Podcasts about qing

This week on Sinica, I chat with Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, editor of Foreign Affairs, about how the journal has both shaped and reflected American discourse on China during a period of dramatic shifts in the relationship. We discuss his deliberate editorial choices to include heterodox voices, the changing nature of the supposed "consensus" on China policy, and what I've called the "vibe shift" in how Americans across the political spectrum think about China. Daniel also reflects on his own intellectual formation, including his work on George Marshall's failed mission to mediate China's Civil War and the cautionary lessons that history holds for today's debates. We explore the challenges of bringing Chinese voices into Foreign Affairs, the balance between driving and reflecting policy debates, and whether we're witnessing a genuine opening of the Overton window on China discussions.7:15 – Foreign Affairs in the era of Iraq and "China's peaceful rise" 12:09 – The Marshall mission and the "Who Lost China?" debate 17:17 – China's changing role and the journal's coverage density 19:43 – The Campbell-Ratner "China Reckoning" and subsequent debates 25:00 – The challenge of including authentic Chinese voices 29:42 – How Chinese leadership perceives and reads Foreign Affairs 32:12 – The "vibe shift" on China across the American political spectrum 35:56 – Cultivating contrarian voices: Van Jackson, Jonathan Czin, and David Kang 40:17 – Avoiding the trap of making everything about U.S.-China competition 43:12 – Diversifying perspectives beyond the Washington-Beijing binary 48:18 – The big questions: American exceptionalism and Chinese identity in a new era 51:42 – The dangers of cutting off U.S.-China scholarly conversations 56:26 – The uses and misuses of historical analogies 58:09 – Spain's Golden Age and late Qing memes as contemporary analogiesPaying it forward: The unsung editorial staff at Foreign AffairsRecommendations: Daniel: Equator.org; The Rise of the Meritocracy by Michael Young; Granta's new India issue; The Party's Interests Come First by Joseph Torigian; The Coming Storm by Odd Arne Westad Kaiser: The Spoils of Time by C.V. WedgwoodSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Ch'en Shu (1660–1736) was a Chinese painter from the Qing dynasty, known for her exquisite flower-and-bird paintings that blended precision with delicate beauty. As one of the few recognized female artists of her time, she mastered traditional painting techniques while incorporating her own refined sense of composition and color. For Further Reading:‘The Mountains are Quiet and the Days Grow Long': The Steady Hand of Ch'en ShuThe Conventional Success of Ch'en ShuChen Shu | Cockatoo | China | Qing dynasty (1644–1911)For the past six years, we've been telling the stories of women you may or may now know– but definitely should. This month, we're bringing back our favorite Womanica episodes from across our back catalog. These are women throughout time and around the world who made their mark. History classes can get a bad rap, and sometimes for good reason. When we were students, we couldn't help wondering... where were all the ladies at? Why were so many incredible stories missing from the typical curriculum? Enter, Womanica. On this Wonder Media Network podcast we explore the lives of inspiring women in history you may not know about, but definitely should.Every weekday, listeners explore the trials, tragedies, and triumphs of groundbreaking women throughout history who have dramatically shaped the world around us. In each 5 minute episode, we'll dive into the story behind one woman listeners may or may not know–but definitely should. These diverse women from across space and time are grouped into easily accessible and engaging monthly themes like Educators, Villains, Indigenous Storytellers, Activists, and many more. Womanica is hosted by WMN co-founder and award-winning journalist Jenny Kaplan. The bite-sized episodes pack painstakingly researched content into fun, entertaining, and addictive daily adventures.Womanica was created by Liz Kaplan and Jenny Kaplan, executive produced by Jenny Kaplan, and produced by Grace Lynch, Maddy Foley, Brittany Martinez, Edie Allard, Carmen Borca-Carrillo, Taylor Williamson, Sara Schleede, Paloma Moreno Jimenez, Luci Jones, Abbey Delk, Adrien Behn, Alyia Yates, Vanessa Handy, Melia Agudelo, and Joia Putnoi. Special thanks to Shira Atkins.Follow Wonder Media Network:WebsiteInstagramTwitter Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

节目简介 / Episode Summary / エピソード概要中文： 你有没有想过，宫保鸡丁和麻婆豆腐这两个菜的名字是怎么来的？一个是清朝官员发明的菜，一个是成都大嫂做的豆腐。它们后来都成了世界有名的中餐。这期节目，我们就来聊聊这两个菜名的来历。English: Have you ever wondered where the names Kung Pao Chicken and Mapo Tofu came from? One was created by a Qing-dynasty official, and the other by a woman in Chengdu. Both later became world-famous Chinese dishes. In this episode, I talk about how these two names came to be.日本語： 宮保鶏丁と麻婆豆腐、この二つの料理名はどこから来たのでしょうか。ひとつは清朝の官僚が考えた料理で、もうひとつは成都のおばさんが作った豆腐料理です。どちらも世界で有名な中華料理になりました。今回は、この二つの名前の由来についてお話しします。#中国菜名 #宫保鸡丁 #麻婆豆腐 #中餐历史 #KungPaoChicken #MapoTofu #ChineseFoodStories  #FoodHistory #ChineseCuisine #CulinaryStories #ChinesePodcast#宮保鶏丁 #麻婆豆腐 #料理名の由来 #中華料理の物語发短信给我！ Send me a text!Support the show如果您喜欢我的播客，欢迎通过下方方式表达您的支持。您的支持对我来说是巨大的鼓励。但无论如何，我都很感激有您作为听众。能够每周与您分享几分钟的时光，对我来说是莫大的荣幸。❤️ If you enjoy my podcast, you're welcome to show your support through the options below. Your support means a great deal to me and is a huge source of encouragement. But no matter what, I'm truly grateful to have you as a listener. It's an honor to share a few minutes with you each week!❤️ ☕

Nous sommes le 29 août 1842. C'est à bord d'une canonnière, ces navires fortement armés, que les envoyés du « Fils du Ciel », l'Empereur de Chine, signent, avec la Grande-Bretagne, le traité de Nankin. Par ce traité, l'empire du Milieu s'engage à céder Hong Kong à la Couronne britannique et à ouvrir, au commerce extérieur, cinq de ses ports du sud au sein desquels les sujets la reine Victoria auront désormais droit de résidence. Nous sommes à l'issue de ce que l'on appelle la première Guerre de l'opium. Le traité de Nankin est le premier d'une série qui, en réalité, abolit la souveraineté chinoise en matière commerciale et entame son intégrité territoriale. C'est une humiliation qui va s'aggraver après la Deuxième Guerre de l'opium, moins d'une vingtaine d'années plus tard, dont la résolution va contraindre l'Empire Qing abandonner ses prétentions à la primauté et à intégrer le droit international occidental régissant les relations entre États souverains. Cette période de dépossession, marquée par la multiplication des concessions et la peur du « dépècement » du pays est devenue un récit national essentiel. « N'oubliez pas l'humiliation » est un impératif qui va imprimer l'esprit de reconquête de la pleine souveraineté du pays et l'enjeu principal du nationalisme chinois. En 2019, lors du XIXe Congrès du Parti communiste, Xi Jinping déclare : « Il faut correctement raconter l'histoire de la Chine au monde ». Le président insistant sur « les contributions majeures, du pays, à la civilisation mondiale ». Comment la Chine écrit ou réécrit-elle son histoire ? Avec nous : Victor Louzon, maître de conférences à la faculté des Lettres de Sorbonne-Université. « Comment la Chine écrit son histoire – L'invention d'un destin mondial » ; Tallandier (Texto). Sujets traités : Chine, histoire, Hong Kong, Grande-Bretagne, reine Victoria, opium, Qing , empire, Xi Jinping Merci pour votre écoute Un Jour dans l'Histoire, c'est également en direct tous les jours de la semaine de 13h15 à 14h30 sur www.rtbf.be/lapremiere Retrouvez tous les épisodes d'Un Jour dans l'Histoire sur notre plateforme Auvio.be :https://auvio.rtbf.be/emission/5936 Intéressés par l'histoire ? Vous pourriez également aimer nos autres podcasts : L'Histoire Continue: https://audmns.com/kSbpELwL'heure H : https://audmns.com/YagLLiKEt sa version à écouter en famille : La Mini Heure H https://audmns.com/YagLLiKAinsi que nos séries historiques :Chili, le Pays de mes Histoires : https://audmns.com/XHbnevhD-Day : https://audmns.com/JWRdPYIJoséphine Baker : https://audmns.com/wCfhoEwLa folle histoire de l'aviation : https://audmns.com/xAWjyWCLes Jeux Olympiques, l'étonnant miroir de notre Histoire : https://audmns.com/ZEIihzZMarguerite, la Voix d'une Résistante : https://audmns.com/zFDehnENapoléon, le crépuscule de l'Aigle : https://audmns.com/DcdnIUnUn Jour dans le Sport : https://audmns.com/xXlkHMHSous le sable des Pyramides : https://audmns.com/rXfVppvN'oubliez pas de vous y abonner pour ne rien manquer.Et si vous avez apprécié ce podcast, n'hésitez pas à nous donner des étoiles ou des commentaires, cela nous aide à le faire connaître plus largement. Hébergé par Audiomeans. Visitez audiomeans.fr/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.

In this episode of CAA Conversations, Dr. Yipaer Aierken hosts a conversation with Dr. Rachel Miller an Dr. Mya Dosch exploring the rise of generative AI and how it is reshaping the practice of teaching art and art history—particularly in general education art history courses. As AI tools become more integrated into students' academic and daily lives, educators are being challenged to rethink not only how we teach but also how we define learning, teaching, and pedagogy in higher education. This week's conversation between three California State University professors covers their teaching experiences, pedagogy development processes, and the course assignments designed to reflect on the key question: Why is it important to rethink how we teach in the Age of AI? Yipaer Aierken is an assistant professor of Asian art at California State University, Sacramento, where she teaches courses on the art of Asia, including China, Japan, Korea, India, and Southeast Asia. Professor Aierken is a scholar with an interdisciplinary focus on both art history and religious studies. She employs methods from art history, religious studies, and ethnography in her study of polyethnic artists and scholar-officials of the Yuan and Qing dynasties, including those of Uyghur, Tibetan, Manchu, and Mongol origins. She has published pedagogy lesson plans on Art History Teaching Resources and previously taught at the University of California, Davis, and Arizona State University. In February 2026, Professor Aierken will present papers and chair panels on Asian and Asian diaspora women artists at the CAA Annual Conference. Rachel Miller is an associate professor of art history and chair of the art department at California State University, Sacramento, where she teaches courses on ancient, medieval, Renaissance, and Baroque art, using teaching methods that place European art in a broader global context and decolonize European art's traditional normative position in the canon of art history. Professor Miller has presented papers and workshops on art history pedagogy and organized pedagogy panels at the College Art Association, the Sixteenth Century Society, and the Renaissance Society of America annual conferences. She has written on pedagogy for the Sixteenth Century Journal and Art History Teaching Resources and has a forthcoming essay, co-written with Dr. Mya Dosch, in the edited volume Equity-Enhancing Strategies for the Art History Classroom. Dr. Miller also serves as an editor of Art History Teaching Resources and is on the editorial board of the journal Art History Pedagogy & Practice. Mya Dosch is associate professor of art of the Americas at California State University, Sacramento. Their current research considers commemorations of the 1968 student movement in Mexico City, from monumental sculptures to ephemeral protest interventions. Dosch's work on Mexican prisons, public art, and protest appears in the journal Future Anterior and the anthologies Teachable Monuments and Imágenes en Colectivo. They have also facilitated student-written audio guides for the Crocker Art Museum and are working on a student-developed public art catalog for Sacramento State.

In the first installment of what will be a two-part feature, we'll talk about the transformation of the Forbidden City into the Palace Museum, focusing on China's last emperor Puyi's expulsion in 1924, the Qing imperial family's financial struggles, and the founding of the museum in 1925.

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,For most of history, stagnation — not growth — was the rule. To explain why prosperity so often stalls, economist Carl Benedikt Frey offers a sweeping tour through a millennium of innovation and upheaval, showing how societies either harness — or are undone by — waves of technological change. His message is sobering: an AI revolution is no guarantee of a new age of progress.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Frey about why societies midjudge their trajectory and what it takes to reignite lasting growth.Frey is a professor of AI and Work at the Oxford Internet Institute and a fellow of Mansfield College, University of Oxford. He is the director of the Future of Work Programme and Oxford Martin Citi Fellow at the Oxford Martin School.He is the author of several books, including the brand new one, How Progress Ends: Technology, Innovation, and the Fate of Nations.In This Episode* The end of progress? (1:28)* A history of Chinese innovation (8:26)* Global competitive intensity (11:41)* Competitive problems in the US (15:50)* Lagging European progress (22:19)* AI & labor (25:46)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. The end of progress? (1:28). . . once you exploit a technology, the processes that aid that run into diminishing returns, you have a lot of incumbents, you have some vested interests around established technologies, and you need something new to revive growth.Pethokoukis: Since 2020, we've seen the emergence of generative AI, mRNA vaccines, reusable rockets that have returned America to space, we're seeing this ongoing nuclear renaissance including advanced technologies, maybe even fusion, geothermal, the expansion of solar — there seems to be a lot cooking. Is worrying about the end of progress a bit too preemptive?Frey: Well in a way, it's always a bit too preemptive to worry about the future: You don't know what's going to come. But let me put it this way: If you had told me back in 1995 — and if I was a little bit older then — that computers and the internet would lead to a decade streak of productivity growth and then peter out, I would probably have thought you nuts because it's hard to think about anything that is more consequential. Computers have essentially given people the world's store of knowledge basically in their pockets. The internet has enabled us to connect inventors and scientists around the world. There are few tools that aided the research process more. There should hardly be any technology that has done more to boost scientific discovery, and yet we don't see it.We don't see it in the aggregate productivity statistics, so that petered out after a decade. Research productivity is in decline. Measures of breakthrough innovation is in decline. So it's always good to be optimistic, I guess, and I agree with you that, when you say AI and when you read about many of the things that are happening now, it's very, very exciting, but I remain somewhat skeptical that we are actually going to see that leading to a huge revival of economic growth.I would just be surprised if we don't see any upsurge at all, to be clear, but we do have global productivity stagnation right now. It's not just Europe, it's not just Britain. The US is not doing too well either over the past two decades or so. China's productivity is probably in the negative territory or stagnant, by more optimistic measures, and so we're having a growth problem.If tech progress were inevitable, why have predictions from the '90s, and certainly earlier decades like the '50s and '60s, about transformative breakthroughs and really fast economic growth by now, consistently failed to materialize? How does your thesis account for why those visions of rapid growth and progress have fallen short?I'm not sure if my thesis explains why those expectations didn't materialize, but I'm hopeful that I do provide some framework for thinking about why we've often seen historically rapid growth spurts followed by stagnation and even decline. The story I'm telling is not rocket science, exactly. It's basically built on the simple intuitions that once you exploit a technology, the processes that aid that run into diminishing returns, you have a lot of incumbents, you have some vested interests around established technologies, and you need something new to revive growth.So for example, the Soviet Union actually did reasonably well in terms of economic growth. A lot of it, or most of it, was centered on heavy industry, I should say. So people didn't necessarily see the benefits in their pockets, but the economy grew rapidly for about four decades or so, then growth petered out, and eventually it collapsed. So for exploiting mass-production technologies, the Soviet system worked reasonably well. Soviet bureaucrats could hold factory managers accountable by benchmarking performance across factories.But that became much harder when something new was needed because when something is new, what's the benchmark? How do you benchmark against that? And more broadly, when something is new, you need to explore, and you need to explore often different technological trajectories. So in the Soviet system, if you were an aircraft engineer and you wanted to develop your prototype, you could go to the red arm and ask for funding. If they turned you down, you maybe had two or three other options. If they turned you down, your idea would die with you.Conversely, in the US back in '99, Bessemer Venture declined to invest in Google, which seemed like a bad idea with the benefit of hindsight, but it also illustrates that Google was no safe bet at the time. Yahoo and Alta Vista we're dominating search. You need somebody to invest in order to know if something is going to catch on, and in a more decentralized system, you can have more people taking different bets and you can explore more technological trajectories. That is one of the reasons why the US ended up leading the computer revolutions to which Soviet contributions were basically none.Going back to your question, why didn't those dreams materialize? I think we've made it harder to explore. Part of the reason is protective regulation. Part of the reason is lobbying by incumbents. Part of the reason is, I think, a revolving door between institutions like the US patent office and incumbents where we see in the data that examiners tend to grant large firms some patents that are of low quality and then get lucrative jobs at those places. That's creating barriers to entry. That's not good for new startups and inventors entering the marketplace. I think that is one of the reasons that we haven't seen some of those dreams materialize.A history of Chinese innovation (8:26)So while Chinese bureaucracy enabled scale, Chinese bureaucracy did not really permit much in terms of decentralized exploration, which European fragmentation aided . . .I wonder if your analysis of pre-industrial China, if there's any lessons you can draw about modern China as far as the way in which bad governance can undermine innovation and progress?Pre-industrial China has a long history. China was the technology leader during the Song and Tang dynasties. It had a meritocratic civil service. It was building infrastructure on scales that were unimaginable in Europe at the time, and yet it didn't have an industrial revolution. So while Chinese bureaucracy enabled scale, Chinese bureaucracy did not really permit much in terms of decentralized exploration, which European fragmentation aided, and because there was lots of social status attached to becoming a bureaucrat and passing the civil service examination, if Galileo was born in China, he would probably become a bureaucrat rather than a scientist, and I think that's part of the reason too.But China mostly did well when the state was strong rather than weak. A strong state was underpinned by intensive political competition, and once China had unified and there were fewer peer competitors, you see that the center begins to fade. They struggle to tax local elites in order to keep the peace. People begin to erect monopolies in their local markets and collide with guilds to protect production and their crafts from competition.So during the Qing dynasty, China begins to decline, whereas we see the opposite happening in Europe. European fragmentation aids exploration and innovation, but it doesn't necessarily aid scaling, and so that is something that Europe needs to come to terms with at a later stage when the industrial revolution starts to take off. And even before that, market integration played an important role in terms of undermining the guilds in Europe, and so part of the reason why the guilds persist longer in China is the distance is so much longer between cities and so the guilds are less exposed to competition. In the end, Europe ends up overtaking China, in large part because vested interests are undercut by governments, but also because of investments in things that spur market integration.Global competitive intensity (11:41)Back in the 2000s, people predicted that China would become more like the United States, now it looks like the United States is becoming more like China.This is a great McKinsey kind of way of looking at the world: The notion that what drives innovation is sort of maximum competitive intensity. You were talking about the competitive intensity in both Europe and in China when it was not so centralized. You were talking about the competitive intensity of a fragmented Europe.Do you think that the current level of competitive intensity between the United States and China —and I really wish I could add Europe in there. Plenty of white papers, I know, have been written about Europe's competitive state and its in innovativeness, and I hope those white papers are helpful and someone reads them, but it seems to be that the real competition is between United States and China.Do you not think that that competitive intensity will sort of keep those countries progressing despite any of the barriers that might pop up and that you've already mentioned a little bit? Isn't that a more powerful tailwind than any of the headwinds that you've mentioned?It could be, I think, if people learn the right lessons from history, at least that's a key argument of the book. Right now, what I'm seeing is the United States moving more towards protectionist with protective tariffs. Right now, what I see is a move towards, we could even say crony capitalism with tariff exemptions that some larger firms that are better-connected to the president are able to navigate, but certainly not challengers. You're seeing the United States embracing things like golden shares in Intel, and perhaps even extending that to a range of companies. Back in the 2000s, people predicted that China would become more like the United States, now it looks like the United States is becoming more like China.And China today is having similar problems and on, I would argue, an even greater scale. Growth used to be the key objective in China, and so for local governments, provincial governments competing on such targets, it was fairly easy to benchmark and measure and hold provincial governors accountable, and they would be promoted inside the Communist Party based on meeting growth targets. Now, we have prioritized common prosperity, more national security-oriented concerns.And so in China, most progress has been driven by private firms and foreign-invested firms. State-owned enterprise has generally been a drag on innovation and productivity. What you're seeing, though, as China is shifting more towards political objectives, it's harder to mobilize private enterprise, where the yard sticks are market share and profitability, for political goals. That means that China is increasingly relying more again on state-owned enterprises, which, again, have been a drag on innovation.So, in principle, I agree with you that historically you did see Russian defeat to Napoleon leading to this Stein-Hardenberg Reforms, and the abolishment of Gilded restrictions, and a more competitive marketplace for both goods and ideas. You saw that Russian losses in the Crimean War led to the of abolition of serfdom, and so there are many times in history where defeat, in particular, led to striking reforms, but right now, the competition itself doesn't seem to lead to the kinds of reforms I would've hoped to see in response.Competitive problems in the US (15:50)I think what antitrust does is, at the very least, it provides a tool that means that businesses are thinking twice before engaging in anti-competitive behavior.I certainly wrote enough pieces and talked to enough people over the past decade who have been worried about competition in the United States, and the story went something like this: that you had these big tech companies — Google, and Meta, Facebook and Microsoft — that these were companies were what they would call “forever companies,” that they had such dominance in their core businesses, and they were throwing off so much cash that these were unbeatable companies, and this was going to be bad for America. People who made that argument just could not imagine how any other companies could threaten their dominance. And yet, at the time, I pointed out that it seemed to me that these companies were constantly in fear that they were one technological advance from being in trouble.And then lo and behold, that's exactly what happened. And while in AI, certainly, Google's super important, and Meta Facebook are super important, so are OpenAI, and so is Anthropic, and there are other companies.So the point here, after my little soliloquy, is can we overstate these problems, at least in the United States, when it seems like it is still possible to create a new technology that breaks the apparent stranglehold of these incumbents? Google search does not look quite as solid a business as it did in 2022.Can we overstate the competitive problems of the United States, or is what you're saying more forward-looking, that perhaps we overstated the competitive problems in the past, but now, due to these tariffs, and executives having to travel to the White House and give the president gifts, that that creates a stage for the kind of competitive problems that we should really worry about?I'm very happy to support the notion that technological changes can lead to unpredictable outcomes that incumbents may struggle to predict and respond to. Even if they predict it, they struggle to act upon it because doing so often undermines the existing business model.So if you take Google, where the transformer was actually conceived, the seven people behind it, I think, have since left the company. One of the reasons that they probably didn't launch anything like ChatGPT was probably for the fear of cannibalizing search. So I think the most important mechanisms for dislodging incumbents are dramatic shifts in technology.None of the legacy media companies ended up leading social media. None of the legacy retailers ended up leading e-commerce. None of the automobile leaders are leading in EVs. None of the bicycle companies, which all went into automobile, so many of them, ended up leading. So there is a pattern there.At the same time, I think you do have to worry that there are anti-competitive practices going on that makes it harder, and that are costly. The revolving door between the USPTO and companies is one example of that. We also have a reasonable amount of evidence on killer acquisitions whereby firms buy up a competitor just to shut it down. Those things are happening. I think you need to have tools that allow you to combat that, and I think more broadly, the United States has a long history of fairly vigorous antitrust policy. I think it'd be a hard pressed to suggest that that has been a tremendous drag on American business or American dynamism. So if you don't think, for example, that American antitrust policy has contributed to innovation and dynamism, at the very least, you can't really say either that it's been a huge drag on it.In Japan, for example, in its postwar history, antitrust was extremely lax. In the United States, it was very vigorous, and it was very vigorous throughout the computer revolution as well, which it wasn't at all in Japan. If you take the lawsuit against IBM, for example, you can debate this. To what extent did it force it to unbundle hardware and software, and would Microsoft been the company it is today without that? I think AT&T, it's both the breakup and it's deregulation, as well, but I think by basically all accounts, that was a good idea, particularly at the time when the National Science Foundation released ARPANET into the world.I think what antitrust does is, at the very least, it provides a tool that means that businesses are thinking twice before engaging in anti-competitive behavior. There's always a risk of antitrust being heavily politicized, and that's always been a bad idea, but at the same time, I think having tools on the books that allows you to check monopolies and steer their investments more towards the innovation rather than anti-competitive practices, I think is, broadly speaking, a good thing. I think in the European Union, you often hear that competition policy is a drag on productivity. I think it's the least of Europe's problem.Lagging European progress (22:19)If you take the postwar period, at least Europe catches up in most key industries, and actually lead in some of them. . . but doesn't do the same in digital. The question in my mind is: Why is that?Let's talk about Europe as we sort of finish up. We don't have to write How Progress Ends, it seems like progress has ended, so maybe we want to think about how progress restarts, and is the problem in Europe, is it institutions or is it the revealed preference of Europeans, that they're getting what they want? That they don't value progress and dynamism, that it is a cultural preference that is manifested in institutions? And if that's the case — you can tell me if that's not the case, I kind of feel like it might be the case — how do you restart progress in Europe since it seems to have already ended?The most puzzling thing to me is not that Europe is less dynamic than the United States — that's not very puzzling at all — but that it hasn't even managed to catch up in digital. If you take the postwar period, at least Europe catches up in most key industries, and actually lead in some of them. So in a way, take automobiles, electrical machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, nobody would say that Europe is behind in those industries, or at least not for long. Europe has very robust catchup growth in the post-war period, but doesn't do the same in digital. The question in my mind is: Why is that?I think part of the reason is that the returns to innovation, the returns to scaling in Europe are relatively muted by a fragmented market in services, in particular. The IMF estimates that if you take all trade barriers on services inside the European Union and you add them up, it's something like 110 percent tariffs. Trump Liberation Day tariffs, essentially, imposed within European Union. That means that European firms in digital and in services don't have a harmonized market to scale into, the way the United States and China has. I think that's by far the biggest reason.On top of that, there are well-intentioned regulations like the GDPR that, by any account, has been a drag on innovation, and particularly been harmful for startups, whereas larger firms that find it easier to manage compliance costs have essentially managed to offset those costs by capturing a larger share of the market. I think the AI Act is going in the same direction there, ad so you have more hurdles, you have greater costs of innovating because of those regulatory barriers. And then the return to innovation is more capped by having a smaller, fragmented market.I don't think that culture or European lust for leisure rather than work is the key reason. I think there's some of that, but if you look at the most dynamic places in Europe, it tends to be the Scandinavian countries and, being from Sweden myself, I can tell you that most people you will encounter there are not workaholics.AI & labor (25:46)I think AI at the moment has a real resilience problem. It's very good that things where there's a lot of precedent, it doesn't do very well where precedence is thin.As I finish up, let me ask you: Like a lot of economists who think about technology, you've thought about how AI will affect jobs — given what we've seen in the past few years, would it be your guess that, if we were to look at the labor force participation rates of the United States and other rich countries 10 years from now, that we will look at those employment numbers and think, “Wow, we can really see the impact of AI on those numbers”? Will it be extraordinarily evident, or would it be not as much?Unless there's very significant progress in AI, I don't think so. I think AI at the moment has a real resilience problem. It's very good that things where there's a lot of precedent, it doesn't do very well where precedence is thin. So in most activities where the world is changing, and the world is changing every day, you can't really rely on AI to reliably do work for you.An example of that, most people know of AlphaGo beating the world champion back in 2016. Few people will know that, back in 2023, human amateurs, using standard laptops, exposing the best Go programs to new positions that they would not have encountered in training, actually beat the best Go programs quite easily. So even in a domain where basically the problem is solved, where we already achieved super-human intelligence, you cannot really know how well these tools perform when circumstances change, and I think that that's really a problem. So unless we solve that, I don't think it's going to have an impact that will mean that labor force participation is going to be significantly lower 10 years from now.That said, I do think it's going to have a very significant impact on white collar work, and people's income and sense of status. I think of generative AI, in particular, as a tool that reduces barriers to entry in professional services. I often compare it to what happened with Uber and taxi services. With the arrival of GPS technology, knowing the name of every street in New York City was no longer a particularly valuable skill, and then with a platform matching supply and demand, anybody could essentially get into their car who has a driver's license and top up their incomes on the side. As a result of that, incumbent drivers faced more competition, they took a pay cut of around 10 percent.Obviously, a key difference with professional services is that they're traded. So I think it's very likely that, as generative AI reduces the productivity differential between people in, let's say the US and the Philippines in financial modeling, in paralegal work, in accounting, in a host of professional services, more of those activities will shift abroad, and I think many knowledge workers that had envisioned prosperous careers may feel a sense of loss of status and income as a consequence, and I do think that's quite significant.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions.   Hey before I begin I just want to thank all of you who have joined the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please let me know what other figures, events or other things you want to hear about in the future and I will try to make it happen.   So as you can see the title of this episode is, Why did the Japanese perform so many Atrocities during the Pacific War. Phewww, its honestly a difficult one to tackle, for there are countless reasons. I had a university professor who taught; ancient and modern Japanese history, history of the Japanese empire and the Pacific War. He actually answered this very question in a single lecture and in many ways I found it to be one of the most illuminating things I ever learnt about the Pacific War. To truly understand the reasons why they did such horrible things, you actually need to learn the general history of Japan, particularly the changes from Tokugawa, to Meiji, to Showa. I am going to do my very best, but I know many of you might be asking “what were the worst things they did?”, not everyone takes a special interest into such a niche part of history. May I recommend for those with strong stomachs “the knights of Bushido” by Edward Russel that covers pretty much all the atrocities of the Asia-Pacific War. For those of you who like darker things, check out Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II by David Wallace and Peter Williams, absolute nightmare fuel.   I can't go through the entire history of Japan, but I think it's important to start off with the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. This was the first time the Empire of Japan fought a true war with a foreign nation, that being the Qing dynasty. At this point in time, there really emerged a sort of, to be blunt, race war. The Chinese had historically referred to the Japanese as “woren”, a racist term meaning dwarf. Now historically the Japanese had always revered the Chinese, kind of like in the way a little brother looks up to his big brother. In tokugawa Japan they would learn from the Chinese, but as the Meiji restoration began this dramatically changed. Japan watched as the Chinese were humiliating and abused by the western powers and failed to modernize. Meanwhile Japan emulated the best of the west, to modernize and become a great power themselves. In many ways, Japan saw itself become big brother and now China was little brother. The Meiji restoration had an element of nationalism built into it that would explode come the Show era. Japan for its entire history had this belief they were the “Yamato Race” dating back to the 6th century. Now while the Meiji restoration sought to emulate the west, they also emulated racism and propaganda, which in the 19th century was kind of a big deal. The Japanese government gradually began a long term campaign promoting the idea the Japanese, or Yamato people were superior to that of the other asian races. Who was the next big asian boy on the block? China, so it was inevitable they would direct a lot of racist attitudes towards the Chinese. During the first sino-japanese war, the Chinese, particularly Manchu had a habit of performing atrocities upon the Japanese. They would often cut off body parts of Japanese soldiers in grotesque manners and leave them to be found by their comrades. This was honestly a pretty typical thing of war in the region, but it did also have a racist element to it, the Chinese certainly saw the Japanese as lesser people. Just before the battle of Port Arthur, the Japanese found mutilated remains of the comrades, here is a passage from Makio Okabe who was there:   As we entered the town of Port Arthur, we saw the head of a Japanese soldier displayed on a wooden stake. This filled us with rage and a desire to crush any Chinese soldier. Anyone we saw in the town, we killed. The streets were filled with corpses, so many they blocked our way. We killed people in their homes; by and large, there wasn't a single house without from three to six dead. Blood was flowing and the smell was awful. We sent out search parties. We shot some, hacked at others. The Chinese troops just dropped their arms and fled. Firing and slashing, it was unbounded joy. At this time, our artillery troops were at the rear, giving three cheers [banzai] for the emperor.   The Japanese performed a massacre at Port Arthur, butchering perhaps up to 3000 Chinese civilians, some claim 10's of thousands and in full few of western war correspondents. It became a huge controversy that destroyed the image of the IJA internationally and hurt the Japanese governments efforts at riding themselves of unequal treaties with the western powers. The Japanese learnt a hell of a lesson and an Imperial Proclamation was made in 1894 stating that Japanese soldiers should make every effort to win the war without violating international laws. According to Japanese historian Yuki Tanaka, Japanese forces during the First Sino-Japanese War released 1,790 Chinese prisoners without harm, once they signed an agreement not to take up arms against Japan if they were released.   During the next major war the Japanese performed a dramatic 180, well at least to their enemy. During the Russo-Japanese War, over 80,000 Russian POWs were held by the IJA who were treated in accordance with the Hague conventions of 1899. The Japanese paid them for labor, housed them in conventional POW camps, made sure they received good medical treatment, ironically better than the Russians were capable of. The Japanese did all of this, making sure the foreign war correspondents wrote about it. It was a massive PR stunt in many ways. The Japanese were emulating how a world power should act, because they sought to be one. Meanwhile the Japanese swallowed their pride at being called yellow monkeys, as the prevalent Yellow Peril ideology was being pushed by Kaiser Wilhehelm and Tsar Nicholas II heavily. The Japanese treated the entire war like gentlemen and suffered horrific higher casualties than necessary because of it. But something many people don't take much notice of, because the IJA made sure of it, was they horrible treatment of the Chinese during the war.   Now the Russians in Manchuria looted, killed and raped many Chinese, pushed quite a bit by the Yellow Peril. The Chinese, certainly the Honghuzi bandits were working for the Japanese to attack them, so its not like they had no reasons. The IJA was more professional and had orders not to molest the Chinese, as they were helping the war effort, but this did not prevent it. The Japanese also looted, killed and raped Chinese. The Japanese would often wave it off as reprisals against potential spies. I only bring this up as it was very apparent, the Japanese treated the Russians much different than the chinese.   Fast forward to WW1, the Japanese had a battle against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians known in the west as the Siege of Tsingtau. The Japanese took up an identical methodology to the Russo-Japanese war with their approach to the Germans, but even took it a step further. After winning the siege, the Japanese seized nearly 5000 German POW's who were treated with a surreal amount of respect. They were brought back to Japan and housed for the rest of the war in 12 cities around Tokyo and Kumamoto. The POW's enjoyed humane treatment and a rather famous event occurred at the Bando camp where a large orchestra was formed of German POW's who toured the nation performing 100 concerts, lectures and plays. Evidence the Germans were treated well can be seen in the fact 170 prisoners never left Japan and sought wives and lives there. Now is this all a feel good love story, no, just like during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was playing up the PR, for during WW1 they wanted official recognition as a world power and that of being racially equal to the whites.    Japan was officially recognized as a world power during the treaty of Versailles, but when Japan gave its racial equality proposal, President Woodrow Wilson of the US and Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes refused to allow it to pass, even though they received majority votes. Now The Japanese had been for a lack of better words, fucked over, during the first sino-japanese war when the triple intervention of France, Germany and Russia stole away their war earning of the Liaodong peninsula. During the Russo-Japanese war, Theodore Roosevelt limited the Japanese war gains and now here after WW1 the Japanese received another humiliation. To the Japanese, it was the last straw and it was a major reason they went to war with the west, who they viewed, and honestly rightfully so, would never see them as equals.   Ompf, lot of history there, but now we come to the Showa era, which was molded by the feelings of the past decades.   In 1937 Japan and China enter an unofficial war that saw one of the worst wartime atrocities in human history, the rape of Nanjing. It began on December 13th of 1937, lasting 6 or so weeks seeing the murder of possibly 300,000 civilians and pows, the mass rape of 20,000 and untold hardship upon the Chinese people. The Japanese followed this up with numerous other massacres in China such as the Changjiao Massacre claiming possibly 30,000 Chinese civilian lives, the Alexandra Hospital Massacre killing 200 patients and medical staff in Hong Kong, the Laha Massacre on Ambon island where 300 members of the Gull force were executed, the Bangka island massacre where 60 Australian and British soldiers and 22 Australian nurses were murdered, the Parit Sulong massacre in Malay where 150 wounded Australian and Indian POW's were executed, the Bataan Death march where negligence and brutality took the lives of 650 Americans and perhaps a possible 18,000 Filipinos, the Manila massacres claiming the lives of perhaps 54,000 filipinos including women and children in the Philippines, the Balikpapan massacre in the dutch east indies taking the lives of 78 Dutch Civilians, I can keep going and going. Where the Japanese went, massacres and horrors occurred.    Again if you really want to delve into these stories check out “the knights of Bushido”.   The Japanese also had the infamous special units like 731, who conducted horrifying experiments on civilians and POWs like vivisectioning live people without anesthesia, testing biological and chemical weapons on live people, the freezing peoples to study frostbite treatment and giving people sexually transmitted diseases to study. Lt General Shiro Ishii's unit 731 deployed plague infested fleas, cholera, bubonic plague and other nasty weapons upon Chinese civilians killing perhaps up to 500,000. This was seen during the battle of Changde and famously during operation Sei-go also known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign.    The Japanese also enacted the infamous “Sanko Sakusen / three all's policy : kill all, urn all, loot all” in retaliation to the Chinese communists Hundred regiments offensive in December of 1940. Sanctioned by Hirohito personally, it is thought this act resulted in the death of 2.7 million Chinese civilians. According to author Werner Gruhl 8 million Chinese civilian deaths could be attributable to the Japanese.     So then we come back to the big question, why? So now that I've covered the loose history for coherency sake I want to list here the largest reasons for the atrocities and by no means is this official categories or even all of them, I am simply stating kind of my top ones I guess you can say:   Treaties signed or not signed War strategy and indoctrination  Ultra-Nationalism and Racism Surrender & the Bastardization of the Bushido code The Brutality of the Japanese military Treaties signed or not signed   Yes its time to talk about treaties, yawn. Now I said previously Japan did sign the Hague Conventions of 1899 and would ratify them in 1907. The Hague conventions did contain laws for prisoners of war, protection of civilians. Alongside this, in 1894 an imperial proclamation was made stating Japanese soldiers should make every effort to win a war without violating international laws. More significantly Japan “signed” but unlike the majority of other world powers did not ratify the Geneva convention of 1929. Why? To be blunt, the geneva conventions did not really benefit the Japanese military from their point of view.   First the Japanese had a very specific perspective on surrendering, they simply did not do it, so they did not expect many of their soldiers to ever become POW's, so how would it benefit them to ratify such a thing? If they are not going to have many POW's, why would they burden themselves with upholding all the conventional laws for POW's they would obtain during war?  Another glaring reason involved aerial bombing. Many Japanese leaders, like Kanji Ishiwara, believed the home islands would be subjected to massive aerial bombing if a global war broke out. If Japan was subjected to aerial bombing and ratified the geneva convention, this meant they would have to take the pilots who were caught prisoner. The Japanese believed this would encourage further bombing. Lastly the convention had rules for POW treatment that literally contradicted how Japanese soldiers were treated by their own superiors. More about that in the last part about the military's brutality, but summarized, the Japanese army were abusive as hell and to sign such a thing would literally contradict how they did things.   Emperor Hirohito personally ratified a decision to remove certain constraints of the Hague Conventions when it came to the treatment of Chinese POW's in the directive of 5 August 1937. This notification advised staff officers to simply stop using the term "prisoners of war". They would refer to their enemy as bandits, guerillas and such, anything but soldiers so they would not have to take any prisoners, though they typically did not leave anyone alive in China regardless. The Geneva Convention exempted POWs of sergeant rank or higher from manual labor, and stipulated that prisoners performing work should be provided with extra rations and other essentials. The Japanese in the later half of the war would be starved of provisions and resources, thus its to no surprise they could not meet these demands, even if they sought to uphold them. I will note in 1942, Japan indicated they would “follow” the Geneva rules and would observe the Hague Convention of 1907 outlining the laws and customs of war. Yet this is like a verbal confirmation, it had no legal basis, something the Japanese particularly loved to do during the war.   According to Dr. William Skelton III, who produced a document entitled American Ex Prisoners of War for the U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs, more POWs died at the hands of the Japanese in the Pacific theater and specifically in the Philippines than in any other conflict to date. For example in Germany, POWs died at a rate 1.2%. In the Pacific theater the rate was 37%. In the Philippines, POWs died at a rate of 40%.    Now these pieces of paper that were signed or not signed, what does this really matter when it comes to war, its obvious they were not upholding certain rules, but how did this quote en quote make them more brutal and perform more atrocities? Well here is the sticky thing, if you are part of the Japanese military and you know your nation did not ratify certain rules of war, this meant your enemy had no supposed legal basis to follow said rules against you either.    So I want you to think of two aspects of this. If your nation did not sign or ratify certain treaties, then you could not expect the enemy to respect such rules when it comes to you. But more importantly, what if the leader of your nation…just told you to believe that?    In early 1942, Great Britain, the United States of America and other great powers did officially let the Japanese know that they would, on their  part, observe all the provisions of the Convention and requested reciprocity. Japanese foreign minister at the time, Hideki Tojo gave a formal assurance that although Japan was not bound by the Geneva convention, the Japanese would apply it “mutatis mutandis” towards the Americans, British, Canadians, Australians and New Zealander POW's, note he most definitely did not extend this to the asiatic groups, nor the Dutch whom I guess he just forgot about. But this did morally bind Japan to comply with the convention. However the top brass of the Japanese military, notably Hideki Tojo in these cases, went out of his way to instill beliefs within the military as to what they should expect from the enemy. As you will see in the next points, this was basically a type of indoctrination.   War strategy and indoctrination    The leaders of Japan knew full well how unmatched they were in terms of resources and productivity before they began the war with the west. How could they possibly win the war? The IJN was dead set on a decisive naval battle, but for the IJA to compensate for their lack of resources, they believed their “spirit” would overcome the enemy. In many ways this spirit meant going above and beyond normal human endurance, to literally outperform the allies and notably to conduct the war with absolutely zero mercy. Once Japan lost the initiative in the war, after Guadalcanal, the IJA were forced to fight a war of attrition. Now they would prolong and exact maximum casualties upon the allies hoping to force them to the peace table. The idea was quite simple, the IJA would do everything possible to make the allies believe they would never give up and it would far too costly to defeat them. How does one go about achieving these aims? Well the IJA officers would tell you “by steeling your hearts”. To achieve all of this required extreme indoctrination.    Japanese children grew up in regimentation, they were desensitized to violence through tales of martial glory, and were taught that their purpose in life was to serve the emperor. Upon entering  military service, they were trained out of any individualistic spirit, and taught that compassion was a weakness and had no place in the field of war. The soldier's motto was faith equaled strength.  Faith being devotion to duty and service to the Divine Emperor. Apart from ideology and spiritual toughening, training in the Japanese Imperial Army was also extremely harsh and violent. This was not even particularly a special aspect of Showa Japan, it went all the way back to the Meiji era. From a young age children's education directed them, like a pipeline for military duty.   Now at the offset of the war, Hideki Tojo released the “Senjinkun” “instructions for the battlefield”. This was basically a manual for soldiers on how to conduct war. The document was used to establish standards of behavior for Japanese troops and improve discipline and morale within the Army, it also included things like a prohibition against being taken prisoner. It stated if you were captured by the enemy, because Japan did not sign or ratify certain treaties, you would be killed or tortured by the allies, and if you survived you and your family would face shame back home, and punishment resulting typically in 6 months of prison.   Here is a small excerpt from the document Those who know shame are weak. Always think of [preserving] the honor of your community and be a credit to yourself and your family. Redouble your efforts and respond to their expectations. Never live to experience shame as a prisoner. By dying you will avoid leaving a stain on your honor.   The purpose was basically psychological warfare, against their own army. Those like Hideki Tojo believed Japan could only defeat the resource rich Americans with spirit. Thus the manuals like Senjinkun demanded the forces not ever surrender, because the allies would do horrible things, it was shameful to do so and there were disciplinary actions for any who did. In 1942 the Army amended its criminal code to specify that officers who surrendered soldiers under their command faced at least six months imprisonment, regardless of the circumstances in which the surrender took place. This change attracted little attention, however, as the Senjinkun imposed more severe consequences and had greater moral force.   In a report dated June 1945, the U.S. Office of War Information noted that 84 percent of one group of interrogated Japanese prisoners, many of whom had been injured or unconscious when captured stated that they had expected to be killed or tortured by the Allies if taken prisoner. The OWI analysts described this as being typical, and concluded that fear of the consequences of surrender, “rather than Bushido,” was the motivation for many Japanese battle deaths in hopeless circumstances–as much as, and probably more than, the other two major considerations: fear of disgrace at home, and “the positive desire to die for one's nation, ancestors, and god-emperor.”   Something barely talked about in the west, was during the Pacific War, the Americans had a habit of taking human trophies. Human trophies were Japanese skulls, gold teeth, finger bones and such. The famous novel “With the Old Breed” by Eugene Sledge spoke of his personal accounts of these actions, its a rather gruesome and dark part of the war. Now some of these actions were publicized, despite the US military's efforts to quell and hush it down. Time magazine famously had an iconic photo of a woman whose enlisted boyfriend sent her home a Japanese skull. FDR also famously was given a letter opener carved out of Japanese bones. These stories were seized up greedily by the Japanese government who used them as propaganda to prove to their soldiers what would happen if they were captured. It had a profound effect as you can imagine. And this was not limited to Japanese soldiers. The propaganda machine would contribute at the end of the war to mass civilian suicides on Okinawa and Saipan.   Back to the POW subject. When it came to the treatment of POW's, Hideki Tojo began submitting in May of 1942 a series of memorandum, basic orders as to how POW's should be treated. “Prisoners of war can be used for the enlargement of our production and as military labor, white prisoners of war will be confined successively in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria. Superior technicians and high ranking officers -- Colonels and above -- will be included among the prisoners of war confined in Formosa. Those who are not suitable for use in enlargement of our production will be confined in prisoner of war camps which will be built immediately on the spot.Although the working of prisoner of war officers and warrant officers is forbidden by the Regulations of 1903, the policy of the control authorities is that under the situation of our country where not one person now eats without working they want them to set to work. It is desired that you give proper orders on this.The present situation of affairs in this country does not permit anyone to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely. With that in view, in dealing with prisoners of war, I hope you will see that they may be usefully employed. In Japan, we have our own ideology concerning prisoners of war, which should naturally make their treatment more or less different from that in Europe and America. In dealing with them, you should, of course, observe the various Regulations concerned, aim at an adequate application of them . . . At the same time, you must not allow them to lie idle doing nothing but eating freely for even a single day. Their labor and technical skill should be fully utilized for the replenishment of production, and contribution rendered toward the prosecution of the Greater East Asiatic War for which no effort ought to be spared."   Thus in the end as a grunt in the IJA you were led to believe: if I am captured I will be tortured, killed maybe turned into a letter opener, or someone will place my skull on their mantle. If I surrender and survive and make it back home, I will be severely punished and worst of all me and my family will be shamed. I could not expect any humanity from the enemy, because my nation did not sign or ratify treaties like the Geneva convention. More so, because my armies conduct was so unbelievably barbaric, I could only expect the very same from my enemy. It was a vicious cycle. You perform atrocities, expecting the enemy to do the same, and thus it just keeps perpetuating itself. Ultra-Nationalism and Racism   Now we spoke a little bit about the concept of the Yamato race, the Japanese were indoctrinated to believe they were a superior race and that their emperor was something akin to a living god. Until this war, the Japanese empire was on a hell of a winning streak going all the way back to the Meiji Era. For the first half of the Pacific war, the Japanese won nearly every battle. This led to something historians called “victory disease” that made them become somewhat arrogant and cocky, but it also made them feel “superhuman”. The allies' news reporting at the beginning of the war began to frantically refer to the Japanese as “supermen”or  “super jungle fighters”. Particularly because of the Malay campaign, the Japanese soldier just seemed to be tougher, could survive harsher jungle climates, even doing so with less food or war materials. The Japanese read the allied news reports and came to the conclusion that had been driven down their throats by their government, indeed the Japanese spirit was winning the war. The Japanese public ate this up in their propaganda and it perpetuated their ultra-nationalistic beliefs. The Japanese truly came to believe they were destined to rule the asia-pacific. Look at the results in China for example. Within a short amount of time they conquered much of China, though the public really had no idea how bad the China was bottled down by 1940. Then came the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere propaganda, which is an excellent example of their megalomania.    Yet alongside their ultra-nationalism, seen more strongly perpetuated against other Asian groups, the Japanese also indoctrinated their public with racism against them. The Yellow Peril of the 19th century and anti-japanese or anti-asian racism fueled the Japanese soldiers. The Japanese as a people had faced brutal racist hardships historically at the hands of the west, particularly from their point of view from America. There was the slights against them during the first sino-japanese war, the infamous triple intervention of france, germany and Russia stealing away their prize that was the liaodong peninsula. Then during the Boxer rebellion they faced racism, not being allowed to lead mutli national army formations, despite them being the lionshare of said military force. The Russo-Japanese war saw from their point of view, America stealing their war prizes. Last but not least, after WW1 they were told to their faces that they were a world power, but not racially equal. The Japanese faced anti-Japanese and anti-asian immigration laws when it came to America in the form of the gentleman's agreement and Australia's “great white Australia policy”. During the war, the American propaganda machine began pumping out racist caricatures of Japanese as rats, goggle eyed  bucktooth people, literal yellow monkey's.   For the IJA the pacific war in many was a holy war directed at the arrogant whites who had abused them for so long. This will probably sound controversial, but indeed, the pacific war was very much a race war. If you are not convinced of that, I recommend reading “War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War” by John Dower. The human trophy taking, anti-japanese bucktooth, rat people cartoon propaganda, history of racial abuse like the japanese concentration camps, the gentleman's agreement, the stealing of victories during the first sino-japanese war, russo-japanese war and ww1 all plagued the mind of a Japanese soldier. To them in many ways, the “whites had it coming”. Which is rather ironic given how the Japanese would treat the other asian racial groups they came into contact with. But such is the contradictory nature of the Imperial Japanese military.    The Japanese also held racist beliefs about the westerners. The Japanese soldiers were taught the allies were akin to demons or beasts. They were described often as “the hairy ones” or “anglo-American demons”. Taught these men would rape women and girls, stample upon the civilians they captured with the treads of their tanks. The marines were especially dreaded.  According to a story circulated widely among the Japanese on Saipan, all Marine Corps recruits were compelled to murder their own parents before being inducted into service. It was said that Japanese soldiers taken prisoner would suffer hideous tortures—their ears, noses, and limbs would be cut off; they would be blinded and castrated; they could also be cooked and fed to dogs. As silly as this may sound, do remember the Americans were taking human trophies so the Japanese propaganda machine had its evidence. Tons of photos of skulls atop american tanks for example were displayed to the Japanese public. Another famous one was the cartoon appearing in an American servicemen's magazine, which was later reproduced and translated in the Japanese press. It suggested the existence of “Japanese hunting licenses, promising open season on the enemy, complete with free ammunition and equipment—with pay!    In terms of how the Japanese exacted their own racism towards their fellow asians. During the War the Japanese dragged into forced labor, Koreans, Chinese and southeast asians. 670,000 Koreans were brought to Japan to work mines and heavy industry, around 60,000 of them died to harsh conditions. Between April 1943 to May 1945, 41,862 Chinese were sent to Japan to work, 2800 died before even reaching the home islands. 6872 died in the work sites again from brutal conditions. When it comes to southeast asian numbers are hard to pinpoint but its safe to say at least 300,000 Javanese, Malay, Burmese, Tamil and other groups were mobilized to construct the Burma-Siam railroad between October 1942 to november 1943 and 60,000 perished. This all went for the men, for the women, all those racial groups would face the horrors of becoming comfort women, historians estimate there could have been 50-200,000 pressed into it. But for the Japanese, believing their were superior to these other asiatic groups, groups whom they would publicly say were like children, they as the father figure would guide, well they simply abused them.   So in a contradictive fashion, the Japanese believed they were superior and could do horrible things to their Asian neighbors while simultaneously decrying the racism cast towards them by western powers as justification for their brutal actions against them. These types of feelings and perspectives molded the mind of the average Japanese soldier, dehumanizing others has always been a standard military practice afterall.    Surrender & the Bastardization of the Bushido code   I think this is one the vast majority of WW2 history buffs know, the Japanese perspective on surrender and the bushido code. In the book “military trials of war criminals in the Netherlands east indies 1946-1949” Fred Borch had this to say about the variable of bushido for the brutality   As Japan continued its modernization in the early 20th century, her armed forces became convinced that success in battle would be assured if Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen had the "spirit" of Bushido. ... The result was that the Bushido code of behavior "was inculcated into the Japanese soldier as part of his basic training." Each soldier was indoctrinated to accept that it was the greatest honor to die for the Emperor and it was cowardly to surrender to the enemy. ... Bushido therefore explains why the Japanese soldiers who were stationed in the NEI so mistreated POWs in their custody. Those who had surrendered to the Japanese—regardless of how courageously or honorably they had fought—merited nothing but contempt; they had forfeited all honor and literally deserved nothing. Consequently, when the Japanese murdered POWs by shooting, beheading, and drowning, these acts were excused since they involved the killing of men who had forfeited all rights to be treated with dignity or respect. While civilian internees were certainly in a different category from POWs, it is reasonable to think that there was a "spill-over" effect from the tenets of Bushido.   It is very true, the Japanese soldiers and sailors were taught Japan was a sacred nation. Traditional samurai values of bushido were merged with modern training and weaponry. The government propagandized the figure of the Emperor as a living god who embodied the Japanese state, the Kokutai. Emperor Hirohito and his family were the spiritual essence of Japan. To even show your back to the enemy let alone surrender was deemed cowardly and brought dishonor upon your family. As written by Inouye Jukichi in 1910, something read by many Japanese “The Japanese warriors looked upon it as shame to themselves not to die when their Lord was hard pressed . . . their own shame was the shame upon their parents, their family, their house and their whole clan, and with this idea deeply impressed upon their minds, the Samurai, no matter of what rank, held their lives light as feathers when compared with the weight they attached to the maintenance of a spotless name”.    Young men of Japan were taught that "The greatest honor is to die for the Emperor" Additionally precept the Japanese were taught that it is an ignominy to surrender to the enemy. The combined effect of these two precepts was to inculcate in the Japanese soldier a spirit of contempt for Allied soldiers who surrendered, which, in defiance of the rules of war, was demonstrated in their ill-treatment of prisoners. They made no distinction between the soldier who fought honorably and courageously up to an inevitable surrender, and the soldier who surrendered without a fight. All enemy soldiers who surrendered under any circumstance were to be regarded as being disgraced and entitled to live only by the tolerance of their captors.   Surrender was unforgivable under their code, drilled into them through the Imperial Japanese education system and military. When the Japanese would come across vast swathes of the enemy surrendering, particularly if the enemy used up all their ammunition killing their comrades and then surrendered, well it added fuel to their brutality. One only needs to look at the deaths due to Banzai charges, take for example the incredibly massive one at the battle of Saipan seeing around 4000 dead Japanese. IJA officers brought ancestral katana's to the war, the Japanese cut off the heads of the enemies as it was seen to be honorable. When faced with death, many chose to commit seppuku, the bushido propaganda was intense.    A brutal practice emerged in the Pacific island hopping campaign, whereupon wounded Japanese would pretend to be dead or surrender only to explode grenades upon allied forces coming closer. This began to be noticed by US marines during the battle of Guadalcanal and Australians in New Guinea. This began a vicious cycle . There were of course Japanese who would surrender. Hell the Koreans forced into service often did try to surrender, but they would all be hampered by something. Because of the actions of those Japanese feinted death and taking down allied soldiers with them, the allied soldiers gradually began a practice of not bothering to accept surrender. It became a self fulfilling prophecy. Many Japanese made the allies believe all they could expect was a grenade death, thus the allies became more brutal to them. This simply led the Japanese to conclude their government was accurate about how the allies would treat them, so more and more did not surrender. An absolutely horrible cycle that went on to the very end of the war, though the allies did figure out means to get Japanese to surrender more in the last year.    The Brutality of the Japanese military   I think this is probably one of the most important factors, and its also one the “normies” would not know as much about. The Imperial Japanese military, more so the Army, had what I can only describe as a built in system of abuse. As described to me by the same university professor I keep bringing up in podcasts, picture a literal pecking order. Going from the highest ranked general to the very bottom grunt. Imagine each one who is higher than the other, routinely physically abuses them. For example, it was very typical for a colonel to slap a major across the face, the major would then strike one of his captains, and the abuse would continue through the ranks to the grunts who would have no one to abuse, thus they turned to POW's or civilian populations. This was not just an accepted part of the Japanese Imperial Army it was indoctrinated.    From day one of basic training, IJA officers taught their men, races like the Chinese were their blood enemies and racially inferior. These were people the Japanese would rule over one day. The trainers would toss the boys into rigorous training activities involving physical violence towards another alongside the notion any orders given by a higher ranking officer was infallible and to be treated as if the divine emperor himself, the living god was giving it.    The Japanese army even taught methods of torture that would be employed in all areas they occupied. Among these tortures were the water treatment, burning, electric shocks, the knee spread, suspension, kneeling on sharp instruments and flogging. The Kempetai, were the ones doing the lionshare of these tortures. Other Army and Navy units, however, used the same methods as the Kempetai. Camp guards performed similar methods, local police forces organized by the Kempetai in the occupied territories also applied the same methods of torture. The Kempetai were administered by the War Ministry, trained at specialized schools who were maintained and operated by the War Ministry in Japan. Thus the conduct of Kempetai and the camp guards directly reflected the policy of the War Ministry.    The Japanese army leadership made sure recruits were physically and mentally abused, they were given strenuously duty tasks and pushed to their absolute limit. During the war given where they were deployed, take guadalcanal for example, the Japanese soldiers would be facing starvation as well. Being half starved, beaten and suffering the effects of war would drive anyone to perform horrifying acts. The life of a Japanese solider was simply at the whims of an extremely toxic management culture. The lowest ranking echelons received the lionshare of abuse and they took out their frustration with whomever they could find deemed lower than them, ie: POW's, civilians, etc.   All of these variables combined contributed to the creation of a military willing to perform just about any atrocity they thought necessary to win the war. It was a war they could not hope to win, but many of them went to their deaths trying to defeat the hands of fate. There are countless other reasons of course for the atrocities committed in cold or hot blood. Countless books have been written on this subject, please do check out the few I mentioned. With that again, a big thanks to you patreons, you guys are awesome. Please let me know what you think in the comments, and what you want to hear more about in the future. This has been the pacific war channel over and out.

One of the great heroes of the Song Dynasty, born into the wrong time.Support the show

Piracy in Great Qing surges to a "golden age" during the Qianlong & Jiaqing eras. Corsair Confederations like Zheng Yi Sao's vast-beyond-reckoning Red Flag Fleet, backed by the likes of Vietnam's Tay Son rebels, dominating the South China Sea through organized plunder and shadow economies. Jiaqing's shift to accomodation, while necessary, may expose Qing naval vulnerabilities, paving the way for foreign interventions and imperial decline... Time Period Covered: Prelude: ca. 15th-18th Cs. Main: ~1780-1810 CE Major Sources Cited: Antony, Robert J. Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in Late Imperial South China. Andrade, Tonio. Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West. Murray, Dian H. Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790–1810. Perdue, Peter C. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Qing Shilu (Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty). Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. Woodside, Alexander. "The Ch'ien-lung Reign" in The Cambridge History of China Vol. 9, Pt. 1: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle of Nanjing. As the relentless tide of war approached Nanjing in December 1937, fear gripped its residents. As atrocities unfolded in the countryside, civilians flocked toward safety zones, desperate for refuge. Under the command of General Tang Shengzhi, the Chinese forces prepared for a fierce defense, determined to hold their ground against the technologically superior invaders. Despite heavy losses and internal strife, hopes flickered among the defenders, fueled by the valor of their troops. Key positions like Old Tiger's Cave became battlegrounds, exemplifying the fierce resistance against the Japanese advance. On December 9, as artillery fire enveloped the city, a battle for the Gate of Enlightenment commenced. Both sides suffered grievously, with the Chinese soldiers fighting to the last, unwilling to yield an inch of their soil. Each assault from Japan met with relentless counterattacks, turning Nanjing into a symbol of perseverance amidst impending doom, as the siege marked a critical chapter in the conflict, foreshadowing the brutal events that would follow.   #167 The Battle of Nanjing Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By mid-December, the landscape surrounding Nanjing was eerily quiet. The Japanese Army marched through what seemed to be desolate fields and mountains, but they were not truly empty. Civilians were scarce, with most having fled, but a few remained in their homes, hiding in cellars and barns, clinging to the hope that the war would bypass them. Meanwhile, thousands of Chinese soldiers, left behind and unable to keep pace with their units, still posed a significant danger to the Japanese forces. The Japanese Army had not truly conquered the territory east and south of Nanjing; they had merely passed through. Mopping-up operations became a top priority. Soldiers from the 16th Infantry Division, stationed near Purple Mountain, spent early December conducting these missions far from the city's walls. “Chinese stragglers may be hiding in this area, and they must be flushed out. Any small structure of no strategic value to the Japanese Army must be burned!” This command rang out to the division's soldiers as they spread across the countryside around Unicorn Gate. Soon, isolated fires began to illuminate the horizon, one for each home. Soldiers from the 9th Infantry Division, who were not directly engaged in combat south of the Gate of Enlightenment, were also conducting similar mopping-up operations. On December 11 at noon, one squad received orders to investigate a suspicious farm building. Although it had been searched previously, movement inside prompted renewed caution. The Japanese entered carefully, moving from room to room. In the basement, they discovered eight Chinese soldiers who offered no resistance, immediately raising their hands in surrender. Bound together, they were brought outside. Using a few Chinese words supplemented by sign language, the Japanese gathered that the Chinese had been in the vicinity where one of their comrades had been killed days earlier. Unanimously, they decided the prisoners should be executed in front of their comrade's grave. Some of the older soldiers hesitated, reluctant to partake in the killings, leaving it to the younger ones to carry out the order. Soon, eight headless bodies lay sprawled before a solitary Japanese grave.  On the morning of December 11, the first soldiers of the 6th Japanese Infantry Division finally spotted the distant city wall of Nanjing. They had been engaged in fierce combat for nearly two days, attempting to dislodge the tenacious defenders of the Yuhuatai plateau, the elite soldiers of the 88th Division. In a desperate bid to maintain their foothold on Yuhuatai, the 88th Division deployed its reserved 528th Regiment along with a battalion of engineers. Despite their efforts, the regiment's ranks had been depleted, filled with inexperienced recruits, and their leadership nearly obliterated, limiting their effectiveness. Under the relentless assaults from the Japanese forces, their defenses began to falter almost immediately. Faced with the stiff resistance at the Gate of Enlightenment, the Japanese shifted their focus to the Chinese Gate on December 11. Japanese aircraft were summoned for tactical air support, forcing the 88th Division's defenders to retreat behind the wall. This withdrawal occurred swiftly and somewhat chaotically, allowing the Japanese to pursue closely. Before the Chinese could regroup, 300 Japanese soldiers had breached the wall. Only the mobilization of all available forces enabled the Chinese to push the attackers back outside. Meanwhile, the left flank of the 88th Division, stationed east of Chinese Gate, remained outside the wall. Here, they clashed with elements of the 9th Japanese Division but faced intense pressure and were compelled to fall back. By the end of the day, the Chinese division had shortened its defensive line, regrouping in front of the city wall. Plans for a nighttime counterattack were ultimately abandoned, as it became clear that the division's soldiers were too fatigued to mount an effective offensive. Overall, it proved to be a successful day for the Japanese 10th Army. Further south, the Kunisaki Detachment successfully crossed the Yangtze River at Cihu village, beginning their advance toward Pukou. Its special amphibious training made the detachment ideally suited for the operation, but its limited numbers, essentially a reinforced infantry regiment, raised concerns at field headquarters about whether it could accomplish the task alone. Prince Asaka proposed transporting part of the 13th Division across the Yangtze further north to sever the railway connecting Tianjin to Pukou, cutting off a potential retreat route for Chinese forces that had escaped Nanjing.  On December 11, Japanese artillery shells rained down relentlessly, targeting both the interior and exterior of Nanjing's city walls. Administrators of the Safety Zone were alarmed to witness several shells landing perilously close to its southern edge. In a bid to provide some semblance of security, American and foreign flags were raised around the zone's perimeter, though their protective influence against artillery fire from miles away was negligible. The leaders of the Safety Zone faced an unexpected dilemma: how to handle lawbreakers with the city courts now out of operation. That day, they encountered a thief caught in the act. As Rabe noted in his diary “We sentence the thief to death, then pardon him and reduce his punishment to 24 hours in jail, and ultimately, due to the absence of a jail, we simply let him go”. Refugees continued to pour in, with a total of 850 having found shelter at Ginling College. Vautrin and her colleagues began to feel that their initial estimate of 2,700 women and children seeking refuge on the campus was overly optimistic. They were soon proven wrong. On the banks of the Yangtze River, hundreds of injured soldiers and civilians were lining up to be ferried across to Pukou, where trains awaited to transport them further inland and away from danger. Many had been waiting for days without food. While ferries made continuous trips across the river to rescue as many as possible, the process was painfully slow. As of late December 10, approximately 1,500 wounded civilians remained stranded on the south bank of the Yangtze. The Japanese forces were confronted by a fiercely determined enemy composed largely of young soldiers from the Training Division. These soldiers had the advantage of having been stationed near Purple Mountain for several years, making them familiar with the terrain. Additionally, they were part of an elite unit, groomed not just in equipment and training but also instilled with a sense of nationalism rooted in Chiang Kai-shek's ideology. Li Xikai, the commander of the division's 3rd Regiment, had set up his command post directly in the path of the primary Japanese advance, yet his regiment continued to resist. Despite the fierce resistance, the Japanese gradually gained control over the Purple Mountain area. General Nakajima Kesago, commander of the 16th Division, visited an artillery observation post early in the day and was pleased to receive reports that his troops had captured two peaks of Purple Mountain and were poised to take the main peak.  Yet there loomed a problem on Nakajima's right flank. A widening gap was emerging between the 16th Division and the 13th Division, which had advanced along the southern bank of the Yangtze. There was a risk that Chinese forces could escape through this lightly guarded area. The 13th Division was stationed in the strategically important river port city of Zhenjiang, preparing to cross the Yangtze. The Central China Area Army ordered the 13th Division to mobilize three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. This new formation, known as the Yamada Detachment after its commander, Yamada Senji, was tasked with remaining on the Yangtze's south bank and advancing westward to capture two Chinese fortresses on the river: Mt. Wulong and Mt. Mufu. This redeployment alleviated concerns about the gap, allowing the 16th Division to focus on the city wall. As the sun dipped towards the horizon, one Captain Akao Junzo prepared for what he believed would be his final assault. He had been ordered to seize a hill northeast of Sun Yat-sen Gate that overlooked the city entrance. His commander told him “The attack on Nanjing will likely be the last battle of this war, and I hope your company can be at the front when the enemy's lines are breached”. The hill was fortified with numerous machine gun positions, reinforced with mud, bricks, and tiles, and connected by an intricate network of trenches. Dense rows of barbed wire lay before the positions, designed to halt attackers and expose them to machine-gun fire. Additionally, the area was likely heavily mined, and Chinese soldiers maintained a high level of alertness. Akao knew this all too well; when he crawled forward and slightly lifted his head to survey the landscape, he triggered a hail of bullets, one of which grazed his helmet. Around late afternoon, four mountain guns from the regimental artillery began firing on the Chinese positions, sustaining the bombardment for over an hour. By 5:00 pm, as the winter sky darkened, Akao decided it was time to launch the attack. Expecting close-quarters combat, he instructed his men to carry only their rifles and small entrenchment tools. With the entire company poised to move, he dispatched a small group of soldiers ahead to cut openings in the barbed wire while receiving covering fire from the mountain guns and the rifles and machine guns of their comrades. The remainder of the company advanced with swords raised and bayonets fixed. As they approached within about 700 feet of the enemy positions, the artillery bombardment ceased as planned. The enemy, still reeling from the ferocity of the earlier assault, scrambled in a panic from their trenches, retreating in disarray. Akao and his fellow soldiers pressed forward, cutting down any opposition in their path. Seizing the momentum, Akao charged to occupy the hill that had been his target. He found it deserted upon his arrival and sent a triumphant message back to command, reporting that the objective had been achieved. However, the reply he received left him baffled: he was ordered to withdraw with his company and return to their lines. Apparently, the regimental command deemed the position too precarious. Sensing that a precious advantage was being squandered, Akao disregarded the order. Before his company could establish a defensive position on the hill, the Chinese launched a counterattack. Lying down, the Japanese soldiers returned fire while frantically digging into the earth to fortify their position. Gradually, they began to form a rudimentary perimeter at the summit. The fighting continued into the night. Exhausted from days without sleep, many soldiers rotated between guard duty and rest, dozing off intermittently in their shallow trenches, reassuring one another that everything would be alright before drifting back to sleep. They successfully repelled all attempts by the Chinese to reclaim the hill and were eventually relieved. On December 11, after leaving his capital, Chiang Kai-shek took time to reflect on everything that had happened in his diary. He reassured himself that his nationalist revolution would persist, regardless of whether he held Nanjing, “Temporary defeat can be turned into eventual victory.” Yet he did not fear so much the Japanese invasion itself, but rather how the weakening of his nationalist government might allow the Communists to rise. He wrote about how his nation was on the brink of becoming a second Spain. While foreign invasions were undoubtedly disastrous, they could eventually be overcome, if not immediately, then over years or decades. Sometimes, this could be achieved merely by absorbing the outmatched invader and assimilating them into Chinese society. In contrast, internal unrest posed a far more fundamental threat to the survival of any regime. As we have seen in this series, going back to the mid 19th century, was it the foreign empires of Britain, France and Russia that threatened to destroy the Qing dynasty, or was it the internal civil war brought on by the Taiping? As Chiang famously put it “the Japanese were a treatable disease of the skin. Communism however was a disease of the heart”. Chiang could accept a humiliating but rapid retreat from Nanjing. In his view, it would be far more difficult to recover from a bloody yet futile struggle for the city that might cost him what remained of his best troops. A prolonged defensive battle, he reasoned, would be a tragic waste and could shift the balance of power decisively in favor of the Communists. This new mindset was reflected in a telegram he sent late on December 11 to Tang Shengzhi: “If the situation becomes untenable, it is permissible to find the opportune moment to retreat to regroup in the rear in anticipation of future counterattacks.” On December 12, tankettes cautiously plunged into the Yuhuatai plateau. Unexpectedly the Chinese defenders abandoned their positions and rushed down the hillside toward Nanjing's walls. Upon discovering this, the Japanese tankettes opened fire on the retreating Chinese, cutting swathes through the masses and sending bodies tumbling down the slope. Some Japanese infantry caught up, joining in the slaughter and laughing boisterously as they reveled in the chaos. A tankette column escorted a group of engineers to the Nanjing wall and then drove east along the moat until they reached a large gate, flanked by two smaller openings, all securely shut. A chilling message, painted in blue, adorned the gate's surface. Written in Chinese characters, it conveyed a stark warning: “We Swear Revenge on the Enemy.” The wall itself loomed three stories high, but Japanese artillery was already targeting it, this was known as the Chinese Gate. Now that Yuhuatai was virtually in Japanese hands, capturing the gate had become the primary objective. At this location, the wall stood 70 feet tall, protected by a 100-foot moat to the outside. All bridges spanning the moat had been destroyed. The area around the gate was heavily defended, with approximately one machine gun positioned every 50 yards atop the wall. Inside, the gate was reinforced with a formidable barrier of sandbags. Chinese infantry armed with mortars and small arms could fire down on the Japanese attackers while others had established isolated positions in nearby buildings that had survived the “scorched earth” policy. Taking the gate and the heavily fortified southwestern corner of the wall was the responsibility of the 6th Division. The division was deploying its regiments: the 13th, the 47th, and the 23rd from east to west. The 45th Regiment, the final unit of the division, was tasked with skirting the western side of the wall and advancing northward, aiming for the Yangtze docks at Xiaguan. The soldiers of the division had already formed a rough understanding of the formidable defenses they were facing. During the night between December 11 and 12, they had advanced nearly to the wall, gathering intelligence to prepare for an assault at dawn. As planned, the assault commenced. Field artillery fired round after round at the gate, but the wall sustained minimal damage. A Japanese tank rolled up, firing point-blank at the gate but producing no visible effect. Next, it was the engineers' turn. A “dare-to-die” squad, equipped with long ladders, crept as close to the wall as possible without exposing themselves and then sprinted the final distance. The moment they broke into the open, a Chinese machine gun opened fire, cutting them down to the last man. At noon, three Japanese planes soared overhead, dropping bombs near a Chinese-held building outside the gate. The smoke from the resulting fire briefly obscured the area. Seizing the opportunity presented by the reduced visibility, a large group of Chinese soldiers holed up inside attempted to dash back to the wall. The Japanese spotted their movement instantly, and every soldier in the line opened fire. The fleeing Chinese were mowed down like ripe grass, collapsing in heaps.  Meanwhile the battle for the Gate of Enlightenment was drawing to a close. On the Chinese side of the wall, confusion reigned regarding the overall situation on December 12. Chen Yiding, brigade commander of the 87th Division, had been warned that heads would roll if the Gate of Enlightenment fell to the Japanese. Hearing the sounds of fierce fighting on the edges of Yuhuatai and seeing the smoke rise from numerous fires on Purple Mountain, he was left in the dark about their implications, surrounded by the fog of war. Chen's troops had finally managed to establish a telephone link to the rear, but by mid-afternoon, it was cut off, likely due to a stray artillery shell. After dark, Chen sent an officer to his left flank to make contact with the Chinese forces there. The report that followed was far from reassuring. A unit from Guangdong Province was abandoning its positions and retreating north, attempting to exit the capital through one of the gates in the city wall. The officer had attempted to inquire about their destination, but the retreating soldiers ignored him. With neighboring units evacuating autonomously, a significant gap was opening in the Chinese line atop the wall between the Gate of Enlightenment and Sun Yat-sen Gate. A frightening possibility emerged: the Japanese could walk right in across the undefended southeastern corner of the city wall and surround Chen Yiding's troops before they had a chance to withdraw. The situation was becoming untenable, a fact underscored by the artillery fire raining down on Chen's position. Despite this, retreat was not a simple decision for Chen and the other commanders of the 87th Division. They had been garrisoned in Nanjing before the war, and the city had become home to many of the soldiers. Shortly after midnight, Chen called a meeting with his senior officers. After considerable discussion, they concluded that they had no choice but to withdraw. Nonetheless, Chen insisted that everyone sign a document confirming their support for this decision, recognizing the potential danger of taking such a significant step without consensus. After all, his own life had been threatened if the situation deteriorated further. Soon after, the Chinese began to move out of their positions. The Japanese were initially unaware of the retreat; all they noticed during the night between December 12 and 13 was that the Chinese artillery fire began to grow increasingly distant. By 4:00 am it had stopped completely. The few remaining Chinese were quickly overwhelmed and killed. In the end, the gate, which had cost so many lives during the seemingly endless battle, was taken almost effortlessly by the Japanese. Soldiers of the 9th Division, stationed outside the wall, scrambled up the slope created by the previous days' shelling. Once at the top, they thrust their hands into the air, shouting “Banzai!” so loudly that they believed their families back home in Japan might hear them. Tears streamed down their faces as soldiers embraced and shook hands, reflecting on the friends they had lost throughout the months of fighting, from Shanghai to their current position. They reassured each other that their sacrifices had been worth it for this very moment. On December 12,  the slopes of Purple Mountain  were ablaze. Zhou Zhenqiang, commander of the Training Division's 1st Brigade, led his men in a desperate struggle to maintain control of the mountain's forested peaks. However, they were being overwhelmed by the better-equipped Japanese troops, and Zhou knew it was only a matter of time before he would have to relinquish his position. Zhou found himself unable to obtain any information from his superiors about the overall situation, despite repeated attempts to contact the Training Division's headquarters. He dispatched a runner, who returned a few hours later with disheartening news: the divisional commander had left late in the afternoon. Other reports indicated a general breakdown in command. The elite 88th Division was in disarray, and an entire division of Guangdong troops, that being the same force that had abandoned the wall near the Gate of Enlightenment, had been spotted marching out of the Gate of Great Peace, seemingly intent on returning home. With indications of collapse all around him, Zhou decided to execute an orderly withdrawal from Purple Mountain, leaving a small contingent behind to cover the retreat. His troops entered through the city wall at Sun Yat-sen Gate and marched in disciplined columns through the streets of Nanjing, where signs of imminent anarchy were evident. Chinese soldiers were scattered everywhere, speaking a cacophony of dialects, yet they appeared to lack any coherent command. Tang Shengzhi's grip on the situation was weakening. Meanwhile Japan's 13th Air Group had been busy with the final stages of the battle for Nanjing.  In the morning of December 12, after raiding Chinese positions at Sun Yat-sen Gate, they  received new orders. Intelligence indicated that Chinese ships, laden with troops, were moving up the Yangtze from Nanjing. Japanese infantry on the ground could only watch as this prize slipped through their fingers, and the army requested air support. All available planes at Changzhou, a mix of A4N fighters and Yokosuka B4Y bombers, totaling 24 aircraft, were assembled for the crucial mission. The day was clear, providing excellent visibility as the pilots headed toward the section of the Yangtze where they believed the vessels would be, based on reasonable assumptions about their speed. At 1:30 p.m., 28 nautical miles upriver from Nanjing, the pilots sighted four ships. Trusting their military intelligence, they saw no need for further identification. Initially, the B4Ys bombed the vessels from a considerable height. One bomb struck the lead ship, a military vessel, disabling its forward gun and snapping the foremast. Then, a first wave of six A4Ns dove down over the line of ships, attacking individually. In total, they dropped about 20 bombs. Several exploded close enough to the lead vessel to damage its hull and injure crew members on deck. A 30-caliber machine gun on board was manned, with gunners stripped to the waist firing at the Japanese planes but failing to score a hit. Several of the A4Ns strafed the ship with machine-gun fire. After 20 minutes of sustained bombing and strafing, the result was utter devastation. The lead vessel was stuck in mid-river, riddled with bullets, aflame, and listing to starboard. Two other ships were beached on the right bank, while another sat stranded on the left. Satisfied with their mission, the Japanese aviators broke off and returned to their temporary base. Upon their landing in Changzhou, instead of receiving accolades, the pilots were met with reprimands. Why hadn't they sunk all the vessels? They were ordered to return immediately to finish the job. Though they didn't find the original targets, they stumbled upon four other vessels closer to Nanjing. One aircraft dove toward the ships, releasing a 60-kilogram bomb that struck one vessel. As the pilot pulled up, he caught sight of the Union Jack on the hull and realized his mistake; he had inadvertently targeted neutral ships. The other pilots recognized the significance of the markings as well and withheld their bombs. The vessel was identified as the SS Wantung. Soon after, the Japanese pilots understood that the ships they had attacked earlier upriver from Nanjing were also Western; three of them were Standard Oil tankers. The last vessel, which had sustained the most damage, was the USS Panay, a lightly armed flat-bottomed gunboat,  tasked with protecting American lives and property along China's longest river. The Panay had been instrumental in evacuating American citizens from the war zone in November and December. On the day it was attacked, the Panay was carrying four American embassy personnel and ten American and foreign journalists to safety. The ship's doctor converted the engine room into a makeshift sick bay, treating a steady stream of injured personnel. By the end, he was tending to 45 patients. The soldiers and passengers were evacuated in two small boats to a nearby marshy island covered in reeds, where they hid, fearful of further strafing. From their hiding place, they watched as a Japanese powerboat filled with soldiers approached the Panay. After firing more volleys at the vessel, the soldiers boarded it, remaining for only five minutes before departing. The American flag still flew from the bow at that time. At 3:54 pm, the Panay rolled over to starboard and sank in seven to ten fathoms of water. Cold and frightened, the survivors waded through knee-deep mud to a nearby village, assisting those too severely wounded to walk.  Meanwhile back at Chinese Gate, the mutual slaughter continued into the afternoon of December 12. The Japanese made no significant progress, although their failure was not for lack of trying. The commanders of the 6th Division had strategically placed the boundary between the 13th and 47th Regiments exactly at the gate, encouraging both units to compete to be the first to seize the position. Yet, despite their efforts, it became clear that willpower alone was not enough to breach the Chinese defenses at Chinese Gate. In peacetime, Nanjing's city gates served as entry points into a bustling capital, but in wartime, they transformed into heavily fortified and nearly impregnable strongholds. Any Japanese officer hoping for a swift victory would soon be disappointed; by early afternoon, the situation at the gate had devolved into a stalemate. The section of the wall manned by the 47th Infantry Regiment, located east of the gate, also saw little meaningful movement as the day wore on. Japanese soldiers, pinned down by Chinese fire from atop the wall, could do little more than take pride in a symbolic triumph. A small group of soldiers had managed to reach the wall and place a ladder against it, but it fell nearly ten feet short of the top. One soldier skillfully scaled the last portion, gripping protruding bricks and crevices of the nearly vertical surface. The entire Japanese front watched him with bated breath. He reached the top and unfurled a Japanese flag, but it immediately drew intense Chinese fire, forcing him to duck for cover. Soon, he vanished from sight, raising concerns among his compatriots about his fate. Later, it was revealed that he had taken refuge in a depression in the wall, waiting out the battle. The real breakthrough of the day would occur west of the gate. The 23rd Regiment was deployed there with orders to capture sections of the wall near the southwestern corner. It became evident that the wall could not be scaled without first bringing up artillery to create gaps in its solid masonry. A significant portion of the divisional fire support, 36 small-caliber mountain guns, four 100mm howitzers, and four 150mm howitzers, was assigned to this section. Artillery observers were also sent to the 23rd Regiment's forward command post to coordinate with the infantry and assess the effects of the shelling. By mid-afternoon, the artillery bombardment had created a ravine-like hole in the wall large enough for an assault. The 23rd Regiment positioned its 2nd and 3rd Battalions at the front, with the 1st Battalion held in reserve. First, the engineers undertook the challenging task. As the assault commenced, the rest of the regiment provided covering fire to force the Chinese defenders to seek shelter while the engineers charged into the 70-foot-wide moat. Once a human chain formed, they held up ladders as a makeshift bridge, allowing a company from the 3rd Battalion to rush across and into the gap in the wall. As the batteries switched to close infantry support, they laid down a barrage around the breach to prevent Chinese interference as the attack entered its decisive phase. The Japanese soldiers scrambled up the rubble, created by the artillery fire, which rose several dozen feet high. Shortly before 5:00 p.m., the Japanese seized control of the southwestern segment of the wall. The Chinese launched several counterattacks to reclaim the position, but none were successful. This action ultimately sealed Nanjing's fate; beyond the wall, there was nothing left to save the ancient city and its inhabitants. As defeat appeared imminent, more and more civilians sought safety in foreign-controlled areas, though danger still loomed large. Bits of shrapnel narrowly missed Dr. Robert Wilson while he operated in the Safety Zone. Every square foot of John Rabe's property became filled with families, many camping in the open with their own blankets. Some sought refuge under his large swastika flag, believing that this would make the area especially “bomb-proof” given the growing friendship between Tokyo and Berlin; they assumed Japanese aviators would think twice before targeting a region seemingly under German protection. With just hours left before the Japanese Army was expected to gain control, the residents of Nanjing made their last preparations, prioritizing personal survival. The brutal behavior of Japanese troops in conquered territories fueled intense concern over the possible fate of injured soldiers who might fall into enemy hands. As Nanjing's last hours as a free city unfolded, it became imperative for local hospitals to evacuate as many wounded soldiers as possible across the Yangtze. On December 12, doctors found a motorboat stranded on the riverbank, having apparently broken down. They managed to repair it and ferried several hundred patients to safety throughout the day. Throughout December 12, the citizens of Nanjing were subjected to the unsettling cacophony of heavy shelling, mixed with the roar of bombers overhead. By evening, the entire horizon south of the city glowed with flames. The sound of fighting emanated from all directions, continuing long after sunset. However, in the middle of the night, activity began to wan. Every few minutes, the muffled thuds of shells could still be heard, though their origin was unclear. For the most part, an eerie silence prevailed, as if the city was holding its breath in anticipation of the final onslaught. Chiang Kai-shek had indicated he would understand if Tang chose to abandon the capital. However, on December 12, he reversed his stance, sending a telegram to Tang expressing optimism that the Nanjing garrison could hold out significantly longer. In his words “If you do not shy away from sacrifices, you will be able to hold high the banner of our nation and our army, and this could transform defeat into victory. If you can hold out one more day, you will add to the pride of the Chinese nation. If you can hold out for half a month or more, the domestic and international situation could see a substantial change.” Tang adopted a hardline approach toward any signs of defeatism among his troops. When he learned that General Sun Yuanliang, commander of the formerly elite 88th Division, was leading approximately 2,000 men from the Gate of Enlightenment to the dock area, Tang acted swiftly. He dispatched Song Xilian, the commanding general of the 36th Division, to halt the retreat. When the two units met, a fratricidal clash nearly occurred. Fortunately, the 88th Division agreed to return to the gate and continue fighting. Whatever Tang's plans, they were rendered irrelevant at 3:00 pm,  when he received another telegram from Chiang, this time ordering a full retreat. Rumors that the Chinese Army had started evacuating Nanjing triggerec panic among many units. Thousands abandoned their positions and joined the throngs of soldiers and civilians moving slowly down the city's main avenues. The crowd seemed to have collectively decided that getting a boat out of Nanjing was the best option, and by late afternoon, a solid mass of humanity stretched for miles through the city toward the dock areas at Xiaguan. To reach Xiaguan, everyone had to pass through Yijiang Gate. This relatively modern structure had served as the main entry point for visitors arriving in Nanjing by boat in recent decades and now only half of the main entrance was open. A crowd of that size trying to get through such a narrow bottleneck was a recipe for disaster. Those unfortunate enough to be right at the front felt the crushing pressure of tens of thousands of individuals pushing from behind. In that densely packed throng, stumbling and falling to the ground was akin to a death sentence; anyone who went down was inevitably crushed by the oncoming waves of terrified civilians and soldiers. As chaos erupted, discipline evaporated entirely. Officers lost control over their men, leading to infighting among the soldiers. Pushing and shoving escalated into fistfights, and trucks drove directly into the mass of people to force their way through. Tanks, emitting sounds akin to prehistoric beasts, rolled through the mob, crushing many under their weight. Amid the madness, some soldiers, driven by frustration over the lack of movement, began shooting into the crowd at random. To relieve the pressure at Yijiang Gate, some units were ordered to exit Nanjing via the Gate of Great Peace at the northeastern corner of the city wall. Upon arrival, they found the entrance nearly sealed shut. Thick walls of sandbags had been erected around it, leaving only a narrow opening through which one person could pass at a time. Massive crowds fought among themselves to get through; even under perfect order and discipline, it would have taken the entire night and most of the following day for everyone to pass. In the midst of the frantic chaos, it could take a week or more. During the night of the 12th, a select group of Japanese soldiers, chosen for the offensive, stripped their equipment down to the bare essentials: rifles, bayonets, and helmets. They avoided any gear that could produce a metallic noise, alerting the Chinese defenders to their approach. Stealthily, they moved up to the wall, carrying bamboo ladders tied together in threes for added height. Ascending the rungs, they ensured not to make a sound that could betray their position to an alert Chinese sentry. Everything hinged on remaining undetected; even a couple of hand grenades tossed down the wall could halt the attack in its tracks. Reaching the top without being noticed, the soldiers quickly fanned out. Chinese soldiers stationed on the wall saw the swift dark figures and opened fire, but it was too late to thwart the assault. A brief fight ensued; most Japanese soldiers were too close to use their rifles and immediately resorted to their bayonets. The stunned defenders were pushed back, and the successful assault team established a perimeter, awaiting reinforcements from outside the wall. They didn't have to wait long. A massive assault along the length of the 6th Division's front line commenced at dawn on December 13. Japanese artillery concentrated its fire on a narrow section of the city wall, progressively working its way from the bottom up. Gradually, the shells formed a slope of debris that soldiers could use to scale the wall. A short air raid was executed, and after the planes had weakened the remaining resistance, a group of soldiers rushed up the slope. While their comrades provided covering fire, they climbed the last stretch, rolling down a rope ladder. Within minutes, 40 other Japanese soldiers had joined them. By 10:30 am, the Rising Sun flag was flying over the wall. The Japanese invaders were met with a horrific sight at the top of the wall. Beyond lay the grim aftermath of days of shelling. Some houses were leveled, while others burned. The ground was littered with bodies, some decapitated or disemboweled, and pools of blood surrounded them. As Chiang Kai-shek's order to abandon the city gradually filtered down to the troops manning the wall around Nanjing, things began to move rapidly.  By late morning on December 13, all the major entry points into the city had fallen to the Japanese. These included Chinese Gate in the southwest, the Gate of Enlightenment in the south, and Sun Yat-sen Gate in the east. The first thing that struck the Japanese soldiers upon ascending the wall was how starkly different it was from their expectations. They had anticipated a bustling city teeming with people, but instead, the area adjacent to the wall was characterized by farm plots, resembling countryside more than an urban center. The second notable observation was the complete absence of inhabitants. Cautiously, the Japanese soldiers entered the city they had just conquered, their bayonets fixed and rifles at the ready. Yet, surprisingly, very few shots were fired. After weeks of fearing death and injury, once the immediate danger receded, a certain stupor settled in. For most civilians in Nanjing, their initial encounter with the city's new rulers was uneventful. It took several hours for the Japanese to move from the wall into the urban parts of the capital. It was not until around noon that residents noticed the first groups of Japanese soldiers marching down the streets in clusters of six to twelve men. Initially, many met the conquerors with relief, hoping they would be treated fairly. Their optimism was bolstered by Japanese planes dropping leaflets over the city, reassuring residents of humane treatment. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On December 9, fierce battles erupted, especially at the Gate of Enlightenment. Despite heavy fighting, the Chinese showed remarkable resilience, turning Nanjing into a symbol of determination. However, the tide shifted as overwhelming Japanese artillery and tactics began to breach defenses. By December 13, as chaos engulfed the city, the invaders claimed victory, but not without significant loss. Civilians, caught amid the destruction, clung to hope amid despair.

The late-Qing author and his famous novel.Support the show

For nearly a quarter century, Heshen served the Qing Empire - and in the process managed to amass a fortune that nearly rivaled the throne itself. Yet with the death of his patron Qianlong, the once-favored Grand Councilor would find his remaining state tenure as short as the length of silk ultimately left in his cell. Time Period Covered: 1799-1800 CE Major Historical Figures: The Qianlong Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Hongli) [r. 1735–1796, d. 1799] The Jiaqing Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Yongyan) [r. 1796-1820] Heshen, Grand Councilor, Chief Grand Secretary, Minister of the Imperial Household, etc., etc. [1750-1799] Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Happy Sunday! For this episode we dive head first into The Blood Phoenix an epic silkpunk fantasy sequel based on the Qing dynasty. In the book Amber Chen sets sail alongside her readers against pirate, dangerous storms, and other assorted chaos in this sparkling follow up to Of Jade and Dragons. Follow AmberFollow OTSMap of Indie BookstoresOTS SubstackGet The Blood Phoenix!Book Bar - SingaporeOdyssey BooksQuail Ridge Books

As both the Qianlong Emperor's extensive reign and the Eighteenth Century itself comes to a close, the Qing Empire faces - in spite of its outward posturing of timeless grandeur and invulnerability - an ever more uncertain future. By this time his successor, the Jiaqing Emperor, assumes power in fact, the winds of historic change have already begun to blow. Time Period Covered: ~1735-1800 Major Historical Actors: The Qianlong Emperor [Aisin-Gioro Hongli) [r. 1735-1796, d. 1799] The Jiaqing Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Yongyan) [r. 1796-1820] Grand Secretary Heshen [1750-1799] Major Sources Cited: Crossley, Pamela Kyle. A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology. Hsü, Immanuel C. Y. The Rise of Modern China. 6th ed. Jones, Susan Mann, and Philip A. Kuhn. “The Chia-ch'ing Reign.” In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part Two: The Ch'ing Empire to 1911. Rowe, William T. China's Last Empire: The Great Qing. Woodside, Alexander. The Centre and the Borderlands in Chinese Political Culture. Woodside, Alexander. “The Ch'ien-lung Reign” In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

What happens when a bodybuilder, dismissed as “too unspiritual,” learns to meditate in the middle of gunfire—and within a week channels Lao Tzu, performs a long-distance healing, and watches gangrene turn pink in front of his eyes?This isn't new age philosophy. This isn't “feel good” spirituality. This is raw power—channeled with precision that doesn't just challenge belief, it obliterates it.Inside this conversation: ⚡ How meditation in chaos rewired his entire field ⚡ The shocking moment he channeled Lao Tzu in front of a doubting teacher ⚡ The spontaneous healing that defied medicine and logic ⚡ Exposing spiritual ego in teachers + gurusIf you're tired of theory and ready for codes that collapse time, confront distortion, and prove miracles in real time—this episode will change how you see reality itself.⬇️Velocity Oracle™https://www.nicolefrolick.com/velocity-oracle-p⬇️Divine Data Drop™https://www.nicolefrolick.com/divine-data-drop-order-form⬇️The 3-Day 180™ Retreat Sept 25-28th, 2025https://www.nicolefrolick.com/3-day-180-retreat⬇️Healing Exit Strategy™https://www.nicolefrolick.com/healing-exit-strategy-p⬇️Help save children from traffickinghttps://forthekids.life/nicole4v4crSan QingWebsite: https://immortaltaoistrites.com/The Way App: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/the-way-126/id1660559464The Way Webiste: https://theway126.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/theway_126/ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@theway126experienceSUBSCRIBE & FOLLOWIf you're enjoying the show, please subscribe to iTunes and leave me a 5 star review!  This is what helps the podcast stand out from the crowd and allows me to help people find a refreshing spin on spirituality with a great blend of entertainment and credible advice.Newsletter: https://tinyurl.com/3wa5dnwjWebsite: http://nicolefrolick.com/Meditations: https://www.nicolefrolick.com/meditationsYoutube: https://www.youtube.com/user/nicolefrolickInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/nicolefrolick/Tiktok: https://tiktok.com/@nicolefrolickSpotify: shorturl.at/fikF7iTunes: http://apple.co/2ve7DtE

From London's harbors to Canton's bustling hongs and the Qianlong Emperor's Dragon Throne, Lord George Macartney's 1792-94 mission to Great Qing unveils profound cultural divides, shaping centuries of Sino-Western relations. This series explores a pivotal diplomatic clash that redefined global history. Time Period Covered: 1792-1794 CE Major Historical Figures: Qing Empire: The Qianlong Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Hongli) [r. 1735–1796] Chief Minister Heshen (1750–1799) Wang Wenxiong, mid-level imperial bureaucrat British Empire: Lord George Macartney, ambassador extraordinaire [1737–1806] Sir George Staunton [1737-1801] William Alexander [1767–1816] John Barrow, Comptroller [1764-1848] Sgt. Maj. Samuel Holmes, 11th Lt. Dragoons Major Works Cited: Berg, Maxine. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons. Cranmer-Byng, John. “The Chinese Documents Relating to the Macartney Embassy.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1961. Gao, Hao. Creating the Opium War: British Imperial Attitudes Toward China, 1792–1840. Hevia, James L. Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793. Holmes, Samuel. Journal of the Macartney Expedition. Macartney, Lord George. Journal of the Macartney Expedition. Peyrefitte, Alain. The Immobile Empire: The First Great Collision of East and West. Knopf, 1992. Qing Archival Records. Tr. in Presents and Tribute: Documents on the Macartney Embassy. Staunton, George. An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Xi Jinping encabezó en Lhasa las grandiosas celebraciones del 60.º aniversario de la región autónoma del Tíbet, durante una visita excepcional en la que hizo un llamamiento a la 'unidad interétnica'. El presidente chino realizó el miércoles su segunda visita como jefe de Estado a la región autónoma del Tíbet, un territorio montañoso del suroeste de China cuya historia está marcada por una larga alternancia entre la independencia y la soberanía de Pekín. En esta ocasión, Xi Jinping no escatimó en festejos para celebrar seis décadas de control sobre el Tíbet. Obsequiado con la khata budista —el pañuelo sagrado tibetano que engalana las ceremonias— y ante 20.000 funcionarios y habitantes locales de “todos los grupos étnicos”, según las autoridades, el líder chino habló sobre la necesidad de "guiar el budismo tibetano en la adaptación a la sociedad socialista". Una "adaptación" que no es un mero ajuste cultural o teológico, sino una estrategia de control del Partido Comunista Chino, según cuenta Anna Ferrer, doctoranda en historia en la Universitat Pompeu Fabra y especialista en el conflicto. "Xi quiere lograr con el budismo tibetano lo mismo que con el resto de religiones permitidas en China", afirma Ferrer. La República Popular China, aunque atea, permite la práctica de ciertas religiones bajo estrictos parámetros gubernamentales que regulan la jerarquía eclesiástica. Y es en este punto donde Pekín se encuentra con un reto mayúsculo. El Dalái Lama, líder espiritual de los budistas, ha cumplido 90 años en la India, donde reside el gobierno tibetano en el exilio desde 1959. El escenario para su sucesión es aún incierto y complejo. Él mismo "había llegado a apuntar a la posibilidad de no reencarnarse", dice Ferrer. Si se reencarnara, la historiadora advierte que "es posible que exista una fragmentación entre un candidato elegido por el gobierno tibetano en el exilio y otro que contaría con el apoyo del gobierno chino". Pekín, por su parte, se aferra a la legitimidad del "proceso de la urna de oro", un método de designación de sucesores que data de la dinastía Qing y que la portavoz del Ministerio de Exteriores de China, Mao Ning, defendió como la única herramienta válida para designarlo. "El gobierno chino implementa una política de libertad de creencias religiosas, pero existen regulaciones sobre asuntos religiosos y métodos para gestionar la reencarnación de los budas vivientes tibetanos", dijo entonces Ning. La comunidad internacional y la propia comunidad tibetana se enfrentarían a la difícil decisión de reconocer a uno u otro, lo que podría conducir a una división religiosa. La dificultad de la sucesión de los líderes budistas ya se hizo patente con el Panchen Lama, la segunda autoridad del budismo tibetano. Anna Ferrer explica que "el candidato avalado por el exilio tibetano acabó desapareciendo en circunstancias que nunca han terminado de aclararse". En su lugar, el gobierno chino impuso su propio candidato, generando una división profunda: "el exilio tibetano sigue reconociendo la legitimidad de ese candidato, de ese niño al que las autoridades chinas hicieron desaparecer en 1995", mientras que el candidato apoyado por Pekín ejerce como Panchen Lama dentro del Tíbet. Históricamente, la relación entre Tíbet y China ha sido compleja, "alternando periodos de vínculo matrimonial o relaciones patrón-sacerdote con otros de 'independencia relativa'", cuenta Ferrer. Tras la proclamación de la República Popular de China en 1949 y de que el gobierno de Mao Zedong se propusiera recuperar el control sobre el Tíbet, los objetivos de Pekín se han cumplido exitosamente. Según Ferrer, el gobierno chino "quiere terminar de ejercer un control efectivo sobre la religión budista tibetana, desde lo que es la práctica de los fieles hasta la jerarquía religiosa y también las normas en cuanto al culto". De su éxito dependerá la autonomía espiritual del Tíbet.

Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened 71-points this morning from yesterday's close, at 24,033 on turnover of $7.2-billion N-T. Taiwan and US sign MOU on combating cross-border drug trafficking Taiwan and the United States have signed a memorandum of understanding to jointly combat transnational drug trafficking. According to the American Institute in Taiwan, the agreement will enhance intelligence sharing between the U-S Drug Enforcement Administration and the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office .. ….. by "enabling more efficient investigations and prosecutions of transnational drug trafficking organizations." A-I-T has issues a press release quoting D-E-A Asia Pacific Division Special Agent in charge John Scott as saying that the annual forum represents the "shared commitment of Taiwan and the United States to combat the scourge (禍害) of drug trafficking." NPM to show 'meat-shaped stone' in first exhibition in Yilan The National Palace Museum has announced that its iconic "meat-shaped stone" and 14 other artifacts will be going on disply in Yilan for the first time. The artifacts will be part of a special exhibition co-organized with the Lanyang Museum in December. Along with its famed "meat-shaped stone," the National Palace Museum also selected a jade duck piece dating back to the Song and Yuan dynasties, a porcelain chicken cup in doucai painted enamels from the Ming dynasty … … and a revolving vase with swimming fish in cobalt blue glaze (釉) from the Qing dynasty as some of the artifacts that will be featured in the Yilan exhibition. Moscow says foreign troops in Ukraine would be ‘unacceptable' Russia called "absolutely unacceptable" the idea of deploying foreign forces in Ukraine discussed by Europe and Kiev as part of security guarantees for Ukraine. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the so-called "coalition of the willing" countries of attempts to undermine US President Donald Trump's peacemaking efforts. And reiterated (重申) any discussions of European security, Ukraine included, must involve Russia. Daria Bondarchuk reports from Moscow. Uganda Announces US Deal to Take Deported Migrants Uganda's foreign ministry says the African country has agreed to a deal with the United States to take deported migrants as long as they don't have criminal records and are not unaccompanied minors. The ministry said in a statement Thursday that the agreement had been concluded but that terms were still being worked out. It added that Uganda prefers that the migrants sent there be of African nationalities (國籍), but did not elaborate on what Uganda might get in return for accepting deportees. The U.S. embassy in Uganda declined to comment on what it called “diplomatic negotiations." Human rights activists criticized the deal as possibly going against international law. New Evidence of Earlier Modern Humans and Neanderthals Interaction And new findings suggest that modern humans and Neanderthals may have interacted 100-thousand years earlier than previously thought. That's according to researchers who used CT scans and 3D mapping to study the bones of a child they believe was the result of interbreeding between the two distinct groups. The child was buried in a cave in Israel some 140-thousand years ago. Because no ancient DNA was extracted from the fossilized (變成化石的) remains, it's impossible to confirm the child's origins, but scientists say microscopic details in the bones indicate the child had traits of both groups. The findings, recently published in a peer-reviewed journal, help shed light on when the two groups began interacting and offers clues about their relationships. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. －－－－以下為 SoundOn 動態廣告－－－－ 情況緊急、靈感斷線、加班爆肝、心情低氣壓？ ♫速速速，速神湯啦♫ 30秒沖一杯，讓你一口補神氣！ 忙碌的日子裡，別忘了給自己一點剛剛好的照顧 @bullhead_1958 #牛頭牌速神湯 https://sofm.pse.is/845xm5 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

In 1793, Emperor Qianlong of Qing decreed a new process by which to select future Tibetan spiritual leaders like the Dalai Lama. And he wrote an essay about it.Support the show

San Qing returns to our show to talk about his newest book, Immortality Crystalized in the Material. He says, "The Path of A Taoist Alchemist is a journey of external transformation where poetry crystalizes the ethereal into the material." San explains what the mystical tool of Rhapsody is, and reads two of his poems. He talks about the teachings embodied when we use the breath. He explains what seamless Unity is, and The Great Bellows. He discusses the teachings of the Tao and his teachers, the Three Pure Ones.CONTACT: San QingE-MAIL: admin@theway126.comWEBSITE/LINKS: The Way 126 APP LIVE now on web, IOS and Android https://immortaltaoistrites.com/https://theway126.com/ Instagram https://www.instagram.com/theway_126 Apple Podcast https://podcasts.apple.com/si/podcast/consciousness-of-the-way-126-podcast/id1710027363FOLLOW US ON FACEBOOK: http://www.facebook.com/ASMALPodcastVISIT OUR WEBSITE: http://www.asmallmediumatlarge.coEMAIL: asmallmediumatlargepodcast @gmail.com Show Produced by Green Valley Production StudioMusic by DJ Booda: http://www.djbooda.com

Qianlong's empire shines as a beacon of both martial might and cultural splendor, yet its mirrored glory hides truths too fragile for celestial ambitions. Time Period Covered: ~1770-1799CE Major Historical Figures: Qing Empire: The Qianlong Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Hongli) [r. 1735–1796, d. 1799] Grand Councillor Heshen [1750-1799] Great Britain: Lord George Macartney (1737-1806) Major Sources Cited: Bland, J.O.P. and Lord Edmund Backhouse. Annals and Memoirs of the Court at Peking. Fairbank, John King, and Denis Twitchett, eds. The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9, Part 1: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800. Perdue, Peter. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Woodside, Alexander. The Qing in the Age of Confucian Empire. Yuan, Wei. Shengwu ji (Sacred Military Achievements). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

By Jonathan Selling Professor Ronald Po joins Jonathan to discuss his new book, Shaping the Blue Dragon: Maritime China in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, which covers the maritime policies of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Download Sea Control 583: Shaping the Blue Dragon with Ronald Po Links 1. Dr Ronald C. Po profile. 2. Shaping … Continue reading Sea Control 583: Shaping the Blue Dragon with Ronald Po →

“Il sogno della Camera rossa” è uno dei grandi classici della letteratura cinese. Al centro del libro ci sono le vicende di una nobile famiglia e il suo inevitabile declino. L'ambientazione è nella Cina del ‘700, durante la dinastia Qing. Realtà e sovrannaturale, ordine e anarchia, declino e ascese: il romanzo ha molteplici chiavi di lettura e - come scrive Edoarda Masi nell'introduzione all'edizione del 2008 pubblicata da Rizzoli - “non è un semplice racconto, ma un universo di specchi e illusioni, un palcoscenico dove la letteratura "irregolare" si mescola al rigore confuciano”. La voce della gemma di giada è di Fiamma Calarco. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Title: Come And WorshipSpeaker: Luke BrandonScripture: Psalm 95Episode Overview:In Psalm 95, we find both an invitation and a warning—an invitation to enter God's presence with joy, reverence, and wholehearted worship, and a sobering reminder to guard our hearts from disbelief. Using vivid stories—from a forgotten Qing dynasty vase to modern sports icons searching for meaning—this message unpacks what it means to worship God with our will, mind, and heart. We discover that everything we do communicates who we worship, and that true worship flows from trust in the Good Shepherd who knows us by name.Key Highlights:• What Worship Really Is: Ascribing ultimate value to God with every part of our being.• Worship with the Whole Person: Engaging mind, heart, and will to magnify God's character and works.• The Privilege of “Come”: God invites us back into His presence—what sin had once driven us from.• Examples from Life: How misplaced worship leaves us empty, from Super Bowl rings to earthly treasures.• The Warning of Psalm 95: How unbelief kept an entire generation from God's rest, and how we can avoid the same.• A Word of Hope: “Today” is God's offer of life, rest, and salvation for those who hear His voice.Call to Action:Today, let your life tell the truth about who sits on the throne of your heart. Worship is not just a Sunday activity—it's every thought you think, word you speak, and choice you make. Take time this week to intentionally ascribe worth to God with your actions: speak words that honor Him, serve someone in need, and replace grumbling with gratitude. Let your everyday life become an act of worship that points others to the King who is above all gods.Redeemer Church211 Northshore Dr. Bellingham, WA 98226www.redeemernw.org

Shaping the Blue Dragon: Maritime China in the Ming and Qing Dynasties (Liverpool UP, 2024) offers a vivid look at China's dynamic and longstanding relationship with the sea. Through the lives of pirates, maritime advisors, cartographers, admirals, writers, and travelers, Ronald C. Po brings maritime China to life — revealing a world far more connected and sea-orientated than often assumed. Richly detailed and captivating, Shaping the Blue Dragon should interest those in Chinese history, East Asian history, and the maritime world. But this is also a book for anyone who loves great stories. Packed with figures from a pirate king ruling the South China Seas to a gentry son-turned-traveler shipwrecked on his voyage to Southeast Asia, Shaping the Blue Dragon is a compelling blend of narrative and analysis. During our conversation we also talked about Po's first book, The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire (Cambridge UP, 2018) (a must-read!). Listeners who want to know more about this book in particular should also check out the episode about the book The Chinese History Podcast Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Shaping the Blue Dragon: Maritime China in the Ming and Qing Dynasties (Liverpool UP, 2024) offers a vivid look at China's dynamic and longstanding relationship with the sea. Through the lives of pirates, maritime advisors, cartographers, admirals, writers, and travelers, Ronald C. Po brings maritime China to life — revealing a world far more connected and sea-orientated than often assumed. Richly detailed and captivating, Shaping the Blue Dragon should interest those in Chinese history, East Asian history, and the maritime world. But this is also a book for anyone who loves great stories. Packed with figures from a pirate king ruling the South China Seas to a gentry son-turned-traveler shipwrecked on his voyage to Southeast Asia, Shaping the Blue Dragon is a compelling blend of narrative and analysis. During our conversation we also talked about Po's first book, The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire (Cambridge UP, 2018) (a must-read!). Listeners who want to know more about this book in particular should also check out the episode about the book The Chinese History Podcast Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Shaping the Blue Dragon: Maritime China in the Ming and Qing Dynasties (Liverpool UP, 2024) offers a vivid look at China's dynamic and longstanding relationship with the sea. Through the lives of pirates, maritime advisors, cartographers, admirals, writers, and travelers, Ronald C. Po brings maritime China to life — revealing a world far more connected and sea-orientated than often assumed. Richly detailed and captivating, Shaping the Blue Dragon should interest those in Chinese history, East Asian history, and the maritime world. But this is also a book for anyone who loves great stories. Packed with figures from a pirate king ruling the South China Seas to a gentry son-turned-traveler shipwrecked on his voyage to Southeast Asia, Shaping the Blue Dragon is a compelling blend of narrative and analysis. During our conversation we also talked about Po's first book, The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire (Cambridge UP, 2018) (a must-read!). Listeners who want to know more about this book in particular should also check out the episode about the book The Chinese History Podcast Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

Shaping the Blue Dragon: Maritime China in the Ming and Qing Dynasties (Liverpool UP, 2024) offers a vivid look at China's dynamic and longstanding relationship with the sea. Through the lives of pirates, maritime advisors, cartographers, admirals, writers, and travelers, Ronald C. Po brings maritime China to life — revealing a world far more connected and sea-orientated than often assumed. Richly detailed and captivating, Shaping the Blue Dragon should interest those in Chinese history, East Asian history, and the maritime world. But this is also a book for anyone who loves great stories. Packed with figures from a pirate king ruling the South China Seas to a gentry son-turned-traveler shipwrecked on his voyage to Southeast Asia, Shaping the Blue Dragon is a compelling blend of narrative and analysis. During our conversation we also talked about Po's first book, The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire (Cambridge UP, 2018) (a must-read!). Listeners who want to know more about this book in particular should also check out the episode about the book The Chinese History Podcast Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Shaping the Blue Dragon: Maritime China in the Ming and Qing Dynasties (Liverpool UP, 2024) offers a vivid look at China's dynamic and longstanding relationship with the sea. Through the lives of pirates, maritime advisors, cartographers, admirals, writers, and travelers, Ronald C. Po brings maritime China to life — revealing a world far more connected and sea-orientated than often assumed. Richly detailed and captivating, Shaping the Blue Dragon should interest those in Chinese history, East Asian history, and the maritime world. But this is also a book for anyone who loves great stories. Packed with figures from a pirate king ruling the South China Seas to a gentry son-turned-traveler shipwrecked on his voyage to Southeast Asia, Shaping the Blue Dragon is a compelling blend of narrative and analysis. During our conversation we also talked about Po's first book, The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire (Cambridge UP, 2018) (a must-read!). Listeners who want to know more about this book in particular should also check out the episode about the book The Chinese History Podcast Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

EVEN MORE about this episode!Step into the mystical with Taoist Master San Qing as we explore how focused intention, ancient wisdom, and spiritual energy can shape your reality. Discover the hidden power of "hopium" and how hope, aligned with purpose, becomes a force for transformation. From miraculous family healings to near-death experiences and the timeless teachings of the Tao Te Ching, this episode uncovers the sacred balance between life and the beyond. Plus, learn how lucid dreaming and breathwork can awaken your true self and unlock unseen realms of healing and insight.Guest Biography:Taoist Master San Qing is a renowned healer, ordained priest, and lineage holder of two ancient Taoist traditions. With over 30 years of experience, he guides people to awaken their true essence—as human, light, and pure being. A master of Qigong and Neigong, San Qing is known for his profound spiritual presence, miraculous healing work, and direct access to the spirit realm. Working with clients worldwide, he channels wisdom from the Tao and the Three Pure Ones, helping others realize that the impossible is truly possible.Episode Chapters:(0:00:01) - The Taoist Path to Create Reality(0:12:26) - Miraculous Healing Stories(0:22:58) - Ancient Wisdom of Lao Tzu(0:27:58) - Exploring Lucid Dreams and Alchemy(0:46:31) - Embarking on a Breathwork Journey➡️Subscribe to Ask Julie Ryan YouTube➡️Subscribe to Ask Julie Ryan Español YouTube➡️Subscribe to Ask Julie Ryan Português YouTube➡️Subscribe to Ask Julie Ryan Deutsch YouTube➡️Subscribe to Ask Julie Ryan Français YouTube✏️Ask Julie a Question!

In the wake of military victory, Qianlong turns inward—launching literary purges, rewriting history, and curating an image of himself as the enlightened ruler of a Confucian empire. Through censorship, spectacle, and the manipulation of memory, the Qing court fights a new kind of war: one for cultural supremacy and imperial legitimacy. Time Period Covered: ~ 1735–1760 CE Major Historical Figures: The Qianlong Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Hongli) [r. 1735-1796] Grand Secretary No'chin [d. 1749] Historican Wei Yuan [1794-1857] Major Works Cited: Perdue, Peter C. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Qian, Zhongshu – Tán Yì Lù, "On the Art of Poetry." Qianlong Emperor. The Siku Quanshu (四库全书) - Qing Imperial Encyclopedia. Woodside, Alexander. Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

What does it take to hold an empire together when conquest alone isn't enough? In this sweeping episode, we explore how the Qianlong Emperor fused culture, coercion, and Confucian performance to stabilize a multiethnic empire—crafting an imperial image as powerful as his armies. Time Period Covered: ~ 1735–1760 CE Major Historical Figures: The Qianlong Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Hongli) [r. 1735-1796] Grand Secretary No'chin [d. 1749] Historican Wei Yuan [1794-1857] Major Works Cited: Perdue, Peter C. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Qian, Zhongshu – Tán Yì Lù, "On the Art of Poetry." Qianlong Emperor, The Siku Quanshu (四库全书) - Qing Imperial Encyclopedia. Woodside, Alexander. Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

#367 In this episode, Guy welcomed back San Qing for an enlightened conversation about the deeper aspects of Daoist alchemy and spirituality. San dived into the intricate relationship between the body, energy, spirit, consciousness, and the primordial pulse, emphasizing the importance of realigning the energy within oneself to achieve immortality. The discussion also touches on the practices of channeling, the significance of conditioning the body and spirit, and the transformative power of empathy. San Qing shared a personal, moving story about using Daoist practices to save his son's life, illustrating the profound impact of these teachings. Guy and San also explored the potential of human longevity and the path to true self-realization. Enjoy this deep, emotive conversation that blends ancient wisdom with modern spiritual practices. About San: Taoist Master San Qing has over 30 years' experience guiding people, teaching people, opening people up to their true potential as a human being, as a light being, as just being. San Qing is an ordained priest and 66th generation lineage holder and 126th generation lineage holder of Taoism. San is a Taoist master of Qigong and Neigong, is a prolific channel and healer who has built a reputation for direct access to the spirit realm. He is grateful every day to his teachers, the Three Pure Ones and the Tao, for allowing him to witness miracles. San works with people all over the world showing them, that the impossible is possible. Key Points Discussed:  (00:00) - TAOIST MASTER Explains INVISIBLE FORCE Creating Reality; And the Forgotten Power Awakening in You (01:01) - Podcast Introduction and Guest Welcome (02:35) - San Qing's Journey and Teachings (03:18) - Understanding Personality and True Self (03:58) - The Path to Self-Realization (06:38) - Energy, Consciousness, and the Pulse (11:36) - The Alchemical Process and Sensory Perception (18:54)) - Holding and Harnessing Energy (25:15) - Breathing Through Consciousness (28:30) - The Unity of Energy and Emotions (31:56) - The World's Greatest Secret (32:22) - Evoking Moments and Unity (34:05) - Channeling and Teachers (35:44) - Alchemical Processes and Superhuman Abilities (36:53) - The Power of Empathy and Raising Humanity (45:01) - The Importance of Fundamentals in Metaphysics (53:56) - Human Potential and Longevity (56:44) - A Miraculous Experience (01:01:14) - Conclusion and Resources How to Contact San Qing:theway126.com www.youtube.com/@theway126experience   About me:My Instagram: www.instagram.com/guyhlawrence/?hl=en Guy's websites:www.guylawrence.com.au www.liveinflow.co

This was no peace borne of reconciliation; this was silence, enforced by amnesia. Time Period Covered: ~ 1739-1759 CE Major Historical Figures: Qing Empire: The Qianlong Emperor (Aisin Gioro Hongli) [r. 1735–1796] Minister Fuheng General Bandi [d. 1755] General Yongchang Khalka Mongols: Prince Erinchindorj [d. 1756] Prince Chingünjav [d. 1757] Dzungar Mongols: Amursana [d. 1757] Major Sources Cited: Perdue, Peter C. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Woodside, Alexander. "The Ch'ien-Lung Reign" in The Cambridge History of Vol. 9: The Ch'ing Dynasty, Part 1: To 1800. Woodside, Alexander. Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

One of the most significant late-Qing officials and the bloody conflicts he fought.Support the show

Her podcast, ‘The Weirdo’, has attracted millions of particularly younger Chinese listeners. She speaks with Monocle’s Chris Cermak about differing perceptions of politics in China, Europe and the West.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The story of the last great nomadic empire's fall - and the Qing's ruthless imperial vision for a New Frontier. Time Period Covered: 1739-1759 CE Major Historical Figures: The Great Qing Empire: The Qianlong Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Hongli) [r. 1735–1796] General Bandi [d. 1755] Hojs, Hakim Beg of Ush Dzungar Khanate: Galdan Tseren [r. 1727–1745] Tsewang Dorji Namjal [blinded 1750] Lama Darja [r. 1750-52] Dawaci, self-declared Hong Taiji, [r.1752-55] Amursana [d. 1757] Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Qing conquest of Dzungaria did not begin with any kind of cannon-fire or musketry. Instead, it began like many wars end: with a funeral. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

As his era of rule over Great Qing drows to a close, the Yongzheng Emperor spares neither expense nor detail to reform the empire he inherited and modernize it for the one who will inherit it from him. But this is no idle fancy - he has a definite purpose. Though no great warrior himself, he is nevertheless fully in-line with the century-long grand objective of his father and son: the absolute destruction of the Zhungar Khanate. Time Period Covered: 1722-1735 CE Major Historical Figures: Great Qing: The Yongzheng Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Yinzhen) [r. 1722-1735] The Qianlong Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Hongli) [r. 1735-1796, d. 1799] Prince Yinxing [1686-1730] General Longkedo [1648-1728] Governor-General Qingfu Governor-General Yinjishan Dzungar Khanate: Galdan Tseren, Khan of the Dzungars [r. 1727-1745] Tsewang Dorji Namjal, Hongtaiji of the Dzungars [1746-1750] Princess Ulan Bayar Lama Darja/Dorji Dawaci [d. 1759] Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Yongzheng Emperor seeks to capitalize on his father's greatness abroad - but cautiously. He wants to exterminate the barbarians... but delicately. He wants to build better worlds... no matter how many he has to destroy in the process. He's riding for a fall. Time Period Covered: ~1725-1731 CE Major Historical Figures: Qing Empire: Kangxi Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Xuanye) [r. 1661-1722] Yongzheng Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Yinzhen) [r. 1722-1735] Prince Yinti, the Fuyuan Daijiangjun [1688-1755] Governor Nian Gengyao [1679-1726] Governor-General Yue Zhongqi [1686-1754] General Erentei [d. 1718] Funingga [d. 1728] Dzungar Khanate: Tsewang Rabdan, Khong Tayiji [r. 1697-1727] Galdan Tseren, Khong Tayiji [r. 1727-1745] General Tsering Dondup Tibetan Gelupa/“Yellow Hats”: 5th Dalai Lama [r. 1642-1682] 6th Dalai Lama [r. 1697] 7th Dalai Lama [r. 1720-1757] sDe-pa Sangya Gyatso [1652-1705] Polhanas (Polhané Sönam Topgyé) [1689-1747] Kokonor Mongols: Khoshots: Güshi Khan (Torbaikhu) [r. 1642-1655] Lhazang Khan [r. 1700-1717] Prince Lobzang Danjin, Dalai Hongtaiji [d. 1731] Sources Cited: Perdue, Peter C. China marches west: the Qing conquest of Central Eurasia. Rowe, William T. China's last empire: the great Qing. Zelin, Madeline. “The Yung-chung reign” in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 9: The Ch'ing Dynasty, Part 1: To 1800. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

No final do século XIX, a China vivia um período de forte presença estrangeira, com concessões territoriais, tratados desiguais e expansão do cristianismo alimentando o descontentamento popular. Nesse contexto, surgiu a Rebelião dos Boxers, liderada pela sociedade secreta I Ho Ch'uan, que buscava expulsar os estrangeiros e restaurar a ordem tradicional. O movimento ganhou força rapidamente, culminando no cerco às legações estrangeiras em Pequim e no apoio da Imperatriz Viúva Cixi. A repressão veio com força internacional, e a derrota da rebelião resultou em novas imposições ao país e no enfraquecimento da dinastia Qing. Convidamos Fernando Pureza para conversar sobre as causas, o desenvolvimento e os desdobramentos desse episódio marcante da história chinesa.Adquira o curso O ofício do historiador para Marc Bloch por apenas R$ 29,90 ⁠⁠CLICANDO AQUIUse o cupom HISTORIAFM para 15% de desconto, ou acesse o site pelo link https://creators.insiderstore.com.br/HISTORIAFM #insiderstore

While the Yongzheng Emperor attempts to get his domestic policy ducks in a row from the Forbidden City, out on the Western Frontiers, change is the only constant. Between squabbling Tibetan lamas, restless Kokonor Khans, and the ever-dangerous Dzungar Empire still on the loose out there, the new successor of the late, great Kangxi Emperor has some very big combat-boots to fill... Time Period Covered: ca. 1722-1728 CE Major Historical Figures: Qing Empire: Kangxi Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Xuanye) [r. 1661-1722] Yongzheng Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Yinzhen) [r. 1722-1735] Prince Yinti, the Fuyuan Daijiangjun [1688-1755]Governor Nian Gengyao [1679-1726]Governor-General Yue Zhongqi [1686-1754]General Erentei [d. 1718]Funingga [d. 1728] Dzungar Khanate: Tsewang Rabdan, Khong Tayiji [r. 1697-1727] Galdan Tseren, Khong Tayiji [r. 1727-1745] General Tsering Dondup Tibetan Gelupa/“Yellow Hats”: 5th Dalai Lama[r. 1642-1682] 6th Dalai Lama [r. 1697] 7th Dalai Lama [r. 1720-1757] sDe-pa Sangya Gyatso [1652-1705] Polhanas (Polhané Sönam Topgyé) [1689-1747] Kokonor Mongols (Khoshots): Güshi Khan (Torbaikhu) [r. 1642-1655] Lhazang Khan [r. 1700-1717] Prince Lobzang Danjin, Dalai Hongtaiji [d. 1731] Sources Cited:Perdue, Peter C. China marches west: the Qing conquest of Central Eurasia.Rowe, William T. China's last empire: the great Qing. Zelin, Madeline. “The Yung-chung reign” in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 9: The Ch'ing Dynasty, Part 1: To 1800. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode, we look at the life of Anson Burlingame, a well-known name  in California. During Lincoln's term as president, he was appointed Chief Minister to China, arriving in Beijing in the summer of 1862. Already well-known in the US as a fiery abolitionist and a man who believed everyone should be treated fairly and with all due respect, he sympathized with the Chinese government. When he arrived in post-Opium Wars, post-Treaty of Tianjin/Convention of Beijing China, he used his respected position among the diplomatic community of the treaty powers to fight for a fair deal for China. In a controversial move, he was appointed by the Qing government to lead a mission to the US and the great capitals of Europe to advocate on China's behalf. While in the US, Burlingame championed the signing of a treaty, the first of its kind, that recognized China as an equal sovereign nation. It opened the door to legal Chinese immigration and travel to the US. That ended up becoming the treaty's undoing.

  Last time we spoke about the Xi'an Incident. In December 1936, tensions in China erupted as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek faced a revolt led by his commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on battling communists instead of the Japanese invaders, the generals swiftly captured him in a coup. Confined in Xi'an, Chiang initially resisted their demands for a united front against Japan but eventually engaged in negotiation with Zhang and the Chinese Communist Party. As public sentiment shifted against him, Chiang's predicament led to urgent discussions, culminating in an unexpected alliance with the communists. This pact aimed to consolidate Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, marking a critical turning point in the Second Sino-Japanese War. By December 26, Chiang was released, and this uneasy collaboration set the stage for a more unified front against a common enemy, though underlying tensions remained between the factions.   #152 China Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Before we jump into the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, which I honestly have no idea how long will take us, I thought it would be a good idea to dedicate two episodes to how both China and Japan prepared themselves for war.  Going all the way back to the 1910s, Chinese intellectuals began to view an outright conflict between Japan and China was inevitable. In the discussions about China's strategic options, Jiang Fangzhen pioneered a strategy of protracted warfare, a concept that would later shape China's approach during the Sino-Japanese War. Having studied in Japan during his youth, Jiang developed a keen understanding of the Japanese government and military. As early as 1917, he predicted that China and Japan would become embroiled in a long-term conflict, with the battleground likely to be west of the Peiping–Wuhan and Guangzhou–Wuhan railways. In his work titled "Guofang Lun" or “On National Defense”, Jiang reiterated the importance of protracted warfare as a means to thwart Japan's aspirations for a swift victory. He argued that China should leverage its vast population and extensive territory to extend the conflict, gradually wearing down Japanese strength and turning the situation to its advantage. Jiang recommended that China not focus on defending its coastal regions but instead confront the enemy west of the Peking–Wuhan Railway.   Chiang Kai-shek would eventually come to share Jiang's belief that “the longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it will be for China.” Despite significant public criticism, both the Nationalist government and General Zhang Xueliang, decided against military resistance when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and attacked Shanghai in 1932. Chiang was particularly hesitant to engage Japan directly, as he was also dealing with a Communist insurgency in central China. He feared that Chinese forces would suffer quick defeat, predicting that Japan would capture key coastal areas and critical infrastructure within just three days, crippling China by dismantling its military and economic lifelines. Following the invasion of North China Chiang was forced to adopt a firmer stance. The Nationalist government proposed a dual strategy of pursuing peace and security while simultaneously preparing for war. If peace proved impossible, China would mobilize its resources for ultimate victory through prolonged conflict. This approach was formalized in the National Defense Plan, which China adopted by prioritizing protracted warfare as its core strategy. After the Sino-Japanese clash in Shanghai on January 28, 1932, the Military Affairs Commission devised a plan that divided China into four defense areas along with a preparation area. While some troops were assigned local security, commanders were directed to concentrate their remaining forces for potential confrontations with Japan. That year, the Military Affairs Commission issued General Defense Guidelines that outlined two strategic responses to a potential Japanese invasion. The first, conservative approach focused on maintaining key positions and utilizing protracted warfare to impede the enemy. The second strategy advocated for decisive battles in key regions to thwart Japan's ambitions and protect China's territorial integrity, prioritizing disengagement from Japanese forces along the Yangtze River and coastline. In August 1935, German military adviser General Alexander von Falkenhausen provided recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek based on his predictions of Japanese advance routes into China. He identified three main routes: one from northern Hebei to Zhengzhou, the second from Shandong toward Xuzhou, and the third crossing the Yangtze River to Nanjing and onwards to Wuhan. He suggested treating the Yangtze River as the primary combat zone and highlighted Sichuan as a possible retreat area. Taking all of this into consideration. in 1936, a draft of a new National Defense Plan divided the country into four zones: a war zone, a defense zone, an internal security zone, and a preparation area. The war zone encompassed ten provinces and established strategies for retreating to predetermined defensive positions when necessary, with Sichuan designated as the main base for the war. In January 1937, the Chinese General Staff Department introduced its annual War Plan, outlining three possible military conflict regions between China and Japan. It proposed two main strategies: Proposal A emphasized sustained combat and retreat to fortified positions if the situation became unfavorable, aiming to eventually go on the offensive against Japan. Proposal B focused on repelling Japanese invasions along the coast and from the north, prioritizing counter offensives against Japanese units stationed near key locations. To prepare, the NRA completed several critical projects outlined in its plans, establishing military supply depots in Nanjing, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huayin, Nanchang, and Wuchang to manage logistics for supplies across various strategic railways. These depots were equipped to sustain the military, with ample ammunition and provisions, including 60 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and food for hundreds of thousands. Despite these preparations, not all projects were completed by the time war broke out in July 1937. In contrast to the Japanese military's tactics, Chinese forces prioritized defensive strategies. For example, at the Mount Lushan Military Officer Training Camp in July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek outlined four possible approaches against Japan, favoring a defense-as-offense strategy. Other options included building fortifications, tenaciously defending key positions, and employing guerrilla warfare through irregular forces to constrain enemy advances. Chiang stressed the importance of national mobilization for the war effort.  There was a significant disparity in equipment between the Japanese and Chinese armies. To give you an idea, each Japanese division included a mechanized group featuring thirty-nine light military vehicles and 21 light armored cars, supplemented by 6,000–7,000 horses, 200–300 automobiles, and specialized troops such as poison gas teams. In contrast, Nationalist divisions lacked any of these capabilities, a typical nationalist division theoretically had an armored regiment, but this unit was equipped with fewer than 72 armored vehicles. Another major weakness of the Nationalist forces was their insufficient artillery. In 1936, a division was officially assigned one artillery battalion, which was divided into three batteries totaling twelve guns. It also included a mechanized cannon company with four direct-fire weapons. By comparison, a Japanese division boasted four infantry regiments and one mountain artillery or field artillery regiment, with each artillery regiment comprising three field artillery battalions and one howitzer battalion. The infantry regiment itself included a mountain artillery section with four mountain guns, while the infantry battalion had one Type 70 mountain gun section with two guns. In total, a Japanese division possessed sixty-four artillery pieces of various calibers, four times the number of a Chinese division and of significantly higher quality. In reality, in 1936, twelve of the twenty elite Chinese “reformed divisions” still lacked artillery battalions. The ordnance available in the “reformed divisions” mostly consisted of the outdated Type 60 mountain gun. Nationwide, very few of the 200 divisions were equipped with any artillery, and those that did often used obsolete field artillery pieces or mountain artillery provided to local forces. Some units even relied on trench mortars as a makeshift solution. The artillery weapons came from various countries, but they frequently lacked necessary observation and signal components, and were often low on ammunition. The majority of mountain guns and field artillery were of the Type 75, which, while capable of providing fire support, had limited range and inflicted minimal damage. To give you an idea of the striking inadequacy of the Chinese artillery, during the Shanghai fighting in 1937, the mountain artillery of the Guangxi 21st Army Group could only reach targets within 1,200 yards, while Japanese field artillery had an effective range of 8,000 yards. Chinese-made mountain artillery suffered due to inferior steel-making technology; the gun shields were constructed from low-quality steel, and the barrels often overheated after firing just a few rounds, increasing the risk of explosions. Additionally, the equipment of local forces varied greatly in quality. In fact, some local units had superior equipment compared to Nationalist units. For example, before the Sino-Japanese War, troops from Yunnan were equipped with French antitank guns and heavy machine guns, which were better than the German water-cooled machine guns used by the Nationalist forces. However, the majority of local troops relied on inferior equipment; the 122nd Division under Wang Mingzhang from Sichuan, noted for its brave defense of Tengxian County during the Xuzhou Battle, was armed with locally produced light and heavy machine guns that frequently malfunctioned, and their Type 79 rifles, also made in Sichuan, were often outdated, with some dating back to the Qing Dynasty. These weapons had limited range and sometimes malfunctioned after fewer than one hundred rounds. Now before the war, both Nationalist and local forces acquired weaponry from diverse foreign and domestic sources. Even domestically produced weapons lacked standardization, with those made in Hanyang and Manchuria differing in design and specifications. Arms manufactured in Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and Italy were similarly inconsistent. Consequently, even within a single unit, the lack of uniformity created significant logistical challenges, undermining combat effectiveness, particularly in the early stages of the war. Despite Nationalist ordnance factories producing over three million rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, the incompatibility of ammunition and weapons diminished the usable quantity of ammunition. Chinese communications infrastructure was inadequate. In the Nationalist army, signal units were integrated into engineering units, leading to low-quality radio communications. In emergencies, telegrams could remain undelivered for days, and orders often had to be dispatched via postal services. By 1937, the entire country boasted only 3,000 military vehicles, necessitating heavy reliance on horses and mules for transport. To effectively equip twenty Nationalist divisions, 10,647 horses and 20,688 mules were needed, but by the end of 1935, only 6,206 horses and 4,351 mules were available. A statistic from 1936 indicated a 5 percent mortality rate among military horses, with some units experiencing a rate as high as 10 percent. The distribution of weaponry led to disputes during army reorganization efforts following the Northern Expedition. Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces were part of the regular army, the quality of their equipment varied significantly. Domestic production of weapons was limited, and imports could not close the gap. Priority was given to small arms; through army reorganization, Chiang aimed to diminish the influence of forces less loyal to him. Nationalist army staff officers observed that troops loyal to Chiang received the best weapons. Northwest and Northeast forces, having cultivated good relations with the KMT, were similarly better equipped, while Shanxi troops received inferior supplies. Troops associated with the Guangxi Clique were given even poorer quality weapons due to their leaders' stronger political ambitions. Troops regarded as “bandit forces,” such as those led by Shi Yousan, Li Hongchang, and Sun Dianying, were naturally assigned the least effective weaponry. This unequal distribution of arms increased some local forces' inclination to align with the KMT while alienating others, which inadvertently led to additional turmoil in the aftermath of the Northern Expedition. Logistical accounting within the Nationalist military was severely lacking. Military expenditures accounted for a significant portion of government spending, roughly 65.48 % in 1937, with personnel costs being the largest component. However, military units prioritized boosting their own resources over accurate accounting. Surpluses were not returned but rather utilized to reward military officers and soldiers for merits in battle, care for the wounded, or to create a reserve. Conversely, if deficits arose, troops would resort to “living off vacancies,” a practice in which they would fail to report desertions promptly and would falsely claim new soldiers had arrived. Military leaders typically appointed their most trusted subordinates to serve as accountants and logistic officers. As the war commenced, these issues became readily apparent. During the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, frontline soldiers sometimes went days without food and went months without pay. Wounded soldiers and civilians had to search tirelessly for medical treatment, and when main forces relocated, they often abandoned grain, ammunition, weapons, and petroleum along the way. General Chen Cheng, the commander in chief during the Battle of Shanghai, noted, “This phenomenon clearly revealed our inability to supply frontline troops, indicating that China remains a backward country with poor management.” Many logistical shortcomings severely impacted troop morale and combat effectiveness. In a 1933 speech, Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that poor food, inadequate clothing, and ineffective logistics contributed to widespread desertion. Soldiers were further demoralized by reduced or embezzled salaries. A lack of professional medical staff and equipment hampered healthcare efforts, leading to high disease and mortality rates. According to official statistics from 1936, approximately 10 percent of soldiers fell ill annually, with a mortality rate as high as 5 percent. Japanese military authorities reported that one in three wounded Japanese soldiers died, while a Dutch military officer present during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War observed that one in every two wounded Nationalist soldiers perished. Due to inadequate equipment and limited transport options, Nationalist forces were compelled to recruit farmers and rent vehicles, as they lacked essential facilities such as tents. This reliance on local resources inevitably led to frequent conflicts between military personnel and civilians. China is clearly a vast nation with an extensive coastline, requiring the construction of several significant fortresses during the modern era. These included Wusong, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Wuhan along the Yangtze River, as well as Zhenhai, Humen, and Changzhou along the seacoast. Except for the Wuhan fortress, built in 1929-1930, all other fortifications were established during the late Qing Dynasty and featured uncovered cannon batteries. These fortresses suffered from inadequate maintenance, and many of their components had become outdated and irreplaceable, rendering them militarily negligible. Following the January 1932 Shanghai Incident, the Japanese military destroyed the Wusong forts, leaving the entrance to the Yangtze River completely unfortified. Consequently, there were no defenses along the coastline from Jiangsu to Shandong, allowing the Japanese to land freely. In December 1932, the Military Affairs Commission established a fortress group tasked with constructing fortresses and defensive installations, seeking assistance from German military advisers. After the North China Incident in 1935, the Nationalist government accelerated the construction of defensive structures in line with national war planning, focusing particularly on Nanjing. The Nationalists prioritized building fortifications along the seacoast and the Yellow River, followed by key regions north of the Yellow River. The government also ordered a significant quantity of heavy artillery from Germany. This included several dozen pieces of flat-fire antiaircraft and dual-purpose heavy artillery, which were installed at fortifications in Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhan. By the summer of 1937, the construction of nine fortified positions was complete: Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Jiangyin, Ningbo, Humen, Mawei, Xiamen , Nantong, and Lianyungang. In total, China had established 41 forts and equipped them with 273 fortress cannons. Some defensive installations were poorly managed, with many units assigned to their perimeters lacking training and access to proper maps. The barbette positions in the fortresses were not well concealed and could hardly store sufficient ammunition. Troops stationed at these fortresses received little training. Despite these shortcomings, the fortresses and fortifications were not entirely ineffective. They bolstered Chinese positions along the defense line stretching from Cangxian County to Baoding and from Dexian County to Shijiazhuang, as well as in southern Shandong.  Before the war, China's political and economic center was situated along the seacoast and the Yangtze River. As Japanese influence expanded, the Nationalist government was compelled to establish bases in China's inner regions, very similar to how the USSR pulled back its industry further west after Operation barbarossa.The Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 prompted the Nationalists to relocate their capital to Luoyang. On March 5, during the Second Plenary Session of the KMT's Fourth Congress, the Western Capital Preparation Committee was formed to plan for the potential relocation of all governmental bodies to Xi'an in the event of full-scale war. In February 1933, the Central Political Conference approved the Northwest Development Bill, and in February 1934, the National Economic Commission set up a northwestern branch to oversee development projects in the region. On October 18, 1934, Chiang Kai-shek traveled to Lanzhou, recording in his diary that “Northwest China has abundant resources. Japan and Russia are poised to bully us. Yet, if we strengthen ourselves and develop northwest China to the fullest extent, we can turn it into a base for China's revival.” Interestingly, it was Sichuan, rather than the northwest, that became China's rear base during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In October 1934, the Communist army evacuated its Soviet base in southern China, initiating the Long March that would ultimately end in the northwest. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to designate Sichuan as the last stronghold for China. In January 1935, the Nanchang Field Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission, responsible for combatting the Communists and serving as the supreme military and political authority over most provinces along the Yangtze River and central China, dispatched a special advisory group to Chongqing. Following this, the Nationalist army advanced into Sichuan. On February 10, the Nationalists appointed a new provincial government in Sichuan, effectively ending the province's long-standing regionalism. On March 2, Chiang traveled to Chongqing, where he delivered a speech underscoring that “Sichuan should serve as the base for China's revival.” He stated that he was in Sichuan to oversee efforts against the Communist army and to unify the provincial administration.  After the Xinhai revolution, the Republic of China was still suing the Qing Dynasty's conscription system. However, once in power, the Nationalist government sought to establish a national military service program. In 1933, it enacted a military service law, which began implementation in 1936. This law categorized military service into two branches: service in the Nationalist army and in territorial citizen army units. Men aged eighteen to forty-five were expected to serve in the territorial units if they did not enlist in the Nationalist army. The territorial service was structured into three phases: active service lasting two to three years, first reserves for six years, and second reserves until the age of forty-five. The Ministry of Military Affairs divided China into sixty divisional conscription headquarters, initially establishing these headquarters in the six provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei. By December 1936, approximately 50,000 new soldiers had been drafted. The military service law disproportionately favored the middle and upper classes. Government personnel were exempt from enlistment, allowing privileged families to register their children with government agencies. Similarly, students in middle and higher education were excused from service, while youth from poorer backgrounds often felt compelled to enlist due to financial constraints that limited their educational opportunities. Village and town leaders were responsible for executing the recruitment process and frequently conspired with army recruiters. Recruitment principles often favored wealthier families, with guidelines stating that one son should be drafted for every three sons, two for five sons, but no drafts if there was only one son. Wealthy families could secure exemptions for all their male children, while poor families might see their only son conscripted if they were unable to provide the requisite bribe. Town and village heads wielded significant power in recruitment. This new recruitment system also created numerous money-making opportunities. Military personnel assigned to escort draftees to their units would often allow draftees to escape for a fee. Additionally, draftees could monetize their service by agreeing to serve as substitutes for others. For some, being drafted became an occupation. For example, in 1936, 600 individuals were drafted in the Wuhu area of Anhui province, and accounts from regional administrators indicated that every draftee had either been traded, replaced, or seized. Beginning in 1929, the Nationalist government also instituted military training for high school students and older individuals. Students were required to participate in one theoretical class and one practical class each week, totaling three hours. Starting in 1934, students had to complete a three-month military training program before graduating. Graduates of military academies were employed as military instructors. By the end of 1936, over 237,000 high school students had undergone military training. This student military training was overseen by the Society for the Implementation of the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, which also provided political education and sometimes gathered information on students' political beliefs.  Although the Nationalists made significant efforts to improve the military training of both officers and troops, they inherited deep-seated challenges that they were unable to completely overcome. A lack of facilities, outdated training manuals, low regard for military instructors, and the ongoing influence of regionalism and warlordism hindered progress. The Japanese would also later exploit these shortcomings of the Nationalist army. The Central Military Academy, which evolved from the Whampoa Military Academy established in 1923 in Guangzhou to train officers for the Northern Expedition, became the primary training institution for junior military officers. The academy offered a basic course, lasting eighteen months, which included general education, specialized training in various subjects, and field practice. This was followed by a two-year cadet training program focused on developing the skills necessary for junior military officers. Seventeen classes were admitted before the outbreak of war. Admission to the academy was highly competitive, with military officers receiving attractive salaries. For instance, in 1935, the academy received 10,000 applications for the twelfth class, but only 7% were accepted. Upon graduation, cadets were typically assigned to divisions within the Nationalist army loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Their training, influenced by German advisors, resulted in a high-quality cadre. In modern China, most sergeants were veterans. While some units provided training for sergeants, a lack of formal education led to their diminished status. Truly qualified sergeants were rare. During his tenure as Minister of Military Training, General Bai Chongxi proposed establishing a sergeant school and creating a professional noncommissioned officer system; however, the Ministry of Military Affairs opposed this on financial grounds. While commanding officers enjoyed rapid promotions, military instructors did not. Furthermore, there was no system for transferring instructors to field commands or assigning commanders to military academies for extended periods. Despite minor updates to cover modern warfare concepts such as tank warfare and machine guns, Qing Dynasty military manuals were still in use at the Central Military Academy at the start of the war. Yeah, 1937 they were still rocking the old Qing books. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Military Training, a bureau for military translation was set up to evaluate existing course materials and translate military manuals, but its contributions were limited. Another significant shortcoming of military instruction focused on theory at the expense of practical application.  To enhance the quality of military officers, the Nationalist army instituted specialized schools for artillery, infantry, transport, engineering, and signals starting in 1931. These institutions were considered to have high-quality administrators and facilities. The Nationalists adopted German military training models, replacing the previously used Japanese models. They appointed German advisors to oversee instructor training at military academies and established three instructional divisions. By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, 15,000 students had graduated from programs with a German military influence, resulting in the creation of about fifty combat divisions from these instructional units. However, the progress of other Nationalist army units was limited because their training was not aligned with contemporary battlefield realities. Before World War I, troops operated in close formations due to limited firepower. The widespread introduction of machine guns after World War I necessitated a shift to dispersed formations. Although a new drill manual issued by the Ministry of Military Training in 1935 introduced small-group tactics, few units adopted these methods. General Chen Cheng highlighted another underlying issue in 1938, commenting on the outmoded focus on parade ground drills and formal military manners. He noted, “We have paid too much attention to stereotypical formality and procedures of no practical use. Sometimes, even though soldiers could not get a haircut or take a bath for several months, their camps had to be in order. They underwent intensive training in close-order drill but learned little about gun handling, marksmanship, or maneuvering. This was inappropriate in peacetime, yet we continued this practice even after the Sino-Japanese War started, even using it on highly educated youth.” In contrast, the Communist army simplified training, emphasizing two essential skills: live-fire exercises and physical endurance, which significantly enhanced troop effectiveness in the challenging terrain characteristic of the Sino-Japanese War. Ultimately, the Nationalist army's training did not reach all soldiers. Only about half of all combat soldiers received adequate training, while the rest were neglected. According to statistics from the time, there were approximately five million military personnel during the Sino-Japanese War, with three million serving in logistics. Most of these logistics personnel had received little training, leading to disastrous consequences for overall combat effectiveness. As warfare has become more complex, the role of highly trained staff officers has become increasingly important. Napoleon developed operational plans close to the front and communicated orders via courier. During World War I, military commanders collected information at their headquarters and utilized telephones and automobiles to relay orders to the front lines. In World War II, with the battlefield expanding to include land, sea, and air, senior commanders often made decisions from headquarters far from the action, relying on a significant number of staff officers with specialized skills to keep them informed. In China, however, the staff officer system was underdeveloped. By 1937, only about 2,000 commanders and staff officers had received training. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, most commanders managed staff work themselves, with staff officers serving primarily as military secretaries who drafted orders, reports, and maps. Many staff officers had no formal military training, and as a whole, the branch lacked respect, causing the most talented officers to avoid serving in it. The situation was even more dire for staff officer departments within local forces. For example, in March 1937, Liu Ziqing, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, was appointed as the director of political instruction in the Forty-fourth Army, a unit under Sichuan warlord Liu Xiang. Liu Ziqing's account illustrates the dysfunction within the ranks: “The commander in chief was not supposed to manage the army and even did not know its whereabouts... But he could appoint relatives and former subordinates—who were officials and businessmen as well—to the army. Each month they would receive a small stipend. At headquarters, there was a long table and two rows of chairs. Around ten o'clock in the morning, senior officers signed in to indicate their presence. Those with other business would leave, while the remaining officers sat down to leisurely discuss star actresses, fortune-telling, business projects, mah-jongg, and opium. Occasionally they would touch on national affairs, chat about news articles, or share local gossip. In the afternoons, they primarily played mah-jongg, held banquets, and visited madams. Most mornings, the commander usually presided over these activities, and at first, I reported for duty as well. But I soon realized it was a waste of time and came very rarely. At headquarters, most staff members wore long gowns or Western-style suits, while military uniforms were a rare sight.” Most senior military personnel were trained at the Baoding Military Academy during the early republic. 2/3rds of commanders in chief, 37 %of army commanders, and 20 % of division commanders were Baoding graduates. Higher-ranking officers were more likely to have launched their careers there. In contrast, only 10 % of division commanders and a few army commanders were graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Additionally, commanders trained in local military schools and those with combat experience accounted for 1/3rd of all commanders. While the prevalence of civil war provided opportunities for rapid promotion, it also hindered officers' ability to update their training or gain experience in different military branches. German advisors expressed their concerns to Chiang Kai-shek, emphasizing that officers should first serve in junior roles before taking command. During one battle in 1938, Chiang noted, “Our commanders in chief are equivalent only to our enemy's regiment commanders, and our army and division commanders are only as competent as our enemy's battalion and company commanders.” Despite not viewing high-ranking Japanese officers as great strategists, Nationalist officers respected them as highly competent, diligent, and professional commanders who rarely made critical errors. The infantry was the primary component of the Nationalist army, with middle and junior infantry officers constituting over 80 %of all army officers. A 1936 registry of military officers listed 1,105 colonels and 2,159 lieutenant colonels within the infantry, demonstrating a significant outnumbering of Baoding graduates at ranks below lieutenant colonel. However, the quality of middle and junior infantry officers declined during the Sino-Japanese War; by 1944, only 27.3 % of these officers were from formal military academies, while those promoted from the ranks increased to 28.1 %. In 1937, 80 % of officers in an ordinary infantry battalion were military academy graduates, but this percentage dropped to 20 % during the war. Its hard to tell how educated soldiers were before the war, but it is generally believed that most were illiterate. In 1929, sociologist Tao Menghe surveyed 946 soldiers from a Shanxi garrison brigade and found that only 13 percent could compose a letter independently, while the rest had either never learned to read or were unable to write. In contrast, in August 1938, General Feng Yuxiang found that 80 percent of a regiment in Hunan were literate. Regardless, during the Sino-Japanese War, the quality of recruits steadily declined. More than 90 percent of soldiers were illiterate, and few possessed any basic scientific knowledge, which hindered their ability to master their weapons. On the battlefield, they heavily relied on middle and junior officers for guidance.  In autumn 1933, General Hans von Seeckt, the architect of the post World War I German army, visited China at the personal invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. In his recommendations for military reform, he identified China's greatest problem as its excessively large forces drawn from diverse backgrounds. He stated, “At present, the most pressing goal is to... establish a small, well-equipped army with high morale and combat effectiveness to replace the numerous poorly armed and trained forces.” He suggested forming an army of sixty divisions and recommended the establishment of a training regiment for military officers to equip them with the skills needed for modern warfare. Chiang Kai-shek accepted von Seeckt's proposals, and on January 26, 1935, he convened a National Military Reorganization Conference in Nanjing. On March 1, the Army Reorganization Bureau was established in Wuchang, under the leadership of General Chen Cheng. In the same month, General Alexander von Falkenhausen took charge of the German Military Advisors Group. Before war broke out, around nineteen divisions, roughly 300,000 troops received training from German advisors and were equipped with German-style weapons. At the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the forces stemming from the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the Whampoa cadets, who had fought in the Northern Expedition, held the highest reputation and were referred to as the “core central forces” by the Japanese. Other notable forces included the Guangxi Army, Northwestern Army, Northeastern Army, some Uyghur units, the Guangdong Army, and the Shanxi Army. In contrast, provincial forces such as the Yunnan Army and Sichuan Army were viewed less favorably. Nationalist forces were generally far inferior to those of the Japanese enemy. In 1937, General He Yingqin noted that Nationalist forces had failed to prevail in 1932 and 1933, even when outnumbering the Japanese by 4-1.  In November 1937, during a national defense conference, Chiang Kai-shek stated, "In recent years we have worked hard, prepared actively, and achieved national unification. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, we were in a better domestic situation and had improved military preparedness compared to before. Since 1935, our strength has doubled. It increased by more than two to three times since January 1932 or September 1931 [when Japan attacked Shanghai and Mukden]. If peace had been achievable, we should have delayed the war for two or three years. Given an additional three years, our defensive capabilities would have been drastically different... Now, if we merely compare the military strength of China and Japan, we are certainly inferior." However, such assessments were overly optimistic, as Chiang failed to recognize that Japan's military capabilities would not have stagnated. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek certainly was dealt a difficult hand of cards for the upcoming poker match he was to play. Yet the Chinese were resilient and they had to be for the absolute horror that would be inflicted upon them from 1937-1945. Until this point, their enemies had been far more lenient, the Empire of Japan would show no mercy.

Leaving behind the imperial court of Beijing, we return to the far frontiers of the northwest, where China, Tibet, Mongolia, and Russia all converge and vie for power. Glory and riches to the victors, subjugation or death for those destined to lose. Into this mix, we follow the travels of three emissaries as they cross deserts, mountains, words, and wits to ensure their sovereign emerges on top. Time Period Covered: ~1712~1724 CE Major Historical Figures: Dzungar Khannate: Tsewang Rabdan Tsarist Russia: Tsar Peter I Leon Vasielevich Izmailov Captain Ivan Unkovskii John Bell Governor Gragarin of Siberia Glazunov Great Qing Empire: The Kangxi Emperor [r. -1722] The Yongzheng Emperor [r. 1722-17] Tulisen Mongols: Ayuki Khan of the Torghuts [r. 1673-1724] Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

The Yongzheng Emperor brings Peace, Justice, & Security to his new Empire. Time Period Covered: 1723-1728 CE Major Works Cited: Perdue, Peter C. China marches west: the Qing conquest of Central Eurasia. Qin, Han Tang (秦漢唐). 不同於戲裡說的雍正皇帝 [A different Yongzheng from the work of fiction]  Rowe, William T. China's last empire: the great Qing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

It's considered to be the bloodiest civil war in history, but there's a fair chance you've never heard of it. The Taiping Rebellion convulsed China from 1850 to 1864, leading to over 20 million deaths and severely weakening the Qing dynasty, but it remains little known outside of China today. Speaking to Rob Attar, Professor Stephen R Platt answers listener questions about the rebellion and explains why it hasn't received the attention it deserves. EXCLUSIVE NordVPN Deal ➼ https://nordvpn.com/hepod Try it risk-free now with a 30-day money-back guarantee! The HistoryExtra podcast is produced by the team behind BBC History Magazine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Yongzheng Emperor's stylings: https://bsky.app/profile/thoc.bsky.social/post/3lnvmogqntk2g Please sign up to support the show at: Patreon.com/thehistoryofchina With the passing of his titan of a father, the Kangxi Emperor's 4th curviving son Prince Yinzheng, will assume the Dragon Throne amidst a tumultuous succession. Amid betrayals and backstabbings, this unlikely monarch will ultimately find himself sandwiched between his father and his son - two uncontestable pillars of Chinese history. And yet, he'll still find ways to shine through, all his own... Time Period Covered: 1722~1728 CE Major Historical Figures: Manchu: The Yongzheng Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Yinzhen) [r. 1723-35], Kangxi's 11th (4th surviving) Son Empress Dowager Xiaogongren [1660-1723] Longkodo, Commandant of the Capital Gendarmerie [d. 1728] Prince Yunzhi, Kangxi's 10th (3rd) Son [1677-1732] Prince Yinsi, Kangxi's 16th (8th) Son [1681-1726] Prince Yintang, Kangxi's 17th (9th) Son [1683-1726] Prince Yinxiang, Kangxi's 22nd (13th) Son [1686-1730] Prince Yunti, Kangxi's 23rd (14th) Son [1688-1755] O'er'tai [1680-1745] Hanjun: Chen Menglei [1650-1741] Nian Genglao, Sichuan-Shaanxi Governor-General [1679-1726] Zeng Qing [1679-1736] Yue Zhongqi [1686-1784] Lü Liuliang [1629-1683] Jiang Tingxi [1669-1732] Zhang Tingyu [1672-1755] Li Wei [1687-1738] Tian Wenjing [1662-1732] Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices