Podcasts about qing

Qing Wang talks with Remko Tanis about what's really behind China's falling birth rate: it's about a lot more than just money, or lack thereof.Qing's eye opening essay on the topic, is available to read and download here.Qing, a multi-award winning journalist, podcaster, and social media influencer, shares her insights as China and the World Fellow at Asia Society Switzerland, made possible through the generous support of MoneyMuseum Zurich.Stay up-to-date on all events and activities at Asia Society Switzerland: subscribe to the newsletter and support our work by becoming a member.--STATE OF ASIA is a podcast from Asia Society Switzerland.  Published: June 10, 2026Host/Editor: Remko Tanis, Managing Editor, Asia Society Switzerland

Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: Discovering Tiantan: Tradition, Bonds, and Dragon Boats Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2026-06-07-07-38-19-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 在龙舟节的早晨，天空明亮晴朗，微风轻拂。En: On the morning of the Longzhou Jie, the sky was bright and clear, with a gentle breeze blowing.Zh: 健宇、梅和莉娜站在庄严宏伟的天坛前。En: Jianyu, Mei, and Lina stood in front of the majestic Tiantan.Zh: 天坛被绿色的草地和五颜六色的龙舟包围，充满了节日的气氛。En: The Tiantan was surrounded by green lawns and colorful dragon boats, full of festive atmosphere.Zh: 健宇兴奋地说：“今天，我要为大家讲解天坛的历史和文化。”En: Jianyu excitedly said, “Today, I will explain the history and culture of the Tiantan to everyone.”Zh: 他是个热爱中国历史的年轻人，喜欢与朋友分享他的知识。En: He was a young man passionate about Chinese history and loved sharing his knowledge with friends.Zh: 梅微笑着点头，她总是随身携带地图和水瓶，以备不时之需。En: Mei nodded with a smile; she always carried a map and a water bottle with her, just in case.Zh: 莉娜，虽然来自遥远的农村，现在来到北京，既兴奋又有些不知所措。En: Lina, despite coming from a distant rural area and now being in Beijing, was both excited and a bit overwhelmed.Zh: 人群开始聚集，热闹非凡。En: The crowd began to gather, becoming lively and bustling.Zh: 健宇一边走，一边讲：“天坛是为了祭天而建的，明清两代的皇帝都在这里祈求五谷丰登。”En: As Jianyu walked, he explained, “Tiantan was built for the purpose of offering sacrifices to heaven, and emperors from the Ming and Qing dynasties prayed here for a bountiful harvest.”Zh: 莉娜试图专心听讲，但被周围的喧闹和忙乱弄得有些头晕。En: Lina tried to concentrate on the explanation but felt a bit dizzy from the surrounding noise and chaos.Zh: 她轻声对梅说道：“这里的人真多，我有点跟不上。”En: She whispered to Mei, “There are so many people here, I'm having a hard time keeping up.”Zh: 梅感受到莉娜的困惑，试着安慰她：“没关系，我们可以一起慢慢逛。”En: Sensing Lina's confusion, Mei tried to reassure her, “It's okay, we can explore slowly together.”Zh: 然后她对健宇说：“或许我们可以先享受一下龙舟比赛的乐趣。”En: She then said to Jianyu, “Perhaps we can first enjoy the fun of the dragon boat races.”Zh: 健宇停了下来，看到莉娜的困扰，En: Jianyu paused, noticing Lina's distress.Zh: 他意识到自己太专注于历史的讲解，忽略了莉娜想参与节日活动的兴趣。En: He realized he had been too focused on the historical explanation and had overlooked Lina's interest in participating in the festival activities.Zh: “你说得对，”他说，“我们应该抓住这个机会，一起体验。”En: “You're right,” he said, “We should seize this opportunity and experience it together.”Zh: 一行人来到了水边，兴致勃勃地参与了一场龙舟比赛。En: The group made their way to the water's edge, enthusiastically taking part in a dragon boat race.Zh: 鼓声震天，水花四溅，健宇、梅和莉娜齐心协力，用力划桨。En: With the drums pounding and water splashing everywhere, Jianyu, Mei, and Lina paddled with all their might.Zh: 莉娜的脸上终于露出了灿烂的笑容。En: Finally, a bright smile appeared on Lina's face.Zh: 比赛结束后，三人笑着坐在草地上，分享着用香叶包成的粽子。En: After the race, the three sat on the grass, laughing and sharing zongzi wrapped in fragrant leaves.Zh: 健宇意识到，有时候体验比知识更重要，而文化不仅在书本中，也在每个人的生活经历中。En: Jianyu realized that sometimes, experiences are more important than knowledge, and culture exists not only in books but also in everyone's life experiences.Zh: 莉娜感激地说：“这真是一个难忘的经历，谢谢你们。”En: Lina gratefully said, “This has been an unforgettable experience, thank you both.”Zh: 梅满足地看着朋友们，心中感到温暖。En: Mei looked at her friends with satisfaction, feeling a warmth in her heart.Zh: 她成功地连接了大家，帮助每个人发现乐趣所在。En: She had successfully connected everyone, helping each person find joy in the festival.Zh: 在这个充满传统与欢乐结合的节日里，他们找到了属于各自的快乐。En: In this holiday filled with a blend of tradition and joy, they found their own happiness. Vocabulary Words:majestic: 庄严宏伟的lawn: 草地festive: 节日的history: 历史passionate: 热爱map: 地图rural: 农村overwhelmed: 不知所措bountiful: 丰登chaos: 忙乱reassure: 安慰seize: 抓住opportunity: 机会enthusiastically: 兴致勃勃地drum: 鼓splashing: 水花四溅paddle: 划桨fragrant: 香叶experience: 经历realize: 意识到knowledge: 知识gratefully: 感激地unforgettable: 难忘的satisfaction: 满足warmth: 温暖connect: 连接tradition: 传统joy: 欢乐blending: 结合happiness: 快乐

Éminent spécialiste de l'histoire politique et culturelle de la Chine contemporaine, Emmanuel Lincot est l'auteur de plusieurs ouvrages sur la Chine et ses rapports compliqués avec sa périphérie. Dans son nouvel essai Chine-Inde : La guerre des mondes, qu'il vient de publier aux éditions du Cerf, il analyse les rivalités géopolitiques croissantes qui opposent les deux géants d'Asie qui se font face, sur fond d'échanges et d'influences réciproques plurimillénaires. RFI : Emmanuel Lincot, vous êtes sinologue de formation. Comment est né votre intérêt pour l'Inde ? Emmanuel Lincot : L'Inde, moi, je l'ai rencontrée finalement sur le tard, par des voies de détours, puisque mes précédents travaux, durant ces dernières années, ont porté sur la Chine et ses périphéries, et notamment la Chine et le monde musulman, en particulier la Chine et l'Asie centrale. Et quand on s'intéresse à l'Asie centrale, on est amené naturellement, pour ne pas dire culturellement, à l'Inde. Tout simplement parce que l'une des grandes dynasties indiennes, les Moghols, a été fondée par Babur, qui était originaire de l'est de l'actuel Ouzbékistan, de la vallée du Ferghana. Donc, de fil en aiguille, évidemment, on est amené à se rencontrer d'une manière ou d'une autre. Chine-Inde : La guerre des mondes, c'est le titre de votre ouvrage. Comment faut-il interpréter le trait d'union qui sépare les noms des deux pays sur la couverture ? Pour le choix du titre, je n'y suis absolument pour rien. C'est mon éditeur, Jean-François Colosimo, que je salue d'ailleurs, qui a trouvé la bonne formule. Ce trait d'union, que vous soulignez, peut désigner à la fois des velléités sur le temps long de rapprochement entre deux grandes aires de civilisation et en même temps une séparation. Pour filer un peu la métaphore, on pourrait dire que ce trait d'union peut apparaître véritablement comme un mur, comme un barrage, celui de l'Himalaya en particulier, qui sépare ces deux énormes masses continentales. Et ce titre est suffisamment vaste et vague, effectivement, pour aborder des questions de géopolitique, mais aussi et surtout des questions liées à l'histoire culturelle. Bref, comment se représente-t-on l'Inde depuis la Chine sur la longue durée et réciproquement ? Et là, ça devient absolument fascinant parce qu'on s'intéresse aux lieux de mémoire, notamment aux monastères qui constituent véritablement un maillage et autant de fils d'Ariane reliant l'Inde à la Chine par le biais du Tibet, région majeure. Je pense aussi à de grandes figures intellectuelles telles que Salman Rushdie, Tagore, Gao Xingjian et bien d'autres encore. Quels ont été les moments forts de cette histoire culturelle entre la Chine et l'Inde ? Ça commence grosso modo avec l'émergence des routes de la soie qui furent des points de contact, des voies de passage. Quant au bouddhisme, ce fut un processus au très long cours. La disparition du Bouddha se situe au VIᵉ siècle avant notre ère, et il faut attendre officiellement le IIᵉ siècle de notre ère, c'est-à-dire huit siècles plus tard, pour que le bouddhisme fasse enfin son entrée officielle dans l'espace chinois. Puis, il va y avoir un fait géopolitique majeur qui survient au Moyen Âge : ce sont les invasions turco-musulmanes qui vont arrêter assez brusquement, justement, ces échanges spirituels et artistiques, mais momentanément, je dirais, parce que le lieu conservatoire de ces échanges, qui va réinterpréter le bouddhisme d'une manière tout à fait particulière, en insufflant une autre dimension spirituelle, c'est le Tibet précisément. Et le Tibet, géographiquement, il est au point d'articulation dans la région de l'Himalaya, entre le monde chinois et le monde indien précisément. Le Tibet – c'est l'une des thèses de ce livre – va très certainement redevenir un point majeur, sinon de confrontation, tout au moins d'échange d'une manière ou d'une autre, au vu de l'importance de cette région, reconnue par Pékin notamment. Le centre de gravité de l'Asie risque très certainement de se déplacer vers cette région où les enjeux sont majeurs. Sur le plan minier par exemple. On pense à l'exploitation du lithium, si important pour la fabrication de nos voitures électriques. Le Tibet est central aussi en matière de ressources en eau. Pratiquement tous les grands fleuves de l'Asie prennent leur source au Tibet. On peut dire que le Tibet est le château d'eau de toute l'Asie ou presque. Quels souvenirs la mémoire collective chinoise garde-t-elle des échanges culturels sino-indiens ? Le monde chinois et le monde indien ont été pendant très longtemps interconnectés. Ils le sont toujours fondamentalement, avec des lieux qui sont des points de cristallisation de ces mémoires collectives. En effet, et j'en mentionne un certain nombre dans ce livre, par exemple, en Chine même, vous avez la Grande pagode de l'oie sauvage, qui est un lieu majeur de l'histoire du bouddhisme, puisque c'est à ses pieds que le moine bouddhiste Xuanzang, de retour de l'Inde, a créé l'une des premières écoles de traductologie de textes d'abord écrits en langue indo-européenne, donc en sanskrit, vers le chinois. Ce lieu, précisément la Grande pagode de l'oie sauvage à Xi'an, ancienne capitale impériale de la Chine, a été, à partir de 2014, choisi par les autorités chinoises comme lieu de visite pour le chef de l'État indien, Narendra Modi. Mais depuis lors, pratiquement tous les chefs d'État étrangers s'y rendent. Alors ça, c'est assez intéressant aussi d'un point de vue de l'histoire du protocole communiste chinois. Jusqu'alors, on privilégiait la visite de la Grande Muraille. Et à partir de 2014, on privilégie un lieu de mémoire qui se veut davantage consensuel, davantage ouvert sur le monde. Et pas n'importe quel monde, au vu justement de la géographie chinoise, à l'ouest de la Chine, l'Occident de la Chine. Donc, évidemment, ça a du sens. Et réciproquement, les Indiens ont choisi par exemple le temple de Mahabalipuram, qui est un lieu majeur lié à la personnalité de Bodhidharma, mieux connu en Chine sous le nom de Damo, qui a lui aussi fait le lien entre les deux mondes. Outre le Tibet, quels sont les principaux contentieux qui opposent l'Inde et la Chine aujourd'hui ? Avec l'avènement du régime communiste en Chine et l'invasion par l'armée chinoise des hauts plateaux tibétains, eh bien, pour la première fois de leur histoire, la Chine va devenir la voisine de l'Inde, ce qui n'était pas le cas jusqu'à présent. Et donc, à partir des années 1950, la partie indienne affirme la légitimité historique des tracés frontaliers qui avaient été décidés d'ailleurs par les Britanniques, la ligne Durand, la ligne McMahon, etc. Bon, sauf que les Chinois n'ont jamais reconnu justement ces tracés frontaliers, non seulement à l'époque impériale, donc à la fin du XIXᵉ siècle, sous la dynastie des Qing, mais non plus à l'époque républicaine et encore moins à l'époque actuelle, celle de la République populaire de Chine. Donc il y a un contentieux très important sur 3 800 kilomètres de frontière commune, ce qui est tout à fait considérable. Sans oublier des contentieux territoriaux, donc des disputes territoriales. L'Aksai Chin, par exemple, qui se trouve dans le prolongement du Ladakh, a été purement et simplement annexé par l'armée chinoise en 1962, au grand dam évidemment de l'Inde. New Delhi, quant à elle, revendique évidemment la restitution de ce territoire. La Chine, pour sa part, revendique la restitution de l'Arunachal Pradesh, situé dans le prolongement du Tibet donc. Il y a un passif très, très important qui présage du pire pour l'avenir. Cet avenir est peut-être plus proche qu'on ne le pense. Croyez-vous que la question de la succession du Dalaï Lama, qui va se poser bientôt, pourrait voir une crise grave éclater entre les deux pays ? Généralement, la question du Dalaï Lama est déconsidérée en Occident. On imagine que c'est peu important. Or pour nombre de peuples, qu'ils soient hindouistes, bouddhistes, le Dalaï Lama est considéré comme un dieu vivant. Donc, la question de sa succession, si l'on traduit cela en langage politique, va de toute évidence provoquer une crise, avec probablement une velléité tantôt indienne, tantôt chinoise, d'instrumentaliser chacune à son profit cette succession. Et le Dalaï Lama, il faut le rappeler, généralement, on n'a pas connaissance de ce fait qui est capital, est considéré aussi comme le chef spirituel des Mongols, par exemple. Donc on est très loin du monde tibétain et du monde indien a priori. Mais donc en retour, cela signifie une affaire politique tout à fait considérable aux yeux de Pékin, bien sûr. La guerre des mondes est le sous-titre de votre ouvrage. Autrement dit, selon vous, une cohabitation pacifique entre les deux voisins demeure improbable dans l'état actuel de leurs relations ? Elle sera très difficile, ça c'est clair. On est totalement sorti de cette vision irénique du rapprochement entre les peuples. Hélas, on peut le déplorer, mais c'est la réalité. On est dans un ordre bismarckien, c'est-à-dire avec le rappel de la souveraineté des États, la défense de leurs intérêts, avec peut-être des configurations neuves qui ont très certainement traversé l'esprit des dirigeants. On pense notamment à un rapprochement « Chine, Russie, Inde » qui n'est pas un projet totalement farfelu, parce que la Russie reste encore la matrice idéologique d'une grande partie de l'élite indienne, mais aussi de l'élite chinoise. Cette tripolarité me paraît invraisemblable, mais néanmoins, on y pense, c'est tout à fait évident. Et donc clairement, vous avez là tout simplement les trois quarts du monde ou presque, qui sont représentés à travers cette tripolarité, qui feraient idéalement contrepoids, évidemment, à l'Occident. En tout cas, on ne va pas du tout dans le sens d'un apaisement des relations, bien au contraire, hélas ! À lire aussiInde-Chine: «La volonté de normalisation n'est pas née de l'humiliation infligée par Trump avec ses tarifs douaniers»

Éminent spécialiste de l'histoire politique et culturelle de la Chine contemporaine, Emmanuel Lincot est l'auteur de plusieurs ouvrages sur la Chine et ses rapports compliqués avec sa périphérie. Dans son nouvel essai Chine-Inde : La guerre des mondes, qu'il vient de publier aux éditions du Cerf, il analyse les rivalités géopolitiques croissantes qui opposent les deux géants d'Asie qui se font face, sur fond d'échanges et d'influences réciproques plurimillénaires. RFI : Emmanuel Lincot, vous êtes sinologue de formation. Comment est né votre intérêt pour l'Inde ? Emmanuel Lincot : L'Inde, moi, je l'ai rencontrée finalement sur le tard, par des voies de détours, puisque mes précédents travaux, durant ces dernières années, ont porté sur la Chine et ses périphéries, et notamment la Chine et le monde musulman, en particulier la Chine et l'Asie centrale. Et quand on s'intéresse à l'Asie centrale, on est amené naturellement, pour ne pas dire culturellement, à l'Inde. Tout simplement parce que l'une des grandes dynasties indiennes, les Moghols, a été fondée par Babur, qui était originaire de l'est de l'actuel Ouzbékistan, de la vallée du Ferghana. Donc, de fil en aiguille, évidemment, on est amené à se rencontrer d'une manière ou d'une autre. Chine-Inde : La guerre des mondes, c'est le titre de votre ouvrage. Comment faut-il interpréter le trait d'union qui sépare les noms des deux pays sur la couverture ? Pour le choix du titre, je n'y suis absolument pour rien. C'est mon éditeur, Jean-François Colosimo, que je salue d'ailleurs, qui a trouvé la bonne formule. Ce trait d'union, que vous soulignez, peut désigner à la fois des velléités sur le temps long de rapprochement entre deux grandes aires de civilisation et en même temps une séparation. Pour filer un peu la métaphore, on pourrait dire que ce trait d'union peut apparaître véritablement comme un mur, comme un barrage, celui de l'Himalaya en particulier, qui sépare ces deux énormes masses continentales. Et ce titre est suffisamment vaste et vague, effectivement, pour aborder des questions de géopolitique, mais aussi et surtout des questions liées à l'histoire culturelle. Bref, comment se représente-t-on l'Inde depuis la Chine sur la longue durée et réciproquement ? Et là, ça devient absolument fascinant parce qu'on s'intéresse aux lieux de mémoire, notamment aux monastères qui constituent véritablement un maillage et autant de fils d'Ariane reliant l'Inde à la Chine par le biais du Tibet, région majeure. Je pense aussi à de grandes figures intellectuelles telles que Salman Rushdie, Tagore, Gao Xingjian et bien d'autres encore. Quels ont été les moments forts de cette histoire culturelle entre la Chine et l'Inde ? Ça commence grosso modo avec l'émergence des routes de la soie qui furent des points de contact, des voies de passage. Quant au bouddhisme, ce fut un processus au très long cours. La disparition du Bouddha se situe au VIᵉ siècle avant notre ère, et il faut attendre officiellement le IIᵉ siècle de notre ère, c'est-à-dire huit siècles plus tard, pour que le bouddhisme fasse enfin son entrée officielle dans l'espace chinois. Puis, il va y avoir un fait géopolitique majeur qui survient au Moyen Âge : ce sont les invasions turco-musulmanes qui vont arrêter assez brusquement, justement, ces échanges spirituels et artistiques, mais momentanément, je dirais, parce que le lieu conservatoire de ces échanges, qui va réinterpréter le bouddhisme d'une manière tout à fait particulière, en insufflant une autre dimension spirituelle, c'est le Tibet précisément. Et le Tibet, géographiquement, il est au point d'articulation dans la région de l'Himalaya, entre le monde chinois et le monde indien précisément. Le Tibet – c'est l'une des thèses de ce livre – va très certainement redevenir un point majeur, sinon de confrontation, tout au moins d'échange d'une manière ou d'une autre, au vu de l'importance de cette région, reconnue par Pékin notamment. Le centre de gravité de l'Asie risque très certainement de se déplacer vers cette région où les enjeux sont majeurs. Sur le plan minier par exemple. On pense à l'exploitation du lithium, si important pour la fabrication de nos voitures électriques. Le Tibet est central aussi en matière de ressources en eau. Pratiquement tous les grands fleuves de l'Asie prennent leur source au Tibet. On peut dire que le Tibet est le château d'eau de toute l'Asie ou presque. Quels souvenirs la mémoire collective chinoise garde-t-elle des échanges culturels sino-indiens ? Le monde chinois et le monde indien ont été pendant très longtemps interconnectés. Ils le sont toujours fondamentalement, avec des lieux qui sont des points de cristallisation de ces mémoires collectives. En effet, et j'en mentionne un certain nombre dans ce livre, par exemple, en Chine même, vous avez la Grande pagode de l'oie sauvage, qui est un lieu majeur de l'histoire du bouddhisme, puisque c'est à ses pieds que le moine bouddhiste Xuanzang, de retour de l'Inde, a créé l'une des premières écoles de traductologie de textes d'abord écrits en langue indo-européenne, donc en sanskrit, vers le chinois. Ce lieu, précisément la Grande pagode de l'oie sauvage à Xi'an, ancienne capitale impériale de la Chine, a été, à partir de 2014, choisi par les autorités chinoises comme lieu de visite pour le chef de l'État indien, Narendra Modi. Mais depuis lors, pratiquement tous les chefs d'État étrangers s'y rendent. Alors ça, c'est assez intéressant aussi d'un point de vue de l'histoire du protocole communiste chinois. Jusqu'alors, on privilégiait la visite de la Grande Muraille. Et à partir de 2014, on privilégie un lieu de mémoire qui se veut davantage consensuel, davantage ouvert sur le monde. Et pas n'importe quel monde, au vu justement de la géographie chinoise, à l'ouest de la Chine, l'Occident de la Chine. Donc, évidemment, ça a du sens. Et réciproquement, les Indiens ont choisi par exemple le temple de Mahabalipuram, qui est un lieu majeur lié à la personnalité de Bodhidharma, mieux connu en Chine sous le nom de Damo, qui a lui aussi fait le lien entre les deux mondes. Outre le Tibet, quels sont les principaux contentieux qui opposent l'Inde et la Chine aujourd'hui ? Avec l'avènement du régime communiste en Chine et l'invasion par l'armée chinoise des hauts plateaux tibétains, eh bien, pour la première fois de leur histoire, la Chine va devenir la voisine de l'Inde, ce qui n'était pas le cas jusqu'à présent. Et donc, à partir des années 1950, la partie indienne affirme la légitimité historique des tracés frontaliers qui avaient été décidés d'ailleurs par les Britanniques, la ligne Durand, la ligne McMahon, etc. Bon, sauf que les Chinois n'ont jamais reconnu justement ces tracés frontaliers, non seulement à l'époque impériale, donc à la fin du XIXᵉ siècle, sous la dynastie des Qing, mais non plus à l'époque républicaine et encore moins à l'époque actuelle, celle de la République populaire de Chine. Donc il y a un contentieux très important sur 3 800 kilomètres de frontière commune, ce qui est tout à fait considérable. Sans oublier des contentieux territoriaux, donc des disputes territoriales. L'Aksai Chin, par exemple, qui se trouve dans le prolongement du Ladakh, a été purement et simplement annexé par l'armée chinoise en 1962, au grand dam évidemment de l'Inde. New Delhi, quant à elle, revendique évidemment la restitution de ce territoire. La Chine, pour sa part, revendique la restitution de l'Arunachal Pradesh, situé dans le prolongement du Tibet donc. Il y a un passif très, très important qui présage du pire pour l'avenir. Cet avenir est peut-être plus proche qu'on ne le pense. Croyez-vous que la question de la succession du Dalaï Lama, qui va se poser bientôt, pourrait voir une crise grave éclater entre les deux pays ? Généralement, la question du Dalaï Lama est déconsidérée en Occident. On imagine que c'est peu important. Or pour nombre de peuples, qu'ils soient hindouistes, bouddhistes, le Dalaï Lama est considéré comme un dieu vivant. Donc, la question de sa succession, si l'on traduit cela en langage politique, va de toute évidence provoquer une crise, avec probablement une velléité tantôt indienne, tantôt chinoise, d'instrumentaliser chacune à son profit cette succession. Et le Dalaï Lama, il faut le rappeler, généralement, on n'a pas connaissance de ce fait qui est capital, est considéré aussi comme le chef spirituel des Mongols, par exemple. Donc on est très loin du monde tibétain et du monde indien a priori. Mais donc en retour, cela signifie une affaire politique tout à fait considérable aux yeux de Pékin, bien sûr. La guerre des mondes est le sous-titre de votre ouvrage. Autrement dit, selon vous, une cohabitation pacifique entre les deux voisins demeure improbable dans l'état actuel de leurs relations ? Elle sera très difficile, ça c'est clair. On est totalement sorti de cette vision irénique du rapprochement entre les peuples. Hélas, on peut le déplorer, mais c'est la réalité. On est dans un ordre bismarckien, c'est-à-dire avec le rappel de la souveraineté des États, la défense de leurs intérêts, avec peut-être des configurations neuves qui ont très certainement traversé l'esprit des dirigeants. On pense notamment à un rapprochement « Chine, Russie, Inde » qui n'est pas un projet totalement farfelu, parce que la Russie reste encore la matrice idéologique d'une grande partie de l'élite indienne, mais aussi de l'élite chinoise. Cette tripolarité me paraît invraisemblable, mais néanmoins, on y pense, c'est tout à fait évident. Et donc clairement, vous avez là tout simplement les trois quarts du monde ou presque, qui sont représentés à travers cette tripolarité, qui feraient idéalement contrepoids, évidemment, à l'Occident. En tout cas, on ne va pas du tout dans le sens d'un apaisement des relations, bien au contraire, hélas ! À lire aussiInde-Chine: «La volonté de normalisation n'est pas née de l'humiliation infligée par Trump avec ses tarifs douaniers»

Episode 4137 │ May 2026 A foreign ethnic minority of 300,000 ruled 100 million Han Chinese for 268 years. The resistance network that formed to restore Han sovereignty never stopped. It outlasted the Qing, the Nationalists, and Mao. Scott Kesterson examines the Han and Manchu distinction — the ethnic occupation at the root of China's 400-year shadow power structure — and connects it to the Opium Wars Britain launched to protect its drug trade, the Boxer Rebellion that was anti-Qing before it was anti-Western, and the Eight-Nation Alliance that forced China to pay reparations for suppressing its own people's uprising. The episode traces the Triad networks from Ming loyalist resistance through Imperial Japan's invasion, Madame Chiang's 1941 double move — the Flying Tigers and the panda simultaneously — to the Soong family holding positions in both the Nationalist and Communist governments at the same time. One question runs through all of it: when every visible government fell, what didn't? What distinguishes Han from Manchu and why did it produce 268 years of underground resistance? Who were the Opium Wars actually started by — and why two? What was the Boxer Protocol and who was the Qing paying, and why? How did Madame Chiang bind American blood and American emotion to China's survival in the same year? What is the one thing that survived the Qing, the Nationalists, and the Communists? BardsFM is a daily independent podcast covering faith, liberty, history, and information warfare. Hosted by Scott Kesterson — combat veteran, documentary filmmaker, and rancher. Over 4,100 episodes and 50 million lifetime downloads. New episodes every weekday. bards.fm #BardsFM #HanAndManchu #TheTriads Bards Nation Health Store: www.bardsnationhealth.com MYPillow promo code: BARDS >> Go to https://www.mypillow.com/bards and use the promo code BARDS or... Call 1-800-975-2939.  EMPShield protect your vehicles and home. Promo code BARDS: Click here Treadlite Broadforks...best garden tool EVER. Promo code BARDS26: TreadliteBroadforks.com EnviroKlenz Air Purification, promo code BARDS to save 10%: www.enviroklenz.com Morning Intro Music Provided by Brian Kahanek: www.briankahanek.com Founders Bible 20% discount code: BARDS >>> TheFoundersBible.com Windblown Media 20% Discount with promo code BARDS: windblownmedia.com White Oak Pastures Grassfed Meats, Get $20 off any order $150 or more. Promo Code BARDS: www.whiteoakpastures.com/BARDS Mission Darkness Faraday Bags and RF Shielding. Promo code BARDS: Click here If you wish to support this podcast directly you can donate here... DONATE: Click here Mailing Address: Xpedition Cafe, LLC Attn. Scott Kesterson 591 E Central Ave, #740 Sutherlin, OR  97479

How did a vast, nationwide institution like a modern postal system come into being in Qing China—right at the very end of the empire? In The Making of China's Post Office: Sovereignty, Modernization, and the Connection of a Nation (Harvard University Press, 2024), Weipin Tsai takes up this question by tracing the origins and early development of China's postal system. The book asks not only how such an institution was built, but why it emerged when it did and in the particular form it took. In doing so, Tsai situates the post office within the Qing's broader efforts to modernize, showing how its development intersected with political maneuvering, imperial pressures, and changing ideas about the nature of the state. The Making of China's Post Office examines both the high-level decisions and the ground-level operations that shaped the system's creation and expansion. Tsai pays particular attention to the economic and social pressures that drove its growth, as well as the everyday work of postal employees, including the nitty-gritty of routes, logistics, and administration. This dual focus allows Tsai to show how the circulation of mail depended on the interplay between central ambitions and local realities, while also uncovering the work that happened at the local level. Tsai's book offers a new perspective on China's encounters with imperialism, efforts at centralization, and changing conceptions of governance. In following the routes and emerging and routines of the post, The Making of China's Post Office delivers a rich account of how a modern communications network took shape. This book will be of interest to readers of modern Chinese history, as well as those working on global histories of infrastructure, communication, and the state. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

How did a vast, nationwide institution like a modern postal system come into being in Qing China—right at the very end of the empire? In The Making of China's Post Office: Sovereignty, Modernization, and the Connection of a Nation (Harvard University Press, 2024), Weipin Tsai takes up this question by tracing the origins and early development of China's postal system. The book asks not only how such an institution was built, but why it emerged when it did and in the particular form it took. In doing so, Tsai situates the post office within the Qing's broader efforts to modernize, showing how its development intersected with political maneuvering, imperial pressures, and changing ideas about the nature of the state. The Making of China's Post Office examines both the high-level decisions and the ground-level operations that shaped the system's creation and expansion. Tsai pays particular attention to the economic and social pressures that drove its growth, as well as the everyday work of postal employees, including the nitty-gritty of routes, logistics, and administration. This dual focus allows Tsai to show how the circulation of mail depended on the interplay between central ambitions and local realities, while also uncovering the work that happened at the local level. Tsai's book offers a new perspective on China's encounters with imperialism, efforts at centralization, and changing conceptions of governance. In following the routes and emerging and routines of the post, The Making of China's Post Office delivers a rich account of how a modern communications network took shape. This book will be of interest to readers of modern Chinese history, as well as those working on global histories of infrastructure, communication, and the state. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

How did a vast, nationwide institution like a modern postal system come into being in Qing China—right at the very end of the empire? In The Making of China's Post Office: Sovereignty, Modernization, and the Connection of a Nation (Harvard University Press, 2024), Weipin Tsai takes up this question by tracing the origins and early development of China's postal system. The book asks not only how such an institution was built, but why it emerged when it did and in the particular form it took. In doing so, Tsai situates the post office within the Qing's broader efforts to modernize, showing how its development intersected with political maneuvering, imperial pressures, and changing ideas about the nature of the state. The Making of China's Post Office examines both the high-level decisions and the ground-level operations that shaped the system's creation and expansion. Tsai pays particular attention to the economic and social pressures that drove its growth, as well as the everyday work of postal employees, including the nitty-gritty of routes, logistics, and administration. This dual focus allows Tsai to show how the circulation of mail depended on the interplay between central ambitions and local realities, while also uncovering the work that happened at the local level. Tsai's book offers a new perspective on China's encounters with imperialism, efforts at centralization, and changing conceptions of governance. In following the routes and emerging and routines of the post, The Making of China's Post Office delivers a rich account of how a modern communications network took shape. This book will be of interest to readers of modern Chinese history, as well as those working on global histories of infrastructure, communication, and the state. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

How did a vast, nationwide institution like a modern postal system come into being in Qing China—right at the very end of the empire? In The Making of China's Post Office: Sovereignty, Modernization, and the Connection of a Nation (Harvard University Press, 2024), Weipin Tsai takes up this question by tracing the origins and early development of China's postal system. The book asks not only how such an institution was built, but why it emerged when it did and in the particular form it took. In doing so, Tsai situates the post office within the Qing's broader efforts to modernize, showing how its development intersected with political maneuvering, imperial pressures, and changing ideas about the nature of the state. The Making of China's Post Office examines both the high-level decisions and the ground-level operations that shaped the system's creation and expansion. Tsai pays particular attention to the economic and social pressures that drove its growth, as well as the everyday work of postal employees, including the nitty-gritty of routes, logistics, and administration. This dual focus allows Tsai to show how the circulation of mail depended on the interplay between central ambitions and local realities, while also uncovering the work that happened at the local level. Tsai's book offers a new perspective on China's encounters with imperialism, efforts at centralization, and changing conceptions of governance. In following the routes and emerging and routines of the post, The Making of China's Post Office delivers a rich account of how a modern communications network took shape. This book will be of interest to readers of modern Chinese history, as well as those working on global histories of infrastructure, communication, and the state. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

How did a vast, nationwide institution like a modern postal system come into being in Qing China—right at the very end of the empire? In The Making of China's Post Office: Sovereignty, Modernization, and the Connection of a Nation (Harvard University Press, 2024), Weipin Tsai takes up this question by tracing the origins and early development of China's postal system. The book asks not only how such an institution was built, but why it emerged when it did and in the particular form it took. In doing so, Tsai situates the post office within the Qing's broader efforts to modernize, showing how its development intersected with political maneuvering, imperial pressures, and changing ideas about the nature of the state. The Making of China's Post Office examines both the high-level decisions and the ground-level operations that shaped the system's creation and expansion. Tsai pays particular attention to the economic and social pressures that drove its growth, as well as the everyday work of postal employees, including the nitty-gritty of routes, logistics, and administration. This dual focus allows Tsai to show how the circulation of mail depended on the interplay between central ambitions and local realities, while also uncovering the work that happened at the local level. Tsai's book offers a new perspective on China's encounters with imperialism, efforts at centralization, and changing conceptions of governance. In following the routes and emerging and routines of the post, The Making of China's Post Office delivers a rich account of how a modern communications network took shape. This book will be of interest to readers of modern Chinese history, as well as those working on global histories of infrastructure, communication, and the state. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/communications

Tunde and his co-host, Showontstop, review Qing Madi's Barely Legal album, plus discuss New Music Friday OUTLINE00:00 - Introduction02:50 - Catch up08:30 - Asake announces Europe and North America tour following 'M$NEY' album success10:27 -   Qing Madi - Barely Legal EP17:50 - New musicElumelu by Young JonnEnergy by Tiwa Savage, Wande Coal & MavoShake That by Patoranking & RugerGorgeous by Kunmie & LojayHIH + Serial Kisser by Rukmani31:40 - Sign outAPPLE MUSIC PLAYLIST LINK HERE SPOTIFY PLAYLIST LINK HERE 

This is the penultimate chapter in the story of Cixi, Empress Dowager of the Qing dynasty, renowned for her enduring love of different types of jade. Even more precious than gold or diamonds, jade is considered the ultimate good luck charm. Over time, it has become a symbol associated with China's emperors and empresses. Steeped in legends and myths, jade is believed to bring wisdom to all those who wear it... and maybe even eternal life.Voice of Jewels, a podcast from L'ÉCOLE, School of Jewelry Arts supported by Van Cleef & Arpels. Unveiling the stories and secrets behind History's most fascinating jewels.With Inezita Gay-Eckel, Jewelry Historian and Lecturer at L'ÉCOLE, School of Jewelry Arts.Written by Martin Quenehen and Aram Kebabdjian, performed by Edoardo Ballerini and produced by Bababam. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Ceci est l'avant-dernier chapitre de l'histoire de Cixi, impératrice douairière de Chine de la dynastie Qing, réputée pour son amour illimité du jade. Plus précieux encore que l'or ou le diamant, le jade est considéré en Chine comme la matière porte-bonheur par excellence, au point de devenir le symbole de tous les empereurs et impératrices chinois.Pierre chargée de légendes et de mythes, le jade offrirait la sagesse à celui qui le porte… et peut-être même la vie éternelle.La Voix des Bijoux est un podcast de L'École des Arts Joailliers avec le soutien de Van Cleef & Arpels, qui vous dévoile les fascinantes histoires et les savoirs secrets que renferment les plus beaux bijoux.Avec la participation d'Inezita Gay-Eckel, historienne du bijou et professeure à L'École des Arts Joailliers.Écrit par Martin Quenehen et Aram Kebabdjian, interprété par Pierre François Garel et produit par Bababam. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Aquesta setmana, A les Portes de Troia, continuem el nostre viatge per la Gran Muralla xinesa. Descobrirem com l'obsessió i la por a una nova invasió mongola van portar la dinastia Ming a construir la icònica frontera de pedra que tots coneixem, amb torres de vigilància i un curiós morter fet amb arròs. Repassarem com el Ministeri d'Obres Públiques va organitzar aquesta titànica construcció i, finalment, analitzarem la seva caiguda per la traïció d'un general, el seu llarg abandonament sota els Qing i la seva resurrecció moderna com a símbol nacional i turístic durant la República Popular de la Xina.

Anna Luisa Pignatelli"Il letto cinese"Fazi Editorewww.fazieditore.itLibro originale, dallo stile raffinato, Il letto cinese racconta il difficile rapporto tra un vecchio professore ormai al tramonto e un giovane in cerca di sé durante gli anni di piombo.Uno stimato accademico, sinologo di fama, chiama suo nipote, un giovane inconcludente e un po' sconclusionato, ad aiutarlo nella stesura di un testo sugli ultimi imperatori cinesi della dinastia dei Qing. Zio e nipote appartengono a due mondi diversi: il primo è dedito alla carriera, ligio e ambizioso, mentre il secondo è ancora uno studente, sognatore e romantico. Il professore cerca di portare il ragazzo sulla propria strada, facendogli battere a macchina i suoi scritti e trasformandolo nel suo assistente. Durante le lunghe sedute di dettatura, lo studioso ha modo di ripercorrere le vicende del tormentato regno dell'imperatrice madre Tzu Hsi e le tragiche circostanze che portarono alla morte del sovrano Kuang Hsu, con il quale il nipote si identifica. Quando la vita, con i suoi drammi, farà irruzione nell'esistenza monotona del giovane, lo zio non lo aiuterà e, anzi, si rivelerà in tutto il suo egoismo. Un evento inaspettato, però, consentirà al nipote di riflettere meglio su quel legame e il ragazzo capirà di aver ricevuto più di quanto abbia realizzato. Si renderà conto che quell'uomo, così diverso, è riuscito a infondergli la passione per lo studio grazie alla sua immensa cultura: un lascito essenziale, che gli permetterà di seguire le sue orme dando finalmente un senso alla propria esistenza.Un racconto profondo che mette a confronto due mondi apparentemente inconciliabili con un unico, grande punto di contatto: l'amore per la vita, per se stessi e per quello che si sceglie di essere. Un romanzo appassionante, scritto con la maestria di un'autrice di talento apprezzata per il suo stile asciutto e oltremodo incisivo, per una storia potente di scontro tra generazioni.Anna Luisa PignatelliToscana di nascita, e già definita da Antonio Tabucchi «una voce insolita nella letteratura italiana di oggi: lirica, tagliente e desolata», ha trascorso molti anni fuori dall'Italia. Tradotta in Francia, nel 2010 ha vinto il Prix des lecteurs du Var con la raccolta di racconti Noir Toscan. Per Fazi Editore, nel 2016 ha pubblicato Ruggine, Premio Lugnano 2016, nel 2019 Foschia, e nel 2023 Il campo di Gosto.Diventa un supporter di questo podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/il-posto-delle-parole--1487855/support.IL POSTO DELLE PAROLEascoltare fa pensarehttps://ilpostodelleparole.it/

One of the most important mandarins of the late-Qing was also one of the most controversial figures in Chinese history.Support the show

兩岸關係 liǎng àn guān xì - cross-strait relations (Taiwan–China relations)角度 jiǎo dù - perspective; angle第二次世界大戰 dì èr cì shì jiè dà zhàn - World War II世紀 shì jì - century佔據 zhàn jù - to occupy據點 jù diǎn - base; strategic point朝代 cháo dài - dynasty納入 nà rù - to incorporate; to include版圖 bǎn tú - territory; domain明末清初 míng mò qīng chū - late Ming and early Qing period明朝 Míng cháo - Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)清朝 Qīng cháo - Qing Dynasty (1644–1912)漢人的政權 Hàn rén de zhèng quán - Han Chinese regime皇帝 huáng dì - emperor女真人 Nǚ zhēn rén - Jurchen people少數民族 shǎo shù mín zú - ethnic minority服氣 fú qì - to accept; to be convinced推翻 tuī fān - to overthrow打敗 dǎ bài - to defeat反攻大陸 fǎn gōng dà lù - to retake mainland China穩固 wěn gù - to stabilize; to consolidate甲午戰爭 Jiǎ wǔ zhàn zhēng - First Sino-Japanese War (First China–Japan War, 25 July 1894 – 17 April 1895)打仗 dǎ zhàng - to wage war割讓 gē ràng - to cede (territory)統治 tǒng zhì - to rule; to govern協議 xié yì - agreement中華民國 Zhōng huá mín guó - Republic of China (Taiwan) (founded in 1912)混亂 hùn luàn - chaotic; disorderly腐敗 fǔ bài - corrupt; corruption起義 qǐ yì - uprising發動革命 fā dòng gé mìng - to launch a revolution推翻 tuī fān - to overthrow內戰 nèi zhàn - civil war共產黨 gòng chǎn dǎng - Communist Party國民黨 guó mín dǎng - Kuomintang (KMT)抗日 kàng rì - to resist Japan (Anti-Japanese resistance)中華人民共和國 Zhōng huá rén mín gòng hé guó - People's Republic of China (October 1, 1949 founded)執政 zhí zhèng - to be in power; to govern民主社會 mín zhǔ shè huì - democratic society戒嚴 jiè yán - martial law (May 20, 1949 – Jul 15, 1987 in Taiwan)撤退 chè tuì - to retreat通信 tōng xìn - to communicate (by mail/phone)間諜 jiàn dié - spy一個中國原則 yí gè Zhōng guó yuán zé - One-China principle十大建設 shí dà jiàn shè - Ten Major Construction Projects (Taiwan)反對台獨 fǎn duì tái dú - to oppose Taiwan independence派 pài - to send; to dispatch軍機軍艦 jūn jī jūn jiàn - military aircraft and warships民主自由 mín zhǔ zì yóu - democracy and freedom親近 qīn jìn - to get closer to; to be close withFollow me on Instagram: fangfang.chineselearning !

We head into the mountains to tell the story of the deep relationship between Taiwan's Indigenous communities and firearms. The warriors' incredible skill and ingenuity with guns enabled them to hold off Qing dynasty forces, Western punitive expeditions, and even the modern Japanese army well into the 20th century. Far from the familiar image of bows and arrows versus modern rifles, Taiwan's Indigenous peoples were quick to adopt and adapt firearms. Early on these firearms were simple matchlock muskets – slow to load but still deadly in skilled hands – but in the late 1880s, the Indigenous groups acquired modern rifles. Sometimes they had firepower equal to, or better than, their opponents. Through the centuries, guns became essential tools for hunting and warfare. They also became items of status and cultural importance. Guns were gifted in marriage, buried with the dead, and woven into customs of justice and belief.For this episode, we drew on the excellent dissertation by Pei-Hsi Lin(Susan Lin), Firearms, Technology and Culture: Resistance of TaiwaneseIndigenes to Chinese, European and Japanese Encroachment in a Global Context(c.1860–1914).

The God-Worshippers of Thistle Mountain managed to survive their first test — but now the world itself seems dead-set on finishing the job. When unprecedented rains lead to flooding, famine, and pestilence across southern China, the last institutions holding things together collapse, leaving those on the margins to their own survival. Until, that is, the divine summons of the Second Son of God calls them — one and all — to the village of Jintian, a bold maneuver that will force a response from the Qing dynasty itself.Time Period Covered:1849-1851 CE Major Historical Figures:God-Worshippers/Taiping:Hong Xiuquan, prophet, Heavenly King [1814–1864]Feng Yunshan, chief evangelist and architect of the God-Worshipping Society [1815–1852]Yang Xiuqing, Eastern King, Voice of God the Father [d. 1856]Xiao Chaogui, Western King, Voice of Jesus Christ [d. 1852]Lo Daguo, Triad chief, Taiping recruit [fl. 1850–1851]Qing Dynasty:Lin Zexu, Imperial Commissioner [1785–1850]Ikedanbu, Manchu Colonel [d. January 1, 1851] Major Sources Cited:Hamberg, Theodore. The Visions of Hung-Siu-tshuen and the Origin of the Kwang-si InsurrectionKuhn, Philip A. "Ch. 6, The Taiping Rebellion" in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10Platt, Stephen R. Autumn in the Heavenly KingdomSpence, Jonathan D. God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today, we'll talk about the Italian Jesuit painter Giuseppe Castiglione, who crossed cultural boundaries to serve three Qing emperors and created a groundbreaking fusion of European realism and Chinese court painting, most famously represented by his masterpiece One Hundred Horses.

What if a single belief system could spark one of the deadliest civil wars in world history? In this episode, we dive into the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864)—a catastrophic uprising that reshaped Qing China and left millions dead. The Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) was the deadliest civil war in human history, fueled by religious vision, political ambition, and massive social upheaval in Qing-dynasty China. It began when Hong Xiuquan, a failed exam candidate, claimed divine revelations and formed a movement that blended biblical ideas with Chinese traditions. Over time, that faith-inspired message became a revolutionary program that rejected Qing rule and promised a radically new society. Several forces helped drive the uprising. Widespread poverty, corruption, and instability left many communities vulnerable, while the effects of the opium trade accelerated economic decline and social breakdown. As Taiping armies grew, they used both military pressure and strict ideological commitment—turning conquest into a cultural and political project. A major turning point came in 1853, when the Taiping captured Nanjing and made it their capital, establishing the Heavenly Kingdom of Taiping. The rebellion then spread across large parts of southern China through campaigns, sieges, and battles—often accompanied by harsh internal crackdowns and leadership rivalries that weakened the movement. Ultimately, Qing forces rebuilt their strength through more effective regional commanders and modernizing tactics. The rebellion was crushed after years of grinding warfare, culminating in the fall of Taiping power in the mid-1860s. Estimates of deaths commonly reach 20–30 million, making the Taiping Rebellion a defining tragedy of 19th-century China—and a key topic for anyone studying revolutionary ideology, imperial decline, and the human cost of civil conflict.

Happy Friday! Today we are talking about the most successful pirate in history, and I don't mean Jack Sparrow or Blackbeard - I'm talking about Ching Shih, the former sex worker turned pirate queen who controlled the South China Sea to such an extent the Qing dynasty paid her to retire! As an Asian woman she defies all the pirate stereotypes toted by historians and western sources alike, and had one hell of a career both on the sea and land!If you're wanting more Hot History you can follow along on ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Instagram⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠TikTok⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠YouTube⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and of course, right here!Til next week, Ainslie x

Today, we'll talk about the Hall of Mental Cultivation, a modest courtyard in Beijing's Forbidden City that served for nearly two centuries as the living quarters and political nerve center of Qing emperors, where the rise, transformation, and eventual decline of China's last imperial dynasty quietly unfolded.

Greg Jenner is joined in nineteenth-century China by historian Professor Yangwen Zheng and comedian Sophie Duker to learn about the Qing dynasty ruler Empress Dowager Cixi. A contemporary of Queen Victoria, Cixi rose from low-ranked concubine to de facto ruler of China for nearly half a century, and lived through a dizzying array of events in China's nineteenth-century history, including the Taiping Rebellion, the Opium Wars, and the Boxer Rebellion. Ruling through her son and then her nephew, Empress Dowager Cixi dominated late Qing dynasty China, and oversaw a variety of economic and military – if not political – reforms. This episode charts her life, from her entry into the Forbidden Palace as a teenager all the way to her death in 1908, taking in the politics and traditions of the Qing imperial court, her relationship with Emperor Xianfeng and her rival turned co-ruler Empress Dowager Ci'an, and her determined attempts to gain and maintain power.If you're a fan of Chinese history, ruthless court politics, and complex women characters, you'll love our episode on Empress Dowager Cixi.If you want to learn more about the history of China, listen to our episodes on the history of Kung Fu and the Terracotta Warriors. And for more fascinating characters with Sophie Duker, check out our episode on Ramesses the Great, naughty nun Benedetta Carlini and the Chevalier de Saint-Georges.You're Dead To Me is the comedy podcast that takes history seriously. Every episode, Greg Jenner brings together the best names in history and comedy to learn and laugh about the past.Hosted by: Greg Jenner Research by: Emma Mitchell Written by: Emma Mitchell, Dr Emmie Rose Price-Goodfellow, Dr Emma Nagouse, and Greg Jenner Produced by: Dr Emmie Rose Price-Goodfellow and Greg Jenner Audio Producer: Steve Hankey Production Coordinator: Gill Huggett Senior Producer: Dr Emma Nagouse Executive Editor: Philip Sellars

The Dramatic end to the deadliest civil war in history, the Taiping Rebellion! In this Taiping Rebellion finale, we trace how one of the deadliest uprisings of the 19th century reached its breaking point as the Qing dynasty tightened its grip and the Taiping state began to collapse from within. After years of fierce fighting, the Taiping leadership faced a perfect storm in the final chapter. Disease swept through key strongholds, including a devastating cholera outbreak in Shanghai, while military pressure intensified around Nanjing—the rebellion's political and symbolic center. As resources ran short and control weakened, Taiping forces struggled to hold territory, protect civilians, and maintain command unity. The siege conditions, combined with collapsing supply lines and mounting casualties, turned desperate resistance into a shrinking circle of survival. This episode explains the turning points that sealed the Taiping Rebellion's fate: the fall of major positions, the breakdown of battlefield effectiveness, and the brutal aftermath that followed the end of organized Taiping resistance. You'll see why the rebellion's final months matter—not only for what happened on the ground, but for what it meant for the future of imperial China. If you're learning about Hong Xiuquan's movement, the rise of the Taiping state, and how the uprising ended in 1864–1865, this history documentary brings the finale into clear, chronological focus. Don't forget I have a Youtube Membership: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbp8JMZizR4zak9wpM3Fvrw/join or my Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel where you can get exclusive content like "What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2?"

With the Emperor dead, the Empress Dowager in charge, how will this effect the Taiping Rebellion? In this captivating podcast episode, hosts Craig and Gaurav explore the dramatic turning points in the Taiping Rebellion, one of history's deadliest civil wars (1850-1864), which ravaged China and claimed 20-30 million lives. They focus on the death of the Taiping leader, the self-proclaimed Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan—referred to here as Emperor Xianfeng—and its profound impact on the rebellion's momentum and the Qing dynasty's fragile stability. Xianfeng's demise in 1864, amid illness and the fall of Nanjing, created a power vacuum that accelerated the Taiping's collapse, with his young son briefly succeeding him before the movement's total defeat. The discussion delves into the rise of Empress Dowager Cixi a key Qing figure who seized control in 1861 through a palace coup, steering the dynasty toward reforms while suppressing rebellions. Craig and GauravHong Xiuquan analyze the military strategies employed by both sides: the Taiping's fanatical, religiously driven guerrilla tactics and mass mobilizations versus the Qing's reliance on modernized armies, foreign mercenaries like the Ever-Victorious Army led by Charles Gordon, and superior artillery. They highlight the evolving dynamics between Taiping and Qing forces, marked by brutal sieges, betrayals, and shifting alliances. Foreign relations play a central role, with Western powers like Britain and France intervening via the Opium Wars, providing aid to the Qing through treaties and arms, ultimately tipping the scales against the Taiping. The episode underscores the rebellion's themes of religious zeal, social upheaval, and anti-Manchu nationalism, offering insights into how it weakened the Qing and paved the way for modern China's emergence.   Don't forget I have a Youtube Membership: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbp8JMZizR4zak9wpM3Fvrw/join or my Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel where you can get exclusive content like "What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2?"

In this episode, we will explore another Chinese herbal formula: xiǎo qīng lóng tāng or Minor Bluegreen Dragon Decoction. This formula is in the sub-category of formulas that release exterior wind-cold and is especially good at treating copious mucus. We are going to do our usual deep dive into this formula and find out if there is any evidence or concerns. We have an extra long episode, so we are going to skip the something a little different... Each episode of the podcast will go into great depth about a single herb or formula. Besides covering the basics of herbology including category, and functions, we will explore the history, quality, science, pharmacology, evidence, and any potential interactions of each herb or formula. It is going to be another scintillating discussion of herbs…please join us as we examine xiǎo qīng lóng tāng or Minor Bluegreen Dragon Decoction!

Craig and Gaurav dive into the Taiping Rebellion's Eastern Campaign, where the war's brutality collides with foreign opportunism and panic in the treaty-port world. As Taiping forces threaten key cities and supply lines, Shanghai becomes a focal point: a booming international enclave surrounded by instability, rumor, and competing interests. Western residents and Qing-aligned officials fear the collapse of trade and security, but their options are limited—regular imperial forces are unreliable, local militias are chaotic, and command structures are fractured. Into this volatile situation steps Frederick Townsend Ward, an American adventurer often described as a filibuster or mercenary organizer. Ward helps assemble and lead foreign-drilled troops meant to bolster local defenses and push back Taiping advances. The episode emphasizes that this wasn't a clean “West vs. Taiping” story; it was a messy scramble of self-interest, improvisation, and shifting alliances, with money, prestige, and survival shaping decisions as much as ideology. The hosts recount disastrous assaults on Taiping-held positions—attacks driven by urgency and overconfidence, executed with poor intelligence and coordination. These failures reveal how hard it was to fight the Taiping on their ground and how quickly modern weapons and “professional” leadership could still be squandered by confusion and hubris. Ultimately, the discussion highlights the conflict's complexity: foreign involvement deepened local power struggles, intensified the violence around Shanghai, and left civilians caught between armies, experiments in private warfare, and a rebellion reshaping China. Don't forget I have a Youtube Membership: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbp8JMZizR4zak9wpM3Fvrw/join or my Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel where you can get exclusive content like "What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2?"

The new envoy from London arrives at Qing's doorstep in August 1842 with a simple mandate: stop allowing Britain to be "humbugged" & finish the war Elliot started. What follows is the British Empire at its most efficient & brutal... and a treaty that, somehow, doesn't mention opium once...Time Period Covered:Aug. 1841–Aug. 1842 Major Historical Figures:The Qing Empire:The Daoguang Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Minning) [r. 1820–1850]Yijing, Imperial Commander [1793–1853]Qiying, Imperial Commissioner [1787–1858]Yilibu, Imperial Commissioner [1772–1843]Niu Jian, Governor-General of Liangjiang [1785–1858]Zhang Xi, intermediary [1840s]Yuqian, Zhejiang Imperial Commissioner [1841] The British Empire:Queen Victoria [r. 1837–1901]Sir Henry Pottinger, Plenipotentiary to China [1789–1856]Sir Hugh Gough, Commander of British Land Forces [1779–1869]Admiral Sir William Parker, Commander-in-Chief, East India Station [1781–1866]Captain William Hutcheon "Nemesis" Hall, HMS Nemesis [c. 1797–1878]Captain Henry Keppel, HMS Dido [1809–1904]Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff, Prussian missionary & Civil Magistrate of Ningbo [1803–1851] Colonel George Mountain [1789–1863]Harry Smith Parkes, attaché to Pottinger's staff [1828–1885] Major Sources Cited:Fay, Peter Ward. The Opium War, 1840–1842. Wakeman, Frederic Jr. "The Canton Trade and the Opium War" in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10.Lovell, Julia. The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China. Platt, Stephen R. Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

John Ross speaks with English travel writer and photographer David Leffman about his new book, A Murder in Yunnan: The Unsolved Killing of a British Diplomat on China's Southwestern Frontier. The conversation begins with David's own long engagement with China, which started with a difficult first trip in 1985, and then continued a decade later with work on The Rough Guide to China. In the 1860s, the British dreamed of opening a profitable overland trade route into China from British India via Burma. The 1868 Sladen Expedition scouted a route from Bhamo in Burma to Tengyue/Tengchong in Yunnan, China. The going was difficult because the southwestern frontier area had been devastated by prolonged Muslim uprisings and banditry. The Browne Expedition tried again in 1875. Augustus Raymond Margary, a young British diplomat and gifted Chinese speaker, joined this second expedition after making a remarkable overland journey from Shanghai across the breadth of China. But tragedy soon struck. Margary's murder near the border – what became known as the Margary Affair – turned into a diplomatic crisis, nearly provoking a third Anglo-Chinese war. This BOA episode contains no spoilers; David doesn't reveal who he thinks killed the young Englishman, but we do run through some of the many suspects and look at the fallout from this true crime case. And, as icing on the cake, we even hear about a Burmese mission to Peking with elephants as tribute. A Murder in Yunnan is published by the Hong Kong-based Blacksmith Books. It's due out April 7, 2026 but can be preordered now. To learn more about David Leffman's writing, visit his website. John has written reviews for Bookish Asia of David's earlier China books. The Mercenary Mandarin: How a British adventurer became a general in Qing-dynasty China. John also did a related author interview with David for this book. Paper Horses: Woodblock Prints of Gods from Northern China The Books on Asia Podcast is co-produced with Plum Rain Press. Podcast host Amy Chavez is author of The Widow, the Priest, and the Octopus Hunter: Discovering a Lost Way of Life on a Secluded Japanese Island. and Amy's Guide to Best Behavior in Japan.The Books on Asia website posts book reviews, podcast episodes and episode Show Notes. Subscribe to the BOA podcast from your favorite podcast service. Subscribe to the Books on Asia newsletter to receive news of the latest new book releases, reviews and podcast episodes.

The Ransom of Canton.The lame-duck Superintendent watches helplessly as a triumvirate of Qing officials arrives to reverse every compromise his predecessor had wrought... & promptly launches the most ambitious Chinese military operation of the entire war. In the midst of that rain-soaked battlefield, a brief skirmish between British soldiers and peasant militiamen plants the seed of a legend that will haunt Chinese politics for the next century. Time Period Covered:Feb. 1841–Oct. 1841 Major Historical Figures: The Qing Empire:The Daoguang Emperor (Aisin-Gioro Minning) [r. 1820–1850]Yishan, Imperial Commissioner and Pacifier-General of the Rebellious (靖逆) [1790–1878]Longwen, Manchu nobleman and ministerial attaché [d. 1841]Yang Fang, Governor-General and military commander [c. 1770–1846]She Baoshun, Prefect of Canton [fl. 1840s]Yuqian, Imperial Commissioner for Military Operations in Zhejiang [fl. 1841] The British Empire:Queen Victoria [r. 1837–1901]Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, Foreign Secretary [1784–1865]Charles Elliot, Chief Superintendent of British Trade in China [1801–1875]Sir Henry Pottinger, incoming Plenipotentiary to China [1789–1856]Sir Hugh Gough, Commander of British Land Forces [1779–1869]Captain William Hutcheon Hall, commanding HMS Nemesis [c. 1797–1878] Major Sources Cited:Wakeman, Frederic Jr. "Canton Trade and the Opium War." The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10.Wakeman, Frederic Jr. Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839–1861.Fay, Peter Ward. The Opium War, 1840–1842.Lovell, Julia. The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Lee Moore's new book challenges both Chinese state propaganda and Western pundits on Taiwan, Xinjiang, the Chinese economy, and Hong Kong with 1400 endnotes, and a drinking game for beheadings. A historian who writes about Ming emperors getting stabbed in the balls, a drinking game for beheadings in Xinjiang, and why almost everything politicians say about Taiwan's history is wrong. In this episode, we talk with Lee Moore about China's Backstory: The History Beijing Doesn't Want You to Read. It is often said that China is the most talked-about country that Americans know the least about. Lee's book seeks to enlighten readers with a fresh perspective and a deep dive into four China-related topics that frequently appear in American media: Taiwan, Xinjiang, the Chinese economy, and Hong Kong. Despite his academic credentials, Lee has chosen to write the book in an accessible style that Jeremiah characterizes as “making the complex simple and the simple complex — complicating narratives without complicating the language, and simplifying complicated histories without dumbing them down.” With this lively and occasionally risqué prose style (one chapter is entitled “The Most Important Motherfucker in Taiwanese History”), Lee challenges the simplistic historical narratives that often dominate both Chinese state propaganda and Western commentary on China. Our conversation explores several of the historical questions raised in his book. Was Taiwan always a part of China? It did not even appear on Chinese maps until the 17th century, and the Qing Dynasty did not take control of the island until a year after William Penn founded Philadelphia. Were the Uyghurs the first inhabitants of Xinjiang? The answer is complicated, but the region's earliest known inhabitants may actually have been Indo-European. And is the Chinese Communist Party's tight state control over the economy really the “secret sauce” behind China's rise? Lee takes direct aim at Western pundits who have argued exactly that. Lee also explains how he makes extensive use of Chinese poetry — from Tang Dynasty border verse to Qing-era colonial writing — translated into colloquial English, to convey the emotions and states of mind of the historical figures who populate his book. Lee Moore has a PhD in Chinese literature. He is the founder of the Chinese Literature Podcast and has written for The Economist, the China Books Review, and The China Project. China's Backstory: The History Beijing Doesn't Want You to Read is available from Unsung Voices Books wherever books are sold. Find the Chinese Literature Podcast wherever you get your podcasts. Warning/Advertisement: This episode contains explicit language.

Can someone be Chinese and Muslim? For some academics, this has been a surprisingly fraught question, with some asserting that Chinese Muslims are not really Chinese, or not really Muslim. Rian Thum, in his book Islamic China: An Asian History (Harvard UP, 2025), strives to make Chinese Muslims “ordinary”, placing them in both Chinese and global history by following pilgrims, merchants, and others across the Ming, Qing, and Republican eras. Rian is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Manchester. A contributor to the New York Times, the Washington Post, and The Nation, he is the author of The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, winner of the Fairbank Prize for East Asian History from the American Historical Association and the Hsu Prize for East Asian Anthropology from the American Anthropological Association. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Islamic China. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Can someone be Chinese and Muslim? For some academics, this has been a surprisingly fraught question, with some asserting that Chinese Muslims are not really Chinese, or not really Muslim. Rian Thum, in his book Islamic China: An Asian History (Harvard UP, 2025), strives to make Chinese Muslims “ordinary”, placing them in both Chinese and global history by following pilgrims, merchants, and others across the Ming, Qing, and Republican eras. Rian is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Manchester. A contributor to the New York Times, the Washington Post, and The Nation, he is the author of The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, winner of the Fairbank Prize for East Asian History from the American Historical Association and the Hsu Prize for East Asian Anthropology from the American Anthropological Association. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Islamic China. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/islamic-studies

Can someone be Chinese and Muslim? For some academics, this has been a surprisingly fraught question, with some asserting that Chinese Muslims are not really Chinese, or not really Muslim. Rian Thum, in his book Islamic China: An Asian History (Harvard UP, 2025), strives to make Chinese Muslims “ordinary”, placing them in both Chinese and global history by following pilgrims, merchants, and others across the Ming, Qing, and Republican eras. Rian is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Manchester. A contributor to the New York Times, the Washington Post, and The Nation, he is the author of The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, winner of the Fairbank Prize for East Asian History from the American Historical Association and the Hsu Prize for East Asian Anthropology from the American Anthropological Association. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Islamic China. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

Can someone be Chinese and Muslim? For some academics, this has been a surprisingly fraught question, with some asserting that Chinese Muslims are not really Chinese, or not really Muslim. Rian Thum, in his book Islamic China: An Asian History (Harvard UP, 2025), strives to make Chinese Muslims “ordinary”, placing them in both Chinese and global history by following pilgrims, merchants, and others across the Ming, Qing, and Republican eras. Rian is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Manchester. A contributor to the New York Times, the Washington Post, and The Nation, he is the author of The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, winner of the Fairbank Prize for East Asian History from the American Historical Association and the Hsu Prize for East Asian Anthropology from the American Anthropological Association. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Islamic China. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/religion

Can someone be Chinese and Muslim? For some academics, this has been a surprisingly fraught question, with some asserting that Chinese Muslims are not really Chinese, or not really Muslim. Rian Thum, in his book Islamic China: An Asian History (Harvard UP, 2025), strives to make Chinese Muslims “ordinary”, placing them in both Chinese and global history by following pilgrims, merchants, and others across the Ming, Qing, and Republican eras. Rian is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Manchester. A contributor to the New York Times, the Washington Post, and The Nation, he is the author of The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, winner of the Fairbank Prize for East Asian History from the American Historical Association and the Hsu Prize for East Asian Anthropology from the American Anthropological Association. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Islamic China. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-review

On today's episode with San Qing, we welcome Robina Courtin, buddhist nun and teacher for over 45 years. She shares her wisdom and knowledge into Tibetan buddhism and the teachings of the buddha. Enjoy. Consciousness of The Way podcast

In this expansive and deeply illuminating episode of The Wholesome Fertility Podcast, Michelle is joined by San Qing, a Daoist priest, teacher of internal alchemy, and lifelong explorer of consciousness, healing, and human potential. San shares his extraordinary origin story, including a near-death experience as a child, spontaneous clairvoyant and healing abilities, and his eventual ordination in Daoist lineages in China. Together, Michelle and San dive into the nature of reality, the illusion of identification with the material world, and how true healing occurs when we access the stillness beneath thought, diagnosis, and fear. This conversation bridges ancient Daoist wisdom with modern conversations around quantum healing, consciousness, and fertility. It explores how attachment to labels, timelines, and medical predictions can keep the body stuck, and how returning to the "void," the place of non-identity and stillness, allows the body and spirit to reorganise into harmony. This episode is a powerful invitation to remember that healing is not something we force, but something we allow when we reconnect with our deeper intelligence. Key Takeaways: Healing begins beyond the physical body, in consciousness and energy Identifying too strongly with diagnoses can limit what the body is capable of Stillness and non-attachment create space for transformation The body must be able to hold the energetic charge of healing Ancient Daoist teachings offer a roadmap for embodied, sustainable healing Guest Bio:  Taoist Master San Qing is a profound healer. When he talks, there is something else that goes on in the room. The room is filled with light and love. Taoist Master San Qing has over 30 years' experience guiding people, teaching people, opening people up to their true potential as a human being, as a light being, as just being. San Qing is an ordained priest and 66th generation lineage holder and 126th generation lineage holder of Taoism. San is a Taoist master of Qigong and Neigong, is a prolific channel and healer who has built a reputation for direct access to the spirit realm. He is grateful every day to his teachers, the Three Pure Ones and the Tao, for allowing him to witness miracles. San works with people all over the world showing them, that the impossible is possible.  Connect with San Qing Website: https://immortaltaoistrites.com/ The Way 126 App (Web, iOS & Android): https://theway126.com/ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCiY-8SXc5g7oJRlA02tQluw Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/theway_126 Disclaimer: The information shared on this podcast is for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended as medical advice. Please consult with your healthcare provider before making any changes to your health or fertility care. Ready to discover what your body needs most on your fertility journey? Take the personalized quiz inside The Wholesome Fertility Journey and get tailored resources to meet you exactly where you are:  https://www.michelleoravitz.com/the-wholesome-fertility-journey For more about my work and offerings, visit: www.michelleoravitz.com Curious about ancient wisdom for fertility? Grab my book The Way of Fertility: https://www.michelleoravitz.com/thewayoffertility Join the Wholesome Fertility Facebook Group for free resources & community support: https://www.facebook.com/groups/2149554308396504/ Connect with me on social: Instagram: @thewholesomelotusfertilityFacebook: The Wholesome Lotus  

We were talking last episode about how the western allies tried to contain the spread of communism in Europe, but I mentioned that Communism was spreading in Asia as well.  This is about to be a problem in China, which, on the face of it, seems an unlikely hotbed for communism.  Back in 1912, before both world wars, the last Chinese dynasty, the Qing dynasty, collapsed.  The Qing had ruled China since the 1600's, but the dynasty had fallen into disarray, and China was really being ruled by a loose system of sort of feudal warlords.  When the dynasty collapsed in 1912, it was replaced by the Chinese Republic, but the republic's hold on power wasn't very strong, and in many places, the warlords still ruled.  In 1921, the Chinese Communist party was created, and in 1927, a civil war broke out between the communists and the nationalists, who were strongly anti-communists.  

Last time we spoke about The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow. Following the brutal 1938 capture of Wuhan, Japanese forces aimed to solidify their hold by launching an offensive against Chinese troops in the 5th War Zone, a rugged natural fortress in northern Hubei and southern Henan. Under General Yasuji Okamura, the 11th Army deployed three divisions and cavalry in a pincer assault starting May 1, 1939, targeting Suixian and Zaoyang to crush Nationalist resistance and secure flanks. Chinese commander Li Zongren, leveraging terrain like the Dabie and Tongbai Mountains, orchestrated defenses with over 200,000 troops, including Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group. By May 23, they recaptured Suixian and Zaoyang, forcing a Japanese withdrawal with heavy losses, over 13,000 Japanese casualties versus 25,000 Chinese, restoring pre-battle lines. Shifting south, Japan targeted Shantou in Guangdong to sever supply lines from Hong Kong. In a massive June 21 amphibious assault, the 21st Army overwhelmed thin Chinese defenses, capturing the port and Chao'an despite guerrilla resistance led by Zhang Fakui. Though losses mounted, Japan tightened its blockade, straining China's war effort amid ongoing attrition.   #188 From Changkufeng to Nomonhan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Well hello again, and yes you all have probably guessed we are taking another detour. Do not worry I hope to shorten this one a bit more so than what became a sort of mini series on the battle of Changkufeng or Battle of Lake Khasan. What we are about to jump into is known in the west as the battle of khalkin Gol, by the Japanese the Nomohan incident. But first I need to sort of set the table up so to say. So back on August 10th, 1938 the Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement established a joint border commission tasked with redemarcating the disputed boundary between the Soviet Union and Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. However, this commission never achieved a mutually agreeable definition of the border in the contested area. In reality, the outcome was decided well before the group's inaugural meeting. Mere hours after the cease-fire took effect on the afternoon of August 11, General Grigory Shtern convened with a regimental commander from Japan's 19th Division to coordinate the disengagement of forces. With the conflict deemed "honorably" concluded, Japan's Imperial General Headquarters mandated the swift withdrawal of all Japanese troops to the west bank of the Tumen River. By the night of August 13, as the final Japanese soldier crossed the river, it effectively became the de facto border. Soviet forces promptly reoccupied Changkufeng Hill and the adjacent heights—a move that would carry unexpected and profound repercussions. Authoritative Japanese military analyses suggest that if negotiations in Moscow had dragged on for just one more day, the 19th Division would likely have been dislodged from Changkufeng and its surrounding elevations. Undoubtedly, General Shtern's infantry breathed a sigh of relief as the bloodshed ceased. Yet, one can't help but question why Moscow opted for a cease-fire at a juncture when Soviet troops were on the cusp of total battlefield triumph. Perhaps Kremlin leaders deemed it wiser to settle for a substantial gain, roughly three-quarters of their objectives, rather than risk everything. After all, Japan had mobilized threatening forces in eastern Manchuria, and the Imperial Army had a history of impulsive, unpredictable aggression. Moreover, amid the escalating crisis over Czechoslovakia, Moscow may have been wary of provoking a broader Asian conflict. Another theory posits that Soviet high command was misinformed about the ground situation. Reports of capturing a small segment of Changkufeng's crest might have been misinterpreted as control over the entire ridge, or an imminent full takeover before midnight on August 10. The unexpected phone call from Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to the Japanese embassy that night—proposing a one-kilometer Japanese retreat in exchange for a cease-fire along existing lines—hints at communication breakdowns between Shtern's headquarters and the Kremlin. Ironically, such lapses may have preserved Japanese military honor, allowing the 19th Division's evacuation through diplomacy rather than defeat. Both sides endured severe losses. Initial Japanese press reports claimed 158 killed and 740 wounded. However, the 19th Division's medical logs reveal a grimmer toll: 526 dead and 914 injured, totaling 1,440 casualties. The true figure may have climbed higher, possibly to 1,500–2,000. Following the armistice, the Soviet news agency TASS reported 236 Red Army fatalities and 611 wounded. Given Shtern's uphill assaults across open terrain against entrenched positions, these numbers seem understated. Attackers in such scenarios typically suffered two to three times the defenders' losses, suggesting Soviet casualties ranged from 3,000 to 5,000. This aligns with a Soviet Military Council investigation on August 31, 1938, which documented 408 killed and 2,807 wounded. Japanese estimates placed Soviet losses even higher, at 4,500–7,000. Not all victims perished in combat. Marshal Vasily Blyukher, a decorated Soviet commander, former warlord of the Far East, and Central Committee candidate, was summoned to Moscow in August 1938. Relieved of duty in September and arrested with his family in October, he faced charges of inadequate preparation against Japanese aggression and harboring "enemies of the people" within his ranks. On November 9, 1938, Blyukher died during interrogation a euphemism for torture-induced death.Other innocents suffered as well. In the wake of the fighting, Soviet authorities deported hundreds of thousands of Korean rice farmers from the Ussuri region to Kazakhstan, aiming to eradicate Korean settlements that Japanese spies had allegedly exploited. The Changkufeng clash indirectly hampered Japan's Wuhan offensive, a massive push to subdue China. The influx of troops and supplies for this campaign was briefly disrupted by the border flare-up. Notably, Kwantung Army's 2nd Air Group, slated for Wuhan, was retained due to the Soviet threat. Chiang Kai-shek's drastic measure, breaching the Yellow River dikes to flood Japanese advance routes—further delayed the assault. By October 25, 1938, when Japanese forces captured Hankow, Chiang had relocated his capital to distant Chungking. Paradoxically, Wuhan's fall cut rail links from Canton inland, heightening Chiang's reliance on Soviet aid routed overland and by air from Central Asia. Japan secured a tactical win but missed the decisive blow; Chinese resistance persisted, pinning down a million Japanese troops in occupation duties. What was the true significance of Changkufeng? For General Koiso Suetaka and the 19th Division, it evoked a mix of bitterness and pride. Those eager for combat got their share, though not on their terms. To veterans mourning fallen comrades on those desolate slopes, it might have felt like senseless tragedy. Yet, they fought valiantly under dire conditions, holding firm until a retreat that blended humiliation with imperial praise, a bittersweet inheritance. For the Red Army, it marked a crucial trial of resolve amid Stalin's purges. While Shtern's forces didn't shine brilliantly, they acquitted themselves well in adversity. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow observed that any purge-related inefficiencies had been surmounted, praising the Red Army's valor, reliability, and equipment. His counterpart in China, Colonel Joseph Stilwell, put it bluntly: the Soviets "appeared to advantage," urging skeptics to rethink notions of a weakened Red Army. Yet, by World War II's eve, many British, French, German, and Japanese leaders still dismissed it as a "paper tiger." Soviet leaders appeared content, promoting Shtern to command the Transbaikal Military District and colonel general by 1940, while honoring "Heroes of Lake Khasan" with medals. In a fiery November 7, 1938, speech, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov warned that future incursions would prompt strikes deep into enemy territory. Tokyo's views diverged sharply. Many in the military and government saw it as a stain on Imperial Army prestige, especially Kwantung Army, humiliated on Manchukuo soil it swore to protect. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji Inada, however, framed it as a successful reconnaissance, confirming Soviet border defense without broader aggression, allowing the Wuhan push to proceed safely. Critics, including Major General Gun Hashimoto and historians, questioned this. They argued IGHQ lacked contingency plans for a massive Soviet response, especially with Wuhan preparations underway since June. One expert warned Japan had "played with fire," risking Manchuria and Korea if escalation occurred. Yet, Japanese commanders gleaned few lessons, downplaying Soviet materiel superiority and maintaining disdain for Red Army prowess. The 19th Division's stand against outnumbered odds reinforced this hubris, as did tolerance for local insubordination—attitudes that would prove costly. The Kremlin, conversely, learned Japan remained unpredictable despite its China quagmire. But for Emperor Hirohito's intervention, the conflict might have ballooned. Amid purges and the Czech crisis, Stalin likely viewed it as a reminder of eastern vulnerabilities, especially with Munich advancing German threats westward. Both sides toyed with peril. Moderation won in Tokyo, but Kwantung Army seethed. On August 11, Premier Fumimaro Konoye noted the need for caution. Kwantung, however, pushed for and secured control of the disputed salient from Chosen Army by October 8, 1938. Even winter's chill couldn't quench their vengeful fire, setting the stage for future confrontations. A quick look at the regional map reveals how Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic each jut into the other's territory like protruding salients. These bulges could be seen as aggressive thrusts into enemy land, yet they also risked encirclement and absorption by the opposing empire. A northward push from western Manchuria through Mongolia could sever the MPR and Soviet Far East from the USSR's heartland. Conversely, a pincer movement from Mongolia and the Soviet Maritime Province might envelop and isolate Manchukuo. This dynamic highlights the frontier's strategic volatility in the 1930s. One particularly tense sector was the broad Mongolian salient extending about 150 miles eastward into west-central Manchukuo. There, in mid-1939, Soviet-Japanese tensions erupted into major combat. Known to the Japanese as the Nomonhan Incident and to the Soviets and Mongolians as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, this clash dwarfed the earlier Changkufeng affair in scale, duration, and impact. Spanning four months and claiming 30,000 to 50,000 casualties, it amounted to a small undeclared war, the modern era's first limited conflict between great powers. The Mongolian salient features vast, semiarid plains of sandy grassland, gently rolling terrain dotted with sparse scrub pines and low shrubs. The climate is unforgivingly continental: May brings hot days and freezing nights, while July and August see daytime highs exceeding 38°C (100°F in American units), with cool evenings. Swarms of mosquitoes and massive horseflies necessitate netting in summer. Rainfall is scarce, but dense morning fogs are common in August. Come September, temperatures plummet, with heavy snows by October and midwinter lows dipping to –34°C. This blend of North African aridity and North Dakotan winters supports only sparse populations, mainly two related but distinct Mongol tribes. The Buriat (or Barga) Mongols migrated into the Nomonhan area from the northwest in the late 17th to early 18th centuries, likely fleeing Russian expansion after the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Organized by Manchu emperors between 1732 and 1735, they settled east of the river they called Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian for "river"), in lands that would later become Manchukuo. The Khalkha Mongols, named for the word meaning "barrier" or "shield," traditionally guarded the Mongol Empire's northern frontiers. Their territories lay west of the Buriats, in what would become the MPR. For centuries, these tribes herded livestock across sands, river crossings, and desert paths, largely oblivious to any formal borders. For hundreds of years, the line dividing the Mongolian salient from western Manchuria was a hazy administrative divide within the Qing Empire. In the 20th century, Russia's detachment of Outer Mongolia and Japan's seizure of Manchuria transformed this vague boundary into a frontline between rival powers. The Nomonhan Incident ignited over this contested border. Near the salient's northeastern edge, the river, called Khalkhin Gol by Mongols and Soviets, and Halha by Manchurians and Japanese, flows northwest into Lake Buir Nor. The core dispute: Was the river, as Japan asserted, the historic boundary between Manchukuo and the MPR? Soviet and MPR officials insisted the line ran parallel to and 10–12 miles east of the river, claiming the intervening strip. Japan cited no fewer than 18 maps, from Chinese and Japanese sources, to support the river as the border, a logical choice in such barren terrain, where it served as the sole natural divider. Yet, Soviets and Mongolians countered with evidence like a 1919 Chinese postal atlas and maps from Japanese and Manchukuoan agencies (1919–1934). Unbeknownst to combatants, in July 1939, China's military attaché in Moscow shared a 1934 General Staff map with his American counterpart, showing the border east of the river. Postwar Japanese studies of 18th-century Chinese records confirm that in 1734, the Qing emperor set a boundary between Buriat and Khalkha Mongols east of the river, passing through the hamlet of Nomonhan—as the Soviets claimed. However, Kwantung Army Headquarters dismissed this as non-binding, viewing it as an internal Qing affair without Russian involvement. Two former Kwantung Army officers offer a pragmatic explanation: From 1931 to 1935, when Soviet forces in the Far East were weak, Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities imposed the river as the de facto border, with MPR acquiescence. By the mid- to late 1930s, as Soviet strength grew, Japan refused to yield, while Mongolians and Soviets rejected the river line, sparking clashes. In 1935, Kwantung Army revised its maps to align with the river claim. From late that year, the Lake Buir Nor–Halha sector saw frequent skirmishes between Manchukuoan and MPR patrols. Until mid-1938, frontier defense in northwestern Manchukuo fell to the 8th Border Garrison Unit , based near Hailar. This 7,000-man force, spread thin, lacked mobility, training, and, in Kwantung Army's eyes, combat readiness. That summer, the newly formed 23rd Division, under Kwantung Army, took station at Hailar, absorbing the 8th BGU under its command, led by Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara. At 52, Komatsubara was a premier Russian specialist in the Imperial Army, with stints as military attaché in the USSR and head of Kwantung's Special Services Agency in Harbin. Standing 5'7" with a sturdy build, glasses, and a small mustache, he was detail-oriented, keeping meticulous diaries, writing lengthy letters, and composing poetry, though he lacked combat experience. Before departing Tokyo in July 1938, Komatsubara received briefings from Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations Section chief. Amid planning for Changkufeng, Inada urged calm on the Manchukuo-MPR border given China's ongoing campaigns. Guidelines: Ignore minor incidents, prioritize intelligence on Soviet forces east of Lake Baikal, and study operations against the Soviet Far East's western sector. Familiar with the region from his Harbin days, Komatsubara adopted a low-key approach. Neither impulsive nor aggressive, he kept the green 23rd Division near Hailar, delegating patrols to the 8th BGU. An autumn incident underscores his restraint. On November 1, 1938, an 8th BGU patrol was ambushed by MPR forces. Per Japanese accounts, the three-man team, led by a lieutenant, strayed too close to the border and was attacked 50 meters inside Manchukuo. The lieutenant escaped, but his men died. Komatsubara sent an infantry company to secure the site but forbade retaliation. He pursued body recovery diplomatically, protested to MPR and Soviet officials, and disciplined his officers: garrison leaders got five days' confinement for poor troop training, the lieutenant thirty days. Despite this caution, pressures at AGS and KwAHQ were mounting, poised to thrust the 23rd Division into fierce battle. Modern militaries routinely develop contingency plans against potential adversaries, and the mere existence of such strategies doesn't inherently signal aggressive intentions. That said, shifts in Japan's operational planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may have inadvertently fueled the Nomonhan Incident. From 1934 to 1938, Japanese war scenarios emphasized a massive surprise assault in the Ussuri River region, paired with defensive holding actions in northwestern Manchuria. However, between mid-1938 and early 1939, a clandestine joint task force from the Army General Staff  and Kwantung Army's Operations Departments crafted a bold new blueprint. This revised strategy proposed containing Soviet forces in the east and north while unleashing a full-scale offensive from Hailar, advancing west-northwest toward Chita and ultimately Lake Baikal. The goal: sever the Transbaikal Soviet Far East from the USSR's core. Dubbed Plan Eight-B, it gained Kwantung Army's endorsement in March 1939. Key architects—Colonels Takushiro Hattori and Masao Terada, along with Major Takeharu Shimanuki—were reassigned from AGS to Kwantung Army Headquarters to oversee implementation. The plan anticipated a five-year buildup before execution, with Hattori assuming the role of chief operations staff officer.  A map review exposes a glaring vulnerability in Plan Eight-B: the Japanese advance would leave its southern flank exposed to Soviet counterstrikes from the Mongolian salient. By spring 1939, KwAHQ likely began perceiving this protrusion as a strategic liability. Notably, at the outbreak of Nomonhan hostilities, no detailed operational contingencies for the area had been formalized. Concurrently, Japan initiated plans for a vital railroad linking Harlun Arshan to Hailar. While its direct tie to Plan Eight-B remains unclear, the route skirted perilously close to the Halha River, potentially heightening KwAHQ's focus on the disputed Mongolian salient. In early 1939, the 23rd Division intensified reconnaissance patrols near the river. Around this time, General Grigory Shtern, freshly appointed commander of Soviet Far Eastern forces, issued a public warning that Japan was gearing up for an assault on the Mongolian People's Republic. As Plan Eight-B took shape and railroad proposals advanced, KwAHQ issued a strikingly confrontational set of guidelines for frontier troops. These directives are often cited as a catalyst for the Nomonhan clash, forging a chain linking the 1937 Amur River incident, the 1938 Changkufeng debacle, and the 1939 conflict.Resentment had festered at KwAHQ over perceived AGS meddling during the Amur affair, which curtailed their command autonomy. This frustration intensified at Changkufeng, where General Kamezo Suetaka's 19th Division endured heavy losses, only for the contested Manchukuoan territory to be effectively ceded. Kwantung Army lobbied successfully to wrest oversight of the Changkufeng salient from Chosen Army. In November 1938, Major Masanobu Tsuji of KwAHQ's Operations Section was sent to survey the site. The audacious officer was dismayed: Soviet forces dominated the land from the disputed ridge to the Tumen River. Tsuji undertook several winter reconnaissance missions. His final outing in March 1939 involved leading 40 men to Changkufeng's base. With rifles slung non-threateningly, they ascended to within 200 yards of Soviet lines, formed a line, and urinated in unison, eliciting amused reactions from the enemy. They then picnicked with obentos and sake, sang army tunes, and left gifts of canned meat, chocolates, and whiskey. This theatrical stunt concealed Tsuji's real aim: covert photography proving Soviet fortifications encroached on Manchukuoan soil. Tsuji was a singular figure. Born of modest means, he embodied a modern samurai ethos, channeling a sharp intellect into a frail, often ailing body through feats of extraordinary daring. A creative tactician, he thrived in intelligence ops, political scheming, aerial scouting, planning, and frontline command—excelling across a tumultuous career. Yet, flaws marred his brilliance: narrow bigotry, virulent racism, and capacity for cruelty. Ever the ambitious outsider, Tsuji wielded outsized influence via gekokujo—Japan's tradition of subordinates steering policy from below. In 1939, he was a major, but his pivotal role at Nomonhan stemmed from this dynamic. Back in Hsinking after his Changkufeng escapade, Tsuji drafted a response plan: negotiate border "rectification" with the Soviets; if talks failed, launch an attack to expel intruders. Kwantung Army adopted it. Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Otozaburo Yano flew to Tokyo with Tsuji's photos, seeking AGS approval. There, he was rebuffed—Changkufeng was deemed settled, and minor violations should be overlooked amid Tokyo's aversion to Soviet conflict. Yano's plea that leniency would invite aggression was countered by notes on Europe's tensions restraining Moscow. Yano's return sparked outrage at KwAHQ, seen as AGS thwarting their imperial duty to safeguard Manchukuo. Fury peaked in the Operations Section, setting the stage for Tsuji's drafting of stringent new frontier guidelines: "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes." The core tenet: "If Soviet troops transgress the Manchukuoan frontiers, Kwantung Army will nip their ambitions in the bud by completely destroying them." Specific directives for local commanders included: "If the enemy crosses the frontiers … annihilate him without delay, employing strength carefully built up beforehand. To accomplish our mission, it is permissible to enter Soviet territory, or to trap or lure Soviet troops into Manchukuoan territory and allow them to remain there for some time… . Where boundary lines are not clearly defined, area defense commanders will, upon their own initiative, establish boundaries and indicate them to the forward elements… . In the event of an armed clash, fight until victory is won, regardless of relative strengths or of the location of the boundaries. If the enemy violates the borders, friendly units must challenge him courageously and endeavor to triumph in their zone of action without concerning themselves about the consequences, which will be the responsibility of higher headquarters." Major Tsuji Masanobu later justified the new guidelines by pointing to the "contradictory orders" that had hamstrung frontier commanders under the old rules. They were tasked with upholding Manchukuo's territorial integrity yet forbidden from actions that might spark conflict. This, Tsuji argued, bred hesitation, as officers feared repercussions for decisive responses to incursions. The updated directives aimed to alleviate this "anxiety," empowering local leaders to act boldly without personal liability. In truth, Tsuji's "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchukuoan Border Disputes" were more incendiary than conciliatory. They introduced provocative measures: authorizing commanders to unilaterally define unclear boundaries, enforce them with immediate force "shoot first, ask questions later", permit pursuits into enemy territory, and even encourage luring adversaries across the line. Such tactics flouted both government policy and official army doctrine, prioritizing escalation over restraint. The proposals sparked intense debate within Kwantung Army's Operations Section. Section chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and Colonel Masao Terada outranked Tsuji, as did Major Takeharu Shimanuki, all recent transfers from the Army General Staff. Tsuji, however, boasted longer tenure at Kwantung Army Headquarters since April 1936 and in Operations since November 1937, making him the de facto veteran. Hattori and Terada hesitated to challenge the assertive major, whose reputation for intellect, persuasion, and deep knowledge of Manchuria commanded respect. In a 1960 interview, Shimanuki recalled Tsuji's dominance in discussions, where his proactive ideas often swayed the group. Unified, the section forwarded Tsuji's plan to Kwantung Army Command. Commander Lieutenant General Kenkichi Ueda consulted Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai and Vice Chief General Otozaburo Yano, seasoned leaders who should have spotted the guidelines' volatility. Yet, lingering grudges from AGS "interference" in past incidents like the Amur River and Changkufeng clouded their judgment. Ueda, Isogai, and Tsuji shared history from the 1932 Shanghai Incident: Tsuji, then a captain, led a company in the 7th Regiment under Colonel Isogai, with Yano as staff officer and Ueda commanding the 9th Division. Tsuji was wounded there, forging bonds of camaraderie. This "clique," which grew to include Hattori, Terada, and Shimanuki, amplified Tsuji's influence. Despite Isogai's initial reservations as the group's moderate voice, the guidelines won approval. Ueda issued them as Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488 on April 25, 1939, during a division commanders' conference at KwAHQ. A routine copy reached AGS in Tokyo, but no formal reply came. Preoccupied with the China War and alliance talks with Germany, AGS may have overlooked border matters. Colonel Masazumi Inada, AGS Operations head, later noted basic acceptance of Order 1488, with an informal expectation—relayed to Hattori and Terada—of prior consultation on violations. KwAHQ dismissed this as another Tokyo intrusion on their autonomy. Some Japanese analysts contend a stern AGS rejection might have prevented Nomonhan's catastrophe, though quelling Kwantung's defiance could have required mass staff reassignments, a disruptive step AGS avoided. Tsuji countered that permitting forceful action at Changkufeng would have deterred Nomonhan altogether, underscoring the interconnectedness of these clashes while implicitly critiquing the 1939 battle's location. Undeniably, Order 1488's issuance on April 25 paved the way for conflict three weeks later. Japanese records confirm that Khalkha Mongols and MPR patrols routinely crossed the Halha River—viewed by them as internal territory, 10 miles from the true border. Such crossings passed uneventfully in March and April 1939. Post-Order 1488, however, 23rd Division commander General Michitaro Komatsubara responded aggressively, setting the stage for escalation. The Nomonhan Incident ignited with a border clash on May 11–12, 1939, that rapidly spiraled into a major conflict. Over a dozen "authoritative" accounts exist, varying in viewpoint, focus, and specifics. After cross-referencing these sources, a coherent timeline emerges. On the night of May 10–11, a 20-man Mongolian People's Republic border patrol crossed eastward over the Halha River (known as Khalkhin Gol to Mongols and Soviets). About 10 miles east, atop a 150-foot sandy hill, lay the tiny hamlet of Nomonhan, a cluster of crude huts housing a few Mongol families. Just south flowed the Holsten River, merging westward into the broader Halha. By morning on May 11, Manchukuoan forces spotted the MPR patrol north of the Holsten and west of Nomonhan. In the MPR/Soviet perspective, Nomonhan Hill marked the Mongolia-Manchuria border. To Manchukuoans and Japanese, it sat 10 miles inside Manchukuo, well east of the Halha. A 40-man Manchukuoan cavalry unit repelled the Mongolians back across the river, inflicting initial casualties on both sides—the Manchukuoans drawing first blood. The MPR patrol leader exaggerated the attackers as 200 strong. The next day, May 12, a 60-man MPR force under Major P. Chogdan evicted the Manchukuoans from the disputed zone, reestablishing positions between the Halha and Nomonhan. The Manchukuoans, in turn, reported facing 700 enemies. Sporadic skirmishes and maneuvering persisted through the week. On May 13, two days post-clash, the local Manchukuoan commander alerted General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division headquarters in Hailar. Simultaneously, Major Chogdan reported to Soviet military command in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital. What began as a Mongolian-Manchukuoan spat was poised to draw in Soviet and Japanese patrons. Attributing the May 10–11 violation hinges on border interpretations: both sides claimed the Halha-Nomonhan strip. Yet, most accounts concur that Manchukuoan forces initiated the fighting. Post-May 13 notifications to Moscow and Tokyo clarify the record thereafter. Midday on May 13, Komatsubara was leading a staff conference on the newly issued Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488—Major Tsuji Masanobu's aggressive border guidelines. Ironically, the first Nomonhan combat report arrived mid-discussion. Officers present recall Komatsubara deciding instantly to "destroy the invading Outer Mongolian forces" per Order 1488. That afternoon, he informed Kwantung Army Headquarters of the incident and his intent to eradicate the intruders, requesting air support and trucks. General Kenkichi Ueda, Kwantung commander, approved Komatsubara's "positive attitude," dispatching six scout planes, 40 fighters, 10 light bombers, two anti-aircraft batteries, and two motorized transport companies. Ueda added a caveat: exercise "extreme caution" to prevent escalation—a paradoxical blend of destruction and restraint, reflective of KwAHQ's fervent mood. Ueda relayed the details to Tokyo's Army General Staff, which responded that Kwantung should handle it "appropriately." Despite Kwantung's impulsive reputation, Tokyo deferred, perhaps trusting the northern strategic imbalance, eight Japanese divisions versus 30 Soviet ones from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, would enforce prudence. This faith proved misguided. On May 14, Major Tsuji flew from KwAHQ for aerial reconnaissance over Nomonhan, spotting 20 horses but no troops. Upon landing, a fresh bullet hole in his plane confirmed lingering MPR presence east of the Halha. Tsuji briefed 23rd Division staff and reported to Ueda that the incident seemed minor. Aligning with Order 1488's spirit, Komatsubara deployed a force under Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma: an armored car company, two infantry companies, and a cavalry troop. Arriving at Nomonhan on May 15, Azuma learned most MPR forces had retreated westward across the Halha the prior night, with only token elements remaining, and those withdrawing. Undeterred, he pursued. The advance met scant resistance, as foes had crossed the river. However, Japanese light bombers struck a small MPR concentration on the west bank, Outpost Number 7, killing two and wounding 15 per MPR reports; Japanese claimed 30–40 kills. All agree: the raid targeted undisputed MPR territory. Hearing of May 15's events, Komatsubara deemed the Mongolians sufficiently rebuked and recalled Azuma to Hailar on May 16. KwAHQ concurred, closing the matter. Soviet leaders, however, saw it differently. Mid-May prompted Soviet support for the MPR under their 1936 Mutual Defense Pact. The Red Army's 57th Corps, stationed in Mongolia, faced initial disarray: Commander Nikolai Feklenko was hunting, Chief of Staff A. M. Kushchev in Ulan Ude with his ill wife. Moscow learned of clashes via international press from Japanese sources, sparking Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov's furious inquiry. Feklenko and Kushchev rushed back to Ulaanbaatar, dispatching a mixed force—a battalion from the 149th Infantry Regiment (36th Division), plus light armor and artillery from the 11th Tank Brigade—to Tamsag Bulak, 80 miles west of the Halha. Led by Major A. E. Bykov, it bolstered the MPR's 6th Cavalry Division. Bykov and Cavalry Commander Colonel Shoaaiibuu inspected the site on May 15, post-Azum's departure. The cavalry arrived two days later, backed by Bykov (ordered to remain west of the river and avoid combat if possible). Some MPR troops recrossed, occupying the disputed zone. Clashes with Manchukuoan cavalry resumed and intensified. Notified of renewed hostilities, Komatsubara viewed it as defiance, a personal affront. Emboldened by Order 1488, he aimed not just to repel but to encircle and annihilate. The incident was on the verge of major expansion. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The ghosts of the Changufeng incident have come back to haunt both the USSR and Japan. Those like Tsuji Masanobu instigated yet another border clash that would erupt into a full blown battle that would set a precedent for both nations until the very end of WW2. 

Quand on pense à Taïwan, on imagine plutôt les tensions entre Pékin et Taipei, les semi-conducteurs, ou la mer de Chine… certainement pas la France. Et pourtant : sur l'île, à Keelung, un cimetière militaire français abrite les dépouilles de plus de 700 officiers, sous-officiers et soldats morts “au champ d'honneur”. Pourquoi des soldats français sont-ils tombés si loin de l'Europe ? La réponse nous ramène à une guerre oubliée : la guerre franco-chinoise de 1884-1885.À cette époque, la France est engagée dans une expansion coloniale en Asie du Sud-Est. Son objectif principal : prendre le contrôle du Tonkin, au nord du Vietnam actuel, et consolider ce qui deviendra bientôt l'Indochine française. Problème : la Chine considère historiquement le Vietnam comme une zone d'influence et soutient des forces locales hostiles à la présence française. Résultat : les tensions montent… jusqu'au conflit ouvert.La guerre éclate en 1884. La France se bat sur plusieurs fronts : au Tonkin, bien sûr, mais aussi sur mer. Et c'est là que Taïwan entre en scène. À l'époque, l'île appartient à l'empire chinois des Qing. Taïwan est stratégique : elle contrôle une partie des routes maritimes et sert de base logistique pour ravitailler les troupes chinoises et harceler les positions françaises au Vietnam. Pour Paris, frapper Taïwan, c'est donc frapper le nerf de la guerre.En 1884, la Marine française attaque Keelung, dans le nord de l'île. Les combats sont rudes, mais l'ennemi le plus meurtrier n'est pas toujours celui qu'on croit. Car dans ces expéditions, les soldats français affrontent aussi un adversaire invisible : le climat, les moustiques, la dysenterie, le paludisme, le choléra. Les pertes sanitaires dépassent souvent les pertes au combat. Beaucoup d'hommes meurent non pas d'une balle, mais d'une fièvre.L'armée française occupe certaines positions, tente d'étouffer l'approvisionnement chinois, et impose un blocus maritime. Mais cette campagne de Taïwan ne se transforme pas en conquête : elle sert surtout de pression militaire et diplomatique dans un conflit plus large.La guerre franco-chinoise se termine en 1885. La Chine renonce à sa tutelle sur le Vietnam, ce qui ouvre la voie à la domination française en Indochine. Le cimetière de Keelung, lui, reste comme le témoin discret d'un épisode presque effacé de notre mémoire : quand, pour contrôler le Vietnam, la France a aussi porté la guerre jusqu'à Taïwan. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

This week on Sinica, I speak with Jia Ruixue and Li Hongbin, coauthors of The Highest Exam: How the Gaokao Shapes China. We're talking about China's college entrance exam — dreaded and feared, with outsized ability to determine life outcomes, seen as deeply flawed yet also sacrosanct, something few Chinese want drastically altered or removed. Cards on table: I had very strong preconceptions about the gaokao. My wife and I planned our children's education to get them out of the Chinese system before it became increasingly oriented toward gaokao preparation. But this book really opened my eyes. Ruixue is professor of economics at UC San Diego's School of Global Policy and Strategy, researching how institutions like examination systems shape governance, elite selection, and state capacity. Hongbin is James Liang Chair at Stanford, focusing on education, labor markets, and institutional foundations of China's economic development. We explore why the gaokao represents far more than just a difficult test, the concrete incentives families face, why there are limited alternative routes for social mobility, how both authors' own experiences shaped their thinking, why exam-based elite selection has been so durable in China, what happened when the exam system was suspended during the Cultural Revolution, why inequality has increased despite internet access to materials, why meaningful reform is so politically difficult, how education translated into productivity and GDP growth, the gap between skill formation and economic returns, how the system shapes governance and everyday life, and the moral dimensions of exam culture when Chinese families migrate to very different education systems like the U.S.6:18 – What the gaokao actually represents beyond just being a difficult exam 11:54 – Why there are limited alternative pathways for social mobility 14:23 – How their own experiences as students shaped their thinking 18:46 – Why the gaokao is a political institution, not just educational policy 22:21 – Why exam-based elite selection has been so durable in China 28:30 – What happened in late Qing and Cultural Revolution when exams were suspended 33:26 – Has internet access to materials reduced inequality or has it persisted? 36:55 – Hongbin's direct experience trying to reform the gaokao—and why it failed 40:28 – How education improvement accounts for significant share of China's GDP growth 42:44 – The gap: college doesn't add measurable skills, but gaokao scores predict income 46:56 – How centralized approach affects talent allocation across fields 51:08 – The gaokao and GDP tournament for officials: similar tournament systems 54:26 – How ranking and evaluation systems shape workplace behavior and culture 58:12 – When exam culture meets U.S. education: understanding tensions around affirmative action 1:02:10 – Transparent rule-based evaluation vs. discretion and judgment: the fundamental tradeoffRecommendations: Ruixue: Piao Liang Peng You (film by Geng Jun); Stoner (a novel by John Williams) Hongbin: The Dictator's HandbookKaiser: Furious Minds: The Making of the MAGA New Right by Laura K. Field; Black Pill by Elle ReeveSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Cet évènement est resté dans l'histoire parce qu'il condense, en un seul événement, les fragilités politiques, économiques et géopolitiques de l'Asie centrale au début du XXᵉ siècle.Khorgas — aujourd'hui Khorgos — était alors une ville-frontière stratégique, située sur la route reliant l'empire russe à la Chine impériale finissante. Poste de commerce, carrefour de caravanes, zone de transit pour la soie, le thé, l'opium et l'argent, Khorgas incarnait un point névralgique des échanges eurasiens. Mais cette prospérité reposait sur un équilibre extrêmement précaire.Dans la nuit du 31 décembre 1910 au 1er janvier 1911, un incendie d'une violence exceptionnelle se déclare dans le quartier marchand. En quelques heures, attisé par des vents glacials et la promiscuité des constructions en bois, le feu ravage la quasi-totalité de la ville. Entrepôts, échoppes, habitations, registres commerciaux et réserves de marchandises disparaissent dans les flammes. Le sinistre fait relativement peu de victimes humaines, mais détruit l'économie locale.Cet incendie survient à un moment critique. La Chine impériale des Qing est à bout de souffle : la révolution de 1911 éclatera quelques mois plus tard, mettant fin à plus de deux millénaires de régime impérial. De l'autre côté de la frontière, l'Empire russe est lui aussi fragilisé, à l'aube des bouleversements qui mèneront à la révolution de 1917. Khorgas devient alors le symbole d'un monde ancien qui brûle littéralement sous nos yeux.Pourquoi cet incendie est-il resté célèbre ? D'abord parce qu'il marque la fin d'un modèle commercial ancien, fondé sur les caravanes et les villes-frontières semi-autonomes. Après le feu, Khorgas ne retrouvera jamais son rôle d'avant. Les routes commerciales se déplacent, les frontières se durcissent, les États modernes imposent leur contrôle administratif et militaire.Ensuite, l'événement nourrit de nombreuses rumeurs et théories. Certains contemporains évoquent un accident banal, d'autres un incendie criminel lié à des rivalités commerciales, voire une manœuvre politique destinée à affaiblir une zone stratégique. Aucune preuve définitive ne tranche, ce qui contribue à la légende de l'événement.Enfin, l'incendie du Nouvel An de Khorgas est devenu un symbole historique : celui d'une Asie centrale charnière, prise entre empires, modernité et effondrement des anciens équilibres. Aujourd'hui encore, alors que Khorgos est redevenue un hub majeur grâce aux nouvelles routes de la soie chinoises, cet incendie rappelle que les grands carrefours du monde sont aussi des lieux de grande vulnérabilité.Un feu, une nuit, et tout un monde qui bascule. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Great Qing begins to buckle under early 19th c. internal pressures. Unrest first erupts not at the imperial core but along its social and geographic margins. This time, we look at three of the early warning shocks: the Miao frontier rebellions, the rise of Triad networks across the southern coastal cities, & the formation of the apocalyptic White Lotus uprising.Time Period Covered:~1790s-1840s CEMajor Historical Figures:Qing Empire:Fu Nai, Qing magistrateHeshen, grand councilor under the Qianlong Emperor, (1750-1799) Miao People:Shi Sanbao, Miao rebel leader, (d. ~1796)Shi Liudeng, Miao rebel leader, (d. 1797)White Lotus Sect:Lin Shuangwen, Leader of the Tiandihui (Heaven and Earth Society), (1756–1788)Liu Song, White Lotus sect figure/leader, (banished~1775; active 1770s–1790s)Liu Zhishi, Disciple of Liu Song; charismatic White Lotus preacher, (active 1790s)Major Works Cited:Mann, Susan and Philip A. Kuhn. “Dynastic decline and the roots of rebellion” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10: Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 1.Naquin, Susan. "Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813."Ownby, David. Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in Early and Mid-Qing China.Rowe, William. China's Last Empire: The Great Qing. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Tao Te Ching with San Qing San Qing is a Taoist Master of Qigong and Neigong. He is an ordained priest and a lineage holder of Taoism. He is also a spirit channeler and healer. He is author of Tao Te Ching, Magical Register, Immortality: Crystallized in the Material, The Ancient Practice of Synchronicity: How to Manifest and Realize You are the Universe, and Primordial Mother Crystallized. His websites are immortaltaoistrites.com and theway126.com. San delves into the profound teachings of the Tao Te Ching, exploring its significance, the essence of Lao Tzu, and the magical aspects of Taoism. He describes how the text serves as a manual for self-discovery and spiritual growth, emphasizing the importance of intuition, the paradoxes within the teachings, and the transformative power of reading and embodying the verses. He highlights the Tao Te Ching’s ability to enhance everyday life and foster a deeper connection with oneself and the universe. New Thinking Allowed CoHost, Emmy Vadnais, OTR/L, is a licensed occupational therapist, intuitive healer and coach, and spiritual guide based in St. Paul, Minnesota. Emmy is the founder of the Intuitive Connections and Holistic OT communities. She is the author of Intuitive Development: How to Trust Your Inner Knowing for Guidance With Relationships, Health, and Spirituality. Her website is https://emmyvadnais.com (Recorded on September 25, 2025) For a short video on How to Get the Most From New Thinking Allowed, go to https://youtu.be/aVbfPFGxv9o Check out our new website for the New Thinking Allowed Foundation at http://www.newthinkingallowed.org. There you will find our incredible, searchable database as well as our new, FREE QUARTERLY MAGAZINE. Also, opportunities to shop and to support our video productions. There, you can also subscribe to our FREE, WEEKLY NEWSLETTER! For a complete, updated list with links to all of our videos, see https://newthinkingallowed.com/Listings.html. Check out New Thinking Allowed’s AI chatbot. You can create a free account at https://ai.servicespace.org When you enter the space, you will see that our chatbot is one of several you can interact with. While it is still a work in progress, it has been trained on 1,600 NTA transcripts. It can provide intelligent answers about the contents of our interviews. It’s almost like having a conversation with Jeffrey Mishlove. To buy a high-quality, printed version of the New Thinking Allowed Magazine, go to nta-magazine.magcloud.com. To join the NTA Psi Experience Community on Facebook, see https://www.facebook.com/groups/1953031791426543/. To download and listen to audio versions of the New Thinking Allowed videos, visit our podcast at https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/new-thinking-allowed-audio-podcast/id1435178031. Download and read Jeffrey Mishlove’s Grand Prize essay in the Bigelow Institute competition, Beyond the Brain: The Survival of Human Consciousness After Permanent Bodily Death. https://www.bigelowinstitute.org/docs/1st.pdf If you would like to join our team of volunteers, helping to promote the New Thinking Allowed YouTube channel on social media, editing and translating videos, creating short video trailers based on our interviews, helping to upgrade our website, or contributing in other ways (we may not even have thought of), please send an email to friends@newthinkingallowed.com. To order Intuitive Development by Emmy Vadnais, click here: https://amzn.to/35sbLIA. To order the book, Tao Te Ching, Magical Register, go to: https://immortaltaoistrites.com/ To order New Thinking Allowed Dialogues: Is There Life After Death? click on https://amzn.to/3LzLA7Y To order Russell Targ: Ninety Years of ESP, Remote Viewing, and Timeless Awareness, go to https://amzn.to/4aw2iyr To order UFOs and UAP – Are We Really Alone?, go to https://amzn.to/3Y0VOVh

She ruled the South China Sea, terrified navies, and ran her pirate empire with ruthless efficiency – meet Zheng Yi Sao, the Pirate Queen of Admin.In this family friendly episode of Dead Funny History, historian Greg Jenner dives into the extraordinary life of Zheng Yi Sao, one of the most powerful pirates who ever lived. Born around 1775 in Guangdong, China, Shi Yang (as she was first known) rose from poverty to command a fleet of 70,000 pirates. Her journey began with a job on a boat where she sold secrets to powerful men, and took a dramatic turn when she married the notorious pirate Zheng Yi.After her husband's death in 1807 – either by cannon or storm – Zheng Yi Sao took command of the pirate confederation. She wasn't just a fearsome fighter; she was a master of organisation. She split her fleet into colour-coded squadrons, enforced strict rules (including ear removal for slackers), and offered perks like pensions and healthcare. Her pirates even had a retirement home.Greg reveals how Zheng Yi Sao's empire grew through clever business tactics. She sold protection certificates to merchants, hijacked salt shipments, and outnumbered the Qing navy three to one. Her pirates wielded massive 8-foot guns called jingals and swam into battle with machete-tipped poles. At one point, the city of Canton panicked just from a polite warning of attack.Despite efforts by the Chinese government – and help from the Portuguese and British navies – Zheng Yi Sao remained undefeated. Eventually, she retired in luxury after being paid off by the empire. She may have run an illegal gambling house in her later years, but she died rich and respected in 1844.With jokes, sound effects, and a quiz to test your memory, this episode is a swashbuckling, spreadsheet-wielding celebration of a pirate legend.Writers: Gabby Hutchinson Crouch, Athena Kugblenu and Dr Emma Nagouse Host: Greg Jenner Performers: Mali Ann Rees and Richard David-Caine Producer: Dr Emma Nagouse Associate Producer: Gabby Hutchinson Crouch Audio Producer: Emma Weatherill Script Consultant: Dr Ron Po Production Coordinator: Liz Tuohy Production Manager: Jo Kyle Sound Designer: Peregrine AndrewsA BBC Studios Production

The Qing Empire did not collapse because it stopped working. It collapsed because it kept working — just barely — under pressures that compounded faster than reform could relieve them... Time Period Covered: ~1790s-1840s CE Major Works Cited: Jones, Susan Mann and Philip A. Kuhn. “Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion.” The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10: Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part I Kuhn, Philip A. Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864. Pomeranz, Kenneth, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

From the koan chants of monasteries tucked between Himalayan peaks, to wending caravan paths stretching endlessly across the arid expanses of the Taklamakan & trackless steppes of Dzungaria, we finish out our look at the four primary frontier regions of the Qing Empire as of 1800, where they'd come from, how they were operated, & the imperial tonnage of headaches for Beijing that came with both.Tibet - 00:01:21Xinjiang - 00:22:08 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The world is coming to Qing's doorstep, but it has a whole other set of problems along its own frontiers... Less chronologically tied-down than most of our episodes, today we look at two of the Qing Empire's four major "inner frontier zones" and how they - in spite of often getting upstaged by the "flashier" elements of the 1800s & Qings clashes with the wider world, many have played an even larger part in its imperial decay than the British East India Co. could've ever hoped to achieve. We start off today with Manchuria & Mongolia... Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices