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Historic coastal region in Southeast Asia

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Best podcasts about arakan

Latest podcast episodes about arakan

AMERICA OUT LOUD PODCAST NETWORK
David Eubank on Trump's Syria policy and minority aid

AMERICA OUT LOUD PODCAST NETWORK

Play Episode Listen Later May 22, 2025 58:00


The National Security Hour with LTC Sargis Sangari USA (Ret.) – LTC Sargis Sangari interviews David Eubank of Free Burma Rangers on his latest mission in Syria, revealing insights on U.S.–Syrian ties, PKK disarmament, frontline medical aid in Mosul, the Rohingya humanitarian crisis in Arakan, and China's strategic investments, plus a comprehensive update on Burma's ongoing conflict and minorities' future prospects.

The National Security Hour
David Eubank on Trump's Syria policy and minority aid

The National Security Hour

Play Episode Listen Later May 22, 2025 58:00


The National Security Hour with LTC Sargis Sangari USA (Ret.) – LTC Sargis Sangari interviews David Eubank of Free Burma Rangers on his latest mission in Syria, revealing insights on U.S.–Syrian ties, PKK disarmament, frontline medical aid in Mosul, the Rohingya humanitarian crisis in Arakan, and China's strategic investments, plus a comprehensive update on Burma's ongoing conflict and minorities' future prospects.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 168 - Pacific War Podcast - the Battle of Manila - February 4th - February 11 - , 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 4, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the return to Bataan. In late January, the 43rd Division secured the Rosario region, while the 25th and 6th Divisions eliminated enemy detachments and advanced towards Manila. General Krueger received reinforcements and planned a coordinated attack. On January 28, an assault began, with guerrillas aiding American forces in capturing strategic locations. A daring raid freed 522 POWs, while MacArthur planned further landings to cut off Japanese retreat. By January's end, American forces were poised for a final offensive, pushing closer to victory in Luzon. The ZigZag Pass became a fierce battleground, where Colonel Nagayoshi's well-camouflaged defenses faced relentless assaults from American forces. Despite challenges, the 129th and 20th Regiments made strategic gains, while the 35th Regiment maneuvered through treacherous terrain. Meanwhile, paratroopers from the 511th struggled with scattered landings but secured key positions. As the fighting intensified, the Allies prepared for a decisive invasion of Iwo Jima, aiming to establish a stronghold for future operations against Japan. This episode is the Battle of Manila Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last observed, by February 3, General Iwanaka's 2nd Tank Division was fending off assaults from the 6th and 25th Divisions in the San Jose area but was on the verge of being encircled. Meanwhile, General Griswold's 14th Corps had successfully taken control of Clark Field and was reorganizing for a final offensive against the Kembu Group. General Hall's 11th Corps had landed on the Bataan Peninsula and was engaged in combat with the Nagayoshi Detachment at ZigZag Pass. Additionally, General Swing's 11th Airborne Division had landed at Nasugbu and had successfully captured Tagaytay Ridge in preparation for an advance toward Manila from the south. The 37th and 1st Cavalry Divisions were advancing on Manila from the north, with the latter's two Flying Columns reaching the outskirts of the Filipino capital. At this stage, the capital was defended by Admiral Iwabuchi's Manila Naval Defense Force, which had consolidated its forces into three primary operational sectors: the Northern Force, led by Colonel Noguchi Katsuzo, responsible for Intramuros on the south bank and all areas of the city north of the Pasig; the Central Force, commanded by Iwabuchi himself, encompassing all of metropolitan Manila south of the Pasig River and extending inland to Guadalupe; and the Southern Force, under Captain Furuse Takesue, covering the Nichols Field and Fort McKinley sectors, as well as the Hagonoy Isthmus. Iwabuchi intended for the Noguchi Force to retreat to Intramuros after disabling the Pasig bridges, while other units carried out extensive demolitions of military infrastructure, including the port area, bridges, transportation systems, water supply, and electrical installations. However, since the Japanese did not anticipate the Americans' arrival for another two weeks, they were ill-prepared to execute these missions or launch any significant counterattacks. Recognizing that the cavalry units were twelve hours ahead of the 148th Regiment, Griswold authorized General Mudge to enter the city. Consequently, late in the afternoon, the 8th Cavalry's Flying Column encountered minimal resistance as it crossed the city limits and advanced towards the gates of Santo Tomas University, where nearly 4,000 American and Allied civilian internees were being held, facing severe shortages of food and medical supplies. Upon their arrival at Santo Tomas, the advance elements of the 8th Cavalry, a medium of the 44th Tank Battalion serving as a battering ram, broke through the gates of the campus wall. Inside, the Japanese Army guards--most of them Formosans--put up little fight and within a few minutes some 3500 internees were liberated amid scenes of pathos and joy none of the participating American troops will ever forget. But in another building away from the internees' main quarters some sixty Japanese under Lt. Col. Hayashi Toshio, the camp commander, held as hostages another 275 internees, mostly women and children. Hayashi demanded a guarantee for safe conduct from the ground for himself and his men before he would release the internees. General Chase, who had come into the university campus about an hour after the 8th Cavalry entered, had to accept the Japanese conditions. In the end, Hayashi obtained permission to lead his unit out with what arms they could carry in exchange for the release of the Allied internees held as hostages. They were then taken by the Americans to the outskirts of Manila early on February 5 and released. Meanwhile, Hayashi was subsequently killed in action. While General Chase worked to secure the release of the internees, Troop G of the 8th Cavalry continued its march south towards the Pasig River but was ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy fire from the Far Eastern University. Meanwhile, frustrated with the slow progress of General Jones' 38th Division, Hall ordered the 34th Regiment to move past the 152nd and press the attack eastward. Unfortunately, Colonel William Jenna's enveloping assault with the 1st Battalion also failed to penetrate Colonel Nagayoshi's robust defenses. As a result, Jenna opted to deploy his entire regiment in a coordinated three-pronged attack, which commenced on February 4. Initially, the attack, supported by the 1st Battalion of the 152nd Regiment, showed promise; however, due to ongoing strong resistance, including intense mortar and artillery fire, the 34th Regiment had to relinquish much of the territory it had captured by dusk. To the north, the 149th Regiment resumed its advance along the bypass trail and successfully made contact with patrols from the 40th Division near Dinalupihan by the end of February 4, having already reached the town. Looking northeast, with enemy armored units at Muñoz and Lupao effectively contained, the 161st Regiment successfully established roadblocks on Route 8 southeast of San Isidro. Most notably, the 1st Regiment entered San Jose in the morning with little resistance and quickly secured the area, thereby completely isolating the majority of the 2nd Tank Division before it could receive orders to withdraw. As a result, the 6th and 25th Divisions were able to methodically eliminate the enemy's isolated strongholds at their convenience. Further south, by the end of the day, the 8th Cavalry liberated 4,000 internees at Santo Tomas; Troop F also secured Malacañan Palace; the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry advanced toward Quezon Bridge but faced strong resistance at Far Eastern University, where the enemy successfully destroyed the bridge before retreating; and the 148th Regiment entered Manila, moving south through the Tondo and Santa Cruz Districts to reach the northwest corner of Old Bilibid Prison, where they freed 800 prisoners of war and 530 civilian internees. Finally, to the south, the 2nd Battalion, 511th Parachute Regiment departed from Tagaytay Ridge along Route 17, swiftly passing through Imus and Zapote to secure the Las Piñas River bridge. The 1st Battalion followed in the late afternoon but was ultimately halted by mortar and artillery fire at Parañaque. On February 5, the paratroopers managed to cross the Parañaque and began advancing north along Route 1, engaging in house-to-house and pillbox-to-pillbox combat as they moved 2,000 yards north over the next two days. Simultaneously, the majority of the 145th Regiment commenced operations in the densely populated Tondo District along the bay, while other units advanced into the San Nicolas and Binondo Districts to combat the fires ignited by Noguchi's demolitions. Throughout February 5 the 37th Division's men had heard and observed Japanese demolitions in the area along and just north of the Pasig in the Binondo and San Nicolas Districts as well as in the North Port Area, on the 145th's right front. The Northern Force was firing and blowing up military stores and installations all through the area and, as these tasks were completed, was withdrawing south across the river. Insofar as 14th Corps observers could ascertain, there was no wanton destruction, and in all probability the fires resulting from the demolitions would have been confined to the North Port Area and the river banks had not an unseasonable change in the wind about 20:30 driven the flames north and west. The 37th Division, fearing that the flames would spread into residential districts, gathered all available demolitions and started destroying frame buildings in the path of the fire. The extent of these demolitions cannot be ascertained--although it is known that the work of destruction continued for nearly 24 hours--and is an academic point at best since the demolitions proved largely ineffectual in stopping the spread of the flames. The conflagration ran north from the river to Azcarraga Street and across that thoroughfare into the North Port Area and Tondo District. The flames were finally brought under control late on February 6 along the general line of Azcarraga Street, but only after the wind again changed direction. The 148th Regiment fought its way to the Santa Cruz District but was unable to reach the bridges before they were destroyed. The 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments cleared the eastern part of the city north of the Pasig with minimal resistance, and the 7th Cavalry secured the Novaliches Dam and the Balara Water Filters, which were found intact but rigged for demolition. To the northwest, the battle for ZigZag Pass continued. Dissatisfied with his progress, Hall had previously informed Jones that the exhibition of his division was the worst he had ever seen--a rather severe indictment of an entire division, as only the 152nd Regiment had yet seen any real action on Luzon. Furthermore, the 152nd was a green unit that had been in combat scarcely 48 hours by February 2. Nevertheless, as he believed that the 152nd had at most encountered only an outpost line of resistance, that the principal Japanese defenses lay a mile or so east of the horseshoe, and that the 152nd had found "nothing that an outfit ready to go forward could not overcome quickly", Hall assumed direct control over the 34th Regiment for the main assault and left only the 152nd under Jones' command, which was to follow the 34th through the ZigZag to mop up bypassed pockets of Japanese resistance. Yet the fighting at the horseshoe on February 3 and 4 was equally disappointing, costing the 34th some 41 men killed, 131 wounded, and 6 missing while on the same days the 152nd lost 4 men killed, 48 wounded, and 1 missing. The 34th had extended the front a little to the north of the horseshoe and a bit east of the eastern leg, but neither the 34th nor the 152nd had made any substantial gains beyond the point the 152nd had reached on February 2. The Japanese still held strong positions north of the horseshoe and they still controlled the northeastern corner and about half the eastern leg. The 34th's greatest contribution during the two days, perhaps, was to have helped convince Hall that the Japanese had strong defenses throughout the ZigZag area and that the regiment had indeed reached a Japanese main line of resistance. It had not been until evening on February 4 that Hall was convinced that the 34th and 152nd Regiments had encountered a well-defended Japanese line. Hall instructed Jones to launch an eastward attack with all available forces. Although the initial phase of the attack was promising, the 2nd Battalion of the 34th Regiment became trapped and had to retreat. After sustaining significant casualties, Jenna ordered the 1st Battalion to fall back as well and halted the 3rd Battalion's advance. This left the 152nd Regiment, which achieved considerable progress and cleared much of the northern and central sections of the ridge; however, its 1st Battalion was ultimately ambushed at close range and forced to retreat in chaos during the night. The following day, due to heavy losses, the 34th Regiment was withdrawn from combat, and the reserve 151st Regiment was deployed to support the 152nd. The 2nd Battalion of the latter was also pulled back from the southeastern corner of the horseshoe as artillery focused on Nagayoshi's defenses. Nevertheless, at noon, Hall called for another assault, prompting Jones to reluctantly advance the 152nd Regiment, with only its 3rd Battalion making significant headway against the northeast corner of the horseshoe. Hall had already made his decision; he relieved Jones and appointed Brigadier-General Roy Easley to take temporary command, with General Chase scheduled to arrive on February 7 to lead the 38th Division. Looking westward, after a week of securing previously held areas, General Brush had positioned the 185th Regiment in the north and the 108th Regiment in the south, while the 160th Regiment maintained its positions at Storm King Mountain in preparation for a renewed assault on the Kembu Group. However, before the divisional attack could resume, the 160th Regiment became engaged in a fierce battle for McSevney Point, which was finally secured by dusk on February 8. After fending off several banzai-style counterattacks, the Americans learned on February 10 that the Takaya Detachment had retreated. Meanwhile, the 185th began its advance toward Snake Hill North on February 7, taking three days of intense fighting to capture half the ground leading to this objective. The 108th also moved westward on February 8, making slow progress as it cleared the paths to the Japanese hill strongholds. Further northwest, the 6th and 25th Divisions were conducting mop-up operations in the San Jose sector. By February 6, the 20th Regiment's pressure on Muñoz had resulted in the destruction of nearly 35 tanks, although another 20 remained operational. The next morning, Colonel Ida finally attempted to escape via Route 5; however, the entire Japanese column was successfully destroyed while the 20th Regiment secured Muñoz. At Lupao, the 35th Regiment continued to push the Japanese garrison into an increasingly confined area. As a result, on the night of February 7, the defenders attempted to flee, with five tanks successfully breaking through the 35th's perimeter. The dismounted Japanese forces in the town dispersed, and by noon on February 8, the 35th had taken control of Lupao with minimal resistance. Meanwhile, the Japanese garrison at San Isidro had retreated before the 161st Regiment could capture the town on February 6. The 63rd Regiment successfully took Rizal on February 7, while the 20th Regiment secured Bongabon and cleared the route to Cabanatuan on February 8. Strong patrols were then dispatched toward Dingalen and Baler Bays, which were found deserted by February 12. Back in Manila on February 7, the 37th Division assumed control of the eastern part of the city, while cavalry units advanced beyond the city limits to clear the suburbs east of the San Juan River, with the 8th Cavalry pushing toward San Juan del Monte despite heavy resistance. Most notably, under a strong artillery barrage, the 148th Regiment crossed the Pasig River in assault boats, facing intense machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. Despite this fierce opposition, two battalions managed to assemble in the Malacañan Gardens area by the end of the day. Further south, the 511th Parachute and the reinforced 188th Glider Regiment launched an unsuccessful coordinated attack on Nichols Field. Over the next two days, the 511th secured a narrow strip of land between the Parañaque River and the western runway of the airfield, overrunning some defenses at the northwest corner, while the 188th struggled to gain ground in the south and southeast. On ZigZag, Chase managed to deploy three regiments for his initial assaults, with the 151st and 152nd Regiments attacking from the west, while the 149th Regiment advanced from the east. The 5th Air Force initiated an extensive bombing and strafing campaign against the pass, and corps and division artillery increased their support fire. Despite this, the Japanese stubbornly held their ground, and it wasn't until the evening of February 8 that the 151st and 152nd Regiments overcame the last significant defenses near the horseshoe area. On that day, the 7th Cavalry captured San Juan Reservoir, and the 8th Cavalry successfully attacked San Juan del Monte, completing the area's reduction as the defenders retreated toward Montalban. The 145th Regiment launched a final assault on the Tondo District pocket, which would be completely eliminated the following day, while the 148th Regiment cleared the Pandacan District with minimal resistance. The 129th Regiment crossed the Pasig River in the afternoon and moved west toward Provisor Island but was halted by heavy fire at the Estero de Tonque. On February 9, the 8th Cavalry secured El Deposito, an underground reservoir supplied by artesian wells, and advanced south to reach the north bank of the Pasig River. The 148th Regiment began clearing the Paco District but failed to eliminate a strongpoint at Paco Railroad Station and the nearby Concordia College and Paco School buildings. Meanwhile, Company G of the 129th Regiment managed to cross to Provisor and entered the boiler plant, only to be quickly repelled by a Japanese counterattack. After an improvised evacuation overnight, tith close support--so close that the fifteen survivors had to keep prone--from the 2nd Battalion's mortars, Company G's isolated group hung on for the rest of the day while the battalion made plans to evacuate them so that artillery could again strike the island. After dark Company G's commander, Captain George West, swam across the Estero de Tonque dragging an engineer assault boat behind him. Although wounded, he shuttled his troops back to the east bank in the dim light of flames from burning buildings on and south of the island. When a count was taken about midnight, Company G totaled 17 casualties--6 men killed, 5 wounded, and 6 missing--among the 18 men, including Captain West, who had reached Provisor Island during the previous eighteen hours. Despite facing strong resistance, Company E successfully crossed and captured the eastern half of the boiler plant. The Americans gradually cleared the remainder of the boiler house, but every attempt to venture outside drew fire from all available Japanese weapons in range of Provisor Island. At the same time, the 148th Regiment finally secured the Paco District after the enemy abandoned their stronghold during the night, allowing the Americans to gain control of the east bank of the Estero de Paco. The 1st Battalion of the 129th Regiment advanced to both this estero and the Estero de Tonque. The 8th Cavalry crossed the Pasig, establishing a bridgehead about 1,000 yards deep in the Philippine Racing Club area, while the 5th Cavalry moved south alongside the 8th, encountering only scattered resistance as they also crossed the Pasig at Makati. Swing's forces consolidated their gains and established a solid line from the northwest corner to the southwest corner of Nichols Field, eliminating the last Japanese resistance on the western side, while elements of the 511th Parachute Regiment advanced along Route 1 nearly a mile beyond the field's northwest corner. On this day, the 11th Airborne Division came under the control of the 14th Corps, with Griswold ordering Swing to maintain pressure on Nichols Field without launching a general assault toward Manila. Now, however, it was time to leave the Philippines and shift focus to Bougainville to cover the ongoing Australian offensive. Following the capture of Pearl Ridge, Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade assumed control of the central and northern sectors, while General Bridgeford's 3rd Division focused its efforts in the Jaba River region to prepare for an offensive southward. By the end of December, the 15th Battalion had landed in the Tavera River area, and the 47th Battalion launched an attack up the Jaba River to disrupt enemy forces. In the first week of January, Brigadier Monaghan redeployed his troops, with the 42nd Battalion and 2/8th Commando Squadron taking over from the 47th to enable its movement down the coast to support the 15th Battalion. As a result, the Australians swiftly occupied the mouth of the Adele River and secured the Tavera area. By January 12, the 47th Battalion had advanced to the mouth of the Hupai River; however, with the Japanese seemingly reinforcing the Kupon-Nigitan-Mendai area on the Australian flank, Monaghan decided to slow his advance while the 2/8th Commandos conducted reconnaissance toward the Pagana River. With no threats emerging, the 42nd Battalion relieved the 47th on January 17 and advanced unopposed to Mawaraka. In the subsequent days, a long-range patrol from the New Guinea Battalion landed by sea and moved forward to Motupena Point, where they caught a Japanese listening post by surprise. While Monaghan awaited relief from Brigadier Field's 7th Brigade in late January, patrols ventured deep into the Sisiruai area and continued to scout beyond Mawaraka. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commandos moved to Sovele Mission and patrolled the mountains toward Kieta, occasionally assisting the Kapikavi people in their guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. While the 11th Brigade concentrated in its northern operations, patrols generally guided by native police were sent out for from 1 day to 6 days to probe forward through the bush. The 11th Battery relieved the 10th and it replaced its short 25-pounders with long 25-pounders, with their greater range, in order to support these deep patrols more effectively; from posts on Pearl Ridge and Keenan's Ridge observers directed the bombardment of the Japanese positions on the slopes beyond. The firing of the guns, far below at the foot of the Laruma escarpment, could not be heard at Pearl Ridge and the only warning that the Japanese had was the brief whistle of the approaching shells. Partly as a result of the skilful guidance of the native police the patrols killed many Japanese and suffered relatively small losses. The 26th Battalion, the first to do a tour of duty here, suffered its first death in action on January 7 when a patrol led by Lieutenant Davis met an enemy patrol. Private Smith died of wounds and three corporals were wounded as a result, so the hill where the clash occurred was then named Smith's Hill. As the 26th Battalion advanced toward Smith's Hill, Stevenson had assembled Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Kelly's 31st/51st Battalion at Sipaai by January 7. The strategy involved moving towards Soraken Harbour through extensive inland patrols designed to drive the enemy back to the coastal area, where they could be decisively defeated. Consequently, the main contingent of the 31st/51st began its advance along the coastal route, while a long-range patrol headed inland via Totokei towards Lalum. By January 16, the Australians reached Rakussia without any issues; however, in the following days, they would need to fight their way to Puto, as the flanking force was also advancing towards Kunamatoro. On January 21, the 31st/51st launched an assault on Tsimba Ridge, where the Japanese had set up their primary defensive positions. The determined defenders successfully repelled several attacks over the next few days, prompting the Australians to attempt an outflanking maneuver on January 25, with a company moving inland to cross the Genga River and attack Tsimba from the north. For the next six days, the Japanese launched strong counterattacks against this bridgehead but suffered significant losses. Ultimately, after a heavy artillery bombardment on February 6, the Australians were able to advance to the western end of the northern side of Tsimba, completely encircling the Japanese forces. The following day, the defenders counterattacked but were pushed back, yet they stubbornly held onto their remaining position at the western tip of the ridge. After an air and mortar assault, Tsimba was finally cleared on February 9, as the Japanese retreated towards the harbour during the night. In the subsequent two weeks, the Australians secured Lalum and the Gillman River, while another flanking force took control of Kunamatoro. On February 22, the 31st/51st Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion. Subsequently, the 55th/53rd Battalion took over at Pearl Ridge, where it continued to advance along the Numa Numa trail to engage the majority of the 81st Regiment. The nature of the deep patrols may be illustrated by drawing on the report of the one which killed the largest number of Japanese (26 confirmed kills). Lieutenant Goodwin and 10 infantrymen of the 55th/53rd, with an artillery observer (Lieutenant Ford) and his team, a native police boy and 2 native scouts, set out on March 2 to gain topographical information and information about the enemy, and find suitable supply-dropping points. They were out for 5 days. On the first morning they saw signs of a Japanese patrol of 3 some 45 minutes ahead of them and traced their movements. The Australians moved 5400 yards that day. Next morning near the Numa Numa trail one of the natives reported that Japanese were nearby. Goodwin detailed 3 men to block the track and led 3 others in from the side to deal with the enemy. They crept stealthily forward and found 6 Japanese in a lean-to. Goodwin gave each man a target and all 6 of the enemy were killed. While Goodwin was examining the bodies there was a burst of fire from a ridge overlooking them. The Australians withdrew to dead ground, circled the enemy and marched on into his territory, the Japanese fire continuing for 15 minutes after they had gone. They travelled 7600 yards that day. The 4th was spent reconnoitring the area they had then reached. Next day they had moved some 5000 yards on the return journey when scouts reported Japanese round the junction of their native pad and a creek that lay ahead. Goodwin moved the patrol to a ridge overlooking the Japanese and sent 3 men to cover the track to the west. After killing 15 Japanese and throwing 15 grenades into the area, the patrol then moved 700 yards and bivouacked for the night. Next day—the 6th—6 hours of marching brought them back to their starting point.  Meanwhile, in the south, Field initiated his own offensive by deploying the 61st Battalion to capture the Kupon-Nigitan-Mosina area, which was successfully taken by February 9. Concurrently, the 25th Battalion advanced along the Tavera despite facing strong resistance, eventually connecting with the 61st Battalion in the Mendai-Sisiruai area. The 9th Battalion also progressed along the Hupai, successfully occupying Makotowa by the end of January and then embarking on a challenging march toward Mosigetta, which was captured on February 16. The following day, a company from the 61st Battalion linked up with the 9th Battalion from the north. Additionally, after quickly securing the Sovele area, the 2/8th Commandos began reconnoitering the Sisiruai-Birosi area on February 2. By February 13, they had established a new base at Opai and discovered that the gardens north of the Puriata River were free of enemy forces. Furthermore, a detached company of the 25th Battalion traveled by barge from Motupena Point to Toko and began pushing inland toward Barara, with the remainder of the battalion expected to arrive shortly to support this advance. However, it is now time to shift focus from Bougainville to the ongoing Burma offensives. Initially, in the north, General Matsuyama's 56th Division began its retreat towards Hsenwi and Lashio, successfully breaching the roadblocks established by the 114th Regiment in late January. Meanwhile, the Mars Task Force struggled to dislodge the determined defenders at Namhpakka. Despite capturing Hpa-pen and executing a clever encirclement against Loikang in early February, they managed to take the ridge only after the Japanese had already completed their withdrawal to Hsenwi on February 4. The 56th Division then focused its efforts on the Lashio region, while the 4th, 55th, and 168th Regiments returned to their original divisions, with the 168th specifically tasked with defending Meiktila. On that same day, the first official convoy from the India-Burma Theater reached Kunming via the Ledo Road, which would later be renamed the Stilwell Road in honor of the individual who initiated this ambitious endeavor. Meanwhile, on February 1, General Festing's 36th Division attempted to cross the Shweli River at Myitson but was met with heavy small arms fire from the Japanese. As a result, the British opted to mislead the enemy, stationing the 72nd Brigade, which included the 114th Regiment, on a small island while the 26th Brigade crossed downstream on February 8, successfully capturing Myitson two days later. In the following days, the 26th Brigade fortified its positions; however, General Naka decided to go on the offensive, deploying his 56th Regiment in increments as it advanced north from Mongmit. Consequently, the 114th and 56th Regiments launched a series of intense counterattacks against the 26th Brigade's foothold, effectively containing the British-Indian forces, although they were unable to push them back across the river. Simultaneously, the Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group, leading the 30th Chinese Division southward, fought its way to Hsenwi on February 19. The 50th Chinese Division, which crossed the Shweli River without opposition, reached the significant nonferrous Bawdwin mines on February 20. Meanwhile, General Slim continued his Extended Capital offensive, with General Stopford's 33rd Corps advancing towards Mandalay, while General Messervy's 4th Corps quietly maneuvered through the Myittha valley toward the Irrawaddy River in the Chauk-Pakokku region. In early February, Stopford made persistent and determined attempts from the north to seize Mandalay, reinforcing the perception that this was Slim's primary focus. By February 12, General Gracey's 20th Indian Division had also arrived at Allagappa, where the 80th Brigade promptly began crossing the Irrawaddy. In the following days, the British-Indian forces would need to defend this bridgehead against fierce counterattacks from the 33rd Division. Additionally, negotiations began to persuade General Aung San's Burma National Army to join the Allies.  In Burma, one man above all others could see the writing on the wall for the Japanese. The Allies received news on January 1 that the Burmese military leader General Aung San and his Burma National Army (BNA) would be prepared to switch sides. An operation by Special Operations Executive (SOE) – codenamed Nation – was launched to liaise with the BNA and the leadership of another group, the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO), and so facilitate this delicate transfer of loyalties. The first parachute drop of agents was to Toungoo on January 27 and comprised an all-Burma force. It reported that the BNA – or significant parts of it – was ready to turn, but that the AFO needed arming. A team parachuted into Burma on March 20 reported that action by the BNA would begin in a week.  At the same time, General Evans' 7th Indian Division was advancing toward the Irrawaddy, aiming to cross the river at Nyaungu. Comprehensive deception tactics, known as Operation Cloak, were implemented to disguise the Nyaungu crossings. The 28th East African Brigade feigned a southward movement to reclaim the Chauk and Yenangyaung oilfields, and dummy parachute drops were carried out east of Chauk to support this ruse. The 114th Indian Brigade also exerted significant pressure on Pakokku to create the impression that crossings were planned there as well. While the 33rd Indian Brigade stealthily approached Nyaungu via Kanhla, the 48th and 63rd Brigades of the 17th Indian Division, reorganized as motorized units, departed from Imphal and began their descent down the Myitha valley. Worried about the enemy buildup near Nyaungu and Pakokkku, General Tanaka opted to send one battalion from the 215th Regiment to bolster defenses in Nyaungu and Pagan. From February 10 to 12, the 114th Brigade successfully captured Pakokku, while the 28th Brigade took control of Seikpyu. Although the 114th Brigade managed to fend off strong enemy counterattacks, elements of the 153rd Regiment recaptured Seikpyu after several days of intense fighting. On the morning of February 14, the 2nd Battalion of the South Lancashire Regiment crossed the Irrawaddy, landing on a beach a mile northeast of Nyaungu and quickly securing the high ground above, followed shortly by the rest of the 33rd Brigade. The next day, the 89th Indian Brigade began crossing the river, with Evans' forces advancing outward and successfully clearing the Nyaungu area by the end of February 16. Meanwhile, to the south, General Christison's 15th Corps continued its offensive in Arakan in early February. General Wood's 25th Indian Division repelled fierce counterattacks from the 154th Regiment, while General Stockwell's 82nd West African Division pursued the retreating Japanese forces. General Lomax's 26th Indian Division chose to bypass the enemy stronghold at Yanbauk Chaung to the northeast, moving swiftly through Sane and engaging some delaying forces at Namudwe. Additionally, due to the perceived weakness in the boundary between the 28th and 15th Armies, General Sakurai had to send the Kanjo Force, centered around the 112th Regiment, to reinforce Yenangyaung. At this point, most of the 2nd Division had also been dispatched to Saigon to stage a coup against the French government in Indochina, leaving Sakurai with only the depleted 49th Division and 16th Regiment in reserve. By 1944, with the war going against the Japanese after defeats in Burma and the Philippines, they then feared an Allied offensive in French Indochina. The Japanese were already suspicious of the French; the liberation of Paris in August 1944 raised further doubts as to where the loyalties of the colonial administration lay. The Vichy regime by this time had ceased to exist, but its colonial administration was still in place in Indochina, though Admiral Jean Decoux had recognized and contacted the Provisional Government of the French Republic led by Charles de Gaulle. Decoux got a cold response from de Gaulle and was stripped of his powers as governor general but was ordered to maintain his post with orders to deceive the Japanese. Instead Decoux's army commander General Eugène Mordant secretly became the Provisional Government's delegate and the head of all resistance and underground activities in Indochina. Following the South China Sea Raid in January 1945, six US navy pilots were shot down but were picked up by French military authorities and housed in the central prison of Saigon for safe keeping. The French refused to give the Americans up and when the Japanese prepared to storm the prison the men were smuggled out. The Japanese then demanded their surrender but Decoux refused, so Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu, the Japanese commander of the 38th Army, decided to begin preparations for a coup against the French colonial administration in Indochina. As a result, he chose to send the Kamui Detachment, centered around the 55th Cavalry Regiment, to Letpadan to bolster his reserve forces, which also welcomed the arrival of the Sakura Detachment in Prome. Meanwhile, Lomax's troops successfully captured Ramree village on February 8, forcing the Japanese defenders to retreat chaotically to the mainland. The remainder of the month was spent clearing the rest of the island. Consequently, Stockwell was instructed to bypass Kangaw and initiate an advance toward An. However, by February 15, the 154th Regiment had started to withdraw to positions west and north of the Dalet River, while the Matsu Detachment hurried toward Tamandu, the next target for an amphibious assault. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Manila was just kicking up. Over 4000 internees at Santo Tomas had been rescued and hard earned victories were being won over the formidable ZigZag Pass. Meanwhile the efforts on Bougainville continued against fierce and stubborn Japanese resistance.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 166 - Pacific War Podcast - the Mandalay Offensive - January 21 - 28 , 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 21, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the South China Sea Raid. In January, General Krueger reinforced the American beachhead at Lingayen Gulf while Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting enemy ships based on faulty intelligence. Despite not finding the expected battleships, American forces decimated a Japanese convoy, sinking numerous vessels and claiming 113 enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, on Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite fierce resistance. As both sides prepared for counteroffensives, the battle intensified, marking a pivotal moment in the Philippines campaign. On January 17, the 58th Brigade and supporting regiments launched a daring operation to destroy enemy positions. As American forces advanced, they faced fierce resistance, but some regiments achieved notable successes. Task Force 38 executed airstrikes on Formosa and Hong Kong, inflicting damage despite heavy losses. Meanwhile, Japanese forces struggled to regroup amid American pressure. General Suzuki devised a plan to fortify Leyte, but ongoing air raids hampered supply efforts. Tensions escalated as both sides prepared for decisive confrontations in the ongoing battle for control. This episode is the Mandalay Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off with, General Krueger strategically positioned General Mullins' 25th Division on the right flank of the 43rd Division to bolster the assault forces at the Rosario front. This maneuver was also intended to facilitate the continuation of the 14th Corps' advance to the south. Following the successful repulsion of General Nishiyama's local counterattack, General Wing ordered the 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments, which had been stalled, to launch an offensive from the west along the Damortis-Rosario road. Simultaneously, the 103rd and 169th Regiments were tasked with advancing northward along Route 3, originating from Pozorrubio. In contrast, while the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 23rd Division worked to contain General Swift's 1st Corps, General Yamashita was reinforcing the San Jose sector. He further instructed the Shigemi Detachment to maintain a defensive position in Binalonan. Although the 27th and 161st Regiments had successfully relieved the 103rd Regiment in the Binalonan area, Major-General Shigemi Isao ultimately opted to halt further troop movements. He decided to leave only a small garrison in Binalonan while the majority of his forces prepared for a decisive stand at San Manuel.   As the situation unfolded, the 3rd Battalion of the 161st Regiment encountered minimal resistance, allowing them to advance into the northern half of Binalonan by nightfall on January 17. In a parallel effort, General Patrick directed the 1st Regiment towards Urdaneta, where they successfully eliminated a small outpost belonging to the Shigemi Detachment. Additionally, he dispatched the 20th Regiment to the Cabaruan Hills, where they achieved their objective by reaching Lunec and securing the central area of the hills by the end of the day. On January 18, the offensive momentum of the 6th and 25th Divisions persisted. The 20th Regiment advanced to a low ridge approximately 2,500 yards west of Cabaruan, where American forces identified the primary defenses of the 2nd Battalion, 71st Regiment. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment successfully cleared Binalonan, and the 27th Regiment moved forward to seize control of the Bactad area, further consolidating their gains in the region. Simultaneously, Wing's units were gearing up for a significant new offensive. In line with this strategy, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment advanced along Route 3, deftly circumventing the town of Sison, and finally reached a crucial road junction located to the northeast of the town. Meanwhile, to the north, the 172nd Regiment executed a successful nighttime ambush against a Japanese artillery battalion. Following this victory, they dispatched a company to seize control of a strategically important hill, rising 600 feet and situated approximately 1,000 yards north of Rosario. This position enabled American forces to exert control over a substantial portion of the surrounding area. By the conclusion of the day, the 158th and 63rd Regiments established contact through patrols about a mile south of Amlang, as they prepared for a coordinated assault that was set to launch on January 19. This offensive culminated in the collapse of the last Japanese defenses just two days later. Concurrently, the 172nd Regiment successfully established a patrol base on Hill 606. From this vantage point, patrols ventured into Rosario, discovering the town was heavily mined, riddled with booby traps, and defended by concealed machine-gunners and riflemen hiding amidst the rubble of the buildings. On January 19, the 103rd Regiment initiated an assault on Hill 600, located at the southern end of the ridge line east of Route 3. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion of the 169th Regiment faced several intense counterattacks from retreating Japanese forces that had been bypassed at Mount Alava and Sison. Despite the fierce resistance, the relentless pressure from Japanese troops and increasingly heavy artillery fire ultimately compelled the battalion to withdraw by noon. Nevertheless, the American operations succeeded in diminishing the Japanese presence in the region. Looking southward, the 161st Regiment cautiously advanced toward San Manuel, while the 27th Regiment effectively moved into Asingan, successfully cutting off Shigemi's escape route. Further south, the 1st Regiment rapidly progressed along Route 3 toward the Agno River, capturing the towns of Villasis, Carmen, and Rosales. Meanwhile, the 20th Regiment commenced an assault on the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment stationed in the Cabaruan Hills. On the front commanded by General Griswold, the 14th Corps was in the process of mobilizing along the Camiling-Anao line, preparing to initiate an advance toward the Tarlac-Victoria line. The 160th Regiment began its march, covering seven miles southward from Camiling along Route 13, while the 129th Regiment took a strong position in Anao, establishing vital contact with other outposts of the 37th Division stationed at Paniqui. The advances made on January 20 were notably swift, with the 148th Regiment successfully capturing the towns of Gerona and Pura. Meanwhile, the 37th Reconnaissance Troop made significant progress by entering the guerrilla-occupied area of Victoria, and units from the 40th Division advanced to within four miles of Tarlac, signaling a promising push toward their objectives. In the area around Cabaruan, the Japanese forces had sustained heavy losses during the initial attack. In response, Colonel Patrick made the strategic decision to withdraw two battalions from the hills to reinforce the southern advance. Probing slowly through the roughest ground in the Cabaruan Hills on January 20 and 21, the 20th Regiment's reinforced battalion jumped off in the morning of the 22nd in what was expected to be the last attack, its way paved by an especially heavy artillery and air bombardment. But from the start, operations did not go as planned. The air strike, conducted by Fifth Air Force A-20s was four hours late, subjecting the infantry to "a nerve racking wait," and did not include requested napalm. Air and artillery concentrations were, however, well placed, and it seemed improbable to the waiting infantry that many Japanese could have lived through them. A combined tank-infantry assault began about 12:30 and proceeded slowly but steadily for almost two hours. Then the attackers were stopped cold by a tremendous burst of rifle, machine-gun, and light artillery fire from the very hillsides that had received the weight of the bombardments. Company E, in the lead, fell back; Company G's officers were all either killed or wounded, and the company was temporarily scattered; Company F was pinned in place; and two supporting tanks were knocked out. Casualties mounted quickly to 10 men killed and 35 wounded. As a consequence, Patrick found it necessary to redirect one battalion from the 1st Regiment to support the ongoing attack. Simultaneously, the remainder of the 20th Regiment pressed forward toward Cuyapo, while the bulk of the 1st Regiment continued its eastward movement toward the guerrilla-held Balungao. Additionally, the 6th Reconnaissance Troop reached Guimba, successfully establishing contact with patrols from the 14th Corps, which was crucial for coordinating their efforts. On another front, with Mount Alava now vulnerable, the 169th Regiment launched a vigorous assault on January 20, managing to secure the summit of the mountain by nightfall. In contrast, the 103rd Regiment continued to face heavy casualties during their frontal assaults against Hill 600, ultimately gaining only a precarious foothold on the exposed southern slopes. Meanwhile, in a significant naval development, Admiral Halsey's Task Force 38 exited the South China Sea through the Balintang Channel on January 20. The task force was poised to execute further strikes against Formosa, aiming to disrupt enemy operations and bolster the Allied offensive in the region. The following day, with significantly improved weather conditions, Admiral McCain's aircraft carriers launched a coordinated series of airstrikes targeting Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the southern Ryukyu Islands. These operations resulted in the destruction of 104 Japanese aircraft on the ground, the sinking of seven oil tankers, and the loss of seven transport ships, along with additional damage inflicted on another seven vessels.  For the first time since November 1944, TF 38 felt the sting of kamikazes. Operating just 100nm east of Formosa, TF 38 was not difficult to find. Just after noon, a single aircraft appeared to conduct a conventional bombing attack on TG 38.3's light carrier Langley. One bomb hit forward. Personnel casualties were light, but the carrier was conducting flight operations three hours later. Within minutes, another aircraft also evaded radar detection and the CAP to commence a suicide dive against Ticonderoga. The kamikaze struck the flight deck and penetrated where its bomb exploded. An impending strike was spotted and ready to launch; now these aircraft provided fuel for the fire which was quickly spreading. Just before 1300hrs, another group of eight kamikazes and five escorts resumed the attack on TG 38.3. Only two suicide aircraft survived the CAP to dive on the wounded Ticonderoga. One was sent spinning into the water by antiaircraft fire, but the final attacker crashed into the carrier's island. More fires were started. The crew succeeded in putting out the flames by 1415hrs and correcting a nine-degree list by 1800hrs. Though the ship was saved, the cost was high. Some 143 men were killed and 202, including her captain, were wounded. In addition, the air group lost 36 aircraft. As a final farewell, kamikazes attacked the two destroyers on picket duty just 65nm off Formosa at 1310hrs. A single Zero had joined a returning strike. Before it could be identified as enemy, it dove on destroyer Maddox, striking her amidships. This and the explosion of the bomb aboard created a fire that was quickly extinguished. After a final day of strikes on January 22 against the Ryukyus, during which eight ships were sunk, Task Force 38 set course for Ulithi. Upon arrival, Admiral Halsey transferred command of the Fast Carrier Force to Admiral Spruance, who would lead the final offensives in the Central Pacific.  Meanwhile, back on Luzon, on January 21, the 160th Regiment swiftly cleared the town of Tarlac and began its advance toward San Miguel. Simultaneously, the 145th and 148th Regiments moved unopposed toward La Paz. The speed of 14th Corps' advance had stretched Griswold's supply lines abnormally and had exposed his left from Cuyapo to La Paz, a distance of nearly 25 miles. He had no definite information about suspected Japanese concentrations in the vicinity of Cabanatuan, on Route 5 just 15 miles east of La Paz. His worries about the security of his flank were hardly put to rest by reports of new contacts with Japanese forces at Moncada, now 20 miles behind the front, and at La Paz. Elements of the 129th and 145th Regiments easily took care of the Japanese in the Moncada area; but during the night of January 21, a pitched battle developed at La Paz when a platoon of Japanese infantry, supported by one tank, attacked a 148th Regiment perimeter at a road junction a mile west of town. The Japanese finally withdrew after destroying a bridge that carried a secondary road across a river a mile east of La Paz; but because of this, Griswold reported to General Krueger that it would be impossible to extend 14th Corps' left any further south until he had more information about Japanese forces east of La Paz. To mitigate this risk, he decided to keep General Beightler's 37th Division positioned in reserve while General Brush's 40th Division continued its advance southward along Route 3 toward Bamban. As a result, elements of the 160th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop reached Capas and conducted patrols toward Camp O'Donnell on January 22. Meanwhile, the 161st Regiment began probing the defenses established by Japanese forces under Shigemi. The 103rd Regiment faced severe losses during their assault on Hill 600, necessitating a withdrawal to reorganize. Concurrently, the 169th Regiment launched an attack on Hill 355, making slow and costly progress against fierce resistance on the steep, barren slopes. By January 24, most of Hill 355 had been cleared, allowing the 3rd Battalion of the 103rd Regiment to move in and conduct mop-up operations in the area. As the 158th Regiment looked northward and secured the area around Amlang, they initiated an eastward push towards the positions held by the 172nd Regiment. However, their advance was slow, with only a modest gain of 500 yards achieved. Over the next two days, the 158th faced a grueling battle, making painstaking progress as they advanced foot by foot across exposed hills and ridges, all while enduring relentless machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. It wasn't until January 26 that they successfully broke through to Cataguintingan, where they provided much-needed support to the 172nd Regiment's ongoing assaults into Rosario. Meanwhile, by the evening of January 23, the 161st Regiment had managed to secure the southern slopes of the barren ridge north of San Manuel. They established trail blocks in the Aboredo Valley, effectively controlling movement in the area. To the south, the 108th Regiment had taken control of the Capas region, while the 160th Regiment successfully captured Bamban. However, it became increasingly evident that the American forces were now confronting the well-fortified and organized defenses of the Kembu Group. The Kembu Group's strength lay in the terrain it held, in the depth of its defenses, and in the great number of automatic weapons (aircraft and anti-aircraft) it possessed. Its major weaknesses were its immobility; the inadequate training and armament of the bulk of its troops; shortages of food, ammunition, and field artillery; and the rudimentary state of many defensive installations, a state deriving from the late start in establishing the positions at and west of Clark Field. The health of the command was poor from the start, and medical supplies were short. Morale was not of the highest order, and many of the troops were easily disaffected Formosan, Okinawan, and Korean labor personnel. In brief, the Kembu Group was the poorest armed, prepared, and supplied of Yamashita's three defense commands. On the other hand, as the 40th Division was soon to learn, even poor service troops, whatever their state of training and armament, can put up stiff resistance in good defensive terrain.  In preparation for the defense of Clark Field, General Tsukada assembled a diverse array of forces, totaling approximately 30,000 troops, although the majority consisted of air and naval personnel. He strategically divided his Army units into four distinct detachments. The Takayama, Takaya, and Eguchi Detachments were positioned along the first and second lines of defense, facing eastward toward Highway 3. Their defensive line extended from the hills west of Bamban to the vicinity of Fort Stotsenburg. In contrast, the Yanagimoto Detachment maintained its mobile units at Angeles and Porac, ready to respond to any potential enemy paratrooper landings on the southern flank of the Clark Field defenses. Additionally, Rear-Admiral Sugimoto Ushie commanded naval units comprising about 15,000 men, tasked with defending positions behind the two forward lines. In light of this formidable opposition, General Griswold made the strategic decision to utilize January 24 for consolidation and regrouping. This involved preparing for further advances southward while also probing into the enemy defenses that had already been uncovered. The 160th Regiment was able to secure Lafe Hill, although they were unable to establish a foothold on Hill 500, highlighting the challenges that lay ahead. To the north, American forces initiated another offensive against the Cabaruan Hills. The units of the 1st Regiment made only modest progress, yet they managed to advance closer to the main defensive positions as night fell. Meanwhile, at San Manuel, the 161st Regiment launched its first assault against the Shigemi Detachment, which encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance. As a result, the Americans were only able to establish a fragile foothold in the northern section of the town. Further north, Wing directed the 103rd Regiment to set up a line of departure along Route 3, aiming to strike eastward at the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. At the same time, they were tasked with advancing up the southwestern slopes of the exposed Hill 700 to secure that strategic location, as well as Hill 800 to the northwest. The 169th Regiment, advancing to the left of the 103rd, was assigned to capture Question Mark Hill. Concurrently, the 63rd and 172nd Regiments were ordered to launch simultaneous assaults on Hills 900 and 1500, respectively, while the reserve 3rd Battalion of the 63rd Regiment was also committed to clear Benchmark Hill. This coordinated attack was scheduled for January 25. The initial phases of the assault showed promise, with the supporting forces making significant headway. However, the 103rd Regiment faced considerable difficulties, managing to secure Hill 800 only by nightfall. Notably, the 172nd Regiment achieved tactical surprise, successfully clearing most of Hill 900. Over the next two days, the 63rd Regiment regrouped around Hill 1500 in preparation for its own offensive. Simultaneously, the 161st Regiment continued its slow advance southward through San Manuel, facing intense opposition. Patrick's units on the Cabaruan Hills managed to gain a mere 300 yards against determined resistance. Meanwhile, Brush pressed his attack on Clark Field, with the 160th Regiment clearing Hill 500 and advancing nearly a mile along the ridge from Lafe Hill, while the 108th Regiment secured Hills E and G. The following day, the 40th Division continued its southward maneuver. Any movement by American troops along the generally open ridges west of Route 3 inevitably brought down Japanese machine-gun and mortar fire, often augmented by fire from the dismounted aircraft automatic weapons, anti-aircraft guns, and light artillery. Seeking cover and usually pinned in place, the American infantry would call for close-in mortar and artillery support, wait for the concentrations to be fired, and then drive forward a few yards, when the process had to be repeated. Each time, the Americans managed to overrun a few Japanese machine-gun or rifle strongpoints. There was little choice of routes of advance. Draws, providing some concealment in scrub growth or bamboo thickets, were usually covered by well-emplaced Japanese weapons both within the draws and on the ridges to each side. Possession of the high ground, as ever, was essential. Yet the troops had to employ draws whenever possible to outflank Japanese ridgeline strongpoints, and often draws and ravines proved to be the only routes by which tanks, tank destroyers, and cannon company self-propelled mounts could get to the front to fire against Japanese cave positions along the sides of the ridges. The capture of one Japanese-held cave served only to disclose another, and one machine-gun position was overrun only to provide access to the next. Dislodging the Kembu Group from such defenses in depth was to prove a slow, laborious, and costly process, demanding the closest teamwork between the infantry and its supporting arms. Casualties, as a rule, would not be heavy on any one day--progress would be too slow and the troops would spend too much of their time pinned down awaiting fire from supporting weapons. But a daily attrition rate of about 5 men killed and 15 wounded for each battalion engaged would soon begin to have its effect. Meanwhile the 160th Regiment swiftly captured Hills 636 and 600 in rapid succession. However, the 108th Regiment lost control of Hill G during the engagement. On January 26, Griswold committed the 37th Division to the fight, with the 145th Regiment successfully capturing Mabalacat and Mabalacat East Airfield. They then shifted westward across Route 3, overrunning Clark Field Runway Number 1. In the Cabaruan Hills, American forces gained only 150 yards at a considerable cost. In response, Patrick decided to deploy another battalion from the 1st Regiment to eliminate this pocket of resistance. The following day, this two-battalion assault proved successful, resulting in the destruction of an entire battalion of Japanese troops, with over 1,400 enemy soldiers killed. Further north, the 161st Regiment finally broke through the main defenses of Shigemi's forces. Before dawn most of the Japanese left in San Manuel scrambled across the draw on the east side of town and fled to join the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment north of San Nicolas, but not before launching a final counterattack to cover their escape. At 0930 the 161st Infantry's two battalions resumed the drive southward through the town, and by 1330 San Manuel was clear. In a heroic but tactically unimportant stand the Shigemi Detachment had virtually fulfilled its self-imposed desire for annihilation in place. The detachment had lost 750 men killed; all its tanks, artillery, trucks, machine guns, and mortars had been either captured or destroyed. Probably no more than 250 troops escaped, and many of them were unarmed and wounded. The 161st Infantry and attached units had lost approximately 60 men killed and 200 wounded; the 716th Tank Battalion lost 3 tanks. Meanwhile, Wing's offensive continued on January 27, with the 103rd Regiment successfully reaching the crest of Hill 700 and the northwestern slopes of Hill 600. Unfortunately, they lost both positions to a brutal Japanese counterattack amidst a violent tropical downpour. On January 28, the 172nd Regiment captured Rosario, while the 63rd secured the southern crest of Hill 1500. Both regiments completed the capture of this strategic feature by January 30, thereby finalizing the occupation of the crucial road junction area. Further south, on January 27, the 160th Regiment advanced only 500 to 800 yards to the west and southwest. The 108th Regiment made a more substantial advance of about 1,000 yards southwest from Hills E and G but failed to reach Hill 5. The 145th Regiment pushed south along Route 3 for an additional three miles, reaching Culayo and Dau before taking control of the guerrilla-occupied Angeles, which had recently been abandoned by the retreating Yanagimoto Detachment. In a similar vein, the 148th Regiment secured Magalang without encountering any resistance. As we shift our focus from Luzon, we turn our attention to Burma, where we will delve into the ongoing developments of Operation Capital. Picking up from our previous discussions, we find ourselves in Central Burma, where the 2nd British Division and the 19th Indian Division are making significant strides toward Shwebo. The 2nd British Division successfully captured Ye-u on January 2, followed by the establishment of a crucial bridgehead across the Mu River just three days later. Meanwhile, the 19th Indian Division also advanced, reaching the Shwebo area by January 5. On January 8, a coordinated assault was launched by units from both divisions, culminating in the capture of Shwebo after two days of intense and brutal combat. To the west, General Festing's 29th Brigade began probing the northern flank of the 15th Division at Twinnge. Concurrently, other elements of the 19th Division worked to solidify their positions by establishing additional bridgeheads over the Irrawaddy River at Thabeikkyin and Kyaukyaung. On January 10, the 20th Indian Division captured Budalin and subsequently pushed towards Monywa, where the 33rd Division had only left a small contingent to serve as a rearguard. However, the campaign faced unexpected challenges; heavy rainfall during the first week of January brought all transport operations of the 4th Corps to a standstill, significantly hampering the Lushai Brigade's planned assault on Gangaw. After enduring a heavy aerial bombardment, the attack on Gangaw finally commenced on January 10. The Lushai Brigade managed to overpower the limited defending forces, forcing them to retreat after a brief skirmish. With Gangaw now under their control, the Lushai Brigade refocused their efforts on reconnaissance, monitoring the flanks of the 7th Indian Division. Meanwhile, the 28th East African Brigade took the lead in the advance, successfully displacing a Japanese garrison at Tilin on January 22. By this time, the 114th Brigade had begun to follow in the wake of the East Africans, while the 89th Brigade executed a long maneuver to the left, advancing toward Pauk in parallel with the other offensives. Although General Kimura was aware of some movements on his southern flank, he perceived these as mere feints by minor forces intended to divert his attention southward. Following a relentless barrage of artillery and air strikes, the 20th Division launched its offensive against Monywa on January 20. This assault faced fierce resistance, and it took two days of intense and bloody combat before the division was able to secure control of the town. After capturing Monywa, the 80th Brigade advanced towards Myaung, while the 110th Brigade shifted its focus to Ayadaw before launching an attack on Myinmu. By January 25, they had successfully established a bridgehead in that area. Meanwhile, to the east, the 2nd Division commenced its assault on Sagaing on January 14. They made significant headway against the forward defenses of the 31st Division, with other units managing to secure a bridgehead at Ywathitgyi. General Katamura, concerned about the expanding bridgeheads established by the 19th Division across the Irrawaddy River, ordered the 15th and 53rd Divisions to neutralize these positions before they could become fortified. As a result, during the last week of January, the Japanese forces executed a series of coordinated night attacks on Kyaukmyaung. By this time, British-Indian troops had dug in deeply, supported by formidable artillery and machine-gun positions. The ensuing conflict was marked by brutal carnage, with the 15th Division suffering a staggering loss of one-third of its personnel, while the 53rd Division was compelled to withdraw to Kyaukse after incurring heavy casualties. In parallel, the 89th Brigade successfully occupied Pauk on January 28, as General Messervy's forces geared up for a decisive push towards Meiktila. Looking northward, General Sultan was also advancing his own offensive aimed at reopening the Burma Road to China. He ordered the 50th Chinese Division to move towards Lashio and deployed the Mars Task Force to Hosi. Additionally, he dispatched the 36th British Division towards Mongmit, although the British advance was expected to be slow until additional forces could be brought into alignment for a more coordinated effort. General Sun's newly established 1st Army initiated a delayed offensive against Namhkam, which resumed in early January. This resurgence was marked by the 90th Regiment's strategic capture of the hill that overlooks the southwestern entrance to the Shweli River valley. Concurrently, the 112th Regiment advanced through Loiwing, subsequently crossing the river to approach Namhkam from the northeast. Meanwhile, the 88th Regiment entered the valley via the main road, making a direct push across the small plain toward Namhkam. The 89th and 114th Regiments executed a broader maneuver around the southern end of the Shweli valley; the 89th crossed the river on January 7 and advanced northward toward Namhkam, while the 114th crossed three days later, navigating through the hills toward the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail. To the south, the 475th Regiment progressed through Mong Hkak and reached Mong Wi on January 6, preparing for another challenging march across the hilly terrain toward Hosi, with the 124th Cavalry Regiment following closely behind. So close is Tonkwa to the mountains that the 475th found the trail rising steeply on the 1st day's march east. Like a crazily twisted drill it bored its way farther east and ever higher. In some places it was 15 to 20 feet across; in others, just wide enough for a man and a mule. As they rounded the turns, the men would peer ahead and look out across the valleys to where lay row on row of hills. Trees were everywhere. In flat places carved by erosion, the Burmese had cut and farmed terraces, and little villages clung to the mountains like limpets to a rock. Because existing maps were unreliable, so that map reconnaissance could not locate water and bivouac areas, and because the sheer fatigue of climbing the steeper slopes was formidable, march schedules went down the mountain side, with quite a few steel helmets and an occasional mule. Halts were a matter of common sense leadership at platoon or company level. The march was tactical but no Japanese were encountered, though rumor of their nearness kept the men alert. The Chinese had passed that way before, while a screen of Kachin Rangers was preceding the American column. Speaking the local dialects and carrying radios and automatic weapons, the Kachins were an excellent screen which masked the MARS Task Force while reporting anything that might be suspicious. Despite the difficult march, crossing the 400-foot wide Shweli was not too hard. The bridge built by the Chinese some weeks before still stood, a triumph of Oriental ingenuity, with bundles of bamboo for pontons and vines for cable. The Shweli was beginning to tear it apart, but work parties from the 475th kept it operable.  Meanwhile, spurred into action by General Wedemeyer after a month of inactivity, General Wei's Y-Force finally resumed its offensive operations in late December. They promptly dispatched the 2nd, 6th, and 71st Armies to launch an assault on the forward positions of the 56th Division at Wanting. Simultaneously, the 53rd Army executed a wide flanking maneuver to the west, aiming to encircle and attack the Japanese forces from the rear. Faced with the intense pressure of this four-pronged offensive, General Matsuyama was compelled to withdraw the 148th Regiment to a position north of Mongyu. He also ordered the Yoshida Force to mount a counteroffensive toward Muse and committed the reserve 2nd Regiment to secure Namhpakka. On January 5, the 53rd Army reached the vicinity of Muse and began crossing the river; however, they were met with fierce resistance from Matsuyama's timely counterattack, which thwarted their advance. Ten days later, Sun's forces initiated a well-coordinated offensive against Namhkam, which ultimately succumbed on January 16 as the 55th Regiment retreated toward Khonung. With the Shweli Valley now firmly under Allied control, Matsuyama began to tighten his defensive perimeter in anticipation of a final withdrawal toward Hsenwi. On January 17, the Mars Task Force made significant progress by reaching the Hosi sector, where they immediately engaged Japanese outposts. The 475th Regiment successfully secured the advantageous high ground near Nawhkam village. Over the next two days, American forces clashed with the 4th Regiment, capturing the strategically important Loikang Ridge and the elevated terrain overlooking Namhpakka. On January 19, the Mars Task Force attempted to disrupt Japanese supply lines by blocking the Burma Road through demolition and artillery bombardment, coinciding with the arrival of the 55th Regiment, which was sent to bolster the defenders. In a parallel effort, the 114th Regiment managed to sever the Namhkam-Namhpakka trail at Loilawn on the same day. Faced with this escalating threat from the south and the intensifying Chinese assaults on Wanting, the 56th Division was compelled to further contract its defensive perimeter. As a result, Wanting fell on January 20. Fortunately for Matsuyama, General Wei received orders from the Generalissimo to conclude the Salween campaign immediately, which meant that the Chinese forces would remain in their positions until they could be relieved by Sultan's units. Over the course of nearly nine months of intense combat, Wei's Y-Force had successfully reoccupied an impressive 24,000 square miles of Chinese territory and had defeated one of the most elite divisions of the Japanese army, along with elements from two additional divisions. However, the fighting was far from over. Sun continued to dispatch the 112th and 113th Regiments toward Wanting and Mongyu, aiming to clear the final stretch of the road leading to China. Meanwhile, the 89th and 114th Regiments pressed eastward to cut off the Burma Road north of Namhpakka, further complicating the situation for the Japanese forces. In the southern region, from January 20 to January 24, the Mars Task Force continued its strategic operations, executing ambushes and demolition missions while successfully repelling several intense counterattacks from enemy forces. By late January, pressure by MARS Task Force and that of the Chinese forces in the north began to register on the Japanese. The soldiers of the 4th Regiment could see the aerial activity that kept MARS supplied. Not recognizing what they saw, they were so impressed by a big supply drop on the 24th that they sent a report to the 56th Division of a large airborne force being landed along the Burma Road. Accepting this report, General Matsuyama decided to destroy his ammunition and retreat south. His superiors on January 24 agreed to let him retreat, but only after he had evacuated casualties and ammunition. Forty vehicles with gasoline accompanied by a Major Kibino of the 33rd Army staff were sent north to support the 56th in its withdrawal. The Japanese truck convoy made its run north the night of January 24. The trucks were heard, and the Americans placed heavy fire on the road. Kibino had been making the trip in a tankette. Hit by a 4.2-inch mortar shell, it burst into flames clearly visible from the American lines. Kibino clambered out, jumped on a truck, and succeeded in getting his convoy through to the 56th Division. Next day the derelict tankette was credited to the 2nd Battalion, 475th Regiment. But  Encouraged by the additional supplies of gasoline and inspired by the heroic examples of Major Kibino and the personnel of the truck companies, the 56th Division renewed its efforts and, during the next four days effected the evacuation of over 1000 casualties and moved several tons of ammunition to Hsenwi.  Meanwhile, General Matsuyama began to systematically reposition his forces toward Namhpakka, a strategic maneuver that would enable Chinese troops to occupy Mongyu on January 27. In a broader context, by the end of January, the 36th and 50th Divisions were also engaged in crossing the Shweli River, preparing to advance their offensives further southward. In the Arakan region, Operation Romulus exceeded expectations. The 1st Battalion of the 111th Regiment had been defending Akyab. On December 31, as the rear guard of the Sakura Detachment crossed the Kaladan River and moved eastward the Battalion was ordered to withdraw to Ponnagyun. As intelligence suggested very few Japanese were left on Akyab island, a recce aeroplane reported the locals showing no anxiety and on January 2 messages were dropped in Urdu and Burmese asking them to sit on the ground if the island was still occupied or stand with their hands in the air if not. Captain Jimmy Jarrett of ‘C' Flight, 656 AOP Squadron, then landed to a rousing reception and found the Japanese had quit on December 31, although nobody believed him until a senior officer flew in to confirm it. This prompted General Christison to swiftly initiate an amphibious invasion. Notably, this operation was executed without the anticipated naval bombardment and without deploying the reserve 26th Indian Division. As a result, the 3rd Commando Brigade successfully captured Akyab on January 3, facing no resistance, and the 25th Indian Division soon followed, reinforcing the area. From Akyab, the 9th York and Lancasters were transported by boat to establish a strategic blockade along the Yo River at Ponnagyun. There, they encountered significant Japanese forces. After a fierce engagement, however, the Japanese defenders were compelled to retreat toward Myohaung by January 11. In response to the evolving situation, Admiral Mountbatten devised a plan to land the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 25th Division on the Myebon Peninsula. This operation aimed to sever the primary lines of communication for Japanese forces, while preparations were made for the 26th Division to conduct a landing on Ramree Island. In response to the urgent military situation, Operation Passport was swiftly conceived and executed on January 12. British-Indian forces successfully landed at the southern tip of the peninsula, supported by both air and naval operations. Once ashore, the commandos advanced inland, facing intense resistance from fortified hill positions. Their efforts culminated in the capture of Pagoda Hill and the village of Myebon. However, as they pushed forward, opposition intensified, making it increasingly difficult for the British-Indian troops to reach Hill 831. Simultaneously, the 82nd West African Division, now commanded by Major-General Hugh Stockwell, entered the Kaladan Valley to relieve the 81st Division, which had been engaged in combat for over a year. The West African forces began to apply pressure against the Matsu Detachment units stationed at Myohaung and Minbya, although these Japanese forces managed to maintain their positions despite the mounting assaults. Meanwhile, planning was underway for the deployment of the 3rd Commando Brigade and the 51st Indian Brigade to land at Kangaw, coinciding with General Lomax's invasion of Ramree Island.  Early on January 21 the naval bombardment group opened fire. Christison and the other Force Commanders were watching through field glasses from the bridge of HMS Queen Elizabeth in her first engagement since the Dardanelles in 1915. Christison later said: ‘Some shells fell on a marsh behind the Jap defences, and I saw a number of duck spring up. “Duck”, I shouted. “The Royal Navy never ducks”, said the Admiral.' With her second salvo Queen Elizabeth scored a direct hit on the Japanese ammunition depot, which facilitated the landing operations. The 71st Indian Brigade successfully captured Kyaukpyu with minimal resistance. This victory enabled them to advance toward Minbyin and Kyaupyauk, both of which fell into their hands by January 23. In the subsequent days, the brigade continued its advance toward the Yanbauk Chaung, where they encountered fierce Japanese defenses. At the same time, other elements of the division worked to secure Cheduba and Sagu Kyun Islands, further consolidating their strategic position in the region. On January 22, the commandos and the 51st Brigade successfully landed in the Kangaw area near the Min River. However, they faced violent and frequent counterattacks from Japanese forces, which hindered their ability to expand their beachhead. Despite these challenges, the intense pressure from the commandos ultimately forced the Japanese defenders at Hill 831, Myohaung, and Minbya to retreat toward Kani, marking a significant shift in the operational landscape. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces advanced against Japanese defenses, capturing key positions despite heavy resistance and casualties. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian troops advanced, seizing key locations despite heavy resistance. Both fronts faced intense combat, leading to significant territorial gains against Japanese forces by the end of January.

Mevlana Takvimi
KANAYAN YARALARIMIZ VE YAPABİLECEKLERİMİZ-16 OCAK 2025-MEVLANA TAKVİMİ

Mevlana Takvimi

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 16, 2025 1:54


Müslüman müslümanın derdiyle dertlenmeli onun sıkıntılarına ortak olmalıdır. Gazze, Doğu Türkistan, Arakan, Somali ve daha pek çok yerde müslümanlar zor durumdadır Teknolojinin getirdiği kolaylıklarla oralara yardım etmek daha kolay hale gelmiş durumda. Önceden aylarca süren yolculuklar şimdi birkaç saatte yapılabilmektedir. Arakan'a gidenler, gitmeden önce bildiklerinin, gittikten sonra öğrendikleri yanında bir hiç olduğunu anlatmaktadır. Zorunlu göç ve katliamlar yüzünden ne ev kalmış, ne de aileler… Bugün Arakan'da yapılanlar, dün de Avrupa'nın ortasında Srebrenica'da yüzbinlerce müslümana yapılmıştı. Yani dünyanın neresinde olursa olsun, zulme hep müslümanlar muhatap olmaktadır. İnsan hakları savunucuları için “insan”ın ne anlama geldiği meselesi kritik bir sorudur. Nedense müslümanlara yapılan katliamlara, zulümlere, haksızlıklara uluslararası insan hakları savunucularının sesi çıkmadığı bir gerçektir. Tabii bu yaşananlarda sorumluluğu olan bir grup insan daha var: Müslümanlar. Zulüm coğrafyalarındaki katliamlara İslâm toplumları kayıtsız kaldıkça bu insanlık ayıbının sonu gelmeyeceğe benzemektedir. 1912'de Balkan savaşları esnasında, dünyanın her tarafındaki Müslümanlar gibi, Arakanlı Müslümanlar da para toplayarak Osmanlı Ordusu'na yardım etmişlerdi. II. Abdülhamid Han döneminde Osmanlı'nın Asya'daki faaliyetleri neticesinde, padişah Hindistan, Çin ve Myanmar Müslümanları arasında popüler olmuştu. 1897'de Türk-Yunan Savaşı çıkınca, Myanmarlıların dahil olduğu Asya'daki Müslümanlar hemen yardım toplayarak Türkiye'ye gönderdiler. Arakanlı Müslümanlara borcumuzu ödeyelim. Geçmişte her zaman yanımızda yer alan ve fakir hâllerine bakmadan bize yardım eden Arakanlı Müslümanların imdadına koşmalı ve onlara olan borcumuzu ödemeliyiz. Binlerce masum Arakanlı Müslüman'ın, cunta yönetimi ve Budist putperestler tarafından alçakça şehit edilmesi ve açlıktan ölmesi karşısında seyirci kalamayız. (Hasan Celal Güzel, 12.08.2012 Tarihli Köşe Yazısı)

The Pacific War - week by week
- 162 - Pacific War Podcast - Victory at Leyte - December 24 - 31 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 24, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the third arakan campaign. In December, General Bruce's forces advanced through Leyte, securing Ormoc and preparing for a decisive push toward Valencia.. The 305th and 306th Regiments steadily overcame enemy positions, while the 307th secured the airstrip. As Japanese forces began to retreat, the 12th Cavalry captured Kananga, opening Highway 2. Meanwhile, in Burma, General Slim devised Operation Extended Capital, aiming to outmaneuver the Japanese and cut off their supply lines, setting the stage for a crucial battle. As Admiral Mountbatten pivoted from Operation Dracula to launch Operation Romulus in Arakan, General Christison devised a three-pronged assault on Akyab. Facing fierce Japanese resistance, Private Kweku Pong displayed extraordinary bravery amidst chaos, earning recognition for his valor. Meanwhile, the 28th Army struggled to defend its positions, ultimately retreating under pressure. Amidst strategic deceptions, the Allies advanced through challenging terrain, culminating in significant victories that shifted the tide in Burma, showcasing courage and tactical ingenuity in the face of adversity. This episode is the Victory at Leyte  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, General Krueger's forces had effectively secured the Ormoc Valley, prompting many Japanese units to begin a challenging retreat toward Palompon. From that point, the best General Suzuki's troops could manage was to hold their positions for as long as possible. The Japanese had pockmarked Matagob and the area surrounding it with foxholes and emplacements and had dug spider holes under the houses. South of Matagob, where the road climbed into the hills, the enemy had utilized natural caves, gullies, and ridges on both sides of the road and dug many deep defensive positions. Some of these were eight feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and widened to six feet at the bottom. The Japanese had emplaced machine guns in culverts and had constructed several well-camouflaged coconut log pillboxes on the forward slopes of the ridges. An excellent, almost invisible installation, which served as an observation post, was dug in on the forward slope of a ridge about three miles north of San Miguel. It had a concealed entrance on the reverse slope. From this post eight miles of the road to the north and east could be observed.  Meanwhile, eager to deliver a decisive blow, Krueger organized his forces for a four-division assault along a wide front toward the west coast. General Bruce's 77th Division was tasked with advancing west along the Palompon road, while the three divisions of General Sibert's 10th Corps embarked on a difficult trek across the mountains to reach the northwest coast. The northwestern mountains of Leyte west of Ormoc Bay provided a difficult barrier to any movement toward the northwest coast. The area was the last one available to the Japanese either for escaping from Leyte or for staging defensive actions. In general, the terrain was rough, increasing in altitude from broken ground and low hills in the north to steep rocky ridges and high hills in the south. The northern part was either under cultivation or covered with cogon grass. Toward the south, the cultivated fields and grasslands were gradually supplanted by dense forests. Palompon had been extensively used by the Japanese as an auxiliary port of entry to Leyte. The town was the western terminus of the road that ran north and eastward across the northwestern hills to join Highway 2 near Libongao. It was this road junction that the 10th and 24th Corps had seized. The Palompon road, as it was called, followed the lower slopes of the hills until the flat interior valley floor was reached. The confining hills were steep-sided with many knife-edged crests. Such was the area into which the forces of the 6th Army had driven remnants of the Japanese 35th Army. To facilitate the capture of Palompon, Bruce planned to land the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment near the port, while the other two battalions advanced westward on the Palompon road. To support this operation, Admiral Kinkaid would provide amphibious vehicles, LCMs, and a PT escort. However, while preparations for the amphibious assault were underway, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment departed from Valencia on December 22, quickly crossing the Togbong and Pagsangahan Rivers without encountering any opposition, and eventually halting just beyond the Humaybunay barrio.  The 302nd Engineer Battalion, which followed behind the assault battalions, fought the "battle of bridges." The engineers worked around the clock, frequently without any infantry protection, to restore the bridges as soon as possible. The bridges were to be sufficiently strengthened initially to support 2.5-ton truck traffic for infantry supply, then they were to be reinforced to carry 20 tons in order to bring M8's forward, and eventually to 36-ton capacity to carry the M10's. General Bruce had hoped that sufficient Bailey bridges could be made available for important crossings to carry traffic while engineers built wooden bridges under the Bailey bridges. Only a limited number of Bailey bridges were furnished, however, and engineer progress to the west was slowed down. At the same time, patrols from the 128th Regiment successfully eliminated the last enemy strongholds in the Limon area, while the 127th Regiment advanced to Lonoy, where the 1st Cavalry Division was gearing up for its westward push. Finally, the 24th Division, now under Major General Roscoe Woodruff, dispatched the 34th Regiment to launch an attack toward Tuktuk. On December 23, as aircraft bombed Palompon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment resumed their advance. The Americans steadily progressed along the road, successfully forcing the Takahashi Detachment to retreat to the mountains northwest of Matag-ob, where they had to fend off a series of strong night counterattacks. That same morning, the assault units of the 1st Cavalry Division moved out from the highway, facing no resistance as they advanced west through the mountains. This initial day of marching established the pattern for the following days, with the cavalry regiments continuing to push forward through challenging terrain, encountering only sporadic resistance. Additionally, from December 23 to 26, the 34th Regiment conducted extensive patrols along the west coast of the Leyte peninsula. Meanwhile, the advance echelon of the 1st Division successfully linked up with the 68th Brigade, reaching the Bagacay sector the next day. However, the main body of the division had to carve its way through dense jungle on its way to Bagacay. The 102nd Division was also advancing toward the area south of Matag-ob, but after failing to make contact with the 35th Army or the Takahashi Detachment, its units began to retreat to Villaba in the following days. On December 24, while the 1st Battalion was boarding at Ormoc, the remainder of the 305th Regiment launched another offensive. At 1000 on 24 December the assault troops jumped off. The Japanese resistance was light and intermittent, but American progress was slow because of the rough, irregular hills in which the enemy had established positions in foxholes, spider holes, and caves. Since it was not possible to bypass these positions, the regiment had to clear each one before the advance could continue. The force received some artillery fire but a mortar platoon from Company A, 88th Chemical Weapons Battalion, silenced the enemy guns. At 1500 the battalions set up their night perimeter 500 yards short of the road bend. During the night a Japanese force of twenty men, which tried to penetrate the defenses of the 3d Battalion, was killed. Both the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments sent out patrols on December 23 to reconnoiter the terrain. At 08:00 on December 24 the two regiments started for the west coast. Throughout the march to the sea, they encountered only small parties of the enemy, who put up no effective resistance, but heavy rains, dense, almost impassable forests, and steep craggy hills slowed the advance. The commanding officer of the 127th Infantry said of the hills encountered on December 24: “The morning was spent in climbing to the top of a mountain ridge. The climbing was difficult but as we later found out, the descent was much worse. The trail led almost perpendicular down the side. After reaching the bottom, another ridge was encountered, this almost straight up, everyone had to use hand holds to pull themselves up. All in all there were seven ridges from the bottom of the first descent to the first possible bivouac area.” The hills were less rugged from then on. Throughout the march both regiments also received supplies by airdrop, which was not completely satisfactory since none of the drops was made at the requested time and frequently there was a wide scattering of supplies. On December 25, the 1st Battalion of the former unexpectedly came across the remnants of the 1st and 57th Regiments. The Japanese forces suffered significant casualties and were compelled to disperse, but they eventually managed to reach Bacacay later that night. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment made slow progress along the Palompon road against a well-entrenched enemy. However, the crucial development was that its 1st Battalion successfully landed at Buaya without facing any opposition.  A light fast armored column moved north to clear the road and to forestall any Japanese counterattack from that direction as the rest of the task force went rapidly south through the barrio of Look to Palompon, which fell at 1206. This closed the last main port of entrance on the island to the Japanese. Within four hours after hitting the beaches the battalion had secured the barrios of Buaya and Look as well as Palompon, and had strong patrols operating to the northeast and south. The troops met no opposition at any point. It was doubtless with great satisfaction that General Bruce sent the following message to the Commanding General, 14th Corps: "The 77th Infantry Division's Christmas contribution to the Leyte Campaign is the capture of Palompon, the last main port of the enemy. We are all grateful to the Almighty on this birthday of the Son and on the Season of the Feast of Lights." The 1st Battalion occupied a defensive position in the vicinity of Look on 25 December, and rested on 26 December, which was Christmas Day back home. It spent the next five days sending out patrols and awaiting the arrival through the mountains of the rest of the 305th Infantry. Once again, Suzuki's plans were thoroughly disrupted. Palompon was to have been used as the rear center of the line of communications and the army headquarters was to have been established at Kompisao, but the seizure of Palompon on 25 December by the 77th Division forced Suzuki to change the location of his army headquarters. He then selected as a base of operations an area in the vicinity of Ginabuyan that overlooked Silad Bay and was about three kilometers north of Villaba. The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet, heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western slopes that made it "a natural fortress." From it one could command a view of Ormoc Valley to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu to the west. There were a few Filipino huts, and cultivated fields and coconut groves, interspersed with salt beds, lay along the beach. The area "was admirably suited for an extended period of defensive action." General Suzuki ordered the units of the 35th Army that were retreating westward to repair to the vicinity of the new base of operations.  He sent orders for his retreating units to gather there instead of in Palompon. Although Suzuki anticipated being able to support 15,000 men in this self-sufficient area, an assessment of the available resources revealed that they would only last for two weeks. Consequently, the Japanese began preparations for Operation Chi-Go, which involved the amphibious movement of several units, including the 35th Army headquarters and the majority of the 1st Division, to other islands in the Visayas. At the same time, on December 26, the 34th Regiment received orders to capture San Isidro. The next day, its 1st Battalion left Calubian and moved to the high ground overlooking the port, while Companies F and G conducted amphibious landings at Gigantangan Island and Taglawigan before securing Daha. The reinforced Company G then re-embarked on the landing craft and proceeded toward the San Isidro Bay area, where they encountered heavier resistance than anticipated and were ultimately forced to retreat. At the same time that the 2nd Battalion, 305th Regiment was being withdrawn for an overwater movement to Palompon, the 3rd Battalion continued its advance along the road, successfully covering over 1,000 yards by December 28. That day the foremost elements of the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments broke out of the mountains and reached the barrio of Tibur on the west coast, about 2,800 yards north of Abijao. By nightfall on the following day, the 7th Cavalry was also on the west coast but farther north. In its advance it had encountered and destroyed many small, scattered groups of the enemy, most of whom showed little desire to fight. The regiment arrived at Villaba, two and one-half miles north of Tibur, at dusk, and in securing the town killed thirty-five Japanese. Additionally, the 34th Regiment launched a coordinated assault on San Isidro, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance and capturing the port. In the following days, the troops moved south along the coast, eliminating small, poorly equipped Japanese units. Looking south on December 29, the 128th Regiment reached the high ground overlooking Tabango and Campopo Bays, while the 127th Regiment secured the high ground overlooking Antipole Point, completing the advance of the 32nd Division. Further south, the 3rd Battalion, 305th Regiment continued its push along the Palompon road despite strong resistance, while Company B secured the barrio of San Miguel. At 0930 on 30 December the 305th Infantry struck along the Palompon road, the 3d Battalion driving west, and the Provisional Mountain Force attacking east. The Mountain Force encountered only scattered resistance until 0930, when the Japanese, from well-entrenched positions in the precipitous sides of the road at a point about four miles east of Palompon, directed strong machine gun fire along the road. The Mountain Force dug in for the night on high ground overlooking the point at which its advance had been halted. The 3d Battalion succeeded in overcoming the opposition which had halted it the previous day, and pushed forward to a point about 1,000 yards southwest of Tipolo. The Japanese had emplaced artillery on curves in the road and could fire directly on the advancing American troops. Although the 305th Infantry lost one tank to enemy artillery fire, it was able to destroy three 75-mm. guns and capture two others intact. Meanwhile, Company C conducted a reconnaissance in force and executed an amphibious landing at Abijao, advancing 1,300 yards north to establish contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division near Villaba. By this time, most of the Japanese forces had successfully regrouped in the Villaba-Mount Canguipot area. Consequently, on December 31, Suzuki launched four strong counterattacks against the forces at Villaba; however, enemy artillery disrupted most of these assaults before elements of the 77th Division arrived to relieve the cavalrymen. With the westward advance to the coast complete, General Eichelberger's 8th Army officially took command of all units on Leyte Island, following MacArthur's announcement that organized resistance had ceased. As a result, on January 1, the 77th Division was instructed to relieve the 32nd and 24th Divisions, while the divisions of the 10th Corps moved to staging areas in preparation for upcoming operations. The 8th Army also assumed control of operations on Samar Island, which had similarly been secured against enemy forces. Units from the 1st Cavalry Division had pushed through heavy resistance to reach the strategic Taft-Wright Highway that runs through central Samar. On December 8, the cavalry successfully captured Wright, the western end of the highway, and then moved east to connect with friendly guerrilla forces advancing from Taft on the opposite coast, thereby securing control of the highway. Meanwhile, following the successful invasion of Mindoro, American forces continued their efforts on Hill Drome and Ellmore Field, with General Dunckel's troops conducting extensive patrols to locate enemy stragglers while awaiting the arrival of the 21st Regiment. The only opposition faced came from the persistent assaults of the 4th Air Army and the 1st Combined Base Force. On December 21 and 22, the 1st Resupply Echelon was attacked by enemy aircraft. About twenty kamikazes attacked the convoy, so damaging two LST's that they later had to be abandoned, and inflicting lesser damage on two destroyers and a Liberty ship. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, en route to Mindoro in this convoy lost 6 men killed and 32 wounded; U.S. Navy losses were about 70 men killed or wounded; the Japanese lost 7 planes in kamikaze attacks and 3 others to shipboard antiaircraft fire. Then, from December 28 to December 30, Task Unit 18.3.15 was also attacked by kamikazes. Meanwhile, Admiral Okawachi was getting Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force ready for a hit-and-run surface attack on enemy invasion ships near San Jose, known as Operation Rei-Go. However, a proposed counter-landing on Mindoro, which was supported by Marshal Terauchi, Admiral Fukudome, and General Tominaga, faced strong opposition from General Yamashita and his 14th Area Army. The Area Army staff adamantly maintained that it would be impossible to move any sizeable forces to Mindoro but agreed to dispatch a small raiding unit to hamper enemy development of airfields in the San Jose area. On or about 24 December, an order was issued to the 8th Division to organize a task unit for this mission as soon as possible. Ultimately, a reluctant compromise was reached, allowing a small raiding unit from the 8th Division to be sent to disrupt enemy airfield development in the San Jose region. The raiding detachment was a specially organized provisional unit which included a small number that originally belonged to the Gi-Go Airborne Raiding Unit. It assembled at Batangas and prepared to embark for Mindoro. While this unit was being organized, Shima's warships left Camranh Bay on December 24. However, as they approached Mindoro on December 26, a lone PBY reconnaissance plane spotted them. In response, 105 aircraft were sent to conduct low-level attacks on the Japanese force.  At 19:40 the first wave of planes found the vessels just offshore. Before the wild engagement was over, the full wing strength had attacked every ship at least once. "When I saw a solid sheet of flame," reported one pilot in describing the AA, "I knew I was over the vessel." While wheeling away from the target, each pilot flashed on his running lights to avoid collision. Some planes landing in the Mindoro blackout for rearming, made as many as three strikes against the enemy vessels. Although PT boats, lurking close to shore, fired torpedoes at the silhouetted Japanese targets, only the destroyer Kiyoshimo went down, and the fleet persisted toward the beachhead, where at 22:40 it fired star shells which began an ineffective 40-minute bombardment. Only one Liberty ship, which had not sought refuge behind Ilin Island as directed, was sunk. Naval gunfire and simultaneous Japanese air attacks caused little damage at Hill, but made it difficult for the airmen aloft to land. With gasoline running short, most of the pilots made as many attacks as possible and then headed through the night and bad weather for Leyte, a flight more dangerous than the Japanese AA had been. When a full count was made, losses during the engagement totaled 26 aircraft. For the force engaged this was a heavy loss, but it was not in vain, for several Japanese survivors attributed the amazingly poor bombardment by their fleet to the aerial clawing which had demolished main batteries and killed a majority of the gun crews. Dunckel thought that without a doubt the airmen had saved the beachhead from serious losses: "The action of our Air Units on that night," he wrote, "will stand forever… as one of the most gallant deeds to be established in the traditions of American fighting men." On 26 December 1944, then with the San Jose bombardment force, Kiyoshimo was crippled by two direct bomb hits in attacks by U.S. Army bombers during the approach to Mindoro, Philippines. The ship was then finished off by a torpedo from U.S. PT-223, 145 miles south of Manila ; 82 were killed and 74 injured. The destroyer Asashimo rescued 169 survivors, including ComDesDiv 2, Captain Shiraishi Nagayoshi, and Lieutenant Commander Kajimoto; U.S. PT boats rescued five others.Despite this, Shima pressed on toward his target, entering the anchorage area at 23:00 to commence bombardment of San Jose. After approximately forty minutes of shelling, during which one auxiliary vessel and a PT boat were sunk, the Japanese ships withdrew northwest at high speed, still under fire from enemy planes. Although Shima's force ultimately managed to escape, the air attacks resulted in the sinking of the Kiyoshimo and damage to the Ashigara, the light cruiser Oyodo, and three destroyers, with a loss of 26 aircraft. The bombardment prevented landings at the Mindoro strips and many pilots, finding their planes running low on fuel, headed through the darkness and heavy weather toward Leyte fields only to crash on the way. Following this unsuccessful operation, on December 31, the raiding unit from the 8th Division finally crossed the Verde Island Passage by landing craft to reach Calapan in northeastern Mindoro, and then proceeded to Pinamalayan, arriving there on January 5. We must now depart from the Philippines and proceed to Bougainville to report on the preparations for a new Australian offensive.  Previously, we observed that General Savige's 2nd Corps had successfully relieved the American troops stationed at the Cape Torokina perimeter.  The Australians had now reached the conclusion that the Japanese had disbanded depleted units to reinforce others and were maintaining a well- disciplined and efficient force. They decided that, at the end of November, the force included the 38th Independent Mixed Brigade, built round the 81st Regiment, and the 6th Division with three depleted infantry regiments -13th, 23rd and 45th. Of these the 38th Brigade was believed to be chiefly concentrated at Numa Numa, with part of the 81st Regiment forward on the trail; most of the 13th Regiment was believed to be round the Jaba River-Gazelle Harbour area, with the 23rd farther south, and the 45th round Kieta on the east coast. The Allied Intelligence estimates of the whereabouts of the main Japanese forma- tions on Bougainville proved accurate. The main shortcoming was that the strength of the naval troops was underestimated. At the time of the arrival of the Aus- tralians there were about 11,000 naval men, including 3,500 civilian workers, on the island; the 87th Garrison Force, about 4,000 strong, was in the Buka area, and in the south were two strong forces of marines: the 6th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force (about 2,000) and the 7th Kure Special Naval Landing Force (about 1,500). Indeed the naval forces were about as strong in fighting men as the 6th Division. The successful attack on Little George by the 9th Battalion on 29th November, six weeks before it was expected, surprised the enemy commanders and convinced them that the Australians were determined to open an offensive. Reinforcements numbering 450 were hurried into the central area (there were 2,000 troops deployed in or forward of Numa Numa) and Colonel Kaneko Atsushi of the 81st Regiment took command. A further 1,000 troops were sent from Kieta and the north to Numa Numa. Hyakutake was convinced that the attack on the Numa Numa trail would be accompanied by a landing at its eastern end with the object of severing his force. The quantity of artillery used in the attack on Little George and later Arty Hill convinced the Japanese that a determined thrust was being made. Arty Hill was defended by men of the 5th and 11th Companies of the 81st Regiment. Meanwhile the 13th Regiment was attacked on the Jaba River. Lieut-General Kanda of the 6th Division did not propose to contest the south bank of the river, considering that the crossing was merely a feint and the principal offensive would be made by sea; the main body of the defending force-1,500 men-was retained in the Mosigetta area. By January Kanda estimated that one Australian division, its name yet unknown, was south of the Jaba, with 25 guns. From 23rd to 26th November the 9th Battalion, with the 12th Field Battery and other detachments under command, took over this sector. The 9th Battalion's first task was actively to reconnoitre the Sisivie area with a view to attacking it later; and to secure ground from which such an attack could be launched. It had been believed that the main supply route from Numa Numa passed through Sisivie, but captured docu- ments and interrogation of prisoners revealed that Sisivie was merely an outpost and that the Piaterapaia area was the terminus of the enemy's line of communication; consequently the battalion's efforts were con- centrated in that direction. At 1.50 p.m. on the 24th one rifle shot was fired from Little George into the battalion's area the first shot in the Australian operations on Bougainville. On the 25th a small patrol moved stealthily to the rear of Little George and was fired on, two men being wounded. On the morning of the 29th the battery in the Doiabi Valley fired high-explosive and smoke shells on to Arty Hill, mortars fired smoke bombs on to Little George, and into the smoke a single platoon attacked. At the run the men reached the top of Little George before the Japanese emerged from shelter, opened fire with machine-guns and threw grenades. The attackers did not falter but worked their way forward in pairs, one man firing on a post while the other moved close and threw in grenades. Lieutenant Deacon, the commander, was 3 wounded but carried on. In about half an hour the position was gained. Two Australians had been killed and six wounded, of whom three remained on duty. Twenty Japanese dead lay on the hill, in- cluding a lieutenant and a sergeant. The expected enemy counter-attack was made in the evening by about 40 Japanese. It was a frontal thrust and gained no ground. Until dawn the enemy tried in vain to infiltrate. While these operations were in progress on the Numa Numa trail, the 2/8th Commando, next on the right, had taken over responsibility for the tangled mountain area rising to an altitude of 4,000 feet south and south-east of Mount Bagana, and known as the Hanemo sector. When the commando squadron took over from a company of the 164th American Regiment there had been no contact with the enemy for several weeks, and it was believed that only a handful of Japanese were in the neighbourhood. For five weeks from 24th November, when the relief was completed, a commando troop patrolled but met Japanese only twice, killing two and capturing another. By 27th December, when the 61st Battalion relieved the troop, it was considered that the area was clear and the flank of a force advancing down the coast would be safe. Additionally, Brigadier Raymond Monaghan's 29th Brigade was deployed to the southwestern edge of the perimeter, and a company from New Guinea was assigned to scout the Jaba River area. On December 3, Matthews sent a platoon to Sisivie, but the defenders were able to pin down the Australians with intense fire. After successfully repelling a strong enemy counterattack, the 9th Battalion advanced on Bawabu Ridge toward Pearl Ridge, with Matthews' C Company ordered to capture Arty Hill on December 18.  Matthews planned an attack on Arty Hill by a full company. At 7 a.m. on 18th December Major Blanch's C Company formed up on the sheltered side of George and Little George, on top of which men of a supporting company were walk- ing about nonchalantly to mislead the enemy into thinking that it was to be another uneventful day. Twelve New Zealand Corsairs at- tacked the Japanese positions; the battery of the 4th Field Regiment opened fire from its positions in the Laruma River Valley; medium machine-guns fired from Mount Deacon and Bawabu Ridge that is, from each flank-on to the reverse slope of Arty Hill at ranges up to 1,000 yards. After thirteen minutes of bombardment, the attackers advanced through the smoke along the razor-back ridge which was the only means of approach to the bare hill. Months of intermittent shelling had destroyed the bush and so loosened the soil on the steep slopes that the men had difficulty in scrambling up them. By 8.10 the leading troops were near the crest of Banyan Knoll and were meeting sharp small arms fire from Japanese in covered weapon-pits. Grenades were hurled down on them. They pressed on. Sergeant Allan, commanding the right platoon, led the way to the top of Banyan Knoll, shot a Japanese machine-gunner and himself fell dead. His men carried on up the slopes of Arty Hill. As at Little George, the attackers worked in pairs, one man covering an enemy post with fire while the other attacked from a flank with grenades. After more than an hour of close fighting the position was won and the defenders were digging in and setting up wire in preparation for the probable counter-attack. There was none: a prisoner said that there were not enough men left to attack. Five Australians were killed and 12 wounded of whom 4 remained on duty. Twenty-five Japanese dead were counted, 2 Japanese were taken prisoner, and from 10 to 20 recently-buried bodies were found. Two days later, Lieutenant-Colonel John McKinna's 25th Battalion began to relieve the exhausted 9th Battalion and was immediately tasked with taking Pearl Ridge, although its initial probing attacks were met with fierce resistance from the determined defenders. Meanwhile, Monaghan had deployed Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert McDonald's 15th Battalion to the Jaba River area, where they effectively cleared out enemy outposts. By the fourth week of December, the unofficial ceasefire on Bougainville had collapsed. Intense fighting erupted in two of the three main sectors, resulting in the deaths of over 100 Japanese soldiers, with their forward positions in each area being captured. The Australians were also bringing in additional reinforcements to sustain their offensive. According to Savige's strategy, Brigadier John Field's 7th Brigade was to be replaced by elements of Brigadier John Stevenson's 11th Brigade in the central sector, with orders to move south and join the rest of Major-General William Bridgeford's 3rd Division for an assault toward the Puriata River. Additionally, a strong contingent from the 11th Brigade was set to advance along the northwest coast of the island toward Soraken Harbour, aiming to push the northern enemy forces into the confined Bonis Peninsula. However, before these plans could be executed, McKinna was intent on capturing Pearl Ridge and aimed to launch one final attack with all his companies by the end of the month. Unbeknownst to the Australians, the few defenders in the area had recently received reinforcements in the form of a battalion under the direct command of Major-General Kijima Kesao, which significantly strengthened the ridge. Nevertheless, on the morning of December 30, aircraft bombarded the Japanese positions for about 40 minutes. At 08:00, the infantry advanced under the cover of artillery and machine-gun fire, with A Company facing heavy resistance just in front of Pear Hill that they could not overcome. Due to this setback on the right flank, McKinna ordered D Company to undertake a challenging climb along Pear Hill instead of the narrow spur where the attack had failed. Meanwhile, C Company made slow progress through dense brush but eventually managed to cut the enemy's track to the west. After repelling several enemy counterattacks during the night, the four companies renewed their assault on December 31. Although the march over Arty Hill and through thick underbrush was physically demanding, D Company managed to approach Pear Hill undetected. With A Company drawing enemy fire, D Company launched a powerful attack following an artillery bombardment that successfully pushed back the Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, B Company captured Baker's Brow to the west, and C Company held its position along the western track. However, by nightfall, Kijima's troops began testing the defenses established by C Company. In the early morning, the Japanese launched a fierce counterattack from the south and southeast, managing to penetrate two forward Australian positions. After an hour of intense hand-to-hand combat, the assault was ultimately repelled with the help of artillery support, and Australian patrols later found that Pearl Ridge had been abandoned by the enemy. Throughout the morning and into the early afternoon, the Australians conducted mopping-up operations until the ridge was completely cleared. With control of Pearl Ridge secured, the Australians gained a strategic vantage point that allowed them to observe from one side of Bougainville to the other, aiding future operations. During the battle, the Australians suffered 10 killed and 25 wounded, while the Japanese lost 34 killed and 1 captured. Shortly after taking Pearl Ridge, the 11th Brigade assumed control of the central sector as per Savige's orders, while the rest of the 7th Brigade began moving south. In conclusion, Major-General Percy Clarkson's 33rd Division began its deployment to Morotai in late December, with Colonel Ray Cavenee's 136th Regiment landing on the island's west coast on December 22. Four days later, the regiment advanced into Japanese-controlled territory to engage Colonel Kisou's 211th Regiment, receiving support from elements of the 130th Regiment moving overland from the Doroeba Plain and the 3rd Battalion of the 137th Regiment marching from Morotai's southern coast into the interior. This coordinated effort aimed to prevent the Japanese from dispersing into smaller groups in the island's mountainous regions. On January 3, the 136th Regiment located and attacked the 211th Regiment at Hill 40, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions advancing from the southwest while the 3rd Battalion approached from the north. After two days of intense combat, the Americans successfully captured Hill 40, inflicting significant casualties on the enemy, and then began pursuing the retreating Japanese forces to the north. Two thousand yards to the north, the 3d Battalion was settling down for the night. Its march from Radja had started badly. From the beginning the battalion had been harried by the enemy. On the nights of December 26-27 and 27-28, its perimeter had been attacked viciously by an estimated enemy battalion. (The 3d Battalion of the Jap 211th Infantry. It had been detached from the 211th for a special mission to Radja to await and guide reinforcements from Halmahera. The five reinforcing barges were ambushed after slipping through the Navy PT screen, and were destroyed along with fifty tons of food and supplies.) The battalion had experienced the hardest march of its history. The jungle was more difficult than that encountered by the Pilowo column. Moreover, to join the Hill 40 battle it had to abandon trails for cross-country movements. Although the battalion had marched and fought its way forward for ten days it was still in fighting trim. The number of Japs killed and found buried along the trail indicated terrible losses for the Japs. The battalion commander, Major Ralph Pate, attributed the lack of enemy resistance during the past two days to the withdrawal of the enemy. Actually, as he learned later, the 3d Battalion, Jap 211th Infantry Regiment, had been destroyed as a military force. By January 14, when the 136th Regiment was finally withdrawn to the main perimeter, the Americans reported having killed 870 Japanese soldiers and captured 10, suffering 46 men killed and 127 wounded in the process. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces captured Palompon, disrupting Japanese plans, while American troops advanced through challenging terrain, overcoming resistance and securing key locations. Japanese forces planned a counter-landing on Mindoro, but faced fierce opposition. Meanwhile, Australians advanced on Bougainville, capturing strategic positions amid heavy fighting.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 161 - Pacific War Podcast - Third Arakan Offensive - December 17 - 24 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 17, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindoro. Ormoc fell on December the 10th. The 149th Regiment cleared the airstrip at Buri, while the Japanese launched a desperate attack on airfields, only to be repelled by American forces. Amid chaotic battles, the Japanese attempted maritime reinforcements, but their vessels were met with devastating American fire, sinking transports and crippling their efforts. By December 13, the American advance continued through heavy resistance, leading to intense skirmishes, showcasing bravery and the struggles faced on both sides during the conflict. On December 14, US troops of the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, advanced against stubborn Japanese defenses near Limon. While under fire, they strategically pushed forward, capturing enemy positions and equipment. Despite heavy artillery, Troop G utilized flamethrowers and close combat, overcoming formidable foxholes, helping to secure vital ground. Meanwhile, Admiral Nimitz prepared for future invasions, and General MacArthur postponed operations to protect his forces. The successful landings on Mindoro marked a pivotal moment, signaling the approaching assault on Luzon. This episode is the Third Arakan Offensive  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we left off last week, General Bruce's 77th Division had effectively advanced to Linao and Cogon, securing Ormoc. Meanwhile, General Sibert's 10th Corps had pushed the weary Japanese forces in the north back to the Lonoy area, with both divisions preparing to continue their assaults through the Ormoc Valley toward Valencia, in line with General Krueger's strategy. To address the emerging situation, the 68th Brigade was mobilizing to support the 1st Division, while the 5th and 77th Regiments were making their way to Huaton to participate in a counteroffensive against Ormoc; however, only the 77th Regiment would reach its destination in time. Concurrently, the isolated 16th Division in the central Leyte mountains was gradually withdrawing from the Burauen front, losing strength with each passing day, and the 26th Division was gathering north of Talisanyan to prepare for the final retreat to Ormoc. On December 16, with the port secured, Bruce's forces were poised for the next stage of their advance north along the Ormoc corridor. Given that his patrols reported minimal enemy resistance west of Highway 2, Bruce aimed to encircle the Japanese forces from the east with the 306th and 307th Regiments, while the 305th would advance along the highway. Following this plan, the 305th Regiment quickly eliminated the remaining enemy positions in Cogon and proceeded 400 yards north of the road junction toward Tambuco. Meanwhile, the 307th swiftly moved through the neighborhoods of Jalubon, Liloan, Bao, and Catayom to San Jose, where they encountered and defeated two platoons of paratroopers. The 306th Regiment also advanced to Jalubon but then shifted north toward Tipic to bypass Huaton and directly assault Valencia. Looking north, while the 126th and 127th Regiments fought bravely against an enemy that restricted the division's progress to just a few dozen yards each day, the 12th Cavalry Regiment continued its advance toward Lonoy. Ultimately, the successful American assault on December 16 left the Japanese defenses exposed, prompting General Suzuki to alter his offensive strategy once more, immediately directing his forces to conduct a delaying action to facilitate a final retreat toward Libongao. Meanwhile, Bruce intensified his attack on December 17. As a result, the 305th Regiment encountered stiff resistance while attempting to reach Tambuco. The Japanese had constructed defensive positions along Highway 2 in the southern part of Ormoc Valley. At the road junction of Highway 2 with the road to Liloan were many trenches three to four feet deep and parallel to the highway. Trenches had also been dug along the sides of a machine gun emplacement that occupied a slight elevation commanding Highway 2 both to the north and to the south. On both sides of the road from Cogon to Catayom foxholes lined Highway 2, in the ditches and under the shacks. Some of these positions were dug on a slant and were six to seven feet deep. At Tambuco the foxholes extended along the highway for 400 yards, with machine gun emplacements on the sides of the foxholes. Other positions along Highway 2 consisted of poorly integrated foxholes and machine guns that covered the road. The field artillery pieces between Tambuco and Catayom were placed along the highway, with the exception of a 75-mm. gun that guarded a bridge and was well concealed inside a roadside shack. At 0830 on 17 December the 305th Infantry moved out along Highway 2. At 1000 the 1st Battalion reported that it was advancing at the rate of 100 yards every ten minutes against light opposition. By 1145 the 305th Infantry was fighting through Tambuco. At a road junction just north of Tambuco, it eliminated some enemy resistance and the advance slowed down. The regiment moved forward to a point about 300 yards north of the road junction and established its night perimeter, which extended 300 yards to the northeast along the Tambuco-Dolores road in order to forestall any Japanese counterattacks from that direction. On the same day the 306th Infantry pushed its attack northeast at 0800. The advancing troops almost immediately encountered Japanese who, apparently taken by surprise, were unable to offer organized resistance. At 1040, when the forward elements were 1,000 yards southwest of Cabulihan, the opposition stiffened and the regimental commander therefore committed the 3d Battalion on the left of the 2d Battalion. The advance continued. As the regiment neared Highway 2, resistance became more intense. The 306th Infantry encountered the Japanese who were fleeing northwest from the assault of the 305th Infantry and the heavy artillery that accompanied it. (Unknown to the Americans, General Suzuki and his staff were among the retreating Japanese. Suzuki succeeded in escaping to Libongao, where he established a new headquarters for the 35th Army.) At 1440 the 306th Infantry reached Highway 2 between Catayom and Cabulihan and proceeded north toward Cabulihan, its objective. Advance elements of the 3d Battalion reached the outskirts of the town but withdrew three or four hundred yards to take advantage of more commanding terrain. After combat patrols had cleared the area, the 306th Infantry established its night perimeter five hundred yards south of Cabulihan at 1600.  General Bruce had ordered the 307th Infantry to remain in San Jose until further notice. Since the guerrilla forces had reported a large number of Japanese in the area, General Bruce had made arrangements to soften the sector with an aerial bombardment and artillery fire before the infantry attack. In response to Bruce's request, fifteen P-40's from the V Fighter Command had been made available by General Whitehead for an air strike against the Valencia area. The 155-mm. guns of the 226th Field Artillery Battalion at Daro began firing on Valencia and the airstrip on the morning of 17 December and hit a Japanese ammunition dump. At 1245 the artillery fire was halted for the air strike, and for fifty minutes the area was bombed and strafed. With the conclusion of the air attack, at 1335, the artillery began anew to pound the area. "The medium artillery . . . reached out from Ormoc and the 'Long Toms' . . . from Daro joined in the fighting." In the meantime the 902d Field Artillery Battalion moved forward to a point from which it could support the advance of the 307th Infantry. At 1415 the artillery fire stopped and the 307th Infantry moved out astride the San Jose-Valencia road toward Valencia. Though the artillery fire and aerial bombardment had driven some of the Japanese from the area, a strong well-equipped force, including a number of paratroopers, remained to oppose the 307th Infantry. The regiment pushed forward, however, and at 1640 its leading elements were on the southwestern edge of the airstrip and within 1,000 yards of Valencia. The 307th Infantry formed its night perimeter on the edge of the airfield and made preparations to continue the attack on 18 December. During 17 December, despite the disorganization of the Japanese forces, Colonel Imahori of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment tried to reach Ormoc, but he was unsuccessful. A few enemy artillery shells landed in the Ormoc area but that was all. General Bruce wrote later: "The men got a laugh because the General's latrine, unoccupied, was struck. He wished about that time that he had remained up front which he had reached by landing in a cub plane on an unimproved jungle road." The following morning, as supplies and ammunition for the 306th and 307th Regiments were running dangerously low, Bruce dispatched an armored column through the 305th's lines, which bypassed enemy strongholds and successfully delivered supplies to both regiments. The 305th Regiment then faced minimal resistance as it advanced toward Huaton, with its 3rd Battalion decisively eliminating all enemy opposition along the Dolores road. Simultaneously, the 306th Regiment steadily pushed toward Valencia, successfully reaching the southern edge of the town, while the 307th secured the airstrip without any resistance. As General Gill directed his forces northward, the 126th Regiment successfully seized a ridge east of the road, advancing closer to the main enemy defensive line located north of Lonoy. On the morning of December 19, the 126th launched another offensive, overrunning numerous enemy positions and advancing 200 yards before being replaced by fresh troops the following day. Meanwhile, the 12th Cavalry encountered only light and sporadic resistance in its efforts to secure Lonoy, although its 2nd Squadron faced tougher opposition while assaulting a knoll southeast of the barrio. To the south, following the fall of Valencia, the 5th Regiment reached Libongao just as Bruce prepared to press forward in the northern campaign. Thus, the 307th Regiment steadily advanced north along Highway 2, engaging an advanced battalion from the Takahashi Detachment, while the 306th moved successfully northwest across the terrain to a position 300 yards south of the Palompon road. On this day, Suzuki received news of the enemy's invasion of Mindoro, along with General Yamashita's orders to conduct a strategic delay on Leyte. In response, he commanded all his forces to begin a gradual withdrawal towards Palompon, leaving Libongao for Matag-ob. On December 20, the 306th Regiment reached the Palompon road and dispatched its 1st Battalion west towards the Togbong River, while the 3rd Battalion turned east towards Highway 2. At the same time, the 307th Regiment launched an assault on the Libongao positions and successfully defeated the 5th Regiment, compelling the Takahashi Detachment to retreat towards Matag-ob, where they established Suzuki's final delaying position. Additionally, as the exhausted 126th Regiment was relieved, the 12th Cavalry began moving south from Lonoy to intercept the enemy's retreat route at Kananga. On December 21, as the 1st and 102nd Divisions began their withdrawal towards Palompon, the 12th Cavalry successfully captured Kananga and established contact with patrols from the 77th Division. Consequently, Highway 2 was finally open from Ormoc to Pinamopoan, and the Ormoc Valley, where the Japanese had fiercely resisted the American advance, was now firmly under the control of the 6th Army. General Mudge, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, said of the 12th Cavalry: “As a result of the stout-hearted efforts of the 12th Cavalry Regiment, elements of the Division are within 2500 yards of making contact with forward elements of the 77th Division. Considering the fact that the regiment has been reduced to 50% strength by the rigors and deprivations of 40 days in the mountains, the display of courage, stamina, and drive on the part of the 12th Cavalry is a credit to the best traditions of the United States Cavalry.” However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to follow the progress of Operation Capital.  Previously, while General Sultan's offensive in the north was advancing well, General Slim's eastern push, led by General Rees' 19th Indian Division, encountered less resistance than anticipated. This indicated that the enemy was rapidly retreating to stronger defensive positions behind the Irrawaddy River. As a result, Slim's strategy to encircle General Katamura's 15th Army on the Shwebo Plain was compromised, necessitating a significant adjustment to his offensive. His forces, stretched from Tamu, were at risk of counterattack while attempting to cross one of the most formidable river barriers. Therefore, Slim aimed to find a way to not only cross his troops over the Irrawaddy without major issues or interference but also to gain the decisive advantage needed to engage the Japanese on his terms, targeting them where their defenses were weakest. In just a few days, Slim and his team devised a new strategy known as Operation Extended Capital. The objective was to convince the Japanese that nothing had altered and that the 14th Army's advance was still primarily directed toward Mandalay, with its two corps crossing the Irrawaddy to the northwest of the city. The core of Slim's revised plan involved General Stopford's 33rd Corps, which, bolstered by the 19th Division and the 268th Tank Brigade, would maintain its planned crossing of the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay. Meanwhile, General Messervy's restructured 4th Corps would tactically cross the river much farther south in Pakokku, allowing them to launch attacks on Meiktila and Thazi, crucial points along General Kimura's communication lines that supported both the 33rd and 15th Armies. The towns of Meiktila and Thazi represented ground that was vital to the enemy defense, a concept 14th Army had first learned painfully in Arakan. The railway and main road from Rangoon ran through Meiktila before bending north on their way to Mandalay, and the town formed a natural location for supply and ammunition dumps, airfields and hospitals. If Slim could cut off both Honda and Katamura's corps from this vital logistical center, the Japanese ability to resist General Stopford's inexorable pressure in the north around Mandalay would be fatally weakened. Slim recognized that without Meiktila, Kimura could not hope to sustain a prolonged battle for Mandalay. Indeed, it might even prove to be the decisive act in the destruction of the whole of Kimura's army. Thus, the northern advance by 33rd Corps would be a deception to hide the decisive strike by 4th Corps to the south. If Slim could attract the greatest possible number of enemy divisions towards the northern crossing points (where, after all, Kimura expected him to strike), he could minimize opposition to the real focus of his attack in the south. This would provide Slim with, as he put it, ‘not only the major battle I desired, but the chance to repeat our old hammer and anvil tactics: 33rd Corps the hammer from the north against the anvil of 4th Corps at Meiktila – and the Japanese between.' Simultaneously, a new offensive was gearing up in the south. Unable to execute Operation Dracula, an intended amphibious assault on Rangoon, Admiral Mountbatten was resolved to initiate an offensive in the Arakan region. Codenamed Operation Romulus, it aimed for General Christison's 15th Corps to again attack Akyab, marking the third attempt to regain Arakan since the war began. Christison's strategy involved a three-pronged attack into northern Arakan, with Major-General George Wood's 25th Indian Division advancing on the right along the coast, Major-General George Bruce's 82nd West African Division in the center within the valley of the Mayu river, and Major-General Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's 81st West African Division on the left in the Kaladan river valley. Expecting heightened Japanese resistance along the Donbaik-Rathedaung-Myohaung line, Christison suggested that while his three frontline divisions engaged the Japanese forces with aggressive attacks, Brigadier Peter Young's 3rd Commando Brigade would land in the Japanese rear on the Myebon peninsula, followed closely by Major-General Cyril Lomax's 26th Indian Division, in a bid to finally capture Akyab. Facing them was General Sakurai's 28th Army, which included the Sakura Detachment, organized around three infantry battalions from the 55th Division along with the 55th Reconnaissance Regiment, stationed along the Godusara-Buthidaung-Kindaung line and the Kaladan Valley. Lieutenant-General Miyazaki Shigesaburo's 54th Division was responsible for defending the remainder of the Mayu Peninsula and the coastal area extending to Taungup. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Sakuma Ryozo's diminished 55th Division occupied the Irrawaddy Delta region, and Major-General Yamamoto Tsunoru's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade was positioned near the oilfields at Yenangyaung. Additionally, the Katsu Force, centered around the 153rd Regiment, was near Yenangyaung, while the Rangoon Defense Unit, which included the Rangoon Anti-Aircraft Unit and various logistical elements, was tasked with protecting Burma's primary port. Sakurai's strategy, known as Operation Kan, entailed a defensive stance on the Mayu Peninsula and Yenangyaung, along with safeguarding the southwestern coast near Bassein against potential amphibious assaults. As the defenders slowed the enemy's progress towards their fortified positions, the 54th Division would be promptly sent to launch a counteroffensive. Depending on the nature of the attack, units from the 55th Division and Katsu Force would also participate in this counterattack. If a significant battle erupted near Rangoon, the reserve 2nd and 49th Divisions would be deployed without delay. Meanwhile, with the 26th Division being withdrawn for rest, the 25th Division preparing to move towards Rathedaung, and the 82nd Division advancing into the Kalapanzin Valley, the 81st Division was dispatched on October 1 to progress through the Mowdok Mountain Range toward Kyauktaw. As they moved southward across challenging and nearly impassable terrain, the West Africans expected to capture Mowdok by October 18, effectively eliminating the last Japanese forces from Indian territory before progressing through the Kaladan Valley. The 55th Reconnaissance Regiment stationed at Paletwa endured multiple assaults until early November, at which point they received orders to retreat to the Kaladan line. On December 15 the Japanese launched a strong attack with artillery support against the 6th (West African) Brigade. Private Kweku Pong, number two on a Bren, was wounded and separated from his section. Well armed with 12 magazines, he engaged the Japanese with short bursts for hours as they searched for him, until he eventually lost consciousness from loss of blood. Havildar Umrao Singh's gun section of the 30th Mountain Regiment was supporting the brigade when it was overrun and his officer badly wounded. With two other men he defended the position with rifles, bayonets and grenades until they were rushed and he defended it by swinging a rammer until borne down and bayoneted. The Japanese were eventually driven off when both men were found; Singh was awarded a VC and Pong an MM. Slim never changed his view that Africans would be ‘lost' without British guidance; but he probably never heard of Kweku Pong, who found himself alone, badly wounded in the middle of the night with Japanese rampaging through the bush around him and a battle going on behind. No white man was there to tell him what to do, no African NCO nor any other African for that matter. Nobody would have blamed him for lying doggo, but instead he showed considerable courage and good tactical sense. For this action, the 5th Gold Coast Regiment was awarded the unique honor ‘Tinma'.  Meanwhile, by late November, Wood had sent the 51st Indian Brigade to assist the African offensive in the Kalapanzin Valley. After successfully completing this mission, the 25th and 82nd Divisions launched their assault on Buthidaung on December 12. Wood's strategy involved a series of coordinated moves, with units leapfrogging one another, while the pace of the advance depended on how fast the sappers could repair the routes for the subsequent vehicles. Significantly outnumbered, Major-General Sakurai Tokutaro's troops were ultimately forced to evacuate Buthidaung on December 14. In response to the escalating enemy pressure in both the Kaladan and Mayu regions, the 28th Army ordered the Matsu Detachment, consisting of three battalions from the 54th Division, to take over control of the Kaladan front, while Major-General Koba Tomotoki's forces advanced toward Tinma. However, Loftus-Tottenham wisely decided to outflank this position, compelling the recently arrived detachment to withdraw, while other African units successfully made their way to Kyauktaw by the month's end. At the same time, the 53rd Indian Brigade progressed along the Kalapanzin River, and the 82nd Division managed to overcome strong resistance at Kindaung village in late December. On the night of December 21, the 6th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Regiment undertook a night march exceeding 20 miles to capture Donbaik, which was taken without resistance. It was only at this point that the remains of the Valentine tanks and crews lost two years prior were discovered. The Sakura Detachment, having reached its limit, had no option but to retreat towards Myohaung, where they would be supported by the Matsu Detachment during their final withdrawal to Prome. With no opposition encountered, the two West African divisions successfully made contact on January 4, resulting in the complete clearance of the Kalapanzin valley. Meanwhile, looking north, Slim had initiated Operation Extended Capital on December 19. In line with this, Stopford instructed the 19th Division to advance along the west bank of the Irrawaddy to launch an attack on Shwebo from the east, while the 2nd British Division, having crossed the Chindwin at Kalewa, approached Shwebo from the west. After capturing Shwebo, the 19th Division was to pivot eastward to secure bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay, while the 2nd Division continued south towards the Irrawaddy bend near Sagaing. Slim aimed to create the impression that the entire 14th Army was advancing on Mandalay by associating the 19th Division with the 4th Corps. Additionally, the 20th Indian Division was tasked with crossing the Chindwin at Kalewa and moving downstream to capture Monywa. Meanwhile, Messervy was organizing his dispersed divisions to commence their advance down the Gangaw valley, from Tamu to Pakokku. In the lead would be the Lushai Brigade and the 28th East African Brigade, tasked with clearing the enemy from Gangaw and subsequently advancing to Pakokku. The tour de force of deceptions against the Japanese would aid the crossing of the Irrawaddy. Slim's intention behind the plan, known as Cloak, was to conceal the main crossing until the last possible moment by persuading the Japanese to believe that the force preparing to move down the Gangaw valley to cross the river near Pakokku and seize Meiktila was merely making a feint to distract attention from the attack on Mandalay by 33rd Corps from the north. Until now 14th Army's commanders had been reluctant to use any but the simplest signals deceptions, but now they were enthusiastic even to the detriment of operational communications. Thus, three schemes were adopted: Pippin, which covered the withdrawal of the 5th Indian and 11th East African Divisions; Stencil, which created a dummy 4th Corps Headquarters that appeared to control formations under 33rd Corps; and Cloak, which was designed to give a false impression of the forces operating – that the forcing of the Irrawaddy would take place away from the real main effort, and that any movement the Japanese saw in the Gangaw valley was itself only a diversion. There is no doubt the speed the advance into central Burma achieved was in no small measure due to this deception scheme, which also used political channels, displays and deception devices dropped by Mosquitos and Beaufighters. Following them, the 7th Indian Division aimed to capture Pakokku, secure the west bank of the Irrawaddy, and establish a bridgehead across the river. Once this bridgehead was established, the 17th Indian Division and the 255th Tank Brigade would cross the Irrawaddy and race towards Meiktila. However, before initiating this advance, Messervy needed to enhance the pathway through the valley to facilitate the movement of his artillery and armored units. The Lushai Brigade, already forward, also needed artillery support before launching their assault on Gangaw. Therefore, while Messervy's engineers promptly began upgrading the road and track south of Kalemyo, only Stopford's units would engage in combat in late December. Moving swiftly, the advance elements of the 2nd Division, along with the tanks from the 254th Brigade, passed through Pyingaing on December 23 and continued towards Paga, successfully overcoming several rearguard positions held by elements of the retreating 33rd Division, which eventually reached Monywa in early January. At the same time, the 19th Division captured Wuntho and began its advance southward towards Shwebo. In the meantime, Messervy's engineers worked diligently for two weeks to prepare the track, and by the end of the month, his field artillery was en route to Gangaw. The 28th East African Brigade departed Imphal on December 22, followed by the 7th Division four days later. However, in the northeast, Sultan continued his northern offensive with minimal success. With the Ledo Road now extended from Kamaing to connect with the Myitkyina-Bhamo road, the 112th and 113th Chinese Regiments received orders to eliminate the Japanese rear guards along the final segment of the road to China. In the period between the split of the CBI Theater in October 1944 and the fall of Bhamo on 15 December, the Ledo Road engineers under General Pick brought the survey of the Ledo Road from a point just below and east of Kamaing, 211 miles from Ledo, to a juncture with the Myitkyina-Bhamo road. The Ledo Road was to bypass Myitkyina, for there was no point to running heavy traffic through an inhabited place, and Myitkyina's supply needs could be served by an access road. Metaling and grading were complete almost to Mogaung. The Mogaung River had been bridged near Kamaing, and a temporary bridge placed across the Irrawaddy. Tonnage carried on the road for use within Burma was steadily rising. In early October it had carried 275 tons a day; by the latter part of the month the rate was twice that. Immediately after Bhamo's capture, the advance headquarters of the road engineers was moved to that town. A combat supply road was made from Mogaung, below Myitkyina, to a point just ten miles west of Namhkam. The 113th Regiment advanced up the valley along the established road from Panghkam, while the 112th proceeded through the hills. The primary assault was to be led by the 30th Chinese Division, with its 90th Regiment advancing straight along the road toward Namhkam, while the 88th and 89th Regiments executed a shallow envelopment to the south of the road. Although conditions were favorable for a rapid advance into the Shweli valley, the commander of the 90th Regiment hesitated, causing delays along the flanks, as they formed the center of the Chinese line. Concurrently, Sultan ordered the Mars Task Force to embark on a challenging march through the hill country to the Mong Wi area, aiming to cut off the Burma Road near Hosi and effectively encircle the enemy 33rd Army. The 50th Chinese Division, which had been following the 36th British Division down the Railway Corridor, was set to occupy the vacated positions at Tonkwa and Si-u. Its objective was to cross the Shweli near Molo and proceed southeast to capture Lashio. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amidst fierce battles, General Bruce's troops advanced against Japanese forces in Leyte, securing key positions and paving the way for further assaults amid strategic retreats. In a strategic deception, Slim's forces advanced on multiple fronts, aiming to outmaneuver the Japanese, ultimately leading to decisive victories in Burma and weakening enemy defenses.

Newshour
Syrians mark the ouster of Bashar al-Assad

Newshour

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 13, 2024 48:18


Syrians took to the streets in mass demonstrations on the first Friday without al-Assad. We hear from the centre of Damascus. Also in the programme: The Arakan army deals a big blow to Myanmar's army; and Chanel has a new creative director.(Photo: Syrians in Latakia celebrate and wave the new Syrian flag. Credit: Reuters)

APRIORI
La situation politique au Myanmar

APRIORI

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 16, 2024 56:58


Pour ce deuxième épisode de la saison, Anthony Bédard Robichaud reçoit Alexandre Lord afin de parler de la situation politique au Myanmar, un pays assez méconnu dans nos médias francophones. Afin de mettre en contexte son sujet, notre invité va remonter l'histoire du pays depuis sa décolonisation et nous expliquer pourquoi le pays est maintenant pris dans une guerre civile. En passant par les tentatives ratées de démocraties, par le coup d'État de la junte militaire ainsi que par l'impact de certains pays étrangers sur le conflit, vous saurez les essentiels sur la situation politique actuelle du Myanmar.Extra : saviez-vous qu'Alexandre Lord est également l'auteur de quelques articles sur le sujets? Vous irez les lires si vous souhaitez plus de détails!« United Wa State Army – impact de la montée du plus puissant groupe armé du Myanmar sur les droits de la personne » https://droits-observatoire-cerium.org/?p=1922« Myanmar : le retour des combats dans la province d'Arakan menace les civils, dont les Rohingyas » https://asie1000mots-cetase.org/Myanmar-le-retour-des-combats-dans-la-province-d-Arakan-menace-les-civils-dont

The Pacific War - week by week
- 149 - Pacific War Podcast - Japanese Triumph in China 26 - October 4 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 24, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the battles for Peleliu and Angaur. Following the amphibious assaults on Peleliu and Anguar, US Marines under General Rupertus intensified their offensive. On September 17, Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines advanced in Peleliu's southern sector, as the 1st and 5th Marines pushed north, confronting the fortified Umurbrogol Mountains, where Colonel Nakagawa's defenses stalled their progress. Despite reaching key positions by mid-morning, intense Japanese counterattacks continued, causing heavy casualties. On September 18, the 7th Marines, aided by armor, resumed their slow advance, securing the southern part of Peleliu by day's end. Meanwhile, the 1st and 5th Marines faced brutal combat in the central ridges, suffering significant losses. By September 21, the capture of nearby Ulithi Atoll provided a strategic base for future operations. Despite securing important positions, the Marines encountered severe resistance in the Umurbrogol Mountains, leading to high casualties and necessitating reinforcements. By September 23, the Americans secured footholds on Peleliu and Anguar, yet fierce fighting persisted in Nakagawa's fortified positions. This episode is the Japanese Triumph in China Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  This week we are picking up back over on Peleliu and Anguar where the Japanese are still providing stiff resistance. On September 23, Colonel Venable's 322nd Regiment had made little progress breaking into the Lake Salome bowl. With their commanding officer severely injured, a change in tactics was imminent. On the morning of September 24, propaganda broadcasts over a public address system were used to try and persuade the remaining Japanese to surrender. However, only two Japanese soldiers surrendered, reporting that over 300 defenders remained in the bowl under Major Goto. This accurate estimate was disregarded by the American command, who believed only about 150 defenders remained. Following this failed attempt, all available artillery bombarded the bowl in preparation for an attack from the north, altering the appearance of the bowl's interior and rims to aid the upcoming assault. Back at Peleliu, after heavy bombardment, Colonel Dark's 321st Regiment resumed its advance north along the coast on September 24, despite continued harassment from Japanese fire from the central ridges. By noon, they had secured the trail-road junction south of Garekoru. Some troops explored the trail to the east, encountering heavy resistance, while Company G advanced rapidly north through Garekoru, reaching the O-4 Line. Behind them, Dark's 3rd Battalion and Colonel Hanneken's 3rd Battalion also pushed northwards. Further east, the 7th Marines pressed against Colonel Nakagawa's main defenses on the Umurbrogol Mountains. By nightfall, having successfully resisted Japanese counterattacks on O-4, General Rupertus' northward drive had proven to be a significant success. He next planned to cut across the island on September 25 through the eastern trail to completely isolate the Japanese forces in the Umurbrogol ridges. At 07:00, Dark's troops began moving eastward, with Company E successfully reaching the edge of East Road against light opposition. They halted in front of Hill B, which dominated the eastern area. However, the 3rd Battalion encountered heavier resistance from pillboxes and emplacements protected by steep walls and sheer cliffs guarding the northern approaches to the Umurbrogol defense system, making little progress. Meanwhile, to the north, a strong tank-infantry patrol advanced about 1,200 yards, killing 30 Japanese and destroying four pillboxes and two large supply dumps before reaching the O-5 Line. The weak resistance encountered by the patrol suggested that remaining Japanese strength was concentrated in the Umurbrogol Pocket. Thus, at 10:30, Rupertus decided to commit the 5th Marines for a drive to the northern tip of Peleliu. Rapidly relieved by the 1st Marines on eastern Peleliu. Orders to move to the western portion of Peleliu found the 5th Marines in static positions on Eastern Peleliu, where the regimental mission had been to prevent enemy counterlandings. The 1st Battalion was deployed in the vicinity of the radio direction finding station near Ngardololok, the 2d Battalion was holding the islands north of the northeastern peninsula, while the 3d Battalion, less one company, occupied defensive positions along Purple Beach. The 1st Marines completed the relief of the 5th shortly after noon and assumed command of the 5th Marines sector at that time. In order to expedite movement of the regiment to the West Road, the battalions moved out on trucks at 1300, with 1/5 in the lead, followed by 3/5 and 2/5.  By 1600, the 5th Marines had executed the passage of the lines, and the regiment passed through Phase Line O-4 near Garekoru. As 1/5 continued its advance up the West Road, it encountered erratic resistance from what appeared to be Japanese holdouts. The level terrain was devoid of the dense jungle growth abounding elsewhere on Peleliu and offered ideal conditions for the movement of tanks and LVT flamethrowers accompanying the advance battalion. Aside from occasional Japanese sniper and mortar fire, the advance continued for about 500 yards without interruption to Road Junction 15, where the West and East Roads met. This vital point was defended by a small Japanese force, which had installed itself on a ridge dominating the road forks. Around 1700, as the Marines approached this point, the enemy opened fire, which served only to delay the Marines. When the firefight ended the Japanese had lost 20 killed. The battalion continued its advance for another 100 yards and seized the Japanese radio station, whose towers the forward elements of RCT 321 had spotted on the previous day. Having secured this objective, the battalion established night defenses north of the radio station from the beach to the high ground east of the West Road. Upon reaching Road Junction 15 in the wake of the advance of 1/5, the 3d Battalion pivoted to the southeast and headed down East Road, where it established night defenses on the road and along the western slopes of Hill 80. The latter hill, in itself an isolated terrain feature, owed its importance to its location, for it was the only link separating the Kamilianlul ridges to the south from the Amiangal ridges, which formed the northernmost hill mass on Peleliu.   Throughout the evening and night, the forward elements at the radio station were continuously and heavily attacked and bombed but managed to hold against the enemy onslaught. Meanwhile, at Angaur, after a heavy and prolonged artillery bombardment, the 3rd Battalion, 322nd Regiment pushed forward to launch its assault from the north. Finding no route south over the cliffs, they assembled near the northern end of the Milwaukee Railroad for an attack west the following day. At 07:30 on September 26, the infantry launched their assault on Lake Salome, quickly taking control of the eastern rim with minimal resistance. Facing increasing enemy fire, the Americans made their way down the eastern rim to the bowl floor. However, by the end of the day, they were halted by Goto's positions on the northern cliffs and "The Island," a gap between an overgrown coral mound and the eastern rim. To the south, the 2nd Battalion supported the attack by advancing north, capturing the southeast rim and clearing out several enemy cave positions.  Back over on Peleliu the Marines had a very rough night full of Japanese infiltrator harassment. In fact our old friend Eugene Sledge wrote about the night of September 25th and what his unit of K Company, 3rd battalion, 5th marines went through. The Japanese who had come across the road in front of me were probably members of what the enemy called a “close-quarter combat unit.” The enemy soldier shot by Sam was not dressed or equipped like their typical infantryman. Rather he wore only tropical khaki shorts, short-sleeved shirt, and tabi footwear (splittoed, rubber-soled canvas shoes). He carried only his bayonet. Why he entered our line where he did may have been pure accident, or he may have had an eye on our mortar. His comrade angled off toward the right near a machine gun on our flank. Mortars and machine guns were favorite targets for infiltrators on the front lines. To the rear, they went after heavy mortars, communications, and artillery. Before Company K moved out, I went down the road to the next company to see what had happened during the night. I learned that those blood-chilling screams had come from the Japanese I had seen run to the right. He had jumped into a foxhole where he met an alert Marine. In the ensuing struggle each had lost his weapon. The desperate Marine had jammed his forefinger into his enemy's eye socket and killed him. Such was the physical horror and brutish reality of war for us. The 1/5 spent the early hours of 26 September in consolidating its positions around the radio station and preparing for continuation of its attack later in the day to the northern tip of Peleliu. Shortly after 0600, 3/5 jumped off for an attack against Hill 80 with Company K on the left and Company I on the right. The attack carried the hill and by 0830 the assault force reached a swamp bordering the east coast of Peleliu. This advance of the 3d Battalion was of major importance because it effectively cut the island in two. Late in the afternoon most of the battalion moved back from Hill 80 to a reserve position near the junction of East and West Roads. The unit's southern flank extended south from the junction along East Road to Hill 80, where Company I was stationed for the night. Between Company I, 5th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, at Hill B, lay a gap approximately 1,800 yards long through which only the 321st Infantry's Neal Task Force had passed. In this gap lay 1,500-yard-long Kamilianlul Mountain, held by an unknown number of Japanese and as yet not even reconnoitered by American units. The 5th Marines consolidated their positions and resumed their assault. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, ran into stiff opposition from the Amiangal ridges dominating northern Peleliu. The northern portion of the L-shaped hill system consisted of ridges running generally from northeast to southwest for about 1,000 yards; the southern leg extended from northwest to southeast. The southern leg of the ridges was not continuous but broken into four separate hills or knobs, designated from northwest to southeast as Hill 1, Hill 2, Hill 3, and Radar Hill, so named because it had at one time served as an enemy radar installation. These four knobs were to gain ill repute as Hill Row. The entire Amiangal ridge system was held in strength by the Japanese, particularly the portion paralleling the route of advance of 1/5. This part contained some of the most elaborate caves and tunnels on Peleliu. The battalion had barely started out along the West Road when the enemy in and on Hill 1 opened up on the Marines with 37mm and 75mm guns as well as automatic weapons and mortars. This curtain of fire from the Amiangal ridges was reinforced by heavy fire from Ngesebus Island. All forward movement soon halted. Attacking eastward from the West Road, Company B assaulted the second knob, Hill 2, but also encountered opposition. Through sheer determination the company was able to gain a firm foothold on the hill by early afternoon. This accomplishment in effect served to outflank the Japanese on Hill 1, but Japanese resistance on the last mentioned hill continued throughout the day. An attempt by Company C to seize all of Hill 1 during the remaining hours of daylight was unsuccessful, and continuation of the assault had to await the following day. During the bitter fighting in which 1/5 engaged during the night of 25-26 September and for most of the following day, 2/5 remained stationary on the southern flank of the regiment. At 1600 on 26 September, when it had become apparent that 1/5 could make no further progress, 2/5 was ordered to attack. The battalion advanced northward through the left wing of 1/5, carefully bypassing embattled Hill 1. In the course of its advance, the battalion drew heavy fire from Japanese emplacements in the plain, from the ridges on its right, as well as from Ngesebus. Enemy mortars proved especially troublesome. As a result of the heavy fire, Company F lost four of its supporting tanks before it had advanced very far beyond Hill 1. Attempts by the artillery to give all possible support to the battalion were largely ineffectual. "We fired frequent missions throughout the day on these mortars; the reported effect was that the mortars were neutralized while we fired but that they were not destroyed. The enemy apparently withdrew into the caves during the period of our fire." As evening approached, the 5th Marines occupied a jagged front line. The 1st Battalion, though out of contact with the 2d, was tied in with the 3d on the right. The mission of the 3d Battalion was to support either the 1st or 2d Battalion in the event of a major Japanese counterattack. Further progress of the 2d Battalion was impeded by a large antitank ditch, which blocked the approach to the remnants of the Peleliu phosphate plant. The Japanese had converted the reinforced concrete foundation of the otherwise demolished structure into a major defensive installation. Exposed to the enemy fire from Ngesebus Island and plunging fire from caves and defensive positions from the hills, 2/5 found itself in a very unenviable situation. Further south, after some necessary adjustments, Dark's forces assaulted Hill B with two battalions. Initially repelled, Dark then sent a task force led by Captain George Neal to attack from the north. After a complex maneuver north and then south, the Neal Task Force attacked Hill B just as other elements of the 321st fought their way to the top through challenging terrain. The hill eventually fell to the Americans, completing the isolation of the Umurbrogol Pocket. By the end of the day, the island was divided in two places, leaving Nakagawa's determined defenders isolated in two major pockets. On September 27, with the Umurbrogol Pocket now contained, the 5th Marines continued their operations against Amiangal Mountain. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 321st Regiment advanced north from the Hill B area to close the long gap along East Road up to Hill 80. Dark's infantrymen secured Kamilianlul Mountain with minimal resistance and then moved towards the Marines' road junction.  The 2d Battalion was to find progress extremely rough for the remainder of the day. First, the erstwhile phosphate plant, which the Japanese had turned into a blockhouse, had to be secured in an area that bristled with snipers. The problem confronting Colonel Harris was a formidable one. The blockhouse in front of 2/5 could not be taken until the antitank ditch blocking the approaches to it had been seized. This was a job that the infantry could not tackle without armored support. The regimental commander decided to utilize all arms available in reducing these obstacles. First of all, Colonel Harris called naval gunfire and artillery in on Ngesebus and any other targets suspected of harboring artillery or mortar positions. A medium tank, equipped with a bulldozer blade, was pressed into service to level the antitank ditch, and filled it by 0830. A LVT flamethrower then was able to come within effective range of the Japanese fortification. Moments later, when the flame and smoke had cleared, all resistance from this stronghold had ceased and more than 60 dead Japanese remained in the rubble. While this action was in progress, patrols from Company E seized a small, weakly defended ridge abutting the road from the east. The 2d Battalion thereafter resumed its advance northward along the road as well as over the adjacent ridge. Company F, at the head of the column, soon found itself embroiled in some of the most bitter and frustrating action of the entire campaign. Aside from receiving heavy Japanese artillery and mortar fire, the company faced a series of pillboxes and field fortifications on level ground, and layer upon layer of caves in the hillsides. Even though they were not aware of it at the time, the men of the 5th Marines had come upon the most skillfully constructed defenses on Peleliu. The Japanese Army had utilized all of the many natural caves possessing tactical value, adapting them for the emplacement of heavier weapons with great ingenuity. On the other hand, Japanese naval troops had preferred to construct their own caves with the help of the 214th Naval Construction Battalion, composed of men who had been professional miners and tunnel workers in civilian life. Since most of these Navy caves were located near the northern end of Peleliu, they proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the 5th Marines. Eugene Sledge faced these obstacles and saw firsthand the effectiveness of flamethrowers. Here is a passage from him: Burgin's order to us to continue firing into the opening interrupted my musings. We kept up a steady fire into the pillbox to keep the Japanese pinned down while the flamethrower came up, carried by Corporal Womack from Mississippi. He was a brave, good-natured guy and popular with the troops, but he was one of the fiercest-looking Marines I ever saw. He was big and husky with a fiery red beard well powdered with white coral dust. He reminded me of some wild Viking. I was glad we were on the same side. Stooped under the heavy tanks on his back, Womack approached the pillbox with his assistant just out of the line of our fire. When they got about fifteen yards from the target, we ceased firing. The assistant reached up and turned a valve on the flamethrower. Womack then aimed the nozzle at the opening made by the 75mm gun. He pressed the trigger. With a whoooooooosh the flame leaped at the opening. Some muffled screams, then all quiet. Even the stoic Japanese couldn't suppress the agony of death by fire and suffocation. But they were no more likely to surrender to us than we would have been to them had we ever been confronted with the possibility of surrender. In fighting the Japanese, surrender was not one of our options.  Sheer courage and heroism in themselves proved inadequate for the task. In the course of the morning of 27 September, Company F seized the two ridges forming the northwestern anchor of the Amiangal system and established observation posts on the crests. But this did not solve the problem of what to do about the Japanese occupying the caves about half way up the hill. Marine casualties mounted steadily, and evacuation of the wounded became more and more difficult. Since the cave openings completely dominated the road leading past the northernmost ridge of Peleliu, the advance of the entire 2d Battalion ground to a halt. The first tank attempting to squeeze through the narrow gap between the hill and the northwestern shore was hit, and the Marines occupying the crest of the hill were powerless to cope with the caves underneath. Although the Americans now controlled the northern shore and blocked further enemy reinforcements, skilled Japanese miners continued their resistance underground. What the Marines did not know was that they were facing the most comprehensive cave system on Peleliu which was the underground home of the Japanese naval construction units who were, luckily for the Marines, better miners than infantrymen. The Japanese Army had utilized all of the many natural caves possessing tactical value, adapting them for the emplacement of heavier weapons with great ingenuity. On the other hand, Japanese naval troops had preferred to construct their own caves with the help of the 214th Naval Construction Battalion, composed of men who had been professional miners and tunnel workers in civilian life. Since most of these Navy caves were located near the northern end of Peleliu, they proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the 5th Marines. In the end, it would take weeks for the Marines to finally quash all resistance on Akarakoro Point, then only by blasting closed all the tunnel entrances, sealing the Japanese defenders inside to their fate. To the south, Harris' 1st Battalion pressed on with their attack on the mountain's southern leg, successfully capturing Hill 1. Meanwhile, the 322nd Regiment resumed its assault on the Lake Salome bowl, fighting to secure the base of the north rim but encountering less resistance in the south as most Japanese defenders had been evacuated towards Romauldo. The following day, despite a successful enemy mortar barrage that initially forced a temporary withdrawal and reorganization, the Americans cleared the entire bowl floor of Japanese troops, isolating Goto's remaining forces in the Romauldo area. This progress enabled the 322nd to launch a final coordinated attack on October 1, with its three battalions trapping the enemy in the Romauldo Pocket, though they were unable to penetrate Goto's final defenses. On September 28 at Peleliu, while Dark's 1st Battalion engaged Japanese infiltrators while mopping up the Kamilianlul Mountain area, Harris' 1st and 2nd Battalions continued their assault on Amiangal and successfully captured Hill 3. This action isolated the remaining Japanese forces at Radar Hill. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines executed a successful landing on Ngesebus Island with minimal resistance after a comprehensive artillery, air, and naval bombardment.  The curtain on the drama of Ngesebus opened on the morning of September 28, when the massed fire of five artillery battalions from Peleliu, as well as heavy fire from warships and aircraft, blanketed the island. Near the northwestern shore of Peleliu, an impressive gathering of high-ranking officers had assembled to witness the operation. The group included such notables as Admiral Fort, and Generals Julian C. Smith, Geiger, Rupertus, Mueller, Oliver P. Smith, and Bell. The weather was cool and cloudy and interspersed with frequent rain squalls. For the Corsair pilots of VMF-114, air support for the Ngesebus landings represented a very interesting and original assignment. The operation marked the beginning of combat work for the squadron, which had reached Peleliu only two days earlier. At 06:30, the Corsairs hit the airstrip on Ngesebus with 500-pound bombs and strafed the entire island as well as Kongauru to the northeast. "Strafing runs were made just a few feet off the deck and a hail of lead laid all over the island." At 08:40, 20 Corsairs preceded the landing craft and gave the island another heavy strafing. In the course of this attack, Japanese mortar positions were spotted and one especially prominent square blockhouse with an iron door was fired on and neutralized. Whenever aircraft were not directly over the island, the artillery on Peleliu and naval guns offshore gave Ngesebus a heavy going over, starting at 07:00 and concluding at 09:05. Both quick and delay fuzes were used. Observers reported that the island was completely covered with fire. In the course of the preliminary bombardment, naval gunfire ships pounded the northern portion of Ngesebus and continued to fire on that part of the island throughout the landing. The Marines advanced inland, swiftly securing the airstrip and the eastern portion of Ngesebus. One platoon then landed on Kongauru and Murphy islands to secure them against light opposition. However, the attack to the northwest encountered strong resistance from Japanese forces entrenched in caves and dugouts, prompting the deployment of tanks to support the Marine assault. By 5:00 PM, nearly all of Ngesebus was under American control, with only a few hundred yards at the extreme northwestern tip remaining in Japanese hands and some caves on the ridges still needing to be cleared.  The 3d Battalion spent a relatively quiet night on Ngesebus. On the morning of 29 September, Companies I and K resumed the attack. Progress was normal until the two companies had nearly reached the northern tip of Ngesebus, when a 75mm gun opened up at point blank range. The Marines quickly destroyed this weapon and went on to overcome the rest of the resistance on the island. At 1500, 29 September, Ngesebus was declared secure. An hour later, 2/321 relieved the Marines and completed mopping up. Having accomplished the mission on the island, 3/5 returned to Peleliu. The battalion had secured the island at a cost of 15 killed and 33 wounded. In return, the Marines killed or captured 470 Japanese. Infantrymen of 2/321 were to account for another hundred of the enemy during the ensuing mop-up. Eugene Sledge wrote this about the final capture of Ngesebus: The next morning, again with the help of tanks and am-tracs, our battalion took most of the remainder of Ngesebus. Our casualties were remarkably low for the number of Japanese we killed.* In midafternoon we learned that an army unit would relieve us shortly and complete the job on the northern end of Ngesebus. Our mortar section halted to await orders and dispersed among some open bushes. In our midst was the wreckage of a Japanese heavy machine gun and the remains of the squad that had been wiped out by Company K. The squad members had been killed in the exact positions to be occupied by such a squad “according to the book.” At first glance the dead gunner appeared about to fire his deadly weapon. He still sat bolt upright in the proper firing position behind the breech of his machine gun. Even in death his eyes stared widely along the gun sights. Despite the vacant look of his dilated pupils, I couldn't believe he was dead. Cold chills ran along my spine. Gooseflesh tickled my back. It seemed as though he was looking through me into all eternity, that at any instant he would raise his hands—which rested in a relaxed manner on his thighs—grip the handles on the breech, and press the thumb trigger. The bright shiny brass slugs in the strip clip appeared as ready as the gunner, anxious to speed out, to kill, and to maim more of the “American devils.” But he would rot, and they would corrode. Neither he nor his ammo could do any more for the emperor.  The rest of the 5th Marines continued their operations on September 29, launching a full-scale assault on Radar Hill using flamethrowers, bazookas, and demolition charges, finally capturing the position by the morning of September 30. Following the completion of operations in northern Peleliu, the 5th Marines were relieved by the 321st Regiment. However, as the Army troops took over, the remaining Japanese, who had been hiding underground, reoccupied some positions, requiring two additional days of fighting to fully secure northern Peleliu. Nonetheless, the Japanese presence in Peleliu had now been reduced to Nakagawa's Umurbrogol Pocket, so Peleliu was officially secured. Total losses during this battle so far included 843 killed, 3845 wounded and 356 missing of the 1st Marine Division; 46 killed, 226 wounded and 7 missing from the 321st Regiment; and an estimated 9076 Japanese dead plus 180 prisoners of war. Yet that is all for today with Peleliu and Anguar as we now need to travel to China where the Japanese are still carrying out Operation Ichi-Go in an effort to capture Guilin and Liuzhou. As we last observed, General Yokoyama's 11th Army had taken control of Lingling Airdrome and Quanzhou by September 14. Following this, they reorganized their units in preparation for resuming their offensive in October. Meanwhile, the 34th Division was deployed towards Changning, and the 37th Division moved to capture Shaoyang, which fell by the end of the month. The 23rd Army also made final preparations for their offensive in early September. General Tanaka directed the Kawakami Raiding Unit in a wide flanking maneuver along the Zhukeng-Huaiji road towards Wuzhou, while the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade embarked on a long march north to Guiping. On September 13, the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade and the 22nd and 104th Divisions began their main advance towards Wuzhou. However, the Kawakami Raiding Unit successfully captured Wuzhou on September 22 and seized the Danzhuzhen airfield six days later. Each unit then continued its advance westward to Guiping, which fell to the 23rd Brigade on October 11. So far, Tanaka's forces had encountered little to no resistance, but this was about to change. After the war, in discussing the performance of the Chinese divisions supposed to defend Guilin and Liuzhou, the political situation in east China, and the attitudes of the east China commanders, Marshal Hata remarked that in his opinion Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi had kept their forces out of serious fighting in order to conserve them "for the future." At the time, there were rumors that these men were planning a coup against Chiang Kai-Shek. Chinese resistance was light, but with its supply situation improved the 14th Air Force again did its best on the Salween as well as in east China. In all September the force dropped 1897.6 tons of bombs and fired 1281382 rounds of machine-gun ammunition, some of the latter of course at aerial targets. In early September, Japanese fighter reinforcements from the homeland also entered combat. The Japanese were pleased at the performance of the latemodel fighters with one of the air regiments they sent to China. Thanks to the air cover thus supplied, for the first time in the east China campaign they found themselves able to move supplies regularly on the Xiang Jiang, which paralleled their line of advance, and so thought their prospects "brightened."  At the beginning of the month, Yokoyama renewed his offensive, with the 58th Division successfully taking Xing'An and the 34th Division capturing Changning. The 37th Division was then deployed to Dao, and the 34th Division was sent to Xing'An in preparation for the final push toward Guilin. On October 20, this attack commenced as Yokoyama directed the 216th Regiment to advance to Lehecun, the 58th Division to assault the area north of Guilin, the 40th Division to move to Gaoshangzhen, the 13th Division to advance to Quanhuicun, and the 3rd Division to push toward Fuchuan. With minimal resistance from the retreating Japanese forces, most of these movements were completed by the end of the month. The 3rd Division pushed further to Pingle, while the 37th Division occupied Gongchengzhen and Yanshan to approach Guilin from the south. On November 3, the 3rd Division captured Lipu and began preparations for the advance towards Liuzhen, encircling Guilin and opening the route to Liuzhen. Meanwhile, on October 22, Tanaka ordered the reinforced 23rd Brigade to continue its advance toward Guigang, with the 104th and 22nd Divisions pushing toward Wuxuan. Their progress, previously unopposed, was now challenged by the Chinese 46th and 64th Armies, which launched daily attacks against Guiping with substantial air support. As a result, the 22nd Division was redirected to counter the Chinese forces, successfully forcing their withdrawal by October 29. Following this victory, the 23rd Brigade captured Guigang on November 3, and the 104th Division seized Wuxuan the following day. This allowed Tanaka's forces to begin a northern pursuit to support Yokoyama's assaults on Guilin and Liuzhen. After the third Anshan strike, General LeMay began implementing reforms within the 20th Bomber Command. These changes included reorganizing the command, enhancing the logistics system, adjusting target priorities, and improving coordination with Pacific operations. As a result, the frequency of missions increased each month, with each mission becoming more substantial and effective. Concurrently, following the successful completion of the newly renamed Isley Field on Saipan, the 73rd Bombardment Wing was redirected to the Marianas instead of the CBI Theater. There, it would join Major-General Haywood Hansell's 21st Bomber Command, tasked with executing high-altitude, daylight precision attacks to cripple Japan's aircraft industry.  The XXI Bomber Command arrived on Saipan on October 12, 1944, and from the start General Hansell was beset by a host of serious command problems, the worst of which were continued teething problems with the B-29, tardy delivery of aircraft, aircrews untrained in high altitude formation flying, primitive airfield conditions, lack of an air service command for logistical support, no repair depots, a total absence of target intelligence, stubborn internal resistance to daylight operations by his sole combat wing, subordinates in the XXI Bomber Command who lobbied for his removal, and Hansell's inferiority in rank in dealing with other AAF commanders in the theater. Furthermore, Hansell was soon prohibited from flying combat missions with his command, possibly because of limited knowledge of the atomic bomb or the perception that he knew the existence of Ultra. As plans for a sustained bomber offensive against Honshu progressed, the strategic focus of Operation Matterhorn diminished. The 20th Bomber Command shifted to flying missions in direct support of other Pacific operations, with target priorities moving from coke ovens to the aircraft industry. In preparation for the upcoming invasion of the Philippines, the command was tasked with two closely spaced maximum missions against Okayama in Formosa, totaling 170 sorties, along with very-long-range reconnaissance missions. Yet now we have to travel over to the India-Burma theater. As the advance towards the Chindwin continued and the resilient 33rd Division finally crossed the river in late November, General Katamura was finalizing his plans for a withdrawal to the Mandalay sector, scheduled for December. This decision was driven by the intense pressure the British 36th Division was putting on General Takeda's defensive positions at Pinwe, forcing the defenders to prepare for a final retreat by the end of November. Meanwhile, General Slim was preparing for Operation Capital. He planned to stretch airpower to its limits to move four and two-thirds divisions across the Chindwin, along with two tank brigades. After establishing bridgeheads at Sittang, Mawlaik, and Kalewa, he intended to cross the Chindwin and confront General Kimura's forces between the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy. The 4th Corps, now under the experienced General Messervy, would break out from the Sittang bridgehead, advance east through the mountains, capture Pinlebu, and then approach the Shwebo plain from the north. Simultaneously, General Stopford's 33rd Corps would move from Kalewa, following the Chindwin southeast to Yeu and Monywa. Once the Japanese forces were pushed onto the open plain, Slim planned to exploit his overwhelming advantage in airpower and tanks to decisively defeat them, anticipating that the enemy would fiercely defend Mandalay. The combination of the defeats at Kohima, Imphal, Mogaung and Myitkyina meant that by the autumn of 1944, Kimura's role was reduced to defending southern Burma as the northern flank of their new ‘South-East Asia defense zone'. With few reinforcements or supplies to look forward to, Kimura had grim prospects. On paper he had ten divisions (2nd, 15th, 18th, 31st, 33rd, 49th, 53rd, 54th, 55th, & 56th), though this was really seven, since little remained of the three divisions that had been devastated at Kohima-Imphal. He also had the dubious support of Bose's INA and Aung San's seven-battalion Burma National Army, but the civilian population was increasingly going over to the side of the likely winners. Unexpectedly, Kimura received 30000 fresh troops in the period June–October, but his problem was more commissariat than raw numbers, since he was rapidly running out of supplies. Even those he had (45000 tons of food, 500 lorries and 2000 pack animals) were difficult to get to the front, and Kimura was painfully aware that the situation could only get worse. The South-East Asia zone was slowly being throttled by the Allied naval blockade, all approaches to Rangoon were mined, and in 1944 total Japanese shipping losses amounted to 2.3 million tons. Even those ships that ran the blockade would proceed no farther than Penang in Malaya. Kimura chose to deploy smaller units to delay the British-Indian forces while the main body of the 15th Army retreated across the Irrawaddy River. His strategy was to launch a counterattack once the British crossed the river, aiming to replicate a reverse Imphal by wearing down the British-Indian forces through attrition and then destroying them during their retreat in the May 1945 monsoon. Meanwhile, Admiral Mountbatten was also seeking a victory of his own. On November 8, he ordered an assault on Japanese positions in Arakan, with a deadline set for the end of January. This operation was assigned to General Christison's 15th Corps.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fighting on Peleliu and Angaur raged asAmerican forces struggled against resilient Japanese defenses. Significant advances were made, including the isolation of the Umurbrogol Pocket and the capture of Ngesebus Island. Despite heavy casualties, Peleliu was eventually secured, leaving a small pocket of Japanese resistance.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 146 - Pacific War Podcast - Invasion of Morotai 2 - September 9 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 3, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the end of Operation Dan. In Yunnan, by late July, General Wei's Y Force worked to eliminate Japanese garrisons at Tengchong, Mount Song, Pingda, and Longling. The 33rd Army prepared for Operation Dan, anticipating resistance from General Honda's garrisons until September. The fall of Myitkyina prompted Honda to expedite his plans. Reinforcements were expected in Mandalay by September. General Matsuyama's forces, cut off and surrounded, provided support only through radio messages. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige vowed to defend against relentless attacks. Chinese forces, after intense fighting and bombing raids, breached the city's defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese resisted fiercely. Major Kanemitsu's garrison defended Moung Song with dwindling supplies. The Chinese forces employed siege tactics and underground mines to break Japanese strongholds. The Chinese launched coordinated attacks, capturing key positions and ultimately compelling Japanese retreats.  This episode is the Invasion of Morotai Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  After the Marianas fell and Sansapor was captured, the Allies set their sights on their next objectives: the Palaus and Halmahera, slated for simultaneous invasion by mid-September. The Japanese had stationed the 14th Division at Palau and the 32nd Division at Halmahera as their primary defenses. The Halmahera-Morotai area had not assumed much importance to the Japanese until early 1944, when they began to develop Halmahera as a focal point for the defense of the southern approaches to the Philippines. In addition to the 32d Division, the Japanese had on Halmahera innumerable service organizations, and they completed or had under construction nine airfields on the island, most of them in northern Halmahera. On that island they concentrated nearly 30,000 men, including at least 11,000 combat troops.  On Halmahera, General Ishii commanded approximately 11,000 troops to safeguard nine airfields, despite having already lost most of their air power. Meanwhile, Morotai Island was defended by around 500 Formosans of the 2nd Raiding Unit, led by Major Kawashima Takenobu. General Ishii planned to counterattack from Halmahera if the Allies landed on Morotai, but soon realized Allied air and naval superiority would foil these efforts. Following their defeat in the Marianas, Tokyo reassigned the Bonin Area Group directly under its command and placed the Palau Area Group under the Southern Army, leaving General Mugikura's 31st Army to defend Truk and other isolated outposts. General Inoue fortified Palau with elaborate defenses along the coast and inland, manned by 21,000 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops, 7,000 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) personnel, and 10,000 laborers.  The IJN had by 1944 constructed numerous reinforced concrete blockhouses and bunkers plus dug an extensive tunnel system near the end of the northeast peninsula as well as taking full advantage of Peleliu's natural caves. This elaborate, multi-level tunnel system could shelter 1000 troops. These defenses, tunnels, the airfield, and the many support facilities were built by the 204th, 214th, and 235th Construction Battalions, mostly manned by Koreans and Okinawans. Detachments of the guard forces manned eight 120mm dual-purpose, and about three 200mm coast defense guns. There was no ammunition for the 200mm short guns nor did any ships report being fired on by coast defense guns. The 114th and 126th Anti-aircraft Units manned single and twin-barreled 25mm automatic guns (estimated at 30) and 13.2mm machine guns. A dozen 20mm cannons, removed from destroyed aircraft, were set up on makeshift mounts, mostly around the airfield. His strategy emphasized prolonged attrition over suicidal charges, aiming to exhaust the American forces. In preparation for the intense pre-landing bombardment, Inoue instructed his troops to utilize natural terrain features like coral caves and sinkholes, tactics that proved effective against the advancing Allies.Based in Koror, the Japanese commander stationed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio's 2nd Regiment on Peleliu, the reinforced 1st Battalion of the 59th Regiment on Angaur, and deployed the 15th and 59th Regiments across Babelthuap and other islands. Major-General Yamaguchi Takeo's 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade defended the central islands, complemented by 4,000 personnel from the Imperial Japanese Navy on Peleliu.  Prior to General Inoue's arrival in the Palaus, the defense of the Palaus had been under the command of Vice-Admiral Ito Yoshioka. Upon his arrival on Koror, where he established his headquarters, Inoue appointed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio as Peleliu's new commander, with his 2nd Regiment (Reinforced). Nakagawa was a most able commander, possibly one of Japan's finest defensive tacticians, in the same league as General Kuribayashi on Iwo Jima. Nakagawa would make full use of all his defenses and troops on Peleliu, making the Americans pay dearly for every inch, as he had been ordered to do. Although a very capable commander, the appointment of an Army colonel over a Navy vice-admiral caused a great rift between the Army and Navy on Peleliu, which deteriorated into farce. To resolve matters and calm the Navy down somewhat, Inoue sent Major-General Murai Kenjiro from his headquarters on Koror Island to Peleliu to provide the Army with sufficient rank to satisfy the vice-admiral's honor, although the defense of Peleliu seems, to practical purposes, to have remained in the hands of Nakagawa. It appears that Murai, after inspecting Nakagawa's defensive works and battle plans for the defense of Peleliu, was content to let Nakagawa continue without interference from himself, lending only the weight of his rank to acquire the required cooperation of the Navy elements on Peleliu. Nakagawa, divided the island into four defense sectors, each manned by an infantry battalion. His 1st Battalion, alongside the 14th Division Tank Unit and Engineer Company, served as a mobile reserve for counterattacks against potential landings. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Halsey had been planning Operation Stalemate, targeting Palau since May 29. Originally slated for September 8, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps would assault Peleliu and Angaur, with General Hodge's 24th Corps landing on Babelthuap.  Intelligence was gathered by aerial reconnaissance photographs. Also, in June 1944 the submarine USS Seawolf (SS-197) carried out photographic reconnaissance of the invasion landing beaches. A further reconnaissance was carried out by the submarine USS Burrfish (SS-312) on Peleliu and Yap beaches. An 11-man reconnaissance group of underwater demolition team (UDT) frogmen landed on the Peleliu beaches from the Burrfish for closer investigation relating to water depth, location of potholes and sandbars, and obstacles. With thousands of Japanese on the island they understandably did not reconnoiter inland, and the rugged terrain of the interior would come as an unpleasant surprise to the Marines. A similar operation was carried out on the Yap invasion beaches, but this time only two of a five-man reconnaissance team made it back to the pick-up point. After several unsuccessful attempts to locate their missing comrades the remaining two men returned to the Burrfish. After this incident, Admiral Nimitz banned any further missions of this type. Given delays in the Guam operation, Operation Stalemate was canceled on July 7, replaced by Stalemate II.  An unusual staff arrangement was established to plan Stalemate II. IIIAC was committed to take Guam under General Geiger. The IIIAC staff would thus be unable to plan the Palaus operation, which it was to execute. Consequently, Major General Julian Smith, designated to command the Expeditionary Troops, was tasked to plan the operation using his own small staff augmented by some IIIAC staff officers. This temporary planning staff was designated X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps. It would plan the operation and IIIAC would execute it – an awkward arrangement, but necessary in order to maintain the increasing tempo of operations. As Commander, Expeditionary Troops, Smith was also to be in control of all ground action in the western Carolines; a position roughly analogous to that of General Krueger of ALAMO Force in the Southwest Pacific. X-Ray was finally dissolved on August 15, 1944. This revised plan scheduled Geiger's forces to land on Peleliu with the 1st Marine Division and on Angaur with the 81st Division on September 15, while the 77th Division remained in floating reserve and the 5th Marine Division in area reserve. Then, on October 8th, the 24th Corps planned to launch an assault on the islands of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines. This was aimed at securing an additional airfield and fully neutralizing Truk and the remaining islands in the group. For this operation, Halsey divided his 3rd Fleet into two main echelons: his Task Force 30, which included covering forces such as Admiral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force (now Task Force 38), and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 31, the Joint Expeditionary Force. At Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division was to land with five battalions advancing over the White and Orange Beaches on the southwest coast. The 1st Marines were to land on the left, pushing up the western shore to clear Japanese forces from ridges overlooking the airfield; the 5th Marines would land in the center to secure the airfield; and the 7th Marines on the right to capture the southern end of the island. Meanwhile, at Angaur, Major-General Paul Mueller's 81st Division planned a two-pronged amphibious assault. The 322nd Regiment was to land on Red Beach on the northeast coast, while the 321st Regiment would land on Blue Beach about 2000 yards to the southeast. Both forces would then push inland to secure a first phase line approximately 300 yards from the beaches, before continuing their advance west and south. The reserve 323rd Regiment was tasked with a feint landing at Beach Black on the northwest coast, with potential deployment to Ulithi if the Palau operations proved successful. Meanwhile, General MacArthur aimed to establish an airbase in the Halmahera area, strategically positioned between the Vogelkop and Mindanao. This location would provide crucial flank protection against Japanese forces in the Dutch East Indies and support land-based operations for the upcoming invasion of Mindanao. Optimistically, in mid-June, MacArthur had tentatively scheduled the invasion of Mindanao for October 25. Nimitz, however, believed that MacArthur's hope of reaching Mindanao by October 25 was too optimistic. During conferences at Pearl Harbor in July, called at the suggestion of Nimitz to coordinate Southwest and Central Pacific plans for the Morotai, Palau, and Mindanao operations, Southwest Pacific planners learned that less amphibious craft and assault shipping could be made available to them than had previously been anticipated. Moreover, restudy of range and weather factors made it appear somewhat risky to depend upon the ability of Morotai-based aircraft to provide air support for Southwest Pacific forces on Mindanao after carriers had to leave the latter area and before airdromes could be developed there. To obtain adequate land-based air support for the Mindanao invasion force, MacArthur returned to discarded plans to seize air-base sites on the Talaud Islands, about equidistant from Morotai and Sarangani Bay, Mindanao, where the first landings in the Philippines were then scheduled to take place. The employment of amphibious means for the Talaud operation would delay preparations for Mindanao, as would the development of airdromes on the Talauds. Finally, to have the invasion of Mindanao take place much before the middle of November would involve a conflict in timing with anticipated employment of assault shipping and carrier support by Admiral Nimitz for the occupation of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines, an operation scheduled for the first week in October. MacArthur therefore revised his program to call for the invasion of Morotai on September 15, the Talauds on October 15, and Mindanao on November 15. As Allied carriers were engaged in the Palau operation, MacArthur needed a target within range of fighters and medium bombers stationed at Sansapor. Thus, Morotai Island was chosen for Operation Tradewind due to its perceived light defenses and ample space for airfield and light naval base facilities. General Krueger selected the 31st Division and the 126th Regiment, totaling approximately 28,000 troops under the overall command of General Hall's 11th Corps, for this operation. Admiral Barbey's Task Force 77, comprising 12 destroyers, 2 APAs, 5 APDs, 1 LSD, 39 LCIs, 12 LSTs, and 12 LCTs, along with a covering force led by Admiral Berkey and an escort carrier force under Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague, facilitated the amphibious movement. Additionally, Vice-Admiral John McCain's fast carrier group provided support. Anticipating minimal resistance, the landings were planned near prospective airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain in southwest Morotai. General Hall's strategy involved the 155th and 167th Regiments landing on Red Beach on the southwestern coast to swiftly capture the abandoned Pitoe Drome and secure the new Pitoe Airfield site. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment landed at White Beach, about 1500 yards to the south, to secure the Gila Peninsula and the Wama Airfield site. The reserve 126th Regiment was scheduled to land the following day, with its 1st Battalion initially supporting the 124th Regiment's operations at the beachhead. Both the Palau and Morotai operations were supported by a coordinated strategic air support program. Admiral Hoover's land-based aircraft were tasked with neutralizing Japanese airfields at various islands including Yap, Woleai, Truk, Ponape, Pagan, Bonin, and Marcus Islands. Concurrently, General Kenney's Allied Air Forces reinforced these efforts and targeted enemy air centers in Palau, Mindanao, western Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera, the Talaud Islands, the Moluccas, the Celebes, and the Arafura Sea islands. Additionally, Mitscher's fast carriers embarked on an ambitious campaign, launching strikes from the Bonin and Volcano Islands to the Palaus and Mindanao between late August and the start of the invasions.  This strike had a twofold objective: the temporary neutralization of Japanese airfields on those island groups and, more important, the creation of a diversion on the north preceding stronger attacks against targets in the Philippines and western Carolines. Carrier action in the latter area was to begin on 6 September, with strikes on the Palaus, Yap, and Ulithi. The bulk of the carrier forces was to leave the western Carolines on the afternoon of the 8th to take up positions off Mindanao. Japanese airfields on Mindanao presented difficult targets because they were scattered over that large island, but it was believed that the cluster of airfields and associated installations in the Davao area would provide profitable targets for carrier-based aircraft attacks. The Davao and Sarangani Bay areas, as well as Japanese shipping routes from Davao to Zamboanga and thence north toward Manila, were also expected to provide profitable targets. Strikes against airdromes and shipping in the Mindanao area were to be carried out on 9 and 10 September, while on the 10th and 11th part of the carrier force was to hit the Palaus and Yap-Ulithi again. Rear-Admiral Ralph Davison's carrier-launched aircraft struck Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima from August 31 to September 2. The Fast Carrier Task Force continued with strikes on Yap and the Palaus from September 6 to 8, and on Mindanao from September 9 to 10. Enemy air resistance was surprisingly weak throughout these operations, prompting Halsey to redirect plans for a follow-up attack on Mindanao to the Central Philippines. While the Japanese forces in the Philippines hastened to complete preparations against anticipated Allied invasion, enemy carrier-borne aircraft served sudden warning on September 9 that the date of this invasion was fast drawing near. In the first large-scale air operation by the Allies against the Philippines, an estimated 400 carrier planes staged a devastating ten-hour offensive against southern Mindanao, concentrating their attacks on Davao, Sarangani, Cagayan and Digos. Since Japanese air patrols had failed to discover the enemy task force, the attacks achieved complete surprise and inflicted widespread and severe damage to ground installations, airfields, anchorages, and lines of communication. Reconnaissance units of the 1st Air Fleet immediately flew off search missions, which revealed that the attacks originated from three enemy naval task groups boldly maneuvering in the waters southeast of Mindanao. As per the Sho-Go directives, however, the 1st Air Fleet withheld retaliatory action pending further developments. Ground and naval units in the Davao area were nevertheless ordered on the alert to meet the possible contingency that an invasion attempt would follow the air strikes, and the Japanese armed forces throughout southern Mindanao became tense with expectancy. A feeling of nervousness gripped the weak local forces at Davao and rapidly spread to the large Japanese civilian colony. A wave of wild rumors swept the city. On September 10, a second series of heavy enemy raids aggravated this state of alarm. The city and harbor were reduced to a shambles and communications paralyzed. Panic and civil disorder broke out.  Less than 48 hours after the termination of the raids on Mindanao, the enemy struck again; this time in the central Philippines. On the morning of 12 September, a navy radar picket station on Suluan Island, in Leyte Gulf, broadcast over the general air-warning net that a vast formation of enemy carrier planes was heading westward toward the Visayas. Since the Suluan Island lookout was only about twenty minutes' flying time from Cebu, the air forces there could not be alerted quickly enough to put up an effective defense. By 0920 the enemy planes were already swarming over the Cebu airfields, where the main fighter strength of the First Air Fleet was based following its transfer from Davao. Although the attacks extended over the entire Visayan area and later took in Tawitawi, in the Sulu Archipelago, the Cebu fields appeared to be the principal objective. In the three days over which this air offensive continued, the First Air Fleet suffered damage to 50 Zero fighters on Cebu alone, while in other areas 30 additional aircraft of all types were rendered non-operational. Flight personnel suffered numerous casualties, and training was disrupted. Heavy damage was also sustained by Army air units. The 13th Air Brigade, made up of Type I fighters, was so hard hit that it had to be ordered back to Japan for regrouping, while the 45th Fighter­bomber Regiment was reduced to half strength. In addition, 11 transports totalling 27,000 gross tons and 13 naval combat vessels were sent to the bottom of Cebu harbor.The unexpected weakness in enemy air defenses led Nimitz to reconsider bypassing Yap and Mindanao, instead focusing forces on an early invasion of Leyte. McCain's group continued with attacks on Zamboanga, the Talauds, and Menado en route to Morotai. Meanwhile, between September 1 and 14, Kenney's aircraft conducted heavy raids on Japanese air bases within range of Morotai, effectively isolating the island. Targeted locations included Halmahera, the northern Celebes, Ceram, western New Guinea, and Mindanao. After rehearsals and preparations were completed, Barbey's convoy departed Aitape on September 9. Two days later, they rendezvoused at Maffin Bay with the majority of General Persons' 31st Division. The entire convoy departed the area on September 12, joined the next day by the covering force and escort carriers. The voyage proceeded smoothly, and Barbey successfully reached Morotai on the morning of September 15. Meanwhile, McCain's carrier aircraft conducted a bombing and strafing mission over Japanese air bases in the Manado area, destroying 28 enemy aircraft. Kenney's bombers also struck Japanese air installations on Batjan Island, while Berkey's cruisers and destroyers shelled enemy positions along Galela Bay. Barbey's surface warships conducted a bombardment of the landing area. During the naval and air bombardment, assault ships moved into their assigned positions west of the landing beaches efficiently and without confusion. The initial waves formed quickly and landed the 155th and 167th Regiments on Red Beach at 08:30, followed by the 124th Regiment on White Beach one minute later. Encountering no opposition, the troops swiftly reorganized on shore and advanced toward their objectives inland. By 13:00, the 167th Regiment had secured Pitoe Drome, and by 15:00, Colonel Starr's 1st Battalion had secured Gila Peninsula. Other units also advanced inland, establishing the 2000-yard beachhead line. Although there were some minor skirmishes, the Japanese could not mount significant resistance against the overwhelming Allied force and retreated into Morotai's rugged interior. The day's action resulted in seven wounded among the 124th Regiment and the loss of twelve Japanese soldiers, with one captured. Beach conditions, however, proved unexpectedly poor, severely hindering the unloading efforts. Consequently, starting on September 16, all the LSTs, along with numerous LCTs and LCMs, had to be unloaded at Blue Beach, a favorable landing spot on Pitoe Bay's shores. Simultaneously, as the reserve 126th Regiment was disembarking, Persons resumed advancing inland against minimal opposition. Swiftly, they secured a perimeter around the Pitoe Drome area, spanning over 7000 yards wide and approximately 5000 yards deep. Following this, American patrols were dispatched to eliminate small Japanese groups, radar stations and observation posts were established on various offshore islands and Morotai's coastline, and efforts were made to expand the perimeter to the Sabatai River to accommodate additional bivouacs and supply installations.  Leaving Morotai behind, attention shifts to Burma to explore the aftermath of Operation U-Go. Following the decisive victories at Imphal-Kohima, General Slim opted to pursue retreating Japanese forces toward the Chindwin River, despite the need for rest among his weary British-Indian divisions. Consequently, the 23rd Division spearheaded the pursuit to Tamu, at the head of the Kabaw Valley, where Major-General Charles Fowkes' 11th East African Division took over in early August. Meanwhile, to the south, General Evans' 5th Division pressed toward Tiddim, encountering stubborn resistance from General Tanaka's 33rd Division. Slim's strategy aimed for both divisions to eliminate remaining Japanese forces west of the Chindwin and converge at Kalemyo. Subsequently, the Tiddim road would be abandoned as a supply route in favor of the Kabaw Valley and aerial resupply drops. As a result, the 31st Division, now led by Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, successfully reached Sittaung. Their mission was to cover the withdrawal of other units in the region. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division faced challenges as it conducted delaying actions along the Tiddim road, with the added threat of East African forces potentially cutting off their withdrawal route towards Yazagyo. Japanese delaying tactics were always the same, and the means of dealing with them was also always the same. A crater would be found beyond which the lead infantry would come under fire and would have to be filled or covered using a Valentine bridgelayer, while air strikes would break up the blocking position to allow tanks from 3rd Carabiniers forward to support them. To disrupt Tanaka's communications south of the road, an ad hoc light unit, the Lushai Brigade, was deployed. By mid-August, General Mutaguchi ordered his forces to commence withdrawal towards the Zibyu Range. The 15th and 31st Divisions were directed to cross the Chindwin River by August 25, despite shortages of small boats. At the beginning of the crossing operation, a serious setback was experienced. It had been planned to bring small boats upstream to the crossing area with supplies for the Army and to utilize the same boats to evacuate casualties and heavy weapons south to Kalewa. Because of the enemy air activity over the Chindwin River, it was impossible to bring the boats to the crossing points. As a result, approximately 3000 sick and wounded were forced to cross the river and continue to the rear on foot with increasingly heavy death losses. By August 31, they were expected to reach the eastern bank of the Chindwin, with the 15th Division consolidating along the Pinbon-Pinlebu line by the end of September and the 31st Division reaching Shwebo by mid-October. By the end of August, key command changes occurred following the setbacks of Operation U-Go. Lieutenant-General Katamura Shihachi replaced General Mutaguchi as commander of the 15th Army, while Lieutenant-General Kimura Heitaro took over from General Kawabe as commander of the Burma Area Army. Kimura Heitaro, noted for his strategic flexibility and acumen, subsequently directed the 33rd Army to secure a defensive line from Lashio to Mandalay, safeguarding the right flank of the 15th Army. The 15th Army, in turn, was tasked with holding the Irrawaddy River from Mandalay to Pakkoku, while the 28th Army was assigned to defend the Yenangyaung oilfields, the Arakan coast, and the Rangoon delta. Meanwhile, on September 12, the 33rd Division crossed the Manipur River and proceeded with their retreat towards the Kabaw valley. They left the 215th Regiment to guard the rear at Tonzang, while units of the 5th Division infiltrated the area between Tonzang and Kalemyo to disrupt Tanaka's withdrawal and mount significant attacks against the 215th. By September 20, the Japanese forces were forced back to Tiddim, where the 214th Regiment covered the retreat of the rest of the division. Simultaneously, the 26th King's African Rifles moved east from Tamu to Sittang, crossing the Chindwin River on September 8 to assess enemy strength across the river and prepare bridgeheads for a broader crossing. Encountering unexpectedly strong resistance, they were compelled to retreat back across the river. Under persistent pressure, the Japanese evacuated Tiddim on the night of October 6. Tanaka consolidated his division in the Kalemyo-Kalewa area by the end of October, while pursuing forces captured Fort White and Kennedy Peak. On October 10, the 4th King's African Rifles launched an assault on Leik Ridge, suffering significant casualties but ultimately securing the main hill twelve days later. Meanwhile, after withdrawing from Mogaung, the 53rd Division regrouped at Mawhun by September 10, where they successfully defended against enemy units until the end of the month. They then retreated towards Pinwe and came under the command of the 15th Army on October 5. Following the Quebec conference in September, a strategic overview of Burma emerged: the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved two plans. The first, codenamed Dracula, proposed an amphibious assault on Rangoon with a target date of March 15, 1945. The second plan, Capital, aimed at the conquest of north and central Burma, with General Slim suggesting an overland capture of Rangoon as part of the operation. Initially skeptical, the Americans reluctantly agreed to Dracula, contingent on ensuring that northern Burma received adequate resources. However, due to Allied setbacks at Arnhem and during the Battle of the Bulge, it became clear that reinforcements from the European theater could not be spared for the Rangoon offensive. Consequently, it was announced that the operation would need to be postponed until after the 1945 monsoon season. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After intense Allied operations in the Pacific, including the capture of the Marianas and Sansapor, attention turned to the Palaus and Halmahera. Japanese defenses were formidable, with significant troop concentrations and elaborate fortifications. Despite setbacks, Allied forces meticulously planned and executed operations, paving the way for further strategic advances in the region.

Yeni Şafak Podcast
Mustafa Kutlu - Izdırabın boyutu

Yeni Şafak Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 12, 2024 3:39


Rahmetli Nurettin Topçu ızdıraptan bahsederken şunları söylüyor: “Izdırap insanda kalbin varlığına ilk alâmettir ve onun dost gibi karşılanması kalbin şaheseridir.” Uğranılan büyük felaketler ve sevdiğim insanların kaybı karşısında bir şey yazamıyorum. Herhâlde şu sebepten olmalı. Kaybettiğim şey (kişi) bende öylesine büyük bir yer tutuyor ki; bu kaybı söz ile anlatmaya kalkıştığımda sözlerim duyduğum ızdırap yanında çok zayıf, cılız, acımı yansıtmaktan çok uzak görünüyor. Yazınca Âkif gibi yazacaksın. Çanakkale'yi onun gibi içimize gömeceksin. Yoksa herkes elbette bir şeyler duyuyor, bir iki söz edebilir. Ama düşünün aklınızda “Çanakkale Şehitleri” gibi bir Bosna şiiri var mı? Filistin yıllardır kan ağlıyor, şimdi de Irak, Suriye, Arakan. Her nereye baksan Müslüman kanı akıyor. Izdırap gittikçe katlanıyor. Ya feryat edeceksin ya sükut (bu konularda kırık dökük denemelerimi daha sonra Fırtınayı Kucaklamak adlı kitabımda topladım). Topçu Hoca şöyle devam ediyor: “İnsanlığın büyük hareketlerini yansıtan ızdıraptır. Dinler ve sanatlar, tarihin kaydettiği parlak medeniyetler ızdırabın şaheserleridir. Peygamberler ümmetlerinin ızdırabını yüklenerek kurtuluş vadini Allah'tan getiren büyük muzdariplerdir. Büyük sanatkârlar da dünyamızın bahtiyarları değillerdir. Yunus'tan Âkif'e, Fuzulî'den Dostoyevski'ye kadar bu insanüstü kafilenin sahip olduğu büyük ve adeta ilahî imtiyaz, onların büyük ızdıraplarıdır.” Mevlânâ İdris bir görünüp bir kaybolan yıldız gibidir. Onu Atmeydanı'nda ararsınız, o sırada Kaçkar dağlarında sadece orada yetişen bir çiçeği koklamaktadır.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 129 - Pacific War - The Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima , May 7-14, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later May 7, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the remarkable success of Operation Reckless and Persecution.  Colonel Oliver Newman led the drive towards Hollandia's airfields, encountering scattered opposition and discovering large undefended Japanese supply dumps. General MacArthur was forced to postpone future plans until May 21st. Meanwhile, Allied submarine interceptions disrupted IJN troop movements, and Task Force 58's airstrikes neutralized Truk. Within Burma, General Stilwell's offensive faced challenges from Japanese resistance and heavy monsoon rains. Despite setbacks, the 22nd Division aimed to capture Inkangahtawng while Chinese forces engaged the enemy along various fronts. Chindits continued Operation Thursday, facing logistical hurdles and Japanese attacks. Colonel Kinnison's Marauders encountered strong resistance near Tingkrukawng, while Colonel Hunter's force successfully surprised the Japanese at Myitkyina.  This episode is the Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are jumping right back into the heat of General Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go. Poor General Yamauchi after suffering a devastating defeat at Nungshigum, was now facing allied tanks he simply had no answer for. Yamauchi ordered his men to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi, basically so they would at least be hung around the Kohima-Imphal road. The allies answer to this was 6000 sorties, dropping 1000 bombs in the sector. It was a tremendous amount of damage, but the Japanese did benefit from bunkers. Yamauchi's 15th Division due north of Imphal were now being contained successfully, allowing General Briggs and Roberts to initiate their own counter offensives by the end of April. Simultaneously the 33rd Division was struggling to advance upon Bishenpur and the Shenam Saddle; over at Kohima, General Sato's 31st Division was reluctantly falling onto the defensive as the looming threat of a full British-Indian counteroffensive was dawning upon them. Imphal was still facing a grave threat from the Japanese along the Tiddim Road. Mutaguchi was personally directing the 33rd Divisions actions around Bishenpur at this time. Mutaguchi planned a three-pronged attack, one prong along the Tiddim Road, another down south from the Silchar Track by the 215th Regiment and a lastly from the north by the 214th Regiment. For the assault the 33rd Division received reinforcements in the form of the 14th Tank Regiment; the 2nd Battalion, 18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment; and the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion from the Yamamoto Detachment. In late May they would also be receiving the 151st regiment and the 14th Tank regiment, amongst other units. This of course meant other units like the Yamamoto Detachment were being deprived of men, thus they in turn would be reinforced. The Yamamoto Detachment received the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment who were previously engaged with the Chindits at Indaw. They would arrive at Kampang after the fall of Crete West. Now in preparation for Mutaguchis renewed offensive the IJA would be tossing aircraft against the Gun Box in Bsihenpur. The Japanese Army Air Force made four air raids on the Gun Box position in Bishenpur in the first ten days of May. There was good reason for this, for at Gun Box the 32nd Indian Brigade had concentrated its artillery support. This included four 3.7in. howitzers, eight 25-pdrs, six 6-pdrs and three A/A guns. From here the guns were able to support the infantry's actions both on and around the Silchar Track, as well as the villages on the Tiddim Road such as Potsangbam. The Japanese heavy field artillery was at Khoirentak. The 215th regiment meanwhile performed some preliminary attacks against the positions at Ngarangial. Attacks began in early May against positions between Wireless Hill and Ngarangial, with two battalions attacking from the north and one from the south. The enemy, in strong positions, withstood a series of attacks which continued until the middle of May. While Mutaguchi waited for reinforcements to arrive so he could renew his southern offensive, Generals Yamamoto and Gracey were slugging it out for control over Crete West. The extremely exhausted 3rd battalion, 213 Regiment finally made a break through against the Lynch Pimple on the 8th,  forcing the 80th Brigade to evacuate Crete West two days later. On the night of the 10th, Yamamoto launched his first attacks against Scraggy Hill, which was extensively shelled, followed by a massive infantry assault: in classic style, wave upon wave of Japanese soldiers crashed on Scraggy, overwhelming its forward defenses. A point was finally reached in the night when the British battalion commander on Scraggy felt that the hill would fall unless supporting artillery fire was directed on his own positions. This was called in and the Japanese advance finally halted on the morning of 11th. But parts of Scraggy were now under the control of Yamamoto Force, which dug in. General Scoones reacted by relieving the exhausted 20th Division with the fresher 23rd Division of General Roberts. The new arrivals were shocked to see the conditions on the forward positions of the Shenam Saddle. Scraggy stood out. The Japanese were on part of the hill, while the rest of it was under British control. Trenches and bunkers covered the feature; in places, mere meters separated the two sides' front trenches. Bits of body parts of soldiers lay everywhere and a terrible stench covered the hillside. Now Cowan was planning a counter to Mutaguchis incoming offensive. He planned for an anvil and hammer maneuver; the hammer would be the 63rd Indian Brigade recently relieved from Sekmai in the first week of May by the 89th Indian Brigade. They would push down from Bishenpur towards Potsangbam, Ningthoukhong and even further south while the 48th Brigade established a roadblock on the Tiddim Road around Torbung, deep behind enemy lines. Cowan hoped to crush the 33rd Division along the road between his hammer and anvil while also cutting off the incoming Japanese reinforcements. Thus Brigadier Ronald Cameron's 48th Brigade stealthily advanced south along the eastern shore of Lake Loktak, crossed the Manipur River at Shuganu. It was a long grueling march. Simultaneously, Brigadier Guy Burton's 63rd Brigade advanced south against Potsangbam on the 10th. In their frustrated push southwards on the Tiddim Road, Burton's men had to deal first with the determined Japanese defense of Potsangbam. Burton took over on the 9th from Mackenzie's 32nd Indian Brigade, which had gained a foothold in the village the day before and was now to give its full attention to the Silchar Track. The 63rd Indian Brigade put in a first attack on Potsangbam on 10th. This involved two Gurkha battalions, each supported by a troop of tanks from the 3rd Carabiniers. The area they targeted was the main part of the village east of the Tiddim Road. The initial full frontal attacks failed to make much progress. Burton then changed tack against the Japanese, who had withdrawn to their main defenses south of the Potsangbam turel. He called for a heavy artillery bombardment from the same direction as before in the northern half of Potsangbam to make it appear that he was repeating the previous line of attack. Except this time he instructed one of his battalions to pass secretly behind the other and make for the area to the immediate east of the road. The move worked and the road through the village and its immediate vicinity were captured by the 15th. The Tiddim Road through Potsangbam was now open, although the Japanese still held on in parts of the village. But it had all taken much longer than expected. While the anvil at Torbung was about to be put in place, the hammer had only inched forward. After a long and difficult march, the brigade arrived near Torbung in mid-May. The roadblock was set up on 17th where three nullahs crossed the road near Milestone 33. To the east were several low-lying hills where brigade headquarters was established, centered on one called Point 3404. The sluggish Khuga River flowed between the hills and the road. In the Torbung sector, the Americas surprised Lt. Colonel Matsuki of the 33rd Supply Regiment, who was given the mission of reopening the line of communications using whatever troops were available in the immediate area. A composite company from the 33rd Supply Regiment, which had been deployed in the Mountainous area west of Churachandpur, held Hill 4358 against several enemy attacks. On the night of 17th, approximately 100 men of the 33rd Supply Regiment were gathered from rear elements to make the first attack on the roadblock. The attacking group was mounted on trucks and the leaders miscalculating the location of the enemy position drove squarely up to the roadblock and the entire attacking unit was virtually annihilated. Mutaguchi reacted furiously to this by unleashing artillery fire upon Point 3404 and the roadblock from the surrounding hills. Cameron's guns responded with retaliatory fire. Simultaneously Mutaguchi tossed his 1st battalion, 67th regiment against the Torbung roadblock, but Cameron's men held on inflicting tremendous casualties against the Japanese. Meanwhile Burton unleashed an attack against the hills immediately west of the road in the hopes of cutting off the supply line of the 214th and 215th Regiments. The 63rd rigade set off on 18th; the next day it had captured the villages of Tokpa Khul and Kha Aimol, and near them Three Pimple Hill and OP Hill respectively. This directly threatened the 33rd Divisions HQ at Laimanai. Mutaguchi reacted by abandoning the assaults from the west and south, and redirected the 215th Regiment to deal with Burton's 63rd division. All three of Sasahara's battalions were thrown into the counterattack, the first of which went in on the 20th. Another major assault was made two days later; both were driven off. The Japanese lost over 110 men. But they persisted and put in further attacks over the next week, frustrating any further movement southwards for the 63rd Indian Brigade. The Japanese failed to clear Burton's position, their relentless attacks would completely pin down the 63rd Brigade, thus preventing any further movement southwards.  Now at this point the 32nd Brigade had managed to recapture Wireless Hill, prompting Mutaguchi to abandon Potsangbam by the 24th. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment and 2nd battalion, 213th Regiment fell back to Ningthoukhong. Mutaguchi then tossed another battalion to help out in the attack against Burton's 63rd division. Without further support of the hammer, Cameron's anvil force had to repel a coordinated tank-infantry attack on the 21st and again on the 23rd. The 2nd Battalion, 154th Infantry Regiment and a composite company from the 14th Tank Regiment attacked on the 21st and again on the 23rd but were not only unsuccessful in dislodging the enemy, but also suffered extremely heavy losses. Two tanks were destroyed during these attacks. Though the anvil held firm, Burton's failed attempts to continue the push south would ultimately force Cameron to abandon the roadblock and head back.  On May 24th, the 48th Brigade was fighting through Bishenpur heading up the road finally linking up with the other brigade around Potsangbam. Thus the Torbung roadblock was an enormous success for Cowan, his men had inflicted 500 casualties and disrupted Mutaguchi's plan completely. Now Mutaguchi chose to go ahead with only part of his original plan, the attack from the north that would be carried out by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi's 214th regiment. To oversee the Bishenpur offensive,  Major-General Tanaka Nobuo was appointed in command of the 33rd Division. Leaving Bungte on the night of the 19th, Sakuma's 1st battalion advanced south to attack Bishenpur from the north, while the 2nd battalion moved north from Wainen and attacked Hill 2926. Yet as they tried to storm Point 2926, they were beaten off by a platoon of the 7/10th Baluchs. Failing to take the peak, they captured the southern part of the feature and parts of the adjacent Maibam village. The 1st battalion proceeded with their assault against Bishenpur targeting the area at the northern end of the village, near the junction between the Tiddim Road and the Silchar Track. This is also the area where the Gun Box was. Once they had managed to infiltrate the road junction area, however, the Japanese were repeatedly counter-attacked in the next few days, British tanks firing on their positions at close range. Without any anti-tank guns and the British tanks firing on their positions at close range, they were ultimately wiped out.  Back over with the 2nd Battalion, they had successfully captured Maibam village and Hill 2926, very close to Cowan's headquarters, so the British would have to direct several reinforcements to lay siege on these enemy positions. Early on the 26th, Sakuma directed a composite company to launch a last charge on Bishenpur from the north, but this attack would also end in failure. Cowan then directed the brigade-strength Woodforce to evict the Japanese from Hill 2926.  Woodforce consisted of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade's HQ, commanded by Brigadier Woods and was a composite force of tanks, artillery, sappers and infantry. Taking over the front on the 26th, Woodforce mounted robust counter-attacks over the next two days, finally overcoming all opposition and recapturing the hill and Maibam by the 29th. With most of the 33rd Division fighting to reopen the Tiddim road at Torbung, Sakuma's 214th Regiment was left to extricate itself as best it could. But the fall of the Torbung roadblock on the 24th also allowed Mutaguchi's reinforcements to finally reinforce Ningthoukong in preparation for an attack on Potsangbam.  At this point, the balance of power had shifted very definitely to the allies. Sakuma's early success at Hill 2926 was the closest any Japanese would get to Imphal from the south. Meanwhile General Yamamoto's attacks against the Shenam Saddle resumed on the 20th, with his men rushing the crest of Scraggy in waves throwing gelignite bombs and grenades, but ultimately getting pushed back each time. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment and 1st battalion, 60th regiment began an attack against Gibraltar, a very steep hill along the saddle. Their initial attacks were repelled easily, but on the night of the 23rd they managed to gain a foothold on Gibraltar's crest and this in effect cut off the 37th Indian brigade at Malta and Scraggy. With the Fourteenth Army units on Malta and Scraggy cut off, the fate of the entire Shenam Saddle now hung in the balance, but the very next day the hill was recovered by a counter-attack led by the 5/6th Rajputana Rifles and 3/10th Gurkha Rifles. Gibraltar would be the farthest the Japanese would be able to advance on the Shenam Saddle and the closest they came to breaking through; and from then on, a stalemate developed with neither side making any important moves. After the Japanese had been evicted from Gibraltar on the 24th, they did not follow up with another major attempt to push through the Shenam Saddle for a fortnight. But there was never really a quiet moment on these heights. Sniper fire was ever-present, as was the booming of artillery guns. The situation was the worst on Scraggy, where both sides continued to maintain their respective positions. The British and Indian units here would be fired on from Nippon Hill, besides being subjected to rifle fire, mortaring and grenade attacks from Scraggy itself. To the north, General Brigg's resumed his counteroffensive against Molvom, tossing his 9th Brigade into a series of attacks against the Japanese held Hump. The infantry put in several attacks against the Hump, suffering increasing casualties. The men of the 3/14th Punjabis attacked Hump at least half a dozen times that month. Despite it all, the Japanese were still found in their bunkers at the end of May. Sited on the reverse slopes of Hump, their bunkers were difficult to target by guns firing from the other side. Even when they were hit, they were so solidly built that they suffered little damage. The defenders of Hump would wait until the 3/14th Punjabis neared the crest; they would then let loose a barrage of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks. Attack after attack had to be called off in the face of such furious resistance. Though heavy artillery and mortar fire and repeated air strikes were called in on it, the tenacious Japanese defenders would successfully repel all British-Indian attacks throughout early May.  On the other side, realizing the vital need for artillery support, General Yamauchi decided to bring to the front the field guns that had been left east of the Chindwin River. He also was reinforced with the 2nd Battalion, 67th Regiment, which would seize Lamu on May 10th, securing the rear of the 15th Division. On the 15th, thanks to the timely arrival of the 89th and 123rd Brigades, Briggs was able to renew his assaults in front of Sekmai with greater intensity, finally clearing Kanglatongbi and the hills to the immediate east six days later.  Colonel Matsumura responded by creating new defensive positions around Modbung. As the month came to a close, Briggs decided to concentrate both his division's brigades on the Imphal–Kohima Road. The 9th Indian Brigade was to be brought on to the road, swapping places with the 89th Indian Brigade, which would move to the Iril River Valley. The opening of the Imphal–Kohima Road was a far greater priority than clearing the Mapao– Molvom Range. The Japanese defenders of the latter would be left where they had hung on for weeks. In any case, the opening of the road was likely to encourage them much more to leave than any direct attacks on their positions.  On May 15th Yamauchi was relieved of his command. Yamauchi had really drawn the short end of the straw. As he admitted at the time, his men simply had no answer to the British tanks. His men had thrown themselves into the jungle as lightly as possible in order to strike Imphal quickly, so they did not have effective anti-tank weapons. Ymauchi's division was always the Japanese weak spot, but they valiantly had refused to lift their roadblock at Kanglatongbi. As a last desperate throw, Yamauchi had ordered the use of poison gas. Yamauchi was also a man who understood how strong the allies were, especially America. Unlike the xenophobic and ignorant Tojo and Mutaguchi, Yamauchi had spent time in the USA and this led him to be quite pessimistic. Regardless, without anti-tank weapons it was quite hopeless. Yamauchi was carried from the battlefield on a litter and would later die in a hospital in Maymyo. Back over at Kohima, Generals Stopford and Grover were continuing their counteroffensive. Brigadiers 4th Brigade were occupying Oaks Hill when on May 1st, they began to descend during  The Royal Scots stopped their advance and reoccupied Oaks Hill, the brigade artillery back in Jotsoma was on standby to pound any Japanese positions the Norfolks, who were pressing on down the ridge, encountered. The Japanese, alert now to the dangerous presence of enemy troops above them, moved up against Oaks Hill and fought hard to expel the Royal Scots during that first night, with no success. The morning that followed a night of screaming, fear-inducing attacks found the jungle undergrowth littered with Japanese bodies. It was usual practice for the Japanese to take away their dead and wounded, but on this occasion there were too few Japanese survivors for the task. As the Royal Scots repelled numerous enemy counterattacks, the Norfolks were continuing their descent towards the GPT ridge. On May 4th, the Norfolks found themselves in a good position to assault the crests of the ridge. They stormed up catching the Japanese by surprise, managing to seize numerous bunkers. At the same time, the 161st Brigade was able to seize the area southeast of Two Tree Hill, but the Japanese had a complex bunker system there preventing them from linking Jotsoma with Pulebadze. The bunker complex on GPT Ridge was much more substantial than the British had expected, with literally dozens of small, carefully sited bunkers littering the entire area with interlocking arcs of fire, while the entire position was also covered by Japanese machine guns further to the east on the Aradura Spur. No sooner would one be discovered and attacked, than another would open up against the attackers from somewhere else. Until the entirety of GPT Ridge was cleared, Goschen's brigade could not enjoy the shortcut through to Jotsoma via Two Tree Hill; the road to Imphal remained in Japanese hands and their machine guns continued to spray fire on 6th Brigade's exposed right flank. Within the center the 6th Brigade was attacking Kuki Piquet and FSD Hill. While the attack against Kuki Piquet was not seeing much progress, they did gain a toehold atop FSD Hill. Further north, the 5th Brigade were able to bypass the 138th regiments position on Merema Ridge. They managed to secure a small part of Naga Village by the end of the day. Being close in proximity to General Sato's HQ, the response from the Japanese was a series of fierce counterattacks. THe 33rd battalion, 14th regiment stormed the Cameron Highlanders who did not have time to consolidate their success by digging in, and heavy Japanese mortar fire at daylight forced the Jocks back to the western edge of the hill. Here Hawkins had them dig to secure the ground that had been seized and the Worcesters, who had protected the flanks of the night advance, were called up to help build a defensive position able to resist counterattack. The rain was by now constant. Everyone was drenched to the skin. The next morning the Japanese Air Force made one of their occasional forays into the deep valley that flowed out of the Kohima Ridge westward, but to limited effect.  Meanwhile Brigadier Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's newly arrived 33rd Brigade was in the process of reinforcing the exhausted 6th Brigade at Kohima Ridge, with preparations being made for a renewed general counteroffensive. Meanwhile, over on Pulebadze on the 6th, B Company of the Norfolks, commanded by Captain Jack Randle, was ordered to seize the remaining part of the bunker position at the bottom of GPT Ridge, while the 4/lst Gurkhas of , assisting the breakthrough in the center against Kohima Ridge and Jail Hill, were to attack the lower, western slopes of GPT Ridge. In these attacks the Norfolks were to seize the remaining Japanese bunkers but at high cost, in which Capt. Randle was awarded the posthumous VC.  The Norfolks remained in the positions they had seized and, after a night of heavy rain, a further attempt to attack the remaining Japanese positions was made at first light on the morning of 7 May by the 4/lst Gurkhas and the Royal Scots. It was important that this operation was successful, as at 10.30am an attempt was to be made by the 1st Queen's - part of 33rd Indian Brigade, who had arrived at Kohima exhausted and malaria-ridden from Arakan the day before - on Jail Hill. If the machine-gun nests on GPT Ridge could be wiped out before the Queen's attacked they would enjoy a much higher chance of success. The only result of this failed assault would be the death of Brigadier Goschen, shot by snipers.  The Queen's, aware that 4th Brigade had not managed to secure GPT Ridge, nevertheless went in against Jail Hill as planned and were slaughtered. In retrospect the attack was premature, but Stopford continued to demand speed to remove the Japanese stranglehold on Kohima in order to relieve beleaguered Imphal. There was a belief in some higher quarters - held in particular by those whose only experience of the terrain came from reading a map in the comfort of a headquarters tent in the rear - that 2nd Division's offensive lacked pace. These accusations were preposterous to the hard-pressed men on the ground. It was impossible for commanders and staff officers in the rear who could not see the ground to understand how a small piece of jungle-topped hillside could absorb the best part of a brigade; how a small group of well-sited bunkers could hold up an advance until every single one - together with every single occupant - had been systematically destroyed; how only medium artillery could penetrate the roof of a Japanese trench; how only direct and short-range sniping by Lee/Grant tanks was guaranteed to defeat a Japanese bunker; how the desperate terrain, incessant rain and humidity led even the fittest men to tire quickly and what an extraordinarily determined opponent they faced. With few exceptions, the Japanese gave in only when they were dead. Every conscious man who could lift a weapon fought until he collapsed.  Due to these defeats, the British-Indian morale plummeted, even though Sato's men were also facing a serious supply problem that was further weakening them with each passing day.  Nevertheless, the Japanese continued a brave defense under heavy artillery, mortar and aerial bombardment. Sato's defensive technique, while it was not going to enable him to break through Kohima by dint of offensive action, was designed to do the next best thing: to draw the enemy onto defences of great complexity and depth and to break them there, both physically and morally. In so doing his troops had to withstand the sort of conditions few other soldiers in history could have survived. They did so, and very nearly succeeded in persuading Stopford that battering through Kohima was an impossible task. Between the 4th and the 'Black 7th', for instance, the 38 3.7in. mountain guns dug in around Jotsoma fired over 3,000 rounds, the 48 25-pdrs fired over 7,000 rounds and the big 5.5in. guns of the medium artillery fired more than 1,500 shells at the Japanese positions, not to mention the almost continuous salvoes from the 3in. mortars of the infantry battalions and the constant strafing and bombing by Hurricanes and Vengeance dive-bombers. For the next few days, General Stopford's brigades were slowly reducing the Japanese defenses. British progress, though slow, remained sure, even though it seemed to the troops on the ground as if this battle would go on for ever. 4th Brigade cleared GPT Ridge on 11 May, by which time further costly attacks by the British 6th and 33rd Indian Brigades had finally forced the Japanese to relinquish their hold on Pimple, FSD and Jail hills, the latter of which was captured by the Queen's and C Company, 4/lst Gurkha Rifles. The tide was slowly - and painfully - beginning to turn. On the days that followed, the positions seized on 11 and 12 May were carefully consolidated, the remaining Japanese being exterminated one by one, sniper by sniper and gun by gun. The Berkshires cleared FSD Hill on 12 May, discovering that the Japanese had honeycombed the hill with tunnels, creating an elaborate underground fortress that included a battalion headquarters, repair shop, ammunition storage dump and hospital. Those Japanese bunkers on the western edge of the ridge that remained out of reach of the British artillery could now be engaged directly and at pointblank range by the Lee/Grants, trundling up the road that divides DIS and Jail hills. They did so to the cheers of the British and Indian infantry, who found themselves hugging the ground as the 75mm smashed the enemy foxholes only metres from them, the ground shaking and the shockwave of the blast sucking out their breath and showering them with dirt and debris. The capture of the southern part of Kohima Ridge a full 37 days after the arrival of Sato's units would force the Japanese to retreat to a secondary defensive line north of Aradura. On the 15th, patrols of the 5th Brigade advanced down from Naga Hill, securing Treasury Hill before meeting up with the exhausted victors of Kohima Ridge who were advancing along the Imphal road. Yet that is all for the India front, as we now need to jump back over to check out what is going on with Operation Ichi-Go. After the fall of Xuchang, General Uchiyama dispatched some units south to attack Luohe, while the bulk of his 12th Army advanced north to capture Luoyang and hopefully annihilate General Enbo's 31st Army Group. On May 2nd, General Uchiyama dispatched the 110th Division against Dengfeng, the 62nd Division against Yuzhou and the bulk of his 37th Division, 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigade against Jia and Ruzhou. On 2nd, the 4th Cavalry Brigade defeated the enemy force in the sector southwest of Yingchiaochen and, on the 4th, advanced to the sector northwest of Linju. The 3rd Armored Division routed the retreating enemy heading west and, on the 4th, mopped up the enemy in the vicinity of Linju. Also on the 4th, the 37th Division arrived at Linju. On the same day, the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade occupied Hsiangcheng. on the 3rd the 62nd defeated the 29th Army at Yuzhou while the 3rd Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade pursued the retreating Chinese towards Ruzhou. On the 4th, Uchiyama's main forces were able to capture Ruzhou and the 110th Division managed to dislodge the 13th Army's position east of Dengfeng. After this Uchiyama's main forces enveloped the area, annihilating the 13th and 29th Armies at Dengfeng while the 62nd and 110th Divisions made a frontal assault of the city. Alongside this the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked the enemy near Likouzhen. Yet before Uchiyama's men could complete the envelopment, General Enbo's men pulled out towards Tangjiezhen and Changshuixiang around midnight on the 5th. On the 7th, the 37th Division and 7th Brigade managed to envelop Tangjiezhen, and with air support inflicted heavy casualties on the outflanked defenders. Simultaneously, the 27th Division captured Luohe and Suipin. General Yokoyama had dispatched the 11th Independent Brigade to aid Uchiyamas men from the south, facing little resistance as they captured Queshan and Zhumadian before linking up with the 27th Division on the 11th.  On the other side, General Jiang Dingwen's 1st War Area Army was regrouping the bulk of its forces along the Luoyang-Yiyang line. General Okamura Ysuji ordered the 12th Army to advance upon Luoyang while Lt General Yoshimoto Teiichi's 1st Army crossed the Yellow River to try and cut off the Chinese retreat at Xin'An and Xiashichiang. Having defeated the enemy in the sector southwest of Dengfeng, the 12th Army continued to keep the enemy in the Loyang area under strict observation while, at the same time, it ordered the 110th Division to pursue the enemy toward Iyang, the 62nd Division to pursue them toward Pingteng, the main force of the 3rd Armored Division toward Iyang and Hsinan and the 4th Cavalry Brigade to the western sector of Pingteng. Okamura dispatched his reserve 63rd Division led by Lt General Nozoe Masanori to try and break through at Sishuizhen so they could join the attack upon Luoyang. They were successful and in the process, defeated the 177th Division and managed to reach the northeastern sector of Luoyang by the 12th. With assistance from the 59th Brigade coming from the west, Nozoe captured Xin'an by the 14th. The 62nd Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade captured Pingdengxiang on the 13th and part of the 110th Division captured Yiyang on the 14th. Most of the 110th Division, however, moved to Lungmenchieh below Luoyang. The 3rd Armored Division also reached the area southwest of Lungmenchieh at this point. The 37th Division, meanwhile, was directed to move towards Sunghsien. These actions effectively enveloped Luoyang as Uchiyama had his 110th Division advance through the Luohe River Valley; Yoshimoto's men advance to Sanmenxia which would fall by the 18th. The 37th Division captured Song alongside the aidromes at Luoning and Lushi by the 20th. But the main effort would be made by the 63rd Division assisted by elements o the 110th Division who launched the assault against Luoyang, being defended by the 36th Army Group. On the 19th, the 63rd Division initiated its attack against enemy positions on the outskirts of Loyang, however, the enemy positions were so strong that the battle situation did not progress as planned. As a result of this the North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to place the main force of the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade together with part of the 110th Division under the command of the 63rd Division commander. At the same time, the 63rd Division was ordered to defend the railway east of Mienchih. At 1pm on the 23rd, the 12th Army dispatched the 63rd Division to attack Luoyang Castle from the north and northeastern fronts of Luoyang to the northeastern corner of the castle while the 3rd Armored Division was to attack the castle from the western front toward the northwestern corner of the castle. The Army also directed the Cavalry Brigade to capture and destroy the enemy which it was expected would flee to the south at the line of the Lo Ho. On the 24th, the Army-called on the enemy in Luoyang to surrender but they refused. At 1pm, therefore, the Army opened its attack and, on the 25th, completely occupied the castle. During this battle, Lieutenant-General Li Jiayu would heroically die covering the retreat of the remaining troops of his battered 36th Army Group. With the fall of Luoyang and the near destruction of the 1st War Area, Operation Kogo ended in a resounding success for the Japanese, thus securing the South Beijing-Hankou railway. The Japanese estimated over 32000 Chinese casualties and some 7800 troops captured. In turn, they claimed to have lost only 2000 casualties. Interestingly, Operation Kogo also saw the Henan peasants attack the Kuomintang forces in revenge for the Yellow River flood of 1938 and the Henan Famine of 1942. As told to us by General Jiang Dingwen "During the campaign, the unexpected phenomenon was that the people of the mountains in western Henan attacked our troops, taking guns, bullets, and explosives, and even high-powered mortars and radio equipment... They surrounded our troops and killed our officers. We heard this pretty often. The heads of the villages and baojia (village mutual-responsibility groups) just ran away. At the same time, they took away our stored grain, leaving their houses and fields empty, which meant that our officers and soldiers had no food for many days… Actually this is truly painful for me to say: in the end the damages we suffered from the attacks by the people were more serious than the losses from battles with the enemy." In the end, the peasants would be able to disarm over 50000 troops, picking their weapons to defend themselves from the Japanese, but also causing much damage to the Nationalist defense. For their role in this disaster, Generals Dingwen and Enbo would be relieved from their commands, with General Chen Cheng later taking over the 1st War Area in July to oversee its recovery. Meanwhile, the Japanese would continue to prepare for Operation Togo, the Hunan offensive. Yet to finish off this episode we also need to mention some progress in the future plans to invade Wakde. Admiral King had requested support from the British Eastern Fleet. At this time the Eastern Fleet was organized into three forces for Operation Transom, the invasion of Japanese occupied Surabaya. Force 65 consisted of Battleships Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, the French battleship Richelieu, two cruisers and eight destroyers, under the direct command of Admiral Somerville; Force 66 consisted of aircraft carriers Illustrious, Saratoga, two cruisers and six destroyers, under the command of Rear-Admiral Clement Moody aboard Illustrious. Force 67 was the replenishment group and comprised six tankers, a water distilling ship and the cruisers London and Suffolk. Somerville commanded the entire fleet from Queen Elizabeth. The warships were drawn from six navies, the capital ships being accompanied by three American destroyers, four British cruisers and three destroyers, four Australian destroyers, a Dutch cruiser and destroyer and a New Zealand cruiser. The Australian light cruiser HMAS Adelaide also sailed from Fremantle in Western Australia to protect the tankers while they were at Exmouth Gulf; this allowed their two escorting cruisers to augment Force 66 during the attack. Two squadrons of Supermarine Spitfire fighters were transferred from No. 1 Wing RAAF at Darwin to Exmouth Gulf to protect the Eastern Fleet while it refueled and Australian and American maritime patrol aircraft were assigned to operate offshore. Each carrier had an air group made up of units from their parent navies. Illustrious embarked two squadrons equipped with 14 Vought F4U Corsair fighters each and two squadrons with nine Avengers. Saratoga's air group comprised a squadron with 26 Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters, a squadron with 24 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers and a squadron operating 18 Avenger torpedo bombers, as well as a single Hellcat allocated to the Air Group Leader. As for Surabaya, its defenses against air attack at the time of Operation Transom included a few anti-aircraft guns, whose crews were inadequately trained. Radar stations and a network of observer posts were also sited to detect minelaying aircraft. The Japanese forces stationed in the city included the Imperial Japanese Army's 28th Independent Mixed Brigade and the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet under Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi. Because of the distance to be covered from Ceylon and the Royal Navy's lack of experience in underway replenishment, the final plans for the operation involved the Eastern Fleet refueling at Exmouth Gulf in Western Australia before striking Surabaya. Force 67 was the first element of the Eastern Fleet to sail, departing on April 30th. Forces 65 and 66 sailed on May 6th. The Allied ships proceeded to Exmouth Gulf on a course that kept them at least 600 miles from Japanese airfields to avoid being detected or attacked. The carriers air wings practiced the attack they would conduct on Surabaya three times during the voyage. The warships arrived at Exmouth Gulf on 14 and 15th ofMay. The Eastern Fleet departed Exmouth Gulf on the afternoon of the 15th and proceeded north. It arrived at the flying off point at 6:30 am local time on the 17th without being detected by the Japanese. One British and seven American submarines also took up positions near Surabaya, the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca and the Bali, Lombok and Sunda Straits to support the Eastern Fleet. The submarines were positioned to rescue Allied aircrew that were forced down, attack ships that tried to escape from Surabaya and intercept any Japanese warships that attempted to attack the Allied fleet. Operation Transom opened up with 76 aircraft launched from Illustrious and Saratoga. The aircraft launched by the carriers were organized into two strike forces. Force A was made up of nine Avengers from Illustrious, twelve Dauntless dive bombers and an escort of eight Corsairs. Force A's Avengers were to bomb the Braat Engineering Works and the Dauntlesses the oil refinery. Force B was to attack shipping and dock facilities in Surabaya's port. It comprised twenty-one Avengers and six Dauntlesses escorted by eight Corsairs and twelve Hellcats. The commander of Saratoga's air group, Commander Joseph C. Clifton, led both carriers' air wings during the attack. All of the aircraft were launched and formed up with the rest of their force by 7:20 am. Two British Avengers crashed during takeoff, their crews being rescued. The attack on Surabaya commenced at 8:30 am. The Japanese had not detected the aircraft as they approached, and were taken by surprise. The two forces made a well-synchronized attack, Force A approaching Wonokromo from the south and Force B attacking the port from the north. No Japanese fighter aircraft were encountered, and the anti-aircraft guns were largely ineffective. One of Saratoga's Avengers was shot down, and both members of its crew became prisoners of war. The two forces claimed to have damaged 10 ships, demolished the Wonokromo oil refinery and the Braat Engineering Works, destroyed 16 aircraft and leveled several buildings. Saratoga and her three escorting American destroyers detached from the Eastern Fleet shortly before sunset on the 18th, and proceeded to Fremantle. The remainder of the Eastern Fleet reached Exmouth Gulf the next morning, and sailed for Ceylon before sunset after refueling again. Adelaide and one of the Australian destroyers that had been attached to the Eastern Fleet left Exmouth Gulf bound for Fremantle after the tanker group departed on 19 May. The Eastern Fleet arrived back at Ceylon on the 27th. Saratoga reached Bremerton, Washington, on June 10th and after a refit re-joined the Pacific Fleet in September 1944. Though the Japanese would not really divert any forces from western New Guinea in response to the raid and despite the fact that the Japanese claim that not much damage had been inflicted on their shipping or shore facilities, with only one vessel confirmed sunk, Operation Transom would provide Somerville's Eastern Fleet important experience of carrier strike operations and exposure to superior American carrier tactics.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allies were gradually countering Operation U-Go as the intense battles at Kohima Ridge and Pulebadze saw British-Indian forces slowly gaining ground amid heavy casualties. Meanwhile, Operation Ichi-Go saw major Japanese successes in China. Lastly Operation Transom saw British-Dutch-American successful carrier strikes against Surabaya, yielding experience despite limited damage.

Radio NUG for Myanmar Spring
" Interview With NUG Foreign Ministry, Deputy Minister U Moe Zaw Oo And Radio NUG About The Discussion On Rakhine State In Bangladesh"

Radio NUG for Myanmar Spring

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 30, 2024


"Interview with Radio NUG about the discussion on the Arakan issue in Bangladesh with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NUG, Deputy Minister U Moe Zaw Oo" Nway Oo Lay Pyae.This item has files of the following types: Archive BitTorrent, Metadata, VBR MP3

The Pacific War - week by week
- 122 - Pacific War - Operation Thursday, March 19-26, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 19, 2024 45:26


Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville, action on the Burma front and New Guinea. General Hyakutake was under immense pressure to dislodge the Americal force from Bougainville. He unleashed a grand counter offensive trying to break the American defensive lines. Both the Japanese and Americans began suffering heavy casualties, yet neither side wavered in its resolve. Over in the Burma front, the Galahad unit, aka Merrills marauders joined their British, American and Chinese allies in pushing the Japanese back. There were some issues involving friendly fire, but overall the allies were making gains in a theater where the Japanese had dominated for years. Over in New Guinea, the Japanese were continuing to retreat to Madang. Things were going so terribly, units were now being deployed to defend the western part of New Guinea. Japan was simply not winning the war of attrition.  This episode is the Operation Thursday Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Things have really been heating up on the Burma front. General Mutaguchi basically tricked his own superiors into allowing him to invade India under the guise of Operations HA-GO and U-GO. This saw Japanese units advancing towards Imphal and Kohima. On the other side General Stilwell's forces were advancing upon Myitkyina in the north, as General Slim's 15th corp were clashing with the Japanese in the Arakan region. Americans, British, Indians, Chinese were all performing operations to halt Japanese attacks and push further into Burma, but on top of all of that, we now need to talk about our favorite child born from the onion eating madman Wingate, the Chindits.  All the way back in early February, Operation Thursday was in development. The operation was basically an extended version of the first Chindit raid, this time in two waves, with 3 brigades making long marches across the Chindwin. The first wave would go into the enemy territory, then 2-3 months later the second wave would come in to reinforce them. There were large issues with the operation, namely a lack of aircraft. Aircraft were being used for the Arakan campaign and flying supplies over the Hump. Chiang Kai-shek would not part with any aircraft set to go over the Hump and not even Mountbatten had the authority to touch the issue. Regardless Thursday would be authorized and its goals were as follows; to assist Stilwell's advance; to create favorable conditions for the Y-Force to gord the Salween and to inflict maximum damage to the Japanese in northern Burma. Their principles targets were the Shwebo-Myitkyina railway and the Myitkyina-Bhamo-Indaw road. There would be 4 strongholds to be designated, Piccadilly, Chowringhee, Broadway and Templecombe, the last one later renamed Aberdeen. The US 900th airborne engineer company would clear strips suitable for Dakotas to land. On February 4th Wingate and Stratemeyer, commander of the Eastern Air command issued the essential guidelines for Thursday, stressing this raid would require the wounded being flown out from the strongholds rather than to be abandoned as was the case with the first expedition. Stratemeyer added orders to bomb the stronghold areas prior to their establishment, though Wingate had instead favored diversionary bombings of Rangoon, Mandalay and Bangkok.  On February 5th of 1944, Fergussons 16th brigade kicked off first from Ledo and onlookers would remark they looked more like a mule train than a commando force. There were elephants, 250 bullocks, 547 horses and 31314 mules assigned to the operation. Fergusson's 4000 men took 500 mules, fully laden along with them. They avoided Japanese forces by traversing exceptionally difficult terrain. It would be a full month before all Brigade Battalions crossed the Chindwin river. The main target was Indaw, although two Columns were tasked to attack the town of Lonkin, in the Kachin Hills and 20 miles west of Kamaing. Two gliders, loaded with folding boats, outboard engines, and gasoline, were towed by air to the Chindwin River and softly set down on a sandbar. Not only were the necessities delivered to Fergusson, but also for reuse the pair of C-4As were plucked from the scene by a C-47. Wingate traveled with Fergusson and his men for the first the start of the grueling ascent up the Paktai. They faced mud slides, torrential rain, the usual Burma experiences. It would take them all of February to reach the Chindwin, after that it was another 200 miles to their target of Indaw. Wingate departed after the first few days, but would come back over by aircraft to observe the crossing of the Chindwin. Fergusson had been critical of Wingate in January, describing him as a liar, but he continued to believe in the man. “Wingate was sometimes wrong in small things but never in big.' When Wingate met Fergusson he showed up with an entourage of war correspondents, trying to publicize the Chindits activities. He began talking to them of a new fad he came across, turtle eggs which he declared provided singular nourishment. Like so many of Wingate's eccentric ideas, no one favored it. Turtles' eggs were found to be no more appetizing than those of any other reptile, and in fact many of the Chindits experienced stomach pains and other digestive problems after eating them. Then Fergusson had to tell Wingate they could not possibly reach Indaw earlier than March 20th. The expectation had been March 5th, thus Wingate was pissed. At the same time, the 1st air commando had performed aerial reconnaissance over the 3 selected locations suitable for bringing gliders, Broadway, Piccadilly and Chowringhee. Yet Wingate had issued strict orders banning any further overflights fearing it would give up their intentions to the Japanese. Despite the warning, Colonel Cochram dispatched a B-25 on March 5th to perform a final look over the sites, giving last minute reports that Broadway and Chowinghee were clear, but it looked like teak logs were sprawled over the Piccadilly site. Since the Piccadilly site seemed unsuitable, Brigadier Calvert persuaded Wingate to send the Gliders into Broadway. On the night of March 5th, the gliders carrying the second wave were flown in. The pathfinder gliders, first to touch down, set out flare pots to facilitate succeeding waves of gliders. However, the field proved far less accessible than expected. For many years, the local people had logged teak and during the wet season, slid the huge logs across the ground down to a river. Over time the technique gouged deep ruts that elephant grass covered, making the trenches invisible to aerial photographs or reconnaissance. Co-commander of the 1st air commando group John Richardson Alison recalled "They formed perfect glider traps, and there was no way to avoid them. The gliders arrived overhead in large numbers, and when a glider starts down there is no way to stop it. As each one hit the trenches the landing gears would come off and the gliders would go in a heap. We tried to arrange the lights to spread the gliders all over the field to avoid collisions, but this was impossible. They were coming in too fast to change directions, and glider after glider piled into each other while landing.” The next day the gliders landed successfully on Chowringhee and the airstrip was completed by nightfall. Meanwhile transports began to bring Calverts 77th brigade, followed by Brigadiers Lentaigne's 111th brigade. By the 11th, the fly in was complete, now 9250 Chindits were landed on Broadway and Chowringhee. The Chindits then began their advance east to hit the Lashio-Bahmo-Myitkyina motor supply line. Trekking from Chowringhee, Morris Force Columns headed north-east, to cut the Bhamo-Myitkyina road, as 111 Brigade's British Battalions marched south from Broadway to link up with other elements flown into Chowringhee. Their job was to stop Indaw being reinforced from the south. Thus, 111th Brigade set up ambushes and roadblocks south of Indaw although part of the brigade which landed at Chowringhee was delayed in crossing the Irrawaddy River, before moving west to Pinlebu. Broadway was held with a garrison that included field artillery, anti-aircraft guns and some six Spitfires that would successfully repel a Ki-43 attack on March 13.  Meanwhile Calvert's columns advanced over the railway towards Henu, where they would establish the White City stronghold, roughly 20 miles north of Indaw. Columns were directed to demolish bridges and railroads around the Kadu, Mawhun and Pinwe stations. It was a long and gruesome march over some very tough terrain. For example, it took Column 45, bringing up the Brigade's rear, nine days to cover the first 35 miles, to Hkalak Ga. They set out again on February 22nd. By this time, the men were tiring of K-rations, which gave calories but no bulk. Smoking was confined to lunch and evening bivouacs. The Leicesters were in the lead and reached the Chindwin on February 29th. Meanwhile, 45 Recce's columns, still in the rear, reached the Chindwin during the afternoon of Saturday March 4. It had taken them 21 days to cover some of the wildest, toughest country on earth. After successfully crossing the Chindwin, on March 12th Fergusson received orders to seize Indaw's airfield, destroy supply dumps in the area and establish a new Stronghold, to be known as Aberdeen. The Brigade continued south, moving parallel to and west of the railway. Meanwhile Calvert's 5 columns to 5 days to reach Henu. The South Staffords were the first to arrive and the Japanese reacted before they could dig in – they would have to fight for the Block. were on the alert to resist their incursion. In the afternoon of 16th, Calvert launched a bayonet charge up Pagoda Hill, with the Chindits soon engaging the Japanese engineers, who were charging down, in a vicious hand-to-hand combat. Eventually, with the assistance of the 1st Air Commando's close support, the Japanese were successfully pushed off the hill and the White City stronghold was established. For the loss of 23 dead and 64 wounded, Calvert's Chindits had killed 42 Japanese and had effectively cut the line of communications supporting the 18th Division far to the north. In the ensuing days, the stronghold would be developed into a fortress, with some airstrips becoming operational by March 21st. The time chosen to drop the Chindits near the 18th Division's line of communications was most embarrassing to General Tanaka. On January 10, Headquarters, 15th Army, had suspended movement of supplies to the 18th Division in order to accumulate stocks for the projected attack on Imphal. Shipment was to resume as soon as the Imphal operation was underway. Then the Chindits cut the rail line, and just when the supply movement was to have resumed, the 18th Division had to start living on what was at hand in north Burma. It was aided by the 56th Division, which shipped about ninety tons of vital supplies to Myitkyina via Bhamo, but Tanaka's supply position was fundamentally compromised by the Chindits fighting along the railway to north Burma. On the 18th Calvert's force took a large night drop, including wire and entrenching tools. They slaved away to turn the Block into a fortress. The parachutes festooned across the forest canopy gave the Block its popular name – White City – soon a maze of slit trenches and bunkers roofed with heavy timbers. White City, with its commanding position, became a powerful concentration of force, with Calvert's three Battalions steadily reinforced. The Block grew a heavily wired perimeter and a garrison strong enough to raise a substantial force for mobile action. Calvert regarded White City as “ideally situated around a series of hills about 30ft to 50ft high, with numerous small valleys in between, with water at the north and south. I brought the village of Henu into our defended area, so that we would have a good field of fire across the paddy to the south. I also brought into the perimeter what we called ‘OP Hill', a feature slightly higher than our own little hills, to give us good observation. Our perimeter was now about 1,000 yards long, mostly along the railway, and 800 yards deep.” Calvert now had 2,000 men inside the Block, with mobile “floater” columns operating to north and south, together with a sizeable force protecting Broadway. He called in air strikes to punish a Japanese force at nearby Mawlu. Meanwhile the 15th Army's staff were beginning to panic. Many of the officers were beginning to see the paint on the wall and were calling for the Imphal offensive to be abandoned. General Mutaguchi refused to give up and instead directed some troops to thwart the Chindits. To do this a reserve battalion was taken from the 15th, 18th, 33rd and 56th divisions and redirected to Indaw while Colonel Yanagisawa Hiroshi's 67th regiment moved over to Napin. Major General Hayashi Yoshihide's 24th independent mixed brigade was ordered to advance north along with some units of the 2nd division who would open a new HQ at Indaw by March 25th. Further behind the lines, the 53rd division led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro were directed to rush north to engage the enemy as fast as possible. All of this was still a diversion from the main effort against Imphal and it basically helped Stilwell's operations. To aid the war effort the IJA air force were also stepping up their game. On march 18th, a KI-43 raid managed to destroy some Spitfires grounded at broadway. William 'Babe' Whitamore and Alan M Peart managed to get airborne, with both shooting down one 'Oscar' each. Whitamore was shot down and killed but Peart survived for over half an hour, holding off over 20 enemy fighters. The remaining Spitfires were destroyed on the ground for the loss of another pilot, Lt Coulter. Peart flew back to Kangla the same day in his damaged Spitfire and reported the action.  The following day, Fergusson's footsore columns finally neared Manhton village and prepared to establish the Aberdeen Stronghold. After an appalling final leg of their terrible march into Burma, with progress reduced at some points to 100 yards per hour, the 16th Brigade elements finally reached Aberdeen clearing, some 60 miles west of Broadway Stronghold. The Aberdeen clearing was at Manhton, just east of the Meza River and 25 miles from the railway supplying the Japanese 18th Division, fighting Stilwell's Chinese troops, and the 56th Division, opposing the Yunnan Chinese. Aberdeen took in three villages: Manhton, Kalat and Naunghmi. Aberdeen's site had a lot of advantages. It was only two days' march from Indaw and 14 miles from the Indaw-Banmauk road. The dominant feature was a hill at the northern end, where the permanent garrison would be quartered. There were, however, some drawbacks – mainly the fact that, as Fergusson himself acknowledged, it was “highly accessible” to the enemy. The 16th brigade were exhausted and needed rest, the planned attack against Indaw would have to be delayed. To the south, on the 21st the Japanese launched a major night attack against White City. The battle was ferocious, Calvert's Chindits managed to successfully repel numerous attacks for over 8 hours until the Japanese finally pulled back. The Japanese suffered an estimated 300 deaths, the Chindits also suffered heavy losses. In the White City perimeter, men took solace from the companionship of the animals sharing their hardships. A pony gave birth to a foal during a Japanese attack and murderous mortar barrage. The foal was named “Minnie” after a nearby mortar post. In another attack, Minnie was kicked in the eye by a panic-stricken mule. They fought to save the eye and Brigadier Mike Calvert ordered regular reports of Minnie's progress to be circulated to all forward positions. When recovered, Minnie took to “doing the rounds” of the mortar positions, on the scrounge for tea – which she drank from a pint pot. Minnie survived White City and further battles and went on to enjoy a distinguished military career as the Lancashire Fusiliers' mascot. Minnie got out to India, traveled to Britain and subsequently joined the Regiment on a tour of duty in Egypt. On the 23rd, leading elements of Brigadier Thomas Brodies 14th brigade began to arrive to Aberdeen with the task of blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road.  At the same time, the 111th Brigade's columns were ordered to stop Japanese movements along the Pinlebu-Pinbon. The advance on Indaw may have been compromised inadvertently by the movements of 111 Brigade. One of its British Battalions, the Cameronian's, moved in a wide sweep west of Indaw, crossed the Banmauk road on the 22nd, with orders to cut the Indaw-Homalu road. They bumped into a Japanese patrol at night and their two wounded were flown out by light aircraft the next day. The men became hardened to the realities of jungle warfare against the Japanese, who fought to the death. Some columns were luckier than others regarding their supply drops. The King's Own columns had a reputation for being unlucky. During the 21-23, three successive attempts to re-supply them failed. Already, the columns were heavily reliant on food purchased in villages.  Wingate then visited Bernard Fergusson at Aberdeen. Fergusson wanted to rest 16 Brigade after its exhausting march in but Wingate told him to press on to Indaw before it could be reinforced. Unfortunately, however, the Japanese had already accomplished this. The 16th brigade departed Aberdeen on the 24th, heading south to Auktaw, drawing closer to the heavily-reinforced Indaw. Between them were strongpoints at Thetkegyin village. This part of the country was quite dry and the Japanese controlled all the water sources, thus the Chindits would be forced to fight to drink. Despite successfully blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road, most of Fergussons columns would get sucked into heavy fighting around Thetkegyin on the 26th. Only the 2nd Leicester's columns 17 and 71 made it to Indaw, holding a toehold grimly until they were ordered to pull back. After 5 intense days of fighting, Fergusson ordered his men to withdraw and regroup at Aberdeen.  Back on the 24th, Wingate flew down to Broadway and White City on a morale-boosting mission to 77 Brigade. After a side trip to Aberdeen, he flew back to Broadway and then on to Imphal. This would be the last time Calvert ever saw him. Wingate flew back to Imphal, landing at 6:23pm before taking off again at 8pm for Hailakandi airfield. Half an hour later the B-25 crashed into the Naga hills due west of Imphal near the village of Thilon. Cochran dispatched a special force to search for the crash and they found it the next day. Everyone inside the B-25 had died instantly. Investigators believed the crash could have occurred from freak weather, engine failure or pilot error. But since it was Wingate, there was an air of reluctance to accept it was just an accident. An official investigation concluded it had been the result of engine failure and that the pilot unsuccessfully tried to return to Imphal. Yet other theories emerged and were tested out. Sabotage was the first, but it was ruled out because the B-25 had been closely guarded at all times and nobody knew Wingates intentions or flight plans. Thunderstorms and turbulence were cited as plausible, but all pilots in the area confirmed no thunderstorms.  General Slim opted for extreme turbulence, even though the pilots' testimony also ruled that out. ‘The wreckage was eventually found on the reverse side of a ridge, so that it was unlikely that the aircraft had flown into the hill. The most probable explanation is that it had suddenly entered one of those local storms of extreme turbulence so frequent in the area. These were difficult to avoid at night, and once in them an aeroplane might be flung out of control, or even have its wings torn off.' Another theory had it that the B-25's cluster bombs had broke loose from the bay's rolled into the fuselage and detonated. Given, well how Wingate was, many in the Indian army rejoiced at his death, some quoted Shakepears Macbeth ‘Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it.' Mountbatten wrote to his wife Edwina ‘I cannot tell you how much I am going to miss Wingate. Not only had we become close personal friends but he was such a fire-eater, and it was such a help to me having a man with a burning desire to fight. He was a pain in the neck to the generals over him, but I loved his wild enthusiasm and it will be difficult for me to try to inculcate it from above.' General Slim had this to write on Wingate “With him, contact had too often been collision, for few could meet so stark a character without being violently attracted or repelled. To most he was either prophet or adventurer. Very few could regard him dispassionately; nor did he care to be so regarded. I once likened him to Peter the Hermit preaching his Crusade. I am sure that many of the knights and princes that Peter so fierily exhorted did not like him very  much – but they went crusading all the same. The trouble was, I think, that Wingate regarded himself as a prophet, and that always leads to a single-centredness that verges on fanaticism, with all his faults. Yet had he not done so, his leadership could not have been so dynamic, nor his personal magnetism so striking.” And so went Wingate, probably one of the most colorful characters of the Pacific War. In light of Wingates death, General Slim promoted Lentaigne to Major-General and appointed him the new commander of the 3rd Division. Slim, had loose operational control over Special Force, selected Brigadier Lentaigne to be Wingate's replacement after conferring with Brigadier Derek Tulloch, Wingate's Chief of Staff. Lentaigne was judged to be the most balanced and experienced commander in the force; he had been an instructor at the Staff College at Quetta, had led a Gurkha battalion with distinction during the grueling retreat from Burma in 1942 and had commanded a Chindit brigade in the field. As an officer of Gurkha troops, he had a similar outlook and background to Slim. The other Chindit brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, some of whom had never even commanded a battalion-sized unit in combat before 1944, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience. The force's second-in-command, Major General George Symes, was bypassed by Slim and formally protested and asked to be relieved. In selecting Lentaigne, Slim did not take into account the tensions between those Chindit commanders and staff who were closely associated with Wingate, and Lentaigne, who had a classical "line" officer's background and had been critical of Wingate's methods and techniques. The loss of Wingate caused significant damage to the Chindits, it was as if they lost their persona. The month following Wingate's death, the 14th, 16th and 111th Brigades appeared to lack direction. They stayed around Indaw, ambushing the Japanese but with no major objective. As Slim, noted, "The immediate sense of loss that struck like a blow, even those who had differed most from him—and I was not one of these- was a measure of the impact he had made. He had stirred up everyone with whom he had come in contact. " At Broadway, for instance, after days of aerial attack, the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment stormed across the airstrip on March 27th and attacked its lightly defended western perimeter. Thankfully, the attack was repulsed, partly due to superior numbers. Three days of hard fighting at Broadway then ended with counterattacks and concentrated airstrikes finally dislodging the enemy. Though the Japanese regrouped, they were again pushed back by counterattacks supported by airstrikes in the end. Meanwhile, White City's defenses were strengthened. The Dakota brought over four 25 pounders, six Bofors anti-aircraft guns and four two-pounder anti-tank guns. This would allow Calvert to attack Mawlu on the 27th. As a result, the village was successfully taken and burnt out with flamethrowers, with the Chindits then reducing the remaining Japanese strongpoints. By the end of March, however, several major changes were made at the highest level. Much of the air support was diverted to the critical battles of Imphal and Kohima, where troops were cut off and could only be resupplied by air. The 23rd Brigade, yet to fly in, was also dispatched to Kohima. Finally, the Chindits were formally subordinated to General Stilwell, who ordered them to abandon their dispersed operations around Indaw and concentrate on interdicting the supply lines to the Japanese forces opposing his troops. In early April, while the 3rd West African Brigade and the remainder of Brodie's 14th Brigade were being brought in to Aberdeen, Lentaigne ordered the 111th Brigade led by Major John Masters to advance north and build the new Blackpool stronghold, which would block the railway and main road at Hopin. To Calvert's disgust, he was ordered to abandon White City and Broadway and move north to support the new stronghold, as Lentaigne insisted that the Chindit brigades were too far apart to support each other. But that is all for today in the Burma front as we now need to head over to Bougainville. The counterattack on Bougainville shifted on March 15th. General Kanda noticed Iwasa and Muda's Units were struggling to break through in their areas, so he changed the point of attack for the Magata Unit. He withdrew the bulk of the forces from Hills 700 and 260, sending them westward in preparation for a final attempt to break through towards the Piva airfields. The reserve 6th cavalry regiment was sent to reinforce Mugata's rear while the 2nd battalion, 4th South Seas Garrison was brought forward to try and contain the Americans at the Saua river mouth. Thus, there was a five-day break in the major action while the Japanese transferred the 13th and 23rd Regiments to reinforce what was left of Colonel Mugata's 45th Regiment. At this time the Japanese maintained patrols, which sometimes got into firefights with American patrols. A number of Japanese were taken prisoner during these patrol actions. From time to time the Japanese would lob mortar shells into the 129th's sector. During this lull in the fighting, the tired American riflemen and engineers were busy strengthening the defenses. Pillboxes were rebuilt, tactical wire reestablished, illuminating devices installed, communications improved, and the many Japanese dead buried. Information gained from prisoners and reconnaissance led General Beightler to conclude that the Japanese would launch a major assault on March 23rd. It was estimated that General Kanda had approximately 4850 men at his disposal to renew the attack on the 129th's front. Meanwhile the American artillery was smashing the South Knob who were now only being defended by a screening force. On the 18th, General McCulloch launched a final combined assault against the Knob. Companies A and B of the 132nd regiment performed a enveloping maneuver and enjoyed some initial success until they came upon heavy fire from Japanese bunkers. At 2:10pm the next day the attack resumed, this time successfully destroying several pillboxes, but the Americans were halted short of the crest. On the 20th, Company B was reinforced with a platoon from A and they circled the south end of the Knob, reaching the base of the trail going east. There they discovered the Japanese could pour down just as much fire, seeing another failed attack. Because of this failure it was decided to leave the reduction of Hill 260 to artillery and mortars. On the 23rd, the Iwasa and Muda units had completed their movement, now 4850 troops were concentrated on the northern sector ready to perform a major assault. Having been forewarned by the captured documents, the American forces were expecting the attack. The Americans unleashed a heavy artillery bombardment against Magata's assault forces as they were forming up, disrupting their initial advance and causing massive casualties. Late in the evening, Kanda launched his own assault, with General Iwara's 2nd battalion, 23rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 13th regiment through Cox Creek followed by Muda's men. Advancing under darkness, the Japanese surprised the Americans and managed to knock out 3 pillboxes under heavy fire. The area of attack was so narrow, artillery and air strikes could not be performed safely, so General Beightler ordered the 148th regiment to respond with a combined tank-infantry assault. With the support of Sherman's the Americans stormed the Japanese positions at 7:25am successfully reoccupying must of their lost territory within only 20 minutes. The Japanese tossed further attacked but were being gradually pushed from the narrow area by noon.  During the afternoon, General Kreber's corp and divisional artillery began concentrating their fire on a very narrow sector where the bulk of the surviving Japanese were dug in. An infantryman of the 129th recalled: “All these big guns opened fire into this area about 500 yards in front of us, and I remember what they called a million dollar barrage and it's something you never forget–the big guns shooting over your head. It was very frightening because you wondered whether one of these shells would not go far enough. It was all jungle out in front of us and when they got done it was all cleared out. They had knocked everything down. A lot of Japs were killed by this… I can remember the day after the big attack the bulldozers came in and dug these huge trenches and we had to go out and take the Japanese and drag them into these. Because of the warm weather they began to smell pretty bad. Many, many killed!” It was the heaviest artillery concentration seen as of yet during the Pacific War. It completely disrupted the Magata unit, causing tremendous casualties. The 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment were completely disorganized; the 1st and 3rd Battalions were reduced to 20 men; the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment were reduced to 40 men; and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment were down to 100 men. The massive losses forced the Japanese to withdraw. General Hyakutake now realized his counteroffensive was a failure and forced to call it off.  The Japanese were in full retreat by the 28th. The Magata force, with an estimated strength of over fifteen hundred men, utilized the Numa Numa Trail and withdrew toward the northern part of Bougainville. The remnants of the Iwasa and Muda forces, covered by reinforcements from the 4th South Seas Garrison unit and the 6th Cavalry Regiment, moved quickly along a number of trails to the relative safety of southern Bougainville. The units of the 17th Infantry Group returned to northern Bougainville and rejoined its parent unit. On the 28th, the 182nd regiment found the South Knob abandoned and finally secured Hill 260. The three-week battle for the rather insignificant knoll had cost the Americans 98 deaths and 581 wounded, counting 560 dead Japanese on the knob. Total casualties for the final Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville would be 263 American dead and over 2489 Japanese bodies counted. In reality, Hyakutake's 17th Army lost a total of 3000 killed and 4000 wounded in their March operations, including 2398 killed and 3060 wounded from the 6th Division. General Beightler expressed the feelings of many in stating that the beating administered to the 6th Division was a partial repayment for its role in the rape of Nanking in 1937. Although the Japanese would plan another concentrated assault on Allied positions later down the line, they would never again launch a major attack. For all practical purposes, the battle for the Solomons was now over. Now we need to jump over to the Southwest Pacific.  As a result of the Admiralty Islands being invaded a month ahead of schedule. Yet General MacArthur kept his gaze on the development in the Central Pacific. He needed to pick up the pace if he wanted to win the race, so he planned to carry out the invasion of Kavieng, bypassing the Hansa Bay area with a direct jump to Holland before the end of April. General Sutherland gave the Joint Chiefs an outline calling for the Southwest Pacific forces to move into the Hollandia area with two divisions on April 15, supported by the Pacific Fleet. Air, naval, and logistic bases would be established at Hollandia to support subsequent Southwest Pacific advances northwest to the Geelvink Bay region of Dutch New Guinea. The Southwest Pacific forces would then move to Geelvink Bay about June. In the middle of the next month, according to General Sutherland's presentation, three Southwest Pacific divisions would be sent against the Arafura Sea islands, southwest of Dutch New Guinea. There, air bases would be established from which to cover later advances to the Vogelkop Peninsula and Halmahera, both scheduled for mid-September, when Central Pacific forces might be ready to move to the Palaus. If the Marianas were bypassed, however, the Palaus might then be invaded as early as mid-July. Land-based aircraft of the Southwest Pacific Area could support a July invasion of the Palaus from air bases in the Hollandia and Geelvink Bay regions. If air bases on the Vogelkop, Halmahera, and the Arafura Sea islands proved inadequate to provide left flank protection for the move into the Philippines, then airdrome sites on Ambon Island might also be seized in September or October. The entry into the Philippines would be effected at southeastern Mindanao on 15 November 1944. Yet for all of this, MacArthur needed something he did not have, the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers. After concluding the Marshall islands campaign, Admiral Nimitz argued that the next move would be to bypass Truk and invade the southern Marianas and the Palaus islands to further neutralize the Carolines. To seize the Philippines a good fleet base would be required in the western Pacific. Nimitz proposed seizing Ulithi atoll, around midway between the Marianas and Palaus. Nimitz also argued the case for Woleai in the Carolines, 400 miles south of the Marianas. By early March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thus met at the Washington Planning Conferences with Nimitz and Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland, to hear about their plans and discuss what the best course of action would be. In the end, on March 12th, they issued a new directive for operations in 1944.  The Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur to cancel his Kavieng operation and instead to complete the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng with minimum forces necessary. The Southwest Pacific's forces were to jump from eastern New Guinea to Hollandia on April 15, thus bypassing Wewak and Hansa Bay, with the mission to develop an air center from which heavy bombers could start striking the Palaus and Japanese air bases in western New Guinea and Halmahera. Once Hollandia was secured, MacArthur was to conduct operations northwest along the northern New Guinea coast in preparation for the invasion of the Palaus and Mindanao.  The target date for the Southwest Pacific's landing on Mindanao in the Philippines was set for November 15. Admiral Nimitz, in turn, was ordered to cancel his Truk operation and to speed the aerial neutralization of Truk, Woleai, and other Japanese bases in the central and eastern Carolines. He was also directed to conduct heavy carrier strikes against the Marianas, the Carolines and the Palaus, and to provide carrier support and amphibious means for the Southwest Pacific's landings in the Hollandia area. The Marianas would be occupied by Central Pacific forces beginning in mid June and Palaus by mid September. The Joint Chiefs, were looking to extend Allied control over the eastern approaches to the Philippines and Formosa and to secure air and naval bases from which to support operations against Mindanao, Formosa, and the China coast. The invasion of the Admiralty and Green Islands led the Americans to seize full control over the South Pacific. This allowed the US Navy to begin sending destroyers to harass the Japanese at Rabaul and Kavieng. Admiral Halsey at Guadalcanal assembled an invasion force to hit Kavieng. When he heard about the decision to cancel the Kavieng invasion, he searched for another task for the boys he got together. He decided to capture the Emirau island, lying halfway between Kavieng and the Admiralties, thinking it could be the last link to strangle Rabaul. For what would be the last operation of Cartwheel, Admiral Wilkinson put Commodore Reifsneider in command of the amphibious operation and assigned Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines to carry out the landing. As a preliminary, Admiral Griffin's Task Force 36, formed around four battleships and two escort carriers, also bombarded Kavieng and its nearby airfields on March 20th. The bombardment gave Rear-Admiral Tamura Ryukichi the impression that the expected invasion by Allied forces was imminent and he gave the order to kill all the European prisoners in Kavieng. At least 25 of them were executed in the Kavieng Wharf Massacre, which later led to six of the perpetrators being sentenced for war crimes in 1947. Sentenced to death by hanging, Tamura was executed at Stanley Prison on March 16, 1948. Meanwhile Reifsneider's convoy  departed Guadalcanal in two echelons, successfully reached the unoccupied Emirau Island at 6:05am. The Marines of the two assault battalions, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Marines, traveled on nine high speed transports while the remainder of the force were on the dock landing ships, Epping Forest, Gunston Hall and Lindenwald, and the attack transport Callaway. One LSD carried the 66 LVTs for crossing Emirau's fringing reef, one carried three LCTs, two of them loaded with tanks, and the third carried three LCTs with radar sets and anti-aircraft guns. The LVTs were launched, and the assault troops transferred to the amphibious tractors using the APDs' boats, supplemented by those from Callaway while F4U Corsairs of VMF-218 flew overhead to make a last-minute check of the island for any signs of the Japanese. The assault waves touched down on schedule. The reserve 3rd Battalion's boats grounded on the reef soon afterwards, and its marines waded ashore through knee deep water. The only problem encountered was with launching the LCTs carrying the tanks. The LSD's flooding mechanism failed and the LCTs had to be dragged out by a fleet tug. While the detachment sent to occupy Elomusao Island was approaching the beach, some supposed opposition caused the amphibious tractors and then a destroyer to open fire, and a man was wounded by a shell fragment. After all of this…well the Marines were told by the natives the Japanese had left Emirau two months before and only a small detachment remained on Mussau Island. Thus 3727 troops and 844 tons of cargo were ashore by nightfall, when the ships sailed; and within a month, some 18,000 men and 44,000 tons of supplies had been landed and it had become a motor torpedo base that could keep watch on the north coast of New Ireland.  As for the Japanese Admiral Koga was planning to carry out a desperate program of reorganization, including the creation of the Mobile Fleet. Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet was formed by the 2nd and 3rd Fleets; consisting of most of the IJN's warships. This would leave the combined fleet as a mere administrative organization. Land-based forces in the Central Pacific were expanded, their main base was at Tinian; Saipan was fortified and it became the new fleet HQ. Fuel shortages and loss of tankers to submarine attacks had become so severe, Admiral Ozawa's new command would have to remain within the Singapore zone. They would operate close to the Dutch East Indies oilfield and within Japanese waters for training. Koga also prepared a new defensive plan, with the inner perimeter now extending from the Kuriles to the Nanpo Islands,  then the Marianas and the Carolines to the west end of New Guinea. He also drew up plans for the formation of a 3rd Aircraft Carrier Fleet, in three divisions, each composed of three carriers. It looked very impressive on paper, but the reality was that the 3rd division actually consisted of two converted tankers the Zuiho and Chitose and the converted naval auxiliary ship Chiyoda. Furthermore, the carriers lacked any experienced pilots, with most of them having been lost around Rabaul and in the Solomons and Marshalls. Thus, new pilots for the three carrier divisions would have to be trained. Finally, he developed Plan Z, a strike against the American fleet the moment it entered the Philippine Sea.  For this decisive battle, that in his eyes could allow the Japanese to win an “honorable peace”, Koga wanted to be prepared to use 500 planes on the carriers and another 500 on the islands, so he needed to increase the Japanese air force by about 50%, something that would be hard to achieve.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And with that the South Pacific was liberated from the Japanese Empire. Operation Cartwheel was effectively done. The allies were squeezing the Japanese empire back to the home islands and honestly it was a good time to negotiate a peace on the side of the Japanese. But they would not do so, always on the search for the famed decisive victory. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 120 - Pacific War - The battle of Imphal, March 5-12, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 12, 2024 39:21


Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Admiralty Islands and some action on New Britain and Bougainville. The last steps of operation Cartwheel would see the Bismarck-Solomon area sealed off with the capture of the admiralty islands. MacArthur was yet again trying to seize the initiative and force a drive upon the Philippines. A diversionary landing was made against Momote and Los Negros would cost 116 lives, 434 wounded by March 8th. On New Britain, General Rupertus began new amphibious assaults and other actions to cut off the retreat for the Japanese defenders. Then on Bougainville, under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake prepared to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA. He assembled 15,000 men who would hit the American defensive perimeter to dislodge the enemy from the island. Was this idea even feasible, or would it all end in a terrific disaster? This episode is the battle of Imphal Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The war was not going well for the Japanese in 1944. They were on the cusp of being dislodged from the south pacific. Rabaul and Truk were effectively neutralized and the Americans were making enormous strides in the central pacific, seen in the Gilberts and Marshall campaigns. Even in Burma, a war front the Japanese had basically been winning every battle flawlessly, was now suffering defeats. The first defeats were found in the Hukawng Valley and Arakan region. In the face of these terrible defeats, the Japanese General Mutaguchi argued he had the answer.  Mutaguchi, a victor over the Singapore campaign, had wargamed the possibility of invading India and won support of some of his superiors in Tokyo. His reasoning had been to brush past the British in Assam, to storm the gateway into the subcontinent, where hopefully the Indians would rise up to greet the Japanese as liberators. With Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army, the Japanese could rally the Indians to turn against the British. The collapse of India would be a killing blow against Britain's influence in Asia. Initially it was also believed, such a move would allow the Japanese to link up with the Axis forces in Persia. Such fantastical ideas were farfetched even for 1942 standards, but in 1944 these were laughable. Stalingrad and Kursk had effectively turned the Eastern Front completely around, the Germans were fighting for their survival. Yet this all did not dissuade Mutaguchi.  Lt General Hanaya Tadashi was placed in charge of the Arakan region. Hanaya was tasked with deceiving the British into believing the counter attack in Arakan was an attempt to invade India, thus dragging units out of Imphal. The Operation was codenamed HA-GO, an intended feint, to mask another operation, U-GO to invade Imphal. To pull it off the assault in Arakan was made to be massive. Slim was forced to meet the enemy fiercely in Arakan, he had no choice but to pull his reserves out of Imphal. The Japanese were delivered a nasty surprise with the Admin Box tactic. For over 18 days the battle raged around the Admin Box, but the Japanese could not make a dent. The Japanese forces had expected once the British saw their lines of communications cut and were outflanked they would panic and flee. It was after all what had been occurring for years in Burma. The Japanese hoped to annihilate the 15th corp, but instead the British dug their heels in. Once again victory disease sprang its head force, the arrogant and overly confident Japanese, bit off more than they could chew. It was as if they were facing a brand new opponent. The Admin Box was hit by infantry and aerial attacks, the casualties were terrific, but the Admin Box never wavered. The Japanese had planned for a lighting battle, traveling light and seizing supplies on the go, but the British did not roll over. The Japanese began to run out of supplies, starvation loomed over the invaders. Casualties on both sides increased sharply, and Slim predicted the Japanese would not allow for defeat and instead would redouble their efforts. By February 13th, Slim was confident victory was in their hands as the 26th Indian division began to arrive to deliver a hammer blow with the Admin Box as the anvil. The Japanese fought desperately, but by the 24th they were withdrawing leaving 5000 dead. After defeating the Japanese Slim unleashed his own operation into the Arakan and while doing so his men captured some Japanese documents showcasing operation HA-GO in full. Slim now knew the Japanese were feinting him to draw resources away from Imphal Now Mutaguchi had sold Operation U-GO to his superiors in Tokyo as a pre-emptive strike to disable 14th Army, but in reality it was always to invade India. He also wanted to press the attack farther and take Dimapur, a major supply base through which ran the railway line to Ledo. Taking Dimapur would deal a major blow to the Allies and could potentially open the door to further operations deeper into India. Once they had broken through, the INA would rally local support, enabling them to extend the fight to the British in Assam, Bengal and beyond. For his Operation U-Go, Mutaguchi thought he could outsmart the British in terms of how he would approach Imphal. His plan called for the 33rd Division of Lt General Yanagida Motoso to begin an advance on March 8th attacking from the south. It was presumed the British would expect this and rush reinforcement when attacked. Meanwhile he planned to send the 15th division under Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi a week later to ford the Chindwin River and advance on Imphal from the north. Even further north the entire 31st division of Lt General Sato Kotoku would also ford the Chindwin between Homalin and Tamanthi, advancing northwest to block the main British supply route in the hills at Kohima.  To pull all of this off, Mutaguchi needed to ensure his forces captured Imphal before the monsoon rains made the jungle tracks impassable. He did not have much in terms of supplies to give to his 3 divisions. By 1943, the supply route into Rangoon by sea through the Bay of Bengal had become too dangerous because of attacks by Allied submarines, so the supplies had to rely on the railway being constructed by forced labor and POWs from Thailand. Mutaguchi was well aware of these issues. He knew, however, from personal experience in Malaya and Singapore, that taking logistical risks against the British could bring great rewards. This was because the British, who were usually immeasurably better supplied than the Japanese, frequently left behind large quantities of what the latter referred to as Chachiru kyuyo 'Churchill Rations' in their haste to flee the advancing Japanese. Accordingly, the capture of British supply dumps around Imphal formed a key assumption in his planning. The essence of Mutaguchi's plan was speed - totsusbin ‘swift onslaught' - for if these vast depots were not seized as a matter of priority, the whole offensive would literally run out of fuel. He thought it would take no more than three weeks for his forces to fall on the British supply dumps. Without the capture of these supplies success could not be guaranteed, but it seemed increasingly inconceivable to Mutaguchi that a decisive, overwhelming attack against Imphal would not bring with it rapid and substantial rewards. At no time was he concerned that he might not capture the vast British depots needed to fuel his advance. Imphal needed to be taken by April 10th or it would all be a disaster General Slim planned for his 14th Army to make a stand at Imphal, taking the hit on the chin as they say, before pushing the enemy back. He needed to draw the Japanese in the Imphal Valley, in a tight circle so he could launch an effective counteroffensive. Lt General Geoffrey Scoones 4th corps would deploy the 20th Indian division led by Major General Douglas Gracey around Tamu and the 17th Indian Light Division of Major General David Punch Cowan around Tiddim. Both divisions had been aggressively carrying out patrols in the valley and along the banks of the Chindwin River. The 23rd Indian Division of Major General Ouvry Roberts was held in reserve at Imphal, with his 49th brigade in the Ukhrul area to the northeast.  Once Mutaguchi's offensive kicked off, Slim planned for his two southern divisions to withdraw up the Tamu-Palel and Tiddim roads to go on the defensive around the Imphal Valley. The two divisions would have a short and more secure line of communications and supply behind them as they forced the Japanese to extend them self over the mountains. To counter losing the overland supply line from Kohima, Slim planned to use air supply to maintain his men during the long siege. Slim also expected Mutaguchi to send a single regiment to seize the defenseless Kohima, not an entire division that was further tasked with pouring down into the Brahmaputra valley. That last part would put his entire plan in jeopardy. On March 8th, Operation U-Go was kicked off with Lt General Yanagida Motoso's 33rd division beginning their advance in 4 columns. The left column was the 215th regiment led by Colonel Sasahara Masahiko who advanced south of Tiddim before swinging north towards the village of Singgel. They would come across the large supply deport between the milestones 109 and 110 around the Tiddim road. The central column consisted of the 214th regiment led by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi, advancing up the Kabaw Valley to assault Tonzang. Following this column up was the Fort White Garrison unit led by Colonel Yagi Shigeru. Both columns would cut off the route of withdrawal of Major General David Cowan's 17th division and annihilate it. Lastly the right column consisting of the Yamamoto Force led by Major General Yamamoto Tsunoru. They would be advancing north up the Kabaw valley to assault Major General Douglas Gracey's 20th Division on the Tamu-Palel Road. There had been early reports from scouts that groups of Japanese soldiers were advancing west of the Tiddim road. This only sounded off the alarm bells for the 14th corps on March 12th, after a verified sighting report was made stating a large group of Japanese were just a few kilometers off the road at Milestone 109.  Consequently, Scoones ordered Cowan to withdraw, so the 17th would begin to move from Tiddim on March 14, after laying mines and booby traps. But it was too late, as the Japanese had already cut the Tiddim Road earlier that morning, so Cowan would have to fight its way out to Imphal. That day, Yamamoto Force had also started attacking Gracey's southern front-line positions, with a particular tank-on-tank battle developing between a troop of M3 Lee/Grant tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers and some six light tanks of the 14th Tank Regiment. The latter were trounced in the end, with four tanks destroyed and two captured. Meanwhile on the 15th, Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi's 15th division began fording the Chindwin river at Thaungdut and Sittaung and would descend upon Imphal from the north. Lt General Sato Kotoku's 31st division also forded the river further north at Homalin, Kawya nad Tamanthi and were rapidly advancing towards Kohima and Ukhrul.  Just as Mutaguchi had guessed, Scoones ordered his 37th and 49th brigades to advance to the Tiddim road to help Cowan's men. Cowan had sent his 63rd indian brigade to attack the 214th regiment at Tonang and Tiutum. Thai left Imphal and Ukhrul with little protection, so Scoones decided to dispatch the newly arrived 50th indian parachute brigade of Brigadier Maxwell Hope-Thomson to defend Ukhrul, but he did not expect them to find a real fight. Ukhrul would only have the lightest of garrisons and no real defenses. Forces in the area comprised two battalions of the newly raised and part-trained 50th Indian Parachute Brigade whose young and professional commander, 31-year-old Brigadier Maxwell 'Tim' Hope-Thomson had persuaded the powers that be in New Delhi to allow him to complete the training of his brigade in territory close to the enemy. At the start of March the brigade HQ and one battalion had arrived in Imphal, and began the leisurely process of shaking itself out in the safety of the hills north-east of the town. To the brigade was added the 4/5th Mahrattas under Lieutenant-Colonel Trim. Sent into the jungle almost to fend for themselves, it was not expected that they would have to fight, let alone be on the receiving end of an entire Japanese divisional attack. They had little equipment, no barbed wire and little or no experience or knowledge of the territory. On March 16th, Scoones ordered Gracey to withdraw, so the 20th Division could begin a controlled withdrawal up the Tamu-Palel Road, gradually moving into three defensive boxes.  The first was to be at Moreh, held by the 32nd Indian Brigade; the second in the Khongkhang–Sibong area, held by the 80th Indian Brigade; and the third was to be on the Shenam Saddle, held by the 100th Indian Brigade. Luckily for the allies, Yamamoto had dispatch two of his battalions in a useless wide flanking maneuver towards Mombi and the Tamu-Palel road. Thus Yamamoto would lack sufficient troops to launch a full attack against the retreating allied forces. Meanwhile Hawker Hurricanes and heavy artillery bombarded as the 63rd launched a direct assault against Tuitum saddle, managing to break through to the Manipur River, leaving a rearguard at the bridge. During the following days, the rearguard would repel a series of intense assaults upon the saddle by the 214th regiment and Yanagida's Fort White column. At the same time the 37th brigade was fighting against the bulk of the 215th regiment around milestone 100. The fighting became very confused as the Japanese units became sandwiched between the allied units who in turn were surrounded by other Japanese units. On March 18th, the 3rd battalion ,215th regiment managed to capture the supply depot between Milestones 109 and 110 facing minor resistance. Then they were forced to repel a number of counter attacks by the 48th Indian brigade. On the 19th, Hope-Thomson received some panicked reports that his battalions were seeing heavy columns of Japanese advancing on their undefended camp at Sheldon's Corner. It was the 31st infantry of Major General Miyazaki Shigesaburo from the 58th regiment. Hope-Thomson made a last minute call to assemble his dispersed forces at the deserted Naga Village of Sangshak. His brigade, when concentrated, consisted of 1850 men. However, as the troops dug in they discovered to their discomfort that they were atop an ancient volcano, and the rock was impervious to their picks. All they could dig were shallow trenches, which provided ineffective protection from Japanese artillery. Like all Naga villages that at Sangshak was perched on a hill, and had no water; anything the men required had to be brought up from the valley floor, through the rapidly tightening Japanese encirclement. Its unknown why Miyazaki diverted his men to hit Sangshak rather than continue towards Kohima. By nightfall of the 22nd, the Japanese infantry overwhelmed Indian defenses without performed a detailed reconnaissance and lacking artillery support. This would prove to be a fatal mistake. 400 Gurkhas of the 153rd parachute battalion began mowing down wave after wave of Japanese troops using machine gun fire. The Japanese 8th Company of 58th lost 90 out of 120 men in the space of just 15 minutes. Suffering tremendous casualties, seeing entire companies decimated, Miyazaki decided to regroup and began tossing numerous frantic efforts to break up the defenders positions.Under heavy mountain artillery fire and unable to be supplied by air, Hope-Thomson's troops grimly held a position that was not even ringed by barbed wire until March 26, when they finally received Scoones' order to pull out.  The Parachute brigade was being virtually destroyed in four battles at Sangshak, suffering 652 casualties. Yet in turn Miyazaki was served nearly 1000 casualties and his advance upon Kohima was held up for a week, severely delaying Sato's plans. Further to the south, Yamauchi's 60th regiment was also facing stubborn defenses at Sangshak. They actually had been waiting for the battle of Sangshak to conclude and only jumped in on the last day's assault. This prevented one of Yamauchi's columns from arriving in time north of Imphal, giving Scoones and Slim an extra few days to prepare Imphal's defenses. Meanwhile on March 23rd, the 48th brigade used their heavy guns and mortars to hit the Japanese positions and managed to force the 215th regiment to pull away from the valuable supply depot. To secure the depot however, they still needed to clear the road from the north. Gurkha's were sent in waves against the strongly defended Japanese bunkers, while the 37th brigade and Hawker Hurricanes hit the main defensive positions of the 215th regiment. At this point, General Yanagida, who had always felt that Allied capabilities were being underestimated, determined that his forces would not be able to hold on much longer and thus ordered them to pull back. Yanagida had received a signal from Colonel Sasahara about the critical situation his regiment was in. Sasahara, in turn, had been reacting to a signal from one of his battalion commanders, Major Sueki. Faced with rapidly depleting ammunition, mounting casualties and attacks on his position near Milestone 109, Sueki had signaled that he would not be able to hold on much longer. He indicated that he would destroy his codes and radio and fight to the end. Sasahara is said to have communicated this and the regiment's resolve to fight to the end to Yanagida. There is some mystery around this signal, some accounts suggesting the division commander received only the latter half of the message. Either way, Yanagida had had enough. All his reservations about the Imphal offensive came to the fore. He ordered the 215th Regiment to pull out and sent a signal to Mutaguchi about his decision. In this he noted the strength of their opponent, questioned the rationale of the operation and remarked on the impossibility of meeting the deadline. He is supposed to have gone so far as to suggest the suspension of the Imphal offensive. This all greatly pissed off Mutaguchi whose divisional commanders for the majority disagreed with his U-GO plan, and Motoso Yanagida openly derided him as an "imbecile". Irregardless, Mutaguchi sought to remove Yanagida from his command. Their relationship would not improve as more setbacks were on the way. With the Japanese dislodged, the 37th Brigade managed to reopen the Tiddim Road and the 48th Brigade finally secured the entire depot area around Milestone 109. Whatever supplies that could be recovered and transported back to Imphal were grabbed, while as many as possible that could be of potential value to the Japanese were destroyed. On the 26th, the 63rd Brigade's rearguard also withdrew, blowing up the Manipur River bridge behind them. Two days later, the 37th made first contact with Cowan's units near Milestone 102 and the 17th Division finally began their retreat towards Imphal. Their only obstacle would be a roadblock established by the 2nd Battalion, 213th Regiment around Khuadam. But that would be cleared out quite easily by Cowan's men who were able to reach Imphal by April 4th. In the meantime, Scoones had asked Gracey to send back one of his 100th indian brigade into the reserve on the 25th, leaving him with only two brigades to fend off the Japanese attacks. The next day, the 11th company, 213th regiment of the Yamamoto Force managed to advance past the main defenses at Moreh, defended by the 32nd indian brigade and captured Nippon Hill. Though they were not under heavy enemy pressure, the 32nd Indian Brigade finally withdrew from Moreh on April 1. It had set the dump on fire; by some estimates at least a million pounds' worth of supplies that had not yet been evacuated were destroyed. They arrived at the Shenam Saddle a few days later to join the 80th Indian Brigade in a fierce battle for Nippon Hill. Meanwhile, Slim had foreseen that reinforcements would be needed at Imphal and Kohima and had already requested them with great urgency.  Slim was granted  30 Dakotas to fly the 5th Division from Arakan back on the 18th. By the 27th, the 9th and 123rd Indian Brigades had arrived at Imphal and the 161st Indian Brigade was being flown to Dimapur to reinforce Kohima. In addition, Slim was promised the 2nd British Division and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade, should it be necessary. General Giffard also decided that once the airlift of the 5th Division was complete, the 7th Division would then be airlifted to Manipur. Yet that is all for the India-Burma front as we need to move over to New Britain. On March 5th, Colonel Smith's 5th marines began loading for an overnight run to the Willaumez Peninsula, departing Iboki by nightfall. The following morning the small convoy assembled off Volupai, waiting for air support to soften up their landing area, but they never showed up. Apparently having reason to believe that the Marines would attempt to land at Beach Red, the defenders constructed an intricate communications net between Talasea and Volupai, placed some mines on the beach, constructed defenses of a sort, sighted in 90mm mortars–and then inexplicably did not attempt to defend the beach as they could have done very well under the circumstances. Realizing the longer they waited the better the enemy could prepare, Smith ordered the first assault wave to hit the beaches at 8:25. LCM-tank gunboats raked the beach with machine-gun fire, as Smith's 1st Battalion successfully landed meeting enemy sniper and mortar fire. Some sniper fire was observed and 90mm mortar shells began splashing in the water, but Companies A and B drove on shoreward and within 10 minutes after crossing the line of departure about 500 Marines had landed. The two assault companies then pushed forward to establish a beachhead line through which the 2nd Battalion could pass and continue the attack in the direction of Bitokara Mission. Company A accomplished this with relatively little difficulty on the right, but on the left there existed a virtually impassable swamp, running north and south and extending to the edge of the Volupai track. As a result, Company B had to pass through a slot between Little Mt. Worri and the swamp in order to accomplish its mission, encountering and eliminating an enemy pocket of resistance before establishing its lines 200 yards inland. Meanwhile the reinforced platoon patrol that had gone after the bunker on Little Mt. Worri had run into difficulty. The retreating enemy joined other of their fellows and hastily manned defensive positions which had been prepared in the Volupai coconut grove. The platoon accounted for about a dozen of the Emperor's troops, losing one Marine killed and another wounded in the process. Finding he could not advance against the Japanese all-around defensive positions, the patrol leader requested assistance but was instructed to hold what he had until the 2nd Battalion arrived on the scene. As the advancing elements pushed their way through the coconut trees, rear echelon personnel on Beach Red suffered heavier casualties than the assault units. All during the day the Japanese lobbed 90mm mortar shells onto the beach, shells landing capriciously and inevitably taking their toll in the crowded, constricted area. Among the early victims was Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Forsythe, regimental surgeon, who continued working with the wounded until he was evacuated. The heaviest casualties that day were recorded in the 11th Marines and among medical company personnel. Both groups had to remain on the beach, there being no other place to go. On top of that, coral reefs were delaying the LCM's from fully landing the 3nd battalion until the early afternoon. Once Company E came ashore, the advance guard rapidly moved forward and began moving through the 1st Battalion's lines astride the Volupai Plantation track at 11:00.  The Marines were brought to an abrupt halt 200 yards farther on where the Japanese had dug positions commanding the narrow trail. As Company E attempted to attack outside the plantation track, a medium tank commanded by Lieutenant John M. Scarborough moved up the trail to the company's assistance and knocked out a heavy machine-gun position. But suddenly two Japanese, one on each side of the trail and each armed with a magnetic mine, leaped out of the brush. The defending Marine infantry killed one before he could reach the tank, but the other succeeded in affixing the mine to the port side of the turret. The blast that followed killed the Japanese and the Marine who was trying to stop him, as well as jamming the turret so that it could not be operated and stunning the tank crew within. Simultaneously the rear of the turret was pierced by a missile, presumably an anti-tank grenade, which made a hole about three quarters of an inch in diameter. Supported by two more tanks and mortars, Company E finally began moving towards the coconut grove with increasing momentum during the afternoon, at the same time capturing a detailed map of Japanese positions in the Talasea-Bitokara-Waru area. As night approached, elements of the 2nd Battalion set up an all-around defense within the coconut grove while the 1st Battalion manned the beachhead. By the end of the first day, the Marines had penetrated approximately 2000 yards inland from the beach and killed 35 Japanese while suffering 13 killed and 71 wounded, most of them to the deadly mortar fire.  More than half of these were incurred on the beach, and the figures for the day represented more than half the total casualties the combat team would suffer between March 6th and its departure on April 25th. 9 of the fatalities and 29 of the wounded were in the 11th Marines alone.  At 2:00am on March 7th, a handful of Japanese attempted to infiltrate the lines of Company E, but the attack was so easily repelled that Smith considered that this wasn't even a counterattack. Actually, realizing that his forces were heavily outnumbered, General Sakai had ordered the defenders to leave a rearguard of about 100 men and withdraw at once towards Bola. During the morning, the 2nd Battalion advanced through the abandoned enemy positions without facing any opposition until they were stopped on Mt. Schleuther's northwest slope at 11:45. It became evident that the Japanese were attempting to turn the battalion's right flank. Luckily, Company F rushed forward and managed to extend the threatened flank and seize the high ground. At 3:00pm, the reserve 3rd Battalion was also landed at Volupai, thus relieving the 1st Battalion at the beachhead. The next morning, after a mortar barrage, the 2nd battalion soon discovered the Japanese had retreated past Bitokara. The Marines quickly captured Bitokara by 1:40pm. The Marines then dispatched scouts towards Mt. Schleuther and Talasea. The Mt. Schleuther scouting group reported that the Japanese were well dug in on a nearby peak, and at 3:00 a task force consisting of Company E and reinforcing elements began the ascent. A request for artillery fire on Scheuther brought several rounds dangerously close to the 2nd battalion, 5th Marines CP, and the battalion's 81mm mortars promptly took over the support missions. As the task force approached the enemy positions, however, it ran into concentrated fire from machine-guns and small arms, backed up by a 90mm mortar and a 75mm field piece. The Marines fought back for an hour and sustained 18 casualties before they were ordered withdrawn to the mission. The second scouting party had returned from Talasea, meanwhile, to report no indications of the enemy.    As no enemy presence was found on the latter, Company F advanced to the airdrome and in less than an hour reported it secured. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion advanced to Liapo and then began to push over rough terrain towards Waru, finally digging in for the night just a bit short of its objective. After some artillery and mortar dueling during the night, Companies G, B and C launched a coordinated assault at 8:00am on the 9th. Once again, they found abandoned positions, successfully clearing the Waru area by 1:00pm. Also a patrol was landed on Garua Island at 11:47, reporting it deserted as well.  By the afternoon, Smith moved his command post to Bitokara and informed the division that Talasea was secure and that his forces would now concentrate on mopping up and patrolling the Willaumez Peninsula. The 4 day campaign had cost the Marines 17 killed and 114 wounded, while estimating they had killed 150 Japanese. But now we need to jump over to Bougainville. The Japanese had begun earlier in the year to improve some trails, particularly the net leading from the Mosigetta-Mawaraka area. A rough road had been completed through the jungle to the jump-off positions for the infantry. Nevertheless, the movement of over fifteen thousand troops with all their equipment proved to be a major task that would have dampened the spirits of all but the most ardent warriors. Artillery units had a particularly difficult time pulling their heavy guns through the jungle to get them into position to support the attack. Their task was made even more difficult by the daily downpour that flooded the streams, washing away many of the makeshift bridges and making some trails veritable seas of mud. American intelligence by mid-February was aware of the large-scale movement toward the perimeter and Allied planes repeatedly attacked the trails. Despite all these difficulties, the Japanese soldiers displaying their tenacity and ability to overcome the most difficult obstacles, brought up the supplies and eventually had all the guns in place for the attack. All of this was done to support a major counteroffensive scheduled to begin on March 8th. On the 7th, the Iwasa unit has assembled behind Hill 1111; the Magata Unit behind Mount Nampei; the Muda Unit at Peko village on the East-West Trail, and the 17th Army Artillery Group, commanded by Colonel Saito Harumasa in place near Hill 600. Facing them, were the men of the 37th and Americal Divisions, who were on full alert in their foxholes and bunkers, waiting for the great Japanese counterattack. On the 8th General Hyakutake's counterattack began with a heavy albeit uncoordinated artillery bombardment. The Japanese artillery concentrated its fire on Piva Yoke instead of the forward areas of the perimeter, which would be the main initial point of attack. The artillery fire was delivered spasmodically and with poor coordination despite the high vantage points from which the Japanese surveyed the central segment of the American positions. The Japanese artillery did little damage. American corps and division artillery countered immediately, the 37th Division guns firing on the suspected hills to the northeast and the Americal howitzers concentrating on those to the east. The 6th Field Artillery Battalion and the 129th Infantry's cannon company were so situated that they could fire directly at the gun flashes. All other guns were directed by forward observers or spotter planes. Destroyers in Empress Augusta Bay also fired counterbattery missions. By midmorning marine dive and torpedo bombers were flying neutralization missions against Hills 250 and 600. Then in the afternoon 56 SBDs and 36 TBFs, guided by artillery smokeshells, struck the main concentrations on and around hill 1111. This all massively delayed the Japanese main assault. Only the 23rd Regiment would manage to assemble in place for the attack on Hill 700 by nightfall. Under drenching rainfall, the Japanese thus attacked the hill with some companies, yet their first assault was easily repelled by the experienced defenders.  At 2:30General Iwasa launched his main assault, sending his 2nd and 3rd battalions, 23rd division against the saddle. Despite the heavy fire from the 145th Regiment, the Japanese stormed the hill en masse, screaming and screaming threats in English and even singing American songs, presumably in attempts to unnerve the defenders of the hill. According to the historian of the 145th  "The enemy stormed the hill, clawing his way up the steep slope, yelling like a maniac, suicidally putting everything he had into a frontal attack designed to take the highest point on the hill. ... The 145th Infantry, defending the ridge, were somewhat taken aback by an enemy so unreasoning as to crawl up the 70-degree slope on all fours, rifles slung over their backs." Suffering severe losses, Iwasa's 2nd Battalion managed to blast their way through the protective wire and knock out one of the pillboxes. Through this gap, the Japanese moved onto the saddle and began to attack adjacent strongpoints, securing a penetration of the 145th's line 70 yards wide and 50 yards deep. Behind them, however, an effective artillery response would break up the attack of Iwasa's 3rd Battalion; yet the 2nd Battalion would continue to expand this perimeter until, by 12:00, they had captured seven pillboxes and had brought up machine-guns and mortars with which they could put McClelland Road, the only lateral supply road for the 145th, under direct fire. Supply of the forward troops became very difficult, since the three-quarter-ton trucks and half-tracks could not use the road. All supplies had to be hand carried. Evacuation of the wounded also became difficult and dangerous. Japanese machine guns on the crest of the hill were able to cover the ridge with accurate and deadly grazing fire. They had placed other machine guns in trees on the spur of the hill about a hundred yards to the rear of the ground-emplaced weapons, which could sweep the entire front. With the exception of a few scattered trees and shallow trenches, there was little cover for troops of the 145th who moved up the steep slopes attempting to retake the lost positions. All during the day the Japanese were also extending the trenches repairing the old pillboxes, and building new ones. In response to this breakthrough, General Beightler sent the 1st Battalion, 145th Regiment to counterattack. By noon, the Americans were attacking the newly-gained Japanese positions, successfully retaking five of the lost pillboxes against heavy fire and establishing a new line just south of the crest by nightfall. The first attempt to recapture Hill 700 was launched at noon on the 9th. Company C moved northward against the saddle in a direct frontal assault while two platoons of Company F attacked the saddle from the flanks. Company C was halted by devastating fire two-thirds of the way to its objective, and the men were forced to dig in and hold what they had gained. Meanwhile the riflemen of Company F had retaken five of the lost pillboxes, and the line, now reinforced, was solidly established by nightfall just south of the crest. Beightler had ordered two tanks forward late in the afternoon to take enemy targets under direct fire, particularly those that menaced McClelland Road, but the terrain proved too steep for them to be used effectively. Thankfully, Iwasa's breakthrough had been contained, with the 145th losing 23 killed and 128 wounded against an estimated 500 enemy dead.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go was not going the way he thought it would. General Slim was outsmarting his enemy and it seems the allies were going to make further gains in Burma. Meanwhile things were heating up on Bougainville as Iwasa continued his grand offensive. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 118 - Pacific War - The battle of Eniwetok, February 20-27, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 20, 2024 42:15


Last time we spoke about Operation Hailstone, the continued drive upon Madang and the horrible massacre during the Indian Ocean Raid of 1944. Operation Hailstone saw what was once called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk nearly annihilated. The demoralized and understrength Japanese could not hope to contest the air strikes and naval bombardment. Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami was held responsible for the defeat and was relieved of his command. Over on New Guinea the Australians were continuing their drive to Madang, killing and taking prisoner all the Japanese they could along the way. Then over in the Indian Ocean, Vice-Admiral Takasu Shiro unleashed a raid against allied shipping, a rarity for the Japanese. Unfortunately the raid devolved into a singular attack against the British steamer Behar. A needless and cruel massacre was performed aboard the Tone, killing 65 to a possible 100 people. Such actions would only see justice after the war. This episode is the battle of Eniwetok Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Operation Flintlock was a huge success, Kwajalien was seized incredibly fast and the invasion of Majuro saw no Japanese even on the atoll. Because of this the allied war planners had to shuffle the schedule and thus was born Operation Hailstone and the invasion of Eniwetok. Eniwetok had been originally slabbed for May, but it seemed obvious the Japanese power in the Marshalls was crumbling a lot faster than anticipated. Consequently, Admiral Nimitz knew it would be necessary to capture the atoll to give shelter to all the ships he intended to deploy westward in the drive against the Japanese inner empire. Since it now seemed Brigadier-General Thomas Watson's 8000 reserve troops of the 22nd Marines and the 106th Regiment would no longer be required, Admirals Spruance and Hill began preparing them for the invasion of Eniwetok.  The operation was codenamed Catchpole and the war planners would only have 12 days to prepare. Moving up the invasion of Eniwetok required stripping the new garrisons of Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur of manpower and supplies. The landing boat crews were greens, not trained with the troops. General Watson reported “the infantry, amphibian tractors, amphibian tanks, tanks, aircraft, supporting naval ships, and most of the staffs concerned had never worked together before.” Nevertheless, the forces available for the operation would be plentiful and well equipped. Having gone through the horribly bloody assault on Tarawa, Admiral Hill was relieved to have a large number of amtracs. The Army's 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion would sail with 119 LVTs, most of which were the heavily armored newer models. As Hill would remark later “At Eniwetok, I felt like a millionaire, but at Tarawa, I was a pauper.” Admiral Hill would have at his disposal 5 attack transports, 1 transport, 2 attack cargo ships, 1 cargo ship, 1 LSD, 2 APDs, 6 LCIs and 9 LSTs to carry General Watson's Tactical Group 1, consisting of the 22nd marines and 106th regiment led by Colonel John Walker. Further support came in the form of 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers and 7 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Jesse Oldendorf's task force 51.17; 3 escort carriers and 3 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Van Ragsdale task group 53.6; and Rear-Admiral Samuel Ginder's carrier  task force 58.4. The plan was to first land two scout companies;  the Reconnaissance Company, V Amphibious Corps, against  Camellia and Canna Islands southeast of Engebi; and the scout company D, 4th Marine Tank Battalion against Zinnia Island northwest of Engebi to prevent any escape of the enemy from Engebi in that direction. The scout would secure Camellia and Canna allowing the 2nd Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion with their 75-mm pack howitzers to deploy on Camellia, and the 104th Field Artillery Battalion with their 105-mm. howitzers to deploy on Canna. The artillery would then be used to support the next day's attack against Engebi. The job of  hitting Engebi was given to the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 22nd Marines of Colonel John Walker. His 3rd Battalion would be kept in regimental reserve. The two battalions were to be supported by medium tanks of the 2nd Separate Tank Company, and a platoon from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, with two 105-mm, self-propelled guns. Lastly Colonel Russell Ayers' 106th Regiment would hit Eniwetok Island; and once it was captured, the infantry would take Parry Island along with the 22nd Marines.  Defending against them would by General Nishida's 1st amphibious brigade; organized from the 3rd Independent Garrison Unit. It had 3 1,036-man mobile battalions, a 76-man machine-cannon unit with 6 20mm guns, 66-man tank unit with 9 Type 95 light tanks, a 243-man engineer unit, a 139-man signal unit, and 190-man medical unit. The mobile battalions had a 103-man 1st Company while the other 2 had 197 men, plus a 155-man mortar company, a 121-man artillery company with 3 75mm mountain guns, 2 37mm anti-tank guns, and a 66-man engineer platoon. These units had recently been brought over alongside his HQ.  250 IJN personnel and 1115 troops were deployed on Parry, about 692 soldiers, 500 IJN personnel and 61 men of the 61st Guard Unit would Engebi;  and only 779 troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Hashida Masahiro, commander of the 1st Mobile Battalion  would defend Eniwetok. In the 6 weeks following the Kwajalein assault, the Japanese had been constructing defenses on the lagoon side based on reports they received from the Kwajalein attack, yet there was not enough time to make much progress. The 3 defended islands of Eniwetok Atoll had no naval-manned defenses, other than two 120mm coast defense guns and two 13.2mm twin machine-guns on Engebi's north corner. 3 75mm and 28 20mm anti-aircraft guns had been delivered, but were not even emplaced. The 1st Amphibious Brigade arrived less than a month and a half before the American would land with barely any time to dig in. While significant construction materials had been delivered, there was not nearly enough time to make much progress. Defenses would be mainly dugouts, trenches, and foxholes. The brigade deployed its infantry weapons more or less equally. Engebi was expected to be the most heavily defended, but instead the most troops were actually on Parry. On February 15th, Hill's scout group sailed out from Kwajalein lagoon while Operation Hailstorm smashed Truk. Meanwhile Ginder's carriers proceeded directly to Eniwetok and on February 16th launched a series of preliminary strikes. The strike completely destroyed all the buildings upon the atoll, neutralized her airfield and destroyed 14 aircraft on the ground. Naval bombardment of Engebi, Eniwetok, Parry and Japtan Islands began in the early morning hours of February 17, and was joined by more air strikes after dawn. Simultaneously, Hill's force arrived off Eniwetok's southeast coast. As the surface ship bombarded the islands, amtracs launched and landed by 1:30pm against Camellia and Canna. After securing Canna and Camellia by 2pm, the Reconnaissance Company landed, against no opposition, on the 3 islands northwest of Camellia and on 2 small unnamed islands west of Canna. These landings were made to offer security to the artillery units against possible Japanese infiltration during the night. Hill then landed his 2 artillery battalion to support the invasion of Engebi. Engebi's total weapon strength came to 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dispatchers, 12 light machine guns, 4 heavy machine guns, 2 37-mm. guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 2 20-mm. cannons, 2 mountain guns, 3 light tanks, and 2 12-cm. coast defense guns. Colonel Yano predicted that a heavy bombardment would precede the amphibious landings, he accordingly planned to concentrate his defensive system on the lagoon shore of this triangularly shaped island. The Japanese defenders were ordered to "...lure the enemy to the water's edge and then annihilate him with withering fire and continuous attacks." Most of the prepared defenses and over half of the brigade detachment were concentrated at the center of the lagoon shore. The approach to this strong point was flanked by the fire of 2 75-mm. mountain guns on the northwest corner and 2 20-mm. machine cannon in the southern part of the concentration itself, as well as 2 37-mm. guns emplaced on the southern tip. Frontal fire could be delivered by the 20-mm. automatic guns and the three tanks, each mounting 37-mm. guns. Hill deployed UDT-1 frogmen to first clear obstacles and mines while D Company , 4th Tank Battalion secured Zinnia and 4 other islets west of Engebi in the early morning of February 18. At 6:55 Colorado and Louisville began shelling the northern and eastern part of Enegbi. Tennessee and Pennsylvania moved at dawn to deliver close-range destructive fire against beach defenses from flanking positions on each side of the boat lanes. At 7:20 destroyers, Phelps and Hall, moved into position as direct support ships, but because of the smoke and dust rising from the island, Hall was unable to fire. Just before 8:00 the naval guns ceased fire to allow a half-hour air strike to take place. This was completed ahead of schedule and naval fire was resumed at 8:11 and increased steadily in intensity until just before the first troops landed. Shortly after the air strike was lifted, artillery on Canna and Camellia joined the naval guns and began to fire on the beaches at maximum rate until just after the first wave landed at 8:44, whereupon the artillery barrage was lifted inland to the center of the island for another five minutes. Thereafter, because of the smallness of the island, very few call missions were fired. All of the gunfire detonated the main ammunition dump on Engebi as Colonel Walker's amtracs made their way to the island covered by LCI gunboats. Many of the LCI rockets fell short forcing some amtracs off course, while quite a few would break down as they had been worn out by the attack on Kwajalein. Despite the technical difficulties, the first assault waves hit the beaches at 8:43. The 2nd Battalion hit Beach Blue 3 with G Company  on the left, F Company  in the center and e Company  on the right; and the 1st Battalion hit Beach White 1 with B Company  on the left, A Company  in the center and C Company  on the right. On the left, the 2nd Battalion pushed forward rapidly, bypassing isolated points of resistance and quickly overran the airfield by 10:30. F Company managed to swing towards Weasel Point on the west corner with remarkable speed. On the right, the 1st Battalion quickly split up with A Company  advancing north to New Point and C Company  towards Skunk Point on the southeast corner.  The Japanese put up a stiff fight against them, as their spider-hole defenses on the gap between the 2 companies were covered by the dense brush and palms. As a result, the 3rd Battalion would land at Beach White 1 at 09:55 and quickly advanced with tanks to clear the various tunnels and covered foxholes that resisted them. The Japanese were slowly forced northward along the island's eastern shore, eventually becoming isolated and cut down. By 1:10, Weasel and Newt Points had been cleared; and at 2:50, about 6 hours after the initial landing, General Watson declared the island secured. 6 minutes later, C Company captured Skunk Point; and by 6:30, the 1st Battalion secured their half of Engebi. The assault had been executed so fast that even the veteran IJA defenders were unable to offer any meaningful organized resistance. Bypassed Japanese troops and infiltrators did cause difficulties through the night, but mopping-up continued and Engebi was formally secured at 8:00 on February 19. American losses were 85 dead and missing and 521 wounded against the 1280 Japanese killed and 16 taken prisoner.   For the assault against Eniwetok, new intelligence indicated that the island was more heavily defended than expected, so Watson would reinforce the 106th Regiment with Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion and some Marine tanks. What they would be facing on Eniwetok was a total of 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dischargers, 12 light machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 3 20-mm. cannons, and 3 light tanks. The Eniwetok garrison was divided into 5 forces, 3 on the lagoon shore, 1 placed so as to cut off the narrow eastern neck of the island, and 1 to be held in reserve. The 3 lagoon shore forces were to place their weapons so as to obtain interlocking bands of fire over the surface of the lagoon. The force in the east was to protect the rear of the 3 lagoon shore forces from any American units landing on the northern tip of the island. The reserve force was placed to the rear of the forces on the lagoon shore, near the western tip of the island. The defenses of the island consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches, which were better constructed and better camouflaged than those at Parry. After the capture of Kwajalein, the Japanese had begun construction of concrete pillboxes on the southwest tip of the island and had dug additional foxholes. Land mines were also found on Eniwetok. Colonel Ayers' new plan was to land his two battalions abreast. 1st Battalion would land on the right on Yellow Beach 2 and was charged with making the main effort to the west to clear the lower end of the island. The 3rd Battalion would land on Yellow Beach 1 and form a covering line just east of a road that bisected the island from the lagoon to the ocean shore. For the assault, the infantrymen lacked field artillery support; and although Eniwetok had also been subjected to naval bombardment on February 18, it had only received a fraction of the bombardment targeted against Engebi and Parry. A total of 1,179.7 tons of naval shells had been fired on Engebi, 944.4 tons were to be used on Parry, but Eniwetok received only 204.6 tons altogether. At 8:10am on the 19th, carrier planes began to bomb and strafe the beaches and LCI gunboats followed this up with a last-minute rocket attack against the landing areas. Meanwhile, although the arrival of the marine tanks was delayed by choppy seas and a 9-foot embankment just inland halted the amphibian tanks, but the Americans would manage to hit the Yellow beaches at 9:16. The 3rd Battalion landed on Beach Yellow 1 with L Company on the left, K Company on the right, and I Company following as reserve. Upon landing, L Company, followed by I Company pivoted east along the pier while K Company  pushed across the island to reach the opposite coast at 10:30. On the right, however, the 1st Battalion encountered dense spider-hole defenses as C and B Companies attempted to push across the island while A Company  attacked southwest along the coast. By noon,  the front line of the 1st Battalion was in the shape of an S, extending from the lagoon to the ocean.  The Japanese at this point made a bit of an unexpected move. As the Americans penetrated further inland, the Japanese began abandoning their positions and launched a 400 man counterattack. The Japanese managed to break through before getting completely cut down causing some havoc, but by 12:45 were beaten back. The American casualties were very high during the fight. Because of the strong resistance, Ayers ordered his 3rd battalion to attack east and for the reserves marines to land and relieve the left half of the 1st battalion's lion. The American attack to the west resumed with A Company  on the right wing making slow progress through the enemy positions near the lagoon, but the mingled elements of C and B Companies even after being reorganized and supported by 3 Cannon Company guns, could not push through the line taken up by the enemy at the end of his counterattack. Although it steadily reduced the Japanese positions, the attacking force was unable to move forward. By 2:25, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines landed, passing through Ayers' 1st Battalion one hour later. Both battalions then launched a concerted attack towards the southwest end at 3:15, yet the Marines would soon lag behind, their advance delayed by the rugged terrain and the lack of adequate illumination and tank support. While the fight for Eniwetok was underway, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company occupied Japtan by nightfall after first securing 10 unoccupied islets on the atoll's eastern rim while the scout tank battalion secured eight islets on Eniwetok's eastern rim, successfully subduing the enemy resistance on Rigilli. This would allow Watson to have some much-needed artillery support for the attack against Parry. On Parry the Japanese were able to construct very few installations and gun positions above ground in the short time that the brigade was there. With very few exceptions, the defenses consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches. These fell into two categories, the old and the new. The old foxholes and trenches were located on the ocean side, were well constructed, and often lined with rocks or coconut logs. Relying on their estimate of American amphibious tactics as demonstrated at Tarawa, the Japanese had recently undertaken heavier defenses on the lagoon side. These were freshly and hastily constructed, and therefore much inferior. All entrenchments were well camouflaged. A typical strong point consisted of a spider-web pattern of entrenchments. In the center of the web was a large personnel shelter lined and covered with coconut logs. Strips of corrugated iron and a thick layer of sand were placed over the log roof. The center was surrounded by a circle of foxholes ten to fifteen feet apart, mostly roofed over with corrugated iron. These holes were connected with one another by narrow trenches or tunnels. The trenches and tunnels on the outer edge of the web were in turn joined by radial trenches and tunnels to the shelter or control foxhole in the center of the position. The entire web was extremely well camouflaged and very difficult to locate. Parry was honeycombed with positions of this sort. Back to the action to deny the enemy an opportunity for the customary aggressive night tactics, Ayers ordered  a night attack at 6:50. At 3:33 on February 20, Ayers' 1st Battalion therefore managed to reach the western end of the island, though the Marines were still 100 yards to their left rear. The Japanese, meanwhile, attempted to probe and infiltrate through the night, finally counterattacking at 09:10. The 3rd Battalion, 22d Marines, found one of the main enemy defenses, manned by a strong and determined force, at the southwestern corner of the island in its zone. A combined force of light and medium tanks, 5 guns from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, and a supporting rifle company from the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, joined the Marines in destroying the enemy during the day. The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, mopped up its zone. The next day, after the withdrawal of the Marines, the battalion ran a line across the island from the pier and mopped up to the western end. A Company , at the right, finished first and returned to the battalion area near the landing beach. B Company , in the center, reached the end of the island a little later and then went for a swim. C Company , on the ocean side, found 22 of the enemy in hiding and destroyed them in a firefight that sent some bullets over the heads of B Companies swimmers. B Company  came out of the water, dressed, and rejoined the fight. The western end of Eniwetok Island was finally clear of Japanese. By 2:45, the stronghold was finally reduced and the western end of Eniwetok was at last secured. To the east, Ayers' 3rd Battalion also attempted to continue its attack during the night, but this proved futile as the troops lacked the confidence and experience for such a difficult task. As such, the battalion halted at 4:30, about a third of the way from the island's north end. They resumed their attack at 7:00 on the 21st, finally reached the north end at 4:30. The island was finally declared secure at 5:21, with the Americans losing 37 killed and 94 wounded against 800 Japanese killed and 23 taken prisoner. Because action had been bogged down at Eniwetok, the assault on Parry was delayed until the island was reduced and Walker's 3rd Battalion could re-embark as the regimental reserve. In the meantime, aerial, naval and artillery shells had pounded Parry for three days . Naval bombardment dropped on Parry totaled 944.4 tons, considerably more than the weight delivered on Eniwetok Island; the weight of artillery shells came to 245 tons, and aerial bombs added 99 tons more. Meanwhile while the rest of the 22nd Marines were brought from Engebi to southern Eniwetok. By this point the expedition was running low on ammunition and weapons. Naval and artillery shells were carefully apportioned. From all the ships, available grenades and demolition charges were gathered. To supplement them, 775 grenades and 1,500 percussion caps were flown in from Kwajalein while the attack was in progress. Other units surrendered BAR's and rifles to equip the 22nd Marines. In addition, the Marines had found the M1 carbine, with which many men had armed themselves, to be a less than effective combat weapon, and M1 rifles and Browning Automatic rifles were redistributed from 106th Infantry units to replace them. For the last assault of the operation Catchpole, Walker planned was to land two battalions abreast directly against the defenders' strongpoints; and after seizing the beachhead, tanks and infantry were to press forward to the ocean side of the island. Battleships Tennessee and Pennsylvania took positions only 1,500 yards north of the landing area and not only mauled it with their big guns but also hit it with their 40-mm. automatic weapons batteries. From the other side of the boat lanes, the heavy cruisers Indianapolis and Louisville and the destroyer Hailey also fired. Smoke and dust blew out over the lagoon without masking the target for the battleships but with serious consequences for the other three warships and for the landing craft that started ashore at 8:45. 3 LCI's that approached through the haze with the first wave to fire rockets were hit by 5-inch shells from Hailey, killing 13 and wounding 47. Some LVTs landed outside the designated beaches, thus widening the front and making necessary the suspension of artillery fire in their vicinity. Other tractors crisscrossed or fell behind, so that the landing teams had difficulty in reorganizing on the beaches. While the tractors made their 15-minute run from the line of departure, two formations of planes bombed Parry in the last of 219 sorties made during the 6 days of action at Eniwetok Atoll. This time they only bombed the island, omitting strafing runs because of the type of defense trench systems on Parry Island.At 09:00, Walker's 1st battalion landed at 09.00hrs on Green 1 just north of the island's central portion, with Companies B, C, and A in line left to right. It was 200yds too far south, only landing on the extreme south edge of its assigned beach. The 2nd Battalions landed at 9.00 on Green 2 near Parry's northwest corner, but 200yds farther south than intended, with part of the battalion landing on about two-thirds of Green 3 to the south. Mines were encountered on the beach, causing some casualties. In the line were, from left to right, companies G, F, and E. The first troops struck Green Beaches 2 and 3 at 9:00, with a wave of tractors and one of LCM's carrying medium tanks directly behind them. Heavy machine gun and mortar fire greeted the marines at the water's edge. As they tried to form an assault line, enfilading machine gun fire also struck them from a concealed position on the pier at the right. The machine guns were silenced by grenades and by shells from the amphibian tanks. Then the assault passed inland. Some of the enemy in trenches and foxholes in the dune line on the beach, men who had survived the bombardment, were overcome in hand-to-hand fighting. Thankfully, shells from the amphibian tanks managed to silence the Japanese guns, which allowed the Americans to move inland and to land their medium tanks behind the battalions. The defense plans for Parry outlined that about one half of the troops were disposed at the water's edge, where they were to be grouped into strong points about 140 feet apart. The defense of the beaches was to be supported by mountain guns, 20-mm. automatic guns, and other weapons. The mountain guns and 20-mm's were to fire first. Light and heavy machine guns were to fire on landing craft before and after they reached the underwater obstacles. Next, mortars and grenade throwers were to deliver concentrated fire against the enemy at the beaches and were to cover the sectors between fortified areas and strong points. To facilitate the employment of artillery and heavy weapons, the order called for fields of fire to be cleared through coconut groves. The order gave quite explicit instructions for measures against tanks: "Destroy enemy tanks when they are stopped by obstacles by means of hollow charge anti-tank rifle grenades, close-in attack, land mines, water mines, and Molotov cocktails. Especially at night, have a part of the force attack them." The order made it very clear that the brigade was not expected to survive an American assault once it had established a beachhead. Any troops remaining after the Americans had landed in force were to assemble in a central area. Then, the order continued, "...sick and wounded who cannot endure the battle will commit suicide. [Others]... will reorganize, return to battle as a unit, and die fighting.” 3 dug-in Japanese light tanks decided to attack, rather than earlier when the infantry were vulnerable. Yet the Shermans immediately destroyed them before they inflicted any damage, so Walker's battalions would be allowed to push forward against the retreating enemy. While Companies G and F swung left to reach the north end by 1:30, E Company  drove straight across to reach the ocean shore by 12:00. Then, as the Marines were consolidating, a group of 200 Japanese were discovered marching north and were wiped out within minutes. Over on the right, B Company reached the ocean coast at 11:55, while Companies C and A swung south and  successfully reached Valentine Pier by 1:30. Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion  landed at 10:00, immediately advancing south while clearing bypassed enemy pockets. After artillery bombardment, the attack south was launched at 1:30. Pressing through thick underbrush, both battalions achieved rapid progress as they overran a series of trench and foxhole defenses. The battalions were 450 yards from the island's southern tip when they halted for the night.Walker decided to declare the end of enemy resistance at 19:30, radioing Brigadier General Walker, "I present you with the island of Parry at 7.30." The Only slight enemy activity that existed anymore was occasional sniping, which would be swiftly cleared by 09:30 on February 23. For the capture of Parry, Marine casualties were 73 dead and missing and 261 wounded against 1300 Japanese killed, including General Nishida, and 66 captured. In total, American casualties during the Battle of Eniwetok came to 313 killed, 879 wounded and 77 missing. The Japanese had lost their entire garrison, with 3380 killed and 105 captured. Between March 7 and April 5, Walker would then conduct Operation Flintlock Jr., carrying 29 successful landings, securing 14 mostly unoccupied atolls and killing over 100 Japanese at the cost of two Marines killed. Other detachments would finally occupy the Erikub, Aur and Ujelang Atolls by the end of April, leaving only Mille, Maloelap, Jaluit and Wotje bypassed and unoccupied, in addition to the Japanese presence at Kosrae, Wake and Nauru.  Over on Jaluit Rear-Admiral Masuda Nisuke commanded the 13,000 personnel and beginning on March 4th, the 4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing, headquartered on Majuro, and the 7th Air Force commenced a concerted campaign to neutralize the Japanese garrisons, which continued until the war's end. Navy Aviation and Army Air Forces had previously destroyed most Japanese aircraft on these islands. The 13,000 tons of aerial-delivered ordnance, coupled with frequent naval shelling, killed 2,564 Japanese and 4,876 died of disease and starvation; the Marines sprayed oil over the garrisons' gardens. Fighter-bomber units deploying to the Pacific would first serve in this role, perfecting their bombing techniques before moving forward to support other operations as new units replaced them. The Japanese survivors would finally surrender on September 2, 1945. As the American commander took stock of what they had achieved in the Marshalls, their confidence and self-assurance rose to new heights. In less than 3 months' time, the tragic and costly lessons of Tarawa had been refined and integrated into amphibious planning and doctrine, and the results had been tremendous. To the extent that further improvement was needed, it was in the details of execution rather than any deficiency in the plans themselves. Holland Smith concluded in his final report, “In the attack of coral atolls, very few recommendations can be made to improve upon the basic techniques previously recommended and utilized in Flintlock.” Over in Tokyo there was shock and incomprehension at the speed and ‘low cost' of the US victory over the Marshall Islands. The implications for Japan's future were dire. As Ichiro Koyose, the permanent Director of Japan's Imperial Rule Association said in an address, “The Marshall Islands are the frontporch entrance to Tokyo … The enemy is probably finally thinking of some such thing as bombing Tokyo in deadly earnest …” Yet that is it for today on the Marshall Island front as we are going to be diving back into Burma. The Japanese had launched their main offensive on the Arakan at the start of February, successfully infiltrating through the British positions to cut off their rear. By cutting the Indians' supply lines off, the Japanese expected to force them back into disarray; but these were not the same men they had been fighting for years. The Indian troops were better trained and ready to put up a real fight. This was seen when they faced Japanese attack after attack, using their all-round defensive brigade boxes, also referred to as "baby tortoise" or "beehive" tactics. This baffled Japanese,and soon they would leave the invaders effectively encircled and running out of supplies, as they themselves depended on what supplies could trickle to them over jungle trails. With increasing 'fanatical' desperation, the Japanese  began to press home attacks seeking to secure vitally needed stockpiled supplies of food, arms and ammunition upon which their offensive depended. In the Sinzweya area, the 112th Regiment made a night attack on the 9th, successfully breaking through the southwest corner of the enemy's perimeter defense in the Sinzweya Basin. Although the Regiment was successful in firing an ammunition dump and doing great damage, the enemy's employment of tanks forced it to draw back without further exploiting the breakthrough. On the morning of the 10th, Major General Sakurai met Colonel Tanabashi on Hill 315, due northeast of Sinzweya, and encouraged him to press the enemy more aggressively. The failure of the 112th to achieve a signal success appeared, however, to have so depressed morale that the Regiment was reluctant to repeat its attack. The 7th Indian Division, kept its morale high despite the intense fighting, rapidly mounting casualties and increasing exhaustion. They continued to fight on until the advanced Japanese units had exhausted their own food and ammunition. Whenever possible, the British-Indian troops also struck back against Japanese positions and harried their already tenuous supply lines. Furthermore, the massive firepower of the British mountain, field and medium artillery inflicted massive casualties on the attacking Japanese infantry. Firing from positions within each brigade box, carefully concerted artillery fire plans thus rained death upon Japanese troops scattered in the jungle throughout the divisional area. As such, the 71st Brigade would successfully recaptured Taung Bazaar on February 10, and was steadily advancing southwards towards the Ngakyedauk Pass. That same day, General Giffard realized that there was no possibility of 15th Corps being able to reach the Indin-Rathedaung line before the pre-monsoon swell made amphibious operations impossible, so he recommended canceling the Akyab assault. He placed the 36th Indian Division under the 14th Army, allotted the 50th Brigade to 4th Corps and ordered the 25th Indian Division towards Chittagong. General Slim, however, realized that the Japanese plans had miscarried, so he directed General Christison to resume the offensive against the Tunnels-Buthidaung position as soon as he had cleared the land communications to his forward divisions.    Consequently, as the 29th Brigade of the36th division was arriving at Bawli, Christison sent the bulk of the 26th Indian Division to destroy the enemy in the Kalapanzin valley behind the 7th Division. By the13th, patrols from both divisions successfully linked up near Taung Bazar; but at the same time, the Japanese were bringing reinforcements for their attacks at Sinzweya. The Japanese offensive reached its climax on February 14 when General Sakurai called for an all-out attack that evening. The attack was courageous and managed to achieve some initial gains, but it was also uncoordinated, suicidal and unsuccessful, ending with the Indians reinforcing the Admin Box the following day. Meanwhile elements of the 5th Indian Division, regrouped and battered away against a heavily fortified Japanese roadblock at the summit of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Thus, the Japanese tactical and administrative position quickly went from bad to worse around Sinzweya, as pressure steadily mounted against its vastly outnumbered troops. After a few days of bitter fighting the Japanese finally abandoedn their positions at Kyaukyit and Pyinshe Kala and began occupying areas covering the routes back to their main positions.  By the 20th, the strength of the Japanese striking force had  shrunk to 400 men increasingly-debilitated by lack of sleep and shortages of food. On the 23th, after a short but sharp fight, a battalion of 89th Brigade from the east and 123rd Brigade from the west linked up at Ngakyedauk Pass and by evening had firmly secured it. The following day, as soon as the 500 casualties from Sinzweya had been evacuated, the pass was opened to normal traffic and air supply of the 7th Division ceased. As Geoffrey Evans later wrote with obvious pride: “For eighteen days the British and Indian troops, most of them belonging to the administrative services, had withstood the determined attacks of trained Japanese infantry supported by guns and air. It spoke volumes for the war in which the junior leaders had carried out their task and the stout-heartedness of their men.” At this point, General Hanaya recognized the inevitable and ordered the Ha-Go offensive to be abandoned. The shattered remnants of Sakurai's command subsequently withdrawing in small parties. The last attack on Sinzweya, made on the 22nd, ended in failure. On the following night, acting on his own responsibility, Colonel Tanabashi withdrew his main force to Kreingyaung, leaving the 8th Company of the 112th Infantry at Ngakyedauk Pass and the 2nd Battalion of the 112th on a small hill south of Sinzweya. Upon receiving a report of Tanabashi's withdrawal, Major General Sakurai was really pissed off but realized that the move was undoubtedly inevitable, being forced by lack of food and supplies. At the suggestion of General Sakurai, the Division commander determined to suspend the offensive and ordered the Sakurai Unit to withdraw to the line of the Buthidaung-Maungdaw Road. Moving units into the line to cover the withdrawal, the movement south began on the night of 24 February and was completed by 1 March. The 1st Battalion of the 213th Infantry, which had been holding positions in the vicinity of the road between Ngangyaung and Maunghnama since 6 February, left its positions on the night of the 25th and, after breaking through the enemy lines, returned safely on 3 March. Many units were trapped, however, between units of the 26th and 36th Divisions advancing from the north and 5th Division from the east through the Ngakyedauk Pass upon the anvil of the boxes. In the end, the Battle of Ngakyedauk Pass cost 15th Corps 3506 casualties, but it also marked the turning point in the Burma Front. The Japanese lost 3106 killed and 2229 wounded, in what would be the first time that they met well trained British-Indian formations in battle and the first time that their enveloping tactics, aimed at cutting their opponents' line of communications, failed to produce the results they expected. Not only had operation HA-GO been an abysmal failure, but it materially undermined the Japanese ability to resist further British attacks. By March 5th, the 15th Corps had completely recovered and resumed its own offensive against the now disorganized and weakened Japanese forces in Arakan. Although the Japanese staged a remarkable recovery and still offered dogged resistance, the 5th Division would capture Razabil on March 12th and the 7th Division would seize Buthidaung and later mop up the Letwedet Fortress in late March.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle in the Marshalls absolutely shocked the Japanese in its speed, efficiency and low cost for the American forces. Now the Japanese feared the Americans would soon be in range to hit the home islands with their dreaded bombers. In the Burma Front, the former Japanese super soldiers were now realizing the Indian Army could no longer be pushed around.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 116 - Pacific War - The Fall of Kwajalein , February 6-13, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 6, 2024 51:08


Last time we spoke about Operation Flintlock, the invasion of the Marshall islands. The allies brought overwhelming power against the Marshalls, unleashing the simultaneous invasions of numerous islands in an attempt to strike at the heart of the island chain at Kwajalein. The horror of the Gilbert Island campaign plagued the minds of the commanders who hoped to thwart such carnage. Airstrikes, naval bombardments and massive amounts of land based artillery smashed the Japanese defenders into submission before amphibious assaults were made. Countless islands such as Roi-Namur fell one by one as the Americans secured places to deploy further artillery to forces the ultimate submission of the defenses on Kwajalein. The casualties were light, but the fight for Kwajalein would soon descend into a bitter struggle, for the Japanese were not going to give up their stronghold without a good fight. This episode is The Fall of Kwajalein Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Operation Flintlock went off with a bang, and was initially a grand success. Aerial bombing, followed by naval bombardment and then land based artillery was smashing the Japanese defenders into submission. One by one the islands were falling into the Americans hands. On the second day of the battle, Roi-Namur, the northern objective was seized. Yet the stronghold of Kwajalein would provide much more of a fight. Back on the morning of January 28th Admiral Frederick Sherman's Task Force 58.3 landed a knockout blow against Kwajalein's airfield. Dawn saw a Hellcat fighter sweep ensure the airfield would not be tossing any further action before the amphibious assault occurred. The next day Sherman's force hit Eniwetok with the same kind of treatment. Sherman's carriers would remain off Eniwetok for 3 days while his aircraft smashed its airfields and ground installations. On the third say not much was left, just heaps of rubble and a few scattered palm trees stripped of their foliage. Sherman's airmen reported “they could not find any targets on the ground or in the lagoon that seemed worth bombing, and the island looked like a desert waste.” The warships came in on the 31st just off Roi and at 6:51am, Admiral Conolly maneuvered Maryland 2000 yards away from the northern beaches before unleashing 16 inch guns. As Holland Smith put it “So close that his guns almost poked their muzzles into Japanese positions.” By 7:15am the naval guns went silent as carrier planes came swooping in. Then 127mm artillery from Roi began firing, alongside cruisers and destroyers. Return fire occurred, but for a very short amount of time as they were snuffed out. Admiral Truman Hedding recalled “We learned a lot about softening up these islands before we sent the Marines in. We really worked that place over. They developed a tactic called the ‘Spruance haircut.' We just knocked everything down; there wasn't even a palm tree left.”  The Kwajalein atoll islands were hit with 15,000 tons of bombs and naval shells in 72hrs. Admiral Turner would make a Churchillian statement about the event “Never in the history of human conflict has so much been thrown by so many at so few.” Then transports carrying nearly 64,000 men of the 4th marine division and the 7th army division were launched at Ivan, Jacob, Allen, Andrew, Albert and Abraham islands. Once they were secured, the marines set up artillery batteries. The 7th infantry division was assigned the task of taking the banana shaped Kwajalein island as their colleagues set up 105mm and 155mm howitzers on nearby Roi-Namur. The 32nd and 184th regiments landed on the lagoon side at 9:30am on February 1st, first encountered only feeble and intermittent resistance. The eastern half of the island was secured in quick time, as the bombardments had certainly inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy. The army moved slowly and methodically, advancing cautiously against the Japanese fixed positions. Soon they reached Carl Road, where they were met with an impressive defense system consisting of an anti-tank ditch on the south and a long rifle trench on the north. As February 2nd came on, so did another wide scale smashing of the Japanese. Artillery fire on Carlson Island and from the 32nd Regiments Cannon Company in the Wart Area coordinated with the tank and infantry movements. While the new assault units were moving up, the enemy in Corn Strong Point were kept under heavy artillery bombardment and were isolated from possible reinforcements by naval gunfire. Enemy guns that were still active in the northeastern end of the island were struck by dive bombers. The jump-off was ordered for 12:45. A series of delays deferred this crucial attack over an hour. To assemble the staff and coordinate the plans for employing tanks, artillery, and infantry while the 3d Battalion made its approach march, proved difficult to arrange. The time for the assault had passed before the planning difficulties were resolved. Then came notice of an air strike to be made at 1:15pm later postponed, on Admiral Turner's order, to 1:30, thus necessitating the suspension of all artillery fire. Since the attack on Corn Strong Point was to be immediately preceded by a heavy artillery barrage, the whole operation was postponed to 2:00. For the initial assault on the tank trap and Corn Strong Point, Colonel Logie's 32d Infantry's 3d Battalion was ordered to pass through its 2nd Battalion at Carl Road and to lead the attack. These fresh troops were to be supported by the tanks of A and D comapnies, 767th Tank Battalion and, from the left flank, by the tanks of B company, which would be temporarily detached from the 184th. The tanks of A company, 767th Tank Battalion, lined up along Carl Road to fire against the strong point, while those from B company took up positions almost at right angles to that road and prepared to strike the enemy from the left flank during the first stage of the attack. One of the batteries on Carlson continued to fire during the air strike, and the Cannon Company's howitzers also laid a preparation on the target area before the advance commenced at 2pm. Then, while the artillery lifted fire to ground northeast of the target, the tanks and infantry approached the tank trap in a 225-yard advance across open ground. The tanks poured machine gun fire into the area. Thirty yards behind them the troops came forward to the shelter of the tank ditch without receiving an enemy shot. The Japanese were pinned down. The assault initially saw the Americans pin down the Japanese. While the left wing of infantry troops started to push across the wide tank barrier, the tanks on their left momentarily broke off fire from the flank. A few tanks from A company, 767th Tank Battalion, moved toward the ocean to bypass the deep ditch, and the others after a brief hesitation laid a base of fire to cover the infantry's advance. The tanks hesitated to poke out along the flimsy wooden bridge by which Wallace Road cut through the angle of the tank trap. At this stage, a concentration of white phosphorus shells commenced to fall into the area in which I company, 32nd Infantry, was moving, and countless men were burned. After hesitating briefly the infantry moved steadily to the tank ditch. There the troops remained for some time because the medium tanks pulled back claiming they could not get over the ditch. The tanks finally broke through and began to make their way to the beach smashing pillboxes in the Corn strongpoint. An estimated 100 Japanese were killed in the area, the majority by demolition charges carried forward by engineer details while rifle and BAR men covered them. Little or no defense was put up against these tactics. The Japanese remained huddled in their shelters in spite of efforts made to coax them out to surrender. Only a single prisoner was taken in the whole area. Grenades were thrown into the shelters, and those who survived were then destroyed by demolition charges. Altogether, it took about 35 minutes to reduce Corn Strong Point once the American infantry got beyond the tank trap. Contact between the forward battalion of the 32nd Infantry and that of the 184th was temporarily lost during this fray, and K company, 32nd Infantry, moved through the left platoon of I company to establish contact firmly as soon as Corn Strong Point was taken. Advance to the Nora Road line seemed practicable within the time remaining before taking defensive positions for the night. To escape spending the night in an area too heavily wooded for security, the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, planned to advance northeast of the junction of Nora Road and Wallace Road, even though that would place its perimeter slightly forward of the 184th's front-line elements, which were resting just short of Nora Road itself. To the north, Colonel O'Sullivan's 2nd Battalion began advancing at 12:45 without tank support. F Company was on the right while E Company on the left along the lagoon. For the first 45 minutes no serious resistance was met. There were no tank obstacles in the area and the enemy's positions along the lagoon shore were less formidable than had been expected. At 1:30, however, the 184th had to lend its medium tanks to the 32nd Infantry as the latter moved against Corn Strong Point. This left the infantry unprotected at a time when they began to meet their first serious resistance. Without the tank support the infantry became stalled. The 184th suffered over 60 casualties by the end of the day, including the loss of F Company's commanding officer. O'Sullivan was forced to organize night defenses just 100 yards northeast of Carl Road, which also forced Logie to pull back to the abandoned trenches of Corn for the night. Heavy casualties were suffered that day, with 11 dead and 241 wounded. Japanese prisoners reported only 200 to 300 defenders remained, so the Americans expected a banzai charge to occur during the night. General Corlett's headquarters warned, "Be alert for counterattack at anytime day or night, it's bound to come. The Jap makes his suicide counterattack at dawn on the day after his cause becomes hopeless. Watch out tomorrow morning.” Yet there was no attach, so General Corlett prepared his men for a new assault at 07:15am. For the next day's operations, General Corlett ordered the two assault regiments: "Organize vigorous attack 0715 tomorrow… Finish the job not later than 1500 3 February. The Northern Force [at Roi-Namur] has finished the job…". At this point the Americans on Kwajalein faced a narrow 2000 yards of island. After artillery rained down at 7am, O'Sullivans 1st battalion advanced. In the first 150 yard B Company, along the lagoon, and Company A, at the right, advanced through rubble and broken trees west of Nora Road without more than scattered rifle fire from Japanese riflemen and occasional light machine gun fire from pillboxes. Their momentum carried them on for another 75 yards with such rapidity that the prospects for swift advance seemed excellent. B Company cleaned out an air raid shelter with grenades and shot down fleeing Japanese wearing arm bands like those of the American troops. Both companies were advancing over ground that had been under American mortar fire just before the jumpoff. At 8:06 enemy opposition was reported to be weak. After 250 yards the Americans reached the Admiralty area, finding a group of shattered buildings along the lagoon shore where it was believed the Japanese HQ was. Among the ruins were several underground shelters, with great earthen mounds above them. There were also concrete blockhouses.  Against strong resistance, B Company would not be able to advance further; A Company, meanwhile, pushed farther north and attempted to attack from the flank through the Admiralty area, but became quickly bogged down. At the same time, Logie sent forward his 3rd Battalion, with I Company rapidly advancing along the coast while K Company stopped to subdue a large concrete pillbox on the corner of the Admiralty area. By midday, I Company reached Noel Road and K Company successfully bypassed the Admiralty area. Yet behind them, there was a vertical gap including most of the Admiralty area between the two regiments. Thus, Corlett sent Logie's 1st Battalion to cover the gap and O'Sullivan's 2nd Battalion to swing right and continue the advance north while his 1st Battalion contained and neutralized the Admiralty area. At 3:30, the new attack was launched, with Logie's 3rd Battalion rapidly smashing into the Nap strongpoint while O'Sullivan's 1st Battalion concentrated on the Admiralty area and his 2nd Battalion attacked north towards Nob Pier. E Company started its attack before those of either G Company or the 1st Battalion. At 2:40 E Company began moving northwest. Somewhat more than half an hour later E Company  crossed Noel Road, with G Company on their right. 2 medium and 2 light tanks, taken over from the 1st Battalion, moved forward with each of the companies, and each had one squad of engineer troops with demolitions. Enemy rifle fire was heavy. The men broke up into small groups, proceeding unevenly in the general direction of Nob Pier. Between 6:30 and 7:00, Captain Peter Blaettler, commander of E Company was seriously wounded. Control from the battalion command post was lost seeing the men hugging the ground to avoid sharp fire from enemy riflemen. Colonel Aulich became separated from the main part of his battalion and was to remain so until the next morning, for all intensive purposes he lost command of his unit. The 2nd Battalion's attack was pushed along the eastern side of Will Road toward Nathan Road, but as sunset approached it became evident not only that Company E would not reach Nob Pier but also that across Will Road on the left flank there was an area with many strong enemy defense positions too powerful to be occupied in the 45 minutes before dark. Meanwhile, at 3:45 A Company 1st battalion was joined by 2 medium tanks and C Company  by 2 mediums and 2 M10 tank destroyers. At 4:05 they assaulted the western edge of the built-up Admiralty area along a 300 yard front, with A Company's right wing somewhat south of Noel Road. 10 minutes later they advanced towards the lagoon. Will Road was crossed shortly after 4:30. The enemy was much more firmly established between the highway and the beach, in pillboxes, blockhouses, and strong shelters. Mortar fire kept the enemy down until the tanks and infantry approached. The coordinated effort of tanks, infantry, and demolition teams ran very smoothly, gradually destroying the pillboxes and blockhouses of the Admiralty area, successfully reaching the lagoon by 6pm.  To the east, Logie's I Company rapidly reduced the weakly-defended Nap strongpoint and then pushed forward to the objective Nathan Road with haste while the other companies made slower progress against stronger defenses and would not be able to reach their objectives before nightfall. The Japanese in the areas south of the front line, were in greater numbers than on either of the preceding nights of the Kwajalein Island operation. They prowled in the forward area all night. Some incidents occurred as far to the rear as Corn Strong Point, more than a 1000 yards from the 32nd Infantry's advanced position. Japanese came out of shelters, screaming and yelling, throwing grenades, and charging at the men in their foxholes. They fired rifles and threw grenades from buildings that offered places of advantage. In a pocket northeast of the Admiralty area, they greatly harassed the companies near them. Attacks from the north and from the lagoon shore were also attempted by enemy troops at various times during the night. Just after sunset, a bugle could be heard sounding among the enemy shelters near the base of Nob Pier, and shortly afterward a headlong counterattack by screaming Japanese was made toward E and G Companies, 184th Regiment. As the Japanese tried to cross Will Road, they were cut down to the last man. 5 more attacks were broken up before they were actually in progress by barrages along the entire front from mortars and from the supporting batteries of artillery on Carlson Island; and more attacks followed after midnight. From various positions beyond Nathan Road, enemy machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire was directed into the forward area at irregular intervals during the night, sometimes coinciding so closely with the fire from Carlson Island that Japanese monitoring of the artillery radio was suspected. Nonetheless, over 1000 yards had been gained, by February 3. The Americans estimated they had killed around 1300 Japanese, more than were expected to still be in the island, at the cost of 54 dead and 255 wounded.  After sunset, several Japanese counterattacks and infiltration attempts were carried out against the steadfast Americans, all ending disastrously. Corlett expected to end the enemy resistance by February 4; but far too many small pockets remained in the rear and the reserve battalions were experiencing difficulties rooting them out. Corlett's final plan was for Logie's 1st Battalion to clear the remainder of the island, allowing  Companies C, B and A to attack through O'Sullivan's 2nd Battalion and Logie's 3rd Battalion. Unbeknownst to him, O'Sullivan also directed his 2nd Battalion to attack towards Nob Pier in order to complete the unfinished task of the previous day.  At 7:15, Corlett unleashed his final attack, supported by tanks. On the east, Logie's Companies A and B ran into a full-scale battle with the Japanese who had been bypassed the day before and who now poured heavy fire on the companies as they advanced toward the line of departure. It was not until 10:00 that the 2 1st Battalion companies reached the lines held by the 3rd Battalion. Then, the Americans successfully managed to advance 200 yards past Nathan Road, where the advance was stopped pending relief. Meanwhile, to the west, the attack of O'Sullivan's 2nd Battalion, supported by B Company , prevented the advance of Logie's C Company until 11:00. The Americans managed to push towards Nob Pier by 1:00, where they found no enemy resistance. Behind them, the lagoon shore continued to be mopped up, showcasing a surprising number of Japanese and Koreans surrendering.  All forward movement of the 1st Battalion had stopped, its line consisting of a series of small, exhausted groups in a dense confusion of debris. The ground was interlaced with innumerable trenches and foul with bodies of the enemy, many of them long dead. Some of the corpses had been mangled by maneuvering tanks, adding greatly to the nauseating stench that blighted the area. Finally, at 3:45, Logie's 2nd Battalion passed through the 1st to complete the assault along Kwajalein. These troops would successfully push to the island's northern tip, blasting through the remaining Japanese camouflaged dugouts and ruined concrete blockhouses.  As in every other island battle, Japanese stragglers had infiltrated the American lines through tunnels and overlooked bunkers, and the assault troops quickly learned to watch their backs. Nisei interpreters broadcast surrender appeals through loudspeakers, but there were only a few dozen takers, and most of the men who gave themselves up were Korean laborers. At long last, G Company reached Nero Point at 3:15. At 4:10 Corlett radioed to Admiral Turner: "All organized resistance… has ceased. The troops have been organized for mopping up operations." yet F Company, would still have to methodically destroy the enemy positions until they finally secured Kwajalein's northern end at 7:20. Ken Dodson went ashore the next morning. Writing to his wife, he described a desolate landscape of “shell craters and hillocks of upturned coral. Some of the Japanese had been dead from the first bombardment, the day before we landed. Their bodies were seared and bloated, and the stench was sickening. I saw one half buried in a pillbox. You could not tell whether he had on any clothes or not. The skin was burned off his back and his head lay a few feet from his body. Another looked like a bronze statue in Golden Gate Park. He lay forward in a crouch, helmet still on, both hands holding on to a coconut log of his pillbox. There were many, many others. I lie in bed at night remembering how they looked, and that awful sweetish sickening stench of powder, and kerosene and decaying human flesh, and I wonder, after all, what war is all about. I feel sorry for those Japs in a way. They died courageously after a stubborn, last-ditch, hopeless fight. They fought for the things they had been taught to believe in, with their poor little bundles with pictures of their wives and kiddies tied to their belts. . . . They can't tell me war is a fine and noble thing.' Losses during the last day were 252 wounded, with 65 Japanese killed and over 100 captured. Thus, for the Battle of Kwajalein Island, the Americans suffered a total of 142 killed, 845 wounded and 2 missing, killing around 4300 Japanese and capturing another 166. During the week after Operation Flintlock, numerous high ranking visitors descended on the battle-scarred islands of Kwajalein Atoll. Admiral Nimitz flew out from Pearl Harbor with an entourage of officers. On February 5, when fires were still burning on Kwajalein Island, he toured the blackened wastes alongside Spruance, Turner, Smith, and several other major commanders of the fleet and Amphibious Corps. Three weeks earlier Nimitz had been the guest of honor at a huge “Texas Picnic” in a Honolulu park. Walking among 40,000 sailors, soldiers, and civilians. He had pitched horseshoes, posed for photographs, and signed autographs. Afterward, the park looked as if it had been hit by a hurricane—clean-up crews had to cart away more than 50 truckloads of garbage and debris. An estimated 120,000 beer bottles had been left strewn across the grass. Now, upon setting foot on the lagoon beach at Kwajalein, Nimitz was waylaid by a mob of correspondents. “What do you think of the island?” one asked. The admiral drew a cheerful laugh by replying, “Gentlemen, it's the worst scene of devastation I have ever witnessed—except for the Texas picnic.” The operation had been a model one in almost every respect. The attacking force had achieved strategic surprise; artillery preparation, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment had successfully softened up the target in a fashion unexcelled at any other time in the Pacific War; the ship-to-shore movement had been conducted expeditiously and without too many hiccups; supplies flowed ashore and to the front lines relatively smoothly and without interruption; the infantry-engineer teams assisted by tanks moved steadily clearing the enemy from shelters and pillboxes; and American casualties had been fairly light. Altogether, the battle for Kwajalein represented the ideal for all military operations. To complete the conquest of the southern Kwajalein islands, detachments of amphibian tanks had been landed on Buster and Byron back on February 3. Troops of the 2nd Battalion, 17th Regiment landed on Burnet and Blakenship on February 4; the chain between Ashberry and Bennett was secured by February 5. On that same day, Clement, Clarence, and Clifford Islands were also secured, although on Clifton a force of 101 Japanese fought to the death. Beverly, Benson and Berlin were also secured on February 5, seeing 119 Japanese dead on the latter. Bennett fell against the 7th Reconnaissance Troop and O'Sullivan's 3rd Battalion with 94 Japanese killed. Most importantly, Colonel Zimmerman's 1st and 3rd Battalions landed on Burton's Beach Orange 4. The fortifications on Burton were much lighter than those on Kwajalein, mostly machine gun positions and rifle pits. These were organized at the beaches with a concentration of dual-purpose machine guns grouped around the seaplane base in the lagoon. At the base of the south seaplane ramp was a 20-mm. antiaircraft machine gun. Near it, and between the two seaplane ramps, were two 13-mm. single-mount machine guns, three 7.7-mm. machine guns, and a concrete pillbox. Two 8-cm. dual-purpose guns were located on the ocean shore. The large number of empty machine gun emplacements would seem to indicate that the defenses of the island had not been completed at the time of the invasion. The few pillboxes found in the vicinity of the seaplane base were small, reinforced concrete shelters, each with two firing ports facing seaward. Most of the fire trenches and rifle pits were on the ocean side at the center of the island and at the north and south ends of the island. On the morning of February 3 after a heavy artillery, air and naval bombardment, the 1st Battalion traversed the southern end of the island against weak resistance and began pushing north supported by tanks, ultimately getting stopped by strong enemy resistance at Bailey Pier.  The following morning, the assault was resumed at 0730, the main enemy resistance had shifted to the eastern side of the island. The Japanese had reoccupied four pillboxes close to the American front line on the ocean side, and were able to hold up A Company, but with the aid of self-propelled mounts, the company took the positions. During the morning, a flight of five Navy bombers made two runs over targets that had been spotted with the aid of information from a prisoner. The planes dropped a total of two and three quarters tons on an ammunition dump, a shelter, and a heavy machine gun that had an excellent field of fire across the hangar apron. Direct hits on these targets apparently disheartened the enemy. Not a single shot was fired by them at any later time during the operation. They remained buried in their dugouts until forced out or until they killed themselves. By 1130, when the 3d Battalion passed through and took up the assault, B Company  had moved about 350 yards to the southern edge of the concrete apron, and on the right A Company  was fifty to 75 yards farther back. The 3rd Battalion continued the advance north against meager resistance, ultimately reaching Burton's northern tip by 12:10. After this, the last of the enemy were readily mopped up; and by 3:37, the island was fully secured. During this battle, the 17th Regiment suffered 7 killed and 82 wounded while reporting 450 Japanese dead. Meanwhile, to the north, the 25th Marines led by Colonel Samuel C. Cumming occupied some 55 islands in the northern part of the atoll between February 2-7, finding absolutely no enemy resistance. With Kwajalein Atoll finally secured, the next objective in the Marshalls for Admirals Nimitz and Spruance would be Eniwetok, where Major-General Nishida Yoshimi was preparing his men to fight to the last. Yet that's it for the Marshall islands today, as now we are traveling over to the CBI theater, where Generals Christison and Stilwell's offensives continued.  Now last time we left off with the gang in Burma General Liao's 22nd division, Colonel Rothwell Brown's 1st provisional tank group, General Merrill's Galahad Unit alongside Chinese and American engineers were busy building the Ledo Road through the Hukawng valley. Location parties up ahead cleared a trace the width of a bulldozer and put in the center-line stakes. The final clearing averaged 150 feet. The route of the Ledo Road in some cases followed existing roads, a circumstance that did not greatly diminish the amount of clearing needed. Most clearing was by bulldozer. Combat trails and access roads were cleared to the necessary minimum that would permit heavy equipment to use them. In the valleys, the road was generally built on embankments in order to lift it above flood level. In mountainous regions, side-hill cuts were used. The road itself had about seven culverts to the mile in the mountains and five to the mile in the lowlands. These culverts were most necessary as the road was a barrier to the normal runoff of water. Surfacing was with stream-bed gravel in the valley sections and, so far as hauling permitted, natural gravel in the mountainous sections. Surfacing was about ten inches thick on the average, and from twenty to twenty-eight feet wide. Compaction was by the normal road traffic. Two regiments of Chinese engineers did pioneer construction work. There was also a combat road, a hasty improvement of the existing Kamaing Road plus the Kachin and Naga trails, that ran through Shingbwiyang, Yupbang Ga, and Taihpa Ga, then went south. The trace of the Ledo Road was moved to higher ground on the north. Forward construction units were rationed from combat supply points. Meanwhile Vinegar Joe sought to end the campaign with a single decisive victory. He planned to deploy the 1st Tank Battalion as an armored spearhead against Maingkwan, the 1st battalion, 66th regiment, the 113th was to follow down the road to take over successive positions, while the 114th would assemble at Taihpa in reserve and the 112th was to protect the flank east of the Tanai, advancing on Mashi Daru. He expected his men to hit the enemy across their rear areas. Now January had been a very rainy month, armored warfare does not do well in mud, so it was important the terrain was dry for the offensive. Stilwell would end up on February 4th decided to shift the bulk of the 22nd division to seize Yawngbang-Lakyen line while General Sun's 38th Division cleaned up the area south and east of the Tanai.  Once this first phase was done, then General Liao's 2 regiments could support an armored advance south towards Walawbum. The bad weather, however, had also delayed road work and hampered their supply lines. Stilwell biding his time, building up a reserve at Shingbwiyang and Ningam, while the men progressed their work on the Ledo Road, and built an airfield at Taihpa before launching his second phase. This unfortunately also gave enough time for General Tanaka to prepare an orderly withdrawal towards Maingkwan. During early february, General Sun's 32nd division successfully accomplished their part of the mission, but to the southwest, the enveloping hook from the Taro Plain did not go as planned. By February 14th, the 66th regiment were beginning to arrive on the Taro Plain through heavy rain, but only the 3rd battalion of the 65th regiment managed to join them. The 66th regiment was forced to continue without the proper support until they diverted to Yawngbang Ga which they seized on the 16th. By the 18th, Stilwell and Liao personally went over to check on their regiment's location and found the entire force was within the neighborhood of the 66th command post. It seems the utter confusion during these movements saved the Japanese, as quoted by General Tanaka: "If the Chinese 65th and 66th Infantry Regiments operating in the vicinity of Yawngbang had been prompt in closing in on our left rear flank on the 15th or 16th, as predicted, the main force of the 18th Division would have faced a grave crisis." After sorting out the confusion,  the Chinese advanced from Yawngbang Ga to Lakyen Ga. There they captured a Japanese document indicating they were withdrawing. Thus another chance to envelop the enemy had thus been lost.    Meanwhile, to support Stilwell's offensive, the two Allied long-range penetration units, the Chindits and Merrill's Marauders, were preparing to embark on a new mission, codenamed Operation Thursday. It was to be the second Chindit expedition with the objective of mounting a long range penetration behind the Japanese who were opposing Stilwells forces in the Northern front. It was hoping the action would prevent the arrival of any reinforcements from the two Japanese divisions on the Central Front. General Hap Arnold wanted his airmen to take the Chindits behind Japanese lines, carry their supplies, evacuate their wounded and eventually fly them off, so he decided to create the 1st Air Commando Unit, under Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Cochram. The unit consisted of a squadron of P-51s; one of B-25s; 100 C4A Waco gliders; and a squadron of C-47s. Arnold spelled out the mission to Cochram and Lieutenant-Colonel John Alison, his deputy. "This man [Wingate] has really done some remarkable things. He has walked through the jungles. He has carried his supplies on mules. It takes him about six weeks to get his men through the jungle, across the rivers, and in behind the Japanese lines. The next time he goes in, I don't want him to walk. I want him to go by air. I want to make this an air operation completely independent of land transport. I want to demonstrate that you can use the air just like the navy uses the sea. You can land and maintain a force and support it in battle. I want you to go in there and take out General Wingate's wounded. We will make available the resources that you need. 'I not only want you to do that... but I want the USAAF to spearhead General Wingate's operations.' We gathered he wouldn't mind if we turned it into an air show." The mad onion lad Wingate also wanted to created strongholds within the Japanese controlled areas that could serve as bases to receive aircrafts of all types, store  supplies, hold wounded until they could be extracted, and act as centers for locals resisting the enemy. The motto for the Stronghold, as he called it, was “No Surrender”. Meanwhile Stilwell ordered Merril to close in on Ledo by February 7th, and the last American unit would arrive to Margherita on February 9th. Merrill's Marauders were to assemble at Ningbyen by February 21st whereupon they would envelop the 18th divisions east flank and block the Kamaing road near Shaduzap with the support of Sun's 113th Regiment. Simultaneously Stilwell's other troops were preparing for their attack on Maingkwan. Further in the south General Christison's 15th Corps was in a lot of trouble. The Japanese had been bringing in a lot of reinforcements for their forthcoming Arakan counteroffensive from both within and outside the Burma theater throughout December and January. By early February, General Hanaya had assembled his men and was ready to launch the first phase of Operation Ha-Go. General Hanaya planned to destroy the 7th Indian Division in the region east of Mayu Range using a pincer movement launched simultaneously from the north and south. After that, he would shift the main weight of his 55th Division near Ngangyaung against the 5th Indian Division in the Maungdaw region west of the Mayu Range. From there, he hoped to advance along the Kaladan valley to perform the phase of Ha-Go, named the Kaladan Operation. For this the men would advance towards Chittagong to distract attention from around Imphal and to draw the British reserves into Arakan.  On the night of February 3, Hanaya unleashed his offensive, with several columns, under the command of Major-General Sakurai Tokutaro, commander of the 55th Infantry Group. His force secretly infiltrated through the jungle under the cover of darkness, on the left bank of the Kalapanzin river near Buthidaung, through gaps between the 7th Division's widely separated brigades. The element of terrain and weather was paramount. Throughout the dry season a morning mist with heavy dew formed daily in the small hours and, unless cleared by rain and wind, normally persisted till well after sunrise; the noise made by the dew falling from the trees on to the dry undergrowth was loud enough to drown the sound of footsteps so that, in the jungle, movement in the early morning could be unheard as well as unseen. The tides were an important factor in planning, for at high tide many of the chaungs were unfordable. The knife-edge ridges into which the Japanese so often dug their defenses presented an unusual artillery problem. If guns were to bring effective fire to bear, they had to be sited on the line of the axis of a ridge, which was always difficult and sometimes impossible. Fire from any other angle meant that reverse slope defenses were untouched and accurate ranging was extremely difficult. The dense jungle covering the hilltops greatly restricted their use as observation points. Using the early morning mists, Hanaya's men shrouded their columns advance cutting deeply into the British defenses. At about 9 am the Gwalior Lancers reported to 7th Division by wireless that a column of Japanese about a hundred strong followed by another about eight hundred strong were approaching Taung Bazar. Major-General Frank Messervy immediately ordered his reserve brigade, the 89th to advance north to locate and destroy them and asked 15th Corps to speed up the arrival of the tanks. Christison ordered the 25th Dragoons to send a squadron to Sinzweya and 5th Division to send an infantry detachment to prevent infiltration over Goppe Pass. The 89th Brigade advanced north in two columns: the right column encountered the Japanese at about 4 pm near Ingyaung resulting in hand to hand fighting, and the left reached the bend of the Prein Chaung east of Preingyaung. The right column  dug in at Ingyaung and Lin babi and the left over the Prein Chaung. Although the main force of the 1st Echelon was delayed by some confusion, the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazar garrison at 7am. Without delay, the Battalion crossed the Kalapanzin River south of Taung Bazar, using captured boats, and was followed closely by the 2nd Echelon and the 3rd Battalion of the 112th Infantry Regiment. The main body of the 1st Echelon crossed the river northwest of Taung Bazar on the morning of the 5th. By 9am Taung Bazar was overwhelmed as the Japanese forces crossed the Kalapanzin River to cut the Ngakyedauk Pass in order to isolate the 7th Division. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion, 213th Regiment headed towards Ngangyaung. The battalion advanced parallel to the Sakurai Column before moving towards Goppe Bazaar. It was held up short of its objective, however, by the leading elements of 26th Indian Division committed from army reserve on 5th February to bolster 15th Corps. Despite this local setback, the Japanese hauled their mountain guns and equipment over the Mayu Range, midway between Goppe and Ngakyedauk, before attacking administrative troops, bridges, dumps, ambushing convoys and building a roadblock on the main line of communications along the Bawli-Maungdaw road. It failed to prevent supplies reaching 5th Indian Division, however, whose ammunition, equipment and food was transported by sea to Maungdaw. Overnight the rear areas of 15th Corps were transformed into the front line with administrative troops bearing much of the burden of dealing with advancing Japanese troops. To the surprise of many officers, they displayed a determination and fighting spirit unknown a year before and took a heavy toll of the Japanese attackers bearing out Slim's direction that every man in the army should be a soldier first and a tradesman or specialist second. The bulk of the 112th regiment led by Colonel Tanahashi Shinsaku marched towards the pass as the 2nd battalion 143rd regiment and Sakurai's HQ advanced south. The quickly found enemy resistance near Ingyaung which delayed their advance for over 2 days. Failing to make contact with General Sakurai, the Battalion continued its advance southward, bypassing Awlanbyin. Major Gen. Sakurai and his headquarters also got involved in fighting off enemy counterattacks near Ingyaung on the 5th and 6th and due to failure of his communications, was unable to keep in touch with his units. To further support the offensive, Japanese fighters and bombers from the 5th Air Division's 7th Air Brigade launched a heavy offensive to gian air superiority over the battlefield, using 34 fighters and 10 bombers. Between the 4th and 14th their fighters flew 350 sorties, and bombers attacked the Bawli and Briasco bridges and Sinzweya. Spitfires intercepted them but had less success than before. Japanese losses were believed to be some 14 aircraft destroyed and a number damaged, while RAF losses during the same period were around 11 fighters. On february 5th, having made such quick progress, Hanaya ordered the 143rd regiment to advance north. The 3rd battalion, 143rd managed to infiltrate through the Indian brigades en route and joined Sakurai's men to hit the pass. Seeing the danger, General Slim decided to reinforce Christison with the 26th Indian division led by Under General Lomax. Christison in turn ordered Lomax to move it forward to Bawli Bazar as quickly as possible. Upon their arrival at Bawli North, the 71st Brigade was then ordered to relieve the detachment from 5th Division on Goppe Pass and then attack the Japanese operating in rear of 7th Division. Likewise the 36th Indian division of Major-General F. W. Festing sped up their advance towards Chittagong while C-46 Commandos and C-47 Dakotas air dropped ammunition, food and other supplies to the front units. On the morning of the 6th, the 112th Regiment reached the sector north of Sinzweya and overran the headquarters of the British-Indian 7th Division while the 1st Battalion cut the Ngakyedauk Pass. In a perfect position to envelop the enemy in Sinzweya, Colonel Tanahashi disregarded the vital necessity for speed and delayed for 24 hours, giving the British time to establish a perimeter defense in the Sinzweya Basin. East of the range at about 5:00am, an enemy force, estimated at battalion strength, penetrated the widely separated posts held by the company of 24th Engineer Battalion defending 7th Division Headquarters, established machine-gun posts on tracks throughout the headquarters area and broke into the signal center. In hand-to-hand fighting the attackers were driven out, but not before all communications had been cut and ciphers compromised. Tanks from Sinzweya moved to the sound of the fighting as soon as it was light but the ground prevented them from reaching the headquarters area; rain which set in about 8:30 further hampered them and they had to withdraw. At about 10:00am, the signal center was finally overrun. Messervy, unable to exercise command any longer, sent orders to all branches of his headquarters to destroy papers and equipment of value and make their way in small parties to Sinzweya. Most of them succeeded in doing so during the following 24 hours. Major-General Frank Messervy and his staff would manage to successfully escape towards Sinzweya. Consequently, instead of ordering a general withdrawal like the Japanese expected, Christison directed the 9th Brigade to organize a defense of Sinzweya, which was the weakest link of the four isolated, self-contained all-round defensive boxes held by each brigade of the 7th Division. By the 7th, the defense of Sinzweya, also known as the Admin Box had been consolidated. The perimeter consisted of a series of small defended posts held, in the main, by administrative units, except at the south east and southwest corners where the roads entered the area. These were held by 4/8th Gurkhas and a company of 2nd West Yorkshire. There were insufficient troops to hold the whole of the Point 315 feature, and thus there was a deep reentrant between the southeast and northeast corners of the perimeter extending back to the southern end of Ammunition Hill. Most of the artillery was disposed on the southern face with attachments holding perimeter posts. The 25th Dragoons were in mobile reserve in two harbors held by a company of 3/4th Bombay Grenadiers, one each side of Ammunition Hill. The 2nd West Yorkshire constituted the infantry reserve and was located with divisional and garrison headquarters on the western side of Ammunition Hill. The main dressing station in the southwest corner was being moved to a more secure area. During the night, the Japanese launched an assault against Sinzweya, yet the tenacious defenders managed to hold on against the fierce enemy pressure. That night, the 33rd Brigade also managed to repulse an attack against Sinohbyin, though the arrival of these reinforcements would allow Sakurai to extricate himself from Ingyaung and head to Sinzweya to take command over the assault. On February 8, all British troops east of the Mayu range were receiving supplies by air, yet the strong presence of enemy fighters disrupted the first few attempts. Eventually, British air superiority would be restored. The No. 31 Squadron and 62 Squadron were reinforced on the 10th by 194 Squadron and on the 25th by 117 Squadron, recently arrived from the Middle East. Not only were 7th and 81st Divisions kept supplied with food and ammunition, but such amenities as cigarettes, rum, mail, razor blades and newspapers were delivered by air to the troops in increasing quantities as time went on, certainly a morale booster. Throughout the battle the Strategic Air Force and 224 Group gave constant close support to 15th Corps. In addition to providing escorts for transport squadrons, Hurricanes harried road, river and coastal transport on the Japanese lines of communication to Arakan that movement by day into the area virtually ceased. Tactical bombing of enemy positions was undertaken by two Vengeance squadrons which flew no less than 269 sorties in just over a week. The transports flew a total of 714 sorties in 5 weeks, successfully delivering nearly 2300 tons of supplies. From the night of February 8 onwards, the Admin and other boxes would also hold firm against repeated ferocious Japanese infantry night assaults, occasional air attacks and limited artillery bombardment from a handful of mountain and battalion guns by day and a medium gun firing from the nearby tunnels, thus showcasing the new spirit of the British-Indian troops. As quoted by Lieutenant-General Pownall: “We've learned how to fight where we stand and NOT to be frightened of the bogey of infiltration.” I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Kwajalein has finally fallen, leaving the rest of the Marshalls at the mercy of the colossal allied air, land and sea forces. Within Burma, the Chinese, British, Indian and Americans were ferociously meeting the Japanese, showcasing their dominance in the theater was no longer as sure thing, now the Japanese faced a much stronger enemy.   

The Pacific War - week by week
- 113 - Pacific War - The Battle for Shaggy Ridge , January 16-23, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 16, 2024 40:17


Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and continuation of advances upon New Guinea and New Britain. Operation Michaelmas was a huge success, isolating countless Japanese and threatening those trying to retreat further north. Taking advantage of the new front on New Guinea, the Australians began pushing more so upon the features across Shaggy Ridge and towards Sio. General Adachi frantically shifted units around in an effort to plug up the multiple advancing allied units, but in the end there was little to be done as the Japanese were pushed further and further north. Features were taken upon Shaggy Ridge and Sio fell nearly uncontested. Over in New Britain, General Rupertus triumphed over the Airdrome and his Marines were expanding their perimeters. Katayama made a bold attack against an enemy he overestimated at it certainly did not pan out for his men at suicide creek. This episode is The battle for Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A while back I covered the start of the Chinese-Indian offensive into the Hukawng Valley and Arakan regions. When I did so it was almost entirely from the allied viewpoint, but what of the IJA war planners? The Burma campaign has been arguably a complete disaster for the allies, the Japanese steamrolled all the way through, claiming vast amounts of territory and key cities and ports, so what really did they need to do but garrison it all? After Wingate unleashed operation Longcloth, the relatively idle Japanese raised the idea of potentially attacking India. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya, the victor of the Singapore campaign in 1942 was made a commander in Burma and wargamed the possibility of attacking India to try and earn support from his superiors at Tokyo General HQ. It was his belief, they could brush past the British in Assam and reach the gateway into India, and he expected the Indians to rise up and greet them with open arms. A lot of money and effort had been spent on Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army. The fall of India would be an absolutely devastating blow to the British Empire in Asia and in 1942 there was even the belief the Japanese could link up with their German allies in the middle east. But that was 1942, before Stalingrad and Kursk, 1944 was a very very different geopolitical situation. This however did not stop Mutaguchi from continuing his plans to invade India. Lt General Hanaya Tadashi, commanding the Arakan front was given the task of convincing the British that the counterattack in Arakan was the appearance of the main army earmarked to conquer India, thus leading General Slim to send up reserves from Imphal. The operation was codenamed HA-GO and it was intended to be a fent to mask the real attack upon Imphal designated Operation U-GO. Now let me dig a bit deeper into how this all came about. Until now, General Stilwell had been able to build much of the Ledo Road practically unmolested. Yet by early August, General Kawabe Mazakazu's Burma Area Army was preparing for a counter offensive. Kawabe actually did not trust Mutaguchi and suspected the man was harboring megalomaniac designs to invade India, which he was 100% right about. The “counter offensive” was really just the beginnings of Operation U-GO and it had been sold to Tokyo HQ as a pre-emptive strike to disable the 14th Army and make it unable to invade Burma. Thus General Mutaguchi's 15th Army was given the task of destroying any hostile elements in the Imphal region and to establish a strong defensive line. From December 22nd to the 26th, Mutaguchi held a conference pushing for the possibility of launching Operation U-GO and developed detailed missions for each division which would participate by means of a war game. At the same time Kawabe sold the operation HA-GO the diversionary attack in Arakan, with Lt General Hanaya Tadashi's 55th Division earmarked to pin down as many of the enemy's units as possible and to draw the British reserves away from the main offensive.  When General Christisons offensive kicked off, this forced Kawabe to reinforce Hanaya with the 54th division, and this in turn established the 29th Army under the command of General Sakurai on January 6th. The 29th Army was under the overall command of the Burma Area Army, and its HQ was initially situated in Moulmein. It was assigned to defend the coastal region of Arakan and the lower Irrawaddy valley and consisted at first of the 55th Division in Arakan, the 54th Division in reserve in Prome, and various garrison units including the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade in Moulmein. It also controlled the 11th Shipping Detachment of Major-General Suzuki Gisaburo, consisting of the 11th Shipping Engineer Regiment and the 3rd Sea Transport Battalion. It had roughly 1,105 men, 85 large landing barges, 54 small landing barges, 47 motored sampans, two armored boats, 10 fishing boats, one messenger boat and one speed boat. The 11th Shipping Detachment was stationed at Taungup and its main supply depot was at Prome. Meanwhile after the capture of Maungdaw, the 5th Indian division of Major General Harold Briggs was ordered to attack the main Japanese defenses at Razabil. Razabil's defenses were quite formidable, it dominating the crossroads and road linking Maungdaw with the Tunnels and Buthidaung located 3 miles eastwards, forming the 15th Indian Corps immediate objective following Maungdaw's capture. It was dubbed by its Japanese commander “The Golden Fortress of the Mayu Range”. It was centered on the railway tunnels running through the Mayu Range and at Point 551 to the east with a further forward position at Point 1301. These powerful defenses, built carefully exploiting the rugged mountainous terrain, were tunneled deep into the hills and consisted of bunkers, trenches and other fire positions located amidst dense jungle and camouflaged with customary Japanese skill. The main outworks at Letwedet to the east and at Razabil to the west of the Mayu Range were major fortresses in their own right, requiring careful reduction before the main position could be tackled. With both bastions in direct line of sight from the Tunnels, accurate supporting artillery could be called down with ease, moreover, adding to the problems already facing troops assaulting trenches and bunkers dug into the hillsides invulnerable to all but direct hits by medium artillery. The offensive against Razabil was codenamed Operation Jonathan, but it would be delayed until the corps artillery became available. At the same time the 7th Indian division seized the initiative on January 18th and launched an attack against the 55th division's position between Letwedet and Htindaw. The 9th company, 143rd infantry regiment was defending a hill east of Htindaw and stood their ground against repeated attacks until January 24th. The Japanese strongpoints were well dug in on the tops of narrow ridges. On January 26th, Major General Briggs ordered the 161st brigade, with support in the form of Lee-Grant tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment to attack the Tortoise defended by 1st battalion, 143rd regiment in the Razabil area. The Tortoise was a horseshoe defensive position that dominated the highway. It was an elaborate system of bunkers, trenches and all the typical Japanese goodies. For the boys in Burma it would be the first time for most to face such a thing, as Slim wrote in his memories “This was the first time we had assaulted an elaborate, carefully prepared position that the Japanese meant to hold to the last."   The attack opened up with 12 Vultee Vengeance dive bombers of the 3rd Tactical air force, 12 Mitchell medium bombers and 16 Liberator heavy bombers of the Strategic air force followed up by even more dive bombers. It was a visually spectacular event and to those observing from the ground looked devastating. However little to no damage was inflicted on the strongly constructed Japanese defenses burrowed so deeply into the hillsides. Similarly the mountain artillery regiment and batter from a field regiment did little damage with their bombardment as well. The Japanese had simply pulled back 1000 yards during the bombardments and by the time the allies surged forward came back to man their positions. When the Indians began their assault, the fire coming down the steep and jungle clad hillsides was absolutely devastating. The Lee-Grant tanks fired from the valley floor and managed to destroy all the identified bunkers, but the exposed Indian troops suffered massive casualties. It was virtually impossible to keep the defenders heads down long enough to advance even 50 yards towards the summit. Things got even worse when the men reached the defensive lines for the Lee-Grant tanks had to lift their fire lest they hit their own men. By the end of the day, only a toehold had been secured over the lower slopes of Razabil ridge.  The assault carried on for 3 more days, with intense tank and artillery fire from different directions supporting the infantry as closely as possible. The only immediate effect of the bombardment and indirect fire by 25 pounders and 3.7 howitzers was to destroy the vegetation over the hillsides, thus exposing more and more of the Japanese defensive works. During the intense battle, the Lee-Grant medium tank proved itself a real solution in providing effective covering fire for infantry and soon new techniques were evolving. The Japanese defenses were mainly built over the summit of steep, thick, jungle covered hills and the Lee-Grants provided fire support from positions in the paddy fields below them. Their 75mm guns effectively destroyed or at the least neutralized bunker positions. A procedure was quickly developed for providing cover during the last stages of infantry assaults. Tanks would use high explosive shells to clear the vegetation, than delayed action high explosive shells to break up the front of visible bunkers, then armor piercing shells to enable the infantry to advance close behind the creeping barrage as shrapnel was not flying everywhere. All combined this showed the potential of armor vehicles in jungle warfare, when most claimed they had little practical use in such climats. Despite such developments, the casualties were mounting, little progress was being made. On January 28th, the 123rd brigade attacked Japanese positions on the secondary hill of Wrencat and its smaller neighbor hill Wrenkitten, probably the best hill names I have read on this podcast as of yet haha. These were located on the lower western foothills of the Mayu range. They were extremely steep, cone shaped features with fortified circular trenches around their heads, bunkers, and bamboo jungle. Firing from positions on the valley floor the Lee-Grants and 5.5 inch artillery were able to destroy the bunkers and switch to armor piercing rounds to perform creeping barrages for the infantry. Despite the tank and artillery support, the Japanese were throwing a ton of mortar, grenade and machine gun fire. An officer of the 123rd brigade involved in the fight had this to say 'It appears from our experience that consolidation on the objective which normally consists of a series of deeply constructed bunkers connected one with the other is extremely difficult in the very limited time that the enemy allow.' The failures against the Tortoise and Wrencat, prompted General Christison to call off the attack against Razabil by January30th. Christison regrouped his corps artillery and tanks to instead support the 7th divisions assault against Buthidaung and Letwedet.   Meanwhile further to the north, General Tanaka had brought 6300 men of the 55th and 56th regiments to the Hukawng valley by early January. He wanted to counterattack in strength, but General Mutaguchi believed he could not spare additional motor transport units to give the necessary logistical support to the 18th division since preparations were already going on for operation U-GO. Thus, Tanaka ordered his men to perform a delaying action down the Hukawng valley with the primary objective of holding Kamaing, the ridge line separating Hukawng valley from Mogaung valley. Tanaka weighed his orders and the looming monsoon season that hit the area in May or June. Against Tanaka, Stilwell sought to continue his offensive after successfully taking Yupbang Ga. Stilwell now looked towards Taihpa Ga and convinced both General Wingate and Admiral Mountbatten to unleash the Galahad long penetration unit into the Hukawng valley.   On January 4, 1944, Frank Merrill abruptly relieved a disappointed Brink. Despite having a background with cavalry, like Brink, Merrill understood the Japanese strength, but unlike Brink he respected the chain of command. General Sun met with Stilwell and and it was agreed the bulk of the 114th regiment should swing widely around Tanaka's left flank while the 113th regiment wheeled to the south to hit Tanaka's front along the Tanai Hka. Further north the 2nd battalion ,112th regiment would also advance east across the Tarung Hka to secure Warang Ga; the 65th regiment would continue their advance towards Taro, fording the Tanai river by January 9th; south of Kantau, the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment ran into two Japanese companies. The jungle made it difficult for the Chinese forces to organize themselves. The battalion split into 4 fragments and no two of them were in contact. The supporting 6th battery could not fire until fields of fire were cut and while that was being carried out, the Japanese companies performed infiltration maneuvers and quickly surrounded the battery. Fighting for their guns and lives between the 9th and 11th of January the Chinese cannoneers managed to save both. The battalion was nearly wiped out from these Japanese tactics, but thankfully on January 12th, the regimental HQ arrived and reformed the battalion to launch a concerted attack that managed to gradually push back the Japanese. 3 days later the 2nd battalion arrived allowing the 114th regiment to force a crossing of the Sanip Hka by January 16th.   Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 113th regiment forded the Tarung river near Yupbang Ga and sent patrols north to occupy Tabawng GA on January 13th. From there they advanced southeast to Kaduja Ga then to Brangbram Hka where they formed a line extending to the junction with the Tanai bank by mid january. On January 21st, the Chinese broke through the Japanese lines north of Brangbram Hka and made it to Ningru Ha less than one mile downstream from Taihpa Ga. Simultaneously, the battered 112th regiment swung wide going north east to Warang Ga. By the end of January the 113th continued their advance upon Taihpa Ga where they would meet stronger Japanese resistance. They began fighting within 1,500 yards of Taihpa Ga. Artillery support, the 4th and 5th Batteries, was then brought up. The next 1,000 yards between the 113th regiment and Taihpa Ga took two days to cross; then they spent a week in what was called "preparations for attack." General Sun's men were now approaching the Japanese strongpoint in the area, and Japanese resistance was more freely offered, with heavy shelling by 75- and 150-mm. pieces. At Taihpa Ga, the Kamaing Road crossed the Tanai on a long gravel bar which bullock carts could use quite well. At this point was the village itself, a humble collection of bashas, long since burnt out. About 800 yards upstream was a ferry across a stretch of fairly deep water. The Japanese used this ferry to bring supplies across the Tanai, rather than the vulnerable and easily spotted gravel bar. Here they had their strongpoint, well prepared and stubbornly defended.   Further to the west, the 65th regiment advance was much slower than expected for Stilwell.  Upon reaching the Hukawng Valley, the 65th's commander, despite means more than ample for his mission, contracted the same lethargy that had hastened the demise of the 112th Regiment. Stilwell was greatly frustrated by the delay a few more weeks with Colonel Fu, so he ordered Colonel Liao to relieve him. Stilwell wrote in his diary "Told Liao this included division commanders unless they watched their step. Also that Fu really should be shot. Liao took it OK though it shook him up." On January 22, General Sun was told about this affair, but the news softened somewhat by the presentation of a silk banner for the victory at Yupbang Ga, a dramatic contrast of the respective awards for lethargy and vigor. Having made his point, and hoping that he had given the Chinese a healthy shock, Stilwell restored Fu to his command by January 26. Fu's later performance in combat was rated as excellent.   The Chinese managed to encircle the passive 3rd battalion, 55th regiment on January 23rd, and by the 25th the last Japanese pockets were wiped out. On the 26th the Chinese reached Ahawk Hka and on the 28th crossed the Taro river and occupied Taro on the 30th. This effectively cut behind Tanaka's flank. The bulk of the 112th now was close enough to the 113th to aid them so Sun began an attack against Taihpa Ga on the 30th. The Japanese held on stubbornly for days and would quietly withdrew on the night of February 4th. Tanaka concluded the loss of the Taro plain meant "the failure of the whole division in its operations along the Tanai". Thus Tanaka decided there was no point in continuing the fighting there. Over at Sanip, Sun ordered the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment to rest. However Stilwell thought this was close to disobedience of his orders,  because he wanted Sun to move quickly and cut behind the 18th Division. On January 13, he had spoken very bluntly to Sun, asking him what orders he gave the 114th Regiment and if there had been any word from Chongqing to slow the operation. Stilwell told Sun that if he could not exercise the commands that Peanut had given him, he would resign and report the whole affair to the US Government. "Regardless of what anyone else may say, I assure you that my report will be fully believed in Washington." General Sun was confronted with the prospect that Chinese lethargy in north Burma might mean withdrawal of all US help from China. Stilwell, Sun was told, had been alone in his fight to convince the United States that the Chinese Army was worth helping. "If I am double-crossed by the people I am trying to help I am through for good and I will recommend very radical measures." Stilwell closed by saying that he had done his part; would Sun reciprocate? But despite Stilwell's arguments and threats, General Sun did not meet Stilwell's ideas of how a dynamic field commander should conduct himself. Thus the 114th gradually began to dislodge the Japanese from their positions along the river bank, taking care to annihilate all pockets behind. Stilwell was satisfied with the progress of his offensive and established the northern combat area command on February 1st. This organization would be led by Brigadier General Haydon Boatner and would include American, British and Indian units entering North Burma. But that is all for the wild Burma front as we now need to travel over to New Guinea.   Last time we were in New Guinea, Brigadier Chilton's 18th brigade had just completed their advance upon Shaggy Ridge and Brigadier Hammer's 15th brigade had just relieved the 25th brigade on January 7th. Thus two brigades were flown in and two were flown out, showcasing how far the allied New Guinea air forces had increased their efficiency during the war. The New Guinea force was now under the command of General Milford, though Vasey still retained his task of  "contain hostile forces in the Bogadjim-Ramu area by vigorous action of fighting patrols against enemy posts”. The division's role was still to prevent enemy penetration into the Ramu-Markham valley from Madang and protect the Gusap airfield and the various radar installations the instruction added that the division would "create the impression of offensive operations against Bogadjim Road by vigorous local minor offensive action". This was to be done by holding in strength with two brigades a "line of localities" from Toms' Post on the right to the Mene River on the left, the boundary between the 18th on the right and the 15th on the left being a line from Bebei through Herald Hill to Kankirei Saddle. In addition the 18th Brigade would "by raids and harassing tactics ensure that no major Jap withdrawal takes place undetected and occupy the Mindjim-Faria divide and the high ground to the north and south of it as the administrative position permits". The 15th Brigade would hold the Yogia-Mene River area, delay any enemy advance up the Ramu from the Evapia River, patrol to the Solu River, and deny the 5800 and 5500 Features to the enemy.    Despite this, Vasey was preparing to assault the Kankirei saddle with the fresh 18th brigade. Designated Operation Cutthroat, the seizure of the Kankieri saddle and ultimately that of Shaggy Ridge, Vasey planned to launch an attack against Mount Prothero which was being defended by the 6th company, 78th regiment. He would attack it from the south, preceded by a diversionary attack against Cam's saddle. Brigadier Chilton realized however, that frontal attacks along Shaggy Ridge would not be able to achieve surprise, so he instead wanted to attempt a wide encircling maneuver on the left flank via Canning's saddle to attack Prothero directly. The 18th brigade spent the early part of January patrolling to see if it was possible to advance through Canning's saddle to Prothero 1 while simultaneously and stealthily building a road to Canning's in preparation for the coming offensive.   The possibility of occupying Prothero from Canning's Saddle had been suggested to Chilton by Lt-Colonel Lang of the 2/2nd Pioneers, after a patrol performed by Captain McInnes. Captain McInnes had found an approach along a steep, razor backed spur within a short distance of Prothero's summit where they could hear Japanese. Meanwhile the 2/9th battalion had sent a patrol that found a possible track from McGullough's ridge vie Geyton's Hill to the Mene River. Going up the river bed led one to Canning's saddle. Two companies of the 2/12th spent a few days constructing a track going to the Mene River and they took special precautions to prevent the enemy from finding out. Reconnaissance patrols in general were careful to avoid contact with the enemy and so was the case around Prothero. The jeep track was hurriedly pushed to Guy's Post, existing tracks were improved and shorter and better tracks constructed to improve the supply routes to Shaggy Ridge and Mainstream; reserves of supplies in forward areas were built up, thus enabling a concentration of as many natives as possible to carry for the attacking battalion on the left, and arrangements were made for a limited air dropping at Canning's Saddle at an appropriate time.   To support the upcoming attack, 9 long and two short 25 pounders of the 2/4th field regiment were brought up along with 7000 shells. The guns had to be dragged forward to the Lakes-Guy's Post area. Lt Colonel Charles Bourne's 2/12th battalion was to head the attack. Chilton also planned to have Lt Colonel Charles Geard's 2/10th battalion perform a diversionary attack through Cam's saddle. After Protharo 1 was captured, the 2/10th were to exploit north to Kankieri and south to the Mainstream area; while Lt Colonel Clement Cummins 2/9th battalion attacked northwest along Shaggy Ridge to join up with the 2/12th. By January 18th, the 4000 yard track to Geyton's Hill was complete, allowing the 18th brigade to advance. On that same day, B-25 Mitchell bombers unleashed their cannons and bombed the enemy positions at the junction of Mainstream, the Faria and Shaggy ridge. They dropped 60 delayed action bombs over the Faria river valley and some modified Mitchells sporting 75mm cannons mounted on their chins fired upon the crest of ridges. This cannon, the same used by Sherman tanks, was quite a formidable weapon in the air. To enable its fire, the nose of the B-25G model had to be shortened and the cannon breech positioned behind the pilot from where it could be loaded by the navigator for firing. To fire it the pilot would press a button on his control wheel. The weapon would prove inefficient against shipping, but it would be a lot more successful at hitting ground targets. Over three successive days from 18 to 20 January the Mitchells flew 180 sorties against Shaggy Ridge, firing 135 rounds of 75 mm at the ridge as well as dropping around 200 tons of bombs. The aircraft also fired about 90,000 rounds of .50 caliber. The machine-gun salvos were particularly devastating. From his accompanying Boomerang, Alex Miller-Randle recalled ‘Mitchells strip the trees of Shaggy Ridge clean and shatter the limbs and trunks to matchsticks'.   D-day was the 20th, seeing the 2/10th on the right and 2/12th on the left. Captain Kumnicks company of the 2/10th advanced to Grassy Patch and over on the left a party of the 2/12th led by Major Fraser took vanguard. All of the preliminary actions were completed back on the 19th when Captain Gunn's A company of the 2/10th advanced from Tom's Post for Sprogg's ridge via a Japanese mule track. Later Captain Humnicks D company would use the same track. On the left the 2/12th battalion and B and D company of the 2/2nd Pioneers advanced along the new line of communication to Geyton's. At 8:45am Captain Gunn's company advanced from Sprogg's ridge to attack Cam's Saddle, followed 30 minutes later by Captain Kumnick's company. Operation Cutthroat opened up with artillery and B-25 mitchell bombardments against the Protheros and Kankirei Saddle. By 11 a .m. Captain Gunn was 300 yards from an enemy position on Cam's Saddle while artillery shelled the position until 12.30 pm when the Australians found that the enemy had withdrawn.   Farther on, Captain Gunn's men would be pinned down by Japanese defending the western end of the saddle as Japanese patrols ambushed a signal line party 500 yards behind. Gunn initially tried to outflank the enemy, but then withdrew 200 yards and dug in for the night astride the mule track. At the same time, the 2/12th battalion reached Canning's Saddle by 3:30pm. The next morning, the 2/12th began to silently creep along the razor back ridge towards Prothero 1 with Cameron's C Company taking the lead. At this point Fraser had Captain Cameron's C Company, Captain Geason's A Company  and Captain Thomas's D company enveloping the ridge. They nearly achieved surprise, but the Japanese discovered their advance and rapidly turned their mountain gun upon them causing many casualties. Despite the mountain guns fire, Lt Braithwaites 8th Platoon charged the Japanese and captured the mountain gun upon Prothero 1. The action cost 11 Australian lives with another 44 wounded. The 2/12th had thus captured the key point in the Japanese defenses upon Shaggy Ridge. After the loss of the mountain gun position, Colonel Matsumoto ordered his men to pull back closer to Kankirei. In the process the 2/10th were able to capture Cam's Saddle. On that same day the 2/9th began their attack, sending A Company to envelope the Green Sniper's Pimple defended by a platoon of the 78th regiment. A Company managed to seize the position using stealth and would be met by failed counterattacks. By the end of the day the Japanese defenders were now sandwiched between the 2/9th to the south and the 2/12th to the north, while the 2/10th were advancing from the east.   Way further to the east, General Nakano's men were in an even more dire situation. After the evacuation of Sio, the Japanese were forced to retreat day and night under heavy rainfall, hindered by rough terrain and allied aerial attacks. Lieutenant General Yoshihara Kane, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, recalled this of the march: “The most wearing part was that with these ranges, when they climbed to the craggy summit they had to descend and then climb again, and the mountains seemed to continue indefinitely, until they were at the extreme of exhaustion. Especially when they trod the frost of Nokobo Peak they were overwhelmed by cold and hunger. At times they had to make ropes out of vines and rattan and adopt "rock-climbing" methods; or they crawled and slipped on the steep slopes; or on the waterless mountain roads they cut moss in their potatoes and steamed them. In this manner, for three months, looking down at the enemy beneath their feet, they continued their move. Another thing which made the journey difficult was the valley streams, which were not usually very dangerous. At times, however, there was a violent squall, for which the Finisterres are famous during the rainy season; then these valley streams for the time being flowed swiftly and became cataracts. Then there were many people drowned... General Shoge was swept away by one of these streams on one occasion but fortunately managed to grasp the branch of a tree which was near the bank and was able to save one of his nine lives.”   The men were malnourished, fatigued, but kept going day by day anticipating an abundant food supply at Gali. When they reached Gali in late January they would find nothing there. This anguish was just the beginning. The base had been shelled by allied warships and bombed by allied aircraft. General Muroya was injured on January 17th during the bombardment. Luckily for the Japanese there was no offensive towards Gali. Since the Saidor landing, General Martin's men were busy expanding the perimeter with outposts extending towards Sel and Bilau. Martin was reinforced with the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 128th regiment on January 16th. Although Martin believed launching an eastern attack upon the withdrawing enemy would provide an excellent opportunity to destroy some of their divisions, General Kreuger refused to permit such a thing. This was because the 32nd division was required for an upcoming offensive in the Hansa Bay area.   Meanwhile General Nakai had brought the bulk of his detachment over to the Mot River area and established a strong outpost on Gabumi. Nakai also sent the 3rd battalion 239th regiment to Bilau to try and contest the control of its outpost. On January 12, the Japanese attacked Biliau, forcing the Americans to retreat behind the river. 30 Americans then tried to retake the outpost the following day but were repelled by the Japanese. On January 15th, the Japanese withdrew, allowing the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to occupy it on January 20. Another Japanese attack on January 26 would force them to retreat; and two days later, the Americans were successfully ambushed when they tried to reoccupy the outpost. Nakano's men had thus successfully carried out a fighting withdrawal from Lae. They had suffered horribly for it, crossing unbelievable difficult terrain, with basically no supplies, apart from what meager amounts could be airdropped or brought over via submarine. Yet now they needed to break through towards Madang, and there were 3 possible options of doing so. Number 1, they could advance along the coast, but this one was disregarded immediately because they would have to break directly through the new American defenses. Number 2, codenamed A would be an advance inland through Cabutamon, Monara, Sibog and Bilau towards Mindiri. Option 3 codenamed B was an advance even further inland crossing over the foothills of the Finisterre, through Nokopo, Kwembum, Yugayuga, Gabumi and Singor towards Mindiri. Nakano elected to send the 20th division over plan A while his division would advance in 3 echelons over plan B.   On January 23rd, the 51st division departed Gali along the B route while the 1st battalion, 115th regiment and General Katagiri's 20th division would advance along the A route. Katagiri's 80th regiment and 20th engineer regiment tried the best they could, but the march was only advancing a single kilometer per day. Katagiri's troops had to cut through dense jungle and were facing strong enemy patrols along their route. Facing greater difficulties than expected, Katagiri decided to follow Nakano's 51st division along the A route in the end. Yet unbeknownst to him, the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment had just established new outposts at Sibog and Paramusi on January 22nd. From there they were sending out patrols to Langani and Sindaman. The Americans still could not break through Nakai's defenses at Gabumi giving the Japanese some relief. The bulk of Nakano's forces were withdrawing smoothly, seeing just sporadic harassment from American patrols. On the 1st of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment finally made contact with Nakai's forces at Gabumi while the bulk of the 51st division advanced through Yugayuga. A week later, Nakano himself reached Gabumi and began advancing towards Madang. By the 16th of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment reached Madang and the 20th division had successfully pulled out of Gabumi.   Late February would see 1667 men in total arrive at Madang, 5469 would reach Singor and 1235 would reach Gabumi. Thus 80% of Nakano's strength had effectively withdrawn. Nakai also managed to collect 500 patients that had been abandoned at Yugayuga and brought them over to Madang by March 1st. It seemed once again, Nakano's men had escaped doom. On the other side, Brigadier Cameron had begun his advance towards Saidor on January 25th. His 4th battalion led by Lt Colonel Percy Crosky, with a Papuan company reached Kiari on January 28th. Without taking a break they continued towards Singor the next day, then Malasanga and Crossingtown by the 31st.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese were slowly but surely losing their hold over Shaggy Ridge. With the loss of the vital artillery position it was just a matter of time before the Australians took over the area, meanwhile Nakano's great retreat was a success, but one does not win a war moving backwards. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 112 - Pacific War - Ledo Road Offensive , January 9-16, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 9, 2024 45:18


Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and the drive against Sio. The Australians were still advancing across Shaggy Ridge when General MacArthur unleashed an amphibious assault against Saidor to cut off the Japanese escape and isolate Sio. Numerous features were seized up the large ridge and the Americans successfully amphibiously assaulted Saidor and seized their airfield. General Adachi placed the 51st and 20th divisions under the command of General Nakano, who was tasked with advancing to Gali to try and secure a new supply point. Meanwhile efforts were made to try and contain the new threat in Saidor while simultaneously holding back the Australians in the south. Over on new britain the airdrome was seized as Colonel Katayama launched a failed counter attack against the Marines. The Marines tossed back the attack and began their own advance further inland. This episode is Ledo Road Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Americans had landed at Cape Gloucester, Saidor and were carrying out massive attacks against Rabaul. As we had seen previously, on November 5th, aided by bad weather, a surprise air raid was made by the USS Saratoga and Princeton, led by Rear-Admiral Frederick Sherman that inflicted heavy damage to 4 cruisers within the harbor; Maya's engine room was smashed by a bomb killing over 70 men; a 500 lb bomb hit Mogami; Takao took 2 500 lb bomb hits while 3 500 lb bombs narrowly missed Atago killing 23 seamen and caused severe damage to the ship's plating. 2 other cruisers and 3 destroyers also suffered light damage. Captain George Chandler flying a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag' bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” The devastation caused Admiral Miniechi Koga to withdraw his forces to Truk, thus ending the IJN threat to Bougainville. A Japanese naval officer would later admit that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The successful  raid against Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo's Rabaul.” On November 8th, reinforcements led by Rear-admiral Alfred Montgomery task force 38, with the new fleet carriers USS Bunker Hill, Essex and Independence. With the added carrier strength on November 11th, a follow up air raid was made seeing the IJN cruiser Agano torpedoed and badly damaged, while 35 Japanese aircraft out of 120 launched in a counter attack against the carrier force were shot down. Montgomery would not lose a single ship. Admiral Koga's decision to send carrier pilots to bolster Rabaul had quite literally blown up in his face. Koga's air fleet had lost 43 of its 82 Zeros, 38 of its 34 Vals, 34 of its 40 Kates and 6 Judy spotter planes. Over 86 of his 192 experienced pilots and crew had perished, and he had only inflicted minimal damage to Nimitz fleet, it was a disaster. Yet the fantastical reports from Japanese pilots kept pouring in, claiming the air battles over Bougainville were infact won by the IJN air forces. Newspapers in Japan reported victories that added up to the destruction of 5 American battleships, 10 carriers, 19 cruisers and 7 destroyers. The reality was the destruction of 2 cruisers, the USS Birmingham and Denver. By mid november Vice Admiral Kusaka was finding it difficult to sustain attacks against allied convoys feeding supplies to Empress Augusta Bay. On November 12th, Rabaul only had 113 Zero's of which only 59 were operational. Crews were suffering from malaria and other diseases, no one was granted rest as they were limited in personnel and under constant attack. The quality of ground crews and pilots was deteriorating every week.  From November 12 through December 16, the daytime skies over the Gazelle Peninsula remained relatively quiet, as the US carrier forces had departed to support operations in the Central Pacific. AirSols received a new commander on the November 20th, Major General Ralph Mitchell who continued to support operations in Bougainville and General Kenney's Fifth Air Force was supporting preparations for the landings in western New Britain. The lull gave Admiral Kusaka a brief opportunity to recuperate as replacements began to arrive from the Marshalls and Truk. The Imperial Japanese Navy would take six months to replenish its carrier pilots with less well-trained and inexperienced replacements. In the meantime the carrier fleet itself, Japan's most expensive and precious strategic asset, was forced to remain idle in Truk as Nimitz began his island hop through the Central Pacific Meanwhile the Torokina airfield had become crude but operational. The Seabees had created a single 4750 foot by 200 foot strip. It lacked taxiways, hardstands and buildings, but by December 10th it could launch aircraft. Soon the Seabees would carve 2 additional landing trips in the jungle 3 miles further inland. The first would be a mile long, the second 8000 feet or so for bombers. Unlike the Japanese airfields on the Gazelle Peninsula which would take more than a year to complete, both of these American airfields took a month. You often hear, especially from marine veterans of the pacific, praise for the Seabees, such a colossal advantage in logistics paved the way to victory. A massive fighter sweep was launched on December 17 consisting of 32 Corsairs, 24 F6Fs, and 24 RNZAF Kittyhawks from airfields at New Georgia and Vella Lavella who rendezvoused at Torokina, topped off their fuel tanks, and hit  Rabaul. The strike was led by Major Greg “Pappy” Boyington, the commanding officer of Marine Fighter Squadron 214, better known by its nickname, the "Black Sheep Squadron". The three types of aircraft had different flying characteristics and different cruising speeds. The Kittyhawks, slowest of the bunch, took off first. The plan was for them to come in at 15,000ft, and lure out the Japanese. Next came the Hellcats, flying above the Kittyhawks. And the last were the Corsairs, who flew top cover. It was a long flight over open water, calculated to make the pilot of a single-engine aircraft nervous. If the engine failed it was a long swim home. They were intercepted by 35 Zeros, with the Kittyhawks getting the first jump on them. After the Kittyhawks made their first pass, shooting down a Japanese fighter, the advantage switched over to the more agile  Zeros. The Kittyhawk squadron leader's plane was fatally damaged and a second Kittyhawk went down after colliding with a Zero. Remarkably, both pilots survived. Meanwhile the Hellcats and Corsairs, at high altitudes, were coming up empty. The Corsairs circled Lakunai field finding no targets. Pilot Boyington exchanged insults with an English-speaking Japanese officer over the radio, but despite his challenges found no targets in the air. When all aircraft returned to base, the score was even. Two Kittyhawks and two Zeros were lost; one each due to the collision and one shot down by both sides. It was a rather disappointing fighter sweep, but would become just one of many against Rabual over the course of the next 3 weeks. The next raid came two days later seeing 48 B-24s launched, but 32 were forced turned back. The remaining 16 bombers escorted by 51 were intercepted by 94 Japanese fighters, yet they also suffered from the bad weather. Less than half made contact with the enemy. In the resulting fight, 5 Zeros were shot down and 10 allied aircraft were lost, but only two were shot down. The other eight were due to a mid-air collision and landing mishaps, all near home. The weather persisted to be so bad, it was only on the 23rd another sortie could be launched. B-24s escorted by Corsairs and Hellcats bombed Lakunai. Radar gave the Japanese some early warning and nearly 100 Zeros were scrambled. 60 made contact with the bombers after they hit Lakunai. No bombers were lost, but 2 Corsairs were shot down in the ensuing dogfights. Yet the Americans had a twist, they followed up the raid with a fighter sweep of 48 Corsairs. They arrived 15 minutes after the bombers left, surprising the airborne Japanese fighters, most of whom lacked radios. 6 Zeros were shot down, several others damaged and only 2 Corsairs lost.  2 days later, another fighter sweep preceded by bombers was launched claiming 18 aircraft kills, but it was probably closer to 5. In comparison the Japanese pilots would claim 55 kills, a number greater than the american force sent. On the 27 another sweep was launched against Cape Gloucester downing 7 Japanese aircraft for one American. 28 Corsairs returned the next day but this time the Japanese held the advantage, sandwiching the Marines between 2 large groups of Zeros. 3 Corsairs were shot down, but so were 3 Zeros, with 2 others badly damaged. On 30th 36 Liberators escorted by 20 Hellcats and 20 Corsairs, bombed Rabaul. 1 B-24 was lost on the raid, hit by antiaircraft fire. No air combat occurred. On New Years day 15 B-24s and 68 escorting fighters met heavy fighter opposition. 40 Zeros had been sent to Rabaul from Truk, manned by veteran pilots. 1 B-24 was shot down, and two others badly damaged. On January 2 48 US fighters raided and on the 3rd another 44. The two sweeps took out a handful of fighters. The last sweep was on the 5th seeing another 2 zeros downed. Meanwhile back on December 24th, Admiral Sherman's task force 37 raided Kavieng. The operation had two purposes, 1) was to distract attention from the landings at Cape Gloucester and 2) to interdict sea traffic between Truk and Rabaul. The 5000-ton naval transport Tenyru Maru was sunk and several other ships were damaged. After this task force 37 made several raids against Kavieng through January 4th. They managed to shoot down 10 Japanese fighters, damaged IJN cruiser Noshiro and destroyers Fumizuki and Satsuki. On Janaury 6th, the bomber strip at Piva became operational, thus Rabaul was now within range of allied light and medium bombers, basically it was pounding time.   On January 7th, 16 Avengers and 24 Dauntless raided Tobera airfield. From medium altitudes the Avengers dropped 2000lb pounds smashing the paved runways. The Japanese managed to shoot down 3 fighters and one dauntless, but Tobera was temporarily not operational. It was the first time any Rabaul airbase was neutralized from bomb damage. This would be followed up on the 11th by a low level attack against Vunakanau by B-25's, damaging 8 parked aircraft. Then on the 14th, Simpson Harbor was attacked by 16 Avengers , 36 Dauntless and fighter escorts. The Japanese tossed 84 fighters but the allies held such a tight formation it was difficult to get at the bombers. 2 bombers were lost before reaching Lakunai; 1 to a mid-air collision and 1 to antiaircraft fire. When the Allied aircraft finally arrived, clouds shielded Lakunai so the bombers switched to targeting the ships in Simpson Harbor. The Avengers carried 2,000lb bombs, limiting their effectiveness. Regardless, they landed hits on the 15,400-ton-displacement oiler Naruto, and thus ended its goal of becoming the Hokage. . . sorry folks could not resist that one. The destroyer Matsukaze was also damaged alongside 5 other vessels.    AirSols came back to hit simpson harbor and blanche bay 3 days later sinking  the Komaki Maru, Kosei Maru, Yamayuri Maru, Hakkai Maru and Iwate Maru. To take down the combined 30,000 tons of shipping AirSols lost 8 P-38s, 1 Hellcat, 1 F4U, 1 Avenger, and 1 Dauntless. The rest of January saw so many raids, sometimes 2-3 on the same day, thus I can't spend the entire podcast listing their actions, but the losses were brutal. For the Americans they would lose 23 aircraft between January 23rd-30th, for the Japanese it was around 37. By the end of the month, Rabaul was being bled dry of planes, thus the rest was withdrawn to Truk with around 40 pilots. To make up for the withdrawal, Admiral Koga brought over the air groups of carriers Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho on the 25th adding 62 zeros, 18 vals and 18 kates to Admiral Kusakas dwindling forces. Does that not sound like performing the exact same action that saw such devastating losses in late december to early january? Yes, yes it does.    Moving over to New Britain, General Shepherd had just smashed the Japanese positions along Suicide Creek. While seizing Suicide Creek some Americans captured a Japanese dispatch saying “It is essential that we conceal the intention that we are maintaining positions on Aogiri Ridge. Concerning the occupation of this position, it is necessary that Aogiri Yama is maintained.” While making arrangements for the Japanese assault against Target Hill one, Lieutenant Abe had occasion sent field dispatches to Warrant Officer Kiyoshi Yamaguchi, one of his platoon leaders. The dispatch mentioned command post locations, hour of attack, and other orders. Yamaguchi, with that seemingly incredible indifference to basic security which the Japanese so often demonstrated, simply stuck the dispatch in his pocket and carried it with him to the assault. Marines found it on his body the following morning, thereby gaining their first inkling of the existence of a terrain feature which appeared as such on none of their maps but upon which the Japanese appeared to place great importance, for reasons not yet clear. Aoigiri Ridge was not in the American maps and it was currently held by the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Behind the ridge was a wide trail leading to Magairapua, connecting Matsuda's HQ with Borgen Bay. The trail was heavily used and concealed extremely well from American aircraft. Back over at the American lines, by January 5th, the 3rd battalion, 7th marines had pulled back into the reserve, allowing the weapons company, 7th marines to occupy the extreme left along the shore to prepare for Shepherds offensive against Hill 150. The new formation launched their attack at 11am on the 6th. Tanks surged forward to smash a roadblock held by the 2nd battalion, 141st regiment on the left trail. Artillery was deployed on a nearby hill hitting the Japanese lines as A company tried to break through but was quickly pinned down by the roadblock. The tanks eventually burst through the roadblock sending the Japanese packing.   The americans advanced through the increasingly swampy terrain, facing weaker resistance. B company crossed a small stream and stormed Hill 150 during the afternoon, securing it. Further right, C company and the 3rd battalion, 5th marines were surprised to be held up by extremely heavy fire from the until then unknown feature, Aogiri ridge. The men had no other choice than to pull back to a safe distance to dig in as they reported back the presence of the heavily fortified position. The Japanese would unleash carnage upon the men for 2 days whenever they tried to press forward. On the 7th the commanding officer of the 3rd battalion, 5th Marines, was wounded and replaced by Lt Colonel Lewis Walt. The next day, Walk's men were cautiously inching forward under heavy enemy fire through dense jungle, when they first encountered the ground rising in steepness. At this point Walt realized the feature had to be Aogiri Ridge.    On the 9th, the assault battalions resumed their attacks, this time with heavy artillery support against Aogiri ridge. Walt was reinforced with Companies K and L from the 7th marines, but the advance was extremely slow and painful. Two Japanese bunkers were knocked out with white phosphorus grenades, but that ended the limited gains. Walt personally began pushing a 37mm gun excruciating foot by foot up Aogiri ridge, firing a volley of canisters every few feet. Somehow he managed to get the gun up the steep slope into a decent position to sweep the ridge, allowing the gain of a foothold on the crest of Aogiri. The loss of the ridge was a huge threat to Matsuda and Katayama's positions, so the latter decided to throw his reserves in a desperate but ferocious counterattack.   At 1:15am on the 10th, Katayama sent his recently arrived 3rd battalion to attack the reverse slope. However the Marines held firm and would end up repelling 5 consecutive banzai charges with a fury and persistence unparalleled in the campaign. On the 4th try a Japanese major and two company officers succeeded in knifing through the Marine cordon almost to Colonel Walt's fox hole, 50 yards behind the front line. At that instant one of two short rounds in a 60-round artillery barrage burst in a tall tree almost directly overhead, and the major died there, sword in one hand and a pistol in the other. The 5th charge was blunted by artillery and the Japanese finally cut their losses and pulled back. The Japanese had suffered immense casualties, seeing all 3 of their battalions depleted, forcing Katayama to pull off Aogiri ridge that very night. The morning of the 10th saw Walk's men securing the feature and then discovering the vital Magairapua trail. The marines went to work mopping up the area until January 12th, whereupon Shepherd planned to seize Hill 660. The feature was guarded by the 6th company, 141st regiment supported by a number of guns of the 30th machine cannon company. The fresh 3rd battalion, 7th marines, led by lt colonel Henry Buse Jr were to perform the main assault, with the 1st battalion extending the perimeter behind them. To help the effort, the weapons company,7th marines of Captain Buckley would begin constructing a roadblock between the eastern base of Hill 660 to the shore of Borgen Bay, hoping to cut off the defenders escape route.   At 08:00am on the 13th, after artillery, mortars and the 5th Air Force performed a bombardment of the area, the last Marine offensive commenced. A intricate system of small arms and automatic weapon positions going up the summit unleashed fire upon the marines, quickly pinning down I company. L Company attempted swinging to the right, but were also pinned down. Engineers worked a light tank forward far enough to place fire across a gorge demolishing the more troublesome enemy weapons. By late afternoon, together with artillery supporting fire, the pinned-down companies were rescued and withdrawn for the night. Meanwhile the Weapons company worked with their bulldozer, by 1030 they had skirted the eastern base of the hill and set up an all-around perimeter. There they dug in clearing fields of fire for about 60 yards to both north and south, placing their half-tracks and tanks in supporting positions. The only opposition they encountered during the advance was by two Japanese machine guns and emplaced near the summit of the hill. With all said and done they successfully cut off the Japanese line of retreat.  On the morning of the 14th, the 3rd battalion resumed their assault, with their leading companies advancing to the right working their way up. One unit nearly got atop the crest before coming under fire from heavy machine guns. They got to a position where they could bring 60mm mortars to bear, and went to work neutralizing the machine gun positions before a final surge carried them across the summit. The Japanese fled down the crest heading east, coming straight into the line of fire of the Weapons company below. The result was a terrible rout, seeing many escape to the safety of the swamps to the hills southeast. By the end of the 14th, the marines had seized Hill 660 and were performing mop up operations through the following day. At 5:30am on the 16th, Katayama ordered the 6th and 11th companies, 141st regiment to counter attack Hill 660. Soon the marines were face to face with a large banzai charge, seeing the fighting getting up close and personal. But small arms, rifles, 60mm mortars and 81mm artillery broke the Japanese. Over 110 Japanese bodies would be found after the fight. This ended Shepherds offensive, as the remnants of Colonel Sumiya's forces began to arrive to the Borgen Bay area. Over the next few days, the exhausted 7th marines were relieved by the 5th marines and 2nd battalion, 1st marines who had recently been recalled after completing their mission at Green Beach.  After suffering the defeated in Borgen Bay, General Sakai decided to order the 1st battalion, 54th regiment to reinforce Talasea and for Matsuda to launch a last ditch effort, a suicidal one at that, to obliterate the enemy. But the men were in no condition for such an offensive, thus Katayama elected to postpone it for now. Since every man was needed for the defense of Borgen Bay, Colonel Sato took the remainder of his commander and departed Rooke Island to join the main body. Now that Hill 660 was secured, the Americans began a new method of patrolling; this time their patrols would specifically seek out and destroy what was presumed to be exhausted Japanese units, before the division would attack the defensive line at Borgen Bay-Itni river. Yet that is it for new Britian, as we are going to be traveling over to the CBI theater. Between November 22 to December the 1st, two conference were held between the Allied leaders. The first was the Cairo or “sextant” conference on November 22-26th, between President FDR, Sir Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The second was held in Tehran on November 28-December 1st between FDR, Churchill and Joseph Stalin. You might be asking, why did they all not meet up together. The crux of it was the Soviet-Japanese neutrality Pact and to a lesser extent, though probably not in Chiang Kai-Shek's mind, Stalin was aiding the CCP. Because the Soviets had not declared war on the Japanese, it would not look to good if they met with the leader of China, likewise Chiang Kai-shek was not too forthcoming to meet with Stalin. The easy fix was to just have two different conferences. Overall the conferences did not really touch too much upon the Pacific war. But Stalin did promise to declare war on Japan within ninety days after the end of the European War. In return he demanded military and logistical concessions in Manchuria, maintenance of Outer Mongolia under Soviet control as well as sovereignty over the Kuril Islands that stretched from north of Japan to Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula. When Chiang Kai-shek heard about this he had suspicious and noted “The influence of this conference on China will be great. I hope Roosevelt isn't plotting with Churchill and Stalin against me.” Soon his suspicion would turn to anger when he discovered there were secret protocols relating to Manchuria.  Stalin had made some assurances to Mao Zedong that once the Soviets were in the war against Japan, they would have forces to bear down into China to help tip the scale for the CCP against the NRA. Yet after the war, it would seem promises made by Joseph Stalin were not always kept.  Another important aspect of the conferences was the British decision to cancel Operation Buccaneer, the invasion of the Andaman Islands, because Admiral Mountbatten's landing crafts were required for landings in southern france. The Joint chiefs of staff were livid at this, because it came at the same time the Japanese were reinforcing Burma. FDR overruled them and agreed to the British decision and this in turn greatly pissed off Chiang Kai-Shek. Yet at the same time, the Cairo declaration had lifted up the morale for the Chinese army and people to continue their war against the Japanese. The declarations made by the Tehran conference implied publicly that the CBI theater was all but abandoned to the mercy of Japan's air and land forces. Thus it would be no coincidence the Japanese thought it ripe to launch an all-out offensive against China.  In the meantime, the rather aggressive Admiral Mountbatten was trying to salvage what he could of the situation. To try and please Chiang Kai-Shek, he proposed Operation Pigstick. The operation was something Mountbatten had wargamed a bit, it was to be a landing on the southern Mayu peninsula aimed at hitting Akyab. He began assigning landing craft for the amphibious operation, only to be immediately slapped down by Alanbrooke and told to return 3 fast tank landing crafts that were direly needed for operations against Italy. Mountbatten hoped to retain 2 slower tank landing craft, but Cunningham requested them. Pigstick was to be 2 divisions plus 2 brigades who would be used in a southward advance down the peninsula and 1 division in an amphibious assault aimed at surrounding and destroying not less than 20,000 Japanese. An additional landing similar to PIGSTICK, could perhaps be launched in the Ramree-Cheduba area, could take staging areas that would put 15 Corps within reach of Rangoon. Speaking of Ramree, if any of you have heard this kind of myth about over 1000 Japanese being eaten by crocodiles on that island, over on my personal channel the pacific war channel I did a full investigation into the so called “ramree island massacre” story. A little sad about its performance not going to lie. Dramatically improved my lackluster animation skills for it, came out really well and I did a silly impersonation at the beginning, anyways check it out its a fun one! Alongside Pigstick, Mountbatten changed the Tarzan operation into Operation Gripfast, calling for an offensive on north and central Burma with an airborne landing at Indaw to sever the Japanese line of communications to Myitkyina. But now Chiang Kai-Shek was very wary of anything British, so he rejected the plans on December 19th. Alongside pissing off Chiang Kai-Shek, his estranged wife, Joseph Stilwell was also again angry with the British, particularly Mountbatten. At one point Mountbatten proposed moving certain American units into the Hukawng valley to help the offensive there and Stillwell burst out ‘I should like it placed on record that I am responsible for the training of all American forces in this theatre and I am the person to decide when they are adequately trained and can move forward.' Mountbatten replied: ‘I accept that in principle, but would remind you that these troops are being trained under British officers. I am responsible for operations and will decide when units move into the fighting lines. In other words, general, I should like to place on record that I am Supreme Commander out here and what I say goes.' Stilwell took it good-humouredly and laughed. ‘We none of us dispute that,'”. That day Stilwell wrote a letter to his wife, referring scathingly to Mountbatten as ‘the glamour boy. He doesn't wear well and I begin to wonder if he knows his stuff. Enormous staff, endless walla-walla but damn little fighting . . . And of course the Peanut is unchanged. The jungle is a refuge from them both.' The men would all share some screaming matches against another, until Stilwell would shock everyone by exclaiming “I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing.” It was a truly bizarre idea, Mountbatten asked how such a thing would work, and both Slim and Stilwell asked to discuss the matter amongst themselves. The two men would agree on tactical essentials such as getting more Chinese divisions for the Ledo force and to use the Chindits to assist in hitting Myitkyina. Slim and Stilwell shook hands and Stilwell said to him ‘I would fight under a corporal as long as he would let me fight.' Slim would later reflecte ‘In practice this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well. My method with Stilwell was based on what I had learnt of him in the Retreat – to send him the minimum of written instructions, but, whenever I wanted anything, to fly over and discuss it with him, alone. Stilwell, talking things over quietly with no one else present, was a much easier and more likeable person than Vinegar Joe with an audience. Alone, I never found him unreasonable or obstructive. I think I told him to do something he did not approve of on only two or three occasions, and on each he conformed, I will not say willingly, but with good grace.' In the end Operation Pigstick never became a reality, because the landing crafts were needed for the Italian campaign and thus the hope of meeting Chiang Kai-sheks continued demand for an amphibious operation was gone. It was almost like the British never intended to go through with such a thing in the first place, woops that is just my opinion. Meanwhile the British-Indian command elected to start a new operation in Arakan. The brutal hard-won lessons of 1st Arakan battle had been absorbed in India Command, with senior British officers determined to avoid similar mistakes. The new operation was the subject of meticulous reconnaissance, planning, and rehearsals. A series of lectures, war games, models of the grounds and syndicate discussions were held for commanders, staff and regimental officers whom carefully considered countering Japanese offensive tactics and assaulting prepared defensive positions like those witnessed at Donbaik. A carefully planned programme of continuous, progressive and intensive training was put in hand for all corps and divisional fighting, support and administrative troops to practice necessary skills, including using brigade boxes, aerial resupply and the infiltration and envelop- ment of enemy positions. This comprehensive training programme culminated in intensive rehearsals and combined arms training with artillery, tanks and close support aircraft carried out near Lohardaga, over ground resembling Arakan, simulating attacks on mock Japanese defensive positions on jungle-clad hills. General Auchinleck assigned the 15th corps, reconstituted at Ranchi with the 3 best trained divisions available: Major-General Harold Briggs' 5th Indian Division; Major-General Frank Messervy's 7th Indian Division and Major-General Christopher Woolner's 81st West African Division.The 26th Indian Division formed the corps reserve. Command of the 15th corps would be given to Lt General Philip Christison. The plan called for the 5th and 7th Indian divisions to advance along the summit of the Mayu range towards Maungdaw and Buthidaung while the 5th and 6th west african brigades would provide flanking protection. On November 1st, the 2 Indian divisions began their advance and by mid november would make contact with a Japanese outpost.As the 7th Indian division advanced astride the Kalapanzin River they ran into stiff resistance. Efforts to dislodge Japanese defenders near Awlanbyin and Letwedet, showcased the formidable difficulties that attacking Japanese defensive bunker positions presented. Most were built on razor-back ridges, through which were burrowed fire positions, affording a limited approach, while the reverse slopes protected troops from view and bombardment. With the precipitous Goppe Pass initially only suitable for porters, pack transport and pack artillery, 7th Indian Division quickly devised other methods to overcome enemy defenses, since normal stereotyped, set-piece attacks stood little chance of success without supporting field artillery. Aircraft proved an ineffective substitute, moreover, with dive-bombing having only a transitory effect since the broken terrain and dense jungle absorbed blast leaving defenses and morale largely intact unless a lucky direct hit was made. The Indian forces began to infiltrate and bypass the well-entrenched Japanese defenses, giving the impression they would soon unleash a frontal attack upon them at any moment. General Messervy's would say of the action  “'We will undoubtedly have a Neapolitan sandwich of British - Japs - British, but it will be one made by ourselves, and with the initiative in our hands it will soon be transformed to British - British - Jap.” They were gaining ground and with it valuable combat experience. On the night of November 30th, the 15th Indian Corps commenced large-scale operations to drive in the Japanese outpost line astride the Mayu Range. A series of brisk skirmishes were fought by 33rd Indian Infantry Brigade on the jungle-cloaked ridges south of Awlanbyin quickly evicting small determined parties of Japanese infantry from carefully prepared platoon and company defensive localities. This was by no means an easy task since most heavily camouflaged positions were built atop steep hillsides overlooking paddy fields that provided an open field of five and difficult going for advancing troops. Earlier directions about infiltration paid off in practice. An attack on Awlanbyin west redoubt from the rear through thick jungle achieved complete surprise. Although a neighboring Japanese position initially held out, its garrison withdrew on 2nd December after being cut off. The 33rd Brigade columns  crossed the Ngakyedauk Chaung and occupied the area from Ngakyedauk village to the ridge about 1.5 miles north-west of Sinohbyin village. By December3rd, they extended the area of operation to the hills overlooking Maungyithaung and Sinohbyin. The 89th Brigade, meanwhile, pushed forward down Tatmin Chaung and established forward positions on the hills south of the chaung, one mile west of Tatmingyaungywa. By mid-month, 7th Indian Division had reached the main enemy positions covering the Tunnels and Buthidaung, and the opening of the Ngakyedauk Pass to wheeled traffic in late December considerably eased resupply and allowed the divisional artillery to join the formation. However, both the Indian divisions were under orders not to get engaged in serious fighting with the Japanese, so the advance stopped there. It is also important to note, in November 1943,  Spitfires were deployed in Bengal for the first time. The 615th and 617th squadrons were based in Chittagong to protect the vital port and also to cover the Arakan. Within one month, the Spitfires destroyed four Japanese photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Previously, the Dinah's range, speed and height had enabled them to fly with impunity over the Allied forward bases and the Hurricanes were unable to catch them. The Japanese reacted by sending out fighter sweeps in order to test the Spitfires and whittle down Spitfire strength. However, by the end of December, the Japanese lost 22 aircraft, another 33 were damaged, and the Allied loss was only 13 aircraft. The greatest air battle occurred on the last day of 1943. On that day, No. 136 Squadron destroyed 12 and damaged 11 when a mixed force of Japanese fighters and bombers attempted to attack the light naval force along the Arakan Coast. The Japanese carried out one strategic attack when on 5 December 1943, 60 bombers and fighters, including some naval aircraft, in two waves bombed Calcutta. The Japanese lost two aircraft and another five were damaged. The three and a half squadrons of Hurricane fighters, including half a squadron of night fighters which were defending the area lost five aircraft and another six were damaged.  To the west the 5th Indian Division had also encountered stiffening resistance from Japanese outposts as it advanced southwards along the coastal plain towards Maungdaw, through the foothills further north and along the spine of the jungle-clad Mayu Mountains. They soon discovered that overcoming Japanese bunker defenses presented particular difficulties. As the division would report "The great difficulty in attacking Jap "hill top" positions lies in the concealment of the actual bunker or weapon pit' one brigade commander later wrote, and in the practical impossibility of deploying attacking troops in thick jungle, particularly where the approach runs along the top of a razor backed ridge.' In each case, patrols infiltrated between these localities isolated them from supplies and reinforcements with the result that Japanese normally gave up ground without a contest. A newsletter prepared by the HQ of 5th Indian Division reported: 'The only way to deal with the Jap def positions is by INFILTRATION. Recent experience has shown that the Jap has produced nothing new in def tactics... It is almost physically impossible in hilly and thick country to have every post covered by another, the posts can be eliminated piece- meal by infiltration tactics.' After the outline of the main Japanese defenses became apparent this approach was also increasingly applied at brigade level. At the end of December 1943, the 5th Indian Division held the area from the sea to the crest of the Mayu Peninsula and the 7th Indian Division moved into the Kalapanzin Valley. By the end of the month they reached Maungdaw. The advancing 5th Indian Division discovered that frontal assaults could not be completely avoided, however, when Japanese troops were determined to stay put. During this advance, the 161st Brigade moved to the high ground to the northeast of Bakkagona about five miles to the north of Razabil. On 30th December, 161st Indian Infantry Brigade assaulted Point 124, but the 4/7th Rajputs were held up by dense jungle and heavy mortar and machine fire and suffered heavy casualties. For six days assaults continued with the forward infantry regularly reaching the Japanese defenses before being driven off by showers of hand grenades and supporting machine-gun from every other enemy defensive position within range. Only after a 'policy of strangulation, starvation, and attrition was adopted', did its defenders withdraw. The 5th Indian Division immediately began probing the main Razabil defenses, while its 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade patrolled the western foothills of the Mayu Range and northern side of Razabil, particularly two hill positions dubbed Wrencat and Wrenkitten. To do so an indirect approach was again advocated by Major-General Harold Briggs in note on tactical policy issued on 4th January, stressing the importance of patrolling to identify positions held by the Japanese and infiltration to seize vital ground in their flanks or rear that would either provoke Japanese counterattacks or force a withdrawal. Meanwhile Stilwell arrived to Shingbwiyang on December 21st and assumed command of the Chinese forces in India. To relive the trapped battalion of the 112th regiment at Yupbang Ga, Stilwell and General Sun planned to send the entire 114th regiment to break the Japanese center at Yupang Ga to rescue the 112th, then hook north to envelope the northern fragment of the Japanese defensive line. On December 24th, they unleashed artillery and launched the infantry into the Japanese lines. The 114th regiment managed to envelop the Japanese right flank by the afternoon and soon a breakthrough emerged allowing for them to make contact with the 112th. Sun's men then surrounded the Japanese pocket during the night and would wipe them out the next morning. And thus the Chinese had gained their first victory at Yupbang Ha, though the Japanese still held the river crossing, so Stilwell began plans for another assault set after Christmas. On December 28th, Sun ordered 3 battalions to attack the north, while the 1st battalion, 112th regiment would sweep to the right, getting behind the 3 Japanese outer strongpoints. The chinese forces rapidly broke the Japanese outer defenses creating a breach while the 1st battalion, 114th regiment broke through the river defensive line. The Japanese tossed a large counterattack, but it would be repelled by the night time. Now Yupbang Ga was in allied hands as the surviving Japanese companies split into smaller groups trying to hold out for many days. With the fall of Yupbang Ga, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from Sharaw Ga as well, so elements of the 2rd battalion, 113th Regiment were be able to seize it by December 30. In the meantime, as the 22nd Division's 65th Regiment had been sent towards the Taro Plain to try and secure the southern flank, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 114th Regiment had been sent south to cross the Tanai Hka at the Kantau ford in an effort to cut off the enemy withdrawal line. By the end of 1943, with the loss of 315 killed and 429 wounded, Sun's 38th Division had gained complete control of the Tarung Hka.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were deteriorating for the Japanese on New Britain as American Marines were seizing features and gradually pushing them into Borgan Bay. Within the CBI theater a ton of drama amongst the high commanders was surprisingly not resulting in disaster, as operations in Burma were kicking off with great results. Perhaps Burma could be saved.

Radio NUG for Myanmar Spring
" Due To The Offensive Of The Terrorist Army, Arakan Salt Farmers Are Worried About The Production Of Salt For The Coming Salt Season, And They Are Also Experiencing An Exorbitant Increase In The Price Of Salt"

Radio NUG for Myanmar Spring

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 23, 2023


"Due to the offensive of the terrorist army, Arakan salt farmers are worried about the production of salt for the coming salt season, and they are also facing the exorbitant price of salt" (Agricultural Farmer's Voice) - Loot Latt Nway Oo.This item belongs to: audio/opensource_audio.This item has files of the following types: Archive BitTorrent, Item Tile, Metadata, PNG, Spectrogram, VBR MP3

The Pacific War - week by week
- 83 - Pacific War - Battle of Lababia Ridge, June 20-27, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 20, 2023 26:32


Last time we spoke about operation Cartwheel, developments in Green hell and some new adventures in Burma. General Douglas MacArthur had his work cut out for him as he developed his original Elkton plan into what would become Operation Cartwheel. Alongside the US Navy, MacArthur set out the blueprints for seizing parts of New Guinea and the Solomons before taking the ultimate prize that was Rabaul. The Japanese meanwhile extended their efforts to hammer allied airbases in the south pacific with lackluster results. Over on New Guinea the allied forces were drawing closer to seizing Lau, by using Salamaua as a distraction. Over in the Burma front, the disastrous Arakan campaign had resulted in some shuffling of leadership and now the Auk was working with General Slim to see if they could prepare the Indian Army for another go at the Japanese. And today we are going to be venturing back into all of these stories.  This episode is Battle of Lababia Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Last time we were speaking about Operation Cartwheel and part of phase one for Admiral Halsey in the Solomons was to move north from Guadalcanal to hit New Georgia code named Operation Toenails. Halsey planned to perform four simultaneous landings. One was directed at Wickham Anchorage by the 2nd battalion, 103rd regiment plus two companies from the 4th raider battalion to be led by Lt Colonel Lester Brown. Wickham would become a new landing craft layover base. A second landing would be made at Segi Point by Companies O and P of the 4th Raider battalion and Companies A and D of the 103rd regiment would garrison Segi point and its airfield afterwards. Another landing would be made at Viru Harbor by Company B of the 103rd regiment for its small craft base. And a final landing would be made at Rendova Harbor by the 172nd regiment and 24th naval construction battalion Seabees which would become a stage for further troops coming over to New Georgia before an assault on Munda was made. The 43rd infantry division led by Major General John Hester were going to take the lead against Munda. The 43rd were actually a national guard division from Connecticut, Maine, Rhode island and Vermont who were mobilized and reorganized as a “triangular” division. This meant they were going to be 3 regiments rather than 4. They would be brought up to strength, but in reality the only real experience they by this point was some unopposed landings on the Russell islands early in 1943. They had several months to prepare for the campaign. Hester got the men to construct pill boxes modeled after the Japanese one's found on Guadalcanal for training exercises. However the terrain found on Guadalcanal or on the Russell Islands did not really bear much resemblance to that of New Georgia. In April 1943, the 14th corps arranged for the 147th regiment, veterans of the Guadalcanal campaign who had chased the Japanese west during Operation KE to conduct several training exercises with the 43rd division. However as noted by many of the men in the regiment the terrain was not very similar to what was expected on New Georgia hampering the training. By mid june the 103rd infantry and the 169th infantry also began training exercises on Guadalcanal using landing craft. Now you probably noticed in my listening there was mention of the 4th raiders. Two new Raider battalions were entering the fray; the 3rd Raiders led by Lt Colonel Harry Liversedge were coming over fresh from Samoa; and the 4th Raiders led by Lt Colonel James Roosevelt from Camp Pendleton of California. And yes you are probably wondering, James Roosevelt II was the eldest son of FDR. Since 1936 he had been serving as his fathers military aide, under the commission of a captain in the Marine Corps Reserve. When the war broke out in 1939 he entered active duty and starting in April of 1941 FDR sent him on a secret mission. James traveled around the world on a diplomatic mission to assure other governments that the US would soon join the war despite the official neutrality stance. He met with Chiang Kai-shek in China, King Farouk of Egypt, King George of Greece, Sir Winston CHurchill of Britain and such. After the attack on Pearl Harbor he sat right beside his father as he gave the legendary Day of Infamy speech, and soon he requested an active combat assignment. He was transferred to the Marine Raiders by January of 1942 and became the 2nd in command of the 2nd Raiders under Carlson. He took part in the Makin Island Raid in August of 1942 where he earned a Navy Cross. He had some health issues, such as flat feet, and got the special privilege of being allowed to wear sneakers while the other Marines wore boots. On March 15th the 4 Raider battalions were reorganized as the 1st Raider regiment, stationed at Espiritu Santo with Liversedge as their commander and Carlson executive officer. Carlson infused his fire team and squad models into the raiders, while Edson molded them into a highly trained, lightly equipped force who could accomplish special missions or fill a line battalion on the fly. The 1st Raider Regiment was no guerilla outfit, though it felt like that initially. For Operation Toenails, Halsey assigned both the 1st Raiders led by Colonel Griffith and the 4th Raiders led by Lt Colonel Michael Currin, supported by the 9th defense battalion which was carrying a 155mm gun units and light tank platoon. The Navy was also sending the legendary Seabees; Acorn 7, the 24th and a single section of the 20th naval construction battalions. It can't be said enough how much the Seabee's brought to the table in the Pacific. During the war theSeabee's would receive 5 Navy Crosses, 33 Silver Stars and over 2000 Purple Hearts alongside numerous citations and commendations. They performed legendary deeds in the Atlantic and Pacific creating over 400 advanced bases along the 5 figurative roads to victory.   Lastly and quite interesting to note, the Americans would have a unique commando units of 130 Fijians known as the 1st Commando Fiji Guerillas. When the Pacific War broke out, Japan had seized numerous territory going as far south as the Solomon islands getting just 8 hours flight time away from places like Fiji. At this time Britain was too preoccupied with the Atlantic and America was scrambling to recover from Pearl Harbor. Fiji was in a critical position and for several months while the US was organizing her forces so was Fiji. Fiji possessed 2 good harbors and 2 airfields and her position on earth put her smack dab on the way between America and Australia / New Zealand. The allies knew the Japanese would love to take such a territory and thus she needed defense. Small numbers of troops were garrisoning Fiji, many from New Zealand, but she had little to spare as she became heavily committed to Africa and the Middle East. Thus the Americans came to Fiji to relieve the New Zealanders and they helped expand Fiji's forces. The result were commando units who proved themselves uniquely equipped for combat on pacific islands like the solomons. For New Georgia the Fiji guerillas were tasked with locating enemy soldiers scattered about the island. The eastern landing force consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 103rd regiment alongside the 4 raider battalion to be led by Colonel Daniel Hundley. Their job was to secure the lines of communication to Rendova directly across from Munda. The Western Landing Force consisted of the 172nd and 169th Regiments; 3rd Battalion, 103rd Regiment; 9th Marine Defense Battalion; 24th Naval Construction Battalion (Seabees) and 1st Commando Fiji Guerrillas, to be led by General Hester. They had the initial mission of securing the island of Rendova and afterwards the 3 islets in the Blanche Channel opposite of Munda. For the islets it would be the job of Companies A and B, 169th Regiment; and 1st Commando Fiji Guerillas. Once all of that was done, the 172nd and 169th regiments led by Brigadier General Leonard Wing would advance to Zanana through the Honiavasa passage, then take a overland route over the Barike River for the final drive upon Munda supported by destroyer bombardment. Hester also planned to use the 3rd battalion, 103rd regiment to hook around Munda's from the west coast. For all of these amphibious landings, Admiral Turner was in charge with his task force 31. He divided his forces into two groups; the Western Force under his personal command which would make the Rendova landings; and the Eastern Force led by Rear Admiral George Fort would perform the landings at Wickham, Segi Point and Viru Harbor. For the Rendova harbor landing, Turner employed 4 Attack transports and 2 Aka's; during WW2 Aka's referred to merchant ships that were modified for combat use. These took the 172nd regiment and 24th seabees over on June 30th, while Turners larger landing craft, LST's (landing ship tank), LCT's (Landing craft tank) and LCI's (landing craft infantry) would move Hesters initial units over the next few days. The Amphibious forces would be covered by Halsey's Task Force 36 constituting of forces that had previously been under the command of Admirals Ainsworth and Merrill, destroyers, cruisers, some battleships and a few carriers. Merrill would help the landings by performing a bombardment of the Shortland islands as minelayers created minefields across the southern entrance to Bougainville, and a smaller detachment of destroyers hit Vila as a diversion. Ainsworth would get himself into position in the seas around Rendova while Admiral Fitch would grant the operation a total of 1182 aircraft, including 626 from Admiral Mitschers Airsols as cover. To gain air supremacy, 17 air missions were assigned such as PBY crews for rescue operations and last minute supply drops over New Georgia. AirSols aircraft would be assigned to New Georgia missions with a few SBDS set aside for Russell operations. Fitch also went ahead and created the New Georgia Air force commanded by General Mulcahy who would direct missions from the ground. Closing in on Operation Toenails, Halsey and Turner also decided to add a last minute landing directed at Rice Anchorage on the Kula Gulf. Designated Northern Landing Group, the landing was to be performed by the 3rd battalions, of the 145th and 148th regiments alongside the 1st raider battalion led by Colonel Harry Liversedge. This would occur on July the 4th to create a base from which the allies could launch an attack against the Enogai inlet and Bairoko harbor. By seizing these the allies could interdict Japanese supply lines and prevent reinforcement efforts for Munda. Now that is all for the plans for the Solomons, but Operation Cartwheel had other plans over on New Guinea being handled by General Douglas MacArthur and Kreuger, code named Operation Chronicle, the invasion of the Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. The two Trobriand islands held airfields and were only 125 miles from New Britain and 200 miles from Bougainville. Capturing them would allow the allies to launch bombers with fighter escort to hit Rabaul, Kavieng and the northern solomons. It was also a great opportunity to test what was colloquially known as “MacArthur's Navy”, officially known as the 7th amphibious force. Now Lt General Krueger had sent reconnaissance missions to the islands which indicated there were no Japanese present on them in May. Nonetheless he instructed the men to prepare for a fight and at the least to expect aerial attacks when they approached them. Kruegers plan of attack was simplistic, Colonel Julian Cunningham would lead the Woodlark force. This consisted of the 112th Cavalry Regiment; 134th Field Artillery Battalion; and 12th Defense Battalion. Also, the 20th and 60th Naval Construction Battalions and ARGUS 1. They would depart Townsville Australia on June 25th and land on Woodlark by June 30th. The Kiriwina Force would be led by Colonel Prugh Herndon consisting of the  158th Regiment; and 148th Field Artillery Battalion. They would depart from Milne Bay on June 30th and quickly land at Kiriwina that same day. To get them to the beaches, Admiral Barbey would have 4 destroyer transports, the Gilmber, Sands, Humphrey and Brooks alongside 6 LSTS, a subchaser 7 mechanized landing craft, 2 small coastal transports and a survey ship, a real hodge podge. Escorting them would be Barbey's task force 76 consisting of the destroyers Mugford, Bagley, Conyngham, Henley and helm along with Carpenders task force 74 consisting of cruisers Australia and Jobart with destroyers Arunta and Warramunga. For aerial support they had multiple squadrons from Australian Wing 73 operating off Goodenough island. Now on the grounds of New Guinea in mid June, Generals Savige, Herring, Berryman and Colonels Archibald MacKechnie met with Brigadier Moten to hear about his plans for the 17th brigade's salamaua offensive. Moten laid out a 5 phase plan, phase 1 consisted of the 1st Battalion, 162nd Regiment creating a beach head at Nassau Bay, with the support of a company from the 2/6th battalion. Phase 2 would see the 2/6th reinforced by a company of the 2/5th who would capture Observation Hill and a ridge between Bui Savella and Kitchen Creeks. From there they would be able to move through Mubo Valley to Archway while American forces captured Bitoi ridge. Phase 3 would see the capture of Green Hill and the Pimple by American forces and some of the 2/6th. From there they could advance towards Komaitum and Lokanu. Phase 4 would see the 2/5th advance from Mubo through the 2/6th position to occupy Mount Tambu, linking up with the 15th brigade at Komiatum. Lastly Phase 5 would see the capture of Lokanu and Boisi, clearing the enemy away from the Francisco river area. The plan looked good to all present. But nothing was mentioned about the capture of Lae, nor the critical fact, that Salamaua needed to fall prior to Lae, lest they all lose the element of surprise for Operation Postern. This was done for security reasons, it all had to be held under wraps, but despite this General Savige remained convinced he had to capture Salamaua as soon as possible. His subordinate, Brigadier Moten was aware of the grand plan created by Blamey. Yet while all of these allied commanders were planning, a war was still afoot and the Japanese tossed a counter offensive on the night of June 20th. The Japanese commanders had determined in late May that they needed to dislodge the Australians from Lababia Ridge. General Nakano had brought forward the 1500 men of 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 66th regiment. He concealed their movements by ordered heavy airstrikes and ordered the men to make no fires. This also allowed the exhausted 102nd infantry regiment to rotate back a bit as they had been fighting the Australians ever since the battle of Wau. On the 20th, Nakano began sending patrols made up of the 66th with a few guides from the 102nd who probed the Australian position on Lababia ridge, at that time being held by just 80 men. The Japanese patrols defused many booby traps the Australians laid out for them, made up of piano wire attached to hand grenades. However the Japanese were not too familiar with the Australian hand grenade, so instead of pocketing them to use against the enemy they simply left them. Some sporadic skirmishes occurred that day alongside some bombing missions aimed at Guadagasal, Mat Mat and the Mubo Valley. 83 Japanese aircraft caused some casualties and damage against the 2/6th and spooked a ton of native carriers. The next day the Australians would be searching for native carriers who fled, losing around 578 of them for over 3 days. This greatly delayed the movement of rations, ammunition and other supplies. On the morning of June 21st, the 1st battalion of Araki, guided by some men of the 102nd regiment, began advancing around the eastern flank of the Australian position on Lababia, getting into position for a dawn attack set for the following day. Behind them was the 2nd battalion who were doing a similar maneuver but on the Australians left flank. The Japanese were extremely careful as they advanced having learnt bitter lessons throughout the war about how much the Australians liked to hang grenades attached to piano wire just about anywhere one would think to walk. Oh and it was not limited to fragment grenades, they hooked up thermite grenades, cans of petrol and other goodies. Now they were going to be attacking 80 men as I said, which were being led by Captain Walter Dexter's D company. He had two platoons in a forward position on the Jap track and two others to the back guarding his HQ. Further north he set up listening posts to watch for enemy activity around the Pimple. Dexter figured he was holding a decent enough position going on to say ”if you've got to fight them you've got to see them'. Around noon Australian patrols began to notice signs of Japanese activity along the track towards the observation post just a bit due east along the ridge. At 7:30 the telephone line to that observation post was suddenly cut and the Japanese could be seen approaching. The Australians went to work setting off booby traps that had been rigged up as early warning devices and a small firefight emerged. Then at 2pm the Japanese launched an assault from the north and north east of the Australian position, firing off mortars. The Japanese were repelled, but they came right back later in the afternoon screaming into a bayonet charge. Over the course of the afternoon 3 major attacks were made to the sound of Japanese bugles. This was a classic Japanese strategy to intimidate the enemy, but it actually aided the Australians as it warned them of the incoming attack each time. The attacks were turned back and during the night the Australians were reinforced by another platoon,  70 men of C company led by Corporal Keith Mew. As the night wore on, the Australians sent out some patrols to try and make contact with their forward positions only to find out they had been wiped out in the attacks. Meanwhile under heavy rain, the Japanese were recovering their wounded and trying to get rid of more pesky booby traps in front of the Australian positions.    The next morning came screams and charging Japanese setting off booby traps all morning long. Dexter responded by ordered the men to shoot mortars and rifle grenades at anything that looked like a Japanese position. At 2pm on the 21st, the Japanese began a heavy attack on one of the forward positions held by Sergeant John Hedderman lying between the Jap track and Lababia track. The attack spread to Roach's and Lt Edward Exton's front sending a rain of automatic and mortar fire into the two forward platoons. A bayonet charge along the Jap track was halted within just 10 yards of the forward positions and another one to the right flank got within 20 yards before being stopped. The Australians tossed lead in all forms into the banzai charges, but no matter how much mortar, bullets and grenades were tossed, the Japanese were closing in. Sensing a breakthrough, Moten ordered forward more men from the 2/5th battalion allowing Dexter to reinforce his left flank using a small reserve he had at his HQ. They arrived at the flank just in time to repel another banzai charge. By the late afternoon the Australians had 12 dead men and 10 wounded, they were down to just 55 abled bodies, but the brunt of the Japanese attack was done. The arrival of C company allowed Dexter to reinforce his forward positions, now bolstered to 150 men.    The Japanese did not give up however and continued their attack during the late afternoon. Suffering so many casualties, it looked like the Japanese might break through Exton's position. Exton and Corporal Martine charged forward to rally their men, getting them through the brunt of another assault. By dusk the attacks began to decrease until the gradually stopped. The night saw a ton of rain, making it miserable for the Japanese who were dragging their wounded and dead comrades through booby trapped jungle. On the morning of the 22nd, Araki sent some patrols to probe Dexter's left flank who were met by Australian sniper fire. An attack was launched against Dexter's rear, held by Smiths platoon who overwhelmed the Japanese causing them to give up after 5 minutes. Frustrated by the lack of progress, Araki ordered his two mountain guns from the 14th artillery regiment to start shelling Lababia. However the foliage was too much and only two shells actually landed within Dexters perimeter. Thus when the Japanese recommenced their attacks they were met by the full brunt of the defenders. By night, Araki was forced to toss in the towel and he ordered the men to begin a withdrawal. To cover the retreat, Araki ordered his men to fire heavy automatic guns and motors into Dexter's position on the morning of the 23rd. The Australians responded the same way, but then Dexter unleashed a nasty surprise. He ordered his units to mark the forward lines with smoke. Soon the RAAF send Bristol Beaufighters in who strafed the Japanese up and down the Jap Track.  It was an incredible defense, the defenders had been outnumbered 10-1. The Japanese had received 42 dead, 131 wounded while killing 11 and wounded 12 Australians. As Moten would go on to say ‘the engagement is noteworthy and is a classic example of how well-dug-in determined troops can resist heavy attacks from a numerically superior enemy”. Dexter had been pretty much left to his own to defend Lababia and for his excellent leadership he was later awarded the Distinguished service order while some of his platoon commanders; Lt edward Exton, Laurence and Roach received Military crosses and Sergeant John Hedderman received a military medal. Dexter was praised by Moten for “taking every trick during the battle” and one of his colleagues, Captain Jo Gullet described him as“he was too exacting to be popular, although he was a thorough soldier, a good trainer of men and a painstaking tactician”. Lababia was secured, and in the next week major operations were about to begin. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Cartwheel was getting its ducks all in order for a major push set on June 30th. The boys down unda fought like lions to protect Lababia ridge. Outnumbered 10-1 they proved, well dug-in positions sometimes made all the difference. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 82 - Pacific War - Operation Cartwheel starts rolling, June 6-20, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 16, 2023 31:41


Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the battle for Attu. The American victory over Attu meant the end of the Aleutian campaign for the Japanese, Tokyo decided to pull everyone out. Over 6000 Japanese needed evacuation from Kiska and it would be very tricky for the Japanese to get past Admiral Kinkaids blockade. Then we finished up the West Hubei offensive, with a part of it being known colloquially as the Rice Bowl Campaign. The Japanese had brutalized the Chinese, but we're stopped short of invading Chongqing or Sichuan. Thus for the Chinese it was a victory, but at the same time the Japanese had secured exactly what they wanted, stealing vast amounts of property, notably rice. Vessels left Yichang and sailed further west through the riverways acquiring large sums of goods to help the China war cause. Today we are diving back into the south Pacific. This episode is Operation Cartwheel starts rolling Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So honestly for awhile now we have been hitting the North Pacific and China theaters, which certainly was a change of pace, but as you can imagine these events do not simply move along in a vacuum. Yes a lot was going on in the other theaters and this episode is going to be tackling a lot of different events so buckle up buckos. First we are going to talk about Operation Cartwheel. The ULTRA intelligence that brought Yamamoto's death was not the only information the Americans received in April. A lifeboat bearing a list of the names of 40,000 active Japanese officers washed ashore after the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Using this Cryptographers were able to match each name to radio signals from Japanese army units, ensuring General MacArthurs intelligence remained as operationally up to date as it could be. At the same time William Bull Hasley showed to on April 15th to Brisbane to meet with MacArthur and the two hit it off. Halsey would later write this about their first encounter. “Five minutes after I reported, I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. He was then sixty-three, but he could have passed as fifty. His hair was jet black; his eyes were clear; his carriage erect….My mental picture poses him against the background of these discussions; he is pacing his office, almost wearing a groove between his large, bare desk and the portrait of George Washington that faced it; his corncob pipe is in his hand (I rarely saw him smoke it): and he is making his points in a diction I have never heard surpassed. “ Both men would hammer out a plan on April 26th, it was a revision to MacArthur's Elkton plan, this one would be known as Elkton III, but it was soon to be coded as Operation Cartwheel.  The plan consisted of 13 amphibious landings in just 6 months with MacArthur and Halsey providing maximum support to each others efforts. The first phase of the plan would see MacArthur seizing Woodlark and the Kirwina islands while Hasley invaded New Georgia. Phase 2 would commence 2 months after the start of the offensive where MacArthur would capture Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen. Phase 3 would be the seizure of the Shortland islands and Bougainville in the south pacific. In December MacArthur would seize Cape Gloucester in Western New Britain and shortly after that they would seize Rabaul. Halsey's forces would knock out Japanese air bases on Buka, allowing MacArthurs men to clear the northwestern half of New Guinea. By January of 1944, MacArthur and Halsey figured they would be ready for the final assault on Rabaul which was their ultimate objective for victory. MacArthur resisted sending details of their joint plan to Washington, probably fearing the Europe first obsessed chiefs of staff would veto their ambitious thrust. He told them only that he anticipated that the first move toward Woodlark and Kirwina would start in June. However this was too slow for Admiral King. King wanted his protege Admiral Nimitz to begin a thrust into the central pacific, heading through the Marshalls in November and proposed shifting the Marine 1st and 2nd divisions, the ones that fell under MacArthurs and Halsey's command to help with the Marshalls offensive, this alongside two bomber groups promised to General Kenney. MacArthur was very pissed off and he sent a distressed message to George Marshall damning the entire central Pacific strategy as a quote “unnecessary and even wasteful diversion from what should be the main pacific strategy”,  that being MacArthur's own.”. He added in “from a broad strategic viewpoint, I am convinced that the best course of offensive action in the Pacific is a movement from Australia through New Guinea to Mindanao. Air supremacy is essential to success, for the southwestern strategy where large numbers of land-based aircraft are utterly essential and will immediately cut the enemy lines from japan to his conquered territory to the southward. Pulling any additional heavy bombers groups would in my opinion, collapse the offensive effort in the southwest pacific area…in my judgment the offensive against Rabaul should be considered the main effort, and it should not be nullified or weakened ”. But King was adamant. There would indeed be a thrust through the central pacific led by the navy with its main axis passing through the Marshalls and Marianas towards Japan,which might I remind you listening, bypasses the Philippines. It of course was a strategy completely at odds with MacArthurs. Marshall supported King, as did the other Joint Chiefs. But in the end MacArthurs whining forced King to relent on the transfer of the two marine divisions and the bomber groups, thus MacArthur revealed his timetable for operation Cartwheel. He told them he planned to take Kiriwna and Woodlark in the Trobriand Island around June 30th. The advance on New Georgia would start on the same date, and in September the First Cavalry and 3 Australian divisions would begin operations against the Madang-Salamaua area. Meanwhile MacArthur's 43rd division would invade southern Bougainville on October 15th, while the 1st Marines and 32nd division would invade Cape Gloucester on December 1st.  For all of these amphibious landings, there were no serious problems when it came to shipping and landing craft….that is for Nimitz designated areas. However at the beginning of 1943, MacArthur had practically no amphibious equipment nor experts in these types of operations. The only units available to him were the Army's engineering special boat brigade which had very few small craft. The man who would be responsible for the amphibious assaults during much of the coming campaigns was to be Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey. On January 10th, 1943 he took command of the forces that would later be designated the 7th Amphibious force. Barbey from the offset established good relations with MacArthur…because well anyone who worked with MacArthur had to. He had nearly nothing to work with in the beginning, but started with establishing bases at Toobul Bay, near the mouth of the Brisbane river and Point Stephens. MacArthur had requested more small craft and transports as early as mid 1942, but because of the European and central pacific being a priority, little had come his way. Before the equipment came, MacArthur was receiving American and Australian troops, so he got Barbey's team to improvise. They began training the troops in debarking from larger ships down cargo nets to smaller landing craft. However Barbey had no attack transports (APA), which was the key to this kind of operation. To solve this they rigged nets from cliffs, boy that must have been fun. The first Landing ship tanks LSTs and Landing craft tanks LCTs would not arrive until mid january, and on Easter Sunday 13 Landing craft infantry's LCI's were delivered, giving them very little time before the first operations were to begin to train the crews on how to use them.  Now on the other side Halsey had his own three phase operation. Part 1 saw the invasion of New Georgia, part 2 was the seizure of Buin and Rekata Bay if possible and last 3 was the seizure of Kieta and the neutralization of Buka. Phase 1 was codenamed Operation Toenails. Halsey described the operation to Nimitz as “a infiltration and staging operation”. The operation would see simultaneous landings at Wickham Anchorage to hit its landing craft base; Segi point for its airfield site; Viru Harbor for its small craft base and Rendova Harbor which would serve as a new base to stage troops for a future attack upon Munda. This would all occur on June 30th. The main force assigned to Operation Toenails was General Hester's 43rd division. Admiral Turner and his Task Force 31 were in charge of the amphibious landings while Admiral Fitch would toss 1182 aircraft to give them aircower and Admiral's Ainsworth and Merrill's Task force 36 would provide further naval support. On the other side, interservice coordination between the Japanese Generals and Admirals remained intermittent and largely ad hoc, when it was not hostile. General Imamura's 8th area army HQ at Rabaul stood above Hyakutake's 17th Army, comprising 3 divisions spread over the SOlomons and New Britain, and General Hatazo Adachi's 8th Army had 3 divisions on New Guinea. Troop reinforcements were arriving in Rabaul bolstering the garrison at one point to 90,000 men. Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka remained in command of navy forces at Rabaul and held responsibility for the defense of the central solomons. Admiral Mineichi Koga had succeeded the slain Yamamoto as commander in chief of the combined fleet, based at Truk. Nowhere in the theater was there a blended command, the army and navy had to coordinate their operations through a meticulous process of “nemawashi / digging around the roots” for a consensus. The Japanese moved new air units into the theater, including more of the elite carrier aircrews that had trained and honed their skills prior to the war, but the loss ratios in air combat was ruining them.  As a result of the devastating loss during the battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese were forced to change plans. USAAF and RAAF aircraft based at Port Moresby and Milne Bay had slaughtered an entire convoy of Japanese transports attempting to land troops in the Lae-Slaamaua area using a new technique called “skip bombing”. Imperial General HQ set up a joint Army/Navy investigation board to study the disaster, seeing the IJA accused the IJN of being too focused on the Solomons rather than on New Guinea. The Army argued New Guinea was vital for the national defenses and proposed that if a retreat became necessary, it would be as a direct result of the navy's lack of support. If this were to happen they would have to pull back and create a defensive line from northwest New Guinea to Timor. The Navy's representatives argued that the Huon Peninsula must be held or its loss would swing open the western gate to Rabaul, forcing the combined fleet to withdraw from Truk. Well the fighting eventually resulted in an ultimatum with both sides agreeing the army/navy operations should focus on eastern New Guinea. It was decided that both the army and navy would literally operate as one unit, because that would go well. The Central solomons were still under the overall responsibility of the 8th fleet, now commanded by Vice Admiral Baron Samejima Tomoshige with some IJA units placed under naval command according to agreements made between General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka. It seems the Japanese could get along once and awhile, as just like Halsey and MacArthur, Imamura and Kusaka developed a deep friendship. Both of their staffs ate lunch together once or twice a week, where southeast area affairs were discussed informally and their respective staffs got to know another personally. Kusaka went on the record to say Imamura was a very great person. Many army units would be sent to reinforce the New Georgia defenses and by late May the bulk of the 229th regiment arrived to Munda, and the 13th regiment went to Vila by late June. Imamura placed both regiments under the command of Major General Sasaki Noboru's southeast detachment who responded directly to Samejima. Samejima's first orders were to arrange the responsibilities between General Sasaki's southeast detachment and Admiral Ota's 8th combined SNLF, seeing Sasaki in charge of Munda and Ota in charge of the Enogai and Bairoko area's. If the situation arose, command would be unified under the senior officer on New Georgia, General Sasaki. Ota would also have responsibility for coastal artillery defense, radio communications, and barge operations. Admiral Koga in his new role as commander of the combined fleet, preemptively sent move of his forces back to the home islands in preparation to reinforce Attu. But as the fate of the Aleutians became sealed by late May, Koga decided to concentrate the combined Fleet at Truk, so it would be primed and ready for a decisive naval battle with the Americans. Without the aid of Koga's carriers, Kusaka had launched another air counteroffensive after I-Go, this one taking place in June. The aim was yet again to prevent the Americans from invading the central solomons . Kusaka began tossing waves of Bety's against American shipping east of San Cristobal and night raids over guadalcanal. Simultaneously he also unleashed Operation SO; a major offensive to smash allied air power in the Solomon islands; and operation SE: which targeted airfields and shipping. He sent 105 Zeros to sweep and bomb the enemy airfields with a new type of gasoline bomb. Operation SE began with 25 Val dive bombers attacking US shipping in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area and Operation SO began on June 7th with 81 Zeros led by Lt Commander Shindo Saburo assaulting the Russels. However the Russel group ran right into 104 allied fighters who shot down 9 Zeros. A follow up attack was made on the 12th with 74 Zeros led by Lt Miyano Zenjiro, this time the Japanese lost 7 fighters but took down 6 American. As usual the Japanese pilots made wild claims, stating the first attack saw 41 American fights shot down and the second attack 24.  Kusaka launched the main attack of Operation SE on June 16th led by Lt commander Saburo consisting of 24 Vals and 70 Zero escorts who swung south of the Russells, turning at Beaufort Bay. Yet again they were intercepted, this time by 74 allied fighters over BEaufort Bay and the ensuing ari battle rolled over the mountainous spine of guadalcanal. This time the Japanese lost 15 Zeros and 13 Vals while only shooting down 6 allied fighters. The Japanese lost first rate pilots such as Lt Miyano who had scored a total of 16 kills during the war. Again Japanese veteran pilots were being bled dry severely affecting the nation's airpower. Despite their waves being intercepted nearly every time, the Vals were able to press through with their attacks and managed to hit the cargo ships Caleno and LST-340. But such results were hardly worth the cost, so Kusaka began to urgently request reinforcements. The carrier Ryhuo would lend her bombers to replace the lost ones, arriving on the 2nd of July. The losses taught the Japanese pilots some bitter lessons and never again would the fly over guadalcanal during daylight as the American CAP was far to powerful. Over in New Guinea, General Blamey was laying out his plan for the capture of Lae, codenamed Operation Postern which was approved by MacArthurs headquarters. Before the allies would invade Woodlark and Kiriwana, MacArthur proscribed the seizure of Lae and the Markham and Ramu valley. The Markham operations were to be based on Port Moresby while the north coast operations would be staged from Buna and Milne Bay. The invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwana islands codenamed Operation Chronicle would be entrusted to Lt General Walter Kruegers 6th army. The islands northeast of the Papuan coast would allow the allies to have air bases closer to Japanese targets in the Solomons and around Rabaul, thus Blamey had devised his plan to secure the northeastern part of New Guinea. The first phase of his plan was Lae and the Markham and Ramu Valleys; the 2nd phase was to seize a shore base within 60 miles of Lae, he chose Nassau Bay. Nassau Bay would help with the supply problems in the Wau-Mubo-Bobdubi area, as all the supplies were being flown in from Port Moresby. The mountains were serious obstacles for transport aircraft, not to mention the Japanese fighters that could spring out of nearby Lae. Taking Nassau Bay would greatly shorting supply lines for allied troops fighting in the Salamaua region and also allow a junction to be made with General Saviges forces operating at Mubo The 162nd American Regiment led by Colonel Archibald MacKechnie would help hit Nassau Bay, they would be known as the MacKechnie force. They would seize the high ground around Goodiew Junction and Mount Tambu and the ridges running down therefrom to the sea, allowing the Australians to link up with the 15th brigade at Bobdubi and the American landing force at Nassau. D-day for the Nassau Landing was set for June 30th and it was all going to act as a feint, hoping to lure Japanese forces from Lae to Salamaua.  Now the last time we left off in New Guinea, General Savige had launched a limited offensive against the Japanese at Mubo and Bobdubi ridge. General Nakano was certain Salamaua was the main allied target and this prompting him on the 29th to order Major General Chuichi Muroya to lead the 51st division to fortify it. In the process Muroya's men expelled Warfe's commandos from the northern ridge. To the east of Mubo, Brigadier Moten was trying to take the Pimple, but his 17th brigade would be performing more patrolling than actual attacks throughout the later half of May. Eventually Savige would relieve the exhausted 2/7th battalion with the 2/6th battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Wood who would begin an advance on May the 27th. Meanwhile Nakano had brought more reinforcements to defend Mubo and launched a strong counterattack in early May, nearly breaking through towards the main Australian camp at Lababia ridge. On May 23rd Nakano received two battalions of the 66th regiment and began to work out a plan for assembling supplies and ammunition in the Mubo area to prepare for an offensive. Men would move at night in a single file along the narrow jungle trails carrying the materials by hand, through mud and rain. The main train was a slope on Komiatum ridge known to the Japanese as Regret Hill as the hard working soldiers became more exhausted with each passing day marching along it. The Japanese sought to clear out Lababia ridge as far as Guadagasal, thus securing Mubo. On June 3rd, allied patrols discovered Nakano had reoccupied Markham point which forced Savige to keep the bulk of the 24th away from the action at Bobdubi and Mubo. From their camp at the bank of the Markham Savige ordered patrols to investigate the Nadzab area. On June 14th, a 3 man patrol came across friendly natives at the village of Gabsonkek who informed them of the Japanese activity in the area. They said "that the Japs come to the village every day between 10:00 and 12:00 hours taking everything in sight—pigs, fowls, fruit, etc., without paying; they take native girls back to Lae if they can catch them. The guides would not proceed farther to Ngasawapum because Japan man come up Big Road, cut us off", and they would not go to Narakapor because they claimed there were too many Japs and two big guns". The patrol went back to camp by the 18th informing command. A second patrol was made, led by Lt Dave Burke who forded the Tabali River to get to Nassau Bay. Their report indicated the area was suitable for landing and road construction. To further prepare for the American landings, the Australians began building a footbridge over the Bitoi River and blazed a track up to Bitoi Ridge. On Lababia Ridge the main defensive position withdrew to a junction on the Jap Tracks where it would be easier to counter enemy encirclement attempts. Reports came in from forward platoons that there was considerable enemy activity along the Komiatum-Mubo track. This was Nakano's 66th regiment carrying the food and ammunition in preparation for the upcoming offensive. In response to this, Savige ordered Brigadier Frank Hosking of the 15th brigade to assume command of the Bobdubi ridge area and to begin harassing the Japanese supply route. Meanwhile the 58th/59th battalion relieved the 2/3rd independent company at Hote and a party of Warfe's commando's were sent to attack the Komiatum-Mubo track. However disaster struck as the Australians ran into their own booby-traps on June 16th suffering a number of casualties. By June 20th, the commando's established ambush positions along a ridge near the junction of Stephens Track and the Komiatum Track. They successfully ambushed some Japanese later that day, killing a few men and capturing valuable documents about the arrival of Nakano's 66th regiment. However by this point Nakano's units were already assembling in front of Lababia ridge and the offensive was about to begin. Now we gotta finish up the episode talking about some developments in India. After the disastrous first Arakan Campaign, Marshal Wavell was to receive a promotion, and by promotion I mean he was kicked upstairs as they say, succeeded Lord Linlithgow as the new Viceroy of India. But until then he began looking into training his forces in jungle warfare as the bitter lessons learned at Arakan proved the men were very unprepared. Wavell also wanted to investigate what the hell had happened during the disaster, so he sent Major General Roland Richardson in late May to head a infantry committee at New Delhi for the task. The committee's report about the Arakan campaign found the troops fighting spirit was fundamentally sound, but the major problems that affected their combat performance were more about the over expansion of the army in India. The army mobilization had been rushed, they barely met basic training and the supplying of their sheer numbers was a catastrophe. There were also issues regarding their low status, inferior pay for the infantry, which further deprived them of skilled and well educated recruits.  Yet above all else the Infantry committee found their lack of jungle training to be the most egregious issue. As observed “This is the most urgent problem facing us, and one which requires prompt and energetic action if results are to be produced in time for the winter campaigning season.” The lack of jungle training severely undermined their ability to fight efficiently and ultimately led to the breakdown of infantry battalions in the Arakan. And of course there was the ever present unseen enemy, that of malaria, alongside an assortment of other ailments that were wreaking havoc on the men. But many of these problems could not be tackled until June 20th, when General Claude Auchinleck was officially appointed as the new Commander in Chief in India. For General Slim this was excellent news and certainly worked in his favor alongside the sacking of Irwin. The “Auk” as he was called, had always been a Slim supporter and was the one who recommended him to Wavell for advancement when Wavell was Commander in Chief of the middle east back in 1941. The Auk had wanted to retain Slim in the middle east and fought hard to dissuade Wavell from taking him over to Burma. Churchill never held Wavell ever in high regard and was tired of his quasi-academic effusions and preferred a “fighting general” in Burma. Alongside the Auk, Irwin was replaced with General George Giffard, and Slim had this to say of the replacement.  “The new Army Commander had a great effect on me. A tall, goodlooking man in the late fifties, who had obviously kept himself physically and mentally in first-class condition, there was nothing dramatic about him in either appearance or speech. He abhorred the theatrical, and was one of the very few generals, indeed men in any position, I have known who really disliked publicity . . . But there was much more to General Giffard than good taste, good manners and unselfishness. He understood the fundamentals of war – that soldiers must be trained before they can fight, fed before they can march, and relieved before they are worn out. He understood that front-line commanders should be spared responsibilities in the rear, and that soundness of organization and administration is worth more than specious short-cuts to victory” Auckinleck went to work from the offset of his new command by improving the welfare, health and feeding of the Indian army to foster improved morale. General Giffard as the new commander of the Eastern Army had Major General Temple Gurdon to oversee some reforms for training and the development of new doctrines. A lot of effort was made to conduct intensive collective training under jungle conditions. The men would train near Nasik, Ranchi, Dehradun and in the Jhansi-Nowgong-lalitpur region. Commanders low to high were given a chance at handling units to improve standards of staff work, practice combined army tactics and build team spirit. Auchinleck also initiated a policy of active patrolling at Assam and Arakan to gather intelligence and maintain touch with the Japanese as to destroy the feeling that they were super soldiers.    I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A lot of chess pieces were moved around the board this week. Bitter lessons had been learnt in multiple theaters of the war and now it came time to reorganize and try new things to ultimately bring the war against Japan to a closer end. 

PGurus
Sumit Peer I Manipur burning - CCP interference? I Arakan Army I Imran Khan/ PTI ending, what next?

PGurus

Play Episode Listen Later May 25, 2023 61:03


Amit Shah visiting Manipur, to appeal for peace? Is the PLA egging the Arakan army to attack Manipuris? What is the latest? All the leaders are deserting Imran Khan, and he is getting isolated. He allegedly refused to flee the country. With the President of Pakistan about to be fired, is the Pakistan Army taking a vice-like grip over Pakistan? How will it tackle 5K-10K population that is fully armed with automatic weapons? Will this lead to a refugee crisis?

The Pacific War - week by week
- 76 - Pacific War - Operation Postern, the drive to Salamaua, May 2-9, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later May 2, 2023 32:10


Last time we spoke about actions in New Guinea and the Japanese counteroffensive in Arakan. The good ol boys down unda were getting ready to launch a major offensive aimed to seize Lae and Salamaua. The Australian and American forces gradually built up enough strength to commence the offensive and high command decided to launch some feints, such as at Mubo to distract the Japanese from their real intentions. Over in Arakan, Irwins disaster was still paying dividends to the Japanese as General Koga launched a massive counterattack. Things were continuing to get worse for the British in Burma, though General Slim was beginning to make improvements. Lastly the British began a propaganda campaign to boost morale in the far east using the mad onion man Wingates recent adventure with the Chindits. Things were looking rough in the CBI theater.  This episode is the Operation Postern, the drive to Salamaua Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    I just want to say before we begin, this episode will feel a bit like one of those old tv episodes that rehashes what happened during that season. You've heard me say it a few times, but because we do this series in the week by week format sometimes we get into these messy weeks where either not much occurs or too much occurs. Regardless this episode is about multiple ongoing operations that culminate into the drive upon Salamaua and for the sake of coherency I am going to have to summarize a lot of what occurred in the south west pacific area for early 1943.  General Blamey devised a plan to capture Lae, codenamed Operation Postern. General MacArthur approved of the plan, which was quite complex and reflected the growing power of the allied forces in the southwest pacific. Blamey moved to New Guinea to take overall charge, reverting Herring to commander of the 1st corps, responsible for tactical operations. The key to quick success lay in convincing General Adachi, that Salamaua was the primary target for any major offensive. To accomplish this, it was necessary for the Australian and American forces to press upon the Japanese around the Salamaua area, but not Salamaua.  Operation Postern was preceded by three simultaneous operations occurring in the South west pacific area and the south pacific area. Together the three operations helped set up the conditions necessary to allow for an amphibious landing at Lae, by tying up the Japanese ground, naval and airpower in the region alongside creating important feints. The invasion of New Georgia was the first of these operations carried out by Admiral Bull Halsey and the 1st raider battalion. That offensive codenamed operation Toenails took up a lot of the Japanese ground, sea and air forces and would gradually see the allies capturing Munda. The 2nd was operation Chronicle, the seizure of Kiriwina and Woodlark islands located just northeast of Milne Bay. With their seizure, the allies were able to create new forward airfields from which to launch air strikes against Rabaul and provide air cover for multiple other operations in the region. Lastly the third operation was to be an assault on Nassau Bay, which we will talk about a bit later. Now back to the ground forces.   The 8th Area Army at Rabaul sent General Adachi and the 18th army to secure important areas west of Lae and Salamaua and to do so an offensive was launched against Wau. This prompted the Australian high command to send Brigadier Moten and the 17th brigade over to defend Wau in January of 1943. The battle to defend was tough, but the allies were able to prolong the Japanese advance long enough to transport enough troops to save Wau. The Japanese were sent retreating over to the Mubo area, but instead of pursuing the enemy, Moten limited his men's actions to patrols. The New Guinea force wished to pursue the Japanese, but was prevented by logistical difficulties. As the Australians gathered more strength, the Japanese prepared a second attempt to capture Way. This time the Japanese planned to approach Wau from the north, building a road from Markham point into the snake river valley. From there the Japanese advance would hit Wau. The 51st division was earmarked for the task, but the battle of the Bismarck sea had caused devastating losses to the convoy bringing them over in March of 1943.  The battle of the Bismarck sea had pressed upon the Japanese high command the increasing allied airpower, leading them to reformulate their plans. The Japanese began to construct a road to compensate for their inability to transport men and materials to New Guinea via the sea. As the Japanese did this, on the other side, the allies now felt very secure at Wau and were willing to perform some offensives. General Savige's 3rd division was given command of the Wau-Bulolo area. For this task he had the 17th brigade, the 2/3rd, 25th and 2/7th independent companies. It was believed the Japanese had around 5500 men around Lae and Salamaua with around 6-8 thousand at Madang and 9- 11 thousand at Wewak. Savige was ordered not to attack Salamaua directly, so he decided to establish firm bases as far forward as possible to harass the Japanese, basically you can see this as forward offensive patrol actions. Now the Japanese had dug in some defensive positions in places called the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation Hill which were along the main track from Wau to Mubo. On April 24th, the 2/7th independent company were given a new mission; to clear the Japanese from the vicinity of Mubo. Moten approved a plan for the seizure of the Pimple and Green Hill, ordering Major Warfe and his 2/3rd company to harass the Japanese logistical routes in Mubo as a distraction as the 2/7th hit the Pimple. The Japanese had made the Pimple a nightmare for the allied forces. They had taken defensive positions on commanding ground allowing for concealed ambushes. They cleared firing lanes to enable their machine guns to gundown anyone who took a forward approach. By holding the high grounds they also thwarted the allies from utilizing grenades effectively.   On the morning of April 24, after 20 minutes of air attacks by Boston aircraft against Green Hill, Stony Creek, Observation Hill and Kitchen Creek, the offensive kicked off with a two pronged attack. The 2/7th would start from the Vicker's ridge track, moving in two columns: one going along the Jap track towards the Pimple; the other would move north along the Laws track, a very difficult and quite unknown trail to try an encircle the Pimple from the west. When the two columns got within 100 yards of the pimple, they were met with light machine gun fire and snipers. The Australians attempted an all out assault in the late afternoon, but were unable to gain any ground. The next morning 3 Bostons came roaring in to strafe and bomb Green Hill while allied artillery began to bombard the Pimple. Despite the increased firepower the Australians still were unable to dislodge the enemy with their proceeding assaults. It turns out the Australians had greatly underestimate the defensive capabilities of the Pimple position. Reconnaissance had failed to pinpoint the enemy positions prior to the offensive. A major lack of communication between the two columns because they had no telephone lines or wireless communications led to a lack of coordination, neither allied column knew the plight of the other. Runners were used, but they were too slow and extremely vulnerable to Japanese snipers. The offensive was quickly falling apart as the Japanese continued to reinforce their lines. Meanwhile Warfe's men conducted a number of raids and ambushes in the Missim area, Komiatum Hill and Bobdubi Ridge. Warfe then sent a patrol from Namling along the Bench Cut track to ambush the Japanese at the junction between the Francisco river and the Buirali Creek. The ambush was a large success leading to the deaths of 18 Japanese. Warfe tried to perform an identical operation on April 28th, but this time his men were ambushed by the Japanese at Goodview junctions suffering considerable casualties. As a result of the forward patrolling of Warfe's men, the allies had learned the Dobdubi ridge area was defended quite lightly. Having learnt this, Ware decided to order a second platoon to capture the northern part of the ridge on April 27th. By the end of the month Warfe had two platoons spread over the Bobdubi ridge area, with a 3rd platoon held in reserve at Missim.  Over in his headquarters, Moten now realized the offensive against the Pimple was far too costly and he decided the men should simply bypass it. However the commander in the field, General Savige continued to launch attacks. The reason why Savige pressed on was because on April 28th, one of his reconnaissance patrols found a position on Pimple unoccupied and kicked seized it before the Japanese could return to man it. Colonel Guinn on the ground there deduced the Japanese must have been expecting an airstrike and momentarily left their positions. He therefore elected to order another company led by Captain Leslie Tatterson brought forward to assault the pimple. This time however, the allies used deception. Instead of launching an airstrike and artillery against the Pimple they passed over it and bombarded Green Hill. The deception did not work as planned and Saviges men yet again were unable to make any ground against the pimple. By early May the 2/7th battalion had lost 12 men dead with 25 wounded against the pimple with no end in sight. Meanwhile on May 3rd, an offensive was launched against the northern part of the Bobdubi ridge. The Australians were able to  fight their way close to the mouth of the Francisco river, prompting the Japanese to pull up reinforcements in the form of 70 SNLF marines from Salamua. A battle was fought in a place called the South Coconuts on May 5th. The Australians performed encircling maneuvers, managing to surround large pockets of the Japanese whom they smashed with artillery. The Australians were met with 3 major counter attacks but held their ground successfully occupying another place called the Center Coconuts by May 7th. However the Japanese then performed another counterattack, utilizing mortars to great effect, pushing the Australians back. The Japanese further reinforced the area with 60 additional men coming up from Salamaua, but they were ambushed by the Australians at the North Coconuts location suffering 20 casualties.     On May 9th, Captain Tattersons men were struck a lethal blow when they ran into a Japanese booby trap along the Jap Track. The Japanese opened fire upon the Australians on the track and began to encircle them. Colonel Guinn led a small force along the track to break the encirclement while Tatterson's men resisted tenaciously against the Japanese. Tatterson's force had been completely surrounded by the afternoon of May 9th and were in a state of desperation. The Australians utilized booby-traps, fire control and mass grenade attacks to force the Japanese to give them breathing room. The next day the Japanese launched a fierce attack against Tatterson's rear. The Australians could hear Japanese officers screaming orders as their riflemen poured lead upon them. As the Japanese pressed upon them they were receiving 500 additional reinforcements from the 102nd and 115th regiments. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion of the 102nd regiment in Nassau bay received orders “to capture the high area on the right bank of the Buyawim River fork” to be done in coordination with the May 9th attacks. This action would have endangered the allied positions at Lababia camp, but luckily the Japanese commander decided instead to hold a defensive positions at the bank of the Bitoi mouth. This allowed Colonel Guinn to concentrate some of his forces at Lababia camp. By May 11th, a company of 60 men managed to break the Japanese encirclement of Tatterson's men. According to Tatterson, by 7am on the 11th, the Japanese had continued to fire heavily upon his force, but made no further attempts to advance. It seemed to him the Japanese were actually withdrawing and the increased rifle fire and mortars was a cover. Tattersons men had been battered, he himself was wounded. His force received 12 casualties and estimated they had inflicted 100 casualties upon the enemy with possibly 50 deaths. Having saved Tatterson, Guinn reorganized his forward units and began to dig in along the Jap track and Lababia camp. From May 15th onwards the 17th brigade focused on aggressive patrolling in all sectors. Aggressive patrols each day harassed the Japanese around the Pimple and Observation Hill. The Australians set up booby-traps, practically paralyzing the Japanese troop movements outside their trenches. General Okabe received some much needed reinforcements over the course of the week and began to launch some limited attacks against the south, central and north Coconut areas. Okabe's forces were repelled on the 12th and 13th, but things would greatly change on the 14th.  The 14th saw a heavy shelling of the Bobdubi ridge area before Okabe launched a full scale attack that overwhelmed the Australian defenders forcing them to make a fighting withdrawal from the north and central area further down in the south coconut area. General Nakano was displeased with his troops and issued an address of instruction of May 17th, it is as follows  "In the attack at Bobdubi, although a certain group was advancing on a height on the enemy's flank, instead of really carrying out the attack in such a way as to prepare the way for an assault by our main force, they went no further than a vain firing at the enemy with their weapons. The spiritual and physical strength which was worn down in the Wau campaign is at the present time still lower, but I believe it can easily be restored if the officers will take the initiative, set an example and command as leaders of their men." Despite Nakano's criticism, his men would take a lot of ground forcing the Australians further south, dangerously close to Warfe's headquarters. Warfe realized maintaining the position would lead to heavy casualties, so he pulled his force out and took up a position at Namling.  It was quite fortunate as the day after he made this decision, 20 Japanese dive bombers strafed and bombed the village of Bobdubi. This was part of a Japanese heavy air raid that began on May 15th, culminating in over 100 Japanese aircraft hitting multiple Australian positions over the course of a few days. Three heavy raids were performed, but these air attacks focused general far into the Australian rear, leaving the forward positions rather untouched. On may 17th and 18th large formations of Japanese aircraft performed a raid against Wau's airfield. Although the Australians ultimately were forced to withdraw from many forward positions, such as Warfe's units, they managed the ultimate objective of operation Postern, to take Japanese resources away from Mubo and Lae. They had inflicted numerous casualties upon the Japanese including against Major General Okabe who had stepped on a booby trap that put a bullet through his right foot. Okabe had to be evacuated on the night of may 16th as a result, flown back over to Rabaul. Command was handed over to Major General Muroya Chuichi of the 51st division. The battle for Dobdubi was nowhere near done. General Nakano sent 170 soldiers of the 115th regiment on May 17th to attack Hote via the Malolo track. Nakano estimated the Australians had around 50 men defending Hote. The Japanese force ran into 25 Australians at Cissembob along the way and the defenders inflicted 50 casualties upon the Japanese before withdrawing towards Ohibe. One Australian commander at Cissembob had this to say about the engagement  "During this running fight, all men were under very heavy fire, but once again it was brought out what rotten shots the Japanese were. Not one of our boys were hit, and believe me things were hot." The Australians would return to the Hote area on the 22nd to find it completely deserted, so they simply reoccupied their lost positions. That is it for the New Guinea campaign, but other significant events unfolded for the Pacific War during this time period. On April 21st, with a heavy heart President Roosevelt announced to the American people the Japanese had executed several airmen from the famous Doolittle raid. To refresh your memories, 8 of the Doolittle pilots had been captured in Jiangsu province and put on military trial within China and sentenced to death “because of their act against humanity”. They were then transported to Tokyo where the Army ministry reviewed their case. Hideki Tojo initially opposed the death sentences for fearing the Americans would retaliate against Japanese living in America, he would be right about this. Sugiyama and the rest of the Army general staff however insisted on executing all 8 of the pilots who had contributed to the deaths of around 50 civilians and thwart possible future air raids against Japan. The executions would be authorized by an ex post facto military regulation specifically drafted by the army ministry. What is interesting to note, is Emperor Hirohito chose to intervene and commuted the punishment of 5 out of the 8 pilots. Why he allowed the other 3 to die in violation of international law is unknown as the Japanese destroyed nearly all documentation pertaining to prisoners of war by the end of the war. Some historians theorize Hirohito wished to demonstrate his benevolence. Yet again, this is one of those moments that showcases Hirohito was a very active participant, despite the claims made for decades after the war that he was merely a powerless hostage. The 3 men were executed via firing squad at a cemetery outside Shanghai in China on October 14th of 1942. It was not until april of 1943 that the Doolittle Raid operation was fully disclosed to the American public. The US war department said the chief reason for not explaining the full details of the Doolittle raid sooner was the need to bring the Doolittle pilots safely home and to prevent reprisals against their Chinese allies who aided the pilots. In April of 1943 the 5 surviving pilots were moved to Nanjing and in December of 1943 Pilot Robert Meder died of beri beri. He had been starving for months and rejected medical assistance. His death would result in improvements of conditions for the remaining 4 pilots. A truly tragic part of this war and to add to this I would like to read a short piece written by one of the pilots who survived the captivity and became a Christian missionary in Japan after the war.   I Was a Prisoner of Japan   By Jacob DeShazer   I was a prisoner of war for 40 long months, 34 of them in solitary confinement.   When I flew as a member of a bombing squadron on a raid over enemy territory on April 18, 1942, my heart was filled with bitter hatred for the people of that nation. When our plane ran out of petrol and the members of the crew of my plane had to parachute down into enemy-held territory and were captured by the enemy, the bitterness of my heart against my captors seemed more than I could bear.   Taken to prison with the survivors of another of our planes, we were imprisoned and beaten, half-starved, terribly tortured, and denied by solitary confinement even the comfort of association with one another. Three of my buddies were executed by a firing squad about six months after our capture and 14 months later, another one of them died of slow starvation. My hatred for the enemy nearly drove me crazy.   It was soon after the latter's death that I began to ponder the cause of such hatred between members of the human race. I wondered what it was that made one people hate another people and what made me hate them.   My thoughts turned toward what I heard about Christianity changing hatred between human beings into real brotherly love and I was gripped with a strange longing to examine the Christian's Bible to see if I could find the secret.   I begged my captors to get a Bible for me. At last, in the month of May, 1944, a guard brought me the book, but told me I could have it only for three weeks.   I eagerly began to read its pages. Chapter after chapter gripped my heart. In due time I came to the books of the prophets and found that their every writing seemed focused on a divine Redeemer from sin, One who was to be sent from heaven to be born in the form of a human babe. Their writings so fascinated me that I read them again and again until I had earnestly studied them through six times. Then I went on into the New Testament and there read of the birth of Jesus Christ, the One who actually fulfilled the very prophecies of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Micah, and the other Old Testament writers.   My heart rejoiced as I found confirmed in Acts 10:43, "To Him give all the prophets witness, that through His Name, whosoever believeth on Him shall receive remission of sins." After I carefully read this book of the Acts, I continued on into the study of the epistle Paul wrote to the Christians at Rome.   On June 8, 1944 the words in Romans 10:9 stood out boldly before my eyes: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved."   That very moment, God gave me grace to confess my sins to Him and He forgave me all my sins and saved me for Jesus' sake. I later found that His Word again promises this so clearly in 1 John 1:9, "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness."   How my heart rejoiced in my newness of spiritual life, even though my body was suffering so terribly from the physical beatings and lack of food! But suddenly I discovered that God had given me new spiritual eyes and that when I looked at the enemy officers and guards who had starved and beaten my companions and me so cruelly, I found my bitter hatred for them changed to loving pity.   I realized that these people did not know anything about my Savior and that if Christ is not in a heart, it is natural to be cruel. I read in my Bible that while those who crucified Jesus had beaten Him and spit upon Him before He was nailed to the cross, on the cross He tenderly prayed in His moment of excruciating suffering, "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do."   And now, from the depths of my heart, I too prayed for God to forgive my torturers, and I determined by the aid of Christ to do my best to acquaint these people with the message of salvation that they might become as other believing Christians.   With His love controlling my heart, the 13th chapter of 1 Corinthians took on a living meaning: "Love suffereth long, and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity but rejoiceth in truth; beareth all things, believeth all things. Love never faileth."   A year passed by and during that year the memories of the weeks I had been permitted to spend with my Bible grew sweeter and sweeter day by day. Then, one day as I was sitting in my solitary confinement cell I became very sick. My heart was paining me, even as my fellow prisoner had told me his was paining him just before he died of starvation.   I slid down onto my knees and began to pray. The guards rushed in and began to punish me, but I kept right on praying. Finally they let me alone. God, in that hour, revealed unto me how to endure suffering.   At last freedom came. On August 20, 1945 parachutists dropped onto the prison grounds and released us from our cells. We were flown back to our own country and placed in hospitals where we slowly regained our physical strength.   I have completed my training in a Christian college, God having clearly commanded me: "Go, teach those people who held you prisoner, the way of salvation through the blood of Jesus Christ," and am now back in that land as a missionary, with one single purpose--to make Christ known.   I am sending this testimony to people everywhere, with the earnest prayer that a great host of people may confess Jesus Christ as their personal Savior.   Alongside the unfortunate news for the Americans on May 14th a major tragedy occurred for the Australians. At 4:10am on the 14th, the Australian Hospital Ship Centaur was on a run from Sydney to Port Moresby when she was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. The torpedo struck her portside oil fuel tank below the waterline, creating a 10 meter hole, igniting fuel and setting the ship ablaze. The ship was luckily not carrying patients, but held her normal crew staff, around 332 personnel on board. Many of those on board were killed instantly from the concussion blast, others from the blazing inferno. Centaur quickly took on water from her breach, rolled to port and sank bow-first, submerging within 3 minutes. Her rapid sinking prevented the deployment of lifeboats, though two would break off as she went down. According to Centaurs second officer Gordon Rippon, she was hit 44km northeast of Point Lookout. Of the 332 people onboard, only 64 would survive, most of the crew had been asleep when she was hit, giving barely a chance to react. It is estimated that 200 people may have been alive inside Centaur as she sank. Several who escaped the ship would die of shrapnel wounds or drown having found nothing to support them in the water. The survivors spent 36 hours in the water clinging to barrels, wreckage and two damaged lifeboats. The survivors drifted around 36 kms in the water going further north east. On the morning of May 15th, the destroyer USS Mugford departed Brisbane, escorted the New Zealand freighter Sussex when she saw some of the shipwrecked survivors. Sailors aboard the Mugford took up positions with rifles fending off sharks from the survivors. It took an hour and 20 minutes to rescue all 64 people. One of the survivors was sister Ellen Savage, the only surviving nurse from 12 aboard the Centaur. In 1944 Ellen Savage was presented the George Medal for providing medical care, boosting morale and displaying courage during the time they waited for rescue. The identity of the attacker was suspected to be a Japanese submarine. At the time of the attack three KD7 Kaidai class submarines were operating off Australians east coast; The I-177 commanded by Hajime Nakagawa, the I-178 commanded by Hidejiro Utsuki and the I-180 commanded by Toshio Kusaka. None of these submarines survived the Pacific War; the I-177 was sunk by the USS Samual S Miles on october 3rd of 1944; the I-178 was sunk by the USS Patterson on august 25th of 1943 and the i-180 was sunk by the USS Gilmore on april 26th of 1944. In December of 1943 following protests, the Japanese government issued an official statement denying any responsibility for the sinking of the Centaur. The sinking of a hospital ship was a war crime, and investigations were conducted between 1944-1948. The conclusion of the investigate suspected the I-177 of Nakagawa to be the most likely culprit, but there was not enough evidence, thus the case was closed on december 14th of 1948. Nakagawa survived the war and until his death in 1991 refused to speak about the suspected attack on the Centaur. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Australian and American forces in New Guinea were fighting tooth and nail towards their ultimate goal of Salamaua, trying to deceive the Japanese the whole while. Soon battles for Lae and Salamaua will be fought to rid New Guinea of the Japanese menace. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 75 - Pacific War - Japanese counteroffensive in Arakan, April 25 - May 2, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 25, 2023 38:20


Last time we spoke about Operation Vengeance, the assassination of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. When the decrypted intelligence hit Admiral Nimitz desk about the vulnerability of his Japanese rival, he wondered what he should do. Was it moral? Would it even benefit the allies, Yamamoto was arguably losing the war on his own? In the end he ordered the hit and sent the job over to Admiral Halsey who enthusiastically took the bull by the horns. A special squadron of P-38 Lightnings were sent over to perform an extremely precise interception of Yamamoto's G4M Betty aircraft enroute to Ballale airfield on Bougainville. Yamamoto's aircraft was shot down killing him and all those aboard it. The death of the admiral was hidden from the Japanese public for an entire month and upon learning of it the Japanese people all mourned. It was a terrible moment for the Japanese, one of the greatest had fallen, how would the rest of the war play out?  This episode is the Japanese counteroffensive in Arakan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Before we jump back into the CBI theater some action was heating up in New Guinea. The Okabe detachment was defeated during the battle of Wau seeing the Australians controlling the area from Waipali to Buibaining and much of the Mubo Valley. However the Japanese remained resilient and would not give up Mubo without a fight. Vigorous patrolling and ambushes were all the Australians could perform, because they did not have the necessary numbers to launch a major offensive. In early March General MacKay sent word to Blamey, advising him he believed the Japanese might try another shot to seize Wau. He believed even with the projected arrival of the 4th and 15th brigades they would still be outnumbered by the Japanese. MacKay estimated the Japanese had roughly 7500 men in the Lae-Salamaua area and were maintaining a formidable defense in the Mubo region. Therefore he wanted to continue to restrict their activity to patrols to prevent the Japanese from surprising Wau again and allowing vital time to build up the defenses. The attack on Mubo in January had not accomplished its objectives, but it did show the Japanese at Lae and Salamaua how much of a hornet's nest they had stirred up by attacking Wau. The Japanese were not done however and hoped to launch a counteroffensive. They planned to bring the 51st division in a large convoy across the Bismarck Sea. But as we saw in a previous episode this was met with catastrophe during the battle of the bismarck sea, denying the reinforcements, equipment and supplies the Japanese at Mubo desperately needed. 800 units, mostly from the 102 regiment held various positions at Mubo and they could not hope to launch a counteroffensive.  The supply situation in New Guinea remained a nightmare for both sides. In January Blamey authorized the construction of a new jeep trail going from Bulldog to Wau and it would take months to complete the 68 mile path. By April the Australians improved their situation in the Mubo area by occupying the heights called Saddle and Vicker's ridge. They began placing artillery on the heights and on the 20th began to bombard the Japanese position on Green Hill. On the 23rd, Major General Stanley Savige of the 3rd division established his Headquarters at Bulolo. Kanga force had been officially dissolved, thus henceforth the 3rd division was responsible for offensives in the Wau-Lae-Markham area. For months the focus had been on reinforcing Wau, expecting a major Japanese offensive. But the Australians had also maintained a small force 11 miles from Salamaua guarding the entrance to the Markham valley. The 2/3rd independent company was occupying in the vicinity of Missim village along the Francisco river between the Powerhouse and Salamaua. In early april they began performing reconnaissance of the area. On the 21st the ambushed a column of 60 Japanese managing to kill over 20 of them and wounding 15. Soon after their commander was notified by Moten that they were going to launch an offensive against Mubo finally set for the 24th. The offensive against Mubo was actually part of something grander. General Blamey planned to capture Lae forming a plan codenamed Operation postern which was quickly approved by General MacArthur. For the plan to work, the allies needed to trick General Adachi that Salamaua was the primary target for a major offensive. Thus to accomplish this, the Australians had the ⅔ independent company operate just a few miles from Salamaua. General Stanley Savige would not even be aware of these grander planes until June of 1943. Postern called for a large pincer movement, involving an amphibious assault east of Lae and an airborne assault near Nadzab 50 kms to the west of Lae. Planning for Postern had begun in May, with Generals Blamey and Herring proposing to seize Nadzab as soon as possible with Brigadier Eather's 25th Brigade and a parachute battalion, while the 9th Australian Division, now under the command of Major-General George Wooten, was to take Lae in early August. Nadzab was an obvious target, undefended and of immense value, not only for the Lae operation but also for extending the range of Allied air power. In the meantime Blamey had various forces drive the Japanese from key areas, but not to attack Salamaua directly. The Japanese were going to be in for a major surprise. But now we are turning over to the CBI theater. Last time we were speaking about General Irwins Arakan disaster and the mad onion man Wingate's operation Longcloth. Irwins blunders had cost countless lives and provided General Koga's 55th division ample time to regroup. By March 20th, Wavell, Irwin and Lloyd were accepting they would have to withdraw the forces to the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line. Wavell was incredibly pissed off and decided to make Lloyd a scapegoat. Lloyd was dismissed and replaced by Major General Lomax who was ordered to simply carry on doing what Lloyd had been doing. Lomax came just in time to meet General Koga's counteroffensive which practically annihilated the 47th brigade. Irwin looking to blame anyone and anything but himself, shifted the blame to the brigade itself rather than his tactical blunders and tried again to bring Slim into his mess. The British forces were forced to flee east of the Mayu river and this severely beat India morale which was already horrible to begin with.   Now how bad was morale? By early April morale had plummeted to an all time new low. This was because of the series of terrible defeats, terrible casualties and growing more from malaria. The 6th brigade wsa evacuating 50 men due to malaria a day. Despite using mepacrine as a suppressive treatment alongside anti-moquito nets, cream and wearing long clothes at night, in 8 weeks the 6th brigade lost half its total strength. Desertions were on the rise from many units, causing the British commanders a lot of anxiety over their loyalty.  General's Slim and Lomax met at Chittagong as Koga was sweeping everything before him. Both generals scoured over the maps and agreed, Koga's next logical step was an assault on the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line. To meet this attack, Slim and Lomax devised a stratagem for catching Koga in a box along the Mayu peninsula. The box was to involve 6 battalions, two on the ridges of the Mayu hills, two along the mayu river and two in the hills south of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. The idea was to let the Japanese advance through the most likely location, some tunnels on a disused railway track. Once the Japanese were along the tunnels, they would close the lid on the box using a force of brigade level strength. The hope was to achieve a perfect encirclement, chasing the legendary glory of Hannibal's victory at the battle of Cannae. To do this they had exhausted and unbelievably demoralized men and would have to achieve a scheme of geometric perfection.  The troops Lomax came to command were shaken badly, malaria riden battalions, departing the disastrous Arakan campaign at the point of exhaustion. There were no trained formations available in India to replace them, thus they would have to be retained in combat. By early April, Lomax had skillfully managed to stabilize the front at the Maungdaw-Buthidaung. On April 14th Marshall Wavell had appointed General Slim's 15th corps to lead the British-Indian forces retreat. The Japanese sensing weakness amongst the allied forces continued their advance. On April 24th, the Japanese reached the British defenses at Buthidaung and Maungdaw. The 55th indian Brigade held the first attack at Kanthe while carefully preparing their entrapment box strategy, pushing the Japanese advance along the spine of the Mayu mountains; however it all went to shit. Two demoralized battalions gave way to Japanese pressure, breaking the box. This forced everything to come undone and soon the British-Indian forces were yet again performing a fighting withdrawal going north.  It was reported that the fighting efficiency was so low by April 28th, the men of the 8/13th frontier force regiment had literally fired off all their ammunition at an imaginary opponent, and when they actually were attacked the next day they had no option but to retreat. The withdrawal culminated with the capture of Buthidaung on May 9th. The 55th brigade narrowly escaped annihilation by abandoning their vehicles and heavy equipment while limping by foot over some jungle covered hills to safety. Five days later the port of Maungdaw was evacuated and the British-Indian defenders began to take up defensive positions in the open rice-field country near Cox's Bazar. As General Slim noted “Our only hope of stabilizing the front, if the Japanese really pushed us, was to hold the rice-field country. Our men were still untrained for the jungle; they feared it more than they did the enemy. We had to select areas where we could give our troops reasonable fields of fire and open maneuver.‘It was too much like 1942 over again, with the added bitterness that this time we had been defeated by forces smaller than our own.” Slim was very better about the entire ordeal. To make matters worse, the men only pulled out after Slim's incessant pressure applied to Lomax, because Irwin was counter arguing they should toss the kitchen sink for a siege strategy. All the way over in London Sir Winston Churchill had this to say “‘This campaign goes from bad to worse, and we are being completely outfought and outmanoeuvred by the Japanese. Luckily the small scale of the operations and the attraction of other events has prevented public opinion being directed upon this lamentable scene.” Churchill was writing at a time, after the Anglo-American victory in North Africa and the crushing soviet victory at Stalingrad. It was obvious to Churchill and the other allied leadership, Europe was won. Churchill was furious with Wavell, a man he never really liked. The Americans likewise were not happy with Wavell. Meanwhile Irwin kept blaming everyone except himself, even sending reports of how cowardly his troops were. Irwins last absurdity was to signal a recommendation that General Slim by removed from commanding the 15th corps. But Wavell, under severe criticism of himself by this point was determined that Irwin would be canned. Slim was ordered to report to Irwin's HQ. Slim told his colleagues around him he was about to be dismissed as he made his way. When he got to Irwin he was met with this ‘You're not sacked. I am.' Upon hearing this, Slim remarked: ‘I think this calls for the opening of a bottle of port or something if we have one.'   The British-Indians forces had  916 dead, 2889 wounded and 1252 missing; the Indian high command had suffered another heavy blow, with the myth of Japanese superiority, excellence and skill as a jungle fighter being strongly reinforced in the minds of British and Indian troops, something that gravely affected their morale General Slim held a rather remarkable ability, mental toughness with some extraordinary resistance to stress. The frustrations of all the defeats and the constant shuffling between HQs and the front was a lot to bear. Slim actually found something positive about the Arakan disaster. The British battle casualties were high, but they could have been a hell of a lot higher, given Irwins insistance to perform endless frontal attacks. The British had learnt valuable lessons about the Japanese and the lack of their own training in specific areas. There had been over 7500 cases of malaria and they were only truly learning on the spot how to deal with the pesky disease. Troops heanceforth would be routinely issued with mosquito nets, repellents and by autumn of 1943 a wonder drug was developed, Mepacrine which significantly helped with the symptoms of malaria.  But by far and large the most significant long term development in 1942-1943 was the gradual reasseration of allied air superiorirty. By the end of 1942, 150 new airfields were constructed, RAF pilots and aircraft began to arrive to them in large numbers and the Americans had sent 10,000 air force personnel to serve in the CBI theater. Heavy B-24 Liberator bombers began to appear at the battlefront for the first time and in November of 1942 some made the spectacular 2760 mile return trip after bombing Bangkok. The Japanese quickly realized their proposed Burma-Siam railway was very vulnerable. When the war in the middle east came to a close in early 1943, the US army airforce transferred a ton of their heavy bombers to the far east. Bombing raids on Bangkok, Rangoon and Mandalay were increased significantly by Christmas of 1942. The Japanese were gradually losing their air superiorirty and this was deeply troubling for them.  During the Arakan campaign a Japanese colonel issued the following orders ‘There must be no fear of aircraft. As long as you are not discovered you must seek to remain so. If once our position is revealed, the enemy planes must be shot down. It is not permissible to suppose that our soldiers are no match for aircraft.' The Japanese were forced to yield the skies over Arakan even though they had taken its ground. The RAG would conduct search and destroy missions over Thaitkido, Buthidaung, Sinho and Akyab island in June. 6 Hurricanes would escort some Blenheim bombers on a long range raid against Ramree island, even though they were not safe. Allied air superiority would eventually become the crucial factor to win the struggle over Burma. Now we cant talk about Burma without talking a bit more about the mad onion man Wingate. While the Arakan campaign was coming to its disastrous conclusion, Operation Longcloth had reached its own. The last remaining columns made their way back to allied territory. 2182 returned out of the original 3000 men that entered Burma; an estimated 818 men had been killed, taken prisoner or died of disease. There was a ton of criticism tossed at the operation and the effectiveness of the Chindits, but the operation was moderately successful. To be brutally honest, the Burma campaign had basically no success stories except for the Chindits, thus it got inflated quite heavily. Wavell was very pleased with the performance of Wingate's forces, so much so he put in an order to form the new Long Range Penetration group, the 111th Indian Brigade. Wavell handpicked their commander, Brigadier William Lentaigne who would come to hate Wingate and Wingate hated him haha. The success of the Chindits would be tossed in all the major headlines of every newspaper from England to India. The British had to do something to raise morale and the Chindits kind of just fell into it. Now one last major event that occurred during all of this was a major conference. Wavell had been flown to Washington to partake in the Trident Conference which was carried from May 12-25th. The main focus of the conference was on the European theater, in fact there was an obsession over the Mediterranean cross channel invasion plans. When it came to theaters like Burma there was little interest. In fact Churchill would often only talk about Singapore when the east was brought up, showcasing full and well he only sought to revitalize the prestige of the British empire over other things. Churchill was quite in favor of bypassing Burma which he viewed as only being beneficial to China, a subject he could not understand why FDR obsessed over. It seemed the Churchill FDR regarded China as the emerging dominant power in the far east, while he only regarded CHina as a pacific power, ignoring China's claims over Tibet, Mongolia and northeastern Burma, and of course Churchill would completely ignore any mention of Hong Kong. FDR was seen to be extremely Pro-Chiang Kai-shek, almost maniac by British accounts. The British began to adopt a machiavellian stance of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and Chennault's airpower idea, thinking it would surely fail, which served Britain just fine.  Meanwhile, Vinegar Joseph Stilwell also at the Trident conference, kept trying to persuade his president that Chiang Kai-Shek was cunning and quite evil. He stressed the danger of American becoming a solitary atlas bearing the burden of the world because the British were outplaying them. He underlined Chiang Kai-sheks ambitions to get rid of him and replace him with a “yes man”, so he could acquire lendlease material for his own ends without any pushbacks. Stilwell recommended sending US troops to the CBI theater; to get Chiang Kai-shek to make specific commitments and stop wiggling around issues and above all to stop Chiang Kai-sheks stab-in-the-back secret diplomacy antics. Stilwell would find the British at Trident very unimpressed with him and his opinions. Stilwell also chose to bitterly argue with Field Marshal Alanbrooke, the chief of the imperial staff and a rampant Americanphobe. It got so bad, George Marshall told Stimson ‘Stilwell shut up like a clam and made an unfavourable impression.'  During the conference FDR did ask Stilwell in private what he thought of Chiang Kai-shek to which Stilwell said ‘He's a vacillating, tricky, undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his word.' By contrast Chennault, when asked a similar question, replied: ‘Sir, I think the generalissimo is one of the two or three greatest military and political leaders in the world today. He has never broken a commitment or promise made to me.' Meanwhile Chiang Kai-sheks representatives including his wife were threatening to pull out of Burma and to make a separate peace with Japan, unless the British finally took action to seize Rangoon. Instead it was agreed, more supplies would be tossed over the Hump and for the future operation Anakim to be shelved, to which Stilwell argued that if the allies waited another year before launching a land-based campaign, China would collapse.  Trident was chaotic as hell. Admiral King slammed the table with his fists many times violently supporting Marshall and Stilwell. King and Marshall wanted the land route to China open, but the British kept tossing their support for the Hump operations. Stilwell was not having a good time, but then he had a surprising victory. Stilwell met with Churchill privately, complaining about the abysmal situation in Burma, and Churchill 100% agreed with his criticisms. Churchill acknowledged the high command in India was terrible and that he was going to replace Wavell. As Stilwell wrote after the experience.   “With Wavell in command, failure was inevitable; he had nothing to offer at any meeting except protestations that the thing was impossible, hopeless, impractical. Churchill even spoke of it as silly. The Limeys all wanted to wait another year. After the Akyab fiasco, the four Japanese divisions in Burma have been scared to death. The inevitable conclusion was that Churchill has Roosevelt in his pocket. That they are looking for an easy way, a short cut for England, and that no attention must be diverted from the Continent at any cost. The Limeys are not interested in the war in the Pacific, and with the President hypnotised they are sitting pretty. Roosevelt wouldn't let me speak my piece. I interrupted twice but Churchill kept pulling away from the subject and it was impossible.' Thus Wavell was as they say “kicked up stairs”, promoted to viceroy of India and replaced as commander in India with Sir Claude Auchinleck. Stilwell returned to China and participated on a celebrity tour arranged by George Marshall to heighten his profile. Once that was done, Stilwell fell into a depression writing this  “‘Back to find Chiang same as ever – a grasping, bigoted, ungrateful little rattlesnake.Any Jap threat will put the Peanut in an uproar, and if they are wise they will repeat their attempt, for this if for no other reason. And if they seriously want to gain the game, they can attack Kunming or Chungking, or both, with five divisions on either line and finish the matter. If we sting them badly enough in the air, they are almost sure to try it . . . The Peanut's promise of picked men for India is so much wind; last year 68% of the men sent were rejected for trachoma or skin disease . . . This is going beyond all bounds. This insect, this stink in the nostrils, superciliously inquires what we will do, who are breaking our backs to help him, supplying everything – troops, equipment, planes, medical, signal, motor services, setting up his goddam SOS, training his lousy troops, backing his dastardly chief of staff, and general staff, and he the Jovian dictator, who starves his troops and is the world's worst ignoramus, picks flaws in our preparations and hems and haws about the Navy, God save us.” Stilwell's frustration was a bit understandable as Chiang Kai-shek had still not replied to FDR about if or when he could commit forces into Burma again. Stilwell was baffled by his nations continued support of what he saw as a fascist regime in China, while simultaneously fighting the fascist regimes in Europe. What Stilwell really wanted was to be made field commander in China, and if he ever got that position, the first thing he would do was cancel the lendlease. Things were not going so well for the married couple of Vinegar Joe and Peanut. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were not going well in Burma to say the least. Well except for the Chindits minor success, but that simply could not overcome the incredible low morale of the far east allied forces in the face of what seemed an unstoppable Japanese goliath. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 72 - Pacific War - Operation I-GO, April 4-11, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 10, 2023 28:44


Last time we spoke about the disastrous first Arakan campaign and the Pacific Military conference of 1943. Yes Mr. Irwin had royally messed up the Arakan offensive, so much so it was gradually bringing his bitter rival General Slim into the mix. While Irwin failed, Slim gradually was placed in operation control and would soon unleash a box strategy against General Koga's forces in Burma. On the planning front, the war between MacArthur and King raged on, but compromises were finally hashed out. The July 2 directive, became the Elkton plan which in turn would evolve into Operation Cartwheel. The allies were learning how to play nice together in the Pacific at last. MacArthur was gradually shifting the war towards his own personal goals. However while all of this was going on, the Japanese were also forming their own plans, which would soon be unleashed. This episode is the Operation I-GO Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  It is April of 1943, a year ago, the Empire of the Rising sun stood proud and victorious over the Pacific. The Japanese had taken Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and pretty much anywhere they went, victory was at hand. Yet as Admiral Yamamoto moved his flag from super battleship Yamato to the Musashi, he looked quite withered down. The past 14 months since the great raid on Pearl Harbor had aged him considerably. His close-cropped hair had turned almost entirely gray and his eyes looked discolored. It was rare to see him leave his quarters and whenever he did it was quite briefly, usually him waving his hat in the air as a departing sign to a squadron of aircraft. Rarely did he join his fellow staff officers for a game of ring-toss on deck. In a letter he wrote at the end of January of 1943 he asserted he only set foot ashore 4 times since the previous august, only to check in on the sick or wounded men at the hospitals or to attend funerals. Critics of Yamamoto would claim he actually made considerable amounts of visits to the “naval restaurant” on an island in the lagoon. This “naval restaurant” was actually a well-known brothel near Yokosuka Naval base in Tokyo Bay. The commander in chief seemed resigned to his fate. When he was asked in October of 1942 what he would do after Japan won the war he replied “I imagine I'll be packed off either to the guillotine or to set Helena”. On most occasions he would openly declare he did not believe he would live through the war. Yamamoto mourned the loss of so many IJN officers and sailors and was especially saddened by the loss of the commanders who refused to leave their doomed ships. Yamamoto had actually campaigned to reform the principle that a captain could and should honorably survive the destruction of his ship, but it was to little avail. The belief was so hard-wired into the Japanese naval officer corps.  Yamamoto knew Japan was staggering towards a catastrophic defeat, but he could not openly say it to those around him. He had tossed everything he could to thwart the war in the first place, warning everyone of the great industrial power of America that would gradually overwhelm Japan. His operation against Midway in june of 1942 was a major gambit aimed at forcing a decisive victory to bring the Americans closer to the negotiating table. The utter failure at Midway had ensured the war would be prolonged, it would become a war of attrition and one that Japan could not hope to win. On the morning of April 3rd, 1943 Admirals Yamamoto and Ugaki accompanied by more than a dozen officers of the combined fleet staff boarded two Kawanishi flying boats enroute for Rabaul. The battles of Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona-Sanananda were extremely heavy setbacks to Yamamoto's plans of extending the defensive perimeter towards the east of Australia so it could be strangled of supplies. The disaster that occurred at the battle of the Bismarck Sea showcased how vulnerable their shipping lanes were. The state of their land-based aviation was abysmal, it failed to protect the convey sent to Lae resulting in the terrible loss. As Commander Toshikazu Ohmae stated “The land-based air groups at Rabaul were not effective, largely because there were only a few experienced pilots in them.  Vice-Admiral Ugaki was even harsher, adding “We cannot expect much of the land-based air force partly because of a passive atmosphere among them.”  Admiral Kusaka's 11th air fleet had suffered tremendous losses from a series of serious ongoing issues, but two were of vital importance; 1) the poor health and low morale of those at Rabaul. Men were succumbed to widespread diseases, such as malaria and chronic diarrhea. And 2) the terrible situation when it came to replacing men such as their valuable veterans. As Yamamoto put it “They used to say that one ‘Zero' fighter could take on five to ten American aircraft, but that was at the beginning of the war. Since losing so many good pilots at Midway we've had difficulty in replacing them. Even now, they still say that one ‘Zero' can take on two enemy planes, but the enemy's replacement rate is three times ours; the gap between our strengths is increasing every day, and to be honest things are looking black for us now.” The new recruits were unfamiliar with the aircraft employed by Kusaka's command, requiring to be re-trained upon their arrival to Rabaul. Without their veteran pilots to train these men the task took longer and resulted in less capable pilots and crews. The replacement issue for aircrews was a fleet-wide issue forcing the IJN to shorten their training syllabus for commissioned and enlisted pilots by 2 months. To achieve this reduction, the amount of instructional time devoted to skill areas like tactics, gunnery and formation flying were reduced or in some cases even eliminated. The veterans who began the war in a third position of a 3-plane sector and were still alive now took upon the role of shotai or chutai leadership. Shotai leaders were responsible for flights of 3 aircraft and Chutai leaders were responsible for 9 aircraft or better said 3 shotai. However many of these men did not really have the necessary experience to assume such responsibilities. On March 25th a directive was established to quote “create a superior and impregnable strategic position”. In other words, Tokyo was demanding the Army and Navy come up with a plan to stop the allies southern offensive. Tokyo wanted the two services to actually work together so they could defend the precious gains they had made in the early part of the war, like their holdings in New Guinea which were currently being hammered upon by MacArthur's forces. To implement the new directive, General Imamura summoned a conference on Rabaul for April 12th. Commanders of the 17th and 19th armies, the 6th air division would be in attendance. During the conference it was decided General Hyakutakes 17th Army would take on the responsibility for defending the northern solomons in coordination with the Navy. They would also have to help assist the navy who was expecting allies attacks directed at the central solomons. General Adachi's 18th army was given responsibility to defend Lai-Salamaua, but because of the shipping lane crisis this would have to be done mostly via land routes. They were going to establish a major overland and coastal supply route linking Madang and Western New Britain to the Lae area to aid this. Furthermore naval and air bases would be built up in eastern New Guinea to aid Lt General Itahana Giichi's 6th air division to operation in the region. Despite all these grand plans, American air power was already making Tokyo express runs to places like Finschhafen impossible. The Japanese war effort in New Guinea was gradually being torn apart by constant air raids. Therefore, the only way to get men and supplies to places like Lae would be using the ever glamorous submarine or barge methodology. Now that is all for the Imperial Japanese army boys planning session, but what about Yamamoto and the Naval gang. By the time of the conference, MacArthur's efforts in New Guinea had basically ruined Yamamoto's expansionist strategies. A complete strategic rethink was now necessary. Yamamoto was quartered in a cottage high on a hill behind the town of Rabaul. He spent the following week inspecting airfields and other military installations, meeting with the local army and naval commanders all around New Britain. As was typical of him, he bid good luck to the departing air squadrons, with his usual wave of his hat. Yamamoto set to work creating a new offensive directive erected as part of the March 25th plan. The IJN planned for an air campaign against allied positions in New Guinea and the Solomons. The 11th air fleet, on its lonesome would not able to mount an effective strike, thus Yamamoto called upon the 3rd fleet to augment them.  Admiral Ozawa who led the 3rd fleet voiced opposition to this, not wanting his precious elite units to be squandered. But he eventually gave in and provided aircraft carriers and agreed to supervise plans for the new operation. At the same time it was decided that Yamamoto and Ozawa would shift their headquarters temporarily to Rabaul, this would prove to be a fateful mistake on his part. You see him doing so was announced using a radio message. His operations officer Commander Yasuji Watanabe would go on the record complaining that the information about Yamamoto's visit to the Ballalae Airfield should had been done by courier and not by radio, but the communications officer replied “this code only went into effect on april 1st and cannot be broken”. It would be broken, but more about that later. Now the Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo and Hiyo would toss up 160 aircraft: 54 Vals, 45 Kates and 96 Zeros to augment the 155 aircraft of Admiral Kusaka pushing them to a strength of over 350 aircraft. The aircraft were dispersed to multiple airfields such as Buka and Kahili on Bougainville and Ballale in the Shortlands.   Now before Yamamoto and his team launched their new offensive, Admiral Kusaka decided to do a preliminary fighter sweep down the Slot on April 1st. He hoped to draw out large portions of the allied airpower on Guadalcanal to soften them up. Kusaka launched a first wave of 32 and second wave of 25 Zeros which intercepted 42 fighters of Admiral Mason's ComAirSols command. The allied force consisted mostly of Wildcats, some P-38's and a few new F4U Corsairs. They were intercepted over the Russell Islands causing a giant melee of dog flights lasting over 3 hours. The Americans had home field advantage over the Japanese, managing to shoot down 9 Zero's at the cost of 5 Wildcats and a Corsair. It was not exactly a promising start for the Japanese. As usual both sides of the air battle submitted exaggerated reports. The Americans claimed to have taken down 18 Zeros and the Japanese claimed to have downed 47 American fighters. So yeah the Japanese claimed to have shot down more aircraft than they even encountered haha. Now it was on April the 3rd when Yamamoto and his staff arrived in Rabaul and he personally took command of the upcoming operation alongside Admirals Ozawa and Kusaka. Now Yamamoto had accurately anticipated the allied advance into the solomons and New Guinea would focus on the subjugation of Rabaul. Within five days of the battle of Guadalcanal being officially declared on February 9th of 1942, Lt General Kenney had authorized a plan to take down Rabaul. This plan commence on the night of February 14th with a bombing raid consisting of 12 B-29's from the 63rd bomb squadron. They targeted the fuel dumps and munitions. A second wave of 10 B-29's from the 65th bomb squadron came in dropping incendiaries upon the town of Rabaul. The Japanese had managed no fighter interceptions. Yamamoto had further predicted the allies would launch a double-pronged advance through New Guinea and the northern Solomon islands. To meet this advance he had set up a ring of airfields around Rabaul. His visit to Ballalae airfield was part of developing the rings and it would be his death sentence in the end. The result of these plans led to a triangular combat zone with Port Moresby on its west point, Guadalcanal at its east and Rabaul as its northern apex.  Yamamoto knew the US forces would advance under the cover of air superiority which in turn depending upon their ability to build forward airfields. In anticipation of his Yamamoto had as we mentioned gathered a massive build up of aircraft with the intent to hammer the allies ability to supply materials and build further airfields. The battle for Henderson field on Guadalcanal was the first of these contests and many would follow. Yamamoto hoped the shorter lines of supply from airfields closer to Rabaul would give them an advantage over the Americans, but despite all the claims of great air victories, Yamamoto's personal tour was revealing the opposite. In fact, as Yamamoto used the post-guadalcanal lull in action to bolster his defenses for a anticipated battle ahead, Halsey had likewise prepared his forces for their advance into the central and northern solomons.  Halsey would have a number of new toys to play with such as the Chance Vought F4U Corsair and Grumman F6F Hellcat. 4 new airbases were built upon Guadalcanal and during march of 1943 allied bombers made sporadic attacks on the Japanese airfields at Ballalae, Kahili, Shortland Island and Munda. On top of that large scale reconnaissance efforts were made to get a good picture of the Japanese build up of their airfields. When reconnaissance found out the Japanese were developing a seaplane off southern bougainville, the Japanese launched a dawn fighter attack on March 28th. Led by Captain Lanphier of the 70th squadron, 6 P-38's destroyed 8 Japanese seaplanes. Now after a week of sporadic bombing raids from both sides, allies watchers on the New Guinea coast indicated a major offensive was afoot.  Yamamoto's grand air campaign was codenamed operation I-GO with attack day X set for april 5th. The first target was to be guadalcanal, but bad weather forced a postponement of 2 days. Japanese reconnaissance since March 25th had indicated the allies had roughly 300 aircraft on the island, alongside transports, cargo ships, warships and other goodies going between Lunga Point and Tulagi. In the early hours of April the 7th, Yamamoto unleashed a massive strike force consisting of over 224 planes, the largest striking force since the attack on Pearl Harbor. 67 Vals and 157 Zeros were enroute to smash Guadalcanal. But the allies enjoyed great intelligence and received several warnings of the impending offensive. The coastwatchers were hard at work transmitting their sightings. Rear-Admiral Marc Mitscher , the new commander of AirSols scrambled 76 fighters consisting of Wildcats, Lightnings, Airacobras and Kittyhawks from Hendersonfield, Milne Bay and other outlying airfields. Despite the prior warnings, the allied scramble was rather disorderly and to make matters worse the Japanese cleverly split up their attack force into 4 groups to confuse the allied radar systems. 4 squadrons of Vals were preceded by 2 sweeps of Zeros which were intercepted by 3 squadrons of Wildcats. Marine 1st Lt James E Sweet of the VMF-221 was credited with shooting down7 Vals and possibly an 8th using his Wildcat. His aircraft was badly mauled during the combat forcing him to make a water landing outside Tulagi harbor. He would be awarded the Medal of Honor for this great feat.  Despite valiant efforts made by the allies, the Vals laid havoc to the Tulagi anchorage. The destroyer USS Aaron Ward, New Zealander corvette Moa and US tanker Kanawha were sunk. THe crews over in Henderson field were fortunate as it was not hit too hard as the dog fights broke up the Japanese Vals and Zeros who were forced back towards Bougainville. For their efforts the Japanese lost 12 zerosand 12 vals. The Japanese pilots claimed to have downed 41 allies aircraft, which turned out to be 7 Wildcats and 12 major warships which were the 3 previously mentioned. With what seemed to be a large success for operation X, Yamamoto felt confident and decided to launch operation Y of I-GO. While operation X of I-GO was directed at Guadalcanal, operation Y would hit New Guinea. On april 11, 27 Vals and 73 Zeros departed Rabaul to hit Oro Bay which was adjacent to the rapidly expanding airdrome complex at Dobodura. The allies scrambled 50 aircraft consisting of Lightning and Warhawks of the 7th, 8th and 9th squadrons. The vals managed to sink a US cargo ship, heavily damaging a transport and an Australian minesweeper. The next day Yamamoto traveled to Vanukanau airdrome to personally send off another strike and announced he would do a tour of the forward bases of Buin, Ballale and Shortland island. The signal was picked up by allied listening posts. Cryptanalysts at Station Hypo led by Joseph Rocherfort decrypted the message and pronounced it a jackpot. The message referred to Yamamoto was easily deduced, and the geographic designators for Rabaul, Ballale and Buin were easily extracted. Better than that the message contained the specific information that Yamamoto would be traveling on a medium bomber escorted by 6 fighters, and would arrive at RYZ at 8am. This would put Yamamoto's aircraft over the southern end of Bougainville on the morning of the 18th, a location just within the fighter range of Henderson Field. I will not be speaking anymore of this as it will be discussed in depth in a future episode, just a tease I know. At Vanukanau Yamamoto presented himself in his crisp white uniform, waving his hat to the crews of 43 Bettys followed up shortly by 65 Zeros. A second group of 66 Zeros assisted the raid to perform a sweep, leaving a combined total of 174 aircraft. They flew in two large formations with an initial course direction going towards Milne Bay. Allied radar picked them up prompting General Kenney to scramble every fighter had in the area. However the course the Japanese took was a feint and without warning they broke out going across the Owen Stanley range enroute for Port Moresby. 44 allied fighters were able to intercept them, but many of the bombers managed to get past them. The bombers hit the airstrips, damaged installations alongside 15 grounded aircraft. The Japanese would claim sinking a transport anchored in the harbor and the destruction of 28 enemy planes in the sky, though only two P-39's were shot down at the cost of 2 Zeros and 7 Bettys.  On april the 14th, Yamamoto again personally waved off another attack, this time targeting Milne Bay. 23 vals and 75 Zeros were launched from carriers Hiyo and Junyo joined by 54 fighters and 44 Bettys from the 11th air fleet for a total of 196 aircraft. Here the Japanese scored some luck, because as a result of the air raid against Port Moresby the allies had actually rerouting most of their shipping to Milne Bay. The allies scrambled 44 fighters, 36 Kittyhawks from Milne Bay and 8 lightnings from Dobodura to intercept them. Despite the efforts of the allied airmen, Japanese bombers broke through making their way to Milne Bay in several waves. The high level bombers dropped at least 100 bombs over the anchorage, while the dive bombers attacked the allied shipping. The Dutch troop transport Van Heemskerk was forced to beach itself after suffering several hits lighting her ablaze; the British cargo ship Gorgon was also hit many times and lit on fire; the Dutch transport Van Outhoorn and Australian minesweepers Wagga and Kapunda were damaged by near misses. In the battle in the sky one Kittyhawk was shot down, 4 p-40's were severely damaged and 1 lightning was forced to make a crash landing. The Japanese claimed to have sunk 3 large and 1 medium transport, heavily damaged 6 transports and shot down 44 aircraft. During the air battle one Lt Richard Bong was starting to make a name for himself having shot down a pair of Betty's. He would earn a lot of attention from General Kenney who described him “as a little blonde-haired Norwegian boy. Best watch the boy Bong”.The Japanese claims was so incredible, upon hearing of it Emperor Hirohito sent a message stating “please convey my satisfaction to the commander in chief, combined fleet, and tell him to enlarge the war result more than ever”. To contrast this, General Kenney made some remarks about the intense air raids “the way yamamoto had failed to take advantage of his superiority in numbers and position since the first couple of month of the war was a disgrace to the airman's profession”. The reason he had this scathing remark was because apart from the rare exception of mass attacks, the Japanese attacks were marked by their use of aircraft in Penny-packets. What Kenny did not know was how the IJN's air forces were being hampered heavily by logistical issues. Their inability at this time was a result of lack of experienced aviation engineers, ground crews, adequate airfield facilities and airfield equipment. They simply were not the same aviation force that had hit Pearl Harbor, the spear had been heavily blunted. Yamamoto planned to perform another fighter sweep of the 16th, but reconnaissance flights failed to turn up adequate targets on New Guinea's northeast coastline.  On April the 17th, Yamamoto's chief of staff, Vice-Admiral Ugaki Matome held a conference to review the lessons learned from their air offensive. The staff were reluctant to admit a startling and horrifying truth. Hundreds of aviators had been burnt to a crisp because the aircraft engineers messed up installing the protected fuel tanks. This led to countless aircraft catching fire from minor hits, even tracer rounds. When Japanese aircraft saw they were on fire, they assumed they had been scored a fatale hit from the enemy, though in most cases their aircraft were minorly damaged. Many of the pilots in these situations chose to kamikaze their aircraft. Thus Operation I-Go was finished, but despite all the unrealistic exaggerated reports from the Japanese pilots, the entire operation only really amounted to setting back the American operations in the Solomons for about 10 days. While the Japanese believed they had inflicted tremendous damage, in reality the only real insignificance for the allies was to postpone some bombing raids and minelaying activity. The most significant consequence of operation I-Go would actually end up being Admiral Yamamoto's decision to personally carry out a tour of the forward airbases, as he tried to raise morale for the men like he had done at Rabaual. This would have a very dire effect on the future of the Empire.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation I-Go was quite the lackluster offensive, despite what the Japanese pilots were claiming to their leadership. The leadership likewise believed the claims or were unwilling to see the truth of the matter. They had only accosted the allies about 10 days in the solomons.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 71 - Pacific War - Pacific Military Conference, MacArthur vs King, March 28 - April 4, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 28, 2023 28:26


Last time we spoke about the battle of Komandorski islands. Admirals Kinkaid and McMorris began a naval blockade of Attu and Kiska putting the IJN in a terrible bind. They could either give up the Aleutians, or they would have to reinforce them, either of which came at huge costs. Admiral Hosogaya had no choice but to try and breach the allied blockade to get the much needed reinforcements to the frozen islands. Hosogaya's fleet was superior in numbers and firepower to that of McMorris when they fatefully met in the frigid northern seas. Yet by a stroke of luck, a single man fired a High Explosive shell during the heat of battle causing Hosogaya to make a terrible blunder. Under the impression allied airpower was about to attack them, Hosogaya backed off, losing the chance to claim a major victory. And today we are going to venture, behind the desk so to speak.  This episode is the Pacific Military Conference: MacArthur vs King Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Now before we jump into the real war of the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur vs Admiral Ernest King, I first want to jump over the good old CBI theater. Interesting to mention I recently did a livestream, gaming with a friend of mine, answering some audience questions from you dear old audience members and others from my Youtube channel and Fall and Rise of China Podcast. One guy asked me “how important was the CBI theater?” and it really got me thinking on the spot. Honestly when Americans talk about the Pacific War, two things immediately come to mind, naval battles and island warfare. China gets overshadowed despite literally being the lionshare of fighting against the Japanese, I mean hell they kept like 30+ divisions in China out of 50 or so. But even more than that you hardly hear about Burma or India, they are always the quote en quote benchwarmers compared to lets say your Guadalcanal's or Iwo Jima's. As I said to the audience member on the livestream, its hard to quantify something, but honestly tossing %'s around you could argue the CBI was a hard 50-60% of the war effort, because it did the most important thing necessary to win a way, it drained Japan of men/resources. So lets jump into it a bit shall we? So the last time we were talking about the disastrous First Arakan Campaign. The British launched their offensive and saw heavy resistance at Rathedaung and Donbaik. General Irwin continuously made blunders. When Wavell made an inspection of the battlefields later on he commented how Irwin's forces had “fought in penny packets”. Basically what he was getting out with this little jab, was unlike conventional battles, take for example the famous battle of Alamein. Instead this offensive consisted of hundreds of chance encounters, dozens of disparate set piece clashes, hand-to-hand conflicts, frontal attacks, ambushes, desperate defenses, bombing raids, all of which had been minutely chronicled, but the details of them were quite the mystery. General Slim when asked described it all ‘as an epic that ran across great stretches of wild country; one day its focal point was a hill named on no map; next a miserable unpronounceable village a hundred miles away. Columns, brigades, divisions, marched and counter-marched, met in bloody clashes and reeled apart, weaving a confused pattern hard to unreal”.  Now the beginning of the first arakan offensive seemed to go well. Despite the logistical nightmares, Lloyd enjoyed the advantages of both air superiority and numerical superiority. But the Japanese built their defenses knowing full well what was coming to hit them. The Japanese made no attempt to hold onto the lines between Maungdaw and Buthidaung, nor resist the British forces at Kyauktaw. Lloyd began sending optimistic reports, such as on Christmas Day when the enemy pulled out of Ratheduang. And so the British continued along the peninsula until they came a few miles north of a point of Donbaik, sitting on the coast of the Bay of Bengal. It was here, General Koga had dug in and waited for his enemy. It was to be here, after showcasing the Japanese superior jungle fighting tactics, their roadblocks and amphibious hooks, that they would unleash a new unsuspecting weapon, that of the bunker. General Slim described it as such “‘For the first time we had come up against the Japanese “bunkers” – from now on to be so familiar to us. This was a small strong-point made usually of heavy logs with four to five feet of earth, and so camouflaged in the jungle that it could not be picked out at even fifty yards without prolonged searching. These bunkers held garrisons varying from five to twenty men, plentifully supplied with medium and light machine guns.' The bunkers were impervious to field guns and medium bombs. They also had crossing fire lanes, thus for one force to attack a bunker they would be fired upon by 2 more. The redoubt at Donbaik was situated alongside a “chaung”, which was a natural anti-tank position, having steep sides up to 9 feet high up on the bunkers. On January 7th of 1943, the forces got their first taste of these defenses and were tossed back with heavy casualties. For days a pattern emerged of men throwing themselves at the bunkers, only to be butchered. It was so bad, both Wavell and Irwin were forced to come visit Llyod on the 10th, just to tell him “you must take Donbaik at all cost”. And so Llyod asked for tanks, and he was given them. But to Slims horror the man only asked for one troop of them, prompting Slim to object stating “the more you use the fewer you lose”. His argument was sound and simple, if you were going to utilize tanks, you tried to do so en masse to overwhelm, otherwise the resources would be vulnerable and most likely lost. His objections were tossed aside, and half a squadron of tanks, merely 8 hit the bunkers. The british attacks were beaten off all he same. Now Koga knew he had to fight off the enemy until at least the end of march to receive some decent reinforcements. Thus he determined to hold out; he needed to perform a counterattack. Meanwhile his counterpart Irwin was determined that overwhelming infantry numbers on narrow fronts could achieve victory. And as one contemporary analysis called it “an idea rich in casualties”. Koga brought up the bulk of his 55th division to Akyab and on March 7th the 213th regiment attacked the Kaladan Valley, driving away the V force. Then the 112th regiment attacked the 123rd and 55th Indian brigades north of Rathedaung who were forced to pull back to Zedidaung. This left the 47 indian brigade trapped at the Hwitze bridgehead and the Japanese carried out wide outflanking maneuvers and infiltration attacks against the British lines. In response Irwin tried to toss another assault against Donbaik, which had just been further reinforced by Koga. On March 18th, the 6th brigade of Brigadier Ronald Cavendish launched a front attack on a very narrow front, despite multiple advice given by other commanders stating he should try to outflank the Japanese along the mountain crest. His force made little progress and suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. Meanwhile the 213th regiment secured the eastern side of the Mayu river and the 112th regiment was preparing to cross it. In early March Irwin was doing something aside from tossing his men into a meatgrinder, he began covering his ass. Sensing defeat was staring him in the face, in his desperation he tried to coopt his hated rival, General Slim into sharing some of his blame to come. He sent Slim to Maungdaw to see Lloyd and report on the situation there. When Slim asked him if this meant he was now in operational control, Irwin said absolutely not, he just wanted Slim's assessment of the situation over there. Irwin did however add in, that Slim might gain operational control in the future, but only when Irwin said so and even in that case, Irwin would be retaining administrative control. Well Slim found the Lloyds men's morale was at an all time low. He advised Lloyd to abandon the idiotic frontal assaults and instead to try and flank the enemy through the jungles. Lloyd argued that was too unfeasible and because of Irwins ordered overruled Slim. Thus Slim returned to Irwin with a useless report. Up until this point Wavell pretty much had no idea what was going on. He continued to urge action from Irwin, so Irwin ordered action from Lloyd and the result was just more disaster. By March 20th Wavell, Irwin and Lloyd all accepted they would have to withdraw the forces to the Maundaw-Buthidaung line. Wavell was livid at his subordinates writing “It seemed to me to show a complete lack of imagination, and was neither one thing nor the other. An attack in real depth with determined soldiers like the 6th Brigade would, I am sure, have accomplished something, though it has cost us casualties. But to use one battalion at a time, and that usually only deploying one company, seems to me to be poor tactics. With the Japanese in a pocket like that, I cannot believe that a plan could not have been made to eat them up; it looked to me like practically ideal for covering machine gun and mortar fire from a flank.” On the night of the 24th, the 112th regiment crossed the Mayu river, marched along narrows paths and jungle to get to the crest of the supposedly impassable Mayu range. The following days say lines of communications to Kyaukpandu severed, the enemy captured the mountain crest near Atet Nanra on the 39th and in response to this Lloyd sent the 47th and 6th brigades to retreat west before they were encircled. This of course was in contradiction to direct ordered he had received to wait until the monsoon season had broke before pulling out. Thus Irwin was forced to countermand Lloyd's order. Wavell was livid over his insubordination blundering of things and sought to toss Lloyd under the bus. Thus Irwin was discreetly told to sack Lloyd, and before doing so he took direct command of the 14th indian division.  Lloyd was replaced by Major General C.E.N Lomax who was promptly ordered to carrying on doing the exact same things Lloyd had done. The 26th Indian division and Lomax were sent to bolster the peninsula, Lomax was going to assume command of all the Arakan forces when he got there, but until then Irwin had to run the show. Koga was not letting up of course and the 112th regiment managed to build a roadblock north of Indian village b April 3rd, successfully cutting the lines of communication of the 47th and 6th brigades. Simultaneously the 143rd regiment burst into the area advancing northwards up the Mayu River valley. The Japanese were soon infiltrating British positions at Indin village and overran the HQ of the 6th brigade capturing its commander, Cavendish in the process. However one of Cavendishes last orders before being grabbed was for the British artillery to open fire on Indian, which they did, taking the Japanese completely by surprise. It caused significant casualties on the Japanese, but also the British, killing Cavendish in the end. With the 47th brigade practically annihilated by Koga's forces, Irwin began to launch himself into a frenzy of blame-shifting. He argued the brigade, not his own tactical ideas, was alone to blame and yet again he tried to drag Slim into the mess. This time he told Slim to hold himself in readiness to take over operational control and to move his HQ to Chittagong. But again Irwin reminded him he would not have administrative control of operations nor operational direction until Irwin said so. Slim met with Irwin in Calcutta on April 5th, having been recalled from leave in the small hours, something Irwin did often to him. That evening he dined with Lloyd at the Bengal Club and heard his side of the story, which the man remarkably told without any bitterness of his shabby treatment. After this Slim had a meeting with Lomax at Chittagong. The 6th brigade narrowly escaped annihilation by retreating along a beach road and the 47th brigade avoided the same by destroying their own heavy equipment, broke out into small parties and ran for their lives cross-country to the beach, thus ceasing to be a fighting force.   Following that initial catastrophe, Lomax and Slim devised a stratagem for catching Koga's men in a box along the Mayu peninsula. The box would involve 6 battalion, 2 on the ridges of the Mayu hills, 2 along the mayu river and 2 on the hills due south of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. The idea was that the Japanese would be bound to utilize the tunnels on a disused railway track, dismantled for years. They would be led into a box on their way to the tunnels and then the lid of the box would be shut by a force of brigade strength. It was in many ways an attempt to replicate Hannibals famous victory at the battle of Cannae, every generals dream since ancient times. Lomax and Slim were going to used their tired and greatly demoralized men to carry out a scheme of geometrical perfection. But that is all for this week at the CBI theater.   Now as we all know, during the Pacific War General MacArthur and Admiral King both laid out their own plans for the drive towards Japan. This led to a compromise plan that held 3 phases: Phase 1 was to seize Guadalcanal; phase 2 was to drive up the central solomons and New Guinea; lastly phase 3 was to neutralize Rabaul. Now as much as MacArthur and King hated another, they both understood Rabaul was a crucial lynchpin for both their plans. Working together did not always go so well as you might imagine. Take for example Admiral Halsey who continuously found himself in the middle. At one point in early February  he was forced to go meet MacArthur to request reinforcements, because Operation KE made the allies think a major offensive was on its way. MacArthur argued that his heavy bombers were too few and that he could not promise much support as he believed an impending offensive was about to be launched in his own area. Now Halsey was one of the few men, a Navy man no less, that MacArthur did not hate, so if he was going to jerk him around, you can tell he was being difficult to work with. All of these difficulties emphasized the two services and two area commands needed to better coordinate. And thus a conference was called to hammer out the fine details of how they would all play nice together.   Now meeting all in person was not feasible so the commanders sent their representatives to Washington to present their plans. On March 12th, the Pacific Military conference was held with representatives from each Pacific area command: Lt-General George Kenney, Major General Richard Sutherland and Brigadier-General Stephen Chamberlin represented MacArthurs Southwest command; Lt-General Millard Harmon, Major-General Nathan Twining, Captain Miles Browning and Brigadier-Genreal De Witt Peck represented Halsey's south pacific command; Lt-General Delos Emmons, Rear-admiral Raymond Spruance, Brigader-General Leonard Boyd and Captain Forrest Sherman represented Nimitz Central Pacific command.   Now small side note here, since MacArthur could not make this conference I still wanted to toss my good old 2 cents at the man. While all of this was going on, Richard Sutherland had been sent on another mission to Washington by MacArthur. Richard sutherland was sent to meet Arthur Vandenburg, a senior Republican senator. They met informally at the home of Clare Booth Luce, a strongly anti-Roosevelt republican. She was also the wife of Henry Luce, the man in control of the Time-Life media conglomerate. The purpose of the meeting was to discern how much republican support MacArthur could expect if he ran for President in 1944. Vandenburg was onboard for it and a month later MacArthur would send another aid over bearing a note to the senator stating “I am most grateful to you for your complete attitude of friendship. I can only hope that I can someday reciprocate”.   Vandenburg and his allies  drafted MacArthur for the republican nomination as MacArthur met with his public relations staff, better called his court. One of his court members, Colonel Lloyd Lehrbas was disgusted by open discussions of MacArthur winning the presidency and running the war from washington. Lehrbas was a former newspaper editor who now reviewed press releases in MacArthur's name. MacArthur kept the man on his staff specifically because of his media connections. Vandenburg found strong support for MacArthur amongst the arch-conservatives. The republican party was going to nominate two candidates: Wendell Wilkie and Thomas Dewey, but Vandenburg was trying to sneak MacArthur in as a third. However there was a specific group of republicans who adamantly opposed MacArthur's nomination, veterans who had served under him during the Pacific War and before. Vandenburg tried to get a better picture by sending representatives to canvas the troops in the Pacific theater for their thoughts. The consistent response was overly negative about MacArthur.   In early 1944, a private conversation between MacArthur and Congressman Arthur Miller of Nebraska was leaked to the public. It revealed MacArthurs plot behind the scenes to run for presidency and this forced MacArthur to back pedal heavily. On April 30th of 1944 his staff released a statement from MacArthur stating  “I request that no action be taken that would link my name in any way with the nomination. I do not covet it nor would I accept it”. Yeah, MacArthur would try two more times to run. But anyways now that you know that little tid bit information on my favorite figure lets carry on.   The Pacific Military conference lasted until march 28th, conducted under the supervision of the joint staff planners, headed by Rear-Admiral Charles Cooke and Major-General Albert Wedemeyer. Now MacArthur's team came to the conference with a plan in hand, codenamed Elkon. Elkon was a town in Maryland, a famous destination for quick marriages, and the operation was to be a two-pronged offensive. It called for the seizure of the New Britain, New Ireland and New Guinea area which would be based on phase 2 and 3 of the July 2 directive. That being the two approaches heading for Rabaul: one proceeding along the northern coast of New Guinea and the other through the Solomons. This ambitious plan called for first seizing airfields on the Huon Peninsula and New Georgia, then air bases on New Britain and Bougainville, then the seizure of Kavieng and finally Rabaul would be isolated enough to be invaded.   The first week of the conference became a arm-wrestling match between Sutherland and the other join chiefs, especially General Marshall who squabled over the details of Elkton. Admiral King and the navy were quite hostile to the plan, but rather shocking to some, William Bull Halsey was a large supporter of MacArthurs plan. Halsey's team argued the plan did not overstretch their resources and in fact Halsey was finding working with MacArthur was enormously benefiting the Pacific War effort. Halsye and MacArthur were a lethal combo, but King was hard pressed because the truth was they simply did not have the necessary resources for MacArthur's plan. So as you can imagine compromises were made. Macarthurs initial calculations for the plan to work required 12 and ⅔ divisions and 30 air groups for the southwest pacific area, while 10 divisions and 15 air groups were needed in Hasleys south area.    The joint chiefs responded by asking what the pacific representatives thought they could accomplish in 1943 with the best reinforcements washington could deliver. Sutherland and Halsey's team agreed task two: taking northeastern New Guinea, Madang-Salamua-Huon gulf triangle, Bougainville, New Georgia, Cape Gloucester and New Britain could be taken, but they would probably run out of resources to take Rabaul. The joint chiefs said to forget about Rabaul for the time being and focus on taking the Bismarck Archipelago. MacArthur began writing from Brisbane he thought this idea to be a huge mistake “We are already committed to the campaign in New Guinea….If at the same time we enter upon a convergent attack on the New Georgia group, we have committed our entire strength without assurance of accomplishment of either objective.” This led Hasley to agree to wait for his attack on New Georgia until MacArthur had achieved his objectives of taking the islands of Kiriwina, Woodlark and the Trobriand islands. When proposed back to the joint chiefs, to everyone's amazement King accepted the revised Elkon plan with little compliant. The final directive went out on March 28th, officially canceling the 3 stage drive to rabaul. Instead the objectives for 1943 would be first Woodlark and Kiriwina, then the Madang-Salamaua-Finschhafen triangle and New Britain, and finally the Solomons + southern Bougainville. For the first time in the Pacific war, there was an agreed-to strategy for winning in the southwest pacific. In the mind of MacArthur, who you can imagine was only thinking about the Philippines, he had achieved his plan to direct the war where he wanted it and he had a surprising naval ally in Bull Halsey. The Elkon plan would eventually be called operation Cartwheel   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Cartwheel was greenlit and it showcased MacArthur could under extremely rare circumstances, make peace with his true enemy during the Pacific War, the United States Navy. Yes MacArthur would be able to direct the war, at least for a bit, to where he wanted it, the Philippines.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 65 - Pacific War - First Chindits expedition and Operation Longcloth, February 14-21, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 14, 2023 45:43


Last time we spoke about the successful execution of operation KE and the battle of Wau. Operation KE was a success and the Japanese had managed to evacuate 10652 men. Simultaneously while Operation KE was going on, the Japanese had refocused on New Guinea and sought to secure their important bases at Lae and Salamaua. In order to secure them the Japanese commenced a new offensive, this time aimed at Wau which held a significant airfield that could be used to threaten Lae and Salamaua. The Japanese managed to land significant forces to hit Wau, but the Australians tenaciously held them back long enough to get reinforcements to Wau to push the Japanese back. The Japanese offensive turned into a catastrophic failure, yet despite being pushed back the Japanese would regroup and plan another offensive to take Wau. But for today we are diving back into the CBI theater. This episode is the First Chindits Expedition: Operation Longcloth  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The story of Operation Longcloth and the actions that will take place in Burma require us to talk about some notable figures, one who is to put it frankly, a very bizarre but fascinating man. Orde Wingate was born into a military family in February of 1903, his father was a religious fundamentalist who became a member of the Plymouth Brethren. Wingate and his 6 siblings experienced a very repressed childhood and were kept away from other children for fear of spiritual contamination and would endure a regime of religious mania spending entire days reading and memorizing the Old Testament. For Orde, the religious indoctrination was accompanied by a spirit-shrinking spartan regime, something like a secular boot camp. When his family moved to Godalming, in 1916, Orde was sent to a Charterhouse school. He was very much an outsider there and did not mix with the other children nor participated in any sports. Then in 1921 he was accepted into the Royal Military academy at Woolwich, training as an officer in the Royal Artillery. At this point he suffered a salient trauma, Wingate began breaking all the rules and underwent a ritual known as “running”. The other military students summoned Wingate from his room, stripped him naked and had him run between lines of senior students who whacked him with knotted towels before he was tossed into a tank of icy water, it was the good old running the gauntlet. Wingate would stare the other boys right in the eyes and define them to do their worst to him. Many were intimidated by this and ceased hitting him as a result. Then Wingate would toss himself into the icy water tank. Wingate had thus shown himself to be a student of note at an early age.  By 1923 Wingate received his commission as a gunnery officer and a post at Salisbury Plain where he soon gained a reputation for being a skilled horseman and particularly good at the fox hunt.  But many who knew of him described him to have a dark side, yet again he always broke the rules and conventions. This became more of an issue by 1926 when he took a post at the military school of Equitation where he became very alienated by his peers and superiors by his arrogant insubordination. But Wingate enjoyed a powerful patronage for at this point in his life his fathers first cousin, “Cousin Rex”, Sir Reginald Wingate, the former Governor-General of Sudan and High commissioner in Egypt took him under his wing. Wingate took leave and began studying Arabic at the London School of Oriental and African Studies and then served in Sudan and Ethiopia. He also carried on a 5 year affair with a woman named Enid Peggy Jelley, to whom he got secretly engaged. But after 6 years after boarding the liner Cathay at Port Said, returning for his marriage to Peggy, he fell in love with a 16 year old girl named Lorna Paterson who was traveling home from Australia. As soon as he got home to Peggy he notified her he was in love with another.    Wingate married Lorna in 1935, a woman 13 years younger. In 1936 Wingate became an intelligence officer with the British Mandate in Palestine and almost immediately became an ardent Zionist, though he was not himself Jewish. Palestine at this time had an enormous Jewish population since the end of the first world war and a large influx of those fleeing Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The Arab population saw them as a future threat and guerilla groups sprang up. Archibald Wavell the newly arrived commander in chief in Palestine had Wingate form the Special Night Squads (SNS) to combat Arab terrorism. Wingate was an early proponent of using paramilitary actions at night to induce a unique and singular terror in his enemies. He got the SNS to use slavering dogs, a very calculated piece of cruelty since the animals were regarded as unclean by Muslims. The SNS were basically legitimizing Zionist counterterrorism, using Jewish thugs to strike back at Arab thugs.  Wingate performed war crimes and horrible atrocities while leading the SNS and was recalled. This should have been the end to his career, but Wavell and Sir Edmund Ironside kept making up excuses to cover for criticisms against him. These two men managed to get Wingate back into the game by 1941 where he was brought over to Ethiopia to help fight against the Italians. Backed by Wavell, he attempted another go at the SNS, this time named the Gideon Force, a band of irregulars made up of British, Sudanese, Ethiopians and some ex SNS. Wingates force proved spectacularly successful and this time with no controversy. But still because of his tactlessness and insubordination, Wingate ended up getting whisked out of Ethiopia at the end of hostilities.  Wingate found himself in Cairo in a major depression, he tried to kill himself with a Ethiopian knife but was saved by a man who drove him to the hospital. There is considerable evidence to suggest Wingate was bipolar and had experienced an acute episode of downswing for his manic-depression. Wingates enemies and critiques were delighted at the news of his downfall and hoped he would be court-martialed and tossed into an asylum, but Wingates backers prompted him up yet again. His suicide attempt was attributed to delirium induced by malaria, but as Churchill's personal physician Lord Moran would write in his diary about Wingate ‘Wingate seemed to be hardly sane . . . in medical jargon a borderline case.'  Wingate was certainly a bizarre person, he was also an exhibitionist and extremely eccentric as many sources put it. He was careless in dress, always unkempt, had zero respect for military convention and hierarchy and expected his superiors to satisfy his every whim. When General Auchinlack succeeded Wavell as commander in chief in the middle east he met Wingate who came to his office in shorts, with a dirty solar topi and a greasy blue jacket. Wingate loved to go around camps naked, often appearing out of a shower nude to bark orders at other men. He liked to wear an alarm clock around his wrist that would go off on odd occasions for no particular reason that anyone could figure out. He was rarely seen with his trademark Wolseley helmet and fly whisk. He carried on a string around his neck a raw onion which he occasional snacked upon, cant make that one up people. He had a lot of food fads which he imposed upon his subordinates, such as vegetarianism. He rarely changed his clothes and thought doing laundry was unnecessary.  Wingate went through a limbo period until 1942 where Wavell asked for his services to help in South-East Asia. Originally Wingate was told he would be training Chiang kai-sheks forces guerrilla warfare and he was quite unenthusiastic for 2 reasons. 1) such an endeavor he deemed to be like teaching one's grandmother to suck eggs. 2) he wondered what the point was of sending a Middle East expert to the CBI theater? Yet as of February the 27th Wingate found himself departing to be the liberator of Delhi with the rank of major. It would take 3 weeks for him to get over to Wavell and by that time Rangoon had fallen. Wavell told him that his job had thus changed, now he would be in charge of all guerilla operations against the Japanese within Burma.Wingate was sent to Maymyo east of Mandalay to take over the Bush Warfare School being run by another colorful character named Michael Mad Mike Calvert. Calvert was coming back to Maymyo, returning from a failed operation and found Wingate sitting at his desk. Calvert glared at him and asked who he was and calmly Wingate simply stated his name. And would you know it, they got on perfectly fine and even became friends. The two men both decided their first task should be to go down to see Slim at Prome. Slim had met Wingate back in East Africa in 1940, both men serving under Wavell against the Italians. Upon discussing the matters of organized guerilla groups, Slim agreed to some of Wingates ideas but doubted his Ethiopian experience would be relevant for the task. As Slim was becoming very aware, jungle warfare in Burma was a special type of beast. Wingate was very impressed by Slim and said of the man ‘There is only one soldier worthy of the name East of Suez. He is a bad-tempered little terrier by the name of Slim.' When Chiang Kai-shek was departing back to China after a visit in March, Wingate managed to take a seat on the plan alongside him, hoping to learn about warfare in Burma from the generalissimo. However their aircraft was chased by Japanese fighters, ruining times for conversation. Wingate was informed at Chongqing that he would not be receiving Chinese fighters for his programs as they were now going to Stillwell as a result of the catastrophe in Burma. When he returned to Burma he was informed by Calvert they had sent 100 Bush warfare people into the Irrawaddy and only 11 survived, things were chaotic to say the least. Wingate then took Calvert for a week long car tour of the Burmese frontier making careful notes of animals, insects, reptiles, and terrain details. In Delhi on april 24th, Wingate announced he no longer had any interest on training a guerrilla group, but instead wanted to create a more proactive long-range penetration (LRP0 group. He had 3 major motifs for this, 1) the Japanese troops behind the lines had to be inferior to those as the front, thus the British should get behind. 2) They needed to use communications based on radio and supplied by air. 3) They had to cut the Japanese supply lines and destroy their arms dumps, thus typing up disproportionate numbers of the enemy. He continuously made his case to his superiors and many thought him nuts to think he could train men for jungle warfare in just 8 weeks time. But Wingate kept pushing for it, insisting also that all the men must be volunteers and that he needed at minimum 3000 men.  The finer points of his idea brought up the need to supply special units with airdrops, not a particularly new idea, but certainly a gung-ho one. His superiors wanted to outright reject his ideas, but Wavell yet again was championing his cause. Wingate won out the day and it was agreed to allocate men to his project. The 77th Indian brigade was formed and it was certainly a motley collection. The main British component was the 13th battalion of the King's liverpool regiment raised in Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool in 1941. These were older, married men with no dreams of martial glory, typically employed in the coastal defense of Britain then suddenly shipped to India after the Japanese went supernova in the east. They displayed a lack of enthusiasm for Wingates ideas, many of them were also too old for jungle combat. Wingate rejected 250 of them off the bat and Wavell gave permission to fill the gaps with other units. The rest would come from two oriental units,the first being the 2nd battalion Burma rifles. These were mainly warriors from anti-Japanese hill tribes, the Kachins, Chins, Karens and such, those personally affected by Japans aggression and eager for payback. They were eager and better yet, they taught Wingate a lot about jungle warfare. The other were Gurkhas whom always held high regard amongst the British, though Wingate thought them arrogant, ill-disciplined and overrated. I find that truly bizarre, because all literature i have ever read about Gurkha's troops has been nothing, but praise and something out of a Rambo film. One historian of the Gurkhas said of Wingate ‘Wingate was the only officer in 130 years of service ever to criticise the performance of Gurkha soldiers, characterising them as mentally unsuited for their role as Chindits. Of course the same might be said of Wingate.' Likewise the Gurkhas found Wingate arrogant, overly domineering and someone who paid little heed to them who had vastly more experience fighting in Burma. They also really did not like him because of his rude and autocratic treatment of them.  Wingate divided his force into 8 columns each commanded by a major and each given 15 horses and 100 mules. The columns would be sustained by airdrops, thus an RAF signaling section was attached to each. They trained in the central provinces of India and in the Saugur jungle due south of Gwalior. Within the jungle training the idea was to hit the men with every possible scenario they might face, to push them to the absolute limit. They endured hell. Encounters with giant snakes, mosquitoes, leeches, days filled with half rations deliberately to simulate living off airdrops. Men collapsed from heat, marching with full packs through vegetation. When the monsoons hit, they were marching through mud, rivers and torrential rain. Many days began at 6am with half an hours bayonet drill, followed by unarmed combat. After breakfast they learnt woodcraft, map reading, compass reading, how to forage and distinguish poisonous plants. They learnt how to blow up bridges, lay ambushes, how to storm airfields, how to properly clear paths in jungles, it was grueling.  From the beginning of the training programme there were sickness levels allegedly as high as 70%. Wingate was ruthless, in the case of those saying they were suffering from dysentery, he ordered his officers into the bathrooms to inspect the mens stools to prove if they were lying. Amongst many of his enemies, the Medical Corps would be a large one. Wingate continued to alienate himself and made more and more enemies. At one point Wingate misunderstood the Burmese word for Lion “chinthe” as Chindit and declared it to be the name of his LRP group henceforth, thus they became known as the Chindits. His Burmese aide, Sao Man Hpa told him the word made no sense in Burmese, to which Wingate told the man Chinthe made no sense in English.  Wingate defeated the 70 percent rate of illness, bringing down to a 3 percent, via brutal methodology, most genuinely ill men simply carried on too afraid to be punished. Wingates eccentric qualities spread amongst the men, like his necessity to wear shorts in the rain, to eat raw onions, and to keep a bunch of buffalo to milk because he believed their milk had salubrious qualities. Wingate should have been sacked at countless times, but the rubicon had been crossed and he was expected to lead his men by 1943. By December of 1942, the Chindits and Wingate were ready for action. They had been trained to carry 70 pounds on a march, were equipped with tropical uniform: army bots, mosquito nets, mess tins, sterilizing kits, each man had a rifle or Bren gun plus 50 rounds of .303 ammunition and 6 days worth of rations. The rations were 12 wholemeal biscuits, 2 ounces of nuts and raisins, 2 ounces of cheese, 4 ounces of dates, 2 ounces of chocolate, 20 cigarettes (which greatly annoyed Wingate as he deemed smoking a major hinderance), tea, sugar, powdered milk, salt and vitamin C tablets. The mules of his forces carried 3 inch mortars, ammunition, wireless radio sets and batteries. His force of 8000 were divided into 8 columns of around 400 men each: consisting of 3 rifle platoons, a support platoon with 2-3 inch mortars, 2 Vickers medium machine guns, a mule transport platoon and an RAF air liaison detachment. In addition he had 10 platoons for reconnaissance, scouting and sabotage operations. Now originally Wingates force was supposed to be part of a 3 pronged offensive, utilizing conventional British forces attacking Akyab and the ARakan while the Ledo and Yunnan forces led by Stilwell would secure northern Burma and reopen the land route to China. As we all know during this series, Burma was a colossal mess. Originally 4 Corps would assault Sitang and Kalewa while 15 Corps attacked Akyab and Arakan, but shortages in labour, transport and lack of skilled hands led to the cancellation of the major project. Even worse, Chiang Kai-Shek, greatly pissed off by the decisions made during the Casablanca conference, refused to sanction a Chinese expedition from Yunnan. With all hopes for the great 1943 offensive dashed, Wavell had to consider whether the Chindits were even relevant anymore. Wavell arrived to Wingates HQ on February 7th after countlessly telling the man things were simply postponed. In a 2 hour meeting Wingate fought bitterly to send his men into the fray, but Wavell stated he could not be party to the pointless waste of lives. Wingate made multiple arguments for sending his boys in, 1) cancellation would boost defeatism in the Indian army: 2) it was essential for the British to overcome their current ignorance of Japanese jungle fighting: 3) Fort Hertz, the remaining British outpost in Burma was in desperate need of relief: 4) without a Chindit crossing, the Japanese would dominate the jungle on either side of the Chindwin river: 5) the 77th brigade was not pitch perfect and any delay would be catastrophic to morale: 6) An attack by the 77th brigade would impair and set back Japanese preparations for an offensive. Wavell apparently impressed by Wingates enthusiasm agreed to let the Chindits have their day. The Chindits were not directed south-east to help with the Arakan operation, instead their assignments were to be to cut two railways, one between Myitkyina and Mandalay in northern Burma and the other, the Mandalay-Lashio line. The codename of the operation was Longcloth, which annoyed Wingate because it held no grandiloquence he sought.  In early february the 7 Chindit columns marched south east from Imphal to Moreh on the Assam/Burma border. Once across the border they split into 2 groups, the southern group consisting of columns 1 and 2, around 1000 men and 250 mules which was a feint to throw off the Japanese and the Northern group consisting of columns 3,4,5,7 and 8, around 2000 men and 850 mules who would destroy the railways. Small patrols were sent across the Chindwin marching some 30 miles into enemy territory and coming back without any incident, however doing that with 3000 men was another matter entirely. On February 13th, an advance party of the Northern group crossed at Tonhe around 50 miles north to act as a a doubled bluff to cover for the southern groups feint. Meanwhile a disinformation party with the southern group marched south and ordered a huge quantity of supplies from a village known to be aiding the Japanese, providing a great ruse. The second wave of 2000 men from the Northern group crossed the Chindwin unopposed on the 14th.  Crossing the Chindwin was not easy, while elephants and bullocks swam across with ease, the pack mules proved very skittish, most likely fearing crocodiles. Getting them to the far bank was a nightmare. The southern group also had its problems with their mule. They had the first task of ambushing a 250 strong Japanese garrison at Maingnyaung on the 18th, but ran into a skirmish with a Japanese patrol before they made it there. The enemy was thus alerted and bombarded them with mortars, this spooked the mules and the caused a stampede. Many mules were lost in the jungle, the element of surprise with it and the fiasco cost the southern group a delay of 3 days. The southern group slowly pulled away from the hill country east of the Chindwin, making for the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway. By the night of the 3rd of March they were ambushed in the Mu valley. It was a utter disaster. Radios, ciphers and most of their equipment were lost. Column 2 was almost annihilated, column 1 limped on to the banks of the Irrawady awaiting final orders from Wingate, who instead kept blaming their commander, Major Burnett. As for column 2 he said “the disaster to No. 2 Column, was easily avoidable and would never have taken place had the commander concerned understood the doctrines of penetration”.  Meanwhile Wingate and the Northern group rendezvoused 5 miles inland from the Chindwin and received their parachute drops. Wingate then pondered his options, he could make for Tonmakeng where intelligence reported no enemy presence and wait for the next supply drop and attack the 200 strong Japanese garrison at Sinlamaung or they could bypass it and head into the Mu valley. He kept the men marching and some of his scouts reported a Japanese garrison was at a gold mining village called Metkalet 15 miles east of the Chindwin near Tonmakeng. He ordered columns 3 and 5 under Calvert and Fergusson to attack at once. Then another disaster struck. Fergusson's column got stuck in a swamp and scouts returned again with a new report that no Japanese garrison was in Matkalet after all. So Wingate and Calvert directed the columns to Tonmakeng. Wingates thinking was it was better to strike at an enemy strength he knew, rather than the Mu valley which was an unknown. They reached Tonmakeng without further incident by february 22nd and learnt a Japanese garrison was at Sinlamaung, 10 miles away so WIngate dispatched 3 columns to attack it while the rest of the men waiting for a supply drop expected 3 days away. Disaster struck. The 3 columns were unable to locate Sinlamaung after 3 days and when they finally found it on the 25th, the Japanese garrison had just pulled out. Wingate met with his officers and they decided to march to Zibyutaungdan with Calverts column 3 in the lead. On March 1st they made it to Zibyutaungdan and then proceeded to descend into the Mu Valley. Wingate then ordered the Northern group to disperse into its columns and rendezvous later at the Irrawaddy or beyond. He also dispatched an advance party across the Irrawaddy to the Kachin highlands northeast of Mandalay to try and raise a guerrilla force among the pro-british people there.  By the night of March 3rd disaster struck. At the very same time the southern group was being ambushed, column 4 walked into an ambush, 2 miles west of Pinbon. Major R.B Bromhead, a descendant of the Bromhead famous for fighting the Zulu at Rorke's drift in 1879, did his best to get his panicked mules with their Gurkha handlers to disperse and regroup at a rendezvous point hoping to get help from columns 7 and 8, but while trying to do so, the men were attacked again and by the time they reached the rallying point columns 7 and 8 had moved on. With no food or radios and just a handful of mules left, the column had no choice but to retreat back to India. Within a days time, columns 2 and 4 were broken and on their way back to India. Wingate was livid, his credibility was at stake, but fortunately for him and his men the Japanese assumed when they whipped out Column 2 they had destroyed the entire invasion effort. By March 6th, Calvert and Fergussons columns were within striking distance of the Wuntho-Indaw railway. Calvert and Fergusson hatched a bold and daring plan to assault what was a 800 strong garrison at Pinlebu. They spoke with Major Walter Scott leading Column 8 and told him to attack Punlebu while they supervised a massive supply drop north-east of the town. The idea was that the attackers and supply collectors would support another. Doing so they would set up roadblocks to the north and east of Pinlebu and call upon the RAF to bombard the town, making the Japanese believe they were facing a huge force. The attack turned into an amazing success. The Japanese were quickly confused as Calvert and Fergusson had the railway line demolished. It was a bloody fight, but the line was blown up in several places. The Japanese counterattacked in force trying to stop the demolition. Calverts men also mined 2 railway bridges, one of them a 3-span 120 footer. In the bloody mayhem, Calvert and Fergussons men killed about a third of the Pinlebu defenders and cut railway lines in 70 separate places. During the evening Fergussons column no 5 blew up the 40 foot rail bridge at Bongyaung gorge, leading also to hundreds of rock and rubble going over railway lines around the gorge. Now 10 mites north of Wuntho, Wingate established his HQ in the Babwe Taung hills. He had a tough decision to make, should he retreat back to India or press further and cross the Irrawaddy? Wingate even considered turning his HQ into a new fort like Fort Hertz, to try and push the Japanese to give up the Irrawaddy towns. Wingate as you probably have guessed went with option number 2, despite how unbelievably dangerous it was. The Japanese were hard on their tail as the Chindits made their way trying to cross the Irrawady river. This is where I have to leave our story of the Chindits, but they will come back throughout the war.  We need to make a small detour to speak about the Casablanca conference that took place from January 14 to the 24th. Chiang Kai-Shek had been begging the Americans and British for more aid. FDR told Chiang Kai-shek he would champion his demands to Churchill at the Casablanca Conference, but Churchill brushed this all aside. The conference ended with two large decisions, the first being the controversial doctrine of unconditional surrender. The allies were now confident after the success of operation Torch, the victories at Alamein and at Stalingrad that the Germans were on the run. But over in southeast asia, the Japanese looked impregnable. Thus the 2nd decision made was basically to keep the Europe First course steaming ahead, the Pacific was simply second banana. But for America, the situation in the Pacific had distinctly changed, they had won the initiative and now sought to consolidate their conquests in the east. Admiral King applied considerable pressure to the matter, in private he began urging that if the Pacific did not get 30% of allied resource quote “it would necessitate the US regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater”. Admiral King wanted to continue the momentum in the Pacific by seizing the Solomones, the eastern New Guinea-Rabaul area, capture back Kiska and the Attu islands in the Aleutians begin operations in the Gilberts, Marshalls, Carolines, take Truk and extend the occupation of New Guinea to the Dutch borders. The British opposed this as they continued to argue the best course was to defeat Germany first then devote all resources against Japan. Now as for the CBI theater, plans were continuing for Operation Anakim and the Burma offensive, but the British were not looking to extend their commitments in the theater very much. They argued that the depleted condition of the eastern fleet prevented them from carrying on a naval supremacy campaign in the Bay of Bengal, and this led Chiang Kai-shek to refuse to support an offensive through northern burma, because of the lack of British naval forces at hand. Thus operation Anakim looked like it was only going to get off in late 1943. For all the failures of the conference, FDR did try to remedy the situation as best as he could with their Chinese allies. FDR made it known he wanted to treat China as a great power that the allies would help build up for the current war and postwar. He also acknowledged the dramatic need to keep supply routes to China open. Stilwell advised 5000 tons of supplies be sent over the Hump per month as a goal to hit by February of 1943, this would require 140 aircraft during good weather and 300 aircraft during monsoon seasons. But Washington at this time could only spare 75 aircraft, another disappointment to Chiang Kai-shek. Another important side aspect to the Casablanca conference was brought forward by Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud who were vying to become recognized partners to the allies with their Free French Forces. Until this point, the Japanese had a pretty awkward relationship with their technical ally, Vichy France. This awkward situation led them to simply ignore the Free French forces and by proxy they decided to not touch the French concession of Guangzhouwan which had declared itself part of Free France. French Indochina of course was fully invaded prior to 1941 and remained under nominal Vichy French control, but Guangzhouwan was beginning to stick out like a sore thumb. Chiang Kai-shek recognized Free France's authority over Guangzhouwan and many Chinese forces of the 4th Area Army led by General Zhang Fukui fled into the concession to escape the Japanese. This drew Tokyo's attention and they finally decided to put an end to the Free French presence in China. The 23rd army of General Sakai lent 2 battalions of the 23rd independent mixed brigade from Hong Kong to go over to the Luichow Peninsula. They landed at the village of Peichatsun on February 17th and began skirmishing with some Chinese defenders. They soon overwhelmed the defenders and seized the towns of Hsinlaitsun and Haikang, forcing the Chinese to withdraw towards Suichi. From there the Japanese continued north, seizing Suichi and Chihkan. After these seizures, the Japanese had fully encircled the French concession of Guangzhouwan. The Japanese and representatives of Guangzhouwan soon fell into negotiations and the Free French were forced to declare the concession an open city, allowing the Japanese to occupy it without a fight.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The eccentric or better said madman Wingate got his wish to send the Chindits into the fray, despite just about no one other than Wavell wanting him to do so. With Onions wrapped around their necks they made their first strike against a Japanese railway and it was a surprising mixed success. 

The Pacific War - week by week
- 57 - Pacific War - First Arakan Campaign, December 20-27, 1942

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 20, 2022 37:08


Last time we spoke about the grueling battle for Buna-Gona. The villages of Buna and Gona had been captured, but the Americans and Australians had a lot more ground to take before their job was done. By Christmas day American companies were marching upon the Buna government station while the Australians were marching in the direction of Giruwa. Then over on starvation island the situation was so dire for the Japanese, they had to perform a feint to draw the American Army's attention away from their coastal lines. They chose to mount a feint from Mount Austen to draw the Americans there and the feint worked. Now the Americans would be marching upon the Seahorse and Galloping horse to face the brutal defenses of the Gifu to claim Mount Austen's peak. But today we are going to venture back to the Burma front where a new offensive is commencing.

HMSI Podcast
Episode 24: Wisuda 126 dan Arak-Arakan

HMSI Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 31, 2022 38:00


The Digression Podcast
78. My Road to Mandalay with David Townsend

The Digression Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 6, 2022 65:19


Major Donald Townsend experienced some of the most extraordinary events in British history. In My Road to Mandalay, author David Townsend recounts his father's adventures fighting with the "Forgotten Army" in the China-Burma-India theater during World War II. David expertly choreographs this story through a collection of more than 500 letters his father wrote to his family and a pen pal named Connie, who later become his wife--and David's mother. David was inspired to write this book during the Covid lockdown in 2020 when he found a diary that recorded his father's homeward journey from Burma in 1946. He typed this up and shared it with a dozen or so family members and close friends. Feedback was such that they all wanted to know more! And there was a lot more! Five hundred letters had been found in his mother's loft in 2011. Although he had already done some preliminary work on these, the lockdown provided time to do it right. Captain Tom was also an inspiration. He was born in the same year as David's father. He served in the 14th Army and was in the major battle of Arakan, that preceded Imphal. A film ‘Captain Tom's War' was shown on ITV on VE Day and again in February 2021 as it had been his wish that this part of history should be remembered. It was after this latter showing that David decided that his father's story should get as wide a publication as possible and not just be kept for family and friends. My Road to Mandalay is the result. What makes this war story different is that it's not about blood and guts – it's the real-life story of a soldier who served in the 14th ‘Forgotten Army' from start to finish and played a far more critical role in the re-take of Burma than his family ever envisaged, combined with amazing first-hand accounts of the battles that took place that provide a decidedly human aspect to the war. Buy David's book: Amazon-UK | Amazon-US  Contact David at Authoright Show notes at https://thedigressionpodcast.com/78 Sound Off! With a comment or a question at https://thedigressionpodcast.com/soundoff Like the show? Leave a 5-star rating and review: https://thedigressionpodcast.com/review Become a Patron or support the show in other ways at: https://thedigressionpodcast.com/donate Or just share our podcast with a friend! It's the best way to grow the show!!

GZT Podcast
Müslümanlar Facebook'a dava açtı

GZT Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 18, 2022 5:18


Filmlerde ve dizilerde gördüğümüz budist rahipler, ruhsal dinginliği ve barışı öğütlüyor olabilir. Ancak gerçek hayatta işler böyle yürümüyor. Mynmar'ın Arakan bölgesinde yaşayan müslümanlar, bunun birinci elden tanığı... Yıllardır süren sistematik saldırılarla Budist çeteler, bölgede yaşayan müslümanları hedef alarak, tüm dünyanın gözü önünde sistematik bir soykırım politikası yürütüyor. İşte bu müslümanlar yakın zaman önce ünlü sosyal medya platformu Facebook'a dava açtı. 150 milyar dolarlık tazminat talep edilen davada platform, müslüman karşıtı soykırımı, ayrımcılığı ve nefreti körüklemekle suçlanıyor. Peki Facebook bunu nasıl yaptı? Propaganda'nın bu bölümünde, Facebook'un bir karanlık yüzünü daha konuştuk...

Khaki Malarkey
War of Empires - with Rob Lyman and Lucy Betteridge-Dyson

Khaki Malarkey

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 17, 2022 63:32


This week we have not one but two fabulous guests - join us as we speak to Rob Lyman about his new book ‘War of Empires' and hear from Lucy Betteridge-Dyson about her Grandad's experience in the Arakan. If you'd like to get in touch, you can find us on Twitter @KhakiMalarkey. Edited by Zack O'Leary (@zickzack142). Hosted by Phoebe Style (@ph0ebestyle) and Olivia Smith (@__OliviaSmith12).

The John Batchelor Show
#Kazakhstan: Putin vs the "colour revolutions." Ambassador John Bolton @AmbJohnBolton

The John Batchelor Show

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 11, 2022 9:30


Photo:  Kazakh man with a golden eagle on a horse in the region where the Arakan in the tsjornaya Berel (tributary of the Katoen) flows. In the background are yurts. 1911-1914 #Kazakhstan: Putin vs the "colour revolutions." Ambassador John Bolton @AmbJohnBolton https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-the-crisis-in-kazakhstan-the-rebirth-of-the-soviet-union-russia-biden-putin-nato-military-kassym-jomart-tokayev-11641741523?mod=opinion_lead_pos7

We Have Ways of Making You Talk

The final task of assaulting the Arakan Peninsula as part of the Burma campaign was given to the British 3rd Commando Brigade. Their challenge was to cut off the Japanese supply and escape routes to Rangoon.Historian Lucy Betteridge-Dyson, whose grandfather fought in Burma, joins Al Murray and James Holland to discuss the campaign and the infamous fight for Hill 170.A Goalhanger Films productionProduced by Joey McCarthyExec Producer Tony PastorTwitter: #WeHaveWays@WeHaveWaysPodWebsite: www.wehavewayspod.comEmail: wehavewayspodcast@gmail.com See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

SBS Indonesian - SBS Bahasa Indonesia
Arak-arakan Ogoh-ogoh menjelang Nyepi - Ibu Tutty Brierty

SBS Indonesian - SBS Bahasa Indonesia

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 14, 2021 14:12


Warga Hindhu Bali melakukan ritual arak-arakan Ogoh-ogoh menjelang hari besar Nyepi di Australia

The Y in History
Episode 3: 1962 - MYANMAR Junta

The Y in History

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 20, 2021 24:14


The events leading to military takeover of Burma/Myanmar and intolerance for minorities.

Genç Derneği
Abdullah Kibritçi - Arakan`da Bir Bayram Sabahı

Genç Derneği

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 23, 2020 2:09


Abdullah Kibritçi - Arakan`da Bir Bayram Sabahı by GENÇ

Il cielo sopra Pechino
S04E10 - Nel labirinto birmano con Carlos Sardiña Galache

Il cielo sopra Pechino

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 21, 2020 30:06


Oggi parliamo di nuovo di elezioni! No, non quelle negli Stati Uniti e no, nessuna elezione in Cina. Oggi vi portiamo in Myanmar, dove l'8 ottobre si è tenuta la seconda elezione “vera” dal 2015. Chi ha vinto? Non è una sorpresa: il partito di Aung San Suu Kyi, la Lega Nazionale per la Democrazia, ha ottenuto la maggioranza dei seggi in parlamento. Il portavoce della NLD ha definito la vittoria “schiacciante”, anche se questo risultato non ha messo tutti d'accordo. Ma il discorso è lungo e complesso, proprio per questo ci siamo rivolti a Carlos Sardiña Galache, giornalista e autore del libro “The Burmese Labyrinth: A History of the Rohingya Tragedy”, “Il labirinto birmano: una storia della tragedia Rohingya”, pubblicato quest'anno da Verso Books.Tra politica e conflitto etnico, tra grandi aspettative per la transizione democratica e problemi ancora mai risolti, ci avventuriamo nel labirinto birmano, cercando una via d'uscita che nessuno sembra poter vedere.

SBS Rohingya - SBS Rohingya
As Rohingyan Indigenous people of Arakan we have similar history of other Indigenous nation - Añara Rohingya Arakan ór Indigenous añarattu ekkúi dilla tarik asé oínno Indigenous kaum loí

SBS Rohingya - SBS Rohingya

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 7, 2020 7:50


NAIDOC WEEK is the week when celebrations are held across Australia each year to celebrate the history, culture and achievements of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. - NAIDOC WEEK hode iba ki yan zanibolla fúni so SBS Rohingya

SBS Rohingya - SBS Rohingya
As Rohingyan Indigenous people of Arakan we have similar history of other Indigenous nation - Añara Rohingya Arakan ór Indigenous añarattu ekkúi dilla tarik asé oínno Indigenous kaum loí

SBS Rohingya - SBS Rohingya

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 7, 2020 7:50


NAIDOC WEEK is the week when celebrations are held across Australia each year to celebrate the history, culture and achievements of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. - NAIDOC WEEK hode iba ki yan zanibolla fúni so SBS Rohingya

New Books in Buddhist Studies
Lost Temples of the Jungle: A History of Mrauk-U with Dr. Bob Hudson

New Books in Buddhist Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 22, 2020 17:08


Deep in the jungles of Myanmar lie the remains of an ancient kingdom, the 15th-century royal city of Mrauk-U. Located in the Bay of Bengal and separated from the rest of the country by the Arakan mountain range, Mrauk-U Township boasts a stunning rural landscape dotted with the hundreds of spires of stone temples, remnants of the former glories of the Arakan Kingdom. Long abandoned by local authorities, the Buddhist temple complex of Mrauk-U was brought back to the spotlight in 2017, when former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan led a mission to Rakhine State and urged Myanmar to nominate Mrauk-U for UNESCO World Heritage Site status. The proposal sought not only to protect the city’s many archaeological sites from ruin, but also aspired to nurture a communal sense of pride in the local population’s heritage. Yet in recent years, efforts to uncover Mrauk-U’s mysteries have been threatened by conflict between the Myanmar military and a secessionist group, the Arakan Army. In this episode, Dr Bob Hudson speaks to Dr Thushara Dibley about the remote archaeological site of Mrauk-U, its turbulent history, and how attempts to have it recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage Site are contributing to peacebuilding efforts in a region torn by civil conflict. Bob Hudson is an archaeologist, an associate of the Asian Studies Program, and an adviser to UNESCO and the Myanmar Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture. Bob holds a PhD in archaeology from the University of Sydney, and recently completed a fellowship with the Australian Research Council. For more information or to browse additional resources, visit the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre’s website here.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

New Books in Archaeology
Lost Temples of the Jungle: A History of Mrauk-U with Dr. Bob Hudson

New Books in Archaeology

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 22, 2020 17:08


Deep in the jungles of Myanmar lie the remains of an ancient kingdom, the 15th-century royal city of Mrauk-U. Located in the Bay of Bengal and separated from the rest of the country by the Arakan mountain range, Mrauk-U Township boasts a stunning rural landscape dotted with the hundreds of spires of stone temples, remnants of the former glories of the Arakan Kingdom. Long abandoned by local authorities, the Buddhist temple complex of Mrauk-U was brought back to the spotlight in 2017, when former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan led a mission to Rakhine State and urged Myanmar to nominate Mrauk-U for UNESCO World Heritage Site status. The proposal sought not only to protect the city’s many archaeological sites from ruin, but also aspired to nurture a communal sense of pride in the local population’s heritage. Yet in recent years, efforts to uncover Mrauk-U’s mysteries have been threatened by conflict between the Myanmar military and a secessionist group, the Arakan Army. In this episode, Dr Bob Hudson speaks to Dr Thushara Dibley about the remote archaeological site of Mrauk-U, its turbulent history, and how attempts to have it recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage Site are contributing to peacebuilding efforts in a region torn by civil conflict. Bob Hudson is an archaeologist, an associate of the Asian Studies Program, and an adviser to UNESCO and the Myanmar Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture. Bob holds a PhD in archaeology from the University of Sydney, and recently completed a fellowship with the Australian Research Council. For more information or to browse additional resources, visit the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre’s website here.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

SSEAC Stories
Lost Temples of the Jungle: A History of Mrauk-U with Dr. Bob Hudson

SSEAC Stories

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 22, 2020 17:08


Deep in the jungles of Myanmar lie the remains of an ancient kingdom, the 15th-century royal city of Mrauk-U. Located in the Bay of Bengal and separated from the rest of the country by the Arakan mountain range, Mrauk-U Township boasts a stunning rural landscape dotted with the hundreds of spires of stone temples, remnants of the former glories of the Arakan Kingdom. Long abandoned by local authorities, the Buddhist temple complex of Mrauk-U was brought back to the spotlight in 2017, when former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan led a mission to Rakhine State and urged Myanmar to nominate Mrauk-U for UNESCO World Heritage Site status. The proposal sought not only to protect the city's many archaeological sites from ruin, but also aspired to nurture a communal sense of pride in the local population's heritage. Yet in recent years, efforts to uncover Mrauk-U's mysteries have been threatened by conflict between the Myanmar military and a secessionist group, the Arakan Army. In this episode, Dr Bob Hudson speaks to Dr Thushara Dibley about the remote archaeological site of Mrauk-U, its turbulent history, and how attempts to have it recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage Site are contributing to peacebuilding efforts in a region torn by civil conflict. Bob Hudson is an archaeologist, an associate of the Asian Studies Program, and an adviser to UNESCO and the Myanmar Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture. Bob holds a PhD in archaeology from the University of Sydney, and recently completed a fellowship with the Australian Research Council. For more information or to browse additional resources, visit the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre's website here.  

New Books Network
Lost Temples of the Jungle: A History of Mrauk-U with Dr. Bob Hudson

New Books Network

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 22, 2020 17:08


Deep in the jungles of Myanmar lie the remains of an ancient kingdom, the 15th-century royal city of Mrauk-U. Located in the Bay of Bengal and separated from the rest of the country by the Arakan mountain range, Mrauk-U Township boasts a stunning rural landscape dotted with the hundreds of spires of stone temples, remnants of the former glories of the Arakan Kingdom. Long abandoned by local authorities, the Buddhist temple complex of Mrauk-U was brought back to the spotlight in 2017, when former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan led a mission to Rakhine State and urged Myanmar to nominate Mrauk-U for UNESCO World Heritage Site status. The proposal sought not only to protect the city’s many archaeological sites from ruin, but also aspired to nurture a communal sense of pride in the local population’s heritage. Yet in recent years, efforts to uncover Mrauk-U’s mysteries have been threatened by conflict between the Myanmar military and a secessionist group, the Arakan Army. In this episode, Dr Bob Hudson speaks to Dr Thushara Dibley about the remote archaeological site of Mrauk-U, its turbulent history, and how attempts to have it recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage Site are contributing to peacebuilding efforts in a region torn by civil conflict. Bob Hudson is an archaeologist, an associate of the Asian Studies Program, and an adviser to UNESCO and the Myanmar Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture. Bob holds a PhD in archaeology from the University of Sydney, and recently completed a fellowship with the Australian Research Council. For more information or to browse additional resources, visit the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre’s website here.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

New Books in Southeast Asian Studies
Lost Temples of the Jungle: A History of Mrauk-U with Dr. Bob Hudson

New Books in Southeast Asian Studies

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 22, 2020 17:08


Deep in the jungles of Myanmar lie the remains of an ancient kingdom, the 15th-century royal city of Mrauk-U. Located in the Bay of Bengal and separated from the rest of the country by the Arakan mountain range, Mrauk-U Township boasts a stunning rural landscape dotted with the hundreds of spires of stone temples, remnants of the former glories of the Arakan Kingdom. Long abandoned by local authorities, the Buddhist temple complex of Mrauk-U was brought back to the spotlight in 2017, when former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan led a mission to Rakhine State and urged Myanmar to nominate Mrauk-U for UNESCO World Heritage Site status. The proposal sought not only to protect the city’s many archaeological sites from ruin, but also aspired to nurture a communal sense of pride in the local population’s heritage. Yet in recent years, efforts to uncover Mrauk-U’s mysteries have been threatened by conflict between the Myanmar military and a secessionist group, the Arakan Army. In this episode, Dr Bob Hudson speaks to Dr Thushara Dibley about the remote archaeological site of Mrauk-U, its turbulent history, and how attempts to have it recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage Site are contributing to peacebuilding efforts in a region torn by civil conflict. Bob Hudson is an archaeologist, an associate of the Asian Studies Program, and an adviser to UNESCO and the Myanmar Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture. Bob holds a PhD in archaeology from the University of Sydney, and recently completed a fellowship with the Australian Research Council. For more information or to browse additional resources, visit the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre’s website here.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Fala Vida Podcast
Fala Vida Podcast #3 - Racismo

Fala Vida Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 22, 2020 65:41


Oi, eu sou o Caio, seu apresentador, e esse é o Fala Vida Podcast. Hoje eu queria trocar uma ideia sobre racismo no geral, mas acontece que eu sou branco né, meio que não é meu lugar de fala, mas como eu considero esse tema muito importante, eu trouxe 2 meninos gente boa pra fala comigo sobre isso, o Leo e o Arakan, escuta ai e vamo conversa sobre isso.@arakan_porto@_caminhaleo

Opini.id
SERTIFIKAT PENCERAMAH, JAM MALAM, ARAKAN PILKADA & NEPOTISME | MR. KECE #BERITABURUBURU

Opini.id

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 9, 2020 11:22


Gak puas denger audio doang? yuk nonton episode lengkapnya MR. KECE #BERITABURUBURU di sini : https://youtu.be/k2MklInpuyg

Gramercy
Shukur Manaf - Myanmar

Gramercy

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 13, 2020 57:12


My guest today is Shukur Manaf. He is a 23 year old Rohingya refugee who's family is originally from Myanmar but who fled to Malaysia before Shukur was born. He is an incredible human being. He inspired me from the moment we sat down to talk. He is overwhelmingly optimistic, is so happy to be living in the US, and is thrilled to be able to help others. The history of Myanmar is very complex but is important to understand because of the current Rohingya refugee crisis .The following is an abbreviated version. The Rohingya are a Muslim, minority population of Myanmar that have historically lived in the western province of Rankine State, formerly known as Arakan.The first Muslims settled in that area alongside the Buddhists in the early 1400s. They were advisors and courtiers in the court of the Buddist king. But in the mid 1700s, an uprising in the south of Burma conquered that region causing many of the Muslim minority to flee for the lives to Bengal because Buddhist invaders were executing every Muslim man they saw.Burma was the name that the British colonizers gave to the region in the mid-18th century. There were many wars between the British and the Burmese. Territories were seized and recaptured by both sides. Great Britain owned India, neighboring Bengal and also desired Burma. The British encouraged many Rohingyas living in Bengal to settle in Rakhine State. The Buddhist majority did not like the many Muslim immigrants flooding their country. This was the beginning of ethnic and religious tension in Burma. The country gained independence from Great Britain in 1948. After several military coups in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, one General decided to rename the country Myanmar because it was more inclusive of minority ethnicities and more importantly was not the name given by their colonizers. There was much unrest in Rakhine state between WWII and the 1960s. During that time, the Rohingyas advocated for a separate country within Rakhine state. When the military eventually took power, they cracked down on the Rohingyas and denied them citizenship and defined them as stateless Bengalis. Since then, many have fled to neighboring Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia where they continue to live in limbo. They have become a stateless people.Refugee resettlement is a very complex and grueling 18-24 month security screening process before even arriving in the United States. Once they arrive, the refugees are matched with a local resettlement agency that helps them navigate their first few months. Admittedly, the focus of the U.S is to encourage the refugee to enter the workforce as soon as possible. Shukur laments his experience of resettlement and wishes that more time was dedicated to education so he could gain better employment. Studies in the European Union have shown that refugees who speak the local language at beginner level or less have an employment rate of only 27%, this more than doubles to 59% for those with intermediate language skills. References:Rohingya history: https://www.thoughtco.com/who-are-the-rohingya-195006Refugee Processing and Security Screening: https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/refugees/refugee-processing-and-security-screeningRefugee resettlement: https://www.state.gov/refugee-admissions/reception-and-placement/Refugee support services: https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/refugee-support-servicesGetting refugees to work quickly: http://www.opennetwork.net/step-get-refugees-work-quickly/

Free Rohingya Coalition Genocide Podcast Series
A conversation with Aman Ullah, a Rohingya historian and former school teacher

Free Rohingya Coalition Genocide Podcast Series

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 8, 2020 50:45


FRC Genocide Podcast Series [in Rohingya, hosted by Ro Nay San Lwin] Mr. Aman Ullah, a Rohingya historian based in Bangladesh and he was a former school teacher in Ann township and the southern part of Maungdaw, Arakan State, Myanmar, who has contributed in the field of Rohingya history and humanitarian stance. This conversation covers: 1) The earliest name of Arakan was ‘Kala Mukha’ (Land of the) Black Faces 2) The second phase of Indianisation of Arakan occurred sometime around the 6th century CE 3) In the 8th century by ruthless oppression of Hindu chauvinists 4) In the later part of 8th century several ships were wrecked on Ramree Island and the Mussalman crews sent to Arakan and placed in villages there 5) In the early part of 15th century the king of Arakan had to flee and took shelter in the Muslims Court of Gaur by the Burmese invasion 6) Muslims conquered Chittagong in 1338 and held under their sway till 1538, and Chittagong formed an integral part of Arakanese up to 1666 7) In the seventeenth century, the Portuguese with Magh captured and enslaved a large numbers of Muslims and non-Muslims from Bengal 8) In 1661 when Shah Shuja, the Maghul prince utterly defeated by Aurangzeb, was driven to seek refuge in Arakan 9) Various migrations and local converts led to form one common racial and linguistic classification as “Rohingya”; a term derived from Rohang, the ancient name of Arakan

SBS Rohingya - SBS Rohingya
Rohingyan should not be easily content,from now on all Rohingyan should report Rakhine internal situation to the world - Tamam Rohingya manúic ókkollotu kucic goratta foribou,Arakan ór halot dunia re zanaidiya foribou

SBS Rohingya - SBS Rohingya

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 25, 2020 6:34


In relation to the ICJ's order to Myanmar in protecting the Rohingya population SBS Rohingya took the opportunity to interview one of the Rohingya leaders from a Rohingya organization based in Victoria Mr Habiburahman. - ICJ ye Borma re corot ókkol ar rai ókkol diyede yan ór baabote SBS Rohingya yé MR Habiburrahman zibaneiki uggwá Rohingya aktivis asé Victoriattu ibare interbiu goíjje.Aro zaínto saíle fúni so SBS Rohingya.

SBS Rohingya - SBS Rohingya
Rohingyan should not be easily content,from now on all Rohingyan should report Rakhine internal situation to the world - Tamam Rohingya manúic ókkollotu kucic goratta foribou,Arakan ór halot dunia re zanaidiya foribou

SBS Rohingya - SBS Rohingya

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 25, 2020 6:34


In relation to the ICJ's order to Myanmar in protecting the Rohingya populationSBS Rohingya took the opportunity to interview one of the Rohingya leaders from a Rohingyaorganization based in Victoria Mr Habiburahman. - ICJ ye Borma re corot ókkol ar rai ókkol diyede yan ór baabote SBS Rohingya yé MR Habiburrahman zibaneiki uggwá Rohingya aktivis asé Victoriattu ibare interbiu goíjje.Aro zaínto saíle fúni so SBS Rohingya.

SBS Burmese - SBS ျမန္မာပိုင္း အစီအစဥ္
Suffering of the innocent people in Arakan conflict. - မပစ္ေပမယ့္ နစ္ေနရေသာ ဘ၀မ်ား

SBS Burmese - SBS ျမန္မာပိုင္း အစီအစဥ္

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 15, 2019 11:24


The armed conflict between the Myanmar army and Arakan army AA has been going on in Arakan State since 2018 and there is no end in sight and due to this, there are forty thousand displaced people in the refugee camps. - ရခိုင္ျပည္နယ္အတြင္းမွာ၂၀၁၈ ခုႏွစ္က စတင္ျဖစ္ပြားခဲ့တဲ့ တပ္မေတာ္နဲ႕ ရခိုင္တပ္ေတာ္ AA တို႔ရဲ႕တိုက္ပြဲဟာ အခုအခ်ိန္ထိ မၿပီးဆံုးေသးပါဘဲ၊ ဒီအက်ဳိးဆက္ေၾကာင့္ ေဒသခံ ေလးေသာင္းေက်ာ္ဟာ စစ္ေဘးေရွာင္စခန္းေတြမွာ တိမ္းေရွာင္ခဲ့ရပါတယ္။

Ankara Palas Buluşmaları
AZEEM IBRAHIM

Ankara Palas Buluşmaları

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 21, 2019 112:40


"Syria, Arakan and Being a Muslim in The West"" February - 2019

SBS Burmese - SBS ျမန္မာပိုင္း အစီအစဥ္
Arakan State Day and the people displaced by armed conflict. - ရခိုင္ ျပည္နယ္ေန႔ နဲ႔ စစ္ေဘးေရွာင္ ရခိုင္ျပည္သူမ်ား။

SBS Burmese - SBS ျမန္မာပိုင္း အစီအစဥ္

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 21, 2018 5:26


Arakan was recognized as a division under the Burma constitution drawn in 1947, later General Ne Win promoted Arakan into a State with the constitution in 1974. December 15 was recognized as the Arakan State Day. - ၁၉၄၇ အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ပံု ဥပေဒအရ ရခိုင္ကို တိုင္းတခုအေနနဲ႔သာ အသိမွတ္ျပဳခဲ့ၿပီး ၁၉၇၄ အုပ္ခ်ဳပ္ပံု ဥပေဒမွာ ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ေန၀င္းက ျပည္နယ္တခု အေနနဲ႔ ထဲ့သြင္းခဲ့ပါတယ္။[[{"fid":"1723640","view_mode":"body_content","uuid":"54ea8581-5ac4-4629-a40f-83281d295747","type":"media","attributes":{"height":"272","width":"500","alt":"Arakan Refugees","title":"Arakan Refugees","class":"media-element file-body-content"}}]]

Doh Athan - Our Voice
Episode 30: Violence in Mrauk U (English version)

Doh Athan - Our Voice

Play Episode Listen Later May 22, 2018 6:12


In January this year violence erupted around the ancient city of Mrauk U. At least seven people were killed and several others injured when police opened fire on an angry protest after local authorities cancelled an event to commemorate the anniversary of the fall of the Arakan kingdom. The incident added more tension to an already complex situation in Rakhine, in the aftermath of the violence last year that sent more than 680,000 Rohingya fleeing to Bangladesh. Many people living in the villages around Mrauk U blame the Myanmar government for the rising tensions and for neglecting them in the aftermath of the deadly clashes. Stay tuned for a Myanmar language version, which will be available later this week. Thank you for listening.

Arrêt sur le monde - Saison 2018-2019 - AUDIO
Rohingyas, l'exode des apatrides

Arrêt sur le monde - Saison 2018-2019 - AUDIO

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 13, 2017 14:15


Depuis le mois d'Août, des centaines de milliers de Rohingyas musulmans ont fui vers le Bangladesh pour échapper à leur répression par l’armée birmane dans l'État d’Arakan. Cela porte à plus d’un million le nombre de réfugiés s’entassant dans des camps bangladais dans des conditions de vie insalubres. Quel espoir d’avenir pour ce peuple apatride? Retour sur les origines et les pistes de sortie de l’une des plus graves crises humanitaires actuelles. Invités: Jean-François Rancourt, Doctorant en science politique à l'Université de Montréal. Alexandre Pelletier, Doctorant en science politique à l'Université de Toronto et chercheur visiteur au CÉRIUM.

Midrats
Episode 402: Mid-September Melee

Midrats

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 17, 2017 64:06


From WESTPAC to the Caribbean to the Euphrates river valley to Arakan province, we’ll be covering the mostly maritime national security developments of the last few weeks for the full hour in a Midrats free-for-all format.This is also your chance to bring up the topics you want addressed. Join in the chat room live to share your questions, or call in to the show if there is something you like us to talk about.

History of Southeast Asia
Episode 18, Arakan and All That

History of Southeast Asia

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 1, 2017 44:04


Today's episode wraps up coverage of seventeenth-century events in Burma, Siam and Laos, with some really obscure stories about two kingdoms that no longer exist: Arakan and Lan Xang. We will cover the peak years and decline of both kingdoms. And that's not all; we will also see another European try to gain control over a Southeast Asian state, this time Siam. Here is the map that was originally posted in Episode 5, showing where Arakan/Rakhine is, in relation to the rest of Burma/Myanmar and Bangladesh. This picture is from the March 1971 issue of National Geographic Magazine, and it shows a lacquer panel painting, made in Siam during the eighteenth century. Here is a scene from a Buddhist legend, which shows the enemies of the Buddha attacking. Note the European in the middle of the crowd, taking aim with a musket. Listen to the episode to get an idea on why the artist thought Europeans were the bad guys. Do you think you would like to become a podcaster on Blubrry? Click here for the details on joining. Enter my SEASIA, to let them know I sent you, and you will get the first month's hosting for free! Support this podcast!

History of Southeast Asia
Episode 5, Ancient Burma and Nanzhao

History of Southeast Asia

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 16, 2016 38:39


For this episode, the main topic is how the nation of Burma, also called Myanmar, got started. We will see the Burmese and tribes related to them settle the north, and we will take a special look at Arakan, a province that often went its own way (see the map below). Also in this episode, we will see the Mons, a tribe we met previously, move the capital of their state in southern Burma, from Thaton to Bago. Finally, we will meet Nanzhao, Burma's northern neighbor from the eighth to the thirteenth century. And here is the website I recommended if you want to look at artifacts from the Pyu civilization: https://www.pyukingdom.com On September 7, 2016, this podcast was accepted on Google Play, probably the best download site on the World Wide Web. Now you have four places online where you can listen: Blubrry, iTunes, Stitcher, and Google Play. Support this podcast!  

Year of Japan Lecture Series (2013-2014)
Part Two: The Japanese "Wild Geese": The Recruitment, Roles and Reputation of Japanese Mercenaries in Southeast Asia, 1593-1688

Year of Japan Lecture Series (2013-2014)

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 17, 2013 45:48


For almost a hundred years Japanese fighting men were employed across a wide area of Southeast Asia as mercenaries in the service of the kings of Siam, Cambodia, Arakan, Spain and Portugal and for the directors of the Dutch East India Company. This activity is described and discussed in the context of contemporary international relations and the spread of European colonialism in the region, noting in particular the impact on the recruitment and activity of mercenaries caused by Japan’s progressively strict regulations from 1621 onwards regarding the employment of its citizens, their overseas travel and Japan’s relations with neighbouring countries. The Japanese ‘Wild Geese’ (a colloquial term for mercenaries) were used in dramatic assault parties, as staunch garrisons and as willing executioners. A stereotypical image of the fierce Japanese warrior thereby developed that had a profound influence on the way they were regarded by their employers. Although this image, which began with the wakō (Japanese pirates,) was a positive one at first, their reputation acquired a negative sheen when employers experienced difficulties in disciplining them or began to question their loyalty. Two contrasts will be noted. First, the mercenaries’ role with regard to the rulers of Southeast Asian kingdoms was largely that of acting as long-term palace guards, while recruitment by European powers tended to be of shorter duration for specific campaigns. Second, whereas the Southeast Asian monarchs tended to trust their well-established units of Japanese mercenaries the Europeans admired them but also feared them, and in every European example a progressive shift in attitude may be discerned from initial enthusiasm to great suspicion that the Japanese might one day turn against them, as illustrated by the long-standing Spanish fear of an invasion of the Philippines by Japan accompanied by a local uprising. Ironically this fear was matched by a similar concern on the other side that Spain would invade Japan with the assistance of Japanese Christians who had been exiled and a ‘fifth column’ of Christian sympathisers within Japan itself. The part played by the suppression of Japanese Christianity in the creation of the independent groups of exiled warriors who posed such a threat is also discussed, and suggestions are made as to the reasons for the profound change of policy with regard to the employment of Japanese mercenaries which took place under the Shogun Tokugawa Hidetada. It is finally suggested that if, during the 1630s, Japan had chosen engagement with Southeast Asia rather than isolation from it the established presence of Japanese communities overseas may have had a profound influence on the subsequent development of international relations within the area.

Year of Japan Lecture Series (2013-2014)
Part One: The Japanese "Wild Geese": The Recruitment, Roles and Reputation of Japanese Mercenaries in Southeast Asia, 1593-1688

Year of Japan Lecture Series (2013-2014)

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 17, 2013 41:53


For almost a hundred years Japanese fighting men were employed across a wide area of Southeast Asia as mercenaries in the service of the kings of Siam, Cambodia, Arakan, Spain and Portugal and for the directors of the Dutch East India Company. This activity is described and discussed in the context of contemporary international relations and the spread of European colonialism in the region, noting in particular the impact on the recruitment and activity of mercenaries caused by Japan’s progressively strict regulations from 1621 onwards regarding the employment of its citizens, their overseas travel and Japan’s relations with neighbouring countries. The Japanese ‘Wild Geese’ (a colloquial term for mercenaries) were used in dramatic assault parties, as staunch garrisons and as willing executioners. A stereotypical image of the fierce Japanese warrior thereby developed that had a profound influence on the way they were regarded by their employers. Although this image, which began with the wakō (Japanese pirates,) was a positive one at first, their reputation acquired a negative sheen when employers experienced difficulties in disciplining them or began to question their loyalty. Two contrasts will be noted. First, the mercenaries’ role with regard to the rulers of Southeast Asian kingdoms was largely that of acting as long-term palace guards, while recruitment by European powers tended to be of shorter duration for specific campaigns. Second, whereas the Southeast Asian monarchs tended to trust their well-established units of Japanese mercenaries the Europeans admired them but also feared them, and in every European example a progressive shift in attitude may be discerned from initial enthusiasm to great suspicion that the Japanese might one day turn against them, as illustrated by the long-standing Spanish fear of an invasion of the Philippines by Japan accompanied by a local uprising. Ironically this fear was matched by a similar concern on the other side that Spain would invade Japan with the assistance of Japanese Christians who had been exiled and a ‘fifth column’ of Christian sympathisers within Japan itself. The part played by the suppression of Japanese Christianity in the creation of the independent groups of exiled warriors who posed such a threat is also discussed, and suggestions are made as to the reasons for the profound change of policy with regard to the employment of Japanese mercenaries which took place under the Shogun Tokugawa Hidetada. It is finally suggested that if, during the 1630s, Japan had chosen engagement with Southeast Asia rather than isolation from it the established presence of Japanese communities overseas may have had a profound influence on the subsequent development of international relations within the area.