Podcasts about Nichiren

Hey guys before you listen to this one, do realize this is part 4 on a series about General Kanji Ishiwara, so if you have not already done so I would recommend listening to Part 1-2-3.    This episode is General Kanji Ishiwara part 4: Ishiwara vs Hideki Tojo So I promised this would be the last one and it is, rest assured. Sheesh what started as a suggested episode turned into an entire series, but then again Ishiwara Kanji was quite a figure. I recently did a podcast with Cody from AlternateHistoryHub, and at the end of the podcast he poked at me for some alternate history ideas related to the Pacific War. My first thought was what if the Triple Intervention after the Russo-Japanese War never occurred, but then I thought….hell what if Ishiwara Kanji never existed or I dunno got hit by a car. Imagine how different things would have been if not for this one, I am just gonna say it, instigator haha. Now I think when one looks at this mans life, we attribute much of the story towards the Mukden Incident and the eventual full scale China war, but thats not where it ends of course. Ishiwara did a lot during the war and after, so to close it all up lets jump back into it.   Ishiwara is now a Major General , chief of the most powerful office on the general staff. He was fighting tooth and nail to limit operations in what was the new China War. A month before everything hit the fan he declared in front of the General staff “I shall never send a single soldier to China as long as I live”. But in mid-June of 1937 rumors emerged that the China garrison was planning another incident in the Beijing area, similar to Ishiwara's famous Mukden incident of September 1931. Two weeks later the Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred on July 7th. The Japanese army were divided on the issue. There was the expansionists who sought to smash China in a single blow and the non-expansionists who sought to settle everything between their nations before the conflict became too large. Ishiwara was on the side of the non-expansionists and from the earliest hours of the war he directed a losing fight to try and localize the conflict. Fight as he must to stop mobilization of further forces, he was forced to relent multiple times and to his horror the conflict grew and grew. Ishiwara's efforts or some would say meddling, ironically made things worse for the non-expansionists. Some of the expansionists would go on the record to state Ishiwara bungled the situation, years after the China incident, Colonel Shibayama would say with bitterness “The idea that Ishiawara Kanji opposed the expansion of the China incident is nonsense. If he really had opposed it he wouldn't have agreed to the mobilization. There were certainly other ways of solving the problem” Ishiwara was stuck between a rock and a hard place. While he wanted to stop the mobilization of more forces to China, the men at the front kept sending reports that Japanese citizens were underthreat in areas like Beijing, his wrists were turned as they say. Ishiwara did not cave in without a fight however, as I said in the last episode he turned to Prime Minister Konoe to strike a deal with Chiang Kai-shek, and Konoe nearly did, but at the last minute he canceled his flight to Nanking.   When the North China incident saw action spring up in Shanghai, it then became officially the China incident and Ishiwara attempted once more to push for a peace settlement in September. However by that point Ishiwara's influence had dropped considerably, few in the Operations division were still following his lead. Many of the expansionists began to bemoan Ishiwara as nothing more than a nuisance. Prince Sainji would go on the record telling Konoe “Ishiwara is like a candly in the wind ready to be snuffed out at any moment”. By late september Ishiwara was removed from the General staff by General Tada. The expansionists had won the day. There were other non-expansionists like Horiba Kazuo and Imai Takeo who carried on fighting the non-expansionist cause, but in january of 1938 Konoe decalred the Japanese government would not treat with Chiang Kai-shek. It was the nail in the coffin.   The war escalted, by 1938 24 divisions were tossed into China, in 1939 it would be 34 bogged down. The IJA was without mobilization divisions and less than half the ammunition necessary for the 15 divisions assigned to the borders with the USSR and that critical weakness became only to apparent with two border clashes in 1938 and 1939. To Ishiwara it was all too predicatable, he had continuously argued the folly of a China War. He lectured about how it was impossible to conquer China “China is like an earthworm. Cut it in two and it will still keep on wriggling”. Ishiwara believed China's territory and self-sufficiency built upon its masses would always make up for Japanese military might. Ishiwara unlike his colleagues believed Japan was not capable of dealing a knock out blow against China. He would criticize many for promoting the idea stating “those who excite the public by claims of victory, just because the army has captured some out of the way little area, do so only to coneal their own incompetence as they squander the nation's power in an unjustified war”.   In the fall of 1937 Ishiwara found himself back in mainland Asia with an appointed as the vice chief of staff of the Kwantung army. But he came back with a scarred reputation now, for his non-expansionist fight earned him a lot of scorn. All of his ideas of a political independent and racially equal Manchukuo in 1932 had all but disappeared. The Japanese military and civilians occupied all important positions in the puppet state. The Kwantung army authorities, particularly that of Hideki Tojo wgo was at the time a provost marshal in Manchuria had taken a stern line against any efforts to revive East Asian League or their ideals. So when Ishiwara arrived, he quickly realized his influence had deminished significantly. None the less he took up his old cause trying to work with the barely relavent Concordia association, but they were fighting against Tojo who received a promotion to chief of staff in Manchuria in March. Tojo was now Ishiwara's superior, it was a hopeless cause, but Ishiwara persisted.    Ishiwara began insisting the Kwantung army must step asie to allow for self-government to reing over Manchuria. He argued Japan's special holdings in Manchuria should be turned over to the Manchukuo government and that the Concordia association should act as a guiding source. He also pointed out how dangerous the USSR was too Manchuria and that Japan must increase its forces in the border areas of Manchuria. For all of this he recommended a solution would be a Asian union, that if Manchukuo flourished under racial equality and harmony, perhaps it would show the rest of China Sino-Japanese cooperation was possible and maybe China would join an East Asian league. Ishiwara would continously hammer the idea, that the solution to the China war was to create an effective east asian league. With China in the fold, they would have unrivaled airpower, a prime element in his preparation for the Final War. Not a single one of his arguments were given any consideration.   Ontop of his radical ideas, Ishiwara also advised reducing salaries for Japanese officials in Manchuria and was as you can imagine denounced quickly by his colleagues for this. Then Ishiwara found out Tojo was embezzling Kwantung army funds to the officers wives club, a pet project of Mrs Tojo. So Ishiwara went ahead by pointing out Tojo's corruption and added a large insult by suggesting Tojo had the mentality of a mere sergeant. In a public speech at the Concordia association infront of a mixed Japanese/manchurian audience he tore into many of his colleagues like General Hashimoto Toranosuke who was an honorary president of said association and Ishiwara said “he did nothing but sit around and draw a high salary, setting a disgraceful example to junior officers”. So yeah Ishiwara soon found himself very very isolated in the Kwantung army staff. Tojo received a promotion to vice minister of war in May of 1938, with the support of notable expansionist types. As for Ishiwara he had became quite a headache to his colleagues. Depressed and disgusted with the situation, Ishiwara decided to quit the army before he was tossed out. He first tried to apply at the war ministry to be placed on the reserve list but was told the matter required approval of the minister of war. At that time, it was actually his old buddy Itagaki Seishiro as minister of war. While the decision was being made, Ishiwara was authorized to return to Japan, but when he did the Kwantung army inisted he had departed without authorization to do so, basically arguing he just walked away from his desk one day.   Itagaki made no move to summon Ishiwara once he was back in Tokyo, but Tojo as vice minister got wind of the situation and was all too eager to pounce. It turned out Tojo had Kenpeitai waching Ishiwara and some of his closest colleagues for awhile and he chose this moment to haul Ishiwara up for military indiscipline. The case against Ishiwara was quite a controversy and in the end all Itagaki could do for his old friend was get him an command over the Maizuru fortress area on Japan's seacost of Kyoto prefecture. The day before the orders were posted, Tojo managed to toss one last punch at Ishiwara. He order his Kenpeitai friend, special service commander Colonel Otani Keijiro to carry out a lightning raid on the Tokyo offices of the Concordia Association which saw the arrests of some of Ishiwara's close colleagues.   1939-1941 marked a terrible time for Ishiwara's military career, but he did take the time to build more so upon his Final War theory, the national defense state, the Showa restoration and the East Asian league. Ishiwara's lackluster Maizuru assignment was a quite backwater, not demanding much attention. During his leisure time he came to the conclussion based on his analysis of military history with some fresh readings of Buddhist texts that the Final War was destined to break out within the next 40 years or so. On March 10th of 1939 he made an address to the Concordia association in Toyko “a concept of world war “sekai sensokan”. He stated based on his analysis that Japan had to prepare for the final war because “world conflict is now in the semifinal round and it is for this reason that the necessity has arrived for an east asian league”. In August of 1939 Itagaki resigned as war minister to take up a position on on the chief of staff in the China expeditionary army which was then grinding to a halt. But before he did so, he made one of his final acts as war minister to give Ishiwara command of the 16th reserve division in Kyoto.   It was not a frontline position, but it was an important one, as the Kyoto command was notable for developing infantry tactics. Japan had just received some major defeats to the USSR at the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol so Ishiwara went to work developing some anti soviet tactics. This led to some infiltration techniques that would see application with the IJA during the early battles of the Pacific War. But despite his work on tactics, what really consumed his mind was pressing for the East Asian League. He argued a Showa restoration needed to happen, like the Meiji restoration, but this new one would be pan-asian, to face the west. In May of 1940 he put all of his arguments together in a public address that gained fame under the title “on the final war”. It was here he unleashed two decades of his thoughts into the Japanese public. He added some new features to his theories such as a “the world had entered a second industrial revolution”. He pointed out German had pioneered in the field of electrochemistry, producing energy for both industrial production and weapons of war. Such discoveries he argued would permit Asian nations to catch up and eventually overtake the west in productive and destructive power. But above all else he kept hammering the necessity for an east asian league, which required a Showa restoration to finally bring pan-asianism.   In November of 1939, as a successor to the Concordia Association, the association for an east asian league was established with its HQ in tokyo. Ishiwara was unable to officially become a member because he was part of the military, but he was an unofficial advisor and more importantly in the eyes of the public it was his association. By 1941 the association blew up to 100,000 members, mostly ex-soldiers, businessmen, journalists, farmers and such. They had a monthly magazine, training courses, meetings, lectures, the works. They extensively studied Ishiwara's writings on the history of war, the Showa restoration and his Final War theory. They spent extensive resources securing bases on the asian mainland trying to recruit supporters amongst other asian peoples to create a federation. Within Japanese controlled portions of China, they propagated the concept of the East Asian league. For the small group of collaborationists in China, many were attracted to it. In February of 1941 the General China assembly for the east asian league, was established in Nanjing with Wang Jingwei as chairman. Oh Wang Jingwei…having spent so much time learning about the Warlord Era and Northern Expedition, it never surprises me this guy would cling to anything for power. The influence of the league even found its way to Chongqing, and Chiang Kai-shek allegedly declared that peace negotiations could be pursued based on some aspects of the movement. But come spring of 1941, all of the leagues efforts would be dashed by Tojo. In early 1941, Tojo as war minister began plotting against the league and its architect Ishiwara. Tojo believed the east asian league was very defeatists and antithetical to his own hard line stance on Sino-Japanese relations. It also provided his nemesis Ishiwara with a political base to generate public opposition to his government's policies. Tojo obviously thought Ishiwara would use such a thing to overthrow him, so he went to war. His first move was to put Ishiwara on the retired list in december of 1940. However Ishiwara was still a influential figure and held some considerably powerful friends like Prince Higashikuni, so he was unable to safely pull this off. Instead he chose to harass the league.    Initially Premier Konoe was backing the league, but Tojo began to pressure Konoe to take a position against it. On January 14th, the konoe cabinet stated “as it appears that they violate respect for the nation and cast a shadow on the imperial authority, theories advocating leagues of states are hereby not permitted”. Thus the east asian league became illegal. Taking the cue on the cabinets decision, the Japanese media began a running hit pieces on the league, kind of like how America works today, ompf. By february of 1941 the criticism towards the league was smashing them. All of Ishiwara's allies within the league were hit hard, some even tortured, it was a purge. For Ishiwara nothing really happened, except for the continual surveillance by the Kenpeitai. Ishiwara proceeded to vent his wrath in public speeches, pretty bold ass move if you ask me and he delivered one fiery one at Kyoto university on east asia problems where he told his audience “the enemy is not the chinese people, but rather certain Japanese. It is particularly Tojo Hideki and Umezu Yoshijiro, who, armed and pursuing their own ambition, are the enemy of Japan. As disturbers of the peace they are the enemies of the world. They should be arrested and executed”. Excuse my french, but the fucking balls on this guy haha. Ishiwara made this statement in public and at the time he was still in military service, its simply incredible he did not suffer horrible punishment after slandering the minister of war and commander of the kwantung army. Why was he not punished, well again it was awkward as he still had a cult following and going after him might see violence. Ishiwara would later state the reason he was not persecuted was because “Tojo was a coward who never had the courage to arrest me. The fact that a man like Tojo and his henchmen came to power was one reason for Japan's downfall”.    Regardless Ishiwara's public statements finally led to him being placed on the retirement list on March 1st of 1941 and yes it was 100% Tojo who pushed this. Tojo ordered the Kenpeitai to watch Ishiwara closely for weeks after his forced retirement. Ishiwara enthusiastically went into retirement as he now was fully dedicated to his four great concerns: the east asian league, the showa restoration, the national defense state and of course the final war theory.   In the meantime another league had opened up, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere and you would be forgiven to believe it was the same as the east asian league if not its successor. Both perpetuated common ideology, like racial harmony, stemming from the Concordia association. Ishiwara's concepts of national defense also found their way in the Greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. It advocated for most of the basic principals of the league, common defense, political independence and integration of economic systems. How did they differ you might ask? Well Ishiwara's east asian league did not share the formers racial superiority of the Japanese as its cornerstone. The east asian league was not built upon the premise that China was incompetent as a modern state and needed to be led. For you american listeners, its actually pretty easy to summarize the co-prosperity sphere idea, its was Japan's monroe doctrine. The east asian league had been undone by the China War and then Pacific War, leaving the co-prosperity sphere to monopolize the asian continent and it did so through brute force and undermined any chance of pan-asianism. Ishiwara sought the east asian league solely because he truly believed pan-asianism would be required to build up enough forces to fight the final war.    During his retirement Ishiwara went on lecturing in major universities, but Tojo unleashed the Kenpeitai upon him, whom often demanded he cancel a lecture or not talk about certain subjects. I guess its like Youtube today, haha. Though ever the more isolated, when the Pacific War kicked off, Ishiwara could not be fully muzzled. He did not opposed the surprise attack on pearl harbor publically, but privately he predicted Japan had begun a war it would lose, based solely on material terms. A famous thing he once said to Satomi Kishio which appears in an cooky anime called Zipang where some member of the SDF accidentally go back in time to june 4th of 1942 if you were curious, really funny premise, but anyways, Ishiwara said this “inevitably, we shall lose this war. It will be a struggle in which Japan, even though it has only a thousand yen in its pocket, plans to spend ten thousand, while the United States has a hundred thousand yen, but only needs to spend ten thousand…we simply cannot last. Japan started this war without considering its resources beforehand”. I love this passage. It's an excellent way to speak to a general public, very effective I find.   Ishiwara criticized the military for spreading themselves out too thinly in the early months of the war, dispersing countless men on small islands in the pacific. But above all else, he kept hammering the fact the China war needed to end. China was sucking up the vast majority of Japan's military resources and men, how could Japan hope to wage a war against a nation like the US when it was stuck in China? When Saipan fell in 1944, Ishiwara said all hope was lost. He believed the only possible way Japan could avoid disaster was if the USSR broke its pact with its allies and offered a settlement to Japan, but he knew that was a long shot given how anti-communist Japan was. I have to make a point here to say a LOT of Ishiwara's talk, comes postwar and feels like a “i told you so”. Ishiwara gave testimony at the Tokyo war crime trials and declared “despite its material inferiority, Japan did not need to suffer a defeat, if its strategy had been well planned and carried out”. He even made a remark to an American correspondent named Mark Gayn in 1946 stating if he held command of the forces he would have ended the war with China, consolidated Japanese defensive lines and made a proper stand.   Throughout the war, Ishiwara battled Tojo, often referring to him as a simpleton. In fact in late 1942 he arranged an audience with Tojo and told him to his face that he was too incompetent to run the nation or wage a war and that he should step down. There was a rumor Ishiwara was part of a plot to assassinate Tojo in the summer of 1944. This was a scheme hatched by some junior officers in the central HQ, and one of their members was a east asian league associate. Ishiwara was called upon to Tokyo during an investigation of the plot and as much as Tojo and his team tried to find evidence of his involvement, they were unable to nail him. The Kenpeitai chased after Ishiwara until Tojo's regime collapsed.    By the end of the war, Ishiwara was asked by Prince Higashikuni if he could join the “surrender cabinet' as an advisor. Ishiwara declined on the grounds he wanted to be unsullied by Japans defeat.    It should be noted again, Ishiwara was a man of countless contradictions. While he was one of the first to be outspoken against the Pacific War and predicted Japan's defeat, during the end half of the way he got really caught up in the war fever. For example in 1944 he began stating Japan needed to prepare to “shed the blood of a million lives in the south seas in a do or die battle”. He also had this blind faith that a German victory in Europe would turn the tide of the war in the east. He said of Hitler in 1944 “he is the greatest hero in Europe since Napoleon”. Some argue his later public stances were the result of him not being in the military and thus he had to conform to the wartime propaganda to get his message across to the general public. He also began linking concepts of the east asian league to the greater east asian co-prosperity sphere, which is quite the contradiction. Again personally I see him as a fence sitter, he loved to always have a backdoor in his arguments.   One major thing that he faced during the Pacific War, was trying to explain to his followers, the current war was not the Final War. As he stated publicly in February of 1942 “Many people think that the greater east asian war is the final war. Nothing could be further from the truth… the greater east asian war is the grand rehearsal for the final war. In other words, it will lead to the liberation of east asia and the establishment of an east asian league and will provide to the league the necessary material and strategic base for the final war”. Well the failure of the China War, Pacific War, the complete military collapse of Japan, the take over of communism in mainland asia, the emerging cold war….I guess that all kind of ruined his final war theory.    With Japan's defeat looming in 1944, Ishiwara began to shift his focus towards a reconstruction effort. He began as early as 1944 to talk about what would happen to Japan. He predicted she would lose much overseas territory, her cities would be in ruins, her people would be starving. He turned his attention to agriculture, how could food production be increased, he became particularly interested in fertilizers. By the end of the war he gathered a farming community to discuss how things could be improved. When the surrender proclamation was made, he began to ponder the meaning of his life's work. After the emperor made his speech, Ishiwara gathered his followers to speak to them about how Japan could regain world power and thus keep his theory intact. Ishiwara had many ideas going forward about how Japan could take a positive footing. He advocated Japan dismantle the remnants of its bureaucratic despotism, abolition the special police force, apologize to the global community for war crimes, but he also argued America needed to answer for her war crimes as well. He especially pointed fingers at President Truman for two atomic bombs and that efforts needed to be made to use bombings to lessen Japan's punishment. Ishiwara also argued Japan should gain sympathy from asia so their former enemies could come together to form an east asian league.   Emperor Hirohito proclaimed the surrender and abolition of all stocks of war materials, and Ishiwara said that was fine because he believed the final war would require new armaments that would be completely different from what existed. He predicted the future wars would be more scientific, fought with decisive weapons developed in laboratories that did not require large organized military forces. He thought perhaps a small body of underground scientists could create terrible new weapons to prepare for the Final War, thats a terrifying idea. In autumn of 1945, Ishiwara found himself in the limelight again. His lectures had made him a viable alternative to the Tojo regime during the last year of the war and his reputation as an opponent and victim of said regime made him special. Many journalists, both Japanese and American came flooding to him followed by a legion of followers who were unable to publicly come forward during the Tojo years.   Ishiwara took advantage of this new situation to make some very large speeches. He spoke about how the Tojo clique was the reason for Japan's defeat, how they all needed to establish a new Japan. He brought out the usual theories he had spoke about for years, and argued the necessity for national reconstruction to prepare for the final war. However he changed his argument a bit, stating while Japan had military been crushed, it now must prepare for the final war by building the highest culture. In this new age, Japan needed to obtain supremacy in fields of science, because he now believed that was the new power. “A single laboratory, a single factory, or perhaps a single man working alone will make the most fantastic discovery that will make war decisive”. He would continue to make speeches throughout 1945, but come 1946 the high authority, one Emperor Douglas MacArthur, haha sorry I had to say it, General MacArthur stamped down on any Japanese leader, especially former military leaders. So Ishiwara had a few months of fame, but then he found himself yet again purged, though not arrested. Alongside this came a ban on the East Asian League association.    Ishiwara was then incapacitated by illness, something that plagued his life. His condition became so bad he required surgery in Tokyo. In April of 1946 he was interviewed by American correspondent Mark Gayn who left with a very memorable impression of the man, he had this to say “ Ishiwara received us in his small room, whose window frames were still buckled from bomb explosions. He is a lean man with a deeply tanned face, close shaven head and hard, unblinking eyes. He was sitting Japanese style on his cot, his hands in his lap. Even in a shapeless gown of yellow silk, his body looked straight as a steel rod… We asked Ishiwara just two questions: what of Japan in defeat and what of himself? He answered readily and at length, in a sharp firm voice. He talked like a man who believed every word he said”. Ishiwara told his life story, the Mukden incident, the China war escalation, his feud with Tojo all of his failed attempts with the East Asian League.    In 1947 Ishiwara was put on a list of those Japanese who were purged from public life. He was extremely bitter about this and at the same time he was called as a defense witness in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Ishiwara was too sick to travel to Tokyo, so a special military court was convened in Sakata city. He made his deposition in front of 50 people, talking about his role in the Mukden incident and China War. He stated President Truman should be indicted for the atomic bombs and firebombing campaigns and turned upon his American audience about the denunciation for Japanese expansionism. “Havent you ever heard of Perry? Don't you know anything about your country's history? Tokugawa Japan believed in isolation; it didnt want to have anything to do with other countries, and had its doors locked tightly. Then along came Perry from your country in his black ships to open those doors; he aimed his big guns at Japan and warned that ‘if you don't deal with us, look out for these; open your doors, and negotiate with other countries too'. And then when Japan did open its doors and tried dealing with other countries, it learned that all those countries were a fearfully aggressive lot. And so for its own defense it took your country as its teacher and set about learning how to be aggressive. You might saw we became your disciples. Why dont you subpoena Perry from the other world and try him as a war criminal?”    In November of 1948 Ishiwara declared on a home recorded video “we must utterly cast war aside. We must firmly avoid questions of interest and advantage and judge our national policy purely on a spirit of righteousness…Japan may be devastated, but we must live by a complete rejection of war. The nation must compose itself like Nichiren at Takenoguchi or Christ on his war to the crucifixion”. It seems Ishiwara at the very end gave up on his theories, and supported Japan attaining a permanent peace. That last years of his life were spent in constant pain due to his illness. In 1949 he contracted a fatal case of pneumonia and realizing he was going to die, dictated a message that summed up all his speculation in the recent years on Japan and its future. The document was originally done in English and directed at General Douglas MacArthur. A month after Ishiwara's death, a Japanese version came out titled “the course for a new Japan / Shin Nihon no Shinro”. The primary purpose of the document was to get MacArthur to lift the ban on the east asia league, but it was also a last apologia. He talked about how Germany, the USSR, Italy and Japan had started on the path of state control, and they all fell prey to group despotism, because all decisions were being made by a few men in the center. He argued Britain's socialist government, the United States New Deal and Marshall plan were great example of a good control system. He argued pure liberalism no longer existed anywhere, not even in the US, yet the US was trying to make Japan a liberal nation. He argued all nations should be allowed to move ahead freely. To end it all of he said this as well “I realize now in my predictions concerning a final war between the east and west I was supremely overconfident and that the facts have proven my wrong. I fear that the real final conflict may be the United States and USSR”   At the age of 61 Ishiwara died in August of 1949, in a small house with some of his followers gathered around him. He said to them before dying he was glad to die at the same age as Nichiren

The last time we spoke, Ishiwara had been spending considerable amounts of time with the Kwantung Army staff trying to figure out a way to push the envelope on seizing Manchuria. Ishiwara and his like minded colleagues had tried everything to persuade the Imperial Japanese army high command to initiate a course of action, but everytime the message was the same “wait, wait until next year, we can't do this at this time”. In 1931 Ishiwara and Itagaki organized the last major expedition into Northern Manchuria to get the newest recruited Kwantung officers up to speed and ready for plans they had been cooking up. Captain Nakamura Shintaro disappeared on the way back to Port Arthur. The Kwantung officers took the initiative, one could call it “Gekokujo / ruling from below” because without approval, in fact basically against the orders of high command they mobilized their forces outside their designated railway zone and headed for Mukden to quote “get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance”. When Tokyo HQ got a whiff of this they dispatched a telegram immediately demanding the Kwantung officers get their men back and not use the Nakamura incident as a way of “solving the Manchurian problem”   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. He doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . During the last hectic weeks, General Honjo Shigeru arrived to take command of the Kwantung Army and there is no solid evidence Ishiwara and his radical group had disclosed their plans to him. However when everything began to move into motion, Honjo agreed to Ishiwara's military solution for the Manchurian problem.   On september 18th of 1931, a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army upon the south manchurian railway tracks at Liutiaokou. There was an explosion and the Kwantung army immediately claimed it to be a Chinese plot and moved with skill and precision to overrun the Peitaying Barracks. General Honjo's first reaction was hesitation, but then he committed additional units to aid the radicals and upon seeing the chaos unfold, ordered the seizure of all of Mukden in the process. Investigators would find the actions of Honjo over the course of the next few days to be quite indecisive. At first he seemed to be attempting to localize the incident, but then, likely as a result of Ishiwara and Itagaki pressuring him, relented to ordering a general assault on all Chinese positions in the area. Thus what was a isolated incident, transformed into a major offensive, and that major offensive was largely directed by two of Honjo's subordinates, as you may guess Ishiwara and Itagaki.   Now after the bomb explosion, the next 10 days saw southern and central Manchuria suddenly under the control of the Kwantung army. Itagaki as a senior staff officer and full colonel, was technically Ishiwara's superior, but for the next 4 months it appears Ishiwara was the main driver behind the military actions. Itagaki was quote to say to a friend during the offensive “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's War”. And indeed, being so far from Tokyo HQ's control, it really was Ishiwara's war. Tokyo dispatched official orders on September the 19th opposing the offensive, despite a lot of sympathy for the cause amongst the high commanders. Ishiwara and Inagaki had been planning this for months, they were willing to risk it all, so they disobeyed and carried on. Ishiwara began by first coercing Honjo for reinforcements and freedom to take initiative, as he was quoted asking ‘to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”.   Now obviously Ishiwara and Itagaki wanted to expand the offensive through the officials means firstmost, but they definitely went around the officials channels as well. One devious method they employed was to create chaos for civilians in Manchurian cities, thus increasing the need for better security for Japanese residents. This would allow the Kwantung army troops to deploy past their set perimeters. Immediately after what is now called “the Mukden incident”, military agents were dispatched to Kirin to create some chaos within the city. Reports of incidents from Kirin began to poor into the Kwantung Army HQ alongside Ishiwara demanding Honjo dispatch forces to Kirin to protect Japanese residents there. He also advocated for demanding reinforcements from the Korea Army, but Honjo was unwilling to go that far. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.    The operation against Kirin was carried out in lightning fast speed. Ishiwara directed the bulk of the 2nd division led by General Tamon Jiro to rush over to Kirin by rail. They entered the city without firing a single shot and forced the local Chinese commander to proclaim the independence of the province from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours after this, the Korea army responded to a aid request sent out by the Kwantung Army staff on september 21st and began moving into Manchuria. Within only 48 hours the Japanese military had seized Kirin which lay outside the Kwantung operational zone and the Korea army was invading Manchuria without any approval from Tokyo, military discipline thus had been shattered.    Chief of staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to limit the scope of the Kwantung army's operations and entrusted discretionary authority to the field commanders for certain emergency situations, usually of a local nature. The Kirin expedition did not exactly fall within any of these boundaries. Bolstered by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki followed up the Kirin operation by pressing for an advance upon Harbin. As you might recall from the previous episode, the entire idea of taking Manchuria was built upon speed and precision. The Kwantung army had tiny forces compared to the immediate Chinese forces in Manchuria. However here they were blocked by directives sent from Tokyo HQ which forbade the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the south manchuria railway, up to this point they had limited their actions along those margins. Ishiwara attempted arguing something on more political lines. He argued Japan should aid Manchurian independence and sent the idea straight to Tokyo central HQ. In a sharp rebuff on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ affirmed its opposition to expanding the hostilities and rejected the political idea.   With the hard no from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals thought the only course of action was to cause even more chaos to force the issue. Ishiwara took the lead again, trying to toss Tokyo HQ off balance. Ishiwara personally went out on October the 8th, dressed in military pilot gear and slipped into one of five Chinese aircraft that had been seized at Mukdens airfield. He then personally led a raid, though later in life, such as at the Tokyo War crimes trials he would argue the flight was supposed to be just a reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. As he asserted, it was only at the last minute, some intelligence sprang up that anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou and thus the Kwantung army Commander had given permission to neutralize them if fired upon. Ishiwara stated that he and the 4 other aircraft accompanying him were fired upon and thus they dropped around 75 bombs on Chinchou, yes quite the course of events. As you might guess, more contemporary accounts would indicate this was a premeditated effort designed to freak out Tokyo.    The raid against Chinchou did indeed freak out Tokyo, the staff there began to fear the west would begin tossing condemnation upon them. Tokyo high command was in a bad spot. They felt obliged to back up the Kwantung army publically, by issuing post-facto approval of the many chaotic attacks, but internally they were livid. Major Endo Saburo of the intelligence division was sent to Manchuria to investigate the Chinchou situation. Saburo said upon asking Ishiwara what occurred, he responded that he had acted under the principle of field initiative and that was the reason why he never informed Tokyo in advance. Saburo also noted the manner in which he spoke to him indicated that Saburo alongside the intelligence division should mind their own business. Saburo also found out there were murmurs in Manchuria that if Tokyo high command did not get onboard, the Kwantung army was prepared to go it alone. It seemed the radical Kwantung officers would even go against the imperial japanese army command to get what they wanted. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire”.If you thought this was pretty nuts, a rumor also emerged that Ishiwara and Itagaki were going to use an independent Manchuria as a base to perform a coup d'etat against the Japanese government, to overthrow the capitalists strangling the people and to establish a national socialist regime built around the emperor. For those of you who know your 1930's Japanese government by assassination history, you know exactly what this rumor is about, a little something that will occur in 1936. Whether Ishiwara and Itagaki actually intended to do this is unknown, but they certainly put out the word.   On october 18th, war minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram over to the Kwantung army ordering them to cease any and all talk of making Manchuria independent or trying to take control of it. Alongside that, they sent operations section, Colonel Imamura Hitoshi to Manchuria to talk some sense into Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”.   And so despite the chaos and mania, the Kwantung Army had been restrained from pursuing any sustained military action through october. Ishiwara as you would imagine kept arguing they had to advance into northern manchuria. In early november Ishiwara got lucky again, finding a pretext in more destroyed railways. The rail bridges over the Nonni river south of Tsitsihar had allegedly been blown up by hostile Chinese forces. When Japanese engineer units showed up to repair the damaged tracks they were fired upon by Chinese forces. To the high officials in Tokyo it looked like a justifiable reason to take defensive measures. This was also being meet with Kwantung intelligence information being sent to Tokyo that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had provided some rather exaggerated reports to the Japanese public to manipulate their opinion through the press which in turn put pressure on Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern manchuria.   Tokyo authorized a defensive operation, limited to time and distance aimed at defending the Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung army forces began moving north and soon were engaged in heavy fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led men during this, it would actually be the only time in his military career to do so. General Honjo, rightfully feared the Kwantung forces were getting out of hand sent a cabled on November 5th announcing under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate”, the general staff was assuming direct command authority in Manchuria. As you can imagine Ishiwara and his like minded Kwantung officer colleagues were livid. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.    Facing yet another terrible situation publicly, the IJA high command allowed the Kwantung to advance upon Tsitsihar, but then uproar started abroad, forcing them to order the city evacuated. Ishiwara then began a huge argument amongst the staff stating the evacuation was unacceptable because of the sacrifices the forces had already made. But Honjo was standing firm. Then a few days later, Chinese forces began to assemble at Chinchou  and there had been some conflicts emerging between Japanese and chinese forces at Tientsin. Well Ishiwara immediately went to work demanding Honjo launch an offensive on Chinchou as a first step of linking their forces closer to Tientsin incase they were overwhelmed. To secure the advance, they also asked the Korea army to help out. Yet again Tokyo was tossed the hot potato. Tokyo high command ordered an immediate cease to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao river. The Kwantung army paused, not so much before of the order, but because the Korea army refused to participate in the offensive against Chinchou, and they were most definitely needed.    Ishiwara faced a dilemma, without the reinforcements the entire offensive might be doomed. And then fatefully, Premier Wakatsuki was outed on December 11th.War Minister Minami and Chief of staff Kanaya, both who tried to moderate the Kwantung army's offensives were replaced by Araki Sadao an aggressive leader of the Kodoha Faction, known in english as “the imperial way faction”. To explain a bit, within the Japanese military there were cliques, kind of like the warlords cliques in many ways. They fought to direct the future operations of the IJA and even IJN to an extent. There were two main ones that influenced the 1930's heavily, the Kodoha and Toseiha (control faction). The Kodoha were not an organized political party, nor did they have an official standing within the IJA, but they were certainly influential. Kodoha members tended to be younger officers in the IJA, particularly those in the Kwantung army. General Sadao Araki was a founder of the faction and they were heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism and the Kokutai. They sought a return to “the good old days” as one says. They say liberal democracy as a poison hurting Japan. They viewed the capitalists, industrialists and elites of Japan, ie the politicians, bureaucrats and Zaibatsu leaders to be responsible for ruining the once great nation. They wanted to see the Emperor take back full power, in what they would call a “showa restoration”. Their number one enemy, as was viewed by most of the Japanese military at this time, was the USSR and communism as a whole. Thus they were also by proxy in favor of the Hokushin-ron “northern strike policy” which was the Japanese theoretical war plan to invade the USSR. Now I don't want to go to far down the rabbit whole, but due note they were counter balanced by another faction known as the Toseiha faction, who were I guess to put it lightly, more moderate. The Toseiha were headed by Hideki Tojo famously and they opposed the Kodoha faction on a few grounds, one important one being, they did not want to cause a violent revolution to usher in the Emperor dominance. The Toseiha shared a lot of principles with the Kodoha, but they did not favor the Hokushin-ron strategy and instead adopted the Nanshin-ron strategy “southern strike” into southeast asia and the resource rich dutch east indies. It goes without saying the Toseiha faction enjoyed better relations with the IJN. So just to place this story within the political realm we are speaking, these two factions began to compete heavily for dominance 1931 onwards.   With Araki Sadao and some help from Prince Kan'in who was a Kodoha sympathizer things dramatically changed in Tokyo command. All of a sudden, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria became “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung army with Tokyo's full backing soon pursued all their military objectives, set out by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were seized in early January of 1932; Tsitsihar by February and by spring of 1932 Ishiwara argued to the staff they should complete the full seizure of Manchuria both north and south. In April that year he laid out “Manshu haiti heiryaku / the program for pacification of manchuria”. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol.   It goes without saying Ishiwara was central to the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and IJA overall had numerous options laid bare to them to solve the Manchurian problem, but Ishiwara's primary concern was total control over Manchuria for its resources, strategic position and to obtain a continental base for a war against America. To Ishiwara, taking all of Manchuria was necessary to prepare for the Final War. Without Ishiwara it is certain there would have been conflict in Manchuria between Japan and China, but would Japan have outright seized the province? Ishiwara spent years planning and pushing the envelope. When the plan was unleashed, it would turn out Ishiwara and his colleagues did not have a concrete timetable for conquest and lacked quite a few contingency plans. Despite the chaotic nature of it all, the conquest of Manchuria was a stunning success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”.   Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria affair started Japan on an inevitable course to fight the China War, which inturn led her to fight the west. It was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The entire affair also brings into question the subject of military discipline. Many look at the Gekokujo variable as an explanation as to how people like Ishiwara and Itagaki got away with all they did. You know, these militarist hardtype junior officers just ran amok, performed some rebellious acts defying their superiors, forcing their hands to become accomplices. Now don't get me wrong Gekokujo definitely played a hand, particularly when you look at Ishiwara. But it does not take away from the fact there simply was a high level of indiscipline within the Japanese army.   Ishiwara would have been 100% fully aware what his actions might result in, hell the guy before him, Colonel Komoto Daisaku is a great example. Ishiwara spent a long time with Komoto and saw the man's career broken as he was exiled for the Huanggutun incident. But Ishiwara was not only focus on Manchuria, he had a close eye on the political situation in Tokyo. Ishiwara knew the 1931 cabinet was crumbling, he knew certain high officials like Araki Sadao were in fast track position for promotions and their sympathies were with his cause. Ishiwara was betting, certain sympathizers such as Kodoha faction aligned ones would take seats of power necessary to help push his cause. His gamble more than paid off. All the main actors in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their accomplishments. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite 3rd class. More importantly he returned to Japan as a rockstar hero, the younger IJA officers were enthralled by him. Ironically Ishiwara had fostered indiscipline within the army more so, that when he went up the ladder becoming a member of the Tokyo staff it would bite him in the ass.   Manchukuo and racial harmony   Now Ishiwara's dream of taking control over Manchuria was almost purely a means to end end: ie to obtain resources and a strategic position to face America. Once Manchuria was under their control, Ishiwara directed his attention towards another goal aside from this, that of racial cooperation among the asian peoples. Manchukuo or rather Ishiwara's view of what it could be was a springboard of his vision for a East-Asian league, something that had a firm basis in his Final War theory. During Ishiwara's tour of duty in Manchuria in 1932, this Pan-Asian idea of what Manchukuo could be is what set him apart from many of his Kwantung Army colleagues, it also marked him to be very unorthodox within the IJA.    Manchukuo as many of you probably know, was a sham puppet state created to legitimize Japan's seizure of Manchuria. The Japanese high command simply sought to use the guise of an indigenous movement for independence to hide the fact the simply invaded a part of China and stole it. To do this they went as far as grabbing the last Qing emperor, Puyi and tossing him upon the throne of the new state of Manchukuo while they tossed up principles of racial harmony. For obvious reasons this was all done. You can't control a region full of a population that rightfully hates you without trying to win them over. Now what the Japanese did have going for them, was there did exist elements in Manchuria who sought independence. This was Manchuria, the heart of Nurhaci's Manchu people, don't get me started on what a Manchu exactly is by the way, listen to the fall and rise of China podcast for that. The Japanese had a lot to work with, it could be seen as a righteous Qing revival, or simply giving power back to the Manchu. There was also a large presence of Mongolians, and yes Inner Mongolia would come into all of this. Manchuria came into the nationalist fold late and not exactly willingly. Also the fear of the USSR was not something Japan had alone, Manchuria had struggled against the USSR for a very long time. There was also of course a large Japanese settler population in Manchuria who obviously welcomed the seizure. The Zhang Xueliang regime was not exactly too too friendly to the Japanese within the borders and a lot of discriminatory measure had been exacted upon them. When Zhang Xueliang had joined the Nationalists this had basically spelt doom upon them, at some point they knew they would be kicked out.   While the offensives were in full swing, Ishiwara and Itagaki met with other influential Kwantung Officers to figure out how they could exert control over Manchuria. Officer Katakura, chief of staff Miyake, Dohihara Kenji of the Mukden special service organ all met, looking over a previous plan created by Colonel Dohihara, for a multi racial autonomous nation of Manchuria. It was to be headed by the last Qing emperor, Puyi and needed to possess complete autonomy in internal matters, but its defense and foreign relations would be entrusted to Japan. Ishiwara drafted the plans by September 22nd and they were telegrammed to Tokyo on October 2nd. Tokyo high command disproved of the objectives, but nonetheless worked with the Kwantung army for 5 months on the creation of a new state based on two major principles: the so-called indigenous movement for Manchurian independence and the administrative planning for the Kwantung army to control it.    The Kwantung army went to work using the traditional structure of Manchuria, local self governing bodies. They bribed, persuaded and threatened as many as they could throughout 1931 carefully cultivating a local autonomy movement against the Kuomintang hardliners. One of the first things they created was “Jichi Shidobu self-government guidance board”, whose organ was responsible for coordinating various regional movements for independence to work with the Kwantung army to, in the words of Miyake “guide Manchuria to self-government”. The head of this board was appointed to the Mukden elder statesmen Yu Ch'ung-han, a man educated in Japan and previous advisor to Zhang Zuolin. His board would consist of 20 Japanese and 10 Manchurian members. Such organs were opened Japanese civilians in Manchuria and they flocked to them to support the so called multiracial political structure, because they could bend it to their own benefit.   The Kwantung army began tossing the slogans “racial harmony, racial equality and the righteous way” around heavily. The Kwantung army control over Manchuria was hashed out easily by establishing Japanese advisors over all organs who held ultimate veto authority, they would be appointed at all levels of government, thus everything was in reality Japanese controlled. Everything was going according to Ishiwara's vision….or was it? You would think so, and Ishiwara was definitely pushing all of this forward, but by 1933 he suddenly became a ferocious critic of the very beast he had helped create. 

I would like to thank Patreon member Xizer for suggesting this one, as Xizer put it    “An in depth look at General Kanji Ishiwara would be interesting. The man was the architect for the Mukden Incident that led to the Second Sino Japanese War, but he was vehemently opposed to the abuse and exploitation Japan's colonialism indulged in. His vocal condemnation of the brutality and excesses of the Imperial Japanese military foreign policy and Tojo in particular led to his removal, but he couldn't be executed for popularity in the rank and file. Even at the trials after the war he remained defiant, declaring that President Truman should be tried alongside the Axis War criminals for firebombing Japanese cities. He was truly a fascinating figure.   Indeed Kanji Ishiwara is a fascinating character and his story has a startling impact on the Pacific War and global history as a whole. Now by the time I am reading this the script got out of hand, its a long one haha, so it might have to be a multi parter, but I want to limit the first part to Ishiwara and how the Mukden Incident occurred first. It might come further down the road but I will finish the story of this fascinating man later on after hitting up more Patrons desired subjects, without further adieu enjoy part one of Kanji Ishiwara.    Kanji Ishiwara was born in Tsuruoka, Yamagata prefecture on January 18th of 1889. He was the second son of a policeman who was a descendent of a samurai family serving the Shonai Domain. His clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War and as a result of their defeat, alongside other Shogunal allied clans would see themselves shut off from larger governmental positions in Meiji Era Japan. Not to go too deep down that rabbit hole, but domains like Choshu and Satsuma would see the lionshare of higher positions, while domains who served on the opposite side would be cast out more.   Ishiware began his army career at the military preparatory school in Sendai at the age of 13, followed up by 2 years at the Central military preparatory school in tokyo. In 1907 he entered the military academy as a member of its 21st class. He left the academy in july of 1909 with the commission of Lieutenant and an assignment as platoon commander of an infantry regiment in Tohoku. After the annexation of Korea in 1910 his regiment was shipped over to the peninsula and he served at Ch'unch'on in a small garrison. After two years of occupation duty, Ishiwara returned to Tohoku and in 1915 passed the examinations necessary to enter the Army Staff college. He held an outstanding record, graduating top of his class in november of 1918 and would be amongst the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, receiving the imperial sword.   Now in 1920 he had a frustrating assignment with the department of military training he applied for service in China and received an assignment to the Central china garrison in Hankow. He spent a year traveling through central china before returning back to Tokyo in 1921 where he worked as a lecturer at the army staff college. He sought another China assignment, but his superiors sent him instead to Europe, as they did with all their promising young officers. He went to Germany for 3 years, studying languages and military history. In 1925, he was now a Major, 36 years of age and he received an assignment to the faculty of the army staff college to lecture about the history of war. Now from the very beginning of his character, Ishiwara proved himself a very unconventional officer. He was on the eccentric side, quite argumentative and burdened with a lot of health problems. He had multiple kidney infections, gastro-intestinal problems, tympanitis and other ailments that clawed at him. You also cant forget his ancestry which was important to the Japanese military even in the 1930s. Many of those that came from a disgraced clan had the habit of going above and beyond in terms of imperial loyalty, sort of like a way to rid themselves of the stigma of distrust that was seen in the early Meiji years.   Ishiwara was a bit bizarre, he was nonconforming, quite an independent spirit you would say. Many biographers of his point out, while he held an outstanding record in his education, this went alongside things like his disregard for military punctilio, such as his dress and appearance. In his early career he spoke out against inequalities he saw within the military such as what he saw as favoritism for staff college graduates. Such talk was quite reckless. He read a lot about politics, religion, history and philosophy, he seemed to have quite the restless mind. His behavior drew attention from his colleagues, many deeming him brilliant.   Now everyone in any military has to learn about military history, but not all seek to learn it outside the required readings and such. Ishiwara is one of those rare individuals who was obsessed with learning more about military history. He read about the Russo Japanese war and took quite a critical look at it. He believed the Japanese victory was due to a large part because of luck. He thought Japan had taken the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but Russia was simply to large to be dislodged from Asia with a swift stroke. If Russia had preserved herself better, he believed Japan would have lost and it was only by a peculiar set of circumstances that Japan had avoided a war of endurance. Ishiwara believed if such a set of circumstance occurred again, Japan defense planning would need to change dramatically to base itself on the realities of modern warfare. This led him to read thoroughly about WW1 in europe and he looked critically at the differences between a short duration vs long duration war. How prolonged conflicts eventually became total wars where politics, economics and social order played larger roles, than just that of the military. This led him to think of categories for different types of war such as “kessenteki senso / decisive war” and “jizokuteki senso / continuous war”. He viewed these two types as flowing back and forth throughout history, in a cyclical rhythm.    While in Germany he studied Clausewitz, von Moltke and the works of Hans Delbruck. He was particularly taken by Delbrucks niederwerfungstragie “strategy of annihilation, the decisive battle” and ermattungsstrategie “the strategy of exhaustion”. He could see his own theorizes more fleshed out in such works and took quite a liking to them. This brought him to analyze the Napoleonic war as the archetype of the war of annihilation and the wars of Frederick the Great as that of a war of exhaustion.    Now further on in his studies, Ishiwara became convinced like many of his colleagues, that Japan and the United States for reasons of power and ideology were on a set course for war. He also concluded such a war would be a protracted one, that of a strategy of exhaustion. But how could Japan prepare for such a protracted war when her natural resources were so clearly inadequate. This led him to think more so about Asia. Ishiwara believed Asia was an entity distinctly different from the west. He held beliefs that Asia should be liberated and unite. During the Xinhai revolution of 1911, as a young cadet in Korea, Ishiwara was quite excited by the idea China might revitalize itself, but he became disillusioned during his time in China later. In the 1920's he dealt with bandits, warlord era conflicts, chaos and disorder, seeing poverty everywhere, all of this shattered his image of China progressing and reforming herself. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite how disappointed he was with the political problems of China, he was likewise disgusted with how his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese. He recalled feelings of shame when he saw fellow colleagues in Hankow descending from rickshaws and tossing coins to the ground at the rickshaw mens feet. He would constantly write of how the Japanese needed to shed their racial superiority feelings, but funny enough he would write this alongside his beliefs it was necessary for Japan to help guide nations like China to their destiny. While he may have held beliefs in racial equality between Japan and China, he certainly did not think the same of China's politics. Like the majority of his colleagues he believed China required reform and modernization that Japan should usher in. To Ishiwara the issue at hand was if Japan did not help China, the west would aggressively do so and thus subjugate her further. To Ishiwara China needed liberation. Ishiwara also linked the incoming war between Japan and the United States to play a large role for what would occur between China and Japan.   Ishiwara like many Japanese officers held beliefs concerning the Kokutai. I will try to summarize exactly what the Kokutai is, but honestly its a unbelievably complex cultural phenomenon. The Kokutai was a spiritual motive force that influenced the Japanese military. It can be viewed as the national character of Japan. Japan was a constitutional monarchy that held the Kokutai (national body or character)  and Seitai (government body/structure). Thus there was in reality two ideologies, one held the traditional belief focusing on that of the emperor and that of the official government. If I were to give you a overly confusing summary, I would tell you “Japan is run by the emperor and the government simultaneously” this of course if confusing as hell, and it should be. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution held “the emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet”. Its like saying you have an absolute monarch, but he will be listening and following the democratically elected people. This contradiction would lead to the Pacific War. A large issue that would emerge is that the constitution literally said the navy and army were controlled by the Emperor and not the political diet. Thus many in the military viewed themselves subject to the Kokutai, which as an ideology would evolve dramatically from the Meiji era to the Showa Era. For example, what if you are a military high ranking officer who views the political elites as nothing more than criminals, taking the emperor hostage against his will and thus against the will of the Japanese people. Well this might lead you to try and overthrow the government to make sure the Emperor was really in charge as you think he should be. A real rabbit hole I could go down.   Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. His issue was how did the Kokutai apply outside Japan? How could its value transcend the national boundaries and interests of Japan? If a Japanese soldier was to sacrifice his life for the Kokutai, how did this take on any meaning for men of all races? How could the kokutai's supra-national value by linked to other outside ideologies?   Ishiwara found some answers to these questions in Nichiren Buddhism. It seems here he was able to combine his conceptions about war, history and national purpose. Now Ishiwara did not come from a religious family. He dabbled in christianity for a bit, but did not pursue it. Shinto likewise did not sufficiently fulfill Shiwara' beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism is strongly patriotic, has a apocalyptic character to it and represents a holy mission to be the religion for all mankind with the center of propagation as Japan. There was this kind of quasi idea of world regeneration behind it with Japan as the moral righteous leader. Thus as you can imagine the Kokutai and Nichiren buddhism sort of fit like a glove in many ways.    Utilizing Nichiren Buddhism, the kokutai could be raised from its purely national dogma and be amplified to the entire world. Ishiwara was introduced to all of this by Tanaka Chigaku who was part of the Kokuchukai “national pillar society” a nichiren nationalist organization with an HQ in tokyo. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism.    One aspect of Kokuchukai's nichirenism that greatly appealed to Ishiwara was its combative passages. Ishiwara would justify and attribute much of the military force Japan used on the asian continent drawing parallels to Nicherns idea of drawing the sword to defend righteousness. He often quoted nichirens statement “that the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law”. Ishiwara become engulfed by the nichiren doctrine and came to believe in its prediction that there would be a “Zendai mimon no dai toso / titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”, something like a global armageddon. After this would come a reign of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law”.   While in Germany Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the US won that war, the kokutai would be destroyed. He took the trans-siberian railway enroute back to Japan and stopped in Harbin. There he met with Nichiren believers and he spoke to them about his idea of “a final war”. He stated he believed it would come through religious prediction and his military analysis. He warned everyone Japan must hasten herself for it and that “the final war is fast approaching”. Ishiwara came back to Japan in 1925 fired up with conviction to lecture at the army staff college about his final war. His audience was the army's bright and youthful officers. He taught them Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke and WW1 and of course his thoughts on the future conflict before them all. The Army staff college continuously called for him to expand his lectures because they were so popular. Then in 1927 he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's present and future national defense”. Here he spoke about the inevitable war between the US and Japan. These were quite provocative and took a hell of a lot of attention from colleagues. Later on in april of 1931, he would brief his fellow Kwantung officers using the essay, arguing the need for decisive action on the asian mainland.   In 1928 he would have given another course on European war, but he came down with influenza and was forced to take leave. As he was getting better he was hit with a case of tympanitis in his ear and had to be hospitalized for 6 months. It was to be one of many ailments that would grind at his health. He eventually was drawn into an elite study circle to talk about war theories led by Major Suzuki. The group consisted of young reformist type officers who talked about political and military issues. He carried on his work on the final war and eventually wrote “Sensoshi taikan / general outline of the history of war” which was delivered as a lecture before Kwantung officers at Changch'un in Manchuria on July 4th of 1929. It would receive revisions in 1931, 1938 and became a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.    Now the 1930's were quite a tense time for Japan. The Japanese leadership saw Marxism everywhere, and believed it was withering away their nation. Japanese liberal types were arguing the military budget was out of hand, many were calling for reduction. To Ishiwara it was insanity, how could Japan not arm itself? Marxists preached communism would save Japan; Liberals preached true democracy would save Japan; Ishiwara and many in the army preached the Kokutai would save Japan. Ishiwara preached his final war theories and that the coming apocalypse would not see an American synthesis, but a supreme victory for the Japanese kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”.   From the offset of his initial theories, Ishiwara believed the final war would be a strategy of exhaustion. But WW1 and the 1920's brought technological advances such as tanks, poison gas and the airplane. The airplane in particular made Ishiwara believe the defensive stalemate seen in WW1 was coming to an end. Airpower could deliver bomb loads past all known defenses such as naval surface units, fortresses, armies with automatic weapons. He believed the final war would see absolute horrors brought upon the greatest cities of the world. London, Shanghai, Paris even Tokyo would be wiped out within a day of the commencement of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”.   Ishiwara argued Japan must directly or indirectly control Manchuria and to a lesser degree over parts of China. He asserted Japan had a moral obligation to the asian continent and a special relationship to Manchuria and China. China must be stabilized, for her people were threatened by turmoil, corruption and conflict. He argued Japan would be eventually obliged for the sake of peace and the welfare of the Chinese people to take a more active effort to stabilize her, particularly in Manchuria. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.    In 1931 he began writing about how China needed to reform and it would be in her best interest to accept Japanese guidance. He saw China as the most valuable ally to be beside Japan in the event of war with the United States. If anything he argued Japan must try to not become involved in a war with China, every effort should be made to avoid provoking such an event. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly.    Now lets talk about Manchuria, specifically Manchuria in the late 1920's. Manchuria was in a huge tug of war between Russia, China and Japan. Her ties to China proper were severed by years of warlordism allowing Japan to grow her position. For Japan, the quote “manchurian problem” as it would be known centered on a single question “how to consolidate and expand it under Japanese influence in the face of an expanding China”. Japan saw 3 viable methods, taking control over the south manchuria railway, using the kwantung army and Japanese colonists, the good old filibuster approach. Each of these 3 methods offered different approaches to the same problem which of course would have very different outcomes.    Controlling the railway allowed quite a lot of control over southern Manchuria. The issue with this of course being Japan having to constantly fight off Chinese political efforts against such control. Zhang Zuolin, the Tiger of Manchuria and arguably greatest of the warlords of China held control over Manchuria and was firmly acting in Japanese interests, but for how long would he play ball? To the Kwantung Army members operating in and around Manchuria, the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek was getting out of hand and threatening Zhang Zuolin and thus their interests as well. Anti-Japanese sentiment was only getting worse as the northern expedition climbed north. The Kwangtung army sought more than anything to assert and retain their control over Manchuria, because it offered a buffer against the USSR. Anything that threatened that control had to be dealt with. Ultimately it was believed by many in the Kwantung Army that Manchuria would have to be separated officially from China and in order for this to occur, Japan would most likely need to use force.    Senior officers of the Kwantung army were invited in June of 1927 for a meeting called upon by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate Japan's policy toward China and Manchuria. A more radical Kwantung army group headed by Colonel Komoto Daisaku sought to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, as he was increasingly being seen as a major obstacle to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Well they would do just that in 1928 when Zhang Zuolin was assassinated via a bomb placed on train tracks known as the Huanggutun incident. The assassination did not work out as the Kwantung Army officers thought it would. Instead of their groomed puppet General Yang Yuting taking up the role as leader of Manchuria, it went instead to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang, who lets just say was not too happy the Japanese had obviously killed his father. Thus the Kwantung Army did not assert the forceful policy they wanted in Manchuria, they had actually made it worse for them.   The half-hearted investigation into those responsible for killing Zhang Zuolin, led to the removal of Colonel Komoto from his post. Tanaka's cabinet was toppled. The Kwantung army were now embarrassed and angry that their stance in Manchuria was weakened. The Japanese colonists within Manchuria felt more threatened and called more so upon the Kwantung army for protection against Chinese nationalists wishing to kick them out. The Kwantung army was grasping at straws trying to think of a way to sever Manchuria from China. In 1928, Ishiwara was a lt colonel and he was consulted in length by Kwantung officers about his views on the Manchurian problem. While he had not fully hashed out his Final War theory by this point, he nonetheless spoke about the fundamentals of it, arguing the necessity of taking action to control Manchuria. For the next few years, all efforts were made by Kwantung officers to influence policy towards Manchuria. Ishiwara's ideas were being stimulated and influencing the debate over Manchuria amongst his high ranking colleagues. In October of 1928, Ishiwara sought and received an appointment to the Kwantung army staff. The assignment was to be as an operations officer and his number one backer was Colonel Komoto Daisaku. It seemed Komoto saw Ishiwara as the firebrand necessary to push the Manchurian policies they wanted.   When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he found the Kwantung Army HQ in a state of confusion and demoralization. This of course was a large part due to the cluster fuck of a failure from the bombing of Zhang Zuolin. The investigation into the assassination led to many shifts within the Kwantung army staff, many quite restrictive. Even though Komoto's career was shattered by the Zhang Zuolin failure, he kept arguing to his colleagues that the Manchurian crisis hamukdend to be resolved by force. Ishiwara it seems agreed with this and during the early months of 1929 worked alongside Komoto, planning operations against Chinese forces in the Mukden area. By spring of 1929, Komoto was officially being kicked out. By May he was relegated to a divisional backwater in Japan and by June he was out of the army. This did not mean however that he lost influence on Manchurian affairs. Komoto's replacement was Lt Colonel Itagaki Seishiro and old comrade of Ishiwara since Sendai military preparatory school.    For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki worked alongside other Kwantung Army staff to solve the Manchurian problem as they saw it. By the mid 1931's the idea Manchuria needed to be seized via force was now the mainstream viewpoint for the Kwantung army in general. Ishiwara believed firmly that Japan could no longer stand idle in Manchuria, because every day that went by saw little by little, Japan relinquishing rights and interests in Manchuria to China, and at some point they would simply be kicked out. To “quit manchuria” would be a national disaster, they would lose their buffer state, the resources and the land for their booming population to emigrate to. Simply put Manchuria was the steroid keeping Japan alive, she needed it to continue to grow. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviethreat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army HQ in Tokyo likewise agreed Manchuria was the vital defensive line against the USSR. But unlike the Kwantung army who sought all of Manchuria, the heads in Tokyo sought to absorb southern Manchuria via the south manchurian railway and did not seek anything north of it. Ishiwara however assumed the only way Japan could prevent the USSR from placing pressure on southern Manchuria was no less that Japan having to occupy northern Manchuria and even further north towards the Amur River so Japan could control the mountain ranges flanking western and eastern frontiers of northern manchuria.  Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”.   Ishiwara took all of this a step further, after Manchuria was conquered, Japan would have to somehow administer and pacify the peoples of it. Ishiwara argued the stability of Manchuria would be developed through the special talents of various races living there. The Chinese would develop the small businesses in the region, the Koreans would use their paddy farming knowledge, etc. These racial ideas would contribute to the development of Manchukuo and the greater east asia co-prosperity sphere. But above all else, Manchuria would serve the interests of Japan, many of which would be exploitative and economic in nature.    By early 1930 Ishiwara and Itagaki worked out a plan using the same strategy used during the Russo-Japanese war, a surprise night attack. The Kwantung army would assault the Liaoning area hitting important Chinese garrisons. The plans had to be meticulous as the Kwantung army was severely smaller than most of the Manchurian forces led by Zhang Xueliang. Around Mukden alone Zhang held 20,000 men well equipped with aircraft and tanks. Throughout all of Manchuria, if a war arose, Zhang could assemble roughly 250,000 troops to bear down on an enemy. The Kwantung army meanwhile could muster 10,000 men which were basically garrison units around the railway. They did not have significant aircraft nor mechanized forces at hand, and were pretty poorly equipped to boot. Ishiwara's answer to the disparity in forces called for the use of intelligence and rigorous training. He sought to perfect specific assault techniques so that when the conflict broke out, the Japanese would use lightning speed and effective concentration of force to overwhelm the Chinese. The plan overall was remarkably simplistic, wagering everything on dealing a crushing blow at the center of Zhang Xueliangs military powerbase at the Peitaying barracks at Mukden. If this fell, he predicted the enemy's morale would break, giving the Kwantung the necessary military and psychological momentum to subdue the surrounding areas. If the USSR got involved, the plan would have gone to utter shit.   One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ”. Ishiwara as you can imagine was very bitter about the idea of prolonging for a year and argued the international environment meant they must strike immediately. The Soviet 5 year plan was still in mid course; the US, Britain and France had yet to overcome their financial crisis and could offer limited resistance in the far east and most obviously the Nationalist regime in China was still busy in its unification efforts south of the Great wall, but that would change soon. If they waited a year all of this would change for the worse, the time was now or never to Ishiwara.   In july of 1931 Ishiwara and Itagki organized a final major staff reconnaissance designed to get the newest Kwantung officers up to date with northern Manchuria. To cover for what they were doing they told high command it was a survey against the USSR, but it was of course to investigate the Chinese power in northern manchuria. On their return trip, the party heard of the disappearance of one Kwantung staff officer, captain Nakamura Shintaro. Ishiwara and the others found out when they reached Port Arthur and the rumor spread that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under “mysterious circumstances”. Now over the past few months there had been violent riots, murders, work strikes and other incidents occurring in Manchuria. The Nakamura affair flared all of these tensions up. Seeing the paint on the wall, Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries tried to negotiate the issue, but those at the central army HQ like Nagata Tetsuzan who were sympathetic to the impatience of their Kwantung colleagues felt compelled to aid them. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that is just what he did. The Kwantung officers took their forces outside the railway zone, which they had been restricted to and without waiting for approval from Itagaki who was in Japan at the time, initiated the steps to despatch an armored train and a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery forces to go to Mukden to get the Chinese military to help investigate the Nakamura disappearance. Tokyo got word of this and dispatched a telegram to stop their departure from the railway and to not use the Nakamura incident as a way to use force to solve the manchurian problem.   For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” .   “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. On september 18th, 1931 a bomb was planted by the Kwantung army on the tracks of the south manchuria railway at Liutiaokou and it exploded. Japanese troops under the guise the bomb was a “chinese terrorist attack” moved to swiftly overrun the Peitaying barracks. Ishiwara's plot had finally unfolded. 

LOVE - Part 2. With these few terms we can define the Engine of Life, the experience of Buddhahood, and the Samsaric delusion that drives our physical desires. “Earthly desires” used to develop our Enlightenment, as Nichiren would encourage us, to discover the profound Love of Buddhist compassion 24/7. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available in the TLK Bookstore; www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon

Bentornati su "FRAGRANZE" un podcast che racconta storie di vita quotidiana di chi, grazie al Buddismo, è riuscito a trasformare la propria vita e a farla fiorire.Che cosa vuol dire essere “solidi” senza diventare rigidi? In questa puntata raccontiamo il viaggio di Viola: dall'adolescenza difficile alla crisi dei trent'anni, dalla cura del padre alla scelta coraggiosa di rimettersi a studiare e reinventare la propria strada. Al centro, la pratica del Buddismo di Nichiren—la recitazione di Nam-myoho-renge-kyo—come allenamento quotidiano a non farsi sviare dagli “otto venti” e a trasformare i desideri in valore. Una storia di missione personale, rivoluzione umana e fiducia che contagia l'ambiente: quando la fragranza interna si manifesta, tutto intorno inizia a cambiare.Buon ascolto e… fate sentire la vostra fragranza!

MahaPariNirvana Part 50. Our effective practice and propagation is a result of great attention to our use of language in transmitting correctly the teachings of Shakyamuni and Nichiren. Is our attitude and intent pure, honest, true? “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available in the TLK Bookstore; www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon

A continuation of the teachings so clearly repeated by Nichiren; to follow the “Law” and not the “Person”; Seek meaning rather than adhere to the words; and to experience the Dharma by instantiating Buddha is the only goal. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available in the TLK Bookstore;   www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon  How to use this study resource :  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suIQ89Nc3BU Buddhism resources : http://threefoldlotus.com    www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon  www.cafepress.com/shop/gohonzon/products PayPal.me/sifusylvain Patreon.com/TLK https://www.podbean.com/eas/pb-yyerv-190dbb9 https://bsky.app/profile/sifusylvain.bsky.social

Attitude. Intent. Shakyamuni's words resonate through Nichiren. Our practice is our guide, “...follow the Law, not the Person”, allowing no others in thought word or deed to impede our sharing and practice of the Mahayana and our praise for all those who seek the path of the Lotus. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available in the TLK Bookstore; www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon

Resolve. Steadfastness. Shakyamuni's words resonate through Nichiren. Our practice is our guide, “...follow the Law, not the Person”, allowing no others in thought word or deed to impede our sharing and practice of the Mahayana. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available in the TLK Bookstore; www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon

Last time we spoke about the Ishiwara Kanji. Born in 1889 in Japan, Kanji Ishiwara was the son of a policeman from a samurai lineage. He entered military training at 13, rising through the ranks to become a Major and a respected lecturer. His unconventional views on military strategy and history led him to predict a prolonged conflict with the United States. Deeply influenced by Nichiren Buddhism, he envisioned Japan as a moral leader destined to guide Asia, advocating for reform in China while grappling with his nation's imperial ambitions. In 1928, ishiwara fell ill with influenza, leading to a six-month hospitalization. During recovery, he joined an elite study group discussing war theories. His lectures on total war gained fame, culminating in a presentation to Kwantung officers. Amid rising tensions in Japan, he advocated for control over Manchuria, believing Japan had a moral duty to stabilize China. His theories on warfare, including the devastating potential of airpower, foreshadowed the horrors of future conflicts, influencing Japan's military strategies.   #137 Ishiwara Kanji Part 2: The Mukden Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.   For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki collaborated with other members of the Kwantung Army to address what they perceived as the Manchurian issue. By the mid-1930s, the belief that Manchuria needed to be forcibly seized had become the prevailing opinion among the Kwantung Army. Ishiwara was convinced that Japan could no longer remain passive in Manchuria, as each passing day meant Japan was gradually losing its rights and interests in the region to China, risking expulsion. Abandoning Manchuria would be a national catastrophe, resulting in the loss of a crucial buffer state, valuable resources, and land for Japan's growing population to settle. In essence, Manchuria was vital for Japan's survival and growth. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviet threat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China's defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army Headquarters in Tokyo also recognized that Manchuria was a crucial defensive line against the USSR. However, unlike the Kwantung Army, which aimed to control all of Manchuria, the leaders in Tokyo focused on incorporating southern Manchuria through the South Manchurian Railway and did not pursue any territory north of it. Ishiwara, on the other hand, believed that the only way for Japan to prevent the USSR from exerting pressure on southern Manchuria was to occupy northern Manchuria and extend even further north toward the Amur River. This would allow Japan to control the mountain ranges that bordered the western and eastern frontiers of northern Manchuria. Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”. Ishiwara advanced his ideas significantly after Japan's conquest of Manchuria, recognizing the necessity of effectively administering and pacifying its diverse populations. He posited that the stability of Manchuria could be achieved through the unique skills and contributions of the various ethnic groups residing there. For instance, he believed that the Chinese would excel in developing small businesses, while the Koreans would apply their expertise in paddy farming. These racial dynamics, according to Ishiwara, would play a crucial role in the development of Manchukuo and the broader vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, it was clear that, above all, Manchuria was intended to serve Japan's interests, many of which were exploitative and economically driven. By early 1930, Ishiwara and his colleague Itagaki devised a military strategy reminiscent of the tactics employed during the Russo-Japanese War, specifically a surprise night attack. Their plan involved the Kwantung Army launching an assault on the Liaoning region, targeting key Chinese garrisons. This operation required meticulous planning, as the Kwantung Army was significantly outnumbered by the forces commanded by Zhang Xueliang. In the vicinity of Mukden alone, Zhang commanded approximately 20,000 well-equipped troops, supported by aircraft and tanks. Across Manchuria, he could mobilize around 250,000 soldiers in the event of conflict. In stark contrast, the Kwantung Army could only field about 10,000 personnel, primarily composed of garrison units stationed along the railway. They lacked substantial air support and mechanized units, and their overall equipment was inadequate. To address this stark imbalance in military strength, Ishiwara emphasized the importance of intelligence and rigorous training. He aimed to refine specific assault techniques, enabling Japanese forces to execute rapid and concentrated attacks that would overwhelm their Chinese adversaries. The overarching strategy was notably straightforward: it hinged on delivering a decisive blow to the heart of Zhang Xueliang's military stronghold at the Peitaying barracks in Mukden. Ishiwara believed that if this critical target fell, it would shatter the enemy's morale, providing the Kwantung Army with the necessary military and psychological momentum to dominate the surrounding regions. However, he acknowledged that if the Soviet Union intervened, the entire plan could unravel catastrophically. One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ” Ishiwara, as you can imagine, was deeply frustrated by the prospect of delaying action for another year. He argued passionately that the current international landscape necessitated an immediate strike. At that time, the Soviet Union was still in the midst of its ambitious five-year plan, which limited its capacity for intervention. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, and France were grappling with their own financial crises, rendering them unable to mount significant resistance in the Far East. Most notably, the Nationalist regime in China was preoccupied with its unification efforts south of the Great Wall, but this situation was expected to shift soon. Ishiwara believed that if they postponed their plans for a year, the geopolitical environment would deteriorate further, making decisive action imperative. For Ishiwara, the moment to act was now or never. In July 1931, Ishiwara and Itagaki orchestrated a crucial reconnaissance mission aimed at familiarizing the newest Kwantung officers with the northern regions of Manchuria. To disguise their true intentions, they informed high command that the mission was a survey focused on the Soviet Union. However, the real objective was to assess the strength and influence of Chinese power in northern Manchuria. During their return journey, the team received alarming news about the disappearance of Captain Nakamura Shintaro, a Kwantung staff officer. Upon reaching Port Arthur, they learned that rumors were circulating that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under what were described as “mysterious circumstances.” In the preceding months, Manchuria had witnessed a surge in violent riots, murders, work strikes, and various other incidents, all contributing to a climate of unrest. The Nakamura affair intensified these existing tensions. In response, both the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries attempted to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. However, figures at the central army headquarters, such as Nagata Tetsuzan, who sympathized with the urgency felt by their Kwantung counterparts, felt compelled to support them. The situation was rapidly escalating, and the stakes were growing ever higher. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that's exactly what he did. The Kwantung officers moved their troops beyond the railway zone, where they had been confined, and without waiting for Itagaki's approval—who was in Japan at the time—they began preparations to send an armored train along with a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to Mukden. Their goal was to enlist the help of the Chinese military in investigating Nakamura's disappearance. Upon learning of this, Tokyo sent a telegram instructing them to halt their departure from the railway and to refrain from using the Nakamura incident as a pretext for employing force to address the Manchurian issue. For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. Ishiwara ordered the dispatch of an armored train carrying a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to compel the Chinese military authorities in Mukden to assist in the investigation of Nakamura's disappearance. However, central headquarters halted the train's departure at the last moment, sending a telegram from Tokyo that specifically instructed the Kwantung Army not to use the Nakamura incident to pressure a resolution to the Manchurian issue.  In addition to the Nakamura situation, another issue was brewing. Colonel Dohihara Kenji was involved in a plot to enlist Warlord Yan Xishan to attack Zhang Xueliang. This scheme was attracting unwanted attention and undermining the effectiveness of the Nakamura incident, prompting Ishiwara to swiftly suppress the plans. Rumors began to circulate in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army was preparing to retaliate against the Chinese due to the Nakamura situation. In response, War Minister General Minami dispatched Major General Yoshiji Tatekawa to Mukden to caution the Kwantung officers against any such actions. Ishiwara was informed of Tatekawa's arrival and sent urgent telegrams to his followers, warning, “Plot exposed. Act before Tatekawa's arrival.” Consequently, the launch date was moved from September 28th to the 18th. Itagaki personally intercepted Tatekawa's train, inviting him for tea and sake, and arranged for him to spend the night with a geisha on the evening of the 18th. On September 18th of 1931, 1st Lt Suemori Kawamoto of the independent Garrison Unit of the 29th infantry regiment planted bombs along the tracks near Liutiaokou. At 10:20pm they exploded doing only minor damage to 1.5 meters of track on one site. The damage was so minor a train actually passed over the tracks without difficulty 10 minutes later. Ishiwara, Itagaki and their followers quickly announced the explosion to be a Chinese atrocity and mobilized the Kwantung Army. Itagaki ordered the Independent Garrison Force and 29th infantry regiment to storm the Peitaying Barracks. Battalion commander Shimamoto was awakened by the orders via telephone and quickly dispatched the 1st (Ono) and 4th (Takahashi) companies from Mukden; the 2nd (kawakami) company at Fushun to advance to Liutiaokou. At 10:40pm the 29th regiment commander Hirata got a call from Shimamoto who ordered him to get his regiment into emergency formation and to storm the Peiyating barracks.  Two secretly hidden 24cm artillery pieces began to bombard the Peitaying barracks as 500 Japanese stormed the 7000 strong Chinese garrison. Despite being outnumbered 14 to 1, the Japanese destroyed Zhang Xueliangs small air force, routed the Chinese and occupied the Peiyating Barracks by 11pm, all at the cost of 500 Chinese lives and allegedly only 2 Japanese lives. A major reason the Japanese had ease was because Zhang Xueliang ordered his men to store away their weapons and not put up a fight if the Japanese invaded. Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek both in Beijing at the time knew they could not initiate an offensive war against such a strong foreign country. They were hoping the League of Nations would intervene as pertaining to the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. But later on Chiang Kai-Shek would find America too wrapped up in its depression at home, Britain indifferent and other nations without enough reason to risk anything in the far east. An hour after the attack, Ishiwara began pressing General Shigeru Honjo, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to send reinforcements to capture all of Mukden. Initially, Honjo hesitated, but Ishiwara convinced him that there was significant provocation from the enemy, prompting Honjo to order additional units into combat to secure the entire city. Historians have since struggled to determine whether Honjo was aware of the invasion plan; it seems likely he had some knowledge, but not the full details, which made him cautious in his actions over the following weeks. In the days that followed, Honjo attempted to confine the incident, but Ishiwara and Itagaki continuously urged all forces to adhere to the secret plan they had trained for. The speed and decisiveness of their actions overwhelmed the Chinese forces and left Honjo unable to change the course of events. Famously when one colleague asked Itagaki what to do in response to cease and desist orders from Honjo, Itagaki responded “Never mind Honjo, it's Ishiwara's war”. Official orders from Tokyo came on the next day, specifically opposing the expansion of hostilities, but Ishiwara and Itagaki had come too far to stop now. They began persuading Honjo to telegram the General Staff to ask for reinforcements and freedom of action “to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”. Ishiwara and Itagaki clearly aimed to expand their offensive through official channels first, but they also circumvented these channels. One cunning tactic they used was to incite chaos among civilians in Manchurian cities, thereby heightening the demand for improved security for Japanese residents. This strategy would enable the Kwantung Army troops to move beyond their established boundaries. Shortly after what is now known as the "Mukden Incident," military agents were sent to Kirin to stir unrest in the city. Reports of disturbances from Kirin began flooding into the Kwantung Army headquarters, with Ishiwara urging Honjo to send forces to Kirin to safeguard Japanese residents. He also pushed for reinforcements from the Korean Army, but Honjo was reluctant to take that step. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki's assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can't do anything more to budge the commander and so i'm giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara's demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops.  The operation against Kirin was executed with remarkable speed. Ishiwara ordered the majority of the 2nd Division, led by General Tamon Jiro, to swiftly travel to Kirin by train. They entered the city without firing a single shot and compelled the local Chinese commander to declare the province's independence from Zhang Xueliang's regime. Within hours, the Korean army responded to an aid request from the Kwantung Army staff sent on September 21st and began advancing into Manchuria. In just 48 hours, the Japanese military had taken control of Kirin, which was outside the Kwantung operational zone, and the Korean army was invading Manchuria without Tokyo's approval, effectively undermining military discipline. Chief of Staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to restrict the Kwantung Army's operations and granted field commanders discretionary authority for certain emergency situations, typically of a local nature. However, the Kirin expedition did not fit within these parameters. Encouraged by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki pushed for an advance on Harbin. As noted in the previous episode, the strategy for taking Manchuria relied on speed and precision. The Kwantung Army had limited forces compared to the immediate Chinese troops in Manchuria, yet they were constrained by directives from Tokyo HQ that prohibited the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the South Manchuria Railway, where they had previously confined their actions. Ishiwara attempted to frame the situation politically, arguing that Japan should support Manchurian independence and sent this proposal directly to Tokyo central HQ. However, on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ firmly rejected the idea of expanding hostilities. Faced with this outright refusal from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals believed their only option was to create further chaos to compel a response. Ishiwara took the lead once more, aiming to unsettle Tokyo HQ. On October 8th, he donned military pilot gear and infiltrated one of five Chinese aircraft seized at Mukden airfield. He personally led a raid, although later in life, during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, he would claim that the flight was intended solely for reconnaissance of enemy activities at Chinchou. He argued that it was only at the last moment that intelligence revealed anti-aircraft guns had been installed at Chinchou, prompting the Kwantung Army Commander to authorize their neutralization if fired upon. Ishiwara maintained that he and the four accompanying aircraft were fired upon, leading them to drop approximately 75 bombs on Chinchou. This series of events was quite dramatic, and contemporary accounts suggest it was a premeditated effort to provoke Tokyo. The raid on Chinchou certainly alarmed Tokyo, leading the staff there to worry that the West would start condemning them. Tokyo's high command found themselves in a difficult position. They felt compelled to publicly support the Kwantung Army by retroactively approving the chaotic attacks, but internally, they were furious. Major Endo Saburo from the intelligence division was dispatched to Manchuria to investigate the situation. When he asked Ishiwara about the events, Ishiwara claimed he acted on the principle of field initiative, which was why he hadn't informed Tokyo beforehand. Saburo also noted that Ishiwara's tone suggested that he and the intelligence division should stay out of the matter. Additionally, Saburo learned that there were whispers in Manchuria indicating that if Tokyo's high command did not align with them, the Kwantung Army was ready to act independently. It appeared that the radical officers of the Kwantung Army were even willing to defy the Imperial Japanese Army command to achieve their goals. Ishiwara went as far as to send this telegram to Tokyo “For the sake of the nation we are doing our very best in Manchuria, but if the Japanese government constantly interferes we cannot complete our great work. Then the Kwantung army will have to come to the point where we will have to break the glorious history of the imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire” If you found this situation quite surprising, there was also a rumor that Ishiwara and Itagaki planned to use an independent Manchuria as a base for a coup d'état against the Japanese government. Their goal was to overthrow the capitalists oppressing the people and establish a national socialist regime centered around the emperor. For those familiar with the history of political assassinations in 1930s Japan, this rumor hints at events that would unfold in 1936. It remains unclear whether Ishiwara and Itagaki genuinely intended to pursue this plan, but they certainly spread the word. On October 18th, War Minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army, instructing them to stop any discussions about making Manchuria independent or attempting to seize control of it. Additionally, they dispatched Colonel Imamura Hitoshi from the operations section to Manchuria to reason with Ishiwara and Itagaki. They all met at a restaurant in Mukden where Imamura began by explaining the purpose of his mission, but before he could even really begin, Ishiwara blurted out “whats the matter? Doesn't central headquarters have any backbone?” A great way to start a meeting to be sure. Imamura tried to explain the situation, but Ishiwara said “if we follow the spineless Tokyo approach we'll never settle the Manchurian problem”. Imamura replied “we can't accomplish anything by following the arbitrary decision of field elements, which may create a crisis that will shake the whole army. In such a problem it is essential for the whole nation to be unified”. To this Ishiwara apparently said really loudly in the restaurant that he was sleepy, rolled over on the tatami and closed his eyes. Imamura furious haha, get up quickly after denouncing his so called hosts for conducting official IJA business at a restaurant and left. The next day they all met again, where Ishiwara and Itagaki kept speaking about the necessity to create an independent state, since there was no hope of the Chinese reforming Manchuria. After Imamura left that meeting, Ishiwara said to Itagaki “Imamura is a fine fellow, but he doesn't understand China”. Despite the chaos and turmoil, the Kwantung Army had been held back from launching any sustained military operations throughout October. As expected, Ishiwara continued to argue for an advance into northern Manchuria. In early November, he found another opportunity when he claimed that more railways had been destroyed. Allegedly, hostile Chinese forces had blown up the rail bridges over the Nonni River, south of Tsitsihar. When Japanese engineering units arrived to repair the damaged tracks, they came under fire from Chinese troops. To the high-ranking officials in Tokyo, this appeared to be a legitimate reason to take defensive action. Additionally, Kwantung intelligence reports were reaching Tokyo, suggesting that Chinese forces in northern Manchuria were planning a southward offensive. Ishiwara had also provided exaggerated reports to the Japanese public, manipulating media narratives to pressure Tokyo into supporting an advance into northern Manchuria. Tokyo approved a defensive operation, restricted in time and scope, aimed at protecting Japanese positions at the Nonni River bridges. Kwantung Army forces began moving north and soon engaged in intense fighting around the railway area of Tahsing. Ishiwara personally led troops during this engagement, marking the only time in his military career that he did so. General Honjo, rightly concerned that the Kwantung forces were becoming uncontrollable, sent a cable on November 5th announcing that under the “rinsan inmei / provisional mandate,” the general staff would assume direct command authority in Manchuria. Unsurprisingly, Ishiwara and his like-minded colleagues in the Kwantung Army were furious. Honjo followed this up by stating he would resign if they did not comply, but Ishiwara brushed off the provisional mandate stating “that the directive from the chief of staff is just a personal, not an imperial order. No matter how many we get of those we shouldn't' care. We'll just go ahead with our plans”. On november 17, the Kwantung army began advancing upon the city of Tsitsihar seizing it 2 days later.  Confronted with yet another dire situation, the IJA high command permitted the Kwantung Army to advance toward Tsitsihar. However, international outcry soon erupted, compelling them to order the evacuation of the city. Ishiwara sparked a significant debate among the staff, arguing that the evacuation was unacceptable given the sacrifices already made by the troops. Nevertheless, Honjo remained resolute. A few days later, Chinese forces began to gather at Chinchou, and tensions escalated with skirmishes occurring between Japanese and Chinese troops in Tientsin. In response, Ishiwara urgently called for Honjo to initiate an offensive at Chinchou as a way to better position their forces closer to Tientsin in case they faced overwhelming opposition. To support this advance, they also requested assistance from the Korean army. Once again, the burden fell to Tokyo. The high command in Tokyo ordered an immediate halt to the offensive and a withdrawal east of the Liao River. The Kwantung Army hesitated, not solely due to the order but also because the Korean army refused to join the offensive against Chinchou, which was crucial for their success. Ishiwara found himself in a predicament; without reinforcements, the entire offensive could fail. Then, on December 11th, a significant change occurred when Premier Wakatsuki was ousted. War Minister Minami and Chief of Staff Kanaya, who had attempted to moderate the Kwantung Army's aggressiveness, were replaced by Araki Sadao, a leader of the Kodoha faction known for its aggressive stance. To provide some context, the Japanese military was divided into factions, similar to warlord cliques, vying to influence the future operations of the IJA and, to some extent, the IJN. Two primary factions shaped the military landscape in the 1930s: the Kodoha and the Toseiha (Control Faction). The Kodoha was not an organized political party nor did it hold an official position within the IJA, but it wielded considerable influence. Its members were typically younger officers, particularly from the Kwantung Army. General Sadao Araki was a founding member of the Kodoha, which was heavily influenced by Bushido, Fascism, and the Kokutai ideology. They aimed to restore Japan to its perceived former glory, viewing liberal democracy as a detrimental force. They blamed the capitalists, industrialists, and elites—politicians, bureaucrats, and Zaibatsu leaders—for the nation's decline. Their goal was to see the Emperor reclaim full power in what they termed a "Showa Restoration." The Kodoha's primary adversary, as perceived by much of the Japanese military at the time, was the USSR and communism in general. Consequently, they supported the Hokushin-ron (Northern Strike Policy), which was Japan's theoretical plan to invade the USSR. While I don't want to delve too deeply into the details, it's important to note that the Kodoha was counterbalanced by the more moderate Toseiha faction, led by Hideki Tojo. The Toseiha opposed the Kodoha on several fronts, notably their desire to avoid a violent revolution to restore imperial dominance. Although they shared many principles with the Kodoha, the Toseiha rejected the Hokushin-ron strategy in favor of the Nanshin-ron (Southern Strike) strategy, which aimed at expanding into Southeast Asia and the resource-rich Dutch East Indies. The Toseiha faction also maintained better relations with the IJN. To contextualize this narrative within the political landscape, these two factions began to fiercely compete for dominance starting in 1931. With the influence of Araki Sadao and support from Prince Kan'in, a Kodoha sympathizer, significant changes occurred in Tokyo's command. Suddenly, offensive operations against Chinese forces in Manchuria were rebranded as “bandit suppression” campaigns. The Kwantung Army, fully backed by Tokyo, swiftly pursued all military objectives established by Ishiwara and Itagaki since September. Chinchou and Shanhaikwan were captured in early January 1932, followed by Tsitsihar in February. By spring 1932, Ishiwara urged the staff to complete the full occupation of Manchuria, both north and south. In April of that year, he presented the “Manshu haiti heiryaku,” or the program for the pacification of Manchuria. This new plan called for the seizure of Hailar in the north because “it was pivotal to the defense against the USSR”. It also called for seizing Jehol province because “it was an important condition to the independence of Manchuria”. By the end of the year Hailar was taken and in 1933 the Kwantung army was marching upon Jehol. It is clear that Ishiwara played a crucial role in the conquest of Manchuria. The Kwantung Army and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had various strategies available to address the Manchurian issue, but Ishiwara focused primarily on achieving complete control over the region for its resources, strategic advantages, and to establish a continental base for a potential war against the United States. For Ishiwara, securing all of Manchuria was essential in preparation for the Final War. While it's likely that conflict between Japan and China would have occurred in Manchuria without Ishiwara's influence, it's uncertain whether Japan would have outright taken the province. Ishiwara dedicated years to planning and pushing boundaries, but when the operation commenced, it became evident that he and his associates lacked a definitive timeline for conquest and had several missing contingency plans. Despite the chaotic circumstances, the conquest of Manchuria proved to be a remarkable success. So much so, Ishiwara said to a friend of his, Satomi Kishio in 1932 “Even if Japan has to face the entire world, she can't be beaten”. Ironically as many of you know, Japan's actions in Manchuria cost her greatly. Japan was now hated by the Chinese, well much more so. The west condemned Japan's actions, alongside the USSR. As my professor first taught me in a class about the Pacific War when I was a wee lad in his early 20's “It all was about Manchuria, everything started with Manchuria, and it ended with Manchuria in 1945”. The Manchuria incident set Japan on an unavoidable path toward the China War, which ultimately led to conflict with the West. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This situation also raises questions about military discipline. Many cite the concept of Gekokujo as a reason why individuals like Ishiwara and Itagaki were able to act as they did. These militaristic junior officers seemingly ran rampant, engaging in rebellious actions that defied their superiors, which forced those higher up to become complicit. While Gekokujo certainly played a role, especially in Ishiwara's case, it does not negate the fact that there was a significant level of indiscipline within the Japanese army. Ishiwara was undoubtedly aware of the potential consequences of his actions. A prime example is Colonel Komoto Daisaku, who had previously seen his career ruined after being exiled due to the Huanggutun incident. However, Ishiwara's focus extended beyond Manchuria; he was closely monitoring the political landscape in Tokyo. He recognized that the 1931 cabinet was unstable and that certain high-ranking officials, like Araki Sadao, were rapidly advancing in their careers and sympathized with his agenda. Ishiwara was betting that supporters from factions like Kodoha would gain the necessary power to further his cause. His gamble paid off handsomely, as all the key players in the Manchurian affair were rewarded for their efforts. Ishiwara received the Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd class, and returned to Japan as a celebrated hero, captivating younger officers in the Imperial Japanese Army. Ironically, the indiscipline he had nurtured within the army would later come back to haunt him as he climbed the ranks and became part of the Tokyo staff. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. As Ron Burgundy once said “Boy, that escalated quickly... I mean, that really got out of hand fast.” While perhaps Ishiwara did not plan for an all out war to break out against China, he certainly was the culprit to it happening. There was no going back, 15 years of blood, sweat and tears would be shed.

Last time we spoke about the reunification of Xinjiang. In Yarkland, chaos erupted as inflation soared, forcing Chinese officials to retreat to fortified New City. As insurgents advanced, Colonel Chin's forces looted and fled, igniting violence against Uyghurs and Hindu moneylenders. By April, rebels captured Kashgar, fracturing Chinese control. Amid shifting alliances, Abdullah revealed a conflict among Muslim troops, leading to a brief Uyghur-Kirghiz unity against the Chinese. After the execution of leader Temur, Abdullah seized Yarkland, while Tawfiq Bay rallied forces, leaving the Tungans besieged amidst chaos. In the tumultuous landscape of 1930s Xinjiang, Ma Chongying's Tungan forces, alongside young Uyghur conscripts, captured Kumul and advanced toward Urumqi. Despite fierce battles, including a significant clash at Kitai, Sheng Shihtsai struggled to maintain control amid shifting loyalties and external pressures. As the TIRET emerged under Khoja Niyas Hajji, internal conflicts and Soviet interventions escalated. Ultimately, Ma Chongying retreated to Russia, leaving Sheng in power, but the region remained fraught with tension and uncertainty.   #136 Ishiwara Kanji Part 1: The Man who Began WW2? Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” Famously said by Gandalf the White. 1931 was the year the Japanese initiated a 15 year long war with China. For those of you who perhaps joined this podcast recently and don't know, I am Craig and I operate the Pacific War Channel on Youtube. I have been covering the 15 year long China War forever it seems, so when we finally reached this part in our larger story I sat down and thought about how to first tackle this. One thing I really believe needs to be said at the beginning, is a lot of what happened was put into motion by one man, Ishiwara Kanji. For those of you who joined my patreon or later listened to my Ishiwara Kanji series on my channel, this one might be a bit of a refresher. But for those of you who have never heard the name of this man, well let me tell you a story about how a single man caused WW2. Kanji Ishiwara was born on January 18, 1889, in Tsuruoka, located in Yamagata Prefecture, Japan. He was the second son of a policeman who hailed from a lineage of samurai that had historically served the Shonai Domain. This domain had a notable history, particularly during the Boshin War, where Ishiwara's clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate. Following the defeat of the Shogunate, clans like Ishiwara's found themselves marginalized in the new political landscape of Meiji Era Japan. The power dynamics shifted significantly, with domains such as Choshu and Satsuma gaining the majority of influential governmental positions, while those that had aligned with the Shogunate were largely excluded from power. At the young age of 13, Ishiwara embarked on his military career by enrolling in a military preparatory school in Sendai. He continued his education for two years at the Central Military Preparatory School in Tokyo, where he honed his skills and knowledge in military affairs. In 1907, he entered the Imperial Japanese Military Academy as a member of its 21st class. After two years of rigorous training, he graduated in July 1909, receiving a commission as a Lieutenant and taking on the role of platoon commander in an infantry regiment stationed in the Tohoku region. In 1910, following Japan's annexation of Korea, Ishiwara's regiment was deployed to the Korean Peninsula, where he served in a small garrison in Ch'unch'on. His time there involved two years of occupation duty, during which he gained valuable experience in military operations and leadership. After returning to Tohoku in 1912, Ishiwara pursued further education and successfully passed the examinations required for entry into the Army Staff College in 1915. His dedication and exceptional performance were evident throughout his studies, culminating in his graduation at the top of his class in November 1918. This achievement earned him a prestigious place among the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, a distinguished group within the Japanese military, and he was honored with the imperial sword, a symbol of his status and accomplishments. In 1920, Ishiwara found himself facing a challenging assignment within the Department of Military Training. Eager for a change, he applied for service in China and was subsequently assigned to the Central China Garrison in Hankow. Over the course of a year, he traveled extensively through central China, immersing himself in the culture and landscape before returning to Tokyo in 1921. Upon his return, he took on the role of lecturer at the Army Staff College, where he shared his knowledge and experiences with aspiring military leaders. Despite his desire for another assignment in China, Ishiwara's superiors redirected him to Europe, a common practice for promising young officers at the time. He spent three years in Germany, where he dedicated himself to studying languages and military history. By 1925, at the age of 36 and having attained the rank of Major, he received a prestigious assignment to the faculty of the Army Staff College, where he lectured on the history of warfare. From the outset, Ishiwara distinguished himself as an unconventional officer. His eccentricities were well-known; he was often seen as argumentative and struggled with numerous health issues, including recurrent kidney infections, gastrointestinal problems, tympanitis, and other ailments that plagued him throughout his career. Additionally, his ancestry played a significant role in his military life, particularly in the context of the Japanese military's values during the 1930s. Officers from disgraced clans often felt compelled to demonstrate exceptional loyalty to the Emperor, striving to overcome the stigma associated with their lineage, a legacy of distrust that lingered from the early Meiji period. Ishiwara's character was marked by a certain oddity; he was a nonconformist with a fiercely independent spirit. Many biographers note that while he excelled academically, he often disregarded military decorum, particularly in terms of his dress and personal appearance. Early in his career, he voiced his concerns about perceived inequalities within the military, particularly the favoritism shown towards graduates of the staff college. Such outspoken criticism was considered reckless, yet it reflected his deep-seated beliefs. An avid reader, Ishiwara immersed himself in a wide range of subjects, including politics, religion, history, and philosophy, revealing a restless and inquisitive mind. His unconventional behavior and intellectual pursuits garnered attention from his peers, many of whom regarded him as a brilliant thinker. While military personnel are typically required to study military history, few pursue it with the same fervor as Ishiwara. He developed a profound obsession with understanding military history beyond the standard curriculum. His critical examination of the Russo-Japanese War led him to conclude that Japan's victory was largely a matter of luck. He believed that Japan had adopted the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but the sheer size of Russia made it impossible to defeat them swiftly. Ishiwara posited that had Russia been better prepared, Japan would likely have faced defeat, and it was only through a unique set of circumstances that Japan avoided a protracted conflict. This realization prompted Ishiwara to advocate for a significant shift in Japan's defense planning, emphasizing the need to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. His studies extended to World War I, where he critically analyzed the distinctions between short and prolonged conflicts. He recognized that extended wars often evolved into total wars, where political, economic, and social factors became as crucial as military strategy. This line of thinking led him to categorize wars into two types: “kessenteki senso” (decisive war) and “jizokuteki senso” (continuous war). Ishiwara viewed these categories as part of a cyclical pattern throughout history, with each type influencing the other in a dynamic interplay. During his time in Germany, Ishiwara immersed himself in the study of prominent military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Hans Delbrück. He found himself particularly captivated by Delbrück's concepts of Niederwerfungstrategie, or "strategy of annihilation," which emphasizes the importance of achieving victory through decisive battles, and Ermattungsstrategie, meaning "strategy of exhaustion," which focuses on wearing down the enemy over time. These theories resonated deeply with Ishiwara, as he recognized parallels between his own ideas and the insights presented in these influential works. This realization prompted him to analyze historical conflicts, viewing the Napoleonic Wars as the quintessential example of annihilation warfare, while interpreting the campaigns of Frederick the Great as emblematic of exhaustion warfare. As Ishiwara advanced in his studies, he became increasingly convinced, much like many of his contemporaries, that Japan and the United States were inevitably on a collision course toward war, driven by conflicting power dynamics and ideological differences. He anticipated that such a conflict would not be swift but rather a drawn-out struggle characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, this led him to grapple with a pressing dilemma: how could Japan effectively prepare for a prolonged war when its natural resources were evidently insufficient to sustain such an endeavor? This predicament prompted him to rethink the broader context of Asia. Ishiwara held a strong belief that Asia was a distinct entity, fundamentally different from the West, and he envisioned a future where Asian nations would liberate themselves and unite in solidarity. His enthusiasm was particularly ignited during the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, while he was a young cadet stationed in Korea. The prospect of China revitalizing itself filled him with hope. However, his later experiences in China led to a profound disillusionment. Throughout the 1920s, he encountered rampant banditry, conflicts during the warlord era, and pervasive chaos and disorder. The widespread poverty and instability he witnessed shattered his earlier optimistic vision of China's potential for progress and reform, leaving him with a more sobering understanding of the challenges facing the region. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite his profound disappointment with the political issues plaguing China, he was equally appalled by the way his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese people. He vividly recalled feelings of shame when he witnessed fellow colleagues in Hankow disembarking from rickshaws and carelessly tossing coins at the feet of the rickshaw pullers. This behavior struck him as not only disrespectful but also indicative of a broader attitude of racial superiority that he believed needed to be addressed. He frequently expressed in his writings that the Japanese needed to abandon their feelings of racial superiority. Ironically, he often juxtaposed this belief with his conviction that Japan had a duty to guide nations like China toward their rightful destiny. While he advocated for racial equality between Japan and China, he held a markedly different view regarding China's political landscape. Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that China required significant reform and modernization, which he felt Japan was uniquely positioned to facilitate. To Ishiwara, the pressing issue was that if Japan did not assist China in its development, Western powers would aggressively intervene, further subjugating the nation. He viewed Japan's role as one of liberation for China, rather than domination. Additionally, Ishiwara connected the impending conflict between Japan and the United States to the broader dynamics of Japan-China relations, suggesting that the outcome of this war would significantly impact the future interactions between the two nations. Ishiwara, like many Japanese military officers of his time, subscribed to the concept of Kokutai, a complex and multifaceted cultural phenomenon that served as a spiritual driving force within the Japanese military. The Kokutai can be understood as the essence of Japan's national character. Japan operated as a constitutional monarchy, embodying both the Kokutai (the national body or character) and Seitai (the governmental structure). This duality created a unique ideological framework: one aspect emphasized the traditional reverence for the emperor, while the other focused on the official government apparatus.   To simplify this intricate relationship, one might say, “Japan is governed simultaneously by the emperor and the government.” However, this characterization is inherently confusing, as it encapsulates a significant contradiction. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution stated, “The emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet.” This provision suggests the existence of an absolute monarch who is nonetheless expected to heed the advice of democratically elected representatives, creating a paradox that would contribute to the tensions leading to the Pacific War. A critical issue that arose from this constitutional framework was that the military was explicitly stated to be under the control of the emperor, rather than the political diet. Consequently, many military leaders perceived themselves as being beholden to the Kokutai, an ideology that evolved significantly from the Meiji era into the Showa era. For instance, consider a high-ranking military officer who views the political elite as corrupt individuals who have effectively taken the emperor hostage, acting against his will and, by extension, against the will of the Japanese people. Such a perspective could lead to radical actions, including attempts to overthrow the government to restore what they believed to be the rightful authority of the emperor. This ideological conflict presents a fascinating and complex rabbit hole that merits further exploration. Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. Ishiwara grappled with a profound question: how could the concept of Kokutai—the national essence of Japan—be relevant beyond the borders of Japan? He pondered how its significance could extend beyond the specific national interests of Japan. If a Japanese soldier were to lay down his life for the Kokutai, what meaning would that sacrifice hold for individuals of different races and nationalities? Furthermore, he sought to understand how the Kokutai's universal value could be connected to other ideologies outside Japan. In his quest for answers, Ishiwara turned to Nichiren Buddhism. This spiritual framework allowed him to weave together his thoughts on warfare, historical narratives, and the national purpose of Japan. Interestingly, Ishiwara did not come from a religious background; he had briefly explored Christianity but did not pursue it further. Similarly, Shintoism did not fully resonate with his beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism, however, presented a compelling alternative. It is characterized by a strong sense of patriotism and an apocalyptic vision, positioning itself as a holy mission intended for all of humanity, with Japan at its center. This belief system embodies a quasi-ideology of world regeneration, casting Japan as a moral leader destined to guide others. Given this context, it is easy to see how the Kokutai and Nichiren Buddhism complemented each other seamlessly. By leveraging the principles of Nichiren Buddhism, Ishiwara envisioned a way to elevate the Kokutai from a strictly nationalistic doctrine to a more universal ideology that could resonate globally. His introduction to these ideas came through Tanaka Chigaku, a prominent figure in the Kokuchukai, or "National Pillar Society," which was a nationalist organization rooted in Nichiren Buddhism and based in Tokyo. This connection provided Ishiwara with a framework to articulate a vision of Japan that transcended its geographical boundaries, linking the Kokutai to a broader, more inclusive mission. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith's view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism. One element of Kokuchukai's Nichirenism that strongly attracted Ishiwara was its aggressive passages. He justified much of Japan's military actions on the Asian continent by drawing parallels to Nichiren's concept of wielding the sword to uphold righteousness. He frequently quoted Nichiren's assertion that “the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law.” Ishiwara became deeply immersed in Nichiren's teachings and came to believe in its prophecy of a “Zendai mimon no dai toso,” or a titanic world conflict unprecedented in human history, akin to a global Armageddon. Following this conflict, he envisioned a period of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law.” While in Germany, Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the U.S. emerged victorious, the kokutai would be obliterated. He traveled back to Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, stopping in Harbin, where he met with Nichiren followers. He shared his thoughts on a “final war,” asserting that it would arise from religious prophecy and his military analysis. He cautioned that Japan must prepare for this impending conflict, declaring that “the final war is fast approaching.” Upon returning to Japan in 1925, he was filled with determination to lecture at the Army Staff College about this final war. His audience consisted of the army's promising young officers, to whom he taught about Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke, World War I, and, of course, his insights on the looming conflict. The Army Staff College repeatedly requested him to expand his lectures due to their popularity. In 1927, he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan's Present and Future National Defense,” in which he discussed the inevitable war between the U.S. and Japan. This essay garnered significant attention from his colleagues. Later, in April 1931, he briefed his fellow Kwantung officers using this essay, advocating for decisive action on the Asian mainland. In 1928, he was scheduled to give another course on European warfare, but he contracted influenza and had to take a leave of absence. As he was recovering, he developed tympanitis in his ear, which required a six-month hospitalization. This was just one of many health issues that would affect him over time. Eventually, he became involved in an elite study group focused on war theories, led by Major Suzuki. This group included young reformist officers who discussed political and military matters. He continued his work on the concept of total war and ultimately wrote “Sensoshi taikan / General Outline of the History of War,” which he presented as a lecture to Kwantung officers in Changch'un, Manchuria, on July 4, 1929. The work underwent revisions in 1931 and 1938 and was published as a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.  The 1930s were a particularly tense period for Japan. The Japanese leadership perceived Marxism as a pervasive threat, believing it was undermining the nation. Many liberal voices argued that the military budget was excessive and called for cuts. To Ishiwara, this was madness; he questioned how Japan could afford to disarm. While Marxists claimed that communism would rescue Japan, liberals argued that true democracy was the answer. In contrast, Ishiwara and many in the military believed that the Kokutai would be Japan's salvation. Ishiwara advocated his final theories of warfare, asserting that the impending apocalypse would not lead to an American synthesis, but rather a decisive victory for the Japanese Kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren's titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”. From the outset of his initial theories, Ishiwara was convinced that the final war would be characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, World War I and the advancements of the 1920s introduced new technologies like tanks, poison gas, and airplanes. The airplane, in particular, led Ishiwara to believe that the defensive stalemate observed in World War I was nearing its end. He argued that airpower could deliver bomb loads beyond all known defenses, including naval surface units, fortifications, and armies equipped with automatic weapons. Ishiwara predicted that the final war would unleash unimaginable horrors on the world's greatest cities. Cities like London, Shanghai, Paris, and even Tokyo could be devastated within a single day of the outbreak of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”. Ishiwara contended that Japan should exert direct or indirect control over Manchuria and, to a lesser extent, certain regions of China. He claimed that Japan had a moral responsibility to the Asian continent and a unique connection to Manchuria and China. He emphasized the need to stabilize China, as its people faced threats from chaos, corruption, and conflict. Ishiwara argued that Japan would ultimately need to take a more proactive role in stabilizing China, especially in Manchuria, for the sake of peace and the well-being of the Chinese population. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.  In 1931, he started advocating for reforms in China, suggesting that it would be beneficial for the country to accept guidance from Japan. He viewed China as Japan's most important ally in the event of a conflict with the United States. He argued that Japan should make every effort to avoid getting involved in a war with China and should strive to prevent any actions that might provoke such a situation. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China's understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly. Let's delve into the historical landscape of Manchuria during the late 1920s, a period marked by intense geopolitical maneuvering among Russia, China, and Japan. The region found itself caught in a complex struggle for dominance, exacerbated by the fragmentation of Chinese authority due to rampant warlordism. This instability effectively severed Manchuria's ties to the rest of China, creating an opportunity for Japan to solidify and expand its influence. The situation in Manchuria, often referred to as the "Manchurian Problem," revolved around a pivotal question for Japanese policymakers: How could Japan consolidate its hold over Manchuria and further its interests in the face of an increasingly assertive China? Japan identified three primary strategies to address this challenge: Control of the South Manchuria Railway: Securing this vital transportation artery would grant Japan significant leverage over southern Manchuria. However, this strategy was fraught with complications, as it necessitated ongoing confrontations with Chinese political forces that opposed Japanese dominance. Utilization of the Kwantung Army: This military force stationed in Manchuria was crucial for projecting Japanese power. Members of the Kwantung Army were particularly concerned about the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek, which threatened the stability of their ally, Zhang Zuolin, known as the "Tiger of Manchuria." While Zhang had been cooperative and acted in Japan's interests, his support could not be guaranteed indefinitely. Japanese Colonization: This approach involved encouraging Japanese settlers to move into Manchuria, thereby establishing a demographic presence that could help legitimize Japan's claims to the territory. This method, often likened to a “filibuster,” aimed to create a Japanese cultural and economic foothold in the region. Each of these strategies presented distinct pathways forward, each with its own implications for the future of Manchuria and its relationship with China. The Kwantung Army, in particular, was increasingly alarmed by the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment as the Northern Expedition advanced northward. The army viewed Manchuria not only as a territory of strategic interest but also as a crucial buffer against the Soviet Union. The growing instability posed by Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the potential loss of influence over Zhang Zuolin were significant threats that needed to be addressed. Ultimately, many within the Kwantung Army believed that the only viable solution to secure Japan's interests in Manchuria would be to formally detach the region from China, a move that would likely require military intervention. This belief underscored the precarious balance of power in Manchuria during this tumultuous period and foreshadowed the escalating conflicts that would shape the region's future. In June 1927, senior officers of the Kwantung Army were summoned to a crucial meeting convened by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The primary objective of this gathering was to establish Japan's strategic policy regarding China and Manchuria. Within the ranks of the Kwantung Army, a more radical faction led by Colonel Komoto Daisaku was determined to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, who had increasingly become perceived as a significant barrier to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. This faction's resolve culminated in the assassination of Zhang Zuolin in 1928, an event infamously known as the Huanggutun Incident, where a bomb was placed on the train tracks to ensure his demise. However, the outcome of this assassination did not unfold as the Kwantung Army officers had anticipated. Instead of the anticipated rise of their chosen puppet leader, General Yang Yuting, control of Manchuria fell to Zhang Zuolin's son, Zhang Xueliang. Unsurprisingly, Zhang Xueliang was deeply angered by the murder of his father and was far from compliant with Japanese interests. Consequently, the Kwantung Army found itself in a precarious position, as their aggressive policies in Manchuria backfired, leading to a situation that was even more unfavorable than before. The investigation into the assassination was notably half-hearted, resulting in the dismissal of Colonel Komoto from his position. This political fallout also led to the collapse of Tanaka's cabinet, leaving the Kwantung Army feeling both embarrassed and enraged over their diminished influence in Manchuria. The Japanese colonists residing in Manchuria, feeling increasingly threatened, began to call upon the Kwantung Army for protection against Chinese nationalists who sought to expel them from the region. In this climate of uncertainty, the Kwantung Army was left scrambling for strategies to detach Manchuria from Chinese control. In 1928, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara was consulted extensively by Kwantung officers regarding his perspectives on the Manchurian situation. Although he had not yet fully developed his Final War theory at this time, he articulated the fundamental principles behind it, emphasizing the urgent need for decisive action to assert control over Manchuria. Over the following years, Kwantung officers made concerted efforts to shape policy in favor of their interests in Manchuria, with Ishiwara's ideas gaining traction and stimulating discussions among his high-ranking peers. By October 1928, Ishiwara successfully secured a position on the Kwantung Army staff as an operations officer, with Colonel Komoto Daisaku as his primary supporter. Komoto recognized Ishiwara as the dynamic force needed to advance the aggressive Manchurian policies that the Kwantung Army sought to implement. This collaboration marked a significant turning point in the Kwantung Army's approach to Manchuria, as they aimed to solidify their control and influence in the region amidst growing tensions. When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he encountered a chaotic and demoralized atmosphere at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. This turmoil was largely a consequence of the disastrous bombing of Zhang Zuolin, which had resulted in significant operational failures. The investigation into this assassination triggered numerous changes within the Kwantung Army's leadership, many of which were quite restrictive and stifling. Despite the catastrophic impact of the Zhang Zuolin incident on Komoto's career, he continued to advocate for a forceful resolution to the escalating Manchurian crisis. Ishiwara appeared to share this perspective, and during the early months of 1929, he collaborated closely with Komoto to devise military operations aimed at countering Chinese forces in the Mukden region. However, by the spring of 1929, Komoto's position became increasingly precarious, leading to his official dismissal. By May, he had been reassigned to a relatively insignificant divisional post in Japan, and by June, he was completely removed from the army. Nevertheless, this did not signify the end of his influence over Manchurian affairs. His successor was Lieutenant Colonel Itagaki Seishiro, a longtime associate of Ishiwara from their days at the Sendai Military Preparatory School. This connection suggested that while Komoto may have been sidelined, the strategic direction in Manchuria would continue to be shaped by familiar faces and longstanding relationships. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A young, brilliant but perhaps insane man named Ishiwara Kanji began a fruitful military career. After spending considerable time in China, Ishiwara came to a dramatic conclusion, China needed to be saved, and to do so Japan needed to invade Manchuria. He began lecturing like minded youth and built a cult following, directing Japan towards war with China.  

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 8. The Great Contemplation and Insight of Tien-Tai Buddhism authored by Zhiyi or Chi-hi, and further extended and developed for our modern practice by Nichiren. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 7. The Five Periods and the Eight Teachings. We can gain a depth of understanding of Nichiren's insights and doctrinal basis. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 5. The One Vehicle, the One Buddha Vehicle, the Lotus Sutra as defined in the Immeasurable Meanings Prologue Sutra. These fundamentals of Zhiyi figure prominently in Nichiren. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 2. The lineage of teachings are discussed in this series on the importance of Zhiyi and the Tien-Tai school of Lotus Sutra practice for our doctrines of Nichiren in this modern era. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Tien-Tai – Part 1. We begin a short series on the importance of Zhiyi and the Tien-Tai school of Lotus Sutra practice for our doctrines of Nichiren in this modern era. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – The Three Periods of the Dharma. A discussion illuminating the stages of enlightenment teachings leading to the Later Age and the doctrines of Nichiren. “Buddhism Reference” – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Bright on Buddhism - Episode 93 - What is Risshō Kōsei Kai? What are its doctrinal roots? What are its historical origins? Resources: Anderson, Richard W. (1994). "Risshō Kōseikai and the Bodhisattva way: Religious ideals, conflict, gender, and status". Japanese Journal of Religious Studies. 21 (2–3): 312–337. doi:10.18874/jjrs.21.2-3.1994.311-337.; Gerlitz, Peter, "Die Rissho Kosei-kai und ihre Assimilation im Westen", in: Michael Pye, Renate Stegerhoff (eds.), Religion in fremder Kultur. Religion als Minderheit in Europa und Asien, Saarbruecken: Dadder 1987, pp. 111–122; Gerlitz, Peter (1975). "Kathartische und therapeutische Elemente in der Seelsorge der Risshō Kosei-kai." Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 27 (4), 346-356; Inaba, Keishin; in: Clarke, Peter B. (2006). Encyclopedia of new religious movements, New York : Routledge. ISBN 0415267072, pp. 539–540; Kisala, Robert (1994). Contemporary Karma: Interpretations of Karma in Tenrikyō and Risshō Kōseikai, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 21 (1), 73-91; Kyoden Sutra Readings: Extracts from the Threefold Lotus Sutra, Romanized Japanese and English Translation, Risshō Kōsei Kai 1994; Stewart Guthrie: A Japanese New Religion: Rissho Kosei-Kai in a Mountain Hamlet (Michigan Monograph Series in Japanese Studies), Univ of Michigan 1988. ISBN 0939512335; Kato, Bunno (1993). The Threefold Lotus Sutra. Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Company. p. 348. ISBN 4333002087. PDF; Morioka, Kiyomi (1979). The Institutionalization of a New Religious Movement, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 6 (1/2), 239-280; Morioka, Kiyomi (1994). Attacks on the New Religions: Risshō Kōseikai and the “Yomiuri Affair, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 21 (2-3), 281-310; Niwano, Nikkyō (1976), Buddhism For Today: A Modern Interpretation of the Threefold Lotus Sutra, Tokyo: Kōsei Publishing Co., ISBN 4333002702 PDF; Stone, Jaquelin (2003). "Nichiren's Activist Heirs: Soka Gakkai, Rissho Koseikai, Nipponzan Myohoji", in Christopher Queen et al., "Action Dharma, New Studies in Engaged Buddhism", RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 63–94; Watanabe, Eimi (1968). Risshō Kōsei-Kai: A Sociological Observation of Its Members, Their Conversion and Their Activities. Contemporary Religions in Japan 9 (1/2), 75-151 Do you have a question about Buddhism that you'd like us to discuss? Let us know by tweeting to us @BrightBuddhism, emailing us at Bright.On.Buddhism@gmail.com, or joining us on our discord server, Hidden Sangha ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://discord.gg/tEwcVpu⁠⁠⁠⁠! Credits: Nick Bright: Script, Cover Art, Music, Voice of Hearer, Co-Host Proven Paradox: Editing, mixing and mastering, social media, Voice of Hermit, Co-Host

This hour, we listen back to conversations with people who think a lot about religion— both their own experiences and how it impacts society. NPR National Political Correspondent Sarah McCammon grew up in Kansas City as an Evangelical. Her book, The Exvangelicals - Loving, Living, and Leaving the White Evangelical Church tells her story and the story of others who felt disenchanted by the movement and walked away. Three Gen Z-ers talk about their relationship with religion and spirituality. Later in the show, we'll hear from Myokei Caine-Barrett, Shonin. She's the first person of African-American and Japanese descent—and the only American woman—to be fully ordained as a Buddhist priest in the Nichiren lineage. GUESTS: Sarah McCammon: NPR National Political Correspondent and author of The Exvangelicals - Loving, Living, and Leaving the White Evangelical Church Myokei Caine Barrett, Shonin: Resident Priest of Myoken-Ji Temple in Houston This episode originally aired on April 3, 2024. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

3 Kinds of Practice. Nichiren gives us advice for steadfastness in our practice in the Gosho, “Daimoku of the Lotus Sutra”. http://threefoldlotus.com/study/ThreeKindsPractice.pdf E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Non-Origination. An early teaching term used often to equate ideas of emptiness, the void, self/not-self to “Destiny” or karma as immutable. Nichiren and the Lotus directly confront and destroy this idea with the invocation of the Engine of Life to alter, to influence all karma by our actions. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

It isn't always easy to believe you can make a change. Immaculate Mutebi, of New York City, has challenged that disbelief many times. In today's episode, we discuss how chanting Nam-myoho-renge-kyo helped her use obstacles in her family, workplace and housing to deepen her conviction in the power of her life. References:On Attaining Buddhahood in This Lifetime: SGI President Ikeda's Lecture Series, p. 38.A Foundation for Your Life: Essentials of Nichiren's Writings for Young Women, p.198.Discussions on Youth, pp. 298–99. Cheat Sheet:03:58 Immaculate joins her first Buddhist meeting09:41 Chanting Nam-myoho-renge-kyo for an impossible family goal19:28 Feeling dis-empowered to change her work environment27:45 A Buddhist friend reminds Immaculate of her potential36:48 Finding her dream apartment

Buddhism Reference – GoHonzon, again. An important distinction to know in our modern understanding of Buddhist scholarship of Nichiren and the Lotus Sutra. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Earthly Desires. The starting block of reasoning leading to Nichiren's doctrine of “Earthly Desires are Enlightenment” as discussed in his writings and teachings. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Dhuta. For Lotus Sutra Mahayana practitioners, this directly equates to Nichiren's teaching of the “Earthly Desires become Enlightenment”, when we take our carnal cravings to our mandala of GoHonzon to invoke our Buddha mind. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Buddhism Reference – Dengyo. An important figure in the lineage of Nichiren's study and Japanese history of Lotus Sutra propagation and scholarship. E-books - “Buddhism Reference – Now Available   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

TLK Lotus Sutra - part 40 – Bodhisattvas Spring Up from Beneath the Earth. Maitreya finally asks the ultimate question. And this brings Shakyamuni to the centrally foundational point of the Dharma as developed by Nichiren throughout his doctrine. E-books – “Threefold Lotus Dharma Sutra”   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

TLK Lotus Sutra - part 33 – Apparition of the Jeweled Stupa. This is the ceremony that Nichiren captures in the mandala of the bequeathing of the teaching of the Law. E-books – “Threefold Lotus Dharma Sutra” –  Artist's Proof   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Chanting – How To – What did Nichiren mean when he wrote on “Earthly Desires”? E-books - “Buddhism Reference Volume 2” – TBA   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

TLK Lotus Sutra - part 1 – In my annotated and transliteration of the Threefold Lotus Sutra I have written many annotations and language corrections to clarify meaning and integrate Nichiren's scholarship and Doctrine for our modern practice, confidence, and insights. E-books – “Threefold Lotus Dharma Sutra” –  Artist's Proof   Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

Hurvitz–Lotus Sutra–part 30. Apparition of the Jeweled Stupa. This chapter explores and defines the revolutionary idea and embodiment of Buddhahood in one's present flesh and blood five-foot body. Nichiren captures this chapter in his representation of the mandala of GoHonzon. E-books - “Buddhism Reference Volume 2” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

A medium paced recitation of all three sections of Nichiren described abbreviated practice of recitation. The three levels of practice are Comprehensive practice; reciting the entire sutra with Daimoku; the Abbreviated practice of the three sections or two chapters of the Hoben(2nd) and Juryo (16th) with Daimoku, and the Essential practice of the Daimoku alone.  

Buddha and Hell. SHORT. A Nichiren quote from his writings on the location of Buddha and Hell as within the human sentient mind. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm How to use this study resource :  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suIQ89Nc3BU Buddhism resources : threefoldlotus.com    www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon  www.cafepress.com/gohonzon PayPal.me/sifusylvain Patreon.com/TLK instagram.com/sylvainchamberlain/

Resolve Alone. SHORT. A Nichiren quote from his writings on the attitude and Intent of chanting the Daimoku. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm How to use this study resource :  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suIQ89Nc3BU Buddhism resources : threefoldlotus.com    www.lulu.com/spotlight/kwoon  www.cafepress.com/gohonzon PayPal.me/sifusylvain Patreon.com/TLK instagram.com/sylvainchamberlain/

This week: the advent of the medieval era brings with it new strands of Buddhism that will radically remake the image of the religion from an aristocratic faith to a distinctly Japanese one. So, how do the wildly different beliefs of Zen, Pure Land, and Nichiren Buddhism all grow out of the same moment in religious history? Show notes here. 

Author and travel-writer Angus Waycott talks about his  8-day walk around Sado Island off Niigata Prefecture in the Japan Sea. He gives us in-depth accounts of: a mujina (tanuki-worshipping) cult, funa-ema (literally "ship horse pictures"), exile (including those of Zeami and Buddhist priest Nichiren), and the controversy behind the Kinzan gold mine and its "slave labor," all topics that he recorded in his book Sado: Japan's Island in Exile, originally published by Stone Bridge Press in 1996 and re-issued as an e-book by the author 2012 and 2023.Book Description: "Given the choice, no-one ever went to Sado. For more than a thousand years, this island in the Sea of Japan was a place of exile for the deposed, disgraced or just plain distrusted — ex-emperors, aristocrats, poets, priests and convicted criminals alike. This book rediscovers the exiles' island, explores the truth about its notorious gold mine, tracks down a vanishing badger cult, and drops in on the home of super-drummer band Kodo. Along the way, it paints a vivid picture of one of Japan's most intriguing backwaters, now emerging from a long exile of its own."About the AuthorAngus Waycott is an author and travel writer whose books have been published in the UK, USA, Japan and the Netherlands. He has been the voice of TV news broadcasts, commercials, and award-winning documentaries, voiced "character" parts in game software and anime productions, and worked as a copywriter, publisher, teacher, translator, lighting designer, and staircase builder. His books are Sado: Japan's Isand in Exile, Paper Doors: Japan from Scratch (2012), The Winterborne Journey: along a small crack in the planet (2023), and National Parks of Western Europe (2012). Check out his short video on Sado Island.The Books on Asia Podcast is sponsored by Stone Bridge Press. Check out their books on Japan at the publisher's website. Amy Chavez, podcast host, is author of Amy's Guide to Best Behavior in Japan and The Widow, the Priest, and the Octopus Hunter: Discovering a Lost Way of Life on a Secluded Japanese Island.Subscribe to the Books on Asia podcast.

Buddhism Reference Volume 2 - Ceremony in the Sky, is a visualization of our practice with the Nichiren mandala to open our GoHonzon mind to experience Buddha. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

BDK – Lotus Sutra – part 37. Nichiren's favorite chapter of the Lotus, “The Lifespan of the Tathagata” is a major transitional teaching of self-Enlightenment from Shakyamuni to all sentient beings. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

BDK – Lotus Sutra – part 28. The Seven (7) Jeweled Stupa. This is the chapter that Nichiren envisions the mandala of GoHonzon, the perfect mirror of the MyoHoRenGeKyo to reflect our entry into the Buddha experience. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

BDK – Lotus Sutra – part 27. The jeweled stupa. This is the chapter that Nichiren envisions the mandala of GoHonzon, the perfect mirror of the MyoHoRenGeKyo to reflect our entry into the Buddha experience. E-books - “Buddhism Reference” - available at  Threefoldlotus.com/home/Ebooks.htm

When Tina Turner, often dubbed the “Queen of Rock ‘N' Roll,” died at her home in Küsnacht, Switzerland, on May 24, 2023, what many did not know is that Ms. Turner had practiced Soka Gakkai International Nichiren Buddhism for the last 50 years. Nichiren taught that chanting the title of this scripture in the form of the mantralike phrase “Nam-myoho-renge-kyo” was the way for all people to reveal their inherent potential for awakening and attain buddhahood. Turner explained: “As I began studying Buddhist teachings and chanting more, it led me to take responsibility for my life and to base my choices on wisdom, courage, and compassion. Not long after I started chanting, I began to see that the power I needed to change my life was already within me.” Russell had proposed titling this episode “Big Wheel Keeps on Turnin' with Dr. Ralph Craig” but this title works better as our guest today is the the eminent author of a new spiritual biography of Tina Turner. So it is with great humility and delight that we sat down and discussed all things yoga, growing up Louisiana, and Mick Jagger's appropriation of Ms. Turner's Dance Moves. “Moves like Tina Turner” should have been the damn song, but alas, yet again our African American progenitors miss out on their due. But not today, Lord! We're talking Ashtanga yoga, philosophy, and the importance of discipline in attaining true wisdom from your spiritual practice. This is basically a class in history, philosophy, Sanskrit and culture all wrapped up into one delicious conversation that we know will enrich your lives! Our guest, Dr. Ralph H. Craig III received his BA in Theological Studies at Loyola Marymount University, where his studies included comparative theology and Yoga Studies. He received his Ph.D. in Religious Studies from Stanford University, where he specialized in Buddhist Studies and in American Religions. His dissertation explored medieval representations of Buddhist preachers across South Asian Buddhist literature. He is also the author of Dancing In My Dreams: A Spiritual Biography of Tina Turner, which will be released in November 7, 2023 by Eerdmans Press in the Library of Religious Biography Series. Other interests include philosophy, metaphysical religion, religious experience, African American religious history, and religion and popular culture. Be sure to order your copy of Dancing in My Dreams! LEARN MORE ABOUT RALPH CRAIG III INSTAGRAM I PRE-ORDER DANCING IN MY DREAMS I LINKEDIN I FACEBOOK A big heart of thanks to our friends, family, and students from around the world, who've generously supported this podcast through your comments, sharing, and financial donations. If you've enjoyed today's podcast, please consider supporting our future episodes by making a donation. Every little bit goes a long way and we are immensely grateful for any and all of your support. ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠   Make A Donation ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠- ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠harmonyslater.com/donate⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ❤ Don't forget to subscribe and leave a review!  ❤  Give us a 5★ rating! Opening and closing music by Nick Evans from his album “for Morgan.” Listen to the entire album on Spotify ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Here⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Purchase your own copy ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Here⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠.

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 1st October 2023. Tonights show is the Tenth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and myself. Tonight we talk about Nichirens exile to Sado Island. We also discuss: Going to Sado Island was not a one way trip, Nichiren's disciples travelled back and forth Our practice to the Gohonzon mandala is the eternal return of the Ceremony in the Air Kankenki drawings of 1254 Without Honen there may not have been Nichiren Sado is where Nichiren starts to cast off his chrysalis and become a butterfly and at Minobu begins to fly Nichirens famous writings on Sado Island, The True Object of Worship and The Opening of the Eyes are extant and clarified so much of Nichiren's teachings We can question whether Nichiren was sent to Sado to die, that might not be true! Japan is unlike Europe, its natural disasters have meant that nothing about Japan has remained the same physically  You can purchase Luigi's books here

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 16 September 2023. Tonights show is the ninth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and myself. Tonight we talk about Nichirens travels to Kamakura, the Komatsubara battle and the Izu Exile, looking for evidence and embracing believers in his mandala signature. You can purchase Luigi's books here

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 7 August 2023 Tonights show begins with a bit of context and then continues with the eighth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and Myself. Please send questions to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com.  You can purchase Luigi's books here

"A sword is useless in the hands of a coward.....", as Nichiren says. Whether you are a “cowardly lion” who suffers from anxiety or a “brave warrior” who can bust down a door, courage is a necessary tool to move forward in life. Not all of us have courage in all areas of life. It comes in many different forms as outlined by these 8 types of courage. Which one(s) do you possess and which one(s) do you you lack? Only YOU can answer that question. Email the show: ⁠⁠⁠rockyourlife@thevignatis.com⁠⁠⁠ Intro Song:  ⁠⁠⁠"GypsyRock'n'Roll" by The Vignatis⁠⁠⁠ Outro Song: ⁠⁠⁠“Red, White & Blue” by The Vignatis

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 26 March 2023 Tonights show is the seventh in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and Myself. Please send questions to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com.  You can purchase Luigi's books here

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 20 February 2023 Tonights show is the sixth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and Myself. Please send questions to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com.  You can purchase Luigi's books here

Welcome to A Buddhist Podcast for 11 December Tonights show is the fifth in a series of dialogues on the Gohonzon between Luigi Finocchiaro, Peter Morris and Myself. Please send questions to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com.  You can purchase Luigi's books here

Welcome to the show, thank you for taking the time to download and listen to this podcast about Nichiren Buddhism. Tonight we have the fourth in a series of dialogues about the Gohonzon. I'm delighted to have as my guests, Peter Morris from the Philippines and Luigi Finocchiaro from Japan. Please send any questions you have for us to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com and we will do our best to answer them on the show.  Have a fabulous week You can find books by Luigi Finocchiaro at Lulu.com - Search for Nichiren Mandala Study Workshop. Some are also available in Italian.

Welcome to the show, thank you for taking the time to download and listen to this podcast about Nichiren Buddhism. Tonight we have the third in a series of dialogues about the Gohonzon. I'm delighted to have as my guests, Peter Morris from the Philippines and Luigi Finocchiaro from Japan. Please send any questions you have for us to @jasonjarrett on twitter.com and we will do our best to answer them on the show.  Have a fabulous week You can find books by Luigi Finocchiaro at Lulu.com - Search for Nichiren Mandala Study Workshop. Some are also available in Italian.