Podcasts about Nichiren

Last time we spoke about the Ishiwara Kanji. Born in 1889 in Japan, Kanji Ishiwara was the son of a policeman from a samurai lineage. He entered military training at 13, rising through the ranks to become a Major and a respected lecturer. His unconventional views on military strategy and history led him to predict a prolonged conflict with the United States. Deeply influenced by Nichiren Buddhism, he envisioned Japan as a moral leader destined to guide Asia, advocating for reform in China while grappling with his nation's imperial ambitions. In 1928, ishiwara fell ill with influenza, leading to a six-month hospitalization. During recovery, he joined an elite study group discussing war theories. His lectures on total war gained fame, culminating in a presentation to Kwantung officers. Amid rising tensions in Japan, he advocated for control over Manchuria, believing Japan had a moral duty to stabilize China. His theories on warfare, including the devastating potential of airpower, foreshadowed the horrors of future conflicts, influencing Japan's military strategies.   #137 Ishiwara Kanji Part 2: The Mukden Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki collaborated with other members of the Kwantung Army to address what they perceived as the Manchurian issue. By the mid-1930s, the belief that Manchuria needed to be forcibly seized had become the prevailing opinion among the Kwantung Army. Ishiwara was convinced that Japan could no longer remain passive in Manchuria, as each passing day meant Japan was gradually losing its rights and interests in the region to China, risking expulsion. Abandoning Manchuria would be a national catastrophe, resulting in the loss of a crucial buffer state, valuable resources, and land for Japan's growing population to settle. In essence, Manchuria was vital for Japan's survival and growth. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviet threat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army Headquarters in Tokyo also recognized that Manchuria was a crucial defensive line against the USSR. However, unlike the Kwantung Army, which aimed to control all of Manchuria, the leaders in Tokyo focused on incorporating southern Manchuria through the South Manchurian Railway and did not pursue any territory north of it. Ishiwara, on the other hand, believed that the only way for Japan to prevent the USSR from exerting pressure on southern Manchuria was to occupy northern Manchuria and extend even further north toward the Amur River. This would allow Japan to control the mountain ranges that bordered the western and eastern frontiers of northern Manchuria. Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”. Ishiwara advanced his ideas significantly after Japan's conquest of Manchuria, recognizing the necessity of effectively administering and pacifying its diverse populations. He posited that the stability of Manchuria could be achieved through the unique skills and contributions of the various ethnic groups residing there. For instance, he believed that the Chinese would excel in developing small businesses, while the Koreans would apply their expertise in paddy farming. These racial dynamics, according to Ishiwara, would play a crucial role in the development of Manchukuo and the broader vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, it was clear that, above all, Manchuria was intended to serve Japan's interests, many of which were exploitative and economically driven. By early 1930, Ishiwara and his colleague Itagaki devised a military strategy reminiscent of the tactics employed during the Russo-Japanese War, specifically a surprise night attack. Their plan involved the Kwantung Army launching an assault on the Liaoning region, targeting key Chinese garrisons. This operation required meticulous planning, as the Kwantung Army was significantly outnumbered by the forces commanded by Zhang Xueliang. In the vicinity of Mukden alone, Zhang commanded approximately 20,000 well-equipped troops, supported by aircraft and tanks. Across Manchuria, he could mobilize around 250,000 soldiers in the event of conflict. In stark contrast, the Kwantung Army could only field about 10,000 personnel, primarily composed of garrison units stationed along the railway. They lacked substantial air support and mechanized units, and their overall equipment was inadequate. To address this stark imbalance in military strength, Ishiwara emphasized the importance of intelligence and rigorous training. He aimed to refine specific assault techniques, enabling Japanese forces to execute rapid and concentrated attacks that would overwhelm their Chinese adversaries. The overarching strategy was notably straightforward: it hinged on delivering a decisive blow to the heart of Zhang Xueliang's military stronghold at the Peitaying barracks in Mukden. Ishiwara believed that if this critical target fell, it would shatter the enemy's morale, providing the Kwantung Army with the necessary military and psychological momentum to dominate the surrounding regions. However, he acknowledged that if the Soviet Union intervened, the entire plan could unravel catastrophically. One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ” Ishiwara, as you can imagine, was deeply frustrated by the prospect of delaying action for another year. He argued passionately that the current international landscape necessitated an immediate strike. At that time, the Soviet Union was still in the midst of its ambitious five-year plan, which limited its capacity for intervention. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, and France were grappling with their own financial crises, rendering them unable to mount significant resistance in the Far East. Most notably, the Nationalist regime in China was preoccupied with its unification efforts south of the Great Wall, but this situation was expected to shift soon. Ishiwara believed that if they postponed their plans for a year, the geopolitical environment would deteriorate further, making decisive action imperative. For Ishiwara, the moment to act was now or never. In July 1931, Ishiwara and Itagaki orchestrated a crucial reconnaissance mission aimed at familiarizing the newest Kwantung officers with the northern regions of Manchuria. To disguise their true intentions, they informed high command that the mission was a survey focused on the Soviet Union. However, the real objective was to assess the strength and influence of Chinese power in northern Manchuria. During their return journey, the team received alarming news about the disappearance of Captain Nakamura Shintaro, a Kwantung staff officer. Upon reaching Port Arthur, they learned that rumors were circulating that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under what were described as “mysterious circumstances.” In the preceding months, Manchuria had witnessed a surge in violent riots, murders, work strikes, and various other incidents, all contributing to a climate of unrest. The Nakamura affair intensified these existing tensions. In response, both the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries attempted to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. However, figures at the central army headquarters, such as Nagata Tetsuzan, who sympathized with the urgency felt by their Kwantung counterparts, felt compelled to support them. The situation was rapidly escalating, and the stakes were growing ever higher. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that's exactly what he did. The Kwantung officers moved their troops beyond the railway zone, where they had been confined, and without waiting for Itagaki's approval—who was in Japan at the time—they began preparations to send an armored train along with a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to Mukden. Their goal was to enlist the help of the Chinese military in investigating Nakamura's disappearance. Upon learning of this, Tokyo sent a telegram instructing them to halt their departure from the railway and to refrain from using the Nakamura incident as a pretext for employing force to address the Manchurian issue. For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. Ishiwara ordered the dispatch of an armored train carrying a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to compel the Chinese military authorities in Mukden to assist in the investigation of Nakamura's disappearance. However, central headquarters halted the train's departure at the last moment, sending a telegram from Tokyo that specifically instructed the Kwantung Army not to use the Nakamura incident to pressure a resolution to the Manchurian issue.  In addition to the Nakamura situation, another issue was brewing. Colonel Dohihara Kenji was involved in a plot to enlist Warlord Yan Xishan to attack Zhang Xueliang. This scheme was attracting unwanted attention and undermining the effectiveness of the Nakamura incident, prompting Ishiwara to swiftly suppress the plans. Rumors began to circulate in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army was preparing to retaliate against the Chinese due to the Nakamura situation. In response, War Minister General Minami dispatched Major General Yoshiji Tatekawa to Mukden to caution the Kwantung officers against any such actions. Ishiwara was informed of Tatekawa's arrival and sent urgent telegrams to his followers, warning, “Plot exposed. Act before Tatekawa's arrival.” Consequently, the launch date was moved from September 28th to the 18th. Itagaki personally intercepted Tatekawa's train, inviting him for tea and sake, and arranged for him to spend the night with a geisha on the evening of the 18th. On September 18th of 1931, 1st Lt Suemori Kawamoto of the independent Garrison Unit of the 29th infantry regiment planted bombs along the tracks near Liutiaokou. At 10:20pm they exploded doing only minor damage to 1.5 meters of track on one site. The damage was so minor a train actually passed over the tracks without difficulty 10 minutes later. Ishiwara, Itagaki and their followers quickly announced the explosion to be a Chinese atrocity and mobilized the Kwantung Army. Itagaki ordered the Independent Garrison Force and 29th infantry regiment to storm the Peitaying Barracks. Battalion commander Shimamoto was awakened by the orders via telephone and quickly dispatched the 1st (Ono) and 4th (Takahashi) companies from Mukden; the 2nd (kawakami) company at Fushun to advance to Liutiaokou. At 10:40pm the 29th regiment commander Hirata got a call from Shimamoto who ordered him to get his regiment into emergency formation and to storm the Peiyating barracks.  Two secretly hidden 24cm artillery pieces began to bombard the Peitaying barracks as 500 Japanese stormed the 7000 strong Chinese garrison. Despite being outnumbered 14 to 1, the Japanese destroyed Zhang Xueliangs small air force, routed the Chinese and occupied the Peiyating Barracks by 11pm, all at the cost of 500 Chinese lives and allegedly only 2 Japanese lives. A major reason the Japanese had ease was because Zhang Xueliang ordered his men to store away their weapons and not put up a fight if the Japanese invaded. Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek both in Beijing at the time knew they could not initiate an offensive war against such a strong foreign country. They were hoping the League of Nations would intervene as pertaining to the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. But later on Chiang Kai-Shek would find America too wrapped up in its depression at home, Britain indifferent and other nations without enough reason to risk anything in the far east. An hour after the attack, Ishiwara began pressing General Shigeru Honjo, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to send reinforcements to capture all of Mukden. Initially, Honjo hesitated, but Ishiwara convinced him that there was significant provocation from the enemy, prompting Honjo to order additional units into combat to secure the entire city. Historians have since struggled to determine whether Honjo was aware of the invasion plan; it seems likely he had some knowledge, but not the full details, which made him cautious in his actions over the following weeks. In the days that followed, Honjo attempted to confine the incident, but Ishiwara and Itagaki continuously urged all forces to adhere to the secret plan they had trained for. The speed and decisiveness of their actions overwhelmed the Chinese forces and left Honjo unable to change the course of events. Famously when one colleague asked Itagaki what to do in response to cease and desist orders from Honjo, Itagaki responded “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's war”. Official orders from Tokyo came on the next day, specifically opposing the expansion of hostilities, but Ishiwara and Itagaki had come too far to stop now. They began persuading Honjo to telegram the General Staff to ask for reinforcements and freedom of action “to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”. Ishiwara and Itagaki clearly aimed to expand their offensive through official channels first, but they also circumvented these channels. One cunning tactic they used was to incite chaos among civilians in Manchurian cities, thereby heightening the demand for improved security for Japanese residents. This strategy would enable the Kwantung Army troops to move beyond their established boundaries. Shortly after what is now known as the "Mukden Incident," military agents were sent to Kirin to stir unrest in the city. Reports of disturbances from Kirin began flooding into the Kwantung Army headquarters, with Ishiwara urging Honjo to send forces to Kirin to safeguard Japanese residents. He also pushed for reinforcements from the Korean Army, but Honjo was reluctant to take that step. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.  The operation against Kirin was executed with remarkable speed. Ishiwara ordered the majority of the 2nd Division, led by General Tamon Jiro, to swiftly travel to Kirin by train. They entered the city without firing a single shot and compelled the local Chinese commander to declare the province's independence from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours, the Korean army responded to an aid request from the Kwantung Army staff sent on September 21st and began advancing into Manchuria. In just 48 hours, the Japanese military had taken control of Kirin, which was outside the Kwantung operational zone, and the Korean army was invading Manchuria without Tokyo's approval, effectively undermining military discipline. Chief of Staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to restrict the Kwantung Army's operations and granted field commanders discretionary authority for certain emergency situations, typically of a local nature. However, the Kirin expedition did not fit within these parameters. Encouraged by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki pushed for an advance on Harbin. As noted in the previous episode, the strategy for taking Manchuria relied on speed and precision. The Kwantung Army had limited forces compared to the immediate Chinese troops in Manchuria, yet they were constrained by directives from Tokyo HQ that prohibited the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the South Manchuria Railway, where they had previously confined their actions. Ishiwara attempted to frame the situation politically, arguing that Japan should support Manchurian independence and sent this proposal directly to Tokyo central HQ. However, on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ firmly rejected the idea of expanding hostilities. Faced with this outright refusal from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals believed their only option was to create further chaos to compel a response. Ishiwara took the lead once more, aiming to unsettle Tokyo HQ. On October 8th, he donned military pilot gear and infiltrated one of five Chinese aircraft seized at Mukden airfield. He personally led a raid, although later in life, during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, he would claim that the flight was intended solely for reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. He argued that it was only at the last moment that intelligence revealed anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou, prompting the Kwantung Army Commander to authorize their neutralization if fired upon. Ishiwara maintained that he and the four accompanying aircraft were fired upon, leading them to drop approximately 75 bombs on Chinchou. This series of events was quite dramatic, and contemporary accounts suggest it was a premeditated effort to provoke Tokyo. The raid on Chinchou certainly alarmed Tokyo, leading the staff there to worry that the West would start condemning them. Tokyo's high command found themselves in a difficult position. They felt compelled to publicly support the Kwantung Army by retroactively approving the chaotic attacks, but internally, they were furious. Major Endo Saburo from the intelligence division was dispatched to Manchuria to investigate the situation. When he asked Ishiwara about the events, Ishiwara claimed he acted on the principle of field initiative, which was why he hadn't informed Tokyo beforehand. Saburo also noted that Ishiwara's tone suggested that he and the intelligence division should stay out of the matter. Additionally, Saburo learned that there were whispers in Manchuria indicating that if Tokyo's high command did not align with them, the Kwantung Army was ready to act independently. It appeared that the radical officers of the Kwantung Army were even willing to defy the Imperial Japanese Army command to achieve their goals. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire” If you found this situation quite surprising, there was also a rumor that Ishiwara and Itagaki planned to use an independent Manchuria as a base for a coup d'état against the Japanese government. Their goal was to overthrow the capitalists oppressing the people and establish a national socialist regime centered around the emperor. For those familiar with the history of political assassinations in 1930s Japan, this rumor hints at events that would unfold in 1936. It remains unclear whether Ishiwara and Itagaki genuinely intended to pursue this plan, but they certainly spread the word. On October 18th, War Minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army, instructing them to stop any discussions about making Manchuria independent or attempting to seize control of it. Additionally, they dispatched Colonel Imamura Hitoshi from the operations section to Manchuria to reason with Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”. Despite the chaos and turmoil, the Kwantung Army had been held back from launching any sustained military operations throughout October. As expected, Ishiwara continued to argue for an advance into northern Manchuria. In early November, he found another opportunity when he claimed that more railways had been destroyed. Allegedly, hostile Chinese forces had blown up the rail bridges over the Nonni River, south of Tsitsihar. When Japanese engineering units arrived to repair the damaged tracks, they came under fire from Chinese troops. To the high-ranking officials in Tokyo, this appeared to be a legitimate reason to take defensive action. Additionally, Kwantung intelligence reports were reaching Tokyo, suggesting that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had also provided exaggerated reports to the Japanese public, manipulating media narratives to pressure Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern Manchuria. Tokyo approved a defensive operation, restricted in time and scope, aimed at protecting Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung Army forces began moving north and soon engaged in intense fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led troops during this engagement, marking the only time in his military career that he did so. General Honjo, rightly concerned that the Kwantung forces were becoming uncontrollable, sent a cable on November 5th announcing that under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate,” the general staff would assume direct command authority in Manchuria. Unsurprisingly, Ishiwara and his like-minded colleagues in the Kwantung Army were furious. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.  Confronted with yet another dire situation, the IJA high command permitted the Kwantung Army to advance toward Tsitsihar. However, international outcry soon erupted, compelling them to order the evacuation of the city. Ishiwara sparked a significant debate among the staff, arguing that the evacuation was unacceptable given the sacrifices already made by the troops. Nevertheless, Honjo remained resolute. A few days later, Chinese forces began to gather at Chinchou, and tensions escalated with skirmishes occurring between Japanese and Chinese troops in Tientsin. In response, Ishiwara urgently called for Honjo to initiate an offensive at Chinchou as a way to better position their forces closer to Tientsin in case they faced overwhelming opposition. To support this advance, they also requested assistance from the Korean army. Once again, the burden fell to Tokyo. The high command in Tokyo ordered an immediate halt to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao River. The Kwantung Army hesitated, not solely due to the order but also because the Korean army refused to join the offensive against Chinchou, which was crucial for their success. Ishiwara found himself in a predicament; without reinforcements, the entire offensive could fail. Then, on December 11th, a significant change occurred when Premier Wakatsuki was ousted. War Minister Minami and Chief of Staff Kanaya, who had attempted to moderate the Kwantung Army's aggressiveness, were replaced by Araki Sadao, a leader of the Kodoha faction known for its aggressive stance. To provide some context, the Japanese military was divided into factions, similar to warlord cliques, vying to influence the future operations of the IJA and, to some extent, the IJN. Two primary factions shaped the military landscape in the 1930s: the Kodoha and the Toseiha (Control Faction). The Kodoha was not an organized political party nor did it hold an official position within the IJA, but it wielded considerable influence. Its members were typically younger officers, particularly from the Kwantung Army. General Sadao Araki was a founding member of the Kodoha, which was heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism, and the Kokutai ideology. They aimed to restore Japan to its perceived former glory, viewing liberal democracy as a detrimental force. They blamed the capitalists, industrialists, and elites—politicians, bureaucrats, and Zaibatsu leaders—for the nation's decline. Their goal was to see the Emperor reclaim full power in what they termed a "Showa Restoration." The Kodoha's primary adversary, as perceived by much of the Japanese military at the time, was the USSR and communism in general. Consequently, they supported the Hokushin-ron (Northern Strike Policy), which was Japan's theoretical plan to invade the USSR. While I don't want to delve too deeply into the details, it's important to note that the Kodoha was counterbalanced by the more moderate Toseiha faction, led by Hideki Tojo. The Toseiha opposed the Kodoha on several fronts, notably their desire to avoid a violent revolution to restore imperial dominance. Although they shared many principles with the Kodoha, the Toseiha rejected the Hokushin-ron strategy in favor of the Nanshin-ron (Southern Strike) strategy, which aimed at expanding into Southeast Asia and the resource-rich Dutch East Indies. The Toseiha faction also maintained better relations with the IJN. To contextualize this narrative within the political landscape, these two factions began to fiercely compete for dominance starting in 1931. With the influence of Araki Sadao and support from Prince Kan'in, a Kodoha sympathizer, significant changes occurred in Tokyo's command. Suddenly, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria were rebranded as “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung Army, fully backed by Tokyo, swiftly pursued all military objectives established by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were captured in early January 1932, followed by Tsitsihar in February. By spring 1932, Ishiwara urged the staff to complete the full occupation of Manchuria, both north and south. In April of that year, he presented the “Manshu haiti heiryaku,” or the program for the pacification of Manchuria. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol. It is clear that Ishiwara played a crucial role in the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had various strategies available to address the Manchurian issue, but Ishiwara focused primarily on achieving complete control over the region for its resources, strategic advantages, and to establish a continental base for a potential war against the United States. For Ishiwara, securing all of Manchuria was essential in preparation for the Final War. While it's likely that conflict between Japan and China would have occurred in Manchuria without Ishiwara's influence, it's uncertain whether Japan would have outright taken the province. Ishiwara dedicated years to planning and pushing boundaries, but when the operation commenced, it became evident that he and his associates lacked a definitive timeline for conquest and had several missing contingency plans. Despite the chaotic circumstances, the conquest of Manchuria proved to be a remarkable success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”. Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria incident set Japan on an unavoidable path toward the China War, which ultimately led to conflict with the West. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This situation also raises questions about military discipline. Many cite the concept of Gekokujo as a reason why individuals like Ishiwara and Itagaki were able to act as they did. These militaristic junior officers seemingly ran rampant, engaging in rebellious actions that defied their superiors, which forced those higher up to become complicit. While Gekokujo certainly played a role, especially in Ishiwara's case, it does not negate the fact that there was a significant level of indiscipline within the Japanese army. Ishiwara was undoubtedly aware of the potential consequences of his actions. A prime example is Colonel Komoto Daisaku, who had previously seen his career ruined after being exiled due to the Huanggutun incident. However, Ishiwara's focus extended beyond Manchuria; he was closely monitoring the political landscape in Tokyo. He recognized that the 1931 cabinet was unstable and that certain high-ranking officials, like Araki Sadao, were rapidly advancing in their careers and sympathized with his agenda. Ishiwara was betting that supporters from factions like Kodoha would gain the necessary power to further his cause. His gamble paid off handsomely, as all the key players in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their efforts. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd class, and returned to Japan as a celebrated hero, captivating younger officers in the Imperial Japanese Army. Ironically, the indiscipline he had nurtured within the army would later come back to haunt him as he climbed the ranks and became part of the Tokyo staff. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Ron Burgundy once said “Boy, that escalated quickly... I mean, that really got out of hand fast.” While perhaps Ishiwara did not plan for an all out war to break out against China, he certainly was the culprit to it happening. There was no going back, 15 years of blood, sweat and tears would be shed.

Last time we spoke about the reunification of Xinjiang. In Yarkland, chaos erupted as inflation soared, forcing Chinese officials to retreat to fortified New City. As insurgents advanced, Colonel Chin's forces looted and fled, igniting violence against Uyghurs and Hindu moneylenders. By April, rebels captured Kashgar, fracturing Chinese control. Amid shifting alliances, Abdullah revealed a conflict among Muslim troops, leading to a brief Uyghur-Kirghiz unity against the Chinese. After the execution of leader Temur, Abdullah seized Yarkland, while Tawfiq Bay rallied forces, leaving the Tungans besieged amidst chaos. In the tumultuous landscape of 1930s Xinjiang, Ma Chongying's Tungan forces, alongside young Uyghur conscripts, captured Kumul and advanced toward Urumqi. Despite fierce battles, including a significant clash at Kitai, Sheng Shihtsai struggled to maintain control amid shifting loyalties and external pressures. As the TIRET emerged under Khoja Niyas Hajji, internal conflicts and Soviet interventions escalated. Ultimately, Ma Chongying retreated to Russia, leaving Sheng in power, but the region remained fraught with tension and uncertainty.   #136 Ishiwara Kanji Part 1: The Man who Began WW2? Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” Famously said by Gandalf the White. 1931 was the year the Japanese initiated a 15 year long war with China. For those of you who perhaps joined this podcast recently and don't know, I am Craig and I operate the Pacific War Channel on Youtube. I have been covering the 15 year long China War forever it seems, so when we finally reached this part in our larger story I sat down and thought about how to first tackle this. One thing I really believe needs to be said at the beginning, is a lot of what happened was put into motion by one man, Ishiwara Kanji. For those of you who joined my patreon or later listened to my Ishiwara Kanji series on my channel, this one might be a bit of a refresher. But for those of you who have never heard the name of this man, well let me tell you a story about how a single man caused WW2. Kanji Ishiwara was born on January 18, 1889, in Tsuruoka, located in Yamagata Prefecture, Japan. He was the second son of a policeman who hailed from a lineage of samurai that had historically served the Shonai Domain. This domain had a notable history, particularly during the Boshin War, where Ishiwara's clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate. Following the defeat of the Shogunate, clans like Ishiwara's found themselves marginalized in the new political landscape of Meiji Era Japan. The power dynamics shifted significantly, with domains such as Choshu and Satsuma gaining the majority of influential governmental positions, while those that had aligned with the Shogunate were largely excluded from power. At the young age of 13, Ishiwara embarked on his military career by enrolling in a military preparatory school in Sendai. He continued his education for two years at the Central Military Preparatory School in Tokyo, where he honed his skills and knowledge in military affairs. In 1907, he entered the Imperial Japanese Military Academy as a member of its 21st class. After two years of rigorous training, he graduated in July 1909, receiving a commission as a Lieutenant and taking on the role of platoon commander in an infantry regiment stationed in the Tohoku region. In 1910, following Japan's annexation of Korea, Ishiwara's regiment was deployed to the Korean Peninsula, where he served in a small garrison in Ch'unch'on. His time there involved two years of occupation duty, during which he gained valuable experience in military operations and leadership. After returning to Tohoku in 1912, Ishiwara pursued further education and successfully passed the examinations required for entry into the Army Staff College in 1915. His dedication and exceptional performance were evident throughout his studies, culminating in his graduation at the top of his class in November 1918. This achievement earned him a prestigious place among the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, a distinguished group within the Japanese military, and he was honored with the imperial sword, a symbol of his status and accomplishments. In 1920, Ishiwara found himself facing a challenging assignment within the Department of Military Training. Eager for a change, he applied for service in China and was subsequently assigned to the Central China Garrison in Hankow. Over the course of a year, he traveled extensively through central China, immersing himself in the culture and landscape before returning to Tokyo in 1921. Upon his return, he took on the role of lecturer at the Army Staff College, where he shared his knowledge and experiences with aspiring military leaders. Despite his desire for another assignment in China, Ishiwara's superiors redirected him to Europe, a common practice for promising young officers at the time. He spent three years in Germany, where he dedicated himself to studying languages and military history. By 1925, at the age of 36 and having attained the rank of Major, he received a prestigious assignment to the faculty of the Army Staff College, where he lectured on the history of warfare. From the outset, Ishiwara distinguished himself as an unconventional officer. His eccentricities were well-known; he was often seen as argumentative and struggled with numerous health issues, including recurrent kidney infections, gastrointestinal problems, tympanitis, and other ailments that plagued him throughout his career. Additionally, his ancestry played a significant role in his military life, particularly in the context of the Japanese military's values during the 1930s. Officers from disgraced clans often felt compelled to demonstrate exceptional loyalty to the Emperor, striving to overcome the stigma associated with their lineage, a legacy of distrust that lingered from the early Meiji period. Ishiwara's character was marked by a certain oddity; he was a nonconformist with a fiercely independent spirit. Many biographers note that while he excelled academically, he often disregarded military decorum, particularly in terms of his dress and personal appearance. Early in his career, he voiced his concerns about perceived inequalities within the military, particularly the favoritism shown towards graduates of the staff college. Such outspoken criticism was considered reckless, yet it reflected his deep-seated beliefs. An avid reader, Ishiwara immersed himself in a wide range of subjects, including politics, religion, history, and philosophy, revealing a restless and inquisitive mind. His unconventional behavior and intellectual pursuits garnered attention from his peers, many of whom regarded him as a brilliant thinker. While military personnel are typically required to study military history, few pursue it with the same fervor as Ishiwara. He developed a profound obsession with understanding military history beyond the standard curriculum. His critical examination of the Russo-Japanese War led him to conclude that Japan's victory was largely a matter of luck. He believed that Japan had adopted the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but the sheer size of Russia made it impossible to defeat them swiftly. Ishiwara posited that had Russia been better prepared, Japan would likely have faced defeat, and it was only through a unique set of circumstances that Japan avoided a protracted conflict. This realization prompted Ishiwara to advocate for a significant shift in Japan's defense planning, emphasizing the need to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. His studies extended to World War I, where he critically analyzed the distinctions between short and prolonged conflicts. He recognized that extended wars often evolved into total wars, where political, economic, and social factors became as crucial as military strategy. This line of thinking led him to categorize wars into two types: “kessenteki senso” (decisive war) and “jizokuteki senso” (continuous war). Ishiwara viewed these categories as part of a cyclical pattern throughout history, with each type influencing the other in a dynamic interplay. During his time in Germany, Ishiwara immersed himself in the study of prominent military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Hans Delbrück. He found himself particularly captivated by Delbrück's concepts of Niederwerfungstrategie, or "strategy of annihilation," which emphasizes the importance of achieving victory through decisive battles, and Ermattungsstrategie, meaning "strategy of exhaustion," which focuses on wearing down the enemy over time. These theories resonated deeply with Ishiwara, as he recognized parallels between his own ideas and the insights presented in these influential works. This realization prompted him to analyze historical conflicts, viewing the Napoleonic Wars as the quintessential example of annihilation warfare, while interpreting the campaigns of Frederick the Great as emblematic of exhaustion warfare. As Ishiwara advanced in his studies, he became increasingly convinced, much like many of his contemporaries, that Japan and the United States were inevitably on a collision course toward war, driven by conflicting power dynamics and ideological differences. He anticipated that such a conflict would not be swift but rather a drawn-out struggle characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, this led him to grapple with a pressing dilemma: how could Japan effectively prepare for a prolonged war when its natural resources were evidently insufficient to sustain such an endeavor? This predicament prompted him to rethink the broader context of Asia. Ishiwara held a strong belief that Asia was a distinct entity, fundamentally different from the West, and he envisioned a future where Asian nations would liberate themselves and unite in solidarity. His enthusiasm was particularly ignited during the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, while he was a young cadet stationed in Korea. The prospect of China revitalizing itself filled him with hope. However, his later experiences in China led to a profound disillusionment. Throughout the 1920s, he encountered rampant banditry, conflicts during the warlord era, and pervasive chaos and disorder. The widespread poverty and instability he witnessed shattered his earlier optimistic vision of China's potential for progress and reform, leaving him with a more sobering understanding of the challenges facing the region. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite his profound disappointment with the political issues plaguing China, he was equally appalled by the way his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese people. He vividly recalled feelings of shame when he witnessed fellow colleagues in Hankow disembarking from rickshaws and carelessly tossing coins at the feet of the rickshaw pullers. This behavior struck him as not only disrespectful but also indicative of a broader attitude of racial superiority that he believed needed to be addressed. He frequently expressed in his writings that the Japanese needed to abandon their feelings of racial superiority. Ironically, he often juxtaposed this belief with his conviction that Japan had a duty to guide nations like China toward their rightful destiny. While he advocated for racial equality between Japan and China, he held a markedly different view regarding China's political landscape. Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that China required significant reform and modernization, which he felt Japan was uniquely positioned to facilitate. To Ishiwara, the pressing issue was that if Japan did not assist China in its development, Western powers would aggressively intervene, further subjugating the nation. He viewed Japan's role as one of liberation for China, rather than domination. Additionally, Ishiwara connected the impending conflict between Japan and the United States to the broader dynamics of Japan-China relations, suggesting that the outcome of this war would significantly impact the future interactions between the two nations. Ishiwara, like many Japanese military officers of his time, subscribed to the concept of Kokutai, a complex and multifaceted cultural phenomenon that served as a spiritual driving force within the Japanese military. The Kokutai can be understood as the essence of Japan's national character. Japan operated as a constitutional monarchy, embodying both the Kokutai (the national body or character) and Seitai (the governmental structure). This duality created a unique ideological framework: one aspect emphasized the traditional reverence for the emperor, while the other focused on the official government apparatus.   To simplify this intricate relationship, one might say, “Japan is governed simultaneously by the emperor and the government.” However, this characterization is inherently confusing, as it encapsulates a significant contradiction. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution stated, “The emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet.” This provision suggests the existence of an absolute monarch who is nonetheless expected to heed the advice of democratically elected representatives, creating a paradox that would contribute to the tensions leading to the Pacific War. A critical issue that arose from this constitutional framework was that the military was explicitly stated to be under the control of the emperor, rather than the political diet. Consequently, many military leaders perceived themselves as being beholden to the Kokutai, an ideology that evolved significantly from the Meiji era into the Showa era. For instance, consider a high-ranking military officer who views the political elite as corrupt individuals who have effectively taken the emperor hostage, acting against his will and, by extension, against the will of the Japanese people. Such a perspective could lead to radical actions, including attempts to overthrow the government to restore what they believed to be the rightful authority of the emperor. This ideological conflict presents a fascinating and complex rabbit hole that merits further exploration. Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. Ishiwara grappled with a profound question: how could the concept of Kokutai—the national essence of Japan—be relevant beyond the borders of Japan? He pondered how its significance could extend beyond the specific national interests of Japan. If a Japanese soldier were to lay down his life for the Kokutai, what meaning would that sacrifice hold for individuals of different races and nationalities? Furthermore, he sought to understand how the Kokutai's universal value could be connected to other ideologies outside Japan. In his quest for answers, Ishiwara turned to Nichiren Buddhism. This spiritual framework allowed him to weave together his thoughts on warfare, historical narratives, and the national purpose of Japan. Interestingly, Ishiwara did not come from a religious background; he had briefly explored Christianity but did not pursue it further. Similarly, Shintoism did not fully resonate with his beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism, however, presented a compelling alternative. It is characterized by a strong sense of patriotism and an apocalyptic vision, positioning itself as a holy mission intended for all of humanity, with Japan at its center. This belief system embodies a quasi-ideology of world regeneration, casting Japan as a moral leader destined to guide others. Given this context, it is easy to see how the Kokutai and Nichiren Buddhism complemented each other seamlessly. By leveraging the principles of Nichiren Buddhism, Ishiwara envisioned a way to elevate the Kokutai from a strictly nationalistic doctrine to a more universal ideology that could resonate globally. His introduction to these ideas came through Tanaka Chigaku, a prominent figure in the Kokuchukai, or "National Pillar Society," which was a nationalist organization rooted in Nichiren Buddhism and based in Tokyo. This connection provided Ishiwara with a framework to articulate a vision of Japan that transcended its geographical boundaries, linking the Kokutai to a broader, more inclusive mission. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism. One element of Kokuchukai's Nichirenism that strongly attracted Ishiwara was its aggressive passages. He justified much of Japan's military actions on the Asian continent by drawing parallels to Nichiren's concept of wielding the sword to uphold righteousness. He frequently quoted Nichiren's assertion that “the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law.” Ishiwara became deeply immersed in Nichiren's teachings and came to believe in its prophecy of a “Zendai mimon no dai toso,” or a titanic world conflict unprecedented in human history, akin to a global Armageddon. Following this conflict, he envisioned a period of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law.” While in Germany, Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the U.S. emerged victorious, the kokutai would be obliterated. He traveled back to Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, stopping in Harbin, where he met with Nichiren followers. He shared his thoughts on a “final war,” asserting that it would arise from religious prophecy and his military analysis. He cautioned that Japan must prepare for this impending conflict, declaring that “the final war is fast approaching.” Upon returning to Japan in 1925, he was filled with determination to lecture at the Army Staff College about this final war. His audience consisted of the army's promising young officers, to whom he taught about Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke, World War I, and, of course, his insights on the looming conflict. The Army Staff College repeatedly requested him to expand his lectures due to their popularity. In 1927, he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's Present and Future National Defense,” in which he discussed the inevitable war between the U.S. and Japan. This essay garnered significant attention from his colleagues. Later, in April 1931, he briefed his fellow Kwantung officers using this essay, advocating for decisive action on the Asian mainland. In 1928, he was scheduled to give another course on European warfare, but he contracted influenza and had to take a leave of absence. As he was recovering, he developed tympanitis in his ear, which required a six-month hospitalization. This was just one of many health issues that would affect him over time. Eventually, he became involved in an elite study group focused on war theories, led by Major Suzuki. This group included young reformist officers who discussed political and military matters. He continued his work on the concept of total war and ultimately wrote “Sensoshi taikan / General Outline of the History of War,” which he presented as a lecture to Kwantung officers in Changch'un, Manchuria, on July 4, 1929. The work underwent revisions in 1931 and 1938 and was published as a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.  The 1930s were a particularly tense period for Japan. The Japanese leadership perceived Marxism as a pervasive threat, believing it was undermining the nation. Many liberal voices argued that the military budget was excessive and called for cuts. To Ishiwara, this was madness; he questioned how Japan could afford to disarm. While Marxists claimed that communism would rescue Japan, liberals argued that true democracy was the answer. In contrast, Ishiwara and many in the military believed that the Kokutai would be Japan's salvation. Ishiwara advocated his final theories of warfare, asserting that the impending apocalypse would not lead to an American synthesis, but rather a decisive victory for the Japanese Kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”. From the outset of his initial theories, Ishiwara was convinced that the final war would be characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, World War I and the advancements of the 1920s introduced new technologies like tanks, poison gas, and airplanes. The airplane, in particular, led Ishiwara to believe that the defensive stalemate observed in World War I was nearing its end. He argued that airpower could deliver bomb loads beyond all known defenses, including naval surface units, fortifications, and armies equipped with automatic weapons. Ishiwara predicted that the final war would unleash unimaginable horrors on the world's greatest cities. Cities like London, Shanghai, Paris, and even Tokyo could be devastated within a single day of the outbreak of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”. Ishiwara contended that Japan should exert direct or indirect control over Manchuria and, to a lesser extent, certain regions of China. He claimed that Japan had a moral responsibility to the Asian continent and a unique connection to Manchuria and China. He emphasized the need to stabilize China, as its people faced threats from chaos, corruption, and conflict. Ishiwara argued that Japan would ultimately need to take a more proactive role in stabilizing China, especially in Manchuria, for the sake of peace and the well-being of the Chinese population. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.  In 1931, he started advocating for reforms in China, suggesting that it would be beneficial for the country to accept guidance from Japan. He viewed China as Japan's most important ally in the event of a conflict with the United States. He argued that Japan should make every effort to avoid getting involved in a war with China and should strive to prevent any actions that might provoke such a situation. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly. Let's delve into the historical landscape of Manchuria during the late 1920s, a period marked by intense geopolitical maneuvering among Russia, China, and Japan. The region found itself caught in a complex struggle for dominance, exacerbated by the fragmentation of Chinese authority due to rampant warlordism. This instability effectively severed Manchuria's ties to the rest of China, creating an opportunity for Japan to solidify and expand its influence. The situation in Manchuria, often referred to as the "Manchurian Problem," revolved around a pivotal question for Japanese policymakers: How could Japan consolidate its hold over Manchuria and further its interests in the face of an increasingly assertive China? Japan identified three primary strategies to address this challenge: Control of the South Manchuria Railway: Securing this vital transportation artery would grant Japan significant leverage over southern Manchuria. However, this strategy was fraught with complications, as it necessitated ongoing confrontations with Chinese political forces that opposed Japanese dominance. Utilization of the Kwantung Army: This military force stationed in Manchuria was crucial for projecting Japanese power. Members of the Kwantung Army were particularly concerned about the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek, which threatened the stability of their ally, Zhang Zuolin, known as the "Tiger of Manchuria." While Zhang had been cooperative and acted in Japan's interests, his support could not be guaranteed indefinitely. Japanese Colonization: This approach involved encouraging Japanese settlers to move into Manchuria, thereby establishing a demographic presence that could help legitimize Japan's claims to the territory. This method, often likened to a “filibuster,” aimed to create a Japanese cultural and economic foothold in the region. Each of these strategies presented distinct pathways forward, each with its own implications for the future of Manchuria and its relationship with China. The Kwantung Army, in particular, was increasingly alarmed by the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment as the Northern Expedition advanced northward. The army viewed Manchuria not only as a territory of strategic interest but also as a crucial buffer against the Soviet Union. The growing instability posed by Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the potential loss of influence over Zhang Zuolin were significant threats that needed to be addressed. Ultimately, many within the Kwantung Army believed that the only viable solution to secure Japan's interests in Manchuria would be to formally detach the region from China, a move that would likely require military intervention. This belief underscored the precarious balance of power in Manchuria during this tumultuous period and foreshadowed the escalating conflicts that would shape the region's future. In June 1927, senior officers of the Kwantung Army were summoned to a crucial meeting convened by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The primary objective of this gathering was to establish Japan's strategic policy regarding China and Manchuria. Within the ranks of the Kwantung Army, a more radical faction led by Colonel Komoto Daisaku was determined to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, who had increasingly become perceived as a significant barrier to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. This faction's resolve culminated in the assassination of Zhang Zuolin in 1928, an event infamously known as the Huanggutun Incident, where a bomb was placed on the train tracks to ensure his demise. However, the outcome of this assassination did not unfold as the Kwantung Army officers had anticipated. Instead of the anticipated rise of their chosen puppet leader, General Yang Yuting, control of Manchuria fell to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang. Unsurprisingly, Zhang Xueliang was deeply angered by the murder of his father and was far from compliant with Japanese interests. Consequently, the Kwantung Army found itself in a precarious position, as their aggressive policies in Manchuria backfired, leading to a situation that was even more unfavorable than before. The investigation into the assassination was notably half-hearted, resulting in the dismissal of Colonel Komoto from his position. This political fallout also led to the collapse of Tanaka's cabinet, leaving the Kwantung Army feeling both embarrassed and enraged over their diminished influence in Manchuria. The Japanese colonists residing in Manchuria, feeling increasingly threatened, began to call upon the Kwantung Army for protection against Chinese nationalists who sought to expel them from the region. In this climate of uncertainty, the Kwantung Army was left scrambling for strategies to detach Manchuria from Chinese control. In 1928, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara was consulted extensively by Kwantung officers regarding his perspectives on the Manchurian situation. Although he had not yet fully developed his Final War theory at this time, he articulated the fundamental principles behind it, emphasizing the urgent need for decisive action to assert control over Manchuria. Over the following years, Kwantung officers made concerted efforts to shape policy in favor of their interests in Manchuria, with Ishiwara's ideas gaining traction and stimulating discussions among his high-ranking peers. By October 1928, Ishiwara successfully secured a position on the Kwantung Army staff as an operations officer, with Colonel Komoto Daisaku as his primary supporter. Komoto recognized Ishiwara as the dynamic force needed to advance the aggressive Manchurian policies that the Kwantung Army sought to implement. This collaboration marked a significant turning point in the Kwantung Army's approach to Manchuria, as they aimed to solidify their control and influence in the region amidst growing tensions. When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he encountered a chaotic and demoralized atmosphere at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. This turmoil was largely a consequence of the disastrous bombing of Zhang Zuolin, which had resulted in significant operational failures. The investigation into this assassination triggered numerous changes within the Kwantung Army's leadership, many of which were quite restrictive and stifling. Despite the catastrophic impact of the Zhang Zuolin incident on Komoto's career, he continued to advocate for a forceful resolution to the escalating Manchurian crisis. Ishiwara appeared to share this perspective, and during the early months of 1929, he collaborated closely with Komoto to devise military operations aimed at countering Chinese forces in the Mukden region. However, by the spring of 1929, Komoto's position became increasingly precarious, leading to his official dismissal. By May, he had been reassigned to a relatively insignificant divisional post in Japan, and by June, he was completely removed from the army. Nevertheless, this did not signify the end of his influence over Manchurian affairs. His successor was Lieutenant Colonel Itagaki Seishiro, a longtime associate of Ishiwara from their days at the Sendai Military Preparatory School. This connection suggested that while Komoto may have been sidelined, the strategic direction in Manchuria would continue to be shaped by familiar faces and longstanding relationships. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A young, brilliant but perhaps insane man named Ishiwara Kanji began a fruitful military career. After spending considerable time in China, Ishiwara came to a dramatic conclusion, China needed to be saved, and to do so Japan needed to invade Manchuria. He began lecturing like minded youth and built a cult following, directing Japan towards war with China.  

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 8. The Great Contemplation and Insight of Tien-Tai Buddhism authored by Zhiyi or Chi-hi, and further extended and developed for our modern practice by Nichiren. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 7. The Five Periods and the Eight Teachings. We can gain a depth of understanding of Nichiren's insights and doctrinal basis. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 5. The One Vehicle, the One Buddha Vehicle, the Lotus Sutra as defined in the Immeasurable Meanings Prologue Sutra. These fundamentals of Zhiyi figure prominently in Nichiren. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 2. The lineage of teachings are discussed in this series on the importance of Zhiyi and the Tien-Tai school of Lotus Sutra practice for our doctrines of Nichiren in this modern era. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 1. We begin a short series on the importance of Zhiyi and the Tien-Tai school of Lotus Sutra practice for our doctrines of Nichiren in this modern era. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – The Three Periods of the Dharma. A discussion illuminating the stages of enlightenment teachings leading to the Later Age and the doctrines of Nichiren. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Bright on Buddhism - Episode 93 - What is Risshō Kōsei Kai? What are its doctrinal roots? What are its historical origins? Resources: Anderson, Richard W. (1994). "Risshō Kōseikai and the Bodhisattva way: Religious ideals, conflict, gender, and status". Japanese Journal of Religious Studies. 21 (2–3): 312–337. doi:10.18874/jjrs.21.2-3.1994.311-337.; Gerlitz, Peter, "Die Rissho Kosei-kai und ihre Assimilation im Westen", in: Michael Pye, Renate Stegerhoff (eds.), Religion in fremder Kultur. Religion als Minderheit in Europa und Asien, Saarbruecken: Dadder 1987, pp. 111–122; Gerlitz, Peter (1975). "Kathartische und therapeutische Elemente in der Seelsorge der Risshō Kosei-kai." Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 27 (4), 346-356; Inaba, Keishin; in: Clarke, Peter B. (2006). Encyclopedia of new religious movements, New York : Routledge. ISBN 0415267072, pp. 539–540; Kisala, Robert (1994). Contemporary Karma: Interpretations of Karma in Tenrikyō and Risshō Kōseikai, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 21 (1), 73-91; Kyoden Sutra Readings: Extracts from the Threefold Lotus Sutra, Romanized Japanese and English Translation, Risshō Kōsei Kai 1994; Stewart Guthrie: A Japanese New Religion: Rissho Kosei-Kai in a Mountain Hamlet (Michigan Monograph Series in Japanese Studies), Univ of Michigan 1988. ISBN 0939512335; Kato, Bunno (1993). The Threefold Lotus Sutra. Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Company. p. 348. ISBN 4333002087. PDF; Morioka, Kiyomi (1979). The Institutionalization of a New Religious Movement, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 6 (1/2), 239-280; Morioka, Kiyomi (1994). Attacks on the New Religions: Risshō Kōseikai and the “Yomiuri Affair, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 21 (2-3), 281-310; Niwano, Nikkyō (1976), Buddhism For Today: A Modern Interpretation of the Threefold Lotus Sutra, Tokyo: Kōsei Publishing Co., ISBN 4333002702 PDF; Stone, Jaquelin (2003). "Nichiren's Activist Heirs: Soka Gakkai, Rissho Koseikai, Nipponzan Myohoji", in Christopher Queen et al., "Action Dharma, New Studies in Engaged Buddhism", RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 63–94; Watanabe, Eimi (1968). Risshō Kōsei-Kai: A Sociological Observation of Its Members, Their Conversion and Their Activities. Contemporary Religions in Japan 9 (1/2), 75-151 Do you have a question about Buddhism that you'd like us to discuss? Let us know by tweeting to us @BrightBuddhism, emailing us at Bright.On.Buddhism@gmail.com, or joining us on our discord server, Hidden Sangha ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://discord.gg/tEwcVpu⁠⁠⁠⁠! Credits: Nick Bright: Script, Cover Art, Music, Voice of Hearer, Co-Host Proven Paradox: Editing, mixing and mastering, social media, Voice of Hermit, Co-Host

This hour, we listen back to conversations with people who think a lot about religion— both their own experiences and how it impacts society. NPR National Political Correspondent Sarah McCammon grew up in Kansas City as an Evangelical. Her book, The Exvangelicals - Loving, Living, and Leaving the White Evangelical Church tells her story and the story of others who felt disenchanted by the movement and walked away. Three Gen Z-ers talk about their relationship with religion and spirituality. Later in the show, we'll hear from Myokei Caine-Barrett, Shonin. She's the first person of African-American and Japanese descent—and the only American woman—to be fully ordained as a Buddhist priest in the Nichiren lineage. GUESTS: Sarah McCammon: NPR National Political Correspondent and author of The Exvangelicals - Loving, Living, and Leaving the White Evangelical Church Myokei Caine Barrett, Shonin: Resident Priest of Myoken-Ji Temple in Houston This episode originally aired on April 3, 2024. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

3 Kinds of Practice. Nichiren gives us advice for steadfastness in our practice in the Gosho, “Daimoku of the Lotus Sutra”. http://threefoldlotus.com/study/ThreeKindsPractice.pdf E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Non-Origination. An early teaching term used often to equate ideas of emptiness, the void, self/not-self to “Destiny” or karma as immutable. Nichiren and the Lotus directly confront and destroy this idea with the invocation of the Engine of Life to alter, to influence all karma by our actions. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

It isn't always easy to believe you can make a change. Immaculate Mutebi, of New York City, has challenged that disbelief many times. In today's episode, we discuss how chanting Nam-myoho-renge-kyo helped her use obstacles in her family, workplace and housing to deepen her conviction in the power of her life. References:On Attaining Buddhahood in This Lifetime: SGI President Ikeda's Lecture Series, p. 38.A Foundation for Your Life: Essentials of Nichiren's Writings for Young Women, p.198.Discussions on Youth, pp. 298–99. Cheat Sheet:03:58 Immaculate joins her first Buddhist meeting09:41 Chanting Nam-myoho-renge-kyo for an impossible family goal19:28 Feeling dis-empowered to change her work environment27:45 A Buddhist friend reminds Immaculate of her potential36:48 Finding her dream apartment

Buddhism Reference – GoHonzon, again. An important distinction to know in our modern understanding of Buddhist scholarship of Nichiren and the Lotus Sutra. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Earthly Desires. The starting block of reasoning leading to Nichiren's doctrine of “Earthly Desires are Enlightenment” as discussed in his writings and teachings. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Dhuta. For Lotus Sutra Mahayana practitioners, this directly equates to Nichiren's teaching of the “Earthly Desires become Enlightenment”, when we take our carnal cravings to our mandala of GoHonzon to invoke our Buddha mind. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Dengyo. An important figure in the lineage of Nichiren's study and Japanese history of Lotus Sutra propagation and scholarship. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

TLK Lotus Sutra - part 40 – Bodhisattvas Spring Up from Beneath the Earth. Maitreya finally asks the ultimate question. And this brings Shakyamuni to the centrally foundational point of the Dharma as developed by Nichiren throughout his doctrine. E-books – “Threefold Lotus Dharma Sutra”   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

TLK Lotus Sutra - part 33 – Apparition of the Jeweled Stupa. This is the ceremony that Nichiren captures in the mandala of the bequeathing of the teaching of the Law. E-books – “Threefold Lotus Dharma Sutra” –  Artist's Proof   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Chanting – How To – What did Nichiren mean when he wrote on “Earthly Desires”? E-books - “Buddhism Reference Volume 2” – TBA   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

TLK Lotus Sutra - part 1 – In my annotated and transliteration of the Threefold Lotus Sutra I have written many annotations and language corrections to clarify meaning and integrate Nichiren's scholarship and Doctrine for our modern practice, confidence, and insights. E-books – “Threefold Lotus Dharma Sutra” –  Artist's Proof   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Hurvitz–Lotus Sutra–part 30. Apparition of the Jeweled Stupa. This chapter explores and defines the revolutionary idea and embodiment of Buddhahood in one's present flesh and blood five-foot body. Nichiren captures this chapter in his representation of the mandala of GoHonzon. E-books - “Buddhism Reference Volume 2” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

A medium paced recitation of all three sections of Nichiren described abbreviated practice of recitation. The three levels of practice are Comprehensive practice; reciting the entire sutra with Daimoku; the Abbreviated practice of the three sections or two chapters of the Hoben(2nd) and Juryo (16th) with Daimoku, and the Essential practice of the Daimoku alone.  

Resolve Alone. SHORT. A Nichiren quote from his writings on the attitude and Intent of chanting the Daimoku. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm How to use this study resource :  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suIQ89Nc3BU Buddhism resources : threefoldlotus.com    www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon  www.cafepress.com/gohonzon PayPal.me/sifusylvain Patreon.com/TLK instagram.com/sylvainchamberlain/

Buddha and Hell. SHORT. A Nichiren quote from his writings on the location of Buddha and Hell as within the human sentient mind. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm How to use this study resource :  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suIQ89Nc3BU Buddhism resources : threefoldlotus.com    www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon  www.cafepress.com/gohonzon PayPal.me/sifusylvain Patreon.com/TLK instagram.com/sylvainchamberlain/

This week: the advent of the medieval era brings with it new strands of Buddhism that will radically remake the image of the religion from an aristocratic faith to a distinctly Japanese one. So, how do the wildly different beliefs of Zen, Pure Land, and Nichiren Buddhism all grow out of the same moment in religious history? Show notes here. 

Author and travel-writer Angus Waycott talks about his  8-day walk around Sado Island off Niigata Prefecture in the Japan Sea. He gives us in-depth accounts of: a mujina (tanuki-worshipping) cult, funa-ema (literally "ship horse pictures"), exile (including those of Zeami and Buddhist priest Nichiren), and the controversy behind the Kinzan gold mine and its "slave labor," all topics that he recorded in his book Sado: Japan's Island in Exile, originally published by Stone Bridge Press in 1996 and re-issued as an e-book by the author 2012 and 2023.Book Description: "Given the choice, no-one ever went to Sado. For more than a thousand years, this island in the Sea of Japan was a place of exile for the deposed, disgraced or just plain distrusted — ex-emperors, aristocrats, poets, priests and convicted criminals alike. This book rediscovers the exiles' island, explores the truth about its notorious gold mine, tracks down a vanishing badger cult, and drops in on the home of super-drummer band Kodo. Along the way, it paints a vivid picture of one of Japan's most intriguing backwaters, now emerging from a long exile of its own."About the AuthorAngus Waycott is an author and travel writer whose books have been published in the UK, USA, Japan and the Netherlands. He has been the voice of TV news broadcasts, commercials, and award-winning documentaries, voiced "character" parts in game software and anime productions, and worked as a copywriter, publisher, teacher, translator, lighting designer, and staircase builder. His books are Sado: Japan's Isand in Exile, Paper Doors: Japan from Scratch (2012), The Winterborne Journey: along a small crack in the planet (2023), and National Parks of Western Europe (2012). Check out his short video on Sado Island.The Books on Asia Podcast is sponsored by Stone Bridge Press. Check out their books on Japan at the publisher's website. Amy Chavez, podcast host, is author of Amy's Guide to Best Behavior in Japan and The Widow, the Priest, and the Octopus Hunter: Discovering a Lost Way of Life on a Secluded Japanese Island.Subscribe to the Books on Asia podcast.

Buddhism Reference Volume 2 - Ceremony in the Sky, is a visualization of our practice with the Nichiren mandala to open our GoHonzon mind to experience Buddha. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

BDK – Lotus Sutra – part 37. Nichiren's favorite chapter of the Lotus, “The Lifespan of the Tathagata” is a major transitional teaching of self-Enlightenment from Shakyamuni to all sentient beings. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

BDK – Lotus Sutra – part 28. The Seven (7) Jeweled Stupa. This is the chapter that Nichiren envisions the mandala of GoHonzon, the perfect mirror of the MyoHoRenGeKyo to reflect our entry into the Buddha experience. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

BDK – Lotus Sutra – part 27. The jeweled stupa. This is the chapter that Nichiren envisions the mandala of GoHonzon, the perfect mirror of the MyoHoRenGeKyo to reflect our entry into the Buddha experience. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

When Tina Turner, often dubbed the “Queen of Rock ‘N' Roll,” died at her home in Küsnacht, Switzerland, on May 24, 2023, what many did not know is that Ms. Turner had practiced Soka Gakkai International Nichiren Buddhism for the last 50 years. Nichiren taught that chanting the title of this scripture in the form of the mantralike phrase “Nam-myoho-renge-kyo” was the way for all people to reveal their inherent potential for awakening and attain buddhahood. Turner explained: “As I began studying Buddhist teachings and chanting more, it led me to take responsibility for my life and to base my choices on wisdom, courage, and compassion. Not long after I started chanting, I began to see that the power I needed to change my life was already within me.” Russell had proposed titling this episode “Big Wheel Keeps on Turnin' with Dr. Ralph Craig” but this title works better as our guest today is the the eminent author of a new spiritual biography of Tina Turner. So it is with great humility and delight that we sat down and discussed all things yoga, growing up Louisiana, and Mick Jagger's appropriation of Ms. Turner's Dance Moves. “Moves like Tina Turner” should have been the damn song, but alas, yet again our African American progenitors miss out on their due. But not today, Lord! We're talking Ashtanga yoga, philosophy, and the importance of discipline in attaining true wisdom from your spiritual practice. This is basically a class in history, philosophy, Sanskrit and culture all wrapped up into one delicious conversation that we know will enrich your lives! Our guest, Dr. Ralph H. Craig III received his BA in Theological Studies at Loyola Marymount University, where his studies included comparative theology and Yoga Studies. He received his Ph.D. in Religious Studies from Stanford University, where he specialized in Buddhist Studies and in American Religions. His dissertation explored medieval representations of Buddhist preachers across South Asian Buddhist literature. He is also the author of Dancing In My Dreams: A Spiritual Biography of Tina Turner, which will be released in November 7, 2023 by Eerdmans Press in the Library of Religious Biography Series. Other interests include philosophy, metaphysical religion, religious experience, African American religious history, and religion and popular culture. Be sure to order your copy of Dancing in My Dreams! LEARN MORE ABOUT RALPH CRAIG III INSTAGRAM I PRE-ORDER DANCING IN MY DREAMS I LINKEDIN I FACEBOOK A big heart of thanks to our friends, family, and students from around the world, who've generously supported this podcast through your comments, sharing, and financial donations. If you've enjoyed today's podcast, please consider supporting our future episodes by making a donation. Every little bit goes a long way and we are immensely grateful for any and all of your support. ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠   Make A Donation ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠- ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠harmonyslater.com/donate⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ❤ Don't forget to subscribe and leave a review!  ❤  Give us a 5★ rating! Opening and closing music by Nick Evans from his album “for Morgan.” Listen to the entire album on Spotify ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Here⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Purchase your own copy ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Here⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠.

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 1st October 2023. Tonights show is the Tenth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and myself. Tonight we talk about Nichirens exile to Sado Island. We also discuss: Going to Sado Island was not a one way trip, Nichiren's disciples travelled back and forth Our practice to the Gohonzon mandala is the eternal return of the Ceremony in the Air Kankenki drawings of 1254 Without Honen there may not have been Nichiren Sado is where Nichiren starts to cast off his chrysalis and become a butterfly and at Minobu begins to fly Nichirens famous writings on Sado Island, The True Object of Worship and The Opening of the Eyes are extant and clarified so much of Nichiren's teachings We can question whether Nichiren was sent to Sado to die, that might not be true! Japan is unlike Europe, its natural disasters have meant that nothing about Japan has remained the same physically  You can purchase Luigi's books here

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 16 September 2023. Tonights show is the ninth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and myself. Tonight we talk about Nichirens travels to Kamakura, the Komatsubara battle and the Izu Exile, looking for evidence and embracing believers in his mandala signature. You can purchase Luigi's books here

“NaMuMyoHoRenGeKyo”, is the Daimoku defined by Nichiren to invoke our innate Buddha.  E-books available on threefoldlotus.com http://threefoldlotus.com/home/ebooks.htm

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 7 August 2023 Tonights show begins with a bit of context and then continues with the eighth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and Myself. Please send questions to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com.  You can purchase Luigi's books here

“Daimoku”, Nichiren specifies the 5 characters (MyoHoRenGeKyo) of the Title of the Lotus Sutra with the invocation Na and Mu making the 7 characters of the full invocation of the resolve and action of manifesting the ultimate Law of Life (Engine of Life). E-books available on threefoldlotus.com http://threefoldlotus.com/home/ebooks.htm

“Chanting”, Nichiren instructs the Lotus method as the invocation of our Buddhahood. Using the Daimoku of the Lotus Sutra we actively invoke our Buddha mind. E-books available on threefoldlotus.com http://threefoldlotus.com/home/ebooks.htm

Are you a “yes” person? Do you find it hard to say “no” or are easily convinced to do something you don't want to do? Do you find yourself going along with the group when you'd rather not? In this episode, we learn about being true to yourself, being authentic.   To connect with SGI and learn more about Nichiren Buddhism: Soka Gakkai International USA -   www.sgi-usa.org Soka Gakkai Global -   www.sokaglobal.org This is not an official SGI podcast.   Email Me -   Seth@RKaneMediaLLC.com Visit our website and download the music here- https://www.rkanemediallc.com/inner-buddha

There are several stages of life. Just as there are several stages of almost anything we venture to accomplish, or journey to learn. In this episode, we learn about leaving behind dependence in order to be more contributive in life.   To connect with SGI and learn more about Nichiren Buddhism: Soka Gakkai International USA -   www.sgi-usa.org Soka Gakkai Global -   www.sokaglobal.org This is not an official SGI podcast.   Email Me -   Seth@RKaneMediaLLC.com Visit our website and download the music here- https://www.rkanemediallc.com/inner-buddha

"A sword is useless in the hands of a coward.....", as Nichiren says. Whether you are a “cowardly lion” who suffers from anxiety or a “brave warrior” who can bust down a door, courage is a necessary tool to move forward in life. Not all of us have courage in all areas of life. It comes in many different forms as outlined by these 8 types of courage. Which one(s) do you possess and which one(s) do you you lack? Only YOU can answer that question. Email the show: ⁠⁠⁠rockyourlife@thevignatis.com⁠⁠⁠ Intro Song:  ⁠⁠⁠"GypsyRock'n'Roll" by The Vignatis⁠⁠⁠ Outro Song: ⁠⁠⁠“Red, White & Blue” by The Vignatis

Many of us find it difficult to not dwell on the one thing, situation, or person that brings challenges to our lives. And when chanting, it's difficult to not bring that one thing into our head space. Chanting more broadly will help to bring a more roundabout success that isn't focused on the singular negatives.   To connect with SGI and learn more about Nichiren Buddhism: Soka Gakkai International USA -   www.sgi-usa.org Soka Gakkai Global -   www.sokaglobal.org This is not an official SGI podcast.   Email Me -   Seth@RKaneMediaLLC.com Visit our website and download the music here- https://www.rkanemediallc.com/inner-buddha

Feeling stressed out? Have you lost some of your passion? Is someone getting on your nerves? Are you sore or tired? Do you feel like you're just going through the motions? Then take a break. You're worth it.   To connect with SGI and learn more about Nichiren Buddhism: Soka Gakkai International USA -   www.sgi-usa.org Soka Gakkai Global -   www.sokaglobal.org This is not an official SGI podcast.   Email Me -   Seth@RKaneMediaLLC.com Download the music here- https://www.rkanemediallc.com/inner-buddha

There are plenty of us that seem to be stuck in the same routine with very little progress in life. A lot of us stay because it's comfortable or because we're afraid to take a leap of faith. We're afraid of what will happen. If you trust yourself, then you need to trust that the universe will be there for you…   To connect with SGI and learn more about Nichiren Buddhism: Soka Gakkai International USA -   www.sgi-usa.org Soka Gakkai Global -   www.sokaglobal.org This is not an official SGI podcast.   Email Me -   Seth@RKaneMediaLLC.com Download the music here- https://www.rkanemediallc.com/inner-buddha

  It's not easy to let things, situations, and especially people, go. Is the drama worth it? Are you settling? Will making a big deal about something small really serve to your benefit? Are you afraid to be alone? Will telling the other person how you really feel change anything at all? Sometimes it's better to run into the storm and let it all go…   To connect with SGI and learn more about Nichiren Buddhism: Soka Gakkai International USA -   www.sgi-usa.org Soka Gakkai Global -   www.sokaglobal.org This is not an official SGI podcast.   Email Me -   Seth@RKaneMediaLLC.com Download the music here- https://www.rkanemediallc.com/inner-buddha

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 26 March 2023 Tonights show is the seventh in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and Myself. Please send questions to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com.  You can purchase Luigi's books here

This episode was in response to a question on www.patreon.com how about connecting with our founder Nichiren Shonin. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/enkyoji-network/support

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 20 February 2023 Tonights show is the sixth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and Myself. Please send questions to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com.  You can purchase Luigi's books here

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 11 December Tonights show is the fifth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and Myself. Please send questions to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com.  You can purchase Luigi's books here

Welcome to the show, thank you for taking the time to download and listen to this podcast about Nichiren Buddhism. Tonight we have the fourth in a series of dialogues about the Gohonzon. I'm delighted to have as my guests, Peter Morris from the Philippines and Luigi Finocchiaro from Japan. Please send any questions you have for us to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com and we will do our best to answer them on the show.  Have a fabulous week You can find books by Luigi Finocchiaro at Lulu.com - Search for Nichiren Mandala Study Workshop. Some are also available in Italian.