Podcasts about hideki tojo

Last time we spoke about the Ishiwara Kanji. Born in 1889 in Japan, Kanji Ishiwara was the son of a policeman from a samurai lineage. He entered military training at 13, rising through the ranks to become a Major and a respected lecturer. His unconventional views on military strategy and history led him to predict a prolonged conflict with the United States. Deeply influenced by Nichiren Buddhism, he envisioned Japan as a moral leader destined to guide Asia, advocating for reform in China while grappling with his nation's imperial ambitions. In 1928, ishiwara fell ill with influenza, leading to a six-month hospitalization. During recovery, he joined an elite study group discussing war theories. His lectures on total war gained fame, culminating in a presentation to Kwantung officers. Amid rising tensions in Japan, he advocated for control over Manchuria, believing Japan had a moral duty to stabilize China. His theories on warfare, including the devastating potential of airpower, foreshadowed the horrors of future conflicts, influencing Japan's military strategies.   #137 Ishiwara Kanji Part 2: The Mukden Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki collaborated with other members of the Kwantung Army to address what they perceived as the Manchurian issue. By the mid-1930s, the belief that Manchuria needed to be forcibly seized had become the prevailing opinion among the Kwantung Army. Ishiwara was convinced that Japan could no longer remain passive in Manchuria, as each passing day meant Japan was gradually losing its rights and interests in the region to China, risking expulsion. Abandoning Manchuria would be a national catastrophe, resulting in the loss of a crucial buffer state, valuable resources, and land for Japan's growing population to settle. In essence, Manchuria was vital for Japan's survival and growth. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviet threat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army Headquarters in Tokyo also recognized that Manchuria was a crucial defensive line against the USSR. However, unlike the Kwantung Army, which aimed to control all of Manchuria, the leaders in Tokyo focused on incorporating southern Manchuria through the South Manchurian Railway and did not pursue any territory north of it. Ishiwara, on the other hand, believed that the only way for Japan to prevent the USSR from exerting pressure on southern Manchuria was to occupy northern Manchuria and extend even further north toward the Amur River. This would allow Japan to control the mountain ranges that bordered the western and eastern frontiers of northern Manchuria. Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”. Ishiwara advanced his ideas significantly after Japan's conquest of Manchuria, recognizing the necessity of effectively administering and pacifying its diverse populations. He posited that the stability of Manchuria could be achieved through the unique skills and contributions of the various ethnic groups residing there. For instance, he believed that the Chinese would excel in developing small businesses, while the Koreans would apply their expertise in paddy farming. These racial dynamics, according to Ishiwara, would play a crucial role in the development of Manchukuo and the broader vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, it was clear that, above all, Manchuria was intended to serve Japan's interests, many of which were exploitative and economically driven. By early 1930, Ishiwara and his colleague Itagaki devised a military strategy reminiscent of the tactics employed during the Russo-Japanese War, specifically a surprise night attack. Their plan involved the Kwantung Army launching an assault on the Liaoning region, targeting key Chinese garrisons. This operation required meticulous planning, as the Kwantung Army was significantly outnumbered by the forces commanded by Zhang Xueliang. In the vicinity of Mukden alone, Zhang commanded approximately 20,000 well-equipped troops, supported by aircraft and tanks. Across Manchuria, he could mobilize around 250,000 soldiers in the event of conflict. In stark contrast, the Kwantung Army could only field about 10,000 personnel, primarily composed of garrison units stationed along the railway. They lacked substantial air support and mechanized units, and their overall equipment was inadequate. To address this stark imbalance in military strength, Ishiwara emphasized the importance of intelligence and rigorous training. He aimed to refine specific assault techniques, enabling Japanese forces to execute rapid and concentrated attacks that would overwhelm their Chinese adversaries. The overarching strategy was notably straightforward: it hinged on delivering a decisive blow to the heart of Zhang Xueliang's military stronghold at the Peitaying barracks in Mukden. Ishiwara believed that if this critical target fell, it would shatter the enemy's morale, providing the Kwantung Army with the necessary military and psychological momentum to dominate the surrounding regions. However, he acknowledged that if the Soviet Union intervened, the entire plan could unravel catastrophically. One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ” Ishiwara, as you can imagine, was deeply frustrated by the prospect of delaying action for another year. He argued passionately that the current international landscape necessitated an immediate strike. At that time, the Soviet Union was still in the midst of its ambitious five-year plan, which limited its capacity for intervention. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, and France were grappling with their own financial crises, rendering them unable to mount significant resistance in the Far East. Most notably, the Nationalist regime in China was preoccupied with its unification efforts south of the Great Wall, but this situation was expected to shift soon. Ishiwara believed that if they postponed their plans for a year, the geopolitical environment would deteriorate further, making decisive action imperative. For Ishiwara, the moment to act was now or never. In July 1931, Ishiwara and Itagaki orchestrated a crucial reconnaissance mission aimed at familiarizing the newest Kwantung officers with the northern regions of Manchuria. To disguise their true intentions, they informed high command that the mission was a survey focused on the Soviet Union. However, the real objective was to assess the strength and influence of Chinese power in northern Manchuria. During their return journey, the team received alarming news about the disappearance of Captain Nakamura Shintaro, a Kwantung staff officer. Upon reaching Port Arthur, they learned that rumors were circulating that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under what were described as “mysterious circumstances.” In the preceding months, Manchuria had witnessed a surge in violent riots, murders, work strikes, and various other incidents, all contributing to a climate of unrest. The Nakamura affair intensified these existing tensions. In response, both the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries attempted to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. However, figures at the central army headquarters, such as Nagata Tetsuzan, who sympathized with the urgency felt by their Kwantung counterparts, felt compelled to support them. The situation was rapidly escalating, and the stakes were growing ever higher. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that's exactly what he did. The Kwantung officers moved their troops beyond the railway zone, where they had been confined, and without waiting for Itagaki's approval—who was in Japan at the time—they began preparations to send an armored train along with a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to Mukden. Their goal was to enlist the help of the Chinese military in investigating Nakamura's disappearance. Upon learning of this, Tokyo sent a telegram instructing them to halt their departure from the railway and to refrain from using the Nakamura incident as a pretext for employing force to address the Manchurian issue. For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. Ishiwara ordered the dispatch of an armored train carrying a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to compel the Chinese military authorities in Mukden to assist in the investigation of Nakamura's disappearance. However, central headquarters halted the train's departure at the last moment, sending a telegram from Tokyo that specifically instructed the Kwantung Army not to use the Nakamura incident to pressure a resolution to the Manchurian issue.  In addition to the Nakamura situation, another issue was brewing. Colonel Dohihara Kenji was involved in a plot to enlist Warlord Yan Xishan to attack Zhang Xueliang. This scheme was attracting unwanted attention and undermining the effectiveness of the Nakamura incident, prompting Ishiwara to swiftly suppress the plans. Rumors began to circulate in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army was preparing to retaliate against the Chinese due to the Nakamura situation. In response, War Minister General Minami dispatched Major General Yoshiji Tatekawa to Mukden to caution the Kwantung officers against any such actions. Ishiwara was informed of Tatekawa's arrival and sent urgent telegrams to his followers, warning, “Plot exposed. Act before Tatekawa's arrival.” Consequently, the launch date was moved from September 28th to the 18th. Itagaki personally intercepted Tatekawa's train, inviting him for tea and sake, and arranged for him to spend the night with a geisha on the evening of the 18th. On September 18th of 1931, 1st Lt Suemori Kawamoto of the independent Garrison Unit of the 29th infantry regiment planted bombs along the tracks near Liutiaokou. At 10:20pm they exploded doing only minor damage to 1.5 meters of track on one site. The damage was so minor a train actually passed over the tracks without difficulty 10 minutes later. Ishiwara, Itagaki and their followers quickly announced the explosion to be a Chinese atrocity and mobilized the Kwantung Army. Itagaki ordered the Independent Garrison Force and 29th infantry regiment to storm the Peitaying Barracks. Battalion commander Shimamoto was awakened by the orders via telephone and quickly dispatched the 1st (Ono) and 4th (Takahashi) companies from Mukden; the 2nd (kawakami) company at Fushun to advance to Liutiaokou. At 10:40pm the 29th regiment commander Hirata got a call from Shimamoto who ordered him to get his regiment into emergency formation and to storm the Peiyating barracks.  Two secretly hidden 24cm artillery pieces began to bombard the Peitaying barracks as 500 Japanese stormed the 7000 strong Chinese garrison. Despite being outnumbered 14 to 1, the Japanese destroyed Zhang Xueliangs small air force, routed the Chinese and occupied the Peiyating Barracks by 11pm, all at the cost of 500 Chinese lives and allegedly only 2 Japanese lives. A major reason the Japanese had ease was because Zhang Xueliang ordered his men to store away their weapons and not put up a fight if the Japanese invaded. Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek both in Beijing at the time knew they could not initiate an offensive war against such a strong foreign country. They were hoping the League of Nations would intervene as pertaining to the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. But later on Chiang Kai-Shek would find America too wrapped up in its depression at home, Britain indifferent and other nations without enough reason to risk anything in the far east. An hour after the attack, Ishiwara began pressing General Shigeru Honjo, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to send reinforcements to capture all of Mukden. Initially, Honjo hesitated, but Ishiwara convinced him that there was significant provocation from the enemy, prompting Honjo to order additional units into combat to secure the entire city. Historians have since struggled to determine whether Honjo was aware of the invasion plan; it seems likely he had some knowledge, but not the full details, which made him cautious in his actions over the following weeks. In the days that followed, Honjo attempted to confine the incident, but Ishiwara and Itagaki continuously urged all forces to adhere to the secret plan they had trained for. The speed and decisiveness of their actions overwhelmed the Chinese forces and left Honjo unable to change the course of events. Famously when one colleague asked Itagaki what to do in response to cease and desist orders from Honjo, Itagaki responded “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's war”. Official orders from Tokyo came on the next day, specifically opposing the expansion of hostilities, but Ishiwara and Itagaki had come too far to stop now. They began persuading Honjo to telegram the General Staff to ask for reinforcements and freedom of action “to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”. Ishiwara and Itagaki clearly aimed to expand their offensive through official channels first, but they also circumvented these channels. One cunning tactic they used was to incite chaos among civilians in Manchurian cities, thereby heightening the demand for improved security for Japanese residents. This strategy would enable the Kwantung Army troops to move beyond their established boundaries. Shortly after what is now known as the "Mukden Incident," military agents were sent to Kirin to stir unrest in the city. Reports of disturbances from Kirin began flooding into the Kwantung Army headquarters, with Ishiwara urging Honjo to send forces to Kirin to safeguard Japanese residents. He also pushed for reinforcements from the Korean Army, but Honjo was reluctant to take that step. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.  The operation against Kirin was executed with remarkable speed. Ishiwara ordered the majority of the 2nd Division, led by General Tamon Jiro, to swiftly travel to Kirin by train. They entered the city without firing a single shot and compelled the local Chinese commander to declare the province's independence from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours, the Korean army responded to an aid request from the Kwantung Army staff sent on September 21st and began advancing into Manchuria. In just 48 hours, the Japanese military had taken control of Kirin, which was outside the Kwantung operational zone, and the Korean army was invading Manchuria without Tokyo's approval, effectively undermining military discipline. Chief of Staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to restrict the Kwantung Army's operations and granted field commanders discretionary authority for certain emergency situations, typically of a local nature. However, the Kirin expedition did not fit within these parameters. Encouraged by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki pushed for an advance on Harbin. As noted in the previous episode, the strategy for taking Manchuria relied on speed and precision. The Kwantung Army had limited forces compared to the immediate Chinese troops in Manchuria, yet they were constrained by directives from Tokyo HQ that prohibited the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the South Manchuria Railway, where they had previously confined their actions. Ishiwara attempted to frame the situation politically, arguing that Japan should support Manchurian independence and sent this proposal directly to Tokyo central HQ. However, on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ firmly rejected the idea of expanding hostilities. Faced with this outright refusal from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals believed their only option was to create further chaos to compel a response. Ishiwara took the lead once more, aiming to unsettle Tokyo HQ. On October 8th, he donned military pilot gear and infiltrated one of five Chinese aircraft seized at Mukden airfield. He personally led a raid, although later in life, during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, he would claim that the flight was intended solely for reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. He argued that it was only at the last moment that intelligence revealed anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou, prompting the Kwantung Army Commander to authorize their neutralization if fired upon. Ishiwara maintained that he and the four accompanying aircraft were fired upon, leading them to drop approximately 75 bombs on Chinchou. This series of events was quite dramatic, and contemporary accounts suggest it was a premeditated effort to provoke Tokyo. The raid on Chinchou certainly alarmed Tokyo, leading the staff there to worry that the West would start condemning them. Tokyo's high command found themselves in a difficult position. They felt compelled to publicly support the Kwantung Army by retroactively approving the chaotic attacks, but internally, they were furious. Major Endo Saburo from the intelligence division was dispatched to Manchuria to investigate the situation. When he asked Ishiwara about the events, Ishiwara claimed he acted on the principle of field initiative, which was why he hadn't informed Tokyo beforehand. Saburo also noted that Ishiwara's tone suggested that he and the intelligence division should stay out of the matter. Additionally, Saburo learned that there were whispers in Manchuria indicating that if Tokyo's high command did not align with them, the Kwantung Army was ready to act independently. It appeared that the radical officers of the Kwantung Army were even willing to defy the Imperial Japanese Army command to achieve their goals. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire” If you found this situation quite surprising, there was also a rumor that Ishiwara and Itagaki planned to use an independent Manchuria as a base for a coup d'état against the Japanese government. Their goal was to overthrow the capitalists oppressing the people and establish a national socialist regime centered around the emperor. For those familiar with the history of political assassinations in 1930s Japan, this rumor hints at events that would unfold in 1936. It remains unclear whether Ishiwara and Itagaki genuinely intended to pursue this plan, but they certainly spread the word. On October 18th, War Minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army, instructing them to stop any discussions about making Manchuria independent or attempting to seize control of it. Additionally, they dispatched Colonel Imamura Hitoshi from the operations section to Manchuria to reason with Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”. Despite the chaos and turmoil, the Kwantung Army had been held back from launching any sustained military operations throughout October. As expected, Ishiwara continued to argue for an advance into northern Manchuria. In early November, he found another opportunity when he claimed that more railways had been destroyed. Allegedly, hostile Chinese forces had blown up the rail bridges over the Nonni River, south of Tsitsihar. When Japanese engineering units arrived to repair the damaged tracks, they came under fire from Chinese troops. To the high-ranking officials in Tokyo, this appeared to be a legitimate reason to take defensive action. Additionally, Kwantung intelligence reports were reaching Tokyo, suggesting that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had also provided exaggerated reports to the Japanese public, manipulating media narratives to pressure Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern Manchuria. Tokyo approved a defensive operation, restricted in time and scope, aimed at protecting Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung Army forces began moving north and soon engaged in intense fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led troops during this engagement, marking the only time in his military career that he did so. General Honjo, rightly concerned that the Kwantung forces were becoming uncontrollable, sent a cable on November 5th announcing that under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate,” the general staff would assume direct command authority in Manchuria. Unsurprisingly, Ishiwara and his like-minded colleagues in the Kwantung Army were furious. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.  Confronted with yet another dire situation, the IJA high command permitted the Kwantung Army to advance toward Tsitsihar. However, international outcry soon erupted, compelling them to order the evacuation of the city. Ishiwara sparked a significant debate among the staff, arguing that the evacuation was unacceptable given the sacrifices already made by the troops. Nevertheless, Honjo remained resolute. A few days later, Chinese forces began to gather at Chinchou, and tensions escalated with skirmishes occurring between Japanese and Chinese troops in Tientsin. In response, Ishiwara urgently called for Honjo to initiate an offensive at Chinchou as a way to better position their forces closer to Tientsin in case they faced overwhelming opposition. To support this advance, they also requested assistance from the Korean army. Once again, the burden fell to Tokyo. The high command in Tokyo ordered an immediate halt to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao River. The Kwantung Army hesitated, not solely due to the order but also because the Korean army refused to join the offensive against Chinchou, which was crucial for their success. Ishiwara found himself in a predicament; without reinforcements, the entire offensive could fail. Then, on December 11th, a significant change occurred when Premier Wakatsuki was ousted. War Minister Minami and Chief of Staff Kanaya, who had attempted to moderate the Kwantung Army's aggressiveness, were replaced by Araki Sadao, a leader of the Kodoha faction known for its aggressive stance. To provide some context, the Japanese military was divided into factions, similar to warlord cliques, vying to influence the future operations of the IJA and, to some extent, the IJN. Two primary factions shaped the military landscape in the 1930s: the Kodoha and the Toseiha (Control Faction). The Kodoha was not an organized political party nor did it hold an official position within the IJA, but it wielded considerable influence. Its members were typically younger officers, particularly from the Kwantung Army. General Sadao Araki was a founding member of the Kodoha, which was heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism, and the Kokutai ideology. They aimed to restore Japan to its perceived former glory, viewing liberal democracy as a detrimental force. They blamed the capitalists, industrialists, and elites—politicians, bureaucrats, and Zaibatsu leaders—for the nation's decline. Their goal was to see the Emperor reclaim full power in what they termed a "Showa Restoration." The Kodoha's primary adversary, as perceived by much of the Japanese military at the time, was the USSR and communism in general. Consequently, they supported the Hokushin-ron (Northern Strike Policy), which was Japan's theoretical plan to invade the USSR. While I don't want to delve too deeply into the details, it's important to note that the Kodoha was counterbalanced by the more moderate Toseiha faction, led by Hideki Tojo. The Toseiha opposed the Kodoha on several fronts, notably their desire to avoid a violent revolution to restore imperial dominance. Although they shared many principles with the Kodoha, the Toseiha rejected the Hokushin-ron strategy in favor of the Nanshin-ron (Southern Strike) strategy, which aimed at expanding into Southeast Asia and the resource-rich Dutch East Indies. The Toseiha faction also maintained better relations with the IJN. To contextualize this narrative within the political landscape, these two factions began to fiercely compete for dominance starting in 1931. With the influence of Araki Sadao and support from Prince Kan'in, a Kodoha sympathizer, significant changes occurred in Tokyo's command. Suddenly, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria were rebranded as “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung Army, fully backed by Tokyo, swiftly pursued all military objectives established by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were captured in early January 1932, followed by Tsitsihar in February. By spring 1932, Ishiwara urged the staff to complete the full occupation of Manchuria, both north and south. In April of that year, he presented the “Manshu haiti heiryaku,” or the program for the pacification of Manchuria. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol. It is clear that Ishiwara played a crucial role in the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had various strategies available to address the Manchurian issue, but Ishiwara focused primarily on achieving complete control over the region for its resources, strategic advantages, and to establish a continental base for a potential war against the United States. For Ishiwara, securing all of Manchuria was essential in preparation for the Final War. While it's likely that conflict between Japan and China would have occurred in Manchuria without Ishiwara's influence, it's uncertain whether Japan would have outright taken the province. Ishiwara dedicated years to planning and pushing boundaries, but when the operation commenced, it became evident that he and his associates lacked a definitive timeline for conquest and had several missing contingency plans. Despite the chaotic circumstances, the conquest of Manchuria proved to be a remarkable success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”. Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria incident set Japan on an unavoidable path toward the China War, which ultimately led to conflict with the West. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This situation also raises questions about military discipline. Many cite the concept of Gekokujo as a reason why individuals like Ishiwara and Itagaki were able to act as they did. These militaristic junior officers seemingly ran rampant, engaging in rebellious actions that defied their superiors, which forced those higher up to become complicit. While Gekokujo certainly played a role, especially in Ishiwara's case, it does not negate the fact that there was a significant level of indiscipline within the Japanese army. Ishiwara was undoubtedly aware of the potential consequences of his actions. A prime example is Colonel Komoto Daisaku, who had previously seen his career ruined after being exiled due to the Huanggutun incident. However, Ishiwara's focus extended beyond Manchuria; he was closely monitoring the political landscape in Tokyo. He recognized that the 1931 cabinet was unstable and that certain high-ranking officials, like Araki Sadao, were rapidly advancing in their careers and sympathized with his agenda. Ishiwara was betting that supporters from factions like Kodoha would gain the necessary power to further his cause. His gamble paid off handsomely, as all the key players in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their efforts. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd class, and returned to Japan as a celebrated hero, captivating younger officers in the Imperial Japanese Army. Ironically, the indiscipline he had nurtured within the army would later come back to haunt him as he climbed the ranks and became part of the Tokyo staff. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Ron Burgundy once said “Boy, that escalated quickly... I mean, that really got out of hand fast.” While perhaps Ishiwara did not plan for an all out war to break out against China, he certainly was the culprit to it happening. There was no going back, 15 years of blood, sweat and tears would be shed.

November 12, 1948. Former general and prime minister Hideki Tojo is sentenced to death for his part in Japanese war crimes. This episode originally aired in 2021.Support the show! Join Into History for ad-free listening and more.History Daily is a co-production of Airship and Noiser.Go to HistoryDaily.com for more history, daily.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The dictator knock-out tournament continues. The hosts unravel the lives and legacies of two dictators of Japan; Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa and General Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister of Imperial Japan. They discuss the three rulers who unified Japan, the wars and back-stabbing politics, the cause of Japan's distinct culture and the birth of the Tokugawa dynasty They also discuss Tojo's rise to power within the military and government, the attack on Pearl Harbour, the war in the pacific, numerous war crimes and the legacy of the second world war in the Pacific theatre. These two dictators battle it out in the knock-out tournament to determine the single greatest dictator of all time. One of these two dictators will be eliminated from the tournament and the other will remain in contention to be crowned history's biggest dictator.

9/11 Memorial day. Entertainment from 1973. George Washington saved at Brandywine, Hideki Tojo tried to commit suicide before he was executed, Ford Pinto went on sale, Atari game system went on sale. Todays birthdays - Jimmie Davis, Dennis Tufano, Amy Madigan, Tommy Shaw, Virginia Madsen, Kristy McNichol, Harry Connick jr., Taraji P. Hansen, Ludacris, Charles Kelly.Intro - Pour some sugar on me - Def Leppard     http://defleppard.com/Have you forgotten - Darryl WorleyLets get it on - Marvin GayeYou've never gone this far before - Conway TwittyBirthdays - In da club - 50 Cent     http://50cent.com/You are my sunshine - Jimmie DavisKind of a drag - The BuckinghamsToo much time on my hands - StyxHad to be you - Harry Connick jrMoney maker - LudacrisNeed you now - Lady AExit - In my dreams - Dokken    

This Pacific War Channel Podcast is about General Ishiwara Kanji, the mastermind behind the invasion of Manchuria and his battle against Hideki Tojo. This Pacific War Channel Podcast explores of the life and ideas of Ishiwara Kanji, a significant figure in Japanese history during the mid-20th century. Ishiwara, was deeply involved in political and military affairs, particularly during Japan's expansionist period leading up to the Pacific War. He advocated for the concept of pan-Asianism and the establishment of the East Asian League as a means to counter Western imperialism. However, his efforts were ultimately undermined by Japan's involvement in wars, particularly the China War and Pacific War, which drained resources and led to Japan's defeat. Ishiwara's views evolved over time, from initially supporting Japan's military actions to later predicting its defeat and advocating for national reconstruction. Despite his initial support for militarism, Ishiwara became disillusioned with the Hideki Tojo's regime and actively criticized it. He foresaw Japan's defeat and focused on post-war reconstruction efforts, emphasizing the importance of science and culture in Japan's recovery. Throughout his life, Ishiwara faced contradictions and challenges, including conflicts with other political figures, illness, and being purged from public life. Despite his setbacks, Ishiwara remained dedicated to his vision of a peaceful and prosperous Japan, even seeking reconciliation with former enemies and advocating for global peace. His final reflections acknowledged the failures of his earlier predictions and the need for a new approach to international relations. Ishiawara's legacy is one of complexity, as he navigated the turbulent waters of wartime politics and post-war reconstruction with determination and conviction.   Don't forget I have a patreon now where you can get exclusive content like "General Kanji Ishiwara & the Mukden Incident" check it out here ⤵️ https://www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel

PREVIEW: From my two-hour radio conversation with Professor Bass: this excerpt describes how worried the Allies became when the defiant Hideki Tojo walked to his hanging death crying out, "Banzai!" 1/8: Judgment at Tokyo: World War II on Trial and the Making of Modern Asia Hardcover – by Gary J. Bass https://www.amazon.com/Judgment-Tokyo-World-Making-Modern/dp/1101947101 1942 Shokaku underattack by aircraft from Yorktown

Last time we spoke about theJapanese advance to Liaoyang. After the loss at Telissu, the Russians began to scramble to defend multiple locations in Manchuria. With multiple Japanese armies advancing simultaneously, Kuropatkin could not be sure where they would hit next and found himself making matters worse when he ordered troops to hold too many places. The Russian losses at Tashihciao, the passes a Fenshuiling and Motien, Chiaotou, Hsimucheng, Tawan, and Yangtzuling. The Russians were in disarray, trying to delay so more troops could gather at Liaoyang and Mukden, but their efforts were being trampled upon. Even out at sea, Admiral Witgeft made and attempt to break out and join up with the Vladivostok Squadron, but was likewise forced to pull back. Now multiple Japanese armies would converge to smash Liaoyang, Manchuria was being slowly conquered city by city.    #79 The Russo-Japanese War part 6: The Battle of Liaoyang    Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The Russians had just been severed multiple defeats. Not a single one of Kuropatkins formations had been spared the humiliation. A times correspondent had this to say ‘There is such a thing as the tradition of defeat, and unenviable is the army that creates it.” The commander of the European 17th corps, General Baron Bildering was appointed commander of the Eastern Front. In addition to his 17th corps, he received the 3rd Siberian army corps and the 10th corps. The two opposing armies spent three weeks skirmishing with another over the course of 6 mountainous miles. On the 3rd of August, Haicheng that had so much attention and effort dedicated to it, was entered with little opposition. The Russians had spent so much time at Haicheng, building up its fortifications and expected a battle that never took place. To make matters worse, so much supplies had been brought over to Haicheng, the Russians did not have enough time to destroy or move it all, so the Japanese took it all as a prize. The 1st, 2nd and 4th IJA met at Haicheng as Kuropatkins front was reduced from 140 to 45 miles. The Russian main body was now deployed along the railway at Anshanchan, 22 miles northeast of Haicheng and around 20 miles west of Liaoyang. The war took its toll on Kuropatkin by this point. If you ever heard the memes about what US presidents look like before and after presidency, its kind of a similar situation. Kuropatkin was said to be unrecognizable by August of 1904, he had that 1000 mile stare. Kuropatkin sat huddled in a carriage riding through Liaoyang, not even acknowledging or looking at men who saluted him. Kuropatkin was a experienced military man, he had worked in numerous political positions, a very distinguished figure, and he was quite broken. The Japanese were consolidating and advancing upon Liaoyang. His overcaution, lack of determination, a gradual erosion of his confidence in the face of a growing admiration for the enemy were losing him the war. Kuropatkin cabled the Tsar that he had withdrawn from Haicheng to Liaoyang because “The Japanese superiority in numbers. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger, carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack transport. Their energetic and intelligent leadership. The extraordinary patriotism and military spirit of their troops; and the lack of such a spirit on our side (caused by general ignorance of what we were fighting for)” This telegram sounds a lot to me like someone simply stating “they are better than us sir”. Its pure defeatism, and completely unwarranted mind you, the war was not lost by a large margin. Now Liaoyang was a city holding a population of roughly 60,000. The railway had a north-south-west-east junction at Liaoyang and the Taitzu river ran north of the city. It was a walled city, and by this point held around three lines of defense running some 40 miles long, something Kuropatkin called his zone of maneuver. The railway line running south from Harbin remained the Russians only line of communication while the Japanese had the benefit of two lines. Liaoyang was a vital junction not just for rail, but also for roads. The old mandarin road ran up the west coast of the Liaodong peninsula and Port Arthur, both passed through places like Liaoyang before going to Korea. The Taitzu river is a tributary of the Liao river flowing east and west into the sea. There are 3 important tributaries; the Lan and Tang rivers east of Liaoyang and the Sha river to her south. The battlefield of Liaoyang would have the mandarin roads on the flat open plains of the Liao valley to the west. Here there was abundant kaoliang, over 9 feet tall offering coverage. To the east of the Mandarin roads, spurs rose up to taller mountains. Within the city the railway station was sitting near the northwest wall. The station was constantly receiving materials of war and troops. Nearby to the railway station was the Russian HQ. Despite the incoming battle the Russians allowed normal civilian life to go by, yet again allowing the numerous Japanese spies to do their work. Kuropatkins troops busied themselves with vodka and women, even his chief of staff was allowed time off to be with his girlfriend as Kuropatkin shouldered the additional work. The battle of Liaoyang was to be a decisive battle, something Kuropatkin wrote himself in his memoirs. If the Russians lost, their communication lines in China would be cut, the resources of the Liao plan would be lost, something their interior economy depended upon and of course Port Arthur would be even more in trouble. Kuropatkin did all he could to delay the enemy so he could build up forces at Liaoyang, if it fell all was left was Mukden.  On August 3rd, Kuropatkin and Alexeiev met at Liaoyang. Both men understood the threat the Japanese advance meant. Alexeiev wanted a an offensive to be made against the 1st IJA, whereupon Kuropatkin was forced to speak to him like a toddler about the reality of the situation. The string of defeats had destroyed the Russian morale, they lacked sufficient officers, their strength was both qualitatively and quantitatively less than the enemy. Alexeiev would depart believing he had achieved some sort of compromise with Kuropatkin to get him to agree to fight at Liaoyang, but of course this was what Kuropatkin sought regardless. Liaoyang was to be defended by three lines of defense. The innermost line ran close to the city, anchored across the river on the northern bank. The line held 8 forts with 130 old pattern guns all dug in. Flank protection, obstacles, ditches and tons of cover provided an impressive line of defense. This defense line was watched and mapped by Chinese spies working for Lt Colonel Isauma. Its number one weakness was some high ground 6 miles south east of it. If the high ground was seized, artillery could be placed upon it to ran down fire upon the city and railway station. The next line of defense  ran a radius of 7 miles from the city. The line went from Manju Yama in the northeast to a feature 693 feet high overlooking the railway. The outermost line this was about 15 miles out going from Anshanchan to Anping. The line was not as strong as the inner line, but offered substantial obstacles against the enemy.  The Russians believed the Japanese would perform two basic courses of action. The first would be to turn a flank, the second to throw a frontal attack against the successive lines of defense. To turn a flank, the Japanese would need to cross a river, leaving them very vulnerable to Russian counter attacks provided by their reserves. The Japanese frontal attack would progressively exhaust itself, setting up counter strokes. The battle would be the first time the leaders of each side would be directly commanding. The Japanese troops were confident, well practiced and yet to be served a real defeat. Despite the losses, Kuropatkins withdrawals were performed perfectly, this battle was quite open to either side winning. The Russians divided themselves into three groups; the southern group, eastern group and reserves. General Zarubaiev led the southern group consisting of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Siberian corps entrenched at Anshanchan. 10 miles south of his position were the advanced guards with the army reserve taken from all 3 corps. Amongst them were 11 cavalry squadrons and 6 guns under General Mishchenko. Baron Bildering led the eastern group consisting of the 3rd Siberian and 10th european corps. They were deployed in a semicircle between the Tang and Taitzu. To the left of the Taitzu was brigade of the 17th corps. A bridge connected this detachment to the main body. The reserves were at Liaoyang under Kuropatkins command, they consisted of 30 battalions taken from the 2nd siberians and 17th corps. Over at Mukden were the recently arrived 5th Siberian corps of which 8 battalions were ordered to advance to the Taitzu river to guard the left flank. Also at Mukden were elements of the 1st european corps. The Russians took specific care to guard their flanks and railway, but most of the detachments were in the east, while approaches from the west were somewhat neglected. At this point in the war, there was a large possibility China might enter the war on Japan's side. This indeed was something Kuropatkin wrote about often, but it had major consequences. If China entered the war it would most likely draw in France, which would draw in Britain both of whom would seek to end hostilities. Such a situation would be against Japan's interests, Japan was actively doing everything she could to stop the Chinese from such actions, but publicly Japan fanned rumors using her spy network. Such rumors spoke of how General Ma had gathered a 30,000 strong force along the western borders of Manchuria. Other rumors spoke of a Japanese army landing at Yingkou to join forces with a large Honghuzi force. On top of the rumor filled paranoia, Kuropatkin had some bad intelligence. He believed the Japanese outnumbered them heavily, but in reality he had some 158,000 men and Commander in Chief of the IJA, Iwao Oyama held 125,000. The Russians had the numbers, Oyama enjoyed perfect intelligence on this and he knew every day they grew. Thus Oyama ordered his commanders to keep grabbing the initiative, because if they did not the Russians would soon overwhelm them. Meanwhile something else deeply concerned Oyama, Nogi was besieging Port Arthur and things were going terribly. Oyama had hoped Port Arthur would fall before he tossed the kitchen sink at Liaoyang, but he could wait no longer.  Kuropatkin's cavalry which he referred to as “old men on little horses” were not living up to what he thought they should be. He relied upon them for intelligence and they over exaggerated everything. His cavalry was three times larger than the Japanese, they should have been crushing them in every battle. Now every day that passed by was a victory for the Russians, already the 5th Siberians at Vladivostok were being diverted to Liaoyang, time was everything. Kuropatkin planned to hold the line between Anshanchan and Anping with a strong covering force, 3 corps strong. He planned to hold back some reserves and hit to Japanese when they began a frontal attack and this strategy did not sit well with Generals like Bildering or Sluchevski. Both generals did not like the idea of fighting in front of an unfordable river and advised pulling the entire force back to Liaoyangs inner defense. Sluchevski took this a step further recommending they take up a new defensive position between Mukden and Liaoyang. Kuropatkin wrote this in his memoirs “These officers reiterated the same opinions still more forcibly early in August, when the difficulty of moving their troops towards Liaoyang became greatly increased by the heavy rains. The Viceroy, who was much perturbed about the fate of Port Arthur, by the news of the unfortunate result of the naval operations on August 10, and whose fears were increased by Stoessel's highly alarmist reports, was at the same time urging me (August 15) to assist the fortress and make an advance of some sort – though it were only a demonstration – towards Haicheng. “ Kuropatkin messaged the Tsar about the conflicting ideas, and the Tsar replied that he acting as the commanding general knew best and would decide what was to be done, not his subordinates. On the 7th of August Kuropatkin told Bildering that they would fight a decisive battle and it would be along the Anshanchan-Anping line. However two days later Kuropatkin instructed the commander of the 3rd Siberians, General Ivanov that his job was to only act as rearguards and not enter into the foray of battle. Ivanov was bewildered by this and sought further clarification to which Kuropatkin said “‘They were to avoid a desperate struggle and simultaneously to hold their positions and gain time, but to retreat to the main defences at Liaoyang if seriously attacked, without permitting themselves to be demoralised or disorganised.” Thus Ivanov basically planned for a retreat from the line before any fighting was to be had. Then on August the 23rd Kuropatkin changed his mind completely and reaffirmed the decisive battle would be fought on the Anshanchan-Anping line, he wrote this to Sluchevski who was commanding the 10th corps “Under these circumstances, I do not think we need confine ourselves to fighting rearguard actions in the positions occupied by the Tenth and Third Siberian Army Corps and by the troops on the southern front. I am resolved to fight in those positions with all the forces apportioned to their defence, to beat the enemy back and to assume the offensive should a favourable opportunity present itself. “ It seems the Russian intelligence throughout August bolstered Kuropatkin. There were reports the 2nd IJA relinquished 3-4 divisions to help at Port Arthur, this of course was not true and most likely fed to the Russian by Japanese spies. There was another report 30-40 thousand Japanese in Oku's army were facing a cholera outbreak, again not true. It seemed to the Russians the Japanese were at the moment at least performing defense in front of Liaoyang. Kuropatkin instructed Sluchevski to prepare a possible offensive should an opportunity present itself, but reaffirmed Bildering and Zarubaiev they would maintain their positions. Thus the outer defensive line changed a bit, something that would aid Oyama.  On the Japanese side they wargamed a few options before them. Everything did not look good on the board and ultimately they decided to pursue a simple course of action. They would exert pressure across the whole Russian line until the combined force could initiate a converging attack. At this point Oyama would decide whether they hit left, center or right. From his HQ at Haicheng, Oyama ordered his forces to drive the Russians from their forward position to their main position hopefully by August 28th. The 1st IJA was to advance west of the Tang river; the 4th IJA would advance against the main Russian line by the 29th; the 2nd IJA would advance along the Sha river and coordinate with the 4th IJA. The 1st IJA began their advance on the 26th followed by the Guards division 3 days prior. The major attack would by performed by the 2nd and half of the 12th division against the 10th corps at Anping. The other half of the 12th with the Kobi brigade would hit the Russian left. Their assault was scheduled for the night of the 25th.  The advance of the Japanese force was terrible, it was a muddy nightmare making the movement of their heavy artillery difficult. General Mishchenko cavalry were patrolling in a gap between the two Russian groups, but had pulled back into the reserve, Kuropatkin planned to use them as a hammer later. The gap was then filled by weaker detachments. The Japanese Guards division were advancing upon the 3rd Siberians while the 10th division of the 4th IJA were hitting the gap. Kuropatkin watched this with despair believing the Guards division were actually 3 divisions strong. The Russians went into a state of frantic reinforcement. Kuropatkin ordered the 17th corps to maintain their position while also detaching the 35th division from the 17th corps to give to Ivanov's 3rd Siberians without telling Bildering. To further assist the 3rd siberians, the 10th corps were ordered to attack eastward on the 26th thus protecting the 3rd right flank. Reserves were tossed to the southwards just before the Russians were attacked. General Liubavin on the 25th reported he believed the Japanese would cross the Taitzu and this caught the attention of both Kuropatkin and Bildering to make sure the gaps there would be filled up. Thus the 10th corps were now exposed to the combined attacks of the 2nd and 12th IJA divisions. On the 25th, the Guards Division surged into the 3rd Siberians outposts. During the night, it seemed inevitable the Japanese were exerting pressure so the 10th corps offensive actions were canceled. At 6:10am Japanese artillery was beginning to support the Guards division, hitting the 3rd Siberians position which sat on a ridge rising some 1000 feet above the river valley. The Russian artillery dueled from better firing positions until 4pm removing the Japanese artillery threat from the sector. Until 8pm the Russian artillery battered the Japanese unchallenged. The Guards division were thus severely hamstrung by the Russian artillery, but they continued without artillery support and threatened to break through into a gap between the two army groups. Meanwhile Colonel Martinov of the Zaraisk regiment, 35th division alongside a cavalry squadron and battery began to hear gunfire 5 miles in front of their position. Martinov was ordered forward more and ran into the Russian right line held by General Grekov along with multiple cavalry squadrons. Grekov reported the situation to Martinov and that he planned to toss a counter attack. The cavalry squadrons were not forthcoming for such an action, so Martinov aided him by moving unseen up a valley to hit the left flank of the advancing Japanese line. Three batteries began firing into the Japanese flank with such a devastating effect, General Asada had to order his brigade to withdraw. The attacker had become the attacked! The commander of the Guards division upon seeing the 3rd Siberian corps entrenchments, requested reserves be brought up. At 8am word was sent to Kuroki who promised him the entire army reserve, unfortunately said reserves were marching from Fenghuangcheng and were exhausted by the time they reached the guards at 6pm. In order to save Asada's brigade, his divisional commander ordered a 3 battalion strong attack against the center of the 3rd siberian corps. The attack was intended to be a diversion, nothing serious. By 4pm the Japanese artillery were snuffed out, their infantry failed to make any progress and thus they pulled back conveniently under the cover of a storm.  Now 4 miles north east of Anping is a saddle known as Hungshaling, it elevates around 1900 feet and dominates the Tang valley. The Tambov regiment of the 9th division were atop it. Their divisional commander placed 9 battalions along the front line each one responsible for about a mile of the line, within his reserve were 7 battalions. They had two field batteries and four mountain guns in the position. The 9th division were about to be hit by Kurokis 2nd IJA main central thrust, supported by the 12th division's 12th brigade. The 23rd brigade of General Kigoshi were given the task of seizing Hangshaling. Now Hungshaling is a formidle steep and rocky ridge, its northern edge covers the Taitzu river while its southern overlooks the Tang river flowing through the Hungsha pass. The lower slopes are covered in trees, but then it becomes 40 yards of open steep ground. The Tambov regiment positioned their 6 field guns on a narrow 20 yard wide ridge for the best visibility possible, but this also made them vulnerable. Kurkoki's men had little chance of taking such a position, anyone who approached would be met with blankets of shrapnel and bullets. The ridge did have one weak spot, in front of it was a carpet of dead ground which could not be properly covered by the defenders, and attackers could get their artillery there to hit them.  The 2nd and 12th IJA divisions attacked the 10th corps position on the night of the 25th. The 2nd division advanced in two columns attacking the right hand side of the 10th corps. By 8am the attack was petering out without progress. The 12th division advanced in five columns and managed to penetrate the Russian line and this led Russian units to pull back, exposing the left flank and Hungshaling. At 8:30pm on the 25th, the 23rd IJA brigade began their approach upon Hungshaling. Just after 1am, two battalions joined up taking a nearby spur called Suribachi Yama, while another regiment to their northwest position two mountain guns on the North Papanling. The Japanese were quite exposed and in isolated pockets, they prodded around, but were repelled everytime from the defenders upon their heights. At dawn the fighting really began. The Japanese artillery located at a place called One Tree Pass moved forward under fire from the Tambov regiment. The Tambov commander sent three companies to counter attack as the Japanese were motioned for a toehold upon the hill. For two hours the battle raged back and forth. The Russians then received word the 9th division on their right had withdrawn. At this point their reserve was down to half, while the Japanese had depleted theres. The Russians began the age old tactic of tossing boulders down the hill upon the advancing Japanese to great effect. By midday both sides were exhausted and bloody.  General Sluchevski of the 10th corp watched Hungshalings struggle nervously. He continuously requested reinforcements from Bildering, but Bildering believed he was overreacting and refused to release the 3rd division. Bouldering was withholding the 3rd division because he sought to use them in the emergency that the Japanese managed to cross the Taitzu, he was also being fed information from Ivanov that he was facing far more units than he actually was. At 3:30pm the Japanese artillery began to fire again, fiercely targeting Hungshaling. The Japanese attacked from the south, but to no avail. A concurrent attack from the north in regimental strength was more successful. The Japanese swept past some abandoned batteries causing nearly 50% casualties upon their occupants before they pulled out. The Tambov regiment clung to the southern portion of the ridge, but their CO was wounded and 500 out of their 2500 men were dead or too wounded to fight. By 6pm the regiment was withdrawing through Peikou under the cover of a storm.  It was a terrible loss, because the 3rd Siberians were crushing the 12th IJA division and the loss of Hungshaling would completely negate it. While Tambov's regiment were pulling out, Sluchevski sent the last regiment of his corps reserve to Peikou while pleading with Bildering for aid. At 8pm Bildering agreed to send two regiment to the 10th corps, but it was all too late. Kuropatkin received word of the fall of the Peikou sector and ordered it recaptured immediately, for it threatened the entire outer defensive line. All the while the storm raged and with so much rain, reports came that the Tang river was rising and that her bridges might be lost, leaving the only viable crossing point for the 10th corps at a bridge 3 miles north of Anping which was now dominated by the Japanese position at Peikou. The 10th corps were withdrawing and this in turn threatened the position of the 3rd Siberians. That night Kuropatkin ordered the whole army to withdraw to the advanced position. The situation of the Southern group was nowhere near as desperate as the Eastern Group. Zarubaiev was ordered to resist but also to withdraw once the enemy began its main attack. The 26th had been a rather quiet day, then on the 27th at 6am the Southern group began their withdrawal. The Eastern group conducted a difficult and rather dangerous withdrawal through the rained out roads, but made it to their advanced positions without conflict. The energy was sapped out of the men, General Stakelberg commanding the 1st Siberians asked Zarubaeiv if his troops could rest on the 28th and Zarubaeiv agreed. For some reason General Zasulich's 2nd siberians did not comply like the rest and continued to retreat and this move exposed the left flank of the stationary 4th Siberians holding a central position. The 4th Siberians could not retreat because the road heading north was blocked. The 3rd and 5th IJA divisions advanced too quickly, Zarubaeiv ordered Zasulich to stop his withdrawal, but he did not comply. Zarubaeiv sent the order again, and yet Zasulich did not comply. Kuropatkin then ordered Zasulich to turn back and help cover the withdrawal of the corps that he had effectively abandoned stating “if it were necessary to do so to cover the retreat of those Corps, to fight to the last man and perish'. Gradually the Russians got into their advanced lines, but it was a terribly messy ordeal. Countless supplies were abandoned, an entire battery was left on a road. Teams of men trying to grab materials were being fired upon by the Japanese who did not let up.  Thus the first round of defenses was defeated. It was a confused mess. The 3rd Siberians and 10th corps received a blow to morale. With the contraction of forces to the secondary advanced line, Kuropatkin now placed his 17th corp on the north bank of the river. The second line of defenses was around 7 miles south of Liaoyang and included numerous hills that were heavily fortified. The Russians line contracted afford more defense, but this also allowed Oyama to encircle them easier. As darkness fell on August 29th, Oyama issued his orders to attack and took the 2nd IJA's 4th division under his personal command. The 2nd IJA would advance upon the Soushanpu position to Hsinlitun overlooking the Tassu brook. To their right was the 4th IJA who would attack the area from Hsinlitun to Tsaofantun. The Guards division with other elements would attack the line of hills running north east. The 12th division with support from the 15th brigade and the 2nd divisions artillery would cross the Taitzu river to try and turn the Russian left flank. Thus three Japanese divisions would be attacking the 1st Siberian corp west of the Tassu brook; to the east of the Tassu brook the 10th division, 10th brigade, guards division and 3rd brigade would attack the 3rd Siberian corps and 10th corps. Assuming the units got over the Taitzu the 2nd and 12th divisions would hit the 17th corps. Kuropatkin outnumbered the Japanese significantly in the east, not so much in the west. Oyama kept his 4th division in his own hands to meet any possible Russian counter moves. Dawn on the 30th, the attack began. There was little progress to be made as the Russian artillery battered the attackers back. The casualties were immense for some units, the 2nd regiment only got within 1000 yard of the Russian lines and suffered 71 deaths and 325 wounded for the day. The second guards brigade supported by a kobi battalion attacked a 1030 feet hill held by the 11th east siberian regiment and 36th regiment. The Japanese managed to seize forward trenches, but soon Russian batteries came in and dislodged them. At 5am the 10th IJA division with 2 kobi regiment attacked some heights south and west of Tsaofantun held by the 3rd corps. The fighting was vicious and the Russians charged out of their trenches to meet the Japanese bayonet to bayonet. British Captain James Jardine attached with the 2nd IJA wrote this of the action “Whenever one side charged, the other side always charged to meet them. To a listener the effect was extraordinary. A hot musketry fight might be in progress, when suddenly the Russians would sound the charge. Instantly all firing would cease on either side, the Japanese cheering wildly in answer to the drums and bugles of the enemy. The Russians cheer ‘Hoorah!', the Japanese, on such desperate occasions, cheer ‘Wa-a-a!' The impression given by these cheers, mingling with the rattle of the drums and the clangour of the bugles, was more melancholy than martial, sounding like a prolonged wail of grief ascending from the troubled earth up into the dark heavens. “ The 3rd battalion of the 23rd east Siberian regiment bore the brunt of the attack and within 20 minutes lost all of their officers and 304 out of 502 soldiers. A russian battery rushed over and at a range of 600 yards battered the Japanese tossing them back.  Oyama's strategy at this point was to unhinge the Tassu brook position so the 4th IJA could turn the flank of the 1st and 3rd corps. The Japanese were gradually pushing forward getting their artillery in range to do more effective damage. Ultimately the Japanese were halted, but Kuropatkin was nervous the Japanese would succeed in turning the flank. Kuropatkin began to shuffle some units around and this allowed the Japanese to seize the village of Wuluntai and begin shelling Hill 693 and Mahyetun. The 2nd IJA advanced along the railway with the 5th division of the 4th IJA supporting them to the right. Their combined force began forcing open a gap. Stakelberg began requesting reinforcements from Kuropatkin, but Kuropatkin rejected this believing the Japanese could not be strong everywhere along the line and thus things must be already be stabilized. Stakelberg was instructed to assist the 3rd corps, but if their position and his was untenable they should withdraw to the inner defense line.  The attacks opening the gap to the Tassu brook were increasing in strength, prompting Stakelberg to plead again for reinforcements. Despite the pressure the Japanese were applying since 6am, it was not until 11am when their line was complete and ready to really assault. At 12:45pm Stakelberg yet again requests more reinforcements and this time he was granted them, but unfortunately they were coming from the hill 693 sector and were heavily delayed. Stakelberg frantically plugged gaps in his line, until 2pm when finally some reinforcements arrived. Meanwhile Mishchenko grabbed a mixed force of 15 battalions drawn from numerous corps and charged into the Japanese north of hill 693. The action was uncoordinated and basically saw the men just filling a defensive line instead of actually dislodging the Japanese attackers upon the hill. Stakelberg reported at 4:40pm he had fully stabilized his lines. The night saw numerous attacks launched against hill 693 and Mahyetun, but without success. To make a demonstration, the Japanese demoted 3 generals for their lack of success. One of those generals was the father of Hideki Tojo. One commander who had a chance at success was General Kuroki. Bold action was required so Kuroki took action at 1pm on his own initiative to order a crossing of the river stated for 11pm that night. At midnight his forces began cross the Taitzu river unopposed some 15 miles to the east of Liaoyang. The water was around 3 feet deep where they crossed. Russian dragoons watched the Japanese cross the river and establish a bridgehead, they frantically sent word to Kuropatkin which only reached him by 11am because their telephones were having problems. The Russians had lost the vital opportunity to smash the Japanese as they crossed, cavalry forces under Liubavin who were supposed to be screening, but instead withdrew leaving the infantry. The morning of the 31st saw further Japanese attacks upon all the strategic features. Hsinlitun was being enveloped slowly, hill 693's forward trenches were overwhelmed and seized, though the Japanese artillery would tragically hit their own men in the process. The Russians and Japanese atop hill 693 ended up fighting with bayonets leading to  The 34th IJA regiment suffered 487 killed with 632 wounded, the 3rd east siberian regiment facing them took 35% officer and 38% casualties in the process. Shoushan hill saw a similar clash and a surprise attack was performed at the villages of Mahyetun and Kuchiatzu, but Russian machine guns saved them. Oyama still held back his 4th division wary of counter attacks, by nightfall the Russian line not only held, it caused 3000 casualties upon the Japanese. The saving grace was only to be Kuroki's river crossing which gravely worried Kuropatkin who issued orders to his corps commanders “disposition No 3”. This plan was for a general retreat to the inner defensive line while reserves would be launched to hit Kuroki's bridge head, then estimated to be 70,000 men. At 7:30pm the corps commanders initiated the command.  Kuropatkin was still under the belief the enemy was much larger than they were, he had thus handed them a victory at the second line and it was completely unwarranted. By 1am the Japanese were discovering the Russians were withdrawing and by 3am, the Japanese seized all the features they had been bleeding for. With the first light of day they could now see Liaoyang more clearly as they brought their artillery closer and closer.  At this point Oyama believed he was dealing with a routed army. The 17th Siberian army corps were now divdied. On the right was the 3rd division holding hil l1057, to the left was Lt General Dobrjinski 35th division on hill 920, the corps reserve was to the rear at the village of Shahotun led by Major General Glasko. Facing them was Kuroki. Kuroki observed the new Russian lines and saw a 75 foot knoll, it was the Russians “vital ground”. Vital ground was a terrain that if possesed by an enemy would seriously interfere with ones defense. Kuroki called the knoll Manju Yama meaning “rice cake hill”. Major General Okasaki's 15th brigade of the 2nd division was given the mission to seize hill 920 and Manju Yama while the 12th division would advance to cut off the railway.  At 8:30am the artillery began a duel and the Japanese took care to batter Manju Yama. At 9:30am the 15th brigade with the 12th divisions artillery for support began to attack Manju Yama, they would soon be joined by the 23rd brigade. As daylight was dimming the fire fight over Manju Yama remained fierce. The knoll was heavily fortified, the Russians knew it was of utmost importance to hold it. By 10:30pm the Japanese managed to gain a toehold on the northside of the knoll. Meanwhile the battle for hill 920 resulted in the Russians gradually evacuating the position. Their evacuation led to further units of the 17th corps pulling back weakening the line. The Russians launched two counter attacks at hill 920, but both failed seeing them pull out of the area by 4am. With the loss of hill 920 also came the loss of Manju Yama. Now three Russian corps wee severely restricted in their ability to maneuver. Within the Japanese hands Manju Yama provided the element of a shield to protect further river crossings, this was a catastrophe for the Russians. Now Kuroki sought to advance the forces to sweep away Liubavins cavalry, to approach the Yentai mines and seize the junction of the Yentai mines- Mukden railway.  Meanwhile Kuropatkin was not informed of the loss of Manju Yama, Bildering only reported a hill to the northeast was captured, but that he would recapture the position when he had reorganized his reserves. When the loss of Manju Yama became known, the 1st Siberian corp was ordered to come up alongside the 17th corp and attack the Japanese right flank and rear. General Orlov commanding the 54th division of the 5th Siberian corp was ordered to cooperate with the 17th corp and recapture Manju Yama. Orlov was to take orders from Bildering and received orders at 7pm on September 1st to attack the Japanese position alongside the 17th corps at dawn. But two hours later Orlov received other orders stating  ‘Your principal task is to keep in touch with Bildering, and if he is not attacked to act in the manner which has been indicated. If however he is attacked at Hsikuantun you will move to his support by the shortest route.' Orlov was confused by this and sent word to Bildering asking for clarification, but his messenger got lost in a field of Kaoliang. Rather than do nothing Orlov took up a position south of the Yentai mines with Samsonov waiting for orders to strike.  From his position Orlov could see the fighting on Manju Yama, it seemed the 17th corps were in deep battle, so Orlov acted. He left Samsonovs cavalry, two battalions and 8 guns to defend the Yentai mines as he rushed forward. Orlovs force became disorganized in some kaoliang, his artillery were unable to keep up properly. Most of Orlov's men were reservists and when they met the enemy everything fell to ruin. By 1pm it was clear to Orlov his force was in a hopeless position, his main body was losing a battle of atrition and his left flank was about to be turned. Amidst the slaughter a messenger showed up at 1:10pm telling Orlov the 17th corps were falling apart and to act with extreme caution. Orlov replied  ‘As I am unable to effect a junction with either the First Siberian or Seventeenth Corps, I am falling back on Yentai Station.' The Japanese chased their terrified fleeing oponents in a tremendous rout. Stakelbergs battered 1st siberian corps were advancing in two columns when they came across Orlov's rabble fleeing westward. Stakelberg in a very sick state ordered Orlov to grab his one remaining battalion and head back into the kaoliang forest to hit the Japanese artillery. Orlov personally led the battalion into the fray of battle and was hit 5 times in the head and stomach, his battalion was destroyed, what would remain of them would limp back to the Yentai mines. The Japanese set up artillery on the Shoushan Hill and began firing upon the western defenses of Liaoyang, as told to us by a correspondant of the times “The civilised world had never seen anything to compare with the final preparations for the advance of the Japanese infantry. The massed and scattered batteries took the line of Russian resistance in sections. The 250 guns opened first on the Russian settlement. Great columns of dust and smoke rose up from amidst the grey stone buildings. Then suddenly out of this whirlwind of bursting shell shot up great tongues of lurid flame. The very rocks of Shoushan quivered with the blasts of ever recurrent discharges. The air shrieked with the rush of high velocity projectiles.”  The railway station was evacuating the wounded and civilians, it became a primary target for the Japanese artillery. Shells burst over the post office, the Red Cross tents, over a hospital, over numerous homes and business, it was chaos. Despite the breakthrough where Orlov was wounded, many Russian positions were holding. Kuropatkin left Liaoyang at 6am for the eastern side of the battlefield. He recieved signals from multiple commanders that Manju Yama was captured, but Bildering contuined to send word he was about to regain the feature. Kuropatkin ordered Zarubaeiv to perform a offensive to buy time, the offensive would costs 1200 Russian casualties. In the meantime General Dobrjinski's 35th division were ordered to recapture Manju Yama. Dobrjinski's men advanced through the Kaoliang forest, but Bildering contuined to issue reports he was “just about to attack the feature” prompting Kuropatkin to continously postpone Dobrjinski's attack until it was nighttime and when they attacked they received no supprt and were defeated with heavy losses. On September 2nd during the afternoon Kuropatkin received news of Orlov's deafeat, the 12th IJA had lost 180 men, Orlov had lost 1450, absolutely crushing.  Numerous Russian units coverged against Manju Yama; 7 battalions from the 1st European and 5th Siberian corps attacked it from the right; General Vasiliev held 13 battalions of the 10th corps in the center and on the left were 6 battalions of the 17th corps under Colonel Istomin. Atop Manju Yama was the 15th brigade with one other regiment already battered. At 2:15pm 152 guns began firing upon the feature until 7pm. The Russian infantry began at 7pm when darkness fell. The Russians quickly became disoriented in the Kaoliang field, friendly fire occurred everywhere. Many of the Russians would not even make it within 20 yards to hurl grenades at the Japanese trenches. By 8:30 the Russians had to pull back. Later that night magnesium flares were launched and a fierce assault was made. By 9pm the attack became chaotic, to many troops of both armies were intermingled. The Russian national anthem literally had to be played to get their troops to assembly positions again. At 11pm the Russians were being pushed away, while Bildering continued to report to Kuropatkin “at any moment the pivot will be back in our hands”. In reality the Russian attack was definitely beaten back. 3 Russian regimental commanders and 300 troops were dead. On September the 5th when Japanese burial teams completed their work they would find 1039 casualties stood atop Manju Yama. At 3am on september 3rd, Zarubaeiv reported to Kuropatkin he was running low on ammunition and being beaten back. Then Stakelberg reported “I report that my situation is serious, and that, in consequence of the severe losses suffered by my regiments during the last five days, I not only cannot without serious reinforcements assume the offensive, but cannot even accept battle. I have therefore resolved to retreat this night on Liulinkou, where I will await fresh orders. ‘ After this were reported of Orlov's defeat and that Liubavins cavalry screen was 20 miles from Mukden. Then Bildering reported that the Russians were forced off Manju Yama and that he would most likely have to withdraw and would not be able to continue offensive actions. At 4am another message came from Bildering ‘Very unfortunate. But since Stakelberg also has retreated, I must decide to retreat on Mukden and beyond. Concentrate there, reorganise and advance.' Kuropatkin replied ‘My communications with Mukden being threatened by considerable Japanese forces, I am retiring my army to that place, as its first duty is to protect those communications.' And thus a 43 miles retreat to Mukden would begin on September 3rd and end by the 10th. The Japanese lost 5337 men dead and 18063 wounded. For the Russians it was 3611 dead and 14,301 wounded. It was in essence an indecisive battle, a army of 200,000 Russians would slip away to fight another day. The Official British History summed up the battle of Liaoyang as such “The importance of this battle can hardly be exaggerated. By their victory the Japanese triumphantly vindicated their strategy and extricated themselves from a position which at one time threatened to prove extremely dangerous. Moreover, the knowledge that they had emerged victorious from a bitter trial of strength gave them that supreme confidence in their own invincibility which is the greatest asset of a soldier. Lastly, a reverse following, as it would have upon the failure of the first general assault upon Port Arthur, must have been disastrous for Japan. It is not, therefore, without reason that the twelve days from 23 August to 3 September have been called the most crucial period in the history of the War. “ Tsar Nicholas II sent Kuropatkin a conciliatory message following the news of the retreat from Liaoyang: ‘From your reports of the fighting at Liaoyang I appreciate that it was impossible for you to have held that position longer without risk of being completely cut off from your communications.' By september 6th, the Tsar ordered a second Manchurian army to be formed and both armies would henceforth be led by Alexeiev. The battle of Liaoyang held up 50,000 Russians at Port Arthur from helping and nearly 100,000 Japanese likewise. Now the road was wide open for the Japanese to conquer the rest of Manchuria.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Kuropatkin was fed terrible intelligence and believed he was facing a much larger enemy than he was. In the end Kuropatkin fought a valiant battle for Liaoyang and inflicted tremendous casualties upon the Japanese, but Oyama's strategy won the day. 

Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the Arawe landing and the drive towards Sio. The Komori detachment did everything they could to bottle up the new American beachhead at Arawe. Meanwhile after the fall of Wareo, the Australians decided it was time to drive towards Sio. General Katagiri had just got his men to Sio, but would have little time to prepare defenses as the Australians were quick on their heels. Likewise the Australians were also expanding past Dumpu, seeing multiple patrols fan out, probing for where the Japanese were massing their forces. In Tokyo, Hideki Tojo invited Japan's allies for the east asian conference, reiterating Pan-Asia unity against the west. Yet for all the talk, in reality Japan sought to dominate its Asian allies, really as a means to an end. In Cairo the allies held a conference of their own, trying to keep Chiang Kai-Shek in the fold. This episode is Landings at Cape Gloucester  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  General Douglas MacArthur faced daunting challenges during the Pacific War. One of these challenges was in the shape of Rabaul, one of Japan's strong points from which she exerted force in the region. To neutralize Rabaul, MacArthur sought to seize some airfields in Western New Britain, but to do this would also require securing control over the Vitiaz strait between New Britain and New Guinea. General HQ sought to use airfields at Cape Gloucester and on the south coast to help neutralize Rabaul. Thus Operation Dexterity was born. It was to be twin landings against originally Gasmata, but then for necessity changed to Arawe and Cape Gloucester. This was but a cog in the major plan within MacArthur's mind to return to the Philippines, one could argue within a greater plan for the white house. The landings at Arawe were largely successful and with that in hand General Krueger felt his Alamo Force could now launch operation backhander. The battle-hardened 1st Marine division was earmarked for the landings against Cape Gloucester. It was to be their first action after a prolonged period of rest and recuperation in South Australia following their heroic campaign on Guadalcanal. The 1st marines were now under the command of Major-General Rupertus. You probably could not ask for better men for the job, they were well refreshed physically, mentally and militarily. They had acquired an enormous amount of experience on Guadalcanal and with it a high degree of morale. The marines began training with the new types of landing crafts available to them, things they did not have during the Gaudalcanal days. Meanwhile Krueger carried out a programme of reconnaissance based on aerial photography, mosaics, older maps and some amphibious patrolling. There were 3 Australian officers who played key roles aiding in the effort. The first was Major John V. Mather, AIF, a former labor contractor in the Solomons who had been attached to the 1st Division for the Guadalcanal operation. He remained an integral component of the D-2 Section, where his proficiency with Pidgin English and grasp of native psychology proved most useful. The second was Sub-Lieutenant Andrew Kirkwall-Smith, RANVR, one of the versatile islanders who could turn his hand to nearly anything, and who had been a coastwatcher in the Cape Gloucester region at the time the Japanese first moved in. The third man and the one most more familiar with the ground and inhabitants was the Reverend William G. Wiedeman, who had operated the Anglican Mission at Sag Sag for several years prior to the war and, like Kirkwall-Smith, he was a commissioned Navy lieutenant to give military status to his present activities. A number of amphibious patrols was performed by the Alamo scouts. The first patrol was led by 1st Lieutenant John D. Bradbeer, who set out for New Britain's western coast by PT boat on September 24th. Around midnight, he cut the motors off on his PT boat around a mile off Grass Point, and his scouts paddled in from there in an inflated rubber boat, landing on a beach at the mouth of the second stream to the south at 0100 on the 25th. After hiding their craft with great care, they proceeded inland through dense secondary jungle growth up the western slopes of Mt. Tangi. There they found enemy defenses in the vicinity of Aisega. After this they turned northward heading through heavy foliage to the upper Gima River and there interrogated the inhabitants. The natives had been excluded from the airdrome area and the coast since the previous July, but they had some information to impart. There was a motor road connected Ongaia and the airdrome, and 12 to 14 Anti aircraft guns were emplaced between these two points; radio stations were located at Aisega, the airdrome, Sakar Island and Rooke Island; barge traffic was heavy on the Itni River and along the coast. Relations between the native population and the Japanese had deteriorated to a low level, although a few quislings still operated in the area. The natives related that the enemy expected an invasion of the Cape Gloucester region. Finally, they retraced their steps; and in the early morning hours of 6 October the Alamo Scouts climbed on board the waiting torpedo boat and returned to Goodenough Island to make their report. The next significant patrol was carried out on the night of 14 October by Captain W. A. Money, AIF, two other Australians, a Marine sergeant and six natives went ashore about one mile south of Higgins Point on Rooke and remained there until the early hours of 26 October. Captain Money reported there were few Japanese on the island, which doubtlessly influenced the later decision to defer a landing there. Shortly before midnight on November 20th two PT boats throttled down to a halt just south of Dorf Point on New Britain's west coast. Eleven men aboard had the general mission of reconnoitering the beach for an offensive landing, but more specifically they were to study beach approaches, beach conditions and inland terrain between Potni and Sumeru. They were commanded by Major Mather. With plans carefully laid the men stealthily made their way ashore, but luck under such conditions could not always hold up, and the Japanese became aware of the patrol's presence almost as soon as it reached the beach. Thirty minutes after leaving the PT boats, they were back on board, but in that time they had obtained enough information to declare the beach unfavorable for a landing operation. The significant patrol occurred on the night of 21 December, and was done to study two beaches at Tauali. Once again Major Mather acted as overall commander. Splitting the patrol into two seven-man groups, Bradbeer took the first on a reconnaissance of "South Beach" while First Lieutenant Joseph A. Fournier of the 1st Marines took the other for a look at "North Beach." The patrol recommended the latter as the more favorable of the two for a landing. It was duly labeled Green Beach, and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, made its D-Day amphibious operation there. Such amphibious patrolling helped Krueger figure out where not to land. Meanwhile the 7th fleet had just come under the command of Admiral Kinkaid and was assigned the naval responsibility for the Gloucester landing. Admiral Barbey would have at his disposal 12 destroyers, taking the USS Conyngham as his flagship, 3 minesweepers, 10 APDs, 16 LCIs and 24 LSTs for the main landings; with another two destroyers 14 LCMs, 12 LCTs and two rocket DUKWs for the secondary landing on Beach Green at Tauali. Covering them would by Admiral Crutchley's task force 74 consisting of 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers and two rocket LCI's. The 1st echelon carried by the APDs Stringham, Crosby, Kilty, Dent and Ward was the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines; and APDs Brooks, Gilmer, Sands, Humphreys and Noa would carry the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The 2nd Echelon of six LCIs would carry the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines; and four LCIs for the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The 3rd Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 500 troops of 1st Marines and 150 tons of supply, escorted by destroyers Drayton, Lamson, Mugford and Bagley. The 4th Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 480 troops of 1st and 7th Marines and 150 tons of supply The 5th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 240 troops of 12th Defense Battalion and 250 tons of supply. And the 6th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 250 Marine engineers and 250 tons of supply.   For air support, General Kenney assigned Brigadier-General Frederic Smith's 1st Air Task Force (FATF). The FATF contained about ⅓ of all the squadrons in the allied air force. It had flown fighter and bomber missions for all ground operations excluding those in the Ramu valley. To support the coming offensive, between November 19th to December 13th, 1241 tons of bombs were dropped over Brogen Bay. For the next 11 days, daylight bombings were intensified with over 1207 bomber sorties being performed, dropping more than 2684 tons of bombs.Their favored point of attack was Target Hill because it was so easily discerned. Gun positions at the airstrip were also given attention, with eighty 2,000-lb. bombs being dropped on 17 December. A few direct hits were claimed on gun positions. Bunkers and supply dumps, protected from view by the lush jungle growth, were fairly safe from air attacks, but the lines of supply suffered heavily. Daylight runs were not all that was performed, simultaneously the allies introduced harassing night tactics as well, to keep the enemy under additional mental strain. You see the Japanese anti-aircraft teams and pilots tried to sleep at night, but the B-24's would continuously drop bombs, grenades and even beer bottles over bivouac areas simply to keep them dazed.   On December 21st, a final rehearsal was carried out at Cape Sudest and 3 days later, Colonel Julian Frisbie's 7th marines boarded Barbey's vessels at Buna Harbor. On Christmas day at 6am the convoy was moving. At 4pm the convoy rendezvous with Colonel William Whaling's 1st marines at Cape Cretin while the 2nd battalion reinforced with H battery of the 11th marines proceeded to Beach Green in their own smaller convoy.    However, as they made their way towards their objective, the main convoy was spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. The convoy would arrive at its destination unmolested. Commander of the southeast area fleet, Admiral Jinichi Kusaka had incorrectly assessed the convoy was bound for Arawe bearing reinforcements and as a result ordered a heavy air strike against the Arawe area instead of Cape Gloucester. At 6am on the 26th Crutchley's cruisers and destroyers began a naval bombardment followed up an hour later with Smith's B-24's, B-25's and A-20's. The 5th air force had tossed B-24's from Dobadura who dropped their payloads all the way from Target Hill to Cape Gloucester. The B-25 medium bombers followed this dropping their heavier loads and the A-20's focused on the landing areas making sure to strafe the beaches until the first wave would be just 500 yards away.   For the next hour and a half the landing craft launched towards the beaches. Two LCI's outfitted with multiple rocket launchers led the first wave. A considerable amount of smoke screen was set over the area, hindering some of the landing craft from finding their marks. One group carrying elements of the 3rd battalion, 7th marines missed their beach altogether and hit the shore some 300 yards further west. The 3rd battalion led by Lt Colonel William Williams landed at Yellow at 7:46, with Lt Colonel John Weber's 1st battalion doing the same at Yellow 2. The men charged down the lowered ramps of their LCVP's seeing marines find unmanned trenches, abandoned guns and a handful of scared shipping engineers cowering in dugouts, too stunned by the naval and aerial bombardments to fight or flee.    The allies had achieved tactical surprise as Matsuda was not expecting an invasion to come to these beaches. Major-General Iwao Matsuda's had deployed his 53rd regiment around the Tsurubu airdrome and Natamo Point. Storming forward, the 3rd battalion reached a region known as the “damp plat” which according to one Marine “was 'damp' up to your neck”. To the Japanese this was known as “swamp forest” and it held some of the most treacherous terrain, thus the Japanese did not expect the enemy to come by it. The forward momentum was beginning to peter out as men were wading through thick mud, with vines tearing at their bodies. A heavy congestion hit the beaches, greatly hamping the unloading process. As the men advanced, trees literally fell around them, rotten to the core from the bombing. The first marine casualty would actually be a result of a falling tree.   Meanwhile the 1st battalion advanced towards Target Hill and Silimati Point. Company B seized their key elevation points by noon. Behind these men came the first echelon of LSTs bearing the 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Odell Conoley. They beached their LCI's and drove straight inland some 900 yards through mud and water all the way up to the center of the new beachhead perimeter on a patch of dry ground. At 2:30 after the LST's were pulling out a force of 25 Vals and 63 Zeros emerged at low altitude who made a very fast bombing and strafe run against the beaches and shipping. The back and forth firing from the Japanese aircraft and allied forces was intense.  A formation of FATF B-25s, coming in at treetop level, suddenly found themselves snarled up with the Japanese flight almost directly over the beach. In the excitement, two were shot down by friendly fire and two seriously damaged before the gunners aboard the LSTs could cool their trigger fingers. Possibly because they wanted to jettison their explosives, or possibly because they mistook their target, the B-25s then proceeded to bomb and strafe the Silimati point position occupied by 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, killing one officer and wounding 14 enlisted Marines. One correspondent had this to say "the most inexcusable small scale blunder of the war." The Japanese attacked Barbey's vessels covering the retreat of the first echelon of LSTs tangling with allied CAP. The destroyer Brownson was sunk, destroyers Lamson, Shaw and Mugford were damaged and two LSTs were driven off. 13 vals and 4 zeros were destroyed, for the allies it was 4 fighters and 3 B-25's. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion was still securing its right flank as Whaling's 1st Marines supported by Sherman tanks were coming up behind on LCI's. Their commander landed at 10:15 with the division command post in operation ashore within the hour as the 1st marines drove towards the airdrome. Lt Colonel Joseph Hankins 3rd battalion ran into one of Colonel Sumiya's roadblocks. It consisted of 4 fortified bunkers with machine guns and a system of rifle trenches manned by  1st, 2nd and 1st Machine-Gun Companies of the 53rd Regiment. The assault was quickly shattered. K company lost its commander and executive officer in a matter of minutes. Everything seemed to go wrong. Bazooka rockets did not explode in the soft earth covering the bunkers; flamethrowers malfunctioned and an LVT carrying ammunition got wedged between two trees. The Japanese defenders were so amped up seeing the chaos, they rushed out of their bunkers trying to swarm the trapped LVT. They managed to kill two men manning its machine guns, but the driver refused to lose his head and skillfully drove the vehicle right over the nearest bunker providing infantry to storm behind him with grenades. The daring LVT maneuver allowed the men to take the bunkers, stealing victory out of the chaos. Behind them was Whaling's 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Walker Reaves who were bogged down in the damp flat. Whaling quickly changed his plan of advance as a result. He ordered his 3rd battalion to advance in a column along the narrow shelf of firm ground while the 1st battalion covered their left rear, speeding up the progress. Yet as the 3rd battalion moved out to expand their perimeter westwards, Sumiya's men began infiltrating unoccupied gaps, forcing Colonel Julian Frisbie to recall his Marines and wait for reserves to pull up. By nightfall Frisbies Marines had secured the beachhead. The landing was so well scheduled that the big LSTs began dropping their ramps on the beaches 40 minutes after the first assault waves had landed. By 1pm, they had unloaded and cleared the area to make way for the second echelon. However, close encroachment of the "damp flat" greatly curtailed the area available for dump dispersal and necessitated some hurried improvising by the Shore Party. According to an officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion: “The true cause of the traffic congestion can be attributed directly to Army personnel who manned 150 odd 6x6 trucks with preloaded cargo. These drivers had been scraped up from an artillery regiment in New Guinea and supplied with salvaged trucks into which had been loaded practically all the supplies. The trucks theoretically were to discharge their cargo at the dumps, return to the LSTs they had debarked from and return to New Guinea for the second load. The plan failed in one respect, as there were no immediate dump areas to unload the trucks in due to the "Damp Flat." It was decided to leave the cargo in the trucks until dump areas were established. This caused consternation in the ranks of the Army drivers, who consequently abandoned their trucks in an effort to get back on the LSTs… This naturally left 150 trucks stranded on the beach exits for quite a time. Eventually the trucks were unloaded by Marines and proved to be a big aid to transportation starved organizations.” Meanwhile Whalings battalions set up their own perimeter for the night with both flanks on the beach, a technique they repeated each evening until the airdrome was captured. Further to the west Lt Colonel James Masters 2nd battalion, 1st marines with H battery of the 11th marines codenamed STONEFACE group landed at Beach Green at 8:35. By 10am they had established a perimeter; E company held the left, G company the center and F company the right. The H battery unit was unable to emplace its 75mm pack howitzer satisfactorily on the rugged jungle terrain so they reorganized themselves into 3 platoons of infantry and took up a mobile reserve at the front line. Stoneface's task was to cut off the coastal road. When Masters men looked around they found the beach completely unoccupied, numerous positions had been abandoned with their weapons. Masters figured the defenders must have fled to the hills during the bombardment, so he ordered patrols to fan out. The only contact made that day was a small group roughly 1000 yards north of the beachhead near the village of Sumeru seeing a small firefight. Yet unbeknownst to Masters, Sumiya had sent a provisional unit consisting of elements of the 3rd and 4th companies, 53rd regiment with the 3rd battalion ,23rd field artillery regiment to drive out the marines via a secondary road east of Mount Talawe. The force was led by 1st Lt Takeda, and was thus called the Takeda Provisional battalion For Barbey the first day saw 13,000 troops and 7600 tons of materials landed on either side of the cape. However many men had landed in swamps so dense and deep that maneuvering out of such areas was quite difficult. General Matsuda was well aware of this and seized the opportunity. Matsuda ordered Colonel Katayama to leave token garrisons at Aisega, Nigol and Cape Bushing while he brought the bulk of his 141st regiment to Magairapua, this would take until December 30th to occur. Yet Matsuda had made one mistake, he thought he was facing just 2500 men. How the 65th brigade staff came to this conclusion is unknown. Perhaps it was became the smoke screen during the landings had made visual observation limited; perhaps the loss of Target Hill so fast also limited further observation of the enemy. The Marines had achieve tactical surprise by landing on undefended beaches, but other than that, they did not do all that much on the first day, perhaps the lack of activity also factored in Matsuda's head. The only real fight of the day had been a brief affair at the roadblock where the invaders, instead of throwing infantry frontally against powerful bunkers in the glorious banzai manner, had awaited supporting weapons to knock out the position. Perhaps to Matsuda this spelled weakness or timidity, or both. Regardless, like most Japanese commanders Matsuda was obsessed by the then-current Japanese doctrine of "annihilate-at-the-water's-edge," so he ordered his own major assault unit hurled in an all-out attack against the center of the invaders' perimeter. Thus instead of reinforcing Sumiyas forces at the airdrome, or withdrawing forces to more defensible areas like Borgen Bay, or even waiting for Katayam's troops to arrive, Matsuda decided to make a daring attack directly at the center of the marine perimeter with only his 2nd battalion, 52rd regiment.   At 3am on December 27, the Japanese attacked the sector held by the 2nd battalion, 7th marines, during one of the worst monsoon storms the Americans had ever seen. Because of the storm, many of the Japanese failed to find gaps existing on each side of the battalions flanks. Thus instead the Japanese hurled themselves frontally against very well dug in positions. By 7am, the surviving Japanese finally began to pull out, Matsuda's men suffered 200 deaths with over 100 wounded. The Marines suffered 8 deaths and 45 wounded, added together for the day the total loss for the Americans was 28 deaths and 68 wounded. After Matsuda's terrible defeat, Whaling's battalions resumed their drive towards the airdrome. While they advanced in columns along the road, patrols were sent into the jungle to hunt down the enemy, but they encountered no resistance. The 1st marines were able to dig in for the night after advancing 5000 yards.   To the east, Frisbie's 2nd battalion had expanded their perimeter towards the bank of Suicide Creek where they would continue to face short and sharp attacks by Matsuda's 2nd battalion. Despite the heavy punishment he was served, Matsuda continued to believe in the destroyer-at-the-water's edge tactics. His men began constructing defensive positions, bunkers, trenches, rifle pits and so forth, so close to the American lines the Americans could hear them doing it. Meanwhile the engineers of the 17th marines performed their own work, widening the Japanese coastal road to allow the movement of supplies. Despite their valiant work, the volume of traffic was immense, coupled with the storm made the narrow coastal road a logistical nightmare.    The next morning the Marines expected to encounter some heavy resistance. The marine artillery crews increased their rate of fire and General Kenney's aircraft bombed Colonel Sumiya's strongpoints. With tank support, Whaling resumed his advance at 11am, with Company I finally hitting the first enemy positions about 12:15. They ran into a Japanese strong point consisting of a system of mutually supporting bunkers and rifle trenches, well armed with anti-tank guns and 75mm guns. The way forward was littered with land mines and barbed wire. The defenders enjoyed an added advantage in the heavy jungle lying a short distance inland which limited the tanks' field of maneuver to the comparatively narrow area directly to their front, facing the flank of the Japanese position which thus became, in effect, a defense in depth for the entire extent of its east-west length: approximately 300 yards.   At 12:00, I Company was fired upon with small arms from the front, followed by 75mm shells along the road area. 15 minutes later the leading elements led by Captain Carl Conron began attacking the fortifications alongside the tanks. They were facing the  2nd Company, 53rd Regiment and the 1st Machine Gun Company, 53rd Regiment and the strong point was quickly nicknamed Hell's Point. Later it would be renamed Terzi Point in honor of Company K's commanding officer who died on the landing day. Within the heavy rain, the tanks surged forward and smashed Sumiya's bunkers, while A company dashed to the left, emerging from kunai grass just 500 yards from the bunkers. Enjoying excellent cover, the defenders' fire successfully stopped the American advance, although the Marines themselves also easily broke up two Japanese frontal assaults and one attempt to turn their flank.    Ammunition began to run low, forcing A company to withdraw at around 3:45. Yet K Company closer to the beach held enormous firepower in the form of Sherman tanks that obliterated 12 bunkers rather quickly.  In the words of Company K's commander: “I was given three tanks (the other two were out of action, one with engine trouble and one with a jammed breech of its 75) to accomplish this mission. I put one squad of the Second Platoon behind each tank and deployed the Third Platoon to set up a skirmish line behind the tanks. We encountered twelve huge bunkers with a minimum of twenty Japs in each. The tanks would fire point blank into the bunkers, if the Japs stayed in the bunkers they were annihilated, if they escaped out the back entrance (actually the front as they were built to defend the beach) the infantry would swarm over the bunker and kill them with rifle fire and grenades. By the time we had knocked out twelve bunkers the Second Platoon . . . were out of ammunition and had been replaced by the Third Platoon and they too were out or down to a clip of ammunition per man. I called a halt and sent for the First Platoon. By the time the First Platoon arrived and ammunition was resupplied forty-five minutes had elapsed. We continued the attack and found two more bunkers but the enemy had in the meantime escaped.” The immense power of the tanks forced the defenders to retreat.    During this action the 1st marines suffered 17 deaths and 52 wounded and claimed to have counted 300 Japanese corpses. The capture of Hell's Point enabled the Americans to establish a position at Blue Beach to reduce the distance for supplies. General Rupertus command post was also moved there by Deemer 28th. The next day the American advance was delayed until the arrival of Colonel John Seldens 5th marines. General Rupertus feared he might be outnumbered at the airdrome so he played it safe. During the fighting at Hell's Point, a curious misadventure befell Corporal Shigeto Kashida of the 1st Machine Gun Company. The trench in which he was defending suddenly caved in, burying him helpless up to the neck. An astonished Marine, observing Shigeto's apparently disembodied head blinking at him, paused to debate whether to shoot or shovel, which dilemma was resolved by the arrival of an intelligence officer who ordered the corporal disinterred and made prisoner. Shigeto painted a depressing picture of his battalion's situation, but he mentioned the original plan for the 2nd Battalion was to reinforce the 1st, something that might still be accomplished; he also mentioned the presence somewhere in the vicinity of the 141st and 142d Regiments, possibly within striking distance. Since Colonel Sumiya had conducted withdrawals following every action to date, it could be presumed that a good part of his force remained intact. Thus Rupertus was right in his belief the Japanese may have large numbers at the airdrome.   The 1st Battalion under Major William H. Barba and the 2nd Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis W. Walt got aboard 9 APD's at Cape Sudest and arrived off Cape Gloucester during the morning. However during the transit, there was a large storm that caused some confusion, leading some elements to land at Yellow 2 and others at Beach Blue. General Rupertus planned for the 1st Marines to continue their advance along the coastal road while the 5th Marines would perform a wide sweep on the left flank to attack airstrip No.2. At 3pm following the artillery and aerial bombardment, the Marines launched a fierce offensive. The 2nd battalion, 5th marines attacked simultaneously with the 1st Marines along the coast road and both ground immediately inland. Major William H. Barba's 1st Battalion was just struggling out of the swamp and jungle near the line of departure. The unexpected terrain difficulties, however, kept the plan from being carried out. Both battalions sent out patrols in an effort to establish contact, but a combination of darkness and unfamiliar territory prevented positive results.  Supported by tanks, artillery, mortars and rocket launchers, Whaling's 1st Battalion successfully reached the eastern end of Strip No. 2 at 5:55 and immediately commenced setting up a defensive perimeter. The 3rd battalion followed behind and extended the perimeter to the left, with Selden's 2nd battalion arriving at 7:25pm extending the perimeter around airstrip No 1 towards the beach. It seemed Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. The Japanese had begun firing artillery and mortars into the airdrome. The Marines, somewhat astonished by such goings-on, called for mortar and artillery support of their own. They reported that, according to their best estimates, the enemy had reoccupied the defenses in at least full company strength.  The marines were formulating a plan to deal with the menace and the Japanese took advantage of the lull time to launch a banzai charge that failed to gain any ground. The Japanese continued their harassment, until the Marines received some tank support to launch an offensive. Platoons from different units got together to perform a sweeping maneuver, advancing 300 yards from the defensive line. They ran into bunkers, foxholes and trenches manned by Japanese. The marines mopped them up with grenades and automatic weapons, then at 11:30 suddenly all the fighting ceased. No more enemy seemed to remain near the front. The marines had suffered 13 deaths and 19 wounded, but counted 150 dead Japanese. With more tanks on hand, the Marines gradually pushed the Japanese to flee back towards Razorback Hill. Meanwhile, because of the repeated attacks, Colonel Masters men had been patrolling, trying to pinpoint where the Japanese were concentrated. At 1:55am on December 30th, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 54th regiment had discovered an excellent approach towards the Marine perimeter. As was always the favored Japanese strategy, to concentrate force against a narrow sector, they chose to attack at this place called Coffin Corner, a natural causeway connected to ridges. The two companies attacked under the cover of a storm. The Japanese unleashed mortars and machine gun fire and quickly overran a machine gun position, but G company launched a counter attack pushing them back. The battle raged for nearly 5 hours, but by 7am it ceased. The marines had 6 deaths, 17 wounded and would count 89 Japanese dead with another 5 captured. Yet that concludes the action in Cape Gloucester for today, for now we need to jump back to New Guinea. Back on December 8th, General Nakai commenced an offensive against Kesawai, dispatching the Saito Volunteer unit for the task. The unit had the aid of native guides who gave them detailed information on the terrain, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate behind a forward Papuan platoon led by Lt C.E Bishop. They explode all of their booby-traps, allowing the 1st battalion, 78th regiment to advance behind them into Kesawai 2 without much difficult, annihilating the Papuan platoon and securing the eastern portion of the highland. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion crossed the Boku River and captured Koropa, cutting off the commandos at Isaria; the 2nd battalion, 239th regiment crossed the Boku river and assaulted the commando position at Ketoba, but the Australians resisted until nightfall before withdrawing towards Isariba. Nakai's enveloping maneuver was a success, forcing the commandos and Papuans to withdraw towards the Evapia River. On December 9th, Brigadier Eather ordered A and C companies of the 2/25th battalion to advance forward as the commands pulled back towards the Mene River. Meanwhile at 7:15am at Isariba, the Japanese had begun a series of attacks. The attacks were repelled with vicker guns, grenades and a quick air strike from 20 Kittyhawks and Boomerangs that bombed and strafed the attackers. The 2/25th companies arrived at Evapia and one of their patrols managed to ambush several Japanese parties over the next few days. On December 12th, Nakai arrived at Kesawai where he ordered his 1st and 3rd battalions, 78th regiment to attack the 2/25th positions by nightfall. C Company's machine gun fire managed to halt the enemy assault from the north, but another came from the south. A Company found itself surrounded as the Japanese managed to get between the two Australian companies, firing their Woodpeckers from multiple directions. It was a 5 hour battle until the Australians repelled the enemy who gradually pulled back west. At 5am on the 13th, the Australians were running low on ammunition and were forced to withdraw. The 2/25th advanced through think jungle and deep swamps, by 8am they had managed to get to safety after suffering 5 deaths and 14 wounded but killing an estimated 67 Japanese. The companies withdrew east of the Evapia River, rejoining the rest of their battalion. Nakai expected his enemy was attempting an offensive against Madang and ordered his men to return to their former defensive positions, leaving token garrisons at Koropa and Kesawai. Because of the heated attacked, General Vasey worried it was preliminary to something much bigger, so he ordered the 2/16th battalion to perform punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge and Eather's 2/33rd battalion would retake Kesawai. The 2/33rd Battalion advanced under the cover of darkness to the 5800 Feature to attack any Japanese there, and to move the Papuans across the Evapia to establish a patrol base for the Koben-Koropa-Solu River area . With three of his companies Colonel Cotton of the 2/33rd moved off an hour and a half after midnight on the 18th-19th December towards the summit of the 5800 Feature arriving just before dawn . At 2.10 p.m. a section made contact with the enemy about 700 yards south of the highest pinnacle on 5800. The patrol withdrew while the artillery fired 120 rounds. By 5 p.m. the enemy had had enough and withdrew enabling one company to occupy the pinnacle . Next day the battalion patrolled the whole area and found evidence of Japanese occupation and a hasty withdrawal.    I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies finally unleashed operation backhander, the amphibious assault of Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marines had a long rest after Guadalcanal and would now be the spearhead to reconquer New Britain. However the Japanese were not going to just roll over easily.  

Last time we spoke about landings against Arawe, the continuation of the Bougainville campaign and some new action in the CBI theater. Despite a rubber boat disaster, the operation against Arawe went off successfully seeing another allied landing taking the Japanese by surprise. Now the Japanese would be forced yet again to launch a counter attack hoping to dislodge the allied forces from a new beachhead. Over on Bougainville the Marines performed some assaults against hills such as Hellzapoppin ridge to expand the perimeter enough so the Army boys would have an easier time of taking over. Over in the CBI theater, the onion man Wingate was given the task of expanding his chindits and the Americans wanted their very own chindit force. Stilwell decided the time was ripe to unleash a minor offensive in Burma and soon saw what looked like a weakened Japanese perimeter was in fact very strong. This episode is Drive on Sio Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last time we saw General Cunningham's men successfully landing at Arawe where they hoped to build a new PT boat base. Troop A was supposed to land an hour before the main landing to cut the coastal road near Umtingalu village and Troop B would land at Pilelo island to cover the main passage to the harbor. Troop A was a disaster. Their 15 rubber boats were met with 25 mm dual purpose guns that sank 12 boats, killed 12 men and wounded another 70. Troop B was more successful landing on Pilelo and capturing the radio station before engaging in a fire fight. For the main landing at House FIreman Beach, there was little resistance. Sporadic machine gun fire was silenced by rockets as the men landed. The Japanese tossed some air strikes to hit further landings and convoys, but allied CAP managed to limit the damage.  A few days after the landing, the Komori Detachment reached the village of Didmop along the Pulie River where they paused to reorganize and rally the incoming survivors fleeing the landing area. The difficult terrain and river crossings prevented Komori and his men from assembling into offensive positions until December 25th. Meanwhile back on the 18th, the 1st battalion, 141st regiment began an advance from the Itni region aboard 7 barges. Unfortunately for them, two LCVP's bearing 19 men on patrol had been sent by Cunningham to Cape Peiho. The two forces ran into another and after an exchange of gunfire the US soldiers abandoned their LCVP's and retreated back along the Arawe coast. Another patrol traveling by LCVP was also fired upon by Japanese barges near Umtingalu that same day, but was able to return to Cape Merkus. On Christmas night, 100 men of the Komori detachment assaulted the main line of defense across the neck of the peninsula. The inexperienced American cavalrymen of the 112th managed to repel, albeit with some difficulty. The attack prompted General Cunningham to believe Komori was in charge of the lead element of a much larger force, most likely enroute from Gasmata. He therefore requested reinforcements and General Krueger responded by dispatching a company of the 158th infantry by PT Boats. Meanwhile the lack of results from the attack prompted Komori to defer further attacks until the arrival of Major Tobuse's battalion. On the 27th, allied intelligence indicated the Japanese had retaken Meselia and Umtingalu, prompting Cunningham to withdraw all outposts and patrols within the main line of defense. The 2nd battalion, 158th regiment were sent to reinforce the beachhead while Komori and Tobuse finally made contact with another. The first order of business to contain the growing American perimeter. Both commanders believed the Americans sought to repair the unserviceable Lupin Aerodrome. 700 yards from the US line the Japanese established a series of alternate positions taking advantage of the terrain and concealment making it difficult to spot. Cunningham would remark "This is not an organized position in the accepted sense of the word, it consists apparently of shallow trenches and deep fox holes… The ground is covered with a thick green mat about 12 to 18 inches in depth which makes observation absolutely impossible… Officers and men… report that they have not seen a single Japanese and that they are unable to locate machine guns firing on them from a distance of 10 to 20 yards.” From these positions the Japanese harassed the Americans using mortar and automatic weapons fire. Whenever the Americans tried to pinpoint where the fire was coming from the Japanese would simply switch positions to another. Within these parameters only limited skirmishing was carried out for the next few days.  On January 4th, Komori reported repulsing a strong American and two days later received his first citation from Emperor Hirohito for his heroic achievement. Meanwhile a much frustrated Cunningham began sending reports to Krueger he could not spot the enemy and was convinced continued attacks would simply result in further casualties. By January the 9th he reported 75 dead, 57 wounded and 14 missing. He requested Kreuger send him some tanks and on the 9th he received the 1st marine division's 1st tank battalion from Finschhafen. The 1st Tank Battalion had been left behind at Finschhafen because of transportation shortage and limited range for tank operations in the inhospitable terrain of the Cape Gloucester region. Eventually Rupertus would also release the rest of the tank company then in reserve at Cape Gloucester to help out. The Marine tanks and Army infantry quickly worked out the details of how they would go about combined operations. The morning of January 16th kicked off with a squadron of B-24's followed by another of B-25s bombing the Japanese positions. This was followed up by artillery and mortars and then two 5 tank platoons began their assault against a 500 yard front. Behind the tanks were infantry of the 158th and despite the swampy terrain and thick vegetation, the tank-infantry stormed forward. The Japanese resisted ferociously, grounding two tanks that had to be destroyed lest the Japanese seize them later. The Americans destroyed the enemy's positions, crushing numerous automatic weapons and a 75mm mountain gun. But the Americans had no orders to hold any positions, so they destroyed and pulled back to their perimeter for the night. The following morning the Americans resumed the attacks with flamethrowers eliminating small pockets of resistance still remaining. Komori still obsessed with defending Lupin aerodrome to the last man ordered a withdrawal, but not before radioing to the brigade HQ "fight till the glorious end to defend the airfield" which earned him a second Imperial citation on February 7. During these actions the Americans suffered 20 dead, 40 wounded and two tanks. For Komori's men they had 116 dead and 117 wounded. For the next 3 weeks the fighting would deteriorate into a matter of patrol skirmishes, with Komori triumphantly reported back to HQ how the airfield was still in Japanese hands. The reality however was the Japanese were heavily outnumbered and lost control of the air and sea. How many men Komori commanded remains difficult to figure out as no documents were captured after the operation. It appears unlikely there were more than 1000 under his command. Early in the operation the Japanese were supplied by airdrop, often during daylight in view of the Americans. Yet as the Americans tightened their grip over the sea and air more, Komori became increasingly dependent on the trickle of supplies coming over the tortuous trail from Iboki. Carrying and distributing these supplies imposed still more of a drain on his manpower, and he withdrew his headquarters to Didmop to give more attention to this phase, leaving direct defense of the airfield to Major Tobuse. Yet that is all for Arawe for today, because we need to travel back over to New Guinea. Wareo had fallen and now the Australians were advancing upon Fortification Point as General Katagiri's 20th division were retreating towards the northern coast. The 20th division would arrive at Zagaheme and Orarako on the 22nd and 25th respectively. With these movements occurring the Australians now felt the time was ripe to launch an offensive against Sio. On December 20th, General Wootten ordered the 20th brigade to advance through the 4th brigade's positions and begin a rapid pursuit towards Sio. The next day, Brigadier Windeyer had his men advance towards Wandokai while Wootten was reorganizing his forces to allow the coastal advance to continue. Meanwhile the 24th brigade took over the Gusika-Wario-Sattelberg area; the 4th brigade took over the Fortification Point-Masaweng River area; the 26th brigade advance down the coast and would be ferried to the mouth of the Masaweng to support Windeyer's advance. The Australians enjoyed the advantage of aerial support in the form of Bostons, Mitchells, Marauders, Airacobras and Thunderbolts who continuously hammered the Japanese with bombs and strafing runs. Alongside this allied PT boats harassed the Japanese barge fleet, between the 9th and 13th they would sink 23 barges along the coast, mostly south of Sio. Despite the air and sea support the overland advances were particularly rough on the men. From fortification point to Kapugara gorge the coastal track ran along a flat kunai ledge some hundred yards wide, between the sea on each side with sharp coral terraces. They had little cover along the line of the advance. There were also few natives inhabiting the area. The men of the 20th brigade were not in great condition when they began the pursuit. They were stricken with malaria and Colonel Simpson anticipated the enemy might hit their left flank so he dispatched two companies to travel parallel with the main coastal advance and those guys had some even rougher terrain to travel. There was little water to be had along the coast and the long kunai fields increased the heat exponentially. The men occupied Hubika on the 22nd without opposition. The allied engineers would find the gorge beyond Hubika would prevent any progress by the tanks, so the troops would have to proceed without their support. By nightfall the 2/13th battalion would advance another 3000 yards facing no opposition. They got around 1500 yards past Wandokai when suddenly mortar and artillery fire rained down upon them. This was Captain Yoshikawa's 1st battalion, 80th regiment who unleashed a bombardment for 2 hours upon the advancing Australians. Though it appeared like there was a major fight on their hands, it was only rearguard actions. Yoshikawa and his men were retreating towards Ago that night.  Christmas would see Windeyer receive the gift of further artillery reinforcements for his advance. The 62nd battery and 2/12th field regiment came over and on Boxing day Colonel Miyake would decide to abandon Ago and continue the retreat towards Kanomi. On the night of the 26th a company from a boat battalion of the 592nd EBSR, alongside an Australian radar detachment landed on Long Island. This was Operation Sanatogen, the mission was to set up a radar station and observation post on Long Island to help with the landing at Saidor and thwart Japanese barge movements. The Japanese had never placed a garrison on Long Island, but it was used as a staging point for barges moving between Rabaul and Wewak.  At 9am on the 27th, 18 Mitchells and 12 Bostons bombed and strafed the Walingai and Kanomi areas before Windeyers resumed his advance. The 2/13th advanced through Ago and occupied Walingai unopposed by the end of the day. The next day saw Australian patrols running into Japanese positions around Kanomi. At 11:15am a patrol of the 2/13th was fording a creek when they were fired upon. The patrol saw at least 14 Japanese retreating north around Blucher Point as they fired vicker guns and mortars upon them. During the afternoon the allied began a heavy artillery bombardment. The speed at which the Australians were advancing was providing results as the Japanese were forced to further withdraw towards Kalasa. Yet the Australians were stretching their logistical lines forcing Wootten to halt the forward units for 2 days. The two day delay allowed General Katagiri to get his men past Kalasa and reach Sio without any hindrance. On new years eve the 2/15th resumed their advance finding slight resistance around Nanda. At 5:30pm the 2/15th were fired upon by a few bands of Japanese and responded with artillery fire forcing them away. To avoid unnecessary casualties the Australians halted at the last creek before Nanda and resumed the march on new years day. The 2/15th then passed through Kwamkwam and captured Sialum Island during the afternoon of the 2nd. Sialum lies around half way between Fortification Point and Sio and it afforded the Australians a decent area to build a large supply dump on its sheltered. Yet the advance to Sio was not the only one going on, on New Guinea.   Since the battle of John's Koll and Trevor's Ridge, General Nakai's detachment were forced to withdraw farther back into the hills. The Nakai detachment were now clinging to Shaggy Ridge the Kankirei Saddle and the area between the Faria River, Madang and Bogadjim. At Kankirei, Nakai dispatched Captain Ohata Masahiko's 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion, 26th Field Artillery Regiment. General Nakai told Ohata that ‘the enemy is extremely sensitive to the use of artillery fire arms so that the artillerymen are expected to cooperate closely with the infantry men until the very end”.Ohata recalled “I realized what was expected from our commander, and he also said please take good care of your life. It took more than twenty years to train one artillery officer, but a gun is only material. We can replace the gun, but not an artilleryman.' There is a very reasonable explanation for Nakai's order. The IJA artillery field manual indicated their field guns were more valuable than artillerymen. In article 10 it said ‘The gun is the life of the Artillery. Therefore, the Artilleryman must live and die with the gun, and share the honor and shame together with the guns. One must continue to fight until the end'. Nakai at this time prohibited suicide and it seems was trying to save the lives of his artillerymen, lest they die for the sake of their guns. The main Japanese position was at Shaggy Ridge, a 4 mile long spur dotted by several rocky outcrops where the Japanese troops established numerous strong points. From the Pimple, a large rocky peak rising around half way along the crest of Shaggy ridge, the Japanese found it extremely sturdy to defend. The feature often saw a mist envelope it adding to its defensive capabilities.  As the Japanese clung to their heights, the Australians were busy developing their new main base at Dumpu. Airstrips, roads, bridge, culverts and numerous buildings were being worked on and with the recent acquisition of the Ramu valley they were also building a forward air base at Gusap. The only major offensive against Shaggy Ridge came in late October.  In accordance with Vasey's advice, Brigadier Dougherty prepared to attack the southernmost peak of Shaggy Ridge on the 20th. For three days from the 17th Dougherty's patrols crept as near as they could, and early on the 20th, Captain Whyte the F.O.O. of the 54th Battery, directed the fire of his guns on to the Japanese position.  At midday forward units reported that they were within five yards of a four-strand barbed-wire fence; the Japanese position on a kunai covered Pinnacle was about 30 yards away. Between the enemy position and his men, there was a steep gully about 100 feet deep with precipitous slopes on both flanks . The Japanese hand cut fire lanes through the kunai and were dug in and heavily bunkered from the cliff face. Through the clever use of artillery fire, the Australians tricked the Japanese into retiring temporarily to gain shelter. The artillerymen varied the rate of fire so it was never the same, while platoons stormed specific ridges, gaining ground without casualties.To defend his western flank, General Vasey dispatched  the 2/7th to Kesawai 1 and the 2/6th to Kesawai 2. Yet the role of the 7th division for the time being was really limited to patrol activities. On 23rd October a section of the 2/2nd Commando Squadron led by Lieutenant Doig crossed the Ramu and moved up the Urigina Track next day, seeking a way east to the Mataloi-Orgoruna area. Lt Doig entered this new territory on the 25th and by 9 a.m. trees across the track near Orgoruna suggested that the Japanese might be in possession. Between 25th and 31st October Captain Haydon's company of the 2/25th Battalion tried to reach the Japanese track between Paipa and Kankirei. After moving up the Evapia River and then through rugged unmapped country for 4 days the patrol leader was forced to return as he realized that it would be impossible for him to reach his objective without further rations. On the 29th the 2/7th Commando Squadron, an engineer, Captain Gossip of the 2/6th Field Company, and two others left to patrol a road from the Ramu Valley across the Finisterre Ranges towards the Japanese road. This patrol returned on 1st November reporting that there was no possibility of making a road from the Kesawai area towards the Japanese roadhead.  Lieutenant Maxwell of the 2/6th Commando Squadron, performed a three-day reconnaissance towards Yokopi , walked right into an enemy defensive position on the first day out, saw five Japanese looking at him from about 20 yards away, and retired before they could fire at him.  Sergeant Berrell of the Papuan Battalion led his section, three men from the 21st Brigade, and 50 native carriers on a 13 days' patrol into the ranges to patrol enemy movement in the Kankirei area. He returned on 11th November without having found a worthwhile observation post near Kankirei. On the 20th October MacAdie sent a patrol from the 2/2nd Squadron to Josephstaal to find out whether the Japanese were there, and whether a strip could be constructed. Accompanied by Sergeant-Major England of Angau, Lieutenant Green's small patrol of five troopers, 32 native carriers and five police boys left for Sepu where it remained until setting out on the main journey on 3rd November. The route chosen by Green and England did not follow the known native tracks as the Australians wished to avoid any contact with Japanese patrols. The journey would take nine days. Over at Atemble, where the Japanese were known to be in some strength, was bypassed and, although there were tracks of Japanese horsemen at Sambanga and reports from natives that the Japanese did occasionally patrol the area between Atemble and Josephstaal and Madang, there were no encounters. On 13th November Green arrived at Josephstaal, which was not occupied and which had only been visited occasionally by small enemy patrols in recent months. The patrol returned to base on 26th November.    On December 2nd a patrol of 42 men from the 2/33rd Battalion led by Lieutenant Scotts set out, urged on by Eather's hope that it would be able to blaze a track into the heart of the Japanese defenses at Kankirei from the west and get a prisoner. Moving up the Mene River Valley and across the 5500 Feature, Scott established a base on a steep ridge. The next day he moved down a spur to some native huts where the dense jungle was replaced by kunai and then crossed into another spur, where they established an observation post. Meanwhile a patrol from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion was attempting to observe the Kankirei Saddle area from the east. On the 7th Lieutenant White led out eight Pioneers, two Angau warrant-officers and 20 natives from Bob's Post following the Japanese Mule Track north to Toms' Post. Next day the patrol moved on along a well-surveyed track, and, about 1,500 yards beyond Toms' Post, saw a strong enemy position ahead on a high feature astride the track. On the 9th and the morning of the 10th White tried to work round to the north of the enemy position to carry out his original task, but dwindling rations, heavy rain, and rugged country forced his return to the track. Accompanied by two men White then advanced along the track but after 20 minutes he came under heavy fire. The three men ran back down the hill which they had been climbing but White was hit by machine-gun fire and fell. All of these patrol actions helped prevent the Japanese from penetrating south and figured out generally where the Japanese were in numbers. On November 9th Vasey relieved the 21st brigade at the front with the 25th brigade. Along with this the 2/6th commando squadron and a Papuan company were sent to reinforce the front while the 2/7th command squadron was withdrawn. And with that, after nearly 10 months since Lt Rooke and his platoon of the 2/7th battalion had arrived on the airstrip at Bena, the Bena Force ceased to exist. They had 12 deaths, 16 wounded and 5 men missing but claimed to have killed over 230 Japanese. They helped build the Garoka airfield; over 78 miles of motor transport road between Bena and Garoka, Sigoiya, Asaloka and Kainantu and produced maps of completely unknown areas In his final report MacAdie wrote: “The force fulfilled its task. Every enemy patrol which crossed the Ramu River was driven back with casualties, and very determined enemy attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties. In addition the enemy lost many men in ambushes on tracks north of the Ramu River... There is no doubt that the enemy regarded this force as a menace to his flank, and little doubt that the size of the force was grossly overestimated.” Now the 2/2nd Commando Squadron would assume the responsibility for the defense of the Bena-Garoka area. November would see the start of an intense hide and seek artillery duel. The Australian artillery was attempting to neutralize the Japanese 75mm guns. Captain Ohata's had placed two gun emplacements on the outskirts of Shaggy ridge in a position that protected the ridgeline in the front. The first emplacement were not entirely concealed and thus quickly became a target. Fortunately the guns survived as the Australian fire hit their shields mostly. Captain Ohata thought he could conceal their muzzle flashes by firing lower. The second gun emplacement was completely covered by shelter yet Ohata would remark ‘However the footsteps of the soldiers who were coming in from the behind the position were spotted by the search airplane. We were indeed astonished by their way of finding the gun position.' By the end of November General Nakai was preparing to hit Kesawai and counterattack towards Dumpu. In early December patrols from the 2/16th were probing Shaggy Ridge. Vasey intended to perform a diversion to attract the Japanese attention away from other pending operations in New Guinea and New Britain. An idea was floated around to have Brigadier Dougherty raid Kankirei, but that's it for New Guinea as major events were unfolding for the CBI theater. Over in Tokyo, on November 5th and 6th the Greater East Asia Conference was being held. Attendees included Hideki Tojo for Japan, Zhang Jinghui for Manchukuo, Wang Jingwei for the Republic of China based in Nanjing, Ba Maw for Burma, Subhas Chandra Bose for Free India, Jose P Laurel for the Philippines and Wan Waithayakon for Thailand. Notable exclusions would be that of Korea and Taiwan, whom the Japanese had annexed and did not want to give any political autonomy to. There was also Vietnam and Cambodia who were not invited so as to not offend the Vichy French government who was still claiming French Indochina to be under their rule. There was also Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, but Japan figured they would be simply annexing these regions as their natural resources were now the lifeblood of the empire. Of the attendee's, Suhas Chandra Bose was only present as an observer as India was still a British colony and the representative of Thailand under strict orders from Plaek Phibunsongkhram was to emphasize on every possible occasion that Thailand was not under Japanese domination, but in fact an allied nation. You might be asking why did Plaek Phibunsongkhram not attend such a grand event himself, well he actually feared if he were to leave Bangkok he would be ousted.  Hideki Tojo made a grand speech, greeting each of the participants and praising the spiritual essence of Asia in opposition to the materialistic civilization of the west. To give you a taste of this meeting here are some of the dialogue amongst participants. Tōjō Hideki stated in his speech: "It is an incontrovertible fact that the nations of Greater East Asia are bound in every respect by ties of an inseparable relationship". Ba Maw of Burma stated: "My Asian blood has always called out to other Asians… This is not the time to think with other minds, this is the time to think with our blood, and this thinking has brought me from Burma to Japan." Jose Laurel of the Philippines in his speech claimed that "the time has come for the Filipinos to disregard Anglo-Saxon civilization and its enervating influence… and to recapture their charm and original virtues as an Oriental people." Subhas Chandra Bose of India declared: "If our Allies were to go down, there will be no hope for India to be free for at least 100 years".   Overall the meeting was characterized by praise of solidarity and condemnation of western imperialism, but in terms of how Asia was going to come together and economic development and such, there really was no meat to any of it. Tojo simply kept reiterating how great Pan-Asianism was against the evils of the white devils. Yet for all the talk of asian unity, the Japanese governments actions were anything but that. The Japanese viewed themselves as racially superior to that of the other asian nations. They saw themselves as the Great Yamato Race and that they were destined to rule over the other asian peoples, similar to a father and son relationship. To actually go off the script so to say, I happen to have covered this topic extremely thoroughly in a 4 part series I did on my patreon about General Ishiwara Kanji. You see, Hideki Tojo's main military/political rival was Ishiwara Kanji, and all of the greater east asian stuff was literally stolen from Ishiwara.   Ishiwara, for those unfamiliar, is someone I believe had an unprecedented impact on global history. Ishiwara pretty much single handedly began WW2 I would argue. He was a very bizarre figure who came to the realization after WW1 that the entire world would be engulfed in what he called “the final war”. To prepare Japan against this apocalypse he believed Japan had to seize Manchuria for her resources, to empower the empire so it could face the United States. He also believed it was absolutely necessary to ally with China and that everything needed to be done to create a harmony between the two peoples. Ironically after Ishiwara caused the invasion of Manchuria, it all in his view got out of hand and he was tossed aside by people like Tojo. He spent the entire war openly criticizing Tojo and the policies of Japan while trying to create this Pan-Asian league, and Tojo simply copied what he was doing, gave it a different name and made sure to eliminate the elements about allying with China and stopping the war with her. Ishiwara is a fascinating figure and to be honest I was so happy with the 4 part series I told on my patreon I might be releasing it on my Youtube channel and on my personal podcast server soon.   Now back to the conference, in the words of Indian Historian Panjaj Mishara  “the Japanese had revealed how deep the roots of anti-Westernism went and how quickly Asians could seize power from their European tormentors”. Tokyo hoped that a major demonstration of Pan-Asianism would lead China to broker peace with Japan and thus join them in a war against the west. A major theme of the conference was that Chiang Kai-Shek was not a proper asian and that no Asian would ally themselves to the white devils. As you can imagine the speeches made by Tojo emphasized how evil Britain and the United states were, yet at the same time praised Nazi Germany. Here are parts of Tojo's speech.   “The need of upholding international justice and of guaranteeing world peace is habitually stressed by America and Britain. They mean thereby no more and no less than the preservation of a world order of their own, based upon division and conflict in Europe and upon the perpetuation of their colonial exploitation of Asia. They sought to realize their inordinate ambition in Asia through political aggression and economic exploitation; they brought on conflict among the various peoples; they tried to destroy their racial integrity under the fair name of education and culture. Thus, they have to this day threatened constantly the existence of the nations and people of Asia, disturbed their stability, and suppressed their natural and proper development. It is because of their notion to regard East Asia as a colony that they harp upon the principles of the open door and equal opportunity simply as a convenient means of pursuing their sinister designs of aggression. While constantly keeping their own territories closed to us, the peoples of Asia, thus denying us the equality of opportunities and impeding our trade, they sought solely their own prosperity. The Anglo-American ambition of world hegemony is indeed a scourge of mankind and the root of the world's evils.”   “As regards the situation in Europe, we are very glad that our ally, Germany, has still further solidified her national unity and, with conviction in modern times. As regards the situation in Europe, we are very glad that our ally, Germany, has still further solidified her national unity and, with conviction in sure victory, is advancing to crush the United States and Britain and to construct a new Europe. The War of Greater East Asia is truly a war to destroy evil and to make justice manifest. Ours is a righteous cause. Justice knows no enemy and we are fully convinced greater of our ultimate victory.”   Meanwhile the allies held the Sextant Conference in Cairo between November 22-26th. This conference established China's status as one of the four world powers, kind of a cheeky jab at Japan and a means to sway Chiang Kai-Shek from surrendering. At the conference plans were made for an offensive in Burma codenamed Operation Champion with sub operations Tarzan and Buccaneer. Lord Mountbatten presented  three plans of action. First Operation Tarzan called for 4 Indian divisions of the British 14th army group's 15th army  to concentrate their forces in Chittagong and cross the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line in mid-January. The next year they would capture the Burmese coast in order to defend Chittagong and occupy Sittwe on the Burmese coast. Then three divisions of the 4th Army, would assemble at Imphal and move east with the objective of destroying Japanese lines of communication and advancing to Arak and various parts of Sidon in northern Burma. In March, the Chindits long-range infiltration force would be parachuted into Burma, behind the Japanese lines while the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) in India would cross the Ho Kang Valley and advance eastward into Myitkyina. The Chindit special forces would then support the Chinese forces and occupy Bhamo in April, while the Yunnan Army would begin operations on March 15 and advance to Lashio in April to join the British forces at Lashio and Bhamo. In the Bay of Bengal, a massive amphibious offensive would also be launched, with 3,000 British and American long-range infiltration troops participating.   Operation Musket would see the capture of Cape Sumatra and Operation Buccaneer was to be an amphibious operation to seize the Andaman Islands in order to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Chiang kai-shek expressed support for Tarzan, but once again insisted for it to be coupled with a massive naval operation in the Bay of Bengal. Though the British were reluctant to do this, US pressure eventually convinced them to land on the Andamans. The Chiefs of Staff then agreed to drive Japan out of Burma and reopen land links with China, with Stilwell conducting the ground attack in the north and Mountbatten commanding the amphibious landings in the south.    The American delegation told Chiang kai-shek that for the following six months, only 8900 tons of supplies could be flown to China via the Hump route each month, even though Chiang continuously pushed for 10000 tons. In the end, President Roosevelt promised to increase the airlift supply to China to 12000 tons, and also promised that B-29 Superfortress bombers would bomb Japan from Chinese bases. By the way if you are interested in the beginnings of the bombing campaigns against the Japanese home islands, please check out the podcast I did with Dave from the cold war channel over on my youtube channel. It is actually B-29's operating in India and China that kicked it all off, and its not often talked about.    Many of the resolutions and promises, would not be really implemented. Politically, many arrangements were also made for the postwar international situation. Roosevelt and Churchill supported the territorial claims of the Republic of China, such as returning Taiwan and Manchuria to the Republic of China and deciding to allow Korea to become independent "in due course". The Cairo Declaration, however, made no specific mention of the future of the Ryukyu Islands. China of course wanted them, but the US believed that the Ryukyu Islands could be left to Japan after the war if they were completely demilitarized. It was also agreed between China and the US that Lushun would be used as a public military port for the Americans after the war, and that Dalian would become a free port. Roosevelt also consulted Chiang kai-shek on the possibility of the abolition of the Japanese imperial system along with the emperor, Hirohito, but Chiang kai-shek mentioned that the cause of the war was the Japanese warlords, and that the issue could be left to the Japanese people to decide for themselves after the war. The Americans did not want France to return to Indochina and offered Chiang kai-shek control of French Indochina; but he publicly declined, as Chiang kai-shek strongly advocated the independence of Korea and wanted to assist in the independence of Vietnam. Roosevelt firmly supported Chiang kai-sheks efforts to end imperialism in East Asia. To end the conference off, on December 1, the Allies issued the Cairo Declaration, demanding Japan's unconditional surrender and the return of all occupied lands.    I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And so the drive to Sio was raging on, the Japanese were not being given a moment to breathe as they continued their withdrawal further north. Back over in Japan, Tojo was trying to win over China, but the allies were making sure to keep Chiang Kai-shek firmly in the fold in a 4d game of global chess.

7/8: Judgment at Tokyo: World War II on Trial and the Making of Modern Asia Hardcover – by Gary J. Bass https://www.amazon.com/Judgment-Tokyo-World-Making-Modern/dp/1101947101 In the weeks after Japan finally surrendered to the Allies to end World War II, the world turned to the question of how to move on from years of carnage and destruction. For Harry Truman, Douglas MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek, and their fellow victors, the question of justice seemed clear: Japan's militaristic leaders needed to be tried and punished for the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor; shocking atrocities against civilians in China, the Philippines, and elsewhere; and rampant abuses of prisoners of war in notorious incidents such as the Bataan death march. For the Allied powers, the trial was an opportunity to render judgment on their vanquished foes, but also to create a legal framework to prosecute war crimes and prohibit the use of aggressive war, building a more peaceful world under international law and American hegemony. For the Japanese leaders on trial, it was their chance to argue that their war had been waged to liberate Asia from Western imperialism and that the court was victors' justice. 1946 Hideki Tojo on trial, Tokyo

9/11 Memorial day. Entertainment from 1991. George Washington saved at Brandywine, Hideki Tojo tried to commit suicide before he was executed, Ford Pinto went on sale, Atari game system went on sale. Todays birthdays - Jimmie Davis, Dennis Tufano, Amymadigan, Tommy Shaw, Virginia Madsen, Kristy McNichol, Harry Connick jr., Taraji P. Hansen, Ludacris, Charles Kelly.Intro - Pour some sugar on me - Def Leppard http://defleppard.com/Have you forgotten - Darryl WorleyI did it for you - Bryan AdamsBrand new man - Brooks & DunnBirthdays - In da club - 50 Cent http://50cent.com/You are my sunshine - Jimmie DavisKind of a drag - The BuckinghamsToo much time on my hands - StyxHad to be you - Harry Connick jrMoney maker - LudacrisNeed you now - Lady Ahttps://www.coolcasts.cooolmedia.com/show/history-factoids-about-today/

In 1933, at the height of the British Empire, a small island off the north east coast of Europe controlled 25% of the world's population and land mass. India, Canada, Australia, the British West Indies, parts of South America and Africa were all under British sway to one degree or another for the better part of the preceding century or longer. In its heyday, this mighty colonial power was admired for the innovation and enlightened principles it brought to newly conquered lands. Now, however, some modern historians want to set the record straight and reconsider British colonialism by its true nature: one defined by mass torture, rape, censorship, and starvation. The British so-called commitment to virtue and social progress, they argue, was a fallacy used to hide the cruelty with which they dominated their underlings.  For these historians, the Brits were no less violent or savage than Russia's Stalin or Japan's Hideki Tojo. Other historians see the vilification of Britain by modern historians as lacking in context; Britain was no better or worse than all the other empires that preceded it. The British Empire is being unfairly blamed for the current economic and political woes of the global south, while the positive attributes they introduced to their colonies - such as free markets, the rule of law, and public transport - fail to receive the acknowledgement they deserve. Lest we are prepared to demand apologies from every colonial power that sought to grow their empire over the last two thousand years, Britain should be left well enough alone. Arguing for the motion is James Heartfield, he's a historian and author of Britain's Empires: A History, 1600–2020 Arguing against the motion is Nigel Biggar, theologian, ethicist, and author of Colonialism: A Moral Reckoning SOURCES: Oxford Union, British Pathe, CNN   The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths - @rudyardg.   Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to podcast@munkdebates.com.   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 10+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz Editor: Kieran Lynch

La orquesta del flautista José Antonio Fajardo triunfaba en salones bailables y en discos Puchito y Panart con el emblema "Fajardo y sus estrellas". Rudy Calzado le ponía voz a sus éxitos. La banda sonora de la primera mitad de la década del 50 del siglo XX cubano, marcada por el auge del chachachá, nos permite acercarnos al repertorio de las orquestas más destacadas. La fiebre del nuevo ritmo recorría todos los escenarios. Una de las más reconocidas y antiguas jazz bands de la Isla: la Hermanos Castro, con su vocalista principal Carlos Díaz, no faltaba en las programaciones de la radio y televisión independientes. Emisiones en directo desde la veterana Radio Progreso que en 1953 estrenaba su soberbio estudio-teatro en la Avenida Infanta número 105. Frecuencia radiofónica ya entonces bien conocida como "La onda de la alegría". Continuamos en "la onda de la alegría", uno de los escenarios permanentes de la Orquesta Aragón durante más de cuatro décadas. Audición del mes de noviembre de 1955. Con la charanga eterna: Olga Guillot y Fernando Albuerne: "Sabrosón" es un chachachá de César Portillo de la Luz. Despide este segmento inicial en clave chá, el guitarrista, arreglista y compositor holguinero Juanito Márquez. Formidable producción discográfica Velvet del año 1960. Recordaremos a tres icónicas e influyentes figuras de la era del swing: el trompetista Harry James, el baterista Gene Krupa y el trombonista Glenn Miller, presentes de alguna manera en el estilo y sonoridad del Conjunto Casino, una de las agrupaciones más progresivas de su tipo en la Isla. El intro de "After you have gone", exitoso tema de la banda de Gene Krupa, asimilado por los músicos del "Casino". Diciembre de 1953, bailable de Nochebuena emitido por CMQ RadioCentro. Así le ponían swing a la conga-comparsa "Los Dandys" del barrio habanero de Belén. Con el Conjunto Casino del año 1950 volvíamos al estudio-teatro número 2 de CMQ-RadioCentro. Roberto Faz y Roberto Espí nos dejaron escuchar sus versiones de "Again" y "Monalisa", clásicos norteamericanos adaptados al bolero, desde sendas presentaciones en los estelares "Cumbanchoa" y el "Gran Show de la Mañana". "Serenata a la luz de la luna", original del binomio Miller-Parish, a la manera de Rolito Rodríguez. Versión al español de la compositora Tania Castellanos. Nunca es tarde si la música es buena. Los cristales de sus gafas, similares a los utilizados por el militar japonés Hideki Tojo, primer ministro de la nación nipona durante la segunda guerra mundial, le ganaron al trombonista Generoso Jiménez el sobrenombre de "Tojo", durante buena parte de su carrera. Como buen augurio, a pesar de los acostumbrados altibajos del músico popular, antes de trasladarse a La Habana, integró la formación que daría lugar a la gran Orquesta Aragón: la "Rítmica 39". Su facilidad natural para la improvisación le permitió introducirse en el ambiente artístico-musical habanero de los primeros años 40, como arreglista y ejecutante. En la orquesta del "Tropicana" compartió atriles junto a otros pioneros del jazz cubano, entre ellos: Armando Romeu. El tremendo desarrollo de la radio independiente en directo lo condujo a integrar la banda del Show "Carnaval Trinidad y hermano", estelar espacio protagonizado por el genial "Cascarita". Generoso Jiménez: su incesante trasiego por la música cubana de comienzos de los años 50 auguraba los ecos inmortales del sabroso montuno que le acompañó hasta el final de su vida, compartido con Castellanos, utilero de la banda del Beny, y que el lajero cantaría hasta la saciedad. "Generoso como toca usted" un sello distintivo entre los ejecutantes de ese difícil instrumento. Música y músicos de Cuba. Generoso Jiménez en la memoria

Last time we spoke about actions in New Guinea and the Japanese counteroffensive in Arakan. The good ol boys down unda were getting ready to launch a major offensive aimed to seize Lae and Salamaua. The Australian and American forces gradually built up enough strength to commence the offensive and high command decided to launch some feints, such as at Mubo to distract the Japanese from their real intentions. Over in Arakan, Irwins disaster was still paying dividends to the Japanese as General Koga launched a massive counterattack. Things were continuing to get worse for the British in Burma, though General Slim was beginning to make improvements. Lastly the British began a propaganda campaign to boost morale in the far east using the mad onion man Wingates recent adventure with the Chindits. Things were looking rough in the CBI theater.  This episode is the Operation Postern, the drive to Salamaua Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    I just want to say before we begin, this episode will feel a bit like one of those old tv episodes that rehashes what happened during that season. You've heard me say it a few times, but because we do this series in the week by week format sometimes we get into these messy weeks where either not much occurs or too much occurs. Regardless this episode is about multiple ongoing operations that culminate into the drive upon Salamaua and for the sake of coherency I am going to have to summarize a lot of what occurred in the south west pacific area for early 1943.  General Blamey devised a plan to capture Lae, codenamed Operation Postern. General MacArthur approved of the plan, which was quite complex and reflected the growing power of the allied forces in the southwest pacific. Blamey moved to New Guinea to take overall charge, reverting Herring to commander of the 1st corps, responsible for tactical operations. The key to quick success lay in convincing General Adachi, that Salamaua was the primary target for any major offensive. To accomplish this, it was necessary for the Australian and American forces to press upon the Japanese around the Salamaua area, but not Salamaua.  Operation Postern was preceded by three simultaneous operations occurring in the South west pacific area and the south pacific area. Together the three operations helped set up the conditions necessary to allow for an amphibious landing at Lae, by tying up the Japanese ground, naval and airpower in the region alongside creating important feints. The invasion of New Georgia was the first of these operations carried out by Admiral Bull Halsey and the 1st raider battalion. That offensive codenamed operation Toenails took up a lot of the Japanese ground, sea and air forces and would gradually see the allies capturing Munda. The 2nd was operation Chronicle, the seizure of Kiriwina and Woodlark islands located just northeast of Milne Bay. With their seizure, the allies were able to create new forward airfields from which to launch air strikes against Rabaul and provide air cover for multiple other operations in the region. Lastly the third operation was to be an assault on Nassau Bay, which we will talk about a bit later. Now back to the ground forces.   The 8th Area Army at Rabaul sent General Adachi and the 18th army to secure important areas west of Lae and Salamaua and to do so an offensive was launched against Wau. This prompted the Australian high command to send Brigadier Moten and the 17th brigade over to defend Wau in January of 1943. The battle to defend was tough, but the allies were able to prolong the Japanese advance long enough to transport enough troops to save Wau. The Japanese were sent retreating over to the Mubo area, but instead of pursuing the enemy, Moten limited his men's actions to patrols. The New Guinea force wished to pursue the Japanese, but was prevented by logistical difficulties. As the Australians gathered more strength, the Japanese prepared a second attempt to capture Way. This time the Japanese planned to approach Wau from the north, building a road from Markham point into the snake river valley. From there the Japanese advance would hit Wau. The 51st division was earmarked for the task, but the battle of the Bismarck sea had caused devastating losses to the convoy bringing them over in March of 1943.  The battle of the Bismarck sea had pressed upon the Japanese high command the increasing allied airpower, leading them to reformulate their plans. The Japanese began to construct a road to compensate for their inability to transport men and materials to New Guinea via the sea. As the Japanese did this, on the other side, the allies now felt very secure at Wau and were willing to perform some offensives. General Savige's 3rd division was given command of the Wau-Bulolo area. For this task he had the 17th brigade, the 2/3rd, 25th and 2/7th independent companies. It was believed the Japanese had around 5500 men around Lae and Salamaua with around 6-8 thousand at Madang and 9- 11 thousand at Wewak. Savige was ordered not to attack Salamaua directly, so he decided to establish firm bases as far forward as possible to harass the Japanese, basically you can see this as forward offensive patrol actions. Now the Japanese had dug in some defensive positions in places called the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation Hill which were along the main track from Wau to Mubo. On April 24th, the 2/7th independent company were given a new mission; to clear the Japanese from the vicinity of Mubo. Moten approved a plan for the seizure of the Pimple and Green Hill, ordering Major Warfe and his 2/3rd company to harass the Japanese logistical routes in Mubo as a distraction as the 2/7th hit the Pimple. The Japanese had made the Pimple a nightmare for the allied forces. They had taken defensive positions on commanding ground allowing for concealed ambushes. They cleared firing lanes to enable their machine guns to gundown anyone who took a forward approach. By holding the high grounds they also thwarted the allies from utilizing grenades effectively.   On the morning of April 24, after 20 minutes of air attacks by Boston aircraft against Green Hill, Stony Creek, Observation Hill and Kitchen Creek, the offensive kicked off with a two pronged attack. The 2/7th would start from the Vicker's ridge track, moving in two columns: one going along the Jap track towards the Pimple; the other would move north along the Laws track, a very difficult and quite unknown trail to try an encircle the Pimple from the west. When the two columns got within 100 yards of the pimple, they were met with light machine gun fire and snipers. The Australians attempted an all out assault in the late afternoon, but were unable to gain any ground. The next morning 3 Bostons came roaring in to strafe and bomb Green Hill while allied artillery began to bombard the Pimple. Despite the increased firepower the Australians still were unable to dislodge the enemy with their proceeding assaults. It turns out the Australians had greatly underestimate the defensive capabilities of the Pimple position. Reconnaissance had failed to pinpoint the enemy positions prior to the offensive. A major lack of communication between the two columns because they had no telephone lines or wireless communications led to a lack of coordination, neither allied column knew the plight of the other. Runners were used, but they were too slow and extremely vulnerable to Japanese snipers. The offensive was quickly falling apart as the Japanese continued to reinforce their lines. Meanwhile Warfe's men conducted a number of raids and ambushes in the Missim area, Komiatum Hill and Bobdubi Ridge. Warfe then sent a patrol from Namling along the Bench Cut track to ambush the Japanese at the junction between the Francisco river and the Buirali Creek. The ambush was a large success leading to the deaths of 18 Japanese. Warfe tried to perform an identical operation on April 28th, but this time his men were ambushed by the Japanese at Goodview junctions suffering considerable casualties. As a result of the forward patrolling of Warfe's men, the allies had learned the Dobdubi ridge area was defended quite lightly. Having learnt this, Ware decided to order a second platoon to capture the northern part of the ridge on April 27th. By the end of the month Warfe had two platoons spread over the Bobdubi ridge area, with a 3rd platoon held in reserve at Missim.  Over in his headquarters, Moten now realized the offensive against the Pimple was far too costly and he decided the men should simply bypass it. However the commander in the field, General Savige continued to launch attacks. The reason why Savige pressed on was because on April 28th, one of his reconnaissance patrols found a position on Pimple unoccupied and kicked seized it before the Japanese could return to man it. Colonel Guinn on the ground there deduced the Japanese must have been expecting an airstrike and momentarily left their positions. He therefore elected to order another company led by Captain Leslie Tatterson brought forward to assault the pimple. This time however, the allies used deception. Instead of launching an airstrike and artillery against the Pimple they passed over it and bombarded Green Hill. The deception did not work as planned and Saviges men yet again were unable to make any ground against the pimple. By early May the 2/7th battalion had lost 12 men dead with 25 wounded against the pimple with no end in sight. Meanwhile on May 3rd, an offensive was launched against the northern part of the Bobdubi ridge. The Australians were able to  fight their way close to the mouth of the Francisco river, prompting the Japanese to pull up reinforcements in the form of 70 SNLF marines from Salamua. A battle was fought in a place called the South Coconuts on May 5th. The Australians performed encircling maneuvers, managing to surround large pockets of the Japanese whom they smashed with artillery. The Australians were met with 3 major counter attacks but held their ground successfully occupying another place called the Center Coconuts by May 7th. However the Japanese then performed another counterattack, utilizing mortars to great effect, pushing the Australians back. The Japanese further reinforced the area with 60 additional men coming up from Salamaua, but they were ambushed by the Australians at the North Coconuts location suffering 20 casualties.     On May 9th, Captain Tattersons men were struck a lethal blow when they ran into a Japanese booby trap along the Jap Track. The Japanese opened fire upon the Australians on the track and began to encircle them. Colonel Guinn led a small force along the track to break the encirclement while Tatterson's men resisted tenaciously against the Japanese. Tatterson's force had been completely surrounded by the afternoon of May 9th and were in a state of desperation. The Australians utilized booby-traps, fire control and mass grenade attacks to force the Japanese to give them breathing room. The next day the Japanese launched a fierce attack against Tatterson's rear. The Australians could hear Japanese officers screaming orders as their riflemen poured lead upon them. As the Japanese pressed upon them they were receiving 500 additional reinforcements from the 102nd and 115th regiments. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion of the 102nd regiment in Nassau bay received orders “to capture the high area on the right bank of the Buyawim River fork” to be done in coordination with the May 9th attacks. This action would have endangered the allied positions at Lababia camp, but luckily the Japanese commander decided instead to hold a defensive positions at the bank of the Bitoi mouth. This allowed Colonel Guinn to concentrate some of his forces at Lababia camp. By May 11th, a company of 60 men managed to break the Japanese encirclement of Tatterson's men. According to Tatterson, by 7am on the 11th, the Japanese had continued to fire heavily upon his force, but made no further attempts to advance. It seemed to him the Japanese were actually withdrawing and the increased rifle fire and mortars was a cover. Tattersons men had been battered, he himself was wounded. His force received 12 casualties and estimated they had inflicted 100 casualties upon the enemy with possibly 50 deaths. Having saved Tatterson, Guinn reorganized his forward units and began to dig in along the Jap track and Lababia camp. From May 15th onwards the 17th brigade focused on aggressive patrolling in all sectors. Aggressive patrols each day harassed the Japanese around the Pimple and Observation Hill. The Australians set up booby-traps, practically paralyzing the Japanese troop movements outside their trenches. General Okabe received some much needed reinforcements over the course of the week and began to launch some limited attacks against the south, central and north Coconut areas. Okabe's forces were repelled on the 12th and 13th, but things would greatly change on the 14th.  The 14th saw a heavy shelling of the Bobdubi ridge area before Okabe launched a full scale attack that overwhelmed the Australian defenders forcing them to make a fighting withdrawal from the north and central area further down in the south coconut area. General Nakano was displeased with his troops and issued an address of instruction of May 17th, it is as follows  "In the attack at Bobdubi, although a certain group was advancing on a height on the enemy's flank, instead of really carrying out the attack in such a way as to prepare the way for an assault by our main force, they went no further than a vain firing at the enemy with their weapons. The spiritual and physical strength which was worn down in the Wau campaign is at the present time still lower, but I believe it can easily be restored if the officers will take the initiative, set an example and command as leaders of their men." Despite Nakano's criticism, his men would take a lot of ground forcing the Australians further south, dangerously close to Warfe's headquarters. Warfe realized maintaining the position would lead to heavy casualties, so he pulled his force out and took up a position at Namling.  It was quite fortunate as the day after he made this decision, 20 Japanese dive bombers strafed and bombed the village of Bobdubi. This was part of a Japanese heavy air raid that began on May 15th, culminating in over 100 Japanese aircraft hitting multiple Australian positions over the course of a few days. Three heavy raids were performed, but these air attacks focused general far into the Australian rear, leaving the forward positions rather untouched. On may 17th and 18th large formations of Japanese aircraft performed a raid against Wau's airfield. Although the Australians ultimately were forced to withdraw from many forward positions, such as Warfe's units, they managed the ultimate objective of operation Postern, to take Japanese resources away from Mubo and Lae. They had inflicted numerous casualties upon the Japanese including against Major General Okabe who had stepped on a booby trap that put a bullet through his right foot. Okabe had to be evacuated on the night of may 16th as a result, flown back over to Rabaul. Command was handed over to Major General Muroya Chuichi of the 51st division. The battle for Dobdubi was nowhere near done. General Nakano sent 170 soldiers of the 115th regiment on May 17th to attack Hote via the Malolo track. Nakano estimated the Australians had around 50 men defending Hote. The Japanese force ran into 25 Australians at Cissembob along the way and the defenders inflicted 50 casualties upon the Japanese before withdrawing towards Ohibe. One Australian commander at Cissembob had this to say about the engagement  "During this running fight, all men were under very heavy fire, but once again it was brought out what rotten shots the Japanese were. Not one of our boys were hit, and believe me things were hot." The Australians would return to the Hote area on the 22nd to find it completely deserted, so they simply reoccupied their lost positions. That is it for the New Guinea campaign, but other significant events unfolded for the Pacific War during this time period. On April 21st, with a heavy heart President Roosevelt announced to the American people the Japanese had executed several airmen from the famous Doolittle raid. To refresh your memories, 8 of the Doolittle pilots had been captured in Jiangsu province and put on military trial within China and sentenced to death “because of their act against humanity”. They were then transported to Tokyo where the Army ministry reviewed their case. Hideki Tojo initially opposed the death sentences for fearing the Americans would retaliate against Japanese living in America, he would be right about this. Sugiyama and the rest of the Army general staff however insisted on executing all 8 of the pilots who had contributed to the deaths of around 50 civilians and thwart possible future air raids against Japan. The executions would be authorized by an ex post facto military regulation specifically drafted by the army ministry. What is interesting to note, is Emperor Hirohito chose to intervene and commuted the punishment of 5 out of the 8 pilots. Why he allowed the other 3 to die in violation of international law is unknown as the Japanese destroyed nearly all documentation pertaining to prisoners of war by the end of the war. Some historians theorize Hirohito wished to demonstrate his benevolence. Yet again, this is one of those moments that showcases Hirohito was a very active participant, despite the claims made for decades after the war that he was merely a powerless hostage. The 3 men were executed via firing squad at a cemetery outside Shanghai in China on October 14th of 1942. It was not until april of 1943 that the Doolittle Raid operation was fully disclosed to the American public. The US war department said the chief reason for not explaining the full details of the Doolittle raid sooner was the need to bring the Doolittle pilots safely home and to prevent reprisals against their Chinese allies who aided the pilots. In April of 1943 the 5 surviving pilots were moved to Nanjing and in December of 1943 Pilot Robert Meder died of beri beri. He had been starving for months and rejected medical assistance. His death would result in improvements of conditions for the remaining 4 pilots. A truly tragic part of this war and to add to this I would like to read a short piece written by one of the pilots who survived the captivity and became a Christian missionary in Japan after the war.   I Was a Prisoner of Japan   By Jacob DeShazer   I was a prisoner of war for 40 long months, 34 of them in solitary confinement.   When I flew as a member of a bombing squadron on a raid over enemy territory on April 18, 1942, my heart was filled with bitter hatred for the people of that nation. When our plane ran out of petrol and the members of the crew of my plane had to parachute down into enemy-held territory and were captured by the enemy, the bitterness of my heart against my captors seemed more than I could bear.   Taken to prison with the survivors of another of our planes, we were imprisoned and beaten, half-starved, terribly tortured, and denied by solitary confinement even the comfort of association with one another. Three of my buddies were executed by a firing squad about six months after our capture and 14 months later, another one of them died of slow starvation. My hatred for the enemy nearly drove me crazy.   It was soon after the latter's death that I began to ponder the cause of such hatred between members of the human race. I wondered what it was that made one people hate another people and what made me hate them.   My thoughts turned toward what I heard about Christianity changing hatred between human beings into real brotherly love and I was gripped with a strange longing to examine the Christian's Bible to see if I could find the secret.   I begged my captors to get a Bible for me. At last, in the month of May, 1944, a guard brought me the book, but told me I could have it only for three weeks.   I eagerly began to read its pages. Chapter after chapter gripped my heart. In due time I came to the books of the prophets and found that their every writing seemed focused on a divine Redeemer from sin, One who was to be sent from heaven to be born in the form of a human babe. Their writings so fascinated me that I read them again and again until I had earnestly studied them through six times. Then I went on into the New Testament and there read of the birth of Jesus Christ, the One who actually fulfilled the very prophecies of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Micah, and the other Old Testament writers.   My heart rejoiced as I found confirmed in Acts 10:43, "To Him give all the prophets witness, that through His Name, whosoever believeth on Him shall receive remission of sins." After I carefully read this book of the Acts, I continued on into the study of the epistle Paul wrote to the Christians at Rome.   On June 8, 1944 the words in Romans 10:9 stood out boldly before my eyes: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved."   That very moment, God gave me grace to confess my sins to Him and He forgave me all my sins and saved me for Jesus' sake. I later found that His Word again promises this so clearly in 1 John 1:9, "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness."   How my heart rejoiced in my newness of spiritual life, even though my body was suffering so terribly from the physical beatings and lack of food! But suddenly I discovered that God had given me new spiritual eyes and that when I looked at the enemy officers and guards who had starved and beaten my companions and me so cruelly, I found my bitter hatred for them changed to loving pity.   I realized that these people did not know anything about my Savior and that if Christ is not in a heart, it is natural to be cruel. I read in my Bible that while those who crucified Jesus had beaten Him and spit upon Him before He was nailed to the cross, on the cross He tenderly prayed in His moment of excruciating suffering, "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do."   And now, from the depths of my heart, I too prayed for God to forgive my torturers, and I determined by the aid of Christ to do my best to acquaint these people with the message of salvation that they might become as other believing Christians.   With His love controlling my heart, the 13th chapter of 1 Corinthians took on a living meaning: "Love suffereth long, and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity but rejoiceth in truth; beareth all things, believeth all things. Love never faileth."   A year passed by and during that year the memories of the weeks I had been permitted to spend with my Bible grew sweeter and sweeter day by day. Then, one day as I was sitting in my solitary confinement cell I became very sick. My heart was paining me, even as my fellow prisoner had told me his was paining him just before he died of starvation.   I slid down onto my knees and began to pray. The guards rushed in and began to punish me, but I kept right on praying. Finally they let me alone. God, in that hour, revealed unto me how to endure suffering.   At last freedom came. On August 20, 1945 parachutists dropped onto the prison grounds and released us from our cells. We were flown back to our own country and placed in hospitals where we slowly regained our physical strength.   I have completed my training in a Christian college, God having clearly commanded me: "Go, teach those people who held you prisoner, the way of salvation through the blood of Jesus Christ," and am now back in that land as a missionary, with one single purpose--to make Christ known.   I am sending this testimony to people everywhere, with the earnest prayer that a great host of people may confess Jesus Christ as their personal Savior.   Alongside the unfortunate news for the Americans on May 14th a major tragedy occurred for the Australians. At 4:10am on the 14th, the Australian Hospital Ship Centaur was on a run from Sydney to Port Moresby when she was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. The torpedo struck her portside oil fuel tank below the waterline, creating a 10 meter hole, igniting fuel and setting the ship ablaze. The ship was luckily not carrying patients, but held her normal crew staff, around 332 personnel on board. Many of those on board were killed instantly from the concussion blast, others from the blazing inferno. Centaur quickly took on water from her breach, rolled to port and sank bow-first, submerging within 3 minutes. Her rapid sinking prevented the deployment of lifeboats, though two would break off as she went down. According to Centaurs second officer Gordon Rippon, she was hit 44km northeast of Point Lookout. Of the 332 people onboard, only 64 would survive, most of the crew had been asleep when she was hit, giving barely a chance to react. It is estimated that 200 people may have been alive inside Centaur as she sank. Several who escaped the ship would die of shrapnel wounds or drown having found nothing to support them in the water. The survivors spent 36 hours in the water clinging to barrels, wreckage and two damaged lifeboats. The survivors drifted around 36 kms in the water going further north east. On the morning of May 15th, the destroyer USS Mugford departed Brisbane, escorted the New Zealand freighter Sussex when she saw some of the shipwrecked survivors. Sailors aboard the Mugford took up positions with rifles fending off sharks from the survivors. It took an hour and 20 minutes to rescue all 64 people. One of the survivors was sister Ellen Savage, the only surviving nurse from 12 aboard the Centaur. In 1944 Ellen Savage was presented the George Medal for providing medical care, boosting morale and displaying courage during the time they waited for rescue. The identity of the attacker was suspected to be a Japanese submarine. At the time of the attack three KD7 Kaidai class submarines were operating off Australians east coast; The I-177 commanded by Hajime Nakagawa, the I-178 commanded by Hidejiro Utsuki and the I-180 commanded by Toshio Kusaka. None of these submarines survived the Pacific War; the I-177 was sunk by the USS Samual S Miles on october 3rd of 1944; the I-178 was sunk by the USS Patterson on august 25th of 1943 and the i-180 was sunk by the USS Gilmore on april 26th of 1944. In December of 1943 following protests, the Japanese government issued an official statement denying any responsibility for the sinking of the Centaur. The sinking of a hospital ship was a war crime, and investigations were conducted between 1944-1948. The conclusion of the investigate suspected the I-177 of Nakagawa to be the most likely culprit, but there was not enough evidence, thus the case was closed on december 14th of 1948. Nakagawa survived the war and until his death in 1991 refused to speak about the suspected attack on the Centaur. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Australian and American forces in New Guinea were fighting tooth and nail towards their ultimate goal of Salamaua, trying to deceive the Japanese the whole while. Soon battles for Lae and Salamaua will be fought to rid New Guinea of the Japanese menace. 

O general e primeiro ministro do Japão morreu faz hoje 74 anos.

(Bonus) Hideki Tojo (December 30, 1884 – December 23, 1948) was a Japanese politician, general of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and convicted war criminal who served as Prime Minister of Japan and President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association for most of World War II. He assumed several more positions including Chief of Staff of the Imperial Army before ultimately being removed from office in July 1944. During his years in power, his leadership was marked by extreme state-perpetrated violence in the name of Japanese ultranationalism, much of which he was personally involved in.

This week, Justin sits down with journalist Chris Corola. Chris spent many years following the story of Jack Wilpers, one of the last surviving men on a team of World War II soldiers that captured Hideki Tojo, prime minister of Japan during WWII and a convicted war criminal. Jack was difficult to get ahold of, but Chris never backed down. Hear about Jack's interesting upbringing, his journey to counterintelligence, and key details of the events that led to Tojo's capture--and  Jack's CIA career to follow.Connect with Spycraft 101:Check out Justin's latest release, Covert Arms, here.spycraft101.comIG: @spycraft101Shop: spycraft-101.myshopify.comPatreon: Spycraft 101Find Justin's first book, Spyshots: Volume One, here.Download the free eBook, The Clandestine Operative's Sidearm of Choice, here.North American Ag SpotlightDevoted to highlighting the people & companies in agriculture who impact our industry...Listen on: Apple Podcasts Spotify Veterans In Politics by CampaignForceVeterans In Politics is a set of interviews with politicians who've served in the militaryListen on: Apple Podcasts SpotifySupport the show

► STØTT WOLFGANG WEE UNCUT!Ler mer her: https://www.wolfgangweeuncut.no/slik-stotter-du-wolfgang-wee-uncut/ Nå som jeg har sagt opp jobben og satser for fullt på Wolfgang Wee Uncut, setter jeg enormt stor pris på alle som ønsker å støtte podcasten. Det gjør at jeg kan holde podcasten åpen og tilgjengelig for alle, og holde trykket oppe. Se hele episoden her: https://youtu.be/HDrngKQahC0 Hentet fra Wolfgang Wee Uncut #270: Asle Toje er forfatter, nestleder i Nobelkomiteen, og statsviter, med doktorgrad i internasjonale relasjoner fra University of Cambridge. #wolfgangweeuncut ► WWU KLIPPKANALhttps://www.youtube.com/wwuklipp ► SOSIALE MEDIER:• Hjemmeside: http://www.wolfgangweeuncut.com• Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/wolfgangwee/• Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/wolfgangweeu...• Twitter: https://twitter.com/wolfgangwee• TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@wolfgangwee Our GDPR privacy policy was updated on August 8, 2022. Visit acast.com/privacy for more information.

Wolfgang Wee Uncut #270: Asle Toje er forfatter, nestleder i Nobelkomiteen, og statsviter, med doktorgrad i internasjonale relasjoner fra University of Cambridge. #wolfgangweeuncutRettelse fra Asle Toje: Hideko Tojo var ikke til stede da offiserer i Kwantung-hæren i september 1931 fabrikkerte et angrep på den japanske jernbanen i Mandsjuria nærheten av Mukden. I dialog med statsministeren sendte den japanske krigsministeren Jirō Minami generalmajor Yoshitsugu Tatekawa til Manchuria for det spesifikke formålet å slå ned Kwantung-hærens ordrenekt og grenseoverskridende aggresjon. Tatekawa ble distrahert med festligheter mens offiserene rigget en jernbanebombing som deretter ble brukt for å legitimere det preventive angrepet som Tatekawa var sendt for å avverge. Tojo Hideki var sjef for, Kempeitai – det Japanske Gestapo - i Kwantung-hæren fra 1935 til 1937. Jeg beklager feilen. For de som ønsker å lese mer om dette, start gjerne med; Weland, James (1994). "Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931". Journal of Military History. 58 (3): 445–460.Temaer: Japan Spesial | Keiserriket, Hiroshima, Samuraiene, General Hideki Tojo, Manga, Battle Royale.Se hele episoden her: https://youtu.be/HDrngKQahC0 See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Wolfgang Wee Uncut #270: Asle Toje er forfatter, nestleder i Nobelkomiteen, og statsviter, med doktorgrad i internasjonale relasjoner fra University of Cambridge. #wolfgangweeuncutRettelse fra Asle Toje: Hideko Tojo var ikke til stede da offiserer i Kwantung-hæren i september 1931 fabrikkerte et angrep på den japanske jernbanen i Mandsjuria nærheten av Mukden. I dialog med statsministeren sendte den japanske krigsministeren Jirō Minami generalmajor Yoshitsugu Tatekawa til Manchuria for det spesifikke formålet å slå ned Kwantung-hærens ordrenekt og grenseoverskridende aggresjon. Tatekawa ble distrahert med festligheter mens offiserene rigget en jernbanebombing som deretter ble brukt for å legitimere det preventive angrepet som Tatekawa var sendt for å avverge. Tojo Hideki var sjef for, Kempeitai – det Japanske Gestapo - i Kwantung-hæren fra 1935 til 1937. Jeg beklager feilen. For de som ønsker å lese mer om dette, start gjerne med; Weland, James (1994). "Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931". Journal of Military History. 58 (3): 445–460.Temaer: Japan Spesial | Keiserriket, Hiroshima, Samuraiene, General Hideki Tojo, Manga, Battle Royale.Se hele episoden her: https://youtu.be/HDrngKQahC0 See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as the Soviet invasion of Manchukuo, Japan formally accepted the unconditional surrender terms imposed on her by the Allies. As general Douglas MacArthur landed on Japanese soil he immediately called for the arrest of suspected war criminals Hideki Tojo and Nobusuke Kishi, the Tokyo Trial then ensued.  After years of war Japanese cities were decimated by incendiary and the atomic bombings while the Japanese populace was on the brink of mass starvation. MacArthur now has the goal of restoring this annihilated nation and rebuilding it. With the Cold War forming what does the future of Japan hold?  Topics Covered  Potsdam acceptance Tokyo Trial Rebuilding Japan Article 9 and the new constitution China falls to the reds Korean War Douglas MacArthur gets sackedSupport the show

Shinzo Abe is Japan's longest serving prime minister. Abe comes from a long dynasty of politicians including those who served The Empire of Japan in World War II. Japan unlike Germany was able to avoid most of the punishment dulled out after WWII.  Nobusuke Kishi is Abe's maternal grandfather who would become Prime Minister and go on to shape post war Japan. Kishi was mentored by Hideki Tojo and was a war criminal, who ruled over Manchukuo or the Japanese puppet state in China. His nickname was the "Monster of the Showa Era".  This is the story of Nobusuke Kishi and his rise to power, subsequent fall, and rise to power again in an American aligned Japan.Support the show

The Context of White Supremacy hosts the 6th and final study session on Philip K. Dick's The Man in the High Castle. Published in 1962, Dick's award-winning science fiction novel is lauded as one of the greatest of all time. Dick is a White Man who died forty years ago at the age of 53, but left an enormous legacy in White literature. In addition to being a torrid writer, Dick was also a drug addict and UFO enthusiast. His substance dependency may help explain his sordid imagination and focus on alternate worlds. Last week's session saw Mr. Tagomi kills two Nazi "thugs" to protect Mr. Baynes and himself. Baynes divulged the Nazi's "Operation Dandelion," which intended to overthrow the Japanese empire to create one Nazi universe. Afterwards, Tagomi feels intense guilt and can no longer possess the Civil War firearm used in the killing. He attempts to return it to Mr. Childan, who refuses to accept the return now that he's aware of the numerous fraudulent pistols. Tagomi instead purchases one of the EdFrink jewels to help restore his sense of balance. After fondling the item, Tagomi somehow falls into the "real" 1962. He tries to boss around Whites, who treat him brusquely and brand him "Tojo" - the name of Gen. Hideki Tojo, who was executed as a war criminal following World War II. Meanwhile, Juliana slits Joe's throat once she finds out he's a spy en route to kill Hawthorne Abendsen. #Tojo #TheMan INVEST in The COWS – http://paypal.me/TheCOWS Cash App: https://cash.app/$TheCOWS CALL IN NUMBER: 720.716.7300 CODE: 564943#

Thursday, March 10th 8:00PM Eastern / 5:00PM Pacific The Context of White Supremacy hosts the 6th and final study session on Philip K. Dick's The Man in the High Castle. Published in 1962, Dick's award-winning science fiction novel is lauded as one of the greatest of all time. Dick is a White Man who died forty years ago at the age of 53, but left an enormous legacy in White literature. In addition to being a torrid writer, Dick was also a drug addict and UFO enthusiast. His substance dependency may help explain his sordid imagination and focus on alternate worlds. Last week's session saw Mr. Tagomi kills two Nazi "thugs" to protect himself and Mr. Baynes. Afterwards he feels intense guilt and can no longer possess the Civil War firearm used in the killing. He attempts to return it to Mr. Childan, who refuses to accept it back now that he's aware of the numerous fraudulent pistols. Tagomi instead purchase one of the EdFrink jewels to help restore his sense of balance. After fondling the item, Tagomi somehow falls into the "real" 1962. He tries to boss around Whites, who treat him brusquely and brand him "tojo" - the name of Gen. Hideki Tojo, who was executed as a war criminal following World War II. Meanwhile, Juliana slits Joe's throat once she finds out he's a spy en route to kill Hawthorne Abendsen. #Tojo #TheMan INVEST in The COWS – http://paypal.me/TheCOWS Invest in The C.O.W.S. - https://cash.app/$TheCOWS CALL IN NUMBER: 720.716.7300 CODE 564943# The C.O.W.S. Radio Program is specifically engineered for black & non-white listeners - Victims of White Supremacy. The purpose of this program is to provide Victims of White Supremacy with constructive information and suggestions on how to counter Racist Woman & Racist Man. Phone: 1-720-716-7300 - Access Code 564943# Hit star *6 & 1 to enter caller cue

Coming hot on the heels of last week's episode, the villains can add another ugly monster to their number. Hideki Tojo was Japan's fascist, genocidal answer to Himmler in Germany. Throughout his career, only Imperial Japanese priorities would matter, and if people got in the way, he treated them as an inconvenience or a resource. Ultimately, he faced justice in a way few war criminals did, but the blood he spilt in the twentieth century is a stain on Japan's history. Taylor Blinds & Shutters

Es uno de los arquitectos principales de la participación japonesa en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Y de su mano vinieron la violencia, los excesos, los experimentos humanos, la masacre de Nanking y la marcha de la muerte de Bataan. Hablemos de Hideki Tojo. Imagen: Hideki Tojo, fotógrafo sin identificar. Fuentes / Textos - Declaración de guerra de Japón a Estados Unidos e Inglaterra, leída por Hideki Tojo. Fuentes / Videos - INTERKAST (2020) 海行かば/Umi Yukaba - Anthem of the Japanese Empire (1937-1945) Youtube. Fuentes / Sitios Web - Criticalpast.com - Wikipedia Música: Miami Nights – Extended Theme Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

In this second installment of the “story after the story” miniseries, James and Scott discuss the postwar careers of key US Army Air Force and Marine leaders, as well as Japanese political leaders. Persons mentioned in the episode include Generals Curtis LeMay and Holland Smith, Col. Chesty Puller, and Major Cleland E. Early, plus Japanese Emperor Hirohito, Prime Ministers Fumimaro Konoe, Hideki Tojo, Kuniaki Koiso, and Kantaro Suzuki; Admirals Soemu Toyoda, Jisaburo Ozawa and Takeo Kurita; General Yoshijiro Umezu; Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura; and Commander Minoru Genda.

In the hours, days and weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan's forces coordinated a vast takeover of the Pacific. Back at home, Hideki Tojo's reign as Prime Minister oversaw brutal wartime atrocities. Kate and Richard from Dictators detail the Japanese war effort, the experiments of Unit 731, and the battles that changed the course of the war. Join us Wednesday for the finale of our Pearl Harbor special.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

In the hours, days and weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan's forces coordinated a vast takeover of the Pacific. Back at home, Hideki Tojo's reign as Prime Minister oversaw brutal wartime atrocities.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Eighty years ago, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese fighter planes devastated the U.S. and spurred the nation into war. Join us for a special crossover between Dictators and Conspiracy Theories where we'll analyze the event from all sides, starting with the life of Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo — a career militarist whose devotion to Japan thrust him into power. We'll be back Wednesday with a Conspiracy Theories episode exploring how tensions between the U.S. and Japan reached a fever pitch as WWII broke out.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

In the 1860s, Japan's emperor was restored and the once-isolated island nation opened to the world. Out of this period of transition came Hideki Tojo — a ruthless career militarist whose devotion to his country thrust him into power. This is the first part of our deep dive into the attack on Pearl Harbor. Come back Wednesday for the next installment, where our friends from Conspiracy Theories explore how the tensions between the U.S. and Japan reached a fever pitch as WWII broke out.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

November 12th, 1947. The notorious Hideki Tojo, General of the Imperial Japanese Army, is put on trial for war crimes. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

(Víspera del Día Internacional de la Paz) «En el salón decorado de rojo y dorado sonó la voz fresca de la mujer: »—¿Qué nos importa a nosotros la guerra, Fernando, si vivimos felices y tranquilos...? ¿Qué puede hacernos a nosotros la guerra? ... »—A la guerra no se va por gusto, Inés, sino fatalmente. Habrá que ir.... »—¿Y por qué existe la guerra? —interrumpió ella... mirándolo con fijeza—. Sí, ¿por qué existe? Si todo el mundo puede vivir tranquilo en su casa. ¿Por qué se van a matar los hombres? Yo no lo comprendo.... Una cosa tan horrible en que todo el mundo muere, ¿por qué existe? »En sus palabras ingenuas estaba vivo el desasosiego de la guerra. Estremecía las almas, vibraba en el aire, sacudía las hojas de los árboles en los lejanos campos. Estaba desatada la guerra. En todos los rincones, mujeres llorosas decían adiós a los hombres. Por los pueblos pasaba la caballería floreciendo incendios. En aquel minuto, alguien moría de mala muerte.... »—El mundo no ha sido hecho, Inés, para lo mejor. Por eso, justamente, es difícil explicarlo. La guerra está en él, y nadie la ha traído, ni nadie podrá quitarla.»1 Así se vale el escritor venezolano Arturo Úslar Pietri de los personajes de Inés y Fernando en su novela histórica titulada Las lanzas coloradas para hacernos reflexionar sobre el inquietante tema de la guerra, que es, en realidad, el personaje central de la novela.2 Y lo cierto es que, a pesar de los grandes adelantos en la ciencia que se dieron en el siglo veinte, la pregunta que hace Inés no deja de desconcertarnos en el siglo veintiuno: «¿Por qué existe la guerra?» Actualmente está de moda afirmar que la causa principal de las guerras es la religión. Sin embargo, en los tres tomos de la Enciclopedia de las guerras, de unas 1.763 guerras que se han librado en el transcurso de la historia, los autores Phillips y Axelrod clasifican sólo 123 como de naturaleza religiosa, que no llega ni siquiera a ser el 7% de todas las guerras. En cambio, durante los regímenes de los dictadores Vladimir Lenin, Adolfo Hitler, José Stalin, Hideki Tojo, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) y Pol Pot, que no querían tener nada que ver con la religión, perecieron más de 111 millones de personas.3 «¿Saben por qué hay guerras y pleitos entre ustedes? —pregunta Santiago el apóstol—. ¡Pues porque no saben dominar su egoísmo y su maldad! —contesta él mismo—. Ustedes quieren algo, y no lo obtienen; matan, sienten envidia de alguna cosa, y como no la pueden conseguir, luchan y se hacen la guerra.»4 De modo que Fernando tiene razón: La guerra está en el mundo, porque está en cada uno de nosotros. Pero gracias a Dios, sí bien Él no la ha traído, sí puede quitarla. Por eso envió al mundo a su Hijo Jesucristo, el Príncipe de paz: para quitar nuestro pecado y darnos la paz. Y para completar, nos promete un cielo nuevo y una tierra nueva, donde la guerra ya no existirá.5 Carlos ReyUn Mensaje a la Concienciawww.conciencia.net 1 Arturo Úslar Pietri,  Las lanzas coloradas (Bogotá: Editorial Norma, 1991), pp. 16-17. 2 Hernando Téllez, «Úslar Pietri, novelista», A propósito de Arturo Úslar Pietri y su obra (Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 1991), pp. 9-15. Tomado de Textos no  recogidos en libro (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, 1979). 3 Robin Schumacher, «The Myth that Religion is the #1 Cause of War», ed. Matt Slick En línea 22 agosto 2016 («El mito de que la religión es la causa primaria de las guerras», trad. Jairo Izquierdo En línea 22 agosto 2016). 4 Stg 4:1-2 (TLA y DHH) 5 Is 9:6-7; 65:17-25; Mi 4:1-3; Jn 14:27; 2P 3:13; Ap 21

Mentiras, más mentiras, propaganda y manipulación: el Partido Republicano moderno explota muchas de las herramientas políticas del fascismo del siglo XX. Learn more about your ad-choices at https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.com

DOCUMENTATION AND ADDITIONAL READING PART 1 (0:0 - 18:26): ────────────────── A Huge Win for Religious Liberty at the Supreme Court: What Signal Does the Unanimous Decision in Fulton v. Philadelphia Send? SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Fulton v. Philadelphia USA TODAY (JOHN FRITZE) Religious freedom vs. LGBTQ rights: Supreme Court sides with Catholic foster care agency PART 2 (18:27 - 21:50): ────────────────── Education Department Announces Protection for Transgender Students Under Title IX: A Reminder That Supreme Court Decisions Can Have Seismic Effects NEW YORK TIMES (KATIE ROGERS) Title IX Protections Extend to Transgender Students, Education Dept. Says PART 3 (21:51 - 24:15): ────────────────── The Moral Issues of World War II Come Rushing Back Decades Later: What Happened to Hideki Tojo's Remains After His Execution? NEW YORK TIMES (LIVIA ALBECK-RIPKA AND HIKARI HIDA) Where Did Hideki Tojo's Body Go After His Execution? A Mystery Is Solved.

Following the recent news that unravelled the mystery of General Hideki Tojo's ashes, Michael is joined by Dr Peter Mauch, modern Japanese historian & Senior Lecturer in Modern History at Western Sydney University, about the history of General Hideki Tojo.   Hideki Tōjō was the Japanese politician and general of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) who served as Prime Minister of Japan and President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association for most of World War II.   Born on December 30, 1884 to a relatively low-ranking samurai family in the Kōjimachi district of Tokyo, Tojo began his career in the Army in 1905 steadily rising through the ranks to become a general by 1934.   By July 1940, he was appointed Minister of War to the Japanese government led by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe and upon being named Prime Minister on October 17, 1941, he oversaw Japan's decision to go to war as well as its ensuing conquest of much of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.  He also presided over numerous war crimes, including the massacre and starvation of civilians and prisoners of war.   After the war's tide decisively turned against Japan, Tojo was forced to resign as Prime Minister in July 1944 and following his nation's surrender to the Allied Powers in September 1945, he was arrested, convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in the Tokyo Trials, sentenced to death, and hanged on December 23, 1948. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Japan attacks the US naval base at Pearl Harbor in the opening salvo of the Pacific War. Caught unawares, President Franklin D. Roosevelt responds by ratcheting up America’s military capabilities at an astonishing rate. Already Prime Minister of Japan, Hideki Tojo now moves to take every significant government post for himself. As Japanese troops sweep through the Malay Peninsula, a military hospital in Singapore comes into their crosshairs. As thousands of Allied soldiers are interned in prisoner of war camps, they face conditions that beggar belief. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We return to Japan and the story of the workaholic army officer who rose through the ranks to lead his nation into total war. Hideki Tojo restores discipline to the military following the Aizawa Incident. He is promoted to Major General and rewarded with command of the secret police - the Kempeitai. The Imperial Japanese Army invades China and embarks on a campaign to terrorise the civilian population. Kempeitai operatives set up a research lab where they carry out horrific medical and weapons experiments, seeking a decisive edge over Japan’s enemies. This is only the beginning. Before long, spurred on by Prime Minister Tojo, the nation readies itself for war with the United States. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

General Hideki Tojo was the man who led Japan into World War 2 and oversaw some of the most horrific war crimes in recorded history. Tojo did not hold absolute power - his means of imposing his will were more nuanced than that. But he more than earns his place at this table. Ruling under a compliant Emperor, Tojo gathered power to himself. This is the story of the minister who outgrew his master, the bureaucrat whose relentless work ethic took him to the apex of Japan’s totalitarian military state. Hideki Tojo is born in 1884. Japan is an emerging power on the world stage, a nation growing in confidence and ambition. We chart Tojo’s upbringing through the 1880s and ‘90s, before the man they call “The Razor” begins his journey up the greasy pole of Japanese politics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Hitler rompe la promesa que contrajo en Múnich y toma Checoslovaquia. Mientras, las fuertes críticas de Churchill a su Gobierno arrastran a aquel a un segundo plano. Más tarde, Stalin y Hitler firman un pacto de no agresión que sacude a la opinión pública. Cuando el ‘führer’ ocupa Polonia, el mundo entra de nuevo en guerra y Churchill se convierte en primer ministro. Hitler traiciona a Stalin e invade la Unión Soviética, una decisión que puede llevarlo a la ruina. Mientras, Hideki Tojo se convierte en jefe del Gobierno de Japón y pone el objetivo en las islas Filipinas controladas por EE UU. Roosevelt responde con un embargo de petróleo que coloca a nipones y norteamericanos al borde de la guerra.

Hitler rompe la promesa que contrajo en Múnich y toma Checoslovaquia. Mientras, las fuertes críticas de Churchill a su Gobierno arrastran a aquel a un segundo plano. Más tarde, Stalin y Hitler firman un pacto de no agresión que sacude a la opinión pública. Cuando el ‘führer’ ocupa Polonia, el mundo entra de nuevo en guerra y Churchill se convierte en primer ministro. Hitler traiciona a Stalin e invade la Unión Soviética, una decisión que puede llevarlo a la ruina. Mientras, Hideki Tojo se convierte en jefe del Gobierno de Japón y pone el objetivo en las islas Filipinas controladas por EE UU. Roosevelt responde con un embargo de petróleo que coloca a nipones y norteamericanos al borde de la guerra.

 “I had, of course, heard people say the sky was beautiful, especially those who were as far away as Fuchü and Furuichi. But it was now, for the first time, that I could picture the cloud, sharply defined against a clear blue August sky. It was at the moment of the birth of this cloud, with its ever-changing color, that Hiroshima was wiped out. It was at this moment that Hiroshima City, the culmination of many years’ work, disappeared with her good citizens into the beautiful sky.” In this episode of Made You Think, Neil and I discuss Hiroshima Diary: The Journal of a Japanese Physician, by Michihiko Hachiya. In this book, Michihiko registered his own life’s experiences following the atomic bomb’s blast, as a doctor in a Hiroshima hospital. “For acres and acres, the city was like a desert, except for scattered piles of brick and roof tile. I had to revise my meaning of the word ‘destruction’ or choose some other word to describe what I saw. ‘Devastation’ may be a better word, but really I know of no word or words to describe the view from my twisted iron bed in the fire-gutted ward of the communications hospital.” We cover a wide range of topics, including: The accounts of survivors of the atomic blast. The uncertainty and confusion that surrounded the mysterious illness befalling the hospital patients and their families. War propaganda and its effects on soldiers. Japan’s cultural attitude and perceptions surrounding WWII. Where did survivors find food and water? And much more. Please enjoy, and be sure to grab a copy of Hiroshima Diary: The Journal of a Japanese Physician, by Michihiko Hachiya!   You can also listen on Google Play Music, SoundCloud, YouTube, or in any other podcasting app by searching "Made You Think." If you enjoyed this episode, be sure to check out our episode on The Denial of Death by Ernest Becker, for another look into death’s effect on humankind, and our episode on Letters from a Stoic by Seneca, that delves into philosophy and stoicism and how humans can adapt in the most adverse situations. Be sure to join our mailing list to find out about what books are coming up, giveaways we're running, special events, and more. Links from the Episode Mentioned in the show: Zapier [34:00] Men Against Fire - Black Mirror episode [38:41] Hardcore History Podcast by Dan Carlin [44:32] Tesla [1:12:26] Satoshi Nakamoto [1:14:59] Nick Szabo [1:15:15] DARPA [1:15:54] CoinBase [1:16:57] Books mentioned: The Denial of Death by Ernest Becker [10:10] (Nat’s Notes) (book episode) Letters from a Stoic by Lucius Seneca [16:45] (Nat’s Notes) (book episode) The Last Lion by William Manchester – Churchill’s 3 Parts Biography [31:35] The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II [38:09] Catch-22 [40:37] Emergency: This Book Will Save Your Life [13:10] (Nat’s Notes) (book episode) Endurance: Shackleton's Incredible Voyage [49:01] Steve Jobs by Walter Isaacson [1:11:14] Elon Musk by Ashlee Vance [1:11:15] The Snowball [1:11:49] People mentioned: Michihiko Hachiya Emperor Hirohito [4:08] Hideki Tojo [4:12] George W. Bush [30:20] Winston Churchill [31:35] Thomas Jefferson [34:10] Steve Jobs [34:53] Jeff Bezos [34:57] Donald Trump [39:12] Taylor Pearson [1:11:39] Warren Buffet [1:11:49] Show Topics 1:08 — The book’s backstory: a physician’s diary from the days following the Hiroshima’s atomic bomb, and its long path into being translated into English. The US Senate’s approving of a resolution condemning the Smithsonian for failing to portray the atomic bombs as mercifully ending the war in 95. 3:44 — A view of the Japanese people as a monolith, and the diary’s portrayal of internal struggles and resentment against the Japanese military. A divide between the Emperor’s authority, which was generally loved by the people, and the military authority, seen as responsible for the war. 6:16 — The author’s background. A doctor working at Hiroshima, for the military, whose diary starts with the bomb dropping and injuring him. A work that was meant only for himself. 8:24 — They didn’t know what the bomb was when it first dropped, nor how radiation lead to all the following illness. The many effects and injuries an atomic bomb can cause. 9:11 — Hachiya’s injuries and survival following the bomb’s blast. His recovery at the hospital and awareness that he could have been dead. 10:58 — The terrifying descriptions of the bomb survivors. The survivor’s confusion and helplessness, as no one had been prepared for so much damage, and there was little information. 13:40 — Following the blast, there were no resources or time to research the causes of all the death and illness. One of Hachiya’s first assumptions were biological agents or poison gas. 16:40 — The desensitization to death that came with all the horror that Hachiya experienced. His guilt as well as his numbness to it. 17:50 — Where did Hachiya’s hospital found water and food, which isn’t addressed in the book. There had to have been water, as it was housing so many patients and their families. It was one of the few structures to survive the blast. 19:45 — “For acres and acres, the city was like a desert, except for scattered piles of brick and roof tile. I had to revise my meaning of the word ‘destruction’ or choose some other word to describe what I saw. ‘Devastation’ may be a better word, but really I know of no word or words to describe the view from my twisted iron bed in the fire-gutted ward of the communications hospital.” 20:06 — The destruction to buildings caused by the atomic blast. One building has been preserved in its destroyed estate near to the bomb’s epicenter. 21:35 — Hachiya’s use of the diary part as a tool for his medical work, in trying to decipher the effects of the bomb. His descriptions on symptoms and their progression. 22:10 — The flash of light caused by the bomb’s blast. Its physical effects, like its sound or lack of it: some people heard the boom (pika don), but other people didn’t, depending on their distance from the bomb. 24:44 — Rumors started arising on whether Hiroshima will be habitable following the blast. Are the people becoming sicker by staying in the hospital? What were the long-term consequences? Many other rumours began to appear. 26:12 — The patient’s reactions to rumors that Japan had retaliated the Hiroshima bomb. Human’s need for agency, to feel like there’s something they can do about their situation, especially in the face of such an awful event like the bomb. 28:54 — Japan’s decision to surrender was also connected to the Russian’s declaration of war, not necessarily the bombs by themselves. Japan’s culture of “surrendering is failing”. 31:35 — Tangent. Churchill and his attempts to participate in the front lines on D-Day. Leaders who declare war, but do not participate themselves in the actual fighting; “leaders” who don’t have ‘skin in the game’. 35:42 — The Japanese people’s expectations to the arrival of American troops in Japan. Differences between the military and civilian perceptions, its relation to war propaganda. Parallels to USA’s propaganda. 39:52 — The rate of participation in killing in the military, who has been going up and up. Conscription, and soldier’s unwillingness to kill other people, how propaganda and a sense of patriotic duty influences the willingness to fight. 45:20 — Other descriptions of horror following the Hiroshima bomb: citizens who tried to save themselves by taking shelter in pools and in rivers, who still didn’t survive. 48:31 — The communications were all down following the bomb: Hachiya’s reflects positively on being without modern ways of communication. Humankind’s adaptability to new circumstances, even the worst of them (hedonistic adaptation). 48:36 — “Besides, we had no radio. For me, this was something of a blessing, for being without the so-called advantages of civilization gave me a freedom of spirit and action others could not enjoy with their telephones, radios, and newspapers. Having lost everything in the fire and being now empty-handed was not entirely without advantage. I experienced a certain light-heartedness I had not known for a long time.” 54:18 — There were many incredible accounts of people who survived the blast, and of people who thought they’d lost loved ones, who had in fact survived. 56:03 — Media downplaying what happened in Hiroshima. Cigarettes becoming currency in disaster situations. 1:00:53 — What happened when Americans showed up. Reconstruction of buildings and reconstruction of minds. Japanese blind loyalty to the country. 1:09:29 — Tangent. Feeling of accomplishment reading books of the to-read list. Biographies of living public figures and… bitcoins! 1:16:52 — Sponsors Time. Perfect Keto will give you 20% off everything you need to maintain, sustain, entertain, get into a keto diet. Kettle & Fire bone broth 20% off on excellent supplements for getting some of your ancestral dietary needs, collagens, bone marrow. Good for cooking and good for drinking. Four Sigmatic for all your mushroom needs. Must to try the Hot Cocoa, it’s delicious with butter or heavy cream. It’s keto-friendly, there no sugar in the cocoa, it’s an amazing dessert. If you buy anything on Amazon, use our affiliate link to help sustain the show. 1:20:45 — If you want to start your own podcast, check Nat’s article on how to start a podcast and buy stuff on Amazon. Also, don’t forget to give us a review on iTunes. If you enjoyed this episode, don’t forget to subscribe at https://madeyouthinkpodcast.com  

As Chiang Kai-Shek moves his capital and military Head Quarters west and Hideki Tojo becomes directly involved in the war to the north, the Japanese troops move out from Shanghai to Nanjing. There, their pent up frustration over the Nationalists… Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1629, a Dutch trading vessel struck a reef off the coast of Australia, marooning 180 people on a tiny island. As they struggled to stay alive, their leader descended into barbarity, gathering a band of cutthroats and killing scores of terrified castaways. In this week's episode of the Futility Closet podcast we'll document the brutal history of Batavia's graveyard, the site of Australia's most infamous shipwreck. We'll also lose money in India and puzzle over some invisible Frenchmen. Intro: In 1946, an Allied dentist inscribed "Remember Pearl Harbor" on Hideki Tojo's dentures. Sigourney Weaver named herself after a character in The Great Gatsby. Sources for our feature on the Batavia mutiny: Mike Dash, Batavia's Graveyard, 2002. Mike Sturma, "Mutiny and Narrative: Francisco Pelsaert's Journals and the Wreck of the Batavia," The Great Circle 24:1 (2002), 14-24. "We Are Still on the Batavia," Queen's Quarterly 12:4 (Winter 2005), 489. Bruce Bennett, "Politics and Spying: Representations of Pre- and Early Australia," Antipodes 22:1 (June 2008), 17-22. "Batavia," Ships of the World: An Historical Encyclopedia, 1997, 52-53. D. Franklin, "Human Skeletal Remains From a Multiple Burial Associated With the Mutiny of the VOC Retourschip Batavia, 1629," International Journal of Osteoarchaeology 22:6 (Jan. 19, 2011), 740-748. Michael Titlestad, "'Changed as to a Tiger': Considering the Wreck of the Batavia," Antipodes 27:2 (December 2013), 149-156. Mark Staniforth, "Murder and Mayhem," dig 8:4 (April 2006), 20-21. Christopher Bray, "The Wreck of the Batavia [review]," Financial Times, Aug 17, 2007. "Batavia's History," Western Australian Museum (accessed May 28, 2017). Sarah Taillier, "Unearthed Grave Sheds Light on Batavia Shipwreck Mass Murder," Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Feb. 3, 2015. "Australia Dig Unearths Batavia Mutiny Skeleton," BBC News, Feb. 4, 2015. Libby-Jane Charleston, "The Batavia Mutiny and Massacre of 1629 Is Still Revealing Secrets," Huffington Post, July 2, 2016. Karl Quinn, "Mutiny, Shipwreck, Murder: The Incredible True Story Russell Crowe Wants to Film," Sydney Morning Herald, March 30, 2016. Interest in the Batavia was reawakened in the 1960s, when archaeologists began to examine the site of the mutiny. This victim, excavated in 1963, had received a cutting wound to the head; the right shoulder blade was broken, and the right foot was missing. Listener mail: Andrew Levy, "Doctors Solve Mystery of a Man Who 'Died From Laughter' While Watching The Goodies After His Granddaughter Nearly Dies From Same Rare Heart Condition," Daily Mail, June 20, 2012. Wikipedia, "2016 Indian Banknote Demonetisation" (accessed June 9, 2017). "The Dire Consequences of India's Demonetisation Initiative," Economist, Dec. 3, 2016. Micheline Maynard, "The 'Zion Curtain' Is About to Fall in Utah, and Restaurants Can't Wait," Forbes, March 29, 2017. Donald Hoffman, "Do We See Reality As It Is?" TED, March 2015. This week's lateral thinking puzzle was contributed by listener Aden Lonergan. Here's a corroborating link (warning -- this spoils the puzzle). You can listen using the player above, download this episode directly, or subscribe on iTunes or Google Play Music or via the RSS feed at http://feedpress.me/futilitycloset. Please consider becoming a patron of Futility Closet -- on our Patreon page you can pledge any amount per episode, and we've set up some rewards to help thank you for your support. You can also make a one-time donation on the Support Us page of the Futility Closet website. Many thanks to Doug Ross for the music in this episode. If you have any questions or comments you can reach us at podcast@futilitycloset.com. Thanks for listening!

Hideki Tojo (1884-1948), fue un destacado militar japonés, que llegó a ser Primer ministro de Japón durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, entre 1941 y 1944. Fue el artífice intelectual de la invasión japonesa de Manchuria y del ataque a Pearl Harbour.

Hideki Tojo (1884-1948), fue un destacado militar japonés, que llegó a ser Primer ministro de Japón durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, entre 1941 y 1944. Fue el artífice intelectual de la invasión japonesa de Manchuria y del ataque a Pearl Harbour.