Allied Forces!  The most pivotal and decisive victory in WWII came when the Japanese army was stopped from advancing towards India via Burma. If Indian soldiers fighting under Union Jack had not disrupted  Japanese advance, they would have easily run over the Indian subcontinent and established a link with the German Army deployed in Iran. Winners of WWII would have been different then!Now come the enigmas, firstly, why Indians fought this war and secondly, why this ginormous contribution of Indians in bringing world order, not being spoken about anywhere in the world.Untangling the facts, one finds that those Indians who fought the war were young men full of nationalistic fervour who were dreaming of the ultimate Independence of their country. These were soldiers who had the assurance of the British prime minister Winston Churchill that once the war is over, India will be given Independence. These patriots fought the war as British Indian Army, laid their lives and defeated the Axis forces, only because they wanted to see their motherland break the shackles of slavery and become a free republic, post-war.If only Winston Churchill had kept his promise, the sacrifices of these Indian soldiers would have been validated. But that did not happen. On the contrary, they were simply Forgotten by Britishers because they were  Indians.The tragic part is that when India did get independence ultimately, the newly formed Indian government de-recognised the British Indian army. The pension benefits of these soldiers were terminated.But there's a solace. Not all forgot them. There is a place where their victory stories are still celebrated with pride and their history embraced with love. It is in the present Indian Army units.  Enter any of the older regiments' offices,  officer's messes, quarter guards etc. and the first thing that catches one's eye is the shine and glitter of fondly kept trophies, mementoes and memorials which are associated with the WWII veterans. Each of them features the strength, determination, valour and courage of their regimental brethren. Most Indian Army Regiments have immaculately preserved the war moments in these pieces and take immense pride displaying them, particularly for their fraternity to draw inspiration from.The details of the British Indian army should be made known to millennials.The present generation should decide whether those soldiers were really undeserving of the tag of Indian Freedom Fighters. The “freedom struggle” narrative of those who formed government immediately after India's independence can once be given a thought.The sacrifice of lakhs of  Indians during  World War II  brought world order. It should be acknowledged.#captainshwetamisra

Priya Herian is a British Indian contemporary artist who has an exhibition of her work at The Brick Lane Gallery in London from 2 to 13 July 2025 with audio descriptions of the artwork produced by Priya, inspired by her father's journey with blindness, making art accessible to her Farther and other blind and partially sighted people too.  RNIB Connect Radio's Toby Davey recently caught up with Priya to firstly find out a bit more about her journey into becoming an artist and a bit about the style and feel of her work. Then to finding out all about her Farther's journey with blindness. With Priya also explaining how she started work on making her artwork accessible to her farther and other blind and partially sighted people through producing her own recorded audio descriptions of the work that is on display at the Brick Lane Gallery in London. For more about Priya, her artwork, the audio descriptions of the work on show at the Brick Lane Gallery in London from 2-13 July do visit her website - https://www.priyaherian.co.uk To find out more about the Brick Lane Gallery do visit - https://thebricklanegallery.com  (Image shows RNIB logo. 'RNIB' written in black capital letters over a white background and underlined with a bold pink line, with the words 'See differently' underneath)

In this week's CARS Reading Skills Workshop, Molly and Jack dissect the June 2 daily passage, “Mutiny of 1857.” You'll see—in real time—how 129 + scorers turn dense paragraphs on British-Indian politics into a clear, test-day game plan.What you'll learn:- How to spot the true argument inside a long list of dates, names, and facts- Why the trial of India's Mughal Emperor signaled a power shift—and how the author uses that to prove a point- “Mythological symbols” as a hidden theme the MCAT loves to test- When a single sentence is the key to the entire passage (and how to find it fast)- Why tougher reads usually mean easier questions—and how to exploit that pattern

Radhika Vekaria is a Grammy-nominated British-Indian artist known for blending ancient Sanskrit mantras with modern soundscapes to create spiritually immersive music. Having overcome a childhood speech impediment through singing, she now uses her voice as a tool for healing and transformation. Her acclaimed album Warriors of Light earned her a 2025 Grammy nomination, and she has collaborated with global artists, including Prince and Deepak Chopra. Rooted in Vedic traditions, Radhika's music bridges cultures, languages, and generations.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mandalay. Fierce battles raged over northern Luzon as General Clarkson's forces advanced, capturing key locations while Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas targeted enemy positions. The challenging terrain favored Japanese defenses, creating fierce resistance. Despite this, American troops steadily progressed, securing hills and towns. By mid-March, the 38th Division's relentless push led to significant Japanese losses. The brutal history of POW massacres fueled American resolve, leading to further victories in the region, American forces, led by Major-General Jens Doe were given the task of invading Palawan. Despite facing fortified defenses and rough terrain, the 41st Division advanced under artillery and air support. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces clashed with the Japanese, capturing key positions and repelling assaults. As tensions rose in French Indochina, the Japanese executed a coup, disarming French forces and establishing puppet governments. The conflict intensified, reshaping the region's power dynamics. This episode is the Fall of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are picking up on Iwo Jima. By March 10, General Schmidt's Marine forces had finally breached the determined enemy defenses to reach the northeastern shore of the island. However, there were still some Japanese strongholds to eliminate in the central and southern areas. One of these was Cushman's Pocket, named after the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, and located around a devastated ridge overlooking the sea, which housed the stubborn resistance southwest of Hill 362C. The other stronghold, held by General Senda's remaining troops, was established on March 11 after General Cates initiated his final push southeast toward the sea. Consequently, while Colonel Wensinger's 23rd Marines advanced quickly to the coast, Colonel Lanigan's 25th Marines struggled to make headway, as they were quickly halted by intense rocket, mortar, and small-arms fire from Senda's pocket. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Senda had committed suicide on March 8 following the failure of his banzai counterattack, leaving the disorganized Japanese forces in the pocket without leadership. Meanwhile, General Rockey's 5th Marine Division had advanced all the way to General Kuribayashi's last line of defense in northern Iwo Jima, where the battered defenders were prepared to make their final stand. Following a 50-minute preparation involving air, naval, and artillery support on March 11, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines launched their attack on the left with three battalions in line, while Colonel Wornham's 27th Marines attacked on the right with four battalions. However, fierce resistance soon forced the combat to close quarters, resulting in the Marines advancing only a few yards—up to 50 yards—across the front. To the right, while the 21st Marines advanced northward to connect with the 5th Division, Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines resumed their assaults on Cushman's Pocket. The 1st and 3rd Battalions effectively eliminated all resistance in the eastern sector, completely sealing off the area controlled by the Japanese. On March 12, these battalions launched an attack westward toward Cushman's Pocket, with Colonel Withers' 3rd Battalion serving as a holding force on the opposite flank. However, the Marines faced strong opposition and could only advance slowly against the camouflaged enemy positions. To the north, Rocky's units continued to face intense resistance, with Liversedge making no progress and Wornham achieving only minor advances. An intelligence officer with the 5th Division estimated that a minimum of 1,000 Japanese troops were defending the northern end of the island, and stated ". . . there is no shortage of manpower, weapons, or ammunition in the area the Japanese have left to defend." The entire northern tip of the island seemed to be honeycombed with caves and passageways. When a 500-pound bomb landed in the mouth of a cave near Kitano Pint, a big puff of smoke blew out the side of a cliff over 400 yards away, and another bomb landing in a cave entrance in the same area caused a ring of smoke and dust to come up through the ground for a radius of 200 yards around the point of impact. Meanwhile, to the south, the 25th Marines pressed eastward while Colonel Jordan's 3rd Battalion contained the pocket from the north. Supported by tanks, flamethrowers, bazookas, anti-tank grenades, and 60mm mortars, Lanigan's troops engaged in fierce combat with the heavily fortified Japanese forces in the pocket for four days. During this time, Jordan's 2nd Battalion cleared the beach road, allowing the Shermans to move behind the pocket. On March 13, as Withers' 3rd Battalion returned to the 21st Marines, Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their offensive from the east, making significant gains that reduced Cushman's Pocket to 250 yards. Meanwhile, following a successful water-borne reconnaissance of Kama and Kangoku Rocks the previous afternoon, an armored amphibian company landed on these islets without encountering any resistance. At the same time, Rocky's weary Marines maintained pressure on the ridge above the gorge, achieving only slight gains on the right. Fortunately, by March 14, it seemed that the slow, arduous progress of the past three days had enabled the 27th Marines to push through the last strong enemy positions along the northeastern side of the island. As a result, Liversedge was instructed to hold position while the 26th and 27th Marines advanced north and northwest against lighter resistance, successfully gaining up to 1,000 yards by March 15.After armored dozers hacked paths forward, tanks were able to lend support. The flame tanks were particularly effective during this phase and provided "the one weapon that caused the Japanese to leave their caves and rock crevices and run." Army planes flew the last air support missions of the operation on 14 March when five P-51's dropped fire bombs (gasoline and diesel oil mixture) and strafed in front of 3/27 from 1030 to 1100. From then on, the narrow confines of the area of operations prevented use of those planes that had performed so well in supporting ground troops. Artillery and destroyers continued to furnish limited support, firing a preparation for RCT 26 on 15 March and performing night harassing and illumination missions. Meanwhile, operations against Cushman's Pocket entered their final phase on March 14, when Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions finally breached the last enemy defenses by nightfall and completed the cleanup of the pocket two days later. On March 15, Lanigan redirected the main focus of the attack on Senda's pocket to the south, ordering the two battalions in the center to engage aggressively, resulting in a gain of approximately 200 yards and a deep penetration into the left flank of the Japanese's strongest positions. During the night, enemy forces attempted to infiltrate Marine lines from the south, but each attempt was detected and thwarted. Lanigan launched his final assault on March 16, facing only small, isolated pockets of resistance that were quickly eliminated as his battalions advanced toward the beach road. That day, with organized resistance in the 3rd Division's area of operations coming to an end, the 21st Marines were deployed to relieve the 27th Marines on the right flank to continue the northwest attack. With strong naval and artillery support, Withers' 1st Battalion encountered light resistance in its sector on the right, while the 2nd Battalion faced tougher opposition from scattered enemy positions. Nevertheless, both battalions reached the coastline at Kitano Point by the afternoon and began mopping up. To the left, Colonel Graham's 26th Marines also advanced cautiously northwest, with tanks effectively neutralizing enemy positions as the Marines gained about 400 yards. Despite the presence of 500 determined enemy troops still resisting in the western section of Kitano Point and the draw to the southwest, Iwo Jima was officially declared secured by the end of the day. However, on March 17, the battle for the gorge commenced as the 26th Marines advanced under moderate rifle fire, reaching the northern coast before shifting their focus southwestward to confront the gorge in front of the 28th Marines. The gorge in which the last resisting Japanese were now cornered was rocky and steep-sided, approximately 700 yards long and between 200 and 500 yards wide. Rock outcrops cut this ravine into other minor draws that constituted major obstacles to all types of movement. The entire area was ideally suited to the type of last ditch defense the Japanese had adopted. All routes into the main gorge were swept by heavy and accurate fire from machine guns and rifles concealed in cave positions in the cliffs and outcrops. The plan for attacking this strong point called for the 28th Marines, with attached elements of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and Division Reconnaissance Company, to hold the southern rim along the steep cliffs, while the reinforced 26th Marines worked in from the north and east. For the next nine days exhausted Marines carried out a battle of attrition against the thoroughly entrenched enemy. Advances into the east end of the ravine were measured in yards as each cave had to be sealed off before further progress could be made. Flame-thrower tanks, armored bulldozers, and infantry combined operations to provide the power and teamwork necessary to penetrate the last stronghold. As they gradually pushed down the ravine, resistance concentrated around a large concrete structure built into a knoll near the eastern end. After two days of assaults that silenced the supporting positions, engineers used bulldozers to seal a door on the north side and then demolished the structure with five charges totaling 8,500 pounds of explosives. Nevertheless, the battle of attrition persisted, and it wasn't until the end of March 24 that the pocket was reduced to an area of about 50 by 50 yards at the northwest end of the draw. The following morning, units of the 28th Marines, which had taken full responsibility for the pocket, reached the coastal cliffs to finally eliminate the last remnants of resistance in the gorge. On March 20, the 147th Regiment, set to take over the defense of Iwo Jima, arrived from New Caledonia, and by March 24, it had relieved the 21st Marines to establish night ambushes and patrols. The Japanese defenders fought tenaciously until the very end, choosing death over surrender. However, Kuribayashi had one final assault planned. In the pre-dawn darkness of March 26, the final act of the tragedy was performed. Between 200 and 300 Japanese troops from Death Valley and other scattered positions on the west coast silently crept through the ravines of the 5th Division sector headed for a tented area between Airfield No. 2 and the sea occupied by a mixture of Seabees, Air Force personnel, Shore Parties and AA Gunners. Most of them were sleeping, secure in the knowledge that the battle was virtually over. In a coordinated three-pronged attack against unsuspecting Marines and Air Force ground crews, aiming to create maximum chaos and destruction. Kuribayashi and his men stealthily cut through tents, bayoneted sleeping soldiers, and threw hand grenades, resulting in the deaths of around 44 Airmen and 9 Marines. The noise soon alerted troops from the surrounding area, and Marines from a nearby Pioneer Battalion, african american troops from a Shore Party, and soldiers from the 147th Infantry joined battle in a frenzy of shooting, punching, kicking and stabbing. Once the initial surprise wore off, the defenders retaliated, engaging in a chaotic hand-to-hand combat until the 5th Pioneer Battalion quickly organized a defensive line and halted the attack. Dawn revealed the full extent of the carnage in the ruined encampment: 44 Airman and 9 Marines lay dead with a further 119 wounded; of the attackers 262 were killed and 18 captured. Lt Harry Martin of the 5th Pioneers had hurriedly organized a defense line during the attack and single-handedly killed four enemy machine gunners before dying himself. He was to be Iwo Jima's final Medal of Honor hero, bringing the total to an incredible 27.  The circumstances of General Kuribayashi's death have always been shrouded in mystery. Over the years various sources have suggested that he died in the fighting around Death Valley or that he killed himself in his HQ. According to General Kuribayashi's son, Taro: “It seems that it was after sunset on March 25 to the dawn of the 26th that surviving Imperial Japanese forces were obliged to stand still under the US onslaught and showering shells. Under such circumstances, he had his sword in his left hand and ordered the chief staff officer, Colonel Takaishi, who was beside him, 'Send snipers to shoot'. Sargent Oyama heard the order. Oyama, who was seriously wounded in the last combat, fell unconscious, was hospitalized by the US and after having served as a POW came back and testified the dreadful account of the night to me. My father had believed it shameful to have his body discovered by the enemy even after death, so he had previously asked his two soldiers to come along with him, one in front and the other behind, with a shovel in hand. In case of his death he had wanted them to bury his body there and then. It seems that my father and the soldiers were killed by shells, and he was buried at the foot of a tree in Chidori Village, along the beach near Osaka Mountain. Afterwards General Smith spent a whole day looking for his body to pay respect accordingly and to perform a burial, but in vain.” Following the destruction of this final force, the capture and occupation phase of the Iwo Jima operation was declared complete. Over 34 days of combat, approximately 18,000 Japanese soldiers were killed, and 216 were taken prisoner, while the American side suffered heavy losses: 6,821 killed, 19,217 wounded, and 137 tanks destroyed. On April 4, the 147th Regiment took over full responsibility for the ground defense of Iwo Jima as the Marines were departing the island. Throughout April and May, aggressive patrols and ambushes by infantrymen resulted in an additional 867 prisoners and 1,602 Japanese killed, with the Americans losing 15 killed and 144 wounded. Meanwhile, General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command continued its firebombing campaign against Japan. After the successful Tokyo Great Air Raid and a less effective attack on Nagoya, LeMay decided to send 301 B-29s on the afternoon of March 13 to strike Osaka. Despite having to use radar bombing due to cloud cover, American bombardiers achieved a denser and more uniform bombing pattern than the impressionistic methods employed in Nagoya. This resulted in the destruction of 8.1 square miles in the city's core, including commercial and industrial areas, and caused 13,129 civilian casualties, with the loss of 2 bombers and 13 others damaged. Keeping up the intensity of the firebombing campaign, LeMay dispatched 307 B-29s to attack Kobe on the night of March 16. They faced 314 enemy interceptors, which proved ineffective against the Superfortresses unleashing fire over the port. Consequently, the fire on March 17 spiraled out of control, obliterating the eastern half of the business district and devastating a significant industrial zone to the southeast, including the Kawasaki shipyards. Japanese statistics show that the destruction was appalling. About 500 industrial buildings were destroyed, 162 damaged. The loss of 65,951 houses left 242,468 persons homeless. Police reported 2,669 dead or missing and 11,289 injured. Although the destruction was devastating for the Japanese, LeMay was disheartened to find that only 2.9 square miles of the city had burned. To complete his campaign, LeMay sent 313 bombers back to Nagoya on the night of March 19, utilizing radar techniques to cover a large portion of the city. This resulted in the burning of 3 square miles, including the Nagoya arsenal, freight yards, and Aichi's engine works. With an average of 380 aircraft, the 21st Bomber Command conducted 1,595 sorties over 10 days, dropping a total of 9,365 tons of bombs. The results far exceeded expectations, as the B-29s left a trail of destruction across four major cities, decimating 32 square miles and destroying numerous critical targets. Thus, LeMay's strategy proved successful, leading to incendiary area bombing becoming standard practice in the future. The focus now shifts from the Central Pacific to the South Pacific, where we need to address the ongoing Australian operations in New Britain. Following the capture of Milim and Ea Ea in January, General Ramsay's 5th Division aimed to continue its limited advances to the north. To secure crossings over the Ip River and patrol towards Henry Reid Bay, the entire 6th Brigade began moving to the Kiep-Milim area on January 26, completing this relocation by February 11. Concurrently, the 14th/32nd Battalion had advanced beyond the Ip and was conducting patrols towards Kalai Plantation, where they faced enemy resistance. The 36th Battalion also moved forward to Mavelo Plantation, leading to retaliatory actions against the new Australian outpost at Baia. In response, Ramsay dispatched stronger patrols to the Sai River throughout February, successfully establishing a new defensive line along the Mavelo River by the month's end. Returning to Wide Bay, after a series of aggressive patrols and nighttime ambushes, the 14th/32nd Battalion managed to reach Kamandran Mission by mid-February. The Australians continued to advance, and by the end of the month, the 19th Battalion, which had replaced the 14th/32nd at Gogbulu Creek, secured crossings over the Mevelo River and patrolled east toward the Wulwut River. On March 3, Ramsay ordered the 6th Brigade to cross the Wulwut and capture the Waitavalo Ridge. Two days later, the 19th Battalion initiated the assault but struggled to push more than one company across the river due to fierce enemy resistance. On March 6, following an artillery bombardment, another company successfully crossed and quickly seized Cake Hill. The next day, Lone Tree Hill was taken following another round of artillery bombardment. By March 10, Moose Hill, Young's Hill, and Perry's Knoll had also been captured. In the days that followed, Australian artillery began to suppress enemy mortars as infantry moved toward Kath's Hill. By mid-March, the 14th/32nd Battalion replaced the 19th Battalion, and on March 16, the Australians resumed their offensive, facing fierce resistance but successfully encircling Bacon Hill. The assault continued the next day as the 14th/32nd fought to reach the summit of the hill. On 18th March the mortar fire was intensified from the few remaining enemy positions, and it seemed that the Japanese were firing off their ammunition while they could. The attack was resumed. When Corporal Martin's section was halted on the steep spur by fire from three posts he jumped up shouting, "They can't do that to me", and went on alone, firing posts, killing five, before he himself was hit. The decisive attack was launched through this foothold. By 3 p.m. all the Japanese had been cleared from Bacon Hill; and a patrol from Kath's, under Lieutenant Lamshed,3 penetrated to a knoll 800 yards to the east and found no enemy there. No Japanese now remained in the Waitavalo-Tol area. In the five days from the 16th to the 20th 4 officers and 53 others had been killed or wounded.  In the following days, patrols ventured deep into enemy territory but found few stragglers. On March 21, the 19th Battalion took over again and advanced toward the Bulus and Moondei Rivers. On March 28, Ramsay ordered the 13th Brigade to relieve the 6th Brigade, a transition that was completed by April 12. Following the capture of Waitavalo Ridge, there were four months of infantry patrolling and routine maintenance by other troops, with the 16th Battalion patrolling forward to Jammer Bay in this area. Additionally, looking west, a company from the 36th Battalion successfully landed north of the Sai on March 30 but could not proceed to the Matalaili River due to heavy rains. However, Japanese positions there were heavily bombarded by aircraft and the sloop Swan, prompting the defenders to withdraw to the Toriu River in April. Meanwhile, Brigadier King's 16th Brigade advanced to the Ninahau River by March 12, while Brigadier Moten's 17th Brigade continued its westward push through the Torricelli Mountains, aiming to capture the Japanese base at Maprik. Throughout March, the 2/7th Battalion executed several successful ambushes from their new bases at Ilahop, Balangabadabil, and Bombeta, while Hayforce advanced through Sinahau to the north of Utumugu and eastward to Tatimba. By early March, Moten had cleverly led the enemy to believe that the primary offensive would be launched by the 2/10th Commando Squadron from the north via Ami. As a result, the Japanese bolstered their forces in that area, successfully driving back Australian patrols from Chaulak, Gwanginan, and Wambak. On March 13, the commando outpost at Milak came under attack, with the Japanese gradually encircling the position in the following days but failing to overcome the defenders' steadfast resistance. Fortunately, by March 17, patrols had restored communication lines, and two days later, the enemy pressure finally subsided. During this time, smaller Japanese forces also targeted the commando outposts at Murak and Aupik, but the defenders managed to repel these attacks as well. However, as the 2/10th was completely exhausted, the 2/6th Battalion was dispatched to relieve the commandos in late March amid a new wave of Japanese assaults. Meanwhile, the 2/7th Battalion was engaged in assaults on the fortified enemy positions at Ilaheta, which fell on March 20. The Australians then turned their attention to the Aupik villages, successfully focusing their efforts on the west bank of the Ninab River by the end of March, coinciding with Hayforce's crossing of the Amuk River. In the following three days, the 2/7th Battalion cleared all opposition along the eastern side of the Ninab in preparation for the final push toward Maprik. Consequently, General Miyake's 78th Regiment was ultimately compelled to retreat toward Jamei. Looking further north, King decided to initiate his advance towards But. By mid-March, a company from the 2/2nd Battalion had crossed the Ninahau on March 14 and quickly moved through Bai and Ultan. Although the Australian advance faced a strong enemy position that delayed progress for two days, the 2/2nd ultimately broke through Manib Creek, catching the defenders off guard and swiftly capturing the But airfield on March 17. Following this, the Australians patrolled the foothills and the Old German Road towards the Dagua airfield, encountering minimal resistance. Consequently, on March 21, the 2/2nd advanced rapidly again, successfully taking Dagua while the 2/1st Battalion moved in to secure But. At this stage, Japanese resistance along the coast was light, as General Adachi had focused on the Maprik district, which could produce more food. With the main enemy forces now concentrated in the hills to the south, King directed the 2/2nd to clear the foothills south of Dagua and eliminate the enemy in the Tokoku Pass, while the 2/3rd Battalion launched a flanking attack in the Mabam River-Hamsuk-Yalaminuni area. The 2/2nd then patrolled deep towards Magahen and Wonginara Mission, facing strong resistance at the 1410 Feature. On March 24, they finally captured the feature, while another patrol reached Wonginara without encountering enemy forces. However, in the final days of March, the Australians struggled to advance against the strong resistance of the Japanese defenders on the Wonginara Track, although one patrol successfully probed towards Kauremerak Hill. On April 2, following intense air and artillery bombardments, the 2/2nd Battalion finally managed to break through to Tokoku Pass, which was secured the next day. Meanwhile, another patrol advanced south from Dagua to the Autogi-Walanduum area and then to the coast near Kofi. The 2/3rd Battalion moved south from Feature 1410 towards the Mabam River and Wonginara Mission, successfully eliminating a series of Japanese ridge positions by April 6. The 2/1st Battalion patrolled deep into the hills south and west of But, completely clearing the area by April 1 while also pushing eastward to capture Saburuman. Concurrently, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion advanced to the upper Ninahau, effectively clearing the region up to a north-south line about two miles beyond Muguluwela by the end of March. In early April, the machine-gunners successfully cleared the Marabus area and connected with the 2/1st Battalion. Finally, it was time to shift focus to Bougainville to continue covering the Australian offensives on the island. As previously noted, Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade had secured the Tsimba Ridge area, while Brigadier Field's 7th Brigade was advancing south towards the Puriata River. The swift capture of Mosigetta and the unexpected secondary landing at Toko had already compelled the Japanese to retreat behind the river amid a command crisis. The Japanese policy of resisting the southward advance more strongly even if it entailed heavier casualties failed to impose the hoped-for delay of the Australians. Nevertheless the Japanese leaders considered that the 13th Regiment's "swift damaging hit-and-run tactics" were well executed. However, Mosigetta was at length abandoned and a withdrawal south of the Puriata ordered. The landing at Toko was unexpected and caused an acceleration of this withdrawal. There now occurred a major crisis in the Japanese command. The young reserve officers were highly critical of the conduct of the campaign and blamed the policies of the older professional officers for the constant reverses. This criticism became so outspoken that, in February, a number of the younger officers were relieved of their commands; perhaps partly as an outcome of this crisis, General Hyakutake suffered a paralysis of his left side. General Kanda took command of the 17th Army and Lieutenant-General Akinaga Tsutomu, Chief of Staff of the Army, succeeded him in command of the 6th Division. "This change of command was regarded favourably by the younger officers, but it soon became apparent that Kanda intended to pursue the same policy as Hyakutake. Kanda was a shrewd, hard, fussy little professional soldier of long experience. He was steeped in tradition and a ruthless commander, but even his bitterest critics admitted his capabilities. Akinaga… was a dyed in the wool militarist and a strict disciplinarian. Unused to an active command he was plunged into a situation which was a little out of his depth. One of his staff stated that he spent too much time doing a corporal's job in his forward battalions to be a good divisional commander." In late February, General Bridgeford's forces advanced toward the Puriata, facing only minor rearguard positions. The 25th Battalion captured Barara on February 22 and a five-acre garden two days later, while the 61st Battalion took control of another garden measuring 600 by 400 yards near the river on March 1. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron was sent to secure the Makapeka area, successfully taking Commando Ridge and a ford across the Makapeka River by March 5. With General Savige aiming to reach the Hari River next, Bridgeford promptly ordered the 7th Brigade to move to the Hongorai River line. As a result, Field planned to initiate his main advance on March 11, utilizing the 25th Battalion and the 2/8th Commando Squadron, while the 61st Battalion pushed forward toward Horinu. In response, Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to bolster the 13th at the front, preparing both units for a full-scale counterattack should the Australians cross the Puriata, aiming to delay the enemy long enough to finalize preparations for a decisive battle along the Silibai-Porror Rivers. By March 5, the 25th Battalion had already crossed the river and swiftly captured Slater's Knoll, which soon came under enemy mortar fire. Patrols were sent ahead and found that the 13th Regiment was poised to fiercely contest the Australian advance. Although the northern flank of the 25th Battalion would be effectively contained along the Buin Road on March 11, two Australian companies managed to maneuver through Tokinotu to the south, reaching Hiru Hiru by the end of the day. One of these companies moved along the eastern side of the Buin Road toward Slater's Knoll, but from March 15 to 17, they faced a heavy counterattack that ultimately forced them to withdraw. In response, Field initiated a strong offensive along the Buin Road on March 19, managing to push the Japanese back to some rear positions. Following a significant air and artillery bombardment, the attack resumed on March 22, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance. Meanwhile, the commandos advanced to Nihero, where they began extensive patrols southward towards Unanai, Hari, and the Buin Road. During one of these patrols, they captured detailed orders for a large-scale Japanese offensive planned for early April. As a result, Bridegeford decided to pause his offensive and send the 15th Brigade along with a tank squadron to Toko to reinforce his perimeter. On March 28 and 29, before Akinaga's main assault, the Japanese conducted a series of raids on the Australian lines of communication and rear areas, all of which were successfully repelled by vigilant defenders. On March 30, the 13th Regiment launched several strong attacks against the 25th Battalion, all of which were costly for the attackers and repelled, while the armored squadron advanced toward Tokinotu. Just as the tanks reached the front, the Japanese initiated another wave of fierce attacks against the 25th Battalion on March 31, which were thankfully repelled with the support of the armored units. Consequently, on April 1, two companies advanced again, establishing a perimeter 1,000 yards south of Slater's Knoll. That evening, and for the following three days, Akinaga launched a series of raids to facilitate the arrival of the 23rd Regiment for a renewed assault. In the early hours of April 5, the Japanese began infiltrating the Australian perimeter, launching a vigorous two-pronged assault on Slater's Knoll later that morning. The 23rd Regiment attacked about 1,000 yards to the right of the 13th and north-east of it. The attack failed, Kawano was killed and the regiment withdrew south to the rear of the 13th. The 13th Regiment with 600 men made the main attack from north and east.  Until 6.20 a.m. wave after wave charged forward and was brought low. Some Japanese fell within four yards of the weapon-pits. The artillery sent over accurate defensive fire, registered the previous day. At dawn the surviving Japanese were heard digging in on dead ground. As the light became clearer, the Australians saw that "enemy dead lay, literally, in heaps in front of the wire", and bodies could be seen scattered over an area some 200 yards square. It was gruesome evidence of the efficient siting of weapons and choice of fields of fire in preparation for expected attack. The attackers were ordered to dig in until darkness and make full use of grenades and mortars. However, in the afternoon, tanks and artillery fire drove the Japanese from the positions they had gained, and the Japanese commander accepted defeat. All three battalion commanders in the 13th were killed. After Akinaga had reported his failure Kanda said to his Chief of Staff, Colonel Yoshiyuki Ejima: "It would not have happened if I had been in command. The enemy right flank was wide open. I would have severed his life line and controlled Toko. We could have delayed the enemy for three months."  Concurrently, around 100 Japanese troops attacked the two forward companies along the Buin Road but were similarly repelled with ease. Following the unsuccessful counteroffensive by Akinaga, Slater's Knoll received reinforcements while the remaining Japanese forces were being dealt with, resulting in 620 Japanese fatalities since March 28, compared to 189 Australian casualties. However, Bridgeford could not capitalize on this victory due to the prolonged supply line, which temporarily halted his offensive. As a result, while the 2/8th Commando Squadron moved forward along the Commando Road, the 13th Brigade began to relieve the battered 7th Brigade under Field on April 13. Meanwhile, in the northern sector of the 11th Brigade area, the 26th Battalion launched a significant advance northward on February 21, successfully overrunning the Lalum-Downs' Ridge area by March 8. Two companies then advanced further north to secure the crossing of the Nagam River. On March 13, another company landed near the southern edge of Soraken Plantation and quickly pushed the enemy back behind the Nagam. Australian patrols harassed the Japanese forces at Horseshoe Knoll until March 20, when they finally withdrew. Simultaneously, the 26th Battalion eliminated the remaining enemy positions at the Compton River and secured the Soraken Peninsula, while the Taiof and Saposa Islands were also captured off the coast. The next battalion to take over the forward positions was the 31st/51st Battalion. Perhaps the outstanding patrol leader in the 31st/51st was Lieutenant Reiter, who led out 3 patrols which killed 10 out of the 78 Japanese killed by this battalion's forays. One of these patrols was named by the battalion "the raid on Reiter's Ridge". Reiter and 15 men were given the task of harassing the Japanese occupying a prominent ridge just east of Sisivie and discovering their strength. They departed from Keenan's Ridge at 17:30 on March 27, bivouacked at a former artillery observation post and moved on at 03:00 next morning for a dawn attack. At 06:00 “the patrol moved in, and throwing grenades and firing LMG occupied a small knoll (its report stated). 2 Japanese were killed and 1 pillbox containing LMG destroyed. Patrol raced down narrow neck to a wide clearing in which several huts were sighted. Phosphorus and HE grenades were thrown. In a matter of seconds 4 more Japanese killed (2 in slit trenches, 1 as he ran and another while abluting). 2 were wounded by phosphorus grenades. 3 huts were blazing and 1 (considered to be an ammunition dump) blew up. Enemy opened up with one LMG and 15 rifles and patrol pulled out with 1 man wounded.” Instead of hastening them away Reiter assembled his men nearby in concealment and watched the enemy. At length Japanese began to move about again, and soon they were washing clothes, chopping wood and performing other tasks. There were from 25 to 30 enemy in the post. The Australians watched throughout the morning and at 12:30 opened fire with all their weapons. 2 Japanese were killed and 4 more huts set on fire. The enemy fired back, and at 01:15 Reiter withdrew his men and returned to Keenan's Ridge leaving an ambush on the enemy's track. The ambush party returned later and reported that it had seen no movement.  On the 29th, the day after Reiter's return, a platoon of the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion under Lieutenant Martin set out for Buritsiotorara along the Wakunai River. There they found three huts and a large garden with seven Japanese moving about unarmed. Throwing grenades and firing from the hip the native soldiers attacked and killed all seven. Three more who emerged from a hut were chased and killed. Three of the dead men were found to be lieutenants; three machine-guns were cap-tured. Next day at Aviang, 1,200 yards away, seven more Japanese were seen, of whom three including another lieutenant were killed and the others fled. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima had come to a bitter end. The lessons learnt on Iwo Jima would become guidelines for the Battle of Okinawa in April and would influence allied plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The war planners would later notably take into account that around a third of the troops committed to Iwo Jima, and later again at Okinawa, had been killed or wounded and that they could expect far more in Japan.

Last time we spoke about the Great Tokyo Air Raid. Amidst fierce battles, Liversedge's forces captured key hills but faced relentless Japanese machine-gun fire. Despite heavy casualties, the Marines advanced, securing strategic positions. General Kuribayashi recognized their struggle, while the Japanese counterattacks faltered. After 19 grueling days, the last pockets of resistance fell, marking a costly victory for the Americans. Amid the fierce battle of Iwo Jima, General LeMay shifted tactics, launching incendiary raids on Tokyo. On March 9, 1945, 334 B-29s unleashed destruction, igniting widespread fires and devastating neighborhoods. The attack shattered Japanese morale, while LeMay's strategy proved effective, paving the way for further offensives in the Pacific. On March 3, three brigades attacked Meiktila, facing fierce resistance. Tanks overwhelmed Japanese forces, resulting in heavy casualties. As Cowan fortified defenses, Japanese counterattacks intensified. Meanwhile, in Mandalay, British-Indian troops advanced, capturing key positions. Amidst confusion and conflicting orders, the Allies pressed forward, striving for victory in Burma. This episode is the Fall of Mandalay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are first picking up this week with the men fighting over northern Luzon. By March 5, General Clarkson's 33rd Division had advanced to Agoo and Pago while gradually pushing the enemy along Route 11. Meanwhile, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla force was carrying out limited offensives in the Laoag, Cervantes, and San Fernando regions. Coming into Salacsac Pass from the west, the Villa Verde Trail twists up the wooded western slopes of a steep-sided height known to the 32nd Division as Hill 502. Another peak, bare crested, forming part of the same hill mass and named Hill 503, centers 250 yards northeast of the crest of Hill 502, while a similar distance to the southeast is Hill 504. Winding along the southern slopes of Hills 502 and 504, the trail continues eastward through a low saddle about 500 yards long, climbing again up the forested northwestern side of Hill 505. After crossing that hill, the trail follows a twisting course 600 yards--as the crow flies--eastward, hugging the densely wooded northern slopes of Hills 506A and 506B. Off the northeast corner of Hill 506B the trail turns south for 1000 yards--again a straight-line distance--and traverses the east side of the noses of Hill 507, designated from north to south A, B, C and D. Turning sharply east again near Hill 507D, the trail continues east another 700 yards and then enters a deep wooded saddle between Hill 508 on the south and Hill 515 to the north. After passing through this saddle, which is about 250 yards long east to west, the trail goes on eastward, dominated on the north by Hills 516 and 525. Roughly 1250 yards beyond the saddle the trail twists across the northern slopes of Hill 526, which lying about 500 yards southeast of Hill 525, marks the eastern limits of the Salacsac Pass area. A mile and a quarter of less rugged but still forested and difficult terrain lies between Hill 526 and barrio Imugan, in turn two and a quarter miles west of Santa Fe.  Meanwhile General Mullins' 25th Division had successfully taken control of Puncan and Digdig. Due to this unexpectedly swift progress, General Swift instructed Mullins to continue advancing toward Putlan while the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment fought for control of Hill 502, which was secured on March 7. In response, Mullins dispatched the 161st Regiment to attack the high ground west of Route 5, the 27th Regiment to advance along and east of the highway, and the 35th Regiment to execute a wide envelopment to the east. Since this last flank approach to Putlan was completely undefended, the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment quickly occupied Putlan on March 8. The following day, the 27th Regiment also arrived in the area and began clearing Japanese stragglers from the ravines east of Route 5 near the barrio, a task that would not be finished until March 15. Finally, despite facing rough terrain and light resistance, the 161st Regiment reached Putlan on March 10, successfully securing the high ground to the west. To the north, as the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment struggled to make significant progress eastward after capturing Hill 502, Gill decided to send the 3rd Battalion, 127th Regiment to outflank the Salacsac Pass defenses from the south.  Although the extremely rough, precipitous mountain country of the Salacsac Pass area, averaging 4500 feet above sea level, was covered by dense rainforest, from Hill 506B to Hill 526, there was sufficient open ground throughout to provide the defender with excellent observation. It was not too difficult for the Japanese to find positions whence they could cover with fire every square foot of the Villa Verde Trail through the pass area. The twisting of the trail also provided defense opportunities, for in a given 1000 yards of straight-line distance through the pass, the trail might actually cover a ground distance of 3000 yards. Whatever its shortcomings in other fields, the Japanese Army always had a feel for terrain, exploiting to the full every advantage the ground offered. Thus, as it moved up, the 2nd Tank Division set to work to establish a system of mutually supporting defensive positions in order to control every twist of the Villa Verde Trail and every fold in the ground throughout the pass area. Every knoll and hillock on or near the trail was the site of at least one machine gun emplacement; every wooded draw providing a route for outflanking a position was zeroed in for artillery or mortars. The cave, natural or man-made, came to characterize the defenses. Artillery was employed in quantity and quality not often encountered in engagements against the Japanese, who, as usual, made excellent use of their light and medium mortars. Finally, the 2nd Tank Division was overstocked in automatic weapons, evidently having available many more than the 32nd Division could bring to bear. To the west, following recent successes in patrols, Clarkson opted to establish a new "secure line" stretching from Aringay southeast through Pugo to Route 11 at Twin Peaks. Consequently, patrols quickly secured Aringay and Caba without facing any opposition, then advanced east along the trails to Pugo and Galiano, and north to Bauang, where they continued to encounter minimal enemy presence. As a result of these movements, the Hayashi Detachment was ultimately withdrawn to bolster the main defenses at Sablan, enabling Volckman's 121st Regiment to enter San Fernando on March 14. Additionally, elements of the 19th Division began arriving in the Cervantes area from Baguio and successfully expelled the guerrilla company from the town in early March. The Filipinos recaptured Cervantes on March 13 but soon found themselves targeted by Japanese artillery positioned on elevated ground. Meanwhile, looking south, by March 5, General Patrick's 6th Division had commenced unsuccessful assaults on Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, while General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade struggled to advance toward the Antipolo area. Recognizing that the success of his attack required a concentration of forces along a narrower front, General Griswold decided to focus on the Noguchi Force and the left flank of the Kobayashi Force, as the northern area was heavily fortified. He retained only one battalion as an infantry reserve and directed the remainder of his available forces, all of which were understrength, to push eastward. Alongside the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 103rd Regiment reached Taytay on March 7 to serve as the 1st Cavalry Division Reserve, signaling the upcoming relief of the cavalrymen in preparation for their redeployment to southern Luzon. By March 10, General Wing's 43rd Division had been replaced in the Clark Field area by the 38th Division and was en route to the eastern front.  The 38th Division pushed on into the untracked, ill-explored, and worse-mapped wilderness of the central Zambales Range, its progress slowed more by supply problems than Japanese resistance. In early April the division noted that the last vestiges of any controlled defensive effort had disappeared. Unknown to 11th Corps General Tsukada, on April 6, had given up and had ordered his remaining forces to disperse and continue operations, if possible, as guerrillas. For the Japanese remnants, it was a case of sauve qui peut. Some tried to escape to Luzon's west coast, whence 38th Division troops were already patrolling inland; others tried to make their way north through the mountains, only to be cut down by American patrols working southward from Camp O'Donnell. The 38th Division had killed about 8000 of the scattering Japanese by the time it was relieved by units of the 6th Division on May 3. The losses of the 38th totaled approximately 100 men killed and 500 wounded. The 6th Division, elements of which remained in the Kembu area until June 25, limited its operations to patrolling and setting up trail blocks along Japanese routes of escape. Troops of the 38th Division ultimately returned to the region and remained there until the end of the war. Insofar as US forces were concerned, the mop-up period under 11th Corps control was even more costly than had been the 14th Corps' offensive period. From February 21 to the end of June the various elements of 11th Corps committed to action against the Kembu Group lost approximately 550 men killed and 2200 wounded. The Kembu Group, during the same period, lost 12500 killed or dead from starvation and disease. By the end of the war the original 30000 troops of the Kembu Group were reduced to approximately 1500 sorry survivors, about 1000 of them Army personnel. Another 500 had already been taken prisoner. As a result, General Tsukada ordered his remaining troops to scatter and operate as guerrillas. Meanwhile, Griswold resumed his eastern offensive on March 8. In the south, bolstered by artillery and mortars, the battered 2nd Cavalry Brigade continued to advance slowly under heavy artillery fire, reaching a point 440 yards short of Antipolo along Route 60A and overcoming the enemy cave defenses at Benchmark 11. By March 11, patrols had entered Antipolo, discovering the town was devastated and deserted, yet still under the threat of Japanese artillery and mortars positioned in the hills to the north and northeast. Simultaneously, the 1st Cavalry Brigade made significant strides to the north, also coming within 440 yards of Antipolo while clearing Benchmark 9 Hill and Hills 520 and 740. Abandoning the Montalban-San Mateo area, Patrick instructed the 1st and 20th Regiments to advance toward Mounts Baytangan and Yabang. Facing unexpectedly light resistance, the 1st Regiment advanced a mile and a half east by March 11 and secured Benchmark 8 Hill to the south despite encountering stubborn opposition. Recognizing the need to capitalize on this success, Patrick then ordered the 20th Regiment to move through the 1st and attack north toward Wawa Dam while the latter continued its eastward assault. On March 11, the 103rd Regiment took over from the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and quickly began planning to outflank General Noguchi's defenses located southeast of Antipolo. However, due to concerns over American advances, General Yokoyama ordered the Noguchi Force to retreat to secondary defensive positions while preparing for a three-pronged counterattack set for March 12. The primary effort involved four reserve battalions from the Kobayashi Force, which launched an attack southward from Mount Mataba toward Marikina but were quickly halted by intense air and artillery fire, falling far short of their target. Additionally, the 182nd Independent Battalion attempted a counterattack toward Benchmark 8 but was unsuccessful, while the majority of the Kawashima Force advanced south from the Ipo Dam area to assault the rear installations of the 6th Division west of the Marikina River, where they were easily repelled by March 15. During this so-called counterattack, Griswold continued his offensive, with the 103rd Regiment swiftly advancing through the deserted Antipolo to Benchmark 7 Hill, and the 20th Regiment moving over a mile north to secure a position on a grassy ridge less than a mile southeast of Mount Mataba's summit. On March 14, the 1st Regiment resumed its eastern assault, successfully advancing north to a bare peak about a mile southwest of Mount Baytangan, despite facing strong resistance that caused heavy casualties, including the loss of General Patrick, who was succeeded by Brigadier-General Charles Hurdis as commander of the 6th Division. Simultaneously, Wing initiated a coordinated offensive with two regiments toward Mounts Yabang, Caymayuman, and Tanauan, aiming to flank the Shimbu Group's left. Although the 103rd and 179th Regiments achieved significant progress that day, Noguchi's determined defenders managed to maintain control of Benchmark 7. Looking further south, Griswold was preparing to launch a two-pronged offensive in southern Luzon. General Swing's 511th Parachute Regiment and the 187th Glider Regiment were set to advance towards Lipa from the north and northwest, while the 158th Regiment gathered near Nasugbu to attack southeast along Route 17 toward Balayan Bay. In response, Colonel Fujishige's Fuji Force had established several small positions in the area to prevent American forces from flanking the Shimbu Group's main defenses by rounding the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay. Swing's offensive commenced on March 7, with the 187th Glider Regiment descending the steep southern slopes of Tagaytay Ridge to the northern shore of Lake Taal, ultimately stopping at a hill two miles west of Tanauan due to strong resistance. The 511th Parachute Regiment moved out from Real, reaching within a mile of Santo Tomas while launching unsuccessful frontal assaults on Mount Bijiang. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment advanced from Nasugbu, quickly securing Balayan before pushing eastward with little opposition toward Batangas, which fell on March 11. On its eastward path, the regiment bypassed significant elements of the 2nd Surface Raiding Base Force on the Calumpan Peninsula, necessitating that a battalion clear that area by March 16. At the same time, other units of the 158th Regiment encountered robust Japanese defenses blocking Route 417 at Mount Macolod, where their advance came to a halt. Concurrently, General Eichelberger continued his offensive against the central islands of the Visayan Passages, with reinforced companies from the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment successfully landing on Romblon and Simara islands on March 11 and 12, respectively. Most importantly for Eichelberger, he was about to initiate his Visayas Campaign. To disrupt Japanese communication lines across the South China Sea, the 8th Army needed to quickly capture airfields that would allow the Allied Air Forces to project land-based air power over the waters west of the Philippines more effectively than from Clark Field or Mindoro. Consequently, the first target chosen was Palawan, which was defended by only two reinforced companies from the 102nd Division. Additionally, MacArthur's strategy included the eventual reoccupation of the East Indies, starting with the capture of Japanese-controlled oil resources in northern Borneo as soon as land-based air support was available. The Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago were identified as the second targets, although these areas were defended by stronger garrisons from the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. Despite this, Eichelberger tasked Major-General Jens Doe's 41st Division with executing these invasions. For the Palawan invasion, codenamed Operation Victor III, Brigadier-General Harold Haney was appointed to lead a force primarily composed of the 186th Regiment, which would be transported to the island by Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2. The convoy departed from Mindoro on February 26, escorted by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs' cruisers and destroyers. Following a naval bombardment, Haney's Palawan Force successfully landed at Puerto Princesa on February 28 without encountering any opposition. They quickly secured the town and the two airstrips to the east, advancing to the western and southern shores of the harbor by late afternoon to establish a defensive perimeter. As the first day progressed, it became clear to the American troops that the Japanese troops would not put up a fight at Puerto Princesa and had withdrawn into the hills to the northwest. More disturbing was the revelation of a massacre of approximately 140 American prisoners of war the previous December. The presence of a passing Allied convoy made the alarmed Japanese believe that an invasion was imminent and had herded their prisoners into air-raid shelters, subsequently setting the shelters afire and shooting prisoners who tried to escape. Only 11 American prisoners of war miraculously survived immolation and escaped the shooting. Sheltered by natives until the Americans landed, they emerged during the battle to tell their horrifying tale, which only hardened American resolve to end Japanese rule over the island. By March 1, the 186th Regiment had successfully taken control of Irahuan and Tagburos. In the following week, American forces would eliminate two or three heavily defended strongholds located ten miles north-northwest of Puerto Princesa, where the enemy garrison was ultimately defeated. The Palawan Force also conducted reconnaissance of several offshore islets, discovering no Japanese presence on some and swiftly clearing others. However, due to the poorly compacted soil, the new airfield on the island would not be operational until March 20, which was too late for any aircraft based in Palawan to assist with the Zamboanga landings. Consequently, on March 8, two reinforced companies from the 21st Regiment were flown to the airstrip at Dipolog, which had been secured by Colonel Hipolito Garma's guerrilla 105th Division. On the same day, sixteen Marine Corsairs arrived to provide air support for the invasion of Zamboanga, codenamed Operation Victor IV. For this operation, Doe assigned the remainder of his division, which was to be transported by Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1. After three days of pre-assault bombardments and minesweeping, the convoy finally set sail southward and entered Basilan Strait from the west early on March 10. Troops from the 162nd Regiment landed almost without opposition around 09:15 near barrio San Mateo and quickly secured Wolfe Field, while the 163rd Regiment was also landing. Doe's two regiments then began to advance inland, facing minimal resistance as they established a night perimeter. With the Japanese having withdrawn, the 162nd and 163rd Regiments easily secured Zamboanga City, San Roque Airfield, and the rest of the coastal plain by dusk on March 11, with one company extending further to Caldera Bay to the west. To drive the Japanese forces from the elevated positions overlooking the airfield, Doe dispatched the 162nd Regiment towards Mount Capisan and the 163rd Regiment towards Mount Pulungbata. Additionally, the guerrilla 121st Regiment was tasked with blocking the east coast road in the Belong area. Supported by continuous artillery fire and close air support from Marine Corps planes, the two regiments of the 41st Division faced arduous tasks. General Hojo's troops held excellent defenses in depth across a front 5 miles wide, some portions of the line being 3 miles deep. All installations were protected by barbed wire; abandoned ground was thoroughly booby-trapped; mine fields, some of them of the remote-control type, abounded; and at least initially the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade had an ample supply of automatic weapons and mortars. While Japanese morale on the Zamboanga Peninsula was not on a par with that of 14th Area Army troops on Luzon, most of the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade and attached units had sufficient spirit to put up a strong fight as long as they held prepared positions, and Hojo was able to find men to conduct harassing counterattacks night after night. Finally, the terrain through which the 41st Division had to attack was rough and overgrown, giving way on the north to the rain forests of the partially unexplored mountain range forming the backbone of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Only poor trails existed in most of the area held by the Japanese, and the 41st Division had to limit its advance to the pace of bulldozers, which laboriously constructed supply and evacuation roads. Once the American troops entered the peninsula's foothills, tanks could not operate off the bulldozed roads. The next day, the 186th Regiment was deployed to relieve the fatigued 163rd Regiment on the eastern front. By the end of the month, it had expanded the front eastward and northward against diminishing resistance, ultimately forcing Hojo's forces to retreat into the rugged interior of the peninsula. For now, however, we will shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to continue our coverage of the Chinese-British-Indian offensives. As we last observed, General Stopford's 33rd Corps was aggressively advancing into Mandalay against a weakened 15th Army, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division had successfully captured Meiktila and was preparing to withstand the combined assaults of the 18th and 49th Divisions. Cowan's forces conducted a robust defense, managing to delay the arrival of the 49th Division until March 18 and successfully repelling General Naka's initial attacks on Meiktila's main airfield. Furthermore, with the reserve 5th Indian Division moving closer to the front in preparation for an advance towards Rangoon, General Slim decided to airlift the 9th Brigade to reinforce Cowan's troops, which landed on Meiktila's main airfield under enemy fire between March 15 and 17. Due to the slow progress on this front and General Katamura's preoccupation with the battles along the Irrawaddy, he was unable to manage the southern units simultaneously. Consequently, General Kimura decided to assign the 33rd Army to take over the fighting in Meiktila. General Honda promptly moved to Hlaingdet, where he was tasked with overseeing the 18th, 49th, and 53rd Divisions. On March 18, he ordered the 18th Division to secure the northern line of Meiktila and neutralize enemy airfields. He instructed the 49th Division to advance along the Pyawbwe-Meiktila road and directed the 53rd Division to regroup near Pyawbwe. However, on that same day, Cowan launched a counterattack by sending two tank-infantry columns to disrupt Japanese preparations along the Mahlaing road and in the villages of Kandaingbauk and Shawbyugan. They faced heavy resistance at Shawbyugan and ultimately had to withdraw. The relentless air assaults also compelled the Japanese to operate primarily at night, limiting their ability to respond with similar force to British offensives. On the night of March 20, Naka decided to initiate a significant attack on Meiktila's main airfield. However, with the 119th Regiment delayed at Shawbyugan, the 55th Regiment had to proceed alone, supported by some tanks, against the defenses of the 99th Brigade around Kyigon. Heavy artillery and mortar fire ultimately disrupted their assault. Meanwhile, as the 49th Division was consolidating its forces to the southeast, Cowan opted to send two tank-infantry columns to eliminate enemy concentrations at Nyaungbintha and Kinlu. Although the initial sweeps met little resistance, the 48th Brigade encountered strong Japanese positions at Shwepadaing on March 21. The next day, Cowan dispatched two tank-infantry columns to secure the Shwepadaing and Tamongan regions, but the British-Indian forces still struggled to eliminate the enemy defenders. That night, Lieutenant-General Takehara Saburo initiated his first significant assault, with the majority of the 106th Regiment targeting the defensive positions of the 48th Brigade in southeastern Meiktila. Despite the fierce and relentless attacks from the Japanese throughout the night, they were ultimately repelled by artillery and machine-gun fire, suffering heavy casualties. On March 23, Cowan sent another tank-infantry column to chase the retreating Japanese forces; however, the reformed 169th Regiment at Kinde successfully defended against this advance. Meanwhile, on the night of March 24, Naka launched another major offensive with the 55th and 119th Regiments, managing to capture Meiktila's main airfield. In response, Cowan quickly dispatched a tank-infantry column to clear the Mandalay road, successfully securing the area northeast of Kyigon by March 26. At this time, Honda had relocated his headquarters to Thazi to better coordinate the battle, although his troops had already suffered significant losses. For the next three days, Cowan's tanks and infantry continued to advance along the Mandalay road while the 63rd and 99th Brigades worked to eliminate Naka's artillery units south of Myindawgan Lake. By mid-March, Stopford's relentless pressure had forced the 31st and 33rd Divisions to retreat in chaos. On March 20, organized resistance in Mandalay was finally shattered as the 2nd British Division linked up with the 19th Indian Division. Consequently, the beleaguered Japanese units had no option but to withdraw in disarray towards the Shan Hills to the east. Following the collapse of the 15th Army front, the 33rd Army received orders on March 28 to hold its current positions only long enough to facilitate the withdrawal of the 15th Army. Consequently, while Cowan's units cleared the region north of Meiktila, Honda halted all offensive actions and promptly directed the 18th Division to secure the Thazi-Hlaingdet area. Additionally, the weakened 214th Regiment was tasked with moving to Yozon to support the withdrawal of the 33rd Division, while the 49th and 53rd Divisions were assigned to contain Meiktila to the south. As the battles for Mandalay and Meiktila unfolded, the reinforced 7th Indian Division at Nyaungu faced several intense assaults from General Yamamoto's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade throughout March, ultimately advancing to Taungtha and clearing the route to Meiktila by the month's end. Meanwhile, in northern Burma, the 36th British Division advanced toward Mogok, which fell on March 19, while the 50th Chinese Division approached the Hsipaw area. Interestingly, the Japanese abandoned Hsipaw without resistance but launched a fierce counterattack between March 17 and 20. Ultimately, General Matsuyama had no option but to prepare for a withdrawal south toward Lawksawk and Laihka. At this stage, the 38th Chinese Division resumed its advance to Hsipaw; however, facing strong opposition along the route, they did not arrive until March 24, when the entire Burma Road was finally secured. General Sultan believed this was his final maneuver and recommended relocating the Chinese forces back to the Myitkyina area for air transport back to China, except for those needed to secure the Lashio-Hsipaw region. Additionally, the 36th Division continued its eastward push and eventually linked up with the 50th Division in the Kyaukme area by the end of the month before being reassigned to Slim's 14th Army. Looking south, the 74th Indian Brigade and West African forces advanced toward Kolan, while the 26th Indian Division established a new beachhead in the Letpan-Mae region. The 154th Regiment maintained its position near the Dalet River, preventing the remainder of the 82nd West African Division from joining the offensive. On March 23, General Miyazaki decided to launch an attack on Kolan. Although the assault achieved moderate success, Miyazaki soon recognized that he was outnumbered and opted to begin a final withdrawal toward the An Pass, completing this by the end of the month.   Meanwhile, on March 17, the 121st Regiment sent its 3rd Battalion to engage the enemy in the Sabyin area and hold their position along the Tanlwe River for as long as possible. Despite strong resistance from the Japanese, British-Indian forces managed to cross the Tanlwe by March 27 and successfully captured Hill 815 two days later. By March 30, the 22nd East African Brigade had also reached Letpan when High Command decided to relieve the units of the 26th Division and return them to India. In a related development, tensions were rising in French Indochina, where the local government refused to permit a Japanese defense of the colony. By early March, Japanese forces began redeploying around the main French garrison towns in Indochina. The Japanese envoy in Saigon Ambassador Shunichi Matsumoto declared to Governor Admiral Jean Decoux that since an Allied landing in Indochina was inevitable, Tokyo command wished to put into place a "common defence" of Indochina. Decoux however resisted stating that this would be a catalyst for an Allied invasion but suggested that Japanese control would be accepted if they actually invaded. This was not enough and Tsuchihashi accused Decoux of playing for time. On 9 March, after more stalling by Decoux, Tsuchihashi delivered an ultimatum for French troops to disarm. Decoux sent a messenger to Matsumoto urging further negotiations but the message arrived at the wrong building. Tsuchihashi, assuming that Decoux had rejected the ultimatum, immediately ordered commencement of the coup. The 11th R.I.C. (régiment d'infanterie coloniale) based at the Martin de Pallieres barracks in Saigon were surrounded and disarmed after their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Moreau, was arrested. In Hue there was sporadic fighting; the Garde Indochinoise, who provided security for the résident supérieur, fought for 19 hours against the Japanese before their barracks was overrun and destroyed. Three hundred men, one third of them French, managed to elude the Japanese and escape to the A Sầu Valley. However, over the next three days, they succumbed to hunger, disease and betrayals - many surrendered while others fought their way into Laos where only a handful survived. Meanwhile, General Eugène Mordant led opposition by the garrison of Hanoi for several hours but was forced to capitulate, with 292 dead on the French side and 212 Japanese. An attempt to disarm a Vietnamese garrison ended badly for the Japanese when 600 of them marched into Quảng Ngãi. The Vietnamese nationalists had been armed with automatic weapons supplied by the OSS parachuted nearby at Kontum. The Japanese had been led to believe that these men would readily defect but the Vietnamese ambushed the Japanese. Losing only three killed and seventeen wounded they inflicted 143 killed and another 205 wounded on the Japanese before they too were overcome. A much larger force of Japanese came the next day but they found the garrison empty. In Annam and Cochinchina only token resistance was offered and most garrisons, small as they were, surrendered. Further north the French had the sympathy of many indigenous peoples. Several hundred Laotians volunteered to be armed as guerrillas against the Japanese; French officers organized them into detachments but turned away those they did not have weapons for. In Haiphong the Japanese assaulted the Bouet barracks: headquarters of Colonel Henry Lapierre's 1st Tonkin Brigade. Using heavy mortar and machine gun fire, one position was taken after another before the barracks fell and Lapierre ordered a ceasefire. Lapierre refused to sign surrender messages for the remaining garrisons in the area. Codebooks had also been burnt which meant the Japanese then had to deal with the other garrisons by force. In Laos, Vientiane, Thakhek and Luang Prabang were taken by the Japanese without much resistance. In Cambodia the Japanese with 8,000 men seized Phnom Penh and all major towns in the same manner. All French personnel in the cities on both regions were either interned or in some cases executed. The Japanese strikes at the French in the Northern Frontier in general saw the heaviest fighting. One of the first places they needed to take and where they amassed the 22nd division was at Lang Son, a strategic fort near the Chinese border. The defences of Lang Son consisted of a series of fort complexes built by the French to defend against a Chinese invasion. The main fortress was the Fort Brière de l'Isle. Inside was a French garrison of nearly 4000 men, many of them Tonkinese, with units of the French Foreign Legion. Once the Japanese had cut off all communications to the forts they invited General Émile Lemonnier, the commander of the border region, to a banquet at the headquarters of the Japanese 22nd Division. Lemonnier declined to attend the event, but allowed some of his staff to go in his place. They were then taken prisoner and soon after the Japanese bombarded Fort Brière de l'Isle, attacking with infantry and tanks. The small forts outside had to defend themselves in isolation; they did so for a time, proving impenetrable, and the Japanese were repelled with some loss. They tried again the next day and succeeded in taking the outer positions. Finally, the main fortress of Brière de l'Isle was overrun after heavy fighting. Lemonnier was subsequently taken prisoner himself and ordered by a Japanese general to sign a document formally surrendering the forces under his command. Lemonnier refused to sign the documents. As a result, the Japanese took him outside where they forced him to dig a grave along with French Resident-superior (Résident-général) Camille Auphelle. Lemonnier again was ordered to sign the surrender documents and again refused. The Japanese subsequently beheaded him. The Japanese then machine-gunned some of the prisoners and either beheaded or bayoneted the wounded survivors. Lang Son experienced particularly intense fighting, with the 22nd Division relentlessly assaulting the 4,000-strong garrison for two days until the main fortress was captured. The Japanese then advanced further north to the border town of Dong Dang, which fell by March 15. The battle of Lạng Sơn cost the French heavy casualties and their force on the border was effectively destroyed. European losses were 544 killed, of which 387 had been executed after capture. In addition 1,832 Tonkinese colonial troops were killed (including 103 who were executed) while another 1,000 were taken prisoner. On 12 March planes of the US Fourteenth Air Force flying in support of the French, mistook a column of Tonkinese prisoners for Japanese and bombed and strafed them. Reportedly between 400 and 600 of the prisoners were killed or wounded.  Nonetheless, the coup was highly successful, with the Japanese subsequently encouraging declarations of independence from traditional rulers in various regions. On 11 March 1945, Emperor Bảo Đại was permitted to announce the Vietnamese "independence"; this declaration had been prepared by Yokoyama Seiko, Minister for Economic Affairs of the Japanese diplomatic mission in Indochina and later advisor to Bao Dai. Bảo Đại complied in Vietnam where they set up a puppet government headed by Tran Trong Kim and which collaborated with the Japanese. King Norodom Sihanouk also obeyed, but the Japanese did not trust the Francophile monarch. Nationalist leader Son Ngoc Thanh, who had been exiled in Japan and was considered a more trustworthy ally than Sihanouk, returned to Cambodia and became Minister of foreign affairs in May and then Prime Minister in August. In Laos however, King Sisavang Vong of Luang Phrabang, who favoured French rule, refused to declare independence, finding himself at odds with his Prime Minister, Prince Phetsarath Ratanavongsa, but eventually acceded on 8 April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. March 1945, saw US forces advance in Luzon, overcoming Japanese defenses through strategic maneuvers, while guerrilla activities intensified amid challenging terrain and heavy resistance. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces advanced against Japanese troops, capturing key locations and in French Indochina the Japanese unleashed a brutal coup d'etat ushering in independence movements.

It was a strange world that emerged from the Second World War.Both genocide and the mass killing of civilians, above all through bombing, culminating with the A-bombs dropped on Japan, had become somehow normalised. They rather weaken the case of the developed nations, which made these things happen, denouncing ethnic cleansing and terrorist bombs when they happen again today.The Soviet Union had massively extended its control of territory and what Churchill called an ‘iron curtain' had as a result descended across Europe, dividing the continent in two.As for Britain, it had emerged broke, a condition it might have hoped the US would help with, discovering with some shock that actually the aid that flowed in under lend-lease would be stopping far more quickly than expected. Instead, the British government would have to negotiate a loan, which it finally paid off sixty years later.As for its imperial role, the Empire was beginning to fall apart. The major step was the independence of India, something on which the new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, had been keen for a long time. Sadly, it was done too quickly and botched, amongst massive violence and bitterness, especially with the partition of India to allow the creation of Muslim Pakistan. The violence and pain continued to decades, with wars and genocidal actions, not just in India and Pakistan but also in the other parts of the British Indian empire, Burma (Myanmar) and Ceylon (Sri Lanka). That rather leads to the question, might it not have been better had Britain never set out to rule India in the first place?Illustration: Muslim refugees attempting to flee India sit on the roof of an overcrowded train near Delhi in September 1947. From The Guardian. Photograph: APMusic: Bach Partita #2c by J Bu licensed under an Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives (aka Music Sharing) 3.0 International License

Last time we spoke about the Fall of Manila. General LeMay's B-29 bombers wreaked havoc on Japan, targeting key factories at a high cost. On February 19, US Marines landed on Iwo Jima, facing fierce Japanese resistance and heavy casualties. By February 23, after relentless fighting and harsh conditions, they raised the American flag atop Mount Suribachi, marking a hard-won victory. This moment inspired a legacy for the Marine Corps, as battles raged on in the Pacific. Meanwhile troops attacked General Kobayashi's defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, struggling to gain ground. Reinforcements arrived, leading to coordinated assaults, but progress was slow. Meanwhile, General Yamashita reorganized his forces in response to increased guerrilla activity. As American divisions advanced, they faced fierce resistance but gradually secured key positions. Guerrilla leader Volckmann disrupted Japanese supply lines, significantly impacting their operations. Amidst the chaos, a daring rescue mission freed over 2,000 internees, though it provoked brutal reprisals against civilians. This episode is the Great Tokyo Air Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are continuing with the ongoing battle over Iwo Jima. By the end of February, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines had successfully secured Mount Suribachi, while the other regiments from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions advanced toward the O-2 Line, situated beyond Airfield No. 2. This location was where General Kuribayashi maintained his primary defensive positions, which were heavily fortified with caves, tunnels, and traps. On March 1, General Rockey continued his offensive on the left flank as the fresh 28th Marines moved through the weary 27th Marines, led by Colonel Wornham, and launched an assault on Hill 362A and its adjacent positions. The corps' 155mm howitzers and 5th Division artillery commenced firing a preparation at K-minus 45 minutes. One battleship and two cruisers from the gunfire and covering force added their heavy fires from 08:00 to 08:30. Aircraft from the support carrier group delivered strikes throughout the day, but did not participate in preparation for the attack. This proved one of the busiest days for Task Force 54 since D-Day as fire support ships dueled with enemy shore batteries until late afternoon. Shortly after dawn enemy guns in the northern part of the island opened up, and at 07:25 the destroyer Terry took a direct hit by a 6-inch shell, suffering heavy casualties. The battleship Nevada immediately engaged these hostile installations, and after completing their mission in support of the landing force, the cruisers Indianapolis and Pensacola shifted to counter battery fire. At 10:25 the destroyer Colhoun was hit by a major-caliber projectile, and soon after this enemy shells straddled the destroyer Stembel. Counter Battery fire continued throughout the day with the Nevada destroying one casemated gun and starting a fire in another emplacement, while the Pensacola's batteries accounted for a third Japanese gun. Following the robust aerial, naval, and artillery bombardment, Liversedge's forces achieved some initial success, including capturing the hilltop, but were ultimately halted by intense machine-gun fire from Nishi Ridge to the north. However, the 3rd Battalion along the coast managed to advance approximately 350 yards against lighter resistance. In the center, General Erskine also pressed forward beyond Airfield No. 2, with Colonel Withers' 21st Marines advancing north and northeast about 500 yards into the incomplete Airfield No. 3. At the same time, General Cates continued to send his troops into the fray. Colonel Jordan's 24th Marines replaced Colonel Wensinger's exhausted 23rd Marines on the left and fought to dislodge the enemy from Hill 382. They succeeded in advancing about 100 yards along the division's left boundary and 50 yards on the right, establishing a foothold on elevated terrain overlooking Minami village. Further south, Colonel Lanigan committed only his 1st Battalion to eliminate the salient around the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, but this assault was again met with fierce Japanese gunfire. This relief enabled Erskine to initiate a late two-regiment offensive, with the 21st Marines on the left and Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines on the right, although this effort did not achieve any significant progress. The following day, the assault persisted, but the 9th Marines made minimal headway against a strong enemy position on the right, while the 21st Marines advanced toward the base of Hill 362B and the southern edge of Airfield No. 3. Concurrently, Liversedge's 28th Marines successfully cleared Hill 362A and moved toward Nishi Ridge, where they repelled a fierce counterattack by 150 Japanese soldiers. Colonel Graham's 26th Marines were once again deployed to fill the gap between the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions, managing to gain approximately 500 yards to the north. Jordan's 24th Marines finally captured Hill 382 and advanced about 300 yards on the left flank. Meanwhile, Lanigan's 1st Battalion made another unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate and take the high ground north of Turkey Knob. As described by an intelligence officer with the 4th Marine Division “As a result of a close study of the enemy's recent defensive action, aided by observation from OP's and air reconnaissance, the following explanation is suggested of the enemy's defense in this Div's Z of A. The enemy remains below ground in his maze of communicating tunnels throughout our preliminary arty fires. When the fire ceases he pushed OP's out of entrances not demolished by our fires. Then choosing a suitable exit he moves as many men and weapons to the surface as he can, depending on the cover and concealment of that area, often as close as 75 yards from our front. As our troops advance toward this point he delivers all the fire at his disposal, rifle, machine-gun, and mortar. When he has inflicted sufficient casualties to pin down our advance he then withdraws through his underground tunnels most of his forces, possibly leaving a few machine gunners and mortars. Meanwhile our Bn CO has coordinated his direct support weapons and delivers a concentration of rockets, mortars and artillery. Our tanks then push in, supported by infantry. When the hot spot is overrun we find a handful of dead Japs and few if any enemy weapons. While this is happening, the enemy has repeated the process and another sector of our advance is engaged in a vicious fire fight, and the cycle continues.”  Meanwhile the remainder of the 25th Marines managed to advance 300 yards along the coast without facing any opposition. On March 3, the capture of Hill 362A enabled flame-thrower tanks to assist in the advance northward. The 5th Marine Division prepared to press on with its assaults through Nishi Ridge and Hill 362B. The majority of the 28th Marines faced strong resistance as they moved forward over 200 yards. Liversedge's 1st Battalion and Graham's 1st Battalion executed a coordinated attack to take the main enemy positions ahead of them. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 26th Marines surged forward, achieving a gain of over 500 yards, which allowed them to relieve Kenyon's 3rd Battalion and secure the summit of Hill 362B. In the center, the 9th Marines remained in a stalemate, while the 21st Marines launched a vigorous attack to the northeast, successfully capturing the summit of Hill 357 at the eastern edge of the Motoyama Plateau. They then attempted another assault southeast toward Hill 362C, which resulted in a modest gain of about 250 yards. Meanwhile, in the 4th Marine Division's sector, Wensinger's 23rd Marines were deployed in the center, where determined Japanese defenders continued to thwart intense American assaults, despite the partial reduction of the Turkey Knob blockhouse. To the left, the 24th Marines resumed their offensive southeast, advancing up to 350 yards in the center. During the eight days of deadlock and fierce conflict in the Hill 382 and Turkey Knob areas, the weather had been generally favorable. Mild temperatures and fair skies predominated, although early in the morning ground haze combined with smoke to limit observation, and on a few days light showers fell in the afternoon. Night temperatures sometimes went below 60°F, and it was then that tired Marines were grateful for the characteristic subterranean heat of the island that warmed their foxholes. The next day, March 4, dawned gray and sullen, and intermittent showers fell from the overcast skies. Visibility was so limited that all air strikes were canceled and aerial observation seriously curtailed. On the right, Cates' Marines pressed the attack southeast but could only gain 150 yards against the defenders' fierce resistance. To the left, after a failed Japanese infiltration attempt overnight to gather food and water, both the 9th and 21st Marines made no progress with their costly eastward assaults. Finally, supported closely by flame-throwing tanks and combat engineers, Rockey's Marines fought fiercely but achieved only minor advances, prompting Wornham's 27th Marines to be thrown back into the battle to reinforce the two battered assault regiments. March 5 was then dedicated to reorganizing and resupplying the three Marine Divisions in preparation for a renewed effort the next day. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Marines, led by Colonel James Stuart, were sent back to Guam without having landed on Iwo Jima. The three divisions accordingly resumed the offensive on March 6 after a terrific artillery and naval gunfire bombardment. First, on the left, Erskine attacked with his three regiments abreast yet failed to make any significant advance. Then, in the center, the 9th and 21st Marines likewise unsuccessfully attacked towards Hill 362C, though the latter managed to clear the entire Hill 357 area. Lastly, Wensinger's 23rd Marines passed through the 24th on the division left and pressed on forward against heavy opposition, successfully gaining between 150 and 350 yards while Jordan's battalions gained up to 150 yards in their front. Additionally, the 25th Marines mopped up in its area and Cates' Provisional Battalion kept hammering against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. In the knowledge that the battle was swinging irrevocably in favor of the Americans, General Kuribayashi radioed Tokyo: "Our strongpoints might be able to fight delaying actions for several more days. I comfort myself a little seeing my officers and men die without regret after struggling in this inch-by-inch battle against an overwhelming enemy...". The General's predictions were, if anything, on the pessimistic side as his garrison would prolong the battle for another three weeks. Although the fighting was dragging terribly, on this day Brigadier-General Ernest Moore successfully landed on Airfield No. 1 alongside 28 P-51s and 12 P-61s of the 15th Fighter Group to take over control of island air activities. The following day, the Island Commander, Major-General James Chaney, assumed responsibility for base development, air defense, and operation of the airfields. Meanwhile, Schmidt was continuing his coordinated offensive, with the 28th Marines meeting only scattered resistance as it pushed 500 yards north; the 26th Marines overrunning the enemy defenses and gaining about 150 yards before resistance stiffened once again; the 27th Marines attacking on a narrow front but likewise gaining only 150 yards; the 21st Marines achieving tactical surprise to reach Hill 331 and then pushing 250 yards more to Hill 362C, which was ultimately seized as well; the 9th Marines ferociously attacking east but gaining only 200 yards before a rain of fire stopped them; the 23rd Marines recovering from a savage Japanese night counterattack and then pushing around 150 yards against strong resistance; the 24th Marines only progressing over 50 yards as it neutralized a number of enemy defenses; and the 25th Marines and the Provisional Battalion continuing secondary operations against the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob area. On March 8, Rockey pressed on toward the northeast coast, with the 28th Marines advancing against minimal resistance, gaining between 300 and 500 yards along the shoreline. Meanwhile, the 26th Marines faced a complete stalemate against the intricate network of pillboxes and interconnected caves that had once comprised the village of Kita. The 27th Marines managed to advance approximately 150 yards with tank support. In the center, the 21st Marines shifted northeast again, successfully gaining 300 yards through the last organized resistance in the area, while the 9th Marines captured Hill 362C and continued their eastward assault, reaching the edge of the plateau overlooking the beach and initiating a flanking maneuver south of Hill 331. On the right flank, the 23rd and 24th Marines continued their attacks but made little headway against the enemy's formidable defenses. That night, General Senda launched a strong counterattack that caught the Americans off guard. Two of Senda's orderlies would survive and report what occurred during the daring counterattack. Many of his troops believed that Inoue was a superior leader who inspired his men to perform outstanding feats of bravery; others thought he was a maniac. The sight of the Stars and Stripes flying on top of Mount Suribachi had filled him with increasing rage. He is quoted as saying: "We shall destroy their banner, we shall replace it with ours in the name of the great Emperor and the great people of Japan." Inoue was in charge of the Naval Guard Force who manned the shore guns that sank and damaged many of the US warships and landing craft, and was described as a bombastic and temperamental character, a fine swordsman, heavy drinker, and womanizer. His bizarre plan almost beggars belief. The Captain was certain that the airfields would be lightly defended by service troops. He and his men would move southward, destroying B29 bombers as they passed; climb Mount Suribachi and tear down the Stars and Stripes; and replace it with the Rising Sun as an inspiration to all Japanese troops on the island.  However this never came to be. The determined defenders, bolstered by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, repelled the assault, resulting in approximately 800 Japanese casualties. Under relentless pressure in a shrinking area where most critical terrain features had been seized, the disorganized Japanese forces saw a fleeting opportunity to escape destruction, raid American-controlled airfields, and reclaim Mount Suribachi with this counterattack. However, its failure effectively depleted Senda's remaining strength and chances for continued resistance. The following day, Cates resumed the offensive, with the 23rd Marines making minor gains along their front, while Jordan's 3rd Battalion achieved a notable breakthrough of 300 yards. Furthermore, the Provisional Battalion was disbanded, and Lanigan's 2nd Battalion assumed control of the Amphitheater-Turkey Knob region. In the center, Erskine persisted in his advance toward the sea, with patrols from the 9th and 21st Marines successfully reaching the beach as American forces continued to secure the area. Meanwhile, to the left, Rockey faced significant resistance, with his troops soon coming under intense and precise fire from elevated positions extending southeast from Kitano Point. Consequently, the 26th and 27th Marines remained in a stalemate while the 28th Marines moved forward. On March 10, Liversedge's men advanced approximately 40 yards across extremely challenging terrain and against fierce opposition, while Graham's 2nd Battalion gained an additional 75 yards, with the rest of the 26th and 27th Marines still held in place. Over the past 14 days, Rockey's 5th Marine Division advanced 3,000 yards along the west coast, ultimately pushing Kuribayashi's forces into a final pocket at the northern tip of the island.  In a dispatch to Tokyo on March 10, General Kuribayashi summed up the Japanese situation in this manner: “Although the attacks of the enemy against our Northern districts are continuing day and night, our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly… 200 or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" all day. The enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers, and aircraft are very severe, especially the bombing and machine-gun fire against Divisional Headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I cannot express nor write here.” Not until 15 bloody days later did Marines eliminate the last pocket of organized enemy resistance in the northern end of the island. By D+19 all that remained for the enemy force was to fight and die for the Emperor. This advance came at a significant cost, with Rockey suffering 1,098 men killed and 2,974 wounded during this time. In the center, the 21st Marines reported that all organized resistance in their area had been eliminated, while the 9th Marines moved toward the beach, facing harassment from enemy fire from a resisting pocket on their right. Nevertheless, Erskine's 3rd Marine Division successfully secured the airfield areas and only needed to eliminate this last remaining pocket in their zone. However, personnel losses during this 14-day campaign were substantial, with Erskine losing 831 men killed and 2,241 wounded. Finally, Cates took over from the 24th Marines as he initiated his final offensive eastward. Consequently, the 23rd Marines advanced southeast with minimal resistance, covering approximately 700 yards before stopping at a strategic high ground about 500 yards from the beach, while patrols moved toward the coast near Tachiiwa Point. Simultaneously, Lanigan's 1st and 3rd Battalions pushed 600 yards southeast against stronger opposition and successfully occupied the key terrain southwest of Higashi. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion advanced northeast to join them, effectively driving the remaining enemy forces into a small pocket in that area. Over the last 14 days, Cates' 4th Marine Division engaged in relentless assaults, fighting fiercely from Charlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Minami, and the formidable defenses northeast of Hill 382, nearly reaching the coast.  The Japanese conducted an astute defense in this sector. General Kuribayashi had planned well, but much credit for execution of the plan in the 4th Marine Division zone must go to General Senda, who commanded the 2nd Mixed Brigade and exercised tactical control during the battle. Enemy weapons and minefields were well placed to take maximum advantage of terrain features, fire control was excellent when judged by Japanese standards, and camouflage discipline outstanding. Machine-gun positions controlled draws, while mortars were disposed to deliver fire on routes of approach, including the crests, forward, and reverse slopes of ridges. The one obvious mistake made by the Japanese in this long, grueling defense to the death was the night counterattack of March 8. This action cost them many lives and gained no advantage. Even this rather hopeless plunge can be somewhat justified, however, when the situation that existed then is seen from the Japanese point of view. By March 8, the enemy was under heavy, constant pressure in an ever-shrinking area where most of the critical terrain features had been captured. He was quickly becoming dispossessed and disorganized, with few courses of action remaining. Because communications were undoubtedly badly disrupted, it is possible that the Japanese facing the 4th Division did not realize just how hopeless his cause appeared and therefore harbored some hope that the counterattack might not be in vain. The cost was significant, with Cates suffering 848 men killed and 2,836 wounded.  While the battle raged on Iwo Jima, General LeMay was also preparing for a major raid on Tokyo, known as Operation Meetinghouse. After a precision strike by 192 B-29 bombers against Musashi on March 4, which resulted in minimal damage due to heavy cloud cover, a decision was made to move away from the 21st Bomber Command's traditional focus on precision bombing. This eighth fiasco at Musashi marked the end of a well-defined phase of 21st Bomber Command's operations. The effort to knock out the Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, daylight precision bombing of carefully selected targets had failed. Production of aircraft engines, not grossly off scheduled programs when 21st Bomber Command came to the Marianas, fell off sharply during the last two months of 1944 and production of aircraft declined slightly during the same period. In neither case, however, could the shortages be accounted for by destruction wrought by the B-29's; indeed, the output of Franks at Ota had decreased from 300 a month to 100 before the first air strike. Not one of the nine high-priority targets had been destroyed, although Akashi had been effectively crippled and production had been slowed down at Mitsubishi's engine and assembly plants at Nagoya and at Nakajima-Ota. Musashi had suffered only 4% damage after 835 B-29 sorties had been sent against it; Navy planes had done more harm in a single strike. Probably the indirect effects of the B-29 raids were most important: with the fall of Saipan, Japanese industrialists had begun to lose confidence in their supposed immunity from air attack. Although under governmental pressure for increased production, they began, with the first attacks on Nakajima and Mitsubishi, to hunt for underground or forest cover, and the official directive for dispersal issued in mid-January merely served to quicken a process already well under way. This radical change in manufacturing techniques, never as efficiently conducted as the similar movement in Germany had been, explains in part the slowdown in production in late 1944 and early 1945.  In 22 missions comprising 2,148 sorties, the command dropped 5,398 tons of bombs on Japan targeting the Imperial aircraft industry, but only about half of the bombers hit primary targets. Losses were substantial, largely due to fierce enemy interceptors and the lengthy overwater journey from the Marianas to Japan, which lacked any friendly bases for refueling or repairs. As a result of the high costs associated with unescorted daylight missions, the susceptibility of Japanese cities to incendiary attacks, and the minimal impact of precision bombing with high explosives, General Arnold ultimately opted for a comprehensive incendiary campaign. In preparation for the forthcoming assault on Okinawa, LeMay was tasked with initiating a series of intensive incendiary strikes from low altitudes. This lower bombing altitude would enhance accuracy, increase bomb load, and prolong the lifespan of B-29 engines. Although this approach carried risks, LeMay believed that the intense Japanese anti-aircraft fire was not overly threatening, as only two B-29s had been lost due to flak alone. He also decided to conduct these missions at night, which would decrease the likelihood of heavy cloud cover and strong winds, simplify navigation, and enable the bombers to reach the two new emergency airstrips at Iwo Jima by dawn. The first mission was set to commence immediately, with 334 B-29s from the 73rd, 313th, and 314th Bombardment Wings taking off in the late afternoon of March 9, carrying approximately 2,000 tons of bombs. The target was a rectangular area in northeastern Tokyo known as Zone I, measuring about 4 by 3 miles and encompassing most of Asakusa, Honjo, and Fukagawa Wards. After a turbulent journey, the initial pathfinders successfully identified their targets under favorable weather conditions and marked them shortly after midnight with fires However LeMay's decision came late. With the first mission set for the night of March 9, the field orders were not cut until the 8th. Although operational details would vary significantly from normal practice, there was no time to consult Washington as was so frequently done. Arnold was not even informed of the revolutionary plans until the day before the mission. The decision to attack at night ruled out the command's standard technique of lead-crew bombing. Formation flying at night was not feasible, and with flak rather than enemy fighters the chief danger, a tight formation would be a handicap rather than a source of defensive strength. With planes bombing individually from low altitudes, bomb loads could be sharply increased, to an average of about six tons per plane. Lead squadron B-29s carried 180 x 70-pound M47s, napalm-filled bombs calculated to start "appliance fires," that is, fires requiring attention of motorized fire-fighting equipment. Other planes, bombing on these pathfinders, were loaded with 24 x 500-pound clusters of M69s. Intervalometers were set at 100 feet for the pathfinders, 50 feet for the other planes. The latter setting was supposed to give a minimum density of 25 tons (8333 M69s) per square mile. Late reports indicated widespread fires that forced formations to search extensively for targets, with visibility severely hampered by smoke and bomb runs complicated by turbulence from intense heat waves. During the three-hour assault, a total of 279 B-29 bombers targeted Tokyo, successfully dropping 1,665 short tons of bombs on the primary objective. Additionally, 19 Superfortresses, unable to reach Tokyo, attacked alternative or last-resort targets. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise by this tactical shift, resulting in only moderate resistance; intense anti-aircraft fire destroyed 14 B-29s and damaged another 42, while enemy interceptors had no significant effect. The fires were so intense that they nearly extinguished themselves by mid-morning, only halted by wide gaps like rivers. Subsequent photographs revealed that 15.8 square miles had been devastated, including 18% of the industrial sector, 63% of the commercial area, and the core of the densely populated residential district. Tokyo's highly effective firefighting system was also caught off guard, leading to the destruction of 95 fire engines and the deaths of 125 firefighters, while lightweight buildings were completely consumed along with their contents. Little rubble remained; only a few fire-resistant structures, marked by heat damage, stood in the devastated areas. In total, 267,171 buildings were destroyed, 83,793 people lost their lives, 40,918 were injured, and 1,008,005 were left homeless. Moreover, it took 25 days to recover all the bodies from the debris. Radio Tokyo referred to the raid as “slaughter bombing,” with one broadcast stating that “the sea of flames engulfing the residential and commercial districts of Tokyo was reminiscent of the holocaust of Rome, caused by Emperor Nero.” The attack significantly undermined the morale of Japanese civilians, and along with other firebombing raids in March, it led many to believe that the war situation was worse than their government had acknowledged. In response, the Japanese government implemented a mix of repression, including severe penalties for those accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and launched an ineffective propaganda campaign aimed at restoring confidence in the nation's air and civil defense efforts. Meanwhile, LeMay and Arnold viewed the operation as a considerable success. As Tokyo mourned its losses, another 313 B-29s were sent on the afternoon of March 11 to execute a similar strike on Nagoya; however, due to minimal wind to spread the fires from the widely dispersed bombs, the results were less impressive. Nonetheless, only one B-29 was lost during the raid, with another 20 sustaining damage. It became evident, as LeMay had predicted, that the Japanese lacked effective tactics for nighttime interception. Now, attention shifts to Burma to report on the ongoing Chinese-British-Indian offensives. On General Slim's primary front, General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued its vigorous advance toward Mandalay, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division successfully made its way to the Meiktila area in the Japanese rear. In response, Generals Kimura and Katamura sent several reinforcements to this crucial area, but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment, led by Colonel Yoshida, managed to arrive in time to establish some defenses in the town, quickly transforming buildings in Meiktila into bunkers and strongpoints. On February 28, Cowan dispatched the 63rd Brigade to launch an attack from the west and the 48th Brigade to advance from the north along the Mahlaing-Meiktila road, while the 255th Tank Brigade executed a wide flanking maneuver to approach from the east. As a result, the 63rd Brigade secured Kyaukpyugon and set up a roadblock southwest of Meiktila; the 48th Brigade advanced to a bridge over a chaung approximately a mile from the town; and the 255th Brigade fought its way to Kyigon and Khanda, successfully destroying several bunkers near Point 860. On March 1, following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, Cowan's three brigades began to push into Meiktila despite fierce resistance. The 48th Brigade, bolstered by a tank squadron, advanced down the Mandalay-Meiktila road, quickly clearing Kyigon before entering the town, where they reached within 100 yards of the railroad line before the attack was halted in the late afternoon. To the east, the majority of the 255th Tank Brigade captured Point 860 and began clearing the camouflaged bunkers along the ridgeline, while a combined force of tanks and grenadiers advanced to within 200 yards of the railroad station before being recalled. Meanwhile, the 63rd Brigade, supported by a tank squadron, cleared the village of Kanna and continued past it to secure the railroad line and the main Kyaukpadaung-Meiktila road. The following day, the 17th Indian Division tightened the encirclement around Meiktila, inflicting significant casualties on the outnumbered defenders and destroying numerous enemy bunkers. On March 3, the three brigades commenced the task of eliminating the last remaining Japanese forces in and around Meiktila. They faced intense sniper and machine-gun fire from every building. However, due to the tanks' superior firepower, the Japanese strongholds were systematically taken down one by one. By the end of the day, the town was cleared, with an estimated 2,000 Japanese troops killed, including Colonel Yoshida. Additionally, 47 field pieces and anti-tank guns were captured, and the supply dumps surrounding Meiktila were secured. Cowan now needed to organize the town's defenses, anticipating a swift and fierce Japanese counterattack. Immediately after the town's capture, Kimura ordered the 18th Division to work with the weakened 49th Division to reclaim Meiktila, while Katamura reinforced General Naka with the majority of the 119th and 214th Regiments, a strong artillery unit, and the battered 14th Tank Regiment. Following the capture of Meiktila, Cowan's forces spent the next few days clearing the area of any remaining snipers and stragglers. For the town's defense, Cowan assigned each brigade and the divisional infantry to four sectors, each featuring a heavily fortified redoubt. He also tasked the 99th Brigade with defending Kyigon and Meiktila's airfield. To maintain the initiative for the 17th Division, Cowan aggressively deployed strong mobile columns of tanks, mechanized artillery, and infantry to disrupt the Japanese formations as they approached Meiktila. Consequently, while the 18th and 49th Divisions advanced, Ywadan and Nyaungaing were secured on March 5. In the following days, the main roads leading to Mahlaing, Kyaukpadaung, Pyawbwe, Thazi, and Mandalay were cleared, and the enemy units of the 214th Regiment at Thangongyi and Yego were successfully repelled on March 8. General Naka was now prepared to initiate his primary assault on Meiktila, instructing his units to concentrate their efforts north of the town, while the 214th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to move southwest to connect with the 49th Division. In response to these movements, on March 10, Cowan sent a robust tank-infantry force along the Mahlaing road to escort a previously dispatched column back to Meiktila, successfully inflicting significant casualties on the 56th Regiment as the British-Indians secured the Leindaw-Kyanngyagon area. However, the troops faced harassment from artillery fire originating from south of Myindawgan Lake, prompting Cowan to launch another armored sweep on March 14 to eliminate this threat. Although the 55th Regiment managed to capture the hill north of Meiktila after Cowan's tanks and infantry withdrew, the Japanese forces were unable to prevent their return, which resulted in further heavy losses. Concurrently, other tank-infantry units disrupted the advance of the 49th Division, effectively delaying the assembly of Japanese forces to the south and east of Meiktila until March 18. Additionally, a strong raid by the Komatsubara Unit was successfully repelled on March 14. In Stopford's sector, the 19th Division was preparing to launch its final offensive southward toward Mandalay, while the 2nd and 20th Divisions, after fierce fighting to expand their bridgeheads, were advancing east to assault the southern approaches to Mandalay. With close support from artillery and aircraft, General Rees' forces successfully breached the primary defenses of Lieutenant-General Yamamoto Kiyoe's 15th Division, reaching the northern outskirts of Mandalay by March 7. As the assault continued, British-Indian forces were set to enter the city on March 9. However, the determined defenders clung to Mandalay Hill and Fort Dufferin, aiming to extend the conflict and fight to the death. While Mandalay was under siege, the 62nd Brigade stealthily advanced east to Maymyo on March 11, catching the garrison off guard. The next day, Mandalay Hill ultimately fell while Fort Dufferin was being heavily bombarded within the city. By mid-March, the 2nd Division was nearing the capture of Ava, and the 20th Division was steadily advancing east to sever the supply routes from Mandalay to the south. In northern Burma, General Sultan was also pursuing his offensive. After establishing a bridgehead at Myitson, General Festing's 36th British Division faced minimal resistance and successfully took Mongmit on March 9 before continuing southward to Mogok. To the east, the 38th Chinese Division encountered only weak delaying positions as it moved towards Lashio, which was successfully occupied by March 7. At this point, the 56th Division, now independently commanding this area, was gradually retreating towards Hsipaw and Kyaukme. Although General Sun paused his advance until the Generalissimo granted permission to resume the offensive later in the month. Mountbatten feared that if more Chinese troops were withdrawn from Burma it might not be possible to take Rangoon before the monsoon rains began. This was an unpleasant prospect, so Mountbatten went to Chungking on March 8 for two days of conference with the Generalissimo. When the conference of March 9 concluded, the Generalissimo, according to the American minutes, said that he would recapitulate his decision of halting the Chinese advance at Lashio. In so doing, he remarked that the details of withdrawal would be settled later and that no final decisions would be made before General Wedemeyer was able to take part in them. Then he stated that unless there was a simultaneous amphibious attack on Rangoon, operations would stop at Lashio and Mandalay and the Allies would assume the defensive. The Chinese would stop at Lashio, but details of their operations between Lashio and Mandalay would be settled later between the staffs. The misunderstanding became quite apparent in mid-March when General Sultan, under whose command the Chinese were, received conflicting orders. Mountbatten ordered Sultan to move his forces southwestward toward Mandalay, yet the Generalissimo directed that the Chinese divisions stay in the Lashio area. As a compromise and to avoid having the Chinese wait idly around Lashio, Sultan suggested that a smaller task force be directed to proceed south. But the Generalissimo and his American advisers stood firm, lest the shift of troops to China be delayed. This in turn caused the British to believe that if the Chinese were not going to advance they should be withdrawn forthwith and end the burden on the line of communications. The 50th Chinese Division began to push south after securing the Namtu region and by mid-March reached Hsipaw. Meanwhile, in South Burma, the 82nd West African Division had taken Dalet, while the 25th Indian Division engaged in a struggle for control of the Ruywa-Tamandu area. Additionally, the 2nd West African Brigade was advancing inland toward An, posing a significant threat to the Japanese rear areas. Due to the rapid advancement of Slim's offensive, Admiral Mountbatten had to prioritize air supply for the 14th Army. This situation soon compelled General Christison to send the 25th Indian Division back to India, as his logistical support was becoming increasingly strained. Capturing Tamandu and establishing a Forward Maintenance Area there became essential. After successfully clearing Dokekan, the 74th Indian Brigade crossed the Me Chaung on March 4 to circumvent the main enemy defenses. The British-Indians pressed on, launching attacks on Tamandu in the following days, but the determined defenders put up strong resistance. Eventually, General Miyazaki withdrew most of the 111th Regiment and ordered it to attack the 2nd West African Brigade from the rear, which was finally contained by March 17. With the 25th Division scheduled to withdraw to Akyab by the end of the month, the 74th was reassigned to the 82nd West African Division and launched a final assault on Tamandu on March 11, successfully capturing the abandoned objective. The British-Indians then began to advance towards Kolan, reaching the vicinity of the town by mid-March. Simultaneously, the 154th Regiment counterattacked the West Africans at Dalet, successfully halting the enemy's advance beyond the river. Meanwhile, the 4th Indian Brigade landed at Mae near Letpan on March 13 from Ramree Island and established a roadblock to prevent enemy escape. In response, the 121st Regiment sent several companies to conduct a delaying action aimed at slowing the enemy's southward advance. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima intensified as the Marines advanced against fortified Japanese positions, facing heavy resistance and suffering significant casualties while capturing key terrain over several weeks of fierce combat. Meanwhile General LeMay shifted from precision bombing to incendiary raids on Tokyo, resulting in significant destruction and civilian casualties, while Japanese morale plummeted amid military setbacks.  

The British-Indian novelist Sir Salman Rushdie has faced his alleged attacker in court, after he was stabbed multiple times in 2022 during a public lecture in New York state. Hadi Matar, accused of assault and attempted murder, denies the charges. The author is no stranger to threats: in 1989, Iran's Supreme Leader called for his death, after deeming his novel The Satanic Verses blasphemous. Will this attack on Rushdie, a symbol of free speech himself, threaten freedom of expression?This podcast was brought to you thanks to the support of readers of The Times and The Sunday Times. Subscribe today: http://thetimes.com/thestoryGuests:Will Pavia, New York Correspondent, The Times.Robbie Millen, Literary Editor, The Times and The Sunday Times. Host: Luke Jones.Further reading: Salman Rushdie trial: I was dying, author says as he recounts attackClips: BBC News, WION, CNN, The Daily Show, Cream Cakes, American Express, CBC News, University of Vermont.Photo: Getty Images. Get in touch: thestory@thetimes.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Last time we spoke about the battle of Manila. In early February, General Iwanaka's 2nd Tank Division faced encirclement as American forces advanced. General Griswold's 14th Corps captured Clark Field, while the 8th Cavalry liberated 4,000 internees at Santo Tomas University. Amid fierce fighting, Japanese defenses crumbled, and by February 9, American troops secured key districts in Manila. Despite heavy resistance, they pressed on, clearing areas and establishing a foothold across the Pasig River. In the wake of Pearl Ridge's capture, Australian brigades advanced through Bougainville, engaging Japanese forces along the Jaba and Tavera rivers. Brigadier Monaghan's troops secured strategic positions, while the 2/8th Commandos aided local guerrillas. In January, significant battles unfolded at Tsimba Ridge, where fierce resistance led to an encirclement of Japanese troops. Meanwhile, in Burma, Allied forces executed deceptive maneuvers and launched offensives, as General Aung San's Burma National Army prepared to switch sides, signaling a shift in the war's momentum. This episode is the Liberation of Bataan and Corregidor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we previously noted, General Griswold had three divisions stationed in Manila, which had achieved significant advancements by February 10. Estimating the strength of the Americans in the Manila area at little more than a regiment, General Yokoyama apparently felt that he had a good opportunity to cut off and isolate the Allied force. Conversely, he was also interested in getting the Manila Naval Defense Force out of the city quickly, either by opening a line of retreat or by having Iwabuchi co-ordinate a breakthrough effort with a Shimbu Group counterattack, scheduled for the night of February 16. Not knowing how far the situation in Manila had deteriorated--communications were faulty and Admiral Iwabuchi had supplied Yokoyama with little information--Yokoyama at first directed the Manila Naval Defense Force to hold fast. The question of a general withdrawal, he told Iwabuchi, would be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the counterattack. There is no indication that the Shimbu Group commander intended to reinforce or retake Manila. Rather, his primary interest was to gain time for the Shimbu Group to strengthen its defenses north and northeast of the city and to move more supplies out of the city to its mountain strongholds, simultaneously creating a good opportunity for the Manila Naval Defense Force to withdraw intact. However, the commander of the Shimbu Group was simultaneously orchestrating a large-scale, coordinated raid on northern Manila, intending to weaken the enemy's offensive capability by targeting their vulnerable eastern flank before they could solidify their positions. Therefore, on the night of February 16, the majority of the 31st Regiment was set to assault Caloocan Airfield, while three provisional battalions of the Kobayashi Force would attack Quezon, Banlat Airfield, and the surrounding areas of Rosario. This meant that Iwabuchi's forces would need to withstand the unyielding American assaults for another week before receiving support. Meanwhile, Griswold was strategizing to cut off the last remaining routes for withdrawal and reinforcement available to Iwabuchi. To achieve this, the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments were tasked with advancing southwest toward Manila Bay to make contact with the 11th Airborne Division, effectively encircling the city. Thus, Griswold continued his offensive on February 11, with Company E of the 129th Regiment successfully clearing Provisor Island without resistance and further establishing a presence on the mainland, west across Estero Provisor. Other elements of the 37th Division were gradually advancing across the Estero de Paco despite heavy enemy fire, while the 5th Cavalry made limited progress at Nielson Field. The 8th Cavalry pushed nearly to the Estero de Paco along the division boundary against scattered opposition, the 511th Parachute Regiment advanced north toward Libertad Avenue, and the 187th Glider Regiment secured the southeast corner and southern runway of Nichols Field. The next day, to complete the encirclement of Manila, the 5th Cavalry swiftly advanced across Nielson Field, facing sporadic rifle fire, and successfully connected with the 511th at Libertad Avenue before reaching the shores of Manila Bay. Simultaneously, the 12th Cavalry Regiment relieved the 8th and rapidly moved westward to establish contact with the 5th at Villarruel Street. Further south, following intense artillery and air bombardment, the 187th and 188th Glider Regiments finally breached the Japanese defenses at Nichols Field. The attack was preceded by artillery and mortar concentrations and by an air strike executed by Marine Corps SBD's from the Lingayen Gulf fields, support that succeeded in knocking out many Japanese artillery positions. The 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry, attacked generally east from the northwest corner of the field; the 188th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, drove in from the south and southeast. By dusk the two regiments had cleared most of the field and finished mopping up the next day. The field was, however, by no means ready to receive Allied Air Force planes. Runways and taxiways were heavily mined, the runways were pitted by air and artillery bombardments, and the field was still subjected to intermittent artillery and mortar fire from the Fort McKinley area. With the seizure of Nichols Field, the 11th Airborne Division substantially completed its share in the battle for Manila. Since its landing at Nasugbu the division had suffered over 900 casualties. Of this number the 511th Infantry lost approximately 70 men killed and 240 wounded; the 187th and 188th Infantry Regiments had together lost about 100 men killed and 510 wounded, the vast majority in the action at Nichols Field. The division and its air and artillery support had killed perhaps 3,000 Japanese in the metropolitan area, destroying the 3d Naval Battalion and isolating the Abe Battalion. From then on the division's activities in the Manila area would be directed toward securing the Cavite region, destroying the Abe Battalion, and, in co-operation with the 1st Cavalry Division, assuring the severance of the Manila Naval Defense Force's routes of escape and reinforcement by clearing Fort McKinley and environs.  Meanwhile, at ZigZag Pass, General Chase's 38th Division had begun to make headway against the strong defenses of the Nagayoshi Detachment, with the 152nd and 149th Regiments set to launch a coordinated attack from the east and west on February 12. It wasn't until the afternoon of February 13 that the 149th and 152nd made their first brief contact from their respective sides of ZigZag. The 149th then captured the last organized Japanese stronghold on February 14, and the following day both regiments completed their mopping-up operations. Nearly 2,400 Japanese soldiers were killed at the pass during this battle, though about 300 men under Colonel Nagayoshi managed to escape south into Bataan. The 38th Division and the 34th Regiment, in turn, suffered around 1,400 casualties, including 250 killed. Meanwhile, General Brush's 40th Division continued its offensive against the Kembu Group. By February 12, the 185th Regiment had successfully secured Snake Hill North with minimal resistance, while also capturing Hills 810 and 1000. Meanwhile, the 160th Regiment made significant advances against Snake Hill West and Scattered Trees Ridge. The 108th Regiment, after neutralizing the Japanese strongholds on the hill, began attacking the remnants of the Eguchi and Yanagimoto Detachments at Hill 7. On February 15, the 185th captured Hill 1500, coinciding with the 160th clearing Snake Hill West and preparing to advance toward Object Hill. The next day, Hill 7 fell to the 108th, while the 160th reached the summit of Object Hill and broke through Scattered Trees Ridge. By February 20, the 160th had cleared the rest of Object Hill and established a foothold on Sacobia Ridge. Whatever the costs, the 40th Division's advances to February 20 marked the end of the Kembu Group as a threat to 6th Army and 14th Corps. Clark Field, Route 3, and the army and corps right were now secure beyond all shadow of doubt. The Kembu Group had defended its ground well since January 24, when 14th Corps had first gained contact, and had inflicted nearly 1500 casualties upon 14th Corps units--roughly 285 men killed and 1180 wounded--but had itself lost around 10000 men killed. The 20000 troops General Tsukada still commanded were hardly in good shape. Supplies of all kinds were dwindling rapidly, morale was cracking, and centralized control was breaking down. The only defenses still intact were those held by the naval 13th and 17th Combat Sectors, and those had been heavily damaged by air and artillery bombardments. Troops of the 6th Army would continue to fight the Kembu Group, but after February 20 operations in the Kembu area were essentially mop-ups. 11th Corps, not 14th, would be in charge of the final mop-up operations in the Kembu area. Under General Hall's leadership, the 40th Division resumed the mop-up operation on February 23, but was replaced by elements of the 43rd Division just five days later. In the following ten days, this division would ultimately eliminate General Tsukada's last defensive position, pushing the Kembu Group further into the Zambales Range. Back in Manila, on February 13, chaos erupted as Iwabuchi's forces prepared for their final stand in the Filipino capital. After February 12th the 14th Corps troops found themselves in a steady war of attrition. Street-to-street, building-to-building, and room-to-room fighting characterized each day's activity. Progress was sometimes measured only in feet; many days saw no progress at all. The fighting became really "dirty." The Japanese, looking forward only to death, started committing all sorts of excesses, both against the city itself and against Filipinos unlucky enough to remain under Japanese control. As time went on, Japanese command disintegrated. Then, viciousness became uncontrolled and uncontrollable; horror mounted upon horror. The men of the 37th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division witnessed the rape, sack, pillage, and destruction of a large part of Manila and became reluctant parties to much of the destruction. Although the 14th Corps placed heavy dependence upon artillery, tank, tank destroyer, mortar, and bazooka fire for all advances, cleaning out individual buildings ultimately fell to individual riflemen. To accomplish this work, the infantry brought to fruition a system initiated north of the Pasig River. Small units worked their way from one building to the next, usually trying to secure the roof and top floor first, often by coming through the upper floors of an adjoining structure. Using stairways as axes of advance, lines of supply, and routes of evacuation, troops then began working their way down through the building. For the most part, squads broke up into small assault teams, one holding entrances and perhaps the ground floor--when that was where entrance had been gained--while the other fought through the building. In many cases, where the Japanese blocked stairways and corridors, the American troops found it necessary to chop or blow holes through walls and floors. Under such circumstances, hand grenades, flame throwers, and demolitions usually proved requisites to progress. In response to the encirclement of Manila, Yokoyama concluded that the situation in the city was irreparable and ordered Iwabuchi to relocate to Fort McKinley and begin withdrawing his troops immediately, without waiting for the Shimbu Group's counterattack. However, Iwabuchi did not receive this order until two days later, by which time he and his troops were determined to fight to the death, taking as many enemies with them as possible. The 129th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to assault the New Police Station and the Manila Club. Meanwhile, the 148th Regiment reached Taft Avenue but could not launch an attack on the Philippine General Hospital and the University of the Philippines. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments turned north, taking two days to fight through the Pasay suburb to Vito Cruz Street. On February 14, although the 148th Regiment struggled to make any headway against Iwabuchi's strong defenses, the 129th, supported by tanks, managed to break through to the Manila Club and the New Police Station. However, the Japanese quickly regrouped at the latter location and began throwing hand grenades from the second floor, forcing the Americans to retreat. Simultaneously, a battalion-sized guerrilla force led by Major John Vanderpool was dispatched to contain the Abe Provisional Battalion at Mabato Point, while elements of the 11th Airborne Division and the 1st Cavalry Division began clearing the routes to Fort McKinley. On February 15 and 16, the 129th conducted probing attacks on the New Police Station, the shoe factory, and Santa Teresita College, while tanks and artillery maintained consistent fire on all buildings still held by the Japanese. The 3rd Battalion of the 148th Regiment reached Manila Bay via Herran Street and then turned to assault the hospital from the south, while the 2nd Battalion made limited progress against the main hospital structures. The 12th Cavalry successfully entered La Salle University and the Japanese Club, and the 5th Cavalry pushed through Harrison Park, clearing Rizal Stadium, with the entire area being secured by February 18. In the early hours of February 16, Yokoyama initiated his limited offensive, with the 31st Regiment advancing toward Novaliches while General Kobayashi's three battalions attacked Marikina.The 112th Cavalry RCT, which had replaced the 12th Cavalry along the 1st Cavalry Division's line of communications, broke up the northern wing's counterattack between 15 and 18 February. In the Novaliches-Novaliches Dam area, and in a series of skirmishes further west and northwest, the 112th Cavalry RCT dispatched some 300 Japanese, losing only 2 men killed and 32 wounded. Un-co-ordinated from the start, the northern counterattack turned into a shambles, and the northern attack force withdrew in a disorganized manner before it accomplished anything. The Kobayashi Force's effort was turned back on the morning of the 16th, when American artillery caught this southern wing as it attempted to cross the Marikina River. During the next three days all Japanese attacks were piecemeal in nature and were thrown back with little difficulty by the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments, operating east and northeast of Manila. By 19 February, when the southern counterattack force also withdrew, the 2d Cavalry Brigade and support artillery had killed about 650 Japanese in the area west of the Marikina from Novaliches Dam south to the Pasig. The brigade lost about 15 men killed and 50 wounded. Consequently, Yokoyama's only achievement was the escape of the remnants of the 3rd and 4th Naval Battalions from the Fort McKinley area, which was later occupied by American forces. Additionally, from February 15 to 20, the 511th Parachute Regiment thoroughly searched the Cavite Peninsula and the adjacent mainland but encountered only a few Japanese stragglers. Meanwhile, to secure the Bataan Peninsula, Hall divided his forces into two groups: East Force and South Force. The East Force, consisting of the recently arrived 1st Regiment and led by Brigadier-General William Spence, was tasked with advancing down the east coast to divert Japanese attention from the Mariveles landing, which was to be executed by Chase's 151st Regiment. Accordingly, the 151st Regiment boarded Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3 vessels at Olongapo just as the 1st Regiment was passing through Orani and beginning its southward advance, reaching Pilar by the end of February 14. The following day, after conducting minesweeping and bombardment operations—during which the destroyers La Vallette and Radford were unfortunately disabled by mines—Struble successfully landed the 151st at Mariveles under machine-gun and rifle fire. The Americans found no Japanese forces before sunset, but during the night, they had to fend off a counterattack by approximately 100 enemy troops. During the night of 15-16 February an estimated 300 Japanese attacked the 1st Infantry's perimeter near Orion, but the U.S. regiment, losing 11 killed and 15 wounded, beat off the Japanese and killed 80 of them in a melee of confused, sometimes hand-to-hand fighting. The incident marked the end of organized Japanese resistance in southern Bataan. The 151st spent the following days securing the Mariveles area while simultaneously sending patrols northward along both sides of the Bataan Peninsula. They connected with the 1st Regiment at Limay on February 18. By February 21, the Americans had advanced across Bataan to Bagac, encountering only abandoned defensive positions and a few Japanese stragglers. However, Nagayoshi's remaining 1,000 troops managed to take refuge in the jungled slopes of Mount Natib, where elements of the 38th Division, the 6th Division, and Filipino guerrillas systematically hunted them down. While Bataan was being cleared, Generals MacArthur and Krueger were also planning the invasion of Corregidor Island. The assault plan involved Colonel George Jones' 503rd Parachute Regiment airdropping onto the island, supported by a nearly simultaneous shore-to-shore operation conducted by the reinforced 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, from the recently secured Mariveles.  The decision to employ paratroopers to make the principal assault against an objective of Corregidor's size and terrain merits attention. Shaped like a tadpole, with its bulbous head pointing west toward the South China Sea, Corregidor is but three and a half miles long and one and a half miles across at its point of greatest width. The prospective cost of amphibious assault was, indeed, one of the chief factors that led to a decision to use paratroopers. Planners saw the obvious risks in sending parachute troops against such a small and rough target, but in view of the GHQ SWPA estimate that the Japanese garrison numbered only 850 men, the cost of the airborne operation promised to be less than that involved in an amphibious attack. Krueger intended to land almost 3,000 troops on Corregidor on 16 February, over 2,000 of them by parachute. Another 1,000 men or more would come in by parachute or landing craft the next day. Planners hoped that such preponderant strength, combined with intensive air and naval bombardment, might render the seizure of the island nearly bloodless. An equally important (if not even more decisive) factor leading to the decision to employ paratroops was the desire to achieve surprise. GHQ SWPA and Sixth Army planners hoped that the Japanese on Corregidor would judge that no one in his right mind would even consider dropping a regiment of parachutists on such a target. The defenses, the planners thought, would probably be oriented entirely toward amphibious attack. The attack was scheduled for February 16, with paratroopers set to land on a parade ground and a golf course at Topside. They would then immediately assault Malinta Hill before the Japanese garrison could recover from the shock of the preparatory air and naval bombardment and the surprise of the parachute drop, with the amphibious troops launching their attack two hours after the paratroopers began jumping. Although Corregidor had been under attack by Allied Air Forces since January 22, General Kenney's forces intensified their assaults at the start of February. By February 16, the 5th and 13th Air Force planes had dropped approximately 3,125 tons of bombs on the island. Naval bombardment also commenced on February 13, in conjunction with the bombardment and minesweeping in preparation for the capture of Mariveles. On the morning of February 16, air and surface forces conducted their final preliminary bombardment before the paradrop. Launching from Mindoro, the 317th Troop Carrier Group transported the first wave of the 503rd Parachute Regiment in two columns of C-47s, swiftly dropping them over Corregidor at 08:30. Encountering only sporadic Japanese rifle and machine-gun fire, the paratroopers successfully secured the Topside drop zones by 09:45. However, approximately 25% of the paratroopers were injured, and many others failed to land on Topside. One unexpected blessing resulted from the scattered drop of paratroopers in the 0830 lift. Captain Itagaki, having been informed that landing craft were assembling off Mariveles, had hurried with a small guard to an observation post near Breakwater Point, obviously more concerned with the imminent amphibious assault than with the possibility that paratroopers might drop out of the C-47's already in sight of Corregidor. Suddenly, his attention was rudely diverted as twenty-five to thirty paratroopers who had been blown over the cliffs near the point began pelting down around the observation post. Fired on by the Japanese, the small American group quickly assembled and attacked. In the ensuing skirmish eight Japanese, including Captain Itagaki, were killed. Effective control among the Japanese units, already rendered practically impossible by the destruction of the communications center during the preassault air and naval bombardment, now ceased altogether. Leaderless, the remaining Japanese were no longer capable of coordinated offensive or defensive efforts. Each group would fight on its own from isolated and widely separated strongpoints. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment departed Mariveles Harbor on 25 LCMs and made their way to the western end of Corregidor, landing on the south beach at 10:28. Contrary to expectations, the first four waves faced no opposition as they came ashore. However, as the fifth wave arrived, Japanese machine-guns opened fire from Ramsay Ravine, Breakwater Point, and the cliffs at San Jose Point. Despite this, Companies K and L advanced quickly and established a strong position on top of Malinta Hill by 11:00. This ensured total surprise, as the paradrop effectively drew Japanese attention away from the amphibious craft approaching Corregidor. At 12:40, the second wave of the 503rd began to land successfully on the drop zones, facing only limited fire from Japanese automatic weapons. With these reinforcements, the paratroopers were positioned to secure the remainder of Topside by the end of the day. However, during the night, the infantrymen would need to fend off a series of small but determined Japanese counterattacks along the northern side of Malinta Hill. For eight consecutive days leading up to February 23, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment successfully defended against relentless banzai charges, mortar assaults, and a suicide squad of soldiers equipped with explosives, resulting in approximately 300 Japanese casualties. On the afternoon of 17 February the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, and other reinforcements reached Bottomside by landing craft. Japanese rifle and machine gun fire, most of which passed overhead, "expedited" the movement ashore, and the battalion soon joined the rest of the regiment on Topside. The troops already on Topside had spent the day expanding their hold, systematically reducing the first of the many Japanese bunkers, pillboxes, and underground defenses they were to encounter, and had developed a pattern for the destruction of the Japanese installations. First, aircraft or naval fire support ships--the air arm using napalm extensively--were called upon to strike positions accessible to these types of bombardment; then the infantry attacked almost as the last shell or bomb burst. When this method failed, the 503d's own 75-mm. pack howitzers and lesser weapons were brought forward for direct fire. Next, having stationed men with submachine guns and rifles at advantageous points to cover approaches to a Japanese position, infantry assault teams moved forward behind white phosphorus hand grenades and the extremely close support of flame thrower teams. To avoid backflash and assure the deepest possible penetration of cave defenses, flame thrower operators often projected their fuel unignited, and then used white phosphorus grenades to fire it. If the Japanese within the caves still could not be induced to give up the fight, engineer demolition experts blocked the cave entrances. One Japanese tactic was both advantageous and disadvantageous to the 503d Infantry. Each night small groups of Japanese would attempt to reoccupy positions cleared during the previous day. To the 503d, this often meant some dirty, repetitive work, and additional casualties. On the other hand, the Japanese sometimes reoccupied tactically indefensible positions that proved easy to take out. The 503d Infantry seems to have been happy to let the Japanese occasionally return to such positions, secure in the knowledge that the only result would be more Japanese killed at no cost to the attackers. The only way to keep the Japanese from reoccupying less vulnerable positions was to stop night infiltration, a process that in turn required the blocking of the underground passageways that abounded on Topside. By these methods Japanese casualties began to mount rapidly. On the 17th, for example, over 300 Japanese were killed; nearly 775 were killed the next day. In the same two days Rock Force's casualties were approximately 30 killed and 110 wounded. The Japanese resistance at Topside finally crumbled two days later after the Americans effectively repelled a fierce counterattack. The last significant opposition, concentrated at Wheeler Point, concluded with a small-scale banzai charge on the morning of February 23. By the end of that day, the 503rd had largely cleared the western section of Corregidor. Following intense air and naval bombardments, the paratroopers launched a final assault on the eastern end of the island on February 24, systematically destroying several strongholds over the next two days. Shortly after 1100 on 26 February the Japanese on Corregidor executed their final, suicidal tour de force, blowing an underground arsenal at Monkey Point amid scenes of carnage on both sides. As the dust from terrific explosions settled, a hollow appeared where a small knoll had previously stood. Debris had flown as far as Topside where one man, almost a mile from the explosion, was injured by flying rock. Other debris hit a destroyer 2,000 yards offshore. A medium tank was hurled 50 yards through the air, most of its crew killed. Bits and pieces of American and Japanese troops splattered the ground; rock slides buried alive other men of both forces. Over 200 Japanese were killed outright, while Rock Force lost some 50 men killed and 150 wounded. This explosion signified the end of organized resistance on Corregidor, and by 16:00, elements of the 503rd Parachute Regiment had reached the island's eastern tip. Mopping-up operations continued until March 2, when Hall and Jones determined that the island was secure. Ultimately, by the conclusion of the battle, the Americans had suffered approximately 215 killed and 790 wounded, while the Japanese losses were estimated at 5,200 killed and 20 captured. On February 17, in Manila, the 129th Regiment secured the damaged shoe factory and cleared several buildings along the south bank of the Pasig River before being relieved by the 145th Regiment. During 17 February, with the aid of support fires from the 1st Battalion, now on the south side of Herran Street, the 2d Battalion smashed its way into the two most easterly of the hospital's four wings and overran the last resistance in the Nurses' Dormitory and the Science Building. The advance might have gone faster had it not been necessary to evacuate patients and other Filipino civilians from the hospital. By dusk over 2,000 civilians had come out of the buildings; the 148th Infantry conducted 5,000 more to safety that night. At the end of the 17th the 148th had overcome almost all opposition except that at the Medical School and in a small group of buildings facing Padre Faura Street at the northwestern corner of the hospital grounds. The next day, the 145th cleared Santa Teresita College but could not establish a presence inside the New Police Station. Meanwhile, the 148th consolidated its gains before being relieved by the 5th Cavalry. The 11th Airborne Division began besieging the Abe Provisional Battalion at Mabato Point, ultimately destroying this unit by February 23. On February 19, the 5th Cavalry launched an assault on and cleared the Medical School and Assumption College, while the 1st Squadron of the 12th Cavalry advanced north along the bay, facing strong opposition, and successfully reached Padre Faura Street. At the same time, the police station and San Pablo Church underwent intense artillery and tank bombardment, with the church eventually falling to the 145th by nightfall. After further artillery and tank fire nearly leveled the police station, American forces secured its ruins on February 20. The 145th also began attacking City Hall and the General Post Office, making minimal progress in the initial days. Supported by heavy bombardment, the 5th Cavalry managed to capture Rizal Hall and the Administration Building but was eventually forced to withdraw after the Japanese detonated significant explosives. The 12th Cavalry overcame the last resistance at the High Commissioner's residence and pressed onward to San Luis Street. The next day, the 12th swiftly entered the Manila Hotel and successfully took control of the area after a fierce battle. Meanwhile, the 5th Cavalry captured the Administration Building with minimal resistance, but they did not secure Rizal Hall and University Hall until February 24. During this time, the 145th Regiment continued its assault on City Hall and the General Post Office, which ultimately fell by February 22. As a result, Griswold's forces had effectively confined the remnants of Iwabuchi's troops to Intramuros, the South Port Area, and the Philippine Commonwealth Government buildings at the southeastern edge of the Walled City, leaving behind a trail of destroyed and damaged public and private structures. The fall of Manila was imminent; however, we must now shift our focus away from the Philippines to cover the Burma offensives. As we last reported, by mid-February, General Messervy's 4th Corps had successfully established a bridgehead over the Irrawaddy River at Nyaungu, while General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued to advance towards Mandalay, with the 19th Indian Division moving toward Madaya by the end of the month. Concerned about the bridgehead established by the 20th Indian Division, General Kimura decided to withdraw the main force of the 18th Division, which was engaged with the 36th British Division at Myitson. Consequently, after leaving the 114th Regiment at Mongmit, General Naka began relocating the majority of his division to Hsumhsai and then to Mandalay. In addition to the 18th Division, Kimura assigned the Kanjo Force to the 15th Army, further instructing General Katamura to prepare a general offensive aimed at destroying Stopford's bridgeheads while the reinforced 31st Division continued its counterattacks against the 20th Division. As attention turned to Nyaungu, a flurry of activity ensued to transport supplies to the 255th Indian Tank Brigade and the 48th and 63rd Indian Motorized Brigades across the river using boats and barges. General Cowan devised a plan for these units to gather at Mahlaing, capture the Thabutkon airstrip, where the air-transportable 99th Indian Brigade would land, and ultimately encircle and take Meiktila. With all his units successfully across by February 21, Cowan launched his advance towards Meiktila, quickly taking Seywa and Ngathayauk with minimal resistance. The following day, British-Indian forces attacked Taungtha from two fronts, with the southern group facing some opposition at the village of Oyin. Despite the Japanese putting up fierce and determined resistance, they were ultimately overwhelmed by the superior firepower of the British tanks. Upon realizing this new threat to his rear, Kimura halted his previous offensive and swiftly redirected the 53rd Division to Taungtha to block the enemy's advance towards Meiktila. Meanwhile, to bolster Kimura's focus on Mandalay, the 2nd British Division crossed the Irrawaddy near Ngazun on the night of February 24, encountering heavy opposition but managing to secure a bridgehead two days later. Nonetheless, by February 24, the 48th Brigade reached Taungtha ahead of Kimura's reinforcements and captured the town with light resistance. In the afternoon, the 63rd Brigade and the tanks moved through and continued towards Mahlaing, arriving on February 25. The next day, the Mahlaing area was completely cleared, and the Thabutkon airstrip was successfully captured. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, Kimura quickly dispatched the 18th and 49th Divisions along with the remaining forces of the 53rd Division towards Meiktila,  but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment under Colonel Yoshida would arrive in time. At Meiktila, Major-General Kasuya Tomekichi, commander of No. 2 Field Transport, which had responsibility for all the transport units supporting the 15th and 33rd Armies, was put in charge of the defense of the town. Kasuya had approximately 2500 administrative and line of communications troops available, and another 2000 from various Japanese Army Air Force units, including the 52nd and 84th Airfield Battalions and the 36th Anti-Aircraft Battalion. The administrative and line of communications troops were hastily organized into three emergency infantry companies and a mobile reserve force. Any hospital patient who could walk or shoot was sent out to man a bunker. Kasuya set up a western and eastern sector for the defense of the town, with the dividing line being Meiktila's northern and southern artificial lakes. The troops in Meiktila hurriedly prepared bunkers throughout the town and laid mines and booby traps along the approaches. Kasuya opened up the ordnance depots around the town and ensured that all units were well supplied with medium and light machine-guns, and had plenty of ammunition. Cowan quickly began airlifting troops from the 99th Brigade to Thabutkon on February 27, with the operation expected to conclude by March 2. During the airlift, armored car patrols advanced along the main road to Meiktila, where they encountered a formidable Japanese roadblock that the 63rd Brigade later destroyed. That evening, advance patrols observed fires in Meiktila as the Japanese started to destroy their supply depots. The Battle for Meiktila was imminent; however, while General Slim's 14th Army continued its Extended Capital offensive, new developments were also occurring in northern and southern Burma. In the north, the 36th Division finally secured Myitson following the withdrawal of the 18th Division and began moving toward Mongmit. The 50th Chinese Division, bolstered by the 1st Chinese Separate Regiment, crossed the Myitnge River at Namtu but encountered fierce resistance, with the 113th Regiment launching nine separate counterattacks before relinquishing the bridgehead. Meanwhile, the 30th Chinese Division advanced toward Lashio, supported by Kachin guerrillas. However, General Wedemeyer and the Generalissimo decided to withdraw all Chinese-American troops back to China once Lashio was captured, allowing them to prepare for a potential offensive toward Canton and Hong Kong. In the south, the 82nd West African Division continued its push toward An, facing strong opposition from General Koba's forces at the Dalet River, while the 63rd Indian Brigade readied for an amphibious assault on Ruywa. Additionally, with a robust garrison in the Tamandu sector, General Miyazaki planned to gather his remaining units at An and launch a counteroffensive to eliminate all enemy forces west of the pass. Before he could proceed, the 53rd successfully landed at Ruywa on February 16 with minimal opposition. In the following days, British-Indian forces quickly secured the area. By February 22, the 2nd West African Brigade had also arrived at the beachhead and immediately began a swift advance eastward toward An, while the 74th Indian Brigade was being deployed. The 74th then launched an attack toward Tamandu and, on February 28, began assaulting the main defenses of the 111th Regiment. However, upon learning of the enemy's approach to Meiktila, General Sakurai ordered the 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade to attack the Nyaungu bridgehead after some earlier probing attacks had failed. He also instructed Miyazaki to send the Koba Detachment, primarily composed of the 154th Regiment, to reinforce Yenangyaung. Consequently, facing less resistance in the north, Dalet would ultimately fall to the West Africans by the end of the month. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In Manila, General Yokoyama planned a counterattack to isolate Allied forces, but chaos ensued as American troops advanced. Fierce street fighting within Manila led to significant casualties, marking a brutal struggle for control. Paratroopers launched a surprise assault on Corregidor, overwhelming Japanese defenses, but taking significant losses in the process. Despite injuries and challenges, they secured the island, leading to significant enemy casualties and the end of organized resistance.

Last time we spoke about the return to Bataan. In late January, the 43rd Division secured the Rosario region, while the 25th and 6th Divisions eliminated enemy detachments and advanced towards Manila. General Krueger received reinforcements and planned a coordinated attack. On January 28, an assault began, with guerrillas aiding American forces in capturing strategic locations. A daring raid freed 522 POWs, while MacArthur planned further landings to cut off Japanese retreat. By January's end, American forces were poised for a final offensive, pushing closer to victory in Luzon. The ZigZag Pass became a fierce battleground, where Colonel Nagayoshi's well-camouflaged defenses faced relentless assaults from American forces. Despite challenges, the 129th and 20th Regiments made strategic gains, while the 35th Regiment maneuvered through treacherous terrain. Meanwhile, paratroopers from the 511th struggled with scattered landings but secured key positions. As the fighting intensified, the Allies prepared for a decisive invasion of Iwo Jima, aiming to establish a stronghold for future operations against Japan. This episode is the Battle of Manila Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last observed, by February 3, General Iwanaka's 2nd Tank Division was fending off assaults from the 6th and 25th Divisions in the San Jose area but was on the verge of being encircled. Meanwhile, General Griswold's 14th Corps had successfully taken control of Clark Field and was reorganizing for a final offensive against the Kembu Group. General Hall's 11th Corps had landed on the Bataan Peninsula and was engaged in combat with the Nagayoshi Detachment at ZigZag Pass. Additionally, General Swing's 11th Airborne Division had landed at Nasugbu and had successfully captured Tagaytay Ridge in preparation for an advance toward Manila from the south. The 37th and 1st Cavalry Divisions were advancing on Manila from the north, with the latter's two Flying Columns reaching the outskirts of the Filipino capital. At this stage, the capital was defended by Admiral Iwabuchi's Manila Naval Defense Force, which had consolidated its forces into three primary operational sectors: the Northern Force, led by Colonel Noguchi Katsuzo, responsible for Intramuros on the south bank and all areas of the city north of the Pasig; the Central Force, commanded by Iwabuchi himself, encompassing all of metropolitan Manila south of the Pasig River and extending inland to Guadalupe; and the Southern Force, under Captain Furuse Takesue, covering the Nichols Field and Fort McKinley sectors, as well as the Hagonoy Isthmus. Iwabuchi intended for the Noguchi Force to retreat to Intramuros after disabling the Pasig bridges, while other units carried out extensive demolitions of military infrastructure, including the port area, bridges, transportation systems, water supply, and electrical installations. However, since the Japanese did not anticipate the Americans' arrival for another two weeks, they were ill-prepared to execute these missions or launch any significant counterattacks. Recognizing that the cavalry units were twelve hours ahead of the 148th Regiment, Griswold authorized General Mudge to enter the city. Consequently, late in the afternoon, the 8th Cavalry's Flying Column encountered minimal resistance as it crossed the city limits and advanced towards the gates of Santo Tomas University, where nearly 4,000 American and Allied civilian internees were being held, facing severe shortages of food and medical supplies. Upon their arrival at Santo Tomas, the advance elements of the 8th Cavalry, a medium of the 44th Tank Battalion serving as a battering ram, broke through the gates of the campus wall. Inside, the Japanese Army guards--most of them Formosans--put up little fight and within a few minutes some 3500 internees were liberated amid scenes of pathos and joy none of the participating American troops will ever forget. But in another building away from the internees' main quarters some sixty Japanese under Lt. Col. Hayashi Toshio, the camp commander, held as hostages another 275 internees, mostly women and children. Hayashi demanded a guarantee for safe conduct from the ground for himself and his men before he would release the internees. General Chase, who had come into the university campus about an hour after the 8th Cavalry entered, had to accept the Japanese conditions. In the end, Hayashi obtained permission to lead his unit out with what arms they could carry in exchange for the release of the Allied internees held as hostages. They were then taken by the Americans to the outskirts of Manila early on February 5 and released. Meanwhile, Hayashi was subsequently killed in action. While General Chase worked to secure the release of the internees, Troop G of the 8th Cavalry continued its march south towards the Pasig River but was ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy fire from the Far Eastern University. Meanwhile, frustrated with the slow progress of General Jones' 38th Division, Hall ordered the 34th Regiment to move past the 152nd and press the attack eastward. Unfortunately, Colonel William Jenna's enveloping assault with the 1st Battalion also failed to penetrate Colonel Nagayoshi's robust defenses. As a result, Jenna opted to deploy his entire regiment in a coordinated three-pronged attack, which commenced on February 4. Initially, the attack, supported by the 1st Battalion of the 152nd Regiment, showed promise; however, due to ongoing strong resistance, including intense mortar and artillery fire, the 34th Regiment had to relinquish much of the territory it had captured by dusk. To the north, the 149th Regiment resumed its advance along the bypass trail and successfully made contact with patrols from the 40th Division near Dinalupihan by the end of February 4, having already reached the town. Looking northeast, with enemy armored units at Muñoz and Lupao effectively contained, the 161st Regiment successfully established roadblocks on Route 8 southeast of San Isidro. Most notably, the 1st Regiment entered San Jose in the morning with little resistance and quickly secured the area, thereby completely isolating the majority of the 2nd Tank Division before it could receive orders to withdraw. As a result, the 6th and 25th Divisions were able to methodically eliminate the enemy's isolated strongholds at their convenience. Further south, by the end of the day, the 8th Cavalry liberated 4,000 internees at Santo Tomas; Troop F also secured Malacañan Palace; the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry advanced toward Quezon Bridge but faced strong resistance at Far Eastern University, where the enemy successfully destroyed the bridge before retreating; and the 148th Regiment entered Manila, moving south through the Tondo and Santa Cruz Districts to reach the northwest corner of Old Bilibid Prison, where they freed 800 prisoners of war and 530 civilian internees. Finally, to the south, the 2nd Battalion, 511th Parachute Regiment departed from Tagaytay Ridge along Route 17, swiftly passing through Imus and Zapote to secure the Las Piñas River bridge. The 1st Battalion followed in the late afternoon but was ultimately halted by mortar and artillery fire at Parañaque. On February 5, the paratroopers managed to cross the Parañaque and began advancing north along Route 1, engaging in house-to-house and pillbox-to-pillbox combat as they moved 2,000 yards north over the next two days. Simultaneously, the majority of the 145th Regiment commenced operations in the densely populated Tondo District along the bay, while other units advanced into the San Nicolas and Binondo Districts to combat the fires ignited by Noguchi's demolitions. Throughout February 5 the 37th Division's men had heard and observed Japanese demolitions in the area along and just north of the Pasig in the Binondo and San Nicolas Districts as well as in the North Port Area, on the 145th's right front. The Northern Force was firing and blowing up military stores and installations all through the area and, as these tasks were completed, was withdrawing south across the river. Insofar as 14th Corps observers could ascertain, there was no wanton destruction, and in all probability the fires resulting from the demolitions would have been confined to the North Port Area and the river banks had not an unseasonable change in the wind about 20:30 driven the flames north and west. The 37th Division, fearing that the flames would spread into residential districts, gathered all available demolitions and started destroying frame buildings in the path of the fire. The extent of these demolitions cannot be ascertained--although it is known that the work of destruction continued for nearly 24 hours--and is an academic point at best since the demolitions proved largely ineffectual in stopping the spread of the flames. The conflagration ran north from the river to Azcarraga Street and across that thoroughfare into the North Port Area and Tondo District. The flames were finally brought under control late on February 6 along the general line of Azcarraga Street, but only after the wind again changed direction. The 148th Regiment fought its way to the Santa Cruz District but was unable to reach the bridges before they were destroyed. The 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments cleared the eastern part of the city north of the Pasig with minimal resistance, and the 7th Cavalry secured the Novaliches Dam and the Balara Water Filters, which were found intact but rigged for demolition. To the northwest, the battle for ZigZag Pass continued. Dissatisfied with his progress, Hall had previously informed Jones that the exhibition of his division was the worst he had ever seen--a rather severe indictment of an entire division, as only the 152nd Regiment had yet seen any real action on Luzon. Furthermore, the 152nd was a green unit that had been in combat scarcely 48 hours by February 2. Nevertheless, as he believed that the 152nd had at most encountered only an outpost line of resistance, that the principal Japanese defenses lay a mile or so east of the horseshoe, and that the 152nd had found "nothing that an outfit ready to go forward could not overcome quickly", Hall assumed direct control over the 34th Regiment for the main assault and left only the 152nd under Jones' command, which was to follow the 34th through the ZigZag to mop up bypassed pockets of Japanese resistance. Yet the fighting at the horseshoe on February 3 and 4 was equally disappointing, costing the 34th some 41 men killed, 131 wounded, and 6 missing while on the same days the 152nd lost 4 men killed, 48 wounded, and 1 missing. The 34th had extended the front a little to the north of the horseshoe and a bit east of the eastern leg, but neither the 34th nor the 152nd had made any substantial gains beyond the point the 152nd had reached on February 2. The Japanese still held strong positions north of the horseshoe and they still controlled the northeastern corner and about half the eastern leg. The 34th's greatest contribution during the two days, perhaps, was to have helped convince Hall that the Japanese had strong defenses throughout the ZigZag area and that the regiment had indeed reached a Japanese main line of resistance. It had not been until evening on February 4 that Hall was convinced that the 34th and 152nd Regiments had encountered a well-defended Japanese line. Hall instructed Jones to launch an eastward attack with all available forces. Although the initial phase of the attack was promising, the 2nd Battalion of the 34th Regiment became trapped and had to retreat. After sustaining significant casualties, Jenna ordered the 1st Battalion to fall back as well and halted the 3rd Battalion's advance. This left the 152nd Regiment, which achieved considerable progress and cleared much of the northern and central sections of the ridge; however, its 1st Battalion was ultimately ambushed at close range and forced to retreat in chaos during the night. The following day, due to heavy losses, the 34th Regiment was withdrawn from combat, and the reserve 151st Regiment was deployed to support the 152nd. The 2nd Battalion of the latter was also pulled back from the southeastern corner of the horseshoe as artillery focused on Nagayoshi's defenses. Nevertheless, at noon, Hall called for another assault, prompting Jones to reluctantly advance the 152nd Regiment, with only its 3rd Battalion making significant headway against the northeast corner of the horseshoe. Hall had already made his decision; he relieved Jones and appointed Brigadier-General Roy Easley to take temporary command, with General Chase scheduled to arrive on February 7 to lead the 38th Division. Looking westward, after a week of securing previously held areas, General Brush had positioned the 185th Regiment in the north and the 108th Regiment in the south, while the 160th Regiment maintained its positions at Storm King Mountain in preparation for a renewed assault on the Kembu Group. However, before the divisional attack could resume, the 160th Regiment became engaged in a fierce battle for McSevney Point, which was finally secured by dusk on February 8. After fending off several banzai-style counterattacks, the Americans learned on February 10 that the Takaya Detachment had retreated. Meanwhile, the 185th began its advance toward Snake Hill North on February 7, taking three days of intense fighting to capture half the ground leading to this objective. The 108th also moved westward on February 8, making slow progress as it cleared the paths to the Japanese hill strongholds. Further northwest, the 6th and 25th Divisions were conducting mop-up operations in the San Jose sector. By February 6, the 20th Regiment's pressure on Muñoz had resulted in the destruction of nearly 35 tanks, although another 20 remained operational. The next morning, Colonel Ida finally attempted to escape via Route 5; however, the entire Japanese column was successfully destroyed while the 20th Regiment secured Muñoz. At Lupao, the 35th Regiment continued to push the Japanese garrison into an increasingly confined area. As a result, on the night of February 7, the defenders attempted to flee, with five tanks successfully breaking through the 35th's perimeter. The dismounted Japanese forces in the town dispersed, and by noon on February 8, the 35th had taken control of Lupao with minimal resistance. Meanwhile, the Japanese garrison at San Isidro had retreated before the 161st Regiment could capture the town on February 6. The 63rd Regiment successfully took Rizal on February 7, while the 20th Regiment secured Bongabon and cleared the route to Cabanatuan on February 8. Strong patrols were then dispatched toward Dingalen and Baler Bays, which were found deserted by February 12. Back in Manila on February 7, the 37th Division assumed control of the eastern part of the city, while cavalry units advanced beyond the city limits to clear the suburbs east of the San Juan River, with the 8th Cavalry pushing toward San Juan del Monte despite heavy resistance. Most notably, under a strong artillery barrage, the 148th Regiment crossed the Pasig River in assault boats, facing intense machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. Despite this fierce opposition, two battalions managed to assemble in the Malacañan Gardens area by the end of the day. Further south, the 511th Parachute and the reinforced 188th Glider Regiment launched an unsuccessful coordinated attack on Nichols Field. Over the next two days, the 511th secured a narrow strip of land between the Parañaque River and the western runway of the airfield, overrunning some defenses at the northwest corner, while the 188th struggled to gain ground in the south and southeast. On ZigZag, Chase managed to deploy three regiments for his initial assaults, with the 151st and 152nd Regiments attacking from the west, while the 149th Regiment advanced from the east. The 5th Air Force initiated an extensive bombing and strafing campaign against the pass, and corps and division artillery increased their support fire. Despite this, the Japanese stubbornly held their ground, and it wasn't until the evening of February 8 that the 151st and 152nd Regiments overcame the last significant defenses near the horseshoe area. On that day, the 7th Cavalry captured San Juan Reservoir, and the 8th Cavalry successfully attacked San Juan del Monte, completing the area's reduction as the defenders retreated toward Montalban. The 145th Regiment launched a final assault on the Tondo District pocket, which would be completely eliminated the following day, while the 148th Regiment cleared the Pandacan District with minimal resistance. The 129th Regiment crossed the Pasig River in the afternoon and moved west toward Provisor Island but was halted by heavy fire at the Estero de Tonque. On February 9, the 8th Cavalry secured El Deposito, an underground reservoir supplied by artesian wells, and advanced south to reach the north bank of the Pasig River. The 148th Regiment began clearing the Paco District but failed to eliminate a strongpoint at Paco Railroad Station and the nearby Concordia College and Paco School buildings. Meanwhile, Company G of the 129th Regiment managed to cross to Provisor and entered the boiler plant, only to be quickly repelled by a Japanese counterattack. After an improvised evacuation overnight, tith close support--so close that the fifteen survivors had to keep prone--from the 2nd Battalion's mortars, Company G's isolated group hung on for the rest of the day while the battalion made plans to evacuate them so that artillery could again strike the island. After dark Company G's commander, Captain George West, swam across the Estero de Tonque dragging an engineer assault boat behind him. Although wounded, he shuttled his troops back to the east bank in the dim light of flames from burning buildings on and south of the island. When a count was taken about midnight, Company G totaled 17 casualties--6 men killed, 5 wounded, and 6 missing--among the 18 men, including Captain West, who had reached Provisor Island during the previous eighteen hours. Despite facing strong resistance, Company E successfully crossed and captured the eastern half of the boiler plant. The Americans gradually cleared the remainder of the boiler house, but every attempt to venture outside drew fire from all available Japanese weapons in range of Provisor Island. At the same time, the 148th Regiment finally secured the Paco District after the enemy abandoned their stronghold during the night, allowing the Americans to gain control of the east bank of the Estero de Paco. The 1st Battalion of the 129th Regiment advanced to both this estero and the Estero de Tonque. The 8th Cavalry crossed the Pasig, establishing a bridgehead about 1,000 yards deep in the Philippine Racing Club area, while the 5th Cavalry moved south alongside the 8th, encountering only scattered resistance as they also crossed the Pasig at Makati. Swing's forces consolidated their gains and established a solid line from the northwest corner to the southwest corner of Nichols Field, eliminating the last Japanese resistance on the western side, while elements of the 511th Parachute Regiment advanced along Route 1 nearly a mile beyond the field's northwest corner. On this day, the 11th Airborne Division came under the control of the 14th Corps, with Griswold ordering Swing to maintain pressure on Nichols Field without launching a general assault toward Manila. Now, however, it was time to leave the Philippines and shift focus to Bougainville to cover the ongoing Australian offensive. Following the capture of Pearl Ridge, Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade assumed control of the central and northern sectors, while General Bridgeford's 3rd Division focused its efforts in the Jaba River region to prepare for an offensive southward. By the end of December, the 15th Battalion had landed in the Tavera River area, and the 47th Battalion launched an attack up the Jaba River to disrupt enemy forces. In the first week of January, Brigadier Monaghan redeployed his troops, with the 42nd Battalion and 2/8th Commando Squadron taking over from the 47th to enable its movement down the coast to support the 15th Battalion. As a result, the Australians swiftly occupied the mouth of the Adele River and secured the Tavera area. By January 12, the 47th Battalion had advanced to the mouth of the Hupai River; however, with the Japanese seemingly reinforcing the Kupon-Nigitan-Mendai area on the Australian flank, Monaghan decided to slow his advance while the 2/8th Commandos conducted reconnaissance toward the Pagana River. With no threats emerging, the 42nd Battalion relieved the 47th on January 17 and advanced unopposed to Mawaraka. In the subsequent days, a long-range patrol from the New Guinea Battalion landed by sea and moved forward to Motupena Point, where they caught a Japanese listening post by surprise. While Monaghan awaited relief from Brigadier Field's 7th Brigade in late January, patrols ventured deep into the Sisiruai area and continued to scout beyond Mawaraka. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commandos moved to Sovele Mission and patrolled the mountains toward Kieta, occasionally assisting the Kapikavi people in their guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. While the 11th Brigade concentrated in its northern operations, patrols generally guided by native police were sent out for from 1 day to 6 days to probe forward through the bush. The 11th Battery relieved the 10th and it replaced its short 25-pounders with long 25-pounders, with their greater range, in order to support these deep patrols more effectively; from posts on Pearl Ridge and Keenan's Ridge observers directed the bombardment of the Japanese positions on the slopes beyond. The firing of the guns, far below at the foot of the Laruma escarpment, could not be heard at Pearl Ridge and the only warning that the Japanese had was the brief whistle of the approaching shells. Partly as a result of the skilful guidance of the native police the patrols killed many Japanese and suffered relatively small losses. The 26th Battalion, the first to do a tour of duty here, suffered its first death in action on January 7 when a patrol led by Lieutenant Davis met an enemy patrol. Private Smith died of wounds and three corporals were wounded as a result, so the hill where the clash occurred was then named Smith's Hill. As the 26th Battalion advanced toward Smith's Hill, Stevenson had assembled Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Kelly's 31st/51st Battalion at Sipaai by January 7. The strategy involved moving towards Soraken Harbour through extensive inland patrols designed to drive the enemy back to the coastal area, where they could be decisively defeated. Consequently, the main contingent of the 31st/51st began its advance along the coastal route, while a long-range patrol headed inland via Totokei towards Lalum. By January 16, the Australians reached Rakussia without any issues; however, in the following days, they would need to fight their way to Puto, as the flanking force was also advancing towards Kunamatoro. On January 21, the 31st/51st launched an assault on Tsimba Ridge, where the Japanese had set up their primary defensive positions. The determined defenders successfully repelled several attacks over the next few days, prompting the Australians to attempt an outflanking maneuver on January 25, with a company moving inland to cross the Genga River and attack Tsimba from the north. For the next six days, the Japanese launched strong counterattacks against this bridgehead but suffered significant losses. Ultimately, after a heavy artillery bombardment on February 6, the Australians were able to advance to the western end of the northern side of Tsimba, completely encircling the Japanese forces. The following day, the defenders counterattacked but were pushed back, yet they stubbornly held onto their remaining position at the western tip of the ridge. After an air and mortar assault, Tsimba was finally cleared on February 9, as the Japanese retreated towards the harbour during the night. In the subsequent two weeks, the Australians secured Lalum and the Gillman River, while another flanking force took control of Kunamatoro. On February 22, the 31st/51st Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion. Subsequently, the 55th/53rd Battalion took over at Pearl Ridge, where it continued to advance along the Numa Numa trail to engage the majority of the 81st Regiment. The nature of the deep patrols may be illustrated by drawing on the report of the one which killed the largest number of Japanese (26 confirmed kills). Lieutenant Goodwin and 10 infantrymen of the 55th/53rd, with an artillery observer (Lieutenant Ford) and his team, a native police boy and 2 native scouts, set out on March 2 to gain topographical information and information about the enemy, and find suitable supply-dropping points. They were out for 5 days. On the first morning they saw signs of a Japanese patrol of 3 some 45 minutes ahead of them and traced their movements. The Australians moved 5400 yards that day. Next morning near the Numa Numa trail one of the natives reported that Japanese were nearby. Goodwin detailed 3 men to block the track and led 3 others in from the side to deal with the enemy. They crept stealthily forward and found 6 Japanese in a lean-to. Goodwin gave each man a target and all 6 of the enemy were killed. While Goodwin was examining the bodies there was a burst of fire from a ridge overlooking them. The Australians withdrew to dead ground, circled the enemy and marched on into his territory, the Japanese fire continuing for 15 minutes after they had gone. They travelled 7600 yards that day. The 4th was spent reconnoitring the area they had then reached. Next day they had moved some 5000 yards on the return journey when scouts reported Japanese round the junction of their native pad and a creek that lay ahead. Goodwin moved the patrol to a ridge overlooking the Japanese and sent 3 men to cover the track to the west. After killing 15 Japanese and throwing 15 grenades into the area, the patrol then moved 700 yards and bivouacked for the night. Next day—the 6th—6 hours of marching brought them back to their starting point.  Meanwhile, in the south, Field initiated his own offensive by deploying the 61st Battalion to capture the Kupon-Nigitan-Mosina area, which was successfully taken by February 9. Concurrently, the 25th Battalion advanced along the Tavera despite facing strong resistance, eventually connecting with the 61st Battalion in the Mendai-Sisiruai area. The 9th Battalion also progressed along the Hupai, successfully occupying Makotowa by the end of January and then embarking on a challenging march toward Mosigetta, which was captured on February 16. The following day, a company from the 61st Battalion linked up with the 9th Battalion from the north. Additionally, after quickly securing the Sovele area, the 2/8th Commandos began reconnoitering the Sisiruai-Birosi area on February 2. By February 13, they had established a new base at Opai and discovered that the gardens north of the Puriata River were free of enemy forces. Furthermore, a detached company of the 25th Battalion traveled by barge from Motupena Point to Toko and began pushing inland toward Barara, with the remainder of the battalion expected to arrive shortly to support this advance. However, it is now time to shift focus from Bougainville to the ongoing Burma offensives. Initially, in the north, General Matsuyama's 56th Division began its retreat towards Hsenwi and Lashio, successfully breaching the roadblocks established by the 114th Regiment in late January. Meanwhile, the Mars Task Force struggled to dislodge the determined defenders at Namhpakka. Despite capturing Hpa-pen and executing a clever encirclement against Loikang in early February, they managed to take the ridge only after the Japanese had already completed their withdrawal to Hsenwi on February 4. The 56th Division then focused its efforts on the Lashio region, while the 4th, 55th, and 168th Regiments returned to their original divisions, with the 168th specifically tasked with defending Meiktila. On that same day, the first official convoy from the India-Burma Theater reached Kunming via the Ledo Road, which would later be renamed the Stilwell Road in honor of the individual who initiated this ambitious endeavor. Meanwhile, on February 1, General Festing's 36th Division attempted to cross the Shweli River at Myitson but was met with heavy small arms fire from the Japanese. As a result, the British opted to mislead the enemy, stationing the 72nd Brigade, which included the 114th Regiment, on a small island while the 26th Brigade crossed downstream on February 8, successfully capturing Myitson two days later. In the following days, the 26th Brigade fortified its positions; however, General Naka decided to go on the offensive, deploying his 56th Regiment in increments as it advanced north from Mongmit. Consequently, the 114th and 56th Regiments launched a series of intense counterattacks against the 26th Brigade's foothold, effectively containing the British-Indian forces, although they were unable to push them back across the river. Simultaneously, the Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group, leading the 30th Chinese Division southward, fought its way to Hsenwi on February 19. The 50th Chinese Division, which crossed the Shweli River without opposition, reached the significant nonferrous Bawdwin mines on February 20. Meanwhile, General Slim continued his Extended Capital offensive, with General Stopford's 33rd Corps advancing towards Mandalay, while General Messervy's 4th Corps quietly maneuvered through the Myittha valley toward the Irrawaddy River in the Chauk-Pakokku region. In early February, Stopford made persistent and determined attempts from the north to seize Mandalay, reinforcing the perception that this was Slim's primary focus. By February 12, General Gracey's 20th Indian Division had also arrived at Allagappa, where the 80th Brigade promptly began crossing the Irrawaddy. In the following days, the British-Indian forces would need to defend this bridgehead against fierce counterattacks from the 33rd Division. Additionally, negotiations began to persuade General Aung San's Burma National Army to join the Allies.  In Burma, one man above all others could see the writing on the wall for the Japanese. The Allies received news on January 1 that the Burmese military leader General Aung San and his Burma National Army (BNA) would be prepared to switch sides. An operation by Special Operations Executive (SOE) – codenamed Nation – was launched to liaise with the BNA and the leadership of another group, the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO), and so facilitate this delicate transfer of loyalties. The first parachute drop of agents was to Toungoo on January 27 and comprised an all-Burma force. It reported that the BNA – or significant parts of it – was ready to turn, but that the AFO needed arming. A team parachuted into Burma on March 20 reported that action by the BNA would begin in a week.  At the same time, General Evans' 7th Indian Division was advancing toward the Irrawaddy, aiming to cross the river at Nyaungu. Comprehensive deception tactics, known as Operation Cloak, were implemented to disguise the Nyaungu crossings. The 28th East African Brigade feigned a southward movement to reclaim the Chauk and Yenangyaung oilfields, and dummy parachute drops were carried out east of Chauk to support this ruse. The 114th Indian Brigade also exerted significant pressure on Pakokku to create the impression that crossings were planned there as well. While the 33rd Indian Brigade stealthily approached Nyaungu via Kanhla, the 48th and 63rd Brigades of the 17th Indian Division, reorganized as motorized units, departed from Imphal and began their descent down the Myitha valley. Worried about the enemy buildup near Nyaungu and Pakokkku, General Tanaka opted to send one battalion from the 215th Regiment to bolster defenses in Nyaungu and Pagan. From February 10 to 12, the 114th Brigade successfully captured Pakokku, while the 28th Brigade took control of Seikpyu. Although the 114th Brigade managed to fend off strong enemy counterattacks, elements of the 153rd Regiment recaptured Seikpyu after several days of intense fighting. On the morning of February 14, the 2nd Battalion of the South Lancashire Regiment crossed the Irrawaddy, landing on a beach a mile northeast of Nyaungu and quickly securing the high ground above, followed shortly by the rest of the 33rd Brigade. The next day, the 89th Indian Brigade began crossing the river, with Evans' forces advancing outward and successfully clearing the Nyaungu area by the end of February 16. Meanwhile, to the south, General Christison's 15th Corps continued its offensive in Arakan in early February. General Wood's 25th Indian Division repelled fierce counterattacks from the 154th Regiment, while General Stockwell's 82nd West African Division pursued the retreating Japanese forces. General Lomax's 26th Indian Division chose to bypass the enemy stronghold at Yanbauk Chaung to the northeast, moving swiftly through Sane and engaging some delaying forces at Namudwe. Additionally, due to the perceived weakness in the boundary between the 28th and 15th Armies, General Sakurai had to send the Kanjo Force, centered around the 112th Regiment, to reinforce Yenangyaung. At this point, most of the 2nd Division had also been dispatched to Saigon to stage a coup against the French government in Indochina, leaving Sakurai with only the depleted 49th Division and 16th Regiment in reserve. By 1944, with the war going against the Japanese after defeats in Burma and the Philippines, they then feared an Allied offensive in French Indochina. The Japanese were already suspicious of the French; the liberation of Paris in August 1944 raised further doubts as to where the loyalties of the colonial administration lay. The Vichy regime by this time had ceased to exist, but its colonial administration was still in place in Indochina, though Admiral Jean Decoux had recognized and contacted the Provisional Government of the French Republic led by Charles de Gaulle. Decoux got a cold response from de Gaulle and was stripped of his powers as governor general but was ordered to maintain his post with orders to deceive the Japanese. Instead Decoux's army commander General Eugène Mordant secretly became the Provisional Government's delegate and the head of all resistance and underground activities in Indochina. Following the South China Sea Raid in January 1945, six US navy pilots were shot down but were picked up by French military authorities and housed in the central prison of Saigon for safe keeping. The French refused to give the Americans up and when the Japanese prepared to storm the prison the men were smuggled out. The Japanese then demanded their surrender but Decoux refused, so Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu, the Japanese commander of the 38th Army, decided to begin preparations for a coup against the French colonial administration in Indochina. As a result, he chose to send the Kamui Detachment, centered around the 55th Cavalry Regiment, to Letpadan to bolster his reserve forces, which also welcomed the arrival of the Sakura Detachment in Prome. Meanwhile, Lomax's troops successfully captured Ramree village on February 8, forcing the Japanese defenders to retreat chaotically to the mainland. The remainder of the month was spent clearing the rest of the island. Consequently, Stockwell was instructed to bypass Kangaw and initiate an advance toward An. However, by February 15, the 154th Regiment had started to withdraw to positions west and north of the Dalet River, while the Matsu Detachment hurried toward Tamandu, the next target for an amphibious assault. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Manila was just kicking up. Over 4000 internees at Santo Tomas had been rescued and hard earned victories were being won over the formidable ZigZag Pass. Meanwhile the efforts on Bougainville continued against fierce and stubborn Japanese resistance.

Last time we spoke about the Mandalay Offensive. In the midst of intense warfare, General Krueger positioned his troops strategically to bolster the assault at Rosario. As the American forces repelled counterattacks and advanced, they faced fierce Japanese resistance, particularly at Binalonan and Hill 600. Despite heavy casualties, the Americans gradually gained ground, clearing key areas and preparing for further offensives. Meanwhile, Japanese defenses were fortified but weakened by shortages. As battles raged, both sides braced for decisive confrontations in the ongoing struggle for control of Luzon. In a fierce battle across the hills of Luzon, the 103rd Regiment aimed to secure key positions but faced heavy resistance, capturing Hill 800 by nightfall. The 172nd Regiment achieved surprise at Hill 900, while other regiments advanced under relentless fire. Meanwhile, in Burma, the British-Indian forces captured Shwebo, pushing deeper against Japanese defenses. The Mars Task Force disrupted supply lines, leading to a Japanese retreat. Amidst the chaos, both sides suffered heavy losses, marking a pivotal moment in the campaign. This episode is the Return to Bataan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By the end of January, as previously noted on Luzon, the 43rd Division had secured most of the Rosario region and Route 3 from Pozorrubio to the crucial junction with Route 11. The 25th Division had successfully eliminated the Shigemi Detachment at San Manuel, while the 6th Division had cleared the Cabaruan Hills and established outposts between Balungao and Guimba. Meanwhile, the 14th Corps had advanced to Clark Field, where it was engaged in a fierce battle with the Kembu Group. By January 27, the 40th Division had breached General Tsukada's northern defensive line, and the 37th Division had fortified Mabalacat, Angeles, and Runway No. 1 in preparation for the final push toward Manila. On that same day, General Krueger received significant reinforcements, with the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 32nd Division, and the 112th Cavalry Regiment at Lingayen Gulf. He planned to gather the cavalry division at Guimba to launch a coordinated advance toward the capital along the eastern side of the Central Plains via Route 5. After returning the reserve 35th Regiment to General Mullins, Krueger intended to deploy the 32nd Division, minus the 126th Regiment in Army Reserve, to the San Manuel-Asingan area. This would allow the 25th and 6th Divisions to narrow their fronts and continue south and southeast toward the Licab-Lupao line with reduced risk of exposing the 1st Corps' flank. Additionally, this strategy would enable the 37th Division to resume its advance toward Manila. However, General Griswold wanted to push Tsukada's forces further into the Zambales Mountains first, directing General Beightler to assault the enemy's southern defensive line centered around Fort Stotsenburg, while only the 148th Regiment and the 37th Reconnaissance Troop moved south along Route 3 to San Fernando. On January 28, the attack commenced as planned, with the 129th Regiment advancing westward through Runway No. 2, but it was quickly halted by the formidable forward defenses of the Eguchi Detachment. Meanwhile, with the assistance of Filipino guerrillas, reconnaissance units from the 37th Division successfully secured the San Fernando bridges intact. To the north of the Bamban River, the 160th Regiment faced unexpectedly light resistance as it moved along its ridge line to capture open-crested Hill 620, although it would later encounter stronger opposition when it reached the main defenses of the Takaya Detachment. At the same time, General Patrick began gathering the 1st and 20th Regiments at Guimba and Victoria, while the 6th Reconnaissance Troop advanced toward Cabanatuan, where they identified a significant Japanese concentration. Further north, the 35th Regiment advanced unopposed to barrio Gonzales, while the 27th Regiment moved overland and successfully dislodged a Japanese outpost from barrio Pemienta. Meanwhile, MacArthur was planning a secondary landing on the Zambales coast of Luzon, assigning Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps, which included the 38th Division and the 34th Regiment, to land at San Antonio and quickly advance across the base of Bataan to prevent any significant Japanese retreat into the peninsula. He also aimed to divert the Kembu Group's attention to relieve some pressure on the 14th Corps. However, General Yamashita had no intention of retreating to Bataan and had only dispatched Colonel Nagayoshi Sanenobu's 39th Regiment to defend the peninsula and the Kembu Group's right flank. On January 26, Hall's 11th Corps had departed Leyte Island aboard vessels from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, heading directly to Luzon for the San Antonio landing, codenamed Operation Mike 7. The convoy reached its destination on the morning of January 29. After receiving reports from Filipino guerrillas indicating that there were no Japanese forces in the landing area, Struble decided to cancel the planned pre-assault bombardment. Instead, he ordered Hall's four regiments to land simultaneously across a nearly six-mile stretch of coastline from San Antonio. Upon landing, the 151st Regiment secured San Felipe and San Antonio, while the 149th Regiment quickly moved inland to capture the San Marcelino Airstrip. However, they discovered that guerrillas led by Captain Ramon Magsaysay had already taken control of the airstrip three days prior. Before nightfall, the 34th Regiment and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop advanced south along Route 7 to the northern shore of Subic Bay. To the east, the 160th Regiment made significant progress, advancing nearly two miles southwest and breaching a stronghold at the center of the Takaya Detachment. The 129th Regiment also managed to penetrate enemy defenses into Fort Stotsenburg but was halted at barrio Tacondo by six tanks from the Yanagimoto Detachment. Despite this setback, the inability of the Japanese counterattacks to reclaim lost territory compelled Tsukada to order the Eguchi and Yanagimoto Detachments to retreat to their main line of resistance. Meanwhile, further north, units from the 1st and 20th Regiments successfully captured Licab and Talavera, cutting off the road between Cabanatuan and Muñoz. The 27th Regiment engaged a small tank-artillery force from the 2nd Tank Division that had become trapped along the highway between Gonzales and Pemienta.  With the rapid advances of the 6th and 25th Divisions, the 2nd Tank Division main strength in the Tayug-Triangle Hill area was in danger of being cut off from its sole remaining escape route into the northern bastion via San Jose and Highway 5. To meet the new situation, General Iwanaka was directed to pull back all remaining division strength from the Tayug-Umingan and Triangle Hill sectors with the exception of small outpost forces to be left at Gonzales and Umingan to delay an enemy advance from the northwest. The division was instead to concentrate the bulk of its forces in a triangular-shaped area bounded by Lupao, Muñoz and Rizal. These new dispositions had barely been effected when enemy elements swept around the outpost force at Gonzales and cut its withdrawal route to Umingan, forcing the detachment to withdraw through the hills after destroying most of its tanks and all of its mechanized artillery. From 20:00 on the 29th until 04:30 the next morning the force tried unsuccessfully to break through the Pemienta perimeter, against a sharp enemy. By the time the action had ended the 27th Regiment had killed 125 Japanese and had destroyed 8 tanks, 8 artillery prime movers, 4 tractors, 8 105-mm howitzers and 5 trucks, while only losing about 15 men killed and 45 wounded. Only four tanks succeeded in breaking through the enemy encirclement and escaped along the highway to Umingan. The next day, the 27th Regiment began positioning itself to attack Umingan from the north and northwest, while the 35th Regiment started preparations for a holding attack from the west and southwest. In an effort to avert the mass execution of prisoners of war at Cabanatuan, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Mucci led a contingent of approximately 233 men, composed of Filipino guerrillas, soldiers from the Alamo Scouts, and Mucci's 6th Ranger Battalion. They traversed 30 miles cross-country between January 28 and 30 to liberate 522 weakened prisoners during the night. Most of the prisoners had vacated the camp by 2010 hours. Rangers and guerrillas had to carry most, piggy-backing them or making hasty litters from rifles and shirts. It was 2 miles to the Pampanga River, where carts waited to take them to Platero to be treated, fed, and organized. Many were still in shock and had not yet fully understood that they were free. At 2040 hours, Capt Prince was at the Pampanga River supervising the loading of stumbling prisoners into 25 carts as Rangers and prisoners trickled in. The rest of the Scouts established an ambush at the crossing site. At 2045 hours, one hour after the raid was launched, Prince fired the third red flare and departed for Balangkare. The loaded carabao carts were ordered on their way to Balangkare at 2145 hours.  Meanwhile Major Robert Lapham's guerrilla forces provided cover for their escape, successfully returning them to Allied lines on January 31. During this operation, around 270 Japanese soldiers were killed at the camp, with an additional 900 casualties along the Cabu River. Over 270 Japanese lay dead or dying in the smoldering camp; most of the wounded dying by dawn as no aid was forthcoming. Japanese bodies were literally stacked at the Cabu bridge and scores more littered the riverside woods. The 359th Battalion had ceased to exist. In the morning, battalion commander Capt Oyanu was still alive, but most of his officers were dead. Only 255 men of 1,200 survived and most were wounded.   In contrast, the Americans suffered only 2 fatalities and 7 wounded, along with 12 wounded Filipinos and 2 dead prisoners. Fortunately, the anticipated retaliation against the Filipino population did not occur, as the Japanese retreated from the area within a day of the raid, while the 20th Regiment secured the road junction barrio of Baloc and began advancing toward Muñoz. On January 30, Griswold continued his vigorous offensive against Clark Field; the 129th Regiment cleared the hills near Dolores and took control of the abandoned Fort Stotsenburg area, while the 160th Regiment made only 500 yards of progress against the determined Takaya Detachment. The 108th Regiment finally captured Hill 5 and Thrall Hill. Further south, patrols from the 37th Division reached within a mile of Calumpit and the Pampanga River, and on Bataan, the 34th Regiment took Olongapo after a fierce skirmish, while the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment captured Grande Island at the entrance to Subic Bay. At the same time, MacArthur was strategizing another secondary landing on Luzon, this time utilizing General Swing's 11th Airborne Division to assault Nasugbu, located 45 miles southwest of Manila. With this operation, MacArthur aimed to initiate a southern advance toward Manila while simultaneously hindering Japanese forces in southern Luzon from moving north to challenge Krueger's main offensive. General Eichelberger intended to deploy the 187th and 188th Glider Regiments and advance them approximately twenty miles along Route 17 to Tagaytay Ridge. There, the 511th Parachute Regiment would conduct an airdrop to secure the ridge for the ground troops and capture adjacent sections of Route 17 before the Japanese could regroup to defend the highway. In opposition, General Yokoyama had assigned only the Fuji Force to defend the area south of Manila. This force, centered around Colonel Fujishige Masatoshi's reinforced 17th Regiment, had only deployed the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment in the Tagaytay Ridge region, with a small outpost at Nasugbu and its main defenses positioned on Mounts Cariliao and Batulao. At this stage, Yokoyama was nearing completion of the organization of the diverse Shimbu Group forces east of Manila into a cohesive combat task force. To the north, near Ipo, he had stationed the Kawashima Force, which was composed of the 82nd Brigade and the 31st Regiment. To the south, the main contingent of the former Manila Defense Force had been relocated from the Philippine capital and renamed the Kobayashi Force, guarding the Wawa-Montalban area. However, the departure of General Tsuda's 105th Division to the northern stronghold had created a significant gap in the Shimbu Group's defenses. Although Yokoyama intended to address this vulnerability with the Noguchi Detachment, Major-General Noguchi Susumu's troops were still in the midst of a lengthy march from the Bicol Peninsula by the end of January. As a temporary solution, the Okita Detachment, a composite force consisting of five battalions centered around the 186th Independent Battalion, and the Kuromiya Detachment, a three-battalion unit based on the 181st Independent Battalion, were deployed in the Bosoboso-Antipolo region. Meanwhile, the Kogure Detachment, organized around the 1st Surface Raiding Base Force, was stationed at Lamon Bay. Manila was entrusted to Rear-Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji's Manila Naval Defense Force, which included approximately 13,700 naval personnel from the 31st Special Base Force responsible for defending the islands of Manila Bay and the capital, along with some Army reinforcements. On January 27, Swing's 11th Airborne Division departed from Leyte Island aboard ships from Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2, heading directly to Nasugbu Bay to carry out Operation Mike 6. Following an uneventful journey and a brief preliminary bombardment on January 31, the 188th Glider Regiment successfully landed with minimal resistance and quickly advanced inland toward the Palico River, aiming for the section of Route 17 that leads to Tagaytay Ridge. Pleased with the initial landing, Swing subsequently deployed the 187th Glider Regiment and the division artillery, which began to relieve the rear elements of the 188th by midday. At the same time, the majority of the 188th secured the Palico bridge and crossed the river to reach Route 17. Further north, under pressure from MacArthur and Krueger, the 148th Regiment successfully crossed the Pampanga River and captured Calumpit, just as Beightler was dispatching the 145th Regiment along Route 3 to assist in the advance toward Manila. At Clark Field, the 108th Regiment was patrolling forward, while the 160th Regiment faced challenges in breaking through enemy defenses. Meanwhile, the 129th Regiment launched an attack on the main positions of the Eguchi Detachment at Top of the World hill, successfully securing its steep, grassy southern and southeastern slopes. On Bataan, General Jones sent the 152nd Regiment to travel through Olongapo and advance east along Route 7, while the 149th Regiment moved east toward Dinalupihan via a challenging trail located about 1,200 yards north of the highway. By the end of January, the 32nd Division had successfully taken control of the recently vacated Tayug area. The 6th and 25th Divisions reorganized in preparation for their final push towards San Jose, and the 1st Cavalry Division gathered at Guimba. The World War II brigade structure of Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge's dismounted 1st Cavalry Division differed greatly from that of the triangular infantry division of the period. Instead of three infantry regiments the 1st Cavalry Division had four cavalry regiments--the 5th and 12th in the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 7th and 8th in the 2d Cavalry Brigade. Each regiment had two cavalry squadrons, each smaller than an infantry battalion, as opposed to the three battalions of an infantry regiment. Each cavalry regiment contained a weapons troop armed with 81-mm. mortars, .30-caliber and .50-caliber machine guns, and bazookas, but there was no heavy weapons troop within each squadron. The cavalry regiments lacked the antitank and cannon companies of an infantry regiment. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery was composed of one 75-mm. howitzer battalion, three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, and, for obvious reasons, an attached 155-mm. howitzer battalion. Reinforcing combat and service attachments brought the division's strength up to nearly 15,000 men, somewhat less than the strength of the reinforced 37th Division at the same time. On paper, each of the four cavalry regiments numbered 1,750 men--in contrast to the 3,000-odd of an infantry regiment--but none of the 1st Cavalry Division's regiments was up to strength. The division had received few replacements since entering combat on Leyte in October, and it had come to Luzon after very little rest from its arduous campaign through Leyte's mountains. The 1st Cavalry division was ready to advance towards Cabanatuan as General Mudge dispatched two reinforced motorized squadrons. On February 1, the Flying Columns, led by General Chase, crossed the Pampanga River and began their southern march with minimal resistance. As a result, Cabanatuan and Gapan were quickly captured, although some opposition was encountered south of the Peñaranda River. Meanwhile, the 188th Glider Regiment continued its advance towards Tagaytay Ridge, facing heavy enemy fire from Mount Cariliao but still managing to secure the important Mount Aiming. The 148th Regiment swiftly moved down Route 3 and captured Malolos with little resistance. However, the 152nd Regiment faced increasingly strong resistance at ZigZag Pass. While more rugged terrain than the ZigZag Pass area is to be found on Luzon, few pieces of ground combine to the same degree both roughness and dense jungle. Route 7 twists violently through the pass, following a line of least terrain resistance that wild pigs must originally have established. The jungle flora in the region is so thick that one can step 5 yards off the highway and not be able to see the road. The Japanese had honeycombed every hill and knoll at the ZigZag with foxholes linked by tunnels or trenches; at particularly advantageous points they had constructed strongpoints centered on log and dirt pillboxes. All the defenses were well camouflaged, for rich jungle foliage covered most positions, indicating that many had been prepared with great care and had been constructed well before Colonel Nagayoshi's 39th Regiment had reached the area in December. Colonel Nagayoshi had plenty of food and ammunition for a prolonged stand, and he also possessed numerous mortars and machine-guns. His artillery, however, was inadequate for the task at hand and he lacked certain types of medical supplies, especially malaria preventatives and cures. He had so scattered his mortars and artillery in order to protect them against American artillery and air strikes that his troops would often have difficulty massing their fires. Finally, his defensive line was scarcely 2000 yards wide northwest to southeast, thus rendering his whole position susceptible to vigorous outflanking maneuvers. On the other hand, he had good troops, well-prepared positions, and excellent defensive terrain. The 129th Regiment secured the summit of Top of the World hill, effectively ensuring Clark Field's protection from all but long-range artillery fire. The 20th Regiment launched its initial attack on Muñoz, which was thwarted by Colonel Ida Kumpei's tanks fortified as pillboxes. Additionally, the 27th Regiment attempted to advance towards Umingan but was unable to break through, while elements of the 35th Regiment bypassed this area and occupied barrio San Roque. February 2 mirrored the previous day in the San Jose sector, as the 20th and 27th Regiments continued their battle against the determined Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, Mullins dispatched the 35th Regiment in a two-pronged maneuver towards Umingan, successfully clearing most of the town by noon. In an effort to recover lost time, Mullins then directed the 35th toward Lupao in the afternoon, but its leading battalion was ultimately halted by intense Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. With their forward units stalled at Muñoz and Lupao, Patrick and Mullins resorted to flanking tactics. Accordingly, Patrick sent the 1st Regiment along the Talavera River to attack San Jose from the southeast, while the 63rd Regiment attempted to bypass Muñoz to the east and rejoin Route 5 north of the town. In turn, Mullins ordered the 161st Regiment to move cross-country to positions on Route 99 south of Lupao, then advance to Route 8 between San Isidro and San Jose while the 35th surrounded and cleared Lupao. However, on this day, the 105th Division successfully evacuated San Jose along with its stockpiled ammunition, regrouping north at Puncan and rendering the entire San Jose offensive ineffective. Simultaneously, Chase's Flying Columns passed through Gapan and entered Sabang, fording the Angat River to launch two simultaneous advances to the south and east. The 148th Regiment secured Plaridel after a brief but fierce skirmish, while the 152nd Regiment faced setbacks in the ZigZag Pass due to nighttime Japanese counterattacks and artillery fire. The 149th Regiment became disoriented and had to return to Olongapo, and the 188th Glider Regiment managed to break through to barrio Aga amidst heavy resistance, while the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment moved forward to begin the assault toward Tagaytay. On February 3, Swing's glider infantry launched an assault on the western end of Tagaytay, while paratroopers from the 511th Parachute Regiment began to drop along the ridge in a rather scattered manner. The first echelon of the 511th, about 915 in all, had come to Tagaytay Ridge aboard 48 C-47 aircraft of the 317th Troop Carrier Group. The planes had flown north from Mindoro to approach Tagaytay Ridge from the northeast in order to avoid fire from Japanese anti-aircraft weapons west of the drop zone. The first 18 planes, carrying about 345 troops, dropped over the assigned area. At this juncture, planes from succeeding flights were nearly 6 miles and 3 minutes behind the lead aircraft. About 08:20 one of these later planes dumped out a couple of bundles of supplies. Taking this as a signal that they were over the proper drop zone, 'troopers of the succeeding 30 planes began jumping. Aircraft pilots, realizing they had not yet reached the proper point, attempted to halt the jumping, but the 511th's jump-masters continued sending the paratroopers out. Most of them landed almost 5 miles east-northeast of the assigned drop zone. A second group of 51 C-47s began approaching the drop area about 12:10. Some 80 men from the first 5 aircraft of this group landed in the proper place. The rest started out of their planes when they saw on the ground the collapsed chutes of the first misplaced jump. In the end, only 425 men landed on the assigned drop zone; the others, about 1325 in all, made scattered landings 4.5 to 6 miles to the east and northeast. The 11th Airborne Division, blaming the 317th Troop Carrier Group for the premature dropping, reported that the "true reason was the refusal of the Air Force to cooperate in a combined training program for Airborne and Air Force troops." In any event, it appears that some lack of jump discipline within the 511th contributed to the scattered, premature jumping. Fortunately for them, they encountered minimal resistance as they secured the unoccupied ridge. To the north, the 148th Regiment continued its advance southward, facing delays at several tidal streams that were unbridged and unfordable, but managed to reach a point two miles south of Marilao by day's end. At the same time, the 5th Cavalry's Flying Column destroyed a Japanese outpost at Angat and moved through the guerrilla-held Norzagaray before crossing the Santa Maria River to join the 8th Cavalry's Flying Column, which had already progressed to Talipapa and was nearing the outskirts of Manila. Meanwhile, the 27th Regiment successfully eliminated the remaining enemy pockets at Umingan; the 3rd Battalion of the 35th Regiment, advancing over elevated terrain northeast of Lupao, established a position on Route 8 approximately 1500 yards southeast of Lupao, while the rest of the regiment continued to launch unsuccessful frontal assaults on the town. The 20th Regiment managed to overrun a few Japanese strongholds at Muñoz but was unable to break through. On 3 February the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, moved in on the northwest, but could not reach Route 99 in its sector. The 3d Battalion pushed across that road at the southwest corner of Muñoz, but gained only half a block into the main section of the town. The 1st Battalion, on the south side of Muñoz, made negligible progress. By dusk, the 20th Infantry had overrun a few Japanese strongpoints, but in order to hold its gains had had to destroy completely and physically occupy every position it had reached so far. Muñoz, General Patrick had begun to realize, was going to be a costly, hard, and time-consuming nut to crack. The 20th Infantry had not yet closed with the main Japanese defenses, but had spent most of the last three days pinned down by Japanese artillery, tank, and machine gun fire. Only by hugging the ground and taking advantage of the little cover even shattered tree stumps afforded had the regiment kept its casualties down to 15 men killed and 90 wounded. Meanwhile the 63rd Regiment successfully bypassed Muñoz and advanced up Route 5 toward Caanawan; and the 1st Regiment similarly advanced along the San Jose-Rizal road, assembling at two points 1000 yards south and 1500 yards east of San Jose. Now, however, it is time to leave Luzon and head toward the Central Pacific. Following the successful capture of the Marianas and the establishment of B-29 Superfortress air bases on these islands, the Allies were finally able to conclude Operation Matterhorn and cease using bases in China and India for conducting raids on the Japanese mainland and other targets in East Asia. Between June 5, 1944, and January 17, 1945, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command executed a total of 29 combat missions, inflicting significant damage on key military installations in southern Japan, Manchuria, Formosa, and Indochina, with a total loss of 73 B-29s. Meanwhile, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command, reinforced by the 313th Bombardment Wing, struggled to achieve similar outcomes in both daylight precision bombing and area incendiary bombing, with the first three missions of January yielding the same disappointing results as those in December and November.  On January 3rd, Norstad's incendiary test mission was run on 3 January, when ninety-seven B-29's got off for Nagoya. Each plane carried a mixed load of bombs -14 x 350-pound M18 IB clusters fuzed to open at 8,000 feet and one 420-pound fragmentation cluster fuzed to open 1,000 feet below releasing altitude. What with aborts and planes straying from course, only fifty-seven bombed the urban area designated as primary target, most of them releasing visually though cloud cover was rated as 6/10. Some fires were started but there was no holocaust. Smoke rising to 20,000 feet combined with cloud to make observation of results impossible for the attackers. As a test, then, the mission was inconclusive. To the citizens of Nagoya, who were better informed than intelligence officers of 21st Bomber Command, the damage seemed slight. On January 9th, having satisfied Norstad's requirement, the command returned to its program of precision bombing against aircraft factories. Performance for the most part was of a piece with what had gone before. On 9 January 1945 seventy-two B-29's were sent against Musashino near Tokyo. High winds broke up the formations so that only eighteen planes were able to bomb the target; twenty-four bombs, widely scattered in the plant area, destroyed one warehouse and damaged two others-a slight return for the effort expended and the six B-29's lost. On January 14th, at the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works at Nagoya on the 14th, precision bombing was again less than precise. Seventy-three B-29's were airborne and forty bombed, getting four GP's-one ton-into the No. 5 Works area and damaging three buildings. Frustrated by this, Hansell increasingly blamed his crews for the unsatisfactory outcomes. Remarkably, he would only achieve his first fully successful B-29 attack on his final mission of the war. The target for the January 19 strike was virgin, a plant of the Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company located 2 miles northwest of Akashi, a village on the Inland Sea some 12 miles west of Kobe. The Akashi works housed Kawasaki's general headquarters and one of the company's two large production units, which built the twin-engine fighters Nick and Randy and engines for Tony, Oscar and Frank fighters. Smaller than Nakajima and Mitsubishi, Kawasaki in 1944 delivered 17% of Japan's combat airframes and 12% of its combat engines. Against Akashi, Hansell sent 77 B-29s, plus 3 others in a diversionary strike. With good weather, 62 bulled it through to the Kawasaki factory, dumped 155 tons of GPs, and then returned with no losses. Interpreting strike photos, intelligence officers estimated that 38% of the roofed area showed major damage. This was an understatement. Every important building in both the engine and airframe branches had been hit and production was cut by 90%. Indeed, the Kawasaki Company liquidated the combined plant and dispersed the machine tools, which had suffered only slightly, to other sites. The Akashi shops were given temporary repairs at the cost of 226 tons of critical materials and over 9000000 yen, but the installation was used thereafter only for limited assembly jobs. It is a pity that the full results of this mission could not have been known to Hansell. His first completely successful B-29 attack, Akashi seemed to epitomize the doctrines of precision bombardment he had championed-and it was his last strike of the war. Unaware of this success, Hansell was replaced the following day as head of the 21st Bomber Command by the determined LeMay, who immediately suggested a shift to firebombing Japan's major cities at low altitude during nighttime, marking a stark departure from Hansell's previous strategies. However, the only obstacle in the flight path was Iwo Jima, which could alert the Japanese to an impending raid and still had operational airfields capable of launching intercepting fighters. These airfields had also been used for sporadic air assaults on the Marianas, although few attacks were actually carried out in January. Capturing Iwo Jima would resolve these issues, and Admiral Nimitz aimed to establish emergency landing facilities for B-29s based in Saipan, as well as a base for their fighter escorts targeting Japan. Consequently, he decided to proceed with the invasion, codenamed Operation Detachment. After this operation, Nimitz planned to invade Okinawa to secure and develop a robust air and naval base for the assault on the Japanese home islands, which we will discuss further later. For the Iwo Jima operation, Admiral Spruance was once again given overall command of the "big blue fleet," which was re-designated as the 5th Fleet. Under his command, Vice-Admiral Richmond Turner led Task Force 51, the Joint Expeditionary Force, responsible for landing Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's Expeditionary Troops. Turner was supported by Rear-Admiral William Blandy's Task Force 52, the Amphibious Support Force, which included ten escort carriers; Rear-Admiral Harry Hill's Task Force 53, comprising all transports and landing craft; Rear-Admiral Bertram Rodgers' Task Force 54, which had six battleships and five cruisers for shore bombardment; and Vice-Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58, the Fast Carrier Force. For the amphibious invasion, Major-General Harry Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps would deploy the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, planning to land the 4th and 5th Divisions side by side with two regiments each along the two-mile stretch of beach between Mount Suribachi and the East Boat Basin on the island's southeast coast. Smith and Schmidt also decided to limit corps artillery to two battalions of 155mm howitzers, organized as the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, due to the limited space available for emplacements on the island. After landing, Major-General Clifton Cates' 4th Marine Division would take control of the Motoyama Plateau and its airfields, while also capturing the O-1 Line on the corps' right flank. Meanwhile, Major-General Keller Rockey's 5th Marine Division would secure the Mount Suribachi region before advancing northeast to capture the O-1 Line on the corps' left flank. They would then push forward across the island until Iwo Jima was fully secured. At the same time, Major-General Graves Erskine's 3rd Marine Division would remain in reserve, with only its 21st Marine Regiment deployed as the corps reserve. To aid in this effort, the 7th Air Force, under Generals Harmon and Hale, had been consistently targeting Iwo Jima's facilities since August 1944. Following intense attacks in December, which included bombardments by Rear-Admiral Allan Smith's 5th Cruiser Division against Iwo Jima, Haha Jima, and Chichi Jima were again struck on January 5, but the next bombardment wouldn't occur until January 25.  A fighter sweep by 28 P-38s opened the attack at 0945; 62 B-29s bombed at 1100 and 102 B-24s at noon; Crudiv 5 (Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith), comprising heavy cruisers Chester, Pensecola and Salt Lake City with six destroyers, arrived off Iwo at 1330 and opened bombardment at 1347. "Hoke" Smith approached the island from the west, rounded Mount Suribachi and then reversed track in a half-circle. Unfortunately the sky was so heavily overcast as to force the planes to bomb by radar and to hamper ships' spotting. Surface visibility was good enough to enable the island to be well covered by a naval bombardment, which lasted for 70 minutes and expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch and 5334 rounds of 5-inch shell. The bombers dropped 814 tons of bombs. Photographs, taken three days later, showed that both airfields on Iwo were wholly or in part operational, but no more enemy air raids hit the Marianas until Christmas Day. The job of keeping Iwo airfields neutralized was now turned over to B-24s of VII A.A.F. Between 8 December 1944 and 15 February 1945 they flew at least one strike daily over the island. The day before Christmas, Rear Admiral Smith's heavy cruisers, together with five destroyers, delivered a second bombardment, coordinated with a B-24 strike. This strike was slightly more eventful than the initial one in December, but even less effective. The bombardment, which expended 1500 rounds of 8-inch, provoked return fire from a 6-inch coast defense battery (designated "Kitty" on the target maps) in the northeast part of the island, but "Kitty's" claws managed to strike no closer than 200 yards. As proof of the slight damage inflicted by this bombardment, the Japanese were able to pay a vicious return visit to Saipan on Christmas Eve, a raid of 25 planes which destroyed one B-29 and damaged three more beyond repair. Crudiv 5 returned 27 December for a repeat performance, lighter than the others; and a fourth bombardment was set up for 5 January 1945. While fighter planes and B-24s hit Iwo Jima the same cruisers and six destroyers bombarded Chichi Jima, 145 northward, and the slightly nearer Haha Jima. Their hope was to catch a convoy bringing Japanese supplies to these islands, whence they were forwarded to Iwo by small craft at night. Destroyer Fanning, steaming ahead of the group as radar picket, encountered at 0206 a surface target, later identified as LSV-102, which she sank. At 0700 Admiral Smith's group opened a one hour and 49 minutes' bombardment of Chichi Jima. During it, destroyer David W. Taylor suffered an underwater explosion, probably from a mine, which flooded her forward magazine. The Haha Jima bombardment by Salt Lake City and two destroyers lasted for an hour. Crudiv 5 then pounded Iwo Jima for another hour and three quarters. The reply was negligible, and a few aircraft which made passes at the cruisers were easily driven off. Starting on the last day of January and continuing for two weeks, 7th Air Force aircraft bombed the island day and night, occasionally joined by LeMay's Superfortresses. For ten weeks, Iwo Jima faced near-daily bombardments from land-based aircraft, with nearly 6,800 tons of bombs dropped. Additionally, there were five naval bombardments that fired 203 rounds of 16-inch shells, 6,472 rounds of 8-inch shells, and 15,251 rounds of 5-inch shells. Under normal circumstances, such a heavy and sustained bombardment would have been more than enough to devastate an island of that size. However, the Japanese managed to restore the airfields on Iwo Jima just hours after each attack and continued to strengthen their defenses on the island. Following the fall of Saipan, the Japanese appointed Lieutenant-General Kuribayashi Tadamichi to oversee the defenses of the Bonin Islands, renaming the Ogasawara District Group as the 109th Division. Kuribayashi stationed Major-General Tachibana Yoshio's 1st Mixed Brigade and most of Colonel Iida Yusuke's 17th Independent Mixed Regiment on Chichi Jima, along with several other units across the islands. He accurately predicted that Iwo Jima would be the target for an Allied landing and took measures to make it virtually indestructible. To this end, he coordinated with Major-General Senda Sadasue's 2nd Mixed Brigade, Colonel Ikeda Masuo's 145th Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Baron Nishi Takeishi's severely weakened 26th Tank Regiment, which had sustained heavy losses from American submarines at sea. Additionally, Major Fujiwara Tamachi's 3rd Battalion of the 17th Independent Mixed Regiment and a robust artillery unit led by Colonel Kaido Chosaku were included in the defense. Rear-Admiral Ichimaru Toshinosuke also provided a significant naval garrison on the island, centered around the 27th Air Flotilla, bringing Kuribayashi's total forces to approximately 21,060 men, far exceeding the American estimate of 13,000. Aware that the beaches would be vulnerable to enemy naval and air assaults, Kuribayashi opted to strengthen the Mount Suribachi and Motoyama Plateau areas. The Mount Suribachi area was made a semi-independent defense sector, its heavily fortified positions bristling with weapons of all types, ranging from casemated coast-defense guns and artillery to automatic weapons emplaced in mutually supporting pillboxes. The narrow isthmus connecting Suribachi to the rest of the island was lightly held by infantry, but heavily defended by enfilade fire from artillery, rockets, and mortars emplaced on both the high ground in the south (Suribachi area) and the northern portion of the island. The main defense line was a belt of mutually supporting positions organized in depth, running generally northwest-southeast across the island. It stretched from the cliffs north of the western beaches south to include Airfield Number 2; then, turning eastward through Minami, terminated at the rugged coast north of the eastern beaches. Pillboxes, blockhouses, bunkers, and dug-in tanks strengthened the defenses in the naturally formidable terrain everywhere throughout this belt. The second defense line generally bisected the remaining area in the northern portion of the island. It began several hundred yards below Kitano Point on the northwest coast, cut through Airfield Number 3 and the Motoyama area in the center, and terminated between Tachiiwa Point and the East Boat Basin on the eastern coast. Man-made emplacements were not as numerous in this second line, but natural caves and other covered positions afforded by the fantastically rugged terrain were skillfully organized for the defense. The beaches would be lightly defended but would receive fire support from the elevated positions. A substantial reserve force, including tanks, was also prepared to counterattack and push the Americans back into the sea if they managed to establish a foothold. In a shift from traditional Japanese defensive strategies, Kuribayashi moved away from full-scale counterattacks and suicidal banzai charges, instead instructing his troops to hold their mutually supportive positions to the last and to carry out small unit counterattacks at cutoff points. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allied forces continued their advance through Luzon, battling Japanese defenses, liberating prisoners, and securing key locations, paving the way for a final push toward Manila. Meanwhile, on Iwo Jima, General Kuribayashi was preparing for a final stand, hoping beyond hope to make the Americans pay so dearly they might end the war.

Last time we spoke about the South China Sea Raid. In January, General Krueger reinforced the American beachhead at Lingayen Gulf while Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting enemy ships based on faulty intelligence. Despite not finding the expected battleships, American forces decimated a Japanese convoy, sinking numerous vessels and claiming 113 enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, on Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite fierce resistance. As both sides prepared for counteroffensives, the battle intensified, marking a pivotal moment in the Philippines campaign. On January 17, the 58th Brigade and supporting regiments launched a daring operation to destroy enemy positions. As American forces advanced, they faced fierce resistance, but some regiments achieved notable successes. Task Force 38 executed airstrikes on Formosa and Hong Kong, inflicting damage despite heavy losses. Meanwhile, Japanese forces struggled to regroup amid American pressure. General Suzuki devised a plan to fortify Leyte, but ongoing air raids hampered supply efforts. Tensions escalated as both sides prepared for decisive confrontations in the ongoing battle for control. This episode is the Mandalay Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with, General Krueger strategically positioned General Mullins' 25th Division on the right flank of the 43rd Division to bolster the assault forces at the Rosario front. This maneuver was also intended to facilitate the continuation of the 14th Corps' advance to the south. Following the successful repulsion of General Nishiyama's local counterattack, General Wing ordered the 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments, which had been stalled, to launch an offensive from the west along the Damortis-Rosario road. Simultaneously, the 103rd and 169th Regiments were tasked with advancing northward along Route 3, originating from Pozorrubio. In contrast, while the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 23rd Division worked to contain General Swift's 1st Corps, General Yamashita was reinforcing the San Jose sector. He further instructed the Shigemi Detachment to maintain a defensive position in Binalonan. Although the 27th and 161st Regiments had successfully relieved the 103rd Regiment in the Binalonan area, Major-General Shigemi Isao ultimately opted to halt further troop movements. He decided to leave only a small garrison in Binalonan while the majority of his forces prepared for a decisive stand at San Manuel.   As the situation unfolded, the 3rd Battalion of the 161st Regiment encountered minimal resistance, allowing them to advance into the northern half of Binalonan by nightfall on January 17. In a parallel effort, General Patrick directed the 1st Regiment towards Urdaneta, where they successfully eliminated a small outpost belonging to the Shigemi Detachment. Additionally, he dispatched the 20th Regiment to the Cabaruan Hills, where they achieved their objective by reaching Lunec and securing the central area of the hills by the end of the day. On January 18, the offensive momentum of the 6th and 25th Divisions persisted. The 20th Regiment advanced to a low ridge approximately 2,500 yards west of Cabaruan, where American forces identified the primary defenses of the 2nd Battalion, 71st Regiment. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment successfully cleared Binalonan, and the 27th Regiment moved forward to seize control of the Bactad area, further consolidating their gains in the region. Simultaneously, Wing's units were gearing up for a significant new offensive. In line with this strategy, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment advanced along Route 3, deftly circumventing the town of Sison, and finally reached a crucial road junction located to the northeast of the town. Meanwhile, to the north, the 172nd Regiment executed a successful nighttime ambush against a Japanese artillery battalion. Following this victory, they dispatched a company to seize control of a strategically important hill, rising 600 feet and situated approximately 1,000 yards north of Rosario. This position enabled American forces to exert control over a substantial portion of the surrounding area. By the conclusion of the day, the 158th and 63rd Regiments established contact through patrols about a mile south of Amlang, as they prepared for a coordinated assault that was set to launch on January 19. This offensive culminated in the collapse of the last Japanese defenses just two days later. Concurrently, the 172nd Regiment successfully established a patrol base on Hill 606. From this vantage point, patrols ventured into Rosario, discovering the town was heavily mined, riddled with booby traps, and defended by concealed machine-gunners and riflemen hiding amidst the rubble of the buildings. On January 19, the 103rd Regiment initiated an assault on Hill 600, located at the southern end of the ridge line east of Route 3. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment faced several intense counterattacks from retreating Japanese forces that had been bypassed at Mount Alava and Sison. Despite the fierce resistance, the relentless pressure from Japanese troops and increasingly heavy artillery fire ultimately compelled the battalion to withdraw by noon. Nevertheless, the American operations succeeded in diminishing the Japanese presence in the region. Looking southward, the 161st Regiment cautiously advanced toward San Manuel, while the 27th Regiment effectively moved into Asingan, successfully cutting off Shigemi's escape route. Further south, the 1st Regiment rapidly progressed along Route 3 toward the Agno River, capturing the towns of Villasis, Carmen, and Rosales. Meanwhile, the 20th Regiment commenced an assault on the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment stationed in the Cabaruan Hills. On the front commanded by General Griswold, the 14th Corps was in the process of mobilizing along the Camiling-Anao line, preparing to initiate an advance toward the Tarlac-Victoria line. The 160th Regiment began its march, covering seven miles southward from Camiling along Route 13, while the 129th Regiment took a strong position in Anao, establishing vital contact with other outposts of the 37th Division stationed at Paniqui. The advances made on January 20 were notably swift, with the 148th Regiment successfully capturing the towns of Gerona and Pura. Meanwhile, the 37th Reconnaissance Troop made significant progress by entering the guerrilla-occupied area of Victoria, and units from the 40th Division advanced to within four miles of Tarlac, signaling a promising push toward their objectives. In the area around Cabaruan, the Japanese forces had sustained heavy losses during the initial attack. In response, Colonel Patrick made the strategic decision to withdraw two battalions from the hills to reinforce the southern advance. Probing slowly through the roughest ground in the Cabaruan Hills on January 20 and 21, the 20th Regiment's reinforced battalion jumped off in the morning of the 22nd in what was expected to be the last attack, its way paved by an especially heavy artillery and air bombardment. But from the start, operations did not go as planned. The air strike, conducted by Fifth Air Force A-20s was four hours late, subjecting the infantry to "a nerve racking wait," and did not include requested napalm. Air and artillery concentrations were, however, well placed, and it seemed improbable to the waiting infantry that many Japanese could have lived through them. A combined tank-infantry assault began about 12:30 and proceeded slowly but steadily for almost two hours. Then the attackers were stopped cold by a tremendous burst of rifle, machine-gun, and light artillery fire from the very hillsides that had received the weight of the bombardments. Company E, in the lead, fell back; Company G's officers were all either killed or wounded, and the company was temporarily scattered; Company F was pinned in place; and two supporting tanks were knocked out. Casualties mounted quickly to 10 men killed and 35 wounded. As a consequence, Patrick found it necessary to redirect one battalion from the 1st Regiment to support the ongoing attack. Simultaneously, the remainder of the 20th Regiment pressed forward toward Cuyapo, while the bulk of the 1st Regiment continued its eastward movement toward the guerrilla-held Balungao. Additionally, the 6th Reconnaissance Troop reached Guimba, successfully establishing contact with patrols from the 14th Corps, which was crucial for coordinating their efforts. On another front, with Mount Alava now vulnerable, the 169th Regiment launched a vigorous assault on January 20, managing to secure the summit of the mountain by nightfall. In contrast, the 103rd Regiment continued to face heavy casualties during their frontal assaults against Hill 600, ultimately gaining only a precarious foothold on the exposed southern slopes. Meanwhile, in a significant naval development, Admiral Halsey's Task Force 38 exited the South China Sea through the Balintang Channel on January 20. The task force was poised to execute further strikes against Formosa, aiming to disrupt enemy operations and bolster the Allied offensive in the region. The following day, with significantly improved weather conditions, Admiral McCain's aircraft carriers launched a coordinated series of airstrikes targeting Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the southern Ryukyu Islands. These operations resulted in the destruction of 104 Japanese aircraft on the ground, the sinking of seven oil tankers, and the loss of seven transport ships, along with additional damage inflicted on another seven vessels.  For the first time since November 1944, TF 38 felt the sting of kamikazes. Operating just 100nm east of Formosa, TF 38 was not difficult to find. Just after noon, a single aircraft appeared to conduct a conventional bombing attack on TG 38.3's light carrier Langley. One bomb hit forward. Personnel casualties were light, but the carrier was conducting flight operations three hours later. Within minutes, another aircraft also evaded radar detection and the CAP to commence a suicide dive against Ticonderoga. The kamikaze struck the flight deck and penetrated where its bomb exploded. An impending strike was spotted and ready to launch; now these aircraft provided fuel for the fire which was quickly spreading. Just before 1300hrs, another group of eight kamikazes and five escorts resumed the attack on TG 38.3. Only two suicide aircraft survived the CAP to dive on the wounded Ticonderoga. One was sent spinning into the water by antiaircraft fire, but the final attacker crashed into the carrier's island. More fires were started. The crew succeeded in putting out the flames by 1415hrs and correcting a nine-degree list by 1800hrs. Though the ship was saved, the cost was high. Some 143 men were killed and 202, including her captain, were wounded. In addition, the air group lost 36 aircraft. As a final farewell, kamikazes attacked the two destroyers on picket duty just 65nm off Formosa at 1310hrs. A single Zero had joined a returning strike. Before it could be identified as enemy, it dove on destroyer Maddox, striking her amidships. This and the explosion of the bomb aboard created a fire that was quickly extinguished. After a final day of strikes on January 22 against the Ryukyus, during which eight ships were sunk, Task Force 38 set course for Ulithi. Upon arrival, Admiral Halsey transferred command of the Fast Carrier Force to Admiral Spruance, who would lead the final offensives in the Central Pacific.  Meanwhile, back on Luzon, on January 21, the 160th Regiment swiftly cleared the town of Tarlac and began its advance toward San Miguel. Simultaneously, the 145th and 148th Regiments moved unopposed toward La Paz. The speed of 14th Corps' advance had stretched Griswold's supply lines abnormally and had exposed his left from Cuyapo to La Paz, a distance of nearly 25 miles. He had no definite information about suspected Japanese concentrations in the vicinity of Cabanatuan, on Route 5 just 15 miles east of La Paz. His worries about the security of his flank were hardly put to rest by reports of new contacts with Japanese forces at Moncada, now 20 miles behind the front, and at La Paz. Elements of the 129th and 145th Regiments easily took care of the Japanese in the Moncada area; but during the night of January 21, a pitched battle developed at La Paz when a platoon of Japanese infantry, supported by one tank, attacked a 148th Regiment perimeter at a road junction a mile west of town. The Japanese finally withdrew after destroying a bridge that carried a secondary road across a river a mile east of La Paz; but because of this, Griswold reported to General Krueger that it would be impossible to extend 14th Corps' left any further south until he had more information about Japanese forces east of La Paz. To mitigate this risk, he decided to keep General Beightler's 37th Division positioned in reserve while General Brush's 40th Division continued its advance southward along Route 3 toward Bamban. As a result, elements of the 160th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop reached Capas and conducted patrols toward Camp O'Donnell on January 22. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment began probing the defenses established by Japanese forces under Shigemi. The 103rd Regiment faced severe losses during their assault on Hill 600, necessitating a withdrawal to reorganize. Concurrently, the 169th Regiment launched an attack on Hill 355, making slow and costly progress against fierce resistance on the steep, barren slopes. By January 24, most of Hill 355 had been cleared, allowing the 3rd Battalion of the 103rd Regiment to move in and conduct mop-up operations in the area. As the 158th Regiment looked northward and secured the area around Amlang, they initiated an eastward push towards the positions held by the 172nd Regiment. However, their advance was slow, with only a modest gain of 500 yards achieved. Over the next two days, the 158th faced a grueling battle, making painstaking progress as they advanced foot by foot across exposed hills and ridges, all while enduring relentless machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It wasn't until January 26 that they successfully broke through to Cataguintingan, where they provided much-needed support to the 172nd Regiment's ongoing assaults into Rosario. Meanwhile, by the evening of January 23, the 161st Regiment had managed to secure the southern slopes of the barren ridge north of San Manuel. They established trail blocks in the Aboredo Valley, effectively controlling movement in the area. To the south, the 108th Regiment had taken control of the Capas region, while the 160th Regiment successfully captured Bamban. However, it became increasingly evident that the American forces were now confronting the well-fortified and organized defenses of the Kembu Group. The Kembu Group's strength lay in the terrain it held, in the depth of its defenses, and in the great number of automatic weapons (aircraft and anti-aircraft) it possessed. Its major weaknesses were its immobility; the inadequate training and armament of the bulk of its troops; shortages of food, ammunition, and field artillery; and the rudimentary state of many defensive installations, a state deriving from the late start in establishing the positions at and west of Clark Field. The health of the command was poor from the start, and medical supplies were short. Morale was not of the highest order, and many of the troops were easily disaffected Formosan, Okinawan, and Korean labor personnel. In brief, the Kembu Group was the poorest armed, prepared, and supplied of Yamashita's three defense commands. On the other hand, as the 40th Division was soon to learn, even poor service troops, whatever their state of training and armament, can put up stiff resistance in good defensive terrain.  In preparation for the defense of Clark Field, General Tsukada assembled a diverse array of forces, totaling approximately 30,000 troops, although the majority consisted of air and naval personnel. He strategically divided his Army units into four distinct detachments. The Takayama, Takaya, and Eguchi Detachments were positioned along the first and second lines of defense, facing eastward toward Highway 3. Their defensive line extended from the hills west of Bamban to the vicinity of Fort Stotsenburg. In contrast, the Yanagimoto Detachment maintained its mobile units at Angeles and Porac, ready to respond to any potential enemy paratrooper landings on the southern flank of the Clark Field defenses. Additionally, Rear-Admiral Sugimoto Ushie commanded naval units comprising about 15,000 men, tasked with defending positions behind the two forward lines. In light of this formidable opposition, General Griswold made the strategic decision to utilize January 24 for consolidation and regrouping. This involved preparing for further advances southward while also probing into the enemy defenses that had already been uncovered. The 160th Regiment was able to secure Lafe Hill, although they were unable to establish a foothold on Hill 500, highlighting the challenges that lay ahead. To the north, American forces initiated another offensive against the Cabaruan Hills. The units of the 1st Regiment made only modest progress, yet they managed to advance closer to the main defensive positions as night fell. Meanwhile, at San Manuel, the 161st Regiment launched its first assault against the Shigemi Detachment, which encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance. As a result, the Americans were only able to establish a fragile foothold in the northern section of the town. Further north, Wing directed the 103rd Regiment to set up a line of departure along Route 3, aiming to strike eastward at the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. At the same time, they were tasked with advancing up the southwestern slopes of the exposed Hill 700 to secure that strategic location, as well as Hill 800 to the northwest. The 169th Regiment, advancing to the left of the 103rd, was assigned to capture Question Mark Hill. Concurrently, the 63rd and 172nd Regiments were ordered to launch simultaneous assaults on Hills 900 and 1500, respectively, while the reserve 3rd Battalion of the 63rd Regiment was also committed to clear Benchmark Hill. This coordinated attack was scheduled for January 25. The initial phases of the assault showed promise, with the supporting forces making significant headway. However, the 103rd Regiment faced considerable difficulties, managing to secure Hill 800 only by nightfall. Notably, the 172nd Regiment achieved tactical surprise, successfully clearing most of Hill 900. Over the next two days, the 63rd Regiment regrouped around Hill 1500 in preparation for its own offensive. Simultaneously, the 161st Regiment continued its slow advance southward through San Manuel, facing intense opposition. Patrick's units on the Cabaruan Hills managed to gain a mere 300 yards against determined resistance. Meanwhile, Brush pressed his attack on Clark Field, with the 160th Regiment clearing Hill 500 and advancing nearly a mile along the ridge from Lafe Hill, while the 108th Regiment secured Hills E and G. The following day, the 40th Division continued its southward maneuver. Any movement by American troops along the generally open ridges west of Route 3 inevitably brought down Japanese machine-gun and mortar fire, often augmented by fire from the dismounted aircraft automatic weapons, anti-aircraft guns, and light artillery. Seeking cover and usually pinned in place, the American infantry would call for close-in mortar and artillery support, wait for the concentrations to be fired, and then drive forward a few yards, when the process had to be repeated. Each time, the Americans managed to overrun a few Japanese machine-gun or rifle strongpoints. There was little choice of routes of advance. Draws, providing some concealment in scrub growth or bamboo thickets, were usually covered by well-emplaced Japanese weapons both within the draws and on the ridges to each side. Possession of the high ground, as ever, was essential. Yet the troops had to employ draws whenever possible to outflank Japanese ridgeline strongpoints, and often draws and ravines proved to be the only routes by which tanks, tank destroyers, and cannon company self-propelled mounts could get to the front to fire against Japanese cave positions along the sides of the ridges. The capture of one Japanese-held cave served only to disclose another, and one machine-gun position was overrun only to provide access to the next. Dislodging the Kembu Group from such defenses in depth was to prove a slow, laborious, and costly process, demanding the closest teamwork between the infantry and its supporting arms. Casualties, as a rule, would not be heavy on any one day--progress would be too slow and the troops would spend too much of their time pinned down awaiting fire from supporting weapons. But a daily attrition rate of about 5 men killed and 15 wounded for each battalion engaged would soon begin to have its effect. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment swiftly captured Hills 636 and 600 in rapid succession. However, the 108th Regiment lost control of Hill G during the engagement. On January 26, Griswold committed the 37th Division to the fight, with the 145th Regiment successfully capturing Mabalacat and Mabalacat East Airfield. They then shifted westward across Route 3, overrunning Clark Field Runway Number 1. In the Cabaruan Hills, American forces gained only 150 yards at a considerable cost. In response, Patrick decided to deploy another battalion from the 1st Regiment to eliminate this pocket of resistance. The following day, this two-battalion assault proved successful, resulting in the destruction of an entire battalion of Japanese troops, with over 1,400 enemy soldiers killed. Further north, the 161st Regiment finally broke through the main defenses of Shigemi's forces. Before dawn most of the Japanese left in San Manuel scrambled across the draw on the east side of town and fled to join the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment north of San Nicolas, but not before launching a final counterattack to cover their escape. At 0930 the 161st Infantry's two battalions resumed the drive southward through the town, and by 1330 San Manuel was clear. In a heroic but tactically unimportant stand the Shigemi Detachment had virtually fulfilled its self-imposed desire for annihilation in place. The detachment had lost 750 men killed; all its tanks, artillery, trucks, machine guns, and mortars had been either captured or destroyed. Probably no more than 250 troops escaped, and many of them were unarmed and wounded. The 161st Infantry and attached units had lost approximately 60 men killed and 200 wounded; the 716th Tank Battalion lost 3 tanks. Meanwhile, Wing's offensive continued on January 27, with the 103rd Regiment successfully reaching the crest of Hill 700 and the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. Unfortunately, they lost both positions to a brutal Japanese counterattack amidst a violent tropical downpour. On January 28, the 172nd Regiment captured Rosario, while the 63rd secured the southern crest of Hill 1500. Both regiments completed the capture of this strategic feature by January 30, thereby finalizing the occupation of the crucial road junction area. Further south, on January 27, the 160th Regiment advanced only 500 to 800 yards to the west and southwest. The 108th Regiment made a more substantial advance of about 1,000 yards southwest from Hills E and G but failed to reach Hill 5. The 145th Regiment pushed south along Route 3 for an additional three miles, reaching Culayo and Dau before taking control of the guerrilla-occupied Angeles, which had recently been abandoned by the retreating Yanagimoto Detachment. In a similar vein, the 148th Regiment secured Magalang without encountering any resistance. As we shift our focus from Luzon, we turn our attention to Burma, where we will delve into the ongoing developments of Operation Capital. Picking up from our previous discussions, we find ourselves in Central Burma, where the 2nd British Division and the 19th Indian Division are making significant strides toward Shwebo. The 2nd British Division successfully captured Ye-u on January 2, followed by the establishment of a crucial bridgehead across the Mu River just three days later. Meanwhile, the 19th Indian Division also advanced, reaching the Shwebo area by January 5. On January 8, a coordinated assault was launched by units from both divisions, culminating in the capture of Shwebo after two days of intense and brutal combat. To the west, General Festing's 29th Brigade began probing the northern flank of the 15th Division at Twinnge. Concurrently, other elements of the 19th Division worked to solidify their positions by establishing additional bridgeheads over the Irrawaddy River at Thabeikkyin and Kyaukyaung. On January 10, the 20th Indian Division captured Budalin and subsequently pushed towards Monywa, where the 33rd Division had only left a small contingent to serve as a rearguard. However, the campaign faced unexpected challenges; heavy rainfall during the first week of January brought all transport operations of the 4th Corps to a standstill, significantly hampering the Lushai Brigade's planned assault on Gangaw. After enduring a heavy aerial bombardment, the attack on Gangaw finally commenced on January 10. The Lushai Brigade managed to overpower the limited defending forces, forcing them to retreat after a brief skirmish. With Gangaw now under their control, the Lushai Brigade refocused their efforts on reconnaissance, monitoring the flanks of the 7th Indian Division. Meanwhile, the 28th East African Brigade took the lead in the advance, successfully displacing a Japanese garrison at Tilin on January 22. By this time, the 114th Brigade had begun to follow in the wake of the East Africans, while the 89th Brigade executed a long maneuver to the left, advancing toward Pauk in parallel with the other offensives. Although General Kimura was aware of some movements on his southern flank, he perceived these as mere feints by minor forces intended to divert his attention southward. Following a relentless barrage of artillery and air strikes, the 20th Division launched its offensive against Monywa on January 20. This assault faced fierce resistance, and it took two days of intense and bloody combat before the division was able to secure control of the town. After capturing Monywa, the 80th Brigade advanced towards Myaung, while the 110th Brigade shifted its focus to Ayadaw before launching an attack on Myinmu. By January 25, they had successfully established a bridgehead in that area. Meanwhile, to the east, the 2nd Division commenced its assault on Sagaing on January 14. They made significant headway against the forward defenses of the 31st Division, with other units managing to secure a bridgehead at Ywathitgyi. General Katamura, concerned about the expanding bridgeheads established by the 19th Division across the Irrawaddy River, ordered the 15th and 53rd Divisions to neutralize these positions before they could become fortified. As a result, during the last week of January, the Japanese forces executed a series of coordinated night attacks on Kyaukmyaung. By this time, British-Indian troops had dug in deeply, supported by formidable artillery and machine-gun positions. The ensuing conflict was marked by brutal carnage, with the 15th Division suffering a staggering loss of one-third of its personnel, while the 53rd Division was compelled to withdraw to Kyaukse after incurring heavy casualties. In parallel, the 89th Brigade successfully occupied Pauk on January 28, as General Messervy's forces geared up for a decisive push towards Meiktila. Looking northward, General Sultan was also advancing his own offensive aimed at reopening the Burma Road to China. He ordered the 50th Chinese Division to move towards Lashio and deployed the Mars Task Force to Hosi. Additionally, he dispatched the 36th British Division towards Mongmit, although the British advance was expected to be slow until additional forces could be brought into alignment for a more coordinated effort. General Sun's newly established 1st Army initiated a delayed offensive against Namhkam, which resumed in early January. This resurgence was marked by the 90th Regiment's strategic capture of the hill that overlooks the southwestern entrance to the Shweli River valley. Concurrently, the 112th Regiment advanced through Loiwing, subsequently crossing the river to approach Namhkam from the northeast. Meanwhile, the 88th Regiment entered the valley via the main road, making a direct push across the small plain toward Namhkam. The 89th and 114th Regiments executed a broader maneuver around the southern end of the Shweli valley; the 89th crossed the river on January 7 and advanced northward toward Namhkam, while the 114th crossed three days later, navigating through the hills toward the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail. To the south, the 475th Regiment progressed through Mong Hkak and reached Mong Wi on January 6, preparing for another challenging march across the hilly terrain toward Hosi, with the 124th Cavalry Regiment following closely behind. So close is Tonkwa to the mountains that the 475th found the trail rising steeply on the 1st day's march east. Like a crazily twisted drill it bored its way farther east and ever higher. In some places it was 15 to 20 feet across; in others, just wide enough for a man and a mule. As they rounded the turns, the men would peer ahead and look out across the valleys to where lay row on row of hills. Trees were everywhere. In flat places carved by erosion, the Burmese had cut and farmed terraces, and little villages clung to the mountains like limpets to a rock. Because existing maps were unreliable, so that map reconnaissance could not locate water and bivouac areas, and because the sheer fatigue of climbing the steeper slopes was formidable, march schedules went down the mountain side, with quite a few steel helmets and an occasional mule. Halts were a matter of common sense leadership at platoon or company level. The march was tactical but no Japanese were encountered, though rumor of their nearness kept the men alert. The Chinese had passed that way before, while a screen of Kachin Rangers was preceding the American column. Speaking the local dialects and carrying radios and automatic weapons, the Kachins were an excellent screen which masked the MARS Task Force while reporting anything that might be suspicious. Despite the difficult march, crossing the 400-foot wide Shweli was not too hard. The bridge built by the Chinese some weeks before still stood, a triumph of Oriental ingenuity, with bundles of bamboo for pontons and vines for cable. The Shweli was beginning to tear it apart, but work parties from the 475th kept it operable.  Meanwhile, spurred into action by General Wedemeyer after a month of inactivity, General Wei's Y-Force finally resumed its offensive operations in late December. They promptly dispatched the 2nd, 6th, and 71st Armies to launch an assault on the forward positions of the 56th Division at Wanting. Simultaneously, the 53rd Army executed a wide flanking maneuver to the west, aiming to encircle and attack the Japanese forces from the rear. Faced with the intense pressure of this four-pronged offensive, General Matsuyama was compelled to withdraw the 148th Regiment to a position north of Mongyu. He also ordered the Yoshida Force to mount a counteroffensive toward Muse and committed the reserve 2nd Regiment to secure Namhpakka. On January 5, the 53rd Army reached the vicinity of Muse and began crossing the river; however, they were met with fierce resistance from Matsuyama's timely counterattack, which thwarted their advance. Ten days later, Sun's forces initiated a well-coordinated offensive against Namhkam, which ultimately succumbed on January 16 as the 55th Regiment retreated toward Khonung. With the Shweli Valley now firmly under Allied control, Matsuyama began to tighten his defensive perimeter in anticipation of a final withdrawal toward Hsenwi. On January 17, the Mars Task Force made significant progress by reaching the Hosi sector, where they immediately engaged Japanese outposts. The 475th Regiment successfully secured the advantageous high ground near Nawhkam village. Over the next two days, American forces clashed with the 4th Regiment, capturing the strategically important Loikang Ridge and the elevated terrain overlooking Namhpakka. On January 19, the Mars Task Force attempted to disrupt Japanese supply lines by blocking the Burma Road through demolition and artillery bombardment, coinciding with the arrival of the 55th Regiment, which was sent to bolster the defenders. In a parallel effort, the 114th Regiment managed to sever the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail at Loilawn on the same day. Faced with this escalating threat from the south and the intensifying Chinese assaults on Wanting, the 56th Division was compelled to further contract its defensive perimeter. As a result, Wanting fell on January 20. Fortunately for Matsuyama, General Wei received orders from the Generalissimo to conclude the Salween campaign immediately, which meant that the Chinese forces would remain in their positions until they could be relieved by Sultan's units. Over the course of nearly nine months of intense combat, Wei's Y-Force had successfully reoccupied an impressive 24,000 square miles of Chinese territory and had defeated one of the most elite divisions of the Japanese army, along with elements from two additional divisions. However, the fighting was far from over. Sun continued to dispatch the 112th and 113th Regiments toward Wanting and Mongyu, aiming to clear the final stretch of the road leading to China. Meanwhile, the 89th and 114th Regiments pressed eastward to cut off the Burma Road north of Namhpakka, further complicating the situation for the Japanese forces. In the southern region, from January 20 to January 24, the Mars Task Force continued its strategic operations, executing ambushes and demolition missions while successfully repelling several intense counterattacks from enemy forces. By late January, pressure by MARS Task Force and that of the Chinese forces in the north began to register on the Japanese. The soldiers of the 4th Regiment could see the aerial activity that kept MARS supplied. Not recognizing what they saw, they were so impressed by a big supply drop on the 24th that they sent a report to the 56th Division of a large airborne force being landed along the Burma Road. Accepting this report, General Matsuyama decided to destroy his ammunition and retreat south. His superiors on January 24 agreed to let him retreat, but only after he had evacuated casualties and ammunition. Forty vehicles with gasoline accompanied by a Major Kibino of the 33rd Army staff were sent north to support the 56th in its withdrawal. The Japanese truck convoy made its run north the night of January 24. The trucks were heard, and the Americans placed heavy fire on the road. Kibino had been making the trip in a tankette. Hit by a 4.2-inch mortar shell, it burst into flames clearly visible from the American lines. Kibino clambered out, jumped on a truck, and succeeded in getting his convoy through to the 56th Division. Next day the derelict tankette was credited to the 2nd Battalion, 475th Regiment. But  Encouraged by the additional supplies of gasoline and inspired by the heroic examples of Major Kibino and the personnel of the truck companies, the 56th Division renewed its efforts and, during the next four days effected the evacuation of over 1000 casualties and moved several tons of ammunition to Hsenwi.  Meanwhile, General Matsuyama began to systematically reposition his forces toward Namhpakka, a strategic maneuver that would enable Chinese troops to occupy Mongyu on January 27. In a broader context, by the end of January, the 36th and 50th Divisions were also engaged in crossing the Shweli River, preparing to advance their offensives further southward. In the Arakan region, Operation Romulus exceeded expectations. The 1st Battalion of the 111th Regiment had been defending Akyab. On December 31, as the rear guard of the Sakura Detachment crossed the Kaladan River and moved eastward the Battalion was ordered to withdraw to Ponnagyun. As intelligence suggested very few Japanese were left on Akyab island, a recce aeroplane reported the locals showing no anxiety and on January 2 messages were dropped in Urdu and Burmese asking them to sit on the ground if the island was still occupied or stand with their hands in the air if not. Captain Jimmy Jarrett of ‘C' Flight, 656 AOP Squadron, then landed to a rousing reception and found the Japanese had quit on December 31, although nobody believed him until a senior officer flew in to confirm it. This prompted General Christison to swiftly initiate an amphibious invasion. Notably, this operation was executed without the anticipated naval bombardment and without deploying the reserve 26th Indian Division. As a result, the 3rd Commando Brigade successfully captured Akyab on January 3, facing no resistance, and the 25th Indian Division soon followed, reinforcing the area. From Akyab, the 9th York and Lancasters were transported by boat to establish a strategic blockade along the Yo River at Ponnagyun. There, they encountered significant Japanese forces. After a fierce engagement, however, the Japanese defenders were compelled to retreat toward Myohaung by January 11. In response to the evolving situation, Admiral Mountbatten devised a plan to land the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 25th Division on the Myebon Peninsula. This operation aimed to sever the primary lines of communication for Japanese forces, while preparations were made for the 26th Division to conduct a landing on Ramree Island. In response to the urgent military situation, Operation Passport was swiftly conceived and executed on January 12. British-Indian forces successfully landed at the southern tip of the peninsula, supported by both air and naval operations. Once ashore, the commandos advanced inland, facing intense resistance from fortified hill positions. Their efforts culminated in the capture of Pagoda Hill and the village of Myebon. However, as they pushed forward, opposition intensified, making it increasingly difficult for the British-Indian troops to reach Hill 831. Simultaneously, the 82nd West African Division, now commanded by Major-General Hugh Stockwell, entered the Kaladan Valley to relieve the 81st Division, which had been engaged in combat for over a year. The West African forces began to apply pressure against the Matsu Detachment units stationed at Myohaung and Minbya, although these Japanese forces managed to maintain their positions despite the mounting assaults. Meanwhile, planning was underway for the deployment of the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 51st Indian Brigade to land at Kangaw, coinciding with General Lomax's invasion of Ramree Island.  Early on January 21 the naval bombardment group opened fire. Christison and the other Force Commanders were watching through field glasses from the bridge of HMS Queen Elizabeth in her first engagement since the Dardanelles in 1915. Christison later said: ‘Some shells fell on a marsh behind the Jap defences, and I saw a number of duck spring up. “Duck”, I shouted. “The Royal Navy never ducks”, said the Admiral.' With her second salvo Queen Elizabeth scored a direct hit on the Japanese ammunition depot, which facilitated the landing operations. The 71st Indian Brigade successfully captured Kyaukpyu with minimal resistance. This victory enabled them to advance toward Minbyin and Kyaupyauk, both of which fell into their hands by January 23. In the subsequent days, the brigade continued its advance toward the Yanbauk Chaung, where they encountered fierce Japanese defenses. At the same time, other elements of the division worked to secure Cheduba and Sagu Kyun Islands, further consolidating their strategic position in the region. On January 22, the commandos and the 51st Brigade successfully landed in the Kangaw area near the Min River. However, they faced violent and frequent counterattacks from Japanese forces, which hindered their ability to expand their beachhead. Despite these challenges, the intense pressure from the commandos ultimately forced the Japanese defenders at Hill 831, Myohaung, and Minbya to retreat toward Kani, marking a significant shift in the operational landscape. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite heavy resistance and casualties. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian troops advanced, seizing key locations despite heavy resistance. Both fronts faced intense combat, leading to significant territorial gains against Japanese forces by the end of January.

Last time we continued to speak about the Kumul Rebellion.. Ma Shaowu, appointed as Taoyin, executed rival Ma Fuxing and tightened anti-Soviet policies, responding to growing Soviet influence following Yang Zengxin's assassination in 1928. Kashgar became a refuge for conservative Turkic Muslims opposing Chinese authority, amidst a backdrop of rising tension with Tungan troops, perceived as oppressors. By 1931, as news of the Kumul Rebellion spread, resistance against the Han Chinese intensified, emboldening local insurgents to unite against their enemies. In May 1932, Jin sought vengeance against Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen, the Torgut Mongol regent, hosting him under the guise of an investigation. At a banquet, Tsetsen was executed, igniting fury among the Turkic peoples. As the Kumul Rebellion grew, rebel leaders Ma Fuming and Ma Shihming united forces, launching assaults that devastated Chinese control. By March 1933, Ma Shaowu found his authority diminished, desperately appealing for British aid as rebellion spread, leaving Xinjiang in chaos.   #134 Kumul Rebellion part 3: A Game of Thrones in Southern Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off in mid March, where Ma Shaowu's control over southern Xinjiang had diminished to just a wedge of territory around Kashgar, Maral Bashi and Yarkland. Morale was so low, Ma Shaowu asked the British Indian government for military assistance as it seemed apparent no help would come from Urumqi. Ma Shaowu had received 3 telegrams from Jin via the USSR lines; the first confirmed his position as Commander in Chief; the second relayed Jin's brother's death and the third directed Jin Kashgar representatives to remit a large sum of money to his personal bank account in Tientsin. That last signal must have been a banger to read. Despite reinforcements sent to Yarkland under Colonel Chin, rampant inflation went unchecked and a sense of panic spread amongst the Chinese officials stationed in the region. In response the Chinese officials began withdrawing into Yarkland New City which was fortified with walls being hurriedly repaired and reinforced. Apparently heavy stones were placed all atop the walls to be thrown upon the rebels and 500 dummy figures were placed on the walls to “give the impression of a well-manned rampart”. When you start making dummy's for a wall defense, you know you are going to die. On March 21st, insurgent forces at Tokhta Langar advanced upon Yarkland. Colonel Chin's men made no attempt to resist the rebels and instead looted Guma and fell back using little known hill track by passing Karghalik and Posgam, killing large numbers of Uyghur civilians for good measure in the process. The rebels advanced straight to Yarkland unnopposed seizing Karghalik and Posgam in the process. Within both places a number of Hindu moneylenders of British Indian nationality were slaughtered. Back in Yarkland New City the provincial forces continued to bolster their defenses. By late March a group of 150 Chinese troops who had fled the rebels at Khotan arrived with a further 300 showing up to the oasis on April 2nd. During this period Muslim insurgents had massed up along the east bank of Yarkland River. They looked ill-armed and untrained as they forced the river during the first week of April. On the 11th of April Yarkland Old City fell to a mixed rebel force from Khotan, Karghalik and Posgam, seeing roughly 100 Chinese who were still outside the fortified New City massacred. In the afternoon, the bazaar connecting the Old and New Cities of Yarkand was set ablaze and completely destroyed. The shops belonging to Chinese moneylenders were ravaged, and their belongings were looted, leading to a siege of Yarkand New City. On the 12, rebel forces moved beyond Yarkand towards Kok Rabat, a key point on the route to Kashgar. At the same time, additional insurgent reinforcements from Khotan began to pour into the Yarkand Oasis. So by April, Ma Shaowu's position was simply done for, his only hope was to reach an agreement with the incoming force led by Ma Chanzeng. He opened up negotiations with Ma Chanzeng through the British Consul General at Kashgar, Fitzmaurice. However Ma Chanzeng could not speak for his Uyghur ally Temur, whom he was having issues with. To make matters worse, the Kirghiz levies began to mutiny on April 5th at Sughun Karaul, a Chinese fortified post roughly 65 miles northwest of Kashgar. This was followed by peasant uprisings amongst the Uyghurs at Artush and Fayzabad. Facing this Ma Shaowu ordered Brigadier Yang and the troops at Maral Bashi to fall back to Kashgar. Before departing Maral Bashi Yans troops burned and looted the town after which “They set out on their way to Kashgar with a large number of carts laden with refugees or loot or both; but this proved to be the last straw. The troops made slow progress, and in the meantime the whole countryside, incensed beyond endurance, rose against the Chinese. A bridge was broken at Kara Yulgun and, while the column was halted, it was set upon by a vast horde of rebels”. Karma is a bitch as they say. Brigadier Yang was wounded during the ambush and taken prisoner by rebels. Of his original force of around 1000, its estimated only 65 men limped back to Kashgar by the 27th of april. Meanwhile the main bulk of the Kirghiz mutineers advanced to Artush by April 15th from whence they menaced Kashgar as other Kirghiz groups attacked Kizil Oi and Ulugh Chat and demolish Chinese pots at Bulun Kul. With the dissolvement of Brigadier Yangs forces from Maral Bashi, Kashgar was completely vulnerable and isolated. Ma Shaowu, was probably very anxious to reach an agreement with Ma Chanzeng, but still took the precaution of preparing for a siege. As the Chinese were soiling themselves awaiting the rebel attacks, suddenly a divide emerged between the Tungan and Turkic factions. It appeared Ma Chanzeng had become concerned over reports of Uyghur insurgents rising up in Khotan, who owed him no loyalty. So he decided to reach an agreement with Ma Shaowu. Ma Shaowu agreed to allow Tungan power to be established at Kashgar, the military and economic key to southern Xinjiang. Ma Chanzeng dispatched a message via the British Consul general at Kashgar offering assurance that the sole objective of the Tungan forces in Xinjiang was to overthrow the tyrannical Jin Shujen and his reforms. Thus having seemingly distanced himself from the Turkic speaking Muslims of the south, whose apparent goal was to fully succeed from the Chinese Republic, Ma Chanzeng and Temur advanced to Kashgar.  Back over in Kashgar Old City, Turkic speaking nationalists calling themselves the Young Kashgar Party or “YKP” had become suspicious of Ma Chanzeng's motives and believed perhaps there was collusion between Gansu Tungans and Ma Shaowu. The Uyghurs feared this would lead to Tungan domination of Kashgar and the replacement of Han Chinese tyrants for Tungan tyrants. 7 leading members of the YKP set out from Kashgar to persuade Ma Chanzeng that Ma Shaowu would betray him. They met at Fayzabad with Uthman Ali, the leader of the Kirghiz mutineers present. Upon hearing their plea, Ma Chanzeng asked Uthman Ali to lead the Kirghiz to attack Kashgar Old City. Early on May 2nd, Uthman Ali led a large Kirghiz force against the Old city and according to the eye witness account of the British Consul General “They took up positions opposite each of the four gates of the city and at the same time sent parties to call up the country people Uyghurs. These appeared from all sides in thousands, armed with clubs and sticks, and there was a great display of enthusiasm ... Firing continued until about two in the afternoon, when the Kirghiz either forced an entry or were admitted by the Tushik Gate'. Most of the non-Chinese garrison simply joined the rebels. At the yamen, Ma Shaowu and his personal bodyguard continued to hold out as the Kirghiz secured the Old City, but notably prevented the Uyghurs from looting and ordered them back to their villages. The reason for this unexpected restraint became clear the next day, when the Kirghiz were left in sole possession of the Old City, and who proceeded to sack it themselves. The British Consul General estimated 100 Chinese were killed and their looted property was carried off or auctioned on the street. During the afternoon around 300 Uyghurs led by Temur arrived at Kashgar and were admitted into the Old City without any question by the Kirghiz, followed by the Tungans with Ma Chanzeng. Both forces marched to the walls of Kashgar New City, roughly 2.5 miles distant and after negotiations with the Chinese defenders were allowed entrance. The British Consul General had this to say of the moment “It was probably better to surrender to the Tungans than to be slaughtered by the Kirghiz”. With the fall of Kashgar New City, Han Chinese power in southern Xinjiang, excluding the besieged garrison of Yarkland New City was effectively brought to an end.  On May 7th, Ma Chanzeng realized the YKP had misled him and that Temur was under their influence and thus no longer a reliable ally. After the capture of Kashgar Old City, it seems the Kirghiz began negotiating with Temur over the spoils of their victory and made zero attempt to loot the Old City Yamen where Ma Shaowu was holding out. Ma Shaowu would make a invaluable ally against the Turkic nationalists who controlled Old city and much of southern Xinjiang. Thus Ma Chanzeng began secretly negotiating with Ma Shaowu. As a result the next day, Ma Chanzengs men put up notices announcing that the Taoyin and other officials of the former regime should retain their official posts. This obviously pissed off the Turkic Muslims who did now share the same loyalty to the Chinese Republic as the Tungans. The Kirghiz immediately manned the walls and closed the gates of the Old City, preparing to face the Tungans. At this point Ma Shaowu defused the situation temporarily by resigning as Taoyin and handed the officials seals over to Ma Chanzeng. Ma Chanzeng did not take the title of Taoyin, but certainly controlled the Old City Yamen and New City, keeping Ma Shaowu close and protected. It seems Ma Chanzengs strategy was to try and drive a wedge between Uthman Ali's Kirghiz and Temurs Uyghurs before a unified Turkic alliance could form, perhaps one that even incorporated Khotan forces. He was of course concerned with limiting the influence of the YKP who seemed to be as anti-Tungan as they were anti-Chinese. On the 10th he ordered the arrest of the most prominent YKP leader, Abd al-Rahim Bay Bachcha, who was released only after agreeing to supply the Tungan forces with 1000 uniforms at his own expense. Following this, Ma Chanzeng seized Temur who had just been proclaimed commander in chief of the combined Muslim armies at Kashgar. Temuar was invited to a meeting at the Old City Yamen on the 17th where he was placed under arrest. Had Ma Chanzeng managed to transfer his captive into the New City, he may have succeeded in his plans. But he did not have enough men to man both the Old and New Cities and when he tried to block the Uyghurs and Kirghiz from rescuing Temur they simply stormed the city walls.  With the failure to secure Temur, Ma Chanzeng had basically revealed to the Turkic Muslims and confirmed the claims of the YKP that he intended to set up a Tungan regime in Kashgar. On May 18th the pissed of Kirghiz mounted a surprise attack on the Old City. They avoided the yamen where Ma Chanzeng and Ma Shaowu remained, as Tungan forces there were heavily armed with artillery and machine guns, but murdered any other Tungans they found in the Old City. Fighting went on throughout the day and night. As a result of the Kirghiz attack, Ma Chanzeng agreed to hand control over Kashgar to Temur and Uthman Ali. On the 19th a very inconclusive treaty was signed seeing Temur confirmed as the Commander in Chief and Uthman Ali promoted to General in command of Kirghiz forces. Ma Chanzeng was given no official position, but retained control of the TUngan troops and on the 22nd accompanied by all of them withdrew from the yamen to Kashgar New City. Meanwhile Ma Chanzengs Tungan chief of staff, Su Qinzhou and Yunus Beg, a Uyghur of Kumul were appointed joint Taoyin of Kashgar and Ma Shaowu was permitted to take up residence in a nearby country house under protection from both Temur and Chanzeng.  The truce was followed awkward and uneasy peace with the Tungans controlling New City and the Turking speaking Muslims the Old City and Taoyins yamen. Fitzmaurice went on to state “that 'Ma Chanzeng, Temur and Uthman Ali all settled down to the congenial business of accumulating wealth and wives, whilst the YKP continued its intrigues against the Tungans, organized a 'parliament' of forty members, subsequently greatly expanded, and sent two delegates to Khoja Niyas Hajji, the leader of the Uighur rebels at Kumul”.  By this point it seemed Temur had fallen completely under the influence of the YKP and began issuing passports styling himself as “Temur Shah”. These documents also employed the Islamic Hijri date and not the Chinese Republic date, thwarting Nanjing's authority.  Over in the southern rim of the Tarim Basin, an are untroubled by the Tungan invasion and free from the Kirghiz movement, Khotan had emerged as a center of exclusive Uyghur control. Ismail Khan Khoja, the leader of the gold miner rebels of Karakash was soon eclipsed by the Uyghur nationalist committee for national revolution, known as the CNR, who was founded in Khotan in early 1932 by Muhammad Amin Bughra. Muhammad Amin Bughra was a scholar in his 30's and alongside his two younger brothers, Abdullah and Nur Ahmad, with some friends and fellow students began the movement. In early 1933 this group was joined by Abd al-Baqi Sabit Damullah, a teacher and former Qadi, that being an islamic judge from Kulja who had traveled extensively through the USSR, Turkey, Egypt and India. According to Muhammad Amin Bughra, “Sabit Damullah brought political information and experience to the Khotanlik Committee for National Revolution”. They were only 300 members who possessed nothing more than 50 antiquated rifles. Their political philosophy, like that of the YKP was uncompromising, they were nationalists who were extremely anti-communist, anti-christian, anti-tungan and anti-Han. The CNR favored the establishment of an Islamic theocracy in Xinjiang, with Muhammad AMin Bughra as its head of state. Muhammad Amin Bughra was working in Khotan as a mudarris, or teacher at Quranic college when an uprising began in February of 1933 in Karakash and Surghak. On the 20th of February the CNR leadership met and formed a provisional government with Muhammad Niyas Alam as president, Sabit Damullah as Prime Minister and Muhammad Amin Bughra as commander of the armed forces. Muhammad Amin Bughra also took the title “Amir al-islam” while his younger brothers took “Amir Abdullah khan” and “Amir Nur Ahmad Jan”. In most sources the rise of the CNR provisional government is referred to as the Government of the Khotan Amirs. Their new government was religiously intolerant, as a result when Khotan New City was captured on March 16th, the 266 or so Han Chinese there were forcibly converted to Islam. Following that, the Hindu moneylenders were murdered and the Swedish missionaries were exiled. Shari a law was implemented under the CNR with strict application of hadd criminal legislation. Between March and April the regime was reinforced by Janib Beg, a well known Basmachi leader who fled the USSR to reside in the Keriya Oasis under Ma Shaowu's control. Janib Beg made common cause with the Amirs and given his extensive military experience during the Basmachi struggle was placed in charge of a large body of Khotanlik rebel forces.  After they secured the Khotan Oasis, the Amirs began expanding their influence east towards Lop Nor and west towards Kashgar. In response to a appeal from the Uyghurs of Charchan who were resisting their Tungan liberators, a force of 100 Khotanliks came to guard against the Kara Shahr Tungan who were occupying the Charkhlik Oasis. Meanwhile in the west, Khotanlik forces captured Guma, Karghalik, Posgam and Yarkland Old City by early April. During the fight for Yarkland New City, over 2000 Han Chinese and Tungans were besieged by their forces. On the 24th, Amir Badullah Khan arrived to Yarkland to personally oversee the siege of its New City. According to Fitzmaurice, the Khotanlik forces had organized a military band, were doning red uniforms in stark contrast to the Tungan troops of Ma Chanzeng who wore green. Amir Badullah was greeted with a large ceremony as Turking speaking officials who had previously served under the Han Chinese were dragged through the streets in chains. On the 27th Amir Abdullah ordered the Swedish missionaries in Yarkland to be arrested and brought to him. We are told “Abdullah kicked and beat them himself, announcing that by their teaching the missionaries had destroyed the religion of Islam, and that it was therefore his duty to kill them'. The poor Swe's were only saved from a firing squad by the intervention of some British officials, instead they were exiled. Afterwards Abdullah focused his attention upon the siege of Yarkland New City. He ordered the water supply cut and for tunnels to be made to breach the walls. On the 27th three delegates from Ma Shaowu came to Yarkland and attempted to negotiate with Abdullah. Abdullahs response was to shoot a prisoner in their presence in what he called “a method of bringing them to a proper state of mind”. Then Abdullah sent them into the besieged New City to inform its defenders that their lives and property would be spared if they simply agreed to convert to Islam and lay down their arms. The besieged Han Chinese led by Colonel Qin, hastily agreed to the terms and on May 12th prepared to surrender. Shortly before this date however, the first Tungan and Turkic speaking troops, fresh from their victory at Kashgar arrived. Believing victory was well within his grasp, Abdullah became openly hostile with the Tungans and made it clear the newcomers were not appreciated. Faced with Khotanlik hostility, the small but well armed Tungans who owed their allegiance to Ma Chanzeng, and through him to Ma Chongying, entered the New City and strengthened its Tungan elements against the Khotanliks. Abdullah was shocked by this revelation and his hostility also had the effect of hardening the Chinese Muslim troops. They even sortied on May 18th briefly attacking and capturing the Altin and Khanqah gates of Yarkland Old City, setting fire to the surrounding areas before pulling back to New City. The Uyghur troops of Aksu and Kashgar led by Hafiz, a subordinate of Temur seemed to be keeping a neutral stance until the 22nd when news of the Tungan-Turkic conflict at Kashgar reached them. Following this, the two Turkic speaking armies at Yarkland cooperated in the siege of the New City. Despite the cooperation, Hafiz and Abdullah remained bitter rivals. Facing the united Turkic attack and realizing there would be no relief efforts from Kashgar, the Chinese of Yarkland New City surrendered on the 26th taking the original terms Abdullah had given them back on the 12th. The surrender would be incomplete however as the Tungans insisted on retaining their weapons and being allowed to go to Kashgar. The victorious Uyghurs and Kirghiz took 540 rifles from the Chinese and divided the spoils. However the men under Hafiz notably took the best quality rifles out of the pickings.  The defeated Chinese and defiant Tungans were divided into two groups roughly 1000 each and given permission to go to Kashgar. Neither party would reach its destination unmolested however. The first column, made up mostly of Tungan cavalry, was attacked and cut to pieces near Kizil. What became known as the Kizil Massacre was performed by a group of Kirghiz who owed their allegiance to Uthman Ali. Following the Kizil massacre, the Kirghiz irregulars entered Yangi Hissar where they killed all the Han Chinese and Tungans they could find. The second column was attacked and looted before they even got out of Yarkland, but did not undergo a massacre. When news came of the Kazil and Yangi Hissar massacrs to Kashgar, Su Qinzhou, the Tungan joint Taoyin departed the Old City Yamen to protest the killing of fellow Tungans and joined Ma Chanzeng in Kashgar New City. On May 31st, the Uyghurs of Aksu rose up and expelled the few Muslim Chinese that remained in their Oasis. The Taoyin that had been appointed by Ma Chanzeng and therefore was considered too pro-Tungan was removed from his post and replace by the leader of the Aksu insurgents, a Uyghur named Ismail Beg whose loyalty belongs to the anti-tungan Khotan Amirs.  The fall of Yarkland New City, massacre at Kizil and Yangi Hissar had not just signaled the final collapse of Han Chinese authority in southern Xinjiang, but also the alienation of Chinese speaking Muslims from their Turkic speaking neighbors. By the summer of 1933, the political power struggle in the south was now between the Uyghur and Kirghiz factions led by Amir Muhammad Amin Bughra at Khotan and the Tungan forces of Ma Chanzeng at Kashgar New City. Excluding Ma Chanzeng's forces the struggle over southern Xinjiang was more or less fought between the rival Turkic speaking Muslim factions at Khotan and Kashgar. Following the fall of Yarkland New City on the 26th of May, Temurs representative Hafiz attempted to conciliate with the Khotan Amirs, who were not happy their side got the less impressive rifles when they distributed the loot. Hafiz strengthened his forces then estimated to be 400 Uyghurs from Aksu and Kashfar, by conscripting another 200 Dunlanis from Merket.  Discovering this, the Amirs transferred command over their Yarkland forces to the youngest brother, Nur Ahmad Jan, while Abdullah set out for Kashgar at the head of 2000 Khotanliks. This action seems to be done to place pressure upon Temur. Meanwhile another force of 1000 Khotanliks under the Basmachi Janib Beg arrived at Kashgar on June 11th. Janib Beg's arrival with his poorly armed troops caused uproar amongst the local Turkic speaking leadership and Soviet Consulate General who feared the anti-Soviet Basmachi leader would swing the ongoing revolution to the right. Janib Beg immediately established his HQ at the garden of the Turkic nationals Abd Al-Rahim Bay Bachcha, raising the old spectre of an alliance forming between the Khotan AMirs and YKP, elements of whom were currently in favor of cooperating with the USSR. On July 4th, the Khotanlik presence was substantially increased by the arrival of Amir Abdullah, who brought over Prime Minister Sabit Dammulah and Shaykh al-Islam. Although Abdullahs forces were numerous, they were very ill-equipped. British reports indicate about 300 of them were armed with Russian rifles while another 300 had antiquated muzzle loaders and the rest bore Chumaq or heavy clubs. Nevertheless they posed a threat to both Uthman Ali and Temur, neither of whom sought to share the large stocks of food, money and arms they had looted in Kashgar New City. Temur made an elaborate show of welcoming Abdullah, installing him at the garden between the Old and New Cities pending more suitable arrangements.  Meanwhile at Yarkland, negotiations between Hafiz and Nur Ahmad Jan continued. Hafiz on behalf of Temur claimed territories of the Yarkland River, including Yarkland Old and New City, while Nur Ahmad Jan on behalf of the Khotan Islamic Government countered with claiming Kashgar and Maral Bashi. After a couple of incidents between the two armies, Nur Ahmad Jan took action against a number of Yarkandlik Begs who had petitioned Hafiz to intervene on their behalf. All the offenders were executed with their severed heads and displayed in public to antagonize Hafiz. When news of this reached Temur at Kashgar he was royally pissed and decided to make a move against the Khotanlik forces at Kashgar. Temur sought the support of his Kirghiz ally Uthman Ali, stressing the threat the Amir's would make to his position and bought off numerous other Kirghiz leaders. By mid-July, Uthman and his Kirghiz cavalry prepared to return to the mountains above Kashgar lulling the Khotanlik's into a false sense of security. Then suddenly on the morning of July 13th, Temur sent a force of 750 men to arrest Janib Beg. Abdullah was informed of this and sent 100 of his men to help Janib Beg, but they arrived too late and found themselves likewise arrested.  Following this minor success against Janib Beg, Temur and Thman Ali coordinated their efforts against Abdullah. They managed to corner and arrest him while disarming a large number of his troops. Realizing he was in imminent danger of getting arrested as well, al-islam Sabit Damullah fled for Artush, but was caught and quickly brought back to the Old City Yamen. During these actions casualties were quite light for both sides. On the night of July 13th, Abdullah and Sabit Damullah were placed under house arrest at the gardens, while Janib Beg was kept under close arrest. Now the new balance of power in southern Xinjiang had been held at a conference in Kashgar Old City on July 4th, attended by all the prominent Muslim leaders except Janib Beg and Ma Chanzeng. At the meeting it was agreed that the entire Yarkland Oasis should be transferred to Temurs control, while the Khotan Islamic government would be on the east bank of the Yarkland River. When news of this agreement reached Yarkland however, panic set in amongst the Khotanlik troops who had been ordred to withdraw from Yarkland New City by Hafiz. Hafiz moved quickly to exploit the situation, sending 200 men to hold the ferries across the Yarkland River to cut off the Khotanlik retreat. He arrested Nur Ahmad Jan and disarmed hundreds of his troops in the process. Nur Ahmad Jan was imprisond in Yarkland Old City, just as his brother Abdullah was in Kashgar. Shortly after this, in violation of the agreements made as Kashgar, Hafiz sent his forces across the Yarkland River into the territory of the Khotan government and captured the town of Karghalik on July 20th.  The major reverses of the Khotan Amirs followed closely with the withdrawal of Ma Chanzeng's Tungan forces to Kashgar New City, leaving the victorious Uyghur leader Temur and Kirghiz leader Uthman Ali well placed to expand their political control over the whole of western Tarim Basin. Such a feat could have been possible, if both leaders were capable of cooperating against the besieged Tungans. Uthman Ali, now taking the name Amir Al-Muslimin “prince of the believers” and Ghazi “holy warrior” was keen to attack Ma Chanzeng, whom he had personal quarrels. Temur on the other hand was not keen on full scale war against his former ally. Thus Uthman Ali withdrew from Kashgar to the hills on July 18th. Shortly after his departure, on the 26th a party of Khoja Niyas Hajjis officers, accompanied by 30 Kumullik soldiers arrived at Kashgar and presented Temur with an official seal and letter recognising his position as Commander in Chief of Kashgar. Its alleged, Khoja Niyas Hajji's delegates pressured Temur to attack Ma Chanzeng's forces in Kashgar New City. But Temur still did not want to do so, but agreed to invite Uthman Ali back to Kashgar to possibly perform joint operations against the besieged New City. Uthman Ali came back, but by August 8th, he departed again as Temur proved too reluctant to act. It seems Temur may have seen the situation as an ideal one to eliminate his Kirghiz ally and emerge the sole Turkic speaking Muslim commander in Kashgar. In any case he secretly formed an agreement with Ma Chanzeng and sent a large part of his army to pursue and disarm Uthman Ali and his Kirghiz forces. How Temurs Uyghur irregular infantry would overtake disarming mounted Kirghiz troops is anyone's guess. On August 9th, Temur left Kashgar Old City by car to see how his men were faring. Shortly after a force of 500 Tungans rapidly overran the ill defended Old City. Temur had made a fatal mistake. He was intercepted by Ma Chanzengs men on his way back to the Old City, where he was arrested and shot without ceremony. His head was cut off and placed on a spike outside the Id-gat Mosque in Kashgar Old City. Its like game of thrones in Xinjiang isnt it? As a result of slaying Temur, the Uyghur forces were left leaderless. Both Janib Beg and Abdullah took advantage of the chaos and escaped prison, fleeing southeast towards Yarkland. Ma Shaowu likewise slipped away from his house arrest, fleeing to Ma Chanzeng. The Tungans made zero effort to garrison the Old City, but disarmed and plundered its arsenal. On August 13th, Uthman Ali returned to Kashgar and sent a message to Ma Chanzeng asking his Kirghiz forces be given a share of the weapons taken from Temurs men. Ma Chanzeng refused to comply, so the Kirghiz forces attacked Old city, capturing it easily by the 16th. During the battle Uthman Ali's younger bother Umar was killed alongside 150 Kirghiz when they failed to attack the walls of New City. After taking Old City, Uthman Ali assumed Temurs title as Commander in Chief of the Turkic speaking forces at Kashgar. But he did not enjoy the full support of the Uyghurs and his Kirghiz had no hunger to attack the walls of New City, eager to return to their lands in Tien Shan. Then two new and unexpected things happened. On the 26th of August, a Syrian Arab adventurer named Tawfiq Bay arrived at Kashgar. He was a charismatic character, claiming to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and had served for a time as an official under King Abd Al Aziz ibn-saud and a man who had formal military training and experience. Two days later the representatives of Khoja Niyas Hajji, arrived as a Kumullik delegation. They soon rallied the dispirited Turkic speaking forces in Kashgar Old City and urged them to renew their attack against Ma Chanzeng. Uthman Ali and his Kirghiz forces thus renewed their attack, aided by the Uyghurs who were rallied under Tawfiq Bay.  Meanwhile on the southern front Hafiz had found out about Temurs death, thus he halted his advance against the Khotanlik forces and returned to Yarkland New City. At the same time Abdullah reappeared in Yarkland taking command of the undefended Old City. From this new base he rallied the disorganized Khotanlik forces still in Karghalik and began a siege of Yarkland New City, still held by Hafiz with a mixed force number 600 Uyghurs and Dulanis. Meanwhile both Tawfiq Bay and the representatives of Khoja Niyas Hajji at Kashgar sent messengers to the Amirs stressing the need for joint Turkic actions against the Tungans, and appealed for a cease-fire between Hafiz and Abdullah in Yarkland. On September 26, Yarkland New City opened its gates to the Khotanlik forces of Hafiz and allowed the Uyghurs of Aksu and Kashgar to leave the oasis disarmed, but unharmed. Following this Abdullah assumed control over Yarkland, while Nur Ahmad Jan advanced at the head of a large force to Yangi Hissar to take control over its fortified citadel. The Khotan Islamic government still led by Amir Muhammad Amin Bughra from Khotan was thus extended west to the fringes of Kashgar and upon invitation from Tawfiq Bay, the Khotanlik Prime Minister and Al-Islam Sabit Damullah, negotiated the formation of a unified Turkic speaking Muslim alliance in southern Xinjiang. The alliance was one of necessity as the Tungan forces of Ma Chanzeng were tossing back attacks by the combined forces of Taqfiq Bay and Uthman Ali with ease. On September 7th, the Tungans sortied from New City and devastated their enemy at the village of Sekes Tash, killing 200 Uyghurs and Kirghiz. Tawfiq Bay and Uthman Ali soon received reinforcements, including Hafiz and his 500 troops, 300 additional Uyghur recruits from Aksu under a officer named Idris and a rather mysterious force of 300 Andijani Uzbeks under the command of Satibaldi Jan, a 25 year old Uzbek from Soviet Uzbekistan. With this mixed and ill armed force they all tried to pressure Ma Chanzeng, but it was still to no avail. Attempts to mine the New City walls all ended in failure as did attempts to starve them out. Uthman Ali's Kirghiz and local Uyghurs began to run into conflicts, as the Kirghiz felt they were bearing the brunt of the fighting. Soon some Kirghiz had 3 Uyghurs executed in Old City for “filling cartridges with sand instead of power”. Other Uyghurs were hung publicly outside the Id-gah Mosque for selling food to the besieged Tungans. Support for the siege wavered and by late September morale was so low, the local authorities stopped issuing passports to stop a exodus from the Oasis. Then on the 26th, Tawfiq Bay was seriously injured and could no longer lead from the front. Uthman Ali then resigned from his post as commander in chief on October 2nd in shame, fleeing to the hills, followed closely by Satibaldi and other local leaders. A power vacuum in Kashgar opened up and was filled by Sabit Damullah, the Prime Minister of the Khotan Islamic Government. Thus in the end, with the exception of the Tungans held up in Kashgar New City, the Khotan Amirs now dominated southern Xinjiang. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In what can only be described as a form of Game of Thrones in Southern Xinjiang, numerous groups fought together, then against each other, then together, until one was king of the hill. The Tungans still clung onto Kashgar New City, but with the Khotan Amirs at the reigns, could they take it all?   

Sunjay Singh is this weeks guest. He is in the sales and marketing world. He has a video agency which he runs with his co-founder, live media UK and a small marketing company which provdes marketing managers for small businesses called Lambardar marketing.   Marcus asks how it started. Sunjay says Will (co-founder) and him had never had “proper jobs”. Sunjay said when he was 14 or 15 his Dad walked in told him he had to photograph a wedding and then left. Sunjay had never taken a picture before in his life. His Dad had always enjoyed photography, But he ended up working at British Aerospace. But his Dad  always had a side hustle and was doing two jobs. So for a while he did wedding video and photography and Sanjay was the photographer. The weddings were British Asian weddings which were a minimum of 3 day events. He said there were so many people, often 50 to 60 people in a 2 bedroom house in Cardiff. Each wedding day could be 14 hours. He could leave one day at 1am and be back the next day at 5am. He says he got better very quickly as he was talking so many pictures in such a short space of time. They stopped doing British Indian weddings as the hours were so long and pay so low and moved onto British weddings.  But eventually he got fed up doing weddings, he had done too many. He was then getting more corporate work and they dropped weddings. But what that time gave him was a work ethic. Sunjay says if you want to get good at your craft, you have to do the reps. Do it again and again. It's not just about working on one shot it's about doing it again and again. If you are creative and not constantly developing your craft that is a dangerous place to be. Now Sunjay is running a video agency using videographers who work for him. He also uses photographers in his agency. Sam asks how Sunjay decided which photographers to work with. Sanjay says that anyway running a business needs to wear many hats and possibly masks. When you are speaking to Sanjay and talking about logistics, don't be a creative, at that point you need to be a business person. He says if it helps, where a tie when you do your emails. Get into the mindset of being a business person. When you are on the shoot, be creative. But be the reliable business person at other times, especially when discussing logistics. The other thing Sanjay looks for is composure. He needs them to be confident and composed. If the photographer doesn't turn up composed and confident then that is hopeless. The photographers needs to stay calm no matter what the shoot throws at you. Speed is another thing. Both getting the shot and getting the photographs back. Clients expect the photos back very quickly. They know it is digital and so expect the photographs very quickly. Yous presentation is also important. Sanjay has seen too many scruffy photographers. By being scruffy you are showing don't care about aesthetics. You are signalling that you don't care about aesthetics which gives the wrong message.   Sam asks how a photographer can go about getting agency work. Sanjay says there is no clear answer, but the key thing is relationship building and being in the right place in the right time. For example Sanjay meets lots of photographers, but he doesn't have a shoot that week and the photographers never get in touch again. They need to stay in touch. Sanjay then says make a list of ten people you want to work with. Get in touch every month and then every other month arrange an in person meeting. Don't chat work, or ask for work, just build a relationship and some of them will give you work.   Sanjay mentions a book The Creative Act, Rick Rubin. He says this is an amazing book. You can connect with Sunjay on LinekdIn To get the Shoot to the Top Podcast in your inbox every week to ensure you don't miss an episode, click here Join the Shoot to the Top Facebook group to meet fellow photographers, guests and Sam and Marcus

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Kumul Rebellion. In 1931, tensions in Kumul escalated after a Muslim girl spurned Han tax collector Chang Mu, leading to his violent death at a family dinner. Enraged, Uyghurs retaliated against Chinese officials, igniting a rebellion. Chaos ensued as rebels targeted Han settlers, ultimately capturing Kumul with little resistance. Amidst the unrest, Yulbars Khan sought support from military leader Ma Chongying, who planned to mobilize his forces to help the Uyghurs. What began as a local incident spiraled into an all-out revolt against oppressive rule. In 1931, young warlord Ma Chongying sought to establish a Muslim empire in Central Asia, leading a small force of Tungan cavalry. As his army attempted to besiege Kumul Old City, they faced fierce resistance from Chinese troops. Despite several assaults, the lack of heavy artillery hampered Ma's progress. Eventually, Ma faced defeat due to a serious injury. After his recuperation, his forces joined with Uyghur insurgents, sparking a guerrilla war against oppressive provincial troops, leading to increasing unrest and rebellion.   #133 Kumul Rebellion part 2: Uprisings in southern Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we spoke about the beginning of the Kumul Rebellion. Now the Kumul Rebellion is actually a series of other rebellions all interlaced into this larger blanket known as the Xinjiang Wars. To be blunt, Xinjiang was the wild west from the 1930s until basically the formation of the PRC. We briefly went over the various groups that inhabit northwestern China, they all had their own interests. I want to start off by looking at the situation of southern Xinjiang. Back in June of 1924, Ma Fuxing, the T'ai of Kashgar was executed. His executioner was Ma Shaowu who had just received the post of Taoyin over the oasis city of Khotan. There was of course always tension, but southern Xinjiang was relatively peaceful in the 1920s. Then Governor Yang Zengxin was assassinated in July of 1928. During the last years of his rule, southern Xinjiang often referred to as Kashgaria, remained entrenched in the British sphere of influence after the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the subsequent closure of the Imperial Russian consulate-General at Kashgar.  Going further back in time, in August of 1918, Sir Geoerge Macartney, the long standing British Consul General to Kashar had retired. His successor was Colonel P. T Etherton, a hardcore anti-communist who actively was cooperating with anti-Soviet Basmachi guerillas in the western portion of Turkestan. One of his missions was to curb Soviet influence in southern Xinjiang. Yang Zengxin understood the British policy towards Xinjiang was to push the Soviets out via enabling the survival of his independent Han led regime. Thus Yang Zengxin was very friendly to the British and allowed them to exercise considerable political influence in Tien Shan. Despite this Soviet influence spread in Ili and Zungharia. This prompted Yang Zengxin to secretly cooperate with the British in Kashgar to counter the looming red growth north of his province. Now by 1924, through a combination of military necessities and the re-emergence of Soviet Russia as Xinjiang's largest trading partner, this forced Yang Zengxin to push away the British. Following the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 which effectively saw the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing, the Soviet government at Omsk dispatched an envoy to Xinjiang to discuss mutual consular representation. Both sides reached an agreement on October 6th, providing for an exchange of consulate-generals between Tashkent and Urumqi and for Soviet consulates in Chuguchak, Kulja, Shara Sume and Kashgar. The new Soviet presence in Kashgar was quite upsetting for the British. It also allowed the Soviets direct access to the densely populated oases of Tarim Basin, the source of nearly all Xinjiang's revenue.  Shortly after the Soviet Consulate in Kashgar officially opened on October 10, 1925, a local power struggle emerged involving Max Doumpiss, the Soviet Consul, of Latvian origin, Major Gillan, the British Consul-General at that time, and the Taoyin of Kashgar. Sino-Soviet relations in southern Xinjiang took a troubled turn in November 1925 when large quantities of silver bullion were discovered hidden in thirty-four boxes labeled as Soviet 'diplomatic bags,' intended for the Kashgar consulate. The Kashgar Taoyin, who was reportedly offended by the 'subtle spread of Soviet propaganda' in the southern oases, retaliated by expelling several suspected Russian agents. In March 1926, significant riots erupted in Kashgar, which the Chinese authorities attributed to an interpreter at the Soviet Consulate named Akbar 'Ali. The unrest was quelled by a force of 400 local Tungan troops, and Akbar 'Ali was imprisoned; the Taoyin ignored subsequent Soviet demands for his release. The rapid increase in the number of European consular staff from around fifteen in 1925 to between thirty and forty by 1927 also alarmed Chinese officials. All these developments were likely reported to Governor Yang Tseng-hsin in Urumchi, who was likely dealing with similar situations at the newly established Soviet Consulates in Kulja, Chuguchak, and Shara Sume. It appears that, with discreet British support, Yang decided to take actions to curb the expansion of Soviet influence in Kashgar. The Kashgar Taoyin then took up a strong anti-soviet stance. Alongside this Yang Zengxin's nephew, the officer in command of Chinese troops along the Kashgar northern frontier, suddenly became a frequent visitor to the British consulate General at Chini Bagh. After the death of the old Taoyin in 1927, Ma Shaowu came over from Khotan to replace him and with this came heightened anti-soviet policies in southern Xinjiang. Ma Shaowu first began by imprisoning 60 alleged local communists and tightened Chinese control over Kashgars northern frontier. The freedom of the Soviet Consul team to travel within southern Xinjiang was tightened to the extreme and all Kashgar citizens suspected of pro-soviet sympathies became targets for confiscation of their property or deportation to other oases. Yang Zengxin backed Ma Shaowu's attempts to limit Soviet influence in Tarim Basin by imposing severe tax on Muslims leaving southern Xinjiang to go on Hajj via the USSR. Similarly, new legislative was unleashed requiring merchants going into the USSR to deposit large sums of money to the Chinese authorities in Kashgar who would forfeit if the depositor failed to return to Xinjiang within 60 days.  These policies did not completely insulate southern Xinjiang from Soviet influence; however, they did ensure that at the time of Yang Zengxin's assassination in 1928, the southern region of the province—especially Ma Shao-wu's domain around Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan—maintained a significant degree of independence from the Soviet Union. This stood in stark contrast to areas like the Ili Valley, Chuguchak, and Shara Sume, where Soviet influence became dominant shortly after 1925, and even to the provincial capital of Urumqi, where, by the spring of 1928, the Soviet Consul-General had considerable sway. It was likely due to Ma Shaowu's anti-Soviet position and the persistent dominance of British influence in southern Xinjiang during the final years of Yang Zengxin's administration that Kashgar emerged as a hub of conservative Muslim opposition to Chinese governance in the 1930s. Yang Zengxins intentional efforts to sever southern Xinjiang from Soviet influence resulted in the Uighurs and, to a lesser extent, the Kirghiz of the Tarim Basin being less influenced by the 'progressive' nationalist propaganda from Soviet-controlled Western Turkestan compared to the Turkic-speaking Muslims of the Ili Valley and Zungharia. This is not to imply that the socialist nationalism promoted by the Jadidists after 1917 was entirely ineffective south of the Tien Shan; however, Kashgar, situated outside the Soviet zone in northwestern Sinkiang, became a natural refuge for right-wing Turkic nationalists and Islamic traditionalists who opposed Chinese authority yet were even more fiercely against the encroachment of 'atheistic communism' and its Soviet supporters in Central Asia. Many of these right-wing Turkic-speaking nationalists were former Basmachi guerrillas, primarily of Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kirghiz descent, but also included several Ottoman Turks and, according to Caroe, "old men who had fought against the Chinese at Kashgar." Among the most notable Basmachi leaders who sought refuge in Kashgar was Janib Beg, a Kirghiz who would play a significant role in the politics of southern xinjiang during the early 1930s. Following Yang Zengxin's assassination in July 1928, Soviet influence in southern Xinjiang began to grow rapidly; nevertheless, at the onset of the Kumul Rebellion in 1931, reports of forced collectivization and the suppression of nomadic lifestyles in Western Turkestan led many Turkic Muslims in southern Xinjiang to be wary of Soviet intentions. If, during the late 1920s and early 1930's, the Turkic Muslims of southern Xinjiang were divided in their approach towards the Soviets and the newly formed Turkic-Tajik SSR's in western Turkestan, they all were united in their attitude towards their Tungan brethren to the east. Unlike the Turkic Muslim rebels of Kumul, the Uyghurs and Kirghiz of southern Xinjiang were far too distant from Gansu to appeal for assistance from the Tungan warlords, such as the 5 Ma Clique. Besides the Han Chinese officials, rule over the oases of Tarim Basin had long been held by Tungans. Ma Fuxing, the Titai of Kashgar had ruthlessly exploited his Turkic Muslim subjects between 1916-1924. He himself was a Hui Muslim from Yunnan, as was Ma Shaowu. The Turkic Muslims of southern Xinjiang therefore had zero illusions of any “muslim brotherhood” with their Tungan brethren. It was Tungan troops who intervened to suppress any demonstration against Chinese rule. The Tungans of Tarim Basin were allies to the Han Chinese administration and thus enemies to the Turkic Muslim peoples. The western rim of Tarim Basin was in a unique political situation during the later half of Yang Zengxins rule as a large part of its Turkic Muslim population looked neither to the progressive Muslim leadership of western Turkestan nor the Tungan warlords of Gansu. Instead they looked at the regimes in Turkey and Afghanistans, both quite conservative. Contacts in these places were sparse ever since the Qing reconquest of Xinjiang. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in WW1, contact ceased to exist at all. Emotional links to what once was however lingerd, and the nationalist revolution of Ataturk sprang something of a Turkish renaissance inspiring Turkic peoples from Crimea to Kumul.  As for Afghanistan, there existed more concrete religious and political contacts with southern Xinjiang. In 1919, Amir Aman Allah, the last Muhammadzay ruler of Afghanistan had taken the throne after the death of his father. He became an impetuous ruler who brought forth his own downfall through a series of radical reforms that caused a revolution by 1928. Yet in his first years of rule he had widespread support of Muslim peoples in central asia, especially after he began the Third Afghan war against Britain, combined with a Jihad for Afghan independence. Because of this the British were forced to recognize Afghanistan's right to independent foreign policy. During this period, it is rumored Amir Aman Allah had toyed with the idea of forming an Islamic Confederacy which would have included Afghanistan, Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand. He would have also been interested in influence over Xinjiang where numerous Afghan merchants resided under British protection. Following Britains recognition of Afghanistan's right to independent foreign policy, with the 1919 treaty of Peshawar, British diplomatic protection for Afghan citizens in Xinjiang was lifted. Amir Aman Allah then established independent diplomatic links between Kabul and Urumqi, sending a delegation in 1922 led by Muhammad Sharif Khan. The Chinese officials regarded the Afghan mission as a trade delegation, but Muhammad Sharif Khan carried with him printed visiting cards styling himself as Afghanistan's Consul-General in Xinjiang. Alongside this he brought draft agreements demanding full extraterritorial rights and other privileges for Afghan subjects in Xinjiang and the right to import opium freely into the province. It is to no surprise Yang Zengxin refused to recognize the mission causing a dispute that would drag on for years. It became a long standing issue for th Turkic speaking Muslims of southern Xinjiang. There were many who looked to Afghanistan to help them against Chinese oppression. Now getting back to our timeline, with the initial outbreak of the Kumul Rebellion and the Tungan invasion, Jin Shujen had made every effort to prevent news of these events occurring mostly in the northeast from getting into the south. But of course one cannot stop the flow of information completely. Rumors and reports of the rebellious activities northeast flooded into the oases of Tarim Basin, invigorating anti-Chinese zeal, from peoples already suffering from increased taxation and inflation caused by unbacked paper currency paying for Jin's war efforts. Jin was well aware of the discontent south in his province, but he was emboldened by his victory of Ma Chongying as well as the recent delivery of 4000 rifles and 4 million rounds of ammunition from British held India. Thus he determined to maintain his current stance. It would prove to be a very fateful decision. The Kumul Rebellion was not crushed by any means. In fact the brutality following the relief of Kumul Old City caused outrage amongst the Turkic speaking peoples and sent refugees westwards towards Turfan. By May of 1932, Ma Chongying had dispatched a young Tungan Lt, Ma Shihming to take command over his Tungan forces remaining in Xinjiang. Ma Shihming quickly established his HQ in Turfan and began to cooperate with the Turkic speaking Muslim insurgents who owed their allegiance to Yulbars Khan and Khoja Niyas Haiji. It's also believed he made contact with Ma Fuming, a Tungan officer in command of the Xinjiang provincial forces at Turfan.  By mere coincidence, in May of 1932, Jin had also elected to seek revenge against Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen, the Torgut Mongol regent inhabiting Tien Shan. That same guy he had asked for military aid from who simply took his army away. Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen was invited to come back to Urumqi where he was to attend an investigation into the assassination plot laid against him. On May 21st, shortly after his arrival, he alongside two Torgut officers and the young Torgut Prince were all invited to an official banquet at Jin Shujens yamen. Now you might be thinking, who in their right mind would fall for that shit? Especially given the Yang Zengxin banquet story. Well according to R.P Watts, the British Vice Consul General at Kashgar who happened to be in Urumqi at the time. “While drinking the usual preliminary cup of tea the regent and the two military officers were led out into a courtyard and executed. According to Chinese custom in such matters proper observance was accorded to the high rank of regent even at the moment of execution. A red carpet was spread on the ground on which he was invited to seat himself. He was then killed by being shot through the head from behind by one of the governor's special executioners. His two companions being men of inferior rank were not given the privilege of a red carpet to sit on whilst being executed.”  The young Torgut prince was allowed to return to Kara Shahr, man that must have been an awkward desert. So Jin hoped the harsh action would terrify the young prince into submission. As you may have guessed, Jin actions were quite toxic for the Torgut Mongols. Might I add the Torgut Mongols were probably the only non Chinese group in Xinjiang that may have sided with Jin against the Turkic peoples? So to tally up things a bit here. Jin pissed off the Uyghurs and Tungans of Turfan, the Kirghiz of Tian Shan and now the Torguts.  In early 1932, Turkic Muslim opposition to forced collectivization and suppression of nomadism by Stalin in the Kazakh and Kirghiz regions of Soviet Central Asia, saw many spill over into Xinjiang. By March of 1932, large numbers of Kirghiz fled the border and were pursued by Soviet forces. A series of skirmishes and raids broke out in the border region. The Soviet Kirghiz naturally received aid from the Xinjiang Kirghiz and in June a Chinese official was killed by Kirghiz insurgents in Tien Shan. The Chinese were outraged, prompting Ma Shaowu to unleash 300 troops from Kashgar New City and 200 troops from Kashgar Old City to defend the frontier area. These units were soon joined by another 100 troops from Opal and 200 from Uch Turfan all under the leadership of Brigadier Yang, the nephew to the late Yang Zengxin. In July Yang's men began joint operations with the Soviets against the Kirghiz insurgents who were led by Id Mirab. The Chinese forces were said to quote “The Chinese forces had been suffering badly from want of opium', and reportedly behaved very badly towards Kirghiz, a number of whom were driven to take refuge in Russian territory”. To try a force the submission of the Kirghiz, Yang's forces took 70 hostages from Kirghiz families and brought them to imprisoned them the oases of Khotan, Keriya and Charchan. Thus Jin and Ma Shaowu had succeeded within a few months of Ma Chongyings withdrawal back into Gansu in both alienating the Turkic speaking and Mongol nomads of Tien Shan. The Sino-Soviet cooperation against the Kirghiz had also not gone unnoticed by other Muslim groups.  Meanwhile the Kumul Rebellion had spread westwards. By Autumn of 1932, months after the arrival of Ma Shihming to Turfan, Ma Fuming joined the rebels cause. Wu Aichen wrote it was his belief that Ma Fuming's decision was based on the continuing flow of Muslim refugees from Kumul to Turfan combined with reports of mass executions being carried out by Xing Fayu. But like I had mentioned, there is also strong evidence Ma Shihming probably negotiated an alliance with Ma Fuming. Wu Aichen wrote Ma Fumings first rebellious action was to send a telegram to Jin requesting he dispatch reinforcements while he also sent a letter to Xing Fayu over in Kumul to come quickly to Turfan. The reinforcements arrived at the oasis without suspecting a thing and were “shot down to the last man” by Ma Fumings forces as they passed the city gates. A few days later another detachment of 100 men led by Xing Fayu reached Turfan only to suffer the same fate. Xing Fayu was taken captive and “tortured to death in public with every refinement of cruelty and vileness of method”. Following Ma Fumings official defection, the Turfan Depression quickly emerged as the main center of Muslim rebellion in northeastern Xinjiang. Kumul which had been laid to ruin by Jin was abandoned to the Turkic Muslim insurgents and a handful of Tungan troops. A large portion of Tungan forces consisting of those following Ma Fuming and Ma Sushiming massed at Turfan preparing to march upon Urumqi, lying 100 miles northwest. The storm brewing in Turfan was followed up by a series of uncoordinated uprisings amongst the Turkic speaking Muslims of southern Xinjiang. The Uyghurs of Tarim Basin and Kirghiz of Tien Shan realized Jin's grip over the province was weakening and the presence of Tungan forces in Turfan effectively cut off the oases of the south from Urumqi and Jin's White Russian troops, whom otherwise may have scared them into submission. The White Russians and other provincial forces were hard pressed by Ma Fuming and Ma Shihming. Reports also spread that Ma Chongying would soon re-enter the fray in person and that Chang Peiyuan, the Military commander over at Ili had fallen out with Jin. Thus the Turkic speaking Muslims of southern Xinjiang knew the time was ripe to rebel against Chinese rule. In the winter uprising began at Pichan, just east of Turfan and at Kara Shahr about 175 miles southwest. Lack of Torgut support at Kara Shahr following the murder of Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen basically sealed the fate of the Chinese forces within the city. The new Tungan leader, Ma Chanzeng emerged the commander of rebel forces in the region. Disregarding the increasingly intense conflict between Ma Shih-ming and the provincial forces along the Turfan-Urumqi road, Ma Chan-ts'ang moved westward, seizing Bugur in early February and progressing to Kucha. There, he formed a strategic alliance with Temiir, the local Uyghur leader, who was noted by Wu Aichen as "a capable individual who had managed the mule wagon service." After occupying Kucha without any resistance, the combined forces of Ma Chanzeng and Temiir continued their advance toward Aksu, capturing the small town of Bai along the way. Ma Shaowu was the Taoyin of Kashgar and second most powerful official in the provincial administration after Jin, thus found himself cut off from Urumqi by two separate armies of Muslim rebels each composed of Tungan and Turkic factions. One of these armies held a small but militarily competent Tungan force led by Ma Chanzeng with a large contingent of poorly armed Uyghur peasants owing their allegiance to Temur. This force advanced southwest towards Aksu, while the other army consisting of a loose coalition of competent Tungan troops under Ma Shihming and Ma Fuming with Turkic speaking Muslim peasants owing allegiance to Khoja Niyas Haiji and Yulbars Khan pressed their attack directly upon Urumqi. In February of 1933 to add further confusion in the south, the rebellion against the Chinese spread southwards across the Tarim Basin to its southern rim. Uprising against the Chinese administration broke out simultaneously amongst the gold miners of the southern oases who had long resented the provincial governments fixed rate for the purchase of gold in Xinjiang alongside brutal working conditions. The spiraling inflation from Jin's worthless currency which was used to pay for the gold only made things worse. By spring their patience had run out, the Uyghurs led by Ismail Khan Khoja seized control of Kara Kash killing a large number of Han Chinese. Meanwhile the Uyghurs at Keriya seized control over the Surghak mines and threatened to take control over the whole oasis. Prominent rebel demands included a fair price for gold and silver and prohibition of the purchase of precious metals with paper currency. More urgent demands were lowering taxes, ending government tyranny, introducing Shari a law and stationing Muslim troops in every city. Now these demands were very real, they were willing to stand down if they were met. One anonymous writer of the demand notices placed at Karakash was as follows “A friend for the sake of friendship will make known a friend's defects and save him from the consequences of his defects. You, who are supposed to rule, cannot even realize this, but try to seek out the supporter of Islam to kill him. Foolish infidels like you are not fit to rule ... How can an infidel, who cannot distinguish between a friend and a foe, be fit to rule? You infidels think that because you have rifles, guns ... and money, you can depend on them; but we depend upon God in whose hands are our lives. You infidels think that you will take our lives. If you do not send a reply to this notice we are ready. If we die we are martyrs. If we survive we are conquerors. We are living but long for death”. Ma Shaowu elected to first move against the Muslim insurgents threatening Aksu, most likely reasoning that if Ma Chanzeng and Temur were defeated the weaker rebel forces at KaraKash and Surghak would just crumble. There also was the fact Ma Shihmings men at Turfan had severed the telegraph line between Urumqi and Kashgar, and that line had been re-routed via Aksu, but if Aksu fell to the rebels, communications with the capital would only be possible via the USSR. At this point its estimated Brigadier Yang had a mixed army of 280 cavalry and 150 infantry as he set out for Aksu on February 6th. Ma Shaowu's position was not good. On February 9th, Jin Shujen's younger brother, Jin Shuqi the commander in chief at Kashgar New City suddenly died of illness. He was replaced with a Chinese officer called Liu who took command of his three detachments of cavalry, about 480 men and a single detachment of artillery, about 160 men. Ma Shaowu held control over two regiments of cavalry, 700 men and 3 detachments of infantry, around 300 men all stationed at Kashgar Old City. In mid february reports reached Kashgar that Brigadier Yang was heavily outnumbered by the rebels under Ma Chanzeng and Temur and had fallen back from Aksu to a defensive line at Maral Bashi. On the 23rd celebrations were held at Kashgar to mark Jin handing Ma Shadowu the new title of Special Commissioner for the Suppression of Bandits. During the celebration, salutes were fired at the yamen and KMT flags were flown from buildings throughout the city. Afterwards all of Liu's forces were sent to Maral Bashi to bolster Yang.  Now in a bid to suppress the uprisings at Surghak and KaraKash before a full scale uprising could develop on the southern road, 200 men led by Colonel Li were dispatched to Khotan, while another force under Colonel Chin was dispatched to Yarkland. Because of these movements of troops to Khotan and Maral Bashi, there was a serious depletion of defenders for Kashgar. Thus Ma Shaowu ordered a raising of Kirghiz levies and recalled some Chinese troops from the frontier districts west of Kashgar. Thus the Chinese garrison at Sarikol pulled out to Kashgar, leaving the region's Tajik population to their own devices. At Kashgar, troops posted on the walls of both cities had strict orders to close all gates at 7pm, with major curfew laws set into place.Despite all of this the provincial troops proved very inept at stemming the rebel advance along both the north and south roads into Kashgar. On the 25th, the rebels entered Aksu Old City, shooting up all its Chinese residents, seized their property, stormed the arsenal and looted the treasury. Later on Ma Changzeng and Temur led an estimated 4700 ill armed Uyghur irregular army to advance on Maral Bashi and Kashgar.  In the Keriya, the Chinese officials consented to convert to Islam and to surrender their possessions; however, on March 3, thirty-five Chinese individuals, including top officials, were executed, with their heads displayed in the marketplace. On February 28, the Old City of Khotan fell into the hands of rebels with little resistance, while the New City of Khotan was besieged before capitulating to the insurgents on March 16th. Following the rebel successes in Khotan, it was reported that 266 Han Chinese converted to Islam, and both the treasury and arsenal of the New City—containing "thousands of weapons and nearly a ton of gold"—were seized by the insurgents. Additionally, uprisings led by a Uighur named ‘Abd ai-Qadir took place in Chira, and in Shamba Bazaar, several Han Chinese and two Hindu moneylenders were killed. Further afield from Keriya, the town of Niya succumbed to the rebel forces from Khotan, while even farther east, at the isolated oases of Charchan and Charkhlik, reports indicate that peaceful insurrections occurred after a small Tungan contingent loyal to Ma Shih-ming entered the region via a little-used desert route connecting Kara Shahr and Lop. Meanwhile, to the west of Khotan, Uighur forces under Isma'il Khan Khoja obstructed the main route to Yarkand at the Tokhta Langar caravanserai, repelling all but two delegates sent from Kashgar by Ma Shao-wu, who aimed to negotiate with the rebel leaders in Khotan. No further news was received from the two Begs allowed to continue to Khotan, and with their diplomatic mission's failure, the entire southern route from the eastern outskirts of the Guma oasis to the distant Lop Nor fell out of Chinese control. To fortify their position against potential counterattacks from Kashgar, the rebel leaders in Khotan destroyed roadside wells in the desert east of Guma and began establishing a clearly Islamic governance in the areas they had liberated. By mid March, Ma Shaowu's control over southern Xinjiang was limited to just a wedge of territory around Kashgar, Maral Bashi and Yarkland. Moral was so low, Ma Shaowu asked the British Indian government for military assistance as it seemed apparent no help would come from Urumqi. Ma Shaowu had received 3 telegrams from Jin via the USSR lines; the first confirmed his position as Commander in Chief; the second relayed Jin's brothers death and the third directed Jin Kashgar representatives to remit a large sum of money to his personal bank account in Tientsin. That last signal must have been a banger to read. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Kumul Rebellion quicked off a storm of different groups' grievances and Jin Shujen did a banger job of pissing off…pretty much every single group. In the southern portions of Xinjiang massive uprisings began and it seemed a tidal wave would hit the entire province.  

After the Seven Years' War (1754-1763), Great Britain instituted the Proclamation Line of 1763. The Line sought to create a lasting peace in British North America by limiting British colonial settlement east of the Appalachian Mountains. In 1768, colonists and British Indian agents negotiated the Treaties of Fort Stanwix and Hard Labour to extend the boundary line further west. In 1774, the Shawnee-Dunmore War broke out as colonists attempted to push further west. Fallon Burner and Russell Reed, two of the three co-managers of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation's American Indian Initiative, join us to investigate the Shawnee-Dunmore War and what this war can show us about Indigenous life, warfare, and sovereignty during the mid-to-late eighteenth century. Show Notes: https://www.benfranklinsworld.com/398 Sponsor Links Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Colonial Williamsburg American Indian Initiative Complementary Episodes Episode 223: A Native American History of the Ohio River Valley & Great Lakes Region Episode 310: History of the Blackfeet Episode 353: Women and the Making of Catawba Identity Episode 367: Brafferton Indian School, Part 1 Episode 368: Brafferton Indian School, Part 2 Listen! Apple Podcasts Spotify Google Podcasts Amazon Music Ben Franklin's World iOS App Ben Franklin's World Android App Helpful Links Join the Ben Franklin's World Facebook Group Ben Franklin's World Twitter: @BFWorldPodcast Ben Franklin's World Facebook Page Sign-up for the Franklin Gazette Newsletter

Growing up, Liz Kleinrock never felt like she fit into her Jewish community in Washington, D.C. Born in Korea and adopted into an Ashkenazi family, she constantly felt pressure to justify her Judaism—whether at Hebrew school, summer camp or synagogue. Years later, after becoming a professional antibias and antiracist educator, she met author Caroline Kusin Pritchard, and the two clicked. One day, they got an idea: to create an educational, illustrated, family-friendly book that redefines the face of Judaism—literally. The result is What Jewish Looks Like, released September 2024, which profiles unconventional Jewish icons. The collection includes British-Indian sculptor Anish Kapoor, historic Ethiopian community leader Uri Ben Baruch and American trans activist Jazz Jennings—about as varied a scope as one could imagine that crosses skin colour, religious affiliation and cultural identity. The book's launch has been met warmly in Jewish spaces. And yet, as Kleinrock and Kusin Pritchard tell Rivka Campbell on The CJN's podcast about Jews of colour, even on their book tour, they face microaggressions in every city. For them, it's a constant reminder of why this kind of content is needed—not just to educate younger Jewish generations, but older ones as well. Credits Host: Rivka Campbell Producer: Michael Fraiman Music: Westside Gravy Support The CJN Subscribe to The CJN newsletter Donate to The CJN (+ get a charitable tax receipt) Subscribe to Rivkush (Not sure how? Click here)

https://notesonfilm1.com/2024/10/30/eva-de-matos-on-bend-it-like-beckham The podcast explores how Bend it Like Beckham humorously and poignantly explores themes of identity, tradition, gender, sexuality, multiculturalism and Britishness. Bend It Like Beckham follows Jess, a British Indian teenager who dreams of playing football despite her family's traditional expectations. Set in a diasporic area of Asian immigrants and 2nd generation children the podcast discusses the associated inter-generational themes that permeate the film. The podcast also discusses the film's specificity to 2003 and how the political climate may have influenced the film's representation of multiculturalism.

Last time we spoke about the battles for Peleliu and Angaur. Following the amphibious assaults on Peleliu and Anguar, US Marines under General Rupertus intensified their offensive. On September 17, Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines advanced in Peleliu's southern sector, as the 1st and 5th Marines pushed north, confronting the fortified Umurbrogol Mountains, where Colonel Nakagawa's defenses stalled their progress. Despite reaching key positions by mid-morning, intense Japanese counterattacks continued, causing heavy casualties. On September 18, the 7th Marines, aided by armor, resumed their slow advance, securing the southern part of Peleliu by day's end. Meanwhile, the 1st and 5th Marines faced brutal combat in the central ridges, suffering significant losses. By September 21, the capture of nearby Ulithi Atoll provided a strategic base for future operations. Despite securing important positions, the Marines encountered severe resistance in the Umurbrogol Mountains, leading to high casualties and necessitating reinforcements. By September 23, the Americans secured footholds on Peleliu and Anguar, yet fierce fighting persisted in Nakagawa's fortified positions. This episode is the Japanese Triumph in China Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  This week we are picking up back over on Peleliu and Anguar where the Japanese are still providing stiff resistance. On September 23, Colonel Venable's 322nd Regiment had made little progress breaking into the Lake Salome bowl. With their commanding officer severely injured, a change in tactics was imminent. On the morning of September 24, propaganda broadcasts over a public address system were used to try and persuade the remaining Japanese to surrender. However, only two Japanese soldiers surrendered, reporting that over 300 defenders remained in the bowl under Major Goto. This accurate estimate was disregarded by the American command, who believed only about 150 defenders remained. Following this failed attempt, all available artillery bombarded the bowl in preparation for an attack from the north, altering the appearance of the bowl's interior and rims to aid the upcoming assault. Back at Peleliu, after heavy bombardment, Colonel Dark's 321st Regiment resumed its advance north along the coast on September 24, despite continued harassment from Japanese fire from the central ridges. By noon, they had secured the trail-road junction south of Garekoru. Some troops explored the trail to the east, encountering heavy resistance, while Company G advanced rapidly north through Garekoru, reaching the O-4 Line. Behind them, Dark's 3rd Battalion and Colonel Hanneken's 3rd Battalion also pushed northwards. Further east, the 7th Marines pressed against Colonel Nakagawa's main defenses on the Umurbrogol Mountains. By nightfall, having successfully resisted Japanese counterattacks on O-4, General Rupertus' northward drive had proven to be a significant success. He next planned to cut across the island on September 25 through the eastern trail to completely isolate the Japanese forces in the Umurbrogol ridges. At 07:00, Dark's troops began moving eastward, with Company E successfully reaching the edge of East Road against light opposition. They halted in front of Hill B, which dominated the eastern area. However, the 3rd Battalion encountered heavier resistance from pillboxes and emplacements protected by steep walls and sheer cliffs guarding the northern approaches to the Umurbrogol defense system, making little progress. Meanwhile, to the north, a strong tank-infantry patrol advanced about 1,200 yards, killing 30 Japanese and destroying four pillboxes and two large supply dumps before reaching the O-5 Line. The weak resistance encountered by the patrol suggested that remaining Japanese strength was concentrated in the Umurbrogol Pocket. Thus, at 10:30, Rupertus decided to commit the 5th Marines for a drive to the northern tip of Peleliu. Rapidly relieved by the 1st Marines on eastern Peleliu. Orders to move to the western portion of Peleliu found the 5th Marines in static positions on Eastern Peleliu, where the regimental mission had been to prevent enemy counterlandings. The 1st Battalion was deployed in the vicinity of the radio direction finding station near Ngardololok, the 2d Battalion was holding the islands north of the northeastern peninsula, while the 3d Battalion, less one company, occupied defensive positions along Purple Beach. The 1st Marines completed the relief of the 5th shortly after noon and assumed command of the 5th Marines sector at that time. In order to expedite movement of the regiment to the West Road, the battalions moved out on trucks at 1300, with 1/5 in the lead, followed by 3/5 and 2/5.  By 1600, the 5th Marines had executed the passage of the lines, and the regiment passed through Phase Line O-4 near Garekoru. As 1/5 continued its advance up the West Road, it encountered erratic resistance from what appeared to be Japanese holdouts. The level terrain was devoid of the dense jungle growth abounding elsewhere on Peleliu and offered ideal conditions for the movement of tanks and LVT flamethrowers accompanying the advance battalion. Aside from occasional Japanese sniper and mortar fire, the advance continued for about 500 yards without interruption to Road Junction 15, where the West and East Roads met. This vital point was defended by a small Japanese force, which had installed itself on a ridge dominating the road forks. Around 1700, as the Marines approached this point, the enemy opened fire, which served only to delay the Marines. When the firefight ended the Japanese had lost 20 killed. The battalion continued its advance for another 100 yards and seized the Japanese radio station, whose towers the forward elements of RCT 321 had spotted on the previous day. Having secured this objective, the battalion established night defenses north of the radio station from the beach to the high ground east of the West Road. Upon reaching Road Junction 15 in the wake of the advance of 1/5, the 3d Battalion pivoted to the southeast and headed down East Road, where it established night defenses on the road and along the western slopes of Hill 80. The latter hill, in itself an isolated terrain feature, owed its importance to its location, for it was the only link separating the Kamilianlul ridges to the south from the Amiangal ridges, which formed the northernmost hill mass on Peleliu.   Throughout the evening and night, the forward elements at the radio station were continuously and heavily attacked and bombed but managed to hold against the enemy onslaught. Meanwhile, at Angaur, after a heavy and prolonged artillery bombardment, the 3rd Battalion, 322nd Regiment pushed forward to launch its assault from the north. Finding no route south over the cliffs, they assembled near the northern end of the Milwaukee Railroad for an attack west the following day. At 07:30 on September 26, the infantry launched their assault on Lake Salome, quickly taking control of the eastern rim with minimal resistance. Facing increasing enemy fire, the Americans made their way down the eastern rim to the bowl floor. However, by the end of the day, they were halted by Goto's positions on the northern cliffs and "The Island," a gap between an overgrown coral mound and the eastern rim. To the south, the 2nd Battalion supported the attack by advancing north, capturing the southeast rim and clearing out several enemy cave positions.  Back over on Peleliu the Marines had a very rough night full of Japanese infiltrator harassment. In fact our old friend Eugene Sledge wrote about the night of September 25th and what his unit of K Company, 3rd battalion, 5th marines went through. The Japanese who had come across the road in front of me were probably members of what the enemy called a “close-quarter combat unit.” The enemy soldier shot by Sam was not dressed or equipped like their typical infantryman. Rather he wore only tropical khaki shorts, short-sleeved shirt, and tabi footwear (splittoed, rubber-soled canvas shoes). He carried only his bayonet. Why he entered our line where he did may have been pure accident, or he may have had an eye on our mortar. His comrade angled off toward the right near a machine gun on our flank. Mortars and machine guns were favorite targets for infiltrators on the front lines. To the rear, they went after heavy mortars, communications, and artillery. Before Company K moved out, I went down the road to the next company to see what had happened during the night. I learned that those blood-chilling screams had come from the Japanese I had seen run to the right. He had jumped into a foxhole where he met an alert Marine. In the ensuing struggle each had lost his weapon. The desperate Marine had jammed his forefinger into his enemy's eye socket and killed him. Such was the physical horror and brutish reality of war for us. The 1/5 spent the early hours of 26 September in consolidating its positions around the radio station and preparing for continuation of its attack later in the day to the northern tip of Peleliu. Shortly after 0600, 3/5 jumped off for an attack against Hill 80 with Company K on the left and Company I on the right. The attack carried the hill and by 0830 the assault force reached a swamp bordering the east coast of Peleliu. This advance of the 3d Battalion was of major importance because it effectively cut the island in two. Late in the afternoon most of the battalion moved back from Hill 80 to a reserve position near the junction of East and West Roads. The unit's southern flank extended south from the junction along East Road to Hill 80, where Company I was stationed for the night. Between Company I, 5th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, at Hill B, lay a gap approximately 1,800 yards long through which only the 321st Infantry's Neal Task Force had passed. In this gap lay 1,500-yard-long Kamilianlul Mountain, held by an unknown number of Japanese and as yet not even reconnoitered by American units. The 5th Marines consolidated their positions and resumed their assault. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, ran into stiff opposition from the Amiangal ridges dominating northern Peleliu. The northern portion of the L-shaped hill system consisted of ridges running generally from northeast to southwest for about 1,000 yards; the southern leg extended from northwest to southeast. The southern leg of the ridges was not continuous but broken into four separate hills or knobs, designated from northwest to southeast as Hill 1, Hill 2, Hill 3, and Radar Hill, so named because it had at one time served as an enemy radar installation. These four knobs were to gain ill repute as Hill Row. The entire Amiangal ridge system was held in strength by the Japanese, particularly the portion paralleling the route of advance of 1/5. This part contained some of the most elaborate caves and tunnels on Peleliu. The battalion had barely started out along the West Road when the enemy in and on Hill 1 opened up on the Marines with 37mm and 75mm guns as well as automatic weapons and mortars. This curtain of fire from the Amiangal ridges was reinforced by heavy fire from Ngesebus Island. All forward movement soon halted. Attacking eastward from the West Road, Company B assaulted the second knob, Hill 2, but also encountered opposition. Through sheer determination the company was able to gain a firm foothold on the hill by early afternoon. This accomplishment in effect served to outflank the Japanese on Hill 1, but Japanese resistance on the last mentioned hill continued throughout the day. An attempt by Company C to seize all of Hill 1 during the remaining hours of daylight was unsuccessful, and continuation of the assault had to await the following day. During the bitter fighting in which 1/5 engaged during the night of 25-26 September and for most of the following day, 2/5 remained stationary on the southern flank of the regiment. At 1600 on 26 September, when it had become apparent that 1/5 could make no further progress, 2/5 was ordered to attack. The battalion advanced northward through the left wing of 1/5, carefully bypassing embattled Hill 1. In the course of its advance, the battalion drew heavy fire from Japanese emplacements in the plain, from the ridges on its right, as well as from Ngesebus. Enemy mortars proved especially troublesome. As a result of the heavy fire, Company F lost four of its supporting tanks before it had advanced very far beyond Hill 1. Attempts by the artillery to give all possible support to the battalion were largely ineffectual. "We fired frequent missions throughout the day on these mortars; the reported effect was that the mortars were neutralized while we fired but that they were not destroyed. The enemy apparently withdrew into the caves during the period of our fire." As evening approached, the 5th Marines occupied a jagged front line. The 1st Battalion, though out of contact with the 2d, was tied in with the 3d on the right. The mission of the 3d Battalion was to support either the 1st or 2d Battalion in the event of a major Japanese counterattack. Further progress of the 2d Battalion was impeded by a large antitank ditch, which blocked the approach to the remnants of the Peleliu phosphate plant. The Japanese had converted the reinforced concrete foundation of the otherwise demolished structure into a major defensive installation. Exposed to the enemy fire from Ngesebus Island and plunging fire from caves and defensive positions from the hills, 2/5 found itself in a very unenviable situation. Further south, after some necessary adjustments, Dark's forces assaulted Hill B with two battalions. Initially repelled, Dark then sent a task force led by Captain George Neal to attack from the north. After a complex maneuver north and then south, the Neal Task Force attacked Hill B just as other elements of the 321st fought their way to the top through challenging terrain. The hill eventually fell to the Americans, completing the isolation of the Umurbrogol Pocket. By the end of the day, the island was divided in two places, leaving Nakagawa's determined defenders isolated in two major pockets. On September 27, with the Umurbrogol Pocket now contained, the 5th Marines continued their operations against Amiangal Mountain. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 321st Regiment advanced north from the Hill B area to close the long gap along East Road up to Hill 80. Dark's infantrymen secured Kamilianlul Mountain with minimal resistance and then moved towards the Marines' road junction.  The 2d Battalion was to find progress extremely rough for the remainder of the day. First, the erstwhile phosphate plant, which the Japanese had turned into a blockhouse, had to be secured in an area that bristled with snipers. The problem confronting Colonel Harris was a formidable one. The blockhouse in front of 2/5 could not be taken until the antitank ditch blocking the approaches to it had been seized. This was a job that the infantry could not tackle without armored support. The regimental commander decided to utilize all arms available in reducing these obstacles. First of all, Colonel Harris called naval gunfire and artillery in on Ngesebus and any other targets suspected of harboring artillery or mortar positions. A medium tank, equipped with a bulldozer blade, was pressed into service to level the antitank ditch, and filled it by 0830. A LVT flamethrower then was able to come within effective range of the Japanese fortification. Moments later, when the flame and smoke had cleared, all resistance from this stronghold had ceased and more than 60 dead Japanese remained in the rubble. While this action was in progress, patrols from Company E seized a small, weakly defended ridge abutting the road from the east. The 2d Battalion thereafter resumed its advance northward along the road as well as over the adjacent ridge. Company F, at the head of the column, soon found itself embroiled in some of the most bitter and frustrating action of the entire campaign. Aside from receiving heavy Japanese artillery and mortar fire, the company faced a series of pillboxes and field fortifications on level ground, and layer upon layer of caves in the hillsides. Even though they were not aware of it at the time, the men of the 5th Marines had come upon the most skillfully constructed defenses on Peleliu. The Japanese Army had utilized all of the many natural caves possessing tactical value, adapting them for the emplacement of heavier weapons with great ingenuity. On the other hand, Japanese naval troops had preferred to construct their own caves with the help of the 214th Naval Construction Battalion, composed of men who had been professional miners and tunnel workers in civilian life. Since most of these Navy caves were located near the northern end of Peleliu, they proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the 5th Marines. Eugene Sledge faced these obstacles and saw firsthand the effectiveness of flamethrowers. Here is a passage from him: Burgin's order to us to continue firing into the opening interrupted my musings. We kept up a steady fire into the pillbox to keep the Japanese pinned down while the flamethrower came up, carried by Corporal Womack from Mississippi. He was a brave, good-natured guy and popular with the troops, but he was one of the fiercest-looking Marines I ever saw. He was big and husky with a fiery red beard well powdered with white coral dust. He reminded me of some wild Viking. I was glad we were on the same side. Stooped under the heavy tanks on his back, Womack approached the pillbox with his assistant just out of the line of our fire. When they got about fifteen yards from the target, we ceased firing. The assistant reached up and turned a valve on the flamethrower. Womack then aimed the nozzle at the opening made by the 75mm gun. He pressed the trigger. With a whoooooooosh the flame leaped at the opening. Some muffled screams, then all quiet. Even the stoic Japanese couldn't suppress the agony of death by fire and suffocation. But they were no more likely to surrender to us than we would have been to them had we ever been confronted with the possibility of surrender. In fighting the Japanese, surrender was not one of our options.  Sheer courage and heroism in themselves proved inadequate for the task. In the course of the morning of 27 September, Company F seized the two ridges forming the northwestern anchor of the Amiangal system and established observation posts on the crests. But this did not solve the problem of what to do about the Japanese occupying the caves about half way up the hill. Marine casualties mounted steadily, and evacuation of the wounded became more and more difficult. Since the cave openings completely dominated the road leading past the northernmost ridge of Peleliu, the advance of the entire 2d Battalion ground to a halt. The first tank attempting to squeeze through the narrow gap between the hill and the northwestern shore was hit, and the Marines occupying the crest of the hill were powerless to cope with the caves underneath. Although the Americans now controlled the northern shore and blocked further enemy reinforcements, skilled Japanese miners continued their resistance underground. What the Marines did not know was that they were facing the most comprehensive cave system on Peleliu which was the underground home of the Japanese naval construction units who were, luckily for the Marines, better miners than infantrymen. The Japanese Army had utilized all of the many natural caves possessing tactical value, adapting them for the emplacement of heavier weapons with great ingenuity. On the other hand, Japanese naval troops had preferred to construct their own caves with the help of the 214th Naval Construction Battalion, composed of men who had been professional miners and tunnel workers in civilian life. Since most of these Navy caves were located near the northern end of Peleliu, they proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the 5th Marines. In the end, it would take weeks for the Marines to finally quash all resistance on Akarakoro Point, then only by blasting closed all the tunnel entrances, sealing the Japanese defenders inside to their fate. To the south, Harris' 1st Battalion pressed on with their attack on the mountain's southern leg, successfully capturing Hill 1. Meanwhile, the 322nd Regiment resumed its assault on the Lake Salome bowl, fighting to secure the base of the north rim but encountering less resistance in the south as most Japanese defenders had been evacuated towards Romauldo. The following day, despite a successful enemy mortar barrage that initially forced a temporary withdrawal and reorganization, the Americans cleared the entire bowl floor of Japanese troops, isolating Goto's remaining forces in the Romauldo area. This progress enabled the 322nd to launch a final coordinated attack on October 1, with its three battalions trapping the enemy in the Romauldo Pocket, though they were unable to penetrate Goto's final defenses. On September 28 at Peleliu, while Dark's 1st Battalion engaged Japanese infiltrators while mopping up the Kamilianlul Mountain area, Harris' 1st and 2nd Battalions continued their assault on Amiangal and successfully captured Hill 3. This action isolated the remaining Japanese forces at Radar Hill. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines executed a successful landing on Ngesebus Island with minimal resistance after a comprehensive artillery, air, and naval bombardment.  The curtain on the drama of Ngesebus opened on the morning of September 28, when the massed fire of five artillery battalions from Peleliu, as well as heavy fire from warships and aircraft, blanketed the island. Near the northwestern shore of Peleliu, an impressive gathering of high-ranking officers had assembled to witness the operation. The group included such notables as Admiral Fort, and Generals Julian C. Smith, Geiger, Rupertus, Mueller, Oliver P. Smith, and Bell. The weather was cool and cloudy and interspersed with frequent rain squalls. For the Corsair pilots of VMF-114, air support for the Ngesebus landings represented a very interesting and original assignment. The operation marked the beginning of combat work for the squadron, which had reached Peleliu only two days earlier. At 06:30, the Corsairs hit the airstrip on Ngesebus with 500-pound bombs and strafed the entire island as well as Kongauru to the northeast. "Strafing runs were made just a few feet off the deck and a hail of lead laid all over the island." At 08:40, 20 Corsairs preceded the landing craft and gave the island another heavy strafing. In the course of this attack, Japanese mortar positions were spotted and one especially prominent square blockhouse with an iron door was fired on and neutralized. Whenever aircraft were not directly over the island, the artillery on Peleliu and naval guns offshore gave Ngesebus a heavy going over, starting at 07:00 and concluding at 09:05. Both quick and delay fuzes were used. Observers reported that the island was completely covered with fire. In the course of the preliminary bombardment, naval gunfire ships pounded the northern portion of Ngesebus and continued to fire on that part of the island throughout the landing. The Marines advanced inland, swiftly securing the airstrip and the eastern portion of Ngesebus. One platoon then landed on Kongauru and Murphy islands to secure them against light opposition. However, the attack to the northwest encountered strong resistance from Japanese forces entrenched in caves and dugouts, prompting the deployment of tanks to support the Marine assault. By 5:00 PM, nearly all of Ngesebus was under American control, with only a few hundred yards at the extreme northwestern tip remaining in Japanese hands and some caves on the ridges still needing to be cleared.  The 3d Battalion spent a relatively quiet night on Ngesebus. On the morning of 29 September, Companies I and K resumed the attack. Progress was normal until the two companies had nearly reached the northern tip of Ngesebus, when a 75mm gun opened up at point blank range. The Marines quickly destroyed this weapon and went on to overcome the rest of the resistance on the island. At 1500, 29 September, Ngesebus was declared secure. An hour later, 2/321 relieved the Marines and completed mopping up. Having accomplished the mission on the island, 3/5 returned to Peleliu. The battalion had secured the island at a cost of 15 killed and 33 wounded. In return, the Marines killed or captured 470 Japanese. Infantrymen of 2/321 were to account for another hundred of the enemy during the ensuing mop-up. Eugene Sledge wrote this about the final capture of Ngesebus: The next morning, again with the help of tanks and am-tracs, our battalion took most of the remainder of Ngesebus. Our casualties were remarkably low for the number of Japanese we killed.* In midafternoon we learned that an army unit would relieve us shortly and complete the job on the northern end of Ngesebus. Our mortar section halted to await orders and dispersed among some open bushes. In our midst was the wreckage of a Japanese heavy machine gun and the remains of the squad that had been wiped out by Company K. The squad members had been killed in the exact positions to be occupied by such a squad “according to the book.” At first glance the dead gunner appeared about to fire his deadly weapon. He still sat bolt upright in the proper firing position behind the breech of his machine gun. Even in death his eyes stared widely along the gun sights. Despite the vacant look of his dilated pupils, I couldn't believe he was dead. Cold chills ran along my spine. Gooseflesh tickled my back. It seemed as though he was looking through me into all eternity, that at any instant he would raise his hands—which rested in a relaxed manner on his thighs—grip the handles on the breech, and press the thumb trigger. The bright shiny brass slugs in the strip clip appeared as ready as the gunner, anxious to speed out, to kill, and to maim more of the “American devils.” But he would rot, and they would corrode. Neither he nor his ammo could do any more for the emperor.  The rest of the 5th Marines continued their operations on September 29, launching a full-scale assault on Radar Hill using flamethrowers, bazookas, and demolition charges, finally capturing the position by the morning of September 30. Following the completion of operations in northern Peleliu, the 5th Marines were relieved by the 321st Regiment. However, as the Army troops took over, the remaining Japanese, who had been hiding underground, reoccupied some positions, requiring two additional days of fighting to fully secure northern Peleliu. Nonetheless, the Japanese presence in Peleliu had now been reduced to Nakagawa's Umurbrogol Pocket, so Peleliu was officially secured. Total losses during this battle so far included 843 killed, 3845 wounded and 356 missing of the 1st Marine Division; 46 killed, 226 wounded and 7 missing from the 321st Regiment; and an estimated 9076 Japanese dead plus 180 prisoners of war. Yet that is all for today with Peleliu and Anguar as we now need to travel to China where the Japanese are still carrying out Operation Ichi-Go in an effort to capture Guilin and Liuzhou. As we last observed, General Yokoyama's 11th Army had taken control of Lingling Airdrome and Quanzhou by September 14. Following this, they reorganized their units in preparation for resuming their offensive in October. Meanwhile, the 34th Division was deployed towards Changning, and the 37th Division moved to capture Shaoyang, which fell by the end of the month. The 23rd Army also made final preparations for their offensive in early September. General Tanaka directed the Kawakami Raiding Unit in a wide flanking maneuver along the Zhukeng-Huaiji road towards Wuzhou, while the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade embarked on a long march north to Guiping. On September 13, the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade and the 22nd and 104th Divisions began their main advance towards Wuzhou. However, the Kawakami Raiding Unit successfully captured Wuzhou on September 22 and seized the Danzhuzhen airfield six days later. Each unit then continued its advance westward to Guiping, which fell to the 23rd Brigade on October 11. So far, Tanaka's forces had encountered little to no resistance, but this was about to change. After the war, in discussing the performance of the Chinese divisions supposed to defend Guilin and Liuzhou, the political situation in east China, and the attitudes of the east China commanders, Marshal Hata remarked that in his opinion Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi had kept their forces out of serious fighting in order to conserve them "for the future." At the time, there were rumors that these men were planning a coup against Chiang Kai-Shek. Chinese resistance was light, but with its supply situation improved the 14th Air Force again did its best on the Salween as well as in east China. In all September the force dropped 1897.6 tons of bombs and fired 1281382 rounds of machine-gun ammunition, some of the latter of course at aerial targets. In early September, Japanese fighter reinforcements from the homeland also entered combat. The Japanese were pleased at the performance of the latemodel fighters with one of the air regiments they sent to China. Thanks to the air cover thus supplied, for the first time in the east China campaign they found themselves able to move supplies regularly on the Xiang Jiang, which paralleled their line of advance, and so thought their prospects "brightened."  At the beginning of the month, Yokoyama renewed his offensive, with the 58th Division successfully taking Xing'An and the 34th Division capturing Changning. The 37th Division was then deployed to Dao, and the 34th Division was sent to Xing'An in preparation for the final push toward Guilin. On October 20, this attack commenced as Yokoyama directed the 216th Regiment to advance to Lehecun, the 58th Division to assault the area north of Guilin, the 40th Division to move to Gaoshangzhen, the 13th Division to advance to Quanhuicun, and the 3rd Division to push toward Fuchuan. With minimal resistance from the retreating Japanese forces, most of these movements were completed by the end of the month. The 3rd Division pushed further to Pingle, while the 37th Division occupied Gongchengzhen and Yanshan to approach Guilin from the south. On November 3, the 3rd Division captured Lipu and began preparations for the advance towards Liuzhen, encircling Guilin and opening the route to Liuzhen. Meanwhile, on October 22, Tanaka ordered the reinforced 23rd Brigade to continue its advance toward Guigang, with the 104th and 22nd Divisions pushing toward Wuxuan. Their progress, previously unopposed, was now challenged by the Chinese 46th and 64th Armies, which launched daily attacks against Guiping with substantial air support. As a result, the 22nd Division was redirected to counter the Chinese forces, successfully forcing their withdrawal by October 29. Following this victory, the 23rd Brigade captured Guigang on November 3, and the 104th Division seized Wuxuan the following day. This allowed Tanaka's forces to begin a northern pursuit to support Yokoyama's assaults on Guilin and Liuzhen. After the third Anshan strike, General LeMay began implementing reforms within the 20th Bomber Command. These changes included reorganizing the command, enhancing the logistics system, adjusting target priorities, and improving coordination with Pacific operations. As a result, the frequency of missions increased each month, with each mission becoming more substantial and effective. Concurrently, following the successful completion of the newly renamed Isley Field on Saipan, the 73rd Bombardment Wing was redirected to the Marianas instead of the CBI Theater. There, it would join Major-General Haywood Hansell's 21st Bomber Command, tasked with executing high-altitude, daylight precision attacks to cripple Japan's aircraft industry.  The XXI Bomber Command arrived on Saipan on October 12, 1944, and from the start General Hansell was beset by a host of serious command problems, the worst of which were continued teething problems with the B-29, tardy delivery of aircraft, aircrews untrained in high altitude formation flying, primitive airfield conditions, lack of an air service command for logistical support, no repair depots, a total absence of target intelligence, stubborn internal resistance to daylight operations by his sole combat wing, subordinates in the XXI Bomber Command who lobbied for his removal, and Hansell's inferiority in rank in dealing with other AAF commanders in the theater. Furthermore, Hansell was soon prohibited from flying combat missions with his command, possibly because of limited knowledge of the atomic bomb or the perception that he knew the existence of Ultra. As plans for a sustained bomber offensive against Honshu progressed, the strategic focus of Operation Matterhorn diminished. The 20th Bomber Command shifted to flying missions in direct support of other Pacific operations, with target priorities moving from coke ovens to the aircraft industry. In preparation for the upcoming invasion of the Philippines, the command was tasked with two closely spaced maximum missions against Okayama in Formosa, totaling 170 sorties, along with very-long-range reconnaissance missions. Yet now we have to travel over to the India-Burma theater. As the advance towards the Chindwin continued and the resilient 33rd Division finally crossed the river in late November, General Katamura was finalizing his plans for a withdrawal to the Mandalay sector, scheduled for December. This decision was driven by the intense pressure the British 36th Division was putting on General Takeda's defensive positions at Pinwe, forcing the defenders to prepare for a final retreat by the end of November. Meanwhile, General Slim was preparing for Operation Capital. He planned to stretch airpower to its limits to move four and two-thirds divisions across the Chindwin, along with two tank brigades. After establishing bridgeheads at Sittang, Mawlaik, and Kalewa, he intended to cross the Chindwin and confront General Kimura's forces between the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy. The 4th Corps, now under the experienced General Messervy, would break out from the Sittang bridgehead, advance east through the mountains, capture Pinlebu, and then approach the Shwebo plain from the north. Simultaneously, General Stopford's 33rd Corps would move from Kalewa, following the Chindwin southeast to Yeu and Monywa. Once the Japanese forces were pushed onto the open plain, Slim planned to exploit his overwhelming advantage in airpower and tanks to decisively defeat them, anticipating that the enemy would fiercely defend Mandalay. The combination of the defeats at Kohima, Imphal, Mogaung and Myitkyina meant that by the autumn of 1944, Kimura's role was reduced to defending southern Burma as the northern flank of their new ‘South-East Asia defense zone'. With few reinforcements or supplies to look forward to, Kimura had grim prospects. On paper he had ten divisions (2nd, 15th, 18th, 31st, 33rd, 49th, 53rd, 54th, 55th, & 56th), though this was really seven, since little remained of the three divisions that had been devastated at Kohima-Imphal. He also had the dubious support of Bose's INA and Aung San's seven-battalion Burma National Army, but the civilian population was increasingly going over to the side of the likely winners. Unexpectedly, Kimura received 30000 fresh troops in the period June–October, but his problem was more commissariat than raw numbers, since he was rapidly running out of supplies. Even those he had (45000 tons of food, 500 lorries and 2000 pack animals) were difficult to get to the front, and Kimura was painfully aware that the situation could only get worse. The South-East Asia zone was slowly being throttled by the Allied naval blockade, all approaches to Rangoon were mined, and in 1944 total Japanese shipping losses amounted to 2.3 million tons. Even those ships that ran the blockade would proceed no farther than Penang in Malaya. Kimura chose to deploy smaller units to delay the British-Indian forces while the main body of the 15th Army retreated across the Irrawaddy River. His strategy was to launch a counterattack once the British crossed the river, aiming to replicate a reverse Imphal by wearing down the British-Indian forces through attrition and then destroying them during their retreat in the May 1945 monsoon. Meanwhile, Admiral Mountbatten was also seeking a victory of his own. On November 8, he ordered an assault on Japanese positions in Arakan, with a deadline set for the end of January. This operation was assigned to General Christison's 15th Corps.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fighting on Peleliu and Angaur raged asAmerican forces struggled against resilient Japanese defenses. Significant advances were made, including the isolation of the Umurbrogol Pocket and the capture of Ngesebus Island. Despite heavy casualties, Peleliu was eventually secured, leaving a small pocket of Japanese resistance.

Last time we spoke about the end of Operation Dan. In Yunnan, by late July, General Wei's Y Force worked to eliminate Japanese garrisons at Tengchong, Mount Song, Pingda, and Longling. The 33rd Army prepared for Operation Dan, anticipating resistance from General Honda's garrisons until September. The fall of Myitkyina prompted Honda to expedite his plans. Reinforcements were expected in Mandalay by September. General Matsuyama's forces, cut off and surrounded, provided support only through radio messages. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige vowed to defend against relentless attacks. Chinese forces, after intense fighting and bombing raids, breached the city's defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese resisted fiercely. Major Kanemitsu's garrison defended Moung Song with dwindling supplies. The Chinese forces employed siege tactics and underground mines to break Japanese strongholds. The Chinese launched coordinated attacks, capturing key positions and ultimately compelling Japanese retreats.  This episode is the Invasion of Morotai Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  After the Marianas fell and Sansapor was captured, the Allies set their sights on their next objectives: the Palaus and Halmahera, slated for simultaneous invasion by mid-September. The Japanese had stationed the 14th Division at Palau and the 32nd Division at Halmahera as their primary defenses. The Halmahera-Morotai area had not assumed much importance to the Japanese until early 1944, when they began to develop Halmahera as a focal point for the defense of the southern approaches to the Philippines. In addition to the 32d Division, the Japanese had on Halmahera innumerable service organizations, and they completed or had under construction nine airfields on the island, most of them in northern Halmahera. On that island they concentrated nearly 30,000 men, including at least 11,000 combat troops.  On Halmahera, General Ishii commanded approximately 11,000 troops to safeguard nine airfields, despite having already lost most of their air power. Meanwhile, Morotai Island was defended by around 500 Formosans of the 2nd Raiding Unit, led by Major Kawashima Takenobu. General Ishii planned to counterattack from Halmahera if the Allies landed on Morotai, but soon realized Allied air and naval superiority would foil these efforts. Following their defeat in the Marianas, Tokyo reassigned the Bonin Area Group directly under its command and placed the Palau Area Group under the Southern Army, leaving General Mugikura's 31st Army to defend Truk and other isolated outposts. General Inoue fortified Palau with elaborate defenses along the coast and inland, manned by 21,000 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops, 7,000 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) personnel, and 10,000 laborers.  The IJN had by 1944 constructed numerous reinforced concrete blockhouses and bunkers plus dug an extensive tunnel system near the end of the northeast peninsula as well as taking full advantage of Peleliu's natural caves. This elaborate, multi-level tunnel system could shelter 1000 troops. These defenses, tunnels, the airfield, and the many support facilities were built by the 204th, 214th, and 235th Construction Battalions, mostly manned by Koreans and Okinawans. Detachments of the guard forces manned eight 120mm dual-purpose, and about three 200mm coast defense guns. There was no ammunition for the 200mm short guns nor did any ships report being fired on by coast defense guns. The 114th and 126th Anti-aircraft Units manned single and twin-barreled 25mm automatic guns (estimated at 30) and 13.2mm machine guns. A dozen 20mm cannons, removed from destroyed aircraft, were set up on makeshift mounts, mostly around the airfield. His strategy emphasized prolonged attrition over suicidal charges, aiming to exhaust the American forces. In preparation for the intense pre-landing bombardment, Inoue instructed his troops to utilize natural terrain features like coral caves and sinkholes, tactics that proved effective against the advancing Allies.Based in Koror, the Japanese commander stationed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio's 2nd Regiment on Peleliu, the reinforced 1st Battalion of the 59th Regiment on Angaur, and deployed the 15th and 59th Regiments across Babelthuap and other islands. Major-General Yamaguchi Takeo's 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade defended the central islands, complemented by 4,000 personnel from the Imperial Japanese Navy on Peleliu.  Prior to General Inoue's arrival in the Palaus, the defense of the Palaus had been under the command of Vice-Admiral Ito Yoshioka. Upon his arrival on Koror, where he established his headquarters, Inoue appointed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio as Peleliu's new commander, with his 2nd Regiment (Reinforced). Nakagawa was a most able commander, possibly one of Japan's finest defensive tacticians, in the same league as General Kuribayashi on Iwo Jima. Nakagawa would make full use of all his defenses and troops on Peleliu, making the Americans pay dearly for every inch, as he had been ordered to do. Although a very capable commander, the appointment of an Army colonel over a Navy vice-admiral caused a great rift between the Army and Navy on Peleliu, which deteriorated into farce. To resolve matters and calm the Navy down somewhat, Inoue sent Major-General Murai Kenjiro from his headquarters on Koror Island to Peleliu to provide the Army with sufficient rank to satisfy the vice-admiral's honor, although the defense of Peleliu seems, to practical purposes, to have remained in the hands of Nakagawa. It appears that Murai, after inspecting Nakagawa's defensive works and battle plans for the defense of Peleliu, was content to let Nakagawa continue without interference from himself, lending only the weight of his rank to acquire the required cooperation of the Navy elements on Peleliu. Nakagawa, divided the island into four defense sectors, each manned by an infantry battalion. His 1st Battalion, alongside the 14th Division Tank Unit and Engineer Company, served as a mobile reserve for counterattacks against potential landings. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Halsey had been planning Operation Stalemate, targeting Palau since May 29. Originally slated for September 8, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps would assault Peleliu and Angaur, with General Hodge's 24th Corps landing on Babelthuap.  Intelligence was gathered by aerial reconnaissance photographs. Also, in June 1944 the submarine USS Seawolf (SS-197) carried out photographic reconnaissance of the invasion landing beaches. A further reconnaissance was carried out by the submarine USS Burrfish (SS-312) on Peleliu and Yap beaches. An 11-man reconnaissance group of underwater demolition team (UDT) frogmen landed on the Peleliu beaches from the Burrfish for closer investigation relating to water depth, location of potholes and sandbars, and obstacles. With thousands of Japanese on the island they understandably did not reconnoiter inland, and the rugged terrain of the interior would come as an unpleasant surprise to the Marines. A similar operation was carried out on the Yap invasion beaches, but this time only two of a five-man reconnaissance team made it back to the pick-up point. After several unsuccessful attempts to locate their missing comrades the remaining two men returned to the Burrfish. After this incident, Admiral Nimitz banned any further missions of this type. Given delays in the Guam operation, Operation Stalemate was canceled on July 7, replaced by Stalemate II.  An unusual staff arrangement was established to plan Stalemate II. IIIAC was committed to take Guam under General Geiger. The IIIAC staff would thus be unable to plan the Palaus operation, which it was to execute. Consequently, Major General Julian Smith, designated to command the Expeditionary Troops, was tasked to plan the operation using his own small staff augmented by some IIIAC staff officers. This temporary planning staff was designated X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps. It would plan the operation and IIIAC would execute it – an awkward arrangement, but necessary in order to maintain the increasing tempo of operations. As Commander, Expeditionary Troops, Smith was also to be in control of all ground action in the western Carolines; a position roughly analogous to that of General Krueger of ALAMO Force in the Southwest Pacific. X-Ray was finally dissolved on August 15, 1944. This revised plan scheduled Geiger's forces to land on Peleliu with the 1st Marine Division and on Angaur with the 81st Division on September 15, while the 77th Division remained in floating reserve and the 5th Marine Division in area reserve. Then, on October 8th, the 24th Corps planned to launch an assault on the islands of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines. This was aimed at securing an additional airfield and fully neutralizing Truk and the remaining islands in the group. For this operation, Halsey divided his 3rd Fleet into two main echelons: his Task Force 30, which included covering forces such as Admiral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force (now Task Force 38), and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 31, the Joint Expeditionary Force. At Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division was to land with five battalions advancing over the White and Orange Beaches on the southwest coast. The 1st Marines were to land on the left, pushing up the western shore to clear Japanese forces from ridges overlooking the airfield; the 5th Marines would land in the center to secure the airfield; and the 7th Marines on the right to capture the southern end of the island. Meanwhile, at Angaur, Major-General Paul Mueller's 81st Division planned a two-pronged amphibious assault. The 322nd Regiment was to land on Red Beach on the northeast coast, while the 321st Regiment would land on Blue Beach about 2000 yards to the southeast. Both forces would then push inland to secure a first phase line approximately 300 yards from the beaches, before continuing their advance west and south. The reserve 323rd Regiment was tasked with a feint landing at Beach Black on the northwest coast, with potential deployment to Ulithi if the Palau operations proved successful. Meanwhile, General MacArthur aimed to establish an airbase in the Halmahera area, strategically positioned between the Vogelkop and Mindanao. This location would provide crucial flank protection against Japanese forces in the Dutch East Indies and support land-based operations for the upcoming invasion of Mindanao. Optimistically, in mid-June, MacArthur had tentatively scheduled the invasion of Mindanao for October 25. Nimitz, however, believed that MacArthur's hope of reaching Mindanao by October 25 was too optimistic. During conferences at Pearl Harbor in July, called at the suggestion of Nimitz to coordinate Southwest and Central Pacific plans for the Morotai, Palau, and Mindanao operations, Southwest Pacific planners learned that less amphibious craft and assault shipping could be made available to them than had previously been anticipated. Moreover, restudy of range and weather factors made it appear somewhat risky to depend upon the ability of Morotai-based aircraft to provide air support for Southwest Pacific forces on Mindanao after carriers had to leave the latter area and before airdromes could be developed there. To obtain adequate land-based air support for the Mindanao invasion force, MacArthur returned to discarded plans to seize air-base sites on the Talaud Islands, about equidistant from Morotai and Sarangani Bay, Mindanao, where the first landings in the Philippines were then scheduled to take place. The employment of amphibious means for the Talaud operation would delay preparations for Mindanao, as would the development of airdromes on the Talauds. Finally, to have the invasion of Mindanao take place much before the middle of November would involve a conflict in timing with anticipated employment of assault shipping and carrier support by Admiral Nimitz for the occupation of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines, an operation scheduled for the first week in October. MacArthur therefore revised his program to call for the invasion of Morotai on September 15, the Talauds on October 15, and Mindanao on November 15. As Allied carriers were engaged in the Palau operation, MacArthur needed a target within range of fighters and medium bombers stationed at Sansapor. Thus, Morotai Island was chosen for Operation Tradewind due to its perceived light defenses and ample space for airfield and light naval base facilities. General Krueger selected the 31st Division and the 126th Regiment, totaling approximately 28,000 troops under the overall command of General Hall's 11th Corps, for this operation. Admiral Barbey's Task Force 77, comprising 12 destroyers, 2 APAs, 5 APDs, 1 LSD, 39 LCIs, 12 LSTs, and 12 LCTs, along with a covering force led by Admiral Berkey and an escort carrier force under Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague, facilitated the amphibious movement. Additionally, Vice-Admiral John McCain's fast carrier group provided support. Anticipating minimal resistance, the landings were planned near prospective airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain in southwest Morotai. General Hall's strategy involved the 155th and 167th Regiments landing on Red Beach on the southwestern coast to swiftly capture the abandoned Pitoe Drome and secure the new Pitoe Airfield site. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment landed at White Beach, about 1500 yards to the south, to secure the Gila Peninsula and the Wama Airfield site. The reserve 126th Regiment was scheduled to land the following day, with its 1st Battalion initially supporting the 124th Regiment's operations at the beachhead. Both the Palau and Morotai operations were supported by a coordinated strategic air support program. Admiral Hoover's land-based aircraft were tasked with neutralizing Japanese airfields at various islands including Yap, Woleai, Truk, Ponape, Pagan, Bonin, and Marcus Islands. Concurrently, General Kenney's Allied Air Forces reinforced these efforts and targeted enemy air centers in Palau, Mindanao, western Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera, the Talaud Islands, the Moluccas, the Celebes, and the Arafura Sea islands. Additionally, Mitscher's fast carriers embarked on an ambitious campaign, launching strikes from the Bonin and Volcano Islands to the Palaus and Mindanao between late August and the start of the invasions.  This strike had a twofold objective: the temporary neutralization of Japanese airfields on those island groups and, more important, the creation of a diversion on the north preceding stronger attacks against targets in the Philippines and western Carolines. Carrier action in the latter area was to begin on 6 September, with strikes on the Palaus, Yap, and Ulithi. The bulk of the carrier forces was to leave the western Carolines on the afternoon of the 8th to take up positions off Mindanao. Japanese airfields on Mindanao presented difficult targets because they were scattered over that large island, but it was believed that the cluster of airfields and associated installations in the Davao area would provide profitable targets for carrier-based aircraft attacks. The Davao and Sarangani Bay areas, as well as Japanese shipping routes from Davao to Zamboanga and thence north toward Manila, were also expected to provide profitable targets. Strikes against airdromes and shipping in the Mindanao area were to be carried out on 9 and 10 September, while on the 10th and 11th part of the carrier force was to hit the Palaus and Yap-Ulithi again. Rear-Admiral Ralph Davison's carrier-launched aircraft struck Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima from August 31 to September 2. The Fast Carrier Task Force continued with strikes on Yap and the Palaus from September 6 to 8, and on Mindanao from September 9 to 10. Enemy air resistance was surprisingly weak throughout these operations, prompting Halsey to redirect plans for a follow-up attack on Mindanao to the Central Philippines. While the Japanese forces in the Philippines hastened to complete preparations against anticipated Allied invasion, enemy carrier-borne aircraft served sudden warning on September 9 that the date of this invasion was fast drawing near. In the first large-scale air operation by the Allies against the Philippines, an estimated 400 carrier planes staged a devastating ten-hour offensive against southern Mindanao, concentrating their attacks on Davao, Sarangani, Cagayan and Digos. Since Japanese air patrols had failed to discover the enemy task force, the attacks achieved complete surprise and inflicted widespread and severe damage to ground installations, airfields, anchorages, and lines of communication. Reconnaissance units of the 1st Air Fleet immediately flew off search missions, which revealed that the attacks originated from three enemy naval task groups boldly maneuvering in the waters southeast of Mindanao. As per the Sho-Go directives, however, the 1st Air Fleet withheld retaliatory action pending further developments. Ground and naval units in the Davao area were nevertheless ordered on the alert to meet the possible contingency that an invasion attempt would follow the air strikes, and the Japanese armed forces throughout southern Mindanao became tense with expectancy. A feeling of nervousness gripped the weak local forces at Davao and rapidly spread to the large Japanese civilian colony. A wave of wild rumors swept the city. On September 10, a second series of heavy enemy raids aggravated this state of alarm. The city and harbor were reduced to a shambles and communications paralyzed. Panic and civil disorder broke out.  Less than 48 hours after the termination of the raids on Mindanao, the enemy struck again; this time in the central Philippines. On the morning of 12 September, a navy radar picket station on Suluan Island, in Leyte Gulf, broadcast over the general air-warning net that a vast formation of enemy carrier planes was heading westward toward the Visayas. Since the Suluan Island lookout was only about twenty minutes' flying time from Cebu, the air forces there could not be alerted quickly enough to put up an effective defense. By 0920 the enemy planes were already swarming over the Cebu airfields, where the main fighter strength of the First Air Fleet was based following its transfer from Davao. Although the attacks extended over the entire Visayan area and later took in Tawitawi, in the Sulu Archipelago, the Cebu fields appeared to be the principal objective. In the three days over which this air offensive continued, the First Air Fleet suffered damage to 50 Zero fighters on Cebu alone, while in other areas 30 additional aircraft of all types were rendered non-operational. Flight personnel suffered numerous casualties, and training was disrupted. Heavy damage was also sustained by Army air units. The 13th Air Brigade, made up of Type I fighters, was so hard hit that it had to be ordered back to Japan for regrouping, while the 45th Fighter­bomber Regiment was reduced to half strength. In addition, 11 transports totalling 27,000 gross tons and 13 naval combat vessels were sent to the bottom of Cebu harbor.The unexpected weakness in enemy air defenses led Nimitz to reconsider bypassing Yap and Mindanao, instead focusing forces on an early invasion of Leyte. McCain's group continued with attacks on Zamboanga, the Talauds, and Menado en route to Morotai. Meanwhile, between September 1 and 14, Kenney's aircraft conducted heavy raids on Japanese air bases within range of Morotai, effectively isolating the island. Targeted locations included Halmahera, the northern Celebes, Ceram, western New Guinea, and Mindanao. After rehearsals and preparations were completed, Barbey's convoy departed Aitape on September 9. Two days later, they rendezvoused at Maffin Bay with the majority of General Persons' 31st Division. The entire convoy departed the area on September 12, joined the next day by the covering force and escort carriers. The voyage proceeded smoothly, and Barbey successfully reached Morotai on the morning of September 15. Meanwhile, McCain's carrier aircraft conducted a bombing and strafing mission over Japanese air bases in the Manado area, destroying 28 enemy aircraft. Kenney's bombers also struck Japanese air installations on Batjan Island, while Berkey's cruisers and destroyers shelled enemy positions along Galela Bay. Barbey's surface warships conducted a bombardment of the landing area. During the naval and air bombardment, assault ships moved into their assigned positions west of the landing beaches efficiently and without confusion. The initial waves formed quickly and landed the 155th and 167th Regiments on Red Beach at 08:30, followed by the 124th Regiment on White Beach one minute later. Encountering no opposition, the troops swiftly reorganized on shore and advanced toward their objectives inland. By 13:00, the 167th Regiment had secured Pitoe Drome, and by 15:00, Colonel Starr's 1st Battalion had secured Gila Peninsula. Other units also advanced inland, establishing the 2000-yard beachhead line. Although there were some minor skirmishes, the Japanese could not mount significant resistance against the overwhelming Allied force and retreated into Morotai's rugged interior. The day's action resulted in seven wounded among the 124th Regiment and the loss of twelve Japanese soldiers, with one captured. Beach conditions, however, proved unexpectedly poor, severely hindering the unloading efforts. Consequently, starting on September 16, all the LSTs, along with numerous LCTs and LCMs, had to be unloaded at Blue Beach, a favorable landing spot on Pitoe Bay's shores. Simultaneously, as the reserve 126th Regiment was disembarking, Persons resumed advancing inland against minimal opposition. Swiftly, they secured a perimeter around the Pitoe Drome area, spanning over 7000 yards wide and approximately 5000 yards deep. Following this, American patrols were dispatched to eliminate small Japanese groups, radar stations and observation posts were established on various offshore islands and Morotai's coastline, and efforts were made to expand the perimeter to the Sabatai River to accommodate additional bivouacs and supply installations.  Leaving Morotai behind, attention shifts to Burma to explore the aftermath of Operation U-Go. Following the decisive victories at Imphal-Kohima, General Slim opted to pursue retreating Japanese forces toward the Chindwin River, despite the need for rest among his weary British-Indian divisions. Consequently, the 23rd Division spearheaded the pursuit to Tamu, at the head of the Kabaw Valley, where Major-General Charles Fowkes' 11th East African Division took over in early August. Meanwhile, to the south, General Evans' 5th Division pressed toward Tiddim, encountering stubborn resistance from General Tanaka's 33rd Division. Slim's strategy aimed for both divisions to eliminate remaining Japanese forces west of the Chindwin and converge at Kalemyo. Subsequently, the Tiddim road would be abandoned as a supply route in favor of the Kabaw Valley and aerial resupply drops. As a result, the 31st Division, now led by Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, successfully reached Sittaung. Their mission was to cover the withdrawal of other units in the region. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division faced challenges as it conducted delaying actions along the Tiddim road, with the added threat of East African forces potentially cutting off their withdrawal route towards Yazagyo. Japanese delaying tactics were always the same, and the means of dealing with them was also always the same. A crater would be found beyond which the lead infantry would come under fire and would have to be filled or covered using a Valentine bridgelayer, while air strikes would break up the blocking position to allow tanks from 3rd Carabiniers forward to support them. To disrupt Tanaka's communications south of the road, an ad hoc light unit, the Lushai Brigade, was deployed. By mid-August, General Mutaguchi ordered his forces to commence withdrawal towards the Zibyu Range. The 15th and 31st Divisions were directed to cross the Chindwin River by August 25, despite shortages of small boats. At the beginning of the crossing operation, a serious setback was experienced. It had been planned to bring small boats upstream to the crossing area with supplies for the Army and to utilize the same boats to evacuate casualties and heavy weapons south to Kalewa. Because of the enemy air activity over the Chindwin River, it was impossible to bring the boats to the crossing points. As a result, approximately 3000 sick and wounded were forced to cross the river and continue to the rear on foot with increasingly heavy death losses. By August 31, they were expected to reach the eastern bank of the Chindwin, with the 15th Division consolidating along the Pinbon-Pinlebu line by the end of September and the 31st Division reaching Shwebo by mid-October. By the end of August, key command changes occurred following the setbacks of Operation U-Go. Lieutenant-General Katamura Shihachi replaced General Mutaguchi as commander of the 15th Army, while Lieutenant-General Kimura Heitaro took over from General Kawabe as commander of the Burma Area Army. Kimura Heitaro, noted for his strategic flexibility and acumen, subsequently directed the 33rd Army to secure a defensive line from Lashio to Mandalay, safeguarding the right flank of the 15th Army. The 15th Army, in turn, was tasked with holding the Irrawaddy River from Mandalay to Pakkoku, while the 28th Army was assigned to defend the Yenangyaung oilfields, the Arakan coast, and the Rangoon delta. Meanwhile, on September 12, the 33rd Division crossed the Manipur River and proceeded with their retreat towards the Kabaw valley. They left the 215th Regiment to guard the rear at Tonzang, while units of the 5th Division infiltrated the area between Tonzang and Kalemyo to disrupt Tanaka's withdrawal and mount significant attacks against the 215th. By September 20, the Japanese forces were forced back to Tiddim, where the 214th Regiment covered the retreat of the rest of the division. Simultaneously, the 26th King's African Rifles moved east from Tamu to Sittang, crossing the Chindwin River on September 8 to assess enemy strength across the river and prepare bridgeheads for a broader crossing. Encountering unexpectedly strong resistance, they were compelled to retreat back across the river. Under persistent pressure, the Japanese evacuated Tiddim on the night of October 6. Tanaka consolidated his division in the Kalemyo-Kalewa area by the end of October, while pursuing forces captured Fort White and Kennedy Peak. On October 10, the 4th King's African Rifles launched an assault on Leik Ridge, suffering significant casualties but ultimately securing the main hill twelve days later. Meanwhile, after withdrawing from Mogaung, the 53rd Division regrouped at Mawhun by September 10, where they successfully defended against enemy units until the end of the month. They then retreated towards Pinwe and came under the command of the 15th Army on October 5. Following the Quebec conference in September, a strategic overview of Burma emerged: the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved two plans. The first, codenamed Dracula, proposed an amphibious assault on Rangoon with a target date of March 15, 1945. The second plan, Capital, aimed at the conquest of north and central Burma, with General Slim suggesting an overland capture of Rangoon as part of the operation. Initially skeptical, the Americans reluctantly agreed to Dracula, contingent on ensuring that northern Burma received adequate resources. However, due to Allied setbacks at Arnhem and during the Battle of the Bulge, it became clear that reinforcements from the European theater could not be spared for the Rangoon offensive. Consequently, it was announced that the operation would need to be postponed until after the 1945 monsoon season. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After intense Allied operations in the Pacific, including the capture of the Marianas and Sansapor, attention turned to the Palaus and Halmahera. Japanese defenses were formidable, with significant troop concentrations and elaborate fortifications. Despite setbacks, Allied forces meticulously planned and executed operations, paving the way for further strategic advances in the region.

Unlock your sensual awakening with author and tantrika Henika Patel. In this episode, dive deep into the world of Tantra, sensuality, and the divine feminine.Henika is the Founder of the School of Sensual Arts. She is a first generation Indian Woman born in England and grew up in a household abundant in the ancient Indian arts, with an ex-monk turned artist father. After studying English and French law and experiencing numbness and depression following a series of losses, she left the corporate world and returned to her roots where she spent several years living and studying in Asia, learning from incredible guides in India and the Far East. Upon returning to England, she began her studies in arts therapy and clinical psychotherapy for individuals and couples, and now combines tantra and yoga with western therapeutic guidelines to create safe spaces to connect more deeply, express more freely and love more intimately through Tantra, Yoga, bodywork, dance and art. As an indigenous practitioner, she is also a thought leader on the topic of cultural appropriation of Tantra and yoga and provides education on driving more cultural appreciation in the wellness world through her workshops, retreats, programmes and social media.Sensuality is about more than just pleasure. Sensuality is an innate power that can help you to tune in to your body, mind, and spirit. To be sensual is to know yourself so intimately that you can move through life with confidence and clarity, deeply connected to the fire within.Whether you're new to Tantra or a seasoned practitioner, this episode offers a rich tapestry of wisdom, personal stories, and practical guidance for awakening your sensual nature and reclaiming your divine feminine power.We'd love to hear your thoughts and experiences after listening. Share with us on social media @christinemariemason on InstagramIn this episode, we cover:Henika's background as a first-generation British Indian woman and her connection to the Goddess KaliThe concept of Tantra - classical vs. neo-Tantra, and the evolution of Tantra over timeMoving fom Numbness to SensationThe Role of Sensuality in HealingThe concept of polarity in sexualityEmbodiment through practices like dance and art therapyThe role of grief and sensuality in Henika's healing processThe structure of her book "Sensual."The School of Sensual Arts The role of community in dissolving shame and the importance of sharing practices and philosophiesHelpful links:Henika Patel - Founder of School of Sensual ArtsInstagram: www.instagram.com/henika.x Tiktok: www.tiktok.com/henika.xClick here to listen to Henika on podcastsClick here for School of Sensual Arts youtubeNew Book: Sensual: Connect Deeply, Express Freely, Love Intimately Episode 146: Classical Tantra and Near enemies of the Truth with Christopher "Hareesh" Wallis Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Listener Week is when all the topics, interviews and discussions are chosen by YOU!Woman's Hour listener Elaine asked the programme to discuss the issue of having sex in later life. Elaine is in her seventies and her partner would like to resume a sexual relationship. They are both negotiating medical conditions and she feels reluctant. Elaine would like to know what is typical or normal in your seventies. Sex and relationship therapist Charlene Douglas and Dr Clare Gerada, former President of the Royal College of General Practitioners, explain the medical and emotional challenges around intimacy in later life and the accommodations that can be made if older couples want to have sex.Listener Teigan Banks got in touch. ‘I would love to talk about how losing my mum at 11 has led to attachment to maternal figures throughout my life and sometimes this can be negative. In all the grief media I see this is something I never see spoken about and it can be quite isolating. I'm sure other people who have lost parents have experienced similar things. I'm 21 now and this is something I still struggle with. I can feel guilty for these attachments as I feel like I'm forgetting my own mum. But knowing these people can't really replace my mum or be that for me.' Anita is joined by Teigan to talk about these issues and also by Julia Samuel, a psychotherapist, the author of Grief Works. Why can women's haircuts cost more than men's, at the same salon? One listener has asked us to find out. Anita is joined by Caroline Larissey, chief executive of the National Hair and Beauty Federation, a trade organisation for the hair, barbering and beauty industries, and equality lawyer Elizabeth McGlone, who has short hair.Listener Kitty Dowry wanted us to take a look at so called 'risky' sports, and to encourage us all to look at them in a different way. Kitty is a climber; she has been doing it for 10 years and wants to see more women give it a go, even those who might have written it off for fear of it being too dangerous. Kitty joins Anita, as does Hazel Findlay, a professional climber and coach. Listener Ameya is a 20 year old singer-songwriter. She joins Anita to talk about her music, explain how her songs represent her neurodiversity, and discuss why it's important for her, as a British-Indian woman, to break into the mainstream and raise awareness of autism.Presenter: Anita Rani Producer: Rebecca Myatt

John Burdon Sanderson Haldane FRS (/ˈhɔːldeɪn/; 5 November 1892 – 1 December 1964[1][2]), nicknamed "Jack" or "JBS",[3] was a British-Indian scientist who worked in physiology, genetics, evolutionary biology, and mathematics. With innovative use of statistics in biology, he was one of the founders of neo-Darwinism. Despite his lack of an academic degree in the field,[1] he taught biology at the University of Cambridge, the Royal Institution, and University College London.[4] Renouncing his British citizenship, he became an Indian citizen in 1961 and worked at the Indian Statistical Institute for the rest of his life.

Romy Gill is a British-Indian chef, food-writer and broadcaster who was awarded an MBE in 2016 for her services to hospitality. She is the author of three cookbooks including her newest, Romy Gill's India, which will be published on 12th September.  On the podcast, she tells Liv and Lara about the joys of long train journeys across India, the state of Indian cuisine in the UK and how you can make magic with just cumin and turmeric.  Photo credit: Sam Harris

Romy Gill is a British-Indian chef, food-writer and broadcaster who was awarded an MBE in 2016 for her services to hospitality. She is the author of three cookbooks including her newest, Romy Gill's India, which will be published on 12th September.  On the podcast, she tells Liv and Lara about the joys of long train journeys across India, the state of Indian cuisine in the UK and how you can make magic with just cumin and turmeric.  Photo credit: Sam Harris

This podcast is a deeply personal one for me. Not just because I resonate so much with Jassa and his experience of not having a true sense of identity, but because I'm expecting a child with my wife late this year who will be of mixed heritage. My wife is Italian and I'm Indian so our child will be both Indian and Italian, rather than half Indian and half Italian. I never really thought of being half something and half something else as ever really something to pay attention to, but recording this podcast with Jassa and reading his story has made a real impact on me.In the same way John Agard educated us all with his wildly popular poem “half caste”, about the impact of words on people's sense of worth, I feel Jassa has educated me on the use of my words and thoughts, regardless of whether there is ill intent or malice behind them. Words mean so much and I'd never want anyone, let alone my unborn child, to feel anything other than a whole person.Jassa Ahluwalia is a British actor, writer, filmmaker and trade unionist. Born in Coventry to a white English mum and a brown Punjabi dad in 1990, he attended school in Leicester and was raised in an extended family environment. He spoke English in the playground, Punjabi with his grandparents, and spent various summer holidays in India. He came to prominence as Rocky in the hit BBC Three series Some Girls, followed by starring roles in Unforgotten, Ripper Street, and Peaky Blinders. He's also one of the funniest comedians I've ever come across on social media. Please watch some of his sketches online!Jassa created the hashtag #BothNotHalf to explore mixed identity in light of his own British-Indian heritage. His TEDx talk on 'How Language Shapes Identity' has clocked up over 170k views and his BBC One documentary Am I English? won an Asian Media Award in 2022.

Last time we spoke about battle of Noemfoor. General MacArthur initiated a successful offensive on Noemfoor, with General Patrick's troops securing a beachhead. American forces encountered minimal resistance, occupying key positions. Despite initial skirmishes, American defenses held firm, inflicting heavy casualties. Meanwhile, in Aitape, ongoing clashes saw American forces repelling Japanese assaults. Despite setbacks, American defenses held, and preparations for a counteroffensive were underway. The Japanese breached American lines, occupying a 1300-yard gap but faced intense resistance. Martin ordered counterattacks and reorganization of forces along the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line. Despite some delays, American forces repelled Japanese assaults. In the Battle of Imphal, British-Indian troops repelled Japanese attacks, leading to their retreat. Operation Crimson saw successful naval and air assaults on Japanese positions, though with some setbacks. Admiral Somerville's diplomatic transfer followed, amidst reorganization of SEAC's higher officers due to internal conflicts. This episode is the First Bombing Campaign against Japan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Our week's story first takes us over to the China Theater. Last time we spoke about China, the 11th Army's progress was halted at Hengyang in early July due to the resilient defense led by General Fang and a severe shortage of ammunition. General Yokoyama had to pause the offensive until his artillery unit could arrive to bolster the siege. Meanwhile, the 64th Division was dispatched to Changsha to relieve garrison duties. Despite these setbacks, the 13th Division secured Leiyang by July 4, and the 40th Division took control of Yongfeng on the same day, followed by Zhajiang on July 6. Although Hengyang was nearly surrounded, the Japanese forces had to entrench due to lack of supplies, which were delayed and harassed by General Chennault's aircraft. Seizing this opportunity, General Xue Yue sent reinforcements and launched counterattacks against the besiegers. The 58th Army recaptured Liling on July 8 before being pushed back by the 27th Division two days later, while the Chinese forces began encircling Maoshizhen from the southwest by mid-July. By July 10, Yokoyama had received sufficient artillery and ammunition to resume the attack on Hengyang. Despite heavy air and artillery support, the 116th Division's assaults from the southwest failed to breach Fang's defenses once again. On July 15, the Japanese launched another assault, this time managing to displace the exhausted defenders from their outer positions and into the city itself. Two days later, the 13th Division also gained control of the airfield on the east bank of Hengyang and strategic points along the railway near the town. Despite these territorial gains, they were deemed insufficient considering the significant loss of life endured during the intense fighting of that week. Consequently, Yokoyama decided to pause the offensive once more on July 20, intending to concentrate his forces around Hengyang. The 40th and 58th Divisions were already en route to reinforce the front lines. However, during this period, two significant aerial operations occurred. Initially, following the bombing of Yawata, General Arnold ordered a subsequent night raid on Japan to underscore that Operation Matterhorn marked the beginning of a sustained bombing campaign, distinct from the isolated nature of the Doolittle raid. This was followed by a 100-plane attack on Manchuria and a 50-plane attack on Palembang.  Two days after the Yawata show General Arnold informed Wolfe that, despite the depleted fuel stocks in China, it was “essential” to increase pressure against Japan. Immediate objectives were: a major daylight attack on Anshan, small harassing raids against the home islands, and a strike against Palembang from Ceylon. When Arnold asked for an estimate of the command's capabilities, Wolfe's reply was none too hopeful. With low storage tanks at Chengdu (only 5000 gallons) he could not with his own resources build up for an all-out mission to Anshan before August 10. Ceylon fields would not be ready before July 15, and either the Palembang mission or the night raids would delay the Anshan attack. In spite of Wolfe's cautious estimate, Arnold on June 27 issued a new target directive calling for a 15-plane night raid over Japan by July 10, a minimum of 100 planes against Anshan between by July 30, and a 50-plane mission to Palembang as soon as Ceylon airfields were ready. To meet this schedule, Wolfe was admonished to improve radically the operations of C-46s and B-29s on the Hump run. He outlined conditions necessary for fulfilling the directive: build-up of his B-29 force and a flat guarantee of ATC Hump tonnage. Even when it was decided that the command would get back its 1500 tons for July, Wolfe's operational plan set up the Anshan mission for 50 to 60 B-29s, not 100 as Arnold wanted. Arnold received this plan on July 1. On the 4th General Wolfe was ordered to proceed immediately to Washington to take over an “important command assignment” and two days later he departed. Thus General Wolfe was in reality sacked, leaving General Saunders to assume temporary leadership.  Subsequently, on July 7, the requested night raid was carried out, involving 18 B-29s targeting the Sasebo Naval Base, with an additional six attacking other sites in Nagasaki, Omura, Yawata, and Tobata. Of the 24 bombers, 11 successfully bombed Sasebo using radar; individual planes struck Omura and Tobata, while the B-29 assigned to Yawata inadvertently bombed the secondary target at Laoyao harbor. Two other bombers, experiencing fuel-transfer issues, redirected to bomb Hankow, narrowly missing it by 20 miles. Despite witnessing explosions in all targeted areas, the damage inflicted on Japanese infrastructure was minimal. Only one bomber sustained damage, yet the successful attack heightened panic within the Home Islands.   After the disastrous loss of Saipan, it was clear to many of Japan's elite that the war was all but lost.  Now Japan needed to make peace before the kokutai and perhaps even the Chrysanthemum Throne itself was destroyed. Tojo had been thoroughly demonized by the United States during the war, thus for the American people, Tojo was clearly the face of Japanese militarism. It was thus  inconceivable that the United States would make peace with a government headed by Tojo. British historian H. P. Willmott noted that a major problem for the "doves" was that: "Tojo was an embodiment of 'mainstream opinion' within the nation, the armed services and particularly the Army. Tojo had powerful support, and by Japanese standards, he was not extreme." Tojo was more of a follower than a leader, and he represented the mainstream opinion of the Army. This meant his removal from office would not end the political ambitions of the Army who were still fanatically committed to victory or death. The jushin, elder statesmen, had advised Emperor Hirohito that Tojo needed to be sacked after Saipan and further advised against partial changes in the cabinet, demanding that the entire Tojo cabinet resign. Tojo, well aware of the efforts to bring him down, sought the public approval of the Emperor Hirohito, which was denied. Hirohito sent him a message to the effect that the man responsible for the disaster of Saipan was not worthy of his approval. Tojo then suggested reorganizing his cabinet to retain his position, but was rebuffed again. Hirohito said the entire cabinet simply had to go. Once it became clear that Tojo no longer held the support of the Emperor, his enemies had little trouble bringing down his government.The politically powerful Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Kōichi Kido spread the word that the Emperor no longer supported Tojo. Thus after the fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on July 18, 1944. Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa and General Koiso Kuniaki were appointed by Hirohito to form a new government, with Koiso ultimately becoming Prime Minister as Tojo's replacement. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Shimoyama Takuma's 5th Air Army discovered Chennault's aircraft and two Chinese squadrons concentrated at Guilin airfield on July 13. Seizing this opportunity, Shimoyama launched a daring raid that caught the Allies off guard, resulting in 80 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Despite this initial setback, Chennault's P-51 Mustangs maintained superiority over the Zero, downing 88 Japanese aircraft in the following weeks at the cost of 27 Allied planes. In Hengyang, preliminary artillery bombardment commenced on July 27 as Yokoyama's forces prepared for their final offensive. Despite minor attacks in the subsequent days, little progress was made while the Japanese awaited the arrival of the 58th Division. Concurrently, the 27th and 34th Divisions advanced towards Lianhua to eliminate the 58th Army, resulting in heavy casualties and their subsequent withdrawal. By August 1, Yokoyama had amassed 110,000 troops around Hengyang, along with heavy artillery and mountain artillery pieces. In contrast, only 3,000 exhausted Chinese troops remained, valiantly resisting despite being cut off for over a month. Returning to Matterhorn, Arnold insisted on a meticulously planned daylight attack involving 100 planes to be executed in July. Saunders managed to fit in the Anshan strike at the month's end by delaying Palembang until mid-August. The primary target was the Showa Steel Works at Anshan in Manchuria–specifically, the company's Anshan Coke Plant, producing annually 3793000 metric tons of metallurgical coke, approximately ⅓ of the Empire's total. About half of this was used by Showa's own steel works, second in size only to Imperial's, and the rest for various industrial purposes in Manchuria, Korea, and Japan. The secondary target was Qinhuangdao harbor whence coking coal from the great Kailan mines was exported to Japan. Tertiary target was the Taku port near Tianjin, which handled coal, iron ore, and pig iron. And as a last resort, bombers were to hit the railroad yards at Zhengxian, a possible bottleneck along a Japanese supply route. Aiming point at Anshan, as at Yawata, was to be a battery of coke ovens and again the bomb load was set at eight soo-pound GPs per plane.  Consequently, on July 25, 111 B-29s began staging to China, with 106 successfully arriving four days later. However, on July 29, only 72 B-29s managed to take off for the Anshan strike due to rain muddying the runway at Guanghan, preventing the 444th Group from launching. Mechanical issues further hindered eleven bombers from reaching Anshan, resulting in one bombing Qinhuangdao, two targeting Zhengxian, and four hitting other targets of opportunity. Despite these challenges, the sixty B-29s that reached Anshan maintained formation and bombed from altitudes close to the designated 25,000 feet under clear skies. However, the first wave mistakenly bombed a by-products plant adjacent to the aiming point, enveloping it in thick smoke. Anti-aircraft opposition was relatively light, with heavy flak damaging five B-29s and Japanese fighters downing only one bomber, whose crew escaped with the help of Chinese guerrillas. B-29 gunners claimed three probable hits and four damaged Japanese fighters. Chinese forces aided in rescuing a stranded bomber near Ankang. The plane was on the ground for five days while an engine, spare parts, tools, and mechanics came in by C-46 from Hsinching to effect an engine change and other repairs. Air cover was furnished by 14th Air Force fighters, who shot down a Lily bomber during a night attack. With full assistance from the Chinese and American garrisons at Ankang, the B-29 took off on August 3 and returned to Chiung-Lai. Another B-29 crash-landed in Vladivostok. Fortunately, on July 30, the wet strip at Kwanghan had dried sufficiently to launch 24 bombers of the 444th, albeit nearly five hours behind schedule. However, they were too late for Anshan, with 16 bombing the Taku port and three targeting Zhengxian instead. The day's efforts, though not flawlessly executed, brought encouragement to the command. American reconnaissance reported significant damage at Anshan, including hits and near misses on several coke-oven batteries, related installations, and the by-products plant. Taku and Zhengxian also showed substantial damage. The command gained valuable insights into conducting daylight missions, and despite the loss of five B-29s, it was deemed acceptable. That is all for now for the China theater as we now need to jump over to Burma. Meanwhile, in north Burma, General Wessels decided to resume the offensive on July 12. Following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, a coordinated attack was launched, supported by 39 B-25s and the 88th Fighter Squadron, which successfully dropped 754 tons of bombs on Myitkyina. However, approximately 40% of the bombs landed among American troops north of Sitapur, resulting in casualties and confusion. Consequently, the coordinated attack stalled, with minimal gains by the 88th and 89th Regiments. Subsequently, Wessels' forces reverted to patient day-by-day advances, pushing back Japanese forces gradually. The tightening grip around Myitkyina was evident, with previously separated units now in close contact, preventing Japanese movement. Further south, General Stilwell directed the weary Chindit brigades to converge on Sahmaw and eliminate the 18th and 53rd Divisions. West African troops fought for control of Hill 60 to the north, while the depleted 111th Brigade engaged in battles at Taungni and the heavily fortified Point 2171. Stilwell also ordered the 300-man 77th Brigade towards Myitkyina, but Brigadier Calvert opted to cut off radio communications and withdraw his men to Kamaing, eventually evacuating them to India. After returning back to Allied lines, Calvert and Lentaigne drove to Stilwell's headquarters, where they found the general at a table with his son and Boatner. Then, speaking with the same sort of blunt honesty that Stilwell prided himself on, Calvert went into a long monologue explaining that despite their crippling losses and lack of heavy weapons, his men had sacrificed so much at Mogaung that now they had nothing left to give. To order the survivors into combat now was to pass nothing more than a death sentence. Stilwell seemed stunned at Calvert's contained monologue. Then his shock turned to scathing anger towards his own staff. “Why wasn't I told?' he demanded. It quickly became obvious to Calvert that Stilwell had not realized the true tribulations his Chindits had gone through since the gliderborne invasion some months ago. As Calvert later wrote: “It became obvious from Stilwell's repeated ‘Why wasn't I told? Is this true?' that his sycophantic staff had kept the true nature of the battle from him.” Overcome with the truth of it all, Stilwell apologized. “You and your boys have done a great job, I congratulate you.” Calvert was then allowed to evacuate his brigade. Their campaign was finally over. The other brigades, nearing the edge of their endurance, didn't experience the same fortune and had to persist in battling against the determined Japanese defenders. With morale faltering, Major Masters' only opportunity for success came through a bold flank attack on July 9 led by Company C of the 3/9th Gurkhas. As the Gurkhas fell back in disarray, savaged by machine-guns firing straight down the ridge, the surviving men scattered, diving into the jungle. Major Gerald Blaker moved on alone, firing his M1 carbine, yelling: “Come on, C Company!” Seeing him, the Japanese threw grenades. Braving the blasts despite an arm savaged by shrapnel, he charged the Japanese. At the last moment, the enemy gunners found the range and a volley of seven bullets plunged into Blaker who fell against a tree, bleeding profusely. He turned his head to call on his men: “Come on, C Company, I'm going to die. Take the position.” The Gurkhas surged forward, bayonets glinting in the dull light, crying: “Ayo Gurkhali, the Gurkhas have come!” Point 2171 then fell into Allied hands. 50 Japanese dead were counted on the summit. Major Gerald Blaker sacrificed his life during the assault and earned a posthumous Victoria Cross.  Shortly thereafter, the 14th Brigade relieved the exhausted 111th, which now counted only 119 fit men; and on July 17, Stilwell finally authorized the evacuation of Masters' men. Thankfully, the seasoned 36th Division under Major-General Francis Festing would arrive in the frontline area to replace the depleted Chindits by the end of July, enabling General Lentaigne's remaining forces to be brought back to India. The final to depart were the West Africans, who assisted the British in capturing Hill 60 on August 5, prompting the Japanese to withdraw towards Pinbow and Mawhun. Since the inception of Operation Thursday, the Chindits had suffered 5000 casualties, including killed, wounded, or missing, 3800 of them after Wingate's demise. Their unconventional warfare had effectively diverted numerous potential reinforcements away from Imphal and Myitkyina; severed the 18th Division's supply line, rendering its holding operation futile; and highlighted the importance of air supply as the sole means of sustenance during military campaigns, a lesson pivotal in the 14th Army's subsequent offensives. Shifting focus to Yunnan, by the beginning of July, General Wei's Y Force had successfully halted General Matsuyama's counteroffensive in the Longling region. In the interim, General Kawabe's Burma Area Army was formulating strategies to address the impending aftermath of Operation U-Go's unfavorable results. Following the completion of the 15th Army's retreat in central Burma, plans were set in motion for Operation Ban, a defensive maneuver aimed at countering anticipated Allied advancements along the Irrawaddy River. Concurrently, General Sakurai's 28th Army was organizing Operation Kan in anticipation of potential Allied incursions along the Bay of Bengal coastline. Additionally, General Honda's 33rd Army initiated preparations for Operation Dan, a synchronized offensive designed to repel the invading Chinese forces eastward across the Nujiang River and deep into Yunnan, thus thwarting the establishment of a land route between India and China by the Allies. Consequently, the 2nd Division under Lieutenant-General Okazaki Seisaburo was reassigned to the 33rd Army on July 19 to partake in the offensive, while Matsuyama's 56th Division was tasked with maintaining defensive positions in Yunnan. The 18th and 53rd Divisions were directed to safeguard the western flank against potential assaults originating from Myitkyina. Subsequently, Matsuyama opted to relocate his primary force from Longling to Mangshi, where he planned to rendezvous with Okazaki at a later date. To facilitate this relocation, Colonel Matsui's task force was dispatched on July 5 to dislodge the 76th Division from Mukang. Following a stealthy infiltration behind enemy lines on July 7, Matsui launched a surprise attack the following day, compelling the Chinese forces to retreat. With the route to Mangshi cleared, the 56th Division vacated Longling and began regrouping in the Mangshi vicinity, leaving a modest garrison of 2500 men to secure Longling. Throughout July, the city faced intense aerial and artillery bombardments, culminating in the capture of East Hill by the 87th Division on July 17. Fortunately, Y Force's efforts were now focused on the previously bypassed blocks at Tengchong, Lameng, and Pingda, as the Chinese prioritized securing the flow of supplies to the front lines. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige was compelled to abandon Feifeng Hill after his 3rd Battalion departed to join Matsui's task force, leaving him with just 2025 men. Facing him, Lieutenant-General Huo Kuizhang's five divisions spread out around Tengchong, occupying the surrounding heights. Despite attempts at medium-level bombing causing severe damage to the residential area, it only resulted in rubble piling around Japanese positions. Thus, entrenched in their dugouts, the Japanese remained steadfast and successfully repelled Chinese attacks, with the Chinese managing to take Kaoliang Hill only by July 9th. Meanwhile, from the south, the 2nd Reserve Division severed Tengchong from Longling and initiated unsuccessful assaults against Laifeng Hill. By mid-July, with the city completely encircled, Huo was poised to launch a coordinated assault, but heavy rains delayed the operation. Concurrently, with the arrival of the 8th Army at Lameng, General Song aimed to continue his attacks against Major Kanemitsu's garrison. Following a night-long artillery bombardment, the 1st and 39th Divisions fiercely assaulted Japanese positions on July 5th, successfully overrunning some of them and destroying Kanemitsu's main water reservoir. However, despite ammunition shortages, Japanese counterattacks pushed them back to their original positions by nightfall. In the second week of July, Song deployed the 82nd and 103rd Divisions for an attack against Kanemitsu's southwest defenses, initially achieving success but ultimately being repelled by Japanese counterattacks. In the meantime, the Pingda garrison, devastated by cholera, was reaching its breaking point. Consequently, the Matsui Force was dispatched to provide relief on July 11, successfully reaching their designated gathering point northwest of Pingda after a challenging two-day march. On July 13, Matsui's initial assaults only secured the forward positions of the 226th Regiment; however, the following day, they managed to breach the Chinese defenses, delivering much-needed supplies to the Pingda Garrison and evacuating its sick patients. Having performed its mission, the Matsui Task Force started its return trip on the morning of 15 July. The following evening, an enemy group was discovered near Chungchai and the Task Force prepared to attack. Just before the actual launching of the attack, Col. Matsui received a message from division headquarters stating that, "A powerful enemy force is advancing toward Mangshih. The Matsui Force will return as soon as possible." To the north, Song opted to halt the sporadic attacks and initiated a synchronized assault with his four divisions on July 23. Backed by intense artillery fire, the Chinese exerted significant pressure, eventually overrunning the Hondo Position by the end of July. Only the timely intervention of Japanese fighters halted the offensive. Further north, following the subsiding of the storms and a heavy air bombardment, Huo finally launched a general offensive on July 26, supported by artillery and mortars. Moving swiftly and with strength, the Chinese successfully demolished all fortifications on Laifeng Hill, compelling the Japanese, grappling with ammunition shortages and heavy casualties, to abandon their other outposts in the vicinity.  The Chinese attack that followed revealed that previous experiences with Japanese positions had not been wasted. The Chinese infantry moved off quickly, on time, and as whole regiments rather than squads committed piecemeal. Mortar and artillery fire was brought down speedily on suspected Japanese positions, and the infantry took full advantage of it by advancing again the minute it lifted. Having taken one pillbox, the Chinese infantry kept right on going rather than stopping to loot and rest. At nightfall they were on top of the mountain and had taken a fortified temple on the summit. After mopping up the next day, the Chinese tallied about 400 Japanese dead. They themselves had lost 1200. Nevertheless, the speedy capture of Laifeng Hill was a brilliant feat of arms and dramatic evidence of the capabilities of Chinese troops when they applied proper tactics While the simultaneous attack on the southeast wall of Tengchong did not breach the massive wall, the Chinese now held a solid position in the sparse cluster of mud huts just outside the wall. Yet that will be all for today for the Burma-Yunnan front as we now are heading over to the Marianas. As we remember, Admiral Spruance devised a plan to initiate the invasions of Guam and Tinian following the capture of Saipan. Tinian's strategic significance stemmed from its close proximity to Saipan and its relatively flat terrain, making it more suitable for bomber airfields compared to its mountainous counterpart. However, its natural features also posed challenges for a seaside landing, with most of its coastline characterized by steep cliffs. Consequently, the American forces had limited options for landing: the well-defended beaches of Tinian Town, particularly the northeast Yellow Beach at Asiga Bay, or the less fortified but narrow White Beaches on the northwest coast. However, the latter option risked congestion and immobility due to the confined space. After assessing the landing beaches firsthand, they opted for the latter, anticipating lower resistance. General Smith's Northern Landing Forces were tasked with this operation, although there were some changes in the chain of command. Smith was appointed commander of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, overseeing all Marine Corps combat units in the region. General Schmidt assumed command of the 5th Amphibious Corps and the Northern Landing Forces, while Major-General Clifton Cates replaced him as commander of the 4th Marine Division. Additionally, Admiral Hill assumed command of a reorganized Northern Attack Force for the amphibious assault. The strategy outlined was for Cates' 24th and 25th Marines to land on the White Beaches on July 24, securing a beachhead line encompassing Faibus San Hilo Point, Mount Lasso, and Asiga Point. This offensive would receive heavy artillery support from Saipan, as well as backing from carrier-based aircraft, Aslito airfield-based planes, and naval gunfire. One of the main justifications for the final decision to land over the unlikely beaches on the northwestern shore of the island was the feasibility of full exploitation of artillery firing from Saipan. Consequently, all of the field pieces in the area except for the four battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers were turned over to 14th Corps Artillery during the preliminary and landing phase. General Harper arranged his 13 battalions, totaling 156 guns and howitzers, into three groupments, all emplaced on southern Saipan. Groupment A, commanded by Col. Raphael Griffin, USMC, consisted of five 105-mm. battalions, two each from the Marine divisions and one from V Amphibious Corps. It was to reinforce the fires of the 75-mm. pack howitzers and be ready to move to Tinian on order. Groupment B, under the 27th Division's artillery commander, General Kernan, was made up of all of that division's organic artillery except the 106th Field Artillery Battalion. It was to reinforce the fires of Groupment A and also to be ready to displace to Tinian. Groupment C, commanded by General Harper himself, contained all the howitzers and guns of 24th Corps Artillery plus the 106th Field Artillery Battalion. It was to support the attack with counterbattery, neutralization, and harassing fire before the day of the landing, deliver a half-hour preparation on the landing beaches immediately before the scheduled touchdown, and execute long-range counterbattery, harassing, and interdiction fire. Concurrently, General Watson's 2nd Marine Division would stage a feint near Tinian Town before landing behind the main assault force post-beachhead establishment. Meanwhile, General Griner's 27th Division would remain on standby in corps reserve, ready to embark on landing craft at short notice. A notable logistical innovation for Tinian involved a dual shuttle system to prevent congestion. Loaded trucks and Athey trailers shuttled between Saipan's base supply dumps and Tinian's division supply depots, while amphibious vehicles directly transported supplies from ship to shore to division dumps, aiming to minimize beachside handling of supplies. Additionally, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps, comprising the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, assisted by Admiral Conolly's Southern Attack Force, were tasked with capturing Guam. Due to formidable coastal defenses, Geiger's plan necessitated landings north and south of Apra Harbor on July 21, bypassing the heavily fortified Orote Peninsula. General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division was tasked with landing on the shores between Adelup Point and the Tatgua River mouth, proceeding southward to occupy the eastern area of Apra Harbor. Simultaneously, General Shepherd's 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was to land between Agat village and Bangi Point, then pivot northward towards the base of the Orote Peninsula. The establishment of a secure beachhead line from Adelup Point to Facpi Point was crucial before Geiger's forces could launch their assault on Orote Peninsula and subsequently secure the rest of the island. With the 27th Division committed elsewhere, Major-General Andrew Bruce's 77th Division, slated to assemble at Eniwetok by July 18, was designated as the new reserve under Geiger's command. The 305th Regiment was assigned to land behind Shepherd's Marines to reinforce the beachhead line. To optimize support for the troops, Conolly divided his Southern Attack Force into two: his Northern Attack Group, backing the 3rd Marine Division's landing, and Rear-Admiral Lawrence Reifsnider's Southern Attack Group, aiding the 1st Provisional Brigade's landing. Coordination of pre-landing bombardments was planned between Conolly's ships and aircraft, synchronized with scheduled strikes by aircraft from Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The time had finally come for the Japanese home islands to be subjected to the horrors of modern bombing campaigns. It would begin gradually, but would escalate to a literal horror show that starved the population of Japan into submission. Meanwhile Hideki Tojo was finally sacked, though by no means was he gone.

FMB MIXTAPE 242 | ANISH KUMAR  FMB MIXTAPE 242 | ANISH KUMAR (iTUNES) FMB MIXTAPE 242 | ANISH KUMAR (320 DOWNLOAD) On this weeks episode of the Feel My Bicep Mixtape, we welcome Anish Kumar, the British Indian producer whose … Continue reading →

HORROR WITH SIR. STURDY EPISODE 499 LET'S GET DIRTY: UNRAVELING THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DOOR

Last time we spoke about the fall of Saipan. General Smith's coordinated attacks on June 27th led to significant progress, with the 4th Marine Division notably advancing. The 27th Division encountered resistance, and casualties rose. By early July, Americans gained ground, pushing toward Marpi Point. Japanese resistance remained fierce, but American forces steadily advanced, capturing strategic positions. The assault on Petosukara was swiftly countered, but intense action unfolded in the Makunsha region. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines faced a fierce enemy thrust, with over 200 attackers killed. Facing defeat, General Saito ordered a suicidal assault, resulting in a chaotic and desperate charge. Despite heavy losses, American forces repelled the onslaught. The battle lasted until midday on July 7, with sporadic skirmishes continuing. Efforts to persuade cave occupants to surrender intensified, yet many civilians chose mass suicide. Saipan was declared secured after extensive casualties on both sides.  This episode is the battle of Noemfoor  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  General MacArthur unleashed a new offensive, seeing General Patrick's troops successfully landed on Noemfoor with little opposition, securing a beachhead. While the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Regiment was being airdropped on July 4, Colonel Sandlin's 3rd Battalion continued eastward through scattered minefields toward Kornasoren Drome, meeting no resistance. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion crossed the Kamiri River and occupied Kamiri village without encountering any opposition. Moving out of Kamiri, the American forces followed a southeastern road to a sizable Japanese garden area, where they faced resistance on Hill 201.  The Japanese garden area was about 600 yards long, east and west, and 350 yards across, north to south. The ground was devoid of large trees except for a few atop Hill 201, but thick, secondary jungle growth covered the eastern and southern slopes of the hill, while the rest of the garden area was overgrown with partially cultivated papaya, taro, and cassava, all averaging about eight feet in height. The trail from Kamiri village passed over the southern slope of Hill 201, and 300 yards away, near the eastern edge of the gardens, joined the main road from Kamiri Drome to Namber Drome, located about six miles to the south. Another trail ran along the eastern side of the hill, branching to the north and northwest at the northeastern corner of the low terrain feature. To counter this, a double envelopment tactic was initiated, with Company C seizing Hill 180 to the north while Company B pushed the Japanese southeast over Mission Hill, a lower terrain feature situated southeast of Hill 201. By 15:15, the battalion secured the ground on both flanks of Hill 201 and consolidated around the hilltop for the night, establishing a tight defensive perimeter. At 05:20 on July 5, the Japanese launched an attack along the southern and southeastern sides of the perimeter with mortar support. The American forces responded with a deadly barrage of mortar and artillery fire, driving the enemy back and neutralizing their machine-gun positions. Some Japanese managed to get through the mortar and artillery barrages and continued up the sides of the trail from the south through fire from Company D's machine guns. The enemy found cover behind a low, 150-yard-long log fence which led from the southeast toward the center of the 1st Battalion's defenses. While the fence afforded some protection, the attacking infantrymen were silhouetted as they tried to clamber over the top. The main body of the attacking force therefore kept down behind the fence, trying to crawl along it to the top of the hill. Advancing cautiously, the attackers encountered sustained machine-gun and rifle fire from the defenders atop the hill, as the fence did not extend beyond the outer defenses of the 1st Battalion. The assault quickly deteriorated into a sequence of small suicide charges carried out by groups of three to six Japanese soldiers. The 1st Battalion now sent patrols out over the battlefield. From prisoners it was determined that the attacking force had consisted of 350 to 400 men--the 10th and 12th Companies, 219th Infantry, reinforced by approximately 150 armed Formosan laborers. During the morning over 200 dead Japanese were counted around the 1st Battalion's perimeter, and the number of enemy dead found or enemy wounded captured on subsequent days along trails leading south from the hill indicated that virtually the entire original attacking force had been annihilated.    By 06:30, the skirmish had concluded, with over 200 Japanese casualties tallied. Following this engagement, operations on Noemfoor transitioned into a series of patrol activities as Allied forces extended their dominance over the island and rapidly expanded the airfield facilities. On the morning of July 6, Sandlin's 2nd Battalion executed an amphibious landing on the deserted Namber Drome following a brief naval bombardment. By July 10, intensive patrolling had only encountered small Japanese groups, leading Patrick to conclude that no significant organized enemy presence remained on Noemfoor. To eradicate the remaining opposition, the 503rd Parachute Regiment was dispatched to the island's southern sector while the 158th addressed the northern half. By the end of August, Sandlin's efforts had resulted in the death of 611 Japanese soldiers, the capture of 179, the loss of 6 American lives with 41 wounded, and the liberation of 209 slave laborers.  The Japanese had never brought the Melanesians of Noemfoor entirely under their control, for the natives had either offered a passive resistance or had faded into the interior to live off the land. A few were impressed into service by the Japanese, while others who were captured but still refused to cooperate were executed. The natives greeted the Allied landings with great enthusiasm and came out of hideaways in the hills carrying Dutch flags which they had concealed from the Japanese. Under the direction of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, the natives were gradually resettled in their old villages. Late in July the village chiefs gathered in formal council and officially declared war on the Japanese. Thereafter, native cooperation increased. Up to August 31 the natives had captured and brought to Allied outposts more than 50 Japanese and had killed another 50. One tale of horror concerns the Javanese on Noemfoor. According to information gathered by the NICA Detachment, over 3000 Indonesians were shipped to Noemfoor in late 1943, mostly from Soerabaja and other large cities on Java. The shipment included many women and children. The Japanese, without regard to age or sex, put the Javanese to work constructing roads and airfields almost entirely by hand. Little or no clothing, shoes, bedding, or shelter was provided, and the Javanese had to supplement their very inadequate allowance of rations by shifting for themselves. Driven by hunger, many attempted to steal Japanese rations but for their pains were beheaded or hung by their hands or feet until dead. Starvation and disease took a steadily increasing toll. The dead were periodically collected for mass burial, and survivors alleged that many of the sick were buried alive. It was considered probable that not more than 10 or 15 Javanese were killed accidentally by Allied forces. Yet only 403 of the 3000-odd brought from Java were found alive on Noemfoor by August 31.  Meanwhile, Colonel Jones pursued the remnants of Colonel Shimizu's Noemfoor Detachment to Hill 670 in the south. From July 13 to 16, both sides engaged in fierce combat for control of the hill, with the Japanese ultimately managing to evade capture. Contact was reestablished on July 23 near Inasi, but Shimizu eluded capture once more. The primary Japanese force was finally located on August 10 near Hill 380, prompting Jones' 1st and 3rd Battalions to converge in an attempt to trap the enemy. However, on August 15, Shimizu once again evaded capture, slipping away towards Pakriki. Although the Japanese forces were either captured or eliminated by August 17, Shimizu evaded capture or death and remained at large by the operation's conclusion. Jones' forces endured 57 fatalities and 302 injuries, but managed to neutralize over 1100 Japanese soldiers and apprehend approximately 560 individuals, while liberating an additional 194 enslaved laborers. This brings the total casualties for the Battle of Noemfoor to 1730 Japanese casualties, with 740 taken prisoner, and 63 American fatalities, 343 wounded, and 3 missing, alongside the liberation of 403 slave laborers. Transitioning to the developments on the Aitape front post-Operation Persecution, significant changes occurred under General Gill's command starting May 4. The defensive setup in the Aitape region was revamped, and Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment bolstered its eastern positions, with the Nyaparake Force extending patrols to the Danmap River. However, General Nakai's advance forces arrived in early May. Shortly after 2:00am on 14 May, after a short preparation by grenades, light mortars, and light machine guns, 100 to 200 Japanese of the 78th Infantry, 20th Division, attacked from the east against the coastal sector of the perimeter. This assault was broken up by rifle and automatic weapons fire and by lobbing mortar shells to the rear of the advancing enemy group. The Japanese disappeared into the jungle south of the narrow beach. For the next hour Captain Fulmer's mortars placed harassing fire into suspected enemy assembly points east of the small stream. Meanwhile, the eight-man outpost reported that many small parties of Japanese were moving up the beach within 300 yards of the main perimeter and then slipping southward into the jungle. Such maneuvers seemed to presage another attack. The second assault came about 0330, this time against the eastern and southeastern third of the defenses. The Japanese were again beaten back by small arms and mortar fire, but at 5:00am they made a final effort which covered the entire eastern half of the perimeter. This last attack was quickly broken up and the Japanese quieted down. About 7:30am on the 14th, elements of Company A, 127th Infantry, began moving into the forward perimeter to reinforce Captain Fulmer's beleaguered units. The 1st Platoon of Company C and the 81-mm. mortar section also moved forward in preparation for continuing the advance. General Martin took charge of the East Sector on the same day, relocating all troops except the Nyaparake Force to the west bank of the Driniumor River. The East Sector forces were supplied by a variety of methods. Units along the coast were supported directly by small boat from BLUE Beach or by native ration trains moving along the coastal track. Supplies to the Afua area went south from the coast along the Anamo-Afua trail or, later, over the inland track from the Tadji fields through Chinapelli and Palauru. Wheeled transport was impracticable except along short stretches of the coastal track. In early June, when the Japanese ambushed many ration parties which attempted to reach Afua, experiments were made with air supply from the Tadji strips. Breakage and loss were heavy at first, but air supply rapidly became more successful as pilots gained experience and ground troops located good dropping grounds. A dropping ground cleared on the west bank of the Driniumor about 2200 yards north of Afua soon became the principal source of supply for troops in the Afua area. Communications during operations east of the Driniumor were carried out principally by radio, but between units along the river and from the stream back to higher headquarters telephone became the principal means of communication. Keeping the telephone lines in service was a task to which much time and effort had to be devoted. The Japanese continually cut the lines, or American troops and heavy equipment accidentally broke the wires. The enemy often stationed riflemen to cover breaks in the line, thus making repair work dangerous. Usually, it was found less time consuming and less hazardous to string new wire than to attempt to find and repair breaks. As a result, miles of telephone wire soon lined the ground along the trails or was strung along the trees in the Driniumor River area and back to the Tadji perimeter. Despite this adjustment, Nakai escalated pressure, advancing beyond Yakamul by month's end. In response, Gill replaced the Nyaparake Force with the 1st Battalion, 126th Regiment, which swiftly recaptured Yakamul and Parakovio. Despite initial success, Nakai's forces launched a heavy counterattack in early June, reclaiming Yakamul by June 5.   In the meantime, additional Japanese units had been conducting exploratory missions inland against Afua since the beginning of the month. However, Howe's 1st Battalion ultimately succeeded in repelling them. This allowed Martin's forces to establish an outer defensive line along the Driniumor River. From there, they continued forward patrols toward the Japanese lines. While the 41st and 51st Divisions struggled to move personnel and supplies to the forward assembly area, Nakai efficiently organized a counter-reconnaissance screen along Niumen Creek to prevent East Sector troops from gathering intelligence about deployments farther east. On June 20, due to the increasingly dire situation in Western New Guinea, the 18th Army was suddenly transferred from 2nd Area Army control to the direct command of the Southern Army. Although General Terauchi's directive was to execute a "delaying action at strategic positions," General Adachi opted to adhere to his original plans for a westward offensive. He was determined to maximize the effectiveness of his forces while they still possessed fighting capability, aiming to divert as much enemy strength as possible away from the Western New Guinea battlefront. Sensing an imminent heavy enemy assault, Generals Krueger and MacArthur decided to reinforce Aitape with General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, arriving on June 27, and Colonel Edward “Ted” Starr's 124th Regiment, expected to arrive in early July. They also expedited the shipment of the 43rd Division from its New Zealand staging area to Aitape, necessitating the establishment of Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps. Upon assuming command of the task force on June 29, Hall reorganized his forces and implemented several troop redeployments in preparation for the looming enemy attack. By June 30th, Adachi had completed concentrating his forces in the assembly area. Consequently, he swiftly initiated preparations for launching an attack against the Driniumor River line on July 10th. His strategy involved Colonel Nara Masahiko's 237th Regiment crossing the river and launching an assault westward towards Koronal Creek, and northwest to clear Anamo and other Paup villages. Meanwhile, the 78th and 80th Regiments were tasked with clearing the Afua area and advancing all the way to Chinapelli. Success in this endeavor would pave the way for Japanese units to advance towards the Tadji airstrips. Furthermore, a Coastal Attack Force was designated to carry out a diversionary maneuver along the coast, aiming to engage the enemy and constrain them with artillery fire. In early July, as the Japanese finalized their preparations, Hall and Martin made the decision to dispatch robust patrols east of the Driniumor to the Harech River. However, these patrols were only able to advance as far as Yakamul, where they encountered only the enemy's forward units. Consequently, on July 10th, Hall and Martin ordered the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment, and the 2nd Squadron, 112th Cavalry to conduct a reconnaissance mission across the Driniumor. Subsequently, the infantry faced significant resistance as they pushed towards Yakamul, while the cavalry's progress was limited to about a mile due to the dense jungle terrain. Despite these efforts yielding disappointing results, a captured Japanese soldier disclosed that their attack was imminent that night. However, this critical piece of information was mistakenly disregarded by the American command, leaving Adachi and Nakai poised to launch their counteroffensive. Around midnight, the assault commenced with the 1st Battalion, 78th Regiment charging across the Driniumor River, facing Company G of the 128th Regiment along a narrow front.  The Japanese attacked in two or three screaming waves, broadening the front after the first assault by throwing in the rest of the 78th Infantry and possibly elements of the 80th Infantry. Japanese reconnaissance had been good--the attackers knew the locations of company and battalion command posts all along the American defenses but not quite good enough. The enemy did not know that Company G had been reinforced during the afternoon of 10 July nor, apparently, had he discovered that the company's front was protected by low barbed wire. The attacks of the 78th Infantry were thrown back with heavy losses. Machine gun and mortar fire from the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, accounted for many Japanese, numbers of whom were caught as they tried to cross the barbed wire in front of Company G. According to Japanese sources, the results of American artillery fire were even more disastrous. As soon as the enemy attack had begun, the 120th and 129th Field Artillery Battalions had started firing previously prepared concentrations along the bed and east bank of the Driniumor. The Japanese units in or near the impact areas suffered heavy casualties. The 1st Battalion. 78th Infantry, was quickly reduced from 400 to 30 men, principally as a result of the American artillery fire, which also destroyed large numbers of artillery weapons, machine guns, and mortars. Despite this, the Americans, skillfully backed by artillery support, ultimately repelled them with significant casualties. Following this initial repulse, Martin concluded that a reconnaissance in force was unnecessary and ordered the units involved to retreat behind the Driniumor River. Confusion among many Japanese units, arriving late, had delayed the commencement of the 80th Regiment's attack, which was directed at Company E and was similarly pushed back. But a second wave of attackers, probably comprising the 237th Infantry and heretofore uncommitted elements of the Right Flank Unit, began pouring across the Driniumor toward Company E at approximately 0200. The new attackers overran the company command post and surrounded most of the unit's widely separated strong points. Fighting continued in the company sector for a little while, but the unit could not long withstand the overwhelming enemy pressure. Company organization and communications broke down. Worse still, the troops began to run out of ammunition. A general withdrawal commenced. By 03:00, the Japanese had breached a gap approximately 1300 yards wide in the American lines, physically occupying that territory. Fortunately, the following hours remained relatively calm as the 78th and 80th Regiments regrouped to the south to resume the offensive. This lull enabled Martin to dispatch the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to counterattack along the Anamo-Afua trail, aiming to reinforce the 2nd Battalion's positions. Initially encountering no resistance for the first 1500 yards, the Americans were eventually halted by intense enemy fire at 10:30, compelling them to retreat back to Tiver. This fierce opposition convinced Martin that the enemy could advance directly westward with minimal hindrance towards the Tadji strips unless he abandoned the Driniumor River line. He decided to reorganize his forces along the secondary delaying position at the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line, preparing for further counterattacks against the Japanese. Accordingly, while Company F maintained their position along the coast, the 128th Regiment began to fall back towards the creek. Further south, Cunningham opted to withdraw his cavalrymen in two stages, successfully reaching X-ray by midnight. However, communication issues delayed Howe's 3rd Battalion, with most of the unit arriving at the river the following day. A small contingent had to engage in combat with Japanese forces and couldn't reach X-ray until July 13. Despite this, Krueger and Hall disagreed with the decision to abandon the Driniumor, promptly deploying the 124th Regiment for a potential counterattack. Martin, who was instructed to hold his position, was replaced by Gill, assuming direct command of the divided covering force, now split into North and South Forces. However, before the American counterattack could commence, Nara's infantry launched an assault towards Tiver and Koronal Creek on July 12. The 128th Regiment successfully repelled them after a fierce confrontation. Meanwhile, Adachi dispatched the main body of the 41st Division and the reserve 66th Regiment towards the Driniumor, augmenting pressure on the Paup coast. To the south, Nakai's units gathered across the river near Afua and Kwamrgnirk, preparing for a final northward push. Finally, at 07:30 on July 13, the American counteroffensive commenced as the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment swiftly moved from Tiver to Chakila, only to be ambushed by Japanese artillery. Nevertheless, precise artillery counterfire silenced most of the enemy artillery, enabling the Americans to advance eastward toward the mouth of the Driniumor. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment under Starr's command advanced southward along the Anamo-Afua trail, facing strong opposition from the 237th Regiment. Despite encountering resistance, they managed to reach the river, although still positioned considerably north of their designated centerline. Cunningham's South Force began its eastward movement from the X-ray River at 10:00, successfully overcoming enemy positions along several stream crossings to reach the Driniumor near Afua. Consequently, all original crossing points on the Driniumor fell to the Allied forces, isolating the 20th Division and the 237th Regiment several miles west of the river's bank. By nightfall, Nara had regrouped his 237th Regiment for another assault on the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment. Company E demonstrated its combat effectiveness by holding firm and repelling the Japanese forces, with the rest of the battalion successfully defending against subsequent small-scale attacks, marking the conclusion of Nara's offensive actions. The following morning, Gill's forces consolidated their defensive positions along the reformed river line, albeit with a 1500-yard gap remaining in the center. Yet this all for today with Noemfoor as we now need to head over to the India-Burma theater. The final phase was coming for the Battle of Imphal. By the start of July, the reopening of the Imphal–Kohima Road facilitated the resupply of the 4th Corps, enabling them to launch an offensive against the fatigued and under-resourced troops under General Mutaguchi's command. Additionally, three brigades from General Stopford's 33rd Corps advanced from the north, swiftly joining General Gracey's 20th Division in an endeavor to reopen the Ukhrul Road. Under intense pressure, General Yamauchi's battered 15th Division units hastily abandoned Tongou and Sokpao, leading to the 80th Brigade occupying Lamu by July 2. The next day, the ailing general, who had long fallen out of favor with Mutaguchi, was carried from the battlefield on a stretcher and later died in a hospital at Maymyo. Lieutenant-General Shibata Uichi replaced him and promptly prepared the 51st and 67th Regiments to retreat. To cover their withdrawal, the newly arrived and utterly exhausted 60th Regiment was tasked with attacking towards Lamu, while General Miyazaki's troops assembled behind Ukhrul. However, the 60th Regiment was so weakened that its attacks were easily repelled, and the 67th Regiment retreated in disorder, leaving the 51st encircled. On July 8, Colonel Omoto's troops fiercely broke through the encirclement in three columns, allowing Stopford's brigades to finally overcome Japanese resistance at Ukhrul and capture the town. This forced Shibata to regroup his forces along a new line from Lungshong through Sangshak to Sakok, ultimately enabling the British-Indian forces to reopen the Ukhrul Road by July 10. With both supply roads reopened, the arrival of Stopford's brigades from the north, and the Japanese forces nearly routed, General Slim decided it was time to go on the offensive. Slim's plan involved the 33rd Corps taking over the Shenam Saddle and the Tamu–Palel Road while the 4th Corps cleared the Japanese from the Silchar Track and the Tiddim Road. On the other hand, Mutaguchi was still planning a combined attack on the Palel area involving the 15th Division, remnants of the 31st Division, and some units from the 33rd Division. Although he issued an attack order, the divisions were too battered to comply. The overall situation of the 15th Army went from bad to worse and the only hope remaining was to rally the 31st at Humine, give the troops a few days rest and then, after a reorganization, to dispatch them to the northern flank of the Yamamoto Detachment to capture Palel. In early July the 31st Division was concentrated in the area east of Myothit but discipline had disintegrated to the point that the Division could scarcely be termed a combat force. The Torikai Unit was organized with the 138th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion); the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment and one artillery battalion to reinforce the Yamamoto Detachment. At the same time,the 15th Army ordered the 33rd Division to attack Palel from the south with the 214th Infantry Regiment. The newly formed Torikai' Unit, however, failed to join the Yamamoto Detachment and the order for the 33rd to attack Palel was never carried out. Consequently, on July 9, General Kawabe had no choice but to order preparations for a withdrawal to a line connecting the Zibyu Mountains, Mawlaik, Kalewa, and Gangaw. Mutaguchi intended to begin the retreat on July 16, directing the 15th Division towards Sittaung, the 31st Division to Thaungdut, and the 33rd Division to Tiddim, while the Yamamoto Detachment would hold the Shenam Saddle until July 24 and then retreat to the Kuntaung-Moreh line to cover the main Army's withdrawal from the Kabaw Valley.   On the southwest front, General Tanaka's forces had already started retreating from the Bishenpur area, leaving a small covering force at Ningthoukhong to prevent a pursuit by the 17th Division. As a result, General Cowan's brigades made limited progress against the stubborn rearguard, ultimately securing Ningthoukhong on July 16 after heavy bombardment, coinciding with Mutaguchi's general withdrawal. By the middle of July, Japanese resistance centered on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. A small hamlet about 300 meters wide and 500 meters long, it lay to the immediate south of Ningthoukhong. Despite probing attacks by the 48th Indian Brigade's infantry and artillery firing on their defenses, the Japanese held on. Finally, in the early hours of 16 July, this small space was subjected to what some describe as one of the heaviest artillery concentrations yet in the Burma Campaign; in the space of an hour, approximately 9,000 shells were fired on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. Fortunately for the Japanese, they had withdrawn from the village just before the shelling began. By the time it ended, the village had been completely flattened and was pockmarked with waterlogged craters. And so the last Japanese stronghold in the Imphal Valley was taken. The 63rd Indian Brigade also reached and occupied the Laimanai area around the same time. The 5th Indian Division, the other division in the reconstituted IV Corps, now took over and commenced the chase of the Japanese 33rd Division down the road towards Tiddim.  The 5th Division, now led by Major-General Geoffrey Evans, continued the pursuit while Stopford's brigades harassed the disordered retreat of the 15th and 31st Divisions. Despite their efforts, the 15th and 31st Divisions reached Thaungdut by early August, and the 33rd Division managed to assemble around Chikha by mid-August, under significant pressure and the serious threat of having their withdrawal route cut off. The 33rd Division distinguished itself by displaying almost superhuman fighting power and repeatedly launched counterattacks against the pursuing British-Indian 5th Division. The Yamamoto Detachment, however, had failed to cover the Yazagyo area and, in mid-August the 33rd Division found itself the vicinity of Chikha facing the serious threat of having its route of withdrawal cut by the enemy which was infiltrating into the Yazagyo area from Moreh and Shuganu through the Kabaw Valley. On the south-eastern approach to Imphal, the two armies continued to face each other on the Shenam Saddle. Yamamoto Force remained in place on these heights and the front line was still on Scraggy. It was in the second half of July that a final, concerted effort was made to evict Yamamoto Force and push it down the Tamu–Palel Road towards the India–Burma frontier. Led by the 23rd Indian Division , the operation involved five brigades in a three-pronged attack. The central thrust was by the 37th Indian Brigade on the Shenam Saddle, with the support of all available artillery and tanks; the 5th British Brigade was deployed behind it and readied to provide assistance. D-day was to be 24 July. The 1st Indian Brigade was sent through the hills on the right, to arrive behind the saddle. The two were to push the Japanese back on the road. It was hoped their withdrawal route would be cut by the 49th Indian Brigade, which would arrive on the road after looping in from the far left; the 268th Indian Brigade would be to its left, protecting its flank.    Before the Japanese could retreat, the 49th Brigade had cut off General Yamamoto's withdrawal route by looping in from the far left. However, Mutaguchi had sent Colonel Sato Genpachi's reserve 61st Regiment to Tamu, which quickly counterattacked and reopened the route. Consequently, Yamamoto withdrew to Moreh, allowing Roberts to swiftly capture Nippon Hill and Scraggy. Within two days, the 23rd Division advanced down the road, forcing the Yamamoto Detachment to retreat toward Mawlaik on July 30. This marked the end of the Battle of Imphal and Operation U-Go, the Japanese Army's largest land defeat. Estimates vary, but about 30,000 Japanese soldiers died and 23,000 were injured during the operation, including 6,000 killed at Kohima and 16,000 at Imphal. Additionally, the INA lost about 2,000 dead and 2,000 wounded. On the other hand, the British-Indians suffered 16,000 casualties, with over 12,000 at Imphal. Though Mutaguchi's plan was initially effective and nearly succeeded in capturing Imphal, he underestimated the enemy's ability to resist his troops and quickly bring reinforcements. Slim's overall strategy for Imphal succeeded, as the Japanese overextended themselves from the Chindwin River to the Imphal Valley, just as he had predicted. A crucial factor in the British-Indian success was the air support, which kept the 14th Army supplied despite the road to Kohima being cut off. Ultimately, in an attempt to thwart a potential British-Indian advance into Burma, Mutaguchi's 15th Army was utterly decimated by the failed attempt to capture Imphal. This failure allowed Slim to seize the moment and launch a rapid offensive into Burma, countering the Japanese U-Go plan. The Allies thus gained the upper hand, marking the beginning of the end for Japanese control over Burma. As a final note for this week by late July, Admiral Somerville executed Operation Crimson, a coordinated naval and air assault on Japanese airfields in Sabang, Lhoknga, and Kutaraja. Departing Trincomalee on July 22, Somerville's Task Force 62, comprising two carriers and four battleships, arrived off Sabang on the morning of July 25, ready to commence the bombardment. On 5th July 1944 the carriers Victorious and Indomitable arrived in Colombo. The former sailed with Illustrious on 22 July for Operation ‘Crimson', a bombardment of Sabang by the battleships over which the carrier-borne aircraft were to provide cover and take photographs of the damage. Illustrious embarked the same aircraft as before with Victorious for a total of thirty-nine Corsairs; together they comprised 47 Naval Fighter Wing commanded by Lieutenant Commander Turnbull. The force assembled for the operation was designated TF 62 and the carriers were supported by Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, Richelieu, Nigeria, Kenya, Gambia, Ceylon, Cumberland, Phoebe, Tromp, Relentless, Rotherham, Racehorse, Raider, Roebuck, Rocket, Rapid, Quilliam, Quality and Quickmatch. The submarines Templar and Tantalus were deployed to ASR positions. The carriers operated only thirty-five miles north of Sabang, not far from the battleships, which approached their bombardment positions at 06:40. The initial launch was planned for thirty-three minutes before sunrise but this proved to be too early as the morning was exceptionally dark and the launch was delayed for five minutes. Even then it was too early and the form-up was clumsy and slow, delaying departure. The fighters were briefed to attack Sabang, Lho Nga and Kotaraja airfields but 1838 NAS made a bad landfall since maps lacked detail and no photographs were available. When the target airfields were found it was still too dark for accurate strafing but the enemy was alert and opened fire as soon as aircraft came within range. To aircrew accustomed to the excellent intelligence material by then available in the Home Fleet, this caused concern and it had to be accepted that it was difficult to obtain good targets without losing the element of surprise. At very low level on a dark morning, flying at 400 knots with flashes from antiaircraft gunfire all around, camouflaged aircraft in revetments were inconspicuous and the strafing runs were not a success. One Corsair was shot down but the pilot was rescued. Concurrently, the battleships targeted harbor facilities and military barracks at Sabang, while cruisers and destroyers shelled radar and wireless stations and engaged enemy shore batteries. After the main bombardment, the destroyers Tromp, Quality, Quickmatch, and Quilliam entered Sabang harbor, attacking Japanese positions and launching torpedoes, sustaining light damage from return fire. On the return journey, two enemy reconnaissance aircraft were intercepted and shot down by fighters. Additionally, ten Zeros attacked Somerville's convoy but were intercepted by 13 Corsairs, leading to two Zeros being shot down and another two damageFollowing this engagement, British pilots noted that the Japanese airmen were not as proficient as they had been in 1942.  Although Operation Crimson's outcomes were not spectacular, Somerville's final offensive was still deemed successful enough. Due to health concerns, he was subsequently transferred to diplomatic duties at Admiral Mountbatten's request. Currently, Admiral Mountbatten was moving toward a complete rearrangement of the higher officers in SEAC. From the time of his arrival in the Far East, he had had trouble with his three commanders in chief. When the Imphal crisis arose, Mountbatten was dissatisfied with General Giffard's conduct of operations, and when he later found Giffard taking what Mountbatten considered a highly negative approach toward an aggressive conduct of operations he resolved to ask for Giffard's relief. Mountbatten's relations with Admiral Somerville had been equally difficult. Somerville had refused to treat him as a Supreme Commander and in Mountbatten's opinion tried to make him simply the chairman of a commanders-in-chief committee. As for the RAF commander, Air Chief Marshal Peirse, Mountbatten was not seeking his relief because he did not wish to change all of his principal subordinates simultaneously. After his relief, Somerville was placed in charge of the British naval delegation in Washington DC in October 1944 where he managed—to the surprise of almost everyone—to get on very well with the notoriously abrasive and anti-British Admiral Ernest King, the United States' Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of Noemfoor was just getting started, seeing General Douglas MacArthur not giving the Japanese a moment to catch their breath. Meanwhile the battle for Imphal was finally coming to a bitter end as Mutaguchi's megalomaniac operation was clearly a disaster.

Monocle's Fernando Augusto Pacheco speaks with Sally El Hosaini and James Krishna Floyd, directors of ‘Unicorns', a cross-cultural romance about an Essex mechanic and a British-Indian drag queen.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Paul Chowdhry is an acclaimed and multi-award winning stand-up comedian, actor, writer and podcaster, he hosts The Paul Chowdhry PudCast for Global Player. He's renowned as the most successful British Indian stand-up comedians in history, and has sold out Wembley Arena, putting him in the top 10 bestselling comics in 2017. His comedy is known for being outspoken and sometimes shocking, tackling subjects like race, sex culture. But in this interview we see a much more serious side to Paul. He talks about the impact of losing his mother at just 5-years-old, the horrific racist abuse he and his family experienced and how he's built a resilient mindset to become an acclaimed comedian.

Last time we spoke about the Siege of Myitkyina. General Vinegar Joe made huge gains in northern Burma. Myitkyina's airstrip was taken, now the main town was under siege. The Japanese resistance around Kamaing was greatly reduced. However setbacks were also seen, such as the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, prompting Stiwell to toss a new attack at Mogaung. Likewise American officers embedded with the Chinese units were sending reports of how the Chinese were suffering very heavy casualties and utilizing far too much ammunition for their objectives. Regardless, it seemed the Ledo Road to China was going to pan out. Calvert chose a new stronghold location, this time at Lakum, where his Chindits faced heavy resistance. Over on New Guinea, the allies were advancing west of their new beachheads to assault Lone Tree Hill. Soon assaults against Arare and Biak would also be made. This episode is the Landing against Biak Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In the last episode, plans were made for an amphibious assault against Biak, yet there were some hiccups. The Hurricane Task Force staged at Humboldt Bay, were facing issues with terrain. Terrain considerations forced most of the task force to assemble on the southern of the two sand spits dividing Humboldt and Jautefa Bays. On this spit the beach had a steep slope which made it impossible for more than a very few LST's to be held against the shore line long enough to load bulk stores. The LST's had to beach on the northern spit, where clearing and salvage after the fires and explosions which had ravaged that beach during the early phases of the Hollandia operation had not been completed. In addition, the northern spit was being used to unload supplies destined to be used at Hollandia, to load supplies being sent to the Tornado Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi, and to unload cargo for the Hurricane Task Force. No road connected the northern and southern sandspits. Consequently, most of the supplies and equipment, as well as many of the troops, had to be transported by water from the southern to the northern loading area. There were only a few LCT's available for this work and only by working twenty-four hours a day, were all the troops and supplies transported to the loading beach in time for departure on the 25th.  Finally, General Fuller's task force would depart the bay on the evening of May 25th, covered by Admiral Fectheler's cruisers and destroyers. Taking the most direct route, the convoy would be able to arrive off Biak on the morning of May 27th. At the time, Biak was held by the Biak Detachment, under Colonel Kuzume Naoyoki. It consisted of the 222nd Regiment; the 19th Guard Unit; and some rear echelon, service, and construction units. There were 10000 IJA personnel, 4000 were combat troops in total and 2000 IJN personnel, 125 were combat troops in total. In view of the intense enemy concentration on the Sorido-Mokmer airfield sector, Colonel Kuzume decided on May 22nd to shift the operational center of gravity of the detachment to the west. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, was relieved of its mission in the sector east of Opiaref and sent to replace the naval garrison unit in the Bosnek sector. The naval troops were, in turn, shifted westward into the Sorido airfield sector, while the tank company was brought over from Arfak Saba and assembled in the area northwest of Mokmer airfield. Although most of the Japanese efforts had been directed to the construction of airfields, Kuzume had ably managed to build a system of strong cave positions.  In this amphitheater-like terrain and along the low ridge, both of which were covered with thick growth, the Biak Detachment emplaced many field artillery and antiaircraft weapons. There were also many automatic weapons and a few mortars. All these weapons were located within range of Mokmer Drome and most of them could also fire on Borokoe Drome. The key to Colonel Kuzume's defenses in this area was the West Caves area, located about 50 yards north of the low ridge and about 1200 yards north of the western end of Mokmer Drome. The West Caves were actually three large sumps, or depressions in the ground, which were connected by underground tunnels and caverns. The caves were ringed with pillboxes, bunkers, and foxholes, and an extensive system of coral and log emplacements was built along the spur ridge above Mokmer Drome. Biak naval headquarters was originally located in the West Caves, which could shelter 1000 men, and Colonel Kuzume planned to move Biak Detachment headquarters to the caves for the final defense of the airdromes. As long as the West Caves and the positions along the low ridge were occupied by the Japanese, Allied planes could not safely use the airfields. Chief of Staff of 2nd Area Army, Lieutenant-General Numata Takazo and Rear-Admiral Senda Sadatoshi, Commander of the 28th Special Base Force, with HQ at Manokwari had come to visit the garrison just as the Allies were preparing to invade, with Numata choosing to stay on the island to direct the battle alongside the resourceful Kuzume. Yet all of the Japanese at Biak were about to be caught with their pants down as many of their troops were scattered about the island. The Biak Detachment would not be in their defensive positions on Z Day but were apparently being held mobile. Detachment headquarters, the 1st Battalion of the 222nd Infantry about half of the 19th Naval Guard Unit, and miscellaneous service organizations were all located in a cave and garden area on the inland plateau about 3,000 yards north-northwest of Bosnek. Outposts at Saba and Opiaref were held by the 1st Company, 222nd Infantry, and a platoon of the 2nd Company was stationed along the main ridge behind Bosnek. The bulk of the 2nd Battalion, the rest of the naval guard unit, and some naval antiaircraft organizations were located at the East Caves. Naval headquarters, various naval service units, and the 6th Company, 222nd Infantry, were at the West Caves. Most of the army service units were at Mokmer Drome or disposed along the low ridge north of that field. The bulk of the 3rd Battalion was posted at the west end of the same airfield. One platoon of the 10th Company was at Sorido, guarding the southern terminus of a trail which led north across the island to Korim Bay. The tanks had not yet moved to Saba but were assembled on the terrace north of the eastern end of Mokmer Drome. On the morning of May 27, Fechteler carried out his naval fire support as planned and General Kenney's bombers also launched their air bombardment, receiving little answering fire from the surprised Japanese shore installations. Yet there was a westerly current off Biak that would push the transports over 3000 yards to the west, which would complicate the landings. A rocket-equipped LCI, which began firing on the beaches about H minus 4 minutes, led the first LVT wave toward the shore. The LCI fire, consisting of rockets and fire from automatic weapons, continued until H plus 2 minutes, when it was lifted because it began to endanger the troops who were unloading and pushing inland. The first waves of LVTs then formed rapidly and crossed the line of departure; but because of the westerly current and the smoke and dust raised by the preliminary bombardment, they would end up landing on a mangrove swamp almost 3000 yards west of Green Beach 4. Nevertheless, by 7:30, the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment had successfully landed and was pushing beyond the swamps to the main coastal road connecting Bosnek and the airfields. Five minutes later, Companies I and K of Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment also landed about 700 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. Realizing about the westerly current, Fechteler then started to turn succeeding waves eastward to the proper beaches, with the troops coming ashore in disorder for the next thirty minutes.  With more than half of his regiment already far west of the proper landing beaches, and knowing that the landing had become disorganized and that the rest of the boat waves were being delayed, Colonel Newman asked the task force commander if the 186th Regiment should continue with its original mission or whether it might be feasible to switch missions with the 162nd Regiment and start moving west toward the airfields. General Fuller, the Task Force commander, ordered the 186th Regiment to continue with its original mission. As events turned out, it might have been better had the regiment continued west, and it is possible that a great deal of time might have been saved if the missions had been switched. In the first place, the maps with which the task force was supplied were so inaccurate that both regiments soon came upon terrain features that threw much planning out of gear. Secondly, most of the 186th Regiment had landed so far west that both it and the 162nd consumed much valuable time getting to their proper locations. Finally, an exchange of missions might have been executed without much difficulty, for, in amphibious training, the 41st Division had learned to switch missions when such mistakes were made. Luckily, the landings would face no opposition, though the confusion would give Kuzume time to prepare his defense. By 8:00, the rest of Newman's 3rd Battalion had landed to secure the jetties; and by 10:30, Companies I and K arrived to take their position west of Old Jetty. Entangled with the landed artillery and tanks, the 2nd Battalion would only be able to reach the area east of New Jetty by noon, then sending patrols to the north and east to secure the Bosnek perimeter. The face of the coral ridge behind Bosnek was found to be rough and honeycombed with small caves. Companies F and G, aided by elements of the Support Battery, 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, sent patrols along the steep slope and to the top of the ridge to investigate many of the caves, most of which proved to be unoccupied, though three Japanese were killed near caves directly north of New Jetty. The companies moved over the first slope to a second ridge line which was parallel to and about seventy-five yards north of the first. Company G started looking for a trail which was thought to lead over the ridges to the plateau north of Bosnek, but it was Company E which, shortly after noon, found the ill-defined track. A few Japanese from the 2nd Company, 222nd Regiment in a pillbox temporarily prevented the two companies from securing the trail, which was not cleared until 2:00 hours, after the pillbox had been destroyed. During the late afternoon, patrols were sent north of the ridges to the area which the Japanese had surveyed for an airdrome. A few Japanese , most of whom fled upon being sighted, were found at the airdrome site, but there were no signs of large organized enemy groups north, northeast, or east of Bosnek insofar as the 186th Infantry could ascertain. The only enemy action during this day would be an air attack by four Japanese bombers.  A few enemy planes which flew over Biak around noon fled before anti-aircraft guns from ship or shore could be brought to bear. But all anti-aircraft crews were on the alert to expect further Japanese air action late in the afternoon. Because of the difference in time of sunset at the closest Allied and Japanese bases, Japanese aircraft could remain in the Biak area about half an hour after Allied planes had to leave. The expected attacks developed shortly after 4:00, when four Japanese two-engined bombers, accompanied by three or four fighters, approached the beachhead from the north, flying low over the ridge behind Bosnek and thus escaping radar detection. Some excellent targets were ready for the Japanese. Admiral Fechteler had permitted four LST's to tie up side by side at one of the jetties. Although he knew this move to be tactically unsound, he considered it justified because of the importance of the cargo aboard the LST's and because the jetty provided the only good spot for LST beaching. The Japanese bombing was accurate, but the LST's were lucky. None of the Japanese bombs exploded! Though the Japanese planes also bombed and strafed the beaches, none of the bombs dropped ashore exploded, while the strafing runs killed only one man and wounded two others. All four bombers were shot down by ground or ship-based antiaircraft, and the Japanese fighters were driven off by some Allied fighter planes which had remained late in the area. One Japanese bomber crashed into the water, sideswiping an SC which was standing offshore. Two of the ship's crew were killed and nine wounded. The SC had to be towed away for repairs, and a few other naval vessels suffered minor damage from strafing. There was negligible damage to supplies and equipment ashore. Total Allied losses as a result of the air raid were three killed and fourteen wounded, most of them naval personnel. Unloading also progressed satisfactorily, with 12000 men, 12 medium tanks, 29 artillery pieces, about 500 vehicles, and an estimated 3000 tons of bulk cargo being landed by 5:15. Meanwhile, Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment had begun landing shortly after 9:00 and immediately started moving west along the main coastal road towards Biak's three airdromes. Moving with speed, the 3rd Battalion passed through Ibdi village at 10:30 and then began to traverse the difficult Parai Defile. At 11:15, the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon discovered an enemy position on the face of the cliff west of Ibdi, that the 162nd Infantry first learned of the existence of the Parai Defile. At 1:00 the 3rd Battalion, with six tanks of the 603rd Tank Company leading the advance, arrived at the eastern entrance to the defile. There was no large Japanese force stationed along the cliff, but the few Japanese had such a tactical advantage over troops moving along the coastal road that they were able to delay the 162nd Infantry's advance for some time. Meanwhile Company E, which had been attempting to advance along the ridge north of the rest of the regiment, had found that the terrain and thick vegetation made progress along that route next to impossible. Since the company was lagging far behind the rest of the advance and since strong enemy opposition had not yet been encountered either inland or on the coastal route, it withdrew to join the rest of the 2nd Battalion on the beach, and by the time that battalion had reached Parai, Company E was back in place.  By 3:00, the 3rd Battalion had successfully pushed through the defile and had secured Parai and a large jetty at that village. Progress west of the Parai Defile was without noteworthy incident during the rest of the afternoon, so Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalion would be able to dig in at Parai by nightfall. On the other side, Kuzume was surprised by the landings, but he was expecting the enemy to land exactly there, where the extreme narrowness of the beach and the few entrances inland would make deployment difficult. Deciding to seize this momentary advantage, he thus ordered his 1st and 3rd Battalions to carry out an attack all along the Bosnek beachhead during the night. On the 3rd Battalion front, after an unsuccessful raid against two batteries near Ibdi. Then the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry , renewed the attack with grenades and rifle fire, some circling to the north around Battery C and a few others moving against Battery B, located 200 yards to the east. Attacks on Battery C continued until daylight, when the last Japanese withdrew. The action cost Battery C 4 men killed and 8 wounded, while a near-by antiaircraft detachment lost 1 man killed and 1 wounded. Over 15 of the enemy had been killed during the night and an unknown number wounded. The 1st Battalion also raided the beachhead, suffering many casualties as a result.  On the morning of May 28th, the 162nd then resumed its westward advance, with its 3rd Battalion rapidly proceeding through Mokmer village without opposition. By 9:30, however, the Americans began to face stiff resistance at a road junction nearly 1500 yards west of Mokmer. Supported by artillery, Company K would be able to push to within 200 yards of Mokmer Drome; yet Kuzume would rapidly counterattack them with his 2nd Battalion. Charging repeatedly, the Japanese would eventually force the Americans to pull back by noon, with Lieutenant Yokoyama Hideo dying heroically during these attacks. Emboldened by this success, Kuzume then launched an all out assault from the East Caves area. On the main ridge north of Mokmer the Japanese had another strongpoint east of the West Caves, which was called by the Japanese the East Caves. Behind Mokmer the ridge rose to a height of 240 feet. It was not so steep a cliff as the Parai Defile barricade, but it could not be climbed without the use of hands. About three quarters of the way to the top was a flat ledge from which two large caverns, similar to those in the West Caves area, could be entered. The Japanese constructed pillboxes on the ridge both below and above the ledge, and in the caverns they emplaced mortars, 20-mm. guns, and heavy machine guns. Observation posts were also set up at the East Caves, from which an unobstructed view of the coast from Parai to the west end of Mokmer Drome could be obtained. The Biak Detachment used the East Caves principally as living quarters, supply dumps, and as a connecting link between the Ibdi Pocket and the West Caves. Continued Japanese occupation of the East Caves would endanger Allied troop and supply movements along the coastal road from Parai to Mokmer Drome. The enemy threw more troops into the battle from the East Caves area until the attackers were coming not only from the west but also from the northwest and north. The Japanese split the 3rd Battalion by driving a wedge along the cliff between the troops on the shore and those on the terrace. Companies L and M were cut off. The 2nd Battalion, attempting to get on the terrace to the north of the 3rd Battalion, was pinned down by Japanese fire from the East Caves and was unable to advance. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off. In response to the attacks, Haney ordered the 1st Battalion to move north from Parai onto the main coastal ridge to outflank the enemy positions, but efforts to do so were halted by enemy fire from the East Caves. Two companies patrolled in the broken terrain along the main ridge but were unable to move westward. Most of Company L and the Company M detachment which was also on the coral terrace managed to find a covered route back to the rest of the 3rd Battalion on the shore, but one platoon, initially surrounded, had to fight its way eastward into the lines of the 2nd Battalion, north of Mokmer village. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off and withdrew to the 2nd Battalion only with difficulty, and after it had suffered many casualties from Japanese fire. During the afternoon the 3rd Battalion stood off two more concerted enemy counterattacks, one at 12:00 and another shortly after 2:00, and suffered more casualties from the enemy mortar and artillery fire. During the latter attack, the Japanese began moving some light tanks forward from the Mokmer Drome area. The 3rd Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, engaged these tanks at a range of 1,200 yards and, with the aid of fire from destroyers lying offshore, drove the enemy tanks back into defilade positions. Three tanks of the 603rd were damaged by Japanese artillery fire and three men of the same organization were wounded during the action. Meanwhile, General Fuller had decided to reinforce the 3rd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. The 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved west along the coastal road. At the same time small boats manned by the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment were also sent forward with ammunition and medical supplies, both dangerously low. The small craft moved along the shore out of range of Japanese mortar and artillery fire until opposite the 3rd Battalion's position and then shot inshore at full speed, one by one. Supplies were replenished and the worst casualties evacuated despite continued shelling of the 3rd Battalion's position by the Japanese. The 1st and 2nd Battalions continued their efforts to clear the Japanese from the terrace behind the 3rd but met with little success. By late afternoon, just as the 3rd Battalion's position was becoming untenable, Fuller gave up plans for further attempts at reinforcement and ordered Haney to withdraw his 3rd Battalion. The withdrawal started slowly because communications difficulties still prevented concentration of supporting fires. However, at 5:00 the regimental commander finally ordered the 3rd Battalion to start moving back along the coastal road. Tanks were to act as point, and rear guard and close-in artillery fire was substituted for a disengaging force. The battalion was to continue eastward until it had passed through the 2nd, which was setting up a new defensive position east of Mokmer village. The men of the 3rd Battalion moved in small parties along the beach and main road, which was intermittently swept by Japanese mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. Many troops were unable to use the main road, but had to drop down to the beach below the overhanging cliff. Four tanks brought up the rear and protected the north flank. Between 1830 and 1900 all elements of the 3rd Battalion reached safety beyond the 2nd Battalion's lines and began digging in for the night east of the latter unit. Casualties for the day, almost all of them suffered by the 3rd Battalion, were 16 killed and 87 wounded. Facing strong resistance, he also decided to commit his tank company to the attack. At around 8:00, new waves of Japanese infantry, now supported by four tanks, appeared west and north of the 2nd Battalion, thus beginning the first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area. The 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, with the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, in support, was astride the main coastal road 1,000 yards east of Mokmer. The battalion's left flank was on the beach while its right was against the coastal cliff and less than forty yards inland. Between the beach and the cliff was a coconut grove. The main coastal road crossed the rise of the cliff at a point about 475 yards west of the 2nd Battalion's lines. Shortly after 8:00 the Japanese tanks, followed by an infantry column, advanced down the incline where the main road crossed the cliff and deployed in echelon left formation in the coconut grove. The Japanese vehicles were light tanks, Type 95, weighing about nine tons, carrying a crew of three men, and armed with one 37-mm. cannon and two 7.7-mm. machine guns. They were opposed by two General Sherman M4A1 medium tanks, the heaviest armament on which was the 75-mm. Each Japanese tank was stopped by one round of 75-mm. armor-piercing ammunition, while the enemy infantry was literally mowed down by the machine guns and mortars of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. Armor-piercing 75-mm. shells passed right through the Japanese light tanks, and the Shermans followed with a few rounds of 75-mm. high explosive, which tore holes in the Japanese vehicles and blew loose their turrets. During this action several hits scored on the Shermans by the Japanese 37-mm. guns caused no damage. About thirty minutes after the first attack the Japanese sent in a second wave of three tanks, which used the same route of approach and the same formation in the coconut grove. These three were quickly destroyed by three Shermans. One enemy 37-mm. shell locked the 75-mm. gun of one Sherman in place, but the American tank backed part way into a shell hole to obtain elevation for its weapon and, despite the damage, managed to destroy one of the enemy tanks. The Japanese tanks having been stopped and the leading elements of the second infantry wave killed, the attack disintegrated and the enemy withdrew. For an hour or so the Japanese were quiet, but late in the morning, under the cover of machine gun fire and mortar barrages, they began to circle north of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 162nd Infantry. New infantry attacks began about 12:00. The enemy was unable to dislodge the 162nd Infantry, but his mortar fire caused many casualties within the regimental perimeter and the Japanese managed to cut the coast road east of a large T-jetty at Parai. Company B and the Cannon Company counterattacked the Japanese roadblock behind close-in mortar support and succeeded in dislodging the enemy by fire and movement. During the afternoon of May 29, the 162nd thus moved back to Parai, where the 2nd Battalion and two companies boarded some amphibious craft back to Bosnek while the rest of the regiment moved overland through the Parai Defile and took up positions at Ibdi The 162nd Infantry's casualties during the day were 16 killed, 96 wounded, and 3 injured. The regiment estimated that it had killed over 500 Japanese during the day. Though Kuzume's forces had suffered massive casualties, they had heroically managed to stop the enemy advance and would subsequently push troops forward to Parai and into the cliffs along the Parai Defile. They would however also lose most of their armor during these attacks. Only five tanks survived and were withdrawn to the West Caves. Pending the arrival of reinforcements, General Fuller planned to use his available troops to hold the west flank at Ibdi and expand the beachhead at Bosnek. The 162nd Infantry was to establish a semicircular perimeter beginning on the beach west of Ibdi, reaching north to the main ridge, and returning to the beach at the village. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, would maintain a perimeter around Mandom, where the Hurrican Task Force HQ was located, while the 3rd Battalion moved over the ridge behind Bosnek to set up defenses on the inland plateau. The 2nd Battalion, with part of the 3rd attached, would remain at the Bosnek beachhead. During this period, the 800 well-armed men of the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry in the Ibdi Pocket, made only harassing attacks with small groups against the positions of the 162nd Infantry. On 30th and 31st of May the 162nd Infantry patrolled around the main ridge near Ibdi for a route over which large bodies of troops might move north to the inland plateau in preparation for the second attack westward. During the course of this patrolling, it was discovered that the main ridge from Bosnek to the Parai Defile actually comprised a series of seven sharp coral ridges, the crests of which were 50-75 yards apart and separated by gullies 50-100 feet deep. These separate ridges were honeycombed with small natural caves, potholes, and crevices. There was little soil on most of the coral, yet the area maintained a cover of dense rain forest containing trees 8-20 inches thick and 100-150 feet high. The 162nd Infantry discovered two native trails over the ridges. The most easterly of these, designated "Old Man's Trail," began on the beach road about 1,200 yards west of Mandom. It was a fairly well defined track which swung north over the seven ridges along a comparatively easy route. Another track began 1,200 yards to the west, near Ibdi. Called "Young Man's Trail," the latter followed a very difficult route over the ridges to the inland plateau. Both of these trails ran through the outer defenses of the Ibdi Pocket, into which the Biak Detachment, on 30 May, moved the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry. On 30 and 31 May the 162nd Infantry's patrols along the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom were harassed by the Japanese in the Ibdi Pocket, which had not yet been recognized as a major enemy strong point. On 30 May the 162nd Infantry located a water hole near the beach terminal of Old Man's Trail. A regimental water point established there was constantly harassed by Japanese rifle fire from the Ibdi Pocket area or by small enemy parties which moved down out of the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom. The Cannon Company, 162nd Infantry, was therefore assigned the missions of clearing the enemy from the water point area and protecting that important installation from Japanese attacks. Halfway through the Parai Defile, a little over a mile west of the 162nd Infantry's main perimeter, an underground stream ran from the base of the cliff into Soanggarai Bay. At the point where the main road crossed the stream, the 162nd Infantry set up an ambush to prevent Japanese infiltration from the west along the beach. The ambush site was also used as a patrol base from which small parties reconnoitered along the cliffs of the Parai Defile to discover enemy dispositions in the area. Patrolling on 30th and 31st of May cost the 162nd Infantry 6 men killed, 17 wounded, and 4 injured. On the main coastal ridge between the village of Ibdi and the Parai Defile the Biak Detachment developed another center of resistance which came to be known as the Ibdi Pocket. The terrain in the area was a series of knifelike east-west ridges separated by depressions and crevices up to fifty feet deep. These ridges were connected in places by cross-ridges, and the entire area was covered with thick rain forest and dense jungle undergrowth which had found a foothold in the coral. Pillboxes of coral and logs, hasty emplacements of the same materials, small caves and crevices, and foxholes at the bases of large trees were all utilized by the enemy to defend the area. Back to the Wakde-Sarmi area, General Patrick was preparing to launch another assault on Lone Tree Hill. On the morning of May 27th at 7:00 two destroyers, firing on Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Strip area, started scheduled fire support for the day's advance. Artillery and infantry action on this morning was much more closely coordinated than on the previous day. The destroyer fire lasted until 7:45, at which time the field artillery and all the 81-mm. mortars of the 158th Infantry laid concentrations on suspected and known enemy positions in the defile, on Lone Tree Hill, and on Hill 225. After this Colonel Herndon sent his 1st Battalion against the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mount Saksin and his 2nd Battalion against Hill 225. At 8:30 Company F, moving around Company E on the south flank, started its attack. Behind close artillery support, apparently controlled by artillery liaison planes for the most part, Company F pushed up a terrain feature initially believed to be Hill 225. It was not discovered until late the next day that F Company was actually on the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin and about 700 yards east of its reported location. Since artillery fire had knocked out two enemy machine gun nests which had been delaying the advance, patrols of Company F were able to reach the top of the eastern ridge. The rest of the company moved up the hill at 10:00; encountering scattered rifle fire from enemy positions to the southwest. Company E, just before noon, arrived atop the same hill on F's right. Company E had orders to secure the southern slopes of the defile between Hill 225 and Lone Tree Hill. Company B, still at the eastern entrance to the defile, was again unable to make any progress and during the morning was held up by machine gun and mortar fire from concealed enemy positions on the southern and southwestern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. No sooner had some of these positions been eliminated by American artillery and mortar fire than Company B was subjected to enemy machine gun and mortar fire originating from the northeast side of Hill 225, the reported location of Companies E and F. Actually, the artillery fire had not been entirely effective, because it had not reached into deep draws or caves in which many of the Japanese weapons were emplaced. Company E, attempting to move down the northern slopes of the eastern ridge to Company B's aid, was soon forced back by enemy rifle fire and infantry counterattacks from the west. At the same time small parties of Japanese, under cover of their own machine guns, started a series of minor counterattacks against Company B. Company F did not become engaged in this action. Instead, the company dug in on the ridge it was holding and sent patrols to the south and west to probe Japanese defenses. It was soon discovered that the combination of rugged terrain and Japanese machine gun and rifle fire limited patrolling to a very small area. North of Company B, Company A patrolled along the west bank of the Snaky River and on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill during the morning and early afternoon. About 4:30 the company moved in force up Lone Tree, finding the eastern slope of the hill to be unoccupied. Most of the fire that had harassed the company during the morning had apparently originated on the beach below the northern face of Lone Tree Hill. For the night the unit dug in at the crest of the hill. Again, little ground had been gained, although the eastern nose of Mr. Saksin and Lone Tree Hill had been at least partially occupied. At the same time, Patrick was informed that two battalions of the 163rd Regiment would be shipped to Biak to reinforce Fuller on June 1st, with General Krueger also preparing the 6th Division led by Major General Franklin Silbert  to be dispatched to Wakde to replace the 163rd. Yet before this could occur, Colonel Matsuyama crossed the Tementoe River and launched a surprise night attack against Toem. During pitch-black night at 8:30, an estimated 100 Japs struck 1st Battalion's area. Divided into small groups, but in two major commands, they carried grappling hooks, knives, grenades, knee-mortars, and rifles. Their grappling hooks had two prongs, like anchors and were attached to long ropes by which they could pull to explode booby traps harmlessly. A knee mortar barrage began the attack. While their mortars drove the men to ground, their grappling hooks caught booby trap wires and exploded attached grenades. They struck from southeast and southwest, two different commands about 150 yards apart. First command shouted wildly and threw grenades. They fired a light machine gun down A Company's street and holed up their tents. But this command's howling rush with grenades was just a feint to cause confusion. The second command, around 35-40,  made the main drive. Easily they broke through 1st Battalion's far-spread perimeter holes. An estimated 25 made the serious penetration. They were trying to reach the Regimental command post to kill the top officers. Some of the staff officers were actually cut off outside their holes in a tent and actually unarmed. Ten Japanese almost reached the command post before they were cut down. Such was the official report, but 163rd men said that they tried to blow up the motor poo, nearly 100 of them. From a slit trench, four blazing M-1s stopped them, from the motor pool chief Staff Sergeant Burton, Staff Sergeant Engbretson, T/4 Switzer, and T/5 Donakowski. They piled up 13 dead Japanese, the last just 20 feet away. On a whistle signal, all Matsuyama's men withdrew. The wild attack prompted Patrick to not to ship the 163rd towards Biak. The following morning, after another well-timed preliminary artillery bombardment, Herndon once again threw his forces against the Ilier Mountains, yet the result was the same as before. Nonetheless, his troops would be able to cover the amphibious arrival of two tanks to aid in further attacks; but with the situation soon becoming untenable because of strong Japanese counterattacks, all his companies ultimately had to withdraw to the Snaky River line. On May 29th, Krueger finally notified Patrick that the two battalions of the 163rd would have to leave for Biak the next day, so this would force Patrick to cease offensive action and withdraw the 1st Battalion, 158th Regiment back to Arare. Yet further Japanese counterattacks also forced Herndon to withdraw his remaining forces to the Maffin area as well, where he would form a new defensive line.  Patrick ultimately disagreed with Herndon's decision to retreat, judging the withdrawal to be unwarranted and would relieve Herndon of his command, replacing him with Colonel Earle Sandlin. Colonel Herndon's fears of attack along his line of communications had been well taken, for the Right Sector Force had begun flanking movements designed to recapture the entire Maffin Bay area. However, the combat engineers quickly proved their versatility by driving off the enemy force with rifle, carbine, and machine gun fire. Five of the engineers were killed. Enemy casualties could not be estimated since the Japanese removed their dead and wounded during the night. The remainder of the night was more quiet, and the next morning the defenses along the Tirfoam were improved. There were a couple of minor attacks during the afternoon and desultory rifle and 70-mm. or 75-mm. artillery fire was directed against all American units still west of the Tor. The 147th Field Artillery Battalion, withdrawing to the east bank of the Tor late in the afternoon, was struck by some of this enemy artillery fire and lost one man killed. A new defensive line along the Tirfoam was being developed on May 30th as the bulk of the 163rd Regiment would depart for Biak. This left Patrick's forces spread out over almost twelve miles of coastline, just as Colonel Yoshino was about to launch his night attack. After the difficult river crossing, the 223rd Regiment had spent three days moving into the jungle southwest of Arara, from where they launched a series of simultaneous attacks against some anti-aircraft positions along the beach.  A 6:05 on June 30th, a guard at B Battery's Position No 6 challenged two men in the jungle across the beach road. Other Japanese were moving west down the road. When they did not answer his challenge, he fired, and hit the ground. Instantly, Japanese machine guns, rifles, mortars, and even grenades hit the B-6 position. The anti-aircraft men killed 10 Japs, but one heavy machine gun jammed. The second gun became overheated and had to cease fire. The Japanese were hard to hit in the dark. They were heavily camouflaged with leaves and nets down to their hips. After one American was killed, the anti-aircraft men left their emplacement and fled 500 yards east on the beach road to Battery A's Position 7. Joined with the men of A-7 - they had already stopped one attack - the B-6 men helped fight about 15-25 Japanese. From 6:40 to 4:30 next day, the Japanese struck intermittently, but rifle and machine guns fire repelled them. About 500 yards west of the B-6 position where the first attack had occurred, Battery A-6 also endured harassment from Japanese mortar, rifle, and machine gun fire. At least twice, the gunners repulsed attacks. A fourth position, Battery B-8, which was 400 yards west of A-6, was assailed about 6:30 also. The anti-aircraft men's .50 multiple heavy machine gun became overheated and jammed. Rifle ammo was running out. Scurrying from the gun-pit, they took cover in the shore brush until the Japanese left at 4:30. All attacks began about the same time, about 8:30, and some men glimpsed a Jap officer with his saber who was giving orders. All Japanese dead had rolls of white gauze in their mouths, and the Japanese officer had completely covered his lower face. The Americans thought that they used these means to prevent them from shouting or screaming when they were wounded. While they attacked the anti-aircraft batteries, Yoshino's men also tried to storm 1st Battalion 158 Infantry protecting Task Force Headquarters and the supply dumps. About 7:00, rifle and machine gun fire began impacting 1st Battalion positions. A captured heavy machine gun fired also. At 10:00 came a furious suicidal attack against B Company - beaten off with rifles, grenades, bayonets, pistols, and even knives. They failed to fire the supply dumps with demolition charges and Molotov cocktails. In the end, the Americans miraculously only lost 12 killed and 10 wounded while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. But fearing more enemy attacks, Patrick would decide to reduce the number of separate perimeters along the beach, from 21 to only 8.  The bulk of the 158th had to withdraw behind the Tor, leaving only its 2nd Battalion west of the river to secure the bridgehead. Facing little resistance, the Japanese recaptured Maffin, though they would be unable to push Sandlin's troops behind the river. Yoshino and Matsuyama were unable to coordinate their efforts however, allowing the Americans to continue to strengthen their defenses for the next few days, with the Japanese only able to launch nightly raiding attacks that were easily repelled. On June 5, the first units of Major-General Franklin Sibert's 6th Division then began to arrive, freeing up the 158th to continue with its offensive.  Sandlin then launched an attack with his 1st and 2nd Battalions supported by tanks crossing the Tor to attack Maffin on June 8, meeting increasingly strong enemy resistance from a line of hastily-repaired bunkers and pillboxes. The tanks were able to reduce the Japanese defenses due to their strong firepower, but not before the Americans had to dig in by nightfall.  The night passed without incident and early on June 9th patrols began to probe westward toward the Tirfoam. Scouts reported that the Japanese were holding another defense line, including reoccupied bunkers, on a slight rise at the west bank of the river. About 10:00, tank-infantry teams began to destroy the Japanese-held positions along the new line. While tank 75-mm fire was destroying bunkers or forcing the Japanese to seek cover, infantrymen crept forward to toss grenades into bunker gun ports or shoot down Japanese who tried to escape from the area. While these tank-infantry team operations were taking place, the rest of the two infantry battalions rested. Japanese 75-mm. fire, from a weapon emplaced on the beach between the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill, harassed the 1st Battalion for a while, but this fire was summarily stopped when a 155-mm howitzer of the 218th Field Artillery Battalion scored a direct hit on the enemy piece. By 11:30 the enemy defensive positions had been cleaned out and the 1st and 2nd Battalions resumed the advance westward. Aided by fire from the 147th Field Artillery, which had supplanted the 167th in the close support role, the two infantry units probed cautiously forward, and it was not until 3:30 that both reached the east bank of the Tirfoam. Opposition was scattered, but the American units lost 6 men killed and 6 wounded. It was estimated that 50 of the enemy had been killed and one was captured. At this point, the 158th would have to stop its advance because they received new orders from Krueger, who planned to employ the regiment for an assault on Noemfoor Island, 300 miles northwest of Sarmi, in late June or early July. As such, advances west of the Tirfoam would be postponed until a second combat team of the 6th Division could arrive in the area to relieve the 158th in mid-June.  General Sibert assumed command of the Tornado Task Force on June 12th. On 10 and 11th June the 158th Infantry limited its activities to patrolling, consolidating defensive positions, and driving Japanese outposts westward. One outpost, lying southeast of the 2nd Battalion, was manned by about a hundred Japanese and had to be cleared by tank fire and infantry assault. The Japanese, who were members of a 223rd Infantry company assigned to the Right Sector Force, fled toward Mr. Saksin, leaving behind 4 heavy machine guns, 1 light machine gun, 2 70-mm. howitzers, and 1 37-mm. antitank gun. On 14 June the 20th Infantry, 6th Division, relieved the 158th Infantry at the Tirfoam. The 158th recrossed the Tor and went into a defensive perimeter on the west bank of Tementoe Creek. Patrols sent south and east during the next week encountered a few stragglers from the Japanese garrison at Hollandia or from the Matsuyama Force. On the 22nd the entire regimental combat team was relieved of all combat responsibility in the Wakde-Sarmi area and began final preparations for the Noemfoor Island operation. During its operations in the Wakde-Sarmi area the 158th Regimental Combat Team lost 70 men killed, 257 wounded, and 4 missing. The unit took 11 Japanese prisoners and estimated that it killed 920 of the enemy. With their supply line compromised, Yoshino and Matsuyama would also decide to withdraw from their present positions about this time, which would allow the 36th Division to establish better defensive positions in the Ilier Mountains line. Yet that is all for Operation Tornado and Hurricane for now, as we now need to head over to the Imphal-Kohima front. By June, the situation at Manipur saw General Slim's 14th Army losing all of their advantages. Despite the extreme odds, with a slim chance of success, General Mutaguchi continued his wild attacks against Imphal. As it was, the two armies had been battling it out in difficult terrain and conditions. There were the steep and often jungle-covered hills, the heat for men not accustomed to it, the risk of tropical diseases like malaria and the leeches – not to mention the weeks and months of both physical and psychological strain from fighting a formidable enemy. The monsoon rains that began later in May only made matters worse. As the days passed by, the low-lying areas in the Imphal Valley would flood because of the downpours, while the streams and small rivers everywhere would become raging torrents. The water level of Loktak Lake would also rise, making it especially uncomfortable for the units of both sides dug in at some of the lakeside villages on the Tiddim Road. Dysentery and diarrhea became an ever-greater concern. Foot rot would start to set in for men in their flooded positions. The slopes in the hills became slippery and that much more treacherous to navigate. The incessant rains would dissolve stretches of ‘fairweather' roads and ‘jeepable' tracks into mud and slush everywhere, while triggering landslides in the hills. For the units on higher altitudes like the Shenam Saddle, Point 5846 and the Ukhrul area, the nights would become shockingly cold and damp, adding to their misery. Yet things were undoubtedly harder for the Japanese, who had carried few supplies and didn't expect to be strung out fighting for so long.  To the north, General Sato's 31st Division were withdrawing from Kohima towards Ukhrul, defying Mutaguchi's orders, with General Miyazaki providing rearguard at Viswema, whileGeneral Grover's 2nd Division pursued them. Miyazaki's men held out at Visweman until June 12th, before withdrawing to Maosongsang. Then they held out at Maosongsang until June 16, before retreating to the last holding position at Maram. Over to the south, General Brigg's 5th Division was engaging Colonel Matsumura's 60th Regiment, fighting brutally for control over the Imphal-Kohima road. The battered Japanese defenders were fighting tooth and nail to prevent the opening of this vital supply line.  The 9th and 123rd Brigades pushed on, they would only be able to capture the Zebra hill on June 7. The following day, the 3/14th Punjabis made a wide hook and arrived on the road behind Japanese lines by nightfall, where they would repel three heavy counterattacks. This would allow the 123rd to clear the hill positions near Modbung and link up with the Punjabis on June 11th. The 9th Brigade made great progress during these days, pushing on to Satarmaina by June 13th. General Gracey's 20th Division was also attacking towards the Ukhrul Road during this period, with the 80th Brigade advancing northwards from Kameng up the Iril River Valley on a wide encircling move towards Litan while the 100th Brigade attacked up the road towards Kasom. Though the 80th faced little resistance, the 100th would struggle to progress against the fierce counterattacks of the recently-arrived 67th Regiment. By mid-June, the 51st Regiment was also ordered to abandon its positions and support the 67th on the Ukhrul Road.  Over in the southwest front, the arrival of reinforcements in the form of the 2nd Battalion, under the command of Colonel Yanagisawa Kanji at the end of May, gave General Tanaka a gleam of hope that he could launch another offensive in early June. On June 6th, four battalions under Colonel Sasahara attacked the 63rd Brigade's hill positions, applying such great pressure, General Cowan was forced to withdraw his brigade to Bishenpur the following day. On June 7th, Tanaka ordered his recently-arrived reinforcements to clear Ningthoukhong and retake Potsangbam, yet their first coordinated attack would end in failure. The attack was almost single-handedly held by Sergeant Hanson Victor Turner of the 1st West Yorks. Defending his platoon's position on the perimeter, Turner grabbed some grenades and charged forward, throwing them at the Japanese. He did this five times, going back to gather grenades each time and returning to the attack in the face of Japanese grenade and small-arms fire. He was killed on the sixth occasion while throwing a grenade. For his bravery, Turner was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The Japanese eventually captured some ground in North Ningthoukhong, but withdrew after being struck from the air and shelled. In the meantime, after the Japanese defeat at the Gibraltar Box, the Yamamoto Detachment would continue to harass the British-Indian positions from Nippon and Scraggy Hills in early June. On the evening of June 9, the Japanese put in their last major attack on Scraggy, starting with a heavy artillery bombardment. Artillery concentrations were directed at the Japanese and an airstrike was made on their part of Scraggy and Lynch. The Gurkhas followed up with an advance. Although some ground was recovered, the Japanese maintained their grip on Scraggy's crest. Having suffered many casualties and feeling that the Gurkhas' new position was sufficiently strong, General Roberts then decided to halt the counterattacks, thus leaving General Yamamoto in control of Scraggy up until the end of July. Concurrently, as a last hope to break through towards Imphal, Mutaguchi was planning to conduct a desperate offensive on Palel with some reinforcements that would fail to arrive in time. Due to these delays, he would end up sending some of Yamamoto's exhausted troops to recover Langgol and advance to the hill northeast of Palel. The Japanese managed to get beyond Langgol and attack some positions in the foothills near Palel Airfield, but were soon rebuffed. They finally sent in a commando raid on the airfield in early July, which succeeded in blowing up eight planes. Over in Ningthoukhong, Tanaka launched another heavy assault on June 12th. Though a salient on the other side was initially captured, a ferocious counterattack would ultimately evict them. This action was performed by units of the 48th Brigade, including reinforcements sent from Potsangbam.  Rifleman Ganju Lama of the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles who earned a Victoria Cross in this action. To the west, Tanaka ordered the newly-arrived 151st Regiment of Colonel Hashimoto Kumakoro to attack the British picquets overlooking the Silchar Track. After a wave of assaults, Water Picquet would fall on June 21; yet the 32nd Brigade would respond immediately with a series of counterattacks that developed into confused fighting as positions were won and lost by both sides.  On the night of 25 June, no less than a company of Japanese began attacking Mortar Bluff, a picquet position bereft of cover and a short distance away from Water Picquet. It was held by a small garrison of some 40-odd men of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles who had replaced the 7/10th Baluchis. In pouring rain, the Japanese first bombarded the position with mortars and guns at point-blank range. For the next few hours, the infantry repeatedly attacked the surrounded and dwindling garrison. Subedar Netra Bahadur Thapa defended the besieged position almost through the night, organizing counter-attacks with whatever ammunition and grenades his unit had left. The Japanese finally overran Mortar Bluff the next morning, with Netra Bahadur Thapa fighting to his death. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. A few hours later, a company of the same unit formed for a counterattack on Mortar Bluff. In the face of heavy fire, Naik Agan Singh Rai led his section in charging a Japanese machine-gun post and killing its crew. It then recaptured Mortar Bluff and neutralized a 37mm gun position and crew. Rai now advanced on a Japanese bunker and killed its occupants, after which his company also recovered Water Picquet. For his actions that day, Rai won the Victoria Cross, the second for the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles the same day. Faced with such counter-attacks and intense artillery fire from Gun Box, the last throw of the Japanese 33rd Division around the Silchar Track ended in failure. This left Hashimoto and Tanaka empty-handed for all the losses they had suffered. Tanaka was forced to withdraw units before they were annihilated. On July 2st the 214th Infantry, with only 400 effectives remaining, completed its withdrawal to the area south of Nouyangtek and the 151st was directed to move back to Laimanai. Having been decimated by sickness and straggling en route to the front, the strength of the entire 151st Infantry Regiment was, at that time, less than 100 men. Back in the north, Briggs' units continued to struggle for control of the Satarmaina area. The struggle over the next week centered on the main feature east of the road, the hill named Liver. The 3/9th Jats attacked repeatedly to try to dislodge the Japanese from this feature. One such attempt was made on June 15th, when Hurribombers strafed the hill, followed by heavy artillery concentrations from 25-pdrs, 3.7in  howitzers and 3in  mortars. A Jat company climbed the hill, but had to withdraw some 100 meters from its objective because of heavy machine-gun fire. At the same time, the 1/17th Dogras were sent off on a wide hook left of the road and the 3/14th Punjabis were able to secure the Octopus position by June 20.  North of them, Grover's troops would also be able to break through Maram and continue south down the road on June 20, finally meeting the Dogras two days later. Beaten, Miyazaki had nonetheless fulfilled his task and could now withdraw east towards Ukhrul. Sato's rearguard fought determinedly. Often a few men with an artillery piece, grenades and a machine-gun would take up positions on the high ground above tracks, ambushing the British advance guards before melting away to repeat the performance a few km further back or, as was often the case, remaining obstinately in their positions until they were killed. Few were free from disease and fatigue, but surrender played no part in these men's vocabulary; they fought on till overtaken by a British bullet or bayonet or, more often, by starvation and exhaustion. But the 31st Division had literally fought itself to death. Exhausted men lay in pits unable to defend themselves, suicide squads with anti-tank mines tottered towards the advancing Lee Grants and Stuarts to be mown down by accompanying infantry, or obliterated by shellfire Although the battered 31st Division would manage to survive the Kohima disaster, General Sato would be relieved of his command as he had refused to carry Mutaguchi's orders numerous times. As a result, Miyazaki was promoted to Lt-General and given temporary command of the division by the end of June. Meanwhile, though his men had resisted like demons, Matsumura now had no choice but to abandon the road and retreat east towards Ukhrul with what remained of his command due to this new threat to the north. On June 21, the Liver position would fall at last. Again, the Japanese positions were bombed and strafed from the air, this time by three squadrons of Hurribombers for half an hour. The 4th and 28th Field Regiments, as well as a troop of the 8th Medium Regiment, fired a concentration on Liver that covered it in dust and smoke. Three companies of the Jats now went in, and yet this attack was also held by the Japanese on and around Liver. They had had enough, however, and by the next morning were found to have withdrawn from the feature. The Jats suffered around 150 casualties that week, including 33 killed. The 15th Division would adopt new defensive positions at Ukhrul to cover the withdrawal of Miyazaki and Matsumura. The main force of the 15th Division then went into defense positions in a line extending generally from Ukhrul through Tongou, Shongphel and Aishan to the 3524 Pass in order to be in position to cover and pick up the Right Assault Unit and the Miyazaki Detachment as they withdrew to the east. In order to hold the new defense positions, all available men, including all those in the rear service units, were thrown into the line. Finally the Imphal-Kohima road was reopened. Slim knew while the battle was not yet over, it had already been won. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings at Biak was another allied success. The first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area saw the American Sherman's absolutely devastate Japanese Type-95's. Within the Burma front, General Slim had finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for Mutaguchi's failed offensive.  

This week on the show, I'm talking to Jassa Ahluwalia about his book and memoir, Both Not Half. Both Not Half is a poignant exploration of Jassa's own heritage – Punjabi and English – and other forms of identity including faith, class, gender and sexuality. Jassa reminds us that we are never fractions of an identity, but always whole, in a myriad of beautiful, overlapping, confusing but empowering ways. Jassa Ahluwalia is a British actor, writer, filmmaker, and trade unionist. Born in Coventry to a white English mom and a brown Punjabi dad in 1990, he attended school in Leicester and was raised in an extended family environment. He spoke English in the playground and Punjabi with his grandparents and spent various summer holidays in India. He came to prominence as Rocky in the hit BBC Three series Some Girls, followed by starring roles in Unforgotten, Ripper Street, and Peaky Blinders.Jassa created the hashtag #BothNotHalf to explore mixed identity in light of his own British-Indian heritage. His TEDx talk on “How Language Shapes Identity” has clocked up over 170k views, and his BBC One documentary Am I English? won an Asian Media Award in 2022.Both Not Half is publishing on 16th May 2024 in the UK. Get your copy here:https://uk.bookshop.org/a/5890/9781788708319----I'd love to hear your thoughts on this episode, so please do think about leaving a review, and like, subscribe and rate wherever you listen to this show :)Come connect with me on social media - I'd love to chat:www.instagram.com/readwithsamiawww.instagram.com/thediversebookshelfpod Support the Show.

Last time we spoke about the Japanese defeats at Imphal and Kohima. General Mutaguchi's Operation U-Go was gradually falling apart. General Yamauchi faced defeat afte defeat and was forced to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi. The allies then began tossing large counteroffensives while Mutaguchi was forced to change targets for Bishenpur, only to be repelled again. The allies' anvil-hammer strategy proved very effective, the Japanese lost their momentum and now the allies were seizing it. The battle for Kohima was fierce, seeing the Japanese struggle to seize key features upon it. Despite many victories in Kohima, it did not seem like the Japanese would be able to seize the entire area. Within the China theater, Operation Kogo saw the Japanese push into Luoyang, earning enormous victories over the Chinese forces. Out in the Pacific, the British eastern fleet launched a successful airstrike against Surabaya, gaining valuable experience despite minimal Japanese response. This episode is the Battle of Wakde Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A new mission was afoot, Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde Island. The nucleus of the force that would hit Wakde was to be General Doe's 163rd regiment of the 41st division. The war planners devoted a lot of time to the selection of a landing beach for Tornado. However the island was too small and her beaches were too limited to permit the landing of a reinforced regiment. Furthermore a landing on Wake would most likely be met by hidden Japanese artillery on the mainland. Thus to stop such a thing from occurring they would have to perform a landing against the mainland to eliminate artillery positions.  It was decided that a landing at Toem, on the mainland directly opposite Wakde, would not be sensible. There the landing craft and cargo ships would be subjected to small-caliber fire from Wakde. In such restricted waters the enemy could place enfilade fire on the ships, but in more open waters to the west naval fire support ships and amphibious vessels would have freedom of movement and could maneuver to neutralize both Wakde and the Toem area while the TORNADO Task Force moved ashore and set up its artillery. After consideration of all these factors, it was finally decided that the initial beachhead would be at Arare, a native settlement on the coast about three miles west of Toem and four and one-half miles southwest of Wakde Island. Additionally, the Allied Air Forces desired that radar warning stations be established in the Wakde area. For this purpose, Liki and Niroemoar Islands, about fifteen miles off Sarmi, were to be seized. As such the Tornado Task Force was going to begin landing on the mainland opposite of Wakde island at Arare on May 17th. The next day the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry would assault Wakde island, covered not only by the task force artillery but also by the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai and by naval fire support ships. After all of that, on the 19th, Liki and Niroemoar islands would be captured where radar stations would be constructed. Furthermore, in reserve would be the 128th and 158th Regiments, ready to reinforce Doe's troops if needed.  Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 was going to take charge of the operations against Wakde and Biak, with Captain Noble's Eastern Attack Group providing fire support for Operation Tornado. Captain Noble divided his fire support ships into three groups: Fire Support Group A two heavy cruisers and four destroyers, Fire Support Group B three light cruisers and six destroyers, and Fire Support Group C, ten destroyers. These ships would  begin firing on assigned targets at H minus 45 minutes and would continue bombardment until H minus 3. The bulk of the D Day fire was to be aimed at Sawar and Maffin Dromes, west of the landing beach. No resistance was expected at the beach and a light bombardment to be directed on it was purely precautionary. Some fire support ships were assigned counterbattery missions and others were to aim their shells at Wakde and Insoemanai Islands. Other ships assigned to participate in the landing phase were 3 submarine chasers, 2 destroyer-escorts, 4 minesweepers, 2 rocket-equipped submarine chasers, and 3 rocket-equipped LCIs. Rocket fire was to begin at H minus 3 minutes and was to be directed principally against the beachhead area. At H minus 1, all fire on the beach was to cease and the landing craft were to make their final dash to the shore. After the landing, the fire support ships were to shift bombardment to targets on the beach flanks and were to be prepared to deliver call fire upon request from the troops ashore. The landing on Insoemanai was to be supported by two LCI”G”s and two destroyers. Throughout the night of 17-18 May, cruisers and destroyers were to bombard Wakde and on the morning of the 18th they and the rocket-equipped vessels were to support the assault on that island. On the 19th a few destroyers were to support the landings on Liki and Niroemoar Islands. Admiral Crutchley's cruisers would shell the mainland around Sarmi and Sawar, while Admiral Berkey's cruisers would hit Wakde Island. On top of that, General Kenney's 5th Air Force would hit the Wakde-Sarmi area alongside other targets along New Guinea's northern coast. Special attention was given to enemy fields east of the Vogelkop Peninsula and on Biak Island. Japanese waterborne supply and reinforcement movements in the Geelvink Bay area were to be stopped insofar as weather, time, and the availability of aircraft permitted it. Insofar as range, weather, and time permitted, Australian bombers, aided by a Dutch squadron of B-25s, were to neutralize enemy air bases on the Arafura Sea islands and on other islands of the Indies southwest of the Vogelkop. On D minus 1 Fifth Air Force bombers were to attempt detonation of possible land mines on the mainland beach and subsurfaces mines in the waters surrounding Wakde. On the morning of D Day there was to be additional bombing west of the landing area, but there was to be no bombing or strafing of the beach immediately before the assault. Fighters were to be on air alert, weather permitting, over the Wakde area from first light to dusk on D Day. During part of the day A-20s would also be on alert over the area and were to strike Wakde. Such daily cover was to continue until aircraft could use the Wakde strip. To face this onslaught was a signal IJA company, the Japanese 9th Company of the 224th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a mountain artillery platoon and a few mortar and both light and heavy machine-gun squads from other 224th Regiment units. The strength of this combat force was about 280 men. They would be assisted by the IJN's 91st Guard Unit of about 150 men and a battery of the 53rd Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, most of whose weapons had long since been demolished by the air attacks. Alongside miscellaneous airdrome engineers and other service personnel, both Army and Navy over on Insoemoear Island, this brought the total of Japanese strength on the island to nearly 800 troops. This was all the result of General Tagami's decision to concentrate the bulk of his division in the Maffin Bay-Sawar sector, leaving the coastal stretch east of the Tor River and opposite of Wakde pretty much unguarded. A series of untoward circumstances emerged which hampered the loading process. LSTs on which the Task Force units at Aitape were to be loaded were some eight hours late reaching the staging point. When these vessels finally reached Aitape, adverse surf conditions and congestion on the shore prevented their beaching until late in the afternoon of May 13th, and loading was delayed another twelve hours. There was also some trouble about units scheduled to take part in the Wakde operation. The Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR, an important element of the Task Force, did not arrive at Aitape until the afternoon of May 12th. The battalion and its equipment could not be unloaded from the ships which had brought it to BLUE Beach from eastern New Guinea and be reloaded on LSTs of the Wakde convoy in time for the departure of the task force from Aitape, scheduled for no later than midnight on May 14th. In view of these logistic difficulties, General Doe was therefore forced to drive his troops to the limit of their endurance in order to get the loading finished on time. He solved the problem of the Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR by substituting for that unit the Shore Battalion, 593rd EBSR, which was already stationed at Aitape. Finally at 1am on the 15th, Noble's ships departed Aitape, stopping at Hollandia to load the remainder of the task force, before assembling off Arare and Wakde by dawn of the 17th. The fire support ships successfully bombarded the Japanese targets against little resistance while as Troops aboard the assault ships arose early, ate the breakfast quickly, and by 5:30 began loading on their assigned landing craft. The sea remained calm and the rain gave way to the sun shortly after dawn. Men of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, transferred from the APA's which had brought them from Aitape to the eight LCVP's of the first wave. The beach was clearly visible and its limits had been marked by colored smoke grenades dropped by cruiser-based seaplanes of the fire support units. Meeting zero opposition, the first American troops would hit the shore at 7:15, with succeeding waves rapidly arriving behind them. The 3rd Battalion then fanned out along the shore and quickly secured the Arare beachhead area, just as the remaining units were being brought to shore. Upon landing, Doe's 2nd Battalion passed through the 3rd and immediately moved eastward towards Tementoe Creek, successfully securing Toem against no opposition by 9:30.  There, the 1st Battalion assembled for the assault on Wakde while Company E was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai Island, where the Americans would successfully establish a Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to support the next day's assault. Within a few hours after the mainland beachhead had been secured, the Tornado Task Force was ready to execute the second phase of the D Day plan, the capture of Insoemanai Island, a little over 3,500 yards offshore. At about 10:45, under cover of fire from two destroyers and two rocket-equipped LCIs, a platoon of Company E, 163rd Infantry, was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai. There was no opposition to this maneuver and the islet proved to be unoccupied. Four LCMs, an LCVP, and two LCSs immediately took the rest of the company and the Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to Insoemanai. The landing of the force was rendered difficult only by the fact that a coral fringing reef made it necessary for the troops to wade ashore from about seventy-five yards out. The mortars and machine guns of the Provisional Groupment were quickly set up and began firing on Wakde. The Japanese at Wakde responding to their first bombardments with machine-gun and mortar fire, which was the only noticeable resistance of this day. At the same time, elements of the 3rd Battalion had moved west to the Tor River, successfully reaching it during the afternoon. Thus, by the end of the day, the Americans had landed a total of 7000 men and had successfully secured a firm beachhead between the Tementoe and Tor Rivers at the cost of only 2 killed and 11 wounded.  Once he received news of the landings, General Tagami ordered all his forces to prepare a counterattack to try and destroy the allied beachhead. He also ordered the Matsuyama Detachment, who were advancing towards Hollandia, to turn back to Toem as quickly as possible so they could launch and attack against the enemy from the east. Yet before the Japanese could begin their advances, General Doe's amphibious assault began. Shore-based artillery, the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai, and some of the naval fire support ships unleashed harassing fire on Wakde throughout the night. 36 A-20s of General Kenney's Fifth Air Force bombed and strafed the Japanese defenses beginning at 7:15am on the 15th. Naval bombardment lasted until 8:57 when the gunfire was aimed at the proposed landing beach on the southern shore of Wakde, and was then to be lifted to the northern side of the island. The 191st Field Artillery Group fired for twenty-three minutes on Wakde, and this bombardment was supplemented by 20-mm. and 40-mm. weapons aboard naval support vessels upon completion of the latters' fire from heavier weapons. The Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai joined in. In addition, rocket-equipped LCIs threw 850 4.5-inch rockets on the island. Noble's warships expending a total of 400 rounds of 6-inch and 1950 rounds of 5-inch ammunition against Wakde's defenses.  The Japanese had constructed many defensive positions on Wakde. There were about a hundred bunkers of various sizes and constructions. Some were made of coconut logs and dirt, others utilized cement in sacks, and a few contained concrete or lumps of coarse coral. There were many foxholes and slit trenches, and the Japanese had improved some of the bomb craters to make defensive positions. There were at least two well-constructed concrete air raid shelters and the Japanese were prepared to use the few coral caves on the eastern shore for both defense and storage. Many of the defensive positions were well camouflaged, and some were dug deep into the ground to present a low silhouette. Coconut trees toppled by pre-assault bombardments added more natural camouflage and protection to the enemy's defensive positions. The majority of the many bunkers were mutually supporting, but, on the other hand, some had been built with no apparent relationship to others. Some of the bunkers, most of the field and anti-aircraft gun positions, the airstrip, and many buildings had been severely damaged or destroyed by carrier-based aircraft during their attacks on the Wakde-Sarmi area in support of the Hollandia operation. By 9am, the first wave of LCVPS were surging forward under Japanese rifle and machine gun fire at around 300 yards range. They hit the beaches at Wakde at 9:10am. For the next 15 minutes, three rifle companies and two Sherman tanks landed against increasing fire from Japanese machine-guns and rifles in hidden positions on the flanks of the beachhead. Despite the resistance, the beachhead was quickly organized and the Americans soon began to expand the perimeter in all directions. The two tanks, with Companies B and F, started moving west to widen the initial hold. Company C struck north toward the airstrip and Company A pushed to the southeast along the small peninsula to destroy a troublesome machine gun nest on the little knoll. After destroying an enemy bunker, Company A cleared the eastern peninsula by 10:45 while Companies B and F, after meeting initial heavy resistance on the west flank, found that most opposition collapsed once the ruins of prewar plantation houses had been cleared by hand grenades and rifle fire. The two companies thereupon left the beach and swung north toward the airfield. Company C then encountered strong resistance in its drive up the center of the island, laboriously clearing a group of bunkers by 10:15 but then calling for tank support to destroy a second group in front of the airfield. At the same time, Companies B and F swung north towards the airfield, reaching its southern edge at 10:30 and then pushing eastwards. Just before 11:30  the tanks joined the infantry unit, which had now pushed halfway from the beach to the airstrip. With this added strength Company C reduced each bunker in a series of separate actions which included 75-mm. fire from the tanks, lobbing hand grenades into the bunkers' fire ports, and killing with rifle fire all Japanese who showed themselves. With Company B's aid and the continued support of the two tanks, Company C was able to push on to the airstrip. In the northeast corner of the island the Japanese forces maintained a fierce defense, and Companies B, C, and F were subjected to considerable small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire originating from positions at the eastern end of the airstrip. Movement eastward along the south side of the strip was slow, even though Companies B and F had been reinforced by Company D's heavy machine guns, which had arrived on Wakde from Insoemanai late in the morning. In the meantime, Company A was sent to aid in the mop up of the plantation houses, before turning northwest to clear the western end of Wakde. Company A pushed along the beach road and down a dispersal lane running off the southwest side of the strip. About 1245 the advance was held up by three Japanese bunkers on the right flank. Tank 75-mm. fire, delivered from as close as 20 yards, soon eliminated the Japanese defenders. Small groups of Japanese, originally hiding in foxholes behind the three pillboxes, attempted to assault the tanks with hand grenades and bayonets. Company A's automatic riflemen quickly dispersed or killed these men, and the unit pushed on around the west end of the airstrip. Little opposition was encountered in this movement and the company reached the north shore of Wakde Island about 1:30pm. Major Wing of the 1st battalion, decided to await the arrival of two more tanks from the mainland and the redisposition of Company D's weapons before attacking what promised to be the strongest Japanese defenses on Wakde. The two additional tanks were to be used wherever opposition proved heaviest, while the heavy weapons of Company D were to be equally divided between Companies B and F. Meanwhile Company C attempted to advance across the strip in support of Company A, but their movement would be delayed due to the ferocious enemy resistance. At 3:45, Company A finally restarted the drive eastwards while Companies B and F kept pushing along the airfield. Company A rapidly moved forward from the western end of the strip, passed through Company C at the halfway point, and pushed cautiously eastward. Movement after passing Company C was slowed by increasingly heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the northeast section of the island. At 6:00, when Major Wing ordered his men to dig in for the night, Company A had not quite reached the northeastern corner of the airfield. Meanwhile, south of the strip Company B had scarcely started its attack when fire from hidden Japanese machine guns held up the advance. Company F was immediately pulled out of its reserve role and committed to action on B's right flank. Two tanks were moved forward to Company B's front at the same time. Despite their best efforts and even with the tank support, Companies B and F were unable to progress more than 300 yards east of the lines of departure. Major Wing decided that since dusk was approaching it would be useless to continue the attack. The two companies were therefore halted and instructed to take up night defensive positions. Company A had set up its night perimeter about 100 yards short of the northeast corner of the airdrome. Company B was on the south side of the strip about 450 yards from the eastern end, and Company F was on B's right. Company C was pulled back to the southern side of the field and extended Company F's line to the southeast beach at the base of the small peninsula. The battalion command post was about 400 yards behind the lines of Company F. There was no connection across the strip between Companies A and B. The former was in a dangerously exposed position. However, Japanese fire against the company perimeter ceased before dark, and the Japanese did not attack. The night was fairly uneventful except at around 2:30 am on the 19th a small group of Japanese attacked a command post, defended by elements of Company D, and a half-hour fire fight raged in the darkness. Twelve Japanese were killed while three Americans, all of D Company, were wounded. This night battle did not delay the next day's attack which started, after an artillery and mortar preparation of one hour's duration, at 9:15am. Company C was the first unit under way on the 19th. Two tanks were assigned to the 3rd Platoon and one to the 2nd. The 3rd Platoon was on the left, the 2nd on the right, and the 1st and Weapons Platoons were in support. The 3rd Platoon pushed eastward up a slight rise, harassed by light rifle fire from the front and left flank. Once on top of the rise the platoon met heavy Japanese fire from behind fallen coconut trees and from a number of bunkers, bomb craters, and demolished buildings to the east. The 75-mm. guns of the tanks methodically destroyed each enemy position, and the few enemy that escaped from the bunkers were cut down by 3rd Platoon riflemen. The 2nd Platoon, followed by the rest of C Company, moved on toward the eastern beaches, and was slowed only by heavy brush near the shore. Upon turning north at the beach the company found that the Japanese had converted a number of small coral caves into minor strong points. These were slowly cleared by riflemen, tank fire, and flame throwers as the company pushed on. Meanwhile, Company B, moving east along the south edge of the airstrip, had also encountered many Japanese defensive positions. Progress was at a snail's pace. Company F, in reserve during the early part of the drive, was thrown into the fight on B's right flank about 11:30 and two tanks were sent from Company C's front to support Company B. The latter, with its zone of responsibility now nearly halved, was able to concentrate its forces for more effective operations. A rifle platoon was assigned to each tank and the remaining rifle platoon was in support. Some Japanese were found hidden in wrecks of aircraft, some of which covered bunkers, and others were in foxholes in heavy brush. This brush was difficult for soldiers afoot to penetrate but the tanks, spraying every likely hiding place with machine gun fire, rapidly broke paths through it. The advance, even with the tank support, was slow, because it was necessary to comb every square foot of ground for Japanese riflemen. It was not until 1400 that Company B reached the southeast corner of the strip. On B's right, Company F and one tank encountered similar opposition but managed to keep abreast of Companies B and C. During the late afternoon, Companies C and F turned north, while Company A advanced northeast to join up with Company B. At this point the eastern end of the field had been cleared out, the Japanese resistance began to collapse as remaining defenders formed a small triangle perimeter by 6pm. Meanwhile Liki and Niroemoar were captured by Companies E and I on the 19th. The two companies had been transported to the objectives by two APD's and two LCT's, protected by DD's. The islands proved to be unoccupied by the Japanese and the Fifth Air Force radar detachments were immediately set up. The only casualty was the native chieftain of Liki, who was wounded by the pre assault naval bombardment. Detachments of the 163d Infantry were left on both islands to protect the radar installations. The morning of the 20th, suddenly opened up with a banzai charge performed by 37 Japanese, who had slipped through Company C's lines during the night against engineer units at the beachhead. The attack began at7:30, leaving36 dead and 1 wounded Japanese, the latter was taken prisoner. At 9:00 Companies A, C, and F started patrolling in the northeast pocket. A few Japanese were killed, others were buried by demolition charges in coral caves along the northeast shore, and many committed suicide. During the afternoon Major Wing's men moved back to the mainland and turned over control of Wakde Island to the Allied Air Forces. The 836th Engineer Aviation Battalion began repairing the western end of the Wakde airdrome, with the strip being declared operational on May 21st. The first planes landed on the island that afternoon, two days ahead of schedule. Within a few more days the Wakde strip was sufficiently repaired and enlarged to furnish the needed base from which bombers could support the Biak operation on May 27 and Admiral Nimitz' advance to the Marianas in mid-June. The final count of Japanese casualties on Wakde was 759 killed and 4 captured, with an additional 50 being killed on the mainland. In turn, the Americans only lost 43 killed and 139 wounded. That is all for today on this front as we now need to cross over to the India-Burma front. Last time, we saw the forces of General Stopford managed to retake Kohima Ridge in mid May, tossing General Sato's 31st Division onto the defense. Stopford reorganized his forces for a final push. The 5th brigade led by Brigadier Michael West prepared to launch  coordinated set-piece attacks against the remaining Japanese positions atop Naga Hill. An attack was made by the Cameron Highlanders on Hunter's Hill on the night of May 15th, but it was hurled back. After this bulldozers were sent to cut a track up Naga Hill to allow tanks to support an infantry assault. On the 19th, Brigadier West launched another attack, but this time terrible weather hindered them, allowing the Worcesters to only seize 9 bunkers before being halted by enemy fire, coming from a group of bunkers on the reverse slope. After this, General Messervy of the 7th division was given responsibility for taking Naga Hill. On May 23rd, he brought with him Brigadier Loftus-Tottenham's 33rd brigade. This switch allowed General Grover to concentrate the remainder of his tired division for an attack on the Japanese positions on Aradura Spur. On the other side, Sato was exhorting his men to “You will fight to the death. When you are killed you will fight on with your spirit.” Yet Sato knew full well he lacked the ammunition and provisions necesary to hold Kohima, he would have to withdraw in short order.  Two sets of attacks were unleashed upon the Japanse, first on Japanese defences around Point 5120, known also as Church Knoll and Hunter's Hill by Messervy's 7th Indian Division on the left of the battlefield, and then of Aradura Spur by Grover's 2nd Division on the right. The 4/15th Punjab suffered a bloody reverse in these assaults, losing 18 officers and 443 casualties for not a single metre of ground in return. No combination of attacks from the air, artillery strikes, tanks, flame-throwers, infantry or mortars could dislodge Sato's men. On the Aradura Spur, Grover ordered simultaneous assaults to take place on 27th and 28th of May. On the right the Royal Scots and Norfolks were to attack the north-east end of Aradura Spur, while 6th Brigade were to take the south-west, where their objectives were named 'Matthew', 'Mark', 'Luke' and 'John'. When launched, however, 6th Brigade's attack on the 28th failed miserably. The weather was poor, the terrain atrocious and the morale of the exhausted 2nd Division the lowest it had been since its arrival. The attack by the Norfolks and the Royal Scots on the north-west spur met the same fate as the luckless 6th Brigade. The Norfolks were now down to 14 officers and 366 men, many exhausted and ill and, despite the remarkable leadership of Lt. Col. Robert Scott and above-average morale, the Japanese positions looked typically impervious to anything other than a direct tank round into each bunker, which of course was not possible in the steep, jungle-matted hillsides. Along with the intantry attacks, Naga Hill was heavily attacked by Hurricane bombers during the 24th and 25th, but the Japanese remained firmly entrenched and resolutely immovable.  The only major result of these attacks would be more casualties and a further drop in morale for the British-Indian troops. Sato's was alianted from the HQ of 15th Army, but had no doubt that it was Mutaguchi's abject failure to send supplies through the mountains that had forced him to undertake the kind of passive defense in which his division was now engaged. On May 29th, Sato thus reported that his position was hopeless, and that he reserved the right to act on his own initiative and withdraw when he felt that it was necessary to do so, in order to save what remained of his battered division from inevitable destruction. Later that day he signaled Mutaguchi: “We have fought for two months with the utmost courage, and have reached the limits of human fortitude. Our swords are broken and our arrows spent. Shedding bitter tears, I now leave Kohima.” Apoplectic with rage and astonished at his subordinate's blatant disobedience, Mutaguchi ordered Sato to stay where he was. Sato ignored him and on receipt of Mutaguchi's threat to court-martial him, replied defiantly: “Do as you please. I will bring you down with me.” The angry exchange continued, with Sato the following day sending a final angry message to Mutaguchi in which he declared: “The tactical ability of the 15th Army staff lies below that of cadets.” Sato then ordered his staff to close down the radio sets, in a final act of defiance. During the back and forth screamfest, Sato had requested Mutaguchi permis him to withdraw to a position that would allowed the 31st division to finally receive supplies, Mutaguchi simply refused and demanded he hold on another 10 days. Sato could simply not keep letting his men down, he made plans to withdraw for May 31st. The Miyazaki detachment was given the task of covering the retreat for the 31st division. On May 27th, the 4/1st Gurkhas under the newly appointed 27-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Horsford, managed to capture the Gun Spur at the extreme eastern edge of Naga Hill via a night infiltration that took the Japanese entirely by surprise. This further allowed tanks to approach the Japanese positions and, by June 1st, an attack by the Queen's discovered that the Japanese were withdrawing. Grover then thrusted his troops from the newly captured Naga Hill south-east across a valley to cut off General Miyazuki's rearguard and the 124th regiment around the Aradura Spur from the road to Imphal just behind it. Recognizing the inevitable, Miyazaki then had to withdraw from Aradura on the night of June 4, planning to conduct further delaying actions at Viswema in protection of Sato's withdrawal. Yet that is it for the battle of Kohima as we now need to travel north to see how General Vinegar Joe's offensive is going. Last time we saw General Merrill's Marauders take the Myitkyina airstrip and prepare for a siege of Myitkyina. The Chinese forces of Generals Sun and Liao were pushing the 18th division towards the Kamaing area. As for the Chindits, Major Master's 111th Brigade contuined to repel numerous Japanese attacks against the Blackpool Stronghold, without the assistance of his floater Brigades. The Japanese artillery continued to take a killing toll on the camp with their near continuous fire. They had been reinforced with even heavier 155mm guns, which together with enemy mortars positions on a ridge 1,000 yards ahead, began to pummel them. Meanwhile allied aircraft were unable to supply them adequately because of the monsoons, and General Takeda's 53rd Division was furiously approaching to crush them. On May 16th Japanese troops penetrated the defenses and a counter-attack failed to eject them. Now many positions within the perimeter came under persistent sniper fire. Shelling that evening heralded another attack. It was beaten back, leaving 50 Japanese dead. This was followed by a night attack involving two companies. This was repulsed, the enemy losing another 70 men. Master's estimated his Brigade had killed about 800 Japanese, they had also suffered 200 casualties during the last few days. Luckily for them, however, the impending threat to Myitkyina and Kamaing, forced General Honda to redirect the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment to reinforce the Myitkyina garrison while the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment continued north to reinforce General Tanaka.  At this point Masters wanted to withdraw deeper into the jungle, from where they could ambush the advancing Japanese and set up a new stronghold with the help of 14th Brigade and West Africans, who were probing the jungle ridges east of them. He signaled Lentaigne asking for permission to abandon the block at his discretion. But Lentaigne's authority had become reduced. He was forced to take the message to Stilwell, who having been thwarted at Myitkyina, had allowed the Hyde to his Jekyll to emerge. In scathing language, he called the British “a bunch of lily-livered Limey popinjays.” Lentaigne then let his Irish temper get the better of him, and a fierce argument erupted at Stilwell's headquarters. Then on May 22nd, General Takeda's 53rd Division reached the stronghold. They unleashed an all-out assault, the Cameronians of 90th Column, who held the southern perimeter, were being forced back, inch by inch, as the Chindit artillery engaged the Japanese assaulters over open sights. Soon the airstrip was in enemy hands, prompting the Bofors 40mm AA gunners to lower their quadruple barrels and blaze away at the enemy troops. The pyrotechnics took on a fantastic quality as night fell. At dawn on the 23rd, the Japanese withdrew to just beyond the airstrip, as 10 Japanese fighters swept in to strafe and bomb the British. Their attack proved almost leisurely compared to the artillery and infantry strikes. When the fighters departed, the Japanese artillery and machineguns resumed. Masters called for a supply drop of ammunition as the previous night's expenditure had been massive, but necessary. Eight RAF Dakotas appeared that afternoon, in light rain, low, just over the hills, twisting and turning over the forested peaks. Nearing Blackpool, they straightened out and flew level. Doors opened, parachutes streamed and crates of supplies came from the sky. A storm of fire erupted from the Japanese positions. The heavy AA guns joined in, the boom-boom-booms of their heavy fire becoming rhythmic in the distance. The wing of a Dakota vanished and plane fell like a twirling leaf, crashing into the jungle across from the “Deep.” Two other planes in their haste to evade fire nearly crossed streams; their payloads hurled far and wide, most of falling into Japanese hands. In all, four Dakotas were shot down. The defenders only managed to get a half an aircraft's load of ammunition. Despite this the Chindits continued to resist the furious Japanese assaults; but before dawn on May 24th, the Japanese would finally overrun a hillock known as the Pimple, held by Harper's 3/9th Gurkhas. Harper mounted an immediate counterattack. Harper's Gurkhas struggled to dislodge the Japanese from the “pimple,” but failed. The defenders threw machine-gun fire and hurled mortar bombs towards the hillock with little apparent effect. The failed counterattack would only see the Japanese secure the Silly Point positions and advance rapidly east and south as the defenses progressively collapsed before them.  By May 25, Masters was forced to withdraw while his forces still had enough ammunition to defend themselves. There were 90 men that could not walk without help and another 30-40 that could not walk at all. A doctor summoned Masters to a group of 40-50 disheveled men, many wounded, but still standing, carrying stretchers from the Main Dressing Station. They were now on the evacuation path, now largely devoid of fighting troops. None of the walking wounded would look Masters in the eye. The stretchers and litters were also full of men with horrific wounds; 19 in all. To Masters' distress, the doctor said there were another 30 such cases ahead who could be saved if they were evacuated. He had given the 19 here full doses of morphine and said, under the thundering noise of the rain, that the men had no chance. It dawned on Masters that the doctor was suggesting that these men be put out of their misery. Master's said “Very well. I don't want them to see any Japanese,” The dotor cried “Do you think I want to do it?” But Masters was already seeking a way out. “Get the stretcher bearers on at once” he snapped. As he went back up the ridge towards what was left of the camp, he heard the carbine shots going off one by one along the line of casualties. He pressed his hands on his ears to blot out the sound, but couldn't. Masters and his subordinate commanders decided to withdraw in stages, with the forward line of defenders leapfrogging over a second line of the defenders covering them from a defensive position, known as a layback. This second line, were in turn, then to be covered by the troops now behind them, allowing them to leapfrog to the next covering position, a formula which could be repeated for as long as possible, and as long as the ground permitted it. The Chindits would have to begin a long and difficult hill climb away from Blackpool,  towards the rallying point of Mokso Sakan. Luckily for them, Takeda decided not to pursue them, as he had been redirected to reinforce Myitkyina instead. The victory was very costly, however, as the 128th Regiment lost about 400 men; but at last the Mogaung-Indaw route had been reopened after a three month's blockade. On May 29th, the survivors of the 111th Brigade would finally reach Mokso Sakan, bringing with them 2000 men whom required immediate hospitalization. In the end, the Blackpool Stronghold, desired by Lentaigne and Stilwell, had been a costly endeavor for the Chindits. Meanwhile, over with the 22nd Division, a failed envelopment maneuver by Task Force Purple, consisting of elements of the 149th regiment and former Galahad evacess, prompting Liao on the 19th to send the 65th regiment to aid the 64th regiments right flank and cut a trail south towards the Mogaung valley. The chinese hastily advanced to Chishidu, pushing the Japanese 1st company, 56th regiment over to Nanyaseik. Further east, Tanaka's right flank in the Mogaung valley was beginning to crumble against the 38th divisions offensive. This prompted Tanaka to reinforce the 1st battalion, 55th regiment with the 146 regiment. Tanaka ordered Major General Aida Shunji, commander of the 18th infantry group to block the Chinese advance in the mountainous region north of Kamaing. Despite this, General Sun had sent his 114th regiment hooking west behind the Japanese strongpoints, soon they would link up with the 113th to clear the Japanese from West Wala, Maran and Sharaw. Simultaneously, the 112th regiment managed to secure Warang on the 20th. Thus despite all his efforts, Tanaka's right flank was going to collapse. At this point, the 18th Division's daily ration of staple food was only 100 grams of rice the regular quantity being 860 grams and there was no supply of auxiliary rations. Moreover, as the supply of ammunition was cut off, the use of ammunition was limited to only four rounds per day and, as there was no gasoline, vehicles could not be used. Cases of malaria and malnutrition occurred successively and the number of men to one company dropped to about 30. As an extreme case, there was even a company of about 15 men led by a sergeant. About this time, the officers of the 18th Division also learned that there was no chance of the Japanese counter offensive in the Hukawng Valley on which so many hopes had been staked, for the U operation was failing "miserably." Their morale began to sag, and in Tanaka's later opinion this realization marked the "turning point" for his division.  In order to deliver a killing blow, Sun elected to dispatch the 112th regiment wide around the Japanse eastern flank to cut the Kamain Road south of Seton, while the 114th regiment advanced down the Kumon Range towards Tumbonghka and Mogaung. The 112th managed to slip past the Aida Detachment whom were holding a position at the village of Lawa and would emerge out of the jungle in the rear of Tanaka's lines on the 25th. The Chinese crossed the Mogaung river by the 26th and captured a supply center at Seton. The Chinese captured 35 Japanese trucks, a jeep, a sedan, 8 warehouses of food and ammunition, 100 horses, 4 pieces of artillery, a workshop, and a motor pool. They then set up a roadblock, prompting Tanaka to strip his divisional HQ and other servicable units to get a force together to hit the 112th as quickly as possible. At the same time Tanaka ordered the 4th regiment to hit the roadblock from the north while the recently arrived 2nd battalion, 146th regiment would hit them from the south. Tanaka also ordered his engineers to cut a secret escape route running from the Noidaw Bum to the Bumrawng Bum via Noidawyang. Takeda's 53rd division had just reached Mogaung as they dispatched a depleted 3rd battalion, 128th regiment towards Seton to relive Myitkyina. Seeing the enemy positions emerge at Chishidu and Seton, Tanaka finally decided to withdraw his division to the Kamaing area on the 28th, while his engineers vigerously were constructing fortifications. The Aida detachment would secure Lawa on the right flank, while the 55th and 56th regiments concentrated in the vicinity of Nanyaseik to cover the withdrawal of rear echlon units to Kamaing. Over at the Seton roadblock, the 112th regiment repeled relentless Japanese attacks, throuhg flood weather.  Meanwhile, Myitkyina was seeing its first two days of siege. The 150th regiment were halted by heavy enemy fire at the railroad yards, suffering 671 casualties on May 20th. K Force took the suburban village of Charpate, north-northwest of Myitkyina, and the 88th Regiment extended its lines south to the railway tracks, which in this area run northwest before turning south to Mogaung. Unfortunately, K Force did not occupy a small height which dominated Charpate. M Force took the little settlement of Namkwi without opposition, in order to shield the Allies against any Japanese attempt to relieve Myitkyina by an attack from Mogaung. General Merrill's forces were now so placed that Japanese reinforcements could reach Myitkyina only from across the Irrawaddy River to the east or along the Myitkyina-Mankrin or Myltkyina-Radhapur roads from the north. The Allied troops were disposed in a semicircle covering all approaches from the northwest, west, southwest, and south. So far, enemy activity was slight in this area. Even at the airfield the continual sniping did not prevent the planes from landing with an ever increasing amount of supplies. If General Merrill retained these positions, he could make a coordinated attack on Myitkyina. For this purpose he was forming a Myitkyina Task Force, which involved reshuffling of all the units under his command. H and K Forces were dissolved; the Marauder battalions were once more combined under Colonel Hunter; and the Chinese regiments operated as separate units.The opportunity to swiftly overrung Myitkyina emerged, as many troops under Major General Minakami Genzo were rushing through enemy gaps during the night to reinforce the battered 114th regiment. On May 30th, Minakami took command over the 3000 man garrison and ordered Myitkyina be held for atleast 3 months to keep the allies from advancing south into central Burma. On the allied side, Merrill suffered a heart attack and had to be evacuated. Colonel John McCammon assumed commander of the Myitkyina Task Force. McCammon immediately ordered Colonel Hunter's 3rd battalion to seize the auxiliary airstrip north of Myitkyina, but the Marauders would be halted by stiff Japanese defenses. Gaps were numerous through which the Japanese could work their way into Myitkyina, and Minakami set up a regular ferry service across the Irrawaddy by which supplies and individual replacements could be brought in. The terrain was excellent for defense. The roads lay high above the surrounding rice paddies, and each was therefore an earthwall making a first-rate obstacle. Clumps of trees were all about, and there were plenty of houses on the outskirts of town which the Japanese used to advantage. The northern part of the Japanese perimeter was well shielded by a crescent-shaped depression which the monsoon rains quickly turned into a swamp. In effect, the Allies and the Japanese were committed to position warfare. Though the operation was called a siege, the Japanese received a steady trickle of supplies and replacements until Mogaung fell. Colonel Hunter and his men would be forced to withdraw back to Charpate the following day. At 10pm on the night of May 23rd a battalion of Japanese launched an attack on Charpate from the rise northeast of the town. Beach's force had been depleted by sickness, and some of his men were out on patrol. The Japanese attack penetrated the 3rd Battalion's position early in the action. From the south 75-mm artillery supported the battalion's defense. The Marauders, fighting stubbornly, repelled the attack, but they suffered severe casualties. On the morning of May 24th at 9:335, the 3rd Battalion had to face still another attack. The fight was going badly when Hunter ordered Beach to break contact with the enemy and move to the railroad, 22 miles to the south. The Japanese occupied Charpate and held it in force as soon as the 3rd Battalion withdrew. McCammon had also ordered the 88th and 89th regiments to attack Myitkyina, but the Chinese barely advanced that day. Two days later the Japanese, supported by mortar fire, attacked Namkwi heavily, and the 2nd Battalion pulled back to a ridge about halfway to Myitkyina. The Japanese then occupied Namkwi and fortified it strongly. They had now taken over two of the towns on the main approaches to Myitkyina. Depressed by these defeats, McCammon was relieved of his command and Stilwell replaced him with General Boatner on May 30. Stilwell was becoming desperate, resorting to sending reinforcements of any kind, with two engineer battalions and a group of replacements and evacuees of Galahad arriving between May 26 and June 1.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings against Wakde, while perhaps a bit overkill, saw the allies yet again showcase the prowess in amphibious assaults. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually becoming an allied victory and Vinegar Joe's first big foray against Myitkyina was painful but looked promising.

Last time we spoke about the remarkable success of Operation Reckless and Persecution.  Colonel Oliver Newman led the drive towards Hollandia's airfields, encountering scattered opposition and discovering large undefended Japanese supply dumps. General MacArthur was forced to postpone future plans until May 21st. Meanwhile, Allied submarine interceptions disrupted IJN troop movements, and Task Force 58's airstrikes neutralized Truk. Within Burma, General Stilwell's offensive faced challenges from Japanese resistance and heavy monsoon rains. Despite setbacks, the 22nd Division aimed to capture Inkangahtawng while Chinese forces engaged the enemy along various fronts. Chindits continued Operation Thursday, facing logistical hurdles and Japanese attacks. Colonel Kinnison's Marauders encountered strong resistance near Tingkrukawng, while Colonel Hunter's force successfully surprised the Japanese at Myitkyina.  This episode is the Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are jumping right back into the heat of General Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go. Poor General Yamauchi after suffering a devastating defeat at Nungshigum, was now facing allied tanks he simply had no answer for. Yamauchi ordered his men to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi, basically so they would at least be hung around the Kohima-Imphal road. The allies answer to this was 6000 sorties, dropping 1000 bombs in the sector. It was a tremendous amount of damage, but the Japanese did benefit from bunkers. Yamauchi's 15th Division due north of Imphal were now being contained successfully, allowing General Briggs and Roberts to initiate their own counter offensives by the end of April. Simultaneously the 33rd Division was struggling to advance upon Bishenpur and the Shenam Saddle; over at Kohima, General Sato's 31st Division was reluctantly falling onto the defensive as the looming threat of a full British-Indian counteroffensive was dawning upon them. Imphal was still facing a grave threat from the Japanese along the Tiddim Road. Mutaguchi was personally directing the 33rd Divisions actions around Bishenpur at this time. Mutaguchi planned a three-pronged attack, one prong along the Tiddim Road, another down south from the Silchar Track by the 215th Regiment and a lastly from the north by the 214th Regiment. For the assault the 33rd Division received reinforcements in the form of the 14th Tank Regiment; the 2nd Battalion, 18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment; and the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion from the Yamamoto Detachment. In late May they would also be receiving the 151st regiment and the 14th Tank regiment, amongst other units. This of course meant other units like the Yamamoto Detachment were being deprived of men, thus they in turn would be reinforced. The Yamamoto Detachment received the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment who were previously engaged with the Chindits at Indaw. They would arrive at Kampang after the fall of Crete West. Now in preparation for Mutaguchis renewed offensive the IJA would be tossing aircraft against the Gun Box in Bsihenpur. The Japanese Army Air Force made four air raids on the Gun Box position in Bishenpur in the first ten days of May. There was good reason for this, for at Gun Box the 32nd Indian Brigade had concentrated its artillery support. This included four 3.7in. howitzers, eight 25-pdrs, six 6-pdrs and three A/A guns. From here the guns were able to support the infantry's actions both on and around the Silchar Track, as well as the villages on the Tiddim Road such as Potsangbam. The Japanese heavy field artillery was at Khoirentak. The 215th regiment meanwhile performed some preliminary attacks against the positions at Ngarangial. Attacks began in early May against positions between Wireless Hill and Ngarangial, with two battalions attacking from the north and one from the south. The enemy, in strong positions, withstood a series of attacks which continued until the middle of May. While Mutaguchi waited for reinforcements to arrive so he could renew his southern offensive, Generals Yamamoto and Gracey were slugging it out for control over Crete West. The extremely exhausted 3rd battalion, 213 Regiment finally made a break through against the Lynch Pimple on the 8th,  forcing the 80th Brigade to evacuate Crete West two days later. On the night of the 10th, Yamamoto launched his first attacks against Scraggy Hill, which was extensively shelled, followed by a massive infantry assault: in classic style, wave upon wave of Japanese soldiers crashed on Scraggy, overwhelming its forward defenses. A point was finally reached in the night when the British battalion commander on Scraggy felt that the hill would fall unless supporting artillery fire was directed on his own positions. This was called in and the Japanese advance finally halted on the morning of 11th. But parts of Scraggy were now under the control of Yamamoto Force, which dug in. General Scoones reacted by relieving the exhausted 20th Division with the fresher 23rd Division of General Roberts. The new arrivals were shocked to see the conditions on the forward positions of the Shenam Saddle. Scraggy stood out. The Japanese were on part of the hill, while the rest of it was under British control. Trenches and bunkers covered the feature; in places, mere meters separated the two sides' front trenches. Bits of body parts of soldiers lay everywhere and a terrible stench covered the hillside. Now Cowan was planning a counter to Mutaguchis incoming offensive. He planned for an anvil and hammer maneuver; the hammer would be the 63rd Indian Brigade recently relieved from Sekmai in the first week of May by the 89th Indian Brigade. They would push down from Bishenpur towards Potsangbam, Ningthoukhong and even further south while the 48th Brigade established a roadblock on the Tiddim Road around Torbung, deep behind enemy lines. Cowan hoped to crush the 33rd Division along the road between his hammer and anvil while also cutting off the incoming Japanese reinforcements. Thus Brigadier Ronald Cameron's 48th Brigade stealthily advanced south along the eastern shore of Lake Loktak, crossed the Manipur River at Shuganu. It was a long grueling march. Simultaneously, Brigadier Guy Burton's 63rd Brigade advanced south against Potsangbam on the 10th. In their frustrated push southwards on the Tiddim Road, Burton's men had to deal first with the determined Japanese defense of Potsangbam. Burton took over on the 9th from Mackenzie's 32nd Indian Brigade, which had gained a foothold in the village the day before and was now to give its full attention to the Silchar Track. The 63rd Indian Brigade put in a first attack on Potsangbam on 10th. This involved two Gurkha battalions, each supported by a troop of tanks from the 3rd Carabiniers. The area they targeted was the main part of the village east of the Tiddim Road. The initial full frontal attacks failed to make much progress. Burton then changed tack against the Japanese, who had withdrawn to their main defenses south of the Potsangbam turel. He called for a heavy artillery bombardment from the same direction as before in the northern half of Potsangbam to make it appear that he was repeating the previous line of attack. Except this time he instructed one of his battalions to pass secretly behind the other and make for the area to the immediate east of the road. The move worked and the road through the village and its immediate vicinity were captured by the 15th. The Tiddim Road through Potsangbam was now open, although the Japanese still held on in parts of the village. But it had all taken much longer than expected. While the anvil at Torbung was about to be put in place, the hammer had only inched forward. After a long and difficult march, the brigade arrived near Torbung in mid-May. The roadblock was set up on 17th where three nullahs crossed the road near Milestone 33. To the east were several low-lying hills where brigade headquarters was established, centered on one called Point 3404. The sluggish Khuga River flowed between the hills and the road. In the Torbung sector, the Americas surprised Lt. Colonel Matsuki of the 33rd Supply Regiment, who was given the mission of reopening the line of communications using whatever troops were available in the immediate area. A composite company from the 33rd Supply Regiment, which had been deployed in the Mountainous area west of Churachandpur, held Hill 4358 against several enemy attacks. On the night of 17th, approximately 100 men of the 33rd Supply Regiment were gathered from rear elements to make the first attack on the roadblock. The attacking group was mounted on trucks and the leaders miscalculating the location of the enemy position drove squarely up to the roadblock and the entire attacking unit was virtually annihilated. Mutaguchi reacted furiously to this by unleashing artillery fire upon Point 3404 and the roadblock from the surrounding hills. Cameron's guns responded with retaliatory fire. Simultaneously Mutaguchi tossed his 1st battalion, 67th regiment against the Torbung roadblock, but Cameron's men held on inflicting tremendous casualties against the Japanese. Meanwhile Burton unleashed an attack against the hills immediately west of the road in the hopes of cutting off the supply line of the 214th and 215th Regiments. The 63rd rigade set off on 18th; the next day it had captured the villages of Tokpa Khul and Kha Aimol, and near them Three Pimple Hill and OP Hill respectively. This directly threatened the 33rd Divisions HQ at Laimanai. Mutaguchi reacted by abandoning the assaults from the west and south, and redirected the 215th Regiment to deal with Burton's 63rd division. All three of Sasahara's battalions were thrown into the counterattack, the first of which went in on the 20th. Another major assault was made two days later; both were driven off. The Japanese lost over 110 men. But they persisted and put in further attacks over the next week, frustrating any further movement southwards for the 63rd Indian Brigade. The Japanese failed to clear Burton's position, their relentless attacks would completely pin down the 63rd Brigade, thus preventing any further movement southwards.  Now at this point the 32nd Brigade had managed to recapture Wireless Hill, prompting Mutaguchi to abandon Potsangbam by the 24th. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment and 2nd battalion, 213th Regiment fell back to Ningthoukhong. Mutaguchi then tossed another battalion to help out in the attack against Burton's 63rd division. Without further support of the hammer, Cameron's anvil force had to repel a coordinated tank-infantry attack on the 21st and again on the 23rd. The 2nd Battalion, 154th Infantry Regiment and a composite company from the 14th Tank Regiment attacked on the 21st and again on the 23rd but were not only unsuccessful in dislodging the enemy, but also suffered extremely heavy losses. Two tanks were destroyed during these attacks. Though the anvil held firm, Burton's failed attempts to continue the push south would ultimately force Cameron to abandon the roadblock and head back.  On May 24th, the 48th Brigade was fighting through Bishenpur heading up the road finally linking up with the other brigade around Potsangbam. Thus the Torbung roadblock was an enormous success for Cowan, his men had inflicted 500 casualties and disrupted Mutaguchi's plan completely. Now Mutaguchi chose to go ahead with only part of his original plan, the attack from the north that would be carried out by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi's 214th regiment. To oversee the Bishenpur offensive,  Major-General Tanaka Nobuo was appointed in command of the 33rd Division. Leaving Bungte on the night of the 19th, Sakuma's 1st battalion advanced south to attack Bishenpur from the north, while the 2nd battalion moved north from Wainen and attacked Hill 2926. Yet as they tried to storm Point 2926, they were beaten off by a platoon of the 7/10th Baluchs. Failing to take the peak, they captured the southern part of the feature and parts of the adjacent Maibam village. The 1st battalion proceeded with their assault against Bishenpur targeting the area at the northern end of the village, near the junction between the Tiddim Road and the Silchar Track. This is also the area where the Gun Box was. Once they had managed to infiltrate the road junction area, however, the Japanese were repeatedly counter-attacked in the next few days, British tanks firing on their positions at close range. Without any anti-tank guns and the British tanks firing on their positions at close range, they were ultimately wiped out.  Back over with the 2nd Battalion, they had successfully captured Maibam village and Hill 2926, very close to Cowan's headquarters, so the British would have to direct several reinforcements to lay siege on these enemy positions. Early on the 26th, Sakuma directed a composite company to launch a last charge on Bishenpur from the north, but this attack would also end in failure. Cowan then directed the brigade-strength Woodforce to evict the Japanese from Hill 2926.  Woodforce consisted of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade's HQ, commanded by Brigadier Woods and was a composite force of tanks, artillery, sappers and infantry. Taking over the front on the 26th, Woodforce mounted robust counter-attacks over the next two days, finally overcoming all opposition and recapturing the hill and Maibam by the 29th. With most of the 33rd Division fighting to reopen the Tiddim road at Torbung, Sakuma's 214th Regiment was left to extricate itself as best it could. But the fall of the Torbung roadblock on the 24th also allowed Mutaguchi's reinforcements to finally reinforce Ningthoukong in preparation for an attack on Potsangbam.  At this point, the balance of power had shifted very definitely to the allies. Sakuma's early success at Hill 2926 was the closest any Japanese would get to Imphal from the south. Meanwhile General Yamamoto's attacks against the Shenam Saddle resumed on the 20th, with his men rushing the crest of Scraggy in waves throwing gelignite bombs and grenades, but ultimately getting pushed back each time. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment and 1st battalion, 60th regiment began an attack against Gibraltar, a very steep hill along the saddle. Their initial attacks were repelled easily, but on the night of the 23rd they managed to gain a foothold on Gibraltar's crest and this in effect cut off the 37th Indian brigade at Malta and Scraggy. With the Fourteenth Army units on Malta and Scraggy cut off, the fate of the entire Shenam Saddle now hung in the balance, but the very next day the hill was recovered by a counter-attack led by the 5/6th Rajputana Rifles and 3/10th Gurkha Rifles. Gibraltar would be the farthest the Japanese would be able to advance on the Shenam Saddle and the closest they came to breaking through; and from then on, a stalemate developed with neither side making any important moves. After the Japanese had been evicted from Gibraltar on the 24th, they did not follow up with another major attempt to push through the Shenam Saddle for a fortnight. But there was never really a quiet moment on these heights. Sniper fire was ever-present, as was the booming of artillery guns. The situation was the worst on Scraggy, where both sides continued to maintain their respective positions. The British and Indian units here would be fired on from Nippon Hill, besides being subjected to rifle fire, mortaring and grenade attacks from Scraggy itself. To the north, General Brigg's resumed his counteroffensive against Molvom, tossing his 9th Brigade into a series of attacks against the Japanese held Hump. The infantry put in several attacks against the Hump, suffering increasing casualties. The men of the 3/14th Punjabis attacked Hump at least half a dozen times that month. Despite it all, the Japanese were still found in their bunkers at the end of May. Sited on the reverse slopes of Hump, their bunkers were difficult to target by guns firing from the other side. Even when they were hit, they were so solidly built that they suffered little damage. The defenders of Hump would wait until the 3/14th Punjabis neared the crest; they would then let loose a barrage of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks. Attack after attack had to be called off in the face of such furious resistance. Though heavy artillery and mortar fire and repeated air strikes were called in on it, the tenacious Japanese defenders would successfully repel all British-Indian attacks throughout early May.  On the other side, realizing the vital need for artillery support, General Yamauchi decided to bring to the front the field guns that had been left east of the Chindwin River. He also was reinforced with the 2nd Battalion, 67th Regiment, which would seize Lamu on May 10th, securing the rear of the 15th Division. On the 15th, thanks to the timely arrival of the 89th and 123rd Brigades, Briggs was able to renew his assaults in front of Sekmai with greater intensity, finally clearing Kanglatongbi and the hills to the immediate east six days later.  Colonel Matsumura responded by creating new defensive positions around Modbung. As the month came to a close, Briggs decided to concentrate both his division's brigades on the Imphal–Kohima Road. The 9th Indian Brigade was to be brought on to the road, swapping places with the 89th Indian Brigade, which would move to the Iril River Valley. The opening of the Imphal–Kohima Road was a far greater priority than clearing the Mapao– Molvom Range. The Japanese defenders of the latter would be left where they had hung on for weeks. In any case, the opening of the road was likely to encourage them much more to leave than any direct attacks on their positions.  On May 15th Yamauchi was relieved of his command. Yamauchi had really drawn the short end of the straw. As he admitted at the time, his men simply had no answer to the British tanks. His men had thrown themselves into the jungle as lightly as possible in order to strike Imphal quickly, so they did not have effective anti-tank weapons. Ymauchi's division was always the Japanese weak spot, but they valiantly had refused to lift their roadblock at Kanglatongbi. As a last desperate throw, Yamauchi had ordered the use of poison gas. Yamauchi was also a man who understood how strong the allies were, especially America. Unlike the xenophobic and ignorant Tojo and Mutaguchi, Yamauchi had spent time in the USA and this led him to be quite pessimistic. Regardless, without anti-tank weapons it was quite hopeless. Yamauchi was carried from the battlefield on a litter and would later die in a hospital in Maymyo. Back over at Kohima, Generals Stopford and Grover were continuing their counteroffensive. Brigadiers 4th Brigade were occupying Oaks Hill when on May 1st, they began to descend during  The Royal Scots stopped their advance and reoccupied Oaks Hill, the brigade artillery back in Jotsoma was on standby to pound any Japanese positions the Norfolks, who were pressing on down the ridge, encountered. The Japanese, alert now to the dangerous presence of enemy troops above them, moved up against Oaks Hill and fought hard to expel the Royal Scots during that first night, with no success. The morning that followed a night of screaming, fear-inducing attacks found the jungle undergrowth littered with Japanese bodies. It was usual practice for the Japanese to take away their dead and wounded, but on this occasion there were too few Japanese survivors for the task. As the Royal Scots repelled numerous enemy counterattacks, the Norfolks were continuing their descent towards the GPT ridge. On May 4th, the Norfolks found themselves in a good position to assault the crests of the ridge. They stormed up catching the Japanese by surprise, managing to seize numerous bunkers. At the same time, the 161st Brigade was able to seize the area southeast of Two Tree Hill, but the Japanese had a complex bunker system there preventing them from linking Jotsoma with Pulebadze. The bunker complex on GPT Ridge was much more substantial than the British had expected, with literally dozens of small, carefully sited bunkers littering the entire area with interlocking arcs of fire, while the entire position was also covered by Japanese machine guns further to the east on the Aradura Spur. No sooner would one be discovered and attacked, than another would open up against the attackers from somewhere else. Until the entirety of GPT Ridge was cleared, Goschen's brigade could not enjoy the shortcut through to Jotsoma via Two Tree Hill; the road to Imphal remained in Japanese hands and their machine guns continued to spray fire on 6th Brigade's exposed right flank. Within the center the 6th Brigade was attacking Kuki Piquet and FSD Hill. While the attack against Kuki Piquet was not seeing much progress, they did gain a toehold atop FSD Hill. Further north, the 5th Brigade were able to bypass the 138th regiments position on Merema Ridge. They managed to secure a small part of Naga Village by the end of the day. Being close in proximity to General Sato's HQ, the response from the Japanese was a series of fierce counterattacks. THe 33rd battalion, 14th regiment stormed the Cameron Highlanders who did not have time to consolidate their success by digging in, and heavy Japanese mortar fire at daylight forced the Jocks back to the western edge of the hill. Here Hawkins had them dig to secure the ground that had been seized and the Worcesters, who had protected the flanks of the night advance, were called up to help build a defensive position able to resist counterattack. The rain was by now constant. Everyone was drenched to the skin. The next morning the Japanese Air Force made one of their occasional forays into the deep valley that flowed out of the Kohima Ridge westward, but to limited effect.  Meanwhile Brigadier Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's newly arrived 33rd Brigade was in the process of reinforcing the exhausted 6th Brigade at Kohima Ridge, with preparations being made for a renewed general counteroffensive. Meanwhile, over on Pulebadze on the 6th, B Company of the Norfolks, commanded by Captain Jack Randle, was ordered to seize the remaining part of the bunker position at the bottom of GPT Ridge, while the 4/lst Gurkhas of , assisting the breakthrough in the center against Kohima Ridge and Jail Hill, were to attack the lower, western slopes of GPT Ridge. In these attacks the Norfolks were to seize the remaining Japanese bunkers but at high cost, in which Capt. Randle was awarded the posthumous VC.  The Norfolks remained in the positions they had seized and, after a night of heavy rain, a further attempt to attack the remaining Japanese positions was made at first light on the morning of 7 May by the 4/lst Gurkhas and the Royal Scots. It was important that this operation was successful, as at 10.30am an attempt was to be made by the 1st Queen's - part of 33rd Indian Brigade, who had arrived at Kohima exhausted and malaria-ridden from Arakan the day before - on Jail Hill. If the machine-gun nests on GPT Ridge could be wiped out before the Queen's attacked they would enjoy a much higher chance of success. The only result of this failed assault would be the death of Brigadier Goschen, shot by snipers.  The Queen's, aware that 4th Brigade had not managed to secure GPT Ridge, nevertheless went in against Jail Hill as planned and were slaughtered. In retrospect the attack was premature, but Stopford continued to demand speed to remove the Japanese stranglehold on Kohima in order to relieve beleaguered Imphal. There was a belief in some higher quarters - held in particular by those whose only experience of the terrain came from reading a map in the comfort of a headquarters tent in the rear - that 2nd Division's offensive lacked pace. These accusations were preposterous to the hard-pressed men on the ground. It was impossible for commanders and staff officers in the rear who could not see the ground to understand how a small piece of jungle-topped hillside could absorb the best part of a brigade; how a small group of well-sited bunkers could hold up an advance until every single one - together with every single occupant - had been systematically destroyed; how only medium artillery could penetrate the roof of a Japanese trench; how only direct and short-range sniping by Lee/Grant tanks was guaranteed to defeat a Japanese bunker; how the desperate terrain, incessant rain and humidity led even the fittest men to tire quickly and what an extraordinarily determined opponent they faced. With few exceptions, the Japanese gave in only when they were dead. Every conscious man who could lift a weapon fought until he collapsed.  Due to these defeats, the British-Indian morale plummeted, even though Sato's men were also facing a serious supply problem that was further weakening them with each passing day.  Nevertheless, the Japanese continued a brave defense under heavy artillery, mortar and aerial bombardment. Sato's defensive technique, while it was not going to enable him to break through Kohima by dint of offensive action, was designed to do the next best thing: to draw the enemy onto defences of great complexity and depth and to break them there, both physically and morally. In so doing his troops had to withstand the sort of conditions few other soldiers in history could have survived. They did so, and very nearly succeeded in persuading Stopford that battering through Kohima was an impossible task. Between the 4th and the 'Black 7th', for instance, the 38 3.7in. mountain guns dug in around Jotsoma fired over 3,000 rounds, the 48 25-pdrs fired over 7,000 rounds and the big 5.5in. guns of the medium artillery fired more than 1,500 shells at the Japanese positions, not to mention the almost continuous salvoes from the 3in. mortars of the infantry battalions and the constant strafing and bombing by Hurricanes and Vengeance dive-bombers. For the next few days, General Stopford's brigades were slowly reducing the Japanese defenses. British progress, though slow, remained sure, even though it seemed to the troops on the ground as if this battle would go on for ever. 4th Brigade cleared GPT Ridge on 11 May, by which time further costly attacks by the British 6th and 33rd Indian Brigades had finally forced the Japanese to relinquish their hold on Pimple, FSD and Jail hills, the latter of which was captured by the Queen's and C Company, 4/lst Gurkha Rifles. The tide was slowly - and painfully - beginning to turn. On the days that followed, the positions seized on 11 and 12 May were carefully consolidated, the remaining Japanese being exterminated one by one, sniper by sniper and gun by gun. The Berkshires cleared FSD Hill on 12 May, discovering that the Japanese had honeycombed the hill with tunnels, creating an elaborate underground fortress that included a battalion headquarters, repair shop, ammunition storage dump and hospital. Those Japanese bunkers on the western edge of the ridge that remained out of reach of the British artillery could now be engaged directly and at pointblank range by the Lee/Grants, trundling up the road that divides DIS and Jail hills. They did so to the cheers of the British and Indian infantry, who found themselves hugging the ground as the 75mm smashed the enemy foxholes only metres from them, the ground shaking and the shockwave of the blast sucking out their breath and showering them with dirt and debris. The capture of the southern part of Kohima Ridge a full 37 days after the arrival of Sato's units would force the Japanese to retreat to a secondary defensive line north of Aradura. On the 15th, patrols of the 5th Brigade advanced down from Naga Hill, securing Treasury Hill before meeting up with the exhausted victors of Kohima Ridge who were advancing along the Imphal road. Yet that is all for the India front, as we now need to jump back over to check out what is going on with Operation Ichi-Go. After the fall of Xuchang, General Uchiyama dispatched some units south to attack Luohe, while the bulk of his 12th Army advanced north to capture Luoyang and hopefully annihilate General Enbo's 31st Army Group. On May 2nd, General Uchiyama dispatched the 110th Division against Dengfeng, the 62nd Division against Yuzhou and the bulk of his 37th Division, 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigade against Jia and Ruzhou. On 2nd, the 4th Cavalry Brigade defeated the enemy force in the sector southwest of Yingchiaochen and, on the 4th, advanced to the sector northwest of Linju. The 3rd Armored Division routed the retreating enemy heading west and, on the 4th, mopped up the enemy in the vicinity of Linju. Also on the 4th, the 37th Division arrived at Linju. On the same day, the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade occupied Hsiangcheng. on the 3rd the 62nd defeated the 29th Army at Yuzhou while the 3rd Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade pursued the retreating Chinese towards Ruzhou. On the 4th, Uchiyama's main forces were able to capture Ruzhou and the 110th Division managed to dislodge the 13th Army's position east of Dengfeng. After this Uchiyama's main forces enveloped the area, annihilating the 13th and 29th Armies at Dengfeng while the 62nd and 110th Divisions made a frontal assault of the city. Alongside this the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked the enemy near Likouzhen. Yet before Uchiyama's men could complete the envelopment, General Enbo's men pulled out towards Tangjiezhen and Changshuixiang around midnight on the 5th. On the 7th, the 37th Division and 7th Brigade managed to envelop Tangjiezhen, and with air support inflicted heavy casualties on the outflanked defenders. Simultaneously, the 27th Division captured Luohe and Suipin. General Yokoyama had dispatched the 11th Independent Brigade to aid Uchiyamas men from the south, facing little resistance as they captured Queshan and Zhumadian before linking up with the 27th Division on the 11th.  On the other side, General Jiang Dingwen's 1st War Area Army was regrouping the bulk of its forces along the Luoyang-Yiyang line. General Okamura Ysuji ordered the 12th Army to advance upon Luoyang while Lt General Yoshimoto Teiichi's 1st Army crossed the Yellow River to try and cut off the Chinese retreat at Xin'An and Xiashichiang. Having defeated the enemy in the sector southwest of Dengfeng, the 12th Army continued to keep the enemy in the Loyang area under strict observation while, at the same time, it ordered the 110th Division to pursue the enemy toward Iyang, the 62nd Division to pursue them toward Pingteng, the main force of the 3rd Armored Division toward Iyang and Hsinan and the 4th Cavalry Brigade to the western sector of Pingteng. Okamura dispatched his reserve 63rd Division led by Lt General Nozoe Masanori to try and break through at Sishuizhen so they could join the attack upon Luoyang. They were successful and in the process, defeated the 177th Division and managed to reach the northeastern sector of Luoyang by the 12th. With assistance from the 59th Brigade coming from the west, Nozoe captured Xin'an by the 14th. The 62nd Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade captured Pingdengxiang on the 13th and part of the 110th Division captured Yiyang on the 14th. Most of the 110th Division, however, moved to Lungmenchieh below Luoyang. The 3rd Armored Division also reached the area southwest of Lungmenchieh at this point. The 37th Division, meanwhile, was directed to move towards Sunghsien. These actions effectively enveloped Luoyang as Uchiyama had his 110th Division advance through the Luohe River Valley; Yoshimoto's men advance to Sanmenxia which would fall by the 18th. The 37th Division captured Song alongside the aidromes at Luoning and Lushi by the 20th. But the main effort would be made by the 63rd Division assisted by elements o the 110th Division who launched the assault against Luoyang, being defended by the 36th Army Group. On the 19th, the 63rd Division initiated its attack against enemy positions on the outskirts of Loyang, however, the enemy positions were so strong that the battle situation did not progress as planned. As a result of this the North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to place the main force of the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade together with part of the 110th Division under the command of the 63rd Division commander. At the same time, the 63rd Division was ordered to defend the railway east of Mienchih. At 1pm on the 23rd, the 12th Army dispatched the 63rd Division to attack Luoyang Castle from the north and northeastern fronts of Luoyang to the northeastern corner of the castle while the 3rd Armored Division was to attack the castle from the western front toward the northwestern corner of the castle. The Army also directed the Cavalry Brigade to capture and destroy the enemy which it was expected would flee to the south at the line of the Lo Ho. On the 24th, the Army-called on the enemy in Luoyang to surrender but they refused. At 1pm, therefore, the Army opened its attack and, on the 25th, completely occupied the castle. During this battle, Lieutenant-General Li Jiayu would heroically die covering the retreat of the remaining troops of his battered 36th Army Group. With the fall of Luoyang and the near destruction of the 1st War Area, Operation Kogo ended in a resounding success for the Japanese, thus securing the South Beijing-Hankou railway. The Japanese estimated over 32000 Chinese casualties and some 7800 troops captured. In turn, they claimed to have lost only 2000 casualties. Interestingly, Operation Kogo also saw the Henan peasants attack the Kuomintang forces in revenge for the Yellow River flood of 1938 and the Henan Famine of 1942. As told to us by General Jiang Dingwen "During the campaign, the unexpected phenomenon was that the people of the mountains in western Henan attacked our troops, taking guns, bullets, and explosives, and even high-powered mortars and radio equipment... They surrounded our troops and killed our officers. We heard this pretty often. The heads of the villages and baojia (village mutual-responsibility groups) just ran away. At the same time, they took away our stored grain, leaving their houses and fields empty, which meant that our officers and soldiers had no food for many days… Actually this is truly painful for me to say: in the end the damages we suffered from the attacks by the people were more serious than the losses from battles with the enemy." In the end, the peasants would be able to disarm over 50000 troops, picking their weapons to defend themselves from the Japanese, but also causing much damage to the Nationalist defense. For their role in this disaster, Generals Dingwen and Enbo would be relieved from their commands, with General Chen Cheng later taking over the 1st War Area in July to oversee its recovery. Meanwhile, the Japanese would continue to prepare for Operation Togo, the Hunan offensive. Yet to finish off this episode we also need to mention some progress in the future plans to invade Wakde. Admiral King had requested support from the British Eastern Fleet. At this time the Eastern Fleet was organized into three forces for Operation Transom, the invasion of Japanese occupied Surabaya. Force 65 consisted of Battleships Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, the French battleship Richelieu, two cruisers and eight destroyers, under the direct command of Admiral Somerville; Force 66 consisted of aircraft carriers Illustrious, Saratoga, two cruisers and six destroyers, under the command of Rear-Admiral Clement Moody aboard Illustrious. Force 67 was the replenishment group and comprised six tankers, a water distilling ship and the cruisers London and Suffolk. Somerville commanded the entire fleet from Queen Elizabeth. The warships were drawn from six navies, the capital ships being accompanied by three American destroyers, four British cruisers and three destroyers, four Australian destroyers, a Dutch cruiser and destroyer and a New Zealand cruiser. The Australian light cruiser HMAS Adelaide also sailed from Fremantle in Western Australia to protect the tankers while they were at Exmouth Gulf; this allowed their two escorting cruisers to augment Force 66 during the attack. Two squadrons of Supermarine Spitfire fighters were transferred from No. 1 Wing RAAF at Darwin to Exmouth Gulf to protect the Eastern Fleet while it refueled and Australian and American maritime patrol aircraft were assigned to operate offshore. Each carrier had an air group made up of units from their parent navies. Illustrious embarked two squadrons equipped with 14 Vought F4U Corsair fighters each and two squadrons with nine Avengers. Saratoga's air group comprised a squadron with 26 Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters, a squadron with 24 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers and a squadron operating 18 Avenger torpedo bombers, as well as a single Hellcat allocated to the Air Group Leader. As for Surabaya, its defenses against air attack at the time of Operation Transom included a few anti-aircraft guns, whose crews were inadequately trained. Radar stations and a network of observer posts were also sited to detect minelaying aircraft. The Japanese forces stationed in the city included the Imperial Japanese Army's 28th Independent Mixed Brigade and the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet under Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi. Because of the distance to be covered from Ceylon and the Royal Navy's lack of experience in underway replenishment, the final plans for the operation involved the Eastern Fleet refueling at Exmouth Gulf in Western Australia before striking Surabaya. Force 67 was the first element of the Eastern Fleet to sail, departing on April 30th. Forces 65 and 66 sailed on May 6th. The Allied ships proceeded to Exmouth Gulf on a course that kept them at least 600 miles from Japanese airfields to avoid being detected or attacked. The carriers air wings practiced the attack they would conduct on Surabaya three times during the voyage. The warships arrived at Exmouth Gulf on 14 and 15th ofMay. The Eastern Fleet departed Exmouth Gulf on the afternoon of the 15th and proceeded north. It arrived at the flying off point at 6:30 am local time on the 17th without being detected by the Japanese. One British and seven American submarines also took up positions near Surabaya, the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca and the Bali, Lombok and Sunda Straits to support the Eastern Fleet. The submarines were positioned to rescue Allied aircrew that were forced down, attack ships that tried to escape from Surabaya and intercept any Japanese warships that attempted to attack the Allied fleet. Operation Transom opened up with 76 aircraft launched from Illustrious and Saratoga. The aircraft launched by the carriers were organized into two strike forces. Force A was made up of nine Avengers from Illustrious, twelve Dauntless dive bombers and an escort of eight Corsairs. Force A's Avengers were to bomb the Braat Engineering Works and the Dauntlesses the oil refinery. Force B was to attack shipping and dock facilities in Surabaya's port. It comprised twenty-one Avengers and six Dauntlesses escorted by eight Corsairs and twelve Hellcats. The commander of Saratoga's air group, Commander Joseph C. Clifton, led both carriers' air wings during the attack. All of the aircraft were launched and formed up with the rest of their force by 7:20 am. Two British Avengers crashed during takeoff, their crews being rescued. The attack on Surabaya commenced at 8:30 am. The Japanese had not detected the aircraft as they approached, and were taken by surprise. The two forces made a well-synchronized attack, Force A approaching Wonokromo from the south and Force B attacking the port from the north. No Japanese fighter aircraft were encountered, and the anti-aircraft guns were largely ineffective. One of Saratoga's Avengers was shot down, and both members of its crew became prisoners of war. The two forces claimed to have damaged 10 ships, demolished the Wonokromo oil refinery and the Braat Engineering Works, destroyed 16 aircraft and leveled several buildings. Saratoga and her three escorting American destroyers detached from the Eastern Fleet shortly before sunset on the 18th, and proceeded to Fremantle. The remainder of the Eastern Fleet reached Exmouth Gulf the next morning, and sailed for Ceylon before sunset after refueling again. Adelaide and one of the Australian destroyers that had been attached to the Eastern Fleet left Exmouth Gulf bound for Fremantle after the tanker group departed on 19 May. The Eastern Fleet arrived back at Ceylon on the 27th. Saratoga reached Bremerton, Washington, on June 10th and after a refit re-joined the Pacific Fleet in September 1944. Though the Japanese would not really divert any forces from western New Guinea in response to the raid and despite the fact that the Japanese claim that not much damage had been inflicted on their shipping or shore facilities, with only one vessel confirmed sunk, Operation Transom would provide Somerville's Eastern Fleet important experience of carrier strike operations and exposure to superior American carrier tactics.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allies were gradually countering Operation U-Go as the intense battles at Kohima Ridge and Pulebadze saw British-Indian forces slowly gaining ground amid heavy casualties. Meanwhile, Operation Ichi-Go saw major Japanese successes in China. Lastly Operation Transom saw British-Dutch-American successful carrier strikes against Surabaya, yielding experience despite limited damage.

Viv Yau had the pleasure of speaking with legendary artist, Keith Khan about whether South Asian and ESEA communities are interconnected, whether it's better to eat with chopsticks or your hands, how Shanghainese people dress so cool and of course, his upcoming show The Accountants, being shown at Factory International at Aviva Studios!  In partnership with Factory International, we have a limited amount of £3 tickets to attend the show across 4th, 5th, and 7th-11th of May 2024 at Aviva Studios, Manchester.  Discount code: ACTVIV3 Dates applicable: 4th, 5th, and 7th-11th of May 2024   2 tickets per transaction Booking fee applies  Location: Factory International at Avivia Studios, Manchester  Book here: https://bit.ly/FactoryInternationalTheAccountants    Follow Keith Khan: https://www.keithkhanassociates.com/  https://www.instagram.com/keithkhanlondon/  About The AccountantsExperience an electrifying encounter of cultures as China and India take centre stage in this awe-inspiring theatrical event from visionary artist Keith Khan, choreographed by Xiexin Dance Theatre and Terence Lewis Contemporary Dance Company. This dance extravaganza challenges our notions of identity and cultural dominance. Main characters Kash and Liam – voiced by the talented Josh Hart and actor and author Shobna Gulati – are of British-Chinese and British-Indian heritage. Delivered via texts and voice notes, their banter and soul-searching dialogues playfully debate which cultural superpower reigns supreme – from food to iconic landmarks and spiritual beliefs. This battle is enriched by a high-tech visual and acoustic feast crafted by the ARIA-nominated sound artist Somatic and the award-winning design studio idontloveyouanymore providing stunning immersive visuals, plus lighting design from the award-winning Simon Corder and dramaturgy by Jude Christian. Brought to you by Keith Khan, whose grand artistic creations have adorned events from the Notting Hill Carnival to the London 2012 Olympic Games, The Accountants invites you on a global journey right from your seat. Follow besean and slide into our DMs and keep the conversation going! https://www.instagram.com/besea.n/ Support the podcast by buying besean a coffee, 100% of the donations now go towards besean! http://bit.ly/Kofibesean Sign petitions: STAND WITH MYANMAR AND TAKE ACTION https://linktr.ee/meemalee ESEA HERITAGE MONTH: Sign the petition to support the launch of East & South East Asian Heritage Month in the UK https://www.change.org/ESEAHeritageMonth Credits: Jingle by John Clapper: https://www.instagram.com/john_clapper/

Last time we spoke about the battle for Kohima and the mop up of the Admiralty islands. The battle for Kohima led to battles raging over the Kohima Ridge. At one point only 2500 allied defenders were facing nearly 15,000 Japanese. Numerous features fell to the Japanese top Kohima ridge. The Japanese were taking heavy casualties while pushing the defenders close to Kohima. A decisive moment presented itself, the Japanese had an open shot against Dimapur. However, mostly because of animosity towards General Mutaguchi the chance to deliver a kill blow was lost. If Dimapur had been taken, it may have changed the entire Burma War. Over in the Admiralty Islands, Los Negros and Manus were finally all mopped up and now the allies had forward airfields to further smash the inner Japanese perimeter. General MacArthurs triumphant return to the Philippines was on its way. This episode is the Defense of India Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we spoke, General Mutaguchi had initiated a grand offensive against Kohima. General Slim, knew the seizure of Kohima would be attempted only in conjunction with the seizure of the much more important target, Dimapur. It was at Dimapur where an enormous allied supply dump lied over the Ledo-Imphal line, it was the hub for which all allied activity in the region revolved. If Dimapur fell, the province of Manipur would be impossible to defend and the Brahmaputra valley would be interdicted thus cutting off all overland supply to China. To everyone's shock the Japanese instead invested an entire division to attack Kohima. Slim thought this was a enormous blunder on the part of General Sato Kotoku, going as far as to ask the RAF not to bomb the Generals HQ as “it never struck him that he could inflict terrible damage on us without taking Kohima at all”. In truth it was not really Sato at fault, it was more so upon his superior General Kawabe Mazakazu who did not trust nor like Mutaguchi and rightly suspected the man's megalomaniac plan to invade India. Thus Mutaguchi's Operation U-Go, the intended invasion of India saw the 33rd and 15th divisions closing in on Imphal by the end of March as the 31st Division attacked Kohima. General Cowan's 17th Division was able to effectively retreat to Imphal by April 4th, with the 49th Brigade acting as rearguard. Meanwhile General Yanagida had just replenished ammunition and provisions after the battle at Tonzang and now ordered the 214th and 215th Regiments to resume their advance. Colonel Sasahara Masahiko's 215th regiment departed Singgel on March 27th and crossed the India-Burma border by April 3rd. They advanced to Churachandpur by the 7th as the 214th followed closely behind them. Meanwhile, the Right Assault Unit, the Yamamoto unit had been in hot pursuit of General Gracey's 20th division since the start of April, and the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment of the Mitsui Unit had just captured the town Chamol. Additionally the 1st battalion, 60th regiment attempted, but failed to break through Laiching Hill in late March. Afterwords the unit was ordered to turn back and attempt a development of Gravey's left flank by Moving through Lamlong and then Kampang in early April. To the north, General Yamauchi's Divisional Headquarters advanced to Kasom on March 28. Yamauchi ordered two companies of the 1st Battalion, 67th Infantry to attack and occupy Kameng, which presented an easy approach route to Imphal. The 123rd Indian Brigade, 5th Indian Division had closed the gap with barbed wire and set up defensive positions in the hills to the immediate north and south of the road. The attack was made on the night of April 3 against the positions held by the 1/17th Dogras of the 123rd Indian Brigade on a hill off the Ukhrul Road, south of the village of Kameng, but failed to achieve its objective. They were then furiously counter-attacked by the guns of the 28th Field Regiment and by the Dogras themselves. A troop of tanks each of the 3rd Carabiniers and 7th Cavalry were also positioned on either side of the hill and fired on what were easy targets. By the next morning, almost 100 Japanese bodies were found; the few survivors had withdrawn. It is believed that the ultimate objective of this attack had been the fair-weather Kangla Airfield farther south. It was now felt the 15th Division's strength was spreed too thinly, thus the Japanese believed their detachments holding along the Imphal-Ukhrul road were badly in need of reinforcement. As such, Yamauchi ordered the 60th and 51st regiments to get into closer contact and by the 4th of April they were moving into positions north of Imphal. On that same day, Colonel Matsumura started moving down the road to seize the supply depot known as the 221 Advance Ordnance Depot, the largest in the Imphal Area justnorth of Kanglatongbi. As Japanese pressure on the road increased, its men and some of the most valuable supplies, including ammunition and explosives, were moved into a defensive area at Kanglatongbi known as Lion Box. The 2nd battalion managed to take Hill 3813 by April 6th, the 3rd battalion was less fortunate facing the Lion Box. The Lion Box had very few fighting troops among the several thousand men within its perimeter. The box was defended against mounting Japanese assaults from 4 to 7 April, while the evacuation of the supplies to Imphal continued apace. Its defense was assisted by units of the 9th Indian Brigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers, who would travel up from Sekmai in the south during the day. On the 5th while the 9th Indian BRigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers were patrolling forward to help out the Lion Box, Cowan's 63rd Brigade arrived to Sekmai to reinforce the northern defenses, and this in turn allowed the 9th Brigade to take up a position to defend Nungshigum. On the 6th, Colonel Omoto's 3rd battalion attacked Nungshigum's northern Hill, known as Hill 3833, successfully overrunning the hastily developed Indian defenses there, while the 1st battalion marched upon Hill 4057. There was a heroic counter attack by a platoon led by 18 year old Jemadar Abdul Hafiz serving as Naib Subedar, Junior Commissioned Officer in the 9th Jat Regiment, British Indian Army. His platoon managed to recover Hill 3833 by the end of the day. Jemadar Abdul Hafiz was tasked with recovering it with two sections of his platoon. He fearlessly led the way and recovered the feature in the face of a hail of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks, killing several Japanese in the process. Injured by now, Hafiz continued the attack, fought to his death and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The hill became known as Runaway Hill because of the way the Japanese had fled from Hafiz's brave actions. April the 7th saw a follow-up charge with Omoto's 3rd battalion re-seizing the hills around Nungshigum. In the four days that followed, Nungshigum exchanged hands a couple of times: the 3/9th Jats recovered it, only to lose it again to the Japanese of the 3/51st Battalion by 11 April who dug in well on the northern and southern bumps around Nungshigum. Meanwhile Matsumura was continuing to exert heavy pressure upon the Lion Box, finally forcing the battle weary defenders to evacuate the box as the position became impossible to defend. The valiant efforts of the Lion Box defenders had earned the British-Indian troops valuable time to evacuate a large amount of critical supplies back to Imphal, preventing their use to the Japanese. Do remember Mutaguchi literally planned the entire offensive on the basis their logistical supply line was simply seizing the allies supply depots. That is what we call a bold strategy. Matsumura's troops had suffered heavy casualties in their efforts against the Lion Box. Now he ordered the 60th regiment east to reassemble around the villages of Tingsat, Molvom and their surrounding heights by April 8th. They would be reinforced by the honda raiding units coming from the north. On the 9th, Omoto's 1st battalion assaulted Hill 4057 taking it from elements of the 123rd Indian Brigade, as the 3rd battalion secured Nungshigum. This breakthrough posed an unacceptable threat to the British, leaving the 4th Corps HQ, the Imphal Main and Kangla airfield vulnerable to further Japanese attacks. This prompted General Brigg's to get forces together to evict the Japanese from their recently gained heights. Brigg's was reinforced with the 254th Indian Tank Brigades armor for the job. An unrelenting artillery and aerial bombardment began against the 51st regiment, greatly reducing the strength of Omoto's companies. Suffering such horrific losses, Omoto was forced to retreat over to the eastern side of the Iril River. At around dusk on the 12th, Omoto's 3rd battalion withdrew from Nungshigum to take up better positions in the hills north of Hill 4057. From this position the 3rd battalion was able to cover the 1st battalion's withdrawal from Hill 4057 during the night.  Simultaneously, Briggs launched his main counteroffensive, tossing two companies of the 1/17th Dogras and B Squadron of the 3rd Carabiniers. That morning, the infantry and tanks began climbing up via two spurs on the south-eastern side of Nungshigum. On each spur was a troop of M3 Lee-Grant tanks, together with a company of Dogras. The division's artillery, together with another troop of tanks, had been placed to the east and west of Nungshigum on the plain. As the infantry and armor climbed, the Vengeance dive-bombers and Hurricanes bombed and strafed the peaks. Soon thereafter, the 88 pieces of artillery and tanks on the plain plastered the same area. The two groups of infantry and tanks joined up at the peak named Pyramid and proceeded in a single file up a narrow ridge towards the Japanese on Southern Bump. As they approached the Japanese defenses, fierce fighting erupted. The tanks were sprayed with machine-gun and rifle fire, and grenades were thrown at them. But there was only so much the Japanese could do. The use of armor on Nungshigum, which rose over 1,000ft above the valley floor, was a masterstroke. The Japanese had never expected to encounter tanks and they had nothing to counter them effectively. The British had to pay a high price, too. All of the British tank officers were killed and the infantry officers wounded later that day. The former had been shot as they stuck their heads out of their tanks' turrets to guide them safely on the narrow and steep ridgeline. It was finally left to the VCO of the Dogras, Subadar Ranbir Singh, and Squadron Sergeant-Major Craddock of the 3rd Carabiniers to complete the battle. They rose to the occasion; the tanks finally destroyed the main bunkers and the infantry charged at and killed any survivors. There were casualties on both sides, but Japanese losses were especially heavy, leaving 250 bodies. This was the closest the Japanese would come to Imphal as a large, organized force in 1944. Yamauchi's 15th Division would never be able to pose such an urgent threat from the north again.  On April 13th, the Honda unit and 2nd battalion, 60th infantry launched an unsuccessful attack against Sengmai. In another attack on the 18th, the 2nd battalion gained a foothold in the enemy positions on the eastern hill of Sengmai, but would be forced off it quickly losing 150 men. The failure to breach the defenders at Sengmai marked a turning point in the operation, forcing the Right Assault Unit onto the defensive. Meanwhile Omoto's withdrawal had opened a gap between his units and Matsumura's, leaving Matsumura isolated around the Imphal-Kohima road and the Mapao-Molvom range. This also left Matsumura's supply lines increasingly vulnerable to attacks by Brigg's 5th Division. General Scoones ordered the 23rd Indian Division to push back on the Ukhrul Road to regain control over the area, while Briggs cleared the Japanese out of the Imphal-Kohima and Mapao-Molvom Range. For this Major-General Ouvry Roberts dispatched the 37th Brigade up the Ukhrul Road while the 1st Brigade made a wide flanking maneuver to the right to swing north in an attempt to capture Yamauchi's HQ. A composite unite of the 51st regiment known as the Suzuta unit formed out of two companies and Suzuta's HQ managed to resist the Indian attacks at Yaingangpokpi. Their mission was to hold the pass near Hill 3524 and they were met by numerous enemy counterattacking groups. The Suzuta Unit was faced with a serious crisis when it was attacked by a strong enemy tank force on 18 April. Meanwhile back on the 15th, the sudden appearance of the 1st Brigade at Hill 5515.. With his headquarters threatened by this new enemy maneuver, Yamauchi decided to move 15th Division headquarters and the Suzuta Unit to the rear of the Right and Center Assault Units. This move was complicated in that it entailed the evacuation of large numbers of casualties, among whom was General Yamanouchi himself. Upon arriving in the vicinity of Nungga intense enemy activity was encountered. It was found impossible to move west, to the desired destination and the headquarters was forced to move toward Lungshong via Ukhrul. The Suzuta Unit troops reverted to their parent organizations. The command post of the Division was finally established at a point about three miles southwest of Lungshong on 29 April. By april 22nd, Robert's Brigades made contact over the Ukhrul Road near Litan and began hunting down Yamauchi's HQ. They searched for it around Shongphel to the north. They converged on the spot, only to find Yamauchi was not there. To the east the 9th Brigade attacked the Mapao-Molvom Range on the 23rd, making some initial gains at Mapao. Their field guns with Hurricane bombers smashed Mapao, allowing the Jats and Punjabis to fight their way up and capture it in two days. But farther north, the heights around Molvom were better defended and the Japanese defied attempts to infiltrate these positions. The brigade soon got bogged down. Further east the 123rd Brigade advanced up the Iril River Valley facing some of Omoto's retreating men and would reach Sengmai by mid-may. The Japanese at this point were also preparing to continue their offensive further south. General Yanagida received reports on the progress of the 15th Division and that Kohima had already fallen. So he decided to bypass the expected resistance in the Moirang vicinity and advance directly upon Imphal. This prompted Colonel Sasagara to send his 2nd battalions of the 215th and 213th regiment to attack the Torbung positions on the 9th. They managed to successfully outflank the 49th brigade and exerted so much pressure in the area, the 49th brigade were forced to withdraw over the next few days. With the Japanese in hot pursuit, Cowan dispatched the 32nd Indian Brigade to defend the Tiddim Road with Brigadier David MacKenzie shifting his main position further back to Bishenpur. The Bishenpur village was well located: it was where the hills touched the Tiddim Road to its west; to the east lay the upper reaches of the Loktak Lake. Bishenpur was considered the best place to position a defense of the southwestern approach to Imphal. It was also important because from here a track wriggled west over the mountains to Silchar in Assam. Besides the Imphal–Kohima Road, the Bishenpur–Silchar Track was the only other navigable route back out to the rest of India. Unsurprisingly then, it was also of interest to the Japanese. On April 12th the Japanese attacked Potsangbam, but the 2nd battalion, 213th regiment was held up by heavy artillery and aerial bombardment from Bishenpur. The Japanese forayed into the villages of Kwa Siphai and Khoijuman to the northeast, but they were rebuffed. To counter them, aerial bombardments were called in on Potsangbam and the next large village, Ningthoukhong. Strategic Air Force Liberators pattern-bombed the two villages with 1,000lb bombs. The British sent tanks, together with infantry units, across the paddy fields towards Potsangbam, but their advance was held up by fierce opposition. Unlike at Nungshigum, the Japanese here were armed with anti-tank guns. Evicting them would require that much more effort. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment was brought up to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 213th Infantry at Potsangbam about 20 April, but it would be unable to break through nonetheless. To the west Sasahara's men tried to break through Kokadan on the 14th. They made repeated attacks for over a month, but would be unable to penetrate Mackenzie's defenses. The 214th regiment tossed three attacks against Hill 5846 from their position on Ingourok by April 24th. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued as each side sought to gain possession of these hills. The British had brought up a troop of Lee-Grant tanks of the 150th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps from Bishenpur and these were pressed into battle, firing in close support of the infantry. By 26 April, Point 5846 and Wooded Ridge were under their firm control, while the Japanese had Wireless Hill. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion reinforced the 214th regiment to skirt around Hill 5846 from the west, going just due north of the track. This endeavor ultimately failed in the end, and the men would have to turn back by the end of the month. Due to his failures and disagreements, General Mutaguchi consequently lost faith in Yanagida, who was ignored from this point onwards while his chief-of-staff, Colonel Tanaka Tetsujiro, effectively commanded the 33rd Division.  Meanwhile over on the hill of the Shenam Saddle, the battle for Nippon Hill had been raging since early April. Gracey's initial piecemeal attempts to retake the feature only saw his men fail. On the other side, the Yamamoto Detachment launched a general attack from Chamol on the 8th, trying to make a breakthrough to Nippon Hill, to relieve the outnumbered 11th company, 213th regiment. While the Japanese were held up by crossfire from Tengnoupal, the 80th Brigade sent three companies of the 1st Devon's to recapture Nippon Hill on the 11th. Following heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, the British troops stormed the hill with a fierce lobing of grenades and machine gun fire, seizing the feature by the end of the day. Nonetheless the Japanese, General Yamamoto kept committing troops to continuous attacks over the next few days. What was witnessed on Nippon Hill was to be repeated on many occasions around Imphal. Japanese defensive positions would be subjected to intense bombardments, which it was hard to imagine anyone surviving. And yet, time and again, the Japanese would emerge out of the targeted positions and counter-attack. In fact, Nippon Hill was one such place where, even days after it had been recaptured by the British, a lone Japanese soldier would emerge from the rubble and attack. This after being buried for hours, or even days, usually without recourse to food or water. This behavior was a measure of the extraordinary capabilities of the Japanese, as defenders in particular, and of their dedication to their cause in general. It was also a testament to the strength of their defenses. On features like Nippon Hill, the Japanese had shown themselves to be adept at digging an extensive, deep network of underground tunnels and holes within their positions. These allowed them to withstand bombardments, while the small openings allowed for a sustained fire to be kept up on anyone who approached. After a week of fighting, the 3rd Battalion, 213th Regiment finally recaptured Nippon Hill on April 16, and this time it was to stay with the Japanese until the end of July. The hill would allow the Japanese to observe allied movements over the Shenam Saddle and the road below, so accurate firing from well-sited guns on this hill and the adjacent ridge would cause many casualties among the defenders. Yamamoto ramped up his efforts trying to break through towards Imphal. With additional tank and artillery support the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment managed to overrun Crete East on the 22nd as the 80th Brigade evacuated to the isolated Cyprus. Pressing onwards, Yamamoto attacked Crete West, tossing multiple attacks at the feature over the next two weeks. Despite the ferocity of the invaders, the defenders would manage to hold on until the end of April. Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 60th regiment was unable to break through Hill 5240 near Kampang, so on the 20th they were redirected to hit the northern sector of Palel. The battalion had suffered 300 casualties, unable to pose much of a threat any longer to Gracey's men. To their left was the 1st INA Division's 2nd Gandhi Brigade,  deployed on the left flank of Yamamoto Force and an initial group that had rushed through the hills towards Palel. They were targeting the airfield from the south in coordination with the Japanese closing in via Langgol from the east. They clashed with Indian and Gurkha defenders at Purum Chumban on May 2nd. There are differing accounts of what happened during the battle of Purum Chumbang. One has the INA group reaching very close to the airfield, while another has it reach some 8km short of it. What is common to both, however, is the reaction of the Fourteenth Army units (Indian and Gurkha) to the INA's effort. A parley between the two is supposed to have taken place at some point, where the latter tried to convince their brethren on the British side not to fight. This being rejected, the INA attacked and was repulsed. At least 50 INA men were killed in the retaliatory response. It has been argued that these attacks by their fellow Indians affected INA morale. They had not expected to be considered traitors by their former comrades of the Indian Army. Several hundred INA men deserted before the end of the battle, although the majority of the force remained in the hills around the Tamu–Palel Road, wracked by disease and hunger. In the meantime, the Kohima Garrison received relief on their ridge positions, now General Grover was formulating a plan to recapture lost territory in the Kohima area and to annhilate the 31st division. His plan was to hold Zubza and Periphema in the rear while Brigadier John Shapland's 6th Brigade would launch an attack against the Japanese center and gradually push them towards the southern and southwestern flanks of the Kohima Ridge. Brigadier Victor Hawkins 5th Brigade would would perform a flanking maneuver to the north while Brigadier William Goshcens 4th Brigade did the same in the south. On April 18, Hawkins thus dispatched his first units across the deep Zubza nullah to the Merema Ridge to cut the Kohima-Merema-Bokajan road, with the rest of the brigade following in an excruciating march and finally assembling at the Merema Ridge by April 27.  Further to the north, in parallel with the 2nd Divisions advance, Brigadier Perowne's men have been performing an extremely difficult march into the Naga Hills. Their task was to prevent the Japanese from escaping the Brahmaputra Valley, taking a track leading from Merema to Bokajan. For weeks the Chindit Brigade had conducted an effective operation, ambushing Japanese supply routes, denying them territory, encouraging local Naga resistance efforts and causing general havoc. General Mutaguchi and ordered Sato to send his 124th Infantry Regiment to support the struggling 15th Division in the south.  Sato decided to occupy Garrison Hill prior to complying with Mutaguchi's directive, immediately sending the 1st Battalion, 138th Regiment to support the attacks of the 58th Regiment. The assault failed on the 23rd and this further convinced Sato he would be unable to hold Kohima if he sent the reinforcements Mutaguchi requested. His decision was also heavily influenced by his increasing anger at his superior as Mutaguchi was completely failing to supply his men. He had been promised at least 250 tons of resupplies would arrive by April 8, Sato testily demanded food and ammunition. In fact, very few supplies ever reached the 31st Division from Burma, the men having to survive on what they had brought with them, what they could beg or steal from Naga villages, or what 'Churchill Rations' they could capture from British stockpiles. Sato's fury at the lack of promised supplies reaching Kohima was fuelled by his belief that the 31st Division was being let down by Mutaguchi's abject failure to break into Imphal. In response to Mutaguchi's demand that he send troops to assist in the Imphal battle, on April 20 Sato sent the first of a number of increasingly tetchy signals to the army commander: 'We captured Kohima in three weeks as promised. How about Imphal?' Mutaguchi replied: 'Probable date for capture of Imphal April 29', which was the Emperor's birthday. Sato plainly did not believe him. On April 30, Sato signaled again: '31st Division at the limit of its endurance. When are you going to destroy Imphal?' To this he received no reply.  The relationship between Sato and Mutaguchi had never been good, but now it was really bad. Over the next two weeks, the battles on Kohima Ridge were not seeing results. Repeated attacks were made against Garrison Hill as Shapland's men tossed desperate attacks at the extreme northern edge of the ridge allowing for a troop of Lee/Grant tanks to lumber up the western end of Naga Hill in order to provide armored support for the 5th Brigade. The plan to get tanks onto the back of Naga Hill by driving through the Japanese positions overlooking the TCP finally succeeded on April 27, the Lee/Grants trundling along the track, wary of mines, but taking the Japanese entirely by surprise at this stroke of legerdemain. Peppered on all sides futilely by bullets, they joined 5th Brigade on Naga Hill, albeit at the cost of 28 Dorset dead, who had kept intense pressure on the TCP end of the Kohima Ridge to distract the Japanese during the operation. In the fighting for control of the tennis court no means of overcoming Japanese bunkers could be discovered using infantry alone, and attempts were made to bulldoze a path up to the remains of the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow to allow a Lee/Grant tank to move onto the tennis court and engage the bunkers directly with its 75mm gun. Unhappily the first effort failed when the Lee/Grant went into reverse, pulling the bulldozer to which it was attached back down the steep slope in a heap of crashing, twisted metal. Four days later a similar attempt with a Stuart Light tank of the 45th Indian Light Cavalry also failed, as the Japanese had brought up a 3.7in. anti-tank gun that put the tank out of action, fortunately with no loss to the crew.By the 27th, the tanks made a break through to the Naga Hill. The Japanese suffered terrible casualties causing them to suspend operations against Garrison Hill. The 31st división was not fully adopting a defensive stance. Meanwhile, Goschen's men had set out on a long march to cut the Imphal Road below the Aradura Spur on the night of April 25. They were advancing through some of the worst terrain of the entire region, it was deep, nearly vertical jungle-covered gullies falling between  Mount Pulebadze and the face of Mount Japfu.  The 4th Brigade would reach the valley between Pulebadze and Japfu in three days. One there, General Stopford ordered Goschen to climb over Pulebadze Ridge then come down into Kohima to hit the Japanese position on the GPT ridge, which were giving serious problems to Shaplands men. The brigade accordingly turned left, climbing up and over the Pulebadze Ridge and beginning the slow descent through the jungle down onto the Kohima side. A prominent pimple above the GPT Ridge known as Oaks Hill, sitting at 6,000ft, was occupied by the Norfolks and the 143rd Company on 1 May, the presence of British troops 1,500ft above the Japanese positions becoming known to them for the first time. But that is all for today for India, as there is something else cooking up in the CBI theater. Since early 1943, the United States had steadily increased its air force in China. By the beginning of 1944 there were more than 500 US planes in this area, whereas, in spite of the organization of the 5th Air Army,the Japanese Air Force had less than half this number of planes in China. Furthermore, with the war situation rapidly growing worse in the Pacific, the Japanese Air Force in China could not hope for any replenishment. Enemy planes not only interfered with Japanese ground operations, but also harassed the lines of communication and attacked the occupied areas. General Chennault's 14th Air Force had been causing such problems, the Japanese were forced to act. The catalyst for their future action was because of a raid against Formosa carried out by 14 B-25s, 8 P-38s and 8 P-51s on November 25, 1943, which caught the Japanese by surprise as the Chinese-American aircraft strafed and dropped bombs over Shinchiku airfield, successfully destroying its installations along with 42 planes on the ground at the cost of three fighters lost.  This prompted the Japanese commanders to target strategic points along the Hunan-Guangxi, Guangzhou-Hankou and Southern Beijing-Hankou Railways. Thus the infamous Operation Ichi-Go was born. Ichi-Go's primary targets were Guilin and Liuzhou's airfields where the US was developing bases for B-29's to launch strikes against the Japanese home islands. If you are interested in a in-depth talk about this by the way, over on the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or Spotify, I did an interview with Dave from the Coldwar about the bombing of Japan and we talked about this very subject. Pretty neat episode I recommend it! Now in general the main objectives were to link railways in Beijing and Hankou in northern China to the southern Chinese coast at Guangzhou. This would spare shipping and avoid the pesky American submarine force who were now ruining havoc; it was also to take out airfields in Sichuan and Guangxi to thwart further US bombing of Formosa and the Japanese home islands. This also in turn would open a land route to Indochina and hopefully would destroy enough NRA units to collapse Chiang Kai-Sheks government, finally solving the China Problem. Ichi-Go would start in late April with an offensive  by the 12th Army of Lt General Kita Seiichi, later replaced by Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro. This was codenamed Operation Kogo, tasked with capturing the areas along the South Beijing-Hankou railway, centered around Zhengzhou and Luoyang, and destroying the main strength of the 1st War Area. Then, early in June, the 11th Army of General Yokoyama would launch Operation Togo, with the objective of capturing Changsha and Hengyang and destroying the main force of the 6th and 9th War Areas. Following the conclusion of the first phase, late in July, the 11th Army would be assisted by the 23rd Army of Lt General Tanaka Hisaichi and the Indochina Garrison Army of Lt General Viscount Machiiji Kazumoto would capture Guilin and Liuzhou and the destruction of the 4th War Area.  Finally, the third phase of Operation Togo would see the 23rd Army capture the strategic areas along the south Canton-Hankou railway, centered around Nanning, by destroying the 7th War Area in September while the 11th Army continued the advance south towards Suichwan Arfield to link with the Indochina forces. For the entire operation, the 5th Air Army of Lt General Shimoyama Takuma would support the offensives from the skies, tasked with annihilating the American-Chinese air force and attaining air supremacy over China. The logistics of Operation Ichi-Go constituted was one of the most notable examples of the IJA's offensive preparations. Between some of the measures taken was the emplacement of dozens of anti-air batteries throughout the Yangtze River to limit the Chinese-American air activity against troop concentrations at its southern channel; the transfer of dozens of thousands of troops by railway without interference from Chinese guerrillas because security at the railway lines was increased; the monthly river transport of 40000 tons of supplies; the secret storage of 600 pontoons; and the constructions of hideouts for a munitions arsenal that should last for two years and of hundreds of deposits that harbored 50 million liters of gasoline that should last for eight months: 40 million for land vehicles and 10 million for planes.By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses.  Meanwhile the British Eastern Fleet had been receiving more naval resources due to the successes in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe and could now carry out more aggressive actions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Agreement had been reached, after objections from Admiral Ernest King, but new procedures would need to be learnt by naval crews and Fleet Air Arm aircrew. To this end, Operation Diplomat, a training exercise, took place in late March 1944. The objective was for the fleet to rendezvous with a group of tankers, escorted by the Dutch cruiser HNLMS Tromp and practice refueling at sea procedures. The ships then rendezvoused with USN Task Group 58.5 built around aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and three destroyers. To further support the coming Hollandia and Aitape landings, Admiral King requested that, during April, the Eastern Fleet should engage Japanese forces in their area and hold them there to reduce the opposition that could be encountered by the Americans at Western New Guinea. In response, Admiral Somerville launched Operation Cockpit on April 16, an air attack against Sabang off Sumatra. The fleet sailed from Trincomalee on 16 April, and two days later the Gambia and Ceylon were detached from Force 69 to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of the carrier force. On the morning of April 19, 17 Barracudas and 13 Corsairs from the carrier Illustrious and 29 Dauntless and Avenger bombers and 24 Hellcats from Saratoga took off towards Sumatra and subsequently caught the Japanese completely by surprise, finding no opposition there. Thirty Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the airfield and a direct hit by a 1000-pound bomb set a large oil tank on fire. The power-station, barracks and wireless station were badly damaged. The submarine HMS Tactician reported large fires in the dockyard burning fiercely hours after the fleet had left the area. The raid was a clear success, with Somerville later saying that the Japanese "had been caught with their kimonos up".  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invaders it seems bit off more than they could chew when they attacked India. General Mutaguchi was facing a determined enemy and very pissed off and somewhat insubordinate colleagues. Operation Ichi-Go was being prepared and the Royal Navy was sending forces into the Indian and Pacific Oceans adding to the IJN's misery.