Podcasts about Nakamura

All the news from Hang's domination at the Pan American Championships, Sugihara podiuming all over the place at Asian Championships.  TICKETS ON SALE NOW FOR LIVE SHOW CHICAGO  Friday, July 18th at the world famous iO Theater. Attend virtually or in-person for games, prizes and a secret guest Q&A.  HEADLINES Can we please prioritize athlete safety? There were A LOT of issues with the mens' equipment at the Pan American Championships, but luckily everyone survived Jayla Hang (USA) and Felix Dolci (Canada) won the all-around titles The USA's mens and women teams won the Pan American team titles Chuso got injured in the vault final at Asian Championships, but the Olympic Channel is reporting she will still compete in Tashkent on her 50th birthday GYMTERNET NEWS MyKayla Skinner supports Riley Gaines and says Simone Biles "belittled, dismissed, and ostracized" her behind the scenes Are we taking the bait by discussing this at all? Mailie O'Keefe receives the Operations Specialist Award and will be staying at Utah for another year NCAA Coaching updates Geralen Stack-Eaton, former Alabama gymnast and Minnesota associate coach, is the new head coach at Cal Simone Brown switched her commitment from Clemson to Arkansas Former Utah gymnast, Jessie (Duke) McDonough, is the new Clemson assistant coach Former Oklahoma gymnast, Olivia Trautman, is now the assistant coach at Utah State Ragan Smith is the new associate coach at Iowa State Corinne Tarver, former Fisk head coach, was named the head coach at Southern Connecticut State University Mary Lou Retton pled "no contest" and said her actions were "completely unacceptable" 2025 Pan American Championships The US women won the team gold comfortably. Watch on PanAm Sports Why bronze was an extremely promising finish for this Brazilian team Helzly Rivera gave us all the drama during the team and all-around competitions Are the beam judges OK? What was up with all the raised scores? Something was definitely off about scoring because our favorite Argentinian beam worker, Isabella Ajalla, didn't even make the beam final??! The Panamanian women had an AMAZING competition  Karla Navas won vault gold with her legit round-off, half-on, full-off Panama qualified for team finals in fourth, AHEAD OF BRAZIL! Jayla Hang Simone'd this meet by winning a medal in every round of competition including team and all-around gold Why Lia Monica Fontaine is Canada's new "it-girl" 2025 Asian Championships China won the team final by about 0.4 over Japan We don't have any pity for Japan's leadership because they only competed with four gymnasts!!! China and Japan finish Asian Championships tied with seven medals each Can someone get Chuso to take a nap?? Chusovitina was injured after her first vault in event finals Nakamura Haruka (Japan) won the "Pussilanimouses Will Never be Heroes" award with her huuuge Def Should Qin Xinyi (China) have won bars gold over Nakamura? Let's discuss Hwang Seohyun (South Korea) upset Zhou Yaqin (China) for beam gold with her stellar BHS to back-full series Sugihara Aiko won four medals here, including all-around gold which she finally is getting 10 years after her Asian Championships debut Tonya Paulsson made her international debut for Taiwan, why her fourth-place all-around finish is huge for the program Feedback Did Chuso make a mistake with her Paris qualifiying strategy  LA2028 Mixed Team Final - can alternates be used How can an Xcel parent learn from GymCastic Has an emergency team ever been called in to replace another Eligabilty Calculus DiCello 7th year This episode is dedicated to the memory of coach, judge and mentor to many, Dean Ratliff. Listen to his judging myth buster episode here. BONUS CONTENT  Join Club Gym Nerd (or give it as a gift!) for access to weekly Behind the Scenes episodes. Club Gym Nerd members can watch the podcast being recorded and get access to all of our exclusive extended interviews, Behind The Scenes and College & Cocktails. Not sure about joining the club?  College & Cocktails: The Friday Night NCAA Gymnastics Post-Meet Show is available to sample (even if you aren't a Club Gym Nerd member yet). Watch or listen here. 2025 College & (M)Cocktails menu (including mocktails of course) MERCH GymCastic Store: clothing and gifts to let your gym nerd flag fly and even “tapestries” (banners, the perfect to display in an arena) to support your favorite gymnast! Baseball hats available now in the GymCastic store NEWSLETTERS Sign up for all three GymCastic newsletters  FANTASY GAME: GymCastic 2025 College Fantasy Game now open. 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ACTION Indivisible Practical ideas about what you can actually do in this moment, check it out: indivisi.org/muskorus 5Calls App will call your Congresspeople by issue with a script to guide you Make 2 to your Congressional rep (local and DC office). 2 each to your US Senators (local and state offices) State your name and zip code or district Be concise with your question or demand (i.e. What specific steps is Senator X taking to stop XYZ) Wait for answer Ask for action items -  tell them what you want them to do (i.e. draft articles of impeachment immediately, I want to see you holding a press conference in front of...etc.) ResistBot Turns your texts into faxes, postal mail, or emails to your representatives in minutes ACLU Mobile Justice App Allows you to record encounters with public officials while streaming to your closest contacts and your local ACLU; REPORT any abuse by authorities to the ACLU and its networks. LAWSUITS Donate to organizations suing the administration for illegal actions ACLU, Southern Poverty Law Center, Northwest Immigration Law Project STAY INFORMED Suggested podcasts:  Amicus, Daily Beans, Pod Save America, Strict Scrutiny Immigrant Rights Know Your Rights Red Cards, We Have Rights Video, Your Rights on trains and buses video  

Welcome to NoSo Takeover, a journey through the history of WWE NXT's biggest events! In this episode, JT, Aaron & Jenny run through NXT Brooklyn II from August 2016! They discuss a GLORIOUS debut, the birth of DIY, the amazing NXT tag team division, Ember Moon's debut, Bayley's farewell, the crowing of Nakamura and so much more! Join us as we take over the podcast world with NXT!

Madeleine Nakamura, editor and gamer

Ciro Hamen e Matheus Laneri comentam as notícias mais quentes do dia.

Buoyed by a big win against Maldives, next up for Singapore is Bangladesh in the Asian Cup Qualifiers. And ahead of the duel in Dhaka, Sports Minutes heads into the Lions den to check in with Song Ui-Young. From returning after a year's absence due to personal reasons, to a budding midfield partnership with Kyoga Nakamura - it’s all building up to a pivotal 90 minutes that could define Singapore’s qualification hopes on the road to Riyadh. READ MORE:Song Ui-young gets Lions recall after year-long absence due to family mattersGot a story to tell? Get in touch!raushan@sph.com.sgSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Krewe is kicking off a 2-part series on Japanese soccer! In Part 1, journalist Dan Orlowitz joins the Krewe to break down Japan's domestic soccer scene — the J.League. From league structure and top teams to standout players making waves right now, this episode is your perfect deep dive into the beautiful game, Japan-style. Whether you're new to Japanese soccer or a longtime fan, you'll come away with fresh insights and maybe even a new favorite club! Don't miss Part 2, where we go global with Japan's national teams and international impact!------ About the Krewe ------The Krewe of Japan Podcast is a weekly episodic podcast sponsored by the Japan Society of New Orleans. Check them out every Friday afternoon around noon CST on Apple, Google, Spotify, Amazon, Stitcher, or wherever you get your podcasts.  Want to share your experiences with the Krewe? Or perhaps you have ideas for episodes, feedback, comments, or questions? Let the Krewe know by e-mail at kreweofjapanpodcast@gmail.com or on social media (Twitter: @kreweofjapan, Instagram: @kreweofjapanpodcast, Facebook: Krewe of Japan Podcast Page, TikTok: @kreweofjapanpodcast, LinkedIn: Krewe of Japan LinkedIn Page, Blue Sky Social: @kreweofjapan.bsky.social, & the Krewe of Japan Youtube Channel). Until next time, enjoy!------ Support the Krewe! Offer Links for Affiliates ------Use the referral links below & our promo code from the episode!Support your favorite NFL Team AND podcast! Shop NFLShop to gear up for football season!Zencastr Offer Link - Use my special link to save 30% off your 1st month of any Zencastr paid plan! ------ Past KOJ Sports-Related Episodes ------Kendo: The Way of the Sword ft. Alexander Bennett, 7th Dan in Kendo (S4E16)The Life of a Sumotori ft. 3-Time Grand Champion Konishiki Yasokichi (S4E10)Talking Sumo ft. Andrew Freud (S1E8)------ About Langston Hill ------Dan's Socials & Writings------ JSNO Upcoming Events ------JSNO Event CalendarJoin JSNO Today!

  Last time we spoke about China's preparations for War. In December 1936, the tension in China reached a boiling point as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was captured by his own commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on fighting communists instead of the encroaching Japanese forces, the generals sought a unified response to Japanese aggression. After being held in Xi'an, Chiang reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a significant shift in strategy against Japan. Amidst the rising chaos, Chiang's government reviewed historical military strategies and prepared for a prolonged conflict. However, they faced challenges, including inadequate supplies and a lack of modern equipment compared to the Japanese. By 1937, China was ill-prepared for war, with Chiang later expressing regret about their military readiness. Despite these setbacks, the alliance formed with the communists laid a foundation for a united Chinese front against the brutalities of the Sino-Japanese War that would follow.   #153 Japan Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we talked about how China was preparing itself for war, now its time for Japan. Since Japan's invasion of North China, Japanese field armies had promoted a series of autonomous zones in northern China. Officers from the Kwantung Army, skeptical of China's capacity to modernize, believed that the vast region would inevitably fragment into regional factions. This policy effectively maintained a weak and divided China, which served Japan's to defend Manchukuo. However many Japanese military leaders frequently pointed to the threat posed by the KMT's five-year plan, initiated in 1933 with assistance from German military advisors, aimed at modernizing and expanding the national army. To counter what they perceived as a Chinese threat, the field armies advocated for a preemptive war to dismantle Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Any attempt by Tokyo to alter the military's China policy faced vigorous opposition from the Kwantung Army, which, in February 1937, pushed for intensified covert actions to expel the KMT from northern China and supported a preemptive war to secure strategic areas for future operations against the Soviet Union. At a March meeting in Tokyo, staff officers from the China Garrison and Kwantung armies insisted that any concessions to China would be a grave mistake and would likely yield only temporary outcomes. In early spring 1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro inherited a China policy fraught with competing views, however, there was consensus that China must not distract the empire from its preparations against the USSR. The end goal was clear, but the means to achieve it remained uncertain. The cabinet's approval of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" in August 1936 indicated a need for stability as the army and navy reconfigured Japan's war machine. The challenge lay in aligning long-term strategic goals with practical short-term interests in northern China without upsetting the existing balance of power. Expanding demands propelled the army's contingency planning, which had traditionally focused on safeguarding Japanese interests and the approximately 13,000 Japanese citizens residing in the region. Tokyo typically responded to serious incidents by deploying troops from homeland garrisons to address localized emergencies and then withdrawing them. However, by the mid-1930s, the growing Soviet threat to Manchukuo rendered this doctrine obsolete. Incidents in northern China gained strategic importance as they diverted resources from the Kwantung Army's preparations against the Soviet Union. Disruptions in northern China hindered access to essential raw materials necessary for army modernization and rearmament, while hostile Chinese forces threatened the Kwantung Army's strategic left flank in the event of war with the Soviets. With these considerations in mind, the army revised its operational war plans, assuming that northern China would serve as Japan's strategic rear area for operations against the USSR. In 1911 Japan's plan for general war mandated thirteen divisions to occupy southern Manchuria, capture Beijing, and subsequently occupy Zhejiang and Fujian. Limited contingency operations in northern China required two divisions to secure rail communications from Beijing to the coast. In the weeks following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the General Staff in Tokyo drafted plans to counter a Sino-Soviet alliance, anticipating a 2 month campaign involving 15-16 divisions, with the majority engaged against the Soviet Red Army. 2 divisions were designated to secure northern China, while smaller units would monitor the Inner Mongolian front to protect Japan's western flank in Manchuria. After further refinement, the General Staff identified three contingencies for China in early 1932: maintaining the traditional mission of safeguarding Japanese interests and citizens with a standard two-division force; ensuring a secure line of communication between the Chinese capital and the sea with the China Garrison Army, which consisted of approximately 1,700 officers and men, reinforced by one division; and, in a worst-case scenario of all-out war, deploying three divisions to reinforce the Kwantung Army, along with 7 additional divisions and 3 cavalry brigades to suppress resistance in northern China and the Shandong Peninsula, while two additional divisions secured key areas in central China. Between 1932-1936, China received less attention as the General Staff focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Anxiety, stemming from the Soviet buildup in the Far East, was a pervasive concern reflected in the draft rearmament plan submitted to the throne on May 21, 1936, as part of the national budget formulation process. The army proposed countering the Soviet threat by enhancing Japanese strategic mobility in Manchukuo through the renovation and expansion of airfields, ports, roads, and rail infrastructure, and by constructing army air force arsenals, storage depots, and medical facilities. The positioning of Japanese divisions in eastern Manchuria suggested their wartime objectives, with the Kwantung Army relying on a mobile independent mixed brigade composed of armored car and mounted cavalry units stationed in Gongzhuling, central Manchuria, as its immediate response force for contingencies in northern China. Major units were not concentrated in western Manchuria, where they would be expected to deploy before any planned invasion of northern China. Nevertheless, General Staff planners remained vigilant regarding developments in China, where the resurgence of nationalism, Communist movements advancing north of the Yellow River in February 1936, and the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments across northern China raised the specter of limited military operations escalating into full-scale warfare. China's improving military capabilities would likely hinder Japanese forces from accomplishing their objectives. For example, around Shanghai, Chinese defenses were bolstered by extensive, in-depth, and permanent fortifications. In mid-September 1936, the General Staff in Tokyo issued orders to preempt significant outbreaks in northern China by repositioning a division in Manchukuo closer to the boundary. If hostilities broke out, the China Garrison Army, supported by Kwantung Army units, would launch punitive operations against Chinese forces as necessary. Higher headquarters expected local commanders to act swiftly and decisively, employing rapid maneuvers and shock tactics to address outbreaks with minimal force. Given that no alternative responses were considered, Japanese operational planning for northern China relied on an all-or-nothing approach to force deployment, even for minor incidents. Yet, the senior leadership of the army remained deeply divided over its China policy. Influenced by Ishiwara, the General Staff wanted to avoid military actions that could lead to a full-scale war with China, focusing instead on advancing the army's extensive rearmament and modernization program. In contrast, a majority of high-ranking officers in the Army Ministry and General Staff, particularly within the 2nd Operations Section and the Kwantung Army, favored forceful action against China, believing it necessary to quell rising anti-Japanese sentiments. Drawing from past experiences, these officers anticipated that the Chinese would quickly capitulate once hostilities commenced. This lack of a unified military strategy reflected broader disagreements among the army's leadership regarding operations in China. While operational planning called for the permanent occupation of large regions in northern and central China, the General Staff aimed to contain outbreaks to maintain focus on Soviet threats. There was a clear absence of long-term operational planning; instead, the army concentrated on initial battles while relegating planning for prolonged combat operations to contingent circumstances. In summary, the Japanese army preferred to avoid military force to address Chinese issues whenever feasible but was equally unwilling to concede to Chinese demands. Since 1914, Tosui Koryo or “Principles of Command” had served as the foundational doctrine for senior Japanese army commanders and staff officers engaged in combined arms warfare at the corps and army levels. The advent of new weapons, tactics, and organizational changes during World War I compelled all major military forces to reassess their existing military doctrines across strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. In response, Japan modified the Principles of Command to blend its traditional post-Russo-Japanese War focus on the intangible factors in battle with the newest concepts of modern total war. A revision in 1918 recognized the significance of “recent great advances in materiel” for total warfare, yet it maintained that ultimate victory in battle relied on dedication, patriotism, and selfless service. In the 1920s, the General Staff's Operations Section, led by Major General Araki Sadao, who would become the leader of the Kodoha faction, had produced the most significant and impactful revision of the Principles. A staunch anti-communist and ideologue who valued the intangible elements of combat, Araki appointed Lieutenant Colonel Obata Toshishiro and Captain Suzuki Yorimichi as the principal authors of the manual's rewrite. Obata, a Soviet expert, was strongly influenced by German General Count Alfred von Schlieffen's classic theories of a “war of annihilation,” while Suzuki, the top graduate of the thirtieth Staff College class, shared Araki's focus on “spiritual” or intangible advantages in warfare. Both men were brilliant yet arrogant, working in secrecy to create a doctrine based on what Leonard Humphreys describes as “intense spiritual training” and bayonet-led assaults to counter the opponent's material superiority.  The latest version of the Principles of Command preserved the operational concept of rapid Japanese mobile offensive operations, aiming to induce a decisive battle or “kaisen” early in the campaign. It reaffirmed the sokusen sokketsu or “rapid victory' principle of rapid warfare. Attaining these goals relied exclusively on offensive action, with the army expecting commanders at all levels to press forward, defeat enemy units, and capture key territories. The troops were indoctrinated with a spirit of aggression and trained to anticipate certain victory. The emphasis on offensive action was so pronounced that Araki eliminated terms like surrender, retreat, and defense from the manual, believing they negatively affected troop morale. This aggressive mindset also infused the Sento Koryo or “Principles of Operations”, first published in 1929 as a handbook for combined arms warfare tailored for division and regimental commanders. The manual emphasized hand-to-hand combat as the culminating stage of battle, a principle regarded as unchanging in Japanese military doctrine since 1910. Senior commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative in skillfully maneuvering their units to encircle the enemy, setting the stage for climactic assaults with cold steel. Infantry was deemed the primary maneuver force, supported by artillery. To complement rapid infantry advances, the army developed light and mobile artillery. Operationally, encirclement and night attacks were vital components of victory, and even outnumbered units were expected to aggressively envelop enemy flanks. In assaults against fortified positions, units would advance under the cover of darkness, avoiding enemy artillery fire and positioning themselves for dawn attacks that combined firepower with shock action to overwhelm enemy defenses. In encounters with opposing forces, commanders would maneuver to flank the enemy, surround their units, and destroy them. If forced onto the defensive, commanders were expected to seize opportunities for decisive counterattacks to regain the initiative. These high-level operational doctrines were distilled into tactical guidelines in the January 1928 edition of the Infantry Manual or “Hohei Soten”, which saw a provisional revision in May 1937 . Both editions opened with identical introductions emphasizing the necessity for a rapid victory through the overpowering and destruction of enemy forces. Infantry was identified as the primary arm in combined arms warfare, and soldiers were taught to rely on cold steel as fundamental to their attacking spirit. The 1928 Infantry Manual underscored the commander's role in instilling a faith in certain victory or “hissho shinnen”, drawing from the glorious traditions of Japanese military history. The 1928 infantry tactics employed an extended skirmish line with four paces between soldiers. Individual initiative in combat was generally discouraged, except under exceptional circumstances, as success relied on concentrating firepower and manpower on narrow frontages to overwhelm defenders. An infantry company would create a skirmish line featuring two light machine gun squads and four rifle squads, preparing for a bayonet-driven breakthrough of enemy defenses. For the final assault, the infantry company would line up along a 150-yard front, likely facing casualties of up to 50% while breaching the enemy's main defensive line. Historical analysis reveals the shortcomings of these tactics. During World War I, armies constructed extensive, multi-layered defenses, trenches, pillboxes, and strong points, each independent yet all covered by artillery. If assaulting infantry suffered heavy losses breaching the first line, how could they successfully prosecute their assault against multiple defense lines? The 1937 revision elaborated on new tactics to overcome entrenched Soviet defenses, drafted in anticipation of arms and equipment that were either in development or production but not yet available for deployment. This became official doctrine in 1940, but as early as summer 1937, units from the China Garrison Army were field-testing these new tactics. The provisional manual adopted combat team tactics, forming an umbrella-like skirmish formation. This involved a light machine gun team at the forefront with two ammunition bearers flanking it to the rear. Behind the machine gun team were riflemen arranged in a column formation, maintaining six paces between each. The light machine gun provided cover fire as the formation closed in on the enemy for hand-to-hand combat. Increased firepower expanded the assault front to 200 yards. The combination of wider dispersion and night movement aimed to reduce losses from enemy artillery fire while the infantry advanced through successive lines of resistance. Commanders at the platoon level were responsible for leading the final assault into enemy lines, with increased tactical responsibility shifting from platoon to squad leaders, allowing for greater initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This emphasis on broader dispersal and fluidity on the battlefield required frontline infantry to exhibit aggressiveness and initiative. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese military did not solely rely on the bayonet or an offensive spirit during engagements with Chinese forces. They effectively employed superior firepower and modern equipment within their combined arms framework, using heavy weapons and artillery to soften enemy positions before launching infantry attacks. Without such firepower, unsupported infantry attacks would have struggled to achieve their objectives. In January 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army consisted of approximately 247,000 officers and men, organized in a structure comprising seventeen standing infantry divisions, four tank regiments, and fifty-four air squadrons equipped with a total of 549 aircraft. The China Garrison Army and the Taiwan Garrison Army each included two infantry regiments, while a separate independent mixed brigade was stationed in Manchuria. Two divisions were permanently based in Korea, with four more assigned on a rotating basis to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. The remainder of the forces were stationed in the Japanese home islands. A substantial pool of reservists and partially trained replacements was available to mobilize, enabling the expansion of peacetime units to their wartime strength as needed. Conscription provided the primary source of enlisted manpower for the army, though a handful of young men volunteered for active duty. For conscription purposes, Japan was divided into divisional areas, which were further subdivided into regimental districts responsible for conscription, mobilization, individual activations, and veteran affairs within their jurisdictions. Typically, conscripts served with the regiment associated with their region or prefecture. However, the Imperial Guards regiments in Tokyo selected conscripts from across the nation, as did the Seventh Infantry Division, which recruited from the sparsely populated Hokkaido area and from regular army units stationed in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Draftees from Okinawa Prefecture usually served with Kyushu-based regiments. All males reaching the age of 20 underwent an army-administered pre-induction physical examination conducted between December 1 and January 30 of the following year. This evaluation classified potential conscripts into three categories: A “suitable for active duty”, B1, and B2, while others were deemed unfit for the demands of military life. In 1935, 29.7% of those examined received A classifications, while 41.2% were graded as B1 or B2. Among the 742,422 individuals eligible for conscription in 1937, approximately 170,000 were drafted, amounting to 22.9% of the cohort; this figure had remained relatively consistent since the post-Russo-Japanese War years. Within the conscripted group, 153,000 men were classified as A and an additional 17,000 as B. Conscripts served for two years of active duty, with variations based on their military specialty and any prior civilian military training. After their discharge, they were subject to a lengthy reserve obligation. In total, 470,635 individuals fell into the B category, being otherwise fit for service but excess to the army's active personnel needs. These men were assigned to the First Replacement Pool, where they underwent around 120 days of basic military training, primarily focused on small arms usage and fundamental tactics. Regular officers and NCOs led the training in their respective regimental districts. Following their initial training, the army called these replacements and reservists to active duty annually for several days of refresher training. Army leaders regarded discipline as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. Basic training emphasized the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders at all levels. Subsequent training focused on fieldcraft, such as utilizing terrain strategically to surprise or encircle the enemy. However, training exercises often lacked diversity due to the limited maneuver areas available in Japan, leading to predictable solutions to field problems. The training regimen was rigorous, merging strict formal discipline and regulated corporal punishment with harsh informal sanctions and unregulated violence from leaders to instill unwavering compliance to orders. As an undergrad taking a course specifically on the Pacific War, it was this variable my professor argued contributed the most to the atrocities performed by the Japanese during WW2. He often described it as a giant pecking order of abuse. The most senior commanders abused, often physically their subordinates, who abused theirs, going through the ranks to the common grunts who had no one else but civilians and the enemy to peck at so to speak. Of course there were a large number of other variables at play, but to understand that you outta join my Patreon Account over at the www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel , where I made a fan favorite episode on “why the Japanese army performed so many atrocities”. In there I basically hit a big 10 reason list, well in depth, I highly recommend it! As the concept of the “Imperial Army” and the cult of the emperor gained prominence, appeals to imperial symbols and authority bolstered this unquestioning obedience to superiors, who were seen as the conduits of the emperor's will. It was during this period that the term kogun or “imperial army” gained favor over kokugun or “national army”, reflecting a deliberate effort by military authorities to forge a direct connection between the military and the imperial throne. The 1937 Japanese infantry division was structured as a square formation, with a peacetime strength established at approximately 12,000 officers and men organized into two brigades, each comprising about 4,000 personnel, formed from two infantry regiments, about 2,000 men each. The division included a field artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, and a transport battalion as organic units. Each infantry regiment was composed of three battalions, approximately 600 men each, which contained three rifle companies, 160 men each and a weapons platoon. A rifle company consisted of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon. Regiments also included infantry assault gun platoons, and battalions contained a heavy machine gun company. Upon mobilization, a fourth infantry company augmented each battalion, along with reserve fillers, nearly 5,000 personnel assigned as transport and service troops, raising the authorized wartime strength of an infantry division to over 25,000 officers and men.  Reforms implemented in 1922 reduced personnel numbers in favor of new and improved weapons and equipment. Among these advancements, the 75 mm Type 90 field artillery piece, which boasted increased range and accuracy, was integrated into the forces in 1930, along with the 105 mm Type 10 howitzer and 75 mm pack mountain artillery which could be disassembled for transport using pack animals. These became standard artillery components for divisions. The emphasis on light, mobile, and smaller-caliber field artillery enabled swift deployment during fast-moving engagements. By minimizing the size of the baggage train, infantry and artillery units could quickly set up off the march formation and maneuver around enemy flanks. Army leaders further streamlined road march formations by eliminating the fourth artillery battery from each regiment, thus sacrificing some firepower for enhanced speed and mobility. Heavier artillery pieces were still used in set-piece battles where mobility was less critical. In a typical 1936 division, the field artillery regiment, equipped with Type 90 field artillery or lighter Type 94 mountain artillery, had thirty-six guns. Training focused on quality rather than quantity, reflecting the conservative doctrine of “one-round-one-hit”. Live-fire training was infrequent due to the scarcity of artillery firing ranges in Japan. Ammunition stockpiles were inadequate for anticipated operational needs; government arsenals produced over 111,000 artillery shells in 1936, which was fewer than one-tenth of the quantities specified in wartime consumption tables. Similar industrial shortcomings also hampered advancements in motorization and armor. Motorization proved costly and relied on foreign supply, presenting challenges given the inferior road networks in Manchuria, northern China, and the Soviet Far East. Military estimates suggested a need for 250,000 trucks to fully motorize the army, a goal beyond the capabilities of the nascent Japanese automotive industry, which produced fewer than 1,000 cars annually until 1933. Japanese tanks, described as “handcrafted, beautifully polished, and hoarded” by Alvin Coox, suffered from shortages similar to heavy artillery and ammunition. The army prioritized light weighing ten tons or less and medium tanks sixteen tons or less due to the necessity of deploying armor overseas, size and weight were crucial for loading and unloading from transport ships. Smaller tanks were also more suitable for the terrains of northern China and Manchuria, as they could traverse unbridged rivers using pontoons or ferries. The Japanese industrial base, however, struggled to mass-produce tanks; by 1939, factories were producing an average of only twenty-eight tanks of all models per month. Consequently, in 1937, foot soldiers remained as reliant on animal transport for mobility as their ancestors had been during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite enjoying technological and material superiority over disorganized Chinese forces, these deficiencies in heavy artillery, armor, and vehicles would prove catastrophic against more formidable opponents. Another significant factor constraining Japanese industry's capacity to produce tanks, trucks, and artillery was the 1936 decision to expand the army's air wing and homeland air defense network. This policy diverted resources, capital, and technology away from the army's ground forces. The nascent Japanese Army Air Force or “JAAF” aimed to support ground operations through reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases, and achieving air superiority. However, direct support for ground operations was limited, and Japanese military planners did not anticipate that aerial bombardment could supplement or replace artillery bombardments. The expanded air arm's strategic mission centered on executing preemptive air strikes against Soviet air bases in the Far East to thwart potential air attacks on Japan. By the mid-1930s, the army had approximately 650 aircraft, roughly 450 of which were operational. The JAAF emphasized rigorous training that prioritized quality over quantity, producing only about 750 pilots annually up until December 1941. Basic flight skills were developed through this training, while specialized tactical instruction was deferred to newly established pilot units. According to logistics doctrine, Japanese maneuver units typically operated within a 120 to 180-mile radius of a railhead to facilitate resupply and reinforcement. A field train transport unit was responsible for moving supplies daily from the railhead to a division control point for distribution. The division established a field depot to manage the transfer of supplies from field transport to company and lower-echelon units. At the depot, transport troops would hand over supplies to a combat train that ferried ammunition, rations, and equipment directly to frontline units. Horse-drawn wagons and pack animals were the primary means of transportation. Each wartime division included a transport battalion, which varied in size from approximately 2,200 to 3,700 personnel, depending on the type of division supported. The division typically carried enough supplies for one day. Upon mobilization, the logistical framework was reinforced with the addition of an ordnance unit, a field hospital, a sanitation unit, and additional field and combat trains. The size of the transport regiment grew from around 1,500 officers and men with over 300 horses to nearly 3,500 troops and more than 2,600 animals. In the battalion, one company generally transported small-arms ammunition while two companies handled artillery shells and two others carried rations; this arrangement was flexible based on operational needs. Pack horses and dray horses were assigned to each company to carry or tow infantry assault artillery, mortars, artillery ammunition, and rations. Infantry soldiers carried minimal rations, approximately two and a half pounds, primarily rice, along with tinned condiments and salt. Consequently, the field train included a field kitchen stocked with fresh vegetables, rice or bread, soy sauce, and pickles. Each evening, a forward echelon train distributed supplies received from the field transport unit to the combat unit's bivouac area. When combat seemed imminent, a section of the transport battalion would move forward to deliver essential combat supplies, ordnance, equipment, medical supplies, directly to frontline units. These units would also handle resupply, medical evacuation, and repair of ordnance and equipment once fighting commenced.  On the evening of September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, Chinese troops from the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with Japanese soldiers from the Seventh Company's rear-guard medical unit at Fengtai. When a Japanese officer arrived on horseback, a Chinese soldier struck his horse, prompting the Chinese troops to retreat to their barracks. Major Ichiki Kiyonao, the battalion commander, ordered an emergency assembly, surrounded the Chinese encampment, and demanded that Chinese authorities surrender the aggressors immediately. To defuse the situation, Major General Kawabe Masakazu, the brigade commander and Ichiki's superior, instructed Regimental Commander Mutaguchi to resolve the incident swiftly. Mutaguchi negotiated an agreement that required the Chinese to apologize, punish those responsible, withdraw from the vicinity of the Japanese barracks, and maintain a distance of two miles. Although Mutaguchi and Ichiki wanted to disarm the Chinese forces, they ultimately complied with Kawabe's wishes and allowed the Chinese to retain their weapons “in the spirit of Bushido.” Later, the Chinese claimed the Japanese had refrained from disarming them due to their fear of the strength and influence of the 29th Army. This insult infuriated Mutaguchi, who vowed not to make any further concessions and promised to eliminate the anti-Japanese provocateurs decisively if another incident occurred. He warned his officers against allowing an “overly tolerant attitude toward the Chinese” to undermine the prestige of the imperial army and emphasized the need for swift, decisive action to prevent such incidents in the future. Tensions were further exacerbated by large-scale Japanese field exercises conducted from late October to early November. These maneuvers, the largest ever executed by Japanese forces in China, mobilized about 6,700 active-duty and reserve troops for a series of complex battle drills, night maneuvers, and tactical field problems. During these exercises, Japanese troops were quartered in Chinese homes. Although local residents were compensated for any damage caused, the exercises nonetheless heightened tensions between the two sides. The fallout from the Suiyuan Fiasco in December 1936, coupled with a tumultuous summer and fall, led to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and prompted Tokyo to caution the Kawabe brigade against actions that might escalate the already precarious situation. In March 1937, during the annual personnel assignments, Ishiwara was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the 1st Department Operations of the General Staff. However, Army Vice Minister Umezu, a hardliner regarding China and a rival of Ishiwara, successfully maneuvered the Hayashi cabinet into approving the command choices for army and navy ministers, overriding Ishiwara's proposals. General Sugiyama Hajime, another hawk on China, replaced the terminally ill General Nakamura Kotaro as army minister shortly after Nakamura's appointment and remained in that position until June 1938. Lieutenant General Imai Kiyoshi, army vice chief of staff and an Ishiwara supporter, was also battling a terminal illness that rendered him largely ineffective during his short five-month tenure from March to August 1937. Imai was expected to play a crucial role in high command because the army chief of staff, Prince Kan'in, had been appointed in 1931 as a figurehead due to internal factions preventing agreement on a candidate. Ishiwara further complicated his conciliatory approach by selecting Colonel Muto Akira, a known hardliner who believed force was the only means to resolve the Japan-China conflict, for the vital position of chief of Operations Section within the General Staff. From Kwantung Army headquarters, Commanding General Ueda Kenkichi and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, advocated for a preemptive war against China to serve the Kwantung Army's interests. In contrast, the China Garrison Army, under Lieutenant General Tashiro and his chief of staff, adopted a more moderate stance, aligning with central headquarters' policy of restraint. The China Garrison Army estimated the 29th Army to consist of 15,000–16,000 troops, with its main strength centered around Peking and an additional 10,000 troops in the surrounding area. Starting in spring 1937, Japanese units began observing tactical indicators suggesting that the Chinese were preparing for war. These indicators included increased guard presence at Peking's gates in June, bolstering units near the Marco Polo Bridge to over two battalions, preparing new fighting positions, digging trenches and constructing concrete pillboxes near the Marco Polo Bridge, infiltrating agents into Japanese maneuver areas for intelligence on night tactical exercises, and heightened strictness among Chinese railroad guards evident since late June. Nevertheless, the Japanese commanders did not view China as a formidable opponent. They believed that Chinese armies would quickly disintegrate due to what they perceived as a lack of fighting spirit and ineffective leadership. By 1937, Japan's national policy was shifting away from the persistent and aggressive efforts of field armies to undermine Chinese political authority in northern China toward a more conciliatory stance. This shift resulted in increased tensions between field armies and the General Staff in Tokyo, leading to substantial fractures among senior officers regarding the “solution” to their so-called China problem. Those tensions broke the camels back that year.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese grossly underestimated their enemy and their own logistical capabilities. There was to say “too many cooks in the kitchen” of the Japanese military and competing visions ultimately were leading Japan and China into an official full blown war. Japan assumed they could bully China until it was so fragmented it would be a simple matter of grabbing the pieces it liked, that was not to be the case at all.   

Meredith Nakamura, Account Manager for Approved Networks, joins JSA TV live from PTC'25 in Honolulu to recap 2024 and discuss the company's innovations around IPoDWDM. Watch now to see how Approved Network's products are benefiting data center operators in an era of AI, HPC and other bandwidth-intensive applications.

Nella puntata 399 abbiamo parlato di Hiroo Onoda, quello che teoricamente fu l’ultimo soldato ad arrendersi dopo la Seconda guerra mondiale. Non nel 1946, non nel 1947, ma nel 1974. Tuttavia, sempre nel 1974, pochissimi mesi dopo Hiroo e quasi 30 anni dopo la fine della guerra, spunta fuori un altro nome, quello di Teruo Nakamura, il VERO ultimo soldato ad arrendersi. E oggi vi raccontiamo la sua triste (tristissima) storia.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

When people visit Oʻahu and stay in Waikiki, most just look for whatever's nearby and end up at chain spots or hotel restaurants. They're everywhere—and they're often overpriced. What's more, many visitors assume that anything affordable or truly local is far away. But Waikiki is just three miles long. You don't need to leave the area to eat well or save money—you just need to know where to look. I've eaten at all the spots below, and trust me, they're worth finding. Here's a short list of my favorite low-key gems—small on size, big on flavor. Pho Minh Thu Waikiki Address: 2301 Kūhiō Ave #136, Honolulu, HI 96815Price Range: $10–$14Portion Size: Generous; big bowls, sharable apps Pho Min Thu I walked into Pho Minh Thu on a humid afternoon craving something comforting and left borderline obsessed with the beef pho. The broth is clear but deeply flavored, and they pile in the tendon if you ask. I could drink that broth like tea. What to order: Beef Pho with tendon, shrimp spring rolls Zigu Waikiki Zigu Address: 413 Seaside Ave, Honolulu, HI 96815Price Range: $18–$32Portion Size: Full entrées, craft presentation Zigu brings a modern touch to Japanese izakaya dining. The interior is hip, and they use local ingredients for a fresh take on traditional dishes. It feels more upscale without being stuffy. What to order: Local vegetable tempura, wagyu sushi, uni udon Maguro Spot Address: 2441 Kūhiō Ave, Honolulu, HI 96815Price Range: $9–$16Portion Size: Bowl portions; solid for one You'll miss it if you blink, but this tiny window spot serves some of the freshest poke in Waikiki. No frills, no fluff—just rice, raw fish, and flavor. It's grab-and-go, and the price is fair. What to order: Spicy ahi poke bowl, shoyu ahi with avocado maguro Buho Cantina Address: 2250 Kalākaua Ave, Honolulu, HI 96815 (Top floor of Waikiki Shopping Plaza)Price Range: $16–$28Portion Size: Large; great for sharing This rooftop Mexican spot delivers killer views and tasty bites. It's lively at night but still chill enough for lunch. They've got solid tacos, strong margaritas, and a vibe you won't get downstairs. What to order: Short rib tacos, churros, jalapeño margarita Buho Cantina Teddy's Bigger Burgers Address: 134 Kapahulu Ave, Honolulu, HI 96815Price Range: $11–$15Portion Size: Big burgers, filling fries This is where I go when I want a real burger. No prefab patties—these are juicy, messy, and cooked to order. The seasoned fries seal the deal. What to order: Original Burger with garlic fries, teri burger Teddy's Bigger Burgers Nakamura Ramen Waikiki Address: 2141 Kalākaua Ave #1, Honolulu, HI 96815Price Range: $12–$18Portion Size: Big bowls, filling Good ramen in Waikiki is rare—Nakamura nails it. Broth is flavorful, noodles have bite, and the char siu melts. It's a small place so you might wait, but it's worth it. What to order: Tonkotsu ramen, black garlic ramen Stix Asia Food Hall (Waikiki Shopping Plaza) Address: 2250 Kalākaua Ave, Honolulu, HI 96815Price Range: $8–$20Portion Size: Small-to-medium; food court variety It's not your average food court. Stix has a curated lineup of Japanese, Korean, and other pan-Asian stalls. It's air-conditioned, clean, and fast. Good for picky eaters or when you're craving variety. Stix Asia Food Hall What to order: Spicy miso ramen, tempura udon, yakitori skewers Waikiki Business Plaza Food Options Address: 2270 Kalākaua Ave, Honolulu, HI 96815Price Range: $10–$20Portion Size: Varies; mostly fast casual This building has low-key good eats if you know where to look. There's udon, curry, local bento, and even a sweet shop. Perfect for a no-fuss lunch stop while shopping. What to order: Katsu curry, oyakodon, mochi ice cream BBQ Chicken Hawaii (Waikiki) Address: 2299 Kūhiō Ave, Honolulu, HI 96815Price Range: $12–$18Portion Size: Shareable boxes, heavy sides

(Seminarhaus Engl) Die Lehren über Nicht-Selbst sind sehr tiefgründig und befreiend. Zugleich sollten sie nicht im Sinne einer Verneinung von Individualität, psychischen Bedürfnissen oder persönlicher Verantwortlichkeit verstanden werden. Es braucht beides: eine psychische Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit, des relativen Selbst, und die Übernahme von Verantwortung für unser eigenes Leben, aber auch die spirituelle Entwicklung, die uns von der Anhaftung an das Selbst befreit.

(Seminarhaus Engl) Die Lehren über Nicht-Selbst sind sehr tiefgründig und befreiend. Zugleich sollten sie nicht im Sinne einer Verneinung von Individualität, psychischen Bedürfnissen oder persönlicher Verantwortlichkeit verstanden werden. Es braucht beides: eine psychische Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit, des relativen Selbst, und die Übernahme von Verantwortung für unser eigenes Leben, aber auch die spirituelle Entwicklung, die uns von der Anhaftung an das Selbst befreit.

(Seminarhaus Engl) Der Buddha lehnte die Vorstellung einer ewigen, unveränderlichen Seele ab. Stattdessen beschrieb er, wie wir durch das Anhaften an den fünf Daseinsgruppen (khandas) und die Identifizierung damit ein Selbst erschaffen. Das Festhalten an einem solchen Selbst ist mit Leiden verbunden. Das Verständnis der Vergänglichkeit und Unzulänglichkeit aller Erfahrungen ermöglicht uns ein Loslassen.

(Seminarhaus Engl) Der Buddha lehnte die Vorstellung einer ewigen, unveränderlichen Seele ab. Stattdessen beschrieb er, wie wir durch das Anhaften an den fünf Daseinsgruppen (khandas) und die Identifizierung damit ein Selbst erschaffen. Das Festhalten an einem solchen Selbst ist mit Leiden verbunden. Das Verständnis der Vergänglichkeit und Unzulänglichkeit aller Erfahrungen ermöglicht uns ein Loslassen.

Djadja, égérie, Pookie, Nakamura : le journaliste Ismaël Mereghetti décrypte les petits et grands mots de l'artiste Aya Nakamura. Que nous raconte-t-elle sur la musique et la France ? Comment est-elle devenue cette artiste majeure ? «J'écris, je chante comme je parle», déclare Aya Nakamura. Fille de griotte, née au Mali, elle écrit sa première chanson à 16 ans. Dans ses textes, elle mêle mots d'argot et mots du nouchi ou d'autres langues et aspire à créer une «écriture du quotidien». Invité : Ismaël Mereghetti, journaliste. Auteur et réalisateur documentaire spécialisé dans la musique. « Aya Nakamura, dictionnaire critique » est publié chez J.-C. Lattès. Et la chronique de Lucie Bouteloup « La puce à l'oreille ». Aujourd'hui «Tirer son épingle du jeu».Une chronique en partenariat avec Le Robert, à retrouver sur Le français facile avec RFI ! Programmation musicale :Artiste : Youssoupha avec le titre Grands boubous des ancêtres.(Rediffusion)

Djadja, égérie, Pookie, Nakamura : le journaliste Ismaël Mereghetti décrypte les petits et grands mots de l'artiste Aya Nakamura. Que nous raconte-t-elle sur la musique et la France ? Comment est-elle devenue cette artiste majeure ? «J'écris, je chante comme je parle», déclare Aya Nakamura. Fille de griotte, née au Mali, elle écrit sa première chanson à 16 ans. Dans ses textes, elle mêle mots d'argot et mots du nouchi ou d'autres langues et aspire à créer une «écriture du quotidien». Invité : Ismaël Mereghetti, journaliste. Auteur et réalisateur documentaire spécialisé dans la musique. « Aya Nakamura, dictionnaire critique » est publié chez J.-C. Lattès. Et la chronique de Lucie Bouteloup « La puce à l'oreille ». Aujourd'hui «Tirer son épingle du jeu».Une chronique en partenariat avec Le Robert, à retrouver sur Le français facile avec RFI ! Programmation musicale :Artiste : Youssoupha avec le titre Grands boubous des ancêtres.(Rediffusion)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Bodhicitta—the mind of awakening—is the aspiration to attain awakening for the benefit of all. Seeing our practice in this light can be a source of inspiration and counteract the tendency to self-centeredness. The talk discusses the historical development of the concept and explains what it means.

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Bodhicitta—the mind of awakening—is the aspiration to attain awakening for the benefit of all. Seeing our practice in this light can be a source of inspiration and counteract the tendency to self-centeredness. The talk discusses the historical development of the concept and explains what it means.

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Introduction and guided meditation

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Introduction and guided meditation

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Introduction and guided meditation

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Thimo, Yuka and Akincano respond to practitioner's questions.

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Saddhā - trust or confidence - is a fundamental quality that we need on our path. Why can it be difficult to trust? What is actually trustworthy? How does it manifest in our mind and in our actions?

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Saddhā - trust or confidence - is a fundamental quality that we need on our path. Why can it be difficult to trust? What is actually trustworthy? How does it manifest in our mind and in our actions?

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Saddhā - trust or confidence - is a fundamental quality that we need on our path. Why can it be difficult to trust? What is actually trustworthy? How does it manifest in our mind and in our actions?

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center)

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) To bring attention to the right things in the right way is crucial for our path. Through the mindful contemplation of our experience we can gain insight and develop liberating wisdom.

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) To bring attention to the right things in the right way is crucial for our path. Through the mindful contemplation of our experience we can gain insight and develop liberating wisdom.

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) To bring attention to the right things in the right way is crucial for our path. Through the mindful contemplation of our experience we can gain insight and develop liberating wisdom.

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Calming and collecting the mind

(Insight Meditation Society - Retreat Center) Calming and collecting the mind

Special Guest Goh Nakamura is a singer, songwriter, musician, composer, and actor. A fortuitous 2007 feature on YouTube's front page brought his music videos over a million views and earned him a new fanbase from all over the world.As a session musician, his guitar and vocal work has been featured in films directed by Ridley Scott, such as A Good Year, American Gangster, and Body of Lies. His track Daylight Savings also appears in the film Feast of Love. Nakamura made his acting debut in Dave Boyle's award-winning film Surrogate Valentine, where he played a fictionalized version of himself. The film screened at a number of festivals, including the SXSW Film Festival, and Nakamura won a Special Jury Prize for Acting from the Dallas International Film Festival for his performance. Most recently, Goh was the composer for the documentaries Be Water and The Greatest Night in PopFollow Goh on Instagram @gohnakamura | Visit his website www.gohnakamura.comGuest Co-host Chris Saunders is a singer/songwriter born and raised in Manhattan. Coming from British and Jamaican roots, he had an innate love of music, which was nurtured by his family. Chris was raised on the music of icons, such as Jimmy Cliff, The Beatles, The Temptations, Marvin Gaye, and Sting & The Police. He also co-hosts The Tracklist Podcast show.Follow Chris on Instagram @chrissaunders_music | Listen to his music on Spotify===========================Subscribe and listen to “Conversations with Daron Jenkins” HERE:

El ajedrez siempre ha sido el juego de la estrategia, la paciencia y la mente calculadora. Pero hay ciertas cosas que en nuestros días están cambiando y añadiendo capas a lo conocido. Anichess ha traído los power-ups al tablero y, en los esports, el ajedrez ha entrado en escena con fuerza. ¿Qué significa todo esto para un juego con más de mil años de historia? Para hablar de ello sube a la Nabucodonosor al Maestro Internacional David Martínez "Divis", de Chess.com, para conversar sobre innovación en el ajedrez, el pulso de Magnus Carlsen a la FIDE y su propia versión sobre el evento Clash of Claims, que tanto comentario y viralidad ha generado.Junto a Manfred y Óscar González, de Real o Virtual, exploramos el "flujo" de Nakamura y la importancia de darle aire fresco a los juegos tradicionales con elementos como los power-ups ¿Es la clave para incorporar nuevas generaciones?Escuchar audio

Jenn speaks to Tokyo bred, global citizen, Kyoto based, Momoko Nakamura (Momo) founder of Kyoto Research Institute. From her young memories of Japanese cookery at home, to her studies in microbiotics and traditional medicinal cooking, food television career in the US, to now returning to her roots in Japan and creating a company that is dedicated to researching, educating and preserving Japanese materials, Momo has been sharing her knowledge with the world, communicating the intangible in tangible ways. She shares with us what she means by intangible to tangible, her passion in the work she is doing, and the ups and downs that she has encountered along the way.  (Recorded on March 14, 2025)About Momoko Nakamura:Momoko leads Kyoto Research Institute, dedicated to the study of heritage Japanese materials. Her interest in fieldwork across the archipelago is rooted in over 20 years of communicating and educating on cookery culture and the food system. The Institute's research now extends beyond food, exploring a wide spectrum of the materials that create Japanese living, and shares these learnings in the form of educational programming, products, and publishing.Episode Resources:Website IG Maana Retreats Becoming Supernatural: How Common People Are Doing The Uncommon

In this week's episode of the Wade Keller Pro Wrestling Post-show from five years ago (3-20-2020), PWTorch editor Wade Keller was joined by Cameron Hawkins from the PWTorch East Coast Cast to discuss with live callers WWE Smackdown including Ron Gronkowski's WWE Smackdown live debut, the Goldberg-Roman Reigns contract signing, Paige reveals Bayley's WrestleMania challengers, The Dirt Sheet with Miz & Morrison, Daniel Bryan & Drew Gulak vs. Shinsuke Nakamura & Cesaro, analysis of how WWE is doing with social spacing on the shows, and much more with live callers and the mailbag.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wade-keller-pro-wrestling-post-shows--3275545/support.

On Episode 364 of DBWP: The Kayfabe Zone, the Mikes start with the Cena Turn and the love triangle of Punk, Rollins, and Reigns. Daniel tells us about his favorite cyprid, the Chupacabra and continues to scare the shit out of us. On the flip side, the Mike's debate Nakamura's time in WWE, and if the Wyatt Sicks are needed. “I Am Strange” written and performend by BZfOS / Schlitzer Pepi Recordsfacebook.com/drivebypodArchives: Danielgrothe.us

In this episode of Wrestling Soup, the hosts dive into the latest WWE Raw, discussing the controversial Seth Rollins vs CM Punk cage match with a critical review of its many finishers. They delve into the continuing storylines, including Jay Uso's prospects against Gunther, Cody Rhodes' promo on John Cena's absence, and the intricacies of the Judgment Day faction potentially ousting Finn. Additionally, there's speculation about future matchups, the discuss Iyo Sky's current character direction, and a look at Nakamura's potential future. The show concludes with a quick touch on an AEW event review and insights into potential NXT call-ups and how they could impact WWE's main rosters.00:42 WWE Job Controversies02:25 Working from Home in WWE06:51 Raquel Gonzalez and NXT Talent08:21 AEW Revolution Reactions12:27 Wrestling Injuries and Dave Meltzer21:42 Logan Paul and WWE Celebrity Appearances35:59 Cody Rhodes and WWE Champions46:41 Seth's Selling Controversy47:21 Roman's Intensity and Paul Heyman's Role49:34 CM Punk's Babyface Journey51:21 Seth Rollins' Character Evolution57:17 Cody Rhodes' Promo and WWE Backstage Promos59:57 New Day's Heel Turn and Lucha Libre Moments01:06:37 Women's Division: Raquel vs. Bayley01:14:31 Judgment Day Drama and Future Predictions01:25:57 Nakamura's WWE Journey and Future Speculations01:30:23 Wrapping Up and Upcoming ContentBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/wrestling-soup--1425249/support.

Smackin It Raw delivers wrestling review shows covering Raw, Smackdown, NXT and PPV/PLE's as well as news and rumors from the world of wrestling. Join us Mondays for RawFlix, Tuesdays for NXXXT and Fridays for Smackin It Down!In this action-packed WWE SmackDown recap, Shinsuke Nakamura battles LA Knight for the United States Championship in an epic showdown! Plus, Chelsea Green faces a mystery opponent, and Cody Rhodes has just ONE day to decide whether he'll sell his soul to The Final Boss, The Rock! With appearances from top Superstars like Solo Sikoa, Jacob Fatu, Jimmy Uso, Tiffany Stratton, Trish Stratus, Nia Jax, Candice LeRae, Alexa Bliss, and more, you won't want to miss the excitement!Also featuring #DIY, Bianca Belair & Naomi, Carmelo Hayes, Drew McIntyre, Motor City Machine Guns, Nick Aldis, Pretty Deadly, R-Truth, The Miz, Street Profits, and more! Who will rise to the occasion and make their mark on WWE SmackDown?

Jeff interviews Spencer Nakamura, where they discuss Christians becoming numb, letting your work replace your walk, struggling with evangelism and being intentional about discipleship. FOLLOW US: https://linktr.ee/elijahfireshow /// ElijahFire and ElijahStreams are part of Elijah List Ministries. Thank you for making the always-free Elijah List Ministries possible! Click here to learn how to partner with us: https://secure.qgiv.com/for/elijahfirepodcast

Send me a Text MessageWhat if music could heal your soul? What if a simple breathing technique could bring you deep peace? In this episode of Grief 2 Growth, I sit down with the incredible Akikazu Nakamura, a world-renowned shakuhachi (Japanese bamboo flute) master. Aki's journey is remarkable—he left the structured world of quantum chemistry to embrace the boundless power of music, meditation, and the ancient Japanese breathing technique, Missoku.What You'll Learn in This Episode:✔️ What is the shakuhachi? The ancient Japanese bamboo flute that transforms sound into meditation✔️ Missoku breathing explained – An ancient Japanese technique for calm, focus, and mindfulness✔️ How music connects us to something greater – Beyond entertainment, it's a spiritual tool✔️ The transition from science to music – How Aki followed his passion from chemistry to sound✔️ How Missoku enhances meditation & stress relief – And how you can apply it to your lifeAki has performed at Lincoln Center and the Montreux Jazz Festival, pioneering new methods of circular breathing and blending tradition with innovation. His music and breathwork offer a unique way to find stillness and healing in a chaotic world.About Akikazu Nakamura:

Nikolaos Ntirlis is a Correspondence chess champion, and computer engineer who has become well known in the chess world for his vast opening expertise. Nikolaos is quite skilled at finding original opening ideas, and has grown popular through his books, and by highlighting new opening ideas on his Twitter/X account. The ideas Nikos suggests have often seen quick adoption by Grandmasters, and he has even seen moves he highlighted subsequently appear in the games of Hikaru Nakamura and Anish Girl. In fact, GM Giri wrote the Foreword to Nicolaos' newest book, the excellent  Reimagining 1. E4. The book offers new ideas for White across many defenses to 1. E4, and explains opening concepts clearly without bombarding you with opening theory. In our conversation, we discussed the origins of Nikolaos' opening enthusiasm, how best to use engines, as well as which defenses to 1.e4 were most challenging to combat theoretically. Nikolaos is also an accomplished chess trainer who hasworked with the national team of Denmark. In our conversation, he offered some helpful chess improvement advice with a philosophical bent. Lastly, we discussed some of  Nicolaos' other interests including correspondence chess, chess books, and martial arts. Timestamps of topics discussed are below.  0:02- What is the origin of Nikos' popular Twitter threads, where he suggests lines that have been used by GMs like Nakamura, Carlsen, and others? Mentioned: Nikolaos' X account here: https://x.com/NikolaosNtirlis/status/1852645135487558104 10:00- Was there any defense against 1. E4 where it was particularly challenging to find fresh ideas? 14:30- What rating range is this book best suited for?  16:00- Does Nikos agree that one should learn opening ideas, rather than openings?  Mentioned: Nikos' interview with Charlyze van Zyl for Forward Chess: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yyanVxu48lk 18:30- Patreon mailbag question: What did Nikos discover about an original line that Niemann played against Kramnik?  Mentioned Han Schut's YouTube channel https://www.youtube.com/c/hanschut Read the Twitter thread in question: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1841408942737420435.html 19:00- Who are Nikos' favorite opening theoreticians?  25:00- What is Nikos' advice for how amateurs should use engines?  32:00- Are there any underappreciated openings?  33:00- Nikos' overall chess improvement advice 34:00- Where did Nikos' love for openings start? Mentioned: GM Efim Geller  41:00-  Patreon mailbag question: How can one still win a game in correspondence chess?  48:00- What is Nikos' advice for remembering openings?  52:00- Does Nikos play any OTB?  56:00- What are Nikos' favorite books?  Mentioned: Mentioned: IM Willy Hendriks, IM Tibor Karolyi's Fischer Books  1:00- Thanks to Nikos for joining me! You can check out his Quality Chess Books here:  https://qualitychess.co.uk/products/coming_soon/24060/reimagining_1e4_by_nikolaos_ntirlis/ If you would like to help support Perpetual Chess via Patreon, you can do so here: https://www.patreon.com/c/perpetualchessQ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the Ishiwara Kanji. Born in 1889 in Japan, Kanji Ishiwara was the son of a policeman from a samurai lineage. He entered military training at 13, rising through the ranks to become a Major and a respected lecturer. His unconventional views on military strategy and history led him to predict a prolonged conflict with the United States. Deeply influenced by Nichiren Buddhism, he envisioned Japan as a moral leader destined to guide Asia, advocating for reform in China while grappling with his nation's imperial ambitions. In 1928, ishiwara fell ill with influenza, leading to a six-month hospitalization. During recovery, he joined an elite study group discussing war theories. His lectures on total war gained fame, culminating in a presentation to Kwantung officers. Amid rising tensions in Japan, he advocated for control over Manchuria, believing Japan had a moral duty to stabilize China. His theories on warfare, including the devastating potential of airpower, foreshadowed the horrors of future conflicts, influencing Japan's military strategies.   #137 Ishiwara Kanji Part 2: The Mukden Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki collaborated with other members of the Kwantung Army to address what they perceived as the Manchurian issue. By the mid-1930s, the belief that Manchuria needed to be forcibly seized had become the prevailing opinion among the Kwantung Army. Ishiwara was convinced that Japan could no longer remain passive in Manchuria, as each passing day meant Japan was gradually losing its rights and interests in the region to China, risking expulsion. Abandoning Manchuria would be a national catastrophe, resulting in the loss of a crucial buffer state, valuable resources, and land for Japan's growing population to settle. In essence, Manchuria was vital for Japan's survival and growth. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviet threat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army Headquarters in Tokyo also recognized that Manchuria was a crucial defensive line against the USSR. However, unlike the Kwantung Army, which aimed to control all of Manchuria, the leaders in Tokyo focused on incorporating southern Manchuria through the South Manchurian Railway and did not pursue any territory north of it. Ishiwara, on the other hand, believed that the only way for Japan to prevent the USSR from exerting pressure on southern Manchuria was to occupy northern Manchuria and extend even further north toward the Amur River. This would allow Japan to control the mountain ranges that bordered the western and eastern frontiers of northern Manchuria. Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”. Ishiwara advanced his ideas significantly after Japan's conquest of Manchuria, recognizing the necessity of effectively administering and pacifying its diverse populations. He posited that the stability of Manchuria could be achieved through the unique skills and contributions of the various ethnic groups residing there. For instance, he believed that the Chinese would excel in developing small businesses, while the Koreans would apply their expertise in paddy farming. These racial dynamics, according to Ishiwara, would play a crucial role in the development of Manchukuo and the broader vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, it was clear that, above all, Manchuria was intended to serve Japan's interests, many of which were exploitative and economically driven. By early 1930, Ishiwara and his colleague Itagaki devised a military strategy reminiscent of the tactics employed during the Russo-Japanese War, specifically a surprise night attack. Their plan involved the Kwantung Army launching an assault on the Liaoning region, targeting key Chinese garrisons. This operation required meticulous planning, as the Kwantung Army was significantly outnumbered by the forces commanded by Zhang Xueliang. In the vicinity of Mukden alone, Zhang commanded approximately 20,000 well-equipped troops, supported by aircraft and tanks. Across Manchuria, he could mobilize around 250,000 soldiers in the event of conflict. In stark contrast, the Kwantung Army could only field about 10,000 personnel, primarily composed of garrison units stationed along the railway. They lacked substantial air support and mechanized units, and their overall equipment was inadequate. To address this stark imbalance in military strength, Ishiwara emphasized the importance of intelligence and rigorous training. He aimed to refine specific assault techniques, enabling Japanese forces to execute rapid and concentrated attacks that would overwhelm their Chinese adversaries. The overarching strategy was notably straightforward: it hinged on delivering a decisive blow to the heart of Zhang Xueliang's military stronghold at the Peitaying barracks in Mukden. Ishiwara believed that if this critical target fell, it would shatter the enemy's morale, providing the Kwantung Army with the necessary military and psychological momentum to dominate the surrounding regions. However, he acknowledged that if the Soviet Union intervened, the entire plan could unravel catastrophically. One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ” Ishiwara, as you can imagine, was deeply frustrated by the prospect of delaying action for another year. He argued passionately that the current international landscape necessitated an immediate strike. At that time, the Soviet Union was still in the midst of its ambitious five-year plan, which limited its capacity for intervention. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, and France were grappling with their own financial crises, rendering them unable to mount significant resistance in the Far East. Most notably, the Nationalist regime in China was preoccupied with its unification efforts south of the Great Wall, but this situation was expected to shift soon. Ishiwara believed that if they postponed their plans for a year, the geopolitical environment would deteriorate further, making decisive action imperative. For Ishiwara, the moment to act was now or never. In July 1931, Ishiwara and Itagaki orchestrated a crucial reconnaissance mission aimed at familiarizing the newest Kwantung officers with the northern regions of Manchuria. To disguise their true intentions, they informed high command that the mission was a survey focused on the Soviet Union. However, the real objective was to assess the strength and influence of Chinese power in northern Manchuria. During their return journey, the team received alarming news about the disappearance of Captain Nakamura Shintaro, a Kwantung staff officer. Upon reaching Port Arthur, they learned that rumors were circulating that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under what were described as “mysterious circumstances.” In the preceding months, Manchuria had witnessed a surge in violent riots, murders, work strikes, and various other incidents, all contributing to a climate of unrest. The Nakamura affair intensified these existing tensions. In response, both the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries attempted to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. However, figures at the central army headquarters, such as Nagata Tetsuzan, who sympathized with the urgency felt by their Kwantung counterparts, felt compelled to support them. The situation was rapidly escalating, and the stakes were growing ever higher. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that's exactly what he did. The Kwantung officers moved their troops beyond the railway zone, where they had been confined, and without waiting for Itagaki's approval—who was in Japan at the time—they began preparations to send an armored train along with a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to Mukden. Their goal was to enlist the help of the Chinese military in investigating Nakamura's disappearance. Upon learning of this, Tokyo sent a telegram instructing them to halt their departure from the railway and to refrain from using the Nakamura incident as a pretext for employing force to address the Manchurian issue. For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. Ishiwara ordered the dispatch of an armored train carrying a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to compel the Chinese military authorities in Mukden to assist in the investigation of Nakamura's disappearance. However, central headquarters halted the train's departure at the last moment, sending a telegram from Tokyo that specifically instructed the Kwantung Army not to use the Nakamura incident to pressure a resolution to the Manchurian issue.  In addition to the Nakamura situation, another issue was brewing. Colonel Dohihara Kenji was involved in a plot to enlist Warlord Yan Xishan to attack Zhang Xueliang. This scheme was attracting unwanted attention and undermining the effectiveness of the Nakamura incident, prompting Ishiwara to swiftly suppress the plans. Rumors began to circulate in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army was preparing to retaliate against the Chinese due to the Nakamura situation. In response, War Minister General Minami dispatched Major General Yoshiji Tatekawa to Mukden to caution the Kwantung officers against any such actions. Ishiwara was informed of Tatekawa's arrival and sent urgent telegrams to his followers, warning, “Plot exposed. Act before Tatekawa's arrival.” Consequently, the launch date was moved from September 28th to the 18th. Itagaki personally intercepted Tatekawa's train, inviting him for tea and sake, and arranged for him to spend the night with a geisha on the evening of the 18th. On September 18th of 1931, 1st Lt Suemori Kawamoto of the independent Garrison Unit of the 29th infantry regiment planted bombs along the tracks near Liutiaokou. At 10:20pm they exploded doing only minor damage to 1.5 meters of track on one site. The damage was so minor a train actually passed over the tracks without difficulty 10 minutes later. Ishiwara, Itagaki and their followers quickly announced the explosion to be a Chinese atrocity and mobilized the Kwantung Army. Itagaki ordered the Independent Garrison Force and 29th infantry regiment to storm the Peitaying Barracks. Battalion commander Shimamoto was awakened by the orders via telephone and quickly dispatched the 1st (Ono) and 4th (Takahashi) companies from Mukden; the 2nd (kawakami) company at Fushun to advance to Liutiaokou. At 10:40pm the 29th regiment commander Hirata got a call from Shimamoto who ordered him to get his regiment into emergency formation and to storm the Peiyating barracks.  Two secretly hidden 24cm artillery pieces began to bombard the Peitaying barracks as 500 Japanese stormed the 7000 strong Chinese garrison. Despite being outnumbered 14 to 1, the Japanese destroyed Zhang Xueliangs small air force, routed the Chinese and occupied the Peiyating Barracks by 11pm, all at the cost of 500 Chinese lives and allegedly only 2 Japanese lives. A major reason the Japanese had ease was because Zhang Xueliang ordered his men to store away their weapons and not put up a fight if the Japanese invaded. Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek both in Beijing at the time knew they could not initiate an offensive war against such a strong foreign country. They were hoping the League of Nations would intervene as pertaining to the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. But later on Chiang Kai-Shek would find America too wrapped up in its depression at home, Britain indifferent and other nations without enough reason to risk anything in the far east. An hour after the attack, Ishiwara began pressing General Shigeru Honjo, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to send reinforcements to capture all of Mukden. Initially, Honjo hesitated, but Ishiwara convinced him that there was significant provocation from the enemy, prompting Honjo to order additional units into combat to secure the entire city. Historians have since struggled to determine whether Honjo was aware of the invasion plan; it seems likely he had some knowledge, but not the full details, which made him cautious in his actions over the following weeks. In the days that followed, Honjo attempted to confine the incident, but Ishiwara and Itagaki continuously urged all forces to adhere to the secret plan they had trained for. The speed and decisiveness of their actions overwhelmed the Chinese forces and left Honjo unable to change the course of events. Famously when one colleague asked Itagaki what to do in response to cease and desist orders from Honjo, Itagaki responded “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's war”. Official orders from Tokyo came on the next day, specifically opposing the expansion of hostilities, but Ishiwara and Itagaki had come too far to stop now. They began persuading Honjo to telegram the General Staff to ask for reinforcements and freedom of action “to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”. Ishiwara and Itagaki clearly aimed to expand their offensive through official channels first, but they also circumvented these channels. One cunning tactic they used was to incite chaos among civilians in Manchurian cities, thereby heightening the demand for improved security for Japanese residents. This strategy would enable the Kwantung Army troops to move beyond their established boundaries. Shortly after what is now known as the "Mukden Incident," military agents were sent to Kirin to stir unrest in the city. Reports of disturbances from Kirin began flooding into the Kwantung Army headquarters, with Ishiwara urging Honjo to send forces to Kirin to safeguard Japanese residents. He also pushed for reinforcements from the Korean Army, but Honjo was reluctant to take that step. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.  The operation against Kirin was executed with remarkable speed. Ishiwara ordered the majority of the 2nd Division, led by General Tamon Jiro, to swiftly travel to Kirin by train. They entered the city without firing a single shot and compelled the local Chinese commander to declare the province's independence from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours, the Korean army responded to an aid request from the Kwantung Army staff sent on September 21st and began advancing into Manchuria. In just 48 hours, the Japanese military had taken control of Kirin, which was outside the Kwantung operational zone, and the Korean army was invading Manchuria without Tokyo's approval, effectively undermining military discipline. Chief of Staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to restrict the Kwantung Army's operations and granted field commanders discretionary authority for certain emergency situations, typically of a local nature. However, the Kirin expedition did not fit within these parameters. Encouraged by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki pushed for an advance on Harbin. As noted in the previous episode, the strategy for taking Manchuria relied on speed and precision. The Kwantung Army had limited forces compared to the immediate Chinese troops in Manchuria, yet they were constrained by directives from Tokyo HQ that prohibited the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the South Manchuria Railway, where they had previously confined their actions. Ishiwara attempted to frame the situation politically, arguing that Japan should support Manchurian independence and sent this proposal directly to Tokyo central HQ. However, on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ firmly rejected the idea of expanding hostilities. Faced with this outright refusal from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals believed their only option was to create further chaos to compel a response. Ishiwara took the lead once more, aiming to unsettle Tokyo HQ. On October 8th, he donned military pilot gear and infiltrated one of five Chinese aircraft seized at Mukden airfield. He personally led a raid, although later in life, during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, he would claim that the flight was intended solely for reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. He argued that it was only at the last moment that intelligence revealed anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou, prompting the Kwantung Army Commander to authorize their neutralization if fired upon. Ishiwara maintained that he and the four accompanying aircraft were fired upon, leading them to drop approximately 75 bombs on Chinchou. This series of events was quite dramatic, and contemporary accounts suggest it was a premeditated effort to provoke Tokyo. The raid on Chinchou certainly alarmed Tokyo, leading the staff there to worry that the West would start condemning them. Tokyo's high command found themselves in a difficult position. They felt compelled to publicly support the Kwantung Army by retroactively approving the chaotic attacks, but internally, they were furious. Major Endo Saburo from the intelligence division was dispatched to Manchuria to investigate the situation. When he asked Ishiwara about the events, Ishiwara claimed he acted on the principle of field initiative, which was why he hadn't informed Tokyo beforehand. Saburo also noted that Ishiwara's tone suggested that he and the intelligence division should stay out of the matter. Additionally, Saburo learned that there were whispers in Manchuria indicating that if Tokyo's high command did not align with them, the Kwantung Army was ready to act independently. It appeared that the radical officers of the Kwantung Army were even willing to defy the Imperial Japanese Army command to achieve their goals. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire” If you found this situation quite surprising, there was also a rumor that Ishiwara and Itagaki planned to use an independent Manchuria as a base for a coup d'état against the Japanese government. Their goal was to overthrow the capitalists oppressing the people and establish a national socialist regime centered around the emperor. For those familiar with the history of political assassinations in 1930s Japan, this rumor hints at events that would unfold in 1936. It remains unclear whether Ishiwara and Itagaki genuinely intended to pursue this plan, but they certainly spread the word. On October 18th, War Minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army, instructing them to stop any discussions about making Manchuria independent or attempting to seize control of it. Additionally, they dispatched Colonel Imamura Hitoshi from the operations section to Manchuria to reason with Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”. Despite the chaos and turmoil, the Kwantung Army had been held back from launching any sustained military operations throughout October. As expected, Ishiwara continued to argue for an advance into northern Manchuria. In early November, he found another opportunity when he claimed that more railways had been destroyed. Allegedly, hostile Chinese forces had blown up the rail bridges over the Nonni River, south of Tsitsihar. When Japanese engineering units arrived to repair the damaged tracks, they came under fire from Chinese troops. To the high-ranking officials in Tokyo, this appeared to be a legitimate reason to take defensive action. Additionally, Kwantung intelligence reports were reaching Tokyo, suggesting that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had also provided exaggerated reports to the Japanese public, manipulating media narratives to pressure Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern Manchuria. Tokyo approved a defensive operation, restricted in time and scope, aimed at protecting Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung Army forces began moving north and soon engaged in intense fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led troops during this engagement, marking the only time in his military career that he did so. General Honjo, rightly concerned that the Kwantung forces were becoming uncontrollable, sent a cable on November 5th announcing that under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate,” the general staff would assume direct command authority in Manchuria. Unsurprisingly, Ishiwara and his like-minded colleagues in the Kwantung Army were furious. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.  Confronted with yet another dire situation, the IJA high command permitted the Kwantung Army to advance toward Tsitsihar. However, international outcry soon erupted, compelling them to order the evacuation of the city. Ishiwara sparked a significant debate among the staff, arguing that the evacuation was unacceptable given the sacrifices already made by the troops. Nevertheless, Honjo remained resolute. A few days later, Chinese forces began to gather at Chinchou, and tensions escalated with skirmishes occurring between Japanese and Chinese troops in Tientsin. In response, Ishiwara urgently called for Honjo to initiate an offensive at Chinchou as a way to better position their forces closer to Tientsin in case they faced overwhelming opposition. To support this advance, they also requested assistance from the Korean army. Once again, the burden fell to Tokyo. The high command in Tokyo ordered an immediate halt to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao River. The Kwantung Army hesitated, not solely due to the order but also because the Korean army refused to join the offensive against Chinchou, which was crucial for their success. Ishiwara found himself in a predicament; without reinforcements, the entire offensive could fail. Then, on December 11th, a significant change occurred when Premier Wakatsuki was ousted. War Minister Minami and Chief of Staff Kanaya, who had attempted to moderate the Kwantung Army's aggressiveness, were replaced by Araki Sadao, a leader of the Kodoha faction known for its aggressive stance. To provide some context, the Japanese military was divided into factions, similar to warlord cliques, vying to influence the future operations of the IJA and, to some extent, the IJN. Two primary factions shaped the military landscape in the 1930s: the Kodoha and the Toseiha (Control Faction). The Kodoha was not an organized political party nor did it hold an official position within the IJA, but it wielded considerable influence. Its members were typically younger officers, particularly from the Kwantung Army. General Sadao Araki was a founding member of the Kodoha, which was heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism, and the Kokutai ideology. They aimed to restore Japan to its perceived former glory, viewing liberal democracy as a detrimental force. They blamed the capitalists, industrialists, and elites—politicians, bureaucrats, and Zaibatsu leaders—for the nation's decline. Their goal was to see the Emperor reclaim full power in what they termed a "Showa Restoration." The Kodoha's primary adversary, as perceived by much of the Japanese military at the time, was the USSR and communism in general. Consequently, they supported the Hokushin-ron (Northern Strike Policy), which was Japan's theoretical plan to invade the USSR. While I don't want to delve too deeply into the details, it's important to note that the Kodoha was counterbalanced by the more moderate Toseiha faction, led by Hideki Tojo. The Toseiha opposed the Kodoha on several fronts, notably their desire to avoid a violent revolution to restore imperial dominance. Although they shared many principles with the Kodoha, the Toseiha rejected the Hokushin-ron strategy in favor of the Nanshin-ron (Southern Strike) strategy, which aimed at expanding into Southeast Asia and the resource-rich Dutch East Indies. The Toseiha faction also maintained better relations with the IJN. To contextualize this narrative within the political landscape, these two factions began to fiercely compete for dominance starting in 1931. With the influence of Araki Sadao and support from Prince Kan'in, a Kodoha sympathizer, significant changes occurred in Tokyo's command. Suddenly, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria were rebranded as “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung Army, fully backed by Tokyo, swiftly pursued all military objectives established by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were captured in early January 1932, followed by Tsitsihar in February. By spring 1932, Ishiwara urged the staff to complete the full occupation of Manchuria, both north and south. In April of that year, he presented the “Manshu haiti heiryaku,” or the program for the pacification of Manchuria. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol. It is clear that Ishiwara played a crucial role in the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had various strategies available to address the Manchurian issue, but Ishiwara focused primarily on achieving complete control over the region for its resources, strategic advantages, and to establish a continental base for a potential war against the United States. For Ishiwara, securing all of Manchuria was essential in preparation for the Final War. While it's likely that conflict between Japan and China would have occurred in Manchuria without Ishiwara's influence, it's uncertain whether Japan would have outright taken the province. Ishiwara dedicated years to planning and pushing boundaries, but when the operation commenced, it became evident that he and his associates lacked a definitive timeline for conquest and had several missing contingency plans. Despite the chaotic circumstances, the conquest of Manchuria proved to be a remarkable success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”. Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria incident set Japan on an unavoidable path toward the China War, which ultimately led to conflict with the West. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This situation also raises questions about military discipline. Many cite the concept of Gekokujo as a reason why individuals like Ishiwara and Itagaki were able to act as they did. These militaristic junior officers seemingly ran rampant, engaging in rebellious actions that defied their superiors, which forced those higher up to become complicit. While Gekokujo certainly played a role, especially in Ishiwara's case, it does not negate the fact that there was a significant level of indiscipline within the Japanese army. Ishiwara was undoubtedly aware of the potential consequences of his actions. A prime example is Colonel Komoto Daisaku, who had previously seen his career ruined after being exiled due to the Huanggutun incident. However, Ishiwara's focus extended beyond Manchuria; he was closely monitoring the political landscape in Tokyo. He recognized that the 1931 cabinet was unstable and that certain high-ranking officials, like Araki Sadao, were rapidly advancing in their careers and sympathized with his agenda. Ishiwara was betting that supporters from factions like Kodoha would gain the necessary power to further his cause. His gamble paid off handsomely, as all the key players in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their efforts. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd class, and returned to Japan as a celebrated hero, captivating younger officers in the Imperial Japanese Army. Ironically, the indiscipline he had nurtured within the army would later come back to haunt him as he climbed the ranks and became part of the Tokyo staff. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Ron Burgundy once said “Boy, that escalated quickly... I mean, that really got out of hand fast.” While perhaps Ishiwara did not plan for an all out war to break out against China, he certainly was the culprit to it happening. There was no going back, 15 years of blood, sweat and tears would be shed.