Podcasts about Harbin

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

Warning: SPOILERS! If you haven't read “The Murder of Roger Ackroyd,” do yourself a favor and stop here and read it. You'll thank us later.“Checkmate” (2022) is the first official adaptation of Agatha Christie's stories. Situ Yan is an idealistic lawyer and when behind-the-scenes machinations sets an assassin free (think “Murder on the Orient Express”), he's left holding the bag. His train trip to Harbin in Manchuria is eventful and after befriending the soldier Luo Shaochuan (think Hastings), they find themselves investigating murders, kidnappings, stolen dogs, and other crimes.“Checkmate” is a 24-episode telenovella that covers “Orient Express,” “The Murder of Roger Ackroyd” (the subject of today's livestream), “One, Two, Buckle My Shoe,” “Three Act Tragedy,” “The Nemean Lion,” “Curtain,” and more!Teresa Peschel, author of "Agatha Christie, She Watched" and the "International Agatha Christie, She Watched," hosts our livestream. Joining Teresa is her husband, technical adviser, and straight man, Bill Peschel. Together, they are Peschel Press, publisher of intriguing, intelligent, and idiosyncratic books (www.peschelpress.com).HOW TO SEE THIS MOVIE: Links: iQIYI website (login needed) https://www.iq.com/album/checkmate-2022-1vwjz1u3j1p?lang=en_usDVD versions for sale on eBay: https://www.ebay.com/sch/i.html?_nkw=checkmate+dvd+chinese+seriesPeschel Press: www.peschelpress.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/peschel_press/NEXT WEEK:We're jumping ahead to “The Seven Dials Mystery.” We're watching first the James Warwick version from 1981 and discussing it on 1/22/26. Then, on Jan. 29, we'll tackle the new Netflix adaptation.

Last time we spoke about The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow. Following the brutal 1938 capture of Wuhan, Japanese forces aimed to solidify their hold by launching an offensive against Chinese troops in the 5th War Zone, a rugged natural fortress in northern Hubei and southern Henan. Under General Yasuji Okamura, the 11th Army deployed three divisions and cavalry in a pincer assault starting May 1, 1939, targeting Suixian and Zaoyang to crush Nationalist resistance and secure flanks. Chinese commander Li Zongren, leveraging terrain like the Dabie and Tongbai Mountains, orchestrated defenses with over 200,000 troops, including Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group. By May 23, they recaptured Suixian and Zaoyang, forcing a Japanese withdrawal with heavy losses, over 13,000 Japanese casualties versus 25,000 Chinese, restoring pre-battle lines. Shifting south, Japan targeted Shantou in Guangdong to sever supply lines from Hong Kong. In a massive June 21 amphibious assault, the 21st Army overwhelmed thin Chinese defenses, capturing the port and Chao'an despite guerrilla resistance led by Zhang Fakui. Though losses mounted, Japan tightened its blockade, straining China's war effort amid ongoing attrition.   #188 From Changkufeng to Nomonhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Well hello again, and yes you all have probably guessed we are taking another detour. Do not worry I hope to shorten this one a bit more so than what became a sort of mini series on the battle of Changkufeng or Battle of Lake Khasan. What we are about to jump into is known in the west as the battle of khalkin Gol, by the Japanese the Nomohan incident. But first I need to sort of set the table up so to say. So back on August 10th, 1938 the Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement established a joint border commission tasked with redemarcating the disputed boundary between the Soviet Union and Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. However, this commission never achieved a mutually agreeable definition of the border in the contested area. In reality, the outcome was decided well before the group's inaugural meeting. Mere hours after the cease-fire took effect on the afternoon of August 11, General Grigory Shtern convened with a regimental commander from Japan's 19th Division to coordinate the disengagement of forces. With the conflict deemed "honorably" concluded, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters mandated the swift withdrawal of all Japanese troops to the west bank of the Tumen River. By the night of August 13, as the final Japanese soldier crossed the river, it effectively became the de facto border. Soviet forces promptly reoccupied Changkufeng Hill and the adjacent heights—a move that would carry unexpected and profound repercussions. Authoritative Japanese military analyses suggest that if negotiations in Moscow had dragged on for just one more day, the 19th Division would likely have been dislodged from Changkufeng and its surrounding elevations. Undoubtedly, General Shtern's infantry breathed a sigh of relief as the bloodshed ceased. Yet, one can't help but question why Moscow opted for a cease-fire at a juncture when Soviet troops were on the cusp of total battlefield triumph. Perhaps Kremlin leaders deemed it wiser to settle for a substantial gain, roughly three-quarters of their objectives, rather than risk everything. After all, Japan had mobilized threatening forces in eastern Manchuria, and the Imperial Army had a history of impulsive, unpredictable aggression. Moreover, amid the escalating crisis over Czechoslovakia, Moscow may have been wary of provoking a broader Asian conflict. Another theory posits that Soviet high command was misinformed about the ground situation. Reports of capturing a small segment of Changkufeng's crest might have been misinterpreted as control over the entire ridge, or an imminent full takeover before midnight on August 10. The unexpected phone call from Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to the Japanese embassy that night—proposing a one-kilometer Japanese retreat in exchange for a cease-fire along existing lines—hints at communication breakdowns between Shtern's headquarters and the Kremlin. Ironically, such lapses may have preserved Japanese military honor, allowing the 19th Division's evacuation through diplomacy rather than defeat. Both sides endured severe losses. Initial Japanese press reports claimed 158 killed and 740 wounded. However, the 19th Division's medical logs reveal a grimmer toll: 526 dead and 914 injured, totaling 1,440 casualties. The true figure may have climbed higher, possibly to 1,500–2,000. Following the armistice, the Soviet news agency TASS reported 236 Red Army fatalities and 611 wounded. Given Shtern's uphill assaults across open terrain against entrenched positions, these numbers seem understated. Attackers in such scenarios typically suffered two to three times the defenders' losses, suggesting Soviet casualties ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. This aligns with a Soviet Military Council investigation on August 31, 1938, which documented 408 killed and 2,807 wounded. Japanese estimates placed Soviet losses even higher, at 4,500–7,000. Not all victims perished in combat. Marshal Vasily Blyukher, a decorated Soviet commander, former warlord of the Far East, and Central Committee candidate, was summoned to Moscow in August 1938. Relieved of duty in September and arrested with his family in October, he faced charges of inadequate preparation against Japanese aggression and harboring "enemies of the people" within his ranks. On November 9, 1938, Blyukher died during interrogation a euphemism for torture-induced death.Other innocents suffered as well. In the wake of the fighting, Soviet authorities deported hundreds of thousands of Korean rice farmers from the Ussuri region to Kazakhstan, aiming to eradicate Korean settlements that Japanese spies had allegedly exploited. The Changkufeng clash indirectly hampered Japan's Wuhan offensive, a massive push to subdue China. The influx of troops and supplies for this campaign was briefly disrupted by the border flare-up. Notably, Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group, slated for Wuhan, was retained due to the Soviet threat. Chiang Kai-shek's drastic measure, breaching the Yellow River dikes to flood Japanese advance routes—further delayed the assault. By October 25, 1938, when Japanese forces captured Hankow, Chiang had relocated his capital to distant Chungking. Paradoxically, Wuhan's fall cut rail links from Canton inland, heightening Chiang's reliance on Soviet aid routed overland and by air from Central Asia. Japan secured a tactical win but missed the decisive blow; Chinese resistance persisted, pinning down a million Japanese troops in occupation duties. What was the true significance of Changkufeng? For General Koiso Suetaka and the 19th Division, it evoked a mix of bitterness and pride. Those eager for combat got their share, though not on their terms. To veterans mourning fallen comrades on those desolate slopes, it might have felt like senseless tragedy. Yet, they fought valiantly under dire conditions, holding firm until a retreat that blended humiliation with imperial praise, a bittersweet inheritance. For the Red Army, it marked a crucial trial of resolve amid Stalin's purges. While Shtern's forces didn't shine brilliantly, they acquitted themselves well in adversity. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow observed that any purge-related inefficiencies had been surmounted, praising the Red Army's valor, reliability, and equipment. His counterpart in China, Colonel Joseph Stilwell, put it bluntly: the Soviets "appeared to advantage," urging skeptics to rethink notions of a weakened Red Army. Yet, by World War II's eve, many British, French, German, and Japanese leaders still dismissed it as a "paper tiger." Soviet leaders appeared content, promoting Shtern to command the Transbaikal Military District and colonel general by 1940, while honoring "Heroes of Lake Khasan" with medals. In a fiery November 7, 1938, speech, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov warned that future incursions would prompt strikes deep into enemy territory. Tokyo's views diverged sharply. Many in the military and government saw it as a stain on Imperial Army prestige, especially Kwantung Army, humiliated on Manchukuo soil it swore to protect. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji Inada, however, framed it as a successful reconnaissance, confirming Soviet border defense without broader aggression, allowing the Wuhan push to proceed safely. Critics, including Major General Gun Hashimoto and historians, questioned this. They argued IGHQ lacked contingency plans for a massive Soviet response, especially with Wuhan preparations underway since June. One expert warned Japan had "played with fire," risking Manchuria and Korea if escalation occurred. Yet, Japanese commanders gleaned few lessons, downplaying Soviet materiel superiority and maintaining disdain for Red Army prowess. The 19th Division's stand against outnumbered odds reinforced this hubris, as did tolerance for local insubordination—attitudes that would prove costly. The Kremlin, conversely, learned Japan remained unpredictable despite its China quagmire. But for Emperor Hirohito's intervention, the conflict might have ballooned. Amid purges and the Czech crisis, Stalin likely viewed it as a reminder of eastern vulnerabilities, especially with Munich advancing German threats westward. Both sides toyed with peril. Moderation won in Tokyo, but Kwantung Army seethed. On August 11, Premier Fumimaro Konoye noted the need for caution. Kwantung, however, pushed for and secured control of the disputed salient from Chosen Army by October 8, 1938. Even winter's chill couldn't quench their vengeful fire, setting the stage for future confrontations. A quick look at the regional map reveals how Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic each jut into the other's territory like protruding salients. These bulges could be seen as aggressive thrusts into enemy land, yet they also risked encirclement and absorption by the opposing empire. A northward push from western Manchuria through Mongolia could sever the MPR and Soviet Far East from the USSR's heartland. Conversely, a pincer movement from Mongolia and the Soviet Maritime Province might envelop and isolate Manchukuo. This dynamic highlights the frontier's strategic volatility in the 1930s. One particularly tense sector was the broad Mongolian salient extending about 150 miles eastward into west-central Manchukuo. There, in mid-1939, Soviet-Japanese tensions erupted into major combat. Known to the Japanese as the Nomonhan Incident and to the Soviets and Mongolians as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, this clash dwarfed the earlier Changkufeng affair in scale, duration, and impact. Spanning four months and claiming 30,000 to 50,000 casualties, it amounted to a small undeclared war, the modern era's first limited conflict between great powers. The Mongolian salient features vast, semiarid plains of sandy grassland, gently rolling terrain dotted with sparse scrub pines and low shrubs. The climate is unforgivingly continental: May brings hot days and freezing nights, while July and August see daytime highs exceeding 38°C (100°F in American units), with cool evenings. Swarms of mosquitoes and massive horseflies necessitate netting in summer. Rainfall is scarce, but dense morning fogs are common in August. Come September, temperatures plummet, with heavy snows by October and midwinter lows dipping to –34°C. This blend of North African aridity and North Dakotan winters supports only sparse populations, mainly two related but distinct Mongol tribes. The Buriat (or Barga) Mongols migrated into the Nomonhan area from the northwest in the late 17th to early 18th centuries, likely fleeing Russian expansion after the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Organized by Manchu emperors between 1732 and 1735, they settled east of the river they called Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian for "river"), in lands that would later become Manchukuo. The Khalkha Mongols, named for the word meaning "barrier" or "shield," traditionally guarded the Mongol Empire's northern frontiers. Their territories lay west of the Buriats, in what would become the MPR. For centuries, these tribes herded livestock across sands, river crossings, and desert paths, largely oblivious to any formal borders. For hundreds of years, the line dividing the Mongolian salient from western Manchuria was a hazy administrative divide within the Qing Empire. In the 20th century, Russia's detachment of Outer Mongolia and Japan's seizure of Manchuria transformed this vague boundary into a frontline between rival powers. The Nomonhan Incident ignited over this contested border. Near the salient's northeastern edge, the river, called Khalkhin Gol by Mongols and Soviets, and Halha by Manchurians and Japanese, flows northwest into Lake Buir Nor. The core dispute: Was the river, as Japan asserted, the historic boundary between Manchukuo and the MPR? Soviet and MPR officials insisted the line ran parallel to and 10–12 miles east of the river, claiming the intervening strip. Japan cited no fewer than 18 maps, from Chinese and Japanese sources, to support the river as the border, a logical choice in such barren terrain, where it served as the sole natural divider. Yet, Soviets and Mongolians countered with evidence like a 1919 Chinese postal atlas and maps from Japanese and Manchukuoan agencies (1919–1934). Unbeknownst to combatants, in July 1939, China's military attaché in Moscow shared a 1934 General Staff map with his American counterpart, showing the border east of the river. Postwar Japanese studies of 18th-century Chinese records confirm that in 1734, the Qing emperor set a boundary between Buriat and Khalkha Mongols east of the river, passing through the hamlet of Nomonhan—as the Soviets claimed. However, Kwantung Army Headquarters dismissed this as non-binding, viewing it as an internal Qing affair without Russian involvement. Two former Kwantung Army officers offer a pragmatic explanation: From 1931 to 1935, when Soviet forces in the Far East were weak, Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities imposed the river as the de facto border, with MPR acquiescence. By the mid- to late 1930s, as Soviet strength grew, Japan refused to yield, while Mongolians and Soviets rejected the river line, sparking clashes. In 1935, Kwantung Army revised its maps to align with the river claim. From late that year, the Lake Buir Nor–Halha sector saw frequent skirmishes between Manchukuoan and MPR patrols. Until mid-1938, frontier defense in northwestern Manchukuo fell to the 8th Border Garrison Unit , based near Hailar. This 7,000-man force, spread thin, lacked mobility, training, and, in Kwantung Army's eyes, combat readiness. That summer, the newly formed 23rd Division, under Kwantung Army, took station at Hailar, absorbing the 8th BGU under its command, led by Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara. At 52, Komatsubara was a premier Russian specialist in the Imperial Army, with stints as military attaché in the USSR and head of Kwantung's Special Services Agency in Harbin. Standing 5'7" with a sturdy build, glasses, and a small mustache, he was detail-oriented, keeping meticulous diaries, writing lengthy letters, and composing poetry, though he lacked combat experience. Before departing Tokyo in July 1938, Komatsubara received briefings from Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations Section chief. Amid planning for Changkufeng, Inada urged calm on the Manchukuo-MPR border given China's ongoing campaigns. Guidelines: Ignore minor incidents, prioritize intelligence on Soviet forces east of Lake Baikal, and study operations against the Soviet Far East's western sector. Familiar with the region from his Harbin days, Komatsubara adopted a low-key approach. Neither impulsive nor aggressive, he kept the green 23rd Division near Hailar, delegating patrols to the 8th BGU. An autumn incident underscores his restraint. On November 1, 1938, an 8th BGU patrol was ambushed by MPR forces. Per Japanese accounts, the three-man team, led by a lieutenant, strayed too close to the border and was attacked 50 meters inside Manchukuo. The lieutenant escaped, but his men died. Komatsubara sent an infantry company to secure the site but forbade retaliation. He pursued body recovery diplomatically, protested to MPR and Soviet officials, and disciplined his officers: garrison leaders got five days' confinement for poor troop training, the lieutenant thirty days. Despite this caution, pressures at AGS and KwAHQ were mounting, poised to thrust the 23rd Division into fierce battle. Modern militaries routinely develop contingency plans against potential adversaries, and the mere existence of such strategies doesn't inherently signal aggressive intentions. That said, shifts in Japan's operational planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may have inadvertently fueled the Nomonhan Incident. From 1934 to 1938, Japanese war scenarios emphasized a massive surprise assault in the Ussuri River region, paired with defensive holding actions in northwestern Manchuria. However, between mid-1938 and early 1939, a clandestine joint task force from the Army General Staff  and Kwantung Army's Operations Departments crafted a bold new blueprint. This revised strategy proposed containing Soviet forces in the east and north while unleashing a full-scale offensive from Hailar, advancing west-northwest toward Chita and ultimately Lake Baikal. The goal: sever the Transbaikal Soviet Far East from the USSR's core. Dubbed Plan Eight-B, it gained Kwantung Army's endorsement in March 1939. Key architects—Colonels Takushiro Hattori and Masao Terada, along with Major Takeharu Shimanuki—were reassigned from AGS to Kwantung Army Headquarters to oversee implementation. The plan anticipated a five-year buildup before execution, with Hattori assuming the role of chief operations staff officer.  A map review exposes a glaring vulnerability in Plan Eight-B: the Japanese advance would leave its southern flank exposed to Soviet counterstrikes from the Mongolian salient. By spring 1939, KwAHQ likely began perceiving this protrusion as a strategic liability. Notably, at the outbreak of Nomonhan hostilities, no detailed operational contingencies for the area had been formalized. Concurrently, Japan initiated plans for a vital railroad linking Harlun Arshan to Hailar. While its direct tie to Plan Eight-B remains unclear, the route skirted perilously close to the Halha River, potentially heightening KwAHQ's focus on the disputed Mongolian salient. In early 1939, the 23rd Division intensified reconnaissance patrols near the river. Around this time, General Grigory Shtern, freshly appointed commander of Soviet Far Eastern forces, issued a public warning that Japan was gearing up for an assault on the Mongolian People's Republic. As Plan Eight-B took shape and railroad proposals advanced, KwAHQ issued a strikingly confrontational set of guidelines for frontier troops. These directives are often cited as a catalyst for the Nomonhan clash, forging a chain linking the 1937 Amur River incident, the 1938 Changkufeng debacle, and the 1939 conflict.Resentment had festered at KwAHQ over perceived AGS meddling during the Amur affair, which curtailed their command autonomy. This frustration intensified at Changkufeng, where General Kamezo Suetaka's 19th Division endured heavy losses, only for the contested Manchukuoan territory to be effectively ceded. Kwantung Army lobbied successfully to wrest oversight of the Changkufeng salient from Chosen Army. In November 1938, Major Masanobu Tsuji of KwAHQ's Operations Section was sent to survey the site. The audacious officer was dismayed: Soviet forces dominated the land from the disputed ridge to the Tumen River. Tsuji undertook several winter reconnaissance missions. His final outing in March 1939 involved leading 40 men to Changkufeng's base. With rifles slung non-threateningly, they ascended to within 200 yards of Soviet lines, formed a line, and urinated in unison, eliciting amused reactions from the enemy. They then picnicked with obentos and sake, sang army tunes, and left gifts of canned meat, chocolates, and whiskey. This theatrical stunt concealed Tsuji's real aim: covert photography proving Soviet fortifications encroached on Manchukuoan soil. Tsuji was a singular figure. Born of modest means, he embodied a modern samurai ethos, channeling a sharp intellect into a frail, often ailing body through feats of extraordinary daring. A creative tactician, he thrived in intelligence ops, political scheming, aerial scouting, planning, and frontline command—excelling across a tumultuous career. Yet, flaws marred his brilliance: narrow bigotry, virulent racism, and capacity for cruelty. Ever the ambitious outsider, Tsuji wielded outsized influence via gekokujo—Japan's tradition of subordinates steering policy from below. In 1939, he was a major, but his pivotal role at Nomonhan stemmed from this dynamic. Back in Hsinking after his Changkufeng escapade, Tsuji drafted a response plan: negotiate border "rectification" with the Soviets; if talks failed, launch an attack to expel intruders. Kwantung Army adopted it. Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Otozaburo Yano flew to Tokyo with Tsuji's photos, seeking AGS approval. There, he was rebuffed—Changkufeng was deemed settled, and minor violations should be overlooked amid Tokyo's aversion to Soviet conflict. Yano's plea that leniency would invite aggression was countered by notes on Europe's tensions restraining Moscow. Yano's return sparked outrage at KwAHQ, seen as AGS thwarting their imperial duty to safeguard Manchukuo. Fury peaked in the Operations Section, setting the stage for Tsuji's drafting of stringent new frontier guidelines: "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes." The core tenet: "If Soviet troops transgress the Manchukuoan frontiers, Kwantung Army will nip their ambitions in the bud by completely destroying them." Specific directives for local commanders included: "If the enemy crosses the frontiers … annihilate him without delay, employing strength carefully built up beforehand. To accomplish our mission, it is permissible to enter Soviet territory, or to trap or lure Soviet troops into Manchukuoan territory and allow them to remain there for some time… . Where boundary lines are not clearly defined, area defense commanders will, upon their own initiative, establish boundaries and indicate them to the forward elements… . In the event of an armed clash, fight until victory is won, regardless of relative strengths or of the location of the boundaries. If the enemy violates the borders, friendly units must challenge him courageously and endeavor to triumph in their zone of action without concerning themselves about the consequences, which will be the responsibility of higher headquarters." Major Tsuji Masanobu later justified the new guidelines by pointing to the "contradictory orders" that had hamstrung frontier commanders under the old rules. They were tasked with upholding Manchukuo's territorial integrity yet forbidden from actions that might spark conflict. This, Tsuji argued, bred hesitation, as officers feared repercussions for decisive responses to incursions. The updated directives aimed to alleviate this "anxiety," empowering local leaders to act boldly without personal liability. In truth, Tsuji's "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes" were more incendiary than conciliatory. They introduced provocative measures: authorizing commanders to unilaterally define unclear boundaries, enforce them with immediate force "shoot first, ask questions later", permit pursuits into enemy territory, and even encourage luring adversaries across the line. Such tactics flouted both government policy and official army doctrine, prioritizing escalation over restraint. The proposals sparked intense debate within Kwantung Army's Operations Section. Section chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and Colonel Masao Terada outranked Tsuji, as did Major Takeharu Shimanuki, all recent transfers from the Army General Staff. Tsuji, however, boasted longer tenure at Kwantung Army Headquarters since April 1936 and in Operations since November 1937, making him the de facto veteran. Hattori and Terada hesitated to challenge the assertive major, whose reputation for intellect, persuasion, and deep knowledge of Manchuria commanded respect. In a 1960 interview, Shimanuki recalled Tsuji's dominance in discussions, where his proactive ideas often swayed the group. Unified, the section forwarded Tsuji's plan to Kwantung Army Command. Commander Lieutenant General Kenkichi Ueda consulted Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai and Vice Chief General Otozaburo Yano, seasoned leaders who should have spotted the guidelines' volatility. Yet, lingering grudges from AGS "interference" in past incidents like the Amur River and Changkufeng clouded their judgment. Ueda, Isogai, and Tsuji shared history from the 1932 Shanghai Incident: Tsuji, then a captain, led a company in the 7th Regiment under Colonel Isogai, with Yano as staff officer and Ueda commanding the 9th Division. Tsuji was wounded there, forging bonds of camaraderie. This "clique," which grew to include Hattori, Terada, and Shimanuki, amplified Tsuji's influence. Despite Isogai's initial reservations as the group's moderate voice, the guidelines won approval. Ueda issued them as Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488 on April 25, 1939, during a division commanders' conference at KwAHQ. A routine copy reached AGS in Tokyo, but no formal reply came. Preoccupied with the China War and alliance talks with Germany, AGS may have overlooked border matters. Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations head, later noted basic acceptance of Order 1488, with an informal expectation—relayed to Hattori and Terada—of prior consultation on violations. KwAHQ dismissed this as another Tokyo intrusion on their autonomy. Some Japanese analysts contend a stern AGS rejection might have prevented Nomonhan's catastrophe, though quelling Kwantung's defiance could have required mass staff reassignments, a disruptive step AGS avoided. Tsuji countered that permitting forceful action at Changkufeng would have deterred Nomonhan altogether, underscoring the interconnectedness of these clashes while implicitly critiquing the 1939 battle's location. Undeniably, Order 1488's issuance on April 25 paved the way for conflict three weeks later. Japanese records confirm that Khalkha Mongols and MPR patrols routinely crossed the Halha River—viewed by them as internal territory, 10 miles from the true border. Such crossings passed uneventfully in March and April 1939. Post-Order 1488, however, 23rd Division commander General Michitaro Komatsubara responded aggressively, setting the stage for escalation. The Nomonhan Incident ignited with a border clash on May 11–12, 1939, that rapidly spiraled into a major conflict. Over a dozen "authoritative" accounts exist, varying in viewpoint, focus, and specifics. After cross-referencing these sources, a coherent timeline emerges. On the night of May 10–11, a 20-man Mongolian People's Republic border patrol crossed eastward over the Halha River (known as Khalkhin Gol to Mongols and Soviets). About 10 miles east, atop a 150-foot sandy hill, lay the tiny hamlet of Nomonhan, a cluster of crude huts housing a few Mongol families. Just south flowed the Holsten River, merging westward into the broader Halha. By morning on May 11, Manchukuoan forces spotted the MPR patrol north of the Holsten and west of Nomonhan. In the MPR/Soviet perspective, Nomonhan Hill marked the Mongolia-Manchuria border. To Manchukuoans and Japanese, it sat 10 miles inside Manchukuo, well east of the Halha. A 40-man Manchukuoan cavalry unit repelled the Mongolians back across the river, inflicting initial casualties on both sides—the Manchukuoans drawing first blood. The MPR patrol leader exaggerated the attackers as 200 strong. The next day, May 12, a 60-man MPR force under Major P. Chogdan evicted the Manchukuoans from the disputed zone, reestablishing positions between the Halha and Nomonhan. The Manchukuoans, in turn, reported facing 700 enemies. Sporadic skirmishes and maneuvering persisted through the week. On May 13, two days post-clash, the local Manchukuoan commander alerted General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division headquarters in Hailar. Simultaneously, Major Chogdan reported to Soviet military command in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital. What began as a Mongolian-Manchukuoan spat was poised to draw in Soviet and Japanese patrons. Attributing the May 10–11 violation hinges on border interpretations: both sides claimed the Halha-Nomonhan strip. Yet, most accounts concur that Manchukuoan forces initiated the fighting. Post-May 13 notifications to Moscow and Tokyo clarify the record thereafter. Midday on May 13, Komatsubara was leading a staff conference on the newly issued Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488—Major Tsuji Masanobu's aggressive border guidelines. Ironically, the first Nomonhan combat report arrived mid-discussion. Officers present recall Komatsubara deciding instantly to "destroy the invading Outer Mongolian forces" per Order 1488. That afternoon, he informed Kwantung Army Headquarters of the incident and his intent to eradicate the intruders, requesting air support and trucks. General Kenkichi Ueda, Kwantung commander, approved Komatsubara's "positive attitude," dispatching six scout planes, 40 fighters, 10 light bombers, two anti-aircraft batteries, and two motorized transport companies. Ueda added a caveat: exercise "extreme caution" to prevent escalation—a paradoxical blend of destruction and restraint, reflective of KwAHQ's fervent mood. Ueda relayed the details to Tokyo's Army General Staff, which responded that Kwantung should handle it "appropriately." Despite Kwantung's impulsive reputation, Tokyo deferred, perhaps trusting the northern strategic imbalance, eight Japanese divisions versus 30 Soviet ones from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, would enforce prudence. This faith proved misguided. On May 14, Major Tsuji flew from KwAHQ for aerial reconnaissance over Nomonhan, spotting 20 horses but no troops. Upon landing, a fresh bullet hole in his plane confirmed lingering MPR presence east of the Halha. Tsuji briefed 23rd Division staff and reported to Ueda that the incident seemed minor. Aligning with Order 1488's spirit, Komatsubara deployed a force under Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma: an armored car company, two infantry companies, and a cavalry troop. Arriving at Nomonhan on May 15, Azuma learned most MPR forces had retreated westward across the Halha the prior night, with only token elements remaining, and those withdrawing. Undeterred, he pursued. The advance met scant resistance, as foes had crossed the river. However, Japanese light bombers struck a small MPR concentration on the west bank, Outpost Number 7, killing two and wounding 15 per MPR reports; Japanese claimed 30–40 kills. All agree: the raid targeted undisputed MPR territory. Hearing of May 15's events, Komatsubara deemed the Mongolians sufficiently rebuked and recalled Azuma to Hailar on May 16. KwAHQ concurred, closing the matter. Soviet leaders, however, saw it differently. Mid-May prompted Soviet support for the MPR under their 1936 Mutual Defense Pact. The Red Army's 57th Corps, stationed in Mongolia, faced initial disarray: Commander Nikolai Feklenko was hunting, Chief of Staff A. M. Kushchev in Ulan Ude with his ill wife. Moscow learned of clashes via international press from Japanese sources, sparking Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov's furious inquiry. Feklenko and Kushchev rushed back to Ulaanbaatar, dispatching a mixed force—a battalion from the 149th Infantry Regiment (36th Division), plus light armor and artillery from the 11th Tank Brigade—to Tamsag Bulak, 80 miles west of the Halha. Led by Major A. E. Bykov, it bolstered the MPR's 6th Cavalry Division. Bykov and Cavalry Commander Colonel Shoaaiibuu inspected the site on May 15, post-Azum's departure. The cavalry arrived two days later, backed by Bykov (ordered to remain west of the river and avoid combat if possible). Some MPR troops recrossed, occupying the disputed zone. Clashes with Manchukuoan cavalry resumed and intensified. Notified of renewed hostilities, Komatsubara viewed it as defiance, a personal affront. Emboldened by Order 1488, he aimed not just to repel but to encircle and annihilate. The incident was on the verge of major expansion. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ghosts of the Changufeng incident have come back to haunt both the USSR and Japan. Those like Tsuji Masanobu instigated yet another border clash that would erupt into a full blown battle that would set a precedent for both nations until the very end of WW2. 

In this new episode of The Rumors Are True Podcast, host Jeremy Alan Gould sits down with Keller Harbin, best known for his work with The Chariot, The Glass Ocean, Holy + Gold, and New Rituals. Keller reflects on his early days in heavy music and the path that led him into some of the most intense and boundary-pushing projects in the scene. The conversation explores what it was like stepping into The Chariot during a pivotal era, the pressure and purpose behind that role, and how chaos, creativity, and conviction all collided onstage and off.The episode also dives into Keller's evolution beyond The Chariot, tracing his artistic journey through The Glass Ocean and into newer projects like Holy + Gold and New Rituals. Keller opens up about creative freedom, spiritual shifts, and how his relationship with music has changed over time. He shares thoughtful insight into redefining success, staying honest as an artist, and learning how to create from a healthier and more intentional place.Throughout the conversation, Keller offers vulnerability, perspective, and stories that longtime fans will deeply connect with, while giving newer listeners a clear picture of his growth and resilience as a musician. This episode is a powerful reflection on transformation, legacy, and continuing to create with purpose long after the noise fades.Produced by Wesley Hill @thebigwesArtwork by Jared Chase Bowser @jaredchasebowserMusic by Brian Jerin R.I.P.

A burly tractor rumbles across the vast snowfield, hauling two snaking lines of adventurers. Each is nestled in an inflatable snow tube, all roped together, gliding effortlessly through the howling wind and swirling snow with cries of delight.一辆粗壮的拖拉机在辽阔的雪原上轰鸣前行，牵引着两条蜿蜒的游客队伍。游客们各自坐在充气雪圈中，被绳索串联在一起，在呼啸的寒风和飞旋的雪花中轻快滑行，欢呼声此起彼伏。At the Jingpo Lake scenic area in Ning'an, Heilongjiang province, the sled takes them to the lake's frozen heart to witness the traditional winter ice fishing.在黑龙江省宁安市的镜泊湖景区，雪橇将游客带到冰封湖面的核心区域，近距离观赏传统的冬季冰上捕鱼活动。The fishermen chant and carefully lower a massive net into the icy depths. The climax comes when dozens of them work together to haul the net up, revealing a spectacular harvest of fish leaping onto the ice.渔民们一边高声吟唱，一边小心翼翼地将巨大的渔网放入冰冷的湖水深处。高潮时刻随之到来，数十人齐心协力将渔网拉出水面，成群活蹦乱跳的鱼跃上冰面，场面蔚为壮观。"The cold bites, but the excitement is so real," said Liao Xiaohan, a 32-year-old tourist from Chongqing, who's bundled up from head to toe against the approximately — 18 C cold, with frozen eyelashes.“寒冷刺骨，但兴奋感是真切的。”32岁的重庆游客廖晓涵说。当天气温约为零下18摄氏度，她从头到脚裹得严严实实，睫毛上甚至结了霜。"The picturesque view of Jingpo, a magnificent volcanic lava barrier lake featured in school textbooks, has captivated me and made me long to see it for myself."“镜泊湖如画的景色令人陶醉。作为一座曾出现在中小学课本中的壮丽火山熔岩堰塞湖，它让我心生向往，迫切想亲眼看看。”The city of Ning'an was historically a dreaded cold frontier and a harsh land of exile during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). It was called Ningguta during the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-1911). Its very name was once enough to make one tremble. Now, it draws visitors eager to delve into its poignant past, many of whom first heard of it through costume dramas.宁安市在历史上曾是清代（1644—1911年）令人闻之色变的寒冷边疆与流放之地。明清时期（1368—1911年），这里被称为“宁古塔”，仅其名号便足以令人心生畏惧。如今，这座城市吸引着渴望探寻其厚重历史的游客，其中不少人最初正是通过古装影视剧了解到这里。Growing up in the downtown area of Chongqing, where snow scarcely falls, Liao, like many people from China's warmer southern regions, said she always longs for the crisp chill and endless white expanse of a true northern winter.廖晓涵成长于几乎不下雪的重庆主城区。她表示，和许多来自中国南方温暖地区的人一样，自己始终向往北方冬季特有的凛冽寒意与一望无际的银白世界。In addition to traditional winter sports like skiing and skating, China's unique snow-based activities and immersive winter experiences are attracting domestic tourists such as Liao, as well as inbound tourists who benefit from China's facilitative visa-free policies and their expansion to more countries.除滑雪、滑冰等传统冬季运动外，中国独具特色的冰雪项目和沉浸式冬季体验，正吸引着廖晓涵这样的国内游客，同时也吸引了得益于中国便利化免签政策及其不断扩容的入境游客。During the ongoing ice and snow season, there is also a significant surge of inbound tourists to various winter destinations across China.在当前冰雪季期间，中国多地冬季旅游目的地迎来了入境游客数量的显著增长。Data from the General Administration of Sport of China showed that, in the first month of this year's ice and snow season, ski resorts across the country received a total of 35 million visitor trips, a year-on-year increase of 10 percent. The number of inbound visitors reached 190,000, marking a 66 percent increase compared with the same period last year.国家体育总局数据显示，今年冰雪季首月，全国滑雪场共接待游客3500万人次，同比增长10%。其中，入境游客达19万人次，同比增幅达66%。According to travel platform Trip.com Group's latest data, as of December, inbound bookings for ice and snow destinations have nearly doubled overall year-on-year. Among the most popular destinations, the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region saw an increase of 158 percent, while bookings for the Inner Mongolia autonomous region rose 141 percent and those for Hebei province were up 130 percent.据旅游平台携程集团最新数据显示，截至12月，冰雪目的地入境游订单整体同比接近翻倍。其中，新疆维吾尔自治区增幅达158%，内蒙古自治区增长141%，河北省增长130%。Booking data showed that the majority of inbound visitors came from Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Russia and Australia.预订数据显示，入境游客主要来自新加坡、马来西亚、泰国、韩国、俄罗斯和澳大利亚。Wu Liyun, a professor at Beijing International Studies University's China Academy of Culture and Tourism, said, "The popularity of Chinese winter destinations is extending to snow-scarce Southeast Asia, as well as to Russia, which is itself a winter destination.北京第二外国语学院中国文化和旅游产业研究院教授吴丽云表示：“中国冬季旅游目的地的热度正向缺乏降雪的东南亚地区延伸，同时也吸引了本身就是冬季旅游目的地的俄罗斯游客。”"For these inbound visitors, the draw is not just ice and snow, but also the diverse cultural experiences and festive activities in the winter setting," Wu said.吴丽云指出：“对这些入境游客而言，吸引力不仅在于冰雪本身，还包括冬季场景下丰富多样的文化体验和节庆活动。”According to Wang Xiaoxue, deputy head of the Mafengwo Tourism Research Institute in Beijing, popular winter destinations in northeastern China are upgrading their infrastructure and developing innovative offerings that blend ice and snow with live concerts, auroras, intangible cultural heritage, folk culture and travel photography.北京马蜂窝旅游研究院副院长王晓雪表示，中国东北地区的热门冬季旅游目的地正加快基础设施升级，并推出将冰雪与演唱会、极光、非物质文化遗产、民俗文化及旅拍相结合的创新产品。Wu added that Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang province, recently began offering direct chartered flights to more Southeast Asian countries, which has also increased visitor arrivals.吴丽云补充说，黑龙江省省会哈尔滨近日开通了通往更多东南亚国家的直航包机航线，也进一步带动了游客数量增长。wintry fun /ˈwɪntri fʌn/冰雪乐趣ice fishing /aɪs ˈfɪʃɪŋ/冰上捕鱼volcanic lava barrier lake /vɒlˈkænɪk ˈlɑːvə ˈbæriə leɪk/火山熔岩堰塞湖land of exile /lænd əv ˈeksaɪl/流放之地intangible cultural heritage /ɪnˈtændʒəbl ˈkʌltʃərəl ˈherɪtɪdʒ/非物质文化遗产

Près de quatre ans après que Vladimir Poutine a envoyé ses soldats en Ukraine, la nouvelle donne en Russie se précise et s'installe. Ascenseur social pour certains vétérans, la guerre fait aussi sentir ses effets sur les finances nationales et locales. C'est notamment le cas pour le budget 2026 de la région d'Irkoutsk, difficile à boucler. Au sommet d'une colline, une petite église aux bulbes dorés qui se découpent dans le ciel de neige. Un cercueil recouvert du drapeau russe franchit la sortie, pendant que le long du chemin, des femmes, chacune un drapeau à la main, l'escorte pour un hommage : c'est l'enterrement d'un soldat russe mort en Ukraine, annoncé dans la presse locale par le comité des mères de combattants. Quelques centaines de mètres plus bas, le long d'une voie rapide, un atelier de réparation de pneus. Entre les deux, en pente douce, une petite allée arborée, bordée de portraits de combattants décédés : on l'appelle ici « l'allée des héros ». « Je les connais presque tous personnellement », confie Artëm, lui-même vétéran de « l'opération spéciale ». « Il y en a un avec qui je me suis battu côte à côte. Il y en a qui étaient avec Wagner, et il y en a d'autres du ministère de la Défense. Leurs portraits ont été ajoutés à ceux morts au combat en Tchétchénie et en Afghanistan. » Artëm est le propriétaire d'un atelier de réparation, 20 mètres carrés à la sortie de Baïkalsk, une petite localité en déclin depuis une dizaine d'années et qui comptait 13 000 habitants au dernier décompte officiel de 2021. Une agglomération sur les rives du lac Baïkal dans laquelle « on ne trouve pas de travail décent », dit-il. Recruté par Evgueni Prigojine Entre les scies visseuses, marteaux, clous et pneus, Artëm accueille ses clients avec, dès l'entrée, le drapeau de Wagner déployé sur un pan de mur. « Certains posent des questions, d'autres ne reconnaissent même pas le drapeau ; pour eux, ce n'est qu'une image. Certains sont tout simplement trop loin de cette réalité. Pour moi, bien sûr, c'est le souvenir d'y avoir participé. Même si, avec le bout de métal que j'ai désormais à la place d'une partie du bras et de l'épaule, j'ai une mémoire pour toujours. » Artëm a été blessé lors de la bataille de Bakhmout en 2023, dans un bataillon d'assaut. « Certains clients m'embrassent et me félicitent », raconte-t-il, « mais ce n'est pas le cas de tout le monde. Beaucoup de gens, je dirais à peu près 50 %, se fichent de savoir qu'il y a une guerre qui se déroule en ce moment. » À écouter dans Grand reportageSyndrome afghan : le pouvoir russe face à ses vétérans de la guerre d'Ukraine  Quant au fait que le groupe paramilitaire fondé par Evgueni Prigojine ait été sanctionné par les États-Unis et l'Union européenne ainsi que d'autres pays pour — notamment — crimes de guerre et activités déstabilisatrices en Ukraine, en Syrie et en Afrique, peu importe en Russie, tant le groupe s'est banalisé et même parfois romantisé dans certains esprits. Artëm, lui, a choisi Wagner plutôt que l'armée régulière en juin 2023 « parce que ses hommes y ont leur propre loi ». Artëm dit aussi avoir été à l'époque « épuisé mentalement » par sept années passées derrière les barreaux, sept d'une peine de dix ans pour « consommation de drogue », affirme-t-il. Les prisons russes sont réputées pour leur implacable brutalité, et celles de la région d'Irkoutsk, très nombreuses, ont été secouées en 2021 par un scandale de tortures et d'abus tels que le comité d'enquête, organe qui répond directement au Kremlin, s'en était officiellement saisi. Combattre en Ukraine : « Une deuxième chance dans sa vie » pour un prisonnier Au printemps 2023, alors qu'Artëm est derrière les barreaux, une rumeur traverse la prison « comme une radio interne », dit-il : les recruteurs de Wagner arrivent. C'est Evgueni Prigojine lui-même qui se présente. Le dirigeant du groupe paramilitaire est précédé par un bus d'Omon, les forces anti-émeutes, pour garantir l'ordre, et est arrivé dans la cour de la prison en hélicoptère, une arrivée « spectaculaire » se rappelle Artëm. Ses souvenirs sont très précis. Il décrit Prigojine qu'il surnomme « Oncle Génia » au milieu des prisonniers en cercle, posant les conditions du contrat, « ne cachant rien des pour et des contre ». Précisant aussi que n'étaient pas concernés pour le recrutement « les condamnés pour viol et pédophilie », dit Artëm, qui ajoute : « les orphelins étaient prioritaires ». À lire aussiRussie: après les funérailles, l'amertume des partisans d'Evgueni Prigojine  À 33 ans à l'époque, Artëm avait de toute façon déjà pris sa décision. « Il me restait encore beaucoup de temps à passer en prison et je n'en pouvais plus. Et pour moi, signer, c'était une deuxième chance, une chance de réparer ma vie, et il fallait la prendre. Quand on a traversé la guerre, on recommence sa vie à zéro, on est gracié par décret du président de la Fédération de Russie. On a un document officiel signé par Vladimir Poutine lui-même, qui dit qu'on est pardonné pour héroïsme et pour bravoure. C'est quelque chose qui encourage à signer. » Sorti de prison au terme de sa peine, Artëm sait qu'il aurait été en difficulté dans une société russe sans concessions pour les anciens « taulards ». Aujourd'hui, avec la somme généreuse que lui a versée Wagner pendant la guerre, Artëm a investi dans un commerce rentable. Il a aussi désormais un statut symbolique dans la société, tant les combattants sont glorifiés et présentés par le pouvoir comme des modèles à suivre, et rencontre régulièrement des gradés au sein de la société locale des vétérans. À lire aussiL'armée russe recrute aussi à la télévision  À 38 ans aujourd'hui, Alexander a lui signé à l'automne 2023 pour deux ans pour le ministère de la Défense. Sans prévenir sa famille ni ses amis, leur envoyant une simple photo de lui en uniforme. Pourquoi s'engager ? « C'est une question difficile », répond-il. Avant d'avancer que c'est la décision d'« un homme, un vrai ». C'est d'ailleurs un motif d'engagement régulièrement mis en avant par le ministère russe de la Défense dans ses spots de campagne de recrutement. Alexander affirme aussi avoir voulu « voir ce qu'était la guerre ». Il refuse de parler de ce qu'il a fait et vu, « vous ne comprendriez rien », dit-il d'un air de défi ; et ne dit pas un mot de la blessure qui lui a valu de longs mois d'hospitalisation et une démobilisation au bout d'un an et demi. Avant de s'engager, cet ancien commandant d'une unité d'assaut dirigeait une entreprise de bâtiment de taille moyenne. De retour d'un long séjour à l'hôpital après les combats, avec essentiellement l'argent de son contrat et les indemnités pour blessure, il a construit puis ouvert en décembre un restaurant de grillades, « un rêve qu'il avait depuis plusieurs années » Quant au terrain pour le construire, Alexander a fait valoir ses droits auprès de l'administration locale : un décret de Vladimir Poutine accorde gratuitement un terrain à tous ceux décorés, comme lui, de l'ordre du Courage. Il est normalement dédié à la construction de la résidence principale, mais, dit Alexander avec un sourire en coin, « avec moi, l'administration locale regarde ailleurs ». La valeur du terrain est estimée à 1,5 million de roubles, presque 20 000 euros au cours actuel. Une somme particulièrement difficile à emprunter dans une Russie où le taux directeur de la Banque centrale est à 16%. La région ne se contente pas d'appliquer les décisions du pouvoir central. Par décret régional signé le 30 décembre dernier, elle a augmenté la prime de signature d'un contrat pour aller se battre en Ukraine aux volontaires résidant dans la région à 1,4 million de roubles (près de 17 000 euros au cours actuel), allant jusqu'à 2,4 millions (près de 30 000 euros) si le contrat est signé entre le 1ᵉʳ et le 31 janvier. Nombreuses prisons et tradition militaire, double vivier de recrutement Soldats de métier, mobilisés ou volontaires, dans la région d'Irkoutsk, ils sont nombreux à être partis pour l'Ukraine, mais les chiffres précis sont inconnus : ils sont classés secret défense. Les indices d'un large engagement sont cependant nombreux. « Dans presque chaque famille, il y a des gens qui connaissent quelqu'un lié d'une manière ou d'une autre à la guerre. Ou ils ont des amis qui se sont battus, qui sont en quelque sorte impliqués », explique Alexey Petrov, historien local, désigné agent de l'étranger en 2021. « Et parce que beaucoup de Sibériens se battent là-bas [en Ukraine, NDLR], Irkoutsk se classe parmi les plus gros contributeurs régionaux en termes de montant d'argent collecté pour la guerre, mais aussi en termes d'aide directe aux soldats, sans doute la première sur les dix régions de Sibérie. Toutes les organisations et fondations qui y sont liées sont très actives ici, envoient constamment de l'aide, des cadeaux pour la nouvelle année, des cartes, toutes sortes de choses ». Les nombreuses prisons, vivier de recrutement, y sont évidemment pour quelque chose — deux ont déjà été fermées en presque quatre ans de conflit, et il en reste 21. L'argent, évidemment, aussi : « Hier, vous étiez conducteur de tracteur, et aujourd'hui, vous êtes conducteur de camion sur le front. Et vous gagnerez cinq fois plus », dit Alexey Petrov. Mais l'histoire régionale joue aussi un rôle décisif, explique-t-il, et elle prend ses racines sous l'Union soviétique : « Irkoutsk était le centre du district militaire sibérien jusqu'en 1953, date de la mort de Staline. Toutes les troupes stationnées sur le front de l'Est ont été formées ici. Le défilé de la Victoire de 1945 dans la ville chinoise de Harbin [défilé militaire solennel de troupes de l'Armée rouge soviétique le 16 septembre 1945, NDLR] était dirigé par le général Beloborodov, originaire d'Irkoutsk. Jusqu'à sa fermeture en 2011, nous avions une très grande école, l'École d'aviation militaire d'Irkoutsk. Et il y a des dizaines de milliers de soldats qui se sont toujours entraînés ici. » Rare alerte budgétaire L'attaque de drones ukrainiens le 1er juin dernier, à plus de 4 000 kilomètres de la ligne de front, a, elle, marqué les esprits. Kiev a affirmé avoir visé la base aérienne stratégique de Belaïa, à une quinzaine de kilomètres d'Irkoutsk, une cible non confirmée par la Russie. Le gouverneur de la région a évoqué une unité militaire stationnée dans un village. Mais ce dont on parle le plus facilement à Irkoutsk cet hiver, c'est de la hausse des prix, manifeste partout en Russie. Le budget 2025 de la région, qui a été si difficile à boucler, a aussi suscité des réactions. Selon le journal Védomosti, daté du 25 novembre dernier, les plus larges déficits régionaux en valeur absolue sur les 89 régions que compte le territoire national concernaient deux régions de Sibérie : celle de Kemerovo (-43.9 milliards de roubles) et Irkoutsk (-41.1 milliards de roubles). À lire aussiLe charbon russe connaît sa pire crise depuis trente ans  Kemerovo, au sud, est une région industrielle réputée pour être en crise depuis deux ans, car elle dépend d'une filière charbon qui ne trouve plus de débouchés. Pour expliquer les difficultés de celle d'Irkoutsk, Nadejda Grosheva, docteur en économie, directeur de la Baikal International Business School de l'université d'État d'Irkoutsk, et membre du Conseil stratégique de la région d'Irkoutsk, avance par exemple qu'en Russie, les entreprises paient leurs impôts sur le lieu de leur siège. « Si vous avez une société enregistrée à Moscou, l'impôt sur les bénéfices est payé à Moscou. Ils sont tous intégrés verticalement. » De nombreuses grandes entreprises comme Gazprom ou Rosneft opèrent en effet dans la région. Chute libre des investissements dans les infrastructures Face à la grogne suscitée par certains paiements publics en retard cet automne et au début de l'hiver, et notamment le salaire des professeurs, le gouverneur Igor Kobzev, lui, a notamment expliqué dans la presse locale la baisse des recettes de cette manière : « Des signes avant-coureurs sont apparus en 2024, car nous sommes une région tournée vers l'exportation avec des produits à forte valeur ajoutée qui représentent la part du lion du budget. » Derrière cet euphémisme, cette réalité : le budget de la région est fortement dépendant des impôts des entreprises des secteurs de l'aluminium, du diamant et du gaz, des secteurs tous sous sanctions occidentales depuis la guerre en Ukraine. Autrement dit : si le budget de la région souffre, c'est que les recettes de ces entreprises ont baissé. La région dispose bien d'un gisement de gaz, le gisement de Kavytkinskoye, qui doit être exploité pour le gazoduc « Force de Sibérie 2 », pour fournir la Chine. Mais le projet tarde toujours à se concrétiser. De quoi faire monter dans une partie de la population une question sensible sur le contrat social et la répartition des efforts. Dimitri et Oleg, deux habitants de la région qui ont demandé à rester anonymes, ont effleuré ce sujet tabou au micro de RFI. « Il y a un déséquilibre qui est en train d'apparaître au sein de la population », a avancé Oleg. « Parce que, si on compare de manière relative, les participants à l'opération spéciale reçoivent beaucoup d'argent, tandis que les travailleurs du secteur public reçoivent des kopecks. Et ce déséquilibre n'apporte rien de bon ».  Dimitri a tiqué et avancé : « Combattre est un métier dangereux. C'est pour ça qu'il est si bien payé. » Oleg s'est contenté de répondre : « Je comprends pourquoi ceux qui sont à l'opération spéciale gagnent beaucoup d'argent. Je dis juste que ceux qui sont restés ici, ceux qui élèvent de jeunes enfants notamment, ne reçoivent pas beaucoup d'argent. C'est un déséquilibre qui est en train de naître, je n'ai rien de plus à dire. » Fin de l'échange. On n'est jamais trop prudents. Le gouverneur a promis de ne pas couper dans les dépenses sociales, mais la région a dû prendre un prêt pour boucler son budget 2025. Il a aussi annoncé un grand coup de frein pour l'investissement dans les infrastructures. En 2026, les financements passeront dans ce domaine de 18 milliards de roubles en 2025 à 4,3 milliards. Et encore, ce montant sera dépensé essentiellement dans les projets éligibles à un cofinancement fédéral. Tous les autres projets de construction et de réparation seront suspendus ou mis en sommeil. Cela concerne notamment les écoles et les centres sportifs.

Près de quatre ans après que Vladimir Poutine a envoyé ses soldats en Ukraine, la nouvelle donne en Russie se précise et s'installe. Ascenseur social pour certains vétérans, la guerre fait aussi sentir ses effets sur les finances nationales et locales. C'est notamment le cas pour le budget 2026 de la région d'Irkoutsk, difficile à boucler. Au sommet d'une colline, une petite église aux bulbes dorés qui se découpent dans le ciel de neige. Un cercueil recouvert du drapeau russe franchit la sortie, pendant que le long du chemin, des femmes, chacune un drapeau à la main, l'escorte pour un hommage : c'est l'enterrement d'un soldat russe mort en Ukraine, annoncé dans la presse locale par le comité des mères de combattants. Quelques centaines de mètres plus bas, le long d'une voie rapide, un atelier de réparation de pneus. Entre les deux, en pente douce, une petite allée arborée, bordée de portraits de combattants décédés : on l'appelle ici « l'allée des héros ». « Je les connais presque tous personnellement », confie Artëm, lui-même vétéran de « l'opération spéciale ». « Il y en a un avec qui je me suis battu côte à côte. Il y en a qui étaient avec Wagner, et il y en a d'autres du ministère de la Défense. Leurs portraits ont été ajoutés à ceux morts au combat en Tchétchénie et en Afghanistan. » Artëm est le propriétaire d'un atelier de réparation, 20 mètres carrés à la sortie de Baïkalsk, une petite localité en déclin depuis une dizaine d'années et qui comptait 13 000 habitants au dernier décompte officiel de 2021. Une agglomération sur les rives du lac Baïkal dans laquelle « on ne trouve pas de travail décent », dit-il. Recruté par Evgueni Prigojine Entre les scies visseuses, marteaux, clous et pneus, Artëm accueille ses clients avec, dès l'entrée, le drapeau de Wagner déployé sur un pan de mur. « Certains posent des questions, d'autres ne reconnaissent même pas le drapeau ; pour eux, ce n'est qu'une image. Certains sont tout simplement trop loin de cette réalité. Pour moi, bien sûr, c'est le souvenir d'y avoir participé. Même si, avec le bout de métal que j'ai désormais à la place d'une partie du bras et de l'épaule, j'ai une mémoire pour toujours. » Artëm a été blessé lors de la bataille de Bakhmout en 2023, dans un bataillon d'assaut. « Certains clients m'embrassent et me félicitent », raconte-t-il, « mais ce n'est pas le cas de tout le monde. Beaucoup de gens, je dirais à peu près 50 %, se fichent de savoir qu'il y a une guerre qui se déroule en ce moment. » À écouter dans Grand reportageSyndrome afghan : le pouvoir russe face à ses vétérans de la guerre d'Ukraine  Quant au fait que le groupe paramilitaire fondé par Evgueni Prigojine ait été sanctionné par les États-Unis et l'Union européenne ainsi que d'autres pays pour — notamment — crimes de guerre et activités déstabilisatrices en Ukraine, en Syrie et en Afrique, peu importe en Russie, tant le groupe s'est banalisé et même parfois romantisé dans certains esprits. Artëm, lui, a choisi Wagner plutôt que l'armée régulière en juin 2023 « parce que ses hommes y ont leur propre loi ». Artëm dit aussi avoir été à l'époque « épuisé mentalement » par sept années passées derrière les barreaux, sept d'une peine de dix ans pour « consommation de drogue », affirme-t-il. Les prisons russes sont réputées pour leur implacable brutalité, et celles de la région d'Irkoutsk, très nombreuses, ont été secouées en 2021 par un scandale de tortures et d'abus tels que le comité d'enquête, organe qui répond directement au Kremlin, s'en était officiellement saisi. Combattre en Ukraine : « Une deuxième chance dans sa vie » pour un prisonnier Au printemps 2023, alors qu'Artëm est derrière les barreaux, une rumeur traverse la prison « comme une radio interne », dit-il : les recruteurs de Wagner arrivent. C'est Evgueni Prigojine lui-même qui se présente. Le dirigeant du groupe paramilitaire est précédé par un bus d'Omon, les forces anti-émeutes, pour garantir l'ordre, et est arrivé dans la cour de la prison en hélicoptère, une arrivée « spectaculaire » se rappelle Artëm. Ses souvenirs sont très précis. Il décrit Prigojine qu'il surnomme « Oncle Génia » au milieu des prisonniers en cercle, posant les conditions du contrat, « ne cachant rien des pour et des contre ». Précisant aussi que n'étaient pas concernés pour le recrutement « les condamnés pour viol et pédophilie », dit Artëm, qui ajoute : « les orphelins étaient prioritaires ». À lire aussiRussie: après les funérailles, l'amertume des partisans d'Evgueni Prigojine  À 33 ans à l'époque, Artëm avait de toute façon déjà pris sa décision. « Il me restait encore beaucoup de temps à passer en prison et je n'en pouvais plus. Et pour moi, signer, c'était une deuxième chance, une chance de réparer ma vie, et il fallait la prendre. Quand on a traversé la guerre, on recommence sa vie à zéro, on est gracié par décret du président de la Fédération de Russie. On a un document officiel signé par Vladimir Poutine lui-même, qui dit qu'on est pardonné pour héroïsme et pour bravoure. C'est quelque chose qui encourage à signer. » Sorti de prison au terme de sa peine, Artëm sait qu'il aurait été en difficulté dans une société russe sans concessions pour les anciens « taulards ». Aujourd'hui, avec la somme généreuse que lui a versée Wagner pendant la guerre, Artëm a investi dans un commerce rentable. Il a aussi désormais un statut symbolique dans la société, tant les combattants sont glorifiés et présentés par le pouvoir comme des modèles à suivre, et rencontre régulièrement des gradés au sein de la société locale des vétérans. À lire aussiL'armée russe recrute aussi à la télévision  À 38 ans aujourd'hui, Alexander a lui signé à l'automne 2023 pour deux ans pour le ministère de la Défense. Sans prévenir sa famille ni ses amis, leur envoyant une simple photo de lui en uniforme. Pourquoi s'engager ? « C'est une question difficile », répond-il. Avant d'avancer que c'est la décision d'« un homme, un vrai ». C'est d'ailleurs un motif d'engagement régulièrement mis en avant par le ministère russe de la Défense dans ses spots de campagne de recrutement. Alexander affirme aussi avoir voulu « voir ce qu'était la guerre ». Il refuse de parler de ce qu'il a fait et vu, « vous ne comprendriez rien », dit-il d'un air de défi ; et ne dit pas un mot de la blessure qui lui a valu de longs mois d'hospitalisation et une démobilisation au bout d'un an et demi. Avant de s'engager, cet ancien commandant d'une unité d'assaut dirigeait une entreprise de bâtiment de taille moyenne. De retour d'un long séjour à l'hôpital après les combats, avec essentiellement l'argent de son contrat et les indemnités pour blessure, il a construit puis ouvert en décembre un restaurant de grillades, « un rêve qu'il avait depuis plusieurs années » Quant au terrain pour le construire, Alexander a fait valoir ses droits auprès de l'administration locale : un décret de Vladimir Poutine accorde gratuitement un terrain à tous ceux décorés, comme lui, de l'ordre du Courage. Il est normalement dédié à la construction de la résidence principale, mais, dit Alexander avec un sourire en coin, « avec moi, l'administration locale regarde ailleurs ». La valeur du terrain est estimée à 1,5 million de roubles, presque 20 000 euros au cours actuel. Une somme particulièrement difficile à emprunter dans une Russie où le taux directeur de la Banque centrale est à 16%. La région ne se contente pas d'appliquer les décisions du pouvoir central. Par décret régional signé le 30 décembre dernier, elle a augmenté la prime de signature d'un contrat pour aller se battre en Ukraine aux volontaires résidant dans la région à 1,4 million de roubles (près de 17 000 euros au cours actuel), allant jusqu'à 2,4 millions (près de 30 000 euros) si le contrat est signé entre le 1ᵉʳ et le 31 janvier. Nombreuses prisons et tradition militaire, double vivier de recrutement Soldats de métier, mobilisés ou volontaires, dans la région d'Irkoutsk, ils sont nombreux à être partis pour l'Ukraine, mais les chiffres précis sont inconnus : ils sont classés secret défense. Les indices d'un large engagement sont cependant nombreux. « Dans presque chaque famille, il y a des gens qui connaissent quelqu'un lié d'une manière ou d'une autre à la guerre. Ou ils ont des amis qui se sont battus, qui sont en quelque sorte impliqués », explique Alexey Petrov, historien local, désigné agent de l'étranger en 2021. « Et parce que beaucoup de Sibériens se battent là-bas [en Ukraine, NDLR], Irkoutsk se classe parmi les plus gros contributeurs régionaux en termes de montant d'argent collecté pour la guerre, mais aussi en termes d'aide directe aux soldats, sans doute la première sur les dix régions de Sibérie. Toutes les organisations et fondations qui y sont liées sont très actives ici, envoient constamment de l'aide, des cadeaux pour la nouvelle année, des cartes, toutes sortes de choses ». Les nombreuses prisons, vivier de recrutement, y sont évidemment pour quelque chose — deux ont déjà été fermées en presque quatre ans de conflit, et il en reste 21. L'argent, évidemment, aussi : « Hier, vous étiez conducteur de tracteur, et aujourd'hui, vous êtes conducteur de camion sur le front. Et vous gagnerez cinq fois plus », dit Alexey Petrov. Mais l'histoire régionale joue aussi un rôle décisif, explique-t-il, et elle prend ses racines sous l'Union soviétique : « Irkoutsk était le centre du district militaire sibérien jusqu'en 1953, date de la mort de Staline. Toutes les troupes stationnées sur le front de l'Est ont été formées ici. Le défilé de la Victoire de 1945 dans la ville chinoise de Harbin [défilé militaire solennel de troupes de l'Armée rouge soviétique le 16 septembre 1945, NDLR] était dirigé par le général Beloborodov, originaire d'Irkoutsk. Jusqu'à sa fermeture en 2011, nous avions une très grande école, l'École d'aviation militaire d'Irkoutsk. Et il y a des dizaines de milliers de soldats qui se sont toujours entraînés ici. » Rare alerte budgétaire L'attaque de drones ukrainiens le 1er juin dernier, à plus de 4 000 kilomètres de la ligne de front, a, elle, marqué les esprits. Kiev a affirmé avoir visé la base aérienne stratégique de Belaïa, à une quinzaine de kilomètres d'Irkoutsk, une cible non confirmée par la Russie. Le gouverneur de la région a évoqué une unité militaire stationnée dans un village. Mais ce dont on parle le plus facilement à Irkoutsk cet hiver, c'est de la hausse des prix, manifeste partout en Russie. Le budget 2025 de la région, qui a été si difficile à boucler, a aussi suscité des réactions. Selon le journal Védomosti, daté du 25 novembre dernier, les plus larges déficits régionaux en valeur absolue sur les 89 régions que compte le territoire national concernaient deux régions de Sibérie : celle de Kemerovo (-43.9 milliards de roubles) et Irkoutsk (-41.1 milliards de roubles). À lire aussiLe charbon russe connaît sa pire crise depuis trente ans  Kemerovo, au sud, est une région industrielle réputée pour être en crise depuis deux ans, car elle dépend d'une filière charbon qui ne trouve plus de débouchés. Pour expliquer les difficultés de celle d'Irkoutsk, Nadejda Grosheva, docteur en économie, directeur de la Baikal International Business School de l'université d'État d'Irkoutsk, et membre du Conseil stratégique de la région d'Irkoutsk, avance par exemple qu'en Russie, les entreprises paient leurs impôts sur le lieu de leur siège. « Si vous avez une société enregistrée à Moscou, l'impôt sur les bénéfices est payé à Moscou. Ils sont tous intégrés verticalement. » De nombreuses grandes entreprises comme Gazprom ou Rosneft opèrent en effet dans la région. Chute libre des investissements dans les infrastructures Face à la grogne suscitée par certains paiements publics en retard cet automne et au début de l'hiver, et notamment le salaire des professeurs, le gouverneur Igor Kobzev, lui, a notamment expliqué dans la presse locale la baisse des recettes de cette manière : « Des signes avant-coureurs sont apparus en 2024, car nous sommes une région tournée vers l'exportation avec des produits à forte valeur ajoutée qui représentent la part du lion du budget. » Derrière cet euphémisme, cette réalité : le budget de la région est fortement dépendant des impôts des entreprises des secteurs de l'aluminium, du diamant et du gaz, des secteurs tous sous sanctions occidentales depuis la guerre en Ukraine. Autrement dit : si le budget de la région souffre, c'est que les recettes de ces entreprises ont baissé. La région dispose bien d'un gisement de gaz, le gisement de Kavytkinskoye, qui doit être exploité pour le gazoduc « Force de Sibérie 2 », pour fournir la Chine. Mais le projet tarde toujours à se concrétiser. De quoi faire monter dans une partie de la population une question sensible sur le contrat social et la répartition des efforts. Dimitri et Oleg, deux habitants de la région qui ont demandé à rester anonymes, ont effleuré ce sujet tabou au micro de RFI. « Il y a un déséquilibre qui est en train d'apparaître au sein de la population », a avancé Oleg. « Parce que, si on compare de manière relative, les participants à l'opération spéciale reçoivent beaucoup d'argent, tandis que les travailleurs du secteur public reçoivent des kopecks. Et ce déséquilibre n'apporte rien de bon ».  Dimitri a tiqué et avancé : « Combattre est un métier dangereux. C'est pour ça qu'il est si bien payé. » Oleg s'est contenté de répondre : « Je comprends pourquoi ceux qui sont à l'opération spéciale gagnent beaucoup d'argent. Je dis juste que ceux qui sont restés ici, ceux qui élèvent de jeunes enfants notamment, ne reçoivent pas beaucoup d'argent. C'est un déséquilibre qui est en train de naître, je n'ai rien de plus à dire. » Fin de l'échange. On n'est jamais trop prudents. Le gouverneur a promis de ne pas couper dans les dépenses sociales, mais la région a dû prendre un prêt pour boucler son budget 2025. Il a aussi annoncé un grand coup de frein pour l'investissement dans les infrastructures. En 2026, les financements passeront dans ce domaine de 18 milliards de roubles en 2025 à 4,3 milliards. Et encore, ce montant sera dépensé essentiellement dans les projets éligibles à un cofinancement fédéral. Tous les autres projets de construction et de réparation seront suspendus ou mis en sommeil. Cela concerne notamment les écoles et les centres sportifs.

in this episode, Jared sits down with Alexander Brose, President & CEO of the Royal Conservatory of Music in Toronto, Canada, to trace his remarkable journey learning Chinese and how it shaped his life and career in unexpected ways.From his early years living in South Korea with his family, to choosing Mandarin over Cantonese at an international school in Hong Kong, Alex shares how Chinese gradually became part of his identity. He continued studying the language through high school and later majored in Asian Studies at Cornell University. A pivotal summer in Harbin with the CET immersion program further deepened both his language skills and cultural connection to China.Alex's path led him to build cross-cultural musical collaborations between China and the U.S., eventually becoming the founding Executive Director of the Tianjin Juilliard School. He reflects on how speaking Chinese created unique professional opportunities, opened doors to deep cultural understanding, and enabled him to be at the forefront of classical music education in China.Throughout the episode, Alex offers thoughtful reflections on the value of immersion, the challenges of maintaining language confidence, and the power of music as a bridge between cultures.Links from the episode:Alexander Brose | Royal Conservatory of Music (Canada)Mandarin Companion Graded ReadersCET Academic ProgramsFrom Mao to Mozart: Isaac Stern in China | IMDB 

rWotD Episode 3180: Harbin–Mudanjiang intercity railway Welcome to random Wiki of the Day, your journey through Wikipedia's vast and varied content, one random article at a time.The random article for Saturday, 17 January 2026, is Harbin–Mudanjiang intercity railway.Harbin–Mudanjiang intercity railway is a high-speed railway in Heilongjiang Province, China, between the cities Harbin and Mudanjiang. It is a Passenger Dedicated Line (PDL), with a design speed of 250 km/h (155 mph) and a total length 293.2 km (182.2 mi). Starting in Harbin, it leads east to Acheng, into mountains at Mao'ershan, to Shangzhi, again through the mountains to the southeast, Weihe, Yabuli, Hengdaohezi, Hailin and on to the end at Mudanjiang station. Future proposals for this line could see it extended across the border into Russia and the Russian port city of Vladivostok.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 00:47 UTC on Saturday, 17 January 2026.For the full current version of the article, see Harbin–Mudanjiang intercity railway on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Bluesky at @wikioftheday.com.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm neural Emma.

Dal 1938 al 1945 nella Manciuria occupata i giapponesi condussero esperimenti proibiti. All'interno di una struttura nei sobborghi della città di Harbin l'esercito imperiale nipponico affidò una missione segreta al tenente generale Shiro Ishii e ai suoi sottoposti: studiare e realizzare le peggiori armi chimiche e batteriologiche mai viste prima. L'Unità 731, questo il nome in codice del reparto, si rese protagonista di mostruosità contro civili inermi e prigionieri di guerra, in un distorto concetto di liceità della condotta bellica. Le risultanze delle ricerche dell'equipe di Ishii furono sfruttate nel Dopoguerra senza che le vittime dell'Unità 731 ricevessero mai giustizia.

“Our Teacher” is a collection of essays written by students of Falun Dafa (also known as Falun Gong). This series is comprised of their personal experiences with the practice and their interactions with Dafa's founder, Mr. Li Hongzhi, when the practice was first taught to the public. The writings were originally published on the Minghui website. Original Articles:1. Recalling Several Occasions When Master Taught the Fa in Shijiazhuang2. Looking Back to 1994: Attending Master Li Hongzhi’s Lectures in Harbin, China3. Recalling Teacher’s Grace to Encourage Myself to Become More Diligent in CultivationTo provide feedback on this podcast, please email us at feedback@minghuiradio.org

Comenzamos este programa de Gente viajera con Carles Lamelo, abriendo camino con una de esas historias que inspiran de verdad con Aitor Francesena, autor de Surfear la vida y miraremos al futuro del sector preguntándonos cómo la inteligencia artificial cambiará la forma de viajar, con Lorena Pérez Mansillas. Soñaremos con Perú en Navidades 2026, descubriremos una joya natural como la Cueva de los Murciélagos de Artana, en Castellón y viajaremos hasta el frío extremo del festival de hielo y nieve de Harbin, en China, con Lluís Paradero, director general de Aidu Travel. En la segunda hora hablaremos de las grandes novedades de los cruceros para 2026 con Eva Miquel. Os daremos claves para viajar con perros junto a Javier Rodríguez, Area Manager de Booking.com, y nos sentaremos a la mesa de Casa Toro, una taberna castiza-andaluza en Madrid, con Lorena Pérez Mansillas. Viajaremos rápido con destinos flash como Doha y un crucero por Emiratos y Omán y nos iremos de festival a Hamburgo con el BIG3 Festival de bachata, salsa y kizomba. Haremos turismo deportivo en el Open de Australia con Marc González, director y fundador de Sport Trips Experience.

This week on Cowboy Shit, we're joined by Ted Harbin, one of the most respected and recognizable voices in rodeo journalism. Ted is one of only eight media professionals honored by both the Professional Rodeo Cowboys Association (PRCA) and the Women's Professional Rodeo Association (WPRA), earning the PRCA Media Award for Excellence in Print Journalism in 2010 and the WPRA Media Award in 2014. With more than two decades in the newspaper business, his career has spanned small-town weeklies, major dailies, and ultimately the founding of TwisTed Rodeo, a media relations company dedicated to the sport. His work has appeared in hundreds of newspapers and publications including Western Horseman, Texas Monthly, WPRA Magazine, and Chatter Magazine. Ted has served as media director for countless rodeos and stock contractors and has been a publicist for dozens of cowboys and cowgirls. In this episode, we talk about the evolution of rodeo media, the importance of authentic storytelling, and why the written word still matters in Western culture. Check out all our apparel at cowboyshit.ca 

What if winter itself became a city's most valuable asset? In Harbin, ice is not mere artistry; it is the powerful engine driving a booming economy. We're going inside the world's largest snow festival to see how a frozen wonderland is creating a red-hot tourist boom. On the show: Steve, Yushan & Yushun

2025 was another exciting year in human origins research! In this episode, four scientists and Leakey Foundation grantees (and one podcast host) share their picks for the top discoveries of the year. Support this show and the science we talk about. Your tax-deductible gift to The Leakey Foundation will be matched! Click here to donate.  Want more science between podcast episodes? Join our monthly newsletter for human origins news and updates from Origin Stories and The Leakey Foundation. Links to learn more All research articles are open-access and free to read New research reveals the hand of Paranthropus boisei Earliest evidence of making fire Complete sequencing of ape genomes Highly selective cannibalism in the Late Pleistocene of Northern Europe reveals Neandertals were targeted prey Denisovan mitochondrial DNA from dental calculus of the >146,000-year-old Harbin cranium

On today's episode of Renew Your Mind we are talking with Gaylord Methodist Church's new pastor Kevin Harbin. We are joined by Pastor Kevin Harbin, Youth & Family/ Worship leader Jordan Kettlewell and moderator Dana Hall. Questions/topics for today's episode include:- What exactly happened in 1986 when you were invited to a Methodist Church Service?- What churches have you served over the span of your life?- How did you become a Presiding Elder in the GMC? - Could you tell us what a Presiding Elder does? - How do you juggle those duties while pastoring your own church?Thanks for listening and we pray this podcast encourages you and helps grow your walk in the Lord! God bless!

Eagerly awaiting the upcoming New Year's Day holiday, Wang Xiaohui, 32, has planned a trip to Harbin — a traditional winter tourism destination and the capital of Heilongjiang province — for the three-day break starting on Jan 1. Wang will ring in the New Year amid the city's dreamlike snowy vistas.32岁的王晓慧正满怀期待地迎接即将到来的元旦假期，她计划在1月1日开始的三天假期里前往哈尔滨——这一传统的冬季旅游目的地，也是黑龙江省省会。她将在这座城市如梦似幻的雪景中迎接新年的到来。"I used to spend New Year's Eve in Beijing with my family, eating dumplings, but this year I'll spend it with three friends," she said.她说：“以前我都是和家人在北京一起过除夕、吃饺子，但今年我会和三位朋友一起度过。”She had planned to see in the New Year at Harbin Ice and Snow World, one of China's top snow-themed parks, but was unable to get tickets.她原本计划在中国顶级冰雪主题乐园之一——哈尔滨冰雪大世界迎接新年，但未能买到门票。Travel agencies have forecast significant growth in both domestic and outbound tourism during the three-day holiday. Within the country, colder regions with abundant snow and regions with milder climates are competing for travelers.多家旅行机构预测，在为期三天的假期中，国内游和出境游均将实现显著增长。在国内市场，冰雪资源丰富的寒冷地区与气候相对温和的地区正共同争夺游客。Qi Chunguang, vice-president of travel portal Tuniu, said, "In the past 10 days, searches for 'New Year' tour products on our platform have doubled compared with the previous 10 days, and searches for 'New Year's Eve countdown' have grown by over 50 percent."旅游网站途牛副总裁齐春光表示：“过去10天，我们平台上‘元旦'旅游产品的搜索量较此前10天翻了一番，‘跨年倒计时'相关搜索量增长超过50%。”Qi noted the soaring popularity of snow destinations like Harbin and predicted that a travel peak in the winter tourism market would occur during the New Year's Day holiday. This is supported by data from Tujia, a domestic homestay booking platform, which reported that Harbin currently leads in holiday bookings.齐春光指出，哈尔滨等冰雪旅游目的地热度持续攀升，并预计元旦假期将迎来冬季旅游市场的出行高峰。国内民宿预订平台途家提供的数据也印证了这一判断，目前哈尔滨在假期预订量中位居前列。"Warmer places like Quanzhou in Fujian province and Libo in Guizhou province are also popular, with searches increasing by three to five times in the past 10 days," he said.他说：“福建泉州、贵州荔波等气候较为温暖的地区同样受到欢迎，过去10天相关搜索量增长了三到五倍。”Li Ailing, from Beijing, has booked a three-day trip to Quanzhou with her husband.来自北京的李爱玲已与丈夫预订了一次为期三天的泉州之行。"Beijing is too cold in winter, so we want to go to a warmer place with beautiful sea views," Li said. "My husband visited Quanzhou last year, and highly recommended it for its delicious food and distinct culture."李爱玲表示：“北京冬天太冷了，所以我们想去一个温暖、还能看到海景的地方。我丈夫去年去过泉州，他非常推荐那里，觉得美食丰富、文化特色鲜明。”Li said that they plan to leave on Dec 31, a day before the holiday period starts, to avoid the traffic rush.李爱玲说，他们计划在12月31日、即假期开始前一天出发，以避开交通高峰。The outbound tourism market is also expected to boom over the holiday. Online travel agency Qunar forecasts its first travel peak on Saturday. Popular destinations include South Korea, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam, with South Korea seeing the fastest growth in bookings due to lower flight prices.元旦假期期间，出境游市场也有望迎来增长。在线旅游平台去哪儿网预测，其首个出行高峰将出现在周六。热门目的地包括韩国、泰国、新加坡和越南，其中韩国因机票价格较低，预订量增长最快。Qunar noted that some tourists are extending their trips by taking extra paid vacation days to visit more distant destinations such as Egypt and Spain. "New Zealand is also popular among those extending their breaks because it's midsummer there. We've seen flight bookings to New Zealand increase by 1.1 times on our platform," it added.去哪儿网指出，一些游客通过额外请带薪年假，将行程延长，前往埃及、西班牙等较远的目的地。该平台补充称：“新西兰也受到延长假期游客的青睐，因为当地正值盛夏。我们平台上飞往新西兰的机票预订量增长了1.1倍。”snow-themed park/snəʊ θiːmd pɑːk/冰雪主题乐园homestay booking platform/ˈhəʊmsteɪ ˈbʊkɪŋ ˈplætfɔːm/民宿预订平台traffic rush/ˈtræfɪk rʌʃ/交通高峰flight bookings/flaɪt ˈbʊkɪŋz/机票预订量paid vacation days/peɪd vəˈkeɪʃən deɪz/带薪休假

Last time we spoke about the Japanese Victory over Changkufeng. Japan's generals hatched a plan: strike at night, seize the peak, then bargain if need be. Colonel Sato, steady as a compass, chose Nakano's brave 75th Regiment, selecting five fearless captains and a rising star, Nakajima, to lead the charge. Ahead, scouts and engineers threaded a fragile path through darkness, while distant Soviet tanks rumbled like distant thunder. At 2:15 a.m., wire breached and soldiers slipped over the slope. The crest resisted with brutal tenacity, grenades flashed, machine guns spit fire, and leaders fell. Yet by 5:15 a.m. dawn painted the hill in pale light, and Japanese hands grasped the summit. The dawn assault on nearby Hill 52 and the Shachaofeng corridor followed, with Takeshita's and Matsunobe's units threading through fog, fire, and shifting trenches. Narukawa's howitzers answered the dawn with measured fury, silencing the Soviets' early artillery as Japanese infantry pressed forward. By daybreak, the Russians were driven back, their lines frayed and retreating toward Khasan. The price was steep: dozens of officers dead or injured, and a crescent of smoke and memory left etched on every face.    #181 The Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After admitting the loss of Changkufeng and Shachaofeng by dawn on 31 July, the Russian government issued a communique the next day asserting that Soviet troops had "hurled back a Japanese division… after a two-day battle" involving tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Some hours after the Japanese penetration, Soviet regulars rushed to the scene and drove out the invaders. Japanese losses amounted to 400 men; Soviet losses were 13 killed and 55 wounded. On Soviet soil, the Japanese abandoned five cannons, 14 machine guns, and 157 rifles, while the Russians admitted losing one tank and one gun. A Soviet reconnaissance pilot may have fallen into Japanese hands after bailing out. "Both before and during the Japanese attack… Soviet troops did not once cross the Manchukuoan frontier,which deprived them of the possibility of surrounding or outflanking the invaders." By 1 August, Russian ground forces were deployed and the Soviet Air Force took action. Soviet aircraft appeared at 24:30 to reconnoiter. Soon after, more than ten planes flew in formation, launching strikes against forward units. Eight sorties, light bombers and fighters, roughly 120–150 aircraft in flights of two or three dozen, bombed and strafed. Raids were conducted by as many as 30 planes, though no Soviet losses were reported. The Russians also hit targets on the Korean side of the Tumen. The 75th Regiment judged that the Soviet Air Force sought only to intimidate. Russian planes dropped several dozen bombs on the Kyonghun bridge, but the span was not struck; damage was limited to the railway, producing an impression of severity that was misleading. The lack of air cover troubled the troops most. Japanese casualties on 1 August were modest: three men wounded in the 75th Infantry, and one wounded and a horse killed in the 76th. However the three Japanese battalions expended over 15,000 machine-gun and 7,000 rifle rounds that day. The appearance of Soviet air power at Changkufeng drew anxious international attention. Shanghai reports electrified observers, who anticipated that major Russo-Japanese hostilities would transform the China campaign overnight. Some observers were openly dismayed, foreseeing a prolongation of the mainland war with potential benefits to Soviet interests. Japanese Army spokesmen sought to downplay the situation. Officers in Hsinking told correspondents that the raids, while serious, represented only a face-saving measure. The Red Army was reportedly attempting to compensate for losses at Changkufeng and other disputed positions, but aside from the bombings, the frontier remained quiet. If the Russians were serious, observers noted, they would have bombed the vital Unggi railway bridge, which remained untouched; raids focused on minor bridges, with limited damage. In Tokyo, foreign observers believed the appearance of about 50 Soviet heavy bombers over North Korea signaled an extension of the incidents and that the Japanese government was taking urgent measures. Military leaders decided not to escalate but prepared for emergencies. The Korea Army Headquarters denied Soviet bombing of Harbin in Manchuria or Najin and Chongjin in Korea. Regarding retaliation, an American correspondent reported that the Japanese military had no intention of bombing Russian territory. Although Soviet use of aircraft introduced a new dimension of danger, the main efforts remained ground-based on both sides. After Japanese troops cleared Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, the Russians appeared to be redeploying to contract their defensive frontage; no troops or works remained west of Khasan. Four or five Russian infantry companies and ten artillery pieces stood between the lake and Paksikori, while the main forces, with numerous gun sites, were concentrated west of Novokievsk. On the Kwantung Army front in southeast Manchuria, no changes were observed. "The Russians were apparently shocked by their defeat at Changkufeng and must suddenly have resorted to negative, conservative measures." Korea Army Headquarters assessed the situation as of the evening of 31 July: "The enemy must fear a Japanese advance into the Novokievsk plain and therefore is concentrating his main forces in that district. Our interests require that we anticipate any emergency, so we must prepare the necessary strength in the Kyonghun region and reinforce positions at Wuchiatzu."  At 20:45 on the 31st, the 19th Division received a detailed message from the Hunchun garrison commander describing his northward deployments. Suetaka was heartened; he "earnestly desired to bring about the end of the incident as a result of the fighting of 30–31 July but was equally resolved to defend the border firmly, based on Japanese interpretation of the Hunchun pact, in case the Soviet side did not perform intensive self-reflection." First, Suetaka issued instructions from Kyonghun at 8:15 on the 31st via K. Sato: "It is our intention that Changkufeng and the high ground northwest of Shachaofeng be secured, as well as the high ground south of Shachaofeng if possible. Enemy attacks are to be met at our positions, but you are not to pursue far." Second, Colonel Tanaka was instructed not to fire as long as Russian artillery did not bombard friendly forces. "Except for preparing against counterassaults, your actions will be cautious. In particular, harassing fire against inhabited places and residents is prohibited." Suetaka was finally armed with formal authority, received at 22:05 on 1 August. He did not delay in implementing it. At 23:00 he ordered the immediate rail movement of strong reinforcements: the alerted infantry brigade headquarters, as well as four infantry battalions and the remaining mountain artillery battalion. Thus, Suetaka could deploy forward not only the forces he had requested but also a brigade-level organization to assume control of the now sizeable combat elements massed at the front for "maneuvers." Earlier that afternoon he had already moved his division's message center forward to the Matsu'otsuho heights at the Tumen, and he regularly posted at least one staff officer there so that the center could function as the division's combat headquarters. An additional matter of explosive potential was built into the divisional order: provision of Japanese Air Force cover for rail movements forward, although use of aircraft had been prohibited by all higher headquarters; Nakamura intended only ground cover. At the front, Japanese units spent most of their time consolidating their hard-won positions. By 3 on 1 August, a column of Soviet forces with vehicles was observed moving from the east side of Khasan. Late in the day, the division received an extremely important telegram from the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of the Kwantung Army: "According to a special espionage report from our OSS in Khabarovsk city, Red Army authorities there have decided to retake the high ground along Changkufeng." From other intelligence, the Kwantung Army concluded that the Russians were rebuilding in the Novokievsk region. Frequent movements observed immediately to the rear of the Soviet battle zone caused K. Sato to grow apprehensive about a dawn counterattack on the 1st, and he reinforced Changkufeng with the 6th Company. The second of August was marked by continuation of Soviet air attacks and the anticipated Russian counteroffensive. According to Japanese intelligence, Marshal Blyukher had arrived in Khabarovsk, and Lieutenant General Sokolov was in Voroshilov. An offensive buildup, estimated at about 3,000 men plus tanks and guns, was reported in the Kozando area by evening on the 1st. Hirahara, commanding the battalion at Changkufeng, grew concerned about Hill 52. With day's end approaching, he reinforced the defenses further and ordered the battalion medical officer to establish a dressing station at Fangchuanting. Around 15:00 Soviet artillery began firing at forward areas, especially gun positions; the bombardments were described as severe. Japanese artillery sought to conserve ammunition, firing only at worthwhile, short-range targets. Main Russian ground actions focused on the far-right (Hill 52) and far-left (Shachaofeng) sectors, not Changkufeng. In line with Hirahara's orders, two infantry companies and four heavy machine guns were moved by 8:00 from Changkufeng to the heights 800 meters southeast. Soviet heavy artillery pounded the zone between Fangchuanting and Hill 52; observing the enemy became difficult. Russian planes engaged at 9:00 fighters, then bombers, to soften defenses and gun positions. Meanwhile, the Soviets deployed firepower southeast of Khasan, while two infantry battalions and more than ten tanks advanced through the pines on the western slopes. Japanese regimental guns and two machine-gun platoons at Hill 52 attacked the enemy heavy machine guns and neutralized them. By 10:00 the Russians had advanced with heavy weapons to the high ground 800 meters from Hill 52. From Changkufeng, the battalion guns engaged heavy weapons. Hirahara moved with the engineers and battalion guns to the heights to which he had transferred reinforcements earlier, took command, and prepared an assault. Initially, Soviet troops advanced in formation, but after cresting a dip, they dispersed and moved onto the high ground opposite Hill 52. Heavily armed, they drew within 700 meters, with artillery and heavy machine guns providing coverage. By 10:00 Sato requested Shiozawa's mountain guns across the Tumen to unleash a barrage against Hill 52's front. For about half an hour, the battery fired. By 10:30, the Soviet advance grew listless. Believing the moment ripe, Hirahara deployed his men to charge the foe's right wing, ordering rapid movement with caution against eastern flank fire. On the heights north of Hill 52, Inagaki watched the struggle; with the telephone out and the situation urgent, he brought up firepower on his own initiative. Taking the main body of the 1st Machine Gun Company, along with the battalion guns, he moved out at noon, making contact with the 10th Company on Hill 52 around 14:00, where the Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians, losing momentum, were checked by Japanese heavy weapons and by mountain guns from Hill 82. Hirahara's main battalion advanced onto the high ground north of Hill 52 around noon. By 15:00, two enemy companies began to fall back, climbing the western slopes of Hill 29 as the main forces retreated piecemeal to a dip. By 16:00, Suetaka observed that his units were continuing to secure their positions and were "gradually breaking the hostile intention." Despite heat and rain, front-line troops showed fatigue but remained vigilant. Between 11:00 and 16;00, Sato inspected the lines and directed defensive positions, particularly at Hill 52. After a poor initial performance, the Russians awaited reinforcements before attempting another assault on Hill 52. They moved up a mechanized corps, and by 15:00 50 tanks massed east of Maanshan. Around 17:00, the Russians began moving south along the high ground across Khasan. Another two Soviet battalions advanced along the Tumen hills, led by armor. Hirahara anticipated an assault at twilight, especially after 18:00, when nine bombers struck Hill 52. Earlier, Takeshita had received reports from the antitank commander, Lieutenant Saito, that at 17:00 several enemy tanks and three infantry battalions were advancing from Hill 29. Convinced of an imminent Soviet strike, Takeshita ordered the defense to conceal its efforts and to annihilate the foe with point-blank fire and hand-to-hand fighting. He sought to instill confidence that hostile infantry could not reach the positions. Before 19:00, the enemy battalions came within effective range, and Japan opened with all available firepower. Rapid-fire antitank guns set the lead tank alight; the remaining tanks were stopped. Support came from Hisatsune's regimental guns and two antitank gun squads atop Changkufeng. The Russian advance was checked. By nightfall, Soviet elements had displaced heavy weapons about 400 meters from Japanese positions. As early as 16:00, Suetaka ordered a mountain artillery squad to cross the river. Sato told Takeshita at 7:30 that there would be a night attack against Hill 52. Takeshita was to annihilate the foe after allowing them to close to 40–50 meters. The Russians did mount a night assault and pressed close between 8 and 9 p.m. with three battalions led by four tanks. The main force targeted Takeshita; all ten Russian heavy machine guns engaged that side. Japanese machine guns and battalion guns joined the fray. The Russians pressed within 30 meters, shouted "Hurrah! Hurrah!" and hurled grenades before advancing a further 15 meters. The Japanese repelled the first waves with grenades and emplaced weapons, leaving light machine guns and grenade dischargers forward. Soviet illuminating shells were fired to enable closer approaches within 100 meters. Japanese grenade-discharger fire blasted the forces massed in the dead space before the works. While the Hill 52 night attack collapsed, other Russian units, smaller in strength and with one tank leading, moved against the hill on the left that the Japanese had not yet occupied that morning. The Russians advanced along the Khasan slope north of Hill 52, came within point-blank range, and shouted but did not charge. By 22:00, the Japanese, supported by machine guns, had checked the foe. Thereupon, the 6th Company, now under a platoon leader, Narusawa, launched a counterattack along the lake. "The enemy was bewildered and became dislocated. Buddies were heard shouting to one another, and some could be seen hauling away their dead." The Soviet troops held back 300–400 meters and began to dig in. Sato decided artillery should sweep the zone in front of Hill 52. At 21:30, he requested support, but the mountain guns could not open fire. Still, by 23:00, not a shadow of an enemy soldier remained on the Hill 52 front, where the Japanese spent the night on alert. In the northern sector, eight Russian tanks crossed the Japanese-claimed border at 5:25 on 2 August and moved south to a position northwest of Shachaofeng. Around 7 Russian artillery opened fire to "prepare" the Japanese while a dozen heavy bombers attacked. An hour later, the ground offensive began in earnest, with one and a half to two infantry battalions, a dozen machine guns, and several tanks. Supporting Takenouchi's left wing were several batteries of mountain artillery and two heavy batteries. Well-planned counterfire stopped the offensive. There was little change north of Shachaofeng and in the southeast, where Kanda's company held its positions against attack. On Takenouchi's front, Akaishizawa notes 120-degree daytime heat and nighttime chill. Men endured damp clothes and mosquitoes. To keep warm at night, soldiers moved about; during the day they sought shade and camouflage with twigs and weeds. No defense existed against cold night rain. Nocturnal vigilance required napping by day when possible, but the intense sun drained strength. For three days, Imagawa's company had only wild berries and dirty river water to eat. At 6:00 on 2 August, Colonel Tanaka exhorted his artillery to "exalt maximum annihilation power at close range, engage confirmed targets, and display firepower that is sniperlike—precise, concentrated, and as swift as a hurricane." Tanaka devised interdiction sectors for day and night attacks. At 10:30, the artillery laid down severe fire and eventually caused the enemy assault to wither. Around 24:40, Rokutanda's battalion detected a Russian battalion of towed artillery moving into positions at the skirt of Maanshan. When the first shells hit near the vanguard, a commander on horseback fled; the rest dispersed, abandoning at least eight artillery wagons and ten vehicles. Suetaka, observing from the Kucheng BGU, picked up the phone and commended the 3rd Battalion. Japanese casualties on 2 August were relatively light: ten men killed and 15 wounded. Among the killed, the 75th Infantry lost seven, the 76th Infantry two, and the engineers one. Among the wounded, the 75th suffered nine and the 76th six. Infantry ammunition was expended at an even higher rate than on 30–31 July. In Hirahara's battalion area, small arms, machine guns, ammunition, helmets, knapsacks, and gas masks were captured. A considerable portion of the seized materiel was employed in subsequent combat, as in the case of an antitank gun and ammunition captured on 31 July. Soviet casualties to date were estimated at 200–250, including 70 abandoned corpses. Twelve enemy tanks had been captured, and five more knocked out on 1–2 August; several dozen heavy bombers and about 5,000 Soviet ground troops were involved in the concerted offensives.  Nevertheless, reports of an imminent Soviet night attack against Hill 52 on 2–3 August alarmed Suetaka as much as his subordinates. Shortly after 20:00 accompanied by his intelligence officer, Suetaka set out for the hill, resolved to direct operations himself. Somewhat earlier, the division had sent Korea Army Headquarters a message, received by 18:30, reflecting Suetaka's current outlook: 30 to 40 Soviet planes had been bombing all sectors since morning, but losses were negligible and morale was high. The division had brought up additional elements in accord with army orders, and was continuing to strive for nonenlargement, but was "prepared firmly to reject the enemy's large-scale attacks." Impressed by the severity of the artillery and small-arms fire, Suetaka deemed it imperative "quickly to mete out a decisive counterassault and thus hasten the solution of the incident." But Japanese lines were thinly held and counterattacks required fresh strength. This state of affairs caused Suetaka to consider immediate commitment of the reinforcements moving to the front, although the Korea Army had insisted on prior permission before additional troops might cross the Tumen. Suetaka's customary and unsurprising solution was again to rely on his initiative and authorize commitment of every reinforcement unit. Nearest was T. Sato's 73rd Regiment, which had been ordered the night before to move up from Nanam. Under the cover of two Japanese fighters, these troops had alighted from the train the next morning at Seikaku, where they awaited orders eagerly.   K. Sato was receiving reports about the enemy buildup. At 20:10 orders were given to the 73rd Regiment to proceed at once to the Matsu'otsuho crossing and be prepared to support the 75th. Involved were T. Sato's two battalions, half of the total infantry reinforcements. Suetaka had something else in mind: his trump, Okido's 76th Infantry. At 23:40 he ordered this regiment, coming up behind the 73rd, to proceed to Huichungyuan on the Manchurian side of the Tumen, via Kyonghun, intercept the enemy, and be ready to go over to the offensive. On the basis of the information that the division planned to employ Okido's regiment for an enveloping attack, K. Sato quickly worked out details. He would conceal the presence of the reinforcements expected momentarily from the 73rd Regiment and would move Senda's BGU and Shimomura's battalion to Huichungyuan to cover the advance of the 76th Regiment and come under the latter's control. Japanese forces faced the danger of Soviet actions against Changkufeng from the Shachaofeng front after midnight on 2 August. Takenouchi had been ready to strike when he learned that the enemy had launched an attack at 01:00 against one of his own companies, Matsunobe's southwest of Shachaofeng. Therefore, Takenouchi's main unit went to drive off the attackers, returning to its positions at 02:30. The Russians tried again, starting from 04:00 on 03 August. Strong elements came as close as 300 meters; near 05:00 Soviet artillery and heavy weapons fire had grown hot, and nine enemy fighters made ineffective strafing passes. By 06:30 the Russians seemed thwarted completely. Hill 52 was pummeled during the three battles on 2 August. Taking advantage of night, the Russians had been regrouping; east of the hill, heavy machine guns were set up on the ridgeline 500 meters away. From 05:00 on 03 August, the Russians opened up with heavy weapons. Led by three tanks, 50 or 60 infantrymen then attacked from the direction of Hill 29 and reached a line 700–800 meters from the Japanese defenses. Here the Russian soldiers peppered away, but one of their tanks was set ablaze by gunfire and the other two were damaged and fled into a dip. Kamimori's mountain artillery reinforcements reached Nanpozan by 07:15 on 03 August. Tanaka issued an order directing the battalion to check the zone east of Hill 52 as well as to engage artillery across Khasan. A site for the supply unit was to be selected beyond enemy artillery range; on the day before, Russian shells had hit the supply unit of the 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion, killing two men and 20 horses. The exposed force was ordered to take cover behind Crestline 1,000 meters to the rear. After 09:00 on 03 August, the artillery went into action and Japanese morale was enhanced. Near 09:00, Soviet bombardment grew pronounced, accompanied by bomber strikes. The Japanese front-line infantry responded with intensive fire, supported by mountain pieces and the regimental guns atop Changkufeng. Enemy forces stayed behind their heavy weapons and moved no further, while their casualties mounted. At 11:00 the Russians began to fall back, leaving only machine guns and snipers. One reason the Soviets had been frustrated since early morning was that K. Sato had seen the urgency of closing the gap midway between Changkufeng and Hill 52 (a site called Scattered Pines) and had shifted the 2nd Company from Changkufeng. Between 06:00 and 07:40, the company fired on Soviet troops which had advanced north of Hill 52, and inflicted considerable casualties. A corporal commanding a grenade launcher was cited posthumously for leading an assault which caused the destruction of three heavy machine guns. In the afternoon, the Japanese sustained two shellings and a bomber raid. Otherwise, the battlefield was quiet, since Russian troops had pulled back toward Hill 29 by 15:00 under cover of heavy weapons and artillery. At Hill 52, however, defense posed a problem, for each barrage smashed positions and trenches. During intervals between bombardments and air strikes, the men struggled to repair and reinforce the facilities. Changkufeng was again not attacked by ground troops during the day but was hit by planes and artillery. Trifling support was rendered by the mountain gun which had been moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen. Japanese infantry reinforcements were on the way. By 23:00 on 02 August, T. Sato had left Shikai. His 73rd Regiment pushed forward along roads so sodden that the units had to dismantle the heavy weapons for hauling. The rate of advance was little more than one kilometer per hour, but finally, at 05:20 on 03 August, he reached Chiangchunfeng with the bulk of two battalions. The esprit of the other front-line troops "soared." K. Sato, who was commanding all forces across the Tumen pending Morimoto's setting up of headquarters for the 37th Brigade, had T. Sato take over the line to the left of Changkufeng, employing Takenouchi's old unit and the 73rd Regiment to cover Shachaofeng. T. Sato set out with his battalions at 06:00 amid heavy rain. By 07:30, under severe fire, he was in position to command the new left sector. According to division orders to Morimoto, this zone was to include the heights south and northwest of Shachaofeng, but, in the case of the former, it was "permissible to pull back and occupy high ground west of the heights south of Shachaofeng." T. Sato contemplated using his regiment to encircle the foe on the north side of the lake, while Okido's 76th Infantry formed the other prong. Most of the day afterward, Soviet artillery was active; the Japanese responded with barrages of their own. Eventually, from 15:30, the entire enemy front-line force in this sector began falling back under violent covering fire. Morimoto's initial operations order, received at 18:00, advised T. Sato officially that he was coming under command of the 37th Brigade. The night of 03–04 August passed with the units uneasy, striving to conduct security and reconnaissance while working on the battered defenses. Total Japanese casualties on 3 August were light again: six men killed and ten wounded, four of the dead and seven of the wounded being suffered by the 75th Infantry, the rest by Takenouchi's battalion. Ammunition was expended at a lower rate than on the preceding day. The Japanese War Ministry reported no significant change since nightfall on 03 August. Thereafter, the battlefield seemed to return to quiescence; Japanese morale was high. In the press abroad, Changkufeng attracted overriding attention. The world was no longer talking of "border affrays." Three-column headlines on page 1 of the New York Times announced: "Soviet Hurls Six Divisions and 30 Tanks into Battle with Japanese on Border, 2 Claims Conflict, Tokyo Reports Victory in Manchukuo and Foes' Big Losses, Moscow Asserts It Won." The startling claim that six Soviet divisions were in action seemed to have been supplied for external consumption by Hsinking as well as Seoul. According to Nakamura Bin, the Russians employed 4,000 to 5,000 men supported by 230 tanks. Although Japanese casualties were moderate, Soviet artillery bombardment had stripped the hills of their lush summer grass. According to the uninformed foreign press, "the meager information showed both sides were heavily armed with the most modern equipment. The Russians were using small, fast tanks and the Japanese apparently were forewarned of this type of weapon and were well supplied with batteries of armor-piercing antitank guns." On 03 August the Russians lost 200 men, 15 tanks, and 25 light artillery pieces. One feature of the fighting was Japanese use of "thousands of flares" to expose fog-shrouded enemy ranks during a Soviet night attack. During the "first phase counteroffensive" by the Russians on 2–3 August, the 75th Regiment judged that the enemy's choice of opportunities for attacking was "senseless"; once they started, they continued until an annihilating blow was dealt. "We did not observe truly severe attacking capacity, such as lightning breakthroughs." With respect to tactical methods, the Japanese noted that Soviet offensive deployment was characterized by depth, which facilitated piecemeal destruction. When Russian advance elements suffered losses, replacements were moved up gradually. Soviet artillery fired without linkage to the front-line troops, nor was there liaison between the ground attacks staged in the Shachaofeng and Hill 52 sectors. Since enemy troops fought entirely on their own, they could be driven off in one swoop. Additionally, although 20–30 Russian tanks appeared during the counterattacks, their cooperation with the infantry was clumsy, and the armor was stopped. Soviet use of artillery in mobile warfare was "poorness personified." "Our troops never felt the least concern about hostile artillery forces, which were quite numerous. Even privates scoffed at the incapability of Russian artillery." It seemed that "those enemies who had lost their fighting spirit had the habit of fleeing far." During the combat between 31 July and 03 August, the defeated Russians appeared to fear pursuit and dashed all the way back to Kozando, "although we did not advance even a step beyond the boundary." On 4 August Suetaka prepared a secret evaluation: the enemy attacks by day and night on 2 August were conducted by front-line corps built around the 40th Rifle Division. "In view of the failure of those assaults, the foe is bound to carry out a more purposeful offensive effort, using newly arrived corps reinforcements." Russian actions on 02 August had been the most serious and persistent offensive efforts undertaken since the outset of the incident, but they were about the last by the front-line corps whose immediate jurisdiction lay in the region of the incident. Consequently, the enemy's loss of morale as a result of their defeat on 30–31 July, combined with their lack of unity in attack power, caused the attacks to end in failure. "We must be prepared for the fact that enemy forces will now mount a unified and deliberate offensive, avoiding rash attacks in view of their previous reversal, since large new corps are coming up." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the shadowed night, Japan's Sato chose Nakano's 75th to seize a peak, sending five captains and a rising Nakajima into darkness. At 2:15 a.m., they breached wires and climbed the slope; dawn lit a hard-won crest, then Hill 52 and Shachaofeng yielded to resolve and fire. The day wore on with brutal artillery, fluttering bombers, and relentless clashes. By August's edge, casualties mounted on both sides, yet Japanese regiments held fast, repelling night assaults with grit. 

On today's episode of Renew Your Mind we are talking with Gaylord Methodist Church's new pastor Kevin Harbin. We are joined by Pastor Kevin Harbin, Youth & Family/ Worship leader Jordan Kettlewell and moderator Dana Hall. Questions/topics for today's episode include:- What exactly happened in 1986 when you were invited to a Methodist Church Service?- What churches have you served over the span of your life?- How did you become a Presiding Elder in the GMC? - Could you tell us what a Presiding Elder does? - How do you juggle those duties while pastoring your own church?Thanks for listening and we pray this podcast encourages you and helps grow your walk in the Lord! God bless!

Welcome to another episode of What's Trending! To start the week, Hongbin Jeong and Alexandra Parada discuss how much to give in an angbao from market-rate dinners at five-star hotels to keeping it stress-free or not even bothering to show up. Then, we switch gears to something holly-jolly - from tiny snowmen made while traveling abroad to a colossal 19-metre snowman in Harbin, China.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Attending as guest of honor at the 11th Global Tourism Economy Forum held in Harbin, Zimbabwe draws insights from China's culture-driven tourism model. We speak with Stanley Banda, Zimbabwe's Tourism Attaché to China and ASEAN, on key takeaways from the forum and opportunities for deeper China-Africa tourism cooperation

On today's episode of Renew Your Mind we are talking with Gaylord Methodist Church's new pastor Kevin Harbin. We are joined by Pastor Kevin Harbin, Youth & Family/ Worship leader Jordan Kettlewell and moderator Dana Hall. Questions/topics for today's episode include:- What exactly happened in 1986 when you were invited to a Methodist Church Service?- What churches have you served over the span of your life?- How did you become a Presiding Elder in the GMC? - Could you tell us what a Presiding Elder does? - How do you juggle those duties while pastoring your own church?Thanks for listening and we pray this podcast encourages you and helps grow your walk in the Lord! God bless!

Les astronautes de Shenzhou-21 achèvent la première série des activités extravéhiculaires;La Chine lance un nouveau satellite de télédétection;Le bilan s'alourdit à douze morts après l'incendie d'un immeuble résidentiel en Chine;La Chine affiche une amélioration des prix, l'IPP continue d'augmenter d'un mois sur l'autre;La Chine enregistre une hausse des réserves de devises étrangères en novembre;Le FMI a inauguré son centre régional à Shanghai;Le port de Tianjin reçoit une cargaison record de composants Airbus;Deux personnalités influentes chinoises nommées dans liste « Nature's 10 » de 2025;Harbin dévoile ses paysages enneigés et glacés;Des musées chinois et français présentent conjointement une exposition d'étoffes en or à Chengdu

David Gokhman of the Weizmann Institute of Science explores how changes in gene regulation shaped recent human evolution. His team used massively parallel reporter assays in skeletal and neural cells to test 71,443 genetic variants that distinguish Neanderthals and Denisovans from modern humans, building a catalog that reveals hundreds of noncoding variants that alter gene expression. The work uncovers evolutionary trends and examples of convergent evolution, including an enhancer of KDM8, a gene involved in tumor progression, that was completely silenced in both archaic and modern human lineages through different mechanisms: motif disruption in Neanderthals and Denisovans, and hypermethylation in modern humans. Gokhman also introduces a way to reconstruct anatomical profiles from DNA sequence and methylation, using it to model Denisovan anatomy and scan the fossil record. The results suggest that the Harbin and Dali fossils were likely Denisovans, while Kabwe may have been related to the ancestor of Neanderthals and Denisovans, helping to clarify the regulatory changes underlying human evolution. Series: "CARTA - Center for Academic Research and Training in Anthropogeny" [Science] [Show ID: 41195]

David Gokhman of the Weizmann Institute of Science explores how changes in gene regulation shaped recent human evolution. His team used massively parallel reporter assays in skeletal and neural cells to test 71,443 genetic variants that distinguish Neanderthals and Denisovans from modern humans, building a catalog that reveals hundreds of noncoding variants that alter gene expression. The work uncovers evolutionary trends and examples of convergent evolution, including an enhancer of KDM8, a gene involved in tumor progression, that was completely silenced in both archaic and modern human lineages through different mechanisms: motif disruption in Neanderthals and Denisovans, and hypermethylation in modern humans. Gokhman also introduces a way to reconstruct anatomical profiles from DNA sequence and methylation, using it to model Denisovan anatomy and scan the fossil record. The results suggest that the Harbin and Dali fossils were likely Denisovans, while Kabwe may have been related to the ancestor of Neanderthals and Denisovans, helping to clarify the regulatory changes underlying human evolution. Series: "CARTA - Center for Academic Research and Training in Anthropogeny" [Science] [Show ID: 41195]

David Gokhman of the Weizmann Institute of Science explores how changes in gene regulation shaped recent human evolution. His team used massively parallel reporter assays in skeletal and neural cells to test 71,443 genetic variants that distinguish Neanderthals and Denisovans from modern humans, building a catalog that reveals hundreds of noncoding variants that alter gene expression. The work uncovers evolutionary trends and examples of convergent evolution, including an enhancer of KDM8, a gene involved in tumor progression, that was completely silenced in both archaic and modern human lineages through different mechanisms: motif disruption in Neanderthals and Denisovans, and hypermethylation in modern humans. Gokhman also introduces a way to reconstruct anatomical profiles from DNA sequence and methylation, using it to model Denisovan anatomy and scan the fossil record. The results suggest that the Harbin and Dali fossils were likely Denisovans, while Kabwe may have been related to the ancestor of Neanderthals and Denisovans, helping to clarify the regulatory changes underlying human evolution. Series: "CARTA - Center for Academic Research and Training in Anthropogeny" [Science] [Show ID: 41195]

David Gokhman of the Weizmann Institute of Science explores how changes in gene regulation shaped recent human evolution. His team used massively parallel reporter assays in skeletal and neural cells to test 71,443 genetic variants that distinguish Neanderthals and Denisovans from modern humans, building a catalog that reveals hundreds of noncoding variants that alter gene expression. The work uncovers evolutionary trends and examples of convergent evolution, including an enhancer of KDM8, a gene involved in tumor progression, that was completely silenced in both archaic and modern human lineages through different mechanisms: motif disruption in Neanderthals and Denisovans, and hypermethylation in modern humans. Gokhman also introduces a way to reconstruct anatomical profiles from DNA sequence and methylation, using it to model Denisovan anatomy and scan the fossil record. The results suggest that the Harbin and Dali fossils were likely Denisovans, while Kabwe may have been related to the ancestor of Neanderthals and Denisovans, helping to clarify the regulatory changes underlying human evolution. Series: "CARTA - Center for Academic Research and Training in Anthropogeny" [Science] [Show ID: 41195]

David Gokhman of the Weizmann Institute of Science explores how changes in gene regulation shaped recent human evolution. His team used massively parallel reporter assays in skeletal and neural cells to test 71,443 genetic variants that distinguish Neanderthals and Denisovans from modern humans, building a catalog that reveals hundreds of noncoding variants that alter gene expression. The work uncovers evolutionary trends and examples of convergent evolution, including an enhancer of KDM8, a gene involved in tumor progression, that was completely silenced in both archaic and modern human lineages through different mechanisms: motif disruption in Neanderthals and Denisovans, and hypermethylation in modern humans. Gokhman also introduces a way to reconstruct anatomical profiles from DNA sequence and methylation, using it to model Denisovan anatomy and scan the fossil record. The results suggest that the Harbin and Dali fossils were likely Denisovans, while Kabwe may have been related to the ancestor of Neanderthals and Denisovans, helping to clarify the regulatory changes underlying human evolution. Series: "CARTA - Center for Academic Research and Training in Anthropogeny" [Science] [Show ID: 41195]

A powerful cold wave is gripping large parts of China this week, driving temperatures sharply lower and pushing the freezing line steadily south, according to the National Meteorological Center.据国家气象中心称，本周一股强劲寒潮正席卷中国大部分地区，气温急剧下降，冰冻线持续向南推进。The center continued to issue blue alerts — the lowest of a four-tiered color-coded warning system — for a cold wave and strong winds on Tuesday morning, forecasting that the cold air will keep moving east and south through Wednesday.气象中心周二上午继续针对寒潮和大风发布蓝色预警——这是四级颜色编码预警系统中的最低级别——并预测冷空气将持续向东和向南移动至周三。Yang Shunan, chief forecaster at the center, said the cold wave has already gripped the entire northern part of the country and continues to push south.气象中心首席预报员杨舒楠表示，这波寒潮已覆盖全国北方地区，并持续向南推进。As of Tuesday afternoon, temperatures in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, Northeast China and North China had fallen by 6 to 10 C, with some areas recording drops of 12 to 14 C. These regions, along with the Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas, have also recorded winds of up to 39 kilometers per hour, Yang said.截至周二下午，内蒙古自治区、东北地区和华北地区气温普遍下降6至10摄氏度，部分地区降温幅度达12至14摄氏度。杨舒楠表示，这些地区以及山东半岛和辽东半岛还出现了时速达39公里的强风。On Tuesday, Beijing and Tianjin recorded their coldest morning of the second half of the year at around minus 5 C, while Changchun in Jilin province, Shenyang in Liaoning province and Shijiazhuang in Hebei province also hit new seasonal lows.周二，北京和天津录得今年下半年最低气温，约为零下5摄氏度；吉林省长春市、辽宁省沈阳市和河北省石家庄市也创下本季新低。The cold wave is set to keep pressing south over the next two days, bringing the coldest conditions of the season so far to large parts of central and eastern China. In some areas of Jiangsu, Anhui and Zhejiang provinces, temperatures are expected to plunge by more than 10 C, with wind chills exacerbating the cold conditions.未来两天，寒潮将继续向南推进，给中国中部和东部大部地区带来今冬迄今最严寒的天气。江苏、安徽和浙江部分地区气温预计将骤降10摄氏度以上，寒风将使体感温度进一步降低。"The most notable features of this cold wave are its complex weather impacts and the significant temperature plunge," Yang said.杨舒楠表示：“此轮寒潮最显著的特征在于其复杂的气象影响和显著的降温幅度。”In addition to strong winds and plummeting temperatures, sand and dust storms were reported in parts of Inner Mongolia and North China in the early stages of the cold air outbreak.在冷空气来袭初期，除强风和气温骤降外，内蒙古和华北部分地区还出现了沙尘暴。Unlike the cold wave in mid-November, which took a more westerly track and brought sharper temperature drops to southern and western regions, the current system is tracking slightly farther north, resulting in the strongest cooling being concentrated north of the Yangtze River, she said.杨舒楠指出，与11月中旬那场偏西路径、导致南方和西部地区气温骤降的冷空气不同，当前这股冷空气路径略偏北，因此强降温主要集中在长江以北地区。On Wednesday morning, the nation's coldest regions will be in parts of the northeast, northwest and North China, according to the center.气象中心称，周三上午，全国最寒冷的地区将出现在东北、西北和华北的部分地区。Minimum temperatures below minus 10 C are forecast across more than 10 provincial-level regions, including the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region as well as the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Hebei.预计新疆维吾尔自治区、青海省、甘肃省、河北省等十余个省级行政区最低气温将低于零下10摄氏度。Major northeastern cities such as Harbin and Changchun may see temperatures dip below minus 20 C for the first time this season. Forecasters advise commuters and students to bundle up with hats, gloves and scarves to avoid frostbite.哈尔滨、长春等东北主要城市的气温可能在本季首次跌破零下20摄氏度。气象预报员建议通勤者和学生做好保暖措施，戴好帽子、手套和围巾，以防冻伤。By Thursday, the freezing line will reach its southernmost point during this cold spell, extending into parts of Zhejiang, Anhui and Hubei. The cold wave is expected to weaken and come to an end from late Wednesday into Thursday night, Yang said.到周四，冻线将达到此轮寒潮的南端极限，延伸至浙江、安徽和湖北部分地区。杨舒楠表示，预计寒潮将于周三晚至周四夜间逐渐减弱并结束。bundle up做好保暖措施、裹紧衣物frostbite n./ˈfrɑːst.baɪt/冻伤；冻疮

Russia has adopted a visa-free policy for Chinese citizens visiting the country for tourism or business purposes, a reciprocal move that is expected to promote the development of tourism, trade and exchanges between the two countries and contribute to their economic growth.俄罗斯对中国公民实施免签政策，适用于旅游或商务目的。作为一项互惠举措，这项政策预计将推动两国旅游、贸易及交流的发展，并为两国经济增长作出贡献。Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive order on Monday allowing Chinese nationals to enter Russia visa-free and stay for up to 30 days for purposes including family visits, business trips, tourism, and participation in scientific, cultural, sociopolitical, economic or sports events, as well as transit.俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京于周一签署行政令，允许中国公民免签入境并停留最长30天，适用于探亲、商务、旅游，以及参与科研、文化、社会政治、经济或体育活动等用途，也包括过境。The order, which took effect immediately, will expire on Sept 14, 2026.该行政令即刻生效，将于2026年9月14日到期。The news quickly went viral in China and several domestic travel portals reported a surge in search traffic for tour products to Russia.消息迅速在中国网络上引发热议，多家旅游平台报告称前往俄罗斯的旅游产品搜索量大幅增长。Travel agency Qunar said that searches for flights from Hangzhou in Zhejiang province to St. Petersburg increased more than threefold within the first hour, while searches for Beijing–Moscow flights surged 44 percent during the same period.旅游平台“去哪儿网”表示，消息发布后一小时内，浙江杭州至圣彼得堡的航班搜索量增长超过三倍，北京—莫斯科航线的搜索量也在同期激增44%。Li Yanqiu, 35, who lives in Beijing, said she and her husband have always wanted to visit Lake Baikal in Siberia as well as Moscow. In 2018, she made a short business trip to Kazan in western Russia and was impressed by the country's culture and natural landscapes.住在北京的35岁李燕秋表示，她和丈夫一直想去西伯利亚的贝加尔湖和莫斯科。2018年，她曾赴俄罗斯西部城市喀山短期出差，对当地文化和自然风光印象深刻。“Now is a good time to visit Russia again, this time with my family,” she said, giving a thumbs up to the reciprocal visa-free policy.“现在正是再访俄罗斯的好时机，这次我想和家人一起去。”她说，并为这项互惠免签政策点赞。Wei Changren, founder of btiii.com, a tourism-related financial news website, said two routes are traditionally popular among Chinese travelers to Russia: Moscow–St. Petersburg and Russia's Far East region. He said the visa-waiver policy will undoubtedly boost cross-border tourism.旅游财经网站劲旅网创始人魏长仁表示，中国游客赴俄的传统热门路线主要有两条：莫斯科—圣彼得堡，以及俄罗斯远东地区。他指出，免签政策必将促进跨境旅游发展。Putin's executive order is based on the principle of reciprocity.普京的行政令以“互惠原则”为基础。On Sept 15, China launched a one-year trial of a 30-day visa-free policy for Russian nationals with ordinary passports, covering business, tourism, family visits, participation in exchange events and transit. This policy also expires on Sept 14, 2026.9月15日，中国对持普通护照的俄罗斯公民实施为期一年的30天免签试行政策，适用于商务、旅游、探亲访友、参加交流活动及过境。该政策同样将于2026年9月14日到期。Inna Klochko, 53, from Vladivostok, recently spent a night at the Maple Leaf Village Hot Spring Resort Hotel in Harbin, Heilongjiang province. Since China's visa-free policy took effect, she has visited Harbin twice, enjoying the city's scenery, food and hot springs.来自俄罗斯符拉迪沃斯托克的53岁游客伊娜·克洛奇科近日入住了中国黑龙江哈尔滨的枫叶小镇温泉度假酒店。自中国免签政策生效以来，她已两次到访哈尔滨，尽享当地美景、美食和温泉。“I felt a sense of familiarity with the European-style architecture on Harbin's Central Avenue. I also tasted guobaorou,” she said. “But the highlight was the hotel's intelligent temperature-controlled hot springs and the unique ‘double-flavor hot pot pool', which made me want to return.”“在哈尔滨中央大街漫步时，那些欧式建筑让我倍感亲切，我还品尝了地道的锅包肉。”她说。“最令人难忘的是酒店的智能恒温温泉和独特的‘双味火锅池'，让我非常想再来。”Previously, applying for a Chinese visa required more time and effort, Klochko said. “Now I just submit an electronic declaration via a mobile app, and I can pass customs in under five minutes.”克洛奇科表示，以前申请中国签证较为繁琐，“现在只需提前通过手机App提交电子申报，入境时不到五分钟就能通关。”In the past two months, Harbin Trip of Garden International Tour Co, a local travel agency, has received more than 400 Russian tourists — a 30 percent year-on-year increase.过去两个月，哈尔滨本地旅行社“哈旅国际旅行社”已接待超过400名俄罗斯游客，同比增加30%。“Most visitors come from Vladivostok and Khabarovsk,” said Wang Taixiang, the company's vice-general manager. “After arriving in Harbin, they often go on to Beijing, Shanghai, Xi'an, Luoyang or Zhangjiajie.”该公司副总经理王太祥表示：“游客大多来自符拉迪沃斯托克和哈巴罗夫斯克。抵达哈尔滨后，他们常会继续前往北京、上海、西安、洛阳或张家界等热门城市。”Zhang Jinshan, a tourism researcher at Beijing Union University, said China, which shares the longest land border with Russia, has a large outbound tourism market. Mutual visa waivers will greatly stimulate tourism and strengthen people-to-people exchanges.北京联合大学旅游规划与发展研究学者张金山指出，中国与俄罗斯拥有世界上最长的陆地边界，并具备庞大的出境旅游市场。互免签政策将大幅促进旅游发展和民间交流。He added that Russia's reciprocal visa-free move will not only boost tourism but also help revitalize industrial zones in Northeast China and Russia's Far East.他补充说，俄罗斯的互免签举措不仅能促进旅游，还将有助于振兴中国东北及俄罗斯远东地区的传统工业区。visa-free policy免签政策electronic declaration电子申报pass customs通关revitalize industrial zones振兴工业区Far East region远东地区

Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin.  As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air.    #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff."  The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th);  (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th);  (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th).  Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix.  After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have".  Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident".  The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail."  The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng.   Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered.  At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled".  Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted."  The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war. 

As winter temperatures continue to drop, people in Northeast China are already looking forward to the upcoming ice and snow season.随着冬季气温持续下降，中国东北地区的人们已开始期待即将到来的冰雪季节。Construction of the 27th Harbin Ice and Snow World, one of the most popular attractions in Harbin, Heilongjiang province, officially began on Tuesday morning as ice blocks stored for more than 10 months were transported to the park.黑龙江省哈尔滨市最受欢迎的景点之一——第27届哈尔滨冰雪世界于周二上午正式开工建设，储存逾十个月的冰块被运抵园区。A total of 200,000 cubic meters of ice harvested last winter has been preserved throughout the year for the 27th edition of the park, ensuring that the area opens to tourists earlier than usual.为迎接第27届冰雪节，去年冬季采收的20万立方米冰块经过全年保存，确保园区能比往年更早向游客开放。Because man-made ice often contains air bubbles and lacks the strength needed for carving, the blocks used in the park are taken from the frozen Songhua River.由于人工冰块常含气泡且缺乏雕刻所需的强度，公园使用的冰块均取自冻结的松花江。Using a mix of traditional ice-storage methods and modern multilayer insulation, Harbin Ice and Snow World Co created conditions — low temperature, light avoidance, insulation and sealing — that kept the ice from melting even when temperatures exceeded 30 C in the peak of summer.哈尔滨冰雪大世界股份有限公司采用传统冰储存技术与现代多层隔热材料相结合的方式，创造了低温、避光、隔热和密封的条件，即使在盛夏气温超过30摄氏度时，冰体也得以保持不融化。The first batch of blocks will be used to build the super ice slide and the main tower.首批冰块将用于建造超级冰滑梯和主塔。"This winter, we have carefully incorporated suggestions from visitors and netizens, integrating elements of the Great Wall, such as its walls and watchtowers, into the design of the super ice slide," said Cong Peiyu, director of the company's design and research department. "The ice-built Great Wall, a key part of the super ice slide, is grand and visually striking, and will become a new landmark for visitors to photograph and interact with."公司设计研究部主任龚培玉表示：“今年冬天，我们认真采纳了游客和网友的建议，将长城元素如城墙、瞭望塔等融入超级冰滑梯的设计中。作为超级冰滑梯的核心部分，这座冰筑长城气势恢宏、视觉震撼，将成为游客拍照互动的新地标。”In the coming days, about 10,000 construction workers will take on the park's most artistic ice and snow challenge, combining ice, snow, sound and lights.未来几天，约1万名建筑工人将迎接这座公园最具艺术性的冰雪挑战，将冰、雪、声与光融为一体。This winter, the park will expand its area from 1 million square meters to 1.2 million sq m, using more than 400,000 cu m of ice and snow — both record highs.今年冬季，该公园将把面积从100万平方米扩大至120万平方米，使用超过40万立方米的冰雪——这两项数据均创历史新高。"To enrich the visitor experience and enhance service quality, the park will introduce new facilities such as a ticketing hall, a snowfield hot spring camp, and new activities including winter fishing, cross-country skiing and snow soccer," Cong said. "An ice and snow stage will be built to complement the Dream Stage, enhancing park performances."龚培玉表示：“为丰富游客体验、提升服务品质，公园将新增售票大厅、雪场温泉营地等设施，并推出冰钓、越野滑雪、雪地足球等新活动，还将建造冰雪舞台与梦幻舞台相呼应，丰富园区演出内容。”The classic Dream Stage will continue to focus on interactive celebrations, creating an energetic disco-style atmosphere for thousands of visitors.经典梦幻舞台将继续聚焦互动庆典，为数千名游客营造充满活力的迪斯科风格氛围。The newly planned stage will incorporate high-level international performance elements, offering a distinct audiovisual experience.新规划的舞台将融入高水准的国际表演元素，呈现独特的视听体验。A grand ice- and snow-themed parade will take place between the two stages, creating a dynamic performance landscape throughout the park.一场以冰雪为主题的盛大游行将在两个舞台之间举行，为整个园区营造出充满活力的表演景观。Meanwhile, park services will be upgraded to offer a more convenient and efficient smart-tourism experience.同时，园区服务将升级升级，提供更便捷高效的智慧旅游体验。More seating areas, restrooms and other public facilities will be added to improve visitor satisfaction.园区还将将增设更多休息区、卫生间及其他公共设施，以提升游客满意度。Despite the upgrades in scale, activities and services, the standard adult ticket price will remain 328 yuan ($46.28), ensuring visitors get to enjoy a richer and higher-quality ice and snow experience at the same price.尽管规模、活动及服务均得到升级，成人票价仍维持328元（约合46.28美元）不变，确保游客以同等价格享受更丰富、更高品质的冰雪体验。ice-storage methods储冰工艺multilayer insulation多层保温技术watchtowers烽火台

Last time we spoke about the Changkufeng Incident. In a frost-bitten dawn along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, a border notched with memory becomes the stage for a quiet duel of will. On one side, Japanese officers led by Inada Masazum study maps, mud, and the hill known as Changkufeng, weighing ground it offers and the risk of war. They glimpse a prize, high ground that could shield lines to Korea—yet they sense peril in every ridge, every scent of winter wind. Across the line, Soviet forces tighten their grip on the crest, their eyes fixed on the same hill, their tents and vehicles creeping closer to the border. The air hums with cautious diplomacy: Moscow's orders pulse through Seoul and Harbin, urging restraint, probing, deterring, but never inviting full-scale conflict. Yet every patrol, every reconnaissance, seems to tilt the balance toward escalation.   #177 The point of no return for the USSR and Japan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Days passed and the local emissaries had not been released by the Russians. Domei reported from Seoul that the authorities were growing worried; the "brazen" actions of Soviet front-line forces infuriated the Manchurians and Japanese. From Seoul, too, came ominous news that villagers were preparing to evacuate because they feared fighting would soon begin in the Changkufeng area. While diplomatic activity continued in Moscow without effect, the Tokyo press continued to report intense military activity throughout the Soviet Far East—the greatest massing of troops in months, with planes, armored cars, and motorized equipment choking the Trans-Siberian railway. The press was dominated by commentary about the danger of war. One enterprising Tokyo publisher ran advertisements under the heading: "The Manchukuo-Soviet Border Situation Is Urgent—Ours Is the Only Detailed Map of the Soviet Far East: Newspaper-size, in seven clear colors, offset printed, only 50 sen." Although the Manchukuoan foreign office issued a statement on 20 July about the dire consequences the Soviets were inviting, it is probable that the next Russian actions, of a conciliatory nature, were reached independently. Either Moscow had taken almost a week to make the decision, or the diplomatic conversations there had had an effect. Local Japanese authorities reported inactivity on the Changkufeng front from the morning of 23 July. On the next day, word was received that the USSR proposed to return the two emissaries as "trespassers." At midday on 26 July, the Russians released the blindfolded agents at a border site along the Novokievsk road. After completing the formalities, the Japanese asked the Russians for a reply concerning local settlement of the incident. According to Japanese sources, the "flustered" Colonel Grebennik answered: "My assignment today was merely to turn over the envoys. As for any request about the Changkufeng Incident, our guard commander must have asked for instructions from the central government. I think this is the type of matter which must be answered by the authorities at Moscow through diplomatic channels." Grebennik's postwar recollection does not differ appreciably from the Japanese version. Soviet sources mention a second effort by the Japanese military to deliver a message under more forceful circumstances. On 23 July a Soviet border unit drove off a four-man party. Russian cavalry, sent to investigate, discovered that the Japanese had pulled down a telegraph pole, severed lines 100–150 meters inside Soviet territory, absconded with wire, and left behind a white flag and a letter. Undated, unsigned, and written in Korean, the message struck Grebennik as being substantively the same as the communication delivered formally by the emissaries on 18 July. Japanese materials make no reference to a second, informal effort by local forces, but there is little reason to doubt that such an attempt, perhaps unauthorized, was made. Although Japanese efforts at low-level negotiations came to naught, two observations emerged from the local authorities and the press. First, on-the-spot negotiations had broken down; it had been difficult even to reclaim the emissaries, and the Russians in the Posyet region were using various pretexts to refer matters to diplomatic echelons. Second, the Russians had released the men. Some interpreted this as the first evidence of Soviet sincerity; possibly, the USSR would even return Matsushima's body as a step toward settlement. Other Japanese observers on the scene warned the public that it was imperative to stay on guard: "All depends on how diplomacy proceeds and how the front-line troops behave." Yet the excitement in the Japanese press began to abate. It is difficult to ascertain the nature of the decision-making process on the Russian side after the Japanese attempted local negotiations. The Soviets contend that nothing special had been undertaken before the Japanese provoked matters at the end of July. Grebennik, however, admits that after receiving the two Japanese communications, "we started to prepare against an attack on us in the Lake Khasan area." He and a group of officers went to Changkufeng Hill and sent as many border guards there as possible. Although he personally observed Japanese troops and instructed his officers to do the same, he denied categorically that the Russians constructed trenches and fortifications. Only the observation of Manchurian territory was intensified while instructions were awaited from higher headquarters. For its part, the Korea Army was carrying out Imperial general headquarters first instructions while pursuing a wait-and-see policy. On 16 July, Korea Army Headquarters wired an important operations order to Suetaka. With a view toward a possible attack against intruders in the Khasan area, the army planned to make preparations. The division commander was to alert stipulated units for emergency dispatch and send key personnel to the Kyonghun sector to undertake preparations for an attack. Lt. Col. Senda Sadasue, BGU commander of the 76th Infantry Regiment, was to reconnoiter, reinforce nearby districts, and be ready for emergencies. Particular care was enjoined not to irritate the Soviet side. Maj. Gen. Yokoyama Shinpei, the Hunchun garrison commander, was to maintain close contact with the BGU and take every precaution in guarding the frontiers. Like Senda, Yokoyama was warned against irritating the Russians. Korea Army Headquarters also dispatched staff to the front and had them begin preparations, envisaging an offensive. Upon receipt of the army order, Suetaka issued implementing instructions from his Nanam headquarters at 4:30 A.M. on the 17th. The following units were to prepare for immediate alert: the 38th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 75th Infantry Regiment, 27th Cavalry Regiment, 5th Antiaircraft Regiment, and 19th Engineer Regiment. The same instructions applied to the next units, except that elements organic to the division were designated: the 76th Infantry Regiment, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, and 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment. Another order enjoined utmost care not to irritate the Russians; Japanese actions were to be masked. Next came a directive to the forces of Senda and K. Sato. The former comprised mainly the 76th Infantry BGU and a cavalry platoon. The latter was built around the 75th Infantry Regiment, the Kucheng garrison unit, another cavalry platoon, two mountain artillery and one heavy field artillery battalion, and the 19th Engineers. Suetaka's idea about a solution to the border troubles had become concrete and aggressive. From the night of July 17, concentration would be accomplished gradually. The exact timing of the attack would be determined by subsequent orders; in Senda's area, there was no such restriction regarding "counteraction brought on by enemy attack." Division signal and intendant officers would conduct reconnaissance related to communications, billeting, food, and supplies. Sato and his subordinates were to reconnoiter personally. Having ordered the division to begin concentration and to stand by, Korea Army Headquarters was prepared the next morning, July 17, to direct the movement. Nevertheless, there was concern in Seoul that Suetaka's advance elements might cross the Tumen River into Manchurian territory, which could result in a clash with Soviet troops. Such an outcome might run counter to the principle established by Imperial general headquarters. Consequently, it was decided that "movement east of the river would therefore have to be forbidden in the Korea Army's implementing order." Nakamura transmitted his operational instructions to Suetaka at 6:00 on July 17: "No great change in latest situation around Lake Khasan. Soviet forces are still occupying Changkufeng area. Diplomaticlevel negotiations on part of central authorities and Manchukuoan government do not appear to have progressed. Considering various circumstances and with view to preparations, this army will concentrate elements of 19th Division between Shikai, Kyonghun, Agochi." Restrictions stipulated that the division commander would transport the units by rail and motor vehicle and concentrate them in the waiting zone in secret. Movement was to begin on the night of July 17 and to be completed the next day. Further orders, however, must govern unit advance east of the Tumen as well as use of force. The remainder of the division was to stay ready to move out. Troops were to carry rations for about two weeks.   Late that day, Suetaka received an order by phone for his subordinates in line with Seoul's instructions. Senda would handle the concentration of elements assembling at Kyonghun, and Sato would do the same for the main units arriving at Agochi. A communications net was to be set up quickly. Caution was to be exercised not to undertake provocative actions against the opposite bank of the Tumen, even for reconnaissance. The division would dispatch two trains from Hoeryong and four from Nanam. At 11:58 pm on 18 July, the first train left Hoeryong for Agochi. Concentration of units was completed by dawn. By that time, the Japanese had dispatched to the border 3,236 men and 743 horses. Past midnight on 20 July, Division Chief of Staff Nakamura wired headquarters that the division was ready to take any action required, having completed the alert process by 11 pm. Japanese scouting of the Changkufeng sector began in earnest after mid-July. Although the affair had seemed amenable to settlement, Sato took steps for an emergency from around the 14th. His thoughts centered on readiness for an attack against Changkufeng, which simultaneously required reconnaissance for the assault and preparation to pull the regiment back quickly to Hoeryong if a withdrawal was ordered. After arriving at Haigan on 18 July, Sato set out with several engineers. At Kucheng, the officers donned white Korean clothing, presumably the disguise directed by the division—and boarded native oxcarts for a leisurely journey southward along the Korean bank of the Tumen across from Changkufeng. The seemingly innocent "farmers" studied the river for crossing sites and Changkufeng Hill for the extent of enemy activity. On the hill's western slope, in Manchurian territory, three rows of Russian entanglements could be observed 300 feet below the crest. Only a handful of soldiers were visible, probably a platoon, certainly not more than a company. Infantry Captain Yamada Teizo conducted secret reconnaissance of the entire Changkufeng-Hill 52 sector for 314 hours in the afternoon of 18 July. Even after intense scanning through powerful binoculars, he could detect no more than 19 lookouts and six horsemen; camouflage work had been completed that day, and there were ten separate covered trench or base points. Barbed wire, under camouflage, extended about four meters in depth, yet even Yamada's trained eye could not determine whether there was one line of stakes or two. He jotted down what he could see and compared his information with that learned from local police. Artillery Colonel R. Tanaka shared the view that the Soviets had intruded. When he went reconnoitering along the Korean bank, he observed Russian soldiers entrenched around the hilltop, easily visible through binoculars at a range of two kilometers. Trenches had been dug 20 to 30 meters below the crest on the western slope. Eventually, there were three rows of barbed wire, the first just below the trenches and the lowest 100 meters under the summit. Tanaka estimated Soviet strength at two companies (about 200 men). Suetaka's intelligence officer, Sasai, recalls seeing barbed wire after Japanese units deployed to the front on 18–19 July; he had surmised then that the entanglements were being prepared out of fear of a Japanese assault.   To obtain first-hand information, the Gaimusho ordered a section chief, Miura Kazu'ichi, to the spot. Between 23 July and the cease-fire in August, Miura collected data at Kyonghun and transmitted reports from the consulate at Hunchun. On 28 July he visited Sozan on the Korean bank. He observed Soviet soldiers on the western slopes of Changkufeng, digging trenches and driving stakes. These actions were clearly on Manchukuoan territory even according to Soviet maps. Miura insisted that he saw no friendly troops on territory claimed by the Russians and observed no provocative actions by the Japanese. These statements are supported by a map drawn for him in early August by Division Staff Officer Saito Toshio, a sketch Miura retained as late as 1947. Miura's testimony is tempered by his assertion that he saw a red flag flying near the top of Changkufeng Hill. This contention conflicts with all evidence, as Russian lawyers at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East argued, it is improbable that a Soviet frontier post, highly interested in camouflage, would have hoisted a pennon so large that it could be seen from Sozan. Russian sources are unanimous in stating that no flag was put up until 6 August and that no trenches or entanglements were established by Soviet border guards in July, at least prior to the 29th. The two Army General staff consultants, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Seoul on 16 July, the day Korea Army Headquarters was ordering an alert for the 19th Division "with a view toward a possible attack against enemy intruders." Inada dispatched them mainly to inspect the frontline situation; but he had not fully decided on reconnaissance in force. At Shikai, Arisue and Kotani donned Korean garb and traveled by oxcart on the Korean side of the Tumen, reconnoitering opposite the Shachaofeng sector. Kotani was convinced that hostile possession of Changkufeng posed a serious threat to the Korean railway. He agreed with the division's estimate that, if the Japanese did decide to seize Changkufeng, it ought not to be too difficult. Arisue, as senior observer, dispatched messages from Kyonghun to Tokyo detailing their analysis and recommendations. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, on 17 July the central military authorities received a cable from the Japanese envoy in Moscow, Colonel Doi Akio, reporting that prospects for a diplomatic settlement were nil. The USSR was taking a hard line because Japan was deeply involved in China, though there were domestic considerations as well. The Russians, however, showed no intention of using the border incident to provoke war. It would be best for Japan to seize Changkufeng quickly and then press forward with parleys. Meanwhile, Japan should conduct an intensive domestic and external propaganda campaign. There was mounting pressure in the high command that negotiations, conducted "unaided," would miss an opportunity. Based on reports from Arisue and Kotani, that army seemed to be contemplating an unimaginative, ponderous plan: an infantry battalion would cross the Tumen west of Changkufeng and attack frontally, while two more battalions would cross south of Kyonghun to drive along the river and assault Changkufeng from the north. Inada sent a telegram on 17 July to Arisue for "reference." Prospects had diminished that Soviet troops would withdraw as a result of negotiation. As for the attack ideas Arisue mentioned, Inada believed it necessary to prepare to retake Changkufeng with a night attack using small forces. To avoid widening the crisis, the best plan was a limited, surprise attack using ground units. The notion of a surprise attack drew on the Kwantung Army's extensive combat experience in Manchuria since 1931.  The next morning, after the forward concentration of troops was completed, Suetaka went to the front. From Kucheng, he observed the Changkufeng district and decided on concrete plans for use of force. Meanwhile, Nakamura was curbing any hawkish courses at the front. As high-command sources privately conceded later, the younger officers in Tokyo sometimes seemed to think the commander was doing too good a job; there was covert sentiment that it might be preferable if someone in the chain of command acted independently before the opportunity slipped away. This is significant in light of the usual complaints by responsible central authorities about gekokujo—insubordination—by local commands. An important report influencing the high command's view arrived from Kwantung Army Intelligence on 19 July: according to agents in Khabarovsk, the USSR would not let the Changkufeng incident develop into war; Russians also believed there would be no large-scale Soviet intrusion into their territory. By 19 July, the Tokyo operations staff was considering the best method to restore control of the lost hill by force, since Seoul appeared to maintain its laissez-faire stance. On 18 July, Arisue and Kotani were instructed by Imperial General headquarters to assist the Korea Army and the 19th Division regarding the Changkufeng Incident. What the Army general staff operations officers sought was an Imperial General headquarters order, requiring Imperial sanction, that would instruct the Korea Army to evict the Russian troops from Changkufeng the way the Kwantung Army would, using units already under Nakamura's command. The sense was that the affair could be handled locally, but if the USSR sought to escalate the incident, it might be prudent for that to occur before the Hankow operation began. The IGHQ and War Ministry coordinated the drafting of an IGHQ order on 19–20 July: "We deem it advisable to eradicate Soviet challenges . . . by promptly delivering blow on this occasion against unit which crossed border at Changkufeng. That unit is in disadvantageous spot strategically and tactically; thus, probability is scant that dispute would enlarge, and we are investigating countermeasures in any case. Careless expansion of situation is definitely not desired. We would like you people also to conduct studies concerning mode of assault employing smallest strength possible for surprise attack against limited objective. Kindly learn general atmosphere here [Tokyo] from [Operations] Major Arao Okikatsu." The 20th of July proved to be a hectic day in Korea, and even more so in Tokyo. The division had informed the Korea Army that it was finally "ready to go," a message received in Seoul in the early hours. Then Arisue received a wire from Inada presenting limited-attack plans and noting that Arao was on the way. By that day, Japanese intelligence judged there were 400 Soviet troops and two or three mountain guns south of Paksikori. Russian positions at Changkufeng had been reinforced, but no aggressive intentions could be detected. Soviet ground elements, as well as materiel, appeared to be moving from Vladivostok and Slavyanka toward Posyet. Suetaka headed back to the front. Sato told him that it was absolutely necessary to occupy Chiangchunfeng Hill across the Tumen in Manchurian territory. Upon reaching the Wuchiatzu sector and inspecting the situation, Suetaka agreed to send a small unit to Chiangchunfeng on his own authority.  Colonel Sato Kotoku had ordered one company to move across the Tumen toward Chiangchunfeng on 21 July, a maneuver that did not escape the Russians' notice. On 24 July, the same day another Japanese unit occupied Shangchiaoshan Hill, Marshal Blyukher ordered the 40th Rifle Division, stationed in the Posyet area to be placed on combat readiness, with a force of regulars assigned to back the Soviet border guards; two reinforced rifle battalions were detached as a reserve. According to Japanese records, Russian border patrols began appearing around Huichungyuan, Yangkuanping, and Shachaofeng from 26 July, but no serious incidents were reported at that stage. At about 9:30 am on 29 July, Captain Kanda, the 2nd Company commander of Lieutenant Colonel Senda's 76th Border Garrison Unit, was observing the Shachaofeng area from his Kucheng cantonments. Through his glasses, Kanda observed four or five Soviet soldiers engaged in construction on high ground on the west side of Shachaofeng. Kanda notified Senda, who was at BGU Headquarters inspecting the forward areas. Senda transmitted the information to Suetaka. Deciding to cross the Tumen for a closer look, Senda set off with Kanda. A little after 11 am, they reached Chiangchunfeng Hill, where the men from Captain Noguchi's company were already located. Senda verified, to his own satisfaction, that as many as 10 enemy infantrymen had "violated the border" to a depth of 350 meters, "even by the Soviets' contention", and were starting construction 1,000 meters south of Shachaofeng. Senda decided to oust the Russian force "promptly and resolutely," in light of the basic mission assigned his unit. He telephoned Suetaka, who was in Kyonghun, and supplied the intelligence and the recommendation. Subordinates recalled Suetaka's initial reaction when the BGU reported a Soviet intrusion about a mile and a half north of Changkufeng. "The arrogant Russians were making fools of the Japanese, or were trying to. At stake was not a trifling hill and a few invaders, but the honor of the Imperial Army. In the face of this insult, the general became furious. He insisted upon smashing the enemy right away."  Kanda phoned 2nd Lieutenant Sakuma, who was still at Kucheng, and told him to bring his 25-man platoon across the river by 2 pm Sakuma crossed by boat and arrived at 1:30. Kanda set out from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20, took over Sakuma's unit, bore east, and approached within 700 meters of the enemy. He ordered the men not to fire unless fired upon, and to withdraw quickly after routing the Russians. It is said that the Japanese troops were fired upon as they advanced in deployed formation but did not respond at first. In a valley, casualties were incurred and the Japanese finally returned fire. Sakuma's 1st Squad leader took a light machine gun and pinned down the Russians facing him. Sakuma himself pressed forward with his other two squads, taking advantage of the slope to envelop the enemy from the right. At the same time, he sent a patrol to the high ground on the left to cover the platoon's flank. Thanks to the 1st Squad's frontal assault, the Russians had no chance to worry about their wings, and Sakuma moved forward to a point only 30 meters from the foe's rear. Kanda was now 50 meters from the Russians. When the enemy light machine gun let up, he ordered a charge and, in the lead, personally cut down one of the foe. Sakuma also rushed the Soviets, but when about to bring down his saber he was stabbed in the face while another Russian struck him in the shoulder. Grappling with this assailant, Sakuma felled him. Other Japanese attackers sabered two more Russians and shot the rest. By 3:10 pm the eight enemy "trespassers" had been annihilated. The covering patrol reported that five Soviet horsemen, with a light machine gun, were galloping up from Khasan. Sakuma had his platoon fire grenade dischargers, which smashed the enemy. Seventy more Russian soldiers now came, attacking from northwest of the lake and supported by fire from the east side. Using light machine guns and grenade dischargers, Sakuma checked them. Meanwhile, Miyashita's platoon, part of Noguchi's company, had departed from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20 pm and swung right until it reached the crestline between Changkufeng and Kanda's company. One squad faced 200 Russians on Changkufeng; the other faced the enemy south of Shachaofeng. Soviet forces opened intense machine-gun fire from Changkufeng and from the high ground east of the lake. After 20 minutes, Kanda's unit charged, two or three Russians fled, and Miyashita's platoon shot one down. Senda, who had gone with Miyashita, directed the platoon's movements and proceeded north, under fire, to Kanda's unit. Once the Russians had been cleared out, Senda forbade pursuit across the boundary and gradually withdrew his forces to the heights line 800 meters southwest. It was 4:30 then. By 5 pm Soviet reinforcements, apparently brought up from the Changkufeng and Paksikori sectors, advanced anew. With 80 men in the front lines, the enemy pushed across the border to a depth of at least 500 meters, according to the Japanese, and began to establish positions. Several tanks and many troops could be observed in the rear. Senda had Noguchi's company hold Chiangchunfeng. Kanda's unit, reinforced by 33 men from Kucheng, was to occupy the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, while Imagawa's company of the 76th Regiment was to occupy other high ground to the west. Senda then reported the situation to Suetaka in Kyonghun and asked for reinforcements. In Seoul, Army headquarters understood the developments reported by Suetaka as a response to the hostile border violation, and about 20 men of the Kucheng BGU under Lt. Sakuma drove the enemy out between 2:30 and 3 pm. Afterward, Sakuma pulled back to high ground two kilometers south of Yangkuanping to avoid trouble and was now observing the foe. Although Seoul had heard nothing about Japanese losses, Corp. Akaishizawa Kunihiko personally observed that Kanda had been wounded in the face by a grenade and bandaged, that Sakuma had been bayoneted twice and also bandaged, and that the dead lay on the grass, covered with raincoats. According to Suetaka "the enemy who had crossed the border south of Shachaofeng suffered losses and pulled back once as a result of our attack at about 2:30 pm". By about 4:30, Suetaka continued, the Russians had built up their strength and attacked the platoon on the heights southwest of Shachaofeng. Behind the Russian counterattack, there were now several tanks. Earlier, Suetaka noted ominously that several rounds of artillery had been fired from the Changkufeng area; "therefore, we reinforced our units too, between 5 and 6 pm., and both sides are confronting each other." Details as to the fate of Sakuma's platoon are not given, but it is now admitted that casualties were incurred on both sides. The Korea Army Headquarters consequently reported to Tokyo in the evening that, according to information from the division, 20 Japanese had driven out the Russians near Shachaofeng; 25 men from Senda's unit were occupying the heights 600 meters west of Changkufeng; and another 16 men were deployed in ambush at Yangkuanping. Such an enumeration would have tended to suggest that only a few dozen Japanese were across the Tumen on the 29th. But a review of the numbers of combat troops committed and the reinforcements sent by Senda reveals that Japanese strength across the river was in the hundreds by nightfall. In Moscow, Tass reported that on 29 July detachments of Japanese-Manchukuoan intruders had attempted to seize high ground apparently located 0.5 miles north of a Russian position. The assailants had been "completely repelled from Soviet territory, as a result of measures taken by Russian frontier guards," and instructions had been sent to the embassy in Tokyo to protest strongly. Walter Duranty, the veteran American correspondent in Moscow, heard that the Japanese press had published reports, likely intended for internal consumption, that hours of furious fighting had occurred at the points in question. Since the dispatches were unsubstantiated and "failed to gain credence anywhere outside Japan," Duranty claimed this may have forced the Japanese to translate into action their boast of "applying force" unless their demands were satisfied. "Now, it appears, they have applied force, unsuccessfully." The Soviet communiqué on the Shachaofeng affair, despite its firm tone, appeared unostentatiously in the following day's Pravda and Izvestiya under the headline, "Japanese Militarists Continue Their Provocation." The Japanese Embassy in Moscow heard nothing about the Shachaofeng affray until the morning of the 30th, when a wire was received from the Gaimusho that ten Russian soldiers had occupied a position northwest of Changkufeng and had begun trench work until ejected by frontier guards. Since the Russian communiqué spoke of afternoon fighting, American correspondents concluded that Soviet troops must have counterattacked and driven off the Japanese. No additional information was available to the public in Moscow on the 30th, perhaps because it was a holiday. Nevertheless, in the afternoon, Stalin's colleague Kaganovich addressed an immense crowd in Moscow on "Railroad Day" and at the conclusion of a long, vigorous speech said:  "The Soviet Union is prepared to meet all enemies, east or west." It certainly was not a fighting speech and there is no reason to suppose the Soviet will abandon its firm peace policy unless Japan deliberately forced the issue. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Diplomacy flickered as Moscow pressed restraint and Tokyo whispered calculated bravado. As July wore on, both sides massed troops, built trenches, and sent scouts across the river. A tense, hidden war unfolded, skirmishes, patrols, and small advances, until a fleeting moment when force collided with restraint, and the hill's future hung in the frost.

On this episode of TMWS, I have two guests who are both from the West Limestone area in Limestone County, Alabama. My first guest is Alex White as she shares about her daughter's fight with hydrocephalus. This is a recent diagnosis, and the family is in the early stages of navigating this battle. After that, we'll be talking to Andrew Harbin in Rogersville, Alabama, as he shares about his family business, Pork Belly BBQ, and their effort to support the community through small business ownership. Listen & share.

Last time we spoke about the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict. The border between Soviet Manchuria and Japanese-occupied territories emerges not as a single line but as a mosaic of contested spaces, marks, and memories. A sequence of incidents, skirmishes along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, reconnaissance sorties, and the complex diplomacy of Moscow, Tokyo, and peripheral actors to trace how risk escalated from routine patrols to calibrated leverage. On the ground, terrain functioned as both obstacle and argument: ridges like Changkufeng Hill shaping sightlines, river valleys shaping decisions, and markers weathered by snow, wind, and drift. In command tents, officers translated terrain into doctrine: contingency plans, supply routes, and the precarious calculus of restraint versus escalation. Both nations sought to establish firmer defensive barriers against the other. Inevitably they were destined to clash, but how large that clash would become, nobody knew.   #176 The Changkufeng Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we broke down a general history of the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict and how it escalated significantly by 1938. Colonel Inada Masazum serving as chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March of 1938 would play a significant role in this story. When the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Changkufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers had been impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Changkufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers had described rowing across the stream as "rather difficult."  Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles moved easily; the Maanshan section comprised the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line between the harbor and town of Novokievsk. Near Changkufeng, hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for vehicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover against aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiangchunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement difficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. At Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but offered none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited. Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no mention of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use, as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Russian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Manchuria from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changkufeng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation between Hongui and Shikai stations. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, lay 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of Japanese shelling of Vladivostok, at an incredible range of 80 miles that was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border. Hills and questions were thought to have two sides. It was the consensus of Japanese that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to them, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. Inada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights. Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts crystallized. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force known as iryoku teisatsu in the strategic sense. Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat intelligence, at the Imperial General Headquarters level the concept was far more sweeping. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome coincidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese exploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war of attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostilities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Japanese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Changkufeng sector, described as "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artillery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged, although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division without tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by Imperial General Headquarters working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces. Calm, clear, and dispassionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demarcation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not insist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the local forces would be withdrawn. As Inada described it "In the process, we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved." The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal, the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Colonel Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had wisely kept the aggressive division away from Changkufeng Hill, but now Imperial general headquarters had its own overriding ideas and needs. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one infantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on Imperial general headquarters responsibility, without considerations of "face." At worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians." In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overextended in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight Imperial general headquarters control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. Inada recalled "How would the Russians react? That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it." By mid-July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan titled, "Imperial General headqaurters Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Considering that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the frontier of Korea, Imperial General headqaurters would immediately urge the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest. Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw voluntarily. On the basis of the guidance received from Imperial General headqaurters, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July. Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. At the same time, military authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal. Even then, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident were not in agreement that everybody at command level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada claimed to be. Some thought that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youthful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; others denied the existence of such an idea. Inada remained clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insisted, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restrictions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the Army general staff and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease." The only real opposition, Inada recalled, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN operations section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly. The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as opposed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If one accepts the comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallow-minded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army. Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, were sharp, cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command to the new Korea Army commander, General Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristic ally displayed a wariness that was reinforced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. At 10:00 on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by Imperial General headquarters officers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalled that when he saw Nakamura off on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserted, promised full cooperation. There was no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force. When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area. Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the Army general staff chief. The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters. Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Colonel Arisue Yadoru in Operations and Major Kotani Etsuo a specialist in Soviet intelligence. Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada stated that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration," he admitted that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalled hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of the Wuhan operation. Koiso had disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division. By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem." Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff. Its commander had been allotted prime responsibility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest-ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the command and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. Imperial General headqaurters would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It had not been the type of incident which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. Imperial General headquarters had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explained that operational guidance by Imperial General headquarters and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "wild boars."    There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two Army general staff experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalled that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue performed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order. Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, that the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures" were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japanese press had not yet given the incident page-one treatment. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japanese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japanese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. Informants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937. Irked by the Korea Army's timidity and eager for first-hand information, the Kwantung Army dispatched two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu. If you listen to my pacific war week by week podcast or echoes of war, you know I highlight Tsuji Masanobu as one of the most evil Japanese officers of WW2. No other way to describe this guy, he was a shithead. In his memoirs, Tsuji asserted that he and Ogoshi climbed Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian territory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion." Although his account aligned with the general thrust, Ogoshi contended that Tsuji could not have accompanied him. According to sources with the 19th Division, when Koiso learned that Tsuji and Ogoshi were disparaging the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted. Ogoshi replied that the army staff was not angry, but Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Ogoshi surmised that Koiso's concern was that emotional outsiders such as Tsuji could provoke trouble, perhaps even war, if they visited Changkufeng. This view was widely shared. Inada stated that he made a practice of keeping away to maintain the degree of detachment and impartiality required of high command authorities. One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by observers from Hsinking was provided by Lt. Colonel Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which handled Manchukuo affairs, primarily political direction. When Katakura visited the Operations Section, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways to evict the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. General Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff, who was already in possession of the draft of an operations order calling for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Russians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a matter to be handled solely by the operations staff. Borders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section, along with the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies, were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions based on having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participation by forces under Kwantung Army command. Staff officers in Tokyo believed that Hsinking could not see the forest for the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate escalation of a negligible frontier incident undoubtedly stemmed from a failure to grasp the strategic requirements of national defense—pursuit of the campaign in China, the nurturance of Manchukuo, and the buildup of operational readiness for the ultimate solution of the Soviet problem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities pressed for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Consequently, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as a "background." Meanwhile, it remained the Imperial will that utmost prudence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautious instructions to subordinate units, especially those on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions did not end the discontent and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Headquarters, nor did they quiet the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki. Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army naïvely sought to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Haensing regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements. On the spot, the situation inflamed. During the afternoon of 15 July, a Japanese military police patrol from Korea reconnoitered at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claimed that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria. The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier that had been violated by thirty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, asserted that Matsushima's effects included a notebook containing reconnaissance results and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled after being challenged. Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the disputed border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a counterprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the negotiations. In his memoirs, he stated that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. The shooting occurred as the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter appeared not to share such an intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they claimed to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might have been imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north as Tungning on the eastern Manchurian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. At Changkufeng, Russian soldiers fortified the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence estimated that Soviet troop strength near Changkufeng had grown to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July. As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, "It would seem that settlement of the affair had become increasingly difficult." Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya sent two emissaries bearing the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor,"set out on 18 July, carrying a message in one hand and a white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report the next day that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night, and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which had been transmitted to higher authorities. Still, the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles behind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front had increased since the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping incidents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on daytime reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese asserted that their forbearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged "Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair at Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Japanese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mortars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; officers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Inada Masazum, studying maps and mud, saw Changkufeng Hill as a prize with peril, a test of nerve rather than a conquest. Tokyo's orders pulsed through Seoul and Harbin: guard, probe, and deter, but avoid full-scale war. Across the border, Soviet units pressed closer, lights and tents flickering on the hillside. The sea within sight whispered of strategy, diplomacy, and a warning: a single misstep could redraw Asia. And so the standoff waited, patient as winter.

The last time we spoke, Ishiwara had been spending considerable amounts of time with the Kwantung Army staff trying to figure out a way to push the envelope on seizing Manchuria. Ishiwara and his like minded colleagues had tried everything to persuade the Imperial Japanese army high command to initiate a course of action, but everytime the message was the same “wait, wait until next year, we can't do this at this time”. In 1931 Ishiwara and Itagaki organized the last major expedition into Northern Manchuria to get the newest recruited Kwantung officers up to speed and ready for plans they had been cooking up. Captain Nakamura Shintaro disappeared on the way back to Port Arthur. The Kwantung officers took the initiative, one could call it “Gekokujo / ruling from below” because without approval, in fact basically against the orders of high command they mobilized their forces outside their designated railway zone and headed for Mukden to quote “get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance”. When Tokyo HQ got a whiff of this they dispatched a telegram immediately demanding the Kwantung officers get their men back and not use the Nakamura incident as a way of “solving the Manchurian problem”   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. He doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . During the last hectic weeks, General Honjo Shigeru arrived to take command of the Kwantung Army and there is no solid evidence Ishiwara and his radical group had disclosed their plans to him. However when everything began to move into motion, Honjo agreed to Ishiwara's military solution for the Manchurian problem.   On september 18th of 1931, a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army upon the south manchurian railway tracks at Liutiaokou. There was an explosion and the Kwantung army immediately claimed it to be a Chinese plot and moved with skill and precision to overrun the Peitaying Barracks. General Honjo's first reaction was hesitation, but then he committed additional units to aid the radicals and upon seeing the chaos unfold, ordered the seizure of all of Mukden in the process. Investigators would find the actions of Honjo over the course of the next few days to be quite indecisive. At first he seemed to be attempting to localize the incident, but then, likely as a result of Ishiwara and Itagaki pressuring him, relented to ordering a general assault on all Chinese positions in the area. Thus what was a isolated incident, transformed into a major offensive, and that major offensive was largely directed by two of Honjo's subordinates, as you may guess Ishiwara and Itagaki.   Now after the bomb explosion, the next 10 days saw southern and central Manchuria suddenly under the control of the Kwantung army. Itagaki as a senior staff officer and full colonel, was technically Ishiwara's superior, but for the next 4 months it appears Ishiwara was the main driver behind the military actions. Itagaki was quote to say to a friend during the offensive “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's War”. And indeed, being so far from Tokyo HQ's control, it really was Ishiwara's war. Tokyo dispatched official orders on September the 19th opposing the offensive, despite a lot of sympathy for the cause amongst the high commanders. Ishiwara and Inagaki had been planning this for months, they were willing to risk it all, so they disobeyed and carried on. Ishiwara began by first coercing Honjo for reinforcements and freedom to take initiative, as he was quoted asking ‘to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”.   Now obviously Ishiwara and Itagaki wanted to expand the offensive through the officials means firstmost, but they definitely went around the officials channels as well. One devious method they employed was to create chaos for civilians in Manchurian cities, thus increasing the need for better security for Japanese residents. This would allow the Kwantung army troops to deploy past their set perimeters. Immediately after what is now called “the Mukden incident”, military agents were dispatched to Kirin to create some chaos within the city. Reports of incidents from Kirin began to poor into the Kwantung Army HQ alongside Ishiwara demanding Honjo dispatch forces to Kirin to protect Japanese residents there. He also advocated for demanding reinforcements from the Korea Army, but Honjo was unwilling to go that far. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.    The operation against Kirin was carried out in lightning fast speed. Ishiwara directed the bulk of the 2nd division led by General Tamon Jiro to rush over to Kirin by rail. They entered the city without firing a single shot and forced the local Chinese commander to proclaim the independence of the province from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours after this, the Korea army responded to a aid request sent out by the Kwantung Army staff on september 21st and began moving into Manchuria. Within only 48 hours the Japanese military had seized Kirin which lay outside the Kwantung operational zone and the Korea army was invading Manchuria without any approval from Tokyo, military discipline thus had been shattered.    Chief of staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to limit the scope of the Kwantung army's operations and entrusted discretionary authority to the field commanders for certain emergency situations, usually of a local nature. The Kirin expedition did not exactly fall within any of these boundaries. Bolstered by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki followed up the Kirin operation by pressing for an advance upon Harbin. As you might recall from the previous episode, the entire idea of taking Manchuria was built upon speed and precision. The Kwantung army had tiny forces compared to the immediate Chinese forces in Manchuria. However here they were blocked by directives sent from Tokyo HQ which forbade the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the south manchuria railway, up to this point they had limited their actions along those margins. Ishiwara attempted arguing something on more political lines. He argued Japan should aid Manchurian independence and sent the idea straight to Tokyo central HQ. In a sharp rebuff on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ affirmed its opposition to expanding the hostilities and rejected the political idea.   With the hard no from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals thought the only course of action was to cause even more chaos to force the issue. Ishiwara took the lead again, trying to toss Tokyo HQ off balance. Ishiwara personally went out on October the 8th, dressed in military pilot gear and slipped into one of five Chinese aircraft that had been seized at Mukdens airfield. He then personally led a raid, though later in life, such as at the Tokyo War crimes trials he would argue the flight was supposed to be just a reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. As he asserted, it was only at the last minute, some intelligence sprang up that anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou and thus the Kwantung army Commander had given permission to neutralize them if fired upon. Ishiwara stated that he and the 4 other aircraft accompanying him were fired upon and thus they dropped around 75 bombs on Chinchou, yes quite the course of events. As you might guess, more contemporary accounts would indicate this was a premeditated effort designed to freak out Tokyo.    The raid against Chinchou did indeed freak out Tokyo, the staff there began to fear the west would begin tossing condemnation upon them. Tokyo high command was in a bad spot. They felt obliged to back up the Kwantung army publically, by issuing post-facto approval of the many chaotic attacks, but internally they were livid. Major Endo Saburo of the intelligence division was sent to Manchuria to investigate the Chinchou situation. Saburo said upon asking Ishiwara what occurred, he responded that he had acted under the principle of field initiative and that was the reason why he never informed Tokyo in advance. Saburo also noted the manner in which he spoke to him indicated that Saburo alongside the intelligence division should mind their own business. Saburo also found out there were murmurs in Manchuria that if Tokyo high command did not get onboard, the Kwantung army was prepared to go it alone. It seemed the radical Kwantung officers would even go against the imperial japanese army command to get what they wanted. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire”.If you thought this was pretty nuts, a rumor also emerged that Ishiwara and Itagaki were going to use an independent Manchuria as a base to perform a coup d'etat against the Japanese government, to overthrow the capitalists strangling the people and to establish a national socialist regime built around the emperor. For those of you who know your 1930's Japanese government by assassination history, you know exactly what this rumor is about, a little something that will occur in 1936. Whether Ishiwara and Itagaki actually intended to do this is unknown, but they certainly put out the word.   On october 18th, war minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram over to the Kwantung army ordering them to cease any and all talk of making Manchuria independent or trying to take control of it. Alongside that, they sent operations section, Colonel Imamura Hitoshi to Manchuria to talk some sense into Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”.   And so despite the chaos and mania, the Kwantung Army had been restrained from pursuing any sustained military action through october. Ishiwara as you would imagine kept arguing they had to advance into northern manchuria. In early november Ishiwara got lucky again, finding a pretext in more destroyed railways. The rail bridges over the Nonni river south of Tsitsihar had allegedly been blown up by hostile Chinese forces. When Japanese engineer units showed up to repair the damaged tracks they were fired upon by Chinese forces. To the high officials in Tokyo it looked like a justifiable reason to take defensive measures. This was also being meet with Kwantung intelligence information being sent to Tokyo that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had provided some rather exaggerated reports to the Japanese public to manipulate their opinion through the press which in turn put pressure on Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern manchuria.   Tokyo authorized a defensive operation, limited to time and distance aimed at defending the Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung army forces began moving north and soon were engaged in heavy fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led men during this, it would actually be the only time in his military career to do so. General Honjo, rightfully feared the Kwantung forces were getting out of hand sent a cabled on November 5th announcing under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate”, the general staff was assuming direct command authority in Manchuria. As you can imagine Ishiwara and his like minded Kwantung officer colleagues were livid. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.    Facing yet another terrible situation publicly, the IJA high command allowed the Kwantung to advance upon Tsitsihar, but then uproar started abroad, forcing them to order the city evacuated. Ishiwara then began a huge argument amongst the staff stating the evacuation was unacceptable because of the sacrifices the forces had already made. But Honjo was standing firm. Then a few days later, Chinese forces began to assemble at Chinchou  and there had been some conflicts emerging between Japanese and chinese forces at Tientsin. Well Ishiwara immediately went to work demanding Honjo launch an offensive on Chinchou as a first step of linking their forces closer to Tientsin incase they were overwhelmed. To secure the advance, they also asked the Korea army to help out. Yet again Tokyo was tossed the hot potato. Tokyo high command ordered an immediate cease to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao river. The Kwantung army paused, not so much before of the order, but because the Korea army refused to participate in the offensive against Chinchou, and they were most definitely needed.    Ishiwara faced a dilemma, without the reinforcements the entire offensive might be doomed. And then fatefully, Premier Wakatsuki was outed on December 11th.War Minister Minami and Chief of staff Kanaya, both who tried to moderate the Kwantung army's offensives were replaced by Araki Sadao an aggressive leader of the Kodoha Faction, known in english as “the imperial way faction”. To explain a bit, within the Japanese military there were cliques, kind of like the warlords cliques in many ways. They fought to direct the future operations of the IJA and even IJN to an extent. There were two main ones that influenced the 1930's heavily, the Kodoha and Toseiha (control faction). The Kodoha were not an organized political party, nor did they have an official standing within the IJA, but they were certainly influential. Kodoha members tended to be younger officers in the IJA, particularly those in the Kwantung army. General Sadao Araki was a founder of the faction and they were heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism and the Kokutai. They sought a return to “the good old days” as one says. They say liberal democracy as a poison hurting Japan. They viewed the capitalists, industrialists and elites of Japan, ie the politicians, bureaucrats and Zaibatsu leaders to be responsible for ruining the once great nation. They wanted to see the Emperor take back full power, in what they would call a “showa restoration”. Their number one enemy, as was viewed by most of the Japanese military at this time, was the USSR and communism as a whole. Thus they were also by proxy in favor of the Hokushin-ron “northern strike policy” which was the Japanese theoretical war plan to invade the USSR. Now I don't want to go to far down the rabbit whole, but due note they were counter balanced by another faction known as the Toseiha faction, who were I guess to put it lightly, more moderate. The Toseiha were headed by Hideki Tojo famously and they opposed the Kodoha faction on a few grounds, one important one being, they did not want to cause a violent revolution to usher in the Emperor dominance. The Toseiha shared a lot of principles with the Kodoha, but they did not favor the Hokushin-ron strategy and instead adopted the Nanshin-ron strategy “southern strike” into southeast asia and the resource rich dutch east indies. It goes without saying the Toseiha faction enjoyed better relations with the IJN. So just to place this story within the political realm we are speaking, these two factions began to compete heavily for dominance 1931 onwards.   With Araki Sadao and some help from Prince Kan'in who was a Kodoha sympathizer things dramatically changed in Tokyo command. All of a sudden, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria became “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung army with Tokyo's full backing soon pursued all their military objectives, set out by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were seized in early January of 1932; Tsitsihar by February and by spring of 1932 Ishiwara argued to the staff they should complete the full seizure of Manchuria both north and south. In April that year he laid out “Manshu haiti heiryaku / the program for pacification of manchuria”. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol.   It goes without saying Ishiwara was central to the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and IJA overall had numerous options laid bare to them to solve the Manchurian problem, but Ishiwara's primary concern was total control over Manchuria for its resources, strategic position and to obtain a continental base for a war against America. To Ishiwara, taking all of Manchuria was necessary to prepare for the Final War. Without Ishiwara it is certain there would have been conflict in Manchuria between Japan and China, but would Japan have outright seized the province? Ishiwara spent years planning and pushing the envelope. When the plan was unleashed, it would turn out Ishiwara and his colleagues did not have a concrete timetable for conquest and lacked quite a few contingency plans. Despite the chaotic nature of it all, the conquest of Manchuria was a stunning success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”.   Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria affair started Japan on an inevitable course to fight the China War, which inturn led her to fight the west. It was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The entire affair also brings into question the subject of military discipline. Many look at the Gekokujo variable as an explanation as to how people like Ishiwara and Itagaki got away with all they did. You know, these militarist hardtype junior officers just ran amok, performed some rebellious acts defying their superiors, forcing their hands to become accomplices. Now don't get me wrong Gekokujo definitely played a hand, particularly when you look at Ishiwara. But it does not take away from the fact there simply was a high level of indiscipline within the Japanese army.   Ishiwara would have been 100% fully aware what his actions might result in, hell the guy before him, Colonel Komoto Daisaku is a great example. Ishiwara spent a long time with Komoto and saw the man's career broken as he was exiled for the Huanggutun incident. But Ishiwara was not only focus on Manchuria, he had a close eye on the political situation in Tokyo. Ishiwara knew the 1931 cabinet was crumbling, he knew certain high officials like Araki Sadao were in fast track position for promotions and their sympathies were with his cause. Ishiwara was betting, certain sympathizers such as Kodoha faction aligned ones would take seats of power necessary to help push his cause. His gamble more than paid off. All the main actors in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their accomplishments. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite 3rd class. More importantly he returned to Japan as a rockstar hero, the younger IJA officers were enthralled by him. Ironically Ishiwara had fostered indiscipline within the army more so, that when he went up the ladder becoming a member of the Tokyo staff it would bite him in the ass.   Manchukuo and racial harmony   Now Ishiwara's dream of taking control over Manchuria was almost purely a means to end end: ie to obtain resources and a strategic position to face America. Once Manchuria was under their control, Ishiwara directed his attention towards another goal aside from this, that of racial cooperation among the asian peoples. Manchukuo or rather Ishiwara's view of what it could be was a springboard of his vision for a East-Asian league, something that had a firm basis in his Final War theory. During Ishiwara's tour of duty in Manchuria in 1932, this Pan-Asian idea of what Manchukuo could be is what set him apart from many of his Kwantung Army colleagues, it also marked him to be very unorthodox within the IJA.    Manchukuo as many of you probably know, was a sham puppet state created to legitimize Japan's seizure of Manchuria. The Japanese high command simply sought to use the guise of an indigenous movement for independence to hide the fact the simply invaded a part of China and stole it. To do this they went as far as grabbing the last Qing emperor, Puyi and tossing him upon the throne of the new state of Manchukuo while they tossed up principles of racial harmony. For obvious reasons this was all done. You can't control a region full of a population that rightfully hates you without trying to win them over. Now what the Japanese did have going for them, was there did exist elements in Manchuria who sought independence. This was Manchuria, the heart of Nurhaci's Manchu people, don't get me started on what a Manchu exactly is by the way, listen to the fall and rise of China podcast for that. The Japanese had a lot to work with, it could be seen as a righteous Qing revival, or simply giving power back to the Manchu. There was also a large presence of Mongolians, and yes Inner Mongolia would come into all of this. Manchuria came into the nationalist fold late and not exactly willingly. Also the fear of the USSR was not something Japan had alone, Manchuria had struggled against the USSR for a very long time. There was also of course a large Japanese settler population in Manchuria who obviously welcomed the seizure. The Zhang Xueliang regime was not exactly too too friendly to the Japanese within the borders and a lot of discriminatory measure had been exacted upon them. When Zhang Xueliang had joined the Nationalists this had basically spelt doom upon them, at some point they knew they would be kicked out.   While the offensives were in full swing, Ishiwara and Itagaki met with other influential Kwantung Officers to figure out how they could exert control over Manchuria. Officer Katakura, chief of staff Miyake, Dohihara Kenji of the Mukden special service organ all met, looking over a previous plan created by Colonel Dohihara, for a multi racial autonomous nation of Manchuria. It was to be headed by the last Qing emperor, Puyi and needed to possess complete autonomy in internal matters, but its defense and foreign relations would be entrusted to Japan. Ishiwara drafted the plans by September 22nd and they were telegrammed to Tokyo on October 2nd. Tokyo high command disproved of the objectives, but nonetheless worked with the Kwantung army for 5 months on the creation of a new state based on two major principles: the so-called indigenous movement for Manchurian independence and the administrative planning for the Kwantung army to control it.    The Kwantung army went to work using the traditional structure of Manchuria, local self governing bodies. They bribed, persuaded and threatened as many as they could throughout 1931 carefully cultivating a local autonomy movement against the Kuomintang hardliners. One of the first things they created was “Jichi Shidobu self-government guidance board”, whose organ was responsible for coordinating various regional movements for independence to work with the Kwantung army to, in the words of Miyake “guide Manchuria to self-government”. The head of this board was appointed to the Mukden elder statesmen Yu Ch'ung-han, a man educated in Japan and previous advisor to Zhang Zuolin. His board would consist of 20 Japanese and 10 Manchurian members. Such organs were opened Japanese civilians in Manchuria and they flocked to them to support the so called multiracial political structure, because they could bend it to their own benefit.   The Kwantung army began tossing the slogans “racial harmony, racial equality and the righteous way” around heavily. The Kwantung army control over Manchuria was hashed out easily by establishing Japanese advisors over all organs who held ultimate veto authority, they would be appointed at all levels of government, thus everything was in reality Japanese controlled. Everything was going according to Ishiwara's vision….or was it? You would think so, and Ishiwara was definitely pushing all of this forward, but by 1933 he suddenly became a ferocious critic of the very beast he had helped create. 

I would like to thank Patreon member Xizer for suggesting this one, as Xizer put it    “An in depth look at General Kanji Ishiwara would be interesting. The man was the architect for the Mukden Incident that led to the Second Sino Japanese War, but he was vehemently opposed to the abuse and exploitation Japan's colonialism indulged in. His vocal condemnation of the brutality and excesses of the Imperial Japanese military foreign policy and Tojo in particular led to his removal, but he couldn't be executed for popularity in the rank and file. Even at the trials after the war he remained defiant, declaring that President Truman should be tried alongside the Axis War criminals for firebombing Japanese cities. He was truly a fascinating figure.   Indeed Kanji Ishiwara is a fascinating character and his story has a startling impact on the Pacific War and global history as a whole. Now by the time I am reading this the script got out of hand, its a long one haha, so it might have to be a multi parter, but I want to limit the first part to Ishiwara and how the Mukden Incident occurred first. It might come further down the road but I will finish the story of this fascinating man later on after hitting up more Patrons desired subjects, without further adieu enjoy part one of Kanji Ishiwara.    Kanji Ishiwara was born in Tsuruoka, Yamagata prefecture on January 18th of 1889. He was the second son of a policeman who was a descendent of a samurai family serving the Shonai Domain. His clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War and as a result of their defeat, alongside other Shogunal allied clans would see themselves shut off from larger governmental positions in Meiji Era Japan. Not to go too deep down that rabbit hole, but domains like Choshu and Satsuma would see the lionshare of higher positions, while domains who served on the opposite side would be cast out more.   Ishiware began his army career at the military preparatory school in Sendai at the age of 13, followed up by 2 years at the Central military preparatory school in tokyo. In 1907 he entered the military academy as a member of its 21st class. He left the academy in july of 1909 with the commission of Lieutenant and an assignment as platoon commander of an infantry regiment in Tohoku. After the annexation of Korea in 1910 his regiment was shipped over to the peninsula and he served at Ch'unch'on in a small garrison. After two years of occupation duty, Ishiwara returned to Tohoku and in 1915 passed the examinations necessary to enter the Army Staff college. He held an outstanding record, graduating top of his class in november of 1918 and would be amongst the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, receiving the imperial sword.   Now in 1920 he had a frustrating assignment with the department of military training he applied for service in China and received an assignment to the Central china garrison in Hankow. He spent a year traveling through central china before returning back to Tokyo in 1921 where he worked as a lecturer at the army staff college. He sought another China assignment, but his superiors sent him instead to Europe, as they did with all their promising young officers. He went to Germany for 3 years, studying languages and military history. In 1925, he was now a Major, 36 years of age and he received an assignment to the faculty of the army staff college to lecture about the history of war. Now from the very beginning of his character, Ishiwara proved himself a very unconventional officer. He was on the eccentric side, quite argumentative and burdened with a lot of health problems. He had multiple kidney infections, gastro-intestinal problems, tympanitis and other ailments that clawed at him. You also cant forget his ancestry which was important to the Japanese military even in the 1930s. Many of those that came from a disgraced clan had the habit of going above and beyond in terms of imperial loyalty, sort of like a way to rid themselves of the stigma of distrust that was seen in the early Meiji years.   Ishiwara was a bit bizarre, he was nonconforming, quite an independent spirit you would say. Many biographers of his point out, while he held an outstanding record in his education, this went alongside things like his disregard for military punctilio, such as his dress and appearance. In his early career he spoke out against inequalities he saw within the military such as what he saw as favoritism for staff college graduates. Such talk was quite reckless. He read a lot about politics, religion, history and philosophy, he seemed to have quite the restless mind. His behavior drew attention from his colleagues, many deeming him brilliant.   Now everyone in any military has to learn about military history, but not all seek to learn it outside the required readings and such. Ishiwara is one of those rare individuals who was obsessed with learning more about military history. He read about the Russo Japanese war and took quite a critical look at it. He believed the Japanese victory was due to a large part because of luck. He thought Japan had taken the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but Russia was simply to large to be dislodged from Asia with a swift stroke. If Russia had preserved herself better, he believed Japan would have lost and it was only by a peculiar set of circumstances that Japan had avoided a war of endurance. Ishiwara believed if such a set of circumstance occurred again, Japan defense planning would need to change dramatically to base itself on the realities of modern warfare. This led him to read thoroughly about WW1 in europe and he looked critically at the differences between a short duration vs long duration war. How prolonged conflicts eventually became total wars where politics, economics and social order played larger roles, than just that of the military. This led him to think of categories for different types of war such as “kessenteki senso / decisive war” and “jizokuteki senso / continuous war”. He viewed these two types as flowing back and forth throughout history, in a cyclical rhythm.    While in Germany he studied Clausewitz, von Moltke and the works of Hans Delbruck. He was particularly taken by Delbrucks niederwerfungstragie “strategy of annihilation, the decisive battle” and ermattungsstrategie “the strategy of exhaustion”. He could see his own theorizes more fleshed out in such works and took quite a liking to them. This brought him to analyze the Napoleonic war as the archetype of the war of annihilation and the wars of Frederick the Great as that of a war of exhaustion.    Now further on in his studies, Ishiwara became convinced like many of his colleagues, that Japan and the United States for reasons of power and ideology were on a set course for war. He also concluded such a war would be a protracted one, that of a strategy of exhaustion. But how could Japan prepare for such a protracted war when her natural resources were so clearly inadequate. This led him to think more so about Asia. Ishiwara believed Asia was an entity distinctly different from the west. He held beliefs that Asia should be liberated and unite. During the Xinhai revolution of 1911, as a young cadet in Korea, Ishiwara was quite excited by the idea China might revitalize itself, but he became disillusioned during his time in China later. In the 1920's he dealt with bandits, warlord era conflicts, chaos and disorder, seeing poverty everywhere, all of this shattered his image of China progressing and reforming herself. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite how disappointed he was with the political problems of China, he was likewise disgusted with how his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese. He recalled feelings of shame when he saw fellow colleagues in Hankow descending from rickshaws and tossing coins to the ground at the rickshaw mens feet. He would constantly write of how the Japanese needed to shed their racial superiority feelings, but funny enough he would write this alongside his beliefs it was necessary for Japan to help guide nations like China to their destiny. While he may have held beliefs in racial equality between Japan and China, he certainly did not think the same of China's politics. Like the majority of his colleagues he believed China required reform and modernization that Japan should usher in. To Ishiwara the issue at hand was if Japan did not help China, the west would aggressively do so and thus subjugate her further. To Ishiwara China needed liberation. Ishiwara also linked the incoming war between Japan and the United States to play a large role for what would occur between China and Japan.   Ishiwara like many Japanese officers held beliefs concerning the Kokutai. I will try to summarize exactly what the Kokutai is, but honestly its a unbelievably complex cultural phenomenon. The Kokutai was a spiritual motive force that influenced the Japanese military. It can be viewed as the national character of Japan. Japan was a constitutional monarchy that held the Kokutai (national body or character)  and Seitai (government body/structure). Thus there was in reality two ideologies, one held the traditional belief focusing on that of the emperor and that of the official government. If I were to give you a overly confusing summary, I would tell you “Japan is run by the emperor and the government simultaneously” this of course if confusing as hell, and it should be. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution held “the emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet”. Its like saying you have an absolute monarch, but he will be listening and following the democratically elected people. This contradiction would lead to the Pacific War. A large issue that would emerge is that the constitution literally said the navy and army were controlled by the Emperor and not the political diet. Thus many in the military viewed themselves subject to the Kokutai, which as an ideology would evolve dramatically from the Meiji era to the Showa Era. For example, what if you are a military high ranking officer who views the political elites as nothing more than criminals, taking the emperor hostage against his will and thus against the will of the Japanese people. Well this might lead you to try and overthrow the government to make sure the Emperor was really in charge as you think he should be. A real rabbit hole I could go down.   Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. His issue was how did the Kokutai apply outside Japan? How could its value transcend the national boundaries and interests of Japan? If a Japanese soldier was to sacrifice his life for the Kokutai, how did this take on any meaning for men of all races? How could the kokutai's supra-national value by linked to other outside ideologies?   Ishiwara found some answers to these questions in Nichiren Buddhism. It seems here he was able to combine his conceptions about war, history and national purpose. Now Ishiwara did not come from a religious family. He dabbled in christianity for a bit, but did not pursue it. Shinto likewise did not sufficiently fulfill Shiwara' beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism is strongly patriotic, has a apocalyptic character to it and represents a holy mission to be the religion for all mankind with the center of propagation as Japan. There was this kind of quasi idea of world regeneration behind it with Japan as the moral righteous leader. Thus as you can imagine the Kokutai and Nichiren buddhism sort of fit like a glove in many ways.    Utilizing Nichiren Buddhism, the kokutai could be raised from its purely national dogma and be amplified to the entire world. Ishiwara was introduced to all of this by Tanaka Chigaku who was part of the Kokuchukai “national pillar society” a nichiren nationalist organization with an HQ in tokyo. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism.    One aspect of Kokuchukai's nichirenism that greatly appealed to Ishiwara was its combative passages. Ishiwara would justify and attribute much of the military force Japan used on the asian continent drawing parallels to Nicherns idea of drawing the sword to defend righteousness. He often quoted nichirens statement “that the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law”. Ishiwara become engulfed by the nichiren doctrine and came to believe in its prediction that there would be a “Zendai mimon no dai toso / titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”, something like a global armageddon. After this would come a reign of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law”.   While in Germany Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the US won that war, the kokutai would be destroyed. He took the trans-siberian railway enroute back to Japan and stopped in Harbin. There he met with Nichiren believers and he spoke to them about his idea of “a final war”. He stated he believed it would come through religious prediction and his military analysis. He warned everyone Japan must hasten herself for it and that “the final war is fast approaching”. Ishiwara came back to Japan in 1925 fired up with conviction to lecture at the army staff college about his final war. His audience was the army's bright and youthful officers. He taught them Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke and WW1 and of course his thoughts on the future conflict before them all. The Army staff college continuously called for him to expand his lectures because they were so popular. Then in 1927 he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's present and future national defense”. Here he spoke about the inevitable war between the US and Japan. These were quite provocative and took a hell of a lot of attention from colleagues. Later on in april of 1931, he would brief his fellow Kwantung officers using the essay, arguing the need for decisive action on the asian mainland.   In 1928 he would have given another course on European war, but he came down with influenza and was forced to take leave. As he was getting better he was hit with a case of tympanitis in his ear and had to be hospitalized for 6 months. It was to be one of many ailments that would grind at his health. He eventually was drawn into an elite study circle to talk about war theories led by Major Suzuki. The group consisted of young reformist type officers who talked about political and military issues. He carried on his work on the final war and eventually wrote “Sensoshi taikan / general outline of the history of war” which was delivered as a lecture before Kwantung officers at Changch'un in Manchuria on July 4th of 1929. It would receive revisions in 1931, 1938 and became a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.    Now the 1930's were quite a tense time for Japan. The Japanese leadership saw Marxism everywhere, and believed it was withering away their nation. Japanese liberal types were arguing the military budget was out of hand, many were calling for reduction. To Ishiwara it was insanity, how could Japan not arm itself? Marxists preached communism would save Japan; Liberals preached true democracy would save Japan; Ishiwara and many in the army preached the Kokutai would save Japan. Ishiwara preached his final war theories and that the coming apocalypse would not see an American synthesis, but a supreme victory for the Japanese kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”.   From the offset of his initial theories, Ishiwara believed the final war would be a strategy of exhaustion. But WW1 and the 1920's brought technological advances such as tanks, poison gas and the airplane. The airplane in particular made Ishiwara believe the defensive stalemate seen in WW1 was coming to an end. Airpower could deliver bomb loads past all known defenses such as naval surface units, fortresses, armies with automatic weapons. He believed the final war would see absolute horrors brought upon the greatest cities of the world. London, Shanghai, Paris even Tokyo would be wiped out within a day of the commencement of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”.   Ishiwara argued Japan must directly or indirectly control Manchuria and to a lesser degree over parts of China. He asserted Japan had a moral obligation to the asian continent and a special relationship to Manchuria and China. China must be stabilized, for her people were threatened by turmoil, corruption and conflict. He argued Japan would be eventually obliged for the sake of peace and the welfare of the Chinese people to take a more active effort to stabilize her, particularly in Manchuria. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.    In 1931 he began writing about how China needed to reform and it would be in her best interest to accept Japanese guidance. He saw China as the most valuable ally to be beside Japan in the event of war with the United States. If anything he argued Japan must try to not become involved in a war with China, every effort should be made to avoid provoking such an event. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly.    Now lets talk about Manchuria, specifically Manchuria in the late 1920's. Manchuria was in a huge tug of war between Russia, China and Japan. Her ties to China proper were severed by years of warlordism allowing Japan to grow her position. For Japan, the quote “manchurian problem” as it would be known centered on a single question “how to consolidate and expand it under Japanese influence in the face of an expanding China”. Japan saw 3 viable methods, taking control over the south manchuria railway, using the kwantung army and Japanese colonists, the good old filibuster approach. Each of these 3 methods offered different approaches to the same problem which of course would have very different outcomes.    Controlling the railway allowed quite a lot of control over southern Manchuria. The issue with this of course being Japan having to constantly fight off Chinese political efforts against such control. Zhang Zuolin, the Tiger of Manchuria and arguably greatest of the warlords of China held control over Manchuria and was firmly acting in Japanese interests, but for how long would he play ball? To the Kwantung Army members operating in and around Manchuria, the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek was getting out of hand and threatening Zhang Zuolin and thus their interests as well. Anti-Japanese sentiment was only getting worse as the northern expedition climbed north. The Kwangtung army sought more than anything to assert and retain their control over Manchuria, because it offered a buffer against the USSR. Anything that threatened that control had to be dealt with. Ultimately it was believed by many in the Kwantung Army that Manchuria would have to be separated officially from China and in order for this to occur, Japan would most likely need to use force.    Senior officers of the Kwantung army were invited in June of 1927 for a meeting called upon by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate Japan's policy toward China and Manchuria. A more radical Kwantung army group headed by Colonel Komoto Daisaku sought to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, as he was increasingly being seen as a major obstacle to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Well they would do just that in 1928 when Zhang Zuolin was assassinated via a bomb placed on train tracks known as the Huanggutun incident. The assassination did not work out as the Kwantung Army officers thought it would. Instead of their groomed puppet General Yang Yuting taking up the role as leader of Manchuria, it went instead to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang, who lets just say was not too happy the Japanese had obviously killed his father. Thus the Kwantung Army did not assert the forceful policy they wanted in Manchuria, they had actually made it worse for them.   The half-hearted investigation into those responsible for killing Zhang Zuolin, led to the removal of Colonel Komoto from his post. Tanaka's cabinet was toppled. The Kwantung army were now embarrassed and angry that their stance in Manchuria was weakened. The Japanese colonists within Manchuria felt more threatened and called more so upon the Kwantung army for protection against Chinese nationalists wishing to kick them out. The Kwantung army was grasping at straws trying to think of a way to sever Manchuria from China. In 1928, Ishiwara was a lt colonel and he was consulted in length by Kwantung officers about his views on the Manchurian problem. While he had not fully hashed out his Final War theory by this point, he nonetheless spoke about the fundamentals of it, arguing the necessity of taking action to control Manchuria. For the next few years, all efforts were made by Kwantung officers to influence policy towards Manchuria. Ishiwara's ideas were being stimulated and influencing the debate over Manchuria amongst his high ranking colleagues. In October of 1928, Ishiwara sought and received an appointment to the Kwantung army staff. The assignment was to be as an operations officer and his number one backer was Colonel Komoto Daisaku. It seemed Komoto saw Ishiwara as the firebrand necessary to push the Manchurian policies they wanted.   When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he found the Kwantung Army HQ in a state of confusion and demoralization. This of course was a large part due to the cluster fuck of a failure from the bombing of Zhang Zuolin. The investigation into the assassination led to many shifts within the Kwantung army staff, many quite restrictive. Even though Komoto's career was shattered by the Zhang Zuolin failure, he kept arguing to his colleagues that the Manchurian crisis hamukdend to be resolved by force. Ishiwara it seems agreed with this and during the early months of 1929 worked alongside Komoto, planning operations against Chinese forces in the Mukden area. By spring of 1929, Komoto was officially being kicked out. By May he was relegated to a divisional backwater in Japan and by June he was out of the army. This did not mean however that he lost influence on Manchurian affairs. Komoto's replacement was Lt Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and old comrade of Ishiwara since Sendai military preparatory school.    For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki worked alongside other Kwantung Army staff to solve the Manchurian problem as they saw it. By the mid 1931's the idea Manchuria needed to be seized via force was now the mainstream viewpoint for the Kwantung army in general. Ishiwara believed firmly that Japan could no longer stand idle in Manchuria, because every day that went by saw little by little, Japan relinquishing rights and interests in Manchuria to China, and at some point they would simply be kicked out. To “quit manchuria” would be a national disaster, they would lose their buffer state, the resources and the land for their booming population to emigrate to. Simply put Manchuria was the steroid keeping Japan alive, she needed it to continue to grow. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviethreat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army HQ in Tokyo likewise agreed Manchuria was the vital defensive line against the USSR. But unlike the Kwantung army who sought all of Manchuria, the heads in Tokyo sought to absorb southern Manchuria via the south manchurian railway and did not seek anything north of it. Ishiwara however assumed the only way Japan could prevent the USSR from placing pressure on southern Manchuria was no less that Japan having to occupy northern Manchuria and even further north towards the Amur River so Japan could control the mountain ranges flanking western and eastern frontiers of northern manchuria.  Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”.   Ishiwara took all of this a step further, after Manchuria was conquered, Japan would have to somehow administer and pacify the peoples of it. Ishiwara argued the stability of Manchuria would be developed through the special talents of various races living there. The Chinese would develop the small businesses in the region, the Koreans would use their paddy farming knowledge, etc. These racial ideas would contribute to the development of Manchukuo and the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. But above all else, Manchuria would serve the interests of Japan, many of which would be exploitative and economic in nature.    By early 1930 Ishiwara and Itagaki worked out a plan using the same strategy used during the Russo-Japanese war, a surprise night attack. The Kwantung army would assault the Liaoning area hitting important Chinese garrisons. The plans had to be meticulous as the Kwantung army was severely smaller than most of the Manchurian forces led by Zhang Xueliang. Around Mukden alone Zhang held 20,000 men well equipped with aircraft and tanks. Throughout all of Manchuria, if a war arose, Zhang could assemble roughly 250,000 troops to bear down on an enemy. The Kwantung army meanwhile could muster 10,000 men which were basically garrison units around the railway. They did not have significant aircraft nor mechanized forces at hand, and were pretty poorly equipped to boot. Ishiwara's answer to the disparity in forces called for the use of intelligence and rigorous training. He sought to perfect specific assault techniques so that when the conflict broke out, the Japanese would use lightning speed and effective concentration of force to overwhelm the Chinese. The plan overall was remarkably simplistic, wagering everything on dealing a crushing blow at the center of Zhang Xueliangs military powerbase at the Peitaying barracks at Mukden. If this fell, he predicted the enemy's morale would break, giving the Kwantung the necessary military and psychological momentum to subdue the surrounding areas. If the USSR got involved, the plan would have gone to utter shit.   One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ”. Ishiwara as you can imagine was very bitter about the idea of prolonging for a year and argued the international environment meant they must strike immediately. The Soviet 5 year plan was still in mid course; the US, Britain and France had yet to overcome their financial crisis and could offer limited resistance in the far east and most obviously the Nationalist regime in China was still busy in its unification efforts south of the Great wall, but that would change soon. If they waited a year all of this would change for the worse, the time was now or never to Ishiwara.   In july of 1931 Ishiwara and Itagki organized a final major staff reconnaissance designed to get the newest Kwantung officers up to date with northern Manchuria. To cover for what they were doing they told high command it was a survey against the USSR, but it was of course to investigate the Chinese power in northern manchuria. On their return trip, the party heard of the disappearance of one Kwantung staff officer, captain Nakamura Shintaro. Ishiwara and the others found out when they reached Port Arthur and the rumor spread that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under “mysterious circumstances”. Now over the past few months there had been violent riots, murders, work strikes and other incidents occurring in Manchuria. The Nakamura affair flared all of these tensions up. Seeing the paint on the wall, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries tried to negotiate the issue, but those at the central army HQ like Nagata Tetsuzan who were sympathetic to the impatience of their Kwantung colleagues felt compelled to aid them. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that is just what he did. The Kwantung officers took their forces outside the railway zone, which they had been restricted to and without waiting for approval from Itagaki who was in Japan at the time, initiated the steps to despatch an armored train and a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery forces to go to Mukden to get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance. Tokyo got word of this and dispatched a telegram to stop their departure from the railway and to not use the Nakamura incident as a way to use force to solve the manchurian problem.   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” .   “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. On september 18th, 1931 a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army on the tracks of the south manchuria railway at Liutiaokou and it exploded. Japanese troops under the guise the bomb was a “chinese terrorist attack” moved to swiftly overrun the Peitaying barracks. Ishiwara's plot had finally unfolded. 

Two years ago, Taiwan bartender Danny Hsu brought his 12 years of mixology experience from Taichung, a city in China's Taiwan region, and opened Stirred Bar in the Three Lanes and Seven Alleys, a historical architectural complex in downtown Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian province.两年前，中国台湾地区台中市的调酒师许丹尼（Danny Hsu）带着12年的调酒经验，在福建省会福州市中心的历史建筑群三坊七巷开设了“Stirred Bar”酒吧。Hsu enjoys experimentally incorporating fresh fruits, tea, coffee and even unexpected ingredients like vinegar and chili into his cocktails, conveying unique tastes and his understanding of life.许丹尼喜欢在调酒中尝试加入新鲜水果、茶、咖啡，甚至醋、辣椒等非常规原料，以此传递独特的口感和他对生活的理解。His latest creation is a cocktail symbolizing the fusion of cultures across the Taiwan Strait, blending full-bodied Kaoliang liquor, a specialty from Taiwan, with the gentle aroma of Fuzhou's jasmine tea.他最新创作的一款鸡尾酒象征着两岸文化融合，将台湾特产的醇厚高粱酒与福州茉莉花茶的淡雅香气相融合。"The fiery spirit meets the sweet jasmine flowers, just like the ongoing cross-Strait integration," he said.他表示：“浓烈的酒香邂逅清甜的茉莉，就像正在推进的两岸融合发展一样。”Oct 25 marks the 80th anniversary of Taiwan's retrocession. Since its return to the motherland in 1945, cross-Strait relations have experienced twists and turns, but integrated development has always been the main historical trend.10月25日是台湾光复80周年纪念日。自1945年回归祖国以来，两岸关系虽历经波折，但融合发展始终是历史主流。Fujian and Taiwan are connected by a single body of water, and share the same ancestry, culture and customs, with about 80 percent of Taiwan's population tracing its ancestry back to Fujian. Such closeness gives the coastal province an irreplaceable role in promoting peaceful cross-Strait development and reunification.福建与台湾隔海相望、同根同源、文化相通、习俗相近，约80%的台湾民众祖籍在福建。这种特殊的亲缘联系，让福建在推动两岸和平发展、促进祖国统一进程中具有不可替代的作用。Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012, President Xi Jinping, who is also general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, has made three field trips to Fujian, consistently emphasizing cross-Strait integrated development.自2012年中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会以来，中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平已三次赴福建考察，始终强调推动两岸融合发展。In his latest tour to the province last year, Xi reiterated the call for Fujian to make greater progress in exploring the new path for cross-Strait integrated development.在去年最新一次福建考察中，习近平总书记再次强调，要推动福建在探索两岸融合发展新路上迈出更大步伐。Statistics showed that Fujian has become a top choice for a growing number of Taiwan businesspeople and young entrepreneurs, thanks to innovative integration policies.数据显示，得益于创新性的融合发展政策，福建已成为越来越多台商和台湾青年创业者的首选地之一。From January to August, Fujian saw 1,653 new enterprises funded by Taiwan investment, with $660 million in utilized capital from Taiwan, the highest among all mainland provinces, according to data from the provincial Taiwan affairs authority.福建省台办数据显示，今年1月至8月，福建新增台资企业1653家，实际使用台资6.6亿美元，两项数据均居大陆各省份首位。In the first eight months of this year, passenger traffic between Fujian and Taiwan surged 36.4 percent to 1.73 million trips, compared with the same period last year, while cross-Strait events saw 28,000 Taiwan participants, a 40 percent increase, data showed.数据还显示，今年前8个月，闽台旅客往来量达173万人次，同比增长36.4%；两岸各类交流活动中，台湾参与人数达2.8万人次，同比增长40%。Chen Lishuang, a deputy researcher at the Fujian Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Modern Taiwan Studies, said the province has achieved notable results in economic cooperation and social integration with Taiwan through pilot policies.福建省社会科学院现代台湾研究所副研究员陈丽霜（音译）表示，福建通过一系列试点政策，在两岸经济合作与社会融合方面取得了显著成效。While working in Fujian for about 17 years, from 1985 to 2002, Xi attached great importance to Taiwan-related work, tirelessly promoting cooperation and cultivating affection between people on both sides of the Strait, Chen said.陈丽霜指出，1985年至2002年，习近平总书记在福建工作的17年间，高度重视对台工作，不懈推动两岸合作，增进两岸同胞情谊。In 1997, a 102-day tour of Taiwan by a statue of the sea goddess Mazu saw millions pay their respects to the deity across the island, becoming the longest and most influential cross-Strait exchange at the time.1997年，海神妈祖雕像赴台巡游102天，全台数百万民众前往瞻仰，成为当时持续时间最长、影响最广的两岸交流活动。In 2001, limited direct transportation, trade and postal services began between Fujian's coast and the islands of Jinmen and Matsu, administered by Taiwan, and this was warmly received. An exchange agreement signed later that year, by representatives from the two sides, included the one-China principle for the first time, causing a stir.2001年，福建沿海与台湾地区管辖的金门、马祖地区开启局部直接通航、通贸、通邮，受到两岸民众热烈欢迎。同年晚些时候，两岸代表签署的一项交流协议首次纳入一个中国原则，引发广泛关注。"Xi made many statements regarding work related to Taiwan from the historical perspective of achieving the peaceful reunification of the motherland, along with a series of forward-looking and strategic explorations and practices while working in Fujian," Chen said.陈丽霜表示：“在福建工作期间，习近平总书记从实现祖国和平统一的历史高度，就对台工作作出许多重要论述，并开展了一系列具有前瞻性、战略性的探索与实践。”The innovative concepts and practical advancements in Taiwan-related work proposed by Xi during his tenure in Fujian constitute an important source of his later significant discourse on Taiwan affairs, she said.她指出，习近平总书记在福建工作期间提出的对台工作创新理念和实践成果，是其后来关于台湾问题重要论述的重要思想源头。In his speech on the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, China's top legislature, in January 2019, Xi emphasized the need to deepen integrated development between the two sides to lay a foundation for peaceful reunification.2019年1月，在全国人大常委会《告台湾同胞书》发表40周年纪念会上，习近平总书记强调，要深化两岸融合发展，为实现和平统一奠定坚实基础。"Just as loved ones wish each other well, we Chinese should help each other. We treat our compatriots in Taiwan as equals, and will continue paving the way for them to share first the mainland's development opportunities," Xi said.习近平总书记表示：“亲人之间，没有解不开的心结。两岸同胞是一家人，有困难就要互相帮助。我们始终把台湾同胞当作一家人，愿意继续率先同台湾同胞分享大陆发展机遇。”He called for enhanced connectivity in trade, infrastructure, energy and industry standards, suggesting initial projects such as supplying water, electricity and gas, and constructing sea-crossing bridges from Fujian to Jinmen and Matsu.总书记呼吁，要加强两岸贸易、基础设施、能源、产业标准等领域互联互通，提出从福建向金门、马祖供水供电供气，建设跨海大桥等先期项目。In 2023, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, China's Cabinet, announced plans to make Fujian a "demonstration zone" for the integrated development across the Strait, offering policies like infrastructure connectivity and incentives for Taiwan residents to create their careers.2023年，中共中央、国务院印发方案，决定支持福建建设海峡两岸融合发展示范区，推出基础设施互联互通、鼓励台湾同胞来闽就业创业等一系列政策举措。"Fujian's supportive policies for Taiwan compatriots have given me a real sense of belonging," said Lin Chun-ying, who operates a tea mountain company in suburban Fuzhou and exports high-mountain oolong tea to countries including the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan.在福州郊区经营茶山企业、向英国、德国、日本等国出口高山乌龙茶的林春英（音译）表示：“福建对台湾同胞的扶持政策，让我真正有了归属感。”"My father often told me when I was a child that we are Chinese, because he was born on the mainland before my grandfather took him to Taiwan," Lin said. "My father said his mission was to bring us back to our motherland."林春英说：“小时候父亲常跟我说，我们是中国人。因为父亲出生在大陆，后来爷爷才带他去了台湾。父亲说，他的心愿就是带我们回到祖国母亲的怀抱。”Back in the 1990s, Lin and her father arrived in the provincial capital to clear a barren mountain to plant tea.上世纪90年代，林春英便和父亲来到福州，开垦荒山种植茶树。"Growing up, making and learning about tea in Fuzhou, I fell in love with Fuzhou's mountains," Lin said. She has now taken over management of the company from her father.“在福州长大，学着种茶、制茶，我早已爱上了这里的山山水水，”林春英说。如今，她已从父亲手中接过公司管理的重任。Wu Yongping, director at the Institute for Taiwan Studies at Tsinghua University, said that Taiwan lacks the economic hinterland for further development, given its limited population and small local market, but the mainland could offer it a much broader space for growth.清华大学台湾研究院院长巫永平表示，台湾人口有限、本地市场规模较小，缺乏进一步发展的经济腹地，而大陆能为其提供更广阔的发展空间。After the launch of reform and opening-up, Taiwan businesses that entered the mainland have contributed to the economy and have been beneficiaries as well, Wu said, adding that economic ties are a fundamental link of cross-Strait relations, so it's important to keep the link strong.巫永平指出，改革开放以来，进入大陆的台商不仅为大陆经济发展作出了贡献，自身也成为受益者。他强调，经济联系是两岸关系的重要基础，必须牢牢巩固这一纽带。Fujian's "demonstration zone" aims to ease the settlement of Taiwan compatriots on the mainland by leading efforts to overcome constraints on specific matters like obtaining phone cards, bank cards and residence permits, he said.他表示，福建建设“海峡两岸融合发展示范区”，旨在率先破解台湾同胞在大陆申领电话卡、银行卡、居住证等具体生活便利化问题，让台湾同胞在大陆生活更便捷。As a veteran Taiwan businesswoman developing on the mainland for decades, Lin has also become a facilitator for cross-Strait youth exchanges, sharing her experiences on employment and entrepreneurship in Fuzhou with young people from Taiwan.作为在大陆发展数十年的资深台商，林春英还成为两岸青年交流的桥梁，经常向台湾青年分享自己在福州就业创业的经验。She met her husband, who is from Harbin, Heilongjiang province, in Shanghai in 2018. They now have two children and live in Fuzhou.2018年，林春英在上海结识了来自黑龙江哈尔滨的丈夫，如今两人已育有两个孩子，在福州定居生活。Taiwan compatriots in Fujiann.在福建的台湾同胞 /ˌtaɪˈwɑːn kəmˈpeɪtriəts ɪn ˈfuːdʒiːn/Taiwan businesspeople (investing in Fujian)n.（在福建投资的）台商/ˌtaɪˈwɑːn ˈbɪznɪsˌpiːpl (ɪnˈvestɪŋ ɪn ˈfuːdʒiːn)/

Hey guys, what you are about to listen to is an extremely graphic episode that will contain many scenes of gore, rape, human experimentation, honestly it will run the gambit. If you got a weak stomach, this episode might not be for you. You have been warned.  I just want to take a chance to say a big thanks to all of you guys who decided to join the patreon, you guys are awesome! Please leave a comment on this episode to let me know what more you want to hear about in the future. With all of that said and done lets jump right into it.   Where to begin with this one? Let start off with one of the major figures of Unit 731, Shiro Ishii. Born June 25th, 1892 in the village of Chiyoda Mura in Kamo District of Chiba Prefecture, Ishii was the product of his era. He came from a landowning class, had a very privileged childhood. His primary and secondary schoolmates described him to be brash, abrasive and arrogant. He was a teacher's pet, extremely intelligent, known to have excellent memory. He grew up during Japans ultra militarism/nationalism age, thus like any of his schoolmates was drawn towards the military. Less than a month after graduating from the Medical department of Kyoto Imperial University at the age of 28, he began military training as a probation officer in the 3rd regiment of the Imperial Guards division. Within 6 months he became a surgeon 1st Lt. During his postgraduate studies at Kyoto Imperial university he networked successfully to climb the career ladder. As a researcher he was sent out to help cure an epidemic that broke out in Japan. It was then he invented a water filter that could be carried alongside the troops.   He eventually came across a report of the Geneva Protocol and conference reports of Harada Toyoji as well as other military doctors. He became impressed with the potential of chemical and biological warfare. During WW1 chemical warfare had been highly explored, leading 44 nations to pass the Geneva Protocol or more specifically  “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”. Representatives from Japan were present at this conference and were involving in the drafting and signing of the Geneva Protocol, but it was not ratified in Japan at the time. Ishii's university mentor, Kiyano Kenji suggested he travel western countries and he did so for 2 years. Many nations were secretive about their research, but some places such as MIT were quite open. After his visit Ishii came to believe Japan was far behind everyone else in biological warfare research. After returning to Japan Ishii became an instructor at the Imperial Japanese Army Medical School. Japan of course lacked significant natural resources, thus it was a perfect nation to pursue biological weapons research. Ishii began lobbying the IJA, proposing to establish a military agency to develop biological weapons. One of his most compelling arguments was “that biological warfare must possess distinct possibilities, otherwise, it would not have been outlawed by the League of Nations.”   Ishii networked his way into good favor with the Minister of Health, Koizumi Chikahiko who lended his support in August of 1932 to allow Ishii to head an Epidemic Prevention Laboratory. Ishii secured a 1795 square meter complex at the Army Medical College. Yet this did not satisfy Ishii, it simply was not the type of work he wanted to do. The location of Tokyo allowed too many eyes on his work, he could not perform human experimentation. For what he wanted to do, he had to leave Japan, and in the 1930's Japan had a few colonies or sphere's of influence, the most appetizing one being Manchuria. In 1932 alongside his childhood friend Masuda Tomosada, Ishii took a tour of Harbin and he fell in love with the location.   During the 1930's Harbin was quite a cosmopolitan city, it was a major trading port and diverse in ethnicities and religions. Here there were Mongols, Russians, Chinese, Japanese, various other western groups in lesser numbers. Just about every religion was represented, it was a researcher's paradise for subjects. Ishii sought human experimentation and needed to find somewhere covert with maximum secrecy. He chose a place in the Nan Gang District of Beiyinhe village, roughly 70 kms southeast of Harbin. It was here and then he began human experimentation. One day in 1932, Ishii and the IJA entered the village and evacuated an entire block where Xuan Hua and Wu Miao intersected. They began occupying a multi-use structure that had been supporting 100 Chinese vendors who sold clothes and food to the locals. They then began drafting Chinese laborers to construct the Zhong Ma complex to house the “Togo Unit” named after the legendary admiral, Togo Heihachiro. The Chinese laborers were underpaid and under constant watch from Japanese guards, limiting their movement and preventing them from understanding what they were building, or what was occurring within the complex. The complex was built in under a year, it held 100 rooms, 3 meter high brick walls and had an electric fence surrounding the perimeter. One thousand captives at any given time could be imprisoned within the complex. To ensure absolute secrecy, security guards patrolled the complex 24/7. Saburo Endo, director of Operations for the Kwantung Army once inspected the Togo Unit and described it in his book “The Fifteen Years' Sino-Japanese War and Me”, as such:   [It was] converted from a rather large soy sauce workshop, surrounded by high rammed earth wall. All the attending military doctors had pseudonyms, and they were strictly regulated and were not allowed to communicate with the outsiders. The name of the unit was “Tōgō Unit.” One by one, the subjects of the experiments were imprisoned in a sturdy iron lattice and inoculated with various pathogenic bacteria to observe changes in their conditions. They used prisoners on death row in the prisons of Harbin for these experiments. It was said that it was for national defense purposes, but the experiments were performed with appalling brutality.The dead were burned in high-voltage electric furnaces, leaving no trace.    A local from the region added this about the complex “We heard rumors of people having blood drawn in there but we never went near the place. We were too afraid. When the construction started, there were about forty houses in our village, and a lot of people were driven out. About one person from each home was taken to work on the construction. People were gathered from villages from all around here, maybe about a thousand people in all. The only things we worked on were the surrounding wall and the earthen walls. The Chinese that worked on the buildings were brought in from somewhere, but we didn't know where. After everything was finished, those people were killed.”    Despite all the secrecy, it was soon discovered prisoners were being taken, primarily from the CCP and bandits who were being subjected to tests. One such test was to gradually drain a victim of blood to see at what point they would die. The unit drew 500 cc of blood from each prisoner every 3-5 days. As their bodies drew weaker, they were dissected for further research, the average prisoner lasted a maximum of a month. Due to the climate of Manchuria, it was soon established that finding methods to treat frostbite would benefit the Kwantung army. Ishii's team gathered human subjects and began freezing and unfreezing them. Sometimes these experiments included observing test subjects whose limbs had been frozen and severed. The Togo team reported to General Okamura Yasuji, the deputy commander in chief of the Kwantung army from 1933-1934 that the best way to treat frostbite was to soak a limb in 37 degree water. According to the testimony of a witness named Furuichi at trial done in Khabarovsk , “Experiments in freezing human beings were performed every year in the detachment, in the coldest months of the year—November, December, January and February. The experimental technique was as follows: the test subjects were taken out into the frost at about 11 o'clock at night, compelled to dip their hands into a barrel of cold water and forced to stand with wet hands in the frost for a long time. Alternatively, some were taken out dressed, but with bare feet and compelled to stand at night in the frost during the coldest period of the year. When frostbite had developed, the subjects were taken to a room and forced to put their feet in water of 5 degrees Celsius, after which the temperature was gradually increased.”   Sergeant Major Kurakazu who was with Unit 731 later on in 1940 and taken prisoner by the Soviets in 1945 stated during the Khabarovsk trial , “I saw experiments performed on living people for the first time in December 1940. I was shown these experiments by researcher Yoshimura, a member of the 1st Division. These experiments were performed in the prison laboratory. When I walked into the prison laboratory, ve Chinese experimentees were sitting there; two of these Chinese had no fingers at all, their hands were black; in those of three others the bones were visible. They had fingers, but they were only bones. Yoshimura told me that this was the result of freezing experiments.”   According to Major Karasawa during the same trial Ishii became curious about using plague as a weapon of war and captured plague infected mice to test on subjects in the Zhong Ma Complex “Ishii told me that he had experimented with cholera and plague on the mounted bandits of Manchuria during 1933-1934 and discovered that the plague was effective.”   According to Lt General Endo Saburo's diary entry on November 16th of 1933, at the Zhong Ma complex “The second squad which was responsible for poison gas, liquid poison; and the First Squad which was responsible for electrical experiments. Two bandits were used by each squad for the experiments.  Phosgene gas—5-minute injection of gas into a brick-lined room; the subject was still alive one day aer inhalation of gas; critically ill with pneumonia.  Potassium cyanide—the subject was injected with 15 mg.; subject lost consciousness approximately 20 minutes later.  20,000 volts—several jolts were not enough to kill the subject; injection of poison required to kill the subject.  5000 volts—several jolts were not enough; aer several minutes of continuous current, subject was burned to death.”    The Togo Unit established a strict security system to keep its research highly confidential. Yet in 1934, 16 Chinese prisoners escaped, compromising the Zhong Ma location. One of the guards had gotten drunk and a prisoner named Li smashed a bottle over his head and stole his keys. He freed 15 other prisoners and of them 4 died of cold, hunger and other ailments incurred by the Togo unit. 12 managed to flee to the 3rd route army of the Northeast Anti Japanese united Army. Upon hearing the horrifying report, the 3rd route army attacked the Togo unit at Beiyinhe and within a year, the Zhong Ma complex was exploded.    After the destruction of the Zhong Ma complex, Ishii needed a better structure. The Togo unit had impressed their superior and received a large budget. Then on May 30th of 1936 Emperor Hirohito authorized the creation of Unit 731. Thus Ishii and his colleagues were no longer part of the Epidemic Prevention Institute of the Army Medical School, now they were officially under the Kwantung Army as the Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department. Their new HQ was located in Pingfan, closer to Harbin. Their initial budget was 3 million yen for the personnel, 200-300 thousand yen per autonomous unit and 6 million yen for experimentation and research. Thus their new annual budget was over 10 million yen.    Pingfan was evacuated by the Kwantung army. Hundreds of families were forced to move out and sell their land at cheap prices. To increase security this time, people required a special pass to enter Pingfan. Then the airspace over the area became off-limits, excluding IJA aircraft, all violators would be shot down. The new Pingfan complex was within a walled city with more than 70 buildings over a 6 km tract of land. The complex's huge size drew some international attention, and when asked what the structure was, the scientists replied it was a lumber mill. Rather grotesquely, prisoners would be referred to as “maruta” or “logs” to keep up the charade. Suzuki, a Japanese construction company back then, worked day and night to construct the complex.    Now many of you probably know a bit about Unit 731, but did you know it's one of countless units?  The Army's Noborito Laboratory was established (1937) The Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the North China Army/ Unit 1855 was established (1938)  The Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of Central China/ Unit 1644 (1939)  Thee Guangzhou Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of South China Army/ Unit 8604 (1942)  The Central Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Southern Expeditionary Army/ Unit 9620 (1942).    There were countless others, detachments included Unit 1855 in Beijing, Unit Ei 1644 in Nanjing, Unit 8604 in Guangzhou, and later Unit 9420 in Singapore. All of these units comprised Ishii's network, which, at its height in 1939, oversaw over 10,000 personnel.   Victims were normally brought to Pingfan during the dead of night within crammed freight cars with number logs on top. They were brought into the building via a secret tunnel. According to a witness named Fang Shen Yu, technicians in white lab coats handled the victims who were tied in bags. The victims included anyone charge with a crime, could be anti-japanese activity, opium smoking, espionage, being a communist, homelessness, being mentally handicap, etc. Victims included chinese, Mongolians, Koreans, White Russians, Harbin's jewish population and any Europeans accused of espionage. During the Khabarovsk trial, Major Iijima Yoshia admitted to personally subjecting 40 Soviet citizens to human experimentation. Harbin's diversity provided great research data. Each prisoner was assigned a number starting with 101 and ending at 1500. Onec 1500 was reached, they began again at 101, making it nearly impossible to estimate the total number of victims. Since the complex had been labeled a lumber mill to the locals, most did not worry about it or were too afraid to do so. The prison's warden was Ishii's brother Mitsuo who made sure to keep it all a secret.    Ethics did not exist within Ishii's network of horrors. Everything was done efficiently in the name of science. Pingfang was equipped for disposing the evidence of their work in 3 large incinerators. As a former member who worked with the incinerators recalled “the bodies always burned up fast because all the organ were gone; the bodies were empty”. Human experimentation allowed the researchers their first chance to actually examine the organs of a living person at will to see the progress of a disease. Yeah you heard me right, living person, a lot of the vivisections were done on live people. As one former researcher explained "the results of the effects of infection cannot be obtained accurately once the person dies because putrefactive bacteria set in. Putrefactive bacteria are stronger than plague germs. So, for obtaining accurate results, it is important whether the subject is alive or not." Another former researcher said this “"As soon as the symptoms were observed, the prisoner was taken from his cell and into the dissection room. He was stripped and placed on the table, screaming, trying to fight back. He was strapped down, still screaming frightfully. One of the doctors stuffed a towel into his mouth, then with one quick slice of the scalpel he was opened up." Witnesses of some of these vivisections reported that victims usually let out a horrible scream when the initial cuts were made, but that the voice stops soon after. The researchers often removed the organ of interest, leaving others in the body and the victims usually died of blood loss or because of the removed organ. There are accounts of experiments benign carried out on mothers and children, because yes children were in fact born in the facilities. Many human specimens were placed in jars to be viewed by Tokyo's army medical college. Sometimes these jars were filled with limbs or organs but some giant ones had entire bodies.   Vivisection was conducted on human beings to observe how disease affected each organ once a human dies. According to testimony given by a technician named Ogawa Fukumatsu “I participated in vivisections. I did them every day. I cannot remember the amount of people dissected. At first, I refused to do it. But then, they would not allow me to eat because it was an order; gradually I changed.” Another technician Masakuni Kuri testified  “I did vivisection at the time. Experiments were conducted on a Chinese woman with syphilis. Because she was alive, the blood poured out like water from a tap.”   A report done by Shozo Kondo studied the effects of bubonic plague on humans. The number of subjects was 57 with age ranging from toddlers to 80 years old with mixed gender. The study used fleas carrying plague that were dispersed upon the local population in June of 1940 at Changchun. 7 plague victims were Japanese residents. The report stated the plague spread because of lack of immunity by the townspeople. Subjects' survival time ranged from 2-5 days, with only 3 surviving 12, 18 and 21 days. The subjects were infected with Glandular, Cutaneous or Septicemic plague, but most had the Glandular variety.     In addition to the central units of Pingfang were others set up in Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Singapore. The total number of personnel was 20,000. These satellite facilities all had their own unique horror stories. One was located in Anda, 100km from Pingfang where outdoor tests for plague, cholera and other pathogens were down. They would expose human subjects to biological bombs, typically by putting 10-40 people in the path of a biological bomb. A lot of the research was done to see the effective radius of the bombs, so victims were placed at different distances. At Xinjing was Unit 100 and its research was done against domesticated animals, horses particularly. Unit 100 was a bacteria factory producing glanders, anthrax and other pathogens. They often ran tests by mixing poisons with food and studied its effects on animals, but they also researched chemical warfare against crops. At Guangzhou was unit 8604 with its HQ at Zhongshan medical university. It is believed starvation tests ran there, such as the water test I mentioned. They also performed typhoid tests and bred rats to spread plague. Witness testimony from a Chinese volunteer states they often dissolved the bodies of victims in acid. In Beijing was Unit 1855 which was a combination of a prison and experiment center. They ran plague, cholera and typhus tests. Prisoners were forced to ingest mixtures of germs and some were vaccinated against the ailments. In Singapore after its capture in February of 1942 there was a secret laboratory. One Mr. Othman Wok gave testimony in the 1990s that when he was 17 years old he was employed to work at this secret lab. He states 7 Chinese, Indian and Malay boys worked in the lab, picking fleas from rats and placing them in containers. Some 40 rat catchers, would haul rats to the lab for the boys to do their work. The containers with fleas went to Japanese researchers and Othman says he saw rats being injected with plague pathogens. The fleas were transferred to kerosene cans which contained dried horse blood and an unidentified chemical left to breed for weeks. Once they had plague infected fleas in large quantity Othman said "A driver who drove the trucks which transported the fleas to the railway station said that these bottles of fleas were sent off to Thailand." If this is true, it gives evidence to claims Unit 731 had a branch in Thailand as well. Othman stated he never understood or knew what was really going on at the lab, but when he read in 1944 about biological attacks on Chongqing using fleas, he decided to leave the lab. Othman states the unit was called Unit 9240.  As you can imagine rats and insects played a large role in all of this. They harvested Manchuria rat population and enlisted schoolchildren to raise them. In the 1990s the Asahi Broadcasting company made a documentary titled “the mystery of the rats that went to the continent”. It involved a small group of high school children in Saitama prefecture asked local farmers if they knew anything about rat farming during the war years. Many stated everybody back then was raising rats, it was a major source of income. One family said they had rat cages piled up in a shed, each cage built to carry 6 rat, but they had no idea what the rats were being used for. Now hear this, after the war, the US military kept these same families in business. The US army unit 406 which was established in Tokyo to research viruses wink wink, would often drive out to these farms in their american jeeps collecting rats.  Getting fleas was a much tricker task. One method was taking older Chinese prisoners and quarantining them with clothes carrying flea or flea eggs and allowing them to live in isolated rooms to cultivate more fleas. These poor guys had to live in filth and not shave for weeks to produce around 100 fleas a day. Now Unit 731 dealt with numerous diseases such as Cholera.  Some experiments used dogs to spread cholera to villages. They would steal dogs from villages, feed them pork laced with cholera germs and return them to the villages. When the disease finished incubating the dogs would vomit and other dogs would come and eat the vomit spread it more and more. The dogs were also stricken with diarrhea and the feces spread it to other dogs as well. 20% of the people in villages hit by this died of the disease. Former army captain Kojima Takeo was a unit member involved in a Cholera campaign and added this testimony "We were told that we were going out on a cholera campaign, and we were all given inoculations against cholera ten days before starting out. Our objective was to infect all the people in the area. The disease had already developed before we got there, and as we moved into the village everyone scattered. The only ones left were those who were too sick to move. The number of people coming down with the disease kept increasing. Cholera produces a face like a skeleton, vomiting, and diarrhea. And the vomiting and defecating of the people lying sick brought flies swarming around. One after the other, people died." I've mentioned it a lot, Plague was a staple of Unit 731. The IJA wanted a disease that was fast and fatal, Cholera for instance took about 20 days, plague on the other hand starts killing in 3 days. Plague also has a very long history of use going back to the medieval times. It was one of the very first diseases Ishii focused on. In october of 1940 a plague attack was conducted against the Kaimingjie area in the port city of Ningbo. This was a joint operation with Unit 731 and the Nanjing based Unit 1644. During this operation plague germs were mixed with wheat, corn, cloth scraps and cotton and dropped from the air. More than 100 people died within a few days of the attack and the affected area was sealed off from the public until the 1960s.  Another horrifying test was the frostbite experiments. Army Engineer Hisato Yoshimura conducted these types of experiments by taking prisoners outside, dipping various appendages into water of varying temperatures and allowing the limbs to freeze. Once frozen, Yoshimura would strike their affected limbs with a short stick and in his words “they would emit a sound resembling that which a board gives when it is struck”. Ice was then chipping away with the affected area being subjected to various treatments, such as being doused in water, exposed to heat and so on. I have to mentioned here, that to my shock there is film of these specific frostbite experiments and one of our animators at Kings and Generals found it, I have seen a lot of things in my day, but seeing this was absolute nightmare fuel. If you have seen the movie or series Snowpiercer, they pretty much nail what it looked like.  Members of Unit 731 referred to Yoshimura as a “scientific devil” and a “cold blooded animal” because he would conduct his work with strictness. Naoji Uezono another member of Unit 731, described in a 1980s interview a disgusting scene where Yoshimura had "two naked men put in an area 40–50 degrees below zero and researchers filmed the whole process until [the subjects] died. [The subjects] suffered such agony they were digging their nails into each other's flesh". Yoshimuras lack of any remorse was evident in an article he wrote for the Journal of Japanese Physiology in 1950 where he admitted to using 20 children and 3 day old infant in experiments which exposed them to zero degree celsius ice and salt water. The article drew criticism and no shit, but Yoshimura denied any guilt when contacted by a reporter from the Mainichi Shimbun. Yoshimura developed a “resistance index of frostbite” based on the mean temperature of 5 - 30 minutes after immersion in freezing water, the temperature of the first rise after immersion and the time until the temperature first rises after immersion. In a number of separate experiments he determined how these parameters depended on the time of day a victim's body part was immersed in freezing water, the surrounding temperature and humidity during immersion, how the victim had been treated before the immersion ("after keeping awake for a night", "after hunger for 24 hours", "after hunger for 48 hours", "immediately after heavy meal", "immediately after hot meal", "immediately after muscular exercise", "immediately after cold bath", "immediately after hot bath"), what type of food the victim had been fed over the five days preceding the immersions with regard to dietary nutrient intake ("high protein (of animal nature)", "high protein (of vegetable nature)", "low protein intake", and "standard diet"), and salt intake. Members of Unit 731 also worked with Syphilis, where they orchestrated forced sex acts between infected and noninfected prisoners to transmit the disease. One testimony given by a prisoner guard was as follows “Infection of venereal disease by injection was abandoned, and the researchers started forcing the prisoners into sexual acts with each other. Four or five unit members, dressed in white laboratory clothing completely covering the body with only eyes and mouth visible, rest covered, handled the tests. A male and female, one infected with syphilis, would be brought together in a cell and forced into sex with each other. It was made clear that anyone resisting would be shot.” After victims were infected, they would be vivisected at differing stages of infection so that the internal and external organs could be observed as the disease progressed. Testimony from multiple guards blamed the female victims as being hosts of the diseases, even as they were forcibly infected. Genitals of female prisoners were infected with syphilis and the guards would call them “jam filled buns”. Even some children were born or grew up in the walls of Unit 731, infected with syphilis. One researcher recalled “one was a Chinese women holding an infant, one was a white russian woman with a daughter of 4 or 5 years of age, and the last was a white russian women with a boy of about 6 or 7”. The children of these women were tested in ways similar to the adults.  There was also of course rape and forced pregnancies as you could guess. Female prisoners were forced to become pregnant for use in experiments. The hypothetical possibility of transmission from mother to child of diseases, particularly syphilis was the rationale for the experiments. Fetal survival and damage to the womans reproductive organs were objects of interest. A large number of babies were born in captivity and there had been no accounts of any survivor of Unit 731, children included. It is suspected that the children of the female prisoners were killed after birth or aborted. One guard gave a testimony “One of the former researchers I located told me that one day he had a human experiment scheduled, but there was still time to kill. So he and another unit member took the keys to the cells and opened one that housed a Chinese woman. One of the unit members raped her; the other member took the keys and opened another cell. There was a Chinese woman in there who had been used in a frostbite experiment. She had several fingers missing and her bones were black, with gangrene set in. He was about to rape her anyway, then he saw that her sex organ was festering, with pus oozing to the surface. He gave up the idea, left and locked the door, then later went on to his experimental work.” In a testimony given on December 28 by witness Furuichi during the Khabarovsk Trial, he described how “a Russian woman was infected with syphilis to allow the scientists to and out how to prevent the spread of the disease.  Many babies were born to women who had been captured and become experimental subjects. Some women were kidnapped while pregnant; others became pregnant aer forced sex acts in the prisons, enabling researchers to study the transmission of venereal disease   Initially Unit 731 and Unit 100 were going to support Japan's Kantokuen plan. The Kantokuen plan an operation plan to be carried out by the Kwantung army to invade the USSR far east, capitalizing on the success of operation barbarossa. Unit 731 and 100 were to prepare bacteriological weapons to help the invasion. The plan was created by the IJA general staff and approved by Emperor Hirohito. It would have involved three-steps to isolate and destroy the Soviet Army and occupy the eastern soviet cities over the course of 6 months. It would have involved heavy use of chemical and biological weapons. The Japanese planned to spread disease using three methods; direct spraying from aircraft, bacteria bombs and saboteurs on the ground. This would have included plague, cholera, typhus and other diseases against troops, civilian populations, livestocks, crops and water supplies. The main targets were Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Voroshilov, and Chita. If successful the Soviet Far East would be incorporated into Japan's greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. Within Kantokuen documents, Emperor Hirohtio instructed Ishii to increase production rate at the units, for those not convinced Hirohito was deeply involved in some of the worst actions of the war. Yet in the end both Emperor Hirohito and Hideki Tojo pulled their support for the invasion of the USSR and opted for the Nanshin-ron strategy instead.    On August 9th of 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. In response, the Japanese government ordered all research facilities in Manchuria to be destroyed and to erase all incriminating materials. A skeleton crew began the liquidation of unit 731 on August 9th or 10th, while the rest of the unit evacuated. All test subjects were killed and cremated so no remains would be found. The design of the facilities however, made them hard to destroy via bombing, several parts of the buildings left standing when the Soviets arrived. While most of the unit's staff managed to escape, including Ishii, some were captured by the soviets. Some of these prisoners told the Soviets about the atrocities committed at Pingfang and Changchun. At first the claims seemed so outrageous, the Soviets sent their own Biological Weapons specialists to examine the ruins of Ping Fang. After a thorough investigation, the Soviet experts confirmed the experiments had been done there. The real soviet investigation into the secrets of Unit 731 and 100 began in early 1946, thus information was not readily available during the Tokyo Tribunal. Both the Americans and SOviets had collected evidence during the war that indicated the Japanese were in possession of bacteriological weapons though. Amongst the 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war in the USSR, Major General Kiyoshi Kawashima and Major Tomoio Karasawa would become essential to uncovering the Japanese bacteriological warfare secrets and opening the path to hold the Khabarovsk trial. The Soviets and Americans spent quite a few years performing investigations, many of which led to no arrests. The major reason for this was similar to Operation Paperclip. For those unaware, paperclip was a American secret intelligence program where 1600 German scientists were taken after the war and employed, many of whom were nazi party officials. The most famous of course was Wernher von Braun. When the Americans looked into the Japanese bacteriological work, they were surprised to find the Japanese were ahead of them in some specific areas, notably ones involving human experimentation. General Charles Willoughby of G-2 american intelligence called to attention that all the data extracted from live human testing was out of the reach of the USA. By the end of 1947, with the CCP looking like they might defeat Chiang Kai-Shek and the Soviet Union proving to be their new enemy, the US sought to form an alliance with Japan, and this included their Bacteriological specialists. From October to December, Drs Edwin Hill and Joseph Victor from Camp Detrick were sent to Tokyo to gather information from Ishii and his colleagues. Their final conclusion laid out the importance of continuing to learn from the Japanese teams, and grant them immunity. The British were also receiving some reports from the Americans about the Japanese Bacteriological research and human experimentation. The British agreed with the Americans that the information was invaluable due to the live human beings used in the tests. The UK and US formed some arrangements to retain the information and keep it secret. By late 1948 the Tokyo War Crimes Trial was coming to an end as the cold war tension was heating up in Korea, pushing the US more and more to want to retain the information and keep it all under wraps.  With formal acceptance, final steps were undertaken, much of which was overseen by General Douglas MacArthur. On May 6, 1947, Douglas MacArthur wrote to Washington that "additional data, possibly some statements from Ishii probably can be obtained by informing Japanese involved that information will be retained in intelligence channels and will not be employed as 'War Crimes' evidence.” Ishii and his colleagues received full immunity from the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Ishii was hired by the US government to lecture American officers at Fort Detrick on bioweapons and the findings made by Unit 731. During the Korean War Ishii reportedly traveled to Korea to take part in alleged American biological warfare activities. On February 22nd of 1952, Ishiiwas explicitly named in a statement made by the North Korean FOreign Minister, claiming he along with other "Japanese bacteriological war criminals had been involved in systematically spreading large quantities of bacteria-carrying insects by aircraft in order to disseminate contagious diseases over our frontline positions and our rear". Ishii would eventually return to Japan, where he opened a clinic, performing examinations and treatments for free. He would die from laryngeal cancer in 1959 and according to his daughter became a Roman Catholic shortly before his death.  According to an investigation by The Guardian, after the war, former members of Unit 731 conducted human experiments on Japanese prisoners, babies, and mental patients under the guise of vaccine development, with covert funding from the U.S. government. Masami Kitaoka, a graduate of Unit 1644, continued performing experiments on unwilling Japanese subjects from 1947 to 1956 while working at Japan's National Institute of Health Sciences. He infected prisoners with rickettsia and mentally ill patients with typhus. Shiro Ishii, the chief of the unit, was granted immunity from prosecution for war crimes by American occupation authorities in exchange for providing them with human experimentation research materials. From 1948 to 1958, less than five percent of these documents were transferred to microfilm and stored in the U.S. National Archives before being shipped back to Japan.

Last time we spoke about the Soviet Victory in Asia. After atomic bombings and Japan's surrender, the Soviets launched a rapid Manchurian invasion, driving toward Harbin, Mukden, Changchun, and Beijing. Shenyang was taken, seeing the capture of the last Emperor of China, Pu Yi. The Soviets continued their advances into Korea with port captures at Gensan and Pyongyang, and occupation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, ahead of anticipated American intervention. Stalin pushed for speed to avoid US naval landings, coordinating with Chinese forces and leveraging the Sino-Soviet pact while balancing relations with Chiang Kai-shek. As fronts closed, tens of thousands of Japanese POWs were taken, while harsh wartime reprisals, looting, and mass sexual violence against Japanese, Korean, and Chinese civilians were reported.  This episode is the Surrender of Japan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  With the Manchurian Campaign over and Japan's surrender confirmed, we've reached the end of the Pacific War and the ushering of a new era. This journey took us 3 years, 8 months, and 27 days and it's been a rollercoaster. We've gone over numerous stories of heroism and horror, victory and defeat, trying to peel back a part of WW2 that often gets overshadowed by the war in Europe. Certainly the China War is almost completely ignored by the west, but fortunately for you all, as I end this series we have just entered the China war over at the Fall and Rise of China Podcast. Unlike this series where, to be blunt, I am hamstrung by the week by week format, over there I can tackle the subject as I see fit, full of personal accounts. I implore you if you want to revisit some of that action in China, jump over to the other podcast, I will be continuing it until the end of the Chinese civil war. One could say it will soon be a bit of a sequel to this one. Of course if you love this format and want more, you can check out the brand new Eastern Front week by week podcast, which really does match the horror of the Pacific war. Lastly if you just love hearing my dumb voice, come check out my podcast which also is in video format on the Pacific War Channel on Youtube, the Echoes of War podcast. Me and my co-host Gaurav tackle history from Ancient to Modern, often with guests and we blend the dialogue with maps, photos and clips. But stating all of that, lets get into it, the surrender of Japan. As we last saw, while the Soviet invasion of Manchuria raged, Emperor Hirohito announced the unconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire on August 15. Public reaction varied, yet most were stunned and bewildered, unable to grasp that Japan had surrendered for the first time in its history. Many wept openly as they listened to the Emperor's solemn message; others directed swift anger at the nation's leaders and the fighting services for failing to avert defeat; and some blamed themselves for falling short in their war effort. Above all, there was a deep sympathy for the Emperor, who had been forced to make such a tragic and painful decision.  In the wake of the Emperor's broadcast, war factories across the country dismissed their workers and shut their doors. Newspapers that had been ordered to pause their usual morning editions appeared in the afternoon, each carrying the Imperial Rescript, an unabridged translation of the Potsdam Declaration, and the notes exchanged with the Allied Powers. In Tokyo, crowds of weeping citizens gathered all afternoon in the vast plaza before the Imperial Palace and at the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines to bow in reverence and prayer. The shock and grief of the moment, coupled with the dark uncertainty about the future, prevented any widespread sense of relief that the fighting had ended. Bombings and bloodshed were over, but defeat seemed likely to bring only continued hardship and privation. Starvation already gripped the land, and the nation faced the looming breakdown of public discipline and order, acts of violence and oppression by occupying forces, and a heavy burden of reparations. Yet despite the grim outlook, the Emperor's assurance that he would remain to guide the people through the difficult days ahead offered a measure of solace and courage. His appeal for strict compliance with the Imperial will left a lasting impression, and the refrain “Reverent Obedience to the Rescript” became the rallying cry as the nation prepared to endure the consequences of capitulation. Immediately after the Emperor's broadcast, Prime Minister Suzuki's cabinet tendered its collective resignation, yet Hirohito commanded them to remain in office until a new cabinet could be formed. Accordingly, Suzuki delivered another broadcast that evening, urging the nation to unite in absolute loyalty to the throne in this grave national crisis, and stressing that the Emperor's decision to end the war had been taken out of compassion for his subjects and in careful consideration of the circumstances. Thus, the shocked and grief-stricken population understood that this decision represented the Emperor's actual will rather than a ratified act of the Government, assuring that the nation as a whole would obediently accept the Imperial command. Consequently, most Japanese simply went on with their lives as best they could; yet some military officers, such as General Anami, chose suicide over surrender. Another key figure who committed seppuku between August 15 and 16 was Vice-Admiral Onishi Takijiro, the father of the kamikaze. Onishi's suicide note apologized to the roughly 4,000 pilots he had sent to their deaths and urged all surviving young civilians to work toward rebuilding Japan and fostering peace among nations. Additionally, despite being called “the hero of the August 15 incident” for his peacekeeping role in the attempted coup d'état, General Tanaka felt responsible for the damage done to Tokyo and shot himself on August 24. Following the final Imperial conference on 14 August, the Army's “Big Three”, War Minister Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, and Inspectorate-General of Military Training General Kenji Doihara, met at the War Ministry together with Field Marshals Hata and Sugiyama, the senior operational commanders of the homeland's Army forces. These five men affixed their seals to a joint resolution pledging that the Army would “conduct itself in accordance with the Imperial decision to the last.” The resolution was endorsed immediately afterward by General Masakazu Kawabe, the overall commander of the Army air forces in the homeland. In accordance with this decision, General Anami and General Umezu separately convened meetings of their senior subordinates during the afternoon of the 14th, informing them of the outcome of the final Imperial conference and directing strict obedience to the Emperor's command. Shortly thereafter, special instructions to the same effect were radioed to all top operational commanders jointly in the names of the War Minister and Chief of Army General Staff. The Army and Navy authorities acted promptly, and their decisive stance proved, for the most part, highly effective. In the Army, where the threat of upheaval was most acute, the final, unequivocal decision of its top leaders to heed the Emperor's will delivered a crippling blow to the smoldering coup plot by the young officers to block the surrender. The conspirators had based their plans on unified action by the Army as a whole; with that unified stance effectively ruled out, most of the principal plotters reluctantly abandoned the coup d'état scheme on the afternoon of 14 August. At the same time, the weakened Imperial Japanese Navy took steps to ensure disciplined compliance with the surrender decision. Only Admiral Ugaki chose to challenge this with his final actions. After listening to Japan's defeat, Admiral Ugaki Kayō's diary recorded that he had not yet received an official cease-fire order, and that, since he alone was to blame for the failure of Japanese aviators to stop the American advance, he would fly one last mission himself to embody the true spirit of bushido. His subordinates protested, and even after Ugaki had climbed into the back seat of a Yokosuka D4Y4 of the 701st Kokutai dive bomber piloted by Lieutenant Tatsuo Nakatsuru, Warrant Officer Akiyoshi Endo, whose place in the kamikaze roster Ugaki had usurped, also climbed into the same space that the admiral had already occupied. Thus, the aircraft containing Ugaki took off with three men piloted by Nakatsuru, with Endo providing reconnaissance, and Ugaki himself, rather than the two crew members that filled the other ten aircraft. Before boarding his aircraft, Ugaki posed for pictures and removed his rank insignia from his dark green uniform, taking only a ceremonial short sword given to him by Admiral Yamamoto. Elements of this last flight most likely followed the Ryukyu flyway southwest to the many small islands north of Okinawa, where U.S. forces were still on alert at the potential end of hostilities. Endo served as radioman during the mission, sending Ugaki's final messages, the last of which at 19:24 reported that the plane had begun its dive onto an American vessel. However, U.S. Navy records do not indicate any successful kamikaze attack on that day, and it is likely that all aircraft on the mission with the exception of three that returned due to engine problems crashed into the ocean, struck down by American anti-aircraft fire. Although there are no precise accounts of an intercept made by Navy or Marine fighters or Pacific Fleet surface units against enemy aircraft in this vicinity at the time of surrender. it is likely the aircraft crashed into the ocean or was shot down by American anti-aircraft fire. In any event, the crew of LST-926 reported finding the still-smoldering remains of a cockpit with three bodies on the beach of Iheyajima Island, with Ugaki's remains allegedly among them. Meanwhile, we have already covered the Truman–Stalin agreement that Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel would surrender to the Soviets while those to the south would surrender to the Americans, along with the subsequent Soviet occupation of Manchuria, North Korea, South Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. Yet even before the first atomic bomb was dropped, and well before the Potsdam Conference, General MacArthur and his staff were planning a peaceful occupation of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. The first edition of this plan, designated “Blacklist,” appeared on July 16 and called for a progressive, orderly occupation in strength of an estimated fourteen major areas in Japan and three to six areas in Korea, so that the Allies could exercise unhampered control over the various phases of administration. These operations would employ 22 divisions and 3 regiments, together with air and naval elements, and would utilize all United States forces immediately available in the Pacific. The plan also provided for the maximum use of existing Japanese political and administrative organizations, since these agencies already exerted effective control over the population and could be employed to good advantage by the Allies. The final edition of “Blacklist,” issued on August 8, was divided into three main phases of occupation. The first phase included the Kanto Plain, the Kobe–Osaka–Kyoto areas, the Nagasaki–Sasebo area in Kyushu, the Keijo district in Korea, and the Aomori–Ominato area of northern Honshu. The second phase covered the Shimonoseki–Fukuoka and Nagoya areas, Sapporo in Hokkaido, and Fusan in Korea. The third phase comprised the Hiroshima–Kure area, Kochi in Shikoku, the Okayama, Tsuruga, and Niigata areas, Sendai in northern Honshu, Otomari in Karafuto, and the Gunzan–Zenshu area in Korea. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially favored Admiral Nimitz's “Campus” Plan, which envisioned entry into Japan by Army forces only after an emergency occupation of Tokyo Bay by advanced naval units and the seizure of key positions ashore near each anchorage, MacArthur argued that naval forces were not designed to perform the preliminary occupation of a hostile country whose ground divisions remained intact, and he contended that occupying large land areas was fundamentally an Army mission. He ultimately convinced them that occupation by a weak Allied force might provoke resistance from dissident Japanese elements among the bomb-shattered population and could therefore lead to grave repercussions. The formal directive for the occupation of Japan, Korea, and the China coast was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 11. The immediate objectives were to secure the early entry of occupying forces into major strategic areas, to control critical ports, port facilities, and airfields, and to demobilize and disarm enemy troops. First priority went to the prompt occupation of Japan, second to the consolidation of Keijo in Korea, and third to operations on the China coast and in Formosa. MacArthur was to assume responsibility for the forces entering Japan and Korea; General Wedemeyer was assigned operational control of the forces landing on the China coast and was instructed to coordinate his plans with the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek; and Japanese forces in Southeast Asia were earmarked for surrender to Admiral Mountbatten. With the agreement of the Soviet, Chinese, and British governments, President Truman designated MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on August 15, thereby granting him final authority for the execution of the terms of surrender and occupation. In this capacity, MacArthur promptly notified the Emperor and the Japanese Government that he was authorized to arrange for the cessation of hostilities at the earliest practicable date and directed that the Japanese forces terminate hostilities immediately and that he be notified at once of the effective date and hour of such termination. He further directed that Japan send to Manila on August 17 “a competent representative empowered to receive in the name of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Imperial Government, and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender.” General MacArthur's stipulations to the Japanese Government included specific instructions regarding the journey of the Japanese representatives to Manila. The emissaries were to leave Sata Misaki, at the southern tip of Kyushu, on the morning of August 17. They were to travel in a Douglas DC-3-type transport plane, painted white and marked with green crosses on the wings and fuselage, and to fly under Allied escort to an airdrome on Lejima in the Ryukyus. From there, the Japanese would be transported to Manila in a United States plane. The code designation chosen for communication between the Japanese plane and US forces was the symbolic word “Bataan.” Implementation challenges arose almost immediately due to disagreements within Imperial General Headquarters and the Foreign Office over the exact nature of the mission. Some officials interpreted the instructions as requiring the delegates to carry full powers to receive and agree to the actual terms of surrender, effectively making them top representatives of the Government and High Command. Others understood the mission to be strictly preparatory, aimed only at working out technical surrender arrangements and procedures. Late in the afternoon of August 16, a message was sent to MacArthur's headquarters seeking clarification and more time to organize the mission. MacArthur replied that signing the surrender terms would not be among the tasks of the Japanese representatives dispatched to Manila, assured the Japanese that their proposed measures were satisfactory, and pledged that every precaution would be taken to ensure the safety of the Emperor's representatives on their mission. Although preparations were made with all possible speed, on August 16 the Japanese notified that this delegation would be somewhat delayed due to the scarcity of time allowed for its formation. At the same time, MacArthur was notified that Hirohito had issued an order commanding the entire armed forces of his nation to halt their fighting immediately. The wide dispersion and the disrupted communications of the Japanese forces, however, made the rapid and complete implementation of such an order exceedingly difficult, so it was expected that the Imperial order would take approximately two to twelve days to reach forces throughout the Pacific and Asiatic areas. On August 17, the Emperor personally backed up these orders with a special Rescript to the armed services, carefully worded to assuage military aversion to surrender. Suzuki was also replaced on this date, with the former commander of the General Defense Army, General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, becoming the new Prime Minister with the initial tasks to hastily form a new cabinet capable of effecting the difficult transition to peace swiftly and without incident. The Government and Imperial General Headquarters moved quickly to hasten the preparations, but the appointment of the mission's head was held up pending the installation of the Higashikuni Cabinet. The premier-designate pressed for a rapid formation of the government, and on the afternoon of the 17th the official ceremony of installation took place in the Emperor's presence. Until General Shimomura could be summoned to Tokyo from the North China Area Army, Prince Higashikuni himself assumed the portfolio of War Minister concurrently with the premiership, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai remaining in the critical post of Navy Minister, and Prince Ayamaro Konoe, by Marquis Kido's recommendation, entered the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio to act as Higashikuni's closest advisor. The Foreign Minister role went to Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had previously served in the Koiso Cabinet. With the new government installed, Prince Higashikuni broadcast to the nation on the evening of 17 August, declaring that his policies as Premier would conform to the Emperor's wishes as expressed in the Imperial mandate to form a Cabinet. These policies were to control the armed forces, maintain public order, and surmount the national crisis, with scrupulous respect for the Constitution and the Imperial Rescript terminating the war. The cabinet's installation removed one delay, and in the afternoon of the same day a message from General MacArthur's headquarters clarified the mission's nature and purpose. Based on this clarification, it was promptly decided that Lieutenant General Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, should head a delegation of sixteen members, mainly representing the Army and Navy General Staffs. Kawabe was formally appointed by the Emperor on 18 August. By late afternoon that same day, the data required by the Allied Supreme Commander had largely been assembled, and a message was dispatched to Manila informing General MacArthur's headquarters that the mission was prepared to depart the following morning. The itinerary received prompt approval from the Supreme Commander. Indeed, the decision to appoint a member of the Imperial Family who had a respectable career in the armed forces was aimed both at appeasing the population and at reassuring the military. MacArthur appointed General Eichelberger's 8th Army to initiate the occupation unassisted through September 22, at which point General Krueger's 6th Army would join the effort. General Hodge's 24th Corps was assigned to execute Operation Blacklist Forty, the occupation of the Korean Peninsula south of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur's tentative schedule for the occupation outlined an initial advance party of 150 communications experts and engineers under Colonel Charles Tench, which would land at Atsugi Airfield on August 23. Naval forces under Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet were to enter Tokyo Bay on August 24, followed by MacArthur's arrival at Atsugi the next day and the start of the main landings of airborne troops and naval and marine forces. The formal surrender instrument was to be signed aboard an American battleship in Tokyo Bay on August 28, with initial troop landings in southern Kyushu planned for August 29–30. By September 4, Hodge's 24th Corps was to land at Inchon and begin the occupation of South Korea. In the meantime, per MacArthur's directions, a sixteen-man Japanese delegation headed by Lieutenant-General Kawabe Torashiro, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, left Sata Misaki on the morning of August 19; after landing at Iejima, the delegation transferred to an American transport and arrived at Nichols Field at about 18:00. That night, the representatives held their first conference with MacArthur's staff, led by Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland. During the two days of conference, American linguists scanned, translated, and photostated the various reports, maps, and charts the Japanese had brought with them. Negotiations also resulted in permission for the Japanese to supervise the disarmament and demobilization of their own armed forces under Allied supervision, and provided for three extra days of preparation before the first occupying unit landed on the Japanese home islands on August 26. At the close of the conference, Kawabe was handed the documents containing the “Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” which concerned the arrival of the first echelons of Allied forces, the formal surrender ceremony, and the reception of the occupation forces. Also given were a draft Imperial Proclamation by which the Emperor would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and command his subjects to cease hostilities, a copy of General Order No. 1 by which Imperial General Headquarters would direct all military and naval commanders to lay down their arms and surrender their units to designated Allied commanders, and the Instrument of Surrender itself, which would later be signed on board an American battleship in Tokyo Bay. After the Manila Conference ended, the Japanese delegation began its return to Japan at 13:00 on August 20; but due to mechanical problems and a forced landing near Hamamatsu, they did not reach Tokyo until August 21. With the scheduled arrival of the advanced party of the Allied occupation forces only five days away, the Japanese immediately began disarming combat units in the initial-occupation areas and evacuating them from those areas. The basic orders stated that Allied forces would begin occupying the homeland on 26 August and reaffirmed the intention ofImperial General Headquarters "to insure absolute obedience to the Imperial Rescript of 14 August, to prevent the occurrence of trouble with the occupying forces, and thus to demonstrate Japan's sincerity to the world." The Japanese government announced that all phases of the occupation by Allied troops would be peaceful and urged the public not to panic or resort to violence against the occupying forces. While they sought to reassure the population, they faced die-hard anti-surrender elements within the IJN, with ominous signs of trouble both from Kyushu, where many sea and air special-attack units were poised to meet an invasion, and from Atsugi, the main entry point for Allied airborne troops into the Tokyo Bay area. At Kanoya, Ugaki's successor, Vice-Admiral Kusaka Ryonosuke, hastened the separation of units from their weapons and the evacuation of naval personnel. At Atsugi, an even more threatening situation developed in the Navy's 302nd Air Group. Immediately after the announcement of the surrender, extremist elements in the group led by Captain Kozono Yasuna flew over Atsugi and the surrounding area, scattering leaflets urging the continuation of the war on the ground and claiming that the surrender edict was not the Emperor's true will but the machination of "traitors around the Throne." The extremists, numbering 83 junior officers and noncommissioned officers, did not commit hostile acts but refused to obey orders from their superior commanders. On August 19, Prince Takamatsu, the Emperor's brother and a navy captain, telephoned Atsugi and personally appealed to Captain Kozono and his followers to obey the Imperial decision. This intervention did not end the incident; on August 21 the extremists seized a number of aircraft and flew them to Army airfields in Saitama Prefecture in hopes of gaining support from Army air units. They failed in this attempt, and it was not until August 25 that all members of the group had surrendered. As a result of the Atsugi incident, on August 22 the Emperor dispatched Captain Prince Takamatsu Nabuhito and Vice-Admiral Prince Kuni Asaakira to various naval commands on Honshu and Kyushu to reiterate the necessity of strict obedience to the surrender decision. Both princes immediately left Tokyo to carry out this mission, but the situation improved over the next two days, and they were recalled before completing their tours. By this point, a typhoon struck the Kanto region on the night of August 22, causing heavy damage and interrupting communications and transport vital for evacuating troops from the occupation zone. This led to further delays in Japanese preparations for the arrival of occupation forces, and the Americans ultimately agreed to a two-day postponement of the preliminary landings. On August 27 at 10:30, elements of the 3rd Fleet entered Sagami Bay as the first step in the delayed occupation schedule. At 09:00 on August 28, Tench's advanced party landed at Atsugi to complete technical arrangements for the arrival of the main forces. Two days later, the main body of the airborne occupation forces began streaming into Atsugi, while naval and marine forces simultaneously landed at Yokosuka on the south shore of Tokyo Bay. There were no signs of resistance, and the initial occupation proceeded successfully.  Shortly after 1400, a famous C-54  the name “Bataan” in large letters on its nose circled the field and glided in for a landing. General MacArthur stepped from the aircraft, accompanied by General Sutherland and his staff officers. The operation proceeded smoothly. MacArthur paused momentarily to inspect the airfield, then climbed into a waiting automobile for the drive to Yokohama. Thousands of Japanese troops were posted along the fifteen miles of road from Atsugi to Yokohama to guard the route of the Allied motor cavalcade as it proceeded to the temporary SCAP Headquarters in Japan's great seaport city. The Supreme Commander established his headquarters provisionally in the Yokohama Customs House. The headquarters of the American Eighth Army and the Far East Air Force were also established in Yokohama, and representatives of the United States Pacific Fleet were attached to the Supreme Commander's headquarters. The intensive preparation and excitement surrounding the first landings on the Japanese mainland did not interfere with the mission of affording relief and rescue to Allied personnel who were internees or prisoners in Japan. Despite bad weather delaying the occupation operation, units of the Far East Air Forces and planes from the Third Fleet continued their surveillance missions. On 25 August they began dropping relief supplies, food, medicine, and clothing, to Allied soldiers and civilians in prisoner-of-war and internment camps across the main islands. While the advance echelon of the occupation forces was still on Okinawa, “mercy teams” were organized to accompany the first elements of the Eighth Army Headquarters. Immediately after the initial landings, these teams established contact with the Swiss and Swedish Legations, the International Red Cross, the United States Navy, and the Japanese Liaison Office, and rushed to expedite the release and evacuation, where necessary, of thousands of Allied internees.  On September 1, the Reconnaissance Troop of the 11th Airborne Division conducted a subsidiary airlift operation, flying from Atsugi to occupy Kisarazu Airfield; and on the morning of September 2, the 1st Cavalry Division began landing at Yokohama to secure most of the strategic areas along the shores of Tokyo Bay, with Tokyo itself remaining unoccupied. Concurrently, the surrender ceremony took place aboard Halsey's flagship, the battleship Missouri, crowded with representatives of the United Nations that had participated in the Pacific War.  General MacArthur presided over the epoch-making ceremony, and with the following words he inaugurated the proceedings which would ring down the curtain of war in the Pacific “We are gathered here, representatives of the major warring powers, to conclude a solemn agreement whereby peace may be restored. The issues, involving divergent ideals and ideologies, have been determined on the battlefields of the world and hence are not for our discussion or debate. Nor is it for us here to meet, representing as we do a majority of the people of the earth, in a spirit of distrust, malice or hatred. But rather it is for us, both victors and vanquished, to rise to that higher dignity which alone befits the sacred purposes we are about to serve, committing all our peoples unreservedly to faithful compliance with the understandings they are here formally to assume. It is my earnest hope, and indeed the hope of all mankind, that from this solemn occasion a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past — a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfillment of his most cherished wish for freedom, tolerance and justice. The terms and conditions upon which surrender of the Japanese Imperial Forces is here to be given and accepted are contained in the instrument of surrender now before you…”.  The Supreme Commander then invited the two Japanese plenipotentiaries to sign the duplicate surrender documents : Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, on behalf of the Emperor and the Japanese Government, and General Umezu, for the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters. He then called forward two famous former prisoners of the Japanese to stand behind him while he himself affixed his signature to the formal acceptance of the surrender : Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, hero of Bataan and Corregidor and Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur E. Percival, who had been forced to yield the British stronghold at Singapore. General MacArthur was followed in turn by Admiral Nimitz, who signed on behalf of the United States. Alongside the recently liberated Generals Wainwright and Percival, who had been captured during the Japanese conquest of the Philippines and Singapore respectively, MacArthur then signed the surrender documents, followed by Admiral Nimitz and representatives of the other United Nations present. The Instrument of Surrender was completely signed within twenty minutes. Shortly afterwards, MacArthur broadcast the announcement of peace to the world, famously saying, “Today the guns are silent.” Immediately following the signing of the surrender articles, the Imperial Proclamation of capitulation was issued, commanding overseas forces to cease hostilities and lay down their arms; however, it would take many days, and in some cases weeks, for the official word of surrender to be carried along Japan's badly disrupted communications channels. Various devices were employed by American commanders to transmit news of final defeat to dispersed and isolated enemy troops, such as plane-strewn leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, strategically placed signboards, and prisoner-of-war volunteers. Already, the bypassed Japanese garrison at Mille Atoll had surrendered on August 22; yet the first large-scale surrender of Japanese forces came on August 27, when Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio surrendered Morotai and Halmahera to the 93rd Division. On August 30, a British Pacific Fleet force under Rear-Admiral Cecil Harcourt entered Victoria Harbour to begin the liberation of Hong Kong; and the following day, Rear-Admiral Matsubara Masata surrendered Minami-Torishima. In the Marianas, the Japanese commanders on Rota and Pagan Islands relinquished their commands almost simultaneously with the Tokyo Bay ceremony of September 2. Later that day, the same was done by Lieutenant-General Inoue Sadae in the Palaus and by Lieutenant-General Mugikura Shunzaburo and Vice-Admiral Hara Chuichi at Truk in the Carolines. Additionally, as part of Operation Jurist, a British detachment under Vice-Admiral Harold Walker received the surrender of the Japanese garrison on Penang Island. In the Philippines, local commanders in the central Bukidnon Province, Infanta, the Bataan Peninsula, and the Cagayan Valley had already surrendered by September 2. On September 3, General Yamashita and Vice-Admiral Okawachi Denshichi met with General Wainwright, General Percival, and Lieutenant-General Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of Army Forces of the Western Pacific, to sign the formal surrender of the Japanese forces in the Philippines. With Yamashita's capitulation, subordinate commanders throughout the islands began surrendering in increasing numbers, though some stragglers remained unaware of the capitulation. Concurrently, while Yamashita was yielding his Philippine forces, Lieutenant-General Tachibana Yoshio's 109th Division surrendered in the Bonins on September 3. On September 4, Rear-Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu and Colonel Chikamori Shigeharu surrendered their garrison on Wake Island, as did the garrison on Aguigan Island in the Marianas. Also on September 4, an advanced party of the 24th Corps landed at Kimpo Airfield near Keijo to prepare the groundwork for the occupation of South Korea; and under Operation Tiderace, Mountbatten's large British and French naval force arrived off Singapore and accepted the surrender of Japanese forces there. On September 5, Rear-Admiral Masuda Nisuke surrendered his garrison on Jaluit Atoll in the Marshalls, as did the garrison of Yap Island. The overall surrender of Japanese forces in the Solomons and Bismarcks and in the Wewak area of New Guinea was finally signed on September 6 by General Imamura Hitoshi and Vice-Admiral Kusaka Jinichi aboard the aircraft carrier Glory off Rabaul, the former center of Japanese power in the South Pacific. Furthermore, Lieutenant-General Nomi Toshio, representing remaining Japanese naval and army forces in the Ryukyus, officially capitulated on September 7 at the headquarters of General Stilwell's 10th Army on Okinawa. The following day, Tokyo was finally occupied by the Americans, and looking south, General Kanda and Vice-Admiral Baron Samejima Tomoshige agreed to travel to General Savige's headquarters at Torokina to sign the surrender of Bougainville. On September 8, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Samarinda surrendered to General Milford's 7th Australian Division, as did the Japanese garrison on Kosrae Island in the Carolines. On September 9, a wave of surrenders continued: the official capitulation of all Japanese forces in the China Theater occurred at the Central Military Academy in Nanking, with General Okamura surrendering to General He Yingqin, the commander-in-chief of the Republic of China National Revolutionary Army; subsequently, on October 10, 47 divisions from the former Imperial Japanese Army officially surrendered to Chinese military officials and allied representatives at the Forbidden City in Beijing. The broader context of rehabilitation and reconstruction after the protracted war was daunting, with the Nationalists weakened and Chiang Kai-shek's policies contributing to Mao Zedong's strengthened position, shaping the early dynamics of the resumption of the Chinese Civil War. Meanwhile, on September 9, Hodge landed the 7th Division at Inchon to begin the occupation of South Korea. In the throne room of the Governor's Palace at Keijo, soon to be renamed Seoul, the surrender instrument was signed by General Abe Nobuyuki, the Governor-General of Korea; Lieutenant-General Kozuki Yoshio, commander of the 17th Area Army and of the Korean Army; and Vice-Admiral Yamaguchi Gisaburo, commander of the Japanese Naval Forces in Korea. The sequence continued with the 25th Indian Division landing in Selangor and Negeri Sembilan on Malaya to capture Port Dickson, while Lieutenant-General Teshima Fusataro's 2nd Army officially surrendered to General Blamey at Morotai, enabling Australian occupation of much of the eastern Dutch East Indies. On September 10, the Japanese garrisons on the Wotje and Maloelap Atolls in the Marshalls surrendered, and Lieutenant-General Baba Masao surrendered all Japanese forces in North Borneo to General Wootten's 9th Australian Division. After Imamura's surrender, Major-General Kenneth Eather's 11th Australian Division landed at Rabaul to begin occupation, and the garrison on Muschu and Kairiru Islands also capitulated. On September 11, General Adachi finally surrendered his 18th Army in the Wewak area, concluding the bloody New Guinea Campaign, while Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's 71st Independent Mixed Brigade surrendered at Kuching and Lieutenant-General Watanabe Masao's 52nd Independent Mixed Brigade surrendered on Ponape Island in the Carolines. Additionally, the 20th Indian Division, with French troops, arrived at Saigon as part of Operation Masterdom and accepted the surrender of Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu, who had already met with Viet Minh envoys and agreed to turn power over to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.  When the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on 15 August 1945, the Viet Minh immediately launched the insurrection they had prepared for a long time. Across the countryside, “People's Revolutionary Committees” took over administrative positions, often acting on their own initiative, and in the cities the Japanese stood by as the Vietnamese took control. By the morning of August 19, the Viet Minh had seized Hanoi, rapidly expanding their control over northern Vietnam in the following days. The Nguyen dynasty, with its puppet government led by Tran Trong Kim, collapsed when Emperor Bao Dai abdicated on August 25. By late August, the Viet Minh controlled most of Vietnam. On 2 September, in Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As the Viet Minh began extending control across the country, the new government's attention turned to the arrival of Allied troops and the French attempt to reassert colonial authority, signaling the onset of a new and contentious phase in Vietnam's struggle.  French Indochina had been left in chaos by the Japanese occupation. On 11 September British and Indian troops of the 20th Indian Division under Major General Douglas Gracey arrived at Saigon as part of Operation Masterdom. After the Japanese surrender, all French prisoners had been gathered on the outskirts of Saigon and Hanoi, and the sentries disappeared on 18 September; six months of captivity cost an additional 1,500 lives. By 22 September 1945, all prisoners were liberated by Gracey's men, armed, and dispatched in combat units toward Saigon to conquer it from the Viet Minh, later joined by the French Far East Expeditionary Corps, established to fight the Japanese arriving a few weeks later. Around the same time, General Lu Han's 200,000 Chinese National Revolutionary Army troops of the 1st Front Army occupied Indochina north of the 16th parallel, with 90,000 arriving by October; the 62nd Army came on 26 September to Nam Dinh and Haiphong, Lang Son and Cao Bang were occupied by the Guangxi 62nd Army Corps, and the Red River region and Lai Cai were occupied by a column from Yunnan. Lu Han occupied the French governor-general's palace after ejecting the French staff under Sainteny. Consequently, while General Lu Han's Chinese troops occupied northern Indochina and allowed the Vietnamese Provisional Government to remain in control there, the British and French forces would have to contest control of Saigon. On September 12, a surrender instrument was signed at the Singapore Municipal Building for all Southern Army forces in Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and the eastern islands; General Terauchi, then in a hospital in Saigon after a stroke, learned of Burma's fall and had his deputy commander and leader of the 7th Area Army, Lieutenant-General Itagaki Seishiro, surrender on his behalf to Mountbatten, after which a British military administration was formed to govern the island until March 1946. The Japanese Burma Area Army surrendered the same day as Mountbatten's ceremony in Singapore, and Indian forces in Malaya reached Kuala Lumpur to liberate the Malay capital, though the British were slow to reestablish control over all of Malaya, with eastern Pahang remaining beyond reach for three more weeks. On September 13, the Japanese garrisons on Nauru and Ocean Islands surrendered to Brigadier John Stevenson, and three days later Major-General Okada Umekichi and Vice-Admiral Fujita Ruitaro formally signed the instrument of surrender at Hong Kong. In the meantime, following the Allied call for surrender, Japan had decided to grant Indonesian independence to complicate Dutch reoccupation: Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta signed Indonesia's Proclamation of Independence on August 17 and were appointed president and vice-president the next day, with Indonesian youths spreading news across Java via Japanese news and telegraph facilities and Bandung's news broadcast by radio. The Dutch, as the former colonial power, viewed the republicans as collaborators with the Japanese and sought to restore their colonial rule due to lingering political and economic interests in the former Dutch East Indies, a stance that helped trigger a four-year war for Indonesian independence. Fighting also erupted in Sumatra and the Celebes, though the 26th Indian Division managed to land at Padang on October 10. On October 21, Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake and Vice-Admiral Hirose Sueto surrendered all Japanese forces on Sumatra, yet British control over the country would dwindle in the ensuing civil conflict. Meanwhile, Formosa (Taiwan) was placed under the control of the Kuomintang-led Republic of China by General Order No. 1 and the Instrument of Surrender; Chiang Kai-shek appointed General Chen Yi as Chief Executive of Taiwan Province and commander of the Taiwan Garrison Command on September 1. After several days of preparation, an advance party moved into Taihoku on October 5, with additional personnel arriving from Shanghai and Chongqing between October 5 and 24, and on October 25 General Ando Rikichi signed the surrender document at Taipei City Hall. But that's the end for this week, and for the Pacific War.  Boy oh boy, its been a long journey hasn't it? Now before letting you orphans go into the wild, I will remind you, while this podcast has come to an end, I still write and narrate Kings and Generals Eastern Front week by week and the Fall and Rise of China Podcasts. Atop all that I have my own video-podcast Echoes of War, that can be found on Youtube or all podcast platforms. I really hope to continue entertaining you guys, so if you venture over to the other podcasts, comment you came from here! I also have some parting gifts to you all, I have decided to release a few Pacific War related exclusive episodes from my Youtuber Membership / patreon at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel. At the time I am writing this, over there I have roughly 32 episodes, one is uploaded every month alongside countless other goodies. Thank you all for being part of this long lasting journey. Kings and Generals literally grabbed me out of the blue when I was but a small silly person doing youtube videos using an old camera, I have barely gotten any better at it. I loved making this series, and I look forward to continuing other series going forward! You know where to find me, if you have any requests going forward the best way to reach me is just comment on my Youtube channel or email me, the email address can be found on my youtube channel. This has been Craig of the Pacific War Channel and narrator of the Pacific war week by week podcast, over and out!

La tertulia semanal en la que repasamos las últimas noticias de la actualidad científica. En el episodio de hoy: Cara A: -Quedada en Madrid, 4 y 5 de octubre. Inscripciones en: +34 610996442 (5:00) -Identificado como denisovano el cráneo de Harbin (“hombre dragón”) (7:00) Este episodio continúa en la Cara B. Contertulios: Alberto Aparici, Borja Tosar, Gastón Giribet, Francis Villatoro, Héctor Socas. Imagen de portada realizada con Midjourney. Todos los comentarios vertidos durante la tertulia representan únicamente la opinión de quien los hace... y a veces ni eso

La tertulia semanal en la que repasamos las últimas noticias de la actualidad científica. En el episodio de hoy: Cara B: -La presa china que puede ralentizar (ligerísimamente) la rotación de la Tierra (06:30) -Starship IFT 10 (30:30) -NANOGRAV y la búsqueda de binarias de agujeros negros supermasivos (1:18:30) -Señales de los oyentes (1:51:30) Este episodio es continuación de la Cara A. Contertulios: Alberto Aparici, Borja Tosar, Juan Carlos Gil, Gastón Giribet, Francis Villatoro, Héctor Socas. Imagen de portada realizada con Midjourney. Todos los comentarios vertidos durante la tertulia representan únicamente la opinión de quien los hace... y a veces ni eso

Oi gente, voltamos! Nesse episódio falamos de “Pachinko” (2017), de Min Jin Lee e da adaptação de mesmo nome. Livros citados: Como tigres na neve (2022), de Juhea Kim Herdeiras do mar (2020), de Mary Lynn Bratch Música da nossa trilha sonora: Not My First Rodeo de Dyalla. Creative Commons Attribution 4.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Artista: https://soundcloud.com/dyallas/not-my-first-rodeo Deixe seus comentários aqui para gente. Sempre que acabamos de gravar, lembramos de algo mais que poderia ser dito, logo o tema sempre fica em aberto. Podcast: 00:00:05 Apresentação 00:08:00 Imperialismo 00:34:00 Literatura coreana 01:15: 00 Indicações Pachinko (2022) https://www.imdb.com/fr/title/tt8888462/ The Handmaiden (2016) https://www.imdb.com/fr/title/tt4016934/ The Age of Shadows (2016) https://www.imdb.com/fr/title/tt4914580/ Harbin (2024) https://www.imdb.com/fr/title/tt23630030/ Blue Bayou (2021) https://www.imdb.com/fr/title/tt11121664/ Agradecimento aos nossos apoiadores: Philippe Sartin MARIA ANGELICA N GOMES LOUISE COSTA PESSANHA Belísia Agulhô Lopes Sayão Lilian Diniz Pedro de Castro Lscher Mari Castro RONY CARLOS BRAGA OLIVEIRA Rafael Sanches Dias O post #88 – Pachinko de Min Jin Lee apareceu primeiro em Chá das Cinco Com Literatura.

Last time we spoke about the Battle for South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. In August 1945, as Japan teetered on the edge of destruction following the atomic bombings, a desperate situation unfolded. The Soviet Union launched a sudden invasion of Manchuria, catching Japanese forces off guard. On August 14, Japan's decision to surrender was made, announced to the world the following day. However, the Kwantung Army resisted fiercely, engaging in frantic evacuations. In South Sakhalin, Japanese defenders clashed with advancing Soviet troops, facing overwhelming odds. By August 18, chaos reigned on the Japanese side, with forces surrendering and civilians in panic. As the Soviets pushed forward, the situation became increasingly dire for Japan. Despite valiant resistance, the imminent defeat became clear. In a moment of critical decision, Emperor Hirohito accepted the surrender terms, officially sealing Japan's fate and marking the end of the Pacific War. However the Soviets had not yet stopped their onslaught.  This episode is the Soviet Victory in Asia Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are drawing near to the real conclusion of this series! Japan has officially surrendered, however the Soviets are not done just yet. East asia is a delicious piece of cake, laid wide open and Stalin intends to take every piece he can grab before the curtain falls. Now as we last left off it was August 18, and General Yamada's Kwantung Army had surrendered to the Soviet forces led by Marshal Vasilevsky, who were advancing rapidly through Manchuria. Yet, some Japanese units, like those at Kalgan, continued to resist occupation until the month's end. On August 19, following Yamada's announcement that all military operations had ceased, a Soviet delegation arrived at Hsinking.  A daring operation took place, where a 225-strong detachment from the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, part of the 5th Guards Tank Corps, was airlifted to the city's main airfield. This mission, along with others, was carried out under orders from Marshal Vasilevsky on August 18, following the commander's initial offer of surrender from the Kwantung Army. Vasilevsky's directive was urgent: “The Japanese resistance is broken, and the challenging road conditions hinder the swift advance of our main forces. We need to deploy specially formed, fast-moving, and well-equipped units to capture Changchun, Mukden, Jilin, and Harbin immediately. These units should remain flexible for future missions, regardless of their distance from the main forces.”The push to accelerate operations came directly from Stalin himself. In Kulichkin's biography of Marshal Vasilevsky, he recounts a pivotal phone call on August 15. Stalin was informed that the Japanese had “lost command and control” and were unable to mount a strong defense, with their forces divided into several fragmented groups. Vasilevsky confidently stated, “Even a miracle cannot save the Japanese from total defeat,” stressing the need to maintain the momentum of the offensive. Stalin's response was straightforward: “Good. We need to increase the pace. What proposals do you have?” Vasilevsky revealed plans to use airborne assault forces against larger cities like Harbin, Changchun, Jilin, and Mukden, alongside advanced mobile units across all combined arms armies. These units, consisting of tanks and assault guns, were fully equipped with desantniki, ready to engage firmly in the ongoing operations. The landing at Shenyang revealed a remarkable twist of fate. Waiting at the airfield for evacuation to Japan was none other than the recently abdicated Emperor Puyi of Manchukuo. On August 15, 1945, Puyi tuned in to the radio and listened to Emperor Hirohito's address announcing Japan's surrender. In this historic speech, the Showa Emperor referred to the Americans' use of a "most unusual and cruel bomb," which had just devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For Puyi, this was the first revelation of the atomic bombings, information that the Japanese had conveniently withheld from him until that moment. The aircraft carrying Major Chelyshev's force, escorted by fighter planes, landed at 1:15 PM without any opposition and captured him. This small unit's survival hinged on remaining unchallenged, and they successfully secured the airfield. They also freed several Allied personnel held at the nearby Hoten prisoner-of-war camp. As soon as the landing was secured, additional reinforcements were airlifted in later that day, led by General Kravchenko, the commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army. He formally accepted the city's surrender, and the Soviets then transported Puyi to the Siberian town of Chita.  Meanwhile, Vasilevsky's ground offensive pressed on, mostly unopposed, though some resistance persisted. In the Transbaikal Front, Marshal Malinovsky's General Pliyev led his cavalry-mechanized units against the Japanese forces at Kalgan. Other units reached Jehol and accepted the surrender of the 108th Division. General Danilov's 17th Army secured the Shanhaiguan coast, while General Managarov's 53rd Army pushed towards Kailu. The main force of General Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army regrouped at Tungliao and Kaitung, preparing to advance south toward Mukden. General Lyudnikov's 39th Army steadily approached Changchun, confronting the bypassed 107th Division, and General Luchinsky's 36th Army occupied Tsitsihar, accepting the surrender of the 136th Independent Mixed Brigade. At the same time, on General Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front, General Teryokhin's 2nd Red Banner Army continued its siege of the Aihun fortified region. Meanwhile, a forward detachment moved slowly south through the Lesser Khinghan Mountains. General Mamonov's 15th Army began capturing and processing prisoners from the many retreating Japanese units after a successful amphibious assault secured Sansing. The Amur Flotilla supported the army's push towards Harbin, while General Pashkov's 5th Rifle Corps finally reached Poli, which had already been occupied by other Soviet units. In Marshal Meretskov's 1st Far Eastern Front, forward detachments of General Zakhvatayev's 35th Army began arriving at Linkou, focusing on the surrender of Japanese units in the area. Rear elements effectively eliminated the last traces of enemy resistance in the Hutou fortified area.  After a challenging struggle through the wetlands and the capture of Mishan on August 12, advanced detachments of the 35th Army's main force, the 66th and 363rd Rifle Divisions, continued their advance against minimal opposition. The situation was starkly different to their rear, where the 1056th Rifle Regiment of the 264th Rifle Division, supported by the heavily reinforced 109th Fortified Region, worked to dismantle the now-isolated Hutou fortified area. Despite the dire circumstances, the garrison refused to surrender. Thus, the focus shifted to systematically eliminating their defenses, which became a painstaking task. The attackers deployed an artillery destruction group, secured air supremacy, and utilized well-trained assault formations. Their techniques included pouring kerosene or gasoline into ventilation shafts of underground structures, sometimes in alarming quantities. For instance, two tonnes of gasoline were recorded being poured into a single installation before ignition was applied. Despite the brutal and methodical obliteration of their positions, the defenders continued to ignore orders to surrender. Notably, on August 18, a Japanese prisoner was sent under a flag of truce to inform those still holding out that the war was officially over; tragically, he was hacked to death by a sword-wielding officer. Ultimately, this stubbornness led to catastrophic consequences: about 3,000 defenders were killed, blasted and burned, before a small number finally capitulated. Additionally, advanced detachments of General Beloborodov's 1st Red Banner Army reached Shangzhi before continuing towards Harbin, and forward elements of General Krylov's 5th Army pushed on toward Jilin. General Chistyakov's 25th Army commenced disarming General Murakami's 3rd Army, while the 10th Mechanized Corps advanced rapidly westward, crossing the Laoilin Mountain passes to arrive at Tunhua by nightfall. Over in North Korea, the 335th Rifle Division successfully landed in Chongjin, as General Kabanov's Southern Defense Region prepared for an assault on Gensan. In South Sakhalin, despite the surrender of the 125th Regiment and ongoing negotiations with General Mineki's 88th Division, Soviet forces opted to proceed with the planned landing at Maoka. Consequently, Admiral Andreyev's Northern Pacific Flotilla departed from Sovetskaya Gavan in the morning, carrying the bulk of the 113th Rifle Brigade along with a battalion of marines for the long and challenging voyage to Maoka. On Shumshu Island, as General Gnechko's forces were landing their artillery to renew their assault, Japanese officers unexpectedly approached the Soviets under flags of truce, carrying a letter from General Tsutsumi proposing negotiations for surrender. Representatives from both sides began discussions, and by 6 PM, the 91st Division formally surrendered the garrisons of Shumshu, Paramushir, and Onekotan. On August 20, Gnechko dispatched a small detachment on six vessels to seize control of the airfield at Kataoka. However, as they crossed the Second Kuril Strait, batteries on both sides of the narrow waterway opened heavy fire on the Soviet ships, forcing them to withdraw. This breach of the surrender agreement sparked a renewed offensive at 1 PM, coordinated with air strikes. The bases at Kataoka and Kashiwabar were bombed by 61 aircraft, which dropped over 200 bombs, enabling ground troops to push forward up to six kilometers. It was not until General Tsutsumi intervened that the Soviets were assured the Japanese would indeed lay down their arms. Meanwhile, Andreyev's convoy arrived at Maoka harbor on the morning of August 20, successfully landing the first wave of marines amid heavy fog. They quickly spread out and secured the area while the second and third waves of infantry followed behind. By noon, the port area was secured, and the marines began advancing eastward into the city, supported by infantry on their flanks. Taken by surprise, the Japanese defenders were ultimately compelled to retreat, with the 113th Rifle Brigade pursuing them through the mountains to the villages of Futamata and Osaka. In Manchuria, between August 20 and 21, Vasilevsky's units continued their advance to occupy the region's main centers. Stalin urged for greater speed, fearing that any delay might prompt President Truman to order General MacArthur's air-naval assault forces to land there. Notably, Pliyev's first column successfully captured Kalgan, while his second column moved south toward Beijing, securing Gubeikou at the border. Located in one of the passes through the Great Wall, marking the border between Manchukuo and China, the town was garrisoned by Japanese units. These forces surrendered upon the approach of the Soviet troops, who then quickly advanced toward Beijing, about 100 kilometers away. Although not the former capital itself, this area was under the control of Chinese Communist forces known as the 8th Route Army, who aligned with the Soviets. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek was acutely aware that any Japanese capitulation to the Communists in northern China would allow the latter to occupy vital territories, making their removal difficult. Consequently, he commanded the 8th Route Army not to accept any Japanese surrenders, insisting they only surrender to Nationalist forces, with dire punishments threatened for defiance. Adding to the complexity, the Soviet Union and China had signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, discussed at Yalta, just six days earlier on August 14. This treaty promised mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The Soviets had also committed to providing “moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources” exclusively to the National Government as the legitimate central authority of China. Thus, a significant political and military predicament loomed. However, the Soviets quickly extricated themselves from this situation when Malinovsky issued an order forbidding Pliyev's forces from crossing the border. As Pliyev recounted, his formations were poised just halfway between Chengde and Beijing, needing “only one 'leap' to the Chinese capital.” He noted, “I had to suspend the offensive and move north beyond the Great Wall.” Units from the 6th Guards Tank Army occupied both Changchun and Mukden, initiating a rail movement towards Port Arthur and Dairen. For those curious, at Pingfan and Changchun, General Shiro Ishii and the remaining personnel from Units 731 and 100 were captured by Soviet forces. In a tragic turn of events, all test subjects were murdered and cremated, while the Japanese attempted to destroy evidence of their facilities but were unable to do so in time. Following their capture, the Soviets launched an extensive campaign to uncover the secrets behind Units 731 and 100, leading to the Khabarovsk Trial. If you want to learn more about what I would call “japans operation paperclip”, the secret dealings between Unit 731 and the Allies after the war, I did make an episode about it over on my patreon. Its pretty gruesome stuff so big disclaimer there.' The Soviets arrived to Dairen on 24 August, although these places had surrendered to air-landed forces two days earlier. This was, no doubt, much to the relief of Stalin, as these were amongst the main locations where he most feared American intervention. Indeed, on the day of the landing he had told Vasilevsky to ‘keep in mind' the fact that any delay could mean ‘Truman will order General MacArthur to land his naval assault forces'. The long-resisting 135th Independent Mixed Brigade finally surrendered at Aihun, while advanced units of the 2nd Red Banner Army secured Nencheng and Peian before pushing towards Tsitsihar and Harbin. Forward detachments from the 15th and 1st Red Banner Armies also reached the already-occupied Harbin. Furthermore, advanced units of the 5th and 25th Armies arrived in Jilin to reinforce the air-landed detachment there. Additionally, units from the 88th Rifle Corps and the 10th Mechanized Corps began their southward movement into Korea, heading toward the 38th Parallel. In North Korea, Kabanov dispatched a marine battalion and other units, totaling around 2,000 men, to occupy the fortified port of Gensan on August 20. The following morning, the landing force arrived and disembarked without opposition. However, the Japanese garrison refused to surrender until orders from higher command were received. Meanwhile, Japanese troops began to peacefully surround the harbor area, while Soviet sailors and marines, in a similarly calm manner, took up their defensive positions. As Kabanov noted, “An incomprehensible situation arose, neither peace nor war. The enemy has numerical superiority, but he neither fights nor wants to capitulate.” Unsurprisingly, he added, “the night passed in suspense.” The surreal situation was resolved when Rear Admiral Hori Yugoro and Colonel Tado boarded the frigate EK-3 to meet with Captain Studenichnikov on the morning of August 22. During their discussions, they attempted to negotiate terms, but the Soviet captain issued a bold threat of an immediate large-scale air strike and the initiation of hostilities at the port unless they surrendered unconditionally. While the latter was likely an empty threat, the Japanese officers signed the surrender agreement nonetheless. The process of surrendering the garrison began that evening and continued until August 26. In total, the Soviets captured more than 7,000 officers and men, along with all their military equipment. Looking toward the northern Kuriles, Japanese forces on Shumshu finally began to lay down their weapons on the afternoon of August 22, as Gnechko's units spread out to secure the island. In Manchuria, airborne detachments were also landed at Dairen and Port Arthur to secure these key administrative centers before the Americans could take control. Vanguard units of the 6th Guards Tank Army arrived to reinforce them two days later. Meanwhile, in South Sakhalin, heavy fighting persisted at Futamata despite Mineki's ceasefire agreement on August 22. Soviet air strikes supported the ground forces when weather conditions allowed, and the Japanese finally surrendered by the nightfall of August 23. At the same time, Andreyev dispatched three marine battalions on a small convoy to capture Otomari. However, a fierce storm forced the flotilla to seek refuge in the port of Honto on the morning of August 24. Once the storm subsided that evening, the force left a company of marines to garrison the port and resumed their voyage to Otomari, arriving there on the morning of August 25, just as elements of the 113th Rifle Brigade reached the eastern outskirts of the city. By noon, the 88th Division surrendered, and the city was secured. Shortly after, the 214th Tank Brigade arrived at Toyohara to secure South Sakhalin's administrative center. Thus, the South Sakhalin operation concluded with nearly 18,320 Japanese soldiers taken prisoner. Yet, this wouldn't mark the end of operations for General Cheremisov's 16th Army. Stalin pushed for the 87th and 135th Rifle Brigades, along with three marine battalions, to assemble at Otomari and execute amphibious landings on the southern Kurile Islands, specifically, Etorofu, Shikotan, and Kunashiri, and the islets of the Habomai group. The failure to include the Kuril Islands in the areas designated for surrender to Soviet forces in Truman's General Order No. 1, originally issued on August 15, exacerbated Stalin's inherent suspicions regarding American intentions. Consequently, Vasilevsky was instructed to organize landings on the Kurils, ensuring that, similar to Port Arthur, Soviet occupation would manifest physically through boots on the ground. Despite Truman's subsequent correction of the omission, mistrust endured, as did the directive to occupy the islands. However, where Stalin hesitated was concerning Hokkaido. Truman's somewhat abrupt rejection of Stalin's demand for a portion of Hokkaido undoubtedly irritated the Soviet dictator, yet he chose not to take further action. Scholarly debates have arisen around the rationale behind Stalin's ‘retreat.' When viewed within the framework of his stated geostrategic goal of securing the Soviet Union's sea lines of communication in the Pacific, it becomes understandable. Churchill once likened the Soviet Union's challenges in this regard to those of a “giant with his nostrils pinched.” A look at the map reveals that control of the Kurils would significantly alleviate this pressure in the Far East, making their acquisition crucial. Similarly, occupying southern Sakhalin would allow the Soviet Union to control the northern side of the La Pérouse Strait, which connects the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk. The strait's opposite shore is formed by the northern coast of Hokkaido, and possessing this area would undeniably enhance the security of communications and is therefore highly desirable. However, any unilateral action in this regard would incur a significant and public breach with the Americans, the consequences of which could not be easily predicted. Given that Stalin's claim to the Kurils was firmly based on the agreement reached at Yalta, an agreement which Truman honored, his choice to avoid completely rupturing relations with the U.S. was motivated by strategic self-interest. Consequently, Andreyev's flotilla, carrying these units, departed Otomari on August 27, reaching the west coast of Etorofu at 3:15 AM on August 28. The landing, conducted using small boats, went unopposed and was met by the surrender of General Ogawa's 89th Division. The occupation of the other islands was also peaceful, with the Soviets securing Kunashiri by September 2, and Shikotan and the Habomai islets by September 5. The remaining northern Kurile Islands surrendered without incident as elements of Gnechko's Kamchatka forces arrived at Paramushir on August 24, Onekotan and Shiashkotan on August 25, Matsuwa by August 26, Shimushiru on August 27, and Uruppu by August 29. In total, 63,840 prisoners were taken throughout the Kuriles. On August 24, air-landed detachments arrived at the cities of Pyongyang and Kange to secure the last administrative centers in North Korea. Two days later, units of the 25th Army reached Gensan. With this move, albeit with some geographical liberties, Chistyakov asserted that "the troops of the 25th Army, on the orders of Marshal Meretskov, reached the 38th Parallel.” In the days that followed, units of General Kushibuchi's 34th Army gradually began to surrender and disarm. Finally, in Manchuria, most of Yamada's units had surrendered and were being disarmed. However, one unit continued to resist until the end of the month. The bypassed and encircled 107th Division was engaged in fierce fighting for survival against the 94th Rifle Corps. Due to a lack of communication with Kwantung Army Headquarters, they did not receive any ceasefire orders. As a result, a staff officer from General Iida's 30th Army was dispatched by plane to locate the division and deliver the ceasefire orders. The 107th Division was found near Chalai, and the plane made a forced landing between the Japanese troops and the opposing Soviet forces. The staff officer successfully delivered the orders terminating hostilities in that sector on August 30, which the Japanese troops promptly complied with. By September 1, units of the 53rd Army occupied Kailu, Chaoyang, Fuhsin, and Gushanbeitseifu, while forward detachments secured the Chinchou area on the Liaotung Peninsula. This marked the conclusion of the Manchurian campaign, with the Soviets claiming to have captured between 594,000 and 609,000 prisoners of war across Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and North Korea. The captured Japanese military personnel were subjected to forced labor in Siberian internment camps, as well as camps in Sakhalin, Manchuria, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia. A significant number were assigned to the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline. Unfortunately, the treatment of prisoners of war was deemed inhumane and mishandled. Many suffered from malnutrition, overwork, cave-ins, floods, unsanitary working conditions leading to epidemics, harsh winter weather, violent guards, and brutal suppression of even mild resistance. Disturbingly, some Japanese prisoners were even lynched by their fellow captives. Estimates suggest that between 60,000 and 347,000 Japanese died in captivity. Although 18,616 prisoners were released in 1946, the process of repatriating prisoners of war extended into the 1950s. Those who remained after 1950 were detained for various convictions. However, their release began in 1953 under different amnesties. Following Josef Stalin's death and the subsequent Khrushchev Thaw, the Soviet attitude toward the remaining Japanese prisoners shifted significantly. Accompanied by Soviet officials, they were taken on tours of cities and allowed to purchase gifts for their families. Before repatriation, a banquet in Khabarovsk, hosted by Nikolai Gagen, included high-ranking prisoners such as Jun Ushiroku as attendees. The last major group of 1,025 Japanese POWs was released on December 23, 1956. After that, some Japanese POWs were released in small groups, with some only returning in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, some prisoners who had been held for decades, many of whom had married and started families during their captivity, chose not to return permanently to Japan. The Soviets committed numerous war crimes during their invasion and occupation of Manchuria and other Japanese territories. During the invasion, Soviet soldiers killed and raped Japanese civilians and looted civilian property. Following the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 9, 1945, a large number of Japanese citizens residing in the region sought to repatriate to Japan. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers supervised this mass movement and, in October 1945, delegated responsibility to Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare. The Kwantung Army, which was meant to protect the Japanese settlers in Manchuria, quickly retreated and abandoned them. With most able-bodied men drafted into the army, the majority of those left behind were women, children, and the elderly, rendering them highly vulnerable to attacks from Soviet soldiers and local Chinese seeking revenge.In Soviet-occupied Manchuria and North Korea, the repatriation of Japanese civilians was characterized by violent expulsions, accompanied by widespread looting, mass killings, and rampant sexual violence perpetrated by both Soviet soldiers and local populations seeking retribution. Many Japanese civilians succumbed to starvation, disease, mass killings, and mass suicides. Approximately 223,000 Japanese civilians residing in the Soviet-occupied zones died, most within a year and a half after August 9, 1945. Regarding the extensive rape of Japanese women and girls by Soviet soldiers, a former Japanese soldier, Wakatsuki Yoshio, detailed these grim experiences in his memoir, The Records of Postwar Repatriation “What word can possibly describe the violence committed by the Soviet soldiers on Japanese women? I can only think of the word “hideous”. The victim could be a girl of twelve or thirteen years old or an old lady of almost seventy years old. These soldiers did not choose the sites where they raped them, in public, in broad daylight, even on snow-covered roads”. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria in 1945 left many Japanese women stranded after their male family members were either conscripted or killed. These women, including young girls, endured severe hardships, facing gang rapes by Soviet soldiers and local Chinese militia groups. In a desperate effort to survive, many were forced to marry Chinese men, either out of necessity or in exchange for assistance in repatriating their remaining family members. Disturbingly, some victims were as young as thirteen. Some women were held in groups and subjected to repeated sexual violence over extended periods. In certain instances, to ensure the safety of the group, members of the Japanese community offered women to their perpetrators. There were also reports of women voluntarily submitting themselves to protect their families, younger peers, or others in their communities. After Japan's defeat in 1945, leaders of the Kurokawa Settler Group in Manchuria offered approximately 15 young women, aged 17 to 21, to Soviet soldiers in exchange for protection. This tragic practice continued from September to November 1945, with some of the women later being offered to Chinese soldiers as well. With no protection from Japanese soldiers, Japanese women often had to devise unique strategies to avoid rape. Memoirs from female repatriates detail various escape tactics. Some women hid in attics every night, narrowly avoiding capture or even gunfire. Others managed to trap intruders in rooms before fleeing or bribed Soviet soldiers with valuables, such as wristwatches, to secure their escape. Notably, some women, particularly former geisha and bar workers, voluntarily went with Soviet soldiers to protect others. These women were referred to as tokkōtai (kamikaze) for their self-sacrifice. Additionally, it wasn't just Japanese women who suffered; Korean and Chinese women were also victims of sexual violence at the hands of various perpetrators in Manchuria. British and American reports indicate that Soviet Red Army troops looted and terrorized the local population in Shenyang, a city in Manchuria. A foreign witness described how Soviet troops, formerly stationed in Berlin, were permitted by the Soviet military to enter Shenyang for "three days of rape and pillage." In Harbin, Soviet forces ignored protests from leaders of the Chinese Communist Party regarding the widespread mass rape and looting committed by their troops. In the immediate aftermath of the war in 1945, in areas of Manchuria occupied by the National Revolutionary Army, 176 Koreans were killed, 1,866 were injured, 3,468 were detained, and 320 were raped by armed Chinese mobs. The attacks against Korean residents in Manchuria were believed to stem from a perception of Korean collaboration with Japanese colonial rule. One of the most infamous instances was the Gegenmiao massacre. On August 10 and 11, Xing'an was bombed, nearly destroying its urban functions. It is estimated that 3,000 of the 4,000 civilians. Anticipating the Soviet invasion, Xing'an had prepared an evacuation plan divided into three groups based on residential area and workplace. The Kwantung Army, however, failed to inform the General Office officials about their retreat. As a result, residents in the eastern area, many of whom were self-employed or office workers, had difficulty obtaining information and securing transportation, while those in the western area had military personnel who were first to learn of the situation. Some of the civilians with a handful of armed men had proceeded on foot towards Gegenmiao Township, about 35 kilometers southeast of Xing'an Street, to wait for a train at Gegenmiao Station and then evacuate to Baichengzi. They aimed to receive protection from the Kwantung Army in Baichengzi. Around 11:40 AM on August 14 in the vicinity of Gegenmyo Hill, where a Lamaist temple was located, they encountered an infantry unit consisting of 14 Soviet medium tanks and 20 trucks. The column reportedly stretched for two kilometers, with about a hundred survivors among them. Soviet troops launched an attack from the hilltop, deploying tanks with machine-gun fire. The tanks attacked multiple times, and when they ceased, Soviet soldiers disembarked and ruthlessly shot and bayoneted survivors. Many who escaped death from gunfire were still severely injured or witnessed family members being killed. Some were left holding their loved ones or chose to commit suicide. It is estimated that only about a hundred survivors were later confirmed, including nearly 200 schoolchildren from the Xing'an Street Zaiman National School. Kwantung Army units, which were supposed to escort the civilians and counterattack, had already retreated southward. Even after the Soviet soldiers left, sporadic gunfire continued, presumably due to suicides. Local residents began to plunder the bodies, stripping them of clothes and valuables. Others drowned in the river while attempting to escape. Reports tell of one woman who had her child killed by Soviet soldiers, only to later face an attack from Chinese militia, who stripped her of her clothes and mutilated her. Surviving mothers and children were also attacked, and those separated were often taken by the Chinese. At the time, it was common for Japanese boys to be sold for 300 yen and girls for 500 yen. Some survivors gathered together and began committing mass suicide, killing those who wished to end their lives. Others expressed intentions to form a death squad with rifles for revenge but ultimately did not resist.   After the war ended on August 15, attacks on displaced persons continued. A 12-year-old girl who joined a group of about ten women after the incident reported that they were attacked and robbed, taking over a week to reach Zhenxi Station, 10 kilometers from Gegenmiao Station. The women sought shelter in an abandoned house near the station but were discovered by Soviet soldiers that night who assaulted them until midnight. Afterward, the soldiers piled dry grass into the house, setting it ablaze in an attempt to burn the women alive. The girl and her sister managed to escape through a window, but many others could not flee in time due to the fire's rapid spread. The girl was forced to live as a residual orphan afterward. Fortunately, some Chinese, Mongolians, and Koreans provided food for the survivors, with some Chinese showing kindness towards the children. Those orphaned children, whose parents had been killed, became known as residual orphans, with about 30 in this unfortunate situation. Many women were forced to become residual women as well. Tragically, around 200 students from a local school, including the headmaster and his wife, were killed during this chaos. Some historians believe the attack stemmed from Soviet soldiers mistaking the refugees for armed Japanese troops because men within the group were carrying firearms for protection. In general, displaced persons at this time often carried small weapons like rifles, and some groups were even armed with light machine guns. In the pioneer groups, women sometimes participated in fighting against bandits, and in the Sado pioneer group incident, children above the fifth grade were forced into combat, regardless of gender. There may also have been prior skirmishes with other Japanese civilian groups before the war's end, further complicating the situation as the Soviet Army, which included female soldiers, may have regarded these mixed civilian and armed groups as a threat. According to Soviet military combat records, on August 14, the Soviet 17th Guards Rifle Division, 19th Guards Rifle Division, 91st Guards Rifle Division, and 61st Tank Division were stationed northwest of Gezhne Temple, but there was no combat activity in the area. On August 15, this unit advanced toward Bai Chengzi and occupied Bai Chengzi Station, which was then taken over by tanks from the 61st Tank Division. Despite extensive documentation, nothing about this incident was revealed until 2014 during the process of perestroika. Reports from British and American sources indicate that the 700,000 Soviet troops occupying Manchuria also terrorized and looted the local population in Mukden. They were not deterred by Soviet authorities and engaged in what was described as "three days of rape and pillage," with similar atrocities occurring in Harbin and across the country. Amid the mass repatriation of Japanese civilians living in the region, Japanese women in Manchuria faced repeated sexual violence at the hands of Russian soldiers every day. In North Korea, it was similarly reported that Soviet soldiers raped both Japanese and Korean women. Additionally, Soviet soldiers looted the property of Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans residing in Manchuria and North Korea. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amid chaotic surrenders, Emperor Hirohito accepted defeat, but Soviet advances continued relentlessly. As they pushed deeper, the Soviets captured key cities, including Harbin, while Japan's soldiers and civilians struggled for survival against the onslaught. War crimes committed by Soviet troops added to the tragedy, with rampant violence against Japanese civilians. Amidst political tensions, the Soviets secured territory, culminating in the surrender of remaining Japanese forces. The grim conclusion of this campaign marked a profound shift in the power dynamics of East Asia and paved the way for post-war ramifications.

Last time we spoke about the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki amidst relentless Allied aerial campaigns, chaos engulfed Japan. Prime Minister Suzuki's cabinet debated surrendering to avoid annihilation while fearing for the imperial family's future. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union launched an unexpected invasion of Manchuria, rapidly advancing and catching Japanese forces off guard. As negotiations unfolded, a group of military conspirators, led by Major Hatanaka, attempted a coup to halt the surrender, believing they could rally support. They seized the Imperial Palace but failed to find the Emperor's recorded surrender speech amid the chaos. In a decisive moment, Emperor Hirohito accepted the Potsdam Declaration, stipulating the emperor's continuation, thus sealing Japan's fate. That same day, the world learned of Japan's capitulation, marking the end of the Pacific War. The once powerful nation now lay in ruins, yet the Emperor's decision bore the weight of a nation saved from further destruction, embodying a fragile hope for the future amidst the horrors of war. This episode is the Battle for South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we previously discussed, the Japanese Empire made the difficult decision to surrender on August 14, amid the turmoil of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and South Sakhalin. The following day, this decision was announced to the world. However, in Manchuria, General Yamada's Kwantung Army chose to continue fighting until they received a clear ceasefire order. At this moment, several developments unfolded. General Hongo's 44th Army was on a forced retreat toward the Hsinking-Mukden line under General Ushiroku's command, leaving their 107th Division trapped behind Soviet lines. Meanwhile, General Iida's 30th Army was redeploying to Hsinking, which was starting to be evacuated, while General Uemura's 4th Army had orders to withdraw to Meihokou, taking over positions left by the 30th Army.  The advance of enemy armored columns in the west was severely hindering the evacuation of Japanese nationals. On the 10th, the Kwantung Army requested the Manchukuoan Government to facilitate the evacuation of Japanese residents in Hainking and its surroundings. They directed the Continental Railway Command to prepare ten trains for this purpose, with the first train scheduled to depart from Hsinking that same day. However, the Manchukuoan Government found it nearly impossible to carry out the withdrawal swiftly. They managed to transport only the families of officers and civilians linked to the army, and these families had to flee with just a few hours' notice, taking almost nothing but the clothes on their backs. By the 12th, Hsinking was in a state of chaos. The advance of enemy armored units, coupled with the retreat of the main force of the 44th Army, led to the evacuation of the capital by the Kwantung Army General Headquarters. This turmoil coincided with the arrival of the first refugee trains, carrying Japanese evacuees from the western border areas, causing widespread panic among local residents. Many hurried to the already overcrowded train station, desperate to escape the unfolding crisis. In the face of enemy pressure, the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 119th Division continued to resist assaults at Hailar and Pokotu, respectively. The 123rd Division and the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade were heavily engaged in the fortified regions of Sunwu and Aihun, and the 136th Independent Mixed Brigade was directed to reinforce Tsitsihar, while the 134th Division retreated to Fangcheng. General Shimizu's 5th Army prepared for a last stand at Mutanchiang, while the isolated 124th Division made plans to withdraw. The 132nd Independent Mixed Brigade had already retreated to Tachienchang, and the 128th Division was getting ready to confront the enemy advance at Lotzokou, with General Murakami's 3rd Army holding strong in the Tumen fortified region. Meanwhile, the Nanam Divisional District Unit successfully repelled an amphibious invasion in Chongjin, and the 88th Division's 125th Regiment staunchly defended Furuton on South Sakhalin. In a desperate bid to avoid further disaster, Yamada finally instructed Ushiroku to adhere to their original plan and prepare for a withdrawal to the Hunjen area, even if it meant leaving Japanese citizens and their cities vulnerable to the approaching Soviets. Ushiroku hesitantly agreed to the order but never got the chance to act on it. On August 15, Marshal Vasilevsky's offensive advanced much like the previous days, facing an enemy that continued to resist fiercely. To counter this, orders came to intensify the assault to gain control of key operational and strategic points as quickly as possible. In Marshal Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front, General Pliyev's cavalry-mechanized units encountered heavy opposition from the Inner Mongolian 3rd, 5th, and 7th Cavalry Divisions at Kanbao. Meanwhile, General Danilov's 17th Army pressed toward Chihfeng but was hindered by water shortages, intense heat, and challenging sandy terrain. General Managarov's 53rd Army began its advance toward Kailu, while General Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army continued its march along two fronts. The 7th Guards Mechanized Corps moved east toward Changchun, while both the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps advanced southeast toward Mukden. Notably, General Lyudnikov's 39th Army finally captured Tepossi and Wangyemiao.  Heavy Japanese resistance persisted in the sector of the 36th Army, notably in the Hailar Fortified Region and along the road and rail line through the Grand Khingan Mountains leading to Pokotu. The Japanese 119th Infantry Division put up a determined defense of Pokotu, successfully delaying the Soviet forces of the 2nd Rifle Corps from August 15 to 17, despite heavy rainfall. Meanwhile, in the rear of the 36th Army, the fighting in Hailar remained intense. The 86th Rifle Corps employed heavy artillery to systematically dismantle enemy strongholds in the hills to the northwest and southwest of the city. Position after position fell to relentless artillery bombardments, combined with sapper and infantry assaults. Ultimately, the Soviets extinguished the last vestiges of Japanese resistance in Hailar on August 18 when the remaining garrison of 3,827 men surrendered. Concurrently, in Marshal Meretskov's 1st Far Eastern Front, forward detachments of General Zakhvatayev's 35th Army secured Poli. General Beloborodov's 1st Red Banner Army broke through the frontline of the 135th Division and initiated an assault on the last Japanese positions just outside Yehho. Meanwhile, General Krylov's 5th Army, having successfully breached the Ssutaoling heights the previous evening, launched attacks against the 126th Division's positions at Aiho but was ultimately repelled by the defenders. In light of these developments, Generals Kita and Shimizu decided to order a withdrawal toward Hengtaohotzu, which they executed successfully after sunset, leaving behind some units to cover the retreat. Further south, General Chistyakov's 25th Army split into two columns at Heitosai. The 17th Rifle Corps and the 72nd Mechanized Brigade advanced west toward the Taipingling Pass, while the 39th Rifle Corps, along with the 72nd and 257th Tank Brigades, headed southwest toward Wangching. The 17th Rifle Corps effectively breached the main defenses of the Japanese 128th Division, forcing it to retreat to second-line positions southwest of Taipingling. On the morning of August 15, enemy air activity against Army Headquarters intensified significantly. Meanwhile, the Army Commander and several staff officers set out via Pataohotzu to inspect the defenses in the Hoeryong area, where the 101st Regiment was retreating from the Chonghak sector. At noon, while at the headquarters of the 127th Division in Pataohotzu, General Murakami and his accompanying staff listened to the Emperor's broadcast announcing the termination of the war. Opinions among the officers were divided regarding the veracity of this broadcast. After a brief discussion, they decided to continue military operations as per existing instructions until they received a formal cessation order. Later that night, a formal order arrived from First Area Army Headquarters, directing that all active resistance be halted, though self-defense measures were still to be implemented if necessary. Around the same time, a report came in from the 1st Mobile Brigade indicating that their positions in the Wangching area, about 25 miles northeast of Army Headquarters at Yenchi, were under attack by a sizable Soviet tank force. In response, a counterattack force was hastily assembled, consisting of two infantry battalions from the 127th Division. They were directed to advance to Wangching along the Yenchi-Chiulungping road to confront the enemy tanks. These battalions likely included the 3rd Battalion of the 280th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 281st Regiment. Additionally, the 88th Rifle Corps took control of Hunchun and crossed the Inanho River, where they encountered well-entrenched Japanese forces from the 112th Division. To further pressure the enemy, the 258th Rifle Division crossed the Tumen River at Hunyong to attack the Japanese right flank. In General Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front, General Mamonov's 15th Army continued its two-pronged advance toward Chiamussu, while General Pashkov's 5th Rifle Corps pushed forward to Poli. Meanwhile, General Teryokhin's 2nd Red Banner Army assigned some elements to maintain the siege of Sunwu and Aihun while forward detachments bypassed these fortified regions, moving south toward Nencheng and Peian. In South Sakhalin, General Cheremisov's 16th Army faced fierce resistance from Japanese forces at Furuton. Admiral Andreyev's Northern Pacific Flotilla prepared for an amphibious landing at Toro, while the Pacific Fleet, under Admiral Yumashev, successfully landed Major-General Vasily Trushin's 13th Naval Infantry Brigade at Chongjin in the early hours of August 15. This effort aimed to relieve the besieged Soviet naval units and gradually push back against the defending Japanese forces. On August 16, the entire Soviet force, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sergey Kabanov, secured Chongjin city and its port after overcoming strong resistance, just as the 393rd Rifle Division was arriving in the area. Simultaneously, Andreyev's fleet departed from Sovetskaya Gavan and approached Toro in the early hours of the day. At 05:17, 141 marines from the initial reconnaissance detachment successfully landed ashore quietly, and by 06:00, they had taken the port with virtually no opposition. The reconnaissance group then advanced about three kilometers east, where they encountered heavy resistance; meanwhile, the rest of the marine battalion landed successfully by 10:00. After securing Shakhtyorsk at midday, the Soviet marines began their push south toward Esutoru, their main objective, while a supporting infantry battalion landed behind them. To the north, the 56th Rifle Corps managed to break through and capture Furuton, though it failed to seize the strategically significant Happo Mountain. In Manchuria, the 88th Rifle Corps continued its attacks on the 112th and 79th Divisions but was unsuccessful. The 39th Rifle Corps column advanced toward Tumen and Yenchi, while the 17th Rifle Corps column effectively expelled Japanese forces from the Taipingling area to secure the pass. By evening, units from the 1st Red Banner Army cleared Mutanchiang, and the 5th Army units moved south of the city to continue their southwest advance toward Ningan. The 15th Army executed a coordinated amphibious assault, successfully capturing Chiamussu. The 39th Army advanced along the railroad from Wangyemiao to Changchun, with its main force ultimately securing Taonan by the end of the day, while other units reduced the Halung-Arshaan fortified region. Finally, forward detachments of the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps secured Tungliao and Kaitung, respectively. On August 17, Prince Takeda Tsuneyoshi, on behalf of the Emperor, arrived at Hsinking to deliver the official ceasefire order. However, this did not cancel ongoing operational missions, as the order stipulated that the cessation of hostilities did not apply to unavoidable acts of self-defense during enemy attacks made before the completion of armistice negotiations. Tokyo's orders demonstrated that Yamada was authorized to conduct on-the-spot negotiations for an armistice with the Soviets. Consequently, the Manchurian Campaign continued amidst the negotiations. Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian units successfully defeated the Inner Mongolians at Kanbao; the 17th Army overcame light opposition from the 108th Division to occupy Chihfeng; the 39th Army concentrated its forces at Taonan while the 94th Rifle Corps mopped up rear areas; and the 36th Army defeated the 119th Division to capture Pokotu. Simultaneously, the 2nd Red Banner Army directed heavy artillery and air strikes to reduce the Aihun and Sunwu Fortified Regions, while the 15th Army initiated a push south along the Sungari River toward Sansing. The 363rd Rifle Division passed through Chihsi, with the 66th Rifle Division focusing on Poli. Units from the 1st Red Banner Army advanced northwest toward Harbin, and the 72nd Rifle Corps marched southward along the east bank of the Mutan River, attempting unsuccessfully to cross the river north of Ningan. The 17th Rifle Corps pursued the 128th Division, and forward elements of the 10th Mechanized Corps moved sixty kilometers from the Taipingling Pass to secure the critical rail and road junction at Tahsingkou. Additionally, the reinforced 72nd Tank Brigade intercepted the counterattacking force of the 127th Division at Nianyantsun. The 39th Rifle Corps broke through the northern defenses of the 79th Division to seize the outskirts of Tumen, while the 88th Rifle Corps successfully pushed aside enemy defenders at Mayusan to occupy Onsang. At South Sakhalin, as the marine force surrounded Esutoru, the 22nd Independent Machinegun Company was deployed to support the marine assault, which quickly penetrated the urban area and secured the city by midday. Meanwhile, fighting continued around Mount Happo, where the 214th Tank Brigade was dispatched south toward the ultimate objective of Toyohara. However, given the distance involved, it was decided to conduct a second amphibious assault on the port of Maoka. On August 18, Yamada finally issued the ceasefire orders to the 1st, 3rd, and 17th Area Armies, as well as to the 4th Army and the 2nd Air Army. His chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Hata Hikosaburo, met with Marshal Vasilevsky in Harbin to discuss procedures for disarmament, the protection of Japanese nationals in Manchuria, and related matters. Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army Headquarters made extensive efforts to relay as much information as possible about the termination of hostilities and disarmament to its subordinate commands using all available communication methods. However, these efforts were hindered by the wide dispersal of forces, many of which initially refused to surrender. General Higuchi's 5th Area Army received the ceasefire orders on August 17. Although he quickly notified his units—particularly those in Sakhalin and the Kuriles, war continued in these islands for a short period as he sought to prevent a potential invasion of Hokkaido. In Sakhalin, Major Yoshio Suzuki, the Chief of Staff of the 88th Division, received Higuchi's combat order on the afternoon of August 16, preparations for ceasefire were already underway, such as the disbandment of mobilized units, the discharge of some troops, and the disposal of the regimental flag. The division had no tanks or aircraft, and certainly no anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons that could withstand Soviet forces. In light of this, Suzuki quickly ordered the re-arming of units and the occupation of positions, in accordance with the desire of Mineki and Higuchi to prevent the fall of South Sakhalin and a possible invasion of Hokkaido. Civilians, at this point, were already voicing complaints, wondering if the military was still going to continue fighting. After the surrender of the 125th Infantry Regiment, the Japanese command in the Northern District was effectively assumed by the staff of the 88th Division stationed at Kamishikika. During the fighting on the central military road, by the morning of August 17, evacuation of the civilian population from Kamishikika had been completed, and the town was burned to the ground by Japanese forces' scorched earth tactics, along with an air raid by 20 Soviet aircraft. Kamishikika was abandoned on August 20, marking the start of a full retreat. The construction of a defensive line involving the destruction of the Uro Bridge and the Chidori River Bridge was considered but ultimately abandoned due to the presence of evacuees. Meanwhile, in the Kuriles, a new operation was unfolding. According to Vasilevsky's orders, once operations against Manchuria and South Sakhalin were sufficiently advanced, a small force from the Kamchatka Defense Region, supported by naval units from the Petropavlovsk Naval Base, was to conduct amphibious assaults on the Kuril Islands in preparation for a future landing at the port of Rumoi on Hokkaido's west coast On August 15, President Truman and Soviet Premier Stalin agreed that Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel would surrender to the Soviets, while those to the south would surrender to the Americans. Stalin's agreement surprised the US, as there was little chance of American forces landing on the Korean peninsula at that time. In what many scholars interpret as an attempt to achieve reciprocal generosity from Truman, Stalin proposed amending the order to include the northern half of Hokkaido and all of the Kuril Islands in the region of surrender to Soviet forces. This northern portion, he stated, should be demarcated by a line drawn ‘from the town of Kushiro on the eastern coast . . . to the town of Rumoe (Rumoi) on the western coast . . .', with both towns included in the occupation area However, Truman only acquiesced concerning the Kuriles, honoring the pact reached at Yalta, while specifying that all the islands of mainland Japan were to surrender to General MacArthur. Nonetheless, concerned by the exclusion of the Kuriles from the original agreement, Stalin instructed Vasilevsky to organize landings to occupy the islands. This mission was assigned to Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front and Yumashev's Pacific Fleet, which, in turn, designated Major-General Aleksei Gnechko's Kamchatka Defense Region and Captain Dmitri Ponomarev's Petropavlovsk Naval Base to execute the first landings on Shumshu and Paramushir, followed by a subsequent amphibious assault on Onekotan. These inexperienced commanders had limited time to plan for their operations, assemble the necessary commercial vessels for transportation, and hurriedly gather the army units dispersed across Kamchatka. Ultimately, the primary unit chosen for the landings was Major-General Porfiry Dyakov's 101st Rifle Division, supplemented by a battalion of marines. Meanwhile, Ponomarev managed to gather an invasion flotilla of 64 vessels. Although the Soviets had air superiority, it was unreliable due to the peculiar climatic conditions. “There were very peculiar climatic conditions in the Far East and Sakhalin; almost every airfield had its own special microclimate. In the coastal zone, frequent outbursts of moist sea air, forming a curtain of thick fog, caused a lot of trouble.”. The limited firepower of Ponomarev's flotilla forced the Soviets to land on the northeast corner of Shumshu, which could be targeted by the coastal guns at Cape Lopatka. Additionally, Gnechko planned a diversionary landing on the southeast side of the island. Opposing the Soviets, Higuchi had Lieutenant-General Tsutsumi Fusaki's 91st Division garrisoning the northern islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, the 41st Independent Mixed Regiment on Matsuwa Island, the 129th Independent Mixed Brigade on Uruppu Island, and Lieutenant-General Ogawa Gonosuke's 89th Division stationed on the southern islands of Etorofu, Shikotan, and Kunashiri.  Shumshu is the northernmost island in the Kuril chain, separated from Cape Lopatka, the southernmost tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula, by the 11-kilometer-wide First Kuril Strait. Covering an area of approximately 388 square kilometers and roughly oval in shape , Shumshu's proximity to Soviet territory, similar to its larger neighbor to the south, Paramushir, ensured that it was strongly defended. The garrison on Shumshu comprised about 8,500 troops, whereas the larger island boasted a garrison of approximately 14,500. The strait between the two islands narrows to about 2.5 kilometers at its smallest point, thus allowing these garrisons to provide mutual support. As Slavinsky notes: “Shumshu and Paramushir, with their naval bases located opposite each other on both sides of the Second Kuril Strait, were, in essence, a single key position.” The capture of Shumshu was crucial to the success of subsequent island operations. While there were several airfields on these islands, they housed very few aircraft, which had been withdrawn earlier to the Japanese main islands in preparation for the anticipated “final battle” with the Americans. However, Shumshu was defended by a tank force from the 11th Tank Regiment, commanded by Colonel Sueo Ikeda. This force consisted of thirty-nine medium tanks, including nineteen Type-97 Chi-Ha tanks and twenty Type-97 ShinHoTo Chi-Ha (improved Type-97) tanks, alongside twenty-five Type-95 Ha-Go light tanks. Both Shumshu and Paramushir were equipped with permanent defensive works along the coast and inland. On Shumshu, these defenses included 34 bunkers and 24 pillboxes within several powerful strongpoints, featuring around 100 guns of varying calibers, some reaching up to 100mm. Approximately 300 prepared firing points were established for both heavy and light machine guns. Most of Shumshu's coast is bordered by cliffs, leading to a concentration of the strongest defenses in areas deemed vulnerable to amphibious assault. Notably, a battery was installed in the wreck of the Soviet tanker Mariupol, which had become stranded on the beach between Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari in 1943. Although the island is relatively flat, it possesses several hills with sides that are nearly bare of trees, and these heights also housed additional strongpoints. Shumshu features 120 kilometers of roads, which facilitated terrestrial communication between various points. Additionally, the garrison constructed numerous dummy installations to mislead reconnaissance efforts. Nevertheless, Ponomarev's flotilla departed from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky at approximately 05:00 on August 17, moving slowly and stealthily toward their objective in foggy conditions. This weather ultimately forced Gnechko to cancel the planned diversionary landing. In any event, the first landing craft approached the beach at 04:22 hours on 18 August still hidden in the murk, but were forced to halt some 100–150m from shore in water up to 2m deep; they had been overloaded which prevented them getting closer in. The troops of the advanced detachment (two companies of marines, a maritime border guard company, and a submachine gun company) had then to wade, heavily burdened, to dry land. This went on undisturbed until personnel on one of the landing craft opened fire; this, spreading to the other ships, alerted the defenders, who replied with ‘promiscuous' machine-gun fire. Nevertheless, by 05:00 hours, and having suffered only ‘insignificant' losses, the advanced detachment was ashore and its main force, under Major Pyotr Shutov, was moving off the beach into the interior of the island. Two groups of marines moved left and right to deal with enemy positions on the capes flanking the landing ground. They managed to destroy several firing points, but were too few to overcome the stronger resistance nests protecting the gun positions. A series of hills inland formed the initial objective of the advance. Behind them, Dyatlov's first wave faced heavy bombardment from Japanese artillery, suffering significant casualties as the troops struggled to scramble ashore by 09:00. The second wave experienced a similar fate but managed to disembark by 13:00, joining the first wave in advancing on the high ground to the southwest. This second wave successfully repelled a series of Japanese tank counterattacks, resulting in the loss of Colonel Sueo. Despite being pushed back somewhat, the Soviets held their position while their aircraft targeted the naval bases on the island's southern side, aiming to hinder reinforcements from Paramushir. By nightfall, Gnechko's forces had secured a beachhead approximately 4 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers deep, while assault groups successfully destroyed Japanese artillery positions on Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari. Meanwhile, Kabanov's new Southern Defense Region command was ordered to quickly land naval units at Odaejin and Gensan to prevent the Japanese from evacuating their forces from Korea to the Home Islands. Consequently, a small naval force from the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade departed from Chongjin, successfully landing unopposed at Odaejin at 08:00 on August 18. Elsewhere in eastern Manchuria, the 25th Army consolidated its hold on northeastern Korea, dispatching the 10th Mechanized Corps west toward Tunhua and Kirin and northwest toward Tungchingcheng amidst the surrender of Murakami's 3rd Army. The 72nd Rifle Corps successfully crossed the Mutan River north of Ningan, while units from the 1st Red Banner Army and the 5th Army were deployed to receive and process surrendering Japanese units of Shimizu's 5th Army. To the north, the 2nd Red Banner Army maintained pressure on the Aihun and Sunwu Fortified Regions, leading to the surrender of the 123rd Division, although the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade continued to resist at Aihun. Be that as it may, the Japanese artillery positioned at Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari wreaked havoc on the second echelon, which was comprised of the 373rd Rifle Regiment. During this engagement, a patrol boat and four landing craft were lost, while eight others sustained serious damage. Once again, Soviet troops were forced to improvise ways to reach dry land; however, this time, the echelon's commander, Colonel P.A. Artyushen, along with his headquarters, managed to land via a torpedo boat. It took until 13:00 hours to fully disembark the second echelon, by which point its forward units had linked up with those forces advancing on the high ground to the southwest. By then, Artyushen had assumed command of all the forces ashore. While the number of troops was considerable, they still lacked heavy weapons, with only four 45mm anti-tank guns having been landed. Unsurprisingly, the Japanese counterattacked as soon as possible, with the advanced forward units under Shutov bearing the brunt of the assault. In a reversal of the combat situations previously encountered throughout the war with Japan, Soviet infantry now found themselves facing several tank attacks from the Japanese. One of these assaults was personally led by Colonel Sueo Ikeda, the commander of the 11th Tank Regiment, who was reported to be waving a samurai sword and Japanese flag from the turret, according to some accounts. Fortunately for the Soviets, these Japanese tanks were relatively weak compared to the T-34. While they posed a threat to unsupported infantry, they proved vulnerable to Degtyarev PTRD-41 anti-tank rifles and RPG-43 anti-tank grenades. The tank-led attacks were ultimately repelled, with Colonel Sueo perishing in the fighting. Despite being pushed back somewhat, the Soviets managed to withstand the onslaught. For his heroism during this challenging combat situation, in which he was wounded three times, Shutov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, along with the Order of Lenin and the Golden Star medal. Despite being somewhat pushed back, the Soviets held their ground while their aircraft targeted the naval bases on the southern side of the island to hinder reinforcements from Paramushir. The weather cleared sufficiently in the late morning, allowing Soviet air strikes to commence that afternoon. These strikes involved groups of eight to sixteen aircraft and were primarily directed at the Kataoka and Kashiwabar naval bases, successfully preventing the transfer of Japanese reinforcements from Paramushir. However, the sky remained cloudy enough to hinder any close battlefield support. As Zakharov et al. described it, the situation on the ground “remained tense.” The thinning fog later allowed seven Japanese aircraft to appear at 10:30 hours, attempting to strike at the shipping gathered off the landing beach. Their first strike targeted the Kirov, but it was unsuccessful, and the attackers were driven off by anti-aircraft fire. A second attempt at 12:00 hours focused on the minesweeper T-525, which also failed, resulting in two of the attacking aircraft being shot down by gunfire.  By nightfall on 18 August, it was evident that the Soviet landing had succeeded to the point where the forces would not be driven back into the sea. The invasion force had established a beachhead approximately 4 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers deep, and they were capable of defending this position against any immediate Japanese counterattacks, despite most of their artillery still being stuck offshore. Gnechko, stationed at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, ordered that enough artillery be transported ashore overnight to resume the offensive, with the goal of occupying the island by the end of 19 August. He also dispatched several self-propelled barges and kungas (shallow-draft boats used for fishing or transport) to assist with the unloading, although these vessels could not arrive until the following morning. To eliminate further artillery attacks on shipping, assault groups were formed to attack and destroy the Japanese strongpoints on Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari during the hours of darkness. Shortly after midnight on 17 August, a second order regarding the cessation of hostilities was received from the First Area Army, directing that all fighting be stopped. At daybreak, General Murakami dispatched his intelligence chief, Lt. Col. Fujimoto, to Chiulungping to inform the Soviet tank battalion commander of the end of hostilities. Simultaneously, he ordered all divisions under his command to cease all combat operations. At approximately 16:00 hours, the Soviet tank battalion commander arrived at the Army Officers Club in Yenchi, where he conferred with Major General Hanjiro Iketani, the Army Chief of Staff. The following day, General Iketani traveled to Wangching to conduct armistice negotiations. The 72nd Rifle Corps finally crossed the Mutan River north of Ningan, while units from the 1st Red Banner Army and the 5th Army were deployed to receive and process the surrendering Japanese units of Shimizu's 5th Army. Since the Army began its withdrawal, communications with Area Army Headquarters in Tunhua had been completely disrupted. On the morning of the 17th, a member of the Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company's Harbin office sent a message via railway telephone concerning disarmament, stating that he had been asked by the First Area Army Headquarters to relay the information. The Army Commander and his staff, however, suspected it might be another ruse from the enemy's fifth column. They agreed to exercise caution in addressing the matter and decided to send Staff Officer Maeda to Area Army Headquarters in Tunhua by railway gasoline engine car to verify the truth. Colonel Maeda proceeded to the railway station, and while preparing to depart, he received a railway telephone call from Staff Officer Tsumori at Area Army Headquarters regarding the cease-fire order. Subsequently, around 14:00 hours, the Army convened a meeting with representatives from each unit to announce the cease-fire orders. That evening, Soviet forces began entering Hengtaohotzu and immediately started disarming Japanese forces.  Looking west, the bulk of the 36th Army advanced southward and seized the railroad station at Chalantun amid the surrender of the 119th Division. The 86th Rifle Corps, after several days of intense artillery bombardment, finally extinguished the last remnants of Japanese resistance at Hailar, forcing the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade to surrender. Meanwhile, the 39th Army forces prepared for transport to Changchun and then on to the Liaotung Peninsula. The 17th Army moved toward the coast, capturing Pingchuan and Linguan before reaching the coastline at Shanhaiguan, directly across from the Liaotung Peninsula. Additionally, Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian forces approached the outskirts of Kalgan, where they encountered a small contingent of the China Expeditionary Army. Indeed, with the surrender of the Kwantung Army, the war was coming to an end. However, several independent units, including the one mentioned, would continue to resist into the last days of August, thereby prolonging the Pacific War by another week. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In August 1945, amidst Japan's turmoil, the Soviet Union surprisingly invaded Manchuria. As chaos ensued, Japanese forces in South Sakhalin faced robust Soviet resistance. Ultimately, Japan's surrender shattered its imperial power, marking a historic end to the Pacific War, leaving a nation in ruins yet igniting a fragile hope for the future beyond the horrors of conflict.

Last time we spoke about the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. In the summer of 1945, Japan faced its most devastating siege, characterized by an aerial campaign called "Starvation" that crippled its industrial capabilities. As resources dwindled and chaos reigned, the Allies intensified their firebombing efforts, targeting major cities. By July, Japan was on the brink of collapse, culminating in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, where over 140,000 lives were altered or lost in a blinding flash. As the nation reeled from the destruction, the Japanese leadership was torn between surrender and continuing the fight. They faced not just the threat of American bombs, but also a Soviet invasion looming on the horizon. Days after Hiroshima, the atomic bomb "Fat Man" was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, resulting in catastrophic casualties and extensive industrial losses. This attack further devastated an already weakened Japan, leaving the Emperor and his government grappling with the dire consequences. This episode is the Invasion of Manchuria Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    August 9 stands as a catastrophic day in Japanese history. On this day, the nation faced the devastating impact of a second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, along with the relentless Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Admiral Ivan Yumashev's Pacific Fleet moved to disrupt Japan's maritime communications in the Sea of Japan and provide support for offensive operations. At the same time, Soviet air forces targeted cities across Northeast Asia, striking both Manchuria and North Korea, as well as Japanese convoys in the Sea of Japan. General Twinning led a diversionary B-29 raid on Amagasaki, followed by a significant attack involving 108 aircraft on the rail yards at Marifu. In addition, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet launched more strikes against airfields in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, where U.S. intelligence suspected a large Japanese air fleet and commando force was preparing for a desperate mission to Okinawa. Japanese paratroopers were gearing up for a new mission, codenamed Ken-go, but this time their target wasn't Okinawa. Similar to the earlier May 24 Raid on Yontan Airfield, Lieutenant General Sugawara Michio's Giretsu Kuteitai, also known as the “Heroic Paratroopers,” set their sights on the B-29 complex in the Mariana Islands for nighttime suicide raids. This operation marked the second planned assault on bases within the Mariana Islands, specifically aimed at destroying B-29 bombers. The plan involved deploying 60 transport aircraft to deliver 900 commandos during the nights of August 19 to 23. Around 300 personnel from Lieutenant Commander Daiji Yamaoka's 1st Kure Special Naval Landing Force initiated preparations at the end of June. Originally established for submarine-delivered raids on U.S.-held islands, these forces were now adapted to be flown in 30 Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' twin-engine bombers, which had the necessary range for an unrefueled, one-way trip to the Marianas. The raid was initially scheduled for July 24. However, ten days earlier, U.S. carrier-based warplanes had attacked Misawa naval air base on Honshu Island, damaging or destroying many of the operation's bombers. Consequently, the raid was postponed to August 19, with the addition of 30 transport planes and 300 paratroopers from the army's 1st Raiding Regiment. Ultimately, however, on August 15, Japan surrendered, and Operation Ken-go was cancelled. Meanwhile, Admiral Shafroth's Bombardment Group unleashed heavy damage on the Kamaishi steel mill. The day after, to assist the Soviets, Halsey ordered additional airstrikes on northern Japanese airfields, causing extensive destruction. However, these were not isolated incidents; they were part of a sustained air-sea siege that had been intensifying for several months. The Allied blockade of Japan had severely impacted food imports, and industrial activity had nearly ground to a halt due to the ongoing blockade and bombings. By this point, six of Japan's ten largest cities had been completely destroyed, and over sixty smaller cities had been reduced to ashes from relentless incendiary raids. This scenario was a powerful manifestation of War Plan Orange in action. More critically, with the reality of Hiroshima's destruction echoing loudly, the Japanese government now grappled with the impending threat of complete annihilation, a grim reality they had never faced before in this war. Though they had recognized their defeat with the loss of Saipan and the initial Yawata raid, the stubborn resolve of the Japanese leadership had pushed them to prolong the conflict for an agonizing 14 months, clinging to the hope of a different outcome. Many now believed that peace was the only path to survival for the Japanese nation. As the crisis intensified, Prime Minister Suzuki and his cabinet engaged in heated discussions. He sought to persuade War Minister General Anami Korechika and Chief of the Army General Staff General Umezu Yoshijiro to accept the Potsdam Declaration on August 9. However, Suzuki and the militants could only agree that if there were any surrender, then it should ensure that the "national polity" or imperial family would continue in any postwar settlement. Anami and Umezu pushed for further, more favourable conditions. First, Japan would demobilize and disarm any IJA or IJN forces overseas. Second, Japanese courts would prosecute any war criminals. Third, after surrender the Allies would not occupy Japan. Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, agreed with Anami and Umezu. To break this deadlock, it became necessary to involve the Emperor directly. Around 2:00 AM on August 10, the cabinet convened with Emperor Hirohito, who ultimately agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration and ordered an end to all military efforts, initiating the surrender process. Faced with no viable alternatives, all present reached a unanimous agreement. That morning, the Japanese government, through Swedish and Swiss intermediaries, sent an offer to accept the Potsdam Declaration, stipulating one condition: there would be no change to Japan's government structure, with Hirohito retaining his title as Emperor and sovereign ruler. Months afte the war Hirohito said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.” Simultaneously, a new military campaign was underway, and several units of General Yamada's Kwantung Army were unexpectedly caught off-guard in Manchuria. In response, he implemented emergency measures and ordered commands to proceed with their plans for delaying operations. Upon learning of the Soviet declaration of war and the subsequent invasion led by Marshal Vasilevsky's Far East Command, Tokyo decided to place General Kozuki's 17th Area Army under the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, they instructed General Okamura Yasuji's China Expeditionary Army to transfer one army headquarters, along with six divisions and six brigades, to support this effort. As directed by Tokyo, the primary objective of the Kwantung Army was to defend Japanese territory in Korea. However, by the end of the first day of conflict, several border observation units had been completely destroyed while attempting to defend their positions. In the east, Lieutenant General Shimizu Noritsune's 5th Army, supported by the reinforced 128th Division, was confronting the main assault by Marshal Meretskov's 1st Far Eastern Front. To the south, Lieutenant General Murakami Keisaku's 3rd Army was engaged in defending against multiple penetrations along the border. In the northern sector, the 134th Division at Chiamussu was withdrawing towards Fangcheng, as planned, while flames engulfed Japanese houses in the city. General Uemura's 4th Army was preparing to face what they expected to be the main assault from General Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front. Meanwhile, the 119th Division had already departed Hailar for Wunoerh, leaving only the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade behind. To the west, Lieutenant General Hongo Yoshio's 44th Army was confronting the formidable armored spearhead of Marshal Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front. Southwest of their position, the 108th Division was redeploying to the Chinhsien area. On August 10, the offensive led by Vasilevsky continued, as Colonel General Ivan Managarov's 53rd Army began crossing the border behind the now distant 6th Guards Tank Army. Recognizing that the 44th Army was not prepared to engage the overwhelming enemy armor in guerrilla warfare across the expansive terrain of western Manchuria, General Ushiroku made the independent decision to order Hongo to retreat to the Dairen-Hsinking line. This was where Lieutenant General Iida Shojiro's 30th Army was already establishing defensive positions. This decision contradicted Yamada's main strategy, which called for delaying the enemy advance at the borders.  Faced with what they deemed an illegal order, the Kwantung Army Headquarters convened an urgent staff conference. During this meeting, several opinions emerged: a sudden shift from established plans would likely create confusion; any attempt to counterattack after a withdrawal would likely fail if the enemy advanced quickly; and abandoning forward airfields prematurely would enable the enemy to advance unimpeded. To most participants, General Ushiroku's decision seemed to deliver a potentially fatal blow to the overall operational direction of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. However, since the 44th Army had already begun its withdrawal as ordered by General Ushiroku, Kwantung Army Headquarters was left with a fait accompli. Thus, they felt compelled to uphold the decision of the Third Area Army Commander, which was subsequently approved by General Yamada. Meanwhile, General Pliyev's cavalry-mechanized units advanced rapidly toward Kalgan and Dolonnor, reaching the foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains. General Danilov's 17th Army also continued to encounter weak resistance, covering an additional 40 kilometers. General Lyudnikov's 39th Army bypassed the encircled 107th Division in the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions. Here, the 5th Guards Rifle Corps moved toward Solun and Tepossi, while the 113th Rifle Corps advanced southeast toward Wangyemiao. The 94th Rifle Corps had to divert southward to support the 124th Rifle Division. In the east, General Luchinsky's 36th Army launched ongoing attacks against Hailar, with the 2nd Rifle Corps bypassing it to the east. Meanwhile, General Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army reorganized its right-wing column and began crossing the Grand Khingan Mountains during the night, with both columns entering the central Manchurian plain by August 11. To the east, Meretskov continued his offensive. The 17th, 65th, and 72nd Rifle Corps of General Krylov's 5th Army advanced swiftly west and south, ultimately securing Machiacho, Laotsaiying, Suiyang, and Suifenho. This maneuver widened the zone of penetration to 75 kilometers and forced the 126th and 135th Divisions to withdraw their main forces to Yehho. In support, General Beloborodov's 1st Red Banner Army to the north broke through into open terrain, pushing rapidly westward to occupy parts of the cities of Pamientung and Lishuchen, along with their vital bridges across the Muleng River. Further south, General Chistyakov's 25th Army captured Tungning and successfully reduced its fortified region. Units in that area also secured Tumentzu, Hunchun, and Wuchiatzu. Lastly, General Zakhvatayev's 35th Army continued its operations far to the north. The 264th Rifle Division and the 109th Fortified Region seized Hutou and initiated a movement west along the railroad toward Hulin, while the 363rd and 66th Rifle Divisions pressed on with their advance northwestward. In northern Manchuria, General Purkayev continued his main assault, with General Mamonov's 15th Army reconnoitering key enemy strongholds south of the Amur River. After successfully crossing the river, the 34th Rifle Division and the 203rd Tank Brigade occupied Lopei and advanced through Fenghsiang to bypass the Hsingshanchen Fortified Region, leaving a force behind to reduce it. Meanwhile, the 361st Rifle Division captured Tungchiang, and the 388th Rifle Division secured Chienchingkou, preparing for an advance toward Fuchin. In support of these operations, General Pashkov's 5th Rifle Corps cleared Japanese forces from the Jaoho Fortified Region, while General Teryokhin's 2nd Red Banner Army was preparing to launch its offensive the following morning. On August 11, forward units landed at Heiho, Aihun, and Holomoching under the cover of artillery fire, quickly establishing a beachhead as additional forces crossed the Amur. However, due to a lack of crossing equipment, it took five days to transport all units across the river. Consequently, Teryokhin had to commit his forces piecemeal against the 123rd Division and the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade. This was not the only new offensive operation initiated by Purkayev on this day. A new target had emerged: South Sakhalin, known as Karafuto to the Japanese. As per Vasilevsky's plans, Major-General Leonty Cheremisov's 16th Army was deployed on North Sakhalin and along the mainland coast of the Tatar Strait, stretching from Sovetskaya Gavan to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. If the invasion of Manchuria continued to progress favorably, this force was set to attack the Japanese-controlled portion of the island alongside the Northern Pacific Flotilla, commanded by Vice-Admiral Vladimir Andreyev, which was prepared to conduct amphibious operations against Esutoru and Maoka on the island's west coast. Opposing the Soviet forces, General Higuchi of the 5th Area Army positioned Lieutenant General Mineki Toichiro's 88th Division in the southern part of South Sakhalin, with only the 125th Regiment stationed to the north. Sakhalin shared many characteristics with several of the Manchukuoan border areas, presenting challenging terrain for mechanized warfare. The only viable invasion route south from the border at the 50th Parallel followed the Poronay River, located more or less in the center of the island. This river flows southward, flanked to the east and west by forested mountain ranges, as well as countless swamps and bogs. Both sides recognized the strategic importance of this potential invasion route and constructed extensive fortification networks. The Japanese fortifications were collectively known as the Koton, or Haramitog, fortified region. These defenses were built in three interlinked layers, with their western flanks anchored in the mountain range and eastern flanks in the wooded, swampy river valley. The permanent defenses spanned approximately 12 kilometers in frontage and extended up to 30 kilometers in depth, containing over 350 bunkers, pillboxes, artillery positions, and similar fortifications. These were protected by an elaborate network of infantry trenches, anti-tank ditches, minefields, and barbed wire. The heavy forest and brush made it challenging to locate these defenses. While enough vegetation had been cleared to allow for effective defensive fire, sufficient cover remained to obscure them from an attacking force. Consequently, the 16th Army would confront these formidable defenses without the advantage of surprise. At daybreak on August 9, reports emerged that the Soviet Army had unexpectedly invaded Manchuria from multiple directions. By 8:00 AM, telegraph lines were cut near Handa, a village located at the center of the Russo-Japanese border in Sakhalin. An excellent military road connected Handa to Kamishikuks, a region known as the Central Military Road area. At the same time, reports indicated that enemy forces were attacking the observation posts in this area. On August 10,  observation posts were forced to withdraw as the Soviet Army gradually advanced toward our main position in the Happo Mountains, situated about 10 kilometers south of the border. That evening, it was reported that the 125th Infantry had engaged in a skirmish, during which the Isunisawa Platoon, fighting near the Handa River bridge for over five hours, was wiped out. On that same day, the commander of the Fifth Area Army declared that not only had the Army engaged Soviet forces, but civilians in the area, including office workers and laborers, had also joined the battle in a desperate attempt to halt the advancing Soviet Army. By August 13, the National Volunteer Combat Teams were summoned. The recruitment of these volunteer combat teams from the general populace was unique to the Sakhalin campaign, aimed at creating the appearance of military readiness to deter the Soviet advance. Additionally, the 125th Regiment executed demolitions while retreating to establish stronger defensive positions on the western flank of Happo Mountain, northwest of Furuton. Given the unexpectedly favorable developments in Manchuria, the invasion of South Sakhalin was authorized on August 10. General Yumashev further directed Vice-Admiral Andreyev's naval forces to commence attacks on both South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Major General Georgii Dziuba's air forces joined the effort, conducting reconnaissance flights over key Japanese ports that revealed Toro and Esutoru were almost entirely unprotected. In the early hours of August 11, the 56th Rifle Corps crossed the border and began its main advance along the central military road but encountered resistance at Handa, where around 100 defenders held them up for an entire day. Back in northern Manchuria, the 5th Rifle Corps embarked on a challenging march southwest toward Paoching, while Mamonov launched a bombing raid followed by an attack on Fuchin, which ultimately fell after a coordinated tank-infantry assault. Concurrently, the 4th Army headquarters and the bulk of the 149th Division received orders to retreat from Tsitsihar to Harbin. To the south, the 112th Fortified Region and the 6th Field Fortified Region crossed the Muleng River south of Mishan during the night. In the following days, they collaborated with units from the 35th Army to secure the Mishan Fortified Region. More importantly, the 26th and 59th Rifle Corps successfully secured Pamientung and Lishuchen, initiating a pursuit of withdrawing Japanese forces to the west and southwest. On August 11, the 5th Army advance continued, with reinforced forward detachments of the 65th and 72nd Rifle Corps reaching the Muleng River and preparing for an advance on Mutanchiang. At this juncture, Meretskov reassessed the situation and determined that his best opportunity for successful exploitation in the front zone lay within the 25th Army area. Consequently, he attached the 17th and 88th Rifle Corps to this command and placed the 10th Mechanized Corps in army reserve. This allowed the 17th and 39th Rifle Corps to commence a coordinated advance toward Wangching, Tumen, Tunhua, and Kirin. Looking west, Pliyev's units continued to encounter minimal resistance. The 17th Army was finally nearing the western foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains. The lead brigade of the 5th Guards Tank Corps reached Lupei, while the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps completed its crossing of the Grand Khingan Mountains. The 39th Army maintained its holding operations against the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions, coupled with main advances toward Solun and Wangyemiao. The 2nd Rifle Corps and the 205th Tank Brigade advanced along the railroad to Yakoshih. The 94th Rifle Division, supported by air and artillery, launched an assault and captured the southwestern portion of Hailar city before being reinforced by the entire 86th Rifle Corps. Meanwhile, the Soviet operational group on the right flank of the 36th Army broke through Japanese resistance at Manchouli, moving eastward along the rail line to join the Soviet forces besieging Hailar. As the Soviet armored units in the west made an unexpectedly swift advance, they were anticipated to reach Hsinking by August 15. On this same day, Yamada decided to relocate his headquarters to Tunghua. Additionally, during the night, a small naval force successfully conducted an assault landing at Yuki in North Korea, securing the port unopposed on August 12. Simultaneously, the 393rd Rifle Division pushed south into North Korea, quickly reaching Yuki before continuing toward Rashin. There, another small naval force landed on August 12, facing minimal resistance except for artillery fire. Meanwhile, the 25th Army advanced up to 40 kilometers in its main march southwest, prompting the commitment of the 10th Mechanized Corps to exploit further toward Wangching and beyond. The 5th Army had to eliminate a strong enemy position east of Taimakou before it could resume its advance to Mutanchiang. The 1st Red Banner Army pressed forward relentlessly, with the 26th Rifle Corps successfully bypassing Tzuhsingtun to advance on Hsientung, cutting the Linkou-Mutanchiang railroad line. The 363rd Rifle Division occupied Mishan while the 264th Rifle Division secured Hulin. The 171st Tank Brigade began a challenging advance southwest toward Chiamussu as the 15th Army reduced the Fuchin fortified region. Forward detachments of the 2nd Red Banner Army engaged Japanese advanced positions south of Holomoching and north of Aihun. After reducing Handa, the 56th Rifle Corps commenced an advance toward Furuton, although it faced delays from small enemy forces. Furthermore, in western Manchuria, Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian formations and the 17th Army continued their advance through Inner Mongolia largely unopposed for the next two days. Throughout 12 and 13 August on the Trans-Baikal Front's right flank, the Soviet-Mongolian formations of General Pliyev swept across the Inner Mongolian deserts towards Dolonnor and Kalgan at a rate of ninety to one hundred kilometers a day, rudely shunting aside local cavalry forces. Pliyev's principal concern was providing his forces in the vast desert wastes sufficient food, fuel, fodder, and water. The 6th Guards Tank Army had to temporarily halt its advance as the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps reached Tuchuan. This pause was necessary due to severe fuel shortages, requiring an increase in fuel supplies before the offensive could resume. This situation allowed Ushiroku to withdraw the 63rd and 117th Divisions before they could be engaged. However, the 107th Division was less fortunate, as it was attacked by the 5th Guards Rifle Corps on the road to Solun. On the northern flank, the 36th Army continued its siege of the Hailar fortifications while the 2nd Rifle Corps seized Yakoshih and advanced up to Wunoerh. That day, Japan also received the initial Allied response to its surrender offer, penned by Secretary of State James Byrnes and approved by the British, Chinese, and Soviet governments. A critic of the Japanese imperial system, Byrnes insisted on an unconditional surrender but remained ambiguous regarding the future of the imperial family's position. The response included a statement that Japan's future form of government should be “established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” Thus, even though the Soviet and Chinese governments aimed for the abolition of the imperial system, the Japanese could choose to retain their emperor, and likely would. Meanwhile, Secretary Stimson urged President Truman to accept the peace offer immediately, believing that, without an organized surrender supported by the emperor, U.S. forces would face “a score of bloody Iwo Jimas and Okinawas” across China and Southeast Asia. He cautioned that without the immediate capitulation of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, rogue military commanders might continue to resist. Retaining Hirohito would also aid Allied efforts to achieve a swift and orderly reconstruction while maintaining a compliant populace. The Japanese cabinet deliberated over the Allied response, with Anami and Suzuki, among other key military figures, arguing for its rejection unless an explicit guarantee for the imperial system was provided. Ultimately, however, Foreign Minister Togo and Marquess Kido Koichi succeeded in persuading Suzuki to support the acceptance of Byrnes' reply. Meanwhile, President Truman issued instructions prohibiting any further atomic weapons from being dropped on Japan without his approval, and he later ordered a complete halt to all bombings. Despite this, Halsey's 3rd Fleet remained in the area, preparing to launch additional strikes. Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 37 unfortunately had to retire at this point, though a token force was integrated into Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 to ensure British support until the end.  The Olympic timetable had called for Third Fleet to retire to Eniwetok and Manus in mid-August, but late on the night of August 10 Missouri intercepted a cryptic radio transmission: “Through the Swiss government, Japan has stated that she is willing to accept Allied surrender ultimatum at Potsdam, provided they can keep their Emperor.” Halsey had long predicted an early Japanese collapse, and had accordingly kept his logistic pipeline full. The following morning, August 11, flagships Missouri and King George V refueled simultaneously alongside oiler USS Sabine. Halsey recalled, “I went across to the ‘Cagey Five' as we called her, on an aerial trolley, just to drink a toast with Vice Admiral Rawlings.” Although Japan teetered near collapse, TF-37 lacked its own fast oilers and would have to retire immediately. With Nimitz's permission Halsey offered to sustain a token British force with Third Fleet so that the Royal Navy would be in “at the death.” Rawlings enthusiastically accepted. After replenishment, King George V, Indefatigable, Gambia, Newfoundland, and ten destroyers were re-designated TG-38.5 and absorbed into McCain's TF-38. The rest of TF-37, under Vian, reluctantly retired for Manus. In a truly desultory attack the following day, August 12, a single Japanese plane penetrated Buckner Bay, Okinawa undetected and torpedoed TF-95's just-arrived battleship Pennsylvania. Twenty Americans were killed, while Oldendorf and nine others were wounded. Back off Honshu, Halsey canceled August 12 strikes due to a typhoon. Late that night Third Fleet intercepted a confusing and ambiguous radio bulletin announcing that Japan had, with qualifications, accepted Allied terms. After a heated staff conference Halsey decided that, without firmer information, the following day's strikes were still on. Nevertheless, the prolonged negotiations were causing the Third Fleet considerable logistical problems; Halsey recalled, “Our galleys were reduced to serving dehydrated carrot salad. If the war was over, we could provision on the spot; if it was not, we would have to retire, reprovision, and return.” That night, a group of officers led by Major Hatanaka Kenji and Colonel Arao Okikatsu approached Anami, seeking his backing for a coup d'état to prevent Japan's surrender. Anami refused, leaving Hatanaka's conspirators to attempt the coup on their own. At the recommendation of American psychological operations experts, B-29 bombers spent August 13 dropping leaflets over Japan detailing the Japanese offer of surrender and the Allied response. In stark contrast, that same day, McCain's newly Anglo-American TF-38 launched 1,167 sorties against Tokyo, expending 372 tons of bombs and 2,175 rockets. Only seven planes and one pilot were lost, none to combat. Airborne opposition was virtually nil, as Lieutenant-General Kanetoshi Kondo, commander of Tokyo's defending 10th Hiko Shidan, “failed to urge his men to press the attack to the utmost, because it seemed absurd to incur additional losses with the war obviously lost and its termination due in a matter of days.”  Simultaneously, Suzuki's cabinet debated their reply to the Allied response late into the night but remained deadlocked. Back in Manchuria, on August 13, the 6th Guards Tank Army resumed its offensive by pushing reconnaissance units toward Tungliao and Taonan. The 39th Army continued its assault on Japanese units at Halung-Arshaan, while the 5th Guards Rifle Corps attacked and captured Solun. To the north, as the battle for Hailar raged on, the 2nd Rifle Corps engaged the determined 119th Division for control of the Grand Khingan passes west of Pokotu, achieving little progress over the next two days. Looking east, the 2nd Red Banner Army gathered sufficient forces to resume its offensive, successfully penetrating the defenses of the 123rd Division at Shenwutan and Chiko. They destroyed small Japanese outposts at Huma and Santaoka, further pushing the 135th Independent Mixed Brigade toward the main fortified region at Aihun. Additionally, the 15th Army reduced the fortified positions at Fuchin, while the 171st Tank Brigade continued its advance toward Chiamussu. To the south, the 66th Rifle Division finally occupied Tungan, cutting the highway and railroad to Hutou. Meanwhile, the 59th Rifle Corps reached and secured Linkou before turning south toward Mutanchiang. Advance elements of the 26th Rifle Corps attacked and occupied the railroad station at Hualin, though they could not secure crossing sites over the Mutan River due to the fierce resistance of a single battalion. During the night, heavy Japanese counterattacks forced Soviet forces back to a hill northeast of Hualin. More importantly, while the 45th Rifle Corps continued to reduce remaining Japanese strongpoints in the Volynsk, Suifenho, and Lumintai centers of resistance, the bulk of the 5th Army advanced 30 kilometers along the road and rail line, successfully approaching the outer fortifications of Mutanchiang by nightfall. Even farther south, the 25th Army pushed southwestward, with its three formations sharing a single road along the military rail line through the mountainous, heavily wooded area from Laoheishan to Heitosai. In South Sakhalin, the 56th Rifle Corps launched a siege attack against Furuton. However, the fierce resistance of the 125th Regiment successfully repelled Soviet assaults for the next three days. On the same day, in preparation for an amphibious invasion of Toro, two naval patrol craft reconnoitered Esutoru. Additionally, Meretskov approved the Seishin Operation in North Korea, leading to another small naval force landing successfully at Chongjin that afternoon. Soon after, they faced a strong Japanese counterattack, which drove the landing force out of the port and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. The following morning, a naval infantry battalion was landed to retake Chongjin, but Japanese reinforcements from the Nanam Divisional District Unit arrived to contest the port. As the Russians were pushed back again, Yumashev decided to embark the 13th Naval Infantry Brigade for a third assault scheduled for August 15. To the north, the 393rd Rifle Division advanced south along the coast, reaching Kwangjuryong by August 14. Concurrently, after breaking through the 128th Division's main defenses at Lotzukou, the 25th Army reached Heitosai and prepared to launch its main attack against Murakami's 3rd Army. The 5th Army struck the right flank of Shimizu's 5th Army at Ssutaoling and in the hills southeast of Mutanchiang, while the 1st Red Banner Army attacked the northern and eastern flanks of the city and the railroad station at Yehho on the eastern bank of the Mutan River. The 35th Army began a rapid advance toward Poli and Linkou, encountering negligible opposition. Meanwhile, the 5th Rifle Corps reached Paoching, drove off its garrison, and continued marching toward Poli. In addition, the 15th Army finally reduced the Hsingshanchen Fortified Region, opening a more direct advance route toward Chiamussu. Meanwhile, the 2nd Red Banner Army succeeded in breaking through the outer Japanese defenses to besiege the Sunwu Fortified Region and surround the Aihun Fortified Region. To the west, the 36th Army continued to encounter strong resistance at Hailar and Wunoerh. The 5th Guards Rifle Corps initiated a southeastward pursuit along the railroad toward Wangyemiao, eventually catching elements of the 107th Division at Tepossi, while also engaging Japanese units retreating from the Wuchakou area. The forward detachment of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps occupied Taonan after a march hindered by wet weather and Japanese kamikaze attacks. The 17th Army captured Taopanshin, and Pliyev's left column overcame a small Manchurian cavalry force, entering Dolonnor at the east end of the pass across the southern Grand Khingan Mountains. Back in the Pacific, the Allies grew restless as they awaited a Japanese response, ultimately interpreting the silence as a non-acceptance of the imposed peace terms. Consequently, Truman ordered a resumption of attacks against Japan at maximum intensity. More than 400 B-29 bombers launched daylight attacks, while over 300 conducted night raids, culminating in what would become the largest and longest bombing raid of the Pacific War. Furthermore, Truman began planning to drop a third atomic bomb on Tokyo. However, before he could proceed, Emperor Hirohito met with the most senior Army and Navy officers in the early hours of August 14, convincing them to cooperate in ending the war. The cabinet immediately convened and unanimously ratified the Emperor's wishes for an unconditional surrender. They also decided to destroy vast amounts of material related to war crimes and the war responsibilities of the nation's highest leaders. Shortly after concluding the conference, a group of senior army officers, including Anami, gathered in a nearby room and signed an agreement to execute the Emperor's order of surrender. This decision would significantly impede any attempts to incite a coup in Tokyo. During this meeting, General Kawabe Torashirō, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, proposed that the senior officers present should each sign an agreement to carry out the Emperor's order of surrender, "The Army will act in accordance with the Imperial Decision to the last." An agreement was ultimately signed by each of the most important officers present, including Minister of War Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, commander of the 1st General Army Field Marshal Sugiyama Hajime, commander of the 2nd General Army Field Marshal Hata Shunroku and Inspector-General of Military Training Doihara Kenji. When Umezu voiced concern about air units causing trouble, Vice Minister of War Wakamatsu Tadaichi took the agreement next door to the Air General Army headquarters, where its commander Kawabe Masakazu, the brother of Torashirō also signed. The document would serve to seriously impede any attempt to incite a coup in Tokyo. Simultaneously, the Foreign Ministry transmitted orders to its embassies in Switzerland and Sweden to accept the Allied terms of surrender, which were received in Washington at 02:49 on August 14. Anticipating difficulties with senior commanders on distant war fronts, three princes of the Imperial Family, who held military commissions, were dispatched to deliver the news personally. By 19:00, the text of the Imperial Rescript on surrender was finalized, transcribed by the official court calligrapher, and presented to the cabinet for their signatures. Around 23:00, the Emperor, with assistance from an NHK recording crew, made a gramophone record of himself reading the rescript. At long last, Japan had admitted defeat.  However at around 21:30 on 14 August, the conspirators led by Hatanaka set their plan into motion. The Second Regiment of the First Imperial Guards had entered the palace grounds, doubling the strength of the battalion already stationed there, presumably to provide extra protection against Hatanaka's rebellion. But Hatanaka, along with Lt. Col. Shiizaki Jirō, convinced the commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, Colonel Haga Toyojirō, of their cause, by telling him (falsely) that Generals Anami and Umezu, and the commanders of the Eastern District Army and Imperial Guards Divisions were all in on the plan. Hatanaka also went to the office of Tanaka Shizuichi, commander of the Eastern region of the army, to try to persuade him to join the coup. Tanaka refused, and ordered Hatanaka to go home. Hatanaka ignored the order. Originally, Hatanaka hoped that simply occupying the palace and showing the beginnings of a rebellion would inspire the rest of the Army to rise up against the move to surrender. This notion guided him through much of the last days and hours and gave him the blind optimism to move ahead with the plan, despite having little support from his superiors. Having set all the pieces into position, Hatanaka and his co-conspirators decided that the Guard would take over the palace at 02:00. The hours until then were spent in continued attempts to convince their superiors in the Army to join the coup. Hatanaka, Shiizaki, Ida, and Captain Shigetarō Uehara (of the Air Force Academy) went to the office of Lt. Gen. Takeshi Mori to ask him to join the coup. Mori was in a meeting with his brother-in-law Michinori Shiraishi. The cooperation of Mori, who was the commander of the 1st Imperial Guards Division, was vital. When Mori refused to side with Hatanaka, Hatanaka killed him, fearing Mori would order the Guards to stop the rebellion. Uehara killed Shiraishi. These were the only two murders of the night. Hatanaka then used General Mori's official stamp to authorize Imperial Guards Division Strategic Order No. 584, a false set of orders created by his co-conspirators, which would greatly increase the strength of the forces occupying the Imperial Palace and Imperial Household Ministry, and "protecting" the Emperor. The rebels, led by Hatanaka, spent the next several hours fruitlessly searching for the recordings of the surrender speech, failing to locate them amid a blackout caused by American bombings. Around the same time, another group of Hatanaka's rebels, led by Captain Takeo Sasaki, targeted Prime Minister Suzuki's office with the intent to kill him. When they found it empty, they opened fire with machine guns, devastating the office, and then set the building ablaze before departing for Suzuki's home. Fortunately, Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief secretary to Suzuki's Cabinet, had warned Suzuki, enabling him to escape just minutes before the assassins arrived. After setting fire to Suzuki's residence, the rebels then proceeded to the estate of Kiichirō Hiranuma, aiming to assassinate him as well. Hiranuma managed to escape through a side gate, but the rebels torched his house too. In the aftermath, Suzuki spent the remainder of August under police protection, sleeping in a different bed each night to avoid detection. Around 03:00, Hatanaka was informed that the Eastern District Army was on its way to the palace to confront him and urged him to surrender. As Hatanaka saw his plan collapse around him, he pleaded with Tatsuhiko Takashima, the Chief of Staff of the Eastern District Army, for airtime on NHK radio to explain his intentions to the Japanese people. His request was denied. Meanwhile, Colonel Haga, commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Imperial Guards, learned that the Army did not support Hatanaka's rebellion and ordered him to vacate the palace grounds. Just before 05:00, while his rebels continued their search, Major Hatanaka went to the NHK studios, desperately trying to secure airtime to convey his actions. However, slightly over an hour later, after receiving a phone call from the Eastern District Army, Hatanaka finally conceded defeat. He gathered his officers and left the NHK studio, feeling the weight of his failed coup. At dawn, General Tanaka learned that the palace had been invaded, so he went there to confront the rebellious officers. He berated them for acting against the spirit of the Japanese army and ultimately convinced them to return to their barracks. By 08:00 on August 15, the rebellion was entirely dismantled. Although they had held the palace grounds for much of the night, they ultimately failed to find the recordings. After his failed coup, Hatanaka took his own life before witnessing Japan's surrender. While TF-38 refueled on August 14, Halsey signaled McCain, stating, “I intend to strike the same general target area on the fifteenth.” McCain informed TF-38, “Our orders to strike indicate the enemy may have dropped an unacceptable joker into the surrender terms. This war could last many months longer. We cannot afford to relax. Now is the time to pour it on.” In fact, the Western Allies had sunk their last Japanese ships of the war that day, when submarines USS Torsk (SS-423) and USS Spikefish (SS-404) torpedoed I-373 and two small escort ships in the East China Sea, resulting in the death of 112 Japanese sailors. The following morning, August 15, the Third Fleet launched its first strike of 103 aircraft at 04:15 hours. At 06:14, just as the first strike was returning and the second strike was five minutes from the target, Halsey was ordered by Nimitz, “Air attack will be suspended. Acknowledge.” Shortly afterward, an officer burst in, waving a transcript—President Truman's official peace announcement. Halsey erupted with exuberance, “pounding the shoulders of everyone within reach.” He recalled, “My first thought at the great news was, ‘Victory!' My second was, ‘God be thanked, I'll never have to order another man out to die.'” However, within minutes, four retiring Hancock Hellcats were attacked by seven Japanese fighters, resulting in the Hellcats shooting down four without loss. Over Tokorazawa airfield, northwest of Tokyo, 20 IJAAF Ki-84 “Franks” ambushed six VF-88 Hellcats from Yorktown. The Hellcats managed to shoot down nine Franks but lost four of their own, along with their pilots. Rawlings' dawn strikes were intercepted by about 12 Zeros. Escorting Seafires shot down eight Zeros but lost one, while an Avenger downed a ninth Zero. Tragically, seven TF-38 flyers never returned. During the morning, Halsey launched his last strike of the war, but was soon ordered by Admiral Nimitz to suspend all air attacks. At 12:00, the Emperor's recorded speech to the nation, reading the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War, was finally broadcast. The war was over… or was it really? I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Prime Minister Suzuki and his cabinet debated surrender, the Emperor Hirohito finally accepted the Potsdam Declaration, conditionally ensuring the imperial family's continuity. However, conspirators attempted a coup to prevent the surrender, ultimately failing. By August 15, Japan officially surrendered, marking the end of the Pacific War.

Last time we spoke about the Siege of Japan. In the summer of 1945, Japan faced its most devastating siege. A pivotal component was the aerial mining campaign entitled "Starvation," masterminded by General Curtis LeMay. B-29 Superfortress bombers were deployed to lay mines in critical waterways, cutting off resources and crippling Japan's industrial capabilities. This silent assault inflicted chaos on Japan's shipping lanes, sinking over 670 vessels and significantly disrupting supply lines. Amid this turmoil, the Allies intensified their firebombing campaigns, targeting urban centers like Tokyo, Osaka, and Kobe, leading to extensive devastation and loss of life. By August, Japan's civilian and military morale crumbled under the weight of destruction. The climax of this siege came with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, which unleashed unparalleled destruction. As Japan's leadership struggled for options, the nation was effectively brought to its knees. The relentless siege had achieved its goal, Japan was irrevocably broken, marking a profound moment in history. This episode is the Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Hello there, again like in the previous episode, this one is just going to state what happened, I am not going to delve into the why's just yet. I am currently writing an entire special episode on why exactly Japan surrendered, focused on the actions of Emperor Hirohito, who I will argue prolonged the 15 year war to protect the Kokutai. So a bit of a spoiler there I guess.  The worst has come to pass for the Japanese Empire. An atomic bomb has fallen, devastating an entire city. In a blinding flash, over 140,000 lives were lost or forever altered. But this was merely the beginning. The Americans were poised to unleash destruction from the skies, a scale of devastation never before witnessed on this planet. The choices were grim: surrender or complete annihilation.The Japanese faced not only this overwhelming threat but also another peril. The Soviet Union prepared to invade Manchuria and other crucial territories within its reach. As we last left off, the Americans had been conducting a prolonged and devastating air and naval siege of the Japanese Home Islands in preparation for the invasion of Kyushu. This campaign culminated in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, reducing the once-great city to ruins and leaving a staggering casualty toll that would forever haunt the Japanese people. Survivor accounts recount the haunting experience of wandering through the destruction, disoriented and unsure of where to go. They spoke of hearing the desperate cries of those trapped beneath crushed buildings or suffering from horrific burns. As small fires ignited by the blast began to spread, they coalesced into a firestorm that surged through the rubble, claiming the lives of many still trapped inside. Frightened residents jumped into the rivers of Hiroshima, only to drown in their desperate attempts to escape the flames. Over 90% of the doctors and 93% of the nurses in Hiroshima perished or were injured, and most hospitals were either destroyed or heavily damaged. By early afternoon, police and volunteers worked tirelessly to establish evacuation centers at hospitals, schools, and tram stations. Yet, tragically, many would die before receiving aid, leaving behind grim rings of corpses around these facilities. Some survivors who initially appeared unharmed would succumb within hours or days to what would later be identified as radiation sickness. Most members of General Hata's 2nd General Army headquarters were undergoing physical training on the grounds of Hiroshima Castle, barely 900 yards from the hypocenter. As a result, 3,243 troops lost their lives on the parade ground. Miraculously, Hata himself survived the explosion with only minor injuries, but many of his staff were not so fortunate, including Lieutenant-Colonel Yi U, a prince of the Korean imperial family, who was killed or fatally wounded. In total, the 2nd General Army, 59th Army, 5th Division, and other combat units in the city lost an estimated 20,000 troops. Survivors regrouped at the Ujina Air Base on the outskirts of Hiroshima, where they organized relief efforts and maintained public order once martial law was declared. With Mayor Awaya Senkichi killed at the mayoral residence, Hata assumed control of the city's administration and coordinated relief efforts. The initial reaction of the Japanese government to the devastation in Hiroshima was mixed. The Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy military leadership received only fragmentary reports about the tragedy, as communications with Hiroshima had been severed. Meanwhile, American and British radio broadcasts promptly informed ordinary Japanese civilians and their government about the atomic bomb attack on August 7. The following day, Tokyo issued a press release confirming the bombing of Hiroshima, but it notably did not state that the United States had dropped an atomic weapon. After technical teams visited the site of the bombing, they concluded that the enemy B-29s had indeed used a nuclear device. At this juncture, the diplomatic situation within Japan was chaotic. Many members of the Japanese cabinet believed that surrender was the only viable option, while others, particularly military figures like Hata, were determined to continue the fight. Looking back, between July 17 and August 2, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Harry Truman convened in Potsdam to negotiate terms for the end of World War II. The Potsdam Conference is perhaps best known for President Truman's conversation with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin on July 24, during which Truman informed Stalin that the United States had successfully detonated the first atomic bomb on July 16. Prior to leaving for the conference, a top-level civilian Interim Committee, led by Secretary of War Henry Stimson, suggested that Truman inform Stalin about America's new nuclear capability. This was intended to prevent the Soviets from learning about the bomb through leaked information, and Truman agreed to share this news. Historians have often interpreted Truman's somewhat firm stance during negotiations as a reflection of the U.S. negotiating team's belief that their nuclear capability would enhance their bargaining power. However, Stalin was already well-informed about the American nuclear program, courtesy of the Soviet intelligence network. This understanding enabled him to hold firm in his positions, complicating the negotiations. In the end, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, despite their differences, remained allied throughout the war. However, they would never meet again collectively to discuss cooperation in postwar reconstruction. One of the critical topics discussed was how to handle Japan. During the conference, Truman sought and received Stalin's final assurance of entering the war on August 9, in accordance with the agreements made among the Allies during the Yalta Conference in February 1945. On April 5, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed Tokyo of the Soviet Union's unilateral abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. He assured Japan that the treaty would remain in effect until April 1946, even though the Soviets were already planning an offensive in the Far East. A Soviet invasion would prove beneficial for the Americans, as it could prevent the movement of hostile troops from Manchuria, Korea, and North China to the Home Islands of Japan before an invasion of Kyushu was launched. On July 26, the United States, Great Britain, and China released a declaration demanding Japan's immediate surrender. The declaration called for the dismemberment of Japan's remaining empire, the demobilization of all military forces, trials for war criminals, and the elimination of Japan's capacity for future belligerence. While the declaration did not alter the requirement for unconditional surrender, critically it left ambiguous how the Japanese people might shape their future government, as it did not specify a direct end to or continuation of the imperial dynasty. The crux of that matter was the preservation of the Kokutai. The Kokutai was the national essence of Japan. It was all aspects of Japanese polity, derived from history, tradition and customs all focused around the cult of the Emperor. The government run by politicians was secondary, at any given time the kokutai was the belief the Emperor could come in and directly rule. If you are confused, dont worry, I am too haha. Its confusing. The Meiji constitution was extremely ambiguous. It dictated a form of constitutional monarchy with the kokutai sovereign emperor and the “seitai” that being the actual government. Basically on paper the government runs things, but the feeling of the Japanese people was that the wishes of the emperor should be followed. Thus the kokutai was like an extra-judicial structure built into the constitution without real legal framework, its a nightmare I know. Let me make an example, most of you are American I imagine. Your congress and senate actually run the country, wink wink lets forget about lobbyists from raytheon. The president does not have executive powers to override any and all things, but what if all American voters simply felt he did. So the president goes above his jurisdiction, and the American people violently attack Congress and the Senate if they don't abide by the president's wishes. That's kind of how it works for a lack of better words. Again in the specials I will roll out soon, it will make more sense after I blabber about it in roughly 7000 words. Now, in response, Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro expressed to the Japanese press on July 29 his belief that the Potsdam Declaration was nothing new and held no "significant value." This statement was interpreted by Truman and his administration as a rejection of the declaration. In reality, since the Yalta Conference, Japan had repeatedly approached the Soviet Union in an attempt to extend the Neutrality Pact and to enlist the Russians in negotiating peace with the Allies, offering attractive territorial concessions in return.  The Japanese, therefore, chose not to officially respond to the Potsdam Declaration as they awaited a reply from the Soviet Union. However, this response never materialized. The Soviet Union was preparing for an invasion of Manchuria, fully aware that Japan had become a weakened nation after suffering several defeats in the Pacific. In contrast, the once-inadequate Russian military had transformed into one of the strongest forces of the time. They had successfully absorbed powerful German offensives in 1941, 1942, and 1943, and rebounded with their own offensives in 1944 and 1945, ultimately crushing the military might of Nazi Germany. Motivated by Allied requests for support and the desire to solidify the Soviet Union's post-war position in the Far East, Soviet leaders began planning in March for a final campaign to reclaim Manchuria, northern Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands from Japan. However, most Soviet troops were stationed more than 10,000 kilometers away in Europe. As a result, forces and equipment designated for deployment to Manchuria had to be transported along a fragile and limited-capacity network over a five-month period from April to August. Initially, they stockpiled equipment in the Far East to re-equip units already present in that region. Then, a massive regrouping of forces to the east commenced in May, with units still arriving even as the campaign opened in August. This shift, involving nearly one million men, effectively doubled the strength of Soviet forces in the Far East from forty to more than eighty divisions. Opposing Valisevsky's Far East Command was General Yamada Otozo's Kwantung Army, along with its Manchukuoan and Inner Mongolian auxiliaries. Once the most prestigious and powerful unit of the Imperial Japanese Army, the Kwantung Army had significantly eroded in strength and quality over the past few years due to the diversion of its main assets to other theaters. Consequently, many experienced units were siphoned off and replaced by formations made up of draft levies, reservists, and smaller, cannibalized units. By August, the Kwantung Army consisted of General Kita Seiichi's 1st Area Army in eastern Manchuria, which included the 3rd and 5th Armies, alongside two divisions under direct area army control. General Ushiroku Jun commanded the 3rd Area Army in central and western Manchuria, encompassing the 30th and 44th Armies, plus two divisions, three independent mixed brigades, and one independent tank brigade under his direct command. In northern Manchuria, Lieutenant-General Uemura Mikio led the 4th Army, which was composed of three divisions and four independent mixed brigades. Additionally, the army of Manchukuo contributed eight infantry and seven cavalry divisions, along with fourteen brigades of infantry and cavalry. Mengjiang added six cavalry formations and other garrison forces from Inner Mongolia. Furthermore, Lieutenant-General Kozuki Yoshio's 17th Area Army was stationed in central and southern Korea, totaling seven divisions and three independent mixed brigades. In northern Korea, Lieutenant-General Kushibuchi Senichi's 34th Army consisted of two divisions and one independent mixed brigade. Recognizing that his forces lacked adequate training and equipment, Yamada's plans called for a delay at the borders, followed by a defense consisting of successive positions culminating in a final stand at a stronghold constructed in the Tunghua area. This strategy would see roughly one-third of the Japanese forces deployed in the border region, while the remaining two-thirds would be concentrated in operational depth to create a series of defensive lines. By July 25, Soviet force deployments to the Far East were virtually complete. The Soviets meticulously tailored all military units, from the front level down to army, corps, division, brigade, and battalion, to effectively achieve specific missions. This tailoring took into account not only the strength and dispositions of enemy forces but also the terrain where the unit would operate and the desired speed of the operation. Each unit was equipped with the necessary artillery, anti-tank, tank, air defense, and engineer support. For instance, the 1st Far Eastern Front received heavy artillery attachments to provide the firepower needed to breach heavily fortified Japanese positions. In contrast, the Transbaikal Front was given heavy vehicular and motorized rifle support, enabling it to conduct rapid, balanced combined arms operations across the broad expanses of western Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Within each front, armies assigned to assault strong enemy fortified zones had significantly more artillery assets compared to those operating on open axes of advance. Units deployed in difficult terrain were afforded extensive engineer support to facilitate their operations. At the lowest tactical levels, specially tailored forward detachments from rifle divisions and tank and mechanized corps, alongside assault groups from rifle regiments and battalions, ensured the firepower and mobility necessary to execute high-speed operations. However, the final decision to attack would not be made until August 7, when Vasilevsky committed the Transbaikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts to a simultaneous assault scheduled for August 9. It is believed that the detonation of the atomic bomb the previous day prompted this hasty decision, resulting in the short two-day period between the decision and the planned attack. Vasilevsky's strategy called for a double envelopment conducted by Soviet forces along three axes to secure Manchuria and destroy a significant portion of the Kwantung Army. The Transbaikal Front was tasked with attacking eastward into western Manchuria, while the 1st Far Eastern Front would move westward into eastern Manchuria. Both offensives were to converge in the Mukden, Changchun, Harbin, and Kirin areas of south-central Manchuria. Meanwhile, the 2nd Far Eastern Front would conduct a supporting attack into northern Manchuria, driving southward toward Harbin and Tsitsihar. Moreover, the timing of on-order operations against southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles would depend on the progress of these main attacks. For the western pincer, Malinovsky's plan involved the 17th and 39th Armies and the 6th Guards Tank Army, followed by the 53rd Army, launching the primary assault. Their objective was to bypass the Halung-Arshaan Fortified Region to the south and advance toward Changchun. The success of the Transbaikal Front operation hinged on speed, surprise, and the deployment of mobile forces across virtually every sector, aiming to preempt effective Japanese defenses. To achieve this swiftness and surprise, tank formations were positioned in the first echelon of units at all command levels. The operation required tank-heavy forward detachments at each command level, with the 6th Guards Tank Army designated to spearhead the front's efforts. A tank division would lead the advance of the 39th Army, supported by tank brigades assigned to the first-echelon corps and divisions. Planned rates of advance were ambitious: 23 kilometers per day for combined arms units and an impressive 70 kilometers for tank units. However, the operation involved significant risks. If Japanese units responded quickly to the Soviet attack, or if even nominal forces occupied strategic positions in the Grand Khingan mountain passes, the Soviet advance could be severely hampered. Additionally, the success of the operation relied heavily on logistical units' capability to supply these fast-moving formations deep into Manchuria. Despite these challenges, the Soviets confidently accepted the risks involved. Their mission was to crush the enemy in the border regions, cross the Grand Khingan Mountains, and occupy positions in the central Manchurian plain from Lupei to Solun by the tenth to fifteenth day of the operation.In support, the Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanized Group was to attack across the Inner Mongolian desert and southern Grand Khingan Mountains toward Kalgan and Dolonnor. Simultaneously, the 36th Army was set to advance from Duroy and Staro-Tsurukaytuy across the Argun River to secure Hailar. In the next phase, for the second pincer, Meretskov's plan involved the 1st Red Banner Army, the 5th Army, and the 10th Mechanized Corps launching the main attack from the Grodekova area, located northwest of Vladivostok. Their objective was to advance toward Mutanchiang to exploit and secure the Kirin, Changchun, and Harbin regions, while coordinating with Soviet forces from the Transbaikal Front. Additionally, the 35th Army was tasked with attacking from the Lesozavodsk-Iman area, north of Lake Khanka, to capture Mishan, Linkou, and Poli. Meanwhile, the 25th Army would launch an offensive from northwest of Ussurysk to secure the Tungning, Wangching, and Yenchi areas. Once the 1st Far Eastern and Transbaikal Fronts converged in the Changchun area, they would advance together to eliminate the final Japanese resistance on the Liaotung Peninsula and secure the strategic naval base at Port Arthur. Furthermore, Purkayev's 2nd Far Eastern Front was to advance on a broad front across the Amur and Ussuri rivers, extending from Blagoveshchensk to south of Khabarovsk. This movement aimed to exert maximum pressure on Japanese forces in northern Manchuria. The 15th Army would spearhead the main attack across the Amur River in the Leninskoye area, advancing southward into the regions around the Sungari and Ruhe rivers. In support, the 2nd Red Banner Army was designated to attack across the Amur River from the Blagoveshchensk area to Sunwu and then advance southward to Tsitsihar. The 5th Rifle Corps would also be involved, attacking from Bikin to secure Paoching and Poli. This multifront operational plan aimed for the complete destruction of Kwantung Army units in Manchuria with maximum speed, effectively cutting off Japanese troops from reinforcements coming from northern China or Korea. These relentless mobile attacks, deployed across the broadest of fronts, were designed to prevent the Japanese from reallocating forces, leading to their ultimate collapse and piecemeal defeat. As planned, the Japanese were caught completely by surprise when they received the Soviet declaration of war just an hour before midnight on August 8. At the same time, they were facing a critical decision in response to the recent bombing of Hiroshima. After learning about the success of Colonel Tibbets' mission, President Truman released a pre-approved statement that detailed the atomic bomb's destructive capabilities and warned that if Japan did not accept the Potsdam Declaration, "they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth." Although Truman had only the plutonium Fat Man device remaining for use, he had been informed that a third bomb might be ready sometime in August. Among American military leaders, including Admiral Nimitz and Generals Spaatz, LeMay, and Twining, there was a belief that this third nuclear weapon should be dropped on Tokyo if Japan did not surrender. Conversely, some Japanese senior officials, like Admiral Toyoda, speculated that even if the Allies had used an atomic bomb, they likely would not have many more at their disposal. They argued that the Japanese people should be prepared to defend their home islands to the death if favorable terms of surrender could not be secured. However, on August 8, Prime Minister Suzuki instructed Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, who advocated for negotiating with the United States, to inform Emperor Hirohito about the devastation caused by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. Hirohito responded by authorizing foreign minister Togo to notify the world on August 10th that Japan would accept the allied terms of surrender with one condition “that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.”  In the meantime, to increase pressure on the Japanese, Twinning launched additional conventional B-29 raids. A total of 412 B-29s targeted the Nakajima aircraft plant in Musashino during a daylight attack on August 8. However, the United States also needed to demonstrate to the Japanese government and people that Little Boy was not just an isolated experimental device. As a result, a decision was made to drop the Fat Man plutonium bomb on either the primary target of Kokura or the secondary target of Nagasaki, with this mission scheduled for August 9. For this operation, Tibbets selected Major Charles Sweeney to pilot the B-29 named Bockscar and deliver the device. The leading B-29 would decide the ultimate target based on weather reports from two reconnaissance B-29s, followed by two additional aircraft assigned to scientific and photographic missions. To prepare for takeoff, the bomb was armed by installing three plugs. At 03:49 on August 9, Sweeney departed from Tinian, heading toward Yakushima Island to rendezvous with his escorts. The mission began with complications that only escalated. A typhoon near Iwo Jima forced mission planners to relocate the planned rendezvous between Bockscar and her escorts to Yakushima, an island south of Kyushu. Sweeney took off at 03:49 on August 9 and headed north, but strong headwinds hindered her progress toward Yakushima. A further issue arose when a photographic specialist assigned to the support aircraft Full House was barred from flying due to forgetting his parachute. Consequently, Major Hopkins on Full House had to break radio silence to seek instructions on operating the camera. However, a more critical situation was uncovered when Commander Ashworth and his assistant discovered that an indicator was showing that Fat Man's electronic fusing circuits had closed, indicating that arming was complete. A faulty switch, with incorrectly installed wiring, posed the risk of a premature explosion. As the mission continued over Yakushima, Sweeney successfully met up with Captain Bock, piloting the scientific support B-29, but failed to rendezvous with Major Hopkins. This meant that Bockscar would only have The Great Artiste to accompany it for the final leg of its mission. According to Ashworth's log, they arrived at the rendezvous point at 09:00 and saw Bock at 09:20, while Full House waited south of the arranged position. Sweeney had initially agreed to circle Yakushima for only 15 minutes; however, he ended up waiting approximately 50 minutes for Hopkins to arrive, wasting precious fuel in the process. Due to the weather conditions, Hopkins had lost visual contact with the other B-29s and had to break radio silence again to locate Bockscar, but Sweeney did not respond. Despite reports indicating 30% cloud cover over Kokura, Sweeney chose to proceed there, believing the haze over the city would clear. Bockscar arrived at the initial start point for the bomb run over Kokura at 10:44, but unfortunately, heavy cloud cover had settled over the city, preventing a successful bomb delivery. After three unsuccessful bomb runs, which consumed an additional 45 minutes of fuel, a flight engineer discovered that a fuel pump had malfunctioned, trapping 600 gallons of fuel in the auxiliary bomb bay fuel tanks. Despite fuel concerns, Sweeney chose to proceed with the mission, heading south and then east toward Nagasaki, which he reached at 11:50. Unfortunately, the weather there was as poor as it had been at Kokura, prompting Sweeney to make the controversial decision to drop Fat Man using radar guidance. Due to the fuel shortage, he only conducted a single bomb run. Just before initiating the radar approach, a hole in the clouds opened, revealing the aim point: the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works located on the Urakami River. Fat Man was dropped at 11:58 and detonated approximately 1,650 feet above the target after a 50-second descent. Initial reports indicated that the explosion occurred about 500 yards north of the Mitsubishi plant and roughly 0.8 miles south of another Mitsubishi facility. While Fat Man had a more powerful detonation, the damage and casualties were not as extensive as those caused by the lower-yield Little Boy. The topography of Nagasaki, surrounded by hills, confined the explosion to the bowl-shaped center of the city, in stark contrast to Hiroshima's relatively flat landscape. Of the 7,500 Japanese employees at the Mitsubishi plant, 6,200 were killed, with an additional 17,000 to 22,000 employees at other war plants and factories also perishing. Unlike Hiroshima, where the military death toll was high, only about 150 Japanese soldiers were killed instantly, alongside at least 8 prisoners of war. Overall, it is estimated that around 45,000 civilians lost their lives due to the explosion, with between 50,000 and 60,000 sustaining injuries. The radius of total destruction extended about one mile, with fires spreading across the northern portion of the city to two miles south of the impact point. Thankfully, no firestorm developed as it had in Hiroshima. Bomb damage to physical structures in Nagasaki was erratic. Some areas, such as the Nagasaki Arsenal and the Mitsubishi plant, experienced significant destruction, while nearby locations appeared almost untouched. Despite this, Sweeney's mission resulted in an estimated 68.3% loss of pre-existing industrial production, excluding the harbor facilities, without disrupting the critical north-south National Railway track. While Fat Man's debut was historic, its destructive capability was comparable to other B-29 incendiary night raids. After circling Fat Man's expanding mushroom cloud, Sweeney headed toward Okinawa at 12:05, with only 300 gallons of fuel remaining. Fortunately, Bockscar's crew managed to return to Yontan Field with just seven gallons of fuel left, successfully making their way back to Tinian later that same day.  Simultaneously, Vasilevsky's Far East Command began its offensive just ten minutes after midnight on August 9. Reconnaissance units, forward detachments, and advanced guard units of the Transbaikal Front crossed the border into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Initially, attacking units faced resistance primarily in the 36th Army zone, where their attack routes passed through fortified Japanese border installations. However, most assault units advanced with little opposition. By 04:30, main force units had begun to follow closely behind the assault troops. Colonel-General Issa Pliyev's Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanized Group advanced in two march columns, 200 kilometers apart. By nightfall, they had penetrated 55 miles into the arid expanses of Inner Mongolia, moving southward toward Dolonnor and Kalgan while sweeping aside small detachments of Inner Mongolian cavalry. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Aleksei Danilov's 17th Army entered Inner Mongolia virtually unopposed in two columns, advancing approximately 70 kilometers by nightfall. To the left, Colonel-General Andrey Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army led the main attack into Inner Mongolia in two columns, encountering limited opposition and rapidly advancing about 150 kilometers until reaching the foothills of the Grand Khingan Mountains, west and north of Khorokhon Pass, by nightfall. Simultaneously, Colonel-General Ivan Lyudnikov's 39th Army advanced along two divergent axes. The 5th Guards and 113th Rifle Corps gained 60 kilometers as they bypassed the Halung-Arshaan and Wuchakou Fortified Regions to the south. Meanwhile, the 94th Rifle Corps struck northeast towards the rear of the Hailar Fortified Region, swiftly overcoming light resistance. The 124th Rifle Division was also deployed between both axes to probe toward the Halung-Arshaan Fortified Region. Lieutenant-General Alexander Luchinsky's 36th Army advanced on two fronts, with the 2nd and 86th Rifle Corps successfully crossing the rain-swollen Argun River between Staro-Tsurukhaytuy and Duroy and securing key bridges north of Hailar. Additionally, an operational group of two rifle divisions attacked across the border, establishing a foothold in the small fortified post at Manchouli. During the night, Luchinsky sent the 205th Tank Brigade to assault Hailar from the northeast, while the 152nd Rifle Regiment maneuvered to attack from the southeast. This offensive succeeded only in capturing the railroad station in the northern part of Hailar, as the southern and eastern sections of the city fell the following day. However, the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade continued to delay the Soviet advance, while the 119th Division moved eastward to fortify positions in the Grand Khingan Mountains, stretching from Yakoshih to Pokotu. Despite these setbacks, the 36th Army had advanced 60 kilometers into Manchuria and had partially secured Hailar. Meanwhile, to the east, drenched by inundating thunderstorms, the 1st Far Eastern Front advanced under the worst weather conditions during the dark of night. This totally surprised the Japanese defenders and led to the rapid reduction of many unsuspecting border posts. Colonel-General Nikolay Krylov's 5th Army spearheaded the main attack, with the 17th, 65th, and 72nd Rifle Corps quickly breaking through the Volynsk center of resistance. They achieved a penetration of 16 to 22 kilometers toward Laotsaiying and Machiacho. Meanwhile, the 105th Fortified Region and assault engineer units attacked the Suifenho center of resistance, successfully seizing critical railroad tunnels on the main rail line into Manchuria. In support, Colonel-General Afanasy Beloborodov's 1st Red Banner Army to the north launched an assault with the 26th and 59th Rifle Corps over a 16-kilometer sector through heavily wooded, wet terrain. As they advanced, they constructed roads through the forest. By nightfall, forward divisional elements had advanced five to six kilometers deep into Manchuria, crossing the Shitouho River and half of the forested region. At the same time, the 6th Field Fortified Region and the 112th Fortified Region stormed several Japanese border positions and slowly advanced north towards Mishan. This assault supported Lieutenant-General Nikanor Zakhvatayev's 35th Army, which deployed the 66th and 363rd Rifle Divisions to cross the Sungacha River and attack towards Mishan. The 264th Rifle Division and the 109th Fortified Region assaulted across the Ussuri River against Hutou. After securing a crossing over the Sungacha, the 66th Division penetrated deep into the swamps, managing to advance 12 kilometers into Tachiao. Meanwhile, the 363rd Division successfully broke through an enemy strongpoint at Maly Huankang, ultimately reaching the southwest edge of Tachiao. In turn, the 264th Division crossed the Ussuri River and outflanked Hutou to the south, capturing the railroad depot and cutting the highway to Hulin. Lastly, Colonel-General Ivan Chistyakov's 25th Army launched an attack along two principal axes. The 39th Rifle Corps and the 259th Tank Brigade targeted Tungning, while border guard units, along with the 108th and 113th Fortified Regions, crossed the Hunchun and Tumen rivers to engage Japanese defenses in Korea and at Hunchun. Shielded by rain, the Russians swiftly captured or subdued the Japanese forward defenses along the front. By nightfall, the 39th Rifle Corps had advanced ten to twelve kilometers into the Japanese rear along the Pad Sennaya River. Lead elements, reinforced by the 72nd Tank Brigade, began their assault on the town of Tungning and the vital railroad line to Tumen. To the north, the 2nd Far Eastern Front deployed its forces across three separate sectors. Lieutenant-General Stepan Mamonov's 15th Army was tasked with the main attack across the Amur River in the center of the front sector. Lieutenant-General Makar Teryokhin's 2nd Red Banner Army was assigned to conduct a supporting attack against the Aihun and Sunwu Fortified Regions, while Major-General Ivan Pashkov's 5th Rifle Corps aimed to seize the fortified region at Jaoho. Supported by the Amur Naval Flotilla, reconnaissance and advanced detachments of the 15th Army launched assaults without artillery preparation and rapidly secured major islands in the Amur River. Mamonov's rifle divisions then sent reconnaissance units across to the south bank of the river, which was likewise secured against light opposition. Throughout the remainder of the day, reconnaissance units and advanced battalions of the 15th Army consolidated their positions on the islands and the south bank, while main forces concentrated on conducting a challenging river crossing, hampered by heavy rains, high water, and mud. At the same time, assault units and reconnaissance detachments of the 5th Rifle Corps crossed the Ussuri River, successfully securing a beachhead north of Jaoho while the remainder of the corps was transported across the river. From August 9 to 11, the forces of the 2nd Red Banner Army limited their activities to reconnaissance, focusing on seizing islands in the Amur River and harassing Japanese installations. This operation occurred at a critical moment for the Japanese, who were still reeling from the impacts of two atomic bombings. The Soviet Union had successfully initiated its invasion of Manchuria, setting the stage for a campaign that, although brief, was just beginning. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Two atomic bombs have been dropped and the Soviet Union has invaded Manchuria. For months the Japanese had been working tirelessly to obtain better peace terms through the Soviets, hoping above all else to preserve the Kokutai. It was all for nothing. The Americans offered terms, leaving the Kokutai ambiguous. What would Japan, or better said, the Emperor do?

En paleontología no hay nada tan frustrante como tener restos de una especie interesante y que sean incompletos: se queda uno con muchas preguntas en la cabeza y consciente de que habrá que esperar a que la suerte nos conceda más respuestas la próxima vez. En pocas especies humanas es esto más palmario que con los denisovanos: descubiertos en Siberia en el año 2010, casi todo lo que sabíamos de ellos viene del ADN... hasta hace dos semanas. Dos estudios, publicados en las revistas Cell y Science, han logrado extraer ADN y proteínas de un cráneo encontrado en el año 2018 y han confirmado que ese cráneo, hasta ahora sin identificar, pertenece a un denisovano. Al fin, quince años después, ya tenemos "la cara" de un denisovano. En el programa de hoy os hablamos de esta especie humana y de su fascinante historia, porque durante 15 años sólo hemos tenido de ellos pequeños trocitos de hueso y algún diente, pero las técnicas genéticas del siglo XXI han permitido, sólo con ese material, establecer que pertenecen a una especie desconocida emparentada con los neandertales. Poco a poco esos huecos se van rellenando, y con el descubrimiento de este año damos un gran paso para conocer mejor a estos parientes que habitaron en Asia durante los últimos 300.000 años. En el programa mencionamos que el único híbrido humano de primera generación que conocemos es la hija de un denisovano y una neandertal. En La Brújula ya os hablamos de este espécimen, poco después de que se descubriera su privilegiada ascendencia: si queréis refrescar la memoria, buscad el episodio s08e01. Si queréis consultar los artículos en los que se detalla el ADN (y las proteínas) extraídos de este cráneo, el primero es "Denisovan mitochondrial DNA from dental calculus of the >146,000-year-old Harbin cranium", de Qiaomei Fu et al, y lo podéis encontrar en este enlace: https://www.cell.com/cell/fulltext/S0092-8674(25)00627-0 El segundo es "The proteome of the late Middle Pleistocene Harbin individual", de nuevo de Qiaomei Fu y colaboradores, y lo tenéis en este otro enlace: https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adu9677 Este programa se emitió originalmente el 1 de julio de 2025. Podéis escuchar el resto de audios de La Brújula en la app de Onda Cero y en su web, ondacero.es