Podcasts about Liao

Last time we spoke about the Hubei-Henan Campaign of 1940-1941. In November 1940, a Central Hubei operation using multiple task forces aimed to exploit Chinese dispersal, achieving only local successes and no lasting territorial gains. The Japanese then tried again in late January 1941 with a major offensive into southern Henan. Despite concentrating a large force, the campaign failed strategically. After the Henan failure, Japan attempted to regain momentum in spring 1941 by attacking western Hubei around Yichang on the Yangtze. Despite an initial barrage and rapid early gains, Japanese forces became exposed in a narrow salient. The Chinese reorganized their river defenses and launched a converging counteroffensive, driving the invaders back and ending the engagement where it began, with the Japanese suffering heavy casualties and their westward push thwarted.   #206 The Battle of Shanggao Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The year 1940 had brought a particular humiliation. In August of that year, Communist General Peng Dehuai had launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive — a massive, coordinated assault across North China that shattered Japanese rail and supply lines, embarrassed Imperial General Headquarters, and demonstrated that the Chinese were far from finished. Japan's response had been brutal, the infamous "Three Alls" campaign of reprisals across the countryside. But the damage had been done, and the attention of Imperial General Headquarters shifted northward. The autumn of 1940 had also seen the First Battle of Changsha, where the Japanese 11th Army under General Sonobe Yahachirō pushed south into Hunan Province expecting to overwhelm the Chinese defenders and finally deal a decisive blow to Chiang Kai-shek's armies. Instead, General Xue Yue — the "Tiger of Changsha" — had allowed the Japanese to advance deep into his prepared killing ground before counterattacking from multiple directions. The Japanese had been forced to retreat in disorder, and the front in Hunan and Jiangxi settled once again into sullen stalemate. It was in this atmosphere of frustrated ambition and strategic inertia that the seeds of Shanggao were sown. By February 1941, Imperial General Headquarters had decided to redeploy the 33rd Division — then garrisoned in the town of Anyi, in northwestern Jiangxi — to North China. The transfer was scheduled to begin in early April, and it made strategic sense: the north required reinforcement, and the front in Jiangxi had been quiet enough that one division could be spared. The problem was that the 33rd Division's departure would leave a gap in Japanese dispositions, and no significant offensive operation had yet been conducted to weaken the Chinese forces that would be left facing a thinned-out Japanese line. Lieutenant General Ōga Shigeru, the energetic commander of the Japanese 34th Division, saw opportunity in the window that existed before the 33rd departed. His division was concentrated around Xishan and Wanshou Palace, astride the Xiang–Gan Highway — the main road running westward through Jiangxi — and across that highway lay the town of Shanggao and the Chinese forces defending it. Ōga proposed exploiting the presence of both divisions for a coordinated strike: a sharp, limited offensive to crush Chinese field forces around Nanchang and the Jiangxi interior before the 33rd Division's train north. The 11th Army headquarters, now commanded by General Marube, endorsed a cautious concept — a "quick strike" with limited objectives. But the 34th Division's staff, energized by Ōga's ambition, had already run well ahead of this guidance. Large-scale requisitioning of coolies for logistics was underway; training exercises aimed at the specific terrain around Shanggao had been conducted; planning had progressed in far more detail than a "limited" operation warranted. This eagerness would prove to be the Japanese undoing before the first shot was fired. Chinese intelligence networks, always attentive to the movement of porters and the telltale preparations that preceded a Japanese offensive, quickly detected the scale of these preparations and reported them to General Luo Zhuoying, commander of the Chinese 19th Army Group. By the time the Japanese columns were forming up to march, Luo had already hardened his defenses and laid the groundwork for a trap. General Luo Zhuoying was not a passive commander. He served simultaneously as commander of the 19th Army Group and as Deputy Commander of the 9th War Zone — the latter post placing him directly under General Xue Yue, the victor of Changsha. Luo had spent the lull after Changsha doing what Chinese commanders across the theater had learned was essential: reorganizing, retraining, and above all improving the defensive architecture of his sector. The plan Luo devised for meeting the anticipated Japanese offensive was elegant in its simplicity and demanding in its execution. Rather than contesting the Japanese advance at the frontier, he would allow the enemy to push westward, yielding ground through three successive defensive lines while bleeding the attackers at every step. The first and second lines would slow the Japanese, exact casualties, and stretch their logistics. The third line — anchored at Shanggao itself — would be the killing ground. There, the Chinese forces would hold fast while other formations swung around the Japanese flanks and rear to close the encirclement. The Japanese, having marched deep into Chinese-held territory with their supply lines thinning and their flanks exposed, would find themselves surrounded rather than victorious. For this plan to work, each Chinese formation had to perform its role with discipline. The 70th Corps, deployed in the north along the arc from Shitou Street through Fengxin to Jing'an, would have to conduct a controlled fighting retreat — yielding ground but making the Japanese pay for it, never breaking and running. The 49th Corps would hold the southern flank and create conditions for flanking action. And the 74th Corps — General Wang Yaowu's elite formation, comprising the 51st, 57th, and 58th Divisions — would hold the final line at Shanggao and serve as the anvil upon which the Japanese advance would shatter. The 74th Corps was by 1941 one of the most battle-hardened formations in the Nationalist Army. It had fought at Shanghai in 1937, at Wuhan in 1938, and in the hills and valleys of Jiangxi through the years since. Its men knew the terrain around Shanggao. They had prepared positions in depth, studied the approaches, and rehearsed the defensive plan Luo had designed. When the Japanese came, they would be ready. Against the Chinese 70,000 — distributed across eleven divisions in four corps, with additional provincial security forces for local coverage — the Japanese would throw roughly 20,000 men: three major formations advancing in coordinated columns. The disparity in numbers was stark, but the Japanese had the advantages of offensive initiative, air superiority, and the formidable fighting quality that the Imperial Army had demonstrated throughout the war in China. The question was whether those advantages would be enough to overcome a prepared defense wielded by a commander who had invited the attack. The operational plan devised by the Japanese 11th Army called for three columns to converge simultaneously on Shanggao from north, center, and south — a classic encirclement concept that, if executed with precision, would catch the Chinese defenders in a tightening vice. In the north, the main force of the 33rd Division under Lieutenant General Sakurai Shōzō would drive westward from its bases around Anyi and Ganzhoujie, descending the Liao River valley to threaten the Chinese right flank and prevent the 70th Corps from interfering with operations in the center.In the center, Ōga's 34th Division would advance along the Xiang–Gan Highway — the direct route from Nanchang toward Shanggao — capturing the town of Gao'an along the way and pressing relentlessly westward until it reached the main defensive positions. This was the principal striking force, the column designed to crack open the Chinese defenses and seize the objective.In the south, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade under Major General Ikeda would cross the Jin River and advance along its south bank, eventually swinging north to link up with the 34th Division and complete the encirclement of whatever Chinese forces remained in the Shanggao area. The plan was coherent on paper. But it contained a structural flaw so serious that, in retrospect, it is difficult to understand how the 11th Army's staff allowed it to proceed uncorrected. The success of any converging operation depends on synchronization — on each column hitting its objectives on schedule and maintaining communication with the others so that each can react to developments on the other prongs. Yet the 11th Army headquarters made no recorded effort to coordinate the 33rd and 34th Divisions before the battle began. There was no forward command post established to oversee the operation. General Marube remained at Hankou, hundreds of miles to the north, throughout the battle — as remote from the fighting as a Tokyo bureaucrat. Operational decisions were left entirely to the individual divisions, with no mechanism to coordinate their actions if something went wrong. Something was going to go wrong. Luo Zhuoying had seen to that. On the morning of March 15, 1941, all three Japanese columns stepped off simultaneously, advancing into the misty hills and rice paddies of northwestern Jiangxi. In the north, Sakurai's 33rd Division moved briskly from Anyi toward Fengxin. The town fell by noon, and the division pressed westward in good order. The Japanese infantry moved confidently along the Liao River valley, experienced soldiers who had fought across China and had no particular reason to expect what was coming. The Chinese 70th Corps gave ground — as it had been ordered to — but did so on its own terms, occupying and then abandoning successive pieces of high ground along both banks of the river, making the Japanese advance uncomfortable and costly. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, the 33rd Division was being drawn forward into terrain that favored the defender. By March 18 and 19, the 33rd Division had pushed all the way to Guzhu'ao and Huamenlo — a considerable advance, but one that had taken the division far from its base at Anyi. And it was here, far from support and with flanks increasingly exposed, that the Chinese blocking forces closed in. Chinese infantry, who had been waiting in prepared positions in the high ground overlooking the river valley, launched coordinated counter-attacks that struck the 33rd Division from multiple directions. The fighting was fierce and costly. In two days of close combat, the division suffered more than 2,500 casualties — a grievous toll that represented a significant fraction of its effective strength. The northern column had been stopped dead. On March 19, Sakurai ordered the 33rd Division to reverse course. By March 23, after four days of painful withdrawal under pressure, it had pulled back to Anyi — the same place it had started. The northern prong of the Japanese offensive had accomplished nothing except the loss of thousands of men. In the south, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade had a rougher start. Its initial attempt to cross the Gan-Jin river junction at noon on March 15 was repulsed by Chinese defenders, and it was only under cover of darkness that the brigade managed to force a crossing. Once across, it moved westward along the south bank of the Jin River, but progress was slow and contested. A detachment — the Gan River Detachment — ran into fierce resistance from the 26th Division of the Chinese 49th Corps on March 19. The brigade's main body meanwhile fought its way through the 51st Division of the 74th Corps, but the 107th Division and elements of the 51st managed to contain the advance at the Laichunling–Zhutoushan line. On the night of March 20, the main body of the 20th Brigade crossed the Jin River at Huifu to link up with the 34th Division — but a portion of its troops, cut off on the south bank, was destroyed by Chinese forces. The southern column was across the Jin River, but it had taken losses and was already engaged in ways its planners had not anticipated. In the center, the 34th Division fared best in the early going. Ōga's division moved westward from Xishan along the Xiang–Gan Highway on March 16, and by the 17th had captured Gao'an — a meaningful early success. The Chinese 74th Corps, executing Luo's plan faithfully, dispatched only screening forces east of the Tangpu River to slow the Japanese advance rather than contesting it decisively. The main body of the 74th Corps fell back to the third-line positions at Sixi, Guanqiao, and Tangpu, preparing the killing ground that Luo had designated. Simultaneously, the 26th Division and most of the 105th Division from the 49th Corps were shifted across the Gan River to operate south of the Jin River on the Japanese left flank, and the 72nd Corps was ordered to maneuver on a wide envelopment around Daxia and south of Ganfang. By March 20–21, the 34th Division had pressed forward to attack the Chinese positions at Sixi and Guanqiao. Ōga's men were confident — they had taken Gao'an, they were moving, and the objective of Shanggao lay within reach. But as the division pushed toward Shangjijia, it ran squarely into the 57th and 58th Divisions of the 74th Corps, fighting with a tenacity that told the Japanese plainly enough: this was where the Chinese intended to stand. The week of March 21–24 brought the battle to its crisis. The 34th Division hammered at the Chinese positions defending Shanggao itself, while on the flanks, the fighting took on a character that neither side had entirely anticipated. On March 21, General Wang Yaowu — commanding the 74th Corps from his headquarters in Shanggao — decided it was time to do more than absorb Japanese blows. He ordered General Li Tianxia to clear Japanese forces from the south bank of the Jin River and advance on Gao'an, with the aim of cutting the 34th Division's supply line and threatening its rear. It was an aggressive move, and if it had worked, it might have produced a decisive result earlier than history would record. It did not work — at least not immediately. That very evening, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade, which had been reorganizing after the chaos of the river crossing, launched a powerful offensive at dawn on the 22nd. Li Tianxia's lead elements had barely set out from Shitou Street when they collided head-on with the main force of the 20th Brigade, which had crossed back from the north bank of the Jin River. The Japanese thrust was coordinated and aggressive: one column circled wide to attack Lazhu Mountain; another swung south of Hu Family west of Shitou Street to strike Li's division in the flank and rear; and nine aircraft with four artillery pieces bombarded the Chinese positions from north to south. Li's division could not hold against this convergent assault and fell back to the high ground southwest of Shitou Street. Wang Yaowu reacted quickly. He ordered Li's main body to wheel left to face the new threat and simultaneously dispatched the Army's Field Supplementary Regiment — held in reserve near Yintang — on a forced march to Huayang to block the Japanese westward drive. This regiment, racing down roads strafed by nine enemy aircraft, covered 15 li per hour and seized Huayang and the high ground to its northeast by around seven in the morning. By nine, the 20th Brigade arrived in strength and — supported by more than ten aircraft — launched a fierce assault on the regiment's positions. The regiment's officers and men held firm, taking heavy casualties but refusing to break. Frustrated at Huayang, the 20th Brigade shifted its effort to the Kuang Family area, linking up with over a thousand men who had crossed from Baichetou to the south bank and pushing along the river toward Xiongfang in an attempt to outflank the Chinese left wing. The Supplementary Regiment sent its 1st Battalion with a mortar company to meet this threat, and the two forces met in a fierce engagement. When the Japanese reinforced their assault and deployed incendiary bombs and poison gas, Xiongfang fell by early afternoon — but Li Tianxia immediately sent two regiments from his right flank to take it back, and by midnight the position was in Chinese hands again. Shitou Street and Jigong Ridge were simultaneously recaptured. The Independent Mixed 20th Brigade now found itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position, fighting with the Jin River at its back and the initiative slipping away. Meanwhile, the main event was being fought in the rubble and ridgelines around Shanggao itself. From March 22 to 25, the 34th Division and whatever remnants of the 20th Brigade could contribute threw themselves repeatedly at the defensive line anchored on Stone Arch Bridge, Xia Po Bridge, Xu Lou, Pan Family Bridge, Cloud Head Mountain, and Lei Family Mountain. This was not the fluid, mobile warfare that the Japanese had envisioned but brutal, grinding attritional combat for individual strongpoints and ridgelines, with positions changing hands multiple times in a single day. The Japanese air arm was deeply involved. Ōga's division had close air support that could operate even in poor weather, and Group 3 of the Japanese Air Force hammered the Chinese positions with sustained effort. On the morning of March 24, after the 34th Division fed in more than 3,000 additional troops transferred across the Jin River, the Air Force dispatched over seventy aircraft that dropped more than 1,700 bombs, largely destroying the defensive positions of Liao Lingqi's division. The Japanese exploited the resulting chaos and twice broke through gaps in the line — but were driven out each time by Chinese counterattacks. At noon, enemy aircraft bombarded in relays and Japanese infantry broke through at Xia Po Bridge. It was at this moment that Li Hanqing, commanding the Chinese infantry defense in that sector, did what officers throughout history have done when systems fail and only personal example can stem the tide: he personally led his officer cadre in repeated counter-attacks, hand-to-hand fighting in the rubble until the Japanese were finally expelled. By this point, the 34th Division's offensive capacity was nearly spent. At the same time — and this was the critical shift that would determine the battle's outcome — General Luo Zhuoying recognized that the moment to spring the trap had arrived. The northern column had already been broken and sent reeling back toward Anyi. The southern column was pinned against the Jin River with its back to the water. The central column was bled white against the defenses of Shanggao. Luo now ordered all his armies to close in from multiple directions. On the morning of March 22, he had already begun revising his orders; by noon on the 23rd, the forces of Liu Duoquan and Li Jue had occupied Shitou Street, Guanqiao Street, and Yanggong Market, pressing on Huifu and Gaoyao. The encirclement of the 34th Division was not yet complete, but its shape was unmistakably forming. By March 25, the 34th Division knew it was in mortal danger. Surrounded on three sides, its ammunition running low and its casualty lists growing by the hour, the division urgently appealed to the 11th Army for rescue. The message that arrived in Hankou was a shock. General Marube and his staff, who had remained at their distant headquarters throughout the battle without establishing a forward command post, had not properly grasped the scale of the disaster unfolding in Jiangxi. The lack of coordination between the 33rd and 34th Divisions — the structural flaw that had been built into the operation from its conception — had allowed Luo Zhuoying to defeat each column separately, and now the central column faced annihilation. The 11th Army responded in a scramble. Chief of Staff Kinoshita was dispatched by aircraft to Nanchang with Operations Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Yamaguchi and Captain Ōne to organize a relief operation. The 33rd Division — barely recovered from its own battering in the north — was ordered to sortie immediately and fight its way to the 34th Division's relief. Sakurai organized his battered 33rd Division into three rescue columns. Infantry Brigade Commander Araki Shōji took the right column, leading Infantry Regiment 215 with one mountain artillery battalion. Infantry Regiment 214 formed the left column. The divisional commander himself led the central column with the main divisional force. On March 24 and 25, all three columns sortied from strongpoints at Niuxing, Fengxin, and other positions, attacking across the Wuqiao River and through Cunqian Street toward Tangpu and Guanqiao. The relief operation brought the battle to its most complicated moment. On the morning of March 25, the 33rd Division launched a fierce assault on the forces that Luo Zhuoying had positioned to tighten the encirclement from the north — striking Zhang Yanchuan's division at Kengkou Leng, Jiezipo, and Nancha Luo. Zhang's division, struck simultaneously from the front and rear, withdrew at dusk to near Tu Di Wang Temple, where it linked up with Tang Boyin's division. What happened next became one of the most controversial decisions of the entire battle. Zhang Yanchuan was serving as deputy army commander in the absence of Li Jue from the front. Surveying the situation — his own division under heavy pressure, the 33rd Division's relief columns pushing aggressively — Zhang concluded that the position was untenable. On his own authority, without authorization from Luo Zhuoying or any superior commander, he withdrew both his own and Tang Boyin's divisions to Fenghuang Market and Zhuangfang. The consequence was immediate and severe. The withdrawal opened a corridor through which the 33rd Division entered Guanqiao and linked up with the encircled 34th Division. An encirclement that had taken days of blood and sacrifice to construct was torn open by a single unauthorized decision. Luo Zhuoying, when he received word of Zhang's withdrawal the following morning, was furious — but he could not change what had already happened. He could only adapt. The breakout itself was an ordeal. A portion of the 34th Division that attempted to escape to the east was intercepted near Huifu by a division of the 49th Corps and lost roughly half its strength before being compelled to turn back. The main body ultimately broke out on March 27, withdrawing in march order that told its own story of disaster: headquarters, baggage, artillery, casualties, field hospital, rear guard — all moving in what the records describe as "a wretched state." On the night of March 27, Japanese troops escorting the 34th Division's field hospital — a field artillery company of the 8th Battery — were completely annihilated in a Chinese night attack. When the division reached Longtuan Xu on March 28, the stretcher-bearer column carrying the wounded stretched some seven to eight kilometers along the road. That same day, the 33rd Division's Infantry Regiment 214 finally made contact with the 34th Division's headquarters, completing what amounted to a rescue of men who had already endured their defeat. The 33rd Division's mountain artillery batteries exhausted their entire ammunition supply covering the retreat and required emergency aerial resupply drops to continue. The 34th Division limped back to its original garrison on April 2. Despite the setback caused by Zhang Yanchuan's unauthorized withdrawal, Luo Zhuoying did not abandon his design. Assessing his situation on the morning of March 26, he found reason for cautious optimism: Wang Yaowu's army was still making progress at Shanggao; the Japanese south of the Jin River had largely been cleared; and Sichuan Army and Northeastern Army units that had been moving to reinforce the battle had now reached the field, meaning Chinese forces retained significant numerical superiority. He resolved to execute a second encirclement. At nine in the morning of March 26, Luo issued strict orders: Zhang Yanchuan's and Tang Boyin's divisions were to immediately comply with their original orders and block the enemy near Guanqiao; Yu Chengwan's division was to attack northward via Pan Family Bridge; Liao Lingqi's and Song Yingzhong's divisions were to press toward Guanqiao with full force; Wang Kejun's division was to strike the enemy's flank and rear east of Guanqiao; Fu Yi's division was to advance south of Jiang Family Isle; and Chen Liangji's division was to swing southeast via Changpu to complete the enemy's destruction. The second ring was being drawn. On March 28, as the 34th Division's battered column trudged eastward toward survival, Wang Kejun's division advancing from Yanggong Market moved to intercept it. The Chinese occupied high ground north and south of Yanggong Market and along Mozi Ridge, and what followed was a grinding all-day battle that fixed the Japanese column at the Xiama Bei–Huxing Ridge line. Part of the 20th Brigade, moving up from Gao'an to assist the withdrawing 34th Division, was blocked near Long Tu Market. Liao Lingqi's division pursued the enemy rear guard to the Changling–Manmei high ground, where the fighting erupted with renewed intensity. At noon, part of Li Tianxia's division arrived and deployed along the Shangluoxiang–Shanyuan–Fangtounao line to harass the Japanese right flank; part of Yu Chengwan's division reached Longxing Mountain and outflanked Guanqiao Street from the south. The surviving Japanese defenders in Guanqiao withdrew into the town for a last stand, and after Liao's division pressed the assault, street fighting raged until five in the afternoon, when over 600 defenders were annihilated. Over 2,000 troops of the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade conducted a fighting withdrawal from Long Tu Market and Yanggong Market, covered by Japanese aircraft bombing to shield the 34th Division's retreat. By noon on March 30, the Japanese had abandoned both strongpoints and scattered northeastward. One group of over 600 men fled directly into the main positions of Zhang Yanchuan's division — an ironic fate, given Zhang's earlier withdrawal — and were largely annihilated. The encircling forces had been essentially dispersed, and the two pursuit columns now pressed forward under the overall direction of General Xue Yue, who had assumed personal coordination of the chase. On March 27, Luo Zhuoying — confident that victory was secured — issued a general order for a final offensive and announced substantial cash rewards to his troops: prizes offered for the capture of Japanese officers, artillery pieces, regimental colors, and other materiel. The rewards were both a practical incentive and a mark of how far the battle had tipped. By midnight on March 31, Chen Hongshi's advance column had recovered Gao'an; Wang Tiehan's division had recovered Xiangfu Guan. On April 2, the divisions of Zhang Yanchuan and Song Yingzhong recovered Fengxin; that afternoon Wang Tiehan's division took back Xishan and Wanshou Palace — the very base from which the 34th Division had launched its offensive. By April 3, the pursuing armies had reached the vicinity of Dacheng and Ganzhoujie. On April 8 and 9, the 70th Corps recovered the outpost strongpoints around Anyi before halting operations. The Japanese had retreated into their original positions and were defending from prepared terrain. The pursuit was over. The Battle of Shanggao had lasted nineteen days and nights. No battle of the Second Sino-Japanese War was ever free of the fog of competing claims, and Shanggao was no exception. On March 29, before the pursuit had even concluded, Luo Zhuoying telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek with his accounting of the victory. His numbers were dramatic: Major General Iwanaga, the Japanese infantry commander, killed; regimental commander Colonel Hamada, killed; over 15,000 Japanese killed or wounded in total. Chinese losses, Luo reported, exceeded 20,000. Ten guns, over a thousand rifles, and numerous machine guns had been captured. His superior, General Xue Yue, was skeptical. In a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek on April 5, Xue reduced Luo's numbers by twenty percent, reporting 12,520 Japanese killed or wounded and 14 prisoners captured. The discrepancy between two Chinese commanders reporting on the same battle speaks to the difficulty of battlefield accounting in any era, and suggests something of the competitive pressures that shaped how Chinese commanders reported their victories to Chongqing. The official Chinese histories, compiled after the war in the History of the War of Resistance, reported approximately 15,000 Japanese killed or wounded, 17 prisoners taken, and significant quantities of captured materiel: 6 mountain guns, 1 mortar, 24 light machine guns, 408 rifles, 24 grenade launchers, and over 111,717 rounds of various ammunition. Chinese casualties, by the same records, were 17,119 killed or wounded and 2,814 missing. Japanese records for the battle do not survive — a consequence of the wholesale destruction of Imperial Army documentation at the war's end. Contemporary scholars, working from other sources, estimate actual Japanese combat losses at approximately 5,500 killed and wounded. This is substantially lower than the Chinese claims, as was nearly always the case in the war, but represents a significant defeat by any measure: roughly a quarter of the force committed, many of them veterans impossible to replace. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently awarded the victorious Chinese units a commendation prize of 150,000 yuan — a substantial sum that marked the battle's significance in Nationalist eyes. The outcome at Shanggao was not accidental. Several interlocking factors combined to produce a Chinese victory, and each deserves consideration. The most fundamental was Luo Zhuoying's defensive plan. The decision to trade space for time — to absorb the Japanese advance through three successive defensive lines rather than contest the frontier — required both tactical confidence and a willingness to accept initial setbacks that could easily be misread as defeat. Chinese forces had to give ground, and they did. They had to suffer through the early days of Japanese advance without breaking and running, drawing the enemy forward and allowing the encirclement to take shape. That they largely succeeded in executing this plan reflects the improving quality of the Nationalist Army by 1941: better trained, better led at the operational level, and — critically — equipped with a strategic design that matched the actual balance of forces. The defeat in detail of the Japanese columns was equally important. By neutralizing the 33rd Division in the north before it could contribute to the central effort, and by pinning the 20th Brigade against the Jin River with its back to the water, Luo's forces ensured that the 34th Division faced the third-line defenses essentially alone — outnumbered, overextended, and unsupported. The Japanese operational concept had been a three-pronged convergence; what actually materialized was a single exhausted division hammering at a prepared defense while two other columns were rendered ineffective. The absence of coordination within the Japanese 11th Army was a gift that kept giving throughout the battle. No forward command post. No mechanism for the divisions to adjust their operations in response to each other's situations. No ability to recognize, in real time, that the northern column was being destroyed and redirect resources accordingly. General Marube's decision to remain at Hankou while his men died in Jiangxi was not merely an administrative failure; it was an operational catastrophe. Japanese commanders acknowledged this failing explicitly after the battle, but the acknowledgment changed nothing for the dead. Zhang Yanchuan's unauthorized withdrawal — the single most consequential individual decision of the battle — ultimately prevented a complete annihilation of the 34th Division rather than affecting the battle's outcome. The 34th Division escaped; but it did so in a "wretched state," having lost enormous numbers of men and equipment. It broke out, not triumphed. The encirclement Luo had constructed was torn open, but the Japanese paid dearly for the breach. The consequences of Shanggao rippled outward in ways that shaped the subsequent course of the war in central China. The transfer of the 33rd Division to North China — the original logistical rationale for the entire operation — was delayed by the division's involvement and subsequent losses at Shanggao. When it finally arrived at the Battle of Central Plains  the following month, it did so on the eve of battle with no time for preparation or orientation, entering combat under severely disadvantaged conditions. The operation that was supposed to facilitate a smooth redeployment had instead damaged one of the two units involved and delayed the other. For the Chinese 74th Corps, Shanggao had an ironic consequence. The Japanese 11th Army, following the battle, formally designated the 74th Corps as a priority target — a "standing enemy" and directed its forces to seek out and destroy it in future operations. At the First Battle of Changsha that September, the 11th Army specifically oriented its forces against the 74th Corps, a testament to the lasting impression that corps's fierce resistance at Shanggao had made on its adversaries. The compliment of being specifically targeted by the enemy was one the 74th Corps had earned in blood at Shanggao's ridgelines and shattered bridges. More broadly, the battle was widely regarded at the time, and has been regarded since, as one of the most significant Chinese tactical victories of the first four years of the War of Resistance. Its significance lay not only in the casualties inflicted — those were contested and probably inflated in the Chinese records — but in what it demonstrated. The improving tactical and operational competence of the Nationalist Army was on display. The deliberate defense, the layered withdrawal, the coordinated encirclement — these were not the operations of an army that had been fighting desperately for survival since 1937 and had learned nothing. They were the operations of an army that had studied its defeats and adapted. Shanggao did not change the strategic situation in China. The front in Jiangxi remained where it had been; the Japanese still occupied Nanchang and the major cities; Chiang Kai-shek was still in Chongqing and the war was still far from over. But it demonstrated something important: that the Chinese Army, given capable commanders, a sound plan, and the discipline to execute it, could do more than survive Japanese offensives. It could reverse them, encircle them, and pursue them back to where they came from. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In March–April 1940, Japanese forces attacked Shanggao with a limited, multi-pronged plan. Chinese troops used elastic defense and coordinated counter-moves, turning initial advantages into a trap. After intense fighting and air strikes, a coordinated encirclement and timely breakout routed the Japanese, forcing retreat despite their numbers in a costly battle.

Dr. Liao breaks down Lions injuries The Daily DLP welcomes Dr. Jimmy Liao to the show to talk about the Lions injuries and recoveries. The biggest name is Kerby Joseph, as the safety is dealing with a troublesome knee injury. Dr. Liao breaks down what options the Lions have with the All-Pro, noting that holding him out from the offseason workouts is medically necessary. Brian Branch's Achilles and what defense demands Brian Branch tore his Achilles on December 4, 2025. A comparison was made to another high-profile Achilles tear, San Francisco TE George Kittle, on January 11. The positions are different. Defense is reactive. The secondary lives in backpedals and sudden bursts. That movement is the top mechanism for Achilles injury. It can slow the return for a defensive back compared with an offensive player who can script his steps. Recent rehab clips showed light treadmill jogging. No hard sprinting. No jumping. No cutting. He is roughly six months out and not ahead of schedule on visible benchmarks. The earlier expectation hovered around midseason. There is no clear evidence to move that up. Sam LaPorta's back: progress now, recurrence is the concern Sam LaPorta appeared at OTAs. He caught passes. He is not full go, but the trend is positive. A herniated disc can flare with accumulated contact. Blocking can hyperextend the back. Last season's issue was not a single moment. It built over time. There is a good chance he is ready for Week 1. The question is durability over months, not days. Recurrence risk sits in the background and will only be answered by workload. Depth chart ripple effects: OL Lisfranc, ACL note, and return-game risk An offensive lineman, Ben Bartch, is recovering from Lisfranc surgery. He has not appeared in the first two weeks of OTAs. Lisfranc injuries live in a small, tricky part of the midfoot. Outcomes can be uncertain, especially for a big body that must anchor and drive. The Lions guaranteed $330,000 on his one-year deal, a sign of confidence at signing, but the absence raises flags until he is on the field. Kendrick Law suffered an ACL tear. Standard ACL recoveries are reliable. Barring complications, the expectation is a full return for 2026 OTAs. Safety Dan Jackson has been present in team photos during OTAs. Last year's leg issue lacked detail, but current participation eases concern. Kickoff changes have pushed return rates above 70 percent. Depth at returner matters. The play remains risky for the returner, even as it gets safer for blockers and coverage. Recent examples include a neck scare for Kalif Raymond and a fractured ankle for James Houston on a high-speed collision. Minicamp next week will sharpen clarity across the Detroit Lions depth chart. #detroitlions #lions #detroitlionspodcast #injuries #recoverytimeline #kerbyjoseph #brianbranch #samlaporta #georgekittle #lisfranc #benbartch #danjackson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Masterpiece Podcasts: Collection of Chinese Classic Novels

Masterpiece Podcasts: Collection of Chinese Classic Novels

Masterpiece Podcasts: Collection of Chinese Classic Novels

In this week's episode, host Daniel Raimi brings in Margaret Walls and Yanjun (Penny) Liao to discuss why homeowners insurance prices and nonrenewals are increasing in the United States—and how insurers, homeowners, and state and federal governments are responding. Walls is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future (RFF), director of RFF's Climate Risk and Resilience Program, and co-host of Resources Radio, while Liao is an RFF fellow. Together, they elaborate on data they shared in the most recent issue of Resources magazine that links areas with previous weather-related property loss to higher premiums and policy nonrenewal rates. As a result, while climate change increases the severity and frequency of extreme weather, many homeowners are left without insurance plans that provide adequate coverage, especially in vulnerable regions such as California and Florida. Walls and Liao analyze why solutions such as “insurance of last resort” plans in the residual market fail to keep up with heightened risk, and where policymakers and communities might look next to support households that are impacted by wildfires, floods, storms, and other disasters across the country. References and recommendations: “Weather Extremes Disrupt Insurance Markets” by Margaret Walls, Yanjun (Penny) Liao, and Emily Joiner; https://www.resources.org/archives/weather-extremes-disrupt-insurance-markets/ “From Risk to Reward: Insurance Discounts for Wildfire Mitigation” by Evan Ludington, Yanjun (Penny) Liao, and Margaret A. Walls; https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/from-risk-to-reward-insurance-discounts-for-wildfire-mitigation/ “Property Insurance and Disaster Risk: New Evidence from Mortgage Escrow Data” by Benjamin J. Keys and Philip Mulder; https://www.nber.org/papers/w32579 Insurance for Good; https://www.insuranceforgood.org/ “Listers: A Glimpse Into Extreme Birdwatching” documentary film; https://www.imdb.com/title/tt38023177/ eBird phone app; https://ebird.org/about/ebird-mobile “American Emergency: The Movement to Kill FEMA” podcast series from On the Media; https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/otm/american-emergency-movement-kill-fema Subscribe to stay up to date on podcast episodes, news, and research from Resources for the Future: https://www.rff.org/subscribe/

In this episode:00:57 How your smartphone's camera could measure your heart rateResearch article: Liao et al.08:55 Research HighlightsNature: A star gone rogue tears through the GalaxyNature: Gold keeps glittering courtesy of surface chemistry11:04 Should you try something new in a restaurant? Maths has the answerNature: Feynman solved the ‘restaurant dilemma' 50 years ago — now a study confirms his mathematicsSubscribe to Nature Briefing, an unmissable daily round-up of science news, opinion and analysis free in your inbox every weekday. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This episode of PRISON BREAKING WITH SARAH & PAUL is sponsored by Hulu. Stream PRISON BREAK on Hulu (U.S.) and Disney+ (Internationally) Sarah Wayne Callies and Paul Adelstein discuss Prison Break episode S4E2 “Breaking and Entering,” sharing behind-the-scenes context about filming in LA (including San Pedro docks and a warehouse set built on the Fox lot), a more relaxed cast dynamic from being home, and their strong reaction to the episode's implied cannibalism involving T-Bag. They introduce and interview James Hiroyuki Liao (Roland Glenn), praising the “new energy” his character brings to the team, and he describes joining an established cast during his first recurring role, his intense preparation habits, and how welcoming the set was. Liao recounts an audition process shaped by era-specific casting biases, a same-day casting-to-producer session, and how producers and writer Zach Estrin helped shape Roland's Brooklyn specificity and informed him of his character's exit. He names his favorite scene as his death sequence and answers a “Scylla team” question by choosing his sister, best friend Matt, teacher Marjorie Ballantine, and the spirit of his mother. For the full experience of enjoying Prison Breaking With Sarah & Paul, subscribe to our Patreon channel where you can watch Sarah & Paul's running commentary on Ep 306 while re-watching the episode on Hulu or your home DVD collection. You can also watch in a group with other fans on our fan-led Discord server. Subscribe here: ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://patreon.com/user?u=116411884⁠⁠⁠⁠ -or- Click Link in Bio Patreon Subscribers get access to all of our Watch Parties and FanFiction (all captioned in six languages - English, French, Spanish, German, Portuguese, and Turkish), exclusive Ask Me Anything's with Sarah & Paul, and unannounced Discord drop-ins on our always rollicking server with fans and friends who come together from around the world. All for less than a cup of coffee. Leave us your comments, shoot us an email, or leave us a voicemail - we love hearing from all of you! prisonbreaking@caliber-studio.com (401) 3-PBREAK Watch the episode on YouTube - / @prisonbreakpodcast Follow us on Instagram - / prisonbreakpodcast Follow us on TikTok - / prisonbreakpodcast Merch!!! - https://pbmerch.printify.me/products #fyp #michaelscofield #saratancredi #michealscofield #prisonbreakedits #prisonbreak #wentworthmilleredits #wentworthmiller #editor #fyy #fyppp #saratancrediedit #prisonbreakseason1 #sarahwaynecallies #prisonbreakseason2 #scofield #fy #sarascofield #saratancrediedits #scofield Logo design by John Nunziatto @ Little Big Brands. If you want one yourself, reach out at https://www.littlebigbrands.com/ and tell him we sent you. PRISON BREAKING WITH SARAH & PAUL is a Caliber Studio production. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the second phase of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive.  During the second phase of the Hundred Regiments offensive, CCP forces emphasized strongpoint and transportation warfare across the Taihang/Jizhong area. Units were organized with wings containing Japanese positions while a central force struck deeper, as in the Renhe Dasu fighting in early October 1940. Night raids seized strongholds, while engineers and sabotage teams disrupted roads, bridges, and mobility, and ambushes targeted Japanese foraging and supply routes. Across these theaters, the strategy was consistent: make Japanese control porous by destroying or capturing local nodes and forcing constant repairs, re-routing, escorts, and slowed reinforcement, so occupation logistics and strongpoint networks could not function reliably. This approach supported wider offensives by isolating strongpoints, draining enemy strength, and giving Communist base areas room to endure and expand.   #204 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase Three Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the two large-scale offensives carried out over wide areas of North China, the Japanese army did what it always did when control started to slip: it tried to turn mobile pressure back into something it could "manage" again. The Eighth Route Army's continued fighting had shown that Japanese-occupied space was not secure, and that base areas could still resist, strike, and persist even while under counterpressure. That was dangerous for occupation. If the enemy could keep operations going, Japanese lines of movement stayed uncertain and "stabilization" became a temporary illusion. To prevent the situation from worsening and to re-stabilize the occupied areas as quickly as possible, the Japanese mobilized heavy forces and launched retaliatory counter–"mopping-up" operations against anti-Japanese base areas in North China beginning October 6. The Japanese attempt wasn't only to punish; it was designed to take advantage of an asymmetry: the Eighth Route Army was striking and fighting continuously, and it did not have the luxury of resting, replenishing, and re-cohering as neatly as a garrison army might. Japanese commanders hoped that if they struck hard enough in enough places, the Communist main forces could be isolated, destroyed, or at least forced into a defensive posture that would break their operational tempo. At Liaodong and Yulin, Japanese reinforcements also created a second political-military stake. After the Yuliao Campaign ended, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued instructions on October 1 to major regions, warning that enemy reinforcements in Liaodong and Yulin might use the opening to "sweep" the Taibei region. In the Communist operational mind, this wasn't just one threat; it was a pattern. A "sweep" could come as a wave that pushed inward, burned villages, destroyed supplies, and tried to force Communist forces out of their protected networks. Even if the offensive couldn't win a conventional decisive battle, it could aim to strip the base areas of people, food, and mobility—things that make guerrilla and strongpoint warfare possible. By October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters issued a counter–"mopping-up" operation plan, and civilian and military authorities in various regions launched counter-"mopping-up" operations accordingly. This is important background: in these campaigns, "mopping-up" was not only an army activity. The Japanese were attempting to break the base system itself—its logistics, its local administration, and the relationship between armed units and civilians who hid, moved, fed, and replaced them. So the counter-operations had to be just as systemic. The Communists needed to keep people alive, keep movement possible, and keep the enemy from consolidating inside a cleared space. In southeastern Shanxi's Taihang and Taiyue regions, the Japanese 1st Army aimed to strike the main force of the 129th Division and destroy anti-Japanese base areas by running a series of mopping operations from October 6 to December 5. The plan had a typical occupation logic: push through strongholds gradually, clear pockets methodically, and rely on local superiority—especially in manpower, logistics, and the ability to reinforce by road. And because the Communist main force had been operating without meaningful rest after the earlier offensives, the Japanese believed they could catch formations while they were still "in between battles." On October 6, in the Taihang region, more than 800 enemy troops from Wu'an in western Hebei began a "mopping-up" operation in the Yangyi area. By October 11, the Japanese posture escalated. Part of the Japanese Independent Mixed 4th Brigade departed from Liaoxian and Wuxiang, while part of the 36th Division departed from Lucheng and Xiangyuan; together they totaled over 3,000 troops. Coordinating from north and south, they carried out operations to "mop up" both banks of the Zhuozhang River between Yulin, Liaoxian, and Wuxiang, encircling and clearing the south side of the Yulin–Liaoxian highway. This emphasis on riverbanks and highway corridors reveals the Japanese method: move along terrain that controls movement, then compress enemy options until the defenders have to fight inside a narrowing space. The counter to that method required more than bravery. The Eighth Route Army's 385th and 386th Brigades, along with the 1st Column of the Decisive Battle, fought on inner lines—where they could move more rapidly between known local positions and threaten the enemy's flanks or supply behavior. Meanwhile the New 10th Brigade fought on outer lines, where it could intercept, delay, and force the enemy to spend time reacting instead of clearing. By the morning of October 15, the New 10th Brigade delivered a concrete example of that interception strategy. Two regiments ambushed an enemy motor-transport convoy at Gongjiagou on the Heliao Highway, destroying more than 40 vehicles and annihilating more than 100 Japanese soldiers escorting the convoy. The meaning of a convoy ambush is strategic even when the numbers are modest: vehicles represent speed, logistics, and reinforcement. If the enemy loses vehicles repeatedly, "mopping" becomes slower, and slower clearing creates openings for the defenders to reorganize, disperse, or shift main effort. After that, on October 17, the enemy forces that had been mopping up the convoy withdrew in different directions. Withdrawal in multiple directions is a sign that the Japanese clearing operation, meant to compress a space, had instead been forced into a reactive mode. It also hints at a recurring pattern in these years: Japanese units could clear what was already weak, but when defenders hit their movement corridors, the occupiers had to spend time and combat power simply to recover mobility. The next major sweep began October 20, 1940, and it was much larger. Nearly 10,000 troops—from the 36th Division and Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4—set off from multiple locations, including Wu'an, Liaoxian, Wuxiang, and Lucheng, to sweep the area east and west of the Qingzhang River, focusing on land between Matian and Zuohui. Crucially, that was not random ground. The Japanese sought to strike the CCP Central Committee Northern Bureau, the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and the 129th Division headquarters, along with party and government organs of the Jin-Ji-Yu Border Region, located together with Shexian and Piancheng. In other words, the Japanese targeted not just armed units but the political-administrative heart that makes base areas function. Once in the attack area, the Japanese carried out "mopping-up" operations paired with burning and killing for several days. That brutality wasn't only cruelty; it served a purpose. Burning villages, destroying crops, and killing civilians could deny the base area food and shelter while making local cooperation more difficult. Then, on October 26, the Japanese began to withdraw and carried out mopping-up in different areas on the way back. The base area was "severely damaged and destroyed," indicating that even when the Japanese didn't annihilate the main Communist force, they could still achieve degradation—hurting the system they needed to keep operating. But the Communists were not simply absorbing damage. On October 29, a force of over 500 men from the 36th Division, plus over 400 supply and laborers, was mopping up Huangyandong and advanced through Zuohui to Guanjia'nao east of Panlong, preparing to return to Wuxiang. This is where counter-mopping becomes operationally dangerous for the occupier. Supply and labor detachments move differently from combat formations, and they represent an enemy's assumption that the base area is being "cleared." The Eighth Route Army headquarters ordered, at 1:00 p.m., for the 129th Division to concentrate its main force to annihilate the enemy. That night, the 129th Division—uniting the main forces of the 385th and 386th Brigades, parts of the New 10th Brigade, and the First Column of the Death Squad—surrounded the enemy at Guanjia'nao with a plan to launch a general offensive at 4:00 a.m. The besieged enemy, besides quickly building fortifications, seized Fengkengding high ground southwest of Guanjia'nao under cover of darkness. The two high points helped defenders support one another and resist stubbornly. The battle lasted until dawn on October 31, when most of the enemy had been annihilated, leaving only more than 60 men to hold positions. Then reinforcements arrived—over 1,500 from Huangyandong—supported by more than 10 aircraft. The 129th Division withdrew, and the remaining enemy fled toward the flood, leaving behind more than 280 corpses. By then, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the central base area. The background stake is clear: "mopping-up" could damage and burn, but if defenders could convert the Japanese attempt into a trap—especially when enemy units had become separated from their core and committed to clearing—they could turn a destructive operation into a costly one for the occupier. In early November, the Japanese continued. In Licheng south of Taihang, Japanese forces invaded Nanweiquan and Beiweiquan and then Xijing. Elsewhere, Japanese forces in Xiangyuan invaded Panlong via Xiying, attempting to attack Dongtian and the area around Zhuanbi, where the Eighth Route Army headquarters was located. In that moment, the 386th Brigade was ordered to rush to the north–south line of Damocun, east of Panlong, block the invading enemy, and cover the transfer of the Eighth Route Army headquarters. At 9:00 a.m. on November 3, 1940, fierce fighting broke out as the troops finished deploying near Damocun. The Japanese launched continuous attacks and captured some positions. The 386th Brigade held until 4:00 a.m. on November 4, then withdrew after the headquarters successfully moved. The Japanese attempt to launch a pincer attack failed, and they retreated to the Baijin Line on November 5. Even when Japanese action couldn't be fully blocked, the counter's aim was not only tactical survival but prevention of strategic encirclement—protecting the central institutions and preserving the ability to fight again. In the northern Taihang region, more than 2,500 enemy troops from Heshun arrived in Yushe on November 3 via Hanwang Town and Changcheng Town, reinforcing Japanese forces in the Yu, Liao, and Wu areas. Then they carried out repeated mopping operations south of the Yuliao Highway, including Jiangtang, Lingshang, Songjiazhuang, Guojiao, and Dayouyi. Harassment and attacks by military and civilians forced Japanese troops back into their strongholds by the 13th. A "40-day" counter-mopping operation in Taihang came to an end. The term "40-day" isn't only calendar time; it suggests that these were not one-off battles but sustained campaigns of movement, dispersal, and repeated harassment meant to drain the enemy's capacity. Starting November 17, the Japanese launched a multi-pronged attack on Qinyuan and the area north of Guodao Town. The attack involved part of the 37th Division from Qin County and Nanguan Town, part of the Independent Mixed Brigade from Pingyao, Jiexiu, and Huo County, and a battalion of the 41st Division from Hongdong—more than 7,000 troops deployed to attack Qinyuan and the north area. But the Taiyue Military Region response shows how the Communist counter-mopping wasn't always to meet force with force. To avoid the enemy's "sharp edge," the Taiyue Military Region formed two detachments—Qin East and Qin West—with leadership and main force moving to both sides of the Qin River outside the Japanese attack zone, targeting scattered Japanese troops instead of being fixed into a single killing field. By November 23, due to harassment by local armed forces, the Japanese reached the attack zone and then carried out dispersed mopping operations. Qinyuan County was the most severely damaged, with more than 5,000 people killed (about one-tenth of its population), nearly 10,000 livestock killed and over 7,000 stolen, and 30,000 to 40,000 houses destroyed. Those details are brutal, but they explain why background stakes mattered: "mopping-up" was meant to break the social base. If civilians died or fled, the guerrilla system became harder to sustain. The response from the Dayue Military Region seized the opportunity created by Japanese dispersal. On November 23, the 42nd Regiment of the Qinxi Detachment annihilated more than 100 Japanese soldiers in Guantan. On November 27, parts of the 42nd and 59th Regiments killed or wounded more than 160 in Huhanping and Mabei. The Qindong Detachment's 17th and 57th Regiments inflicted serious damage in a series of places—Guang'ao, Chenjiagou, Longfosi, Wuyuanzhen, Nanweicun, Nanli, and more. The 17th Regiment's battle at Longfosi annihilated more than 100 Japanese. Additional heavy losses were inflicted by the 212th Brigade in Jiaokou. By December 5, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from the Taiyue area in separate routes. Strategically, dispersal punished the occupier because scattered units are harder to protect and easier to ambush. Across the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, anti-"mopping-up" operations unfolded gradually, beginning with the Pingxi area, the first target of the Japanese on the path toward the Japanese-held headquarters and rail lines. Pingxi mattered because it directly threatened the headquarters of the Japanese North China Area Army and Beiping—the puppet regime's center—and also threatened the Pinghan and Pingsui railways, North China's main transportation lines. So Pingxi became an operational priority: if the occupier couldn't keep the rail network secure, their ability to reinforce and supply their own strongpoints suffered. On October 13, 1940, more than 10,000 Japanese and puppet troops attacked Sanpo, the central area of the Pingxi base area, in 10 routes. This attack used a methodical, steady approach: advance gradually, rely on strongholds, and cover 5 to 10 kilometers each day. In response, the Pingxi Military Sub-district countered using timely maneuvers of its main forces and extensive guerrilla warfare. Over more than a week of fighting, the enemy was constantly harassed and attacked, wearing them down. Although Japanese troops penetrated deep, they failed to identify the main force's movements. By November 21, when the encirclement tightened further, the Pingxi main force jumped out from the Sanpo area and moved southwest. Encountering the enemy at Pengtou, it then moved to the Yegu and Datai line east of Bancheng. After the Japanese entered the Sanpo area, they conducted widespread burning and killing and looted grain. Starting from the 23rd, the Japanese retreated in different routes. By the end of October, the main force had withdrawn from Pingxi, but more than 2,000 troops remained in the Pingxi anti-Japanese base area to build strongholds and roads. Strongholds were added in places like Changping and Wanping—14 strongholds alone—and villages such as Dongzhaitang and Dujiazhuang came under their control. The base area began to shrink and shrink. That shrinkage is the other background stake: even when guerrilla forces avoid annihilation, the occupier may still carve away space through fortification. On October 19, 1940, the Eighth Route Army headquarters instructed that enemy attacks in Pingxi and Taihang might turn around and attack the Beiyue area. The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region needed to prepare quickly to crush these "mopping-up" operations, coordinating Party, government, military, and civilians and conducting in-depth combat mobilization. The main force should assemble in appropriate positions and prepare to annihilate one or two enemy forces decisively. The headquarters also instructed the 129th and 120th Divisions to cooperate actively. By November 9, 1940, the Japanese struck again in a massive sweep. The 110th Division, along with other units and more than 14,000 puppet troops, launched a "mopping-up" operation in the jurisdiction of the 1st Military Sub-district. The Japanese and puppet troops moved in coordinated lines: along the line of Yi County, Dalonghua, Wang'an Town, Laiyuan, and Chajianling from north to south, while those in Baoding and Mancheng moved east to west. The intent was to squeeze Communist sub-district forces into a narrow area for a decisive battle. On November 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region issued operational guidelines and deployments for countering "mopping-up" operations. By the 12th, in response to Japanese widespread burning and killing, it further instructed that without hindering mobility, the main force could disperse a portion of troops—no more than one-third—to strike resolutely at attempts to burn and kill. That instruction captures the balance commanders tried to strike: disperse too much and you lose power; disperse too little and you become trapped by the occupier's brutality. The Japanese then attempted to pressure multiple places. On November 9, more than 6,000 enemy troops from Laiyuan, Yixian, and Baoding attacked Guantou, Yinfang, Huangtuling, and Shenbei. On the 12th, their attack failed; they burned and killed people before retreating in different routes. At that time, the 1st Military Sub-district assembled the 1st and 25th Regiments to intercept them. One enemy force of more than 800 was intercepted on the 14th as it retreated from Wujiazhuang to Yuangang; some were killed or wounded. Even so, the enemy broke through under aircraft cover and retreated to Guantou. On the way, it was intercepted again by the 20th Regiment, suffering heavy casualties, and it fled back to Mancheng. Then on November 13, more than 2,700 Japanese and puppet troops attacked the 3rd Military Sub-district; on November 14, about 2,600 advanced from Dingxiang, Dongye, and Wutai toward Fuping and its southwest area in two routes. The Japanese attacked with east-west coordination, launching joint attacks on Taiyu north of Fuping. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region headquarters and the command organs of the 3rd and 5th military sub-districts, along with the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th regiments and other troops, transferred to the outer line before the enemy encirclement formed. On the 16th, the Japanese launched a joint attack again on Taiyu and Zhangjiayu, and the guerrillas who failed to transfer fought hard. Commander Wang Pu and Deputy Director of the Political Department Hao Yuming were killed, and troops suffered more than 100 casualties. On November 18, the enemy from Taiyu quickly occupied Hanping City. By the 21st, enemy forces from Daying via Shentangbao and Wuwangkou, and from Wutai via Taihuai, Shizui, Longquanguan, and Xiaguan, also gathered in Fuping City. After occupying Fuping, the Japanese launched repeated attacks "sweeping" areas under the jurisdiction of the 3rd Military Sub-district from both inward and outward strongholds, conducting brutal burning and killing and destruction. On the night of November 21, the 2nd Regiment dispatched more than 30 men to raid Dangcheng and attack Japanese barracks with grenades. The Japanese panicked and fired guns and cannons all night. On the 26th, four plainclothes officers infiltrated Baoding and attacked a theater where the Japanese army was holding a meeting, causing panic among the Japanese. The enemy that had invaded the base area withdrew in different routes on the 25th. By December 3, 1940, most Japanese troops had withdrawn from the Beiyue area, but more than 1,000 remained along lines including Fuping, Wangkuai, Dangcheng, and Quyang to continue building points and roads in an attempt to occupy the area long-term. To force the enemy back, eliminate occupied points, and completely crush Japanese and puppet "mopping-up," the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region organized the Fuping–Wangkuai Campaign starting December 9, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th regiments participating. At 21:00 on December 14, the 6th Regiment attacked enemy forces in Dongzhuang. The 1st Battalion captured three fortified positions on the north mountain of Dongzhuang and rushed into the village, only for Japanese counterattacks to recapture fortified positions and kill or wound more than 170 Japanese during the counterfight. The 4th Regiment attacked the enemy in Fuping; the 2nd Regiment and guerrilla forces entered Dangcheng and Lingshan. On the 21st, more than 130 enemy soldiers escorting more than 100 pack animals carrying military supplies reached Wangkuai and were completely annihilated when they reached Wanglinkou. By December 26, an ambush in the Xuancun area of the Pinghan Railway destroyed 14 Japanese trains and their vehicles as well as three heavy artillery pieces. On the 27th, more than 1,200 enemy troops advancing from Dongzhuang in Fuping were attacked in Luoyu and Tumen, suffering more than 140 casualties. The remaining Japanese withdrew from Fuping, Dongzhuang, and Wangkuai starting New Year's Day 1941. By January 4, the 55-day anti-"mopping-up" campaign had basically ended, with the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region killing and wounding more than 2,000 Japanese and puppet troops while suffering 1,382 casualties itself. These numbers and dates show why background and stakes matter: the counter-mopping effort wasn't short. It was sustained, operationally demanding, and required continued offensive action even while facing superior Japanese resources. The pressure didn't end there. From October 25 to early November, about 4,000 Japanese troops, including the 16th Independent Mixed Brigade, launched a mopping operation in the Miyu and Loufan areas of the 8th and 3rd military sub-districts in northwestern Shanxi, but they were attacked by local soldiers and civilians. In mid-December, Japanese forces transferred additional strength: parts of the 37th Division from southern Shanxi and the 41st Division from southeastern Shanxi, along with parts of the 3rd, 9th, and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades and the 26th Division from northwestern Shanxi—totaling more than 20,000 troops—to prepare for a full-scale mopping operation in northwestern Shanxi. After the second phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive ended, the 120th Division anticipated retaliation and actively prepared for counter-mopping. On October 30, the division was ordered to establish the Jin-Northwest Military Region, and on November 7, the military region was established in Lijiawan, Xing County. The Jin-Northwest Military Region had direct military sub-districts and six military sub-districts: the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and Yanbei. Then the occupier escalated. Starting December 14, 1940, the Japanese launched a full-scale mopping operation against the Jin-Northwest region. More than 5,000 enemy troops invaded the Mi-Yu Town area of the 8th Military Sub-district, more than 4,000 invaded Lin-Xian, and more than 6,000 attacked Xing-Xian and the area south of Bao-De from strongholds such as Lan-Xian and Qi-Lan. By December 23, Japanese forces had occupied all county towns, most market towns, and Yellow River crossings in the Jin-Northwest region except for Bao-De and He-Qu counties, and began to implement a systematic policy commonly described as the "Three Alls" policy. The "Three Alls" emphasis is the clearest expression of stakes turning lethal. Japanese troops and traitors disguised themselves as the Eighth Route Army to lure and kill masses. They sent out core detachments to attack and repeatedly sweep the area, seeking to annihilate party, government, and military leadership organs—focusing on destroying the rear organs and facilities that made Communist endurance possible. According to incomplete statistics, more than 5,000 people were brutally killed during these sweeps. In Xingxian County alone, 150,000 catties of grain were looted and burned; in the 4th Military Sub-district, more than 5,000 head of livestock were looted and killed; and more than 19,000 houses and cave dwellings were burned down. In the early stage of this anti-mopping campaign, the Jin-Sui Military Region mainly used a portion of its forces to cooperate with local troops and guerrillas in widespread guerrilla warfare. They harassed and contained the attacking enemy, disrupted enemy transportation, and covered the transfer of the masses. The main force avoided the enemy's sharp edge and moved to the outer line to seek opportunities to attack the Japanese army. This describes the classic guerrilla operational pattern: avoid being fixed into a single decisive trap, but create enough friction that enemy operations degrade into a struggle they can't sustain. repeated attacks and ambushes during the mopping period across Miyu Town and other areas—units striking repeatedly, destroying roads, cutting off enemy transportation, and attacking enemy strongholds north of Dawu. To thwart the Japanese army's plans to build roads and fortifications—plans that would make future sweeps easier—the Jin-Sui Military Region instructed, on December 27, all sub-districts to mobilize forces to disrupt Japanese road construction and fortification. The 358th Brigade attacked enemy road construction from Lanxian to Dashetou and from Puming to Chijianling; the Independent 1st Brigade sabotaged the Dawu–Linxian highway; and the 4th Column of the Death Squad sabotaged the Dawu–Fangshan highway. Part of the Independent 1st Brigade's 2nd Regiment organized over 2,000 civilians to sabotage the Dawu–Sanjiao highway twice, forcing the enemy in Linxian to detour through Fangshan to contact Lishi. The Lishi guerrillas led civilians in two sabotage attacks on the Lishi–Jundu highway, destroying over 30 "li" of road. Other units attacked strongholds along key highways and destroyed or disrupted the "maintenance committees" that surrounded newly built enemy strongholds. There were also direct raids—storming into Linxian County and capturing representatives of enemy maintenance organizations. Meanwhile, the Workers' and Patriots' Brigade carried out continuous sabotage on the Taifen Highway. As the enemy plans ran into persistent disruption, Japanese and puppet forces began to retreat in different routes starting January 2, 1941, and by January 24 they returned to their original strongholds. The Jin-Sui winter counter-mopping operation lasted 40 days, annihilated more than 2,500 enemy troops, destroyed 125 kilometers of roads and 23 bridges, and recovered all towns occupied by the enemy during the campaign. Here the stakes show through most clearly: the campaign was not merely about killing enemy troops. It was about preventing the occupier from building a durable, road-connected grid that would allow future sweeps to be faster, larger, and more decisive. At the wider campaign level, the Eighth Route Army also recorded its total effects from August 20 to December 5, covering roughly three and a half months. During that period, the Eighth Route Army fought 1,824 battles of varying sizes, killing or wounding 20,645 Japanese soldiers (including senior officers), killing or wounding 5,155 puppet troops, and capturing 281 Japanese soldiers and 18,407 puppet troops. 47 Japanese soldiers surrendered voluntarily, and 1,845 puppet troops defected, totaling 46,380 people. The Communists captured 5,942 guns and 53 artillery pieces, and destroyed extensive transportation infrastructure: 474 kilometers of railway, 1,502 kilometers of highway, 213 bridges, 37 railway stations, 11 tunnels, more than 217,000 rails, more than 1,549,000 sleepers, more than 109,000 telephone poles, and more than 424,000 kilograms of telephone wire. Five coal mines and 11 warehouses were destroyed. The narrative further adds that when including casualties of Japanese and puppet forces across related engagements—such as Fuwang and the anti–mopping operations in northwest Shanxi—the total number of casualties reached more than 50,880. Japanese statistics were also cited for damage assessment, noting destruction of track and bridges across key railways (Zhengtai, Tongpu, Pinghan), telegraph pole damage, power line cuts, and effects on coal production—such as the Jingxing New Mine being unable to produce coal for at least six months. These details underline a broader background stake: infrastructure damage was meant to weaken the occupier's ability to keep its occupation apparatus working, even after the direct battles ended. The price of that multi-month struggle was high for the Eighth Route Army as well. Over the three and a half months leading up to the Hundred Regiments Offensive, the Eighth Route Army suffered 17,000 casualties, and more than 20,000 were poisoned. During the Hundred Regiments Offensive itself, post-war statistics state that the 129th Division suffered 7,362 casualties and 450 missing persons, and the entire division suffered 7,812 casualties. When you connect these lines—offensive sabotage, counter-offensives, Japanese mopping-ups, and anti-mopping resistance—you see why this second wave of fighting mattered. It wasn't only about whether the Japanese could respond to the offensive. It was about whether both sides could sustain their operational logic: the Japanese trying to stabilize occupation through "mopping," and the Communists trying to preserve base systems through dispersal, harassment, and counter-moves that convert the occupier's clearing effort into something too costly to maintain. The background of the Hundred Regiments offensive, who authorized it, who planned it, and why, remains unclear. The Japanese response was so severe that, in retrospect, it appeared to some as if the offensive had been a mistake. Some leaders, especially Mao, may have wanted to disavow it. Indirect hints in Mao's writings in subsequent months and years suggest he may have viewed it critically or harbored misgivings from the start. It was not the kind of strategy Mao preferred. More than twenty years later, during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards charged that Mao had not even known of the plan in advance because of Peng Dehuai's alleged duplicity, at the time, Peng was being denounced. While this seems unlikely, it may contain some substance. In his own defense against these charges, Peng stated that after the 8RA headquarters—located not in Yan'an but in Jin-Cha-Ji—planned the operation, it sent mobilization orders downward to each regional command and also notified the Central Military Affairs Commission headed by Mao. In the original plan, the action would begin in early September. But, Peng wrote, to prevent enemy discovery and to ensure simultaneous surprise assaults—thereby inflicting an even greater blow to the enemy and the puppets—they began about ten days earlier than scheduled, during the last week of August. "So we did not wait for approval from the Military Affairs Commission (this was wrong), but went right into combat earlier than planned." There is also the issue of the "spontaneous" participation of more than eighty regiments without authorization from the Eighth Route Army headquarters, and not from Yan'an as well. If Peng Dehuai's account is accepted (written in 1970, shortly before his death), then Mao and Party Central had no role in conceiving or planning the Hundred Regiments campaign. In that case, the "grand strategy" motivations for undertaking it largely vanish—except perhaps insofar as they were considered by Peng and his colleagues. One alleged motive was to counter any tendency toward capitulation by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing regime: if the war heated up and the CCP threw itself into fighting, any accommodation between Chiang and Japan would look like cowardly surrender. A related consideration was the Communist leadership's sensitivity to the charge that they were simply exploiting the war to expand their influence—avoiding Japanese combat while letting KMT armies bear the real burden of fighting. The Nationalists gave major publicity to the accusation that CCP policy devoted 70 percent of effort to expansion, 20 percent to coping with the KMT, and only 10 percent to opposing Japan. A third suggested motive was to divert attention from the New Fourth Army's offensives against Nationalist forces in Central China, which were peaking around the same time. Peng Dehuai acknowledged the campaign was "too protracted," yet he defended its importance in maintaining the CCP's anti-Japanese image in the wake of anti-friction conflicts, in demonstrating the failure of the cage-and-silkworm policy, in returning at least twenty-six county seats to base control, and in keeping "wavering" elements in line. Even if these reasons mattered less than regional and tactical calculations in launching the campaign, they could always be used for propaganda afterward. Whatever misgivings Mao and Party Central may have had, the Party kept them to itself. Mao radioed congratulations to Peng after his victory, and in public statements the Hundred Regiments were turned into legend. Even if the Hundred Regiments campaign aimed to defeat Japanese pacification efforts, it did not succeed in a decisive way. Shocked and stung by the 8RA's action, the North China Area Army intensified its efforts to bring North China under tighter control. Under General Tada and then his successor, General Okamura Yasuji (July 1941–November 1944), the Japanese inflicted brutal, sustained violence against all North China bases. Between 1941 and 1944, about 150,000 Japanese troops were assigned full-time to pacification duty, supported by roughly 100,000 Chinese auxiliaries of widely varying description and effectiveness. The remainder of the NCAA (about 150,000–200,000 men) was assigned to other tasks such as garrisoning major cities and containing Nationalist forces. Communist regulars were estimated at around 250,000 within base areas and 40,000 in SKN. The Japanese and their Chinese auxiliaries invested even more heavily than before in constructing moats, ditches, palisades, and blockhouses. Japanese sources claimed that by 1942 their forces had built 11,860 kilometers of blockade line and 7,700 fortified posts, mostly in the Hebei plains and the foothills of the Taihang mountains. A massive trench ran for 500 kilometers along the western side of the Pinghan railway line, with a depopulated and constantly patrolled zone on either side. The 250 Japanese outposts established in southern Hebei by December 1940 were more than quadrupled by mid-1942. These became the key means of controlling plains areas; by the end of 1941, all Communist bases in such terrain had been reduced to guerrilla status. Many main force units—such as those under Liu Cheng'ao and Yang Xiufeng—were compelled to move westward into mountains to survive. What distinguished the new Tada–Okamura approach from earlier tactics was the much larger and more protracted search-and-destroy thrust into the core mountain-base areas. They also replaced selective repression with indiscriminate, generalized violence. These infamous "Three-All" mop-up campaigns meant: kill all, burn all, loot all. Unable to distinguish ordinary peasants from Communists, the Japanese waged war on everyone. After attempting to seal off major consolidated regions in the base areas, they sent in very large detachments to search for Communist forces, civilian cadres, and activists. They also tried to destroy base facilities and war material stockpiles; to disrupt agriculture by burning crops or interfering with planting and harvesting; and to seize grain stores. Entire villages were razed, and everything alive found there was killed. Unlike earlier mop-ups that swept through an area and then departed, these campaigns left troops in the targeted zones for extended periods, "combing" the area back and forth and building at least temporary strongpoints in more accessible parts of mountain bases. These mop-up operations took a heavy and painful toll on rural populations. No doubt the harsh tactics and atrocities frequently committed during these actions did cause many peasants, rich and poor alike, to harbor deep hatred of the Japanese and to commit more fully to the Communist side. But intra-party sources also portray cases in which repression worked even more effectively than earlier attempts to drive a wedge between party and peasantry. As one internal assessment put it: If we only stress concealment… we are bound to be divorced from the masses. The morale of the masses cannot be sustained for long either. On the other hand, if we only seek fleeting gratification in careless fighting, we may also invite still more cruel enemy suppression. That will also alienate the masses. Communist spokesmen acknowledged that, in North China base areas, the population under Party control fell from 44 million to 25 million, while the Eighth Route Army declined from 400,000 to 300,000. Local records present an even grimmer picture. By 1942, 90 percent of the plains bases had been reduced to guerrilla zones or outright enemy control. In the mountainous Taiyue district within the Jin-Cha-Lu-Yi base, one cadre admitted that "not a single county was kept intact and the government offices of all its twelve counties were exiled in Jin-yuan." All twenty-six county seats occupied following the Hundred Regiments fighting were lost. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japan tried to regain control through retaliatory "mopping-up" operations starting in October 1940. In response, the Eighth Route Army and its commanders issued counter-measures: coordinate party, government, military, and civilians; keep mobility while dispersing forces when possible; and focus on annihilating incoming enemy units decisively. Counter-sweeps and anti-pacification actions continued through December, involving repeated ambushes and sabotage of roads, highways, and fortification efforts. 

From Evidence to Action: Incorporating Disability Inclusion in Medical Training and Practice (ICAM 2026) Session Description The ICAM Series | Recorded Live at the International Congress on Academic Medicine (ICAM) What does it take to move disability inclusion from research and policy into everyday medical training and practice? Recorded live at the International Congress on Academic Medicine (ICAM) in Ottawa, Canada, this special episode of the Docs With Disabilities Podcast brings together an extraordinary panel of physician leaders, educators, and advocates working to transform disability inclusion across undergraduate medical education, residency training, and clinical practice. Together, the panel explores how institutions can move beyond awareness and compliance toward meaningful, sustainable change. Drawing from scholarship, systems leadership, and lived experience, they discuss the realities of accommodation implementation, the importance of centralized and trusted systems, faculty training, universal design, and the role of culture in shaping whether disability inclusion succeeds or stalls. This conversation asks difficult—but necessary—questions: How do we create systems that are consistent and humane? How do we support learners and physicians across transitions and career stages? And how do we build medical environments where disability is expected, planned for, and valued? Rich with practical insight and grounded in real-world experience, this live ICAM session highlights a field at an important turning point—one where we increasingly have the evidence, the tools, and the responsibility to act. Whether you are a learner, educator, physician, administrator, or institutional leader, this episode offers concrete ideas and inspiration for advancing disability inclusion within your own environment. Keywords: UGME, PGME, Disability, Learner, Trainee, Medical Education, Policies, Processes, Ableism, Culture, ICAM, AFMC, Docs With Disabilities. Transcript: https://docs.google.com/document/d/18hNrBcylnDfSuT6hJB-RwFMpIBVzEPY21Qf4y0mU0WY/edit?usp=sharing Co-Moderators Lisa Meeks, PhD, MA  Dr. Meeks is a Professor of Medical Education at the University of Illinois College of Medicine in Chicago, IL and holds an appt as an Associate Professor of Family Medicine at the University of Michigan School of Medicine in Ann Arbor, MI. She is the founder of the Docs with Disabilities Initiative and host of the DWDI Podcast. Lynn Ashdown, MD, MMEd   Lynn Ashdown is a patient experience expert who advocates for patients to be included as stakeholders in all levels of healthcare. She has a medical degree, and was close to finishing her residency in family medicine when she began, and continues to navigate, a complex journey as a full-time patient. She has a masters degree in medical education, and presents, participates in research, and is a senior patient partner consulting with various organizations like the Association of Faculties of Medicine of Canada. She's involved in curriculum reform focusing on patient partnerships and is a disability educator within medicine. Lynn is a disability advocate, drawing from her experiences as a patient and person living with multiple disabilities. She's a board member of the Canadian Association of Physicians with Disabilities and is involved with policy and legislative changes to combat ableism and inequities for people living with disabilities. She co-authored Canada's first position statement on the importance of disability inclusion in medical education, and received the 2024 CMA Dr. Ashok Muzumdar Memorial Award for Physicians with Disabilities. Pam Liao, MD, MEd, FRCPC Dr. Liao is the Inaugural Interim Associate Dean Accessibility and Disability Health at the Toronto Metropolitan University School of Medicine. Here, she previously served as the Disability Health Lead and Special Advisor to the Dean at the Toronto Metropolitan University School of Medicine. In her work, she leads efforts to embed critical disability perspectives and anti-ableist practices into medical education. Drawing from her personal experience navigating medical training with a disability, she has dedicated her career to dismantling systemic barriers faced by individuals with disabilities in medicine. Her work includes groundbreaking research—such as the first analysis of accommodations policies in Canadian undergraduate medical programs—and advocacy efforts like the widely recognized "#docswithdisabilities" social media campaign, which brings attention to the underrepresentation of disabled individuals in healthcare and drives meaningful change. She advocated for the establishment of the Association of Faculties of Medicine of Canada (AFMC) Disability Inclusion Network and currently serves as its inaugural Co-Chair. Her advocacy earned her a place on the Board of Directors of the Canadian Association of Physicians with Disabilities, where she continues to serve. Dr. Liao earned her medical degree from the University of British Columbia and completed her residency in Family and Community Medicine and a fellowship in Palliative Medicine at the University of Toronto. She is also an Assistant Professor in the Department of Family and Community Medicine at the University of Toronto and practices clinically in long-term care and rehabilitation settings. Her contributions have been recognized with several honors, including the OMA Section of Palliative Medicine – Award of Excellence. Jill Rudkowski, MD, FRCPC  Dr. Jill Rudkowski is an Associate Professor of Medicine in Department of Medicine (Critical Care) at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.  She has practised as a critical care physician for over 20 years and is an educator, researcher, and educational leader.  She obtained her MD from the University of Calgary. She trained in Internal Medicine, Respirology, and Critical Care at McGill University after which she completed a Post-doctoral Fellowship with Dr. Barrett Rollins at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Harvard University. She served as Head of Service for the Medical Stepdown Unit and then the Intensive Care Unit at St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton for over 10 years.  Dr. Rudkowski has been involved as a co-investigator on numerous patient-focused clinical studies, and these collaborations focus on improving outcomes for survivors of critical illness and the impact on their caregivers. She has designed and delivered curriculum through sessions and workshops on the concept of team compassion in critical care and its role in effective communication.      Dr. Rudkowski has held several educational leadership roles within the McMaster University DeGroote School of Medicine including the Chair of Clerkship and the Director of Student Advising. She is currently the Postgraduate Medicine (PGME) Accommodation Advisor within Resident Affairs and the PGME Resident Assessment Faculty Lead. Dr. Rudkowski has been involved in writing and implementing policy and guidelines around accessing accommodations as well as designing and delivering curriculum aimed at faculty, learners, and administrators through virtual and in person sessions and workshops. Dr. Rudkowski has had the privilege of collaborating nationally and internationally around disability policy in medical education.  She was a member of the Disability Policy Toolkit Committee, Multimedia Resource Hub for Disability Inclusion in Graduate Medical Education on "Learn at ACGME" supported by the 2024 Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation Catalyst Award for Transformation in Graduate Medical Education.  Dr. Rudkowski is currently a member of the Association of Faculties of Medicine of Canada Disability Inclusion and Accessibility Network.  She lives with a chronic disability and is passionate about ensuring that all medical learners and practitioners with disability experience belonging and accessibility in the clinical learning and practice environments.   Camille Munro MD CCFP (PC) Dr. Camille Munro is a palliative medicine physician in the Department of Medicine at the Ottawa Hospital and an Assistant Professor at the University of Ottawa. Originally from Chester, Nova Scotia, she received her Doctor of Medicine from Dalhousie University in 1991 and completed her rotating internship at Royal Columbian Hospital, University of British Columbia. After practicing family medicine in Ottawa for 18 years while raising her children, she returned to the academic setting, driven by a longstanding commitment to compassionate, whole patient-centred care for those facing a serious illness.  In 2018, Dr. Munro was appointed Director of Equity, Diversity and Inclusion for the Department of Medicine where she led initiatives to foster a more inclusive and equitable academic and clinical environment. Her work included the development and implementation of the first formal accommodations policy for physicians with disabilities at a Canadian academic hospital. She remains a strong advocate for physicians with disabilities and for creating environments free from discrimination and inequity. Here work is grounded in compassion, advocacy, and representation; values she brings to her clinical care, teaching, mentorship and leadership. In recognition of her contributions, she received the 2022 Faculty Member Award of Excellence for Leadership in Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion from the University of Ottawa Faculty of Medicine.  Samantha Lavitt, MD Dr. Samantha Lavitt (she/her) is the first Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion Curricular Lead in undergraduate medical education at the University of Ottawa, which sits on the traditional, unceded territory of the Algonquin people. In this role, she designs educational content including topics such as gender equity, sexual orientation and gender diversity, language rights, and disability, integrating these topics throughout the clinical curriculum in a format that connects students with community teachers with lived experience. Trained as a family physician and dedicated to resilience through sustainable practice development, Dr. Lavitt also offers coaching and peer support to family physicians on advocacy, disability, and well-being through the Ontario College of Family Physicians (OCFP). She established the first peer support group for physicians with chronic illness and/or disabilities at the OCFP in 2024 and continues to co-lead this group monthly.  While she finds working with individual physicians and small groups deeply rewarding, this intervention is not enough to dismantle the system of barriers that disabled physicians face in our medical culture, so Dr. Lavitt brings her professional and lived experience as a disabled physician to advocacy initiatives at her academic institution, provincial, and national levels with involvement in peer support projects, webinars, and conference appearances. Produced by: Dr. Lisa Meeks.  Audio editor: Next Day Podcast Digital Media: Lisa Meeks Resources: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1EXw4F1pt5J-O6Y0k-WksDC71RCA6aTFSCOkz-lqJiyc/edit?usp=sharing  

In the latest episode of the Fiduciary Investors Series, Liao spoke with Top1000funds.com Asia Pacific correspondent Darcy Song on why the convergence of innovation, demographics and improving shareholder returns makes Asian equities an increasingly compelling diversification trade for asset owners navigating a geopolitically fractured world.

Família e Culto: Influências Invisíveis é uma palestra do Pr. Marcos F. Bomfim, gravada na Igreja Adventista Brasileira de Richmond, Virginia (EUA), em meados de 2005. Nesta mensagem, o autor explica de forma prática e inspiradora como o culto familiar transforma a dinâmica do lar, fortalece os relacionamentos e molda o desenvolvimento espiritual dos filhos.Com histórias reais de sua infância e experiências vividas na casa onde cresceu, o Pr. Bomfim mostra como a presença de Deus se torna mais visível e constante quando a família pratica diariamente a leitura da Bíblia, a oração e outros elementos do culto doméstico.Descubra a importância do culto familiar e como estabelecer uma rotina espiritual que traga proteção para os filhos e harmonia ao lar, baseada em princípios bíblicos e valores cristãos.A palestra aborda temas como:A importância do culto familiar na formação espiritual das criançasPor que o lar é o centro do grande conflito espiritual?Como criar um ambiente espiritual saudável em casaO impacto das influências invisíveis no comportamento e no caráterPrincípios bíblicos que orientam pais a conduzirem seus filhos no caminho de DeusTestemunhos e histórias verdadeiras sobre a vida devocional em famíliaO papel do pai como sacerdote e líder espiritual da família.Estratégias para manter a constância mesmo em dias exaustivos.Uma mensagem relevante para pais, educadores, líderes de igreja e para todos que desejam fortalecer a fé dentro de casa e construir um lar centrado em Cristo.* Batalha Invisível: O lar é o cenário de um conflito espiritual real; o culto familiar decide para que lado a vitória penderá. * Legado de Prioridade: A consistência do culto ensina aos filhos o valor inegociável de buscar a Deus primeiro. * Método Prático: O culto deve ser breve (5 a 10 minutos), alegre e adaptado à idade das crianças para ser um momento prazeroso, não um fardo.

When Netflix held its first-ever Netflix Is A Joke festival in Los Angeles 2022, stand-up comedian Leslie Liao was working for Netflix in human resources …

Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter.   #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August.  On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away.   A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement.   That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor.   On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would.   While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources.   Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength.   Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng.   While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted.   As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged.   To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission.   The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan.   On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County.   The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions.   As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption.   Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year.   By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. 

As the world's two largest economies, China and the United States can benefit businesses on both sides and inject fresh momentum into global economic recovery by finding more common ground and working together to manage differences, said economists and business executives.经济学家和商界高管认为，中美作为全球最大的两个经济体，若能在更多领域凝聚共识，携手管控分歧，不仅能让两国企业从中受益，也能为全球经济复苏注入新的动力。The structural complementarity between the two nations, which spans manufacturing, technology and services, is too significant to be disrupted by trade frictions, they added.专家表示，中美在制造业、科技、服务业等领域存在着深厚的结构性互补，这种互补关系之牢固，绝非贸易摩擦所能撼动。"American companies are continuing to invest. American companies aren't going anywhere," said Sean Stein, president of the US-China Business Council, countering the narrative that US businesses are leaving China.美中贸易全国委员会会长肖恩·斯坦驳斥了“美资企业正在撤离中国”的说法。他强调：“美国企业仍在持续投资。它们哪儿也不会去。”"It's not just the China market anymore; it's the China platform," he said, noting that the platform encompasses everything — from consumer access and partnerships with local enterprises to research and development and supply chain resilience — which is "only becoming more important".他进一步指出：“这已不仅仅是‘中国市场'的概念，而是‘中国平台'。”他表示，这个平台涵盖了触达消费者、与本土企业合作、研发到供应链韧性等方方面面，其重要性“与日俱增”。Stein emphasized that coming to China will help US business leaders develop a clearer view and a more realistic understanding of where China stands. Until that happens, it is easy to imagine dangers and concerns that may not be as serious as they seem, he said. "Twenty-five years ago, no one came to China to do R&D. Now what I'm seeing is that the best companies are coming and doing some of their most important R&D," he added.斯坦还强调，亲自来中国走一走、看一看，有助于美国商界领袖更清晰、更真实地了解中国的真实情况。在此之前，人们很容易想象出那些或许并不如想象中严重的风险和忧虑。“25年前几乎没有人会来中国做研发，而现在，我看到的是最优秀的企业纷纷来到这里并开展一些最具分量的研发工作。”According to data from the Ministry of Commerce, foreign direct investment in China's high-tech industries surged 30.7 percent year-on-year to 102.73 billion yuan ($15.12 billion) in the first quarter of 2026, pushing the sector's share in total FDI to 41.2 percent.来自商务部的数据显示，2026年第一季度，中国高技术产业实际使用外资同比增长30.7%，达1027.3亿元人民币（约合151.2亿美元），高技术产业占全国实际使用外资的比重升至41.2%。Eric Zheng, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, said that if US companies want to remain globally competitive, they should invest in China. "A US company that can thrive in China can succeed in many other markets around the world. The experience and capabilities built here can be directly applied elsewhere," he said.上海美国商会会长郑艺表示，美国企业若想保持全球竞争力，就应该到中国投资。“一家能够在中国蓬勃发展的美国企业，同样有能力在全球众多其他市场取得成功。在中国积累的经验和能力，是可以在其他地方直接复用的。”Zheng added that the complementarity of the US-China economic relationship means that stable and predictable bilateral trade ties serve the fundamental interests of both nations and greatly benefit businesses on both sides.郑艺还指出，中美经济关系的互补性决定了稳定、可预期的双边贸易关系不仅符合两国根本利益而且对双方企业都大有裨益。Geoff Martha, chairman and CEO of the US-based medical technology company Medtronic, said that China is not only a market with the potential to become the world's largest market for medical technology, but also a valuable partner.美国美敦力公司董事长兼首席执行官杰夫·马萨表示，中国不仅是有潜力成为全球最大医疗器械市场的国家，更是一个值得珍视的合作伙伴。"That commitment is reflected in our long-term investments," he said. "We see strong alignment between China's focus on new quality productive forces and Medtronic's work to develop next-generation technologies that can improve care and expand access for patients."他说：“这一承诺充分体现在我们的长期投资中。我们看到，中国着力推动的新质生产力，与美敦力致力于研发新一代医疗技术、提升诊疗水平、惠及更多病患的努力高度契合。”Surveys indicate that US businesses prefer stability over confrontation. In late April, a white paper released by the American Chamber of Commerce in China noted that more than half of US companies in China still rank the country among their top three global investment destinations.多项调查显示，美国企业更倾向于稳定而非对抗。4月下旬，中国美国商会发布的白皮书指出，在华美资企业中，有超过一半仍将中国列为其全球三大投资目的地之一。Liao Fan, director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of World Economics and Politics, said that despite years of trade tensions and escalating rhetoric, the underlying economic logic of China-US cooperation remains intact.中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所所长廖凡指出，尽管经历多年贸易摩擦和言辞交锋不断升级，但中美合作的深层经济逻辑并未动摇。"You cannot decouple two economies that have been interwoven together over decades through investment, supply chain integration and market interdependence. The cost of separation would be measured in trillions of dollars and millions of jobs," Liao said.“中美两国经济数十年来通过投资、供应链整合和市场相互依存而紧密交织在一起，根本无法‘脱钩'。强行分离需要付出的代价，将是以万亿美元和数百万个工作岗位来衡量的。”Zhang Yansheng, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research, noted that China and the US are not only very important for each other, but their relationship is of utmost importance for the world.中国宏观经济研究院研究员张燕生指出，中美两国不仅对彼此极为重要，中美关系更是对整个世界至关重要。According to the International Monetary Fund, the combined nominal GDP of China and the US accounted for nearly 45 percent of the global economy in 2025. A report released in March by the US-based McKinsey Global Institute also showed that the decline in US-China trade reduced global trade growth by around 10 percent last year.根据国际货币基金组织的数据，2025年中美两国的名义GDP合计占全球经济总量的近45%。麦肯锡全球研究院3月发布的一份报告也显示，去年中美贸易额的下降导致全球贸易增速放缓了约10个百分点。He Weiwen, a senior fellow at the Beijing-based think tank Center for China and Globalization, said that for the relationship to be truly fair and mutually beneficial, the US must remove the unreasonable restrictions it has imposed on China.全球化智库（CCG）高级研究员何伟文表示，要实现中美关系真正的公平互利，美方必须取消其对中国施加的不合理限制。encompass /ɪnˈkʌmpəs/涵盖，包含decouple /diːˈkʌpəl/脱钩alignment /əˈlaɪnmənt/契合，一致性interwoven /ˌɪntəˈwəʊvən/紧密交织的think tank /ˈθɪŋk tæŋk/智库impose on /ɪmˈpəʊz ɒn/强加于

Craig and Leslie talk about gambling, salads, and video stores.Check out Leslie's new special, "Silky Smooth" here - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1AxfwQr-GA&t=1847sNew Loosey Goosey "Driving on Mushrooms" Merch Out Now!- https://www.craigconantstore.comGet your tickets now for The Woopsie Daisy Tour! - https://punchup.live/craigconantFollow Leslie!IG - https://www.instagram.com/resrieriao/TIkTok - https://www.tiktok.com/@resrieriaoYouTube - https://www.youtube.com/@leslieliaoWebsite - https://leslieliao.com/Follow Craig!IG - https://instagram.com/craigpconant/TikTok - https://tiktok.com/@craigpconant/Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/craigpconant/Merch - https://craigconantstore.com/Follow the podcast!Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/communityservicepodIG - https://www.instagram.com/communityservicepodTikTok - https://www.tiktok.com/@communityservicepodSend your poop stories, party stories, or prank stories to communityservicepod@gmail.com or DM communityservicepod on IG! (audio submissions welcome)Business Plugs:Need a natural, holistic facial or some Ayurvedic healing?Contact Cynthia at Ritual Skin and Soul:https://instagram.com/livecynplyayurveda/https://instagram.com/ritualskinandsoul/Check out Brian Johnson's Art! He did the 3 Skeletons Skateboards + The New Podcast Studio: https://www.instagram.com/brianjohnsonstudios/Aztlan Herbal Remedies - https://www.aztlanherbalremedies.com/Kettlebells South Bay - https://www.instagram.com/kettlebellssouthbay/PV Coin Exchange - https://palosverdescoinexchange.com/Deadlight Visions Graphic Design - https://instagram.com/deadlightvisions/Donny Honcho's Healthy Pet Products - https://linktr.ee/localdogdaddySwank Hank's Handmade EDC - https://swankhanks.com/Glitch Pudding, Acrylic Artist - https://instagram.com/glitchpudding/Hoobs Glass Art - https://www.hoobsglass.net/The Pet's Choice Animal Groomers - https://www.instagram.com/thepetschoice_wilmington.ca/Craig's Holistic Doctors:Dr. Jay - https://www.instagram.com/100yearsjay/PBC Health - https://www.instagram.com/pbchealthwellness/Healing/Hustling Links:Louise Hay - https://youtu.be/lz16YqpWkz4Wayne Dyer - https://youtu.be/44ImQV46lF4Change Your Thoughts, Change Your Life - https://youtube.com/watch?v=14JxE7i0EPcLouise Hay Sleep Meditation - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mz8bHR4o7E0Emmet Fox - Prayer Is Not A Way Of Asking, But Of Receiving - https://youtu.be/Tf4yVNtMOgw?si=fQGIg-SGgbF8nBuSRobert Kiyosaki - Liabilities to Assets - https://youtube.com/watch?v=A8vD_XO0vUUCraig's favorite healers:Esther Hicks (AKA Abraham Hicks)Joe DispenzaBruce LiptonDr. SebiAlso shout out to these light workers giving out that lost knowledge:Dr. Delbert BlairDolores CannonSantos Bonnaci

The leap from corporate banking to mortgage broking often promises more freedom, but for many, it leads to a "lonely" home office and a bottleneck of paperwork. Not for Daniel Liao. Since making the switch, the South Brisbane-based broker has meticulously engineered a business that allows him to manage massive volume without sacrificing his sanity or his values. In this episode of Elite Broker, host Annie Kane catches up with the Mortgage Choice broker to discuss how he has scaled his operations to handle nearly 300 loans a year as a sole broker. He shares the importance of breaking and rebuilding processes, why he focuses on a specific investor niche, and how he stays sharp in a high-pressure industry. Tune in to find out: How he utilises a team of offshore and onshore credit analysts to reduce bottlenecks. How he's able to cherry-pick the types of clients he works with. The way he integrates open banking and AI tools to deliver a "blueprint to wealth". And much more!

Youth and Health Shape the Lions' Plan The Detroit Lions zigged in this NFL draft. Jeff Risdon sat down with Dr. Jimmy Liao on the Detroit Lions Podcast to grade the class through a medical lens. The theme was clear. Youth and health. Every pick landed at age 23 or younger. None of the 24-year-old prospects were taken. The shift tracks with recent lessons. Lower medical risk. Fewer known durability flags. Play the odds. Dr. Liao grades injury risk on a 1-to-10 scale. Younger players start lower. Age 23 and up nudges concern a bit. This class stayed on the low end across the board. It marks a turn from prior years when the Detroit Lions accepted more medical risk. In the NFL, availability matters. Detroit moved to stack it. Blake Miller's Ironman Profile at Clemson The top note was right tackle Blake Miller. Legendary durability at Clemson. He started 54 straight games. He logged 3,778 snaps, a school record. Dr. Liao set his medical concern at 1 out of 10. The only ding was a wrist surgery in 2024, with proof of recovery afterward. The worry there is longer-term stiffness, but his track record is strong. He is 22. That age keeps his grade low. Miller fits what the Detroit Lions want up front. Young. Battle tested. Clean enough medically to project early availability. He even graded as a top-three tackle target on the medical board. For an NFL team intent on protecting its quarterback and stabilizing the run game, this is a trend-breaking selection. Less risk. More snaps. Derek Moore's Hamstring and Second-Round Signal Next came Michigan edge Derek Moore. Before the combine he sat at 1 out of 10. A pre-combine hamstring strain bumped him to 2 out of 10. Hamstrings recur, and they spook timelines. Still, fast-twitch athletes almost all meet one sooner or later. The context matters. Detroit used a second-round pick on Moore. That signals the medical staff saw a minor issue. Dr. Liao moved him effectively back down to a 1 out of 10 after the pick. The Detroit Lions added a high-motor defender with minimal long-term concern. Recent examples of lingering hamstrings exist around the league, but the takeaway here was balance. Note the strain. Price the risk. Trust the file. The NFL demands it. On Deck: Michigan LB Jimmy Rolder The conversation turned to Michigan linebacker Jimmy Rolder. He drew a 3 out of 10 on the injury risk scale. He did not play a ton in college. That makes projection tougher, but it fits the draft's core theme. Younger players with manageable medical profiles. The Detroit Lions Podcast made it clear: Detroit targeted availability without sacrificing upside. #detroitlions #lions #detroitlionspodcast #2026nfldraft #lionsdraftclass #injuryupdates #detroitinjuryrisk #blakemiller #jimmyrolder #brianbranch #kerbyjoseph #jermodmccoy #levionwuzurike Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Things are getting tense on Coastal Idiots as Katherine and Shane's bickering hits a breaking point, so they do the only logical thing—bring in comedian Leslie Liao to fix their relationship live on air. Armed with questionable advice and zero authority, Leslie attempts to untangle their grievances while both sides refuse to back down, and then it all devolves into non-sensical stories. What unfolds is part couples therapy, part verbal cage match, and entirely unhinged. Progress is… debatable. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Coastal Idiots is a weekly comedy podcast where each week your host Shane and Katherine are joined by a friend or two where they do something very stupid and hilarious. Follow Katherine and Shane so they have a reason to keep going. The show is produced by the marvelous Keida Mascaro. Some of the art on the walls by the great Perry Shall. Music by Gymshorts and Alex Orange Drink. Your favorite idiots are now available wherever you listen to podcasts! Stream video on Spotify or Youtube, to drink in every detail of Katherine Blanford & Shane Torres' shenanigans and insane sketches. Listen to audio on all podcast platforms. Welcome to the ATC family! Let's get weird. Let's get Coastal. Don't forget to call our Coastal Idiots hotline and leave a message, we might just publish it! Coastal Idiots Hotline: (510) 974-3349 More Leslie! IG: https://www.instagram.com/resrieriao/ More Coastal Idiots! IG: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/coastalidiots/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ More Katherine! IG⁠: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/itskatherineblanford/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ More Shane! IG: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/shanetorres/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Produced by Keida Mascaro ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠IG: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/keidamascaro/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ The Cave Podcast Studio ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://keidamascaro.com/the-cave⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Presented by: All Things Comedy IG: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/allthingscomedy/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Theme Song by GYMSHORTS IG: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/gymshortsmusic/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Logo & Artwork by Perry Shall IG: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.instagram.com/perryshall/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

On an all-new panel episode of Bad Dates, it's an unexpected holiday special as host Joel Kim Booster sits down with the fabulous Jessica Henwick (Game Of Thrones, Silo, Glass Onion) and Leslie Liao (new stand-up special Silky Smooth out April 28!) to discuss their most iconic dating fiascos. Leslie takes one of the biggest swings imaginable when she agrees to a first date ON CHRISTMAS, and Jessica is shocked to discover she has propositioned a stranger ON VALENTINE'S DAY. We promise we did not plan this.   Subscribe to our YouTube Channel for video clips and full episodes.  Merch available at SiriusXMStore.com/BadDates.   Joel Kim Booster: Scrubs Season 10, Psychosexual, Fire Island, Loot Season 3 Leslie Liao: @resrieriao on socials, new special Silky Smooth out April 28! Jessica Henwick: @jhenwick on socials, Silo S3 on Apple coming soon! Subscribe to SiriusXM Podcasts+ to listen to new episodes of Bad Dates ad-free. Start a free trial now on Apple Podcasts or by visiting siriusxm.com/podcastsplus. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Installez-vous confortablement au fond de votre lit, remontez la couette jusqu'au menton et fermez les yeuxLes histoiresMy neighbour used to peek at me over her fence when I was little. Her fence is 10ft tall, par soapyFor 26 years, I couldn't see faces. Now I'm seeing too many, par RedfangI Thought I Lived Alone, par theidiotsboss (YT Channel, Patreon)Merci à tous les auteurs, n'hésitez pas vous aussi, à envoyer vos histoires sur hello@avantdallerdormir.frRejoignez-nousDiscordInstagram | FacebookYouTube | TwitchTwitterNotre siteNotre répondeur : 0749252790Soutenez-nousSur Patreon. Un remerciement à nos nouveaux patrons : Louisa, Isoyii, Delphly, Alexe Dvl, kevin, Miss Jolyne, Loup Louping, Maxime, Delph_ine79, Berg, Lord Craft, Yû, romane_sba, Loic, Isabelle, Hyou, LeLambert, Alexi.Miriamm, mathilde, Quentin, jeremy, Marie-Pier, Bryan, Julia, Kirakira, Alexandre, Alexandre, Arnaud, Anthéa, Mahélisa, Gabrielle, Helene, Nachos, Céline.momo, Gaetandenis13, Cassandra, Sophie, Magellan, SuperNinja, TOCK ID, Helena, Ally, Yuzu, Arno 14, Adri, Math56, raphael, Liao, AmélieEn nous mettant une note sur SensCritique, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, ou Podcast AddictOn en parle Assassin's Creed: ShadowsMouthwashingAdolescenceLa chaine Twitch de YopL'équipe

Interview with Rebecca Liao - The Culture News

This is a fantastic episode as both Barbara Perez Marquez and Sonia Liao chat with Jimmy about The Curie Society: Game of Code. This is a phenomenal graphic novel series (Game of Code is the 3rd volume) about "a team of young women recruited by an elite secret society—originally founded by Marie Curie—with the mission of supporting the most brilliant female scientists in the world." Barbara joins the creative team to script this 3rd volume and it's great to hear her and Sonia discuss their work on the book, what it means to them, and the unique challenges of working on a graphic novel series like this. Sonia discusses getting a scene set at a convention just right and Barbara talks about how she makes sure she stays true to the characters' voices that have already been established in the first 2 books of the series. This is a wonderful conversation for fans of the series and fellow creators. Order The Curie Society: Game of Code Check out the other books in the series Follow Barbara on Bluesky Head to Sonia's website Follow Comic Book Yeti

I talk about Bride of Liao Manor and a number of other projects I am working on 

In Episode 53, Lisa interviews pianist, cross media artist, and music educator, Dr. Fang Ting Huang. Fang Ting creates immersive new-media installations and interactive musical experiences that integrate technology, arts, and music. Fang Ting reflects on her musical childhood in Taiwan, her studies in Europe, and her career as a cross media artist and musical collaborator. Responding to Fang-Ting's interview is Dr. Melody Liao, a professor of early childhood education, practitioner of Dalcroze Eurythmics, and advocate for early childhood music education. Melody shares insight from her exploratory music-making as a child in rural Taiwan and her current research on the use of loose parts in early childhood music spaces.Episode 53 Shownotes:Fang Ting Huang's YouTube channel Fang Ting's new video performance, Coco's Piano Diary Ep. 1Fang Ting Huang's new media performance of "On My Way”Fang Ting Huang's performance of Debussy's “L'isle Joyeuse” on location by the seaBehind-the-scenes video of filming “L'isle Joyeuse” on locationMelody Liao's webpage with more information on her researchPenn State Research-to-Practice Tip Page on Loose Parts & Early Childhood PlayResearch videos from Melody's research on loose parts: (1) Loose parts in in-between spaces, (2) loose parts musical play on a playground fenceMelody Liao's research on loose parts in early childhood education, “The Possibilities of the In-Between Space: A Case Study on Creating a Music Environment in a Preschool Setting”

If as many Asians drank wine as the average American, we'd have ~100,000 more wine drinkers. And if Asian restaurants had wine lists at the average rate, we'd have ~5,000 more restaurants with wine lists. This is one of the foundations of the Asian Wine Association of America (“AWAA”), whose mission includes bringing wine to Asian cultures, of which food is central. Part of bridging this divide is exploring Asian food and wine pairing. One of AWAA's board members, Sunny Liao, Co-founder and CEO, and Philippe Venghiattis, Operations Manager of Vinus Club, delve into their extensive experience pairing wine with Asian foods. Detailed Show Notes: Sunny's background: exposed to wine from 6, wine educator with Lady Penguin in China, Wine MBA, wine consultant for restaurants, board member of AWAAPhilippe's background: exposed to wine from 3, worked in wine auctions, then went to UC Davis and is a vineyard manager and winemaker as well as operations for Vinus ClubVinus Club is a wine club focused on introducing wine to Asian consumers, including a wine dinner seriesAsian food: texture is a big focus, meals often have a diverse assortment of food at once, often need more than 1 wine to pairWine w/ at least 5-6 years of age are more accessible to a wider array of flavors and spice vs the pure fruit of young wines, more complexity helps for pairingSpicy foods work well w/ wines w/ a denser mid-palate that buffer the alcoholPhilippe's first challenge with Asian food and wine was at UC Davis with spicy hot potEastern palates tend to be more sensitive to acid and more into texture (e.g. - the texture of Petite Sirah attractive to Eastern palates)Pairing suggestionsAged Alsatian whites (15-20 years old) work well, they have texture, complexity, and mid-palate to buffer the spiceSmargad Riesling w/ a few years of age pairs well w/ Singaporean foodBraised duck and BaroloFlor de Muga Blanco's aging process adds textureOrange and volcanic wines work for younger winesChampagne w/ a large amount of reserve wineJura wines a natural fit for a lot of categoriesNicolas Joly's Coulee de Serrant w/ ~15 years of age often pairs well, but also shows a lot of variationHardest pairings: Korean food; often has a hint of sweetness, hard to balance w/ wineIndian cuisine Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

A burly tractor rumbles across the vast snowfield, hauling two snaking lines of adventurers. Each is nestled in an inflatable snow tube, all roped together, gliding effortlessly through the howling wind and swirling snow with cries of delight.一辆粗壮的拖拉机在辽阔的雪原上轰鸣前行，牵引着两条蜿蜒的游客队伍。游客们各自坐在充气雪圈中，被绳索串联在一起，在呼啸的寒风和飞旋的雪花中轻快滑行，欢呼声此起彼伏。At the Jingpo Lake scenic area in Ning'an, Heilongjiang province, the sled takes them to the lake's frozen heart to witness the traditional winter ice fishing.在黑龙江省宁安市的镜泊湖景区，雪橇将游客带到冰封湖面的核心区域，近距离观赏传统的冬季冰上捕鱼活动。The fishermen chant and carefully lower a massive net into the icy depths. The climax comes when dozens of them work together to haul the net up, revealing a spectacular harvest of fish leaping onto the ice.渔民们一边高声吟唱，一边小心翼翼地将巨大的渔网放入冰冷的湖水深处。高潮时刻随之到来，数十人齐心协力将渔网拉出水面，成群活蹦乱跳的鱼跃上冰面，场面蔚为壮观。"The cold bites, but the excitement is so real," said Liao Xiaohan, a 32-year-old tourist from Chongqing, who's bundled up from head to toe against the approximately — 18 C cold, with frozen eyelashes.“寒冷刺骨，但兴奋感是真切的。”32岁的重庆游客廖晓涵说。当天气温约为零下18摄氏度，她从头到脚裹得严严实实，睫毛上甚至结了霜。"The picturesque view of Jingpo, a magnificent volcanic lava barrier lake featured in school textbooks, has captivated me and made me long to see it for myself."“镜泊湖如画的景色令人陶醉。作为一座曾出现在中小学课本中的壮丽火山熔岩堰塞湖，它让我心生向往，迫切想亲眼看看。”The city of Ning'an was historically a dreaded cold frontier and a harsh land of exile during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). It was called Ningguta during the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-1911). Its very name was once enough to make one tremble. Now, it draws visitors eager to delve into its poignant past, many of whom first heard of it through costume dramas.宁安市在历史上曾是清代（1644—1911年）令人闻之色变的寒冷边疆与流放之地。明清时期（1368—1911年），这里被称为“宁古塔”，仅其名号便足以令人心生畏惧。如今，这座城市吸引着渴望探寻其厚重历史的游客，其中不少人最初正是通过古装影视剧了解到这里。Growing up in the downtown area of Chongqing, where snow scarcely falls, Liao, like many people from China's warmer southern regions, said she always longs for the crisp chill and endless white expanse of a true northern winter.廖晓涵成长于几乎不下雪的重庆主城区。她表示，和许多来自中国南方温暖地区的人一样，自己始终向往北方冬季特有的凛冽寒意与一望无际的银白世界。In addition to traditional winter sports like skiing and skating, China's unique snow-based activities and immersive winter experiences are attracting domestic tourists such as Liao, as well as inbound tourists who benefit from China's facilitative visa-free policies and their expansion to more countries.除滑雪、滑冰等传统冬季运动外，中国独具特色的冰雪项目和沉浸式冬季体验，正吸引着廖晓涵这样的国内游客，同时也吸引了得益于中国便利化免签政策及其不断扩容的入境游客。During the ongoing ice and snow season, there is also a significant surge of inbound tourists to various winter destinations across China.在当前冰雪季期间，中国多地冬季旅游目的地迎来了入境游客数量的显著增长。Data from the General Administration of Sport of China showed that, in the first month of this year's ice and snow season, ski resorts across the country received a total of 35 million visitor trips, a year-on-year increase of 10 percent. The number of inbound visitors reached 190,000, marking a 66 percent increase compared with the same period last year.国家体育总局数据显示，今年冰雪季首月，全国滑雪场共接待游客3500万人次，同比增长10%。其中，入境游客达19万人次，同比增幅达66%。According to travel platform Trip.com Group's latest data, as of December, inbound bookings for ice and snow destinations have nearly doubled overall year-on-year. Among the most popular destinations, the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region saw an increase of 158 percent, while bookings for the Inner Mongolia autonomous region rose 141 percent and those for Hebei province were up 130 percent.据旅游平台携程集团最新数据显示，截至12月，冰雪目的地入境游订单整体同比接近翻倍。其中，新疆维吾尔自治区增幅达158%，内蒙古自治区增长141%，河北省增长130%。Booking data showed that the majority of inbound visitors came from Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Russia and Australia.预订数据显示，入境游客主要来自新加坡、马来西亚、泰国、韩国、俄罗斯和澳大利亚。Wu Liyun, a professor at Beijing International Studies University's China Academy of Culture and Tourism, said, "The popularity of Chinese winter destinations is extending to snow-scarce Southeast Asia, as well as to Russia, which is itself a winter destination.北京第二外国语学院中国文化和旅游产业研究院教授吴丽云表示：“中国冬季旅游目的地的热度正向缺乏降雪的东南亚地区延伸，同时也吸引了本身就是冬季旅游目的地的俄罗斯游客。”"For these inbound visitors, the draw is not just ice and snow, but also the diverse cultural experiences and festive activities in the winter setting," Wu said.吴丽云指出：“对这些入境游客而言，吸引力不仅在于冰雪本身，还包括冬季场景下丰富多样的文化体验和节庆活动。”According to Wang Xiaoxue, deputy head of the Mafengwo Tourism Research Institute in Beijing, popular winter destinations in northeastern China are upgrading their infrastructure and developing innovative offerings that blend ice and snow with live concerts, auroras, intangible cultural heritage, folk culture and travel photography.北京马蜂窝旅游研究院副院长王晓雪表示，中国东北地区的热门冬季旅游目的地正加快基础设施升级，并推出将冰雪与演唱会、极光、非物质文化遗产、民俗文化及旅拍相结合的创新产品。Wu added that Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang province, recently began offering direct chartered flights to more Southeast Asian countries, which has also increased visitor arrivals.吴丽云补充说，黑龙江省省会哈尔滨近日开通了通往更多东南亚国家的直航包机航线，也进一步带动了游客数量增长。wintry fun /ˈwɪntri fʌn/冰雪乐趣ice fishing /aɪs ˈfɪʃɪŋ/冰上捕鱼volcanic lava barrier lake /vɒlˈkænɪk ˈlɑːvə ˈbæriə leɪk/火山熔岩堰塞湖land of exile /lænd əv ˈeksaɪl/流放之地intangible cultural heritage /ɪnˈtændʒəbl ˈkʌltʃərəl ˈherɪtɪdʒ/非物质文化遗产

In this second half of our feature on Liao-era architecture, we'll uncover how the lesser-known Gaoyuan Temple and other Liao structures embody cultural continuity, meticulous craftsmanship, and the enduring legacy of China's architectural heritage.

In the first installment of what will be a two-part feature, we'll talk about how two very distinct Liao-era temples reveal the ingenuity, grandeur, and spiritual vision of ancient Chinese wooden architecture.

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Since the early days of Buddhism in China, monastics and laity alike have expressed a profound concern with the past. In voluminous historical works, they attempted to determine as precisely as possible the dates of events in the Buddha's life, seeking to iron out discrepancies in varying accounts and pinpoint when he delivered which sermons. Buddhist writers chronicled the history of the Dharma in China as well, compiling biographies of eminent monks and nuns and detailing the rise and decline in the religion's fortunes under various rulers. They searched for evidence of karma in the historical record and drew on prophecy to explain the past. John Kieschnick provides an innovative, expansive account of how Chinese Buddhists have sought to understand their history through a Buddhist lens. Exploring a series of themes in mainstream Buddhist historiographical works from the fifth to the twentieth century, he looks not so much for what they reveal about the people and events they describe as for what they tell us about their compilers' understanding of history. Kieschnick examines how Buddhist doctrines influenced the search for the underlying principles driving history, the significance of genealogy in Buddhist writing, and the transformation of Buddhist historiography in the twentieth century. This book casts new light on the intellectual history of Chinese Buddhism and on Buddhists' understanding of the past. As I say in the interview, Buddhist Historiography in China (Columbia University Press, 2022) is one of those that you hope exists out there somewhere, and are delighted when you find out it does! This book is highly recommended not only for those with a keen interest in Buddhism and Chinese history, but also those fascinated by questions of historiography and temporarily more broadly.  Lance Pursey is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Aberdeen where they work on the history and archaeology of the Liao dynasty. They are interested in questions of identity, and the complexities of working with different kinds of sources textually and materially. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Since the early days of Buddhism in China, monastics and laity alike have expressed a profound concern with the past. In voluminous historical works, they attempted to determine as precisely as possible the dates of events in the Buddha's life, seeking to iron out discrepancies in varying accounts and pinpoint when he delivered which sermons. Buddhist writers chronicled the history of the Dharma in China as well, compiling biographies of eminent monks and nuns and detailing the rise and decline in the religion's fortunes under various rulers. They searched for evidence of karma in the historical record and drew on prophecy to explain the past. John Kieschnick provides an innovative, expansive account of how Chinese Buddhists have sought to understand their history through a Buddhist lens. Exploring a series of themes in mainstream Buddhist historiographical works from the fifth to the twentieth century, he looks not so much for what they reveal about the people and events they describe as for what they tell us about their compilers' understanding of history. Kieschnick examines how Buddhist doctrines influenced the search for the underlying principles driving history, the significance of genealogy in Buddhist writing, and the transformation of Buddhist historiography in the twentieth century. This book casts new light on the intellectual history of Chinese Buddhism and on Buddhists' understanding of the past. As I say in the interview, Buddhist Historiography in China (Columbia University Press, 2022) is one of those that you hope exists out there somewhere, and are delighted when you find out it does! This book is highly recommended not only for those with a keen interest in Buddhism and Chinese history, but also those fascinated by questions of historiography and temporarily more broadly.  Lance Pursey is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Aberdeen where they work on the history and archaeology of the Liao dynasty. They are interested in questions of identity, and the complexities of working with different kinds of sources textually and materially. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Since the early days of Buddhism in China, monastics and laity alike have expressed a profound concern with the past. In voluminous historical works, they attempted to determine as precisely as possible the dates of events in the Buddha's life, seeking to iron out discrepancies in varying accounts and pinpoint when he delivered which sermons. Buddhist writers chronicled the history of the Dharma in China as well, compiling biographies of eminent monks and nuns and detailing the rise and decline in the religion's fortunes under various rulers. They searched for evidence of karma in the historical record and drew on prophecy to explain the past. John Kieschnick provides an innovative, expansive account of how Chinese Buddhists have sought to understand their history through a Buddhist lens. Exploring a series of themes in mainstream Buddhist historiographical works from the fifth to the twentieth century, he looks not so much for what they reveal about the people and events they describe as for what they tell us about their compilers' understanding of history. Kieschnick examines how Buddhist doctrines influenced the search for the underlying principles driving history, the significance of genealogy in Buddhist writing, and the transformation of Buddhist historiography in the twentieth century. This book casts new light on the intellectual history of Chinese Buddhism and on Buddhists' understanding of the past. As I say in the interview, Buddhist Historiography in China (Columbia University Press, 2022) is one of those that you hope exists out there somewhere, and are delighted when you find out it does! This book is highly recommended not only for those with a keen interest in Buddhism and Chinese history, but also those fascinated by questions of historiography and temporarily more broadly.  Lance Pursey is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Aberdeen where they work on the history and archaeology of the Liao dynasty. They are interested in questions of identity, and the complexities of working with different kinds of sources textually and materially. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

Since the early days of Buddhism in China, monastics and laity alike have expressed a profound concern with the past. In voluminous historical works, they attempted to determine as precisely as possible the dates of events in the Buddha's life, seeking to iron out discrepancies in varying accounts and pinpoint when he delivered which sermons. Buddhist writers chronicled the history of the Dharma in China as well, compiling biographies of eminent monks and nuns and detailing the rise and decline in the religion's fortunes under various rulers. They searched for evidence of karma in the historical record and drew on prophecy to explain the past. John Kieschnick provides an innovative, expansive account of how Chinese Buddhists have sought to understand their history through a Buddhist lens. Exploring a series of themes in mainstream Buddhist historiographical works from the fifth to the twentieth century, he looks not so much for what they reveal about the people and events they describe as for what they tell us about their compilers' understanding of history. Kieschnick examines how Buddhist doctrines influenced the search for the underlying principles driving history, the significance of genealogy in Buddhist writing, and the transformation of Buddhist historiography in the twentieth century. This book casts new light on the intellectual history of Chinese Buddhism and on Buddhists' understanding of the past. As I say in the interview, Buddhist Historiography in China (Columbia University Press, 2022) is one of those that you hope exists out there somewhere, and are delighted when you find out it does! This book is highly recommended not only for those with a keen interest in Buddhism and Chinese history, but also those fascinated by questions of historiography and temporarily more broadly.  Lance Pursey is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Aberdeen where they work on the history and archaeology of the Liao dynasty. They are interested in questions of identity, and the complexities of working with different kinds of sources textually and materially. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/buddhist-studies

Since the early days of Buddhism in China, monastics and laity alike have expressed a profound concern with the past. In voluminous historical works, they attempted to determine as precisely as possible the dates of events in the Buddha's life, seeking to iron out discrepancies in varying accounts and pinpoint when he delivered which sermons. Buddhist writers chronicled the history of the Dharma in China as well, compiling biographies of eminent monks and nuns and detailing the rise and decline in the religion's fortunes under various rulers. They searched for evidence of karma in the historical record and drew on prophecy to explain the past. John Kieschnick provides an innovative, expansive account of how Chinese Buddhists have sought to understand their history through a Buddhist lens. Exploring a series of themes in mainstream Buddhist historiographical works from the fifth to the twentieth century, he looks not so much for what they reveal about the people and events they describe as for what they tell us about their compilers' understanding of history. Kieschnick examines how Buddhist doctrines influenced the search for the underlying principles driving history, the significance of genealogy in Buddhist writing, and the transformation of Buddhist historiography in the twentieth century. This book casts new light on the intellectual history of Chinese Buddhism and on Buddhists' understanding of the past. As I say in the interview, Buddhist Historiography in China (Columbia University Press, 2022) is one of those that you hope exists out there somewhere, and are delighted when you find out it does! This book is highly recommended not only for those with a keen interest in Buddhism and Chinese history, but also those fascinated by questions of historiography and temporarily more broadly.  Lance Pursey is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Aberdeen where they work on the history and archaeology of the Liao dynasty. They are interested in questions of identity, and the complexities of working with different kinds of sources textually and materially. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/religion

Since the early days of Buddhism in China, monastics and laity alike have expressed a profound concern with the past. In voluminous historical works, they attempted to determine as precisely as possible the dates of events in the Buddha's life, seeking to iron out discrepancies in varying accounts and pinpoint when he delivered which sermons. Buddhist writers chronicled the history of the Dharma in China as well, compiling biographies of eminent monks and nuns and detailing the rise and decline in the religion's fortunes under various rulers. They searched for evidence of karma in the historical record and drew on prophecy to explain the past. John Kieschnick provides an innovative, expansive account of how Chinese Buddhists have sought to understand their history through a Buddhist lens. Exploring a series of themes in mainstream Buddhist historiographical works from the fifth to the twentieth century, he looks not so much for what they reveal about the people and events they describe as for what they tell us about their compilers' understanding of history. Kieschnick examines how Buddhist doctrines influenced the search for the underlying principles driving history, the significance of genealogy in Buddhist writing, and the transformation of Buddhist historiography in the twentieth century. This book casts new light on the intellectual history of Chinese Buddhism and on Buddhists' understanding of the past. As I say in the interview, Buddhist Historiography in China (Columbia University Press, 2022) is one of those that you hope exists out there somewhere, and are delighted when you find out it does! This book is highly recommended not only for those with a keen interest in Buddhism and Chinese history, but also those fascinated by questions of historiography and temporarily more broadly.  Lance Pursey is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Aberdeen where they work on the history and archaeology of the Liao dynasty. They are interested in questions of identity, and the complexities of working with different kinds of sources textually and materially.

大家好，我是大力丸，给各位听友报告个事，本人拙作《从前的古人生活慢》，历经波折终于上线当当，请大家多多关注。 没有发明出时光机之前，这本书绝对可以带您穿越回古代，治愈大家的精神内耗，古代 没有网络，没有手机，甚至没有电，为何古人的生活如此的丰富，精神世界那样的充裕，值得我们思考。 定价折扣后很便宜，不过一餐加料的螺蛳粉的钱，“当当”网或淘宝网，搜书名《古人的生活慢》，下单购买后，即刻开始一场沉浸式的穿越之旅，这个门票，值！

In a forthcoming article now available, our guest today, Professor Stephen Courtright, along with co-authors tackle the question of the “beauty bias and leader emergence”. Or to put that into plain English: how important is physical attractiveness to leadership? While pop psychology might tell us one thing, what does the evidence actually tell us and why should we care?About our guest…Stephen Courtright is Professor of Management & Flip and Susan Flippen Endowed Chair and Founding Director of the Flippen Leadership Institute at Texas A&M University.Stephen's research focuses on organizational leadership, teamwork, and work-family dynamics, and has been published in a range of academic journals and has earned many international awards and been featured by outlets such as The Wall Street Journal, NPR, Forbes, Fox News, and Harvard Business Review. The article discussed is available here:Courtright, S. H., Thurgood, G. R., Liao, H., Morgan, T. J., & Wang, J. (2025). The Beauty Bias and Leader Emergence: A Theoretical Integration, Extension, and Meta-Analysis. Journal of management, 01492063251330199.https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/01492063251330199You can follow Stephen's work and that of the Flippen Leadership Institute on LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/in/stephen-courtright-54776325/https://www.linkedin.com/company/flippen-leadership-institute/posts/?feedView=all Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The last time we spoke, Ishiwara had been spending considerable amounts of time with the Kwantung Army staff trying to figure out a way to push the envelope on seizing Manchuria. Ishiwara and his like minded colleagues had tried everything to persuade the Imperial Japanese army high command to initiate a course of action, but everytime the message was the same “wait, wait until next year, we can't do this at this time”. In 1931 Ishiwara and Itagaki organized the last major expedition into Northern Manchuria to get the newest recruited Kwantung officers up to speed and ready for plans they had been cooking up. Captain Nakamura Shintaro disappeared on the way back to Port Arthur. The Kwantung officers took the initiative, one could call it “Gekokujo / ruling from below” because without approval, in fact basically against the orders of high command they mobilized their forces outside their designated railway zone and headed for Mukden to quote “get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance”. When Tokyo HQ got a whiff of this they dispatched a telegram immediately demanding the Kwantung officers get their men back and not use the Nakamura incident as a way of “solving the Manchurian problem”   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. He doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . During the last hectic weeks, General Honjo Shigeru arrived to take command of the Kwantung Army and there is no solid evidence Ishiwara and his radical group had disclosed their plans to him. However when everything began to move into motion, Honjo agreed to Ishiwara's military solution for the Manchurian problem.   On september 18th of 1931, a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army upon the south manchurian railway tracks at Liutiaokou. There was an explosion and the Kwantung army immediately claimed it to be a Chinese plot and moved with skill and precision to overrun the Peitaying Barracks. General Honjo's first reaction was hesitation, but then he committed additional units to aid the radicals and upon seeing the chaos unfold, ordered the seizure of all of Mukden in the process. Investigators would find the actions of Honjo over the course of the next few days to be quite indecisive. At first he seemed to be attempting to localize the incident, but then, likely as a result of Ishiwara and Itagaki pressuring him, relented to ordering a general assault on all Chinese positions in the area. Thus what was a isolated incident, transformed into a major offensive, and that major offensive was largely directed by two of Honjo's subordinates, as you may guess Ishiwara and Itagaki.   Now after the bomb explosion, the next 10 days saw southern and central Manchuria suddenly under the control of the Kwantung army. Itagaki as a senior staff officer and full colonel, was technically Ishiwara's superior, but for the next 4 months it appears Ishiwara was the main driver behind the military actions. Itagaki was quote to say to a friend during the offensive “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's War”. And indeed, being so far from Tokyo HQ's control, it really was Ishiwara's war. Tokyo dispatched official orders on September the 19th opposing the offensive, despite a lot of sympathy for the cause amongst the high commanders. Ishiwara and Inagaki had been planning this for months, they were willing to risk it all, so they disobeyed and carried on. Ishiwara began by first coercing Honjo for reinforcements and freedom to take initiative, as he was quoted asking ‘to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”.   Now obviously Ishiwara and Itagaki wanted to expand the offensive through the officials means firstmost, but they definitely went around the officials channels as well. One devious method they employed was to create chaos for civilians in Manchurian cities, thus increasing the need for better security for Japanese residents. This would allow the Kwantung army troops to deploy past their set perimeters. Immediately after what is now called “the Mukden incident”, military agents were dispatched to Kirin to create some chaos within the city. Reports of incidents from Kirin began to poor into the Kwantung Army HQ alongside Ishiwara demanding Honjo dispatch forces to Kirin to protect Japanese residents there. He also advocated for demanding reinforcements from the Korea Army, but Honjo was unwilling to go that far. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.    The operation against Kirin was carried out in lightning fast speed. Ishiwara directed the bulk of the 2nd division led by General Tamon Jiro to rush over to Kirin by rail. They entered the city without firing a single shot and forced the local Chinese commander to proclaim the independence of the province from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours after this, the Korea army responded to a aid request sent out by the Kwantung Army staff on september 21st and began moving into Manchuria. Within only 48 hours the Japanese military had seized Kirin which lay outside the Kwantung operational zone and the Korea army was invading Manchuria without any approval from Tokyo, military discipline thus had been shattered.    Chief of staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to limit the scope of the Kwantung army's operations and entrusted discretionary authority to the field commanders for certain emergency situations, usually of a local nature. The Kirin expedition did not exactly fall within any of these boundaries. Bolstered by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki followed up the Kirin operation by pressing for an advance upon Harbin. As you might recall from the previous episode, the entire idea of taking Manchuria was built upon speed and precision. The Kwantung army had tiny forces compared to the immediate Chinese forces in Manchuria. However here they were blocked by directives sent from Tokyo HQ which forbade the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the south manchuria railway, up to this point they had limited their actions along those margins. Ishiwara attempted arguing something on more political lines. He argued Japan should aid Manchurian independence and sent the idea straight to Tokyo central HQ. In a sharp rebuff on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ affirmed its opposition to expanding the hostilities and rejected the political idea.   With the hard no from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals thought the only course of action was to cause even more chaos to force the issue. Ishiwara took the lead again, trying to toss Tokyo HQ off balance. Ishiwara personally went out on October the 8th, dressed in military pilot gear and slipped into one of five Chinese aircraft that had been seized at Mukdens airfield. He then personally led a raid, though later in life, such as at the Tokyo War crimes trials he would argue the flight was supposed to be just a reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. As he asserted, it was only at the last minute, some intelligence sprang up that anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou and thus the Kwantung army Commander had given permission to neutralize them if fired upon. Ishiwara stated that he and the 4 other aircraft accompanying him were fired upon and thus they dropped around 75 bombs on Chinchou, yes quite the course of events. As you might guess, more contemporary accounts would indicate this was a premeditated effort designed to freak out Tokyo.    The raid against Chinchou did indeed freak out Tokyo, the staff there began to fear the west would begin tossing condemnation upon them. Tokyo high command was in a bad spot. They felt obliged to back up the Kwantung army publically, by issuing post-facto approval of the many chaotic attacks, but internally they were livid. Major Endo Saburo of the intelligence division was sent to Manchuria to investigate the Chinchou situation. Saburo said upon asking Ishiwara what occurred, he responded that he had acted under the principle of field initiative and that was the reason why he never informed Tokyo in advance. Saburo also noted the manner in which he spoke to him indicated that Saburo alongside the intelligence division should mind their own business. Saburo also found out there were murmurs in Manchuria that if Tokyo high command did not get onboard, the Kwantung army was prepared to go it alone. It seemed the radical Kwantung officers would even go against the imperial japanese army command to get what they wanted. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire”.If you thought this was pretty nuts, a rumor also emerged that Ishiwara and Itagaki were going to use an independent Manchuria as a base to perform a coup d'etat against the Japanese government, to overthrow the capitalists strangling the people and to establish a national socialist regime built around the emperor. For those of you who know your 1930's Japanese government by assassination history, you know exactly what this rumor is about, a little something that will occur in 1936. Whether Ishiwara and Itagaki actually intended to do this is unknown, but they certainly put out the word.   On october 18th, war minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram over to the Kwantung army ordering them to cease any and all talk of making Manchuria independent or trying to take control of it. Alongside that, they sent operations section, Colonel Imamura Hitoshi to Manchuria to talk some sense into Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”.   And so despite the chaos and mania, the Kwantung Army had been restrained from pursuing any sustained military action through october. Ishiwara as you would imagine kept arguing they had to advance into northern manchuria. In early november Ishiwara got lucky again, finding a pretext in more destroyed railways. The rail bridges over the Nonni river south of Tsitsihar had allegedly been blown up by hostile Chinese forces. When Japanese engineer units showed up to repair the damaged tracks they were fired upon by Chinese forces. To the high officials in Tokyo it looked like a justifiable reason to take defensive measures. This was also being meet with Kwantung intelligence information being sent to Tokyo that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had provided some rather exaggerated reports to the Japanese public to manipulate their opinion through the press which in turn put pressure on Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern manchuria.   Tokyo authorized a defensive operation, limited to time and distance aimed at defending the Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung army forces began moving north and soon were engaged in heavy fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led men during this, it would actually be the only time in his military career to do so. General Honjo, rightfully feared the Kwantung forces were getting out of hand sent a cabled on November 5th announcing under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate”, the general staff was assuming direct command authority in Manchuria. As you can imagine Ishiwara and his like minded Kwantung officer colleagues were livid. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.    Facing yet another terrible situation publicly, the IJA high command allowed the Kwantung to advance upon Tsitsihar, but then uproar started abroad, forcing them to order the city evacuated. Ishiwara then began a huge argument amongst the staff stating the evacuation was unacceptable because of the sacrifices the forces had already made. But Honjo was standing firm. Then a few days later, Chinese forces began to assemble at Chinchou  and there had been some conflicts emerging between Japanese and chinese forces at Tientsin. Well Ishiwara immediately went to work demanding Honjo launch an offensive on Chinchou as a first step of linking their forces closer to Tientsin incase they were overwhelmed. To secure the advance, they also asked the Korea army to help out. Yet again Tokyo was tossed the hot potato. Tokyo high command ordered an immediate cease to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao river. The Kwantung army paused, not so much before of the order, but because the Korea army refused to participate in the offensive against Chinchou, and they were most definitely needed.    Ishiwara faced a dilemma, without the reinforcements the entire offensive might be doomed. And then fatefully, Premier Wakatsuki was outed on December 11th.War Minister Minami and Chief of staff Kanaya, both who tried to moderate the Kwantung army's offensives were replaced by Araki Sadao an aggressive leader of the Kodoha Faction, known in english as “the imperial way faction”. To explain a bit, within the Japanese military there were cliques, kind of like the warlords cliques in many ways. They fought to direct the future operations of the IJA and even IJN to an extent. There were two main ones that influenced the 1930's heavily, the Kodoha and Toseiha (control faction). The Kodoha were not an organized political party, nor did they have an official standing within the IJA, but they were certainly influential. Kodoha members tended to be younger officers in the IJA, particularly those in the Kwantung army. General Sadao Araki was a founder of the faction and they were heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism and the Kokutai. They sought a return to “the good old days” as one says. They say liberal democracy as a poison hurting Japan. They viewed the capitalists, industrialists and elites of Japan, ie the politicians, bureaucrats and Zaibatsu leaders to be responsible for ruining the once great nation. They wanted to see the Emperor take back full power, in what they would call a “showa restoration”. Their number one enemy, as was viewed by most of the Japanese military at this time, was the USSR and communism as a whole. Thus they were also by proxy in favor of the Hokushin-ron “northern strike policy” which was the Japanese theoretical war plan to invade the USSR. Now I don't want to go to far down the rabbit whole, but due note they were counter balanced by another faction known as the Toseiha faction, who were I guess to put it lightly, more moderate. The Toseiha were headed by Hideki Tojo famously and they opposed the Kodoha faction on a few grounds, one important one being, they did not want to cause a violent revolution to usher in the Emperor dominance. The Toseiha shared a lot of principles with the Kodoha, but they did not favor the Hokushin-ron strategy and instead adopted the Nanshin-ron strategy “southern strike” into southeast asia and the resource rich dutch east indies. It goes without saying the Toseiha faction enjoyed better relations with the IJN. So just to place this story within the political realm we are speaking, these two factions began to compete heavily for dominance 1931 onwards.   With Araki Sadao and some help from Prince Kan'in who was a Kodoha sympathizer things dramatically changed in Tokyo command. All of a sudden, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria became “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung army with Tokyo's full backing soon pursued all their military objectives, set out by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were seized in early January of 1932; Tsitsihar by February and by spring of 1932 Ishiwara argued to the staff they should complete the full seizure of Manchuria both north and south. In April that year he laid out “Manshu haiti heiryaku / the program for pacification of manchuria”. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol.   It goes without saying Ishiwara was central to the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and IJA overall had numerous options laid bare to them to solve the Manchurian problem, but Ishiwara's primary concern was total control over Manchuria for its resources, strategic position and to obtain a continental base for a war against America. To Ishiwara, taking all of Manchuria was necessary to prepare for the Final War. Without Ishiwara it is certain there would have been conflict in Manchuria between Japan and China, but would Japan have outright seized the province? Ishiwara spent years planning and pushing the envelope. When the plan was unleashed, it would turn out Ishiwara and his colleagues did not have a concrete timetable for conquest and lacked quite a few contingency plans. Despite the chaotic nature of it all, the conquest of Manchuria was a stunning success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”.   Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria affair started Japan on an inevitable course to fight the China War, which inturn led her to fight the west. It was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The entire affair also brings into question the subject of military discipline. Many look at the Gekokujo variable as an explanation as to how people like Ishiwara and Itagaki got away with all they did. You know, these militarist hardtype junior officers just ran amok, performed some rebellious acts defying their superiors, forcing their hands to become accomplices. Now don't get me wrong Gekokujo definitely played a hand, particularly when you look at Ishiwara. But it does not take away from the fact there simply was a high level of indiscipline within the Japanese army.   Ishiwara would have been 100% fully aware what his actions might result in, hell the guy before him, Colonel Komoto Daisaku is a great example. Ishiwara spent a long time with Komoto and saw the man's career broken as he was exiled for the Huanggutun incident. But Ishiwara was not only focus on Manchuria, he had a close eye on the political situation in Tokyo. Ishiwara knew the 1931 cabinet was crumbling, he knew certain high officials like Araki Sadao were in fast track position for promotions and their sympathies were with his cause. Ishiwara was betting, certain sympathizers such as Kodoha faction aligned ones would take seats of power necessary to help push his cause. His gamble more than paid off. All the main actors in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their accomplishments. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite 3rd class. More importantly he returned to Japan as a rockstar hero, the younger IJA officers were enthralled by him. Ironically Ishiwara had fostered indiscipline within the army more so, that when he went up the ladder becoming a member of the Tokyo staff it would bite him in the ass.   Manchukuo and racial harmony   Now Ishiwara's dream of taking control over Manchuria was almost purely a means to end end: ie to obtain resources and a strategic position to face America. Once Manchuria was under their control, Ishiwara directed his attention towards another goal aside from this, that of racial cooperation among the asian peoples. Manchukuo or rather Ishiwara's view of what it could be was a springboard of his vision for a East-Asian league, something that had a firm basis in his Final War theory. During Ishiwara's tour of duty in Manchuria in 1932, this Pan-Asian idea of what Manchukuo could be is what set him apart from many of his Kwantung Army colleagues, it also marked him to be very unorthodox within the IJA.    Manchukuo as many of you probably know, was a sham puppet state created to legitimize Japan's seizure of Manchuria. The Japanese high command simply sought to use the guise of an indigenous movement for independence to hide the fact the simply invaded a part of China and stole it. To do this they went as far as grabbing the last Qing emperor, Puyi and tossing him upon the throne of the new state of Manchukuo while they tossed up principles of racial harmony. For obvious reasons this was all done. You can't control a region full of a population that rightfully hates you without trying to win them over. Now what the Japanese did have going for them, was there did exist elements in Manchuria who sought independence. This was Manchuria, the heart of Nurhaci's Manchu people, don't get me started on what a Manchu exactly is by the way, listen to the fall and rise of China podcast for that. The Japanese had a lot to work with, it could be seen as a righteous Qing revival, or simply giving power back to the Manchu. There was also a large presence of Mongolians, and yes Inner Mongolia would come into all of this. Manchuria came into the nationalist fold late and not exactly willingly. Also the fear of the USSR was not something Japan had alone, Manchuria had struggled against the USSR for a very long time. There was also of course a large Japanese settler population in Manchuria who obviously welcomed the seizure. The Zhang Xueliang regime was not exactly too too friendly to the Japanese within the borders and a lot of discriminatory measure had been exacted upon them. When Zhang Xueliang had joined the Nationalists this had basically spelt doom upon them, at some point they knew they would be kicked out.   While the offensives were in full swing, Ishiwara and Itagaki met with other influential Kwantung Officers to figure out how they could exert control over Manchuria. Officer Katakura, chief of staff Miyake, Dohihara Kenji of the Mukden special service organ all met, looking over a previous plan created by Colonel Dohihara, for a multi racial autonomous nation of Manchuria. It was to be headed by the last Qing emperor, Puyi and needed to possess complete autonomy in internal matters, but its defense and foreign relations would be entrusted to Japan. Ishiwara drafted the plans by September 22nd and they were telegrammed to Tokyo on October 2nd. Tokyo high command disproved of the objectives, but nonetheless worked with the Kwantung army for 5 months on the creation of a new state based on two major principles: the so-called indigenous movement for Manchurian independence and the administrative planning for the Kwantung army to control it.    The Kwantung army went to work using the traditional structure of Manchuria, local self governing bodies. They bribed, persuaded and threatened as many as they could throughout 1931 carefully cultivating a local autonomy movement against the Kuomintang hardliners. One of the first things they created was “Jichi Shidobu self-government guidance board”, whose organ was responsible for coordinating various regional movements for independence to work with the Kwantung army to, in the words of Miyake “guide Manchuria to self-government”. The head of this board was appointed to the Mukden elder statesmen Yu Ch'ung-han, a man educated in Japan and previous advisor to Zhang Zuolin. His board would consist of 20 Japanese and 10 Manchurian members. Such organs were opened Japanese civilians in Manchuria and they flocked to them to support the so called multiracial political structure, because they could bend it to their own benefit.   The Kwantung army began tossing the slogans “racial harmony, racial equality and the righteous way” around heavily. The Kwantung army control over Manchuria was hashed out easily by establishing Japanese advisors over all organs who held ultimate veto authority, they would be appointed at all levels of government, thus everything was in reality Japanese controlled. Everything was going according to Ishiwara's vision….or was it? You would think so, and Ishiwara was definitely pushing all of this forward, but by 1933 he suddenly became a ferocious critic of the very beast he had helped create. 

Patrick and Ted break down a wild football weekend as Manchester United hand Liverpool a fourth straight loss. They discuss Amorim's direct tactics, Liverpool's strange midfield balance, and why both teams are flawed but intriguing. Then it's Manchester City and the “jazz” version of Erling Haaland, Arsenal's quiet dominance, and a deep dive into Serie A's ridiculous title race featuring Milan's defense, Roma's Gasparini reset, and Inter's early control. Plus: Championship betting, set-piece obsession, and Sean Dyche's unexpected Premier League comeback. Enjoy! Subscribe to our FREE newsletter: https://www.thetransferflow.com/subscribe Join Variance Betting: https://www.thetransferflow.com/upgrade Follow us on our Socials: YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCe1WTKOt7byrELQcGRSzu1Q X: https://x.com/TheTransferFlow Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/thetransferflow.bsky.social Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thetransferflow/ TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@transferflowpodcast Timestamps: 00:00 – Intro 01:13 – Crystal Palace chaos and Mateta's 11-shot performance 03:52 – Liverpool vs Manchester United 05:07 – Why United deserve more credit 06:48 – Liverpool's possession drop and loss of control 08:32 – Why Liverpool's structure feels off this season 10:20 – How unsettled teams struggle early in the year 12:49 – The chaos merchants: Bournemouth and Palace 13:15 – Why United's midfield still doesn't work 14:03 – Cunha's impact and late-game control 15:31 – United's attack looks better, defense still shaky 15:52 – What United's next fixtures might reveal 16:22 – Maguire's winning goal and set-piece detail 18:23 – Why set pieces are football's biggest edge 19:11 – Premier League's NFL-style coaching evolution 21:29 – Cross-sport learning and smarter coaching structures 22:43 – Arteta's development and how he learned to adapt 24:15 – Ange out at Forest, Dyche 26:11 – Brazilians, Wood, and Sean Dyche 26:43 – The logic behind hiring a survival specialist 27:11 – How long should clubs wait before firing a manager? 28:34 – Checking in on Manchester City and Haaland's “jazz football” 30:42 – Haaland's strange movements and finishing patterns 31:41 – City's attack, Arsenal's rise, and the title picture 32:39 – Arsenal's evolving system and player leaps 34:23 – Arteta's tactical flexibility and fullback freedom 35:43 – Arsenal's depth, structure, and defensive record 37:01 – Championship talk and betting update 39:11 – Why the Championship is Ted's favorite league to bet 40:53 – Coventry's dominance and historic numbers 42:32 – Serie A's title race: pure chaos and quality 43:53 – Allegri's Milan lead and Juve's collapse 44:59 – The messy brilliance of Serie A 2025 45:56 – Inter's dominance and Roma's Gasparini era 47:47 – Milan's defensive masterclass and Modric's influence 48:55 – Pulisic, Liao, and Milan's front-line balance 50:34 – De Bruyne's Napoli renaissance 50:56 – Inter still the favorites — but it's far from over 52:31 – Final thanks and upcoming content #manchesterunited #liverpool #manchestercity #premierleague #epl #seriea #acmilan #juventus #intermilan #seandyche #arneslot #pepguardiola #haaland #foryou #fyp #football #soccer

What happens when a group of friends gathering at Starbucks on Sundays to experiment with ChatGPT evolves into a global movement spanning more than 40 cities?That's the journey of Build Club, and its founder Annie Liao has some compelling insights about what it takes to actually make AI adoption work—not just in theory, but in practice.Annie, who recently raised over $1.7 million and relocated to San Francisco, has a front-row seat to how AI is reshaping work. From her early days in data science at Westpac to strategy consulting at BCG and venture capital, she's now solving what she calls the "AI adoption problem" that enterprises are struggling with worldwide.In this episode, you'll hear:Why Annie's "AI Champions" approach has been Build Club's most successful way of helping companies embrace AI How she struck partnership deals with big names like Nvidia and LovableAnnie's prediction we're all likely to have agents working overnight on our behalf and what that meansThe AI tools Annie uses in her daily workflow, andWhat makes San Francisco's AI ecosystem fundamentally different from Australia'sFrom her vantage point in the Bay Area, Annie shares what excites her most about seeing people use AI for the first time, why there might be too many no-code tools flooding the market, and the practical steps anyone can take to position themselves for what's coming next.Enjoy this episode with the indomitable Annie Liao. Useful links:Build Club websiteAnnie Liao on LinkedIn Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

BTS, BONUS CONTENT AND MORE! Only on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/c/TrashTuesdayPodcast Welcome to FALL babyyy. Dust off those flannels, get your UGGs on, and double-fist your pumpkin spiced matchas; Kat Bird and Leslie Liao are cozying up with us for peak autumn chaos! We’re talking t*ts, Vegas, and the undeniable fact that it’s officially Leonardo DiCaprio Autumn. Plus, a fall-themed spelling bee where “chrysanthemum” humbles us all. Strap in. We’re dancing on tables at Hakkasan. Happy Fall Sluggies! Thank you to out sponsors: Get 50% Off Monarch Money, the all-in-one financial tool at www.monarchmoney.com/trashtuesday Visit www.HomeChef.com/TRASHTUESDAY for FIFTY PERCENT OFF your first box and free dessert for life! *Listen to Esther's New Solo Pod!* https://www.esthersgrouptherapy.substack.com *Visit Ebb Ocean Club & Holiday Shop* https://www.ebboceanclub.com/ for Khalyla’s reef safe and biodegradable hair products! FOLLOW TRASH ON SOCIALS: Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/itstrashtuesday Tiktok: https://www.tiktok.com/@itstrashtuesday MORE ESTHER:TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@esthermonster Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/esthermonster/ MORE KHALYLA:Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/khalamityk/ Tigerbelly Podcast: https://www.youtube.com/@UCIyIoM_Nd8HtY19fuR_ov2A PRODUCTION:Guy Robinson: https://www.instagram.com/grobfps/ Arielle Jade (Editor): https://www.instagram.com/jade.rabbit.cce/ Elisa Hernandez Kohler: https://www.instagram.com/ellie.lianna/ Megan Clements: https://www.instagram.com/egggymeg/

Long Time No See: The Podcast is thrilled to welcome comedians Leslie Liao (Netflix's Verified Stand-Up, "Fixing Straight Men" on Don't Tell Comedy) and Logan Guntzelman (Just for Laughs Montreal Roastmaster's Invitational Final Four). Get ready for these immensely talented comedians to dive into candid conversations, exploring their careers, lives, and humorous opinionsThey tackle topics ranging from their earliest introductions to comedy, experiences with bombing on stage, and whimsical discussions about historical figures in stand-up to personal anecdotes about their voices and celebrity crushes. Tune in for unfiltered laughs, deep dives into personal experiences, and entertaining fictional scenarios.Listen to these two hilarious comics yak it up, and make sure to follow  Long Time No See: The Podcast!  wherever you get your podcasts. If you enjoy the show, please give us a review (especially on Apple Podcasts!) to keep the laughs coming!You can also check out Leslie Liao here and keep up with Logan Guntzelman here.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Learn these 5 quick insights in climate & clean energy, startup investment, AI tips, and mindfulness in leadership — straight from my newsletter. Join 20,000 who get it. https://entrepreneursforimpact.substack.com

John McAfee turned computer security into a fortune, then spent the rest of his life making increasingly questionable life choices. Whether he was running from murder charges, pumping crypto schemes, or tattooing ""WHACKD"" on his arm before his suspicious prison death, McAfee proved that sometimes the most dangerous virus is success itself.Jeff Hiller and Leslie Liao join Misha to get the download on John McAfee.Be the first to know about Wondery's newest podcasts, curated recommendations, and more! Sign up now at https://wondery.fm/wonderynewsletterListen to The Big Flop on the Wondery App or wherever you get your podcasts. You can listen early and ad-free on Wondery+. Join Wondery+ in the Wondery App, Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Start your free trial by visiting wondery.com/links/the-big-flop/ now.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Comedian Leslie Liao joins Anjelah this week to talk stand-up—and how sometimes looking ugly on stage actually makes them feel more confident in their sets. Leslie shares how she went from Hollywood mailrooms to Netflix HR, all before realizing her true calling—thanks to a comedy show so bad, she knew she could do it better. Now she's ride-or-die for the stage (you'll have to pry the mic from her cold, dead hands). She also gets into her love-hate relationship with journaling and shares how grateful she is for her family, her non-comedy friends, and her super hot Brazilian fiancé. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Kendrick Kumar. This is the episode that made Jameela feel more at home around fellow sociopaths. She welcomes comedians Leslie Liao (Netflix, Tonight Show) and Skyler Higley (Conan, the Oscars). Leslie proves the extent to which she will flip on her friends, and Skyler reveals how ill-equipped he is to handle a kiss.Please support the show by subscribing, reviewing and telling your friends about us. Share your own Wrong Turns with us by emailing a voice memo to PersonalDisasterStories@gmail.com.Jameela's Substack is A Low Desire To Please.Wrong Turns was created and produced by Jameela Jamil and Stewart Bailey. Thank you to our launch producer Eve Bishop, our editor Shannon Joy Rodgers, and consulting producer Colin Anderson. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Do you need hours at the gym for it to count? Nope! In today's episode, I'm breaking down exactly how much movement it really takes to support your health… according to science, not social media. Whether you're struggling to stay consistent or just want to know what the bare minimum is (and why it's enough), I've got you covered with today's episode. You'll learn: How much you have to workout for it to “count” If weekend-only workouts can still improve your health What the CDC and NHS say about minimum activity (and how to make it work for you) Simple mindset shifts that make it easier to stay on track (even when life gets busy) All the links: Liao, Dan‐Qing, et al. "Association of Accelerometer‐Derived Physical Activity Pattern With the Risks of All‐Cause, Cardiovascular Disease, and Cancer Death." Journal of the American Heart Association 14.8 (2025): e039225. Sinatra, Stephen T., et al. "Grounding–The universal anti-inflammatory remedy." biomedical journal 46.1 (2023): 11-16. CDC Physical Activity Basics NHS - Physical activity guidelines for adults aged 19 to 64 Want to make movement a habit (without guessing what to do)? Get your first 2 months inside the Movement Mavens® Video Vault for only $9 with code PODNERD www.aewellness.com/podcast - Show notes, links and more. Instagram @hollaformala TikTok @ aewellness Bodywork Starter Guide - learn the 6 places you need to roll right now for quick relief, plus the reason why what you've tried so far has only given you a temporary fix. Download the guide for free now at www.aewellness.com/bodywork 818-396-6501 is the Body Nerd Hotline - how do you build consistency and/or where are you getting stuck? Drop me a line and let me know your body nerd hacks - you might just hear your voice on a future episode!   Today's episode of The Body Nerd Show is brought to you by Movement Mavens™ Therapy Balls—the official mobility tool of the show and the best way to keep your body moving pain-free. Tight hips? Stiff back? Movement Mavens Therapy Balls are designed to mimic the feel of a massage therapist's hands, helping you release tension, improve flexibility, and move better—every single day. Because let's be real—foam rollers are meh, and tennis balls? Not even close. Get the best. Your body deserves it. And right now, you can save 25% on all therapy balls, kits, and workshops with code BODYNERD25. Shop now at www.aewellness.com/shop-now/

*Content Warning: anxiety, depression, mental illness, suicidal ideation, suicide, cyberbullying, cyberstalking, sextortion, and predatory internet grooming.Resources: National Alliance on Mental Illness: http://www.nami.orgSOSA — Safe from Online Sex Abuse: https://sosatogether.org/ Healthy Children – How to Make a Family Media Plan: https://www.healthychildren.org/English/family-life/Media/Pages/How-to-Make-a-Family-Media-Use-Plan.aspx Sources:Crushell, D. (2023, March 6). Park: Precise advertiser report - kids. YouTube Advertising Insights & Performance Blog. https://blog.precise.tv/blog/park_precise_advertiser_report_kids Proulx, M. (2023). Tiktok usage plateaus among us gen Z teens. Forrester. : https://bit.ly/4avWrZU Joseph, B. (2022, August). Cyberbullying (for parents) | nemours kidshealth. KidsHealth: https://kidshealth.org/en/parents/cyberbullying.prt-en.html Chou, H. G., & Edge, N. (2012). “They are happier and having better lives than I am”: The impact of using Facebook on perceptions of others lives. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 15 (2), 117-121: https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2011.0324Ho, S. S., Lee, E. W., & Liao, Y. (2016). Social network sites, friends, and celebrities: The Roles of Social Comparison and Celebrity Involvement in Adolescents' Body Image Dissatisfaction. Social Media Society, 2(3), 205630511666421: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2056305116664216 Office of the Surgeon General (OSG). (2023). Social Media and Youth Mental Health: The U.S. Surgeon General's Advisory [Internet]. Washington (DC): US Department of Health and Human Services. What Drives Mental Health and Well-Being Concerns: A Snapshot of the Scientific Evidence. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK594764/Yates, J. (2024, January 23). Violence on social media - the online fight for our children's attention. Youth Endowment Fund: https://youthendowmentfund.org.uk/reports/children-violence-and-vulnerability-2023/ Katella, K. (2024, June 17). How social media affects your teen's mental health: A parent's guide. Yale Medicine: https://ym.care/9hg Ivey-Stephenson, A. Z. (2020). Suicidal ideation and behaviors among high school students - youth risk behavior survey, United States, 2019. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/su/su6901a6.htm Connect with Dr Corey Emanuel: Dr. Corey Emanuel's website: http://coreyemanuel.com Dr. Corey Emanuel's Linktree: http://linktr.ee/coreyemanuel Dr. Corey Emanuel's Instagram: http://www.instagram.com/coreyemanuel Dr. Corey Emanuel's TikTok: http://www.tiktok.com/drcoreyemanuel Men Talking Shift: http://www.instagram.com/mentalkingshiftSocials to tag: @coreyemanuel on IG @mentalkingshift on IGFollow Something Was Wrong:Website: somethingwaswrong.com IG: instagram.com/somethingwaswrongpodcastTikTok: tiktok.com/@somethingwaswrongpodcast Follow Tiffany Reese:Website: tiffanyreese.me IG: instagram.com/lookieboo business@tiffanyreese.me The SWW theme Song is U Think U, by Glad Rags. The S21 cover art is by the Amazing Sara Stewart.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.