Podcasts about american b

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  7/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  1/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 Tokyo https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  2/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 Tokyo https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  3/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 TOKYO https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  4/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 TOKYO https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  5/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1945 FUKUYAMA https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR? 6/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1944 https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

HOW  DOES THE FIRBOMBING OF TOKYO'S POOREST NEIGHBORSHOOD WIN A WAR?  8/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  1944 WICHITA B-29 https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date.

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   5/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1945 B-29 CRASH SURVIVOR

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   8/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1946

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   7/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1945

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   6/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1945

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   1/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1941

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:  4/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1945 B-29

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   3/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. 1941 ARIZONA AFTER ATTACK

WHAT PEARL HARBOR WROUGHT 1192 DAYS LATER:   2/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” James M. Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. OCTOBER 1941 PEARL HARBOR

Last time we spoke about the battle of Ormoc Bay. Amid the fierce Battle of Leyte in November 1944, American and Japanese forces clashed across rugged terrains and stormy weather. A typhoon swept the island, halting supply lines, while Colonel Verbeck's forces launched a determined assault on Breakneck Ridge, advancing against Colonel Miyauchi's well-defended lines. Meanwhile, Japanese reinforcements suffered devastating losses from American air raids. Through relentless attacks and strategic maneuvers, the Americans gained ground, signalling the turning point toward Japanese retreat and Allied victory on Leyte. Meanwhile a Japanese convoy led by Rear-Admiral Sato suffered devastating losses to Allied submarines and air attacks while attempting to transport troops. Concurrently, Australian and American forces launched aggressive operations in New Guinea, and American B-29 Superfortresses, despite some challenges, intensified the bombing campaign against Japan. This episode is the Fall of Peleliu Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In our previous update, General Gill's 32nd Division had arrived to relieve the exhausted 24th Division and take charge of the main offensive down the Ormoc Valley. During this lull in the battle, General Kataoka took advantage of the pause to reposition his 1st Division and ordered Colonel Miyauchi's 57th Regiment to counterattack toward Breakneck Ridge. The counterattack had limited success, ultimately leaving the 57th Regiment significantly weakened. On November 16, Colonel John Hettinger's 128th Regiment moved in to relieve the 21st Regiment at Breakneck Ridge but was unable to capture Corkscrew Ridge following a fierce battle. Simultaneously, General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry was deployed to secure and patrol the Mount Minoro area, while Colonel Clifford's reinforced 1st Battalion advanced to Kilay Ridge behind Japanese lines, where it faced artillery fire and unsuccessfully attempted to link up with Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion roadblock on Highway 2. To the south, the 32nd Regiment moved toward Baybay to launch a second push toward Ormoc, initiating an advance north to the Damulaan-Caridad area on November 14. Meanwhile, General Yamagata's 26th Division, including Colonel Saito Jiro's 13th Independent Regiment, advanced in the same direction with plans to assault Burauen, setting up a confrontation with the American forces on Shoestring Ridge. By November 17, Hettinger's 1st Battalion had entrenched on the slopes of Corkscrew Ridge while the 3rd Battalion progressed roughly 1,000 yards down the highway, securing a ridge about 500 yards north of Limon. At the same time, Clifford's patrols finally made contact with Chapman's 2nd Battalion, but they struggled to establish a communication line due to the strong enemy presence between them. The following day, Clifford positioned machine guns for a firefight against the enemy on a ridge to the southeast. Throughout the night and into November 19, Japanese machine-gun fire targeted the perimeter, successfully disabling one gun and surrounding Clifford's southernmost outpost, eventually forcing the Americans to withdraw. Meanwhile, Hettinger's 1st Battalion launched another assault on Corkscrew Ridge on November 18, though it achieved only minor gains. Additionally, Colonel Kora Keijiro's 49th Regiment infiltrated the enemy's left flank, initiating a two-pronged advance toward Colasian and Capoocan, but this had limited impact on Gill's offensive. As a result, Hettinger's 1st Battalion continued its siege of Corkscrew Ridge until November 20, while the 3rd Battalion held positions on a ridge overlooking Limon. On November 20 and 21, Japanese forces also gained ground against Clifford's defenses on Kilay Ridge. At the same time, the 32nd Regiment had established a defensive stance on Shoestring Ridge, while the 13th Independent Regiment fortified the opposite ridge with trenches, machine-gun pits, and other installations, sending a reinforced battalion eastward toward Burauen. On November 22, the 11th Airborne Division arrived to relieve the 7th Division, which subsequently redeployed to the west coast. Gill resumed his offensive, sending Hettinger's 2nd and 3rd Battalions south while the 1st Battalion contained Corkscrew Ridge. The Americans fought their way to Limon, establishing defensive positions along a tributary of the Leyte River south of the town after repelling a fierce Japanese counterattack. Meanwhile, Japanese assaults intensified on Kilay Ridge, pushing back Clifford's troops, though they held firm. Fortunately, the Japanese did not press further on November 23, as Kataoka needed to reorganize his forces following the fall of Limon. To support the division's left flank along the Limon-Ormoc highway, he dispatched the 49th Regiment and his reserve battalion, coinciding with the arrival of the 1st Regiment to reinforce the heavily weakened 57th Regiment. However, the withdrawal of the 49th created a significant gap between the 1st and 102nd Divisions, which the 126th Regiment quickly exploited, advancing through the Hill 1525 area to strike at the enemy's rear. The 128th Regiment also took this time to realign and consolidate its positions, focusing the next three days on extensive patrols and placing harassing fire along an east-west ridge overlooking the highway about 1,000 yards south of Limon. Additionally, on November 24, the 112th Cavalry began advancing southwest from Mount Minoro toward the highway with a similar objective. With the occupation of Limon, the Battle of Breakneck Ridge concluded, costing the 24th and 32nd Divisions a total of 1,498 casualties, while the Japanese suffered an estimated 5,252 fatalities and had eight captured. The American victory was largely aided by the establishment of a roadblock south of Limon by Chapman's 2nd Battalion and the defense of Kilay Ridge in the Japanese rear by Clifford's battalion.  From November 12 to 23 the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment had defended the roadblock under extremely difficult conditions. The operations report of the 24th Division graphically summarizes the deeds for which the battalion received a presidential citation: “These bearded, mud caked soldiers came out of the mountains exhausted and hungry. Their feet were heavy, cheeks hollow, bodies emaciated, and eyes glazed. They had seen thirty-one comrades mortally wounded, watched fifty-five others lie suffering in muddy foxholes without adequate medical attention. Yet their morale had not changed. It was high when they went in and high when they came out. They were proud that they had rendered invaluable aid to the main forces fighting in Ormoc corridor, by disrupting the Japanese supply lines and preventing strong reinforcements from passing up the Ormoc road. They were proud that they had outfought the Emperor's toughest troops, troops that had been battle trained in Manchuria. They were certain they had killed at least 606 of the enemy and felt that their fire had accounted for many more. And they were proud that this had all been accomplished despite conditions of extreme hardship. 241 of the battalion's officers and enlisted men were hospitalized for skin disorders, foot ulcers, battle fatigue, and sheer exhaustion.” These units, facing constant fire and heavily outnumbered, prevented General Suzuki from reinforcing Limon. Abandoning a potential counteroffensive here, Suzuki redirected his primary efforts to the Burauen front for his Wa offensive. Despite Yamagata's preparations for combat, the effectiveness of the 26th Division depended heavily on acquiring more heavy weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Thus, a convoy with three transports and a submarine chaser departed Manila on November 23, carrying the essential supplies to Ormoc. As night fell over Shoestring Ridge, Saito finally launched his main offensive against the stretched defenses of the 32nd Regiment. Artillery, mortars, and machine guns provided cover for two companies advancing forward to capture sections of the ridge. The next morning, the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment reorganized its defensive positions, enabling the Americans to push back a Japanese force that had penetrated south of the Palanas River and east of Hill 918. Meanwhile, General Tominaga initiated a large-scale air offensive to support Operation TA's latest convoy, deploying sixty planes from the 2nd Air Division to strike the Leyte airfields, while thirty Navy aircraft targeted enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. Over the next four days, daily air attacks were conducted in the Leyte area, and the 7th Air Division carried out coordinated strikes against enemy bases on Morotai. However, on November 24, the convoy's transports were sunk by an air attack off Masbate Island, just as another convoy consisting of three transports and one destroyer was dispatched to Ormoc. This convoy was similarly destroyed the next day off Marinduque Island by carrier aircraft, resulting in a complete operational failure. Back in Leyte, on the night of November 24, Saito's troops launched another ferocious assault on enemy positions, beginning with the heaviest artillery barrage the 32nd Regiment had yet encountered. The Americans quickly responded with their own supporting weapons, effectively repelling repeated Japanese attacks. Only Company K was pushed back, but American artillery, mortars, and machine guns prevented the Japanese from exploiting this breakthrough. After failing to penetrate the front lines, Saito's troops desperately attempted to neutralize the artillery supporting the 32nd Regiment before ultimately retreating, allowing the defenders to regroup. By nightfall, the Japanese employed the same tactics as in their previous assault but were ultimately pushed back after a fierce grenade battle and some close-quarters fighting. At the same time, Kataoka's newly deployed reserve battalion launched an attack on Kilay Ridge during the night. However, the weary defenders were able to fend off the assault, resulting in casualties for both sides. After reinforcing Shoestring Ridge, the 32nd Regiment faced another attack on the night of November 26.  At 2100 Colonel Saito renewed the assault against the American position, following the pattern set by the previous night actions. The Japanese first laid down mortar and machine gun fire, and then heavy-weapons fire of the 13th Infantry Regiment hit the right platoons of Company G, shifting to the east in about fifteen minutes. Immediately afterward, about a battalion of Japanese infantry attacked Company G, while twelve machine guns started to fire from a ridge 1,200 yards to the east. The Japanese moved into the fire of their own heavy weapons. The 32d Infantry, using all of its artillery batteries, mortars, machine guns, and rifles, started throwing lead against the enemy force as fast as its men could load and fire. The Japanese, employing an estimated fifty machine guns, continued to come on. "All hell broke loose" as the enemy shot off flares to guide their own artillery fire. The sharp declivity in front of the American lines did not allow for a close concentration of friendly artillery fire. Just as it appeared that the lines were to be overrun, some more enemy flares went up, and the Japanese withdrew, covered by heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Colonel Finn, taking advantage of this fortunate circumstance, hastily rearranged riflemen to fill gaps caused by casualties and replenished his ammunition supplies. The mortars of the regiment continued to fire into the draw. After a short lull Colonel Saito renewed the attack. There was no preparatory artillery fire, but the mortars and machine guns introduced the assault. The attack did not seem as determined as the previous one, though the number of troops was apparently about the same. The 32d Infantry again called down all types of fire upon the enemy. Elements of the 13th Infantry Regiment continued to advance, although "the carnage was terriffic," and attempted to pass through the American lines. A strong enemy group moved into a bamboo grove on a nose in front of the center platoon of G Company. From this position the enemy launched an attack which the company resisted with grenades and bayonets. As Colonel Finn later reported: "The battle continued to flare up and die down as the valiant soldiers fought like devils to hold our lines." The 81-mm. mortars from the mortar platoon of H Company fired 650 rounds in five minutes, and fire from the 60-mm. mortars was "practically automatic." After an hour's intense fighting, the enemy force withdrew. Unbeknownst to the Americans, however, the left and center platoons of Company G fell back in confusion during the fight, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate the American lines in the bamboo thicket previously occupied by the center platoon. The Japanese had not attacked the left flank of Company G. These troops heard the battle raging to the right and the sounds of the Japanese forming below them. A non-commissioned officer in charge of a listening post sent a man to get permission for his 3-man group to withdraw. After receiving permission he shouted the order from a distance of 50 yards. As the men from the listening post started back, they were joined by the left platoon and two squads from the center platoon. Within 45 minutes the two platoons, less one squad, plus the section of heavy machine guns, were moving south on the highway. "There was no thought in their minds that the withdrawal was not authorized." After proceeding down the road 250 yards they met the executive officer of Company H who ordered them back. It was too late, the damage was done. Though the left platoon was able to regain its position without trouble, the two squads from the center platoon found the enemy well dug-in in the bamboo thicket where the squads had been. It was later learned that there were about 200 hostile troops with 20 machine guns in the thicket. The Japanese were within the American lines and in a position from which they could fire on A Battery and the flanks of Companies E, L, I, and K. Although the surprised defenders managed to contain the infiltrators—who seemingly did not recognize the Americans' precarious situation, as they made no attempt to capitalize on it—the situation remained unstable until the 1st Battalion, 184th Regiment arrived on November 27 and regained the lost ground. At this point, all the assault elements of General Arnold's 7th Division had crossed to the eastern shore of the Camotes Sea, and reinforcements were en route. On November 28, the 184th Regiment relieved the exhausted defenders on Shoestring Ridge and successfully repelled a small Japanese attack that night. Meanwhile, Yamashita decided to shift most of his division toward Burauen to initiate Suzuki's planned offensive, leaving only a small detachment to prevent the Americans from reaching Albuera and cutting off the base of his attack. By the end of November, the 184th had successfully taken control of Shoestring Ridge and the Bloody Bamboo Thicket, although it was unable to advance further north due to the enemy's strong resistance. At the same time, Tominaga made an unsuccessful attempt to drop off a raiding unit over Burauen on November 26, marking the first use of a tactic that would be repeated in the coming weeks. On November 27, Admiral Okawachi launched another convoy carrying heavy equipment for the 26th Division, which successfully reached Ormoc Bay overnight. However, it was intercepted by PT boats the following day, resulting in the loss of one frigate and one subchaser during the encounter. The convoy faced further attacks from aircraft on November 29, which sank one transport before the remaining ships departed for Manila. On their return journey, the last two vessels were ultimately destroyed by air strikes. Back in Leyte, on November 29, Clifford's exhausted troops managed to fend off one final heavy assault before being relieved by Hettinger's 2nd Battalion. By the end of the month, the Americans had solidified their positions on Kilay and Shoestring Ridges and were prepared to advance their two offensives against Ormoc. However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to Peleliu, where Colonel Nakagawa's remaining 700 men continued to hold out against American assaults with their dwindling strength. At the beginning of November, Colonel Watson's 323rd Regiment had taken over the task of neutralizing the Umurbrogol Pocket, with Colonel Dark's 3rd Battalion on Walt Ridge and Mortimer Valley being the last unit remaining from the 321st Regiment. After a brief pause in combat at the end of October, operations became more active again on November 2. Watson's 2nd Battalion successfully attacked the Five Sisters from the southwest, while elements of the 1st Battalion advanced north along the ridges west of Death Valley, pursuing the remaining Japanese forces from South Pocket. Meanwhile, part of the 3rd Battalion moved slowly south through the ridges and rugged terrain at the northern end of China Wall. However, before Watson could continue his offensive, heavy rains began on November 4, escalating into a typhoon that persisted for four days. By November 12, no significant progress had been made by any unit, with slow patrols and sandbagging ongoing. The 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and elements of the 321st Regiment focused on securing additional offshore islets north of Peleliu. Attacks in the Umurbrogol resumed on November 13, with Watson's 1st Battalion advancing eastward from the ridges west of Death Valley, and his 2nd Battalion pushing north into the gorge and Wildcat Bowl, though little ground was gained in the following days. Despite this slow advancement, a key center of resistance was identified in the rough terrain west of central Death Valley. On November 16, oil was sent forward through a hose from fuel tanks set up in covered positions 300 yards distant and poured into a large cave which seemed to be the center of the new-found defenses. Ignited by white phosphorus hand grenades lobbed into the cave, the flaming oil produced such promising results in driving Japanese into the open or killing them, that the same method of conquest continued to be used by the 1st Battalion and in other parts of the pocket. Over the next five days, tanks and LVT-flamethrowers targeted enemy caves at the bases of China Wall and Five Brothers, effectively destroying or sealing all accessible enemy positions and leaving Nakagawa with only 150 men still capable of fighting. By November 21, infantry patrols could operate largely unimpeded throughout Wildcat Bowl and the southern section of Death Valley. The next day, the 323rd launched an assault on the China Wall, where the majority of Nakagawa's weary troops were entrenched, effectively compressing the enemy into a space measuring 125 yards wide by 285 yards long. Meanwhile, on November 23, Five Brothers Ridge was finally cleared. The following day, a second assault on the China Wall gained additional ground, leaving only 57 enemy troops alive. To enable tanks and LVT-flamethrowers to access the central hollow of China Wall, engineers began constructing a ramp up the east wall at the northern end of Wildcat Bowl. As the ramp ascended, Nakagawa realized his situation was hopeless.  On November 24th, Nakagawa burnt the regimental colors and performed harakiri.  He was posthumously promoted to lieutenant general for his valor displayed on Peleliu. His final message to General Inoue read  “Our sword is broken, and we have run out of spears.” The 57 remaining soldiers were divided into 17 small teams, instructed to hide during the day and raid American positions at night. With the enemy largely absent, American forces cautiously advanced into the area. On November 26, tanks and LVT-flamethrowers moved up the completed ramp to bombard caves and other defenses in the hollow center of China Wall. The next morning, as units from the north and south finally linked up, Watson declared that hostilities had come to an end. What General Rupertus had anticipated would last only four days had, in fact, extended to nearly two and a half months. The 323rd suffered significant losses during that battle, with approximately 118 soldiers killed and 420 wounded. The overall casualties for the Battle of Peleliu reached over 1,573 American deaths and 6,531 injuries. In contrast, the Japanese forces experienced a total of 10,695 men killed and 301 taken prisoner. Although the fighting was officially declared over and Peleliu secured, isolated groups and individual Japanese troops remained hidden in pockets and caves, primarily in the northern part of the island and the Umurbrogol mountains. For several months afterward, the units of the 81st Division assigned to garrison the island continued to root out stragglers and seal off caves. Many of these soldiers would survive in the mountains and swamps until the war's conclusion and beyond. In fact a Japanese lieutenant with 26 men of the 2nd Infantry soldiers and eight 45th Guard Force sailors held out in the caves in Peleliu until April 22nd of 1947 and surrendered after a Japanese admiral convinced them the war was over. The effort to reduce the Japanese pocket around Umurbrogol Mountain is often regarded as the most challenging battle faced by the U.S. military throughout the entire war. The 1st Marine Division suffered heavy losses and remained inactive until the invasion of Okinawa began on April 1, 1945. During their month on Peleliu, the 1st Marine Division incurred over 6,500 casualties, representing more than one-third of the division's strength. The 81st Infantry Division also experienced significant losses, with approximately 3,300 casualties during their time on the island. Postwar analyses indicated that U.S. forces required more than 1,500 rounds of ammunition to kill each Japanese defender. They expended a staggering 13.32 million rounds of .30-caliber ammunition, 1.52 million rounds of .45-caliber, 693,657 rounds of .50-caliber bullets, 118,262 hand grenades, and 150,000 mortar rounds.The battle sparked considerable controversy in the United States, as many believed that the high number of American casualties was unjustified for an island with minimal strategic importance. The Japanese defenders were incapable of hindering potential U.S. operations in the Philippines, and the airfield captured on Peleliu did not significantly influence subsequent military actions. Instead, the Ulithi Atoll in the Caroline Islands was utilized as a staging ground for the Okinawa invasion. The casualty rate from this battle surpassed that of any other amphibious operation in the Pacific War. Moreover, coverage of the battle was limited, as only six reporters were motivated to report from the shore, influenced by General Rupertus's prediction of a quick victory within three days. The battle also received less attention due to General MacArthur's return to the Philippines and the Allies' advance toward Germany in Europe. The battles for Angaur and Peleliu illustrated the typical patterns of Japanese island defense, yet few adjustments were made for the subsequent battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Naval bombardment before the amphibious assault at Iwo Jima proved to be only marginally more effective than at Peleliu, while the preliminary shelling for Okinawa saw significant improvements. Underwater demolition teams, known as frogmen, conducted operations at Iwo Jima that confused the enemy by targeting both coasts, but this tactic later alerted Japanese defenders to the precise assault beaches during the Okinawa invasion. American ground forces gained valuable experience at Peleliu in assaulting heavily fortified positions similar to those they would encounter again at Okinawa. Admiral William Halsey Jr. recommended canceling the planned occupation of Yap Island in the Caroline Islands. He also suggested that the landings at Peleliu and Angaur be abandoned in favor of deploying their Marines and soldiers to Leyte Island; however, this recommendation was ultimately overruled by Admiral Nimitz. Turning our attention to China, we need to discuss the conclusion of the pivotal Operation Ichi-Go, as the 11th and 23rd Armies pressed on with their offensives against Guilin and Liuzhou. Back in August, following battles in Hunan and Guangdong, the 11th and 23rd Armies of the IJA initiated offensives toward Guilin and Liuzhou, respectively. The NRA troops defending the region were primarily remnants from the Battle of Hengyang, resulting in only 20,000 soldiers being present in Guilin on November 1 when the Japanese commenced their assault on the city. The Chinese government recognized that it could not hold Guilin but chose to prolong the battle for political reasons, sending food and supplies to those besieged. Most civilians had fled Guilin weeks earlier, leaving the city heavily scorched by fire. Defenses were reinforced with pillboxes, barbed wire, and Guangxi troops commanded by Muslim General Bai Chongxi. General Joseph Stilwell, who had a good relationship with Bai, made considerable efforts to supply American munitions to Bai's forces. Trenches were also dug throughout the hilly terrain. By early November, General Yokoyama's forces had effectively surrounded Guilin, with the 3rd and 13th Divisions ready to advance toward Liuzhou, while General Tanaka's units were also preparing to move north following the fall of Wuxuan. Consequently, most of Yokoyama's troops continued to tighten their grip on Guilin, where the determined defenders inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese as they facilitated the withdrawal of American personnel. Additionally, the 13th Division advanced through Yongfu on November 6, the 3rd Division captured Luzhaizhen on November 8, and the 104th Division began its movement toward the area west of Liuzhou. On November 9, just as the 11th Army initiated its main assault on Guilin, General Okamura assigned the 3rd and 13th Divisions to the 23rd Army to enhance coordination for the attack on Liuzhou. Fortunately for them, the Chinese forces offered minimal resistance, leading to the city and its airfield falling the next day. Simultaneously, with the support of the 5th Air Army, Yokoyama successfully captured Guilin, achieving the primary goal of Operation Togo II.  To eliminate the retreating enemy forces, the 23rd Army continued its advance westward. On November 15, the 104th Division took Xincheng, while the 3rd Division captured Yizhou and the 13th Division moved towards Hechi, effectively cutting off the Chinese retreat and destroying the remaining enemy troops. The 3rd Division then advanced north, capturing Huanjian on November 27, while the 13th Division continued west, successfully taking Nandan on November 28 and Dushan on December 2. In response, Tanaka dispatched the 22nd Division and the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade to capture Nanning, which fell by November 28. By early December, elements of the 22nd Division joined forces with the Indochinese garrison near Shangsi, marking the conclusion of Operation Ichi-Go. After ten days of fierce fighting, the Japanese forces captured Guilin and entered Liuzhou on the same day. Sporadic fighting persisted as Chinese forces retreated rapidly. By November 24, the Japanese had taken control of 75 counties in Guangxi, encompassing about two-thirds of the region. Reports indicate that they killed 215,000 civilians in reprisals and during crossfire, injuring over 431,000. After the fall of Guilin and Liuzhou, the majority of NRA troops lost their morale and retreated without ever confronting the enemy, leading to significant losses in both equipment and personnel. This event became one of the most devastating defeats of the entire Second Sino-Japanese War. Nevertheless, despite having destroyed the airbases in this area, the USAAF could still launch attacks on the Japanese mainland from their other bases. While the Japanese achieved some objectives of Operation Ichigo, it ultimately expanded the territory they needed to defend and significantly weakened their lines, creating a favorable scenario for future counterattacks by Chinese forces. After destroying enemy air bases and annihilating the main enemy forces in the Guilin-Liuzhen area, the 6th Area Army assigned the 22nd Division and the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade to the 11th Army to secure strategic locations in the region, while the 23rd Army returned to Guangzhou and the Leizhou Peninsula. By the operation's end, Japanese losses were estimated at around 100,000 killed, 200,000 wounded, and significant material losses, including 1,938 small river vessels and 367 aircraft. In contrast, Chinese losses totaled approximately 310,000 killed, 410,000 wounded, and 80,000 captured, along with substantial war material losses, including 312 Allied aircraft, resulting in the deaths of 100 Americans. Additionally, the entire Japanese offensive resulted in the deaths of approximately 500,000 civilians. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fight on Leyte gruels on as the fight for Peleliu finally came to an end. The controversial battle of Peleliu would have major ramifications for American planners going forward. In China, absolute horror was continuing to be inflicted upon the Chinese people, leaving to the massacre of hundreds of thousands in a war that just never seemed like it would end.

"I'm not slamming my head against the wall every night." Amanda and Ann fabulous interview actor, comedian, and writer Mookie Blaiklock -- you may know him from Don't Trust the B---- in Apartment 23, Wet Hot American Summer: First Day of Camp, Fired Up!, or the hallowed halls of UCB!!We're trying something different these days -- enjoy today's interview episode and stay tuned for another episode about reality TV/pop culture/whatever else Ann and Amanda want to talk about later in the week!Check out:Mookie's socials: @lilmookiebSeason 3 premiere of Lopez vs. Lopez on Oct 18th!NOTE: The WSANDA team is working remotely from various locations right now, so everything's a little fucked up. Thanks for bearing with us!WSANDA SUBMISSIONS: wsandasubmissions@gmail.comFollow us on instagram @wesignedannda @mikiannmaddox @liffordthebigreddog so you can slither in our DMs with constructive feedback, but please, for the love of god, don't cyberbully us. We're fragile :-/If you're picking up what we're putting down and want even more Ann and Amanda comedy content, support us on Patreon. You have no idea how many times we've said "Wait, this is too batshit.....we'll put it on Patreon." Our cover art was made by America's sweetheart producer Maddy, and our theme song features parts of "Kawaii Til I Die" by Starjunk 95 Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/science-technology-and-society

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/japanese-studies

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In our interview about Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), James M. Scott discusses the principles and personalities involved in the most destructive air attack in history. Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. Black Snow is the story of this devastating operation, orchestrated by Major General Curtis LeMay, who famously remarked: “If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.” Scott reconstructs in granular detail that horrific night, and describes the development of the B-29, the capture of the Marianas for use as airfields, and the change in strategy from high-altitude daylight “precision” bombing to low-altitude nighttime incendiary bombing. Most importantly, the raid represented a significant moral shift for America, marking the first time commanders deliberately targeted civilians which helped pave the way for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later. Drawing on first-person interviews with American pilots and bombardiers and Japanese survivors, air force archives, and oral histories never before published in English, Scott delivers a harrowing and gripping account, and his most important and compelling work to date. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. He is currently a DPAA Research Partner Fellow at the University of Southern Mississippi and a co-host of the Diplomatic History Channel on the New Books Network. He is also working on a book about the reversal in US grand strategy from victory at all costs in World War II to peace at any price in the Vietnam War. He can be reached at andrew.pace@usm.edu or via andrewopace.com. Andrew is not an employee of DPAA, he supports DPAA through a partnership. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DPAA, DoD or its components. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/book-of-the-day

After Italian producers balked at director Enzo Castellari's idea to remake The Dirty Dozen, he raised the money himself and hired American B-movie titans Bo Svenson and Fred Williamson to lead a group of military prisoners across Nazi German territory (really the backlots of Cinecitta and surrounding areas) on a trek to freedom into Switzerland.  In 1978's The Inglorious Bastards, Castellari uses all the staples of Italian 70's schlock cinema (boobs, blood and bad dubbing) to great effect in this rousing and silly war film.   Dan and Vicky discuss the film that so inspired Quentin Tarantino he bought the rights to the title to use for his own 2009 Nazi war film.  Along the way, you'll get conversations on saving movie theatres, Sip and Paint and 80's actress Lisa Eilbacher as well as find out what a Disney bitch is (hint: Vicky is one).  You'll also hear talk of some recently seen like Beverly HIlls Cop: Axel F, The Seven Samurai in 4K, A Quiet Place: Day One, Will and Grace reruns and Fly Me To The Moon.  Check us out on all our socials:  hotdatepod.com FB:  Hot Date Podcast Twitter: @HotDate726 Insta:  hotdatepod

Louisiana's unpopular “constitutional carry” law goes into effect on Independence Day. It allows anyone over 18 to carry a concealed firearm without a permit or specialized training. Stephanie Grace, editorial director and columnist for The Advocate | The Times-Picayune, discusses how residents and police are preparing for the new rules.More than 25% of Louisiana's rural hospitals are “vulnerable to closure,” according to a report released earlier this year by Chartis, a healthcare consulting firm. At least 30 rural hospitals across the country that it identified as vulnerable have closed over the past four years.Denaé Hebert, executive director of the Louisiana Rural Health Association, outlines the problems rural health clinics are facing and what it means for the communities they serve. The U.S. Department of Defense reports that more than 72,000 Americans who fought in World War II are still classified as “missing in action.” Families who never recovered a body of their loved ones often struggle to find closure. Now, students from the University of New Orleans are working to change that. They're investigating a site north of Berlin associated with the downing of an American B-17 bomber. Dr. Ryan Gray, the Richard Wallin Boebel Professor of Anthropology, is leading the effort. He shares more about the dig.Today's episode of Louisiana Considered was hosted by Adam Vos. Our managing producer is Alana Schreiber; our contributing producers are Matt Bloom and Adam Vos; we receive production and technical support from Garrett Pittman and our assistant producer, Aubry Procell.You can listen to Louisiana Considered Monday through Friday at 12:00 and 7:00 pm. It's available on Spotify, Google Play, and wherever you get your podcasts. Louisiana Considered wants to hear from you! Please fill out our pitch line to let us know what kinds of story ideas you have for our show. And while you're at it, fill out our listener survey! We want to keep bringing you the kinds of conversations you'd like to listen to.Louisiana Considered is made possible with support from our listeners. Thank you!

Last time we spoke about landings at Biak. General Fuller unleashed a amphibious assault against Biak that faced countless hurdles. The Hurricane Task force encountered a lot of terrain issues at Humboldt bay, leading to logistical headaches. Despite the disorganization, they shipped off and landed, forming a beachhead. Colonel Kuzume and his men were caught with their pants down, units were scattered all over the place. The first tank battle of the Southwest Pacific occurred, seeing American Shermans absolutely desolate Japanese Type 95's. General Fuller planned to consolidate his troops at Ibdi and Bosnek while reinforcements arrived, but the Japanese continuously lobbed surprise night attacks to horrible effect. Over in the Burma front, Mutaguchi's operation continued to unravel as his subordinate officers disregarded his orders and performed their own withdrawals. As Mutaguchi relieved men of command and replaced them, General Slim finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for the Japanese. This episode is the Fall of Mogaung Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As General Vinegar Joe unleashed what he believed to be a masterstroke against Myitkyina, it soon turned out to be an absolute gruesome struggle. As we last saw, General Stilwell's men had begun a long and difficult siege of Myitkyina. The 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions were now pinned down by General Tanaka's battered 18th Division south of Kamaing. To the south Brigadier Calvert's Chindits began a battle for Mogaung, which forced General Takeda's 53rd Division to suspend the relief of Myitkyina and rush back to reinforce the town. Though the Mogaung Garrison and the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to the north had been effectively destroyed by the Chindit and Chinese attacks, the Japanese had been able to maintain their hold on Mogaung by mid-June. To the east, General Wei's Y Force had opened a new offensive on Yunnan, gradually pushing Colonel Kurashige's 148th Regiment to Tengchong but failing to seize Longling against the tenacious resistance of General Matsuyama's forces. Along the Kamaing-Mogaung front, by late June, Tanaka had been able to assemble most of his depleted command at Lakatkawng, determined to keep the blockade on the Hukawng Valley. His main aim was to clear the Seton roadblock, which had been recently reinforced with General Sun's 113th Regiment; but once again, his attacks would fail to dislodge the tenacious Chinese defenders. Yet upon receiving orders from the 33rd Army commander to withdraw, General Tanaka reported that the 18th Division could continue to hold in the Kamaing area. This statement, inspired by Colonel Ohgoshi, the chief of staff, proved to be unwarranted optimism. The 18th had staged a desperate resistance in the vicinity of Kamaing for about a month and, for most of the period, had only 80 men for each mile of front. Supplies of ammunition and food were very low with only about 1400 rounds of rifle ammunition per day for the entire Division and 60 rounds per machine gun. The daily ration was about 2.5 ounces of rice per man. On receipt of the Army's message to withdraw, Colonel Ohgoshi had advised the Division commander that further resistance in the area was possible, but had not made it clear that this was his personal belief and did not reflect the opinions of the rest of the Division staff. Within a day or two the commander became aware of the fact that the other staff officers were convinced that further resistance in the Kamaing area was impossible. He therefore forwarded to the 33rd Army a revised report of the Division's actual situation. Upon receipt of the second message, on June 27 the Army directed the Division to retire to the Sahmaw sector. Tanaka believed he needed to stand his ground while the 53rd Division pushed aside the Seton Block and reopened his line of communications. Thus, he elected to continue to resist the attacks from the north while he himself attacked Seton for three more days; but failing to make any progress, he would finally comply with his orders to withdraw to the hills north of Sahmaw in early July.  While the 4th and 146th Regiments performed covering attacks, the remnants of the 55th and 56th Regiments destroyed their artillery and heavy equipment, and withdrew along an escape trail cut through the forest west of the Seton roadblock. On 2 July the 18th Division began its withdrawal, utilizing an obscure trail that ran directly south from Kamaing. Crossing the mountain range west of Seton, the Division completed its concentration near Sahmaw about 7 July. The Hukawng Operation was then considered concluded, ending a campaign that had been a miserable failure and had cost almost 8,000 casualties. By July 15th, the 18th Division would finally assemble in the Indaw area. Though only 3000 men from the elite 18th Division would survive the Hukawng Valley Campaign, Tanaka had effectively managed to keep intact the blockade to China for another year, something that would have profound repercussions later on in Chinese history. Further south, the 114th Regiment finally arrived at Gurkhaywa on June 16th, ready to reinforce the Chindits; yet Takeda had also brought most of his troops back to Mogaung, subsequently starting a deadly shelling of the Chindit positions. By when June 15th arrived, the Chinese still had not appeared, and Calvert pulled his troops back towards the bridge. At that moment, remarkable news arrived: The Japanese were abandoning their positions along the river. Calvert was exuberant. This meant he could move out of his bridgehead perhaps capture the town. Certainly, it meant a reduction of the shelling which was claiming at least 15 of his men a day. Yet, when the shelling did not die down and it quickly became apparent that Takeda was merely redeploying his troops along the railway, to get them out of flooding in low-lying areas. Chindit recce teams reported the area from the train station, in the heart of the town to the Mogaung Railway Bridge, further north, was heavily defended with eight bunkers dominating the landscape. Shelling from the village of Naungkyaiktaw, astride the road to Mogaung, set between fields of paddy, was persistent. Naungkyaiktaw had to be captured. Calvert estimated the village was held by a hundred Japanese. Because of this, on June 18th, Calvert ordered his forces to attack the apparent Japanese artillery encampment at Naungkyaiktaw after a heavy air and mortar bombardment. His troops outnumbered them, but unwilling to suffer needless casualties, Calvert directed the American fighter-bombers against the village, which was bombarded on the night of the 17th. Half an hour before dawn on the 18th, the Chindit mortars pummeled the place with 400 rounds for good measure. Calvert then sent in his assault force. Among the attackers was a company of 70 men from King's Liverpool led by Major Fred Reeman. This was a company that had stayed on with the 77th Brigade after the rest of the battalion had been transferred to the 111th Brigade. They were joined by 12 men of Blaine's Detachment, once evacuated to India but since returned, this time armed with about a dozen flamethrowers.  In the darkness, Blaine's Detachment was told to advance in front of the company of King's, and to “turn the fucking lights on.” As the detachment began to hurl flames far and wide, the Chindits behind them began cheering. The men had been told that the village had many bunkers, but never saw any at first. The scene soon turned fantastic. They went through the entire village “with twenty or thirty yards of flame shooting out in front.” They soon found the bunkers. The Japanese became crazed with fear especially after the British began yelling “put out the fucking lights,” and turning the flamethrowers their way. Many Japanese fled the bunkers, joined by those outside. They fled through the paddy fields, making for the railway station 400 yards away. Calvert's machine gunners had been waiting and blazed away, killing at least forty. Meanwhile, the rest of Fusiliers and the Kings walked up the paddy, picking off Japanese hiding or trying to crawl away in the ditches. Calvert, his mobile brigade-major Brash and his orderly Lance-Corporal Young decided to join the mop-up, shooting at Japanese while standing on chairs, as more Fusiliers began clearing the last of the bunkers, hurling grenades into them and blasting the insides with flamethrowers. As twilight set in that day, the most peculiar thing happened. The Fusiliers were cooking an evening meal in their newly-won positions, when a weary, seven-man patrol walked into their billet and began to take off their kit. The Fusiliers who looked up casually, noticed to their horror, that the new men were Japanese. The Japanese, for their part, had not noticed. The Fusiliers lunged for their weapons and opened fire. The Japanese patrol did not survive. In all, Calvert estimated that his troops had killed about 70 Japanese in the capture and holding of Naungkyaiktaw, while suffering 16 killed and 38 wounded. Major Reeman's King's company had become reduced to a platoon.  Calvert was considerably cheered on the evening of the 18th, when the much promised Chinese reinforcements finally arrived, guided over the river in motorized ranger boats by a towering Chindit officer, Captain Andrew. This was the 1st Battalion of the Chinese 114th Regiment led by Major P'ang, which quickly deployed in the positions pointed out by Calvert but left the Chindits a little flummoxed when they proclaimed that they were in no particular hurry to fight as they had been fighting for years. On the following day, another battalion of Chinese arrived under the personal command of the regimental leader, Colonel Li Hung, as did a battery of 75mm pack howitzers  the “6th Battery” under US Major Wayne Cook. The Chinese quickly assumed the defense of Mahaung, prompting an American liaison officer with the Chinese to send a press release that the Chinese had “captured” the village, which embarrassed Li. Cook's battery was deployed into position at Pinhmi village began operations on the 20th, hurling fire against the Japanese positions as the Chinese infantrymen consolidated their positions. Meantime, elements of the Chinese 113th Infantry, operating five miles north of Mogaung, surrounded a Japanese company, while Cook's guns hammered them. Fifty Japanese died from first blast alone. The Chinese finished off those who survived.The assault, was so ferocious that all the bunkers were overrun The reinforcements heartened Calvert for his own brigade was now a shell of its former self. The Lancashire Fusiliers and the King's Liverpool had only 110 men, the South Staffords had 180 and the Gurkha Rifles had 230. He planned a fresh advance, this time aiming for the hamlet of Natgyigon, on Mogaung's right flank, near the river. This area, Calvert believed, was the “key to Mogaung.” For the time, he chose the early hours of darkness on June 23rd a day which would go down in the annals of the 77th Brigade as the “stuff of legends.” The plan called for a mortar barrage of 1,000 bombs, in addition to shelling from the 75mm guns to cover the advance of the Chindits across the open ground towards Natgyigon. The Gurkhas were to move on the right, with the South Staffords on the left. Blaine's Detachment and the Lancashire Fusiliers were in reserve. The objective was to capture the entire stretch of ground from the Mogaung Bridge to the train station, the latter of which the Chinese were to secure. Once the area was in Allied hands, the troops were to dig in while the reserve troops mopped up. In addition, Allied aircraft were to bombard the area before the start of the assault, which itself was timed to launch at about 3.10 am. In the dark, section commanders could be heard telling their men: “We attack Mogaung tonight and once we've taken it the Brigadier says we are through!” Later, during the attack, Calvert discovered the Chinese infantry had not captured the all-important train station, even as their American liaison officer insisted that they had. Calvert angrily pointed out that no, the Chinese had not, because enemy fire from that direction continued to pick off his men at the railway embankment. The Gurkhas, moving along a wide right flank along the banks of the Mogaung River, headed for the railway bridge. Approaching the bridge, they came under heavy fire. Captain Allmand, by now suffering from trench foot as were most of the troops, moved forward to silence a machine gun firing on his men. He could barely run because of his affliction but advancing through the mud, he hurled grenades at the Japanese position. A burst of gunfire plunged into him. He fell, badly wounded. One of his Gurkhas, Sergeant. Tilbir Gurung pulled Allmand and another wounded NCO to safety. For this, Gurung was to get a Military Medal. Allmand's own valor was to be recognized by a Victoria Cross. The South Staffords swept into Mogaung town. Resistance was heavy. Lt Durant of the South Stafford deployed his machineguns to rake Japanese positions with fire. Meantime, the flamethrowers were brought up. As they moved up past Durant's positions, a shell burst exploded one, setting the man wielding it on fire. The man screamed and somehow shook off the flamethrowing unit from his back. Durant and some of his men rushed forward and rolled him into water in a nearby ditch. The Japanese had dug-in beneath the ruins of a brick house from where they were stubbornly holding the Staffords at bay. The rest of the flamethrowers moved in and sprayed the building. One Japanese, his clothes ablaze, leapt from his positions and tried to make a run for it. A scythe of gunfire cut him down. The rest valiantly held their positions and were burned to cinder. The Staffords, mopping up the, found the Japanese officer. He had shot himself with his revolver. The Japanese had entrenched themselves at a strategically important building known as the Red House, which was well-protected with machine-gun nests. The advancing Gurkhas consequently ran smack into this killing zone, getting caught in a murderous crossfire and suffering heavy casualties. In response, Calvert threw his reserves into the fray and the Chindits also began to pummel the Japanese positions with mortars and machine-guns, which allowed the infantry to reach the all-important train station. Inflicting some 120 casualties and losing 60 dead and over 100 wounded, the Chindits then successfully captured all their objectives by noon. For the rest of the day, heavy fighting would continue as the Chindits dug in on their gained positions; but during the night, the Japanese would finally pull out, leaving the town to the shattered remnants of the 77th Brigade. Mopping up then continued until June 27, when Mogaung was declared void of Japanese. Though this was the first major town to be recaptured in Burma, Calvert lost over 250 killed and 500 wounded at Mogaung, which was more than any Chindit formation was prepared to take. This was also a bittersweet victory for Calvert because Stilwell would claim that the town had been taken by his Chinese troops, even though the Chindits had done most of the fighting. Stilwill wrote in his diary on June 27th “Good news from Mogaung, We have it!” Then came a remarkable broadcast from Stilwell's headquarters via the BBC “The Chinese had captured Mogaung”. There was no mention of the Chindits. Calvert was incensed. Colonel Li was appalled and apologized profusely. “If anyone has taken Mogaung it is your Brigade and we all admire the bravery of your soldiers.” Calvert, his anger against Stilwell unmitigated, sent a message to US headquarters  “Chinese reported taking Mogaung. My Brigade now taking umbrage” this prompted Stilwell's staff to scour the maps for the location of Umbrage. Meantime, congratulations poured in from Lentaigne, from “Scottie” Scott, from John Masters, and the other brigade commanders. Among the lot, there was one, from Derek Tulloch, which struck Calvert's heart the most: “Wingate would have been proud of you.” After this defeat, and learning of the concurrent withdrawal of the 18th Division, Takeda's 53rd Division would withdraw to the Sahmaw River line in early July, where it was also reinforced with the recently-arrived 119th Regiment.  Meanwhile over at Myitkyina, General Boatner had to order a stop to the attacks after June 18th because of the heavy casualties. For the time being, tunneling would be used to close with the enemy. On June 25th, however, Boatner would have a severe recurrence of malaria that would force him to abandon the frontlines. This led General Stilwell to appoint Brigadier-General Theodore Wessels in command of the Myitkyina Task Force on June 26th. Luckily for Wessels the situation started to improve after the fall of Mogaung, as Chinese troops there could now move up the railroad to connect with Wessels' forces. This removed the recurrent menace of a Japanese drive from Mogaung, guaranteed reinforcements and the opening of a ground line of communications, and further eliminated one of General Minakami's two bases from which supplies had trickled into the Japanese perimeter. Despite this, the only gains in the week of June 25th were a few hundred yards taken by the 150th Regiment and the 236th Engineers. Alongside this, Stilwell ordered the 1st Battalion, 42nd Regiment to penetrate through the Japanese positions towards Sitapur on June 28. They would drive deep into the Japanese defense system, leading Stilwell to hope this was the turning point; on receiving Japanese fire, it halted and dug in. Air supply was necessary.In response, Wessels dispatched some Marauder reinforcements. F Company, unaware it had lost its way and under an inexperienced commander, proceeded with a small point almost directly ahead of the marching column. The company commander at the head of the point met a small group of Orientals whom he took to be Chinese and who greeted him affably. The strangers then suggested he and his party lay aside their guns. At this point the commander realized that he had been ambushed and gave the alarm. The Japanese machine guns opened on his trapped column, inflicting heavy casualties. Some of his men made their way back to the Allied lines, but the company was never reconstituted and was broken up and distributed among the rest of Galahad. For his constant gallantry during a stubborn eight-hour rear-guard action, which permitted the survivors to extricate themselves from ambush, Private first class. Anthony Firenze of New Galahad received the Distinguished Service Cross. Wessels then planning to launch a set-piece attack to capture a stretch of the Sumprabum Road.  Over in the Yunnan front, Colonel Matsui's 113th Regiment had successfully relieved the pressure from Longling by mid-June. General Matsuyama further ordered him to maintain the offensive while he continued to reorganize his forces. Though Matsui managed to seize the Tiechanghe pass on June 21st, most of his attacks would end up in nothing. In the north, the 20th Army Group launched simultaneous attacks against Qianshuang and Gudong on June 18th. This finally forcing the Japanese to retreat in disorder towards Tengchong by June 22nd. With the fall of Qianshuang, the Japanese had been forced to abandon the upper Shweli valley, and were now moving in some disorder toward Tengchong over three excellent trails. In Qianshuang, they left behind large quantities of ammunition and a few pieces of artillery, suggesting a disorganized withdrawal. 150 dead Japanese were found in Qianshuang itself; more than 300 Chinese gave their lives for the village. South of Qianshuang, the Japanese hastily destroyed their pontoon bridge to slow the Chinese pursuit. On reaching the Qianshuang-Baifen-Gudong line, the 20th Army Group had wrested 4000 square miles from Japanese control in forty days of fighting. The advance had been made over the precipitous ranges of the Kaolikung Mountains in an almost constant rain, a downpour sometimes heavy, sometimes light, rarely abating, and always turning to fog and sleet in the higher altitudes. More than 150 coolie supply porters fell to their deaths from the narrow, slippery trails that snaked precariously over the mountains. On June 25th General Wei received a personal order from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to take Teng-chung. A few days later, th 20th Group Army, though delayed by the need to rebuild bridges over each of the swift mountain streams that crossed its advance, had pressed the Japanese rear guards back to the hills that surrounded Teng-chung at a distance of two to three miles from the formidable walled town itself. Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Air Force was trying to soften Teng-chung by daily attacks with bombs and machine-gun fire. The outer defenses of Teng-chung were pillboxes covering every avenue of approach, supported and covered by the 6,500-foot-high, fortified mountain peak of Lai-feng Shan, "The Place Where the Birds Come." Here were 600 or more Japanese with most of the garrison's artillery. Teng-chung itself was girdled by a massive wall of earth that in some places was forty feet high and sixty feet thick at the base, faced throughout with great slabs of stone. Chinese necromancers had carefully laid out the wall in a great square to cut the cardinal points of the compass. Each side had a gate, and each gate now had a Japanese command post, while Japanese machine guns and rifles swept the approaches to the wall, its face, and its parapets. Within the city were about 2,000 Japanese. In all, Colonel Kurashige, who had defended the Kaoli-kung mountains, had about 1,850 Japanese, a heavily reinforced battalion combat team built around the 2nd, 148th regiment. Kurashige's orders were to hold Teng-chung until the Chinese threat to Lung-ling passed Over at Longling, Matsui saw the arrival of some reinforcements on June 22nd that would allow him to continue his counteroffensive. Making repeated night and day attacks, the Japanese would be able to penetrate the enemy positions on June 24. Matsuyama then directed him to exploit towards Bengmiao and Huangcaobacum; yet a heavy raid by 24 B-25s and the arrival of the 1st Division would manage to halt the Japanese attempt to exploit their success, with Mitsui only securing the area northwest of Bengmiao by July 1st. The next day, Matsuyama then suspended the counteroffensive because of heavy casualties and he could see the enemy were strengthening their positions. In the meantime, Major Kanemitsu's Lameng Garrison was successfully holding off against a siege by three divisions since June 4th, though the Chinese would only launch unsuccessful attacks in regimental strength during this period; and to the southeast, the Pingda Garrison was also successfully repelling the small enemy attacks against them in spite of being cut off and disease-ridden. That is all for the Burma front today as we now need to head over to the Biak front. After the arrival of two battalions of the163rd Regiment for reinforcements, General Fuller planed a two-pronged attack against Mokmer Drome, with the 186th Regiment advancing west over the inland plateau while the 162nd Regiment resumed its attack west along the coast. On the morning of June 1, in preparation for the offensive, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion therefore left Bosnek and marched north over the coastal ridge, with the 2nd Battalion also moving from Opiaref to join them. By 11:00, both battalions successfully set up defensive perimeters; yet their preparations would be interrupted abruptly in the afternoon as Colonel Kuzume directed his 1st Battalion to attack the positions held by Company K. These Japanese, who were supported by machine guns and mortars emplaced northwest of the trail crossing, continued attacks until 5:00, when a platoon of Company K, by a flanking movement, forced their withdrawal northward. Company K and two platoons of the Antitank Company remained at the trail crossing for the night. Company I was moved forward to K's left and left rear, and Company L extended K's perimeter east along the main road toward the surveyed drome. Battalion headquarters and Company M stayed near the strip's western end. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, the Cannon Company, the 2nd Battalion, regimental headquarters, the attached engineers, and the tanks remained near the center of the airfield.   Thankfully, the Americans would manage to repel the assaults and would ultimately force a Japanese withdrawal via a bold enveloping maneuver. But the Japanese would return after midnight. The first part of the night passed without incident, but at 3:30 the entire area held by the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, flamed into action. About a company and a half of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, moved from the south against the semicircular perimeter held by Companies I, K, and L, having outflanked the 3rd Battalion on the west. Simultaneously, other elements of the 1st Battalion attacked from the northwest, attempting to drive a wedge between Companies L and K. Under the support of mortar and machine gun fire from both the northwest and southwest, the encircled Japanese desperately tried to fight their way north. Four hours of confused hand-to-hand fighting, marked by the use of bayonets, machetes, and grenades, ensued. At daylight a count revealed that 86 dead Japanese were within and around the 3rd Battalion's perimeter. The dead included the commander of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Losses to the American unit were 3 men killed and 8 wounded.  After dealing with the threat, Newman resumed the westward advance at 9:00 on June 2nd. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, supported by five tanks and an antitank platoon, were to advance abreast, while the 2nd protected the right flank by patrolling north of the main road. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion was to provide continuous close support and was to displace forward with the infantry. Neither artillery nor air bombardment seems to have been provided for or delivered prior to the attack. However, both the 121st and 146th Field Artillery Battalions were registered on targets north and west of the 186th Infantry. Air support was available from Wakde Island upon call. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry broke camp at its beach defense area at 8:00 on June 2nd and moved north over the ridge to join the rest of the regiment. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, had made no serious attempt to stop the 186th Infantry's progress westward because the inland plateau was nearly indefensible and because the battalion would have been decimated in battle with the superior strength of the reinforced American regiment. The 1st Battalion was withdrawn from the surveyed drome area, initially in preparation for counterattack against the Bosnek beachhead. While no such counteroffensive was mounted, the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion at least had the advantage of keeping the unit intact. The American advance would thus be opposed by the 10th Company, 222nd Regiment; the 3rd Company, 36th Division Sea Transportation Unit and some other naval and engineer units.  The 1st and 3rd Battalions then advanced with two companies abreast against scattered but determined opposition from elements of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Small enemy patrols aimed machine gun and rifle fire at the advancing American units and held their positions until killed or dispersed by tank or artillery fire. Most of the enemy parties were located on the north flank and apparently many of them had been driven westward out of the cave and garden area north of the surveyed drome by fire from the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which destroyed Biak Detachment headquarters installations in that area. By nightfall the 186th Infantry had killed 96 Japanese and had itself lost 6 men killed and 10 wounded. The unit halted shortly after 1600 and began digging in at a point about 600 yards northeast of the day's objective. The advance had carried the regiment west until it was almost abreast and north of the 162nd Infantry, at the Ibdi Pocket. The latter had attempted to move west along the coast during the day, but it would be unable to dislodge the Japanese from the Ibdi Pocket, ultimately having to attach its 2nd Battalion to the 186th.  The addition of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Regiment to the 186th Regiment helped to complicate the supply problems of the troops on the plateau. No water had yet been found inland. Heat and humidity were intense, and thick scrub growth, about 12 feet high, stopped any breezes. Despite the best efforts of Company B, 116th Engineers, the supply road could not be repaired fast enough to keep pace with the advancing infantrymen. Water had to be brought around from Bosnek via Opiaref to the forward units, and there were not enough water trailers nor 5-gallon cans available to supply all the water needed. At night each man received only one canteen of water for the next day, an inadequate amount under the conditions which prevailed inland. The water situation and the necessity for hauling all other supplies north through Opiaref did more to delay the 186th Regiment's progress westward than did the opposition of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Regiment. Meanwhile Kuzume's only support so far had been some air raids carried out by the depleted 23rd Air Flotilla and 7th Air Division. By late May, the 23rd Air Flotilla had only twelve fighters and six medium bombers at Sorong and the 7th Air Division had four large bombers, 20 medium bombers and three fighters. Both units threw what strength they could muster into attacks on the enemy landing force. On May 27th four Army heavy bombers and nine Navy fighters carried out a daylight attack against fierce air opposition, all but four fighters failing to return. Kuzume would need more than that to launch a determined attack that would succeed in pushing the enemy back into the sea. Consequently, on May 29th, General Numata and Admiral Senda had requested the immediate commitment of fleet and air strength into the Biak battle. They both relayed this message “The enemy apparently found the difficulty of rapid occupation of the airfield sector. The enemy will change, in all probability, its policy to occupy the whole island of Biak after the arrival of reinforcements, securing its present positions with landed units for a while. The officers and men on Biak Island are firm in their resolution to crush the enemy. However, our operations are severely restricted by the uncontested superiority of the enemy's feet and air units. The Biak Detachment, which is making every effort in destroying the confronting enemy, request for further support by the army and navy units concerned. We believe that the immediate commitment of our air forces and, if possible, some fleet units would give us a splendid opportunity to turn the tide of battle in the whole Pacific area in our favor.“ This finally convinced Admiral Toyoda to send reinforcements to the island.  To counter the Allied advance to Biak, the IJN dispatched from one third of its available naval land-based air strength from the Central Pacific to reinforce the 23rd Air Flotilla in western New Guinea. On May 28th 70 carrier-type fighters, 4 reconnaissance bombers, and 16 medium bombers were dispatched to western New Guinea. Another group of planes, comprising 48 fighters, 8 reconnaissance aircraft, and 20 bombers, were sent to western New Guinea and Halmahera from the Carolines on or about May 31st. On 29-30th May the flotilla carried out fresh attacks on the Biak landing force. On May 29th, sixteen medium bombers attacked the enemy fleet in the sea near BIAK Island before daybreak of that day, yet none of them returned. Furthermore, in a daylight attack on the same day, four Zero fighters strafed BIAK Island. None of them returned to the base either. On May 30th, the unit of the Zero fighters of the Navy again fired upon enemy ships in the sea off Mokmer. The damage on the enemy ships was not confirmed. However, the unit reported that they fought four P-38s and four B-25s of the enemy and shot down two B-25s above BIAK Island. Also as part of Operation KON, a huge task force under Admiral Sakonju, which included the battleship Fuso, four cruisers and eight destroyers, was to transport Major-General Tamada Yoshio's 2nd Amphibious Brigade towards Biak. Additionally, it was decided to move three infantry companies of the 35th Division from Sorong to Biak by barge. Sakonju's convoy finally left Davao on the night of June 2nd. In connection with KON Force's advance, the Japanese had planned heavy air strikes against Biak which were to be carried out by the recently reinforced 23rd Air Flotilla and the few army aircraft which remained at bases within range of Biak. Between 1645 and 1700 on 2 June, from eleven to fifteen Japanese planes bombed Allied positions on Biak, causing a few casualties and some light damage. Seven of these planes were shot down by shore-based anti-aircraft weapons, while guns aboard Seventh Fleet ships lying off Bosnek accounted for at least one more. Later during the same night, a few more enemy planes dropped some bombs harmlessly on and near Owi Island. Still more approached Biak during the night, causing many red alerts but not dropping any bombs. The next night, that of 3-4 June, no Japanese planes attacked Biak, although an unknown number bombed Owi Island without causing any damage or casualties. Again, however, enemy aircraft flew many reconnaissance flights around Biak, causing an almost continuous red alert until the early morning hours of 4 June. Early on the morning of June 3rd, at a point just east of the Talaud Islands, between Mindanao and Morotai, a 7th Fleet submarine sighted the Transport and 1st Screening Units and was in turn sighted by ships of the latter organization. Alongside this 7th Fleet PB4Y's, operating from Wakde Island, kept the Japanese vessels under surveillance the rest of the day, reporting that the course and speed of the enemy ships could bring them into range of Biak during the evening of June 4th. Their discovery by Allied aircraft so far from Biak apparently had not been anticipated by the Japanese, who later reported that they had not known Allied aircraft were capable of such long-range reconnaissance. Nevertheless, the three KON Force elements steamed on toward Biak, probably hoping that friendly aircraft might drive off the Allied reconnaissance planes and also protect the sea approaches to Biak. To further muddy the situation, Sakonju received false reports that a strong American carrier group was approaching the waters east of Biak. Admiral Kinkaid had indeed dispatched a special task force to deal with this threat, yet the warships could only arrive off Biak on the night of June 4th and didn't include any aircraft carrier. Nonetheless, knowing that he had been discovered and unwilling to risk so many ships under these circumstances, Sakonju would have to suspend the reinforcement run and turn back to Davao and Sorong.   When the Japanese called off KON on June 3rd, the Transport and the 1st and 2nd Screening Units were a little over 500 miles northwest of Biak and about 250 miles east-southeast of the Talaud Islands. At this point, the three forces were reorganized. The Transport Unit, accompanied by the three destroyers of the 1st Screening Unit, changed course for Sorong, while the 2nd Screening Unit and the two heavy cruisers of the 1st turned back toward Davao, which they probably reached late on June 5th. Of the ships moving to Sorong, the Fifth Air Force claimed to have sunk one destroyer and damaged at least two others. The Transport Unit and the 1st Screening Unit's three destroyers arrived safely at Sorong during the evening of June 4th. The Detached Unit, which had been moving toward Biak from Zamboanga on an independent course far to the west of the other three sections of KON Force, had also changed its direction during the night of 3-4 June, and reached Sorong sometime on the 4th. At Sorong the Transport Unit unloaded the 1,700 men of the 2nd Amphibious Brigade. The six destroyers of the Transport and 1st Screening Units then proceeded southwest to Ambon where they refueled. The Transport Unit's one heavy cruiser and one light cruiser sought shelter in Kaboei Bay, Waigeo Island, about 60 miles northwest of Sorong. On 6 June the heavy cruiser Aoba was attacked there by fifteen B-24's of the Fifth Air Force. First reports were that at least two hits were scored on the cruiser, but it was later learned that the ship suffered no damage. Instead, it was able to take part in a second KON Operation. Back over at Biak, Newman resumed the advance westward on the morning of June 3rd, making painfully slow progress because of the difficult terrain and lack of adequate supply lines. Meeting no opposition, they would finally dig in half a mile from the point at which the main ridge left the coast and turned inland near Mokmer. That day, however, Fuller learnt about the possible enemy naval attack, so he decided to halt any offensive actions for the moment. On June 4th, upon learning that no enemy carriers were in the Biak area, Sakonju was again ordered to prepare to run the American blockade, this time bringing the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 219th Regiment. There would be two naval groups, the first was the Transport Unit, containing three destroyers which had been part of the first KON Operation Transport Unit. The second section was the Screening Unit, also comprising three destroyers. For the second KON Operation there were two detached units, the 1st had one heavy and one light cruiser while the 2nd Detached Unit included the small craft and patrol boats which had put into Sorong at the end of the first KON. The three destroyers of the Transport Unit were each to embark 200 infantrymen at Sorong. In addition, the destroyers of either or both the Transport and Screening Units were each to tow to Biak one landing barge crammed with troops, probably 30 to 50 men to a barge. After two quiet nights, meanwhile, Newman decided to send three battalions forward toward the north-south section of the main ridge northwest of Mokmer on June 5th. Warned by the regimental commander that it was important to secure a foothold on the ridge before the Japanese could deny it to the 186th Infantry, the three assault battalions started westward about 8:00 on June 5th. Lack of water again slowed the advance. No water had been received in the forward area since the morning of the 4th, and Colonel Newman had ordered the troops westward against the advice of his staff and battalion commanders. About noon, however, a heavy rain fell. The regimental commander ordered all troops to halt, catch the rain in ponchos, and fill their canteens. "Had it not been for this lucky break, we would undoubtedly have had to halt in midafternoon." As events turned out, no Japanese opposition was encountered, and by 1500 the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, was within 500 yards of the main ridge. Although Newman and General Doe then wanted to secure the dominating terrain north and northwest of the airfield, they would receive direct orders from Fuller to immediately seize Mokmer Drome and a beachhead on the coast directly south of that strip. Throughout the morning of June 6th the 186th Infantry directed most of its efforts to bringing supplies up to the forward units. Almost the entire 2nd Battalion was engaged in hand-carrying supplies to the 3rd Battalion atop the ridge, while the latter unit sent patrols toward Mokmer Drome seeking good routes of approach to that objective. About noon Colonel Newman reported to task force headquarters that no good route had been found and that supplies, especially the ever-needed water, had not been brought forward in sufficient quantities to allow a regimental attack to be launched that day, and he therefore recommended that the attack be postponed until June 7th. General Fuller approved this suggestion. The lack of supplies and water would delay the attack, however, though the 3rd Battalion would be able to move down the west side of the main ridge to take up positions along a line of departure for the next morning's attack. To support the infantry attack, on June 7th, a thirty-minute artillery concentration began at 7:00 that morning. The 146th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, from positions along the coast to the east, were registered on targets in the airfield area ready to support the advance, but most of the firing was undertaken by the 121st Field Artillery from its location behind the 186th Infantry. While the artillery fired on Mokmer Drome and along the low ridge between that field and the 186th Infantry, Fifth Air Force bombers attacked the Borokoe Drome area and also struck some targets along the low ridge. The airfield was only occupied by the 108th Airfield Construction Unit, which immediately fled the area because of the heavy bombardment. Newman's 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced south encountering no resistance as they crossed Mokmer Drome and reached the beach.  When, on 5 June, the 186th Infantry had reached the crest of the main coastal ridge, it had been on the left rear of the Japanese defenses on the low ridge and terraces above Mokmer Drome. Thus, the regiment had been in a favorable position to take these defenses from the rear. But in its move to the airfield, the 186th Infantry had bypassed the Biak Detachment's principal defensive positions. The bypassing had not been intentional. Colonel Newman had instructed both leading battalions to halt on the low ridge, reconnoiter along it in both directions, and report on Japanese defenses before moving on. According to Colonel Newman: "I received a negative report from both battalions, and ordered the movement to the airdrome. Evidently, the right battalion had failed in this patrolling effort." Instead, the 186th had captured its main objective, but now found itself surrounded by Kuzume's strongest defenses. The Japanese immediately began to pound the new American perimeter, with an artillery duel soon erupting. By nightfall, it had become impracticable to supply the 186th Regiment over the inland plateau road, which ended on the east side of the main ridge. From that point, all supplies would have to be hand-carried to Mokmer Drome and supply parties would be endangered by Japanese patrols, a few of which moved in behind the 186th as the regiment reached the beach, so the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment would be dispatched to push over the inland plateau and protect the parties. Overwater supply was also attempted, yet as the first boats approached the shore they were greeted by machine gun and rifle fire from Japanese whom the 186th Infantry had not yet cleaned out of caves along the water line in front of Mokmer Drome. The small craft returned the fire, but were finally forced to withdraw. The 186th Infantry, according to Colonel Newman, was "glad to see them withdraw since they had our troops running for cover." At 2:00 another attempt was made to land supplies at Sboeria. The three LCM's managed to put their tanks ashore in the face of continuing Japanese fire, but accompanying LCT's were driven off by Japanese artillery. Two of the LCM's were so damaged by enemy fire that they could not fully retract their ramps and had to proceed the nine and a half miles back to Bosnek in reverse. Plans were made to effect all delivery of supplies and evacuation of casualties at night until the enemy fire on the Sboeria beachhead could be neutralized. The tanks which had been landed lumbered along the shore road fronting Mokmer Drome, destroying several small bunkers along the beach. Then they wheeled toward the low ridge north of the airfield, taking under fire a Japanese 75-mm. mountain gun and a 20-mm. piece which had opposed their landing. These two weapons were silenced. Moving cautiously northwestward from the field along a road which crossed the low ridge, the tanks destroyed two large pillboxes. Alongside this, Fuller sent two companies of Haney's 3rd Battalion to land on the Parai Jetty in order to outflank the Ibdi Pocket, which the 162nd had been unsuccessfully attempting to dislodge since the start of the month. But June 7th would also see the start of Operation KON's second attempt.  After rendezvousing off Misoöl Island that morning, Sakonju instructed his 8 destroyers to proceed to Biak. Air cover was to have been provided by planes of the 23rd Air Flotilla. But the cape area was being patrolled by Allied aircraft on June 8th and, about 1:30, the 23rd Air Flotilla cover of six planes was shot down or driven away by 5th Air Force P-38's.  Finding the air now free of enemy planes, American B-25's dived to the attack th convoy, reporting the convoy as 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers. Initially, it was claimed that 1 destroyer was sunk, 2 were left sinking, and the fourth was damaged. A few days later, destruction was reassessed as 4 destroyers sunk and 2 light cruisers chased to the northwest. These claims were exaggerated. One destroyer, the Harusame, was holed by a near miss and sank rapidly, the bulk of its crew being saved. Another destroyer was damaged by a bomb and took some water; two others were slightly damaged by strafing. Neither speed nor navigation was impeded for any of the three. The two light cruisers reported by the Allied planes were, of course, the other two destroyers. These two might have taken some evasive action by heading northwest for a short time, but as soon as the Harusame crew had been rescued and the Allied planes had disappeared, the convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak. The convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak, undeterred by reports of strong enemy elements in the area. By nightfall, however, it was on a collision course with the cruisers of Admirals Crutchley and Berkey.  At about 6:00 on the 8th, the Transport and Screening Units received a report from a Japanese aircraft that an Allied naval force comprising 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, and 8 destroyers was moving west at high speed from an undesignated point east of Biak. This report was at least partially correct. The Allied task force which had been formed on June 3rd had again assembled on the 8th, having been alerted by reports of the air-sea battle off the Kaap de Goede Hoop. But the Japanese convoy commander apparently took this air reconnaissance report with at least one grain of salt--had not similar information received on June 3rd proved inaccurate? The Transport and Screening Units steamed on, despite the fact that the Kaap de Goede Hoop action had put the force behind schedule. At 11:30 the two enemy groups were approximately forty miles off the north coast of Soepiori Island, ready to turn southeast toward Korim Bay, on the northeast side of Biak. Minutes later a destroyer in the van sighted the Allied task force heading northwest around Biak. The convoy commander quickly realized that he was badly outnumbered and decided that discretion was called for. The Japanese convoy slipping towards the Mapia islands, seeing the allied destroyers failing to pursue them. Yet that is it for Biak for now as we now need to head over to the Wakde-Sarmi front.   General Sibert was preparing to resume the westward offensive. By June 14th, the 20th Regiment had relieved the 158th at the Tirfoam River; and although Sibert wanted to complete unloading of his remaining units before sending the 20th to push westward, General Krueger ordered him to start an immediate offensive on June 18th. Now, however, they were up against almost the full strength of General Tagami's 36th Division. Company B pushed on toward the village at the entrance to the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin. This advance was greeted by a hail of fire from Japanese automatic weapons emplaced in the defile--fire reminiscent of the opposition encountered by Company B, 158th Infantry, at the same place more than three weeks earlier. The 20th Infantry's Company B tried to outflank the enemy position to the south but was halted by intense Japanese machine gun fire. Tanks sent forward to aid the infantry were unable to reach the enemy guns because the terrain was impassable to tracked or wheeled vehicles, which could scarcely negotiate the rough road, let alone the thick jungle and rising ground to the south. Late in the afternoon Company A was sent forward to Company B's position, but both units encountered heavy fire and soon lost contact with the rest of the 1st Battalion. The two companies remained for the night in an isolated perimeter near the village and about 400 yards west of the main body. The 3rd Battalion had moved north off the coastal road during the morning, and late in the afternoon it had established a perimeter extending south 200 yards from the beach along the east bank of the Snaky River. The battalion had encountered little opposition during the day, but patrols which had crossed the Snaky before dark reported finding many Japanese defensive positions on the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. A gap which existed between the 1st and 3rd Battalions was partially filled just before nightfall by elements of the 2nd Battalion, which were sent forward late in the afternoon. Casualties during the day were four killed and twenty-eight wounded. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Infantry, moved across the Tor River in the morning of June 20th and took over the positions in the vicinity of Maffin No. 1 vacated by the 20th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, assumed responsibility for the protection of the bridgehead across the Tor.  The following morning, Sibert then directed his units to patrol extensively in order to locate enemy strong points on and around the hill. Thanks to the information gathered, the 3rd Battalion would attack towards Rocky Point in the afternoon. At the top of Lone Tree Hill was a stretch of rough but generally level ground lying mostly along the western part of the hill. This flat ground, about 700 yards long north to south, was shaped like a crude dumbbell. At its northern end, the level area was about 300 yards wide. It narrowed at the center of the hill to less than 100 yards but broadened again on the south to a width of about 250 yards. There were many coral outcroppings, potholes, and small crevices, while on the north the hill terminated in a very rugged prominence called Rocky Point. This terrain feature, which extended into Maffin Bay from the central mass of Lone Tree Hill, was about 300 yards wide east to west. Its northern face was not as heavily overgrown as the rest of Lone Tree Hill. Although Rocky Point's northeast slope was steep, foot troops could climb that face with more ease than they could approach the top of Lone Tree Hill from most other points. A deep ravine ran southwest into the central mass of Lone Tree Hill from a sandy beach on the east side of Rocky Point. The floor of the ravine varied from 20 to 30 yards in width and its nearly vertical western wall was 40 to 50 feet high. Both sides were honeycombed with natural or man-made tunnels, caverns, and small caves, most of which were connected with each other by underground or deeply defiladed passages. Some caves reached a width of 40 feet, a depth into the hillside of 50 feet, and a height of 20 feet. The ravine terminated on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill in a steep grade at the narrow central portion of the hilltop. At 1:45pm, after a fifteen-minute artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparation, one company moved across the Snaky River, immediately finding the twenty-foot cliff along the eastern side of the shelf which lay between the Snaky River and the central mass of Lone Tree Hill. The morning patrols had not, apparently, reported the existence of this cliff, and naturally it was not known that Japanese defenses were established along it. Machine gun and rifle fire from the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry, soon pinned down the 3rd Battalion's leading platoon. The company commander quickly sent part of his unit northward to find the Japanese left flank. Moving around the northeast end of the shelf, this group discovered the beach entrance to the deep ravine between the western side of the shelf and Rocky Point. Progress into or across the ravine was impossible in the face of the intense Japanese small arms fire which greeted the advancing American unit. Company B, 6th Engineers, then in the forward area to cut a road from the mouth of the Snaky River to Rocky Point, was brought up to the ravine to help clean out caves and crevices with flame throwers and demolitions, but could not reach the enemy positions through the continued machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. Infantry bazooka squads also tried to blast the Japanese out of their caves but failed when their ammunition ran out. Since there was no time to bring additional rockets forward before dark, all elements of the 3rd Battalion and the engineer company were withdrawn to the east bank of the Snaky River for the night. The 20th Infantry was to continue the assault on the morrow with the 3rd Battalion moving against Lone Tree Hill from the northeast, the 2nd Battalion in reserve, and the 1st Battalion remaining in its holding position. On the morning of June 22, after a heavy air and artillery concentration on Rocky Point, the 3rd Battalion once again attacked northwest with Companies K and I, successfully driving the Japanese back into their caves to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill just south of Rocky Point. Meanwhile, another two companies had attacked southwest to force their way up the southeast slope of the hill; but subjected to heavy machine-gun fire, they would have to withdraw and march north to join Companies K and I. The 2nd Battalion also moved forward and took positions to the south of the 3rd Battalion. Worried about the American gains, Colonel Matsuyama personally led two companies in the afternoon to fall on the 3rd Battalion's perimeter with suicidal fury. Confused fighting, sometimes hand-to-hand, continued well into the night, with Matsuyama himself getting shot on the thigh. Yet this attack would successfully position the Japanese companies on the rear of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, thus cutting them off from regimental headquarters. Matsuyama also recalled his 2nd Battalion from the Maffin area, so he would employ these reinforcements to attack Sibert's 2nd Battalion on June 23. At dawn on the 23rd Japanese troops, some of whom were using American weapons and wearing parts of American uniforms, attacked the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, from the deep ravine. The battalion initially held its fire, thinking that the enemy force might be a friendly patrol, and the Japanese were able to advance to within fifteen yards of the battalion lines before being recognized. It was an hour before the results of this error could be corrected--an hour during which both the 2nd Battalion and the Japanese suffered heavy losses. The hour ended with an enemy retreat. Isolated, the 2nd Battalion then decided to withdraw and march north towards the 3rd Battalion's perimeter at the top of the hill, getting harassed all the way by Matsuyama's forces. During the night, the Japanese launched a banzai charge against the perimeter, getting very close to retaking Lone Tree Hill but suffering heavy casualties in the end. Upon learning that his battalions were cut off, meanwhile, Sibert decided to outflank the hill by a shore-to-shore maneuver and then continue the attack from both west and east. Accordingly, Companies K and I of the 1st Regiment boarded ten LVTs on the morning of June 24th and moved to the beach just west of Rocky Point, under the protection of the 6th Reconnaissance Troop. Both companies would land successfully by midday against strong Japanese fire, though they would be rapidly pinned down on the narrow beach. Thankfully, Sibert also landed four tanks two hours later to secure the beachhead. This diversion would allow the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Regiment to begin clearing the Japanese from the many caves and crevices on Rocky Point, the deep ravine east of the point, and the hilltop plateau, further securing the supply route up the hill.  By nightfall, no enemy counterattack developed, as Tagami had instead decided to withdraw the 224th Regiment to the Hill 255-Mount Saksin line while the 223rd Regiment retreated behind the Woske River. Thus Matsuyama's resistance in the area weakened and the Americans were finally able to clear Rocky Point. The next day the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, continued clearing Rocky Point, the deep ravine, the northern part of the hilltop plateau, and the eastern shelf, where a few scattered Japanese still held positions along the twenty-foot-high cliff. Flame throwers, demolition charges, bazookas, and hand grenades all proved successful in eliminating Japanese resistance and sealing or clearing caves and crevices. The task was easier on the 25th, for the Japanese slowly gave up the fight and were killed or sealed off in their caves. Casualties continued to mount, the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, had only about two hundred effectives by the end of the day but many of the losses were not due to Japanese action. Many men were evacuated over the now secured supply route to the top of the hill as they fell from exhaustion or became sick. On the beach west of Rocky Point Companies I and K, 1st Infantry, had little success in expanding their beachhead. The tanks proved useless in the area and were therefore withdrawn to Maffin No. 1. The two infantry companies, pinned down during the morning, kept up a continuous mortar barrage against Japanese positions in the swamp to the south, against the western cliff of Lone Tree Hill, and, when certain such fire would not endanger troops atop the hill, against the northwest corner of Rocky Point. This mortar fire, coupled with the operations on the plateau, began to have the desired effect during the afternoon, and Companies I and K were able to push their defenses beyond the narrow beachhead slightly southward and westward and toward the shore beneath Rocky Point. Once or twice during the afternoon, patrols were able to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill from the northwest corner of the point and established contact with 20th Infantry units. Late in the afternoon Company M, 1st Infantry, operating from the east side of the point, managed to push a patrol around the shore to establish contact with Company K. Though Companies I and K could find little tangible evidence of the results of their operations, they had actually wiped out the 223rd Infantry's defense force in the area just west of Lone Tree Hill. By dusk on the 25th, it had become obvious that the combined efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, had either cleared out the northern half of Lone Tree Hill or had forced the Japanese to withdraw. The latter conclusion was the more nearly correct. The 36th Division decided on 25 June to withdraw the bulk of the Center and Right Sector Forces west of the Woske River and establish new defensive positions, thereby keeping the 223rd Infantry, the bulk of which had not been committed to action in the Lone Tree Hill area, more or less intact. Only the remnants of the 224th Infantry were to remain east of the Woske, and they were to withdraw into rough terrain southwest of Mt. Saksin. At nightfall on the 25th, General Sibert estimated that his three forward battalions had lost approximately 140 men killed and 850 wounded and evacuated, including those who had to be sent back to the rear because of wounds, sickness, heat exhaustion, or psychoneurotic disorders. Known Japanese dead in the northern part of the hill numbered 344, but it could not be estimated how many more had been thrown over the west cliff, sealed in caves, or carried off by withdrawing remnants of the Japanese defense force. According to Japanese sources, the Japanese had lost about 500 men killed and another 300 wounded in the Lone Tree Hill-Hill 225-Mt. Saksin area.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese were accredited with the fall of Moguang despite the Chindits taking the lionshare of the fighting. Things were advancing very well for the allies in the new Biak front. As for the battle for Lone Tree Hill, it was a costly one, and not one the Americans or Japanese would soon forget.   

In this episode, we tell the story of the Night of the Intruders, when Luftwaffe fighters followed a stream of American B-24 Liberator bombers back to England and shot them out of the sky as they tried to land.It was a disastrous end to Mission 311, which took place on 22 April, 1944, less than two months before D-Day.The raid saw 824 Mighty Eighth bombers target the nerve centre of the Third Reich's railway system at Hamm, in Germany's north-east Ruhr.We experience the mission through the eyes of George Glevanik, of the 448th Bomb Group, stationed at Seething, south-east of Norwich.We visit Seething Church of St Margaret & St Remigius, which includes a memorial to the 448th BG; and Seething Control Tower Museum, which includes artefacts from the Night of the Intruders.We examine what went right – and what went wrong – and why the Mighty Eighth attacked Hamm in the evening, rather than sticking to its tried-and-tested strategy of bombing in broad daylight.Our special podcast guest is author, historian and aviation archaeologist Ian McLachlan, whose book 'Night of the Intruders' is published by Pen & Sword.Please like and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.Visit the Mighty Eighth Podcast website: mighty8thpodcast.comTo contact Johann and Mike, email johann@ruralcity.co.ukFollow the Mighty Eighth Podcast on X - @mighty8thpodFollow the Mighty Eighth Podcast on Facebook - @mighty8thpodFollow the Mighty Eighth Podcast on Instagram - @mighty8thpodFollow Johann on X - @johanntaskerFollow Mike on X - @mikehistorian Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

CURTIS LEMAY'S MISSION:  5/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1964 CURTIS LEMAY WITH MCNAMARA, LBJ, AT THE JOHNSON RANCH

CURTIS LEMAY'S MISSION:  8/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 2016

CURTIS LEMAY'S MISSION:  7/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1944-45 GUAM B-29

CURTIS LEMAY'S MISSION:  6/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1984 CURTIS LEMAY

CURTIS LEMAY'S MISSION:  2/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. SEPTEMBER 1945 CURTIS LEMAY

CURTIS LEMAY'S MISSION:  4/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1959 CRTIS LEMAY AT THE PENTAGON

CURTIS LEMAY'S MISSION:  3/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1951 AIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL CURTIS LEMAY

CURTIS LEMAY'S MISSION:  1/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1943 COLONEL CURTIS LEMAY

PREVIEW: #LEMAY: B-29:  From a two-hour conversation with author James Scott re his book, Black Snow, re the relentless determination of USAAF Curtis LeMay to complete his mission and take care of his air crews no matter what obstacles he met.  More of this later tonight. 1945 B-29  Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed.

PREVIEW-#FIREBOMBING-#ATOMICBOMB: Excerpt from the two-hour conversation with author James Scoot re his new work, Black Snow, re how the atomic bombs that were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still in development and untested while Curtis LeMay was methodically burning down Japan.  More later tonight. 1945 Marianna Islands  Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed.

RAGE OF THE USAAF MARCH-AUGUST 1945: 7/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1927 TOKYO BAY

RAGE OF THE USAAF MARCH-AUGUST 1945: 2/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1945 TINIAN

RAGE OF THE USAAF MARCH-AUGUST 1945: 3/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1930 TOKYO

RAGE OF THE USAAF MARCH-AUGUST 1945: 4/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1930 TOKYO

RAGE OF THE USAAF MARCH-AUGUST 1945: 5/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1930 TOKYO

RAGE OF THE USAAF MARCH-AUGUST 1945: 6/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1928 TOKYO

RAGE OF THE USAAF MARCH-AUGUST 1945: 8/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1927 NAGATO