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Last time we spoke about the Ishiwara Kanji. Born in 1889 in Japan, Kanji Ishiwara was the son of a policeman from a samurai lineage. He entered military training at 13, rising through the ranks to become a Major and a respected lecturer. His unconventional views on military strategy and history led him to predict a prolonged conflict with the United States. Deeply influenced by Nichiren Buddhism, he envisioned Japan as a moral leader destined to guide Asia, advocating for reform in China while grappling with his nation's imperial ambitions. In 1928, ishiwara fell ill with influenza, leading to a six-month hospitalization. During recovery, he joined an elite study group discussing war theories. His lectures on total war gained fame, culminating in a presentation to Kwantung officers. Amid rising tensions in Japan, he advocated for control over Manchuria, believing Japan had a moral duty to stabilize China. His theories on warfare, including the devastating potential of airpower, foreshadowed the horrors of future conflicts, influencing Japan's military strategies.   #137 Ishiwara Kanji Part 2: The Mukden Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki collaborated with other members of the Kwantung Army to address what they perceived as the Manchurian issue. By the mid-1930s, the belief that Manchuria needed to be forcibly seized had become the prevailing opinion among the Kwantung Army. Ishiwara was convinced that Japan could no longer remain passive in Manchuria, as each passing day meant Japan was gradually losing its rights and interests in the region to China, risking expulsion. Abandoning Manchuria would be a national catastrophe, resulting in the loss of a crucial buffer state, valuable resources, and land for Japan's growing population to settle. In essence, Manchuria was vital for Japan's survival and growth. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviet threat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army Headquarters in Tokyo also recognized that Manchuria was a crucial defensive line against the USSR. However, unlike the Kwantung Army, which aimed to control all of Manchuria, the leaders in Tokyo focused on incorporating southern Manchuria through the South Manchurian Railway and did not pursue any territory north of it. Ishiwara, on the other hand, believed that the only way for Japan to prevent the USSR from exerting pressure on southern Manchuria was to occupy northern Manchuria and extend even further north toward the Amur River. This would allow Japan to control the mountain ranges that bordered the western and eastern frontiers of northern Manchuria. Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”. Ishiwara advanced his ideas significantly after Japan's conquest of Manchuria, recognizing the necessity of effectively administering and pacifying its diverse populations. He posited that the stability of Manchuria could be achieved through the unique skills and contributions of the various ethnic groups residing there. For instance, he believed that the Chinese would excel in developing small businesses, while the Koreans would apply their expertise in paddy farming. These racial dynamics, according to Ishiwara, would play a crucial role in the development of Manchukuo and the broader vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, it was clear that, above all, Manchuria was intended to serve Japan's interests, many of which were exploitative and economically driven. By early 1930, Ishiwara and his colleague Itagaki devised a military strategy reminiscent of the tactics employed during the Russo-Japanese War, specifically a surprise night attack. Their plan involved the Kwantung Army launching an assault on the Liaoning region, targeting key Chinese garrisons. This operation required meticulous planning, as the Kwantung Army was significantly outnumbered by the forces commanded by Zhang Xueliang. In the vicinity of Mukden alone, Zhang commanded approximately 20,000 well-equipped troops, supported by aircraft and tanks. Across Manchuria, he could mobilize around 250,000 soldiers in the event of conflict. In stark contrast, the Kwantung Army could only field about 10,000 personnel, primarily composed of garrison units stationed along the railway. They lacked substantial air support and mechanized units, and their overall equipment was inadequate. To address this stark imbalance in military strength, Ishiwara emphasized the importance of intelligence and rigorous training. He aimed to refine specific assault techniques, enabling Japanese forces to execute rapid and concentrated attacks that would overwhelm their Chinese adversaries. The overarching strategy was notably straightforward: it hinged on delivering a decisive blow to the heart of Zhang Xueliang's military stronghold at the Peitaying barracks in Mukden. Ishiwara believed that if this critical target fell, it would shatter the enemy's morale, providing the Kwantung Army with the necessary military and psychological momentum to dominate the surrounding regions. However, he acknowledged that if the Soviet Union intervened, the entire plan could unravel catastrophically. One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ” Ishiwara, as you can imagine, was deeply frustrated by the prospect of delaying action for another year. He argued passionately that the current international landscape necessitated an immediate strike. At that time, the Soviet Union was still in the midst of its ambitious five-year plan, which limited its capacity for intervention. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, and France were grappling with their own financial crises, rendering them unable to mount significant resistance in the Far East. Most notably, the Nationalist regime in China was preoccupied with its unification efforts south of the Great Wall, but this situation was expected to shift soon. Ishiwara believed that if they postponed their plans for a year, the geopolitical environment would deteriorate further, making decisive action imperative. For Ishiwara, the moment to act was now or never. In July 1931, Ishiwara and Itagaki orchestrated a crucial reconnaissance mission aimed at familiarizing the newest Kwantung officers with the northern regions of Manchuria. To disguise their true intentions, they informed high command that the mission was a survey focused on the Soviet Union. However, the real objective was to assess the strength and influence of Chinese power in northern Manchuria. During their return journey, the team received alarming news about the disappearance of Captain Nakamura Shintaro, a Kwantung staff officer. Upon reaching Port Arthur, they learned that rumors were circulating that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under what were described as “mysterious circumstances.” In the preceding months, Manchuria had witnessed a surge in violent riots, murders, work strikes, and various other incidents, all contributing to a climate of unrest. The Nakamura affair intensified these existing tensions. In response, both the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries attempted to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. However, figures at the central army headquarters, such as Nagata Tetsuzan, who sympathized with the urgency felt by their Kwantung counterparts, felt compelled to support them. The situation was rapidly escalating, and the stakes were growing ever higher. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that's exactly what he did. The Kwantung officers moved their troops beyond the railway zone, where they had been confined, and without waiting for Itagaki's approval—who was in Japan at the time—they began preparations to send an armored train along with a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to Mukden. Their goal was to enlist the help of the Chinese military in investigating Nakamura's disappearance. Upon learning of this, Tokyo sent a telegram instructing them to halt their departure from the railway and to refrain from using the Nakamura incident as a pretext for employing force to address the Manchurian issue. For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. Ishiwara ordered the dispatch of an armored train carrying a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to compel the Chinese military authorities in Mukden to assist in the investigation of Nakamura's disappearance. However, central headquarters halted the train's departure at the last moment, sending a telegram from Tokyo that specifically instructed the Kwantung Army not to use the Nakamura incident to pressure a resolution to the Manchurian issue.  In addition to the Nakamura situation, another issue was brewing. Colonel Dohihara Kenji was involved in a plot to enlist Warlord Yan Xishan to attack Zhang Xueliang. This scheme was attracting unwanted attention and undermining the effectiveness of the Nakamura incident, prompting Ishiwara to swiftly suppress the plans. Rumors began to circulate in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army was preparing to retaliate against the Chinese due to the Nakamura situation. In response, War Minister General Minami dispatched Major General Yoshiji Tatekawa to Mukden to caution the Kwantung officers against any such actions. Ishiwara was informed of Tatekawa's arrival and sent urgent telegrams to his followers, warning, “Plot exposed. Act before Tatekawa's arrival.” Consequently, the launch date was moved from September 28th to the 18th. Itagaki personally intercepted Tatekawa's train, inviting him for tea and sake, and arranged for him to spend the night with a geisha on the evening of the 18th. On September 18th of 1931, 1st Lt Suemori Kawamoto of the independent Garrison Unit of the 29th infantry regiment planted bombs along the tracks near Liutiaokou. At 10:20pm they exploded doing only minor damage to 1.5 meters of track on one site. The damage was so minor a train actually passed over the tracks without difficulty 10 minutes later. Ishiwara, Itagaki and their followers quickly announced the explosion to be a Chinese atrocity and mobilized the Kwantung Army. Itagaki ordered the Independent Garrison Force and 29th infantry regiment to storm the Peitaying Barracks. Battalion commander Shimamoto was awakened by the orders via telephone and quickly dispatched the 1st (Ono) and 4th (Takahashi) companies from Mukden; the 2nd (kawakami) company at Fushun to advance to Liutiaokou. At 10:40pm the 29th regiment commander Hirata got a call from Shimamoto who ordered him to get his regiment into emergency formation and to storm the Peiyating barracks.  Two secretly hidden 24cm artillery pieces began to bombard the Peitaying barracks as 500 Japanese stormed the 7000 strong Chinese garrison. Despite being outnumbered 14 to 1, the Japanese destroyed Zhang Xueliangs small air force, routed the Chinese and occupied the Peiyating Barracks by 11pm, all at the cost of 500 Chinese lives and allegedly only 2 Japanese lives. A major reason the Japanese had ease was because Zhang Xueliang ordered his men to store away their weapons and not put up a fight if the Japanese invaded. Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek both in Beijing at the time knew they could not initiate an offensive war against such a strong foreign country. They were hoping the League of Nations would intervene as pertaining to the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. But later on Chiang Kai-Shek would find America too wrapped up in its depression at home, Britain indifferent and other nations without enough reason to risk anything in the far east. An hour after the attack, Ishiwara began pressing General Shigeru Honjo, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to send reinforcements to capture all of Mukden. Initially, Honjo hesitated, but Ishiwara convinced him that there was significant provocation from the enemy, prompting Honjo to order additional units into combat to secure the entire city. Historians have since struggled to determine whether Honjo was aware of the invasion plan; it seems likely he had some knowledge, but not the full details, which made him cautious in his actions over the following weeks. In the days that followed, Honjo attempted to confine the incident, but Ishiwara and Itagaki continuously urged all forces to adhere to the secret plan they had trained for. The speed and decisiveness of their actions overwhelmed the Chinese forces and left Honjo unable to change the course of events. Famously when one colleague asked Itagaki what to do in response to cease and desist orders from Honjo, Itagaki responded “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's war”. Official orders from Tokyo came on the next day, specifically opposing the expansion of hostilities, but Ishiwara and Itagaki had come too far to stop now. They began persuading Honjo to telegram the General Staff to ask for reinforcements and freedom of action “to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”. Ishiwara and Itagaki clearly aimed to expand their offensive through official channels first, but they also circumvented these channels. One cunning tactic they used was to incite chaos among civilians in Manchurian cities, thereby heightening the demand for improved security for Japanese residents. This strategy would enable the Kwantung Army troops to move beyond their established boundaries. Shortly after what is now known as the "Mukden Incident," military agents were sent to Kirin to stir unrest in the city. Reports of disturbances from Kirin began flooding into the Kwantung Army headquarters, with Ishiwara urging Honjo to send forces to Kirin to safeguard Japanese residents. He also pushed for reinforcements from the Korean Army, but Honjo was reluctant to take that step. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.  The operation against Kirin was executed with remarkable speed. Ishiwara ordered the majority of the 2nd Division, led by General Tamon Jiro, to swiftly travel to Kirin by train. They entered the city without firing a single shot and compelled the local Chinese commander to declare the province's independence from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours, the Korean army responded to an aid request from the Kwantung Army staff sent on September 21st and began advancing into Manchuria. In just 48 hours, the Japanese military had taken control of Kirin, which was outside the Kwantung operational zone, and the Korean army was invading Manchuria without Tokyo's approval, effectively undermining military discipline. Chief of Staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to restrict the Kwantung Army's operations and granted field commanders discretionary authority for certain emergency situations, typically of a local nature. However, the Kirin expedition did not fit within these parameters. Encouraged by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki pushed for an advance on Harbin. As noted in the previous episode, the strategy for taking Manchuria relied on speed and precision. The Kwantung Army had limited forces compared to the immediate Chinese troops in Manchuria, yet they were constrained by directives from Tokyo HQ that prohibited the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the South Manchuria Railway, where they had previously confined their actions. Ishiwara attempted to frame the situation politically, arguing that Japan should support Manchurian independence and sent this proposal directly to Tokyo central HQ. However, on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ firmly rejected the idea of expanding hostilities. Faced with this outright refusal from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals believed their only option was to create further chaos to compel a response. Ishiwara took the lead once more, aiming to unsettle Tokyo HQ. On October 8th, he donned military pilot gear and infiltrated one of five Chinese aircraft seized at Mukden airfield. He personally led a raid, although later in life, during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, he would claim that the flight was intended solely for reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. He argued that it was only at the last moment that intelligence revealed anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou, prompting the Kwantung Army Commander to authorize their neutralization if fired upon. Ishiwara maintained that he and the four accompanying aircraft were fired upon, leading them to drop approximately 75 bombs on Chinchou. This series of events was quite dramatic, and contemporary accounts suggest it was a premeditated effort to provoke Tokyo. The raid on Chinchou certainly alarmed Tokyo, leading the staff there to worry that the West would start condemning them. Tokyo's high command found themselves in a difficult position. They felt compelled to publicly support the Kwantung Army by retroactively approving the chaotic attacks, but internally, they were furious. Major Endo Saburo from the intelligence division was dispatched to Manchuria to investigate the situation. When he asked Ishiwara about the events, Ishiwara claimed he acted on the principle of field initiative, which was why he hadn't informed Tokyo beforehand. Saburo also noted that Ishiwara's tone suggested that he and the intelligence division should stay out of the matter. Additionally, Saburo learned that there were whispers in Manchuria indicating that if Tokyo's high command did not align with them, the Kwantung Army was ready to act independently. It appeared that the radical officers of the Kwantung Army were even willing to defy the Imperial Japanese Army command to achieve their goals. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire” If you found this situation quite surprising, there was also a rumor that Ishiwara and Itagaki planned to use an independent Manchuria as a base for a coup d'état against the Japanese government. Their goal was to overthrow the capitalists oppressing the people and establish a national socialist regime centered around the emperor. For those familiar with the history of political assassinations in 1930s Japan, this rumor hints at events that would unfold in 1936. It remains unclear whether Ishiwara and Itagaki genuinely intended to pursue this plan, but they certainly spread the word. On October 18th, War Minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army, instructing them to stop any discussions about making Manchuria independent or attempting to seize control of it. Additionally, they dispatched Colonel Imamura Hitoshi from the operations section to Manchuria to reason with Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”. Despite the chaos and turmoil, the Kwantung Army had been held back from launching any sustained military operations throughout October. As expected, Ishiwara continued to argue for an advance into northern Manchuria. In early November, he found another opportunity when he claimed that more railways had been destroyed. Allegedly, hostile Chinese forces had blown up the rail bridges over the Nonni River, south of Tsitsihar. When Japanese engineering units arrived to repair the damaged tracks, they came under fire from Chinese troops. To the high-ranking officials in Tokyo, this appeared to be a legitimate reason to take defensive action. Additionally, Kwantung intelligence reports were reaching Tokyo, suggesting that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had also provided exaggerated reports to the Japanese public, manipulating media narratives to pressure Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern Manchuria. Tokyo approved a defensive operation, restricted in time and scope, aimed at protecting Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung Army forces began moving north and soon engaged in intense fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led troops during this engagement, marking the only time in his military career that he did so. General Honjo, rightly concerned that the Kwantung forces were becoming uncontrollable, sent a cable on November 5th announcing that under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate,” the general staff would assume direct command authority in Manchuria. Unsurprisingly, Ishiwara and his like-minded colleagues in the Kwantung Army were furious. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.  Confronted with yet another dire situation, the IJA high command permitted the Kwantung Army to advance toward Tsitsihar. However, international outcry soon erupted, compelling them to order the evacuation of the city. Ishiwara sparked a significant debate among the staff, arguing that the evacuation was unacceptable given the sacrifices already made by the troops. Nevertheless, Honjo remained resolute. A few days later, Chinese forces began to gather at Chinchou, and tensions escalated with skirmishes occurring between Japanese and Chinese troops in Tientsin. In response, Ishiwara urgently called for Honjo to initiate an offensive at Chinchou as a way to better position their forces closer to Tientsin in case they faced overwhelming opposition. To support this advance, they also requested assistance from the Korean army. Once again, the burden fell to Tokyo. The high command in Tokyo ordered an immediate halt to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao River. The Kwantung Army hesitated, not solely due to the order but also because the Korean army refused to join the offensive against Chinchou, which was crucial for their success. Ishiwara found himself in a predicament; without reinforcements, the entire offensive could fail. Then, on December 11th, a significant change occurred when Premier Wakatsuki was ousted. War Minister Minami and Chief of Staff Kanaya, who had attempted to moderate the Kwantung Army's aggressiveness, were replaced by Araki Sadao, a leader of the Kodoha faction known for its aggressive stance. To provide some context, the Japanese military was divided into factions, similar to warlord cliques, vying to influence the future operations of the IJA and, to some extent, the IJN. Two primary factions shaped the military landscape in the 1930s: the Kodoha and the Toseiha (Control Faction). The Kodoha was not an organized political party nor did it hold an official position within the IJA, but it wielded considerable influence. Its members were typically younger officers, particularly from the Kwantung Army. General Sadao Araki was a founding member of the Kodoha, which was heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism, and the Kokutai ideology. They aimed to restore Japan to its perceived former glory, viewing liberal democracy as a detrimental force. They blamed the capitalists, industrialists, and elites—politicians, bureaucrats, and Zaibatsu leaders—for the nation's decline. Their goal was to see the Emperor reclaim full power in what they termed a "Showa Restoration." The Kodoha's primary adversary, as perceived by much of the Japanese military at the time, was the USSR and communism in general. Consequently, they supported the Hokushin-ron (Northern Strike Policy), which was Japan's theoretical plan to invade the USSR. While I don't want to delve too deeply into the details, it's important to note that the Kodoha was counterbalanced by the more moderate Toseiha faction, led by Hideki Tojo. The Toseiha opposed the Kodoha on several fronts, notably their desire to avoid a violent revolution to restore imperial dominance. Although they shared many principles with the Kodoha, the Toseiha rejected the Hokushin-ron strategy in favor of the Nanshin-ron (Southern Strike) strategy, which aimed at expanding into Southeast Asia and the resource-rich Dutch East Indies. The Toseiha faction also maintained better relations with the IJN. To contextualize this narrative within the political landscape, these two factions began to fiercely compete for dominance starting in 1931. With the influence of Araki Sadao and support from Prince Kan'in, a Kodoha sympathizer, significant changes occurred in Tokyo's command. Suddenly, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria were rebranded as “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung Army, fully backed by Tokyo, swiftly pursued all military objectives established by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were captured in early January 1932, followed by Tsitsihar in February. By spring 1932, Ishiwara urged the staff to complete the full occupation of Manchuria, both north and south. In April of that year, he presented the “Manshu haiti heiryaku,” or the program for the pacification of Manchuria. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol. It is clear that Ishiwara played a crucial role in the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had various strategies available to address the Manchurian issue, but Ishiwara focused primarily on achieving complete control over the region for its resources, strategic advantages, and to establish a continental base for a potential war against the United States. For Ishiwara, securing all of Manchuria was essential in preparation for the Final War. While it's likely that conflict between Japan and China would have occurred in Manchuria without Ishiwara's influence, it's uncertain whether Japan would have outright taken the province. Ishiwara dedicated years to planning and pushing boundaries, but when the operation commenced, it became evident that he and his associates lacked a definitive timeline for conquest and had several missing contingency plans. Despite the chaotic circumstances, the conquest of Manchuria proved to be a remarkable success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”. Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria incident set Japan on an unavoidable path toward the China War, which ultimately led to conflict with the West. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This situation also raises questions about military discipline. Many cite the concept of Gekokujo as a reason why individuals like Ishiwara and Itagaki were able to act as they did. These militaristic junior officers seemingly ran rampant, engaging in rebellious actions that defied their superiors, which forced those higher up to become complicit. While Gekokujo certainly played a role, especially in Ishiwara's case, it does not negate the fact that there was a significant level of indiscipline within the Japanese army. Ishiwara was undoubtedly aware of the potential consequences of his actions. A prime example is Colonel Komoto Daisaku, who had previously seen his career ruined after being exiled due to the Huanggutun incident. However, Ishiwara's focus extended beyond Manchuria; he was closely monitoring the political landscape in Tokyo. He recognized that the 1931 cabinet was unstable and that certain high-ranking officials, like Araki Sadao, were rapidly advancing in their careers and sympathized with his agenda. Ishiwara was betting that supporters from factions like Kodoha would gain the necessary power to further his cause. His gamble paid off handsomely, as all the key players in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their efforts. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd class, and returned to Japan as a celebrated hero, captivating younger officers in the Imperial Japanese Army. Ironically, the indiscipline he had nurtured within the army would later come back to haunt him as he climbed the ranks and became part of the Tokyo staff. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Ron Burgundy once said “Boy, that escalated quickly... I mean, that really got out of hand fast.” While perhaps Ishiwara did not plan for an all out war to break out against China, he certainly was the culprit to it happening. There was no going back, 15 years of blood, sweat and tears would be shed.

In Episode 29 of the podcast we return to Niigata Prefecture and onto Niigata City to speak with Jenya Yuss. Jenya works for Edge of Niigata, a travel company based in Niigata City and operating tours and experiences in the city and wider prefecture. As such she's an ideal person to introduce to the story and the reasons to visit Niigata.When Japanese think about the snow country, Niigata is one of the first prefectures to spring to mind. Subject to very heavy snowfall, Niigata is synonymous with that snow along with its rice, sake and seafood. Situated on the coast of the Sea of Japan and at confluence of two rivers, Niigata City has long been an important trade and port city that connected Japan to the outside world. A place through which people passed along with traded goods. A mix of the traditional, industrial and grittier elements you'd expect of a port city.Jenya and I discuss the city and its history, her own story, travel experiences offered by Edge of Niigata along with tips of onward journeys further into the snow country by train and ferry. You can find more information on the Edge of Niigata website or follow them on Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. More information including links to everything we discuss in the episode, images and a map showing you where in the snow country we are, are on the episode page of the Snow Country Stories Japan website. Snow Country Stories Japan is a bi-weekly podcast about life and travel in Japan's legendary 'yukiguni'. For more information about the show and your host, visit our website - www.snowcountrystories.com - and make sure to subscribe, rate and review the podcast and follow us on Instagram, Twitter and Facebook.

Last time we spoke about the disastrous first Arakan campaign and the Pacific Military conference of 1943. Yes Mr. Irwin had royally messed up the Arakan offensive, so much so it was gradually bringing his bitter rival General Slim into the mix. While Irwin failed, Slim gradually was placed in operation control and would soon unleash a box strategy against General Koga's forces in Burma. On the planning front, the war between MacArthur and King raged on, but compromises were finally hashed out. The July 2 directive, became the Elkton plan which in turn would evolve into Operation Cartwheel. The allies were learning how to play nice together in the Pacific at last. MacArthur was gradually shifting the war towards his own personal goals. However while all of this was going on, the Japanese were also forming their own plans, which would soon be unleashed. This episode is the Operation I-GO Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  It is April of 1943, a year ago, the Empire of the Rising sun stood proud and victorious over the Pacific. The Japanese had taken Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and pretty much anywhere they went, victory was at hand. Yet as Admiral Yamamoto moved his flag from super battleship Yamato to the Musashi, he looked quite withered down. The past 14 months since the great raid on Pearl Harbor had aged him considerably. His close-cropped hair had turned almost entirely gray and his eyes looked discolored. It was rare to see him leave his quarters and whenever he did it was quite briefly, usually him waving his hat in the air as a departing sign to a squadron of aircraft. Rarely did he join his fellow staff officers for a game of ring-toss on deck. In a letter he wrote at the end of January of 1943 he asserted he only set foot ashore 4 times since the previous august, only to check in on the sick or wounded men at the hospitals or to attend funerals. Critics of Yamamoto would claim he actually made considerable amounts of visits to the “naval restaurant” on an island in the lagoon. This “naval restaurant” was actually a well-known brothel near Yokosuka Naval base in Tokyo Bay. The commander in chief seemed resigned to his fate. When he was asked in October of 1942 what he would do after Japan won the war he replied “I imagine I'll be packed off either to the guillotine or to set Helena”. On most occasions he would openly declare he did not believe he would live through the war. Yamamoto mourned the loss of so many IJN officers and sailors and was especially saddened by the loss of the commanders who refused to leave their doomed ships. Yamamoto had actually campaigned to reform the principle that a captain could and should honorably survive the destruction of his ship, but it was to little avail. The belief was so hard-wired into the Japanese naval officer corps.  Yamamoto knew Japan was staggering towards a catastrophic defeat, but he could not openly say it to those around him. He had tossed everything he could to thwart the war in the first place, warning everyone of the great industrial power of America that would gradually overwhelm Japan. His operation against Midway in june of 1942 was a major gambit aimed at forcing a decisive victory to bring the Americans closer to the negotiating table. The utter failure at Midway had ensured the war would be prolonged, it would become a war of attrition and one that Japan could not hope to win. On the morning of April 3rd, 1943 Admirals Yamamoto and Ugaki accompanied by more than a dozen officers of the combined fleet staff boarded two Kawanishi flying boats enroute for Rabaul. The battles of Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona-Sanananda were extremely heavy setbacks to Yamamoto's plans of extending the defensive perimeter towards the east of Australia so it could be strangled of supplies. The disaster that occurred at the battle of the Bismarck Sea showcased how vulnerable their shipping lanes were. The state of their land-based aviation was abysmal, it failed to protect the convey sent to Lae resulting in the terrible loss. As Commander Toshikazu Ohmae stated “The land-based air groups at Rabaul were not effective, largely because there were only a few experienced pilots in them.  Vice-Admiral Ugaki was even harsher, adding “We cannot expect much of the land-based air force partly because of a passive atmosphere among them.”  Admiral Kusaka's 11th air fleet had suffered tremendous losses from a series of serious ongoing issues, but two were of vital importance; 1) the poor health and low morale of those at Rabaul. Men were succumbed to widespread diseases, such as malaria and chronic diarrhea. And 2) the terrible situation when it came to replacing men such as their valuable veterans. As Yamamoto put it “They used to say that one ‘Zero' fighter could take on five to ten American aircraft, but that was at the beginning of the war. Since losing so many good pilots at Midway we've had difficulty in replacing them. Even now, they still say that one ‘Zero' can take on two enemy planes, but the enemy's replacement rate is three times ours; the gap between our strengths is increasing every day, and to be honest things are looking black for us now.” The new recruits were unfamiliar with the aircraft employed by Kusaka's command, requiring to be re-trained upon their arrival to Rabaul. Without their veteran pilots to train these men the task took longer and resulted in less capable pilots and crews. The replacement issue for aircrews was a fleet-wide issue forcing the IJN to shorten their training syllabus for commissioned and enlisted pilots by 2 months. To achieve this reduction, the amount of instructional time devoted to skill areas like tactics, gunnery and formation flying were reduced or in some cases even eliminated. The veterans who began the war in a third position of a 3-plane sector and were still alive now took upon the role of shotai or chutai leadership. Shotai leaders were responsible for flights of 3 aircraft and Chutai leaders were responsible for 9 aircraft or better said 3 shotai. However many of these men did not really have the necessary experience to assume such responsibilities. On March 25th a directive was established to quote “create a superior and impregnable strategic position”. In other words, Tokyo was demanding the Army and Navy come up with a plan to stop the allies southern offensive. Tokyo wanted the two services to actually work together so they could defend the precious gains they had made in the early part of the war, like their holdings in New Guinea which were currently being hammered upon by MacArthur's forces. To implement the new directive, General Imamura summoned a conference on Rabaul for April 12th. Commanders of the 17th and 19th armies, the 6th air division would be in attendance. During the conference it was decided General Hyakutakes 17th Army would take on the responsibility for defending the northern solomons in coordination with the Navy. They would also have to help assist the navy who was expecting allies attacks directed at the central solomons. General Adachi's 18th army was given responsibility to defend Lai-Salamaua, but because of the shipping lane crisis this would have to be done mostly via land routes. They were going to establish a major overland and coastal supply route linking Madang and Western New Britain to the Lae area to aid this. Furthermore naval and air bases would be built up in eastern New Guinea to aid Lt General Itahana Giichi's 6th air division to operation in the region. Despite all these grand plans, American air power was already making Tokyo express runs to places like Finschhafen impossible. The Japanese war effort in New Guinea was gradually being torn apart by constant air raids. Therefore, the only way to get men and supplies to places like Lae would be using the ever glamorous submarine or barge methodology. Now that is all for the Imperial Japanese army boys planning session, but what about Yamamoto and the Naval gang. By the time of the conference, MacArthur's efforts in New Guinea had basically ruined Yamamoto's expansionist strategies. A complete strategic rethink was now necessary. Yamamoto was quartered in a cottage high on a hill behind the town of Rabaul. He spent the following week inspecting airfields and other military installations, meeting with the local army and naval commanders all around New Britain. As was typical of him, he bid good luck to the departing air squadrons, with his usual wave of his hat. Yamamoto set to work creating a new offensive directive erected as part of the March 25th plan. The IJN planned for an air campaign against allied positions in New Guinea and the Solomons. The 11th air fleet, on its lonesome would not able to mount an effective strike, thus Yamamoto called upon the 3rd fleet to augment them.  Admiral Ozawa who led the 3rd fleet voiced opposition to this, not wanting his precious elite units to be squandered. But he eventually gave in and provided aircraft carriers and agreed to supervise plans for the new operation. At the same time it was decided that Yamamoto and Ozawa would shift their headquarters temporarily to Rabaul, this would prove to be a fateful mistake on his part. You see him doing so was announced using a radio message. His operations officer Commander Yasuji Watanabe would go on the record complaining that the information about Yamamoto's visit to the Ballalae Airfield should had been done by courier and not by radio, but the communications officer replied “this code only went into effect on april 1st and cannot be broken”. It would be broken, but more about that later. Now the Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo and Hiyo would toss up 160 aircraft: 54 Vals, 45 Kates and 96 Zeros to augment the 155 aircraft of Admiral Kusaka pushing them to a strength of over 350 aircraft. The aircraft were dispersed to multiple airfields such as Buka and Kahili on Bougainville and Ballale in the Shortlands.   Now before Yamamoto and his team launched their new offensive, Admiral Kusaka decided to do a preliminary fighter sweep down the Slot on April 1st. He hoped to draw out large portions of the allied airpower on Guadalcanal to soften them up. Kusaka launched a first wave of 32 and second wave of 25 Zeros which intercepted 42 fighters of Admiral Mason's ComAirSols command. The allied force consisted mostly of Wildcats, some P-38's and a few new F4U Corsairs. They were intercepted over the Russell Islands causing a giant melee of dog flights lasting over 3 hours. The Americans had home field advantage over the Japanese, managing to shoot down 9 Zero's at the cost of 5 Wildcats and a Corsair. It was not exactly a promising start for the Japanese. As usual both sides of the air battle submitted exaggerated reports. The Americans claimed to have taken down 18 Zeros and the Japanese claimed to have downed 47 American fighters. So yeah the Japanese claimed to have shot down more aircraft than they even encountered haha. Now it was on April the 3rd when Yamamoto and his staff arrived in Rabaul and he personally took command of the upcoming operation alongside Admirals Ozawa and Kusaka. Now Yamamoto had accurately anticipated the allied advance into the solomons and New Guinea would focus on the subjugation of Rabaul. Within five days of the battle of Guadalcanal being officially declared on February 9th of 1942, Lt General Kenney had authorized a plan to take down Rabaul. This plan commence on the night of February 14th with a bombing raid consisting of 12 B-29's from the 63rd bomb squadron. They targeted the fuel dumps and munitions. A second wave of 10 B-29's from the 65th bomb squadron came in dropping incendiaries upon the town of Rabaul. The Japanese had managed no fighter interceptions. Yamamoto had further predicted the allies would launch a double-pronged advance through New Guinea and the northern Solomon islands. To meet this advance he had set up a ring of airfields around Rabaul. His visit to Ballalae airfield was part of developing the rings and it would be his death sentence in the end. The result of these plans led to a triangular combat zone with Port Moresby on its west point, Guadalcanal at its east and Rabaul as its northern apex.  Yamamoto knew the US forces would advance under the cover of air superiority which in turn depending upon their ability to build forward airfields. In anticipation of his Yamamoto had as we mentioned gathered a massive build up of aircraft with the intent to hammer the allies ability to supply materials and build further airfields. The battle for Henderson field on Guadalcanal was the first of these contests and many would follow. Yamamoto hoped the shorter lines of supply from airfields closer to Rabaul would give them an advantage over the Americans, but despite all the claims of great air victories, Yamamoto's personal tour was revealing the opposite. In fact, as Yamamoto used the post-guadalcanal lull in action to bolster his defenses for a anticipated battle ahead, Halsey had likewise prepared his forces for their advance into the central and northern solomons.  Halsey would have a number of new toys to play with such as the Chance Vought F4U Corsair and Grumman F6F Hellcat. 4 new airbases were built upon Guadalcanal and during march of 1943 allied bombers made sporadic attacks on the Japanese airfields at Ballalae, Kahili, Shortland Island and Munda. On top of that large scale reconnaissance efforts were made to get a good picture of the Japanese build up of their airfields. When reconnaissance found out the Japanese were developing a seaplane off southern bougainville, the Japanese launched a dawn fighter attack on March 28th. Led by Captain Lanphier of the 70th squadron, 6 P-38's destroyed 8 Japanese seaplanes. Now after a week of sporadic bombing raids from both sides, allies watchers on the New Guinea coast indicated a major offensive was afoot.  Yamamoto's grand air campaign was codenamed operation I-GO with attack day X set for april 5th. The first target was to be guadalcanal, but bad weather forced a postponement of 2 days. Japanese reconnaissance since March 25th had indicated the allies had roughly 300 aircraft on the island, alongside transports, cargo ships, warships and other goodies going between Lunga Point and Tulagi. In the early hours of April the 7th, Yamamoto unleashed a massive strike force consisting of over 224 planes, the largest striking force since the attack on Pearl Harbor. 67 Vals and 157 Zeros were enroute to smash Guadalcanal. But the allies enjoyed great intelligence and received several warnings of the impending offensive. The coastwatchers were hard at work transmitting their sightings. Rear-Admiral Marc Mitscher , the new commander of AirSols scrambled 76 fighters consisting of Wildcats, Lightnings, Airacobras and Kittyhawks from Hendersonfield, Milne Bay and other outlying airfields. Despite the prior warnings, the allied scramble was rather disorderly and to make matters worse the Japanese cleverly split up their attack force into 4 groups to confuse the allied radar systems. 4 squadrons of Vals were preceded by 2 sweeps of Zeros which were intercepted by 3 squadrons of Wildcats. Marine 1st Lt James E Sweet of the VMF-221 was credited with shooting down7 Vals and possibly an 8th using his Wildcat. His aircraft was badly mauled during the combat forcing him to make a water landing outside Tulagi harbor. He would be awarded the Medal of Honor for this great feat.  Despite valiant efforts made by the allies, the Vals laid havoc to the Tulagi anchorage. The destroyer USS Aaron Ward, New Zealander corvette Moa and US tanker Kanawha were sunk. THe crews over in Henderson field were fortunate as it was not hit too hard as the dog fights broke up the Japanese Vals and Zeros who were forced back towards Bougainville. For their efforts the Japanese lost 12 zerosand 12 vals. The Japanese pilots claimed to have downed 41 allies aircraft, which turned out to be 7 Wildcats and 12 major warships which were the 3 previously mentioned. With what seemed to be a large success for operation X, Yamamoto felt confident and decided to launch operation Y of I-GO. While operation X of I-GO was directed at Guadalcanal, operation Y would hit New Guinea. On april 11, 27 Vals and 73 Zeros departed Rabaul to hit Oro Bay which was adjacent to the rapidly expanding airdrome complex at Dobodura. The allies scrambled 50 aircraft consisting of Lightning and Warhawks of the 7th, 8th and 9th squadrons. The vals managed to sink a US cargo ship, heavily damaging a transport and an Australian minesweeper. The next day Yamamoto traveled to Vanukanau airdrome to personally send off another strike and announced he would do a tour of the forward bases of Buin, Ballale and Shortland island. The signal was picked up by allied listening posts. Cryptanalysts at Station Hypo led by Joseph Rocherfort decrypted the message and pronounced it a jackpot. The message referred to Yamamoto was easily deduced, and the geographic designators for Rabaul, Ballale and Buin were easily extracted. Better than that the message contained the specific information that Yamamoto would be traveling on a medium bomber escorted by 6 fighters, and would arrive at RYZ at 8am. This would put Yamamoto's aircraft over the southern end of Bougainville on the morning of the 18th, a location just within the fighter range of Henderson Field. I will not be speaking anymore of this as it will be discussed in depth in a future episode, just a tease I know. At Vanukanau Yamamoto presented himself in his crisp white uniform, waving his hat to the crews of 43 Bettys followed up shortly by 65 Zeros. A second group of 66 Zeros assisted the raid to perform a sweep, leaving a combined total of 174 aircraft. They flew in two large formations with an initial course direction going towards Milne Bay. Allied radar picked them up prompting General Kenney to scramble every fighter had in the area. However the course the Japanese took was a feint and without warning they broke out going across the Owen Stanley range enroute for Port Moresby. 44 allied fighters were able to intercept them, but many of the bombers managed to get past them. The bombers hit the airstrips, damaged installations alongside 15 grounded aircraft. The Japanese would claim sinking a transport anchored in the harbor and the destruction of 28 enemy planes in the sky, though only two P-39's were shot down at the cost of 2 Zeros and 7 Bettys.  On april the 14th, Yamamoto again personally waved off another attack, this time targeting Milne Bay. 23 vals and 75 Zeros were launched from carriers Hiyo and Junyo joined by 54 fighters and 44 Bettys from the 11th air fleet for a total of 196 aircraft. Here the Japanese scored some luck, because as a result of the air raid against Port Moresby the allies had actually rerouting most of their shipping to Milne Bay. The allies scrambled 44 fighters, 36 Kittyhawks from Milne Bay and 8 lightnings from Dobodura to intercept them. Despite the efforts of the allied airmen, Japanese bombers broke through making their way to Milne Bay in several waves. The high level bombers dropped at least 100 bombs over the anchorage, while the dive bombers attacked the allied shipping. The Dutch troop transport Van Heemskerk was forced to beach itself after suffering several hits lighting her ablaze; the British cargo ship Gorgon was also hit many times and lit on fire; the Dutch transport Van Outhoorn and Australian minesweepers Wagga and Kapunda were damaged by near misses. In the battle in the sky one Kittyhawk was shot down, 4 p-40's were severely damaged and 1 lightning was forced to make a crash landing. The Japanese claimed to have sunk 3 large and 1 medium transport, heavily damaged 6 transports and shot down 44 aircraft. During the air battle one Lt Richard Bong was starting to make a name for himself having shot down a pair of Betty's. He would earn a lot of attention from General Kenney who described him “as a little blonde-haired Norwegian boy. Best watch the boy Bong”.The Japanese claims was so incredible, upon hearing of it Emperor Hirohito sent a message stating “please convey my satisfaction to the commander in chief, combined fleet, and tell him to enlarge the war result more than ever”. To contrast this, General Kenney made some remarks about the intense air raids “the way yamamoto had failed to take advantage of his superiority in numbers and position since the first couple of month of the war was a disgrace to the airman's profession”. The reason he had this scathing remark was because apart from the rare exception of mass attacks, the Japanese attacks were marked by their use of aircraft in Penny-packets. What Kenny did not know was how the IJN's air forces were being hampered heavily by logistical issues. Their inability at this time was a result of lack of experienced aviation engineers, ground crews, adequate airfield facilities and airfield equipment. They simply were not the same aviation force that had hit Pearl Harbor, the spear had been heavily blunted. Yamamoto planned to perform another fighter sweep of the 16th, but reconnaissance flights failed to turn up adequate targets on New Guinea's northeast coastline.  On April the 17th, Yamamoto's chief of staff, Vice-Admiral Ugaki Matome held a conference to review the lessons learned from their air offensive. The staff were reluctant to admit a startling and horrifying truth. Hundreds of aviators had been burnt to a crisp because the aircraft engineers messed up installing the protected fuel tanks. This led to countless aircraft catching fire from minor hits, even tracer rounds. When Japanese aircraft saw they were on fire, they assumed they had been scored a fatale hit from the enemy, though in most cases their aircraft were minorly damaged. Many of the pilots in these situations chose to kamikaze their aircraft. Thus Operation I-Go was finished, but despite all the unrealistic exaggerated reports from the Japanese pilots, the entire operation only really amounted to setting back the American operations in the Solomons for about 10 days. While the Japanese believed they had inflicted tremendous damage, in reality the only real insignificance for the allies was to postpone some bombing raids and minelaying activity. The most significant consequence of operation I-Go would actually end up being Admiral Yamamoto's decision to personally carry out a tour of the forward airbases, as he tried to raise morale for the men like he had done at Rabaual. This would have a very dire effect on the future of the Empire.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation I-Go was quite the lackluster offensive, despite what the Japanese pilots were claiming to their leadership. The leadership likewise believed the claims or were unwilling to see the truth of the matter. They had only accosted the allies about 10 days in the solomons.

When Japanese news outlets reported the problems with software like Microsoft Teams, they used the term “障害”, and since the same term is often used in a news story about disability issues, it was difficult to find news about people with disabilities in Japan, as any Google search with the term “障害” only returned results to do with the Microsoft 365 outage. Coincidentally “障害” – or ‘shogai' can be translated as ‘disability', ‘impairment', as well as more troublingly, ‘hindrance', ‘obstacle' and ‘failure.' A person with disabilities in Japan could be translated literally as a ‘failed' or ‘obstacle' person'.

When Japanese signals were decoded at Bletchley Park, who translated them into English? When Japanese soldiers were taken as prisoners of war, who interrogated them? When Japanese maps and plans were captured on the battlefield, who deciphered them for Britain? When Great Britain found itself at war with Japan in December 1941, there was a linguistic battle to be fought--but Britain was hopelessly unprepared.  Eavesdropping on the Emperor: Interrogators and Codebreakers in Britain's War With Japan (Oxford UP, 2021) traces the men and women with a talent for languages who were put on crash courses in Japanese, and unfolds the history of their war. Some were sent with their new skills to India; others to Mauritius, where there was a secret radio intercept station; or to Australia, where they worked with Australian and American codebreakers. Translating the despatches of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin after his conversations with Hitler; retrieving filthy but valuable documents from the battlefield in Burma; monitoring Japanese airwaves to warn of air-raids--Britain depended on these forgotten 'war heroes'. The accuracy of their translations was a matter of life or death, and they rose to the challenge. Based on declassified archives and interviews with the few survivors, this fascinating, globe-trotting book tells their stories. Jingyi Li is a PhD Candidate in Japanese History at the University of Arizona. She researches about early modern Japan, literati, and commercial publishing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

When Japanese signals were decoded at Bletchley Park, who translated them into English? When Japanese soldiers were taken as prisoners of war, who interrogated them? When Japanese maps and plans were captured on the battlefield, who deciphered them for Britain? When Great Britain found itself at war with Japan in December 1941, there was a linguistic battle to be fought--but Britain was hopelessly unprepared.  Eavesdropping on the Emperor: Interrogators and Codebreakers in Britain's War With Japan (Oxford UP, 2021) traces the men and women with a talent for languages who were put on crash courses in Japanese, and unfolds the history of their war. Some were sent with their new skills to India; others to Mauritius, where there was a secret radio intercept station; or to Australia, where they worked with Australian and American codebreakers. Translating the despatches of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin after his conversations with Hitler; retrieving filthy but valuable documents from the battlefield in Burma; monitoring Japanese airwaves to warn of air-raids--Britain depended on these forgotten 'war heroes'. The accuracy of their translations was a matter of life or death, and they rose to the challenge. Based on declassified archives and interviews with the few survivors, this fascinating, globe-trotting book tells their stories. Jingyi Li is a PhD Candidate in Japanese History at the University of Arizona. She researches about early modern Japan, literati, and commercial publishing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

When Japanese signals were decoded at Bletchley Park, who translated them into English? When Japanese soldiers were taken as prisoners of war, who interrogated them? When Japanese maps and plans were captured on the battlefield, who deciphered them for Britain? When Great Britain found itself at war with Japan in December 1941, there was a linguistic battle to be fought--but Britain was hopelessly unprepared.  Eavesdropping on the Emperor: Interrogators and Codebreakers in Britain's War With Japan (Oxford UP, 2021) traces the men and women with a talent for languages who were put on crash courses in Japanese, and unfolds the history of their war. Some were sent with their new skills to India; others to Mauritius, where there was a secret radio intercept station; or to Australia, where they worked with Australian and American codebreakers. Translating the despatches of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin after his conversations with Hitler; retrieving filthy but valuable documents from the battlefield in Burma; monitoring Japanese airwaves to warn of air-raids--Britain depended on these forgotten 'war heroes'. The accuracy of their translations was a matter of life or death, and they rose to the challenge. Based on declassified archives and interviews with the few survivors, this fascinating, globe-trotting book tells their stories. Jingyi Li is a PhD Candidate in Japanese History at the University of Arizona. She researches about early modern Japan, literati, and commercial publishing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

When Japanese signals were decoded at Bletchley Park, who translated them into English? When Japanese soldiers were taken as prisoners of war, who interrogated them? When Japanese maps and plans were captured on the battlefield, who deciphered them for Britain? When Great Britain found itself at war with Japan in December 1941, there was a linguistic battle to be fought--but Britain was hopelessly unprepared.  Eavesdropping on the Emperor: Interrogators and Codebreakers in Britain's War With Japan (Oxford UP, 2021) traces the men and women with a talent for languages who were put on crash courses in Japanese, and unfolds the history of their war. Some were sent with their new skills to India; others to Mauritius, where there was a secret radio intercept station; or to Australia, where they worked with Australian and American codebreakers. Translating the despatches of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin after his conversations with Hitler; retrieving filthy but valuable documents from the battlefield in Burma; monitoring Japanese airwaves to warn of air-raids--Britain depended on these forgotten 'war heroes'. The accuracy of their translations was a matter of life or death, and they rose to the challenge. Based on declassified archives and interviews with the few survivors, this fascinating, globe-trotting book tells their stories. Jingyi Li is a PhD Candidate in Japanese History at the University of Arizona. She researches about early modern Japan, literati, and commercial publishing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

When Japanese signals were decoded at Bletchley Park, who translated them into English? When Japanese soldiers were taken as prisoners of war, who interrogated them? When Japanese maps and plans were captured on the battlefield, who deciphered them for Britain? When Great Britain found itself at war with Japan in December 1941, there was a linguistic battle to be fought--but Britain was hopelessly unprepared.  Eavesdropping on the Emperor: Interrogators and Codebreakers in Britain's War With Japan (Oxford UP, 2021) traces the men and women with a talent for languages who were put on crash courses in Japanese, and unfolds the history of their war. Some were sent with their new skills to India; others to Mauritius, where there was a secret radio intercept station; or to Australia, where they worked with Australian and American codebreakers. Translating the despatches of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin after his conversations with Hitler; retrieving filthy but valuable documents from the battlefield in Burma; monitoring Japanese airwaves to warn of air-raids--Britain depended on these forgotten 'war heroes'. The accuracy of their translations was a matter of life or death, and they rose to the challenge. Based on declassified archives and interviews with the few survivors, this fascinating, globe-trotting book tells their stories. Jingyi Li is a PhD Candidate in Japanese History at the University of Arizona. She researches about early modern Japan, literati, and commercial publishing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/japanese-studies

When Japanese signals were decoded at Bletchley Park, who translated them into English? When Japanese soldiers were taken as prisoners of war, who interrogated them? When Japanese maps and plans were captured on the battlefield, who deciphered them for Britain? When Great Britain found itself at war with Japan in December 1941, there was a linguistic battle to be fought--but Britain was hopelessly unprepared.  Eavesdropping on the Emperor: Interrogators and Codebreakers in Britain's War With Japan (Oxford UP, 2021) traces the men and women with a talent for languages who were put on crash courses in Japanese, and unfolds the history of their war. Some were sent with their new skills to India; others to Mauritius, where there was a secret radio intercept station; or to Australia, where they worked with Australian and American codebreakers. Translating the despatches of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin after his conversations with Hitler; retrieving filthy but valuable documents from the battlefield in Burma; monitoring Japanese airwaves to warn of air-raids--Britain depended on these forgotten 'war heroes'. The accuracy of their translations was a matter of life or death, and they rose to the challenge. Based on declassified archives and interviews with the few survivors, this fascinating, globe-trotting book tells their stories. Jingyi Li is a PhD Candidate in Japanese History at the University of Arizona. She researches about early modern Japan, literati, and commercial publishing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/british-studies

When Japanese signals were decoded at Bletchley Park, who translated them into English? When Japanese soldiers were taken as prisoners of war, who interrogated them? When Japanese maps and plans were captured on the battlefield, who deciphered them for Britain? When Great Britain found itself at war with Japan in December 1941, there was a linguistic battle to be fought--but Britain was hopelessly unprepared.  Eavesdropping on the Emperor: Interrogators and Codebreakers in Britain's War With Japan (Oxford UP, 2021) traces the men and women with a talent for languages who were put on crash courses in Japanese, and unfolds the history of their war. Some were sent with their new skills to India; others to Mauritius, where there was a secret radio intercept station; or to Australia, where they worked with Australian and American codebreakers. Translating the despatches of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin after his conversations with Hitler; retrieving filthy but valuable documents from the battlefield in Burma; monitoring Japanese airwaves to warn of air-raids--Britain depended on these forgotten 'war heroes'. The accuracy of their translations was a matter of life or death, and they rose to the challenge. Based on declassified archives and interviews with the few survivors, this fascinating, globe-trotting book tells their stories. Jingyi Li is a PhD Candidate in Japanese History at the University of Arizona. She researches about early modern Japan, literati, and commercial publishing.

When Japanese cannibal, Issei Sagawa is extradited back to Japan, a legal loophole allows him to walk free. How has he spent his years as a free man and does he still have the desire to eat people? This podcast is hosted by ZenCast.fm

When Japanese-born Naomi Osaka dropped out of the French Open tennis tournament last month citing mental health concerns, the media world took notice. There were some who accused the athlete of being a prima donna by declining post-competition media interviews. When Osaka cited depression and anxiety as her reason, the media buzz changed from skeptical … Continue reading "Athletes' mental health claims make headlines after star tennis player drops out of competition – Spending the Army birthday with one soldier who “beat the odds”"

On this episode of Ichimon Japan we ask: Who got it more wrong: MatPat or Tony? (This episode is a follow up to episode 11 of Ichimon Japan which focused on the so-called Curse of the Colonel. The episode was recorded in order to address inaccuracies found in that episode.) Topics Discussed A brief summary of the Curse of the Colonel The fact that Hanshin Tigers fans threw the statue of Colonel Sanders into the Dotonbori River after winning the Central League championship in October of 1985 and not after their November, 1985 Japan Series victory A recent video from the Food Theorists YouTube channel in which MatPat suggests that the Curse of the Colonel is invalid due to the Hanshin Tigers having won the Japan Series in 1985 Whether MatPat's conclusions about the Curse of the Colonel are accurate or not When Japanese sources say that the Curse of the Colonel started taking effect on the Hanshin Tigers The idea that throwing a statue of Colonel Sanders into Dotonbori River was actually good luck for the Hanshin Tigers And much more! Support on Patreon If you enjoy Ichimon Japan and want to ensure that we're able to produce more episodes, then please consider becoming a patron on Patreon.com. You can join for just $1 a month and that comes with perks like early access to episodes, a shout-out at the beginning of a future episode, bonus content, and discounts to Kimito Designs. For $3 a month you get all that plus access to Japanese Plus Alpha, a podcast produced by me (Tony Vega) that focuses on the Japanese language and its many quirks. Whether you are studying Japanese or just enjoy learning about language and linguistics, you'll enjoy Japanese Plus Alpha. And it goes without saying that if you sign up, you'll also get my undying gratitude. Thanks in advance! Support on Patreon Sources, Links, Videos, Etc. Use the link below to check out episode 11 of Ichimon Japan in which we discuss the Curse of the Colonel in far more detail. What is the Curse of the Colonel? | Ichimon Japan 11 Here is the Food Theory video (from the Food Theorists YouTube channel) in which MatPat discusses the Curse of the Colonel. Food Theory: KFC and the Curse of Colonel Sanders) If you enjoyed the video above, you may want to check out the Food Theorists YouTube channel. The Food Theory YouTube Channel Here are the Japanese-language sources mentioned in this episode. Japanese Wikipedia entry for the Curse of the Colonel 2009 TV News Report filmed after the statue of Colonel Sanders was found in the Dotonbori River 「呪い」火付け役、救出喜ぶ　探偵！ナイトスクープ This article is from the Asahi TV (ABC) website. Asahi is the producer and broadcaster of the Japanese variety show Tantei Naito Sukūpu. This article confirms that the story of the Curse of the Colonel was covered on the show's first episode in March of 1988. The article also explains that they produced three different episodes that covered the story either in part or from start to finish between the start of the show and March 11 of 2009 (when the article was published). The article adds that the show even had divers go into the Dotonbori River to look for the statue. This was shown on two of the three times they covered the story. Further, the article includes a quote by the producer of the show at the time in which he explains that the Curse of the Colonel's status as an urban legend (toshi densetsu) was cemented after the show covered the story since their efforts to find the statue were so thorough and yet they were unable to locate it. 【都市伝説 2019 最新】カーネルサンダース人形の呪い　ケンタッキーおいしいです。 A Japanese YouTube video explaining the Curse of the Colonel. It describes it as an urban legend (toshi densetsu). 【都市伝説】プロ野球：カーネル・サンダースの呪い【東京ダグアウツ】 This is another Japanese YouTube video that explains the Curse of the Colonel. The person in the video also calls it an urban legend (toshi densetsu).   To listen to another Ichimon Japan episode about a Japanese curse, check out the link below. What’s so scary about the hour of the ox? (About Ushi no Koku Mairi) | Ichimon Japan 21 If you would like to check out the Kimito Designs shop, then use the link below. Remember to use the coupon code OPENING10 when you check out to get 10% off (valid until the end of 2020). Visit KimitoDesigns.com Japanese Vocabulary List Most episodes feature at least one or two interesting Japanese words or phrases. Here’s some of the ones that came up on this episode. All information is from Jim Breen's WWWJDIC. Noroi 呪い : 呪い(P); 詛い; 咒い 【のろい】 (n) curse; spell; malediction; (P); : 呪い; 咒い 【まじない】 ; (n) (uk) charm; incantation; spell; curse; 《verb stem》 呪う : 呪う(P); 詛う 【のろう】 ; (v5u,vt) to curse; to put a curse on; to detest intensely; (P); 《verb stem》 呪う 【まじなう】 ; (v5u) (1) (arch) to pray that one avoids disaster or illness; to pray; (v5u) (2) to pray for the death or misfortune of another; to curse; (v5u) (3) to treat illness with prayer Yokunen/Yokutoshi 翌年 【よくねん(P); よくとし】 (n-t) following year Toshi Densetsu 都市伝説 【としでんせつ】 (n) urban legend We Want Your Questions Is there something about Japan that confuses you? Is there something about Japanese culture that you would like to learn more about? Is there something in Japanese history that you would like us to explain? We're always looking for new questions about Japan to answer, so if you have one, please send it to ichimon@japankyo.com. Special Thanks Opening/Closing Theme: Produced by Apol (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Fiverr) Ichimon Japan cover art: Produced by Erik R. Follow Japankyo on Social Media Facebook (@JapanKyoNews) Twitter (@JapanKyoNews) Full Show Notes https:///www.japankyo.com/ichimonjapan   What are you funniest Japanese mistakes? | Ichimon Japan 30

When Japanese supply lines to New Guinea get cut off, the troops are left to fend for themselves in the midst of World War II. TRANSCRIPT https://castinglotspod.home.blog/2020/12/17/s2-e3-land-part-i-the-pacific-war/ CREDITS Written, hosted and produced by Alix Penn and Carmella Lowkis. Theme music by Daniel Wackett. Find him on Twitter @ds_wack and Soundcloud as Daniel Wackett. Logo by Riley. Find her on Twitter and Instagram @tallestfriend. Casting Lots is part of the Morbid Audio Podcast Network. Network sting by Mikaela Moody. Find her on Bandcamp as mikaelamoody1. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bradley, J. (2003). Flyboys. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Drea, E. et al. (2006). Researching Japanese war crimes records: introductory essays. [n.p.]: National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group. Available at: https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/japanese-war-crimes/introductory-essays.pdf Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2020). ‘Pacific War’, in Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pacific-War Sayas, C. (2017). ‘Intro to Cannibalism in the Pacific’, Pacific Atrocities, 10 June. Available at: https://www.pacificatrocities.org/blog/cannibalism-in-the-pacific Sharma, M.S. (2014). ‘Japanese ate Indian PoWs, used them as live targets in WWII’, The Times of India, 11 August. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Japanese-ate-Indian-PoWs-used-them-as-live-targets-in-WWII/articleshow/40017577.cms Spencer, G. (1992). ‘Japan Hears of World War II Cannibalism A Half-Century Later’, Associated Press, 11 August. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/2e7e9a8dae17cc29862c4562b44c9225 Tanaka, Y. (1998). Hidden Horrors. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. UPI. (1992). ‘Documents claim cannibalism by Japanese World War II soldiers’, UPI, 10 August. Available at: https://www.upi.com/Archives/1992/08/10/Documents-claim-cannibalism-by-Japanese-World-War-II-soldiers/2568713419200/?ur3=1

Luke Grant is joined by Adjunct Professor Kylie Ward, CEO of the Australian College of Nursing, who calls for Vivian Bullwinkel to be celebrated this ANZAC Day for the incredible contribution she made to Australia’s way of life, much like many nurses and front-line staff are doing for the community in response to Coronavirus today. In May 1941, Bullwinkel volunteered for the Australian Army Nursing Service (AANS) and sailed for Singapore, assigned to the 2/13th Australian General Hospital.   In February 1942, with 65 other nurses, she fled Singapore following an invasion by Japanese troops, however her ship, the SS Vyner Brooke, was sunk by Japanese aircraft two days later. Bullwinkel drifted for hours clinging to a lifeboat before she struggled ashore on Banka Island with other survivors. When Japanese troops arrived, they corralled 22 nurses together and ordered them into the sea, where they machine-gunned them.   Sister Bullwinkel, badly wounded and feigning death, was the only survivor. After a long while and as a sole survivor, Bullwinkel got back to the now empty beach. There she found a wounded British soldier from another massacre. They hid out for 12 days, and she cared for the man until he died.   Eventually, Vivian surrendered to the Japanese, but made no mention of the massacre. She was interned with other nurses and endured a further three years of hardship and brutality before her release enabled her to tell her harrowing story. Bullwinkel served in Japan in 1946 and 1947 before resigning from the Army as Captain; she re-joined the Citizen Military Forces in 1955 and served until 1970, when she retired as Lieutenant Colonel.

Interview with Timothy L. Porter who helped support the family compile the history of Talmadge Smithey who was serving as a member of the US Navy on the USS Canopus in the Philippine Islands when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941. When Japanese attacks on US forces in the Philippines followed in 1942, the USS Canopus was severely damaged and Smithey and his comrades scuttled the ship to prevent it from getting into enemy hands. Smithey and his fellow shipmates then joined US and Filipino ground forces in defense of Bataan and Corregidor. Waiting for help that never arrived, Smithey and his fellow soldiers were outmanned and outnumbered. They finally succumbed to Japanese forces in May, 1942, and were taken prisoner. Smithey spent the next three years and four months as prisoners of war in the Philippines and then in Japan.This book is Smithey’s personal account of his capture and his captivity. Sweet Land of Liberty is one man’s story of courage, bravery, endurance, and perseverance. It’s a story of sacrifices Smithey and his fellow soldiers made in return for the freedom Americans enjoy today. Talmadge Smithey retired from the US Navy as a Commander with 32 years of dedicated, faithful service to our Country! To contact the Arthor, Tim Porter to purchase a signed copy:Instagram - @sweetlandofliberty.ww2To purchase a Paperback copy or Kindle at Amazon - https://amzn.to/361gHRI Please visit our website for more information about our services to POW/MIA families - https://www.uspowmiafamilylocating.comPlease visit our affiliate links that help support our Podcast. Bear in mind these are affiliate links and if you go through them to make a purchase I will earn a small commission at no extra cost to you! Keep in mind that I link these companies and their products because of their quality and not because of the commission I receive from your purchases. The decision is yours, and whether or not you decide to buy something is completely up to you.Flipside Canvas - Owned by Medal of Honor recipient Dakota Meyer (USMC). At Flipside Canvas, we believe that art offers an opportunity to showcase your commitment to empowering yourself and others. High quality materials that will last 100+ years. All our art comes stretched and ready to hang on your wall. 100% Made in America using locally sourced and manufactured materials. https://flipsidecanvas.com/?ref=SOSPodcast The Home Depot - Not only for the Do It Yourself building and construction projects, you have access to over two million products ranging from small/large appliances to your everyday needs for the home to camping. Purchase online and pick up in your local Home Depot free of charge or ship it to your home! The sky is the limit on the products offered by the Home Depot!https://homedepot.sjv.io/SOSPodcast Please consider supporting our show - https://www.patreon.com/US_POW_MIA_Family_Locating Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/US_POW_MIA_Family_Locating)

When the Japanese nation began their war in Asia and the Pacific in 1937, they also began the systematic looting of every country they conquered- a looting which lasted through 1944, and which collected what some researchers believe was the largest sum of stolen property ever amassed in the history of man.  Everything from money to gold and silver  to precious jewels to religious artifacts was taken  from national treasuries, museums, banks, personal collections, and more, and shipped to a collection point in Singapore- then secreted to hiding places for later recovery.  When Japanese merchant ships loaded with stolen treasure began to be sunk by allied planes and submarines- Japan needed a safer destination- and General Yamashita in the Phillipines offered a solution. Billions of dollars worth of gold bars and priceless artifacts were sent to him to hide in caverns and tunnels, and usually the prisoners who helped to dig the tunnels and pits and transport the bullion were killed. But legend persisted in the Philippines about buried loot and one man found it. His name was Rogerio Roxas. But when the corrupt president Marcos caught wind of that find, the end was in sight for Roxas, and Marcos was on his way to becoming the wealthiest man on Earth. How much is legend- and how much is fact- you can decide. This is the story of Yamashita's Gold. Credit BBC Marcos Gold. Credit article by David Guillot. TEST YOUR HISTORY SMARTS!  CATCH OUR NEWEST SHOW 1001 HISTORY CHALLENGE HERE: (main website all 1001 shows) https://www.1001storiespodcast.com or HERE: at Google Play:  https://play.google.com/music/listen?u=0#/ps/Iwdojx2zx4jj2xj25fwupwrdcxq or HERE at Apple Podcasts  https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/1001-history-challenge/id1482436263 SUPPORT OUR SHOW BY BECOMING A PATRON!  www.patreon.com/1001storiesnetwork.  Its time I started asking for support! Thank you. Its a few dollars a month OR a one time. (Any amount is appreciated). YOUR REVIEWS  AND SUBSCRIPTIONS AT APPLE/ITUNES AND ALL ANDROID HOSTS ARE NEEDED AND APPRECIATED! LINKS BELOW...   Copy and Paste the highlighted links to your Apple or Android Devices for free listening:  APPLE USERS   Catch 1001 RADIO DAYS now at Apple  iTunes!   https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/1001-radio-days/id1405045413?mt=2 Catch 1001 Heroes on any Apple Device here (Free): https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/1001-heroes-legends-histories-mysteries-podcast/id956154836?mt=2  Catch 1001 CLASSIC SHORT STORIES at iTunes/apple Podcast App Now: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/1001-classic-short-stories-tales/id1078098622 Catch 1001 Stories for the Road at iTunes/Apple Podcast now:  https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/1001-stories-for-the-road/id1227478901 ANDROID USERS- 1001 Radio Days right here at Player.fm FREE:  https://player.fm/series/1001-radio-days 1001 Classic Short Stories & Tales:https://castbox.fm/channel/1001-Classic-Short-Stories-%26-Tales-id1323543?country=us 1001 Heroes, Legends, Histories & Mysteries: https://castbox.fm/channel/1001-Heroes%2C-Legends%2C-Histories-%26-Mysteries-Podcast-id1323418?country=us 1001 Stories for the Road:https://castbox.fm/channel/1001-Stories-For-The-Road-id1324757?country=us Catch ALL of our shows at one place by going to www.1001storiesnetwork.com- our home website with Megaphone.

Season 8: Simply the B-Est! wraps up with Samurai Cop, the final film from legendary director Amir Shervan. A passion project and almost-lost classic of the VHS era, Samurai Cop is a hilarious ride.  When Japanese organized crime embeds itself within LA, the police turn to one man to take down the deadly Yakuza – […] The post KFEB 808: Samurai Cop appeared first on We Talk Podcasts.

第9回「When Japanese start calling your fir

More and more Japanese founders are moving their startups to San Francisco. It’s easy to see why. There is more venture capital, more startup know-how, and more startup energy in that city than anywhere else in the world. In fact, there is a small, close knit Japanese startup community in San Francisco, with Japanese startups, mentors and investors all supporting each other and trying to grow their business there. On my last trip to San Francisco, I had a chance to sit down with one of these startup founders, Keisuke Kajitani, co-founder of Ramen Hero. He moved to Silicon Valley from Japan to start his company because he thought the US market was a better fit. Ramen Hero sells home delivered ramen meal kits. Interestingly, the popularity and ubiquity or ramen in Japan works against them, while the novelty and price of ramen in the US has enabled them to get attention from both VCs and customers there. It’s a fascinating discussion, and I think you’ll enjoy it. Show Notes for Startups Why ramen gives them a competitive advantage in the US Previous failures in the ramen business and why it's different this time Why Ramen Hero had to pivot from B2B to home delivery What's great about the Japanese startup scene in San Francisco How many companies can the market sustain? When Japanese companies should move to Japan   Links from the Founder Learn more about Ramen Hero at their home page Follow Ramen Hero on Instagram [shareaholic app="share_buttons" id="7994466"] Leave a comment Transcript from Japan Disrupting Japan, episode 69. Welcome to Disrupting Japan, straight talk from the Japan’s most successful entrepreneurs. I'm Tim Romero and thanks for joining me. More and more, Japanese startup founders are looking at, or even moving to Silicon Valley. It’s easy to see the appeal. San Francisco is home to the largest and most competitive startup ecosystem in the world. In fact, there’s a small Japanese startup community in San Francisco, with Japanese startups, mentors, and investors all supporting each other and trying to make it work. Of course, the founders that come from Japan—well, it’s a mixed group. Some successful companies view San Francisco as their logical first step towards global expansion; some are new founders that have an idea they feel is more suited to the American market than the Japanese market; and some, well, some are kind of startup tourists, visiting the offices of famous startups and going through the motions, as if they were in some sort of startup role playing game. On my last trip to San Francisco, I had a chance to sit down and talk with Keisuke Kajitani, co-founder of Ramen Hero. He and his co-founder moved to San Francisco from Japan because they thought the US would be a better market for their product, oddly, because ramen is already too popular in Japan. Now, Ramen Hero sells home delivery ramen meal kits and it’s a business that makes much more sense to launch in the US than it does in Japan. But, you know, Keisuke explains all that much better than I can. So let’s hear from our sponsor and get right to the interview. [pro_ad_display_adzone id="1404" info_text="Sponsored by" font_color="grey" ] [Interview] Tim: I’m sitting here with Keisuke Kajitani of Ramen Hero and we’re sitting here in beautiful San Francisco. So thanks for sitting down with us. Keisuke: Thanks for having me. Tim: I’ve got to say, San Francisco is not so beautiful today. Keisuke: Yeah, it’s raining hard. Tim: I don’t think I’ve ever seen this much rain in San Francisco. Keisuke: Yeah, it’s unfortunate. Tim: But we’re inside and dry, so that’s good. Listen, to get things started, why don’t you tell me a bit about Ramen Hero? Keisuke: Sure. So Ramen Hero is a meal kit service specifically focused on delivering authentic ramen to your house. So what we deliver inside of the meal kit is fresh noodles, and soup, and toppings,

When Japanese bombers and fighter planes attacked the US fleet in the Pacific it came as a huge surprise to many. Listen to some archive recordings from the time.

When Japanese bombers and fighter planes attacked the US fleet in the Pacific it came as a huge surprise to many. Listen to some archive recordings from the time.

Jan 2008 - When Japanese cops get angry